The Effect of External Security Threats on Collective Burden Sharing in NATO

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Abstract

This thesis examined to what extent external security threats to NATO have influenced the balance of the collective burden that its members have to bear with regard to the collective security of the alliance. Financial, political, and military contributions by member states to collective efforts during the Korean War, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the post 9/11 “War on Terror” were researched. Although the North Atlantic Treaty itself was a peace-time agreement, the most important changes to the composition and institutionalization of the alliance happened during, or were a result of, external security threats.

From a rationalist point of view (material and individualist), countries that were members of NATO generally looked to the alliance for resolving external security threats to their territories out of cost-benefit considerations. This significantly influenced intra-alliance negotiations and burden sharing outcomes to the point where the United States often had to actively encourage their European allies to contribute, with mixed results.

A constructivist point of view (social and collective) explains why NATO members made efforts to bolster the alliance when they deemed that there was high interdependence and common fate (in the form of external security threats), which emphasized for them the legitimacy of the Kantian culture. Whenever NATO members did not adhere to burden sharing norms, they always offered justification in the form of other norms such as economic reconstruction norms (Korean War), consultation norms (Soviet invasion of Afghanistan) or, in the case of the war in Iraq, the norm that intervention requires a mandate from the United Nations Security Council. This means burden sharing as a norm exists and is widely recognized in NATO, but it is not a norm that overrides all others.

That NATO survived as a multilateral arrangement, despite internal upheaval during the Cold War and the disintegration of NATO’s ‘raison d’être’ (the Soviet Union), can best be explained with reference to the collective identity and collective trust that was developed over the years. This made the Atlantic Alliance always the best, though suboptimal, security option for its member states.

Key words: NATO, external security threats, burden sharing, rationalism, constructivism.
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# Table of Contents

Abstract.................................................................................................................................................. i
Acknowledgements.................................................................................................................................. ii
Table of Contents................................................................................................................................... iii
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms...................................................................................................... v
List of Figures and Tables ...................................................................................................................... vi

Chapter 1. Introduction............................................................................................................................ 1
  1.1 Background....................................................................................................................................... 1
  1.2 Collective Security and Collective Goods Theory........................................................................... 2
  1.3 The Puzzle....................................................................................................................................... 3
  1.4 Research Aim .................................................................................................................................... 5
  1.5 Justification...................................................................................................................................... 6
  1.6 Structure......................................................................................................................................... 7

Chapter 2. Theoretical Framework ........................................................................................................ 8
  2.1 Rationalism, Constructivism and the Great Debates in IR................................................................. 8
    2.1.1 The first and second Great Debate ........................................................................................... 8
    2.1.2 The ‘Neo-Neo’ debate and the rise of Rationalism....................................................................... 9
    2.1.3 The advent of Reflectivism and Social Constructivism ............................................................... 9
    2.1.4 Critical vs. Conventional Constructivism .................................................................................. 11
  2.2 Rationalism and alliances .................................................................................................................. 12
    2.2.1 Rational choice theory ............................................................................................................... 12
    2.2.2 Balance-of-threat theory .......................................................................................................... 13
    2.2.3 Collective action theory ........................................................................................................... 14
    2.2.4 The Security Dilemma .............................................................................................................. 15
    2.2.5 Conclusion Rationalism and Hypotheses .................................................................................. 16
  2.3 Constructivism and Alliances .......................................................................................................... 17
    2.3.1 Collective identity, shared knowledge and international cooperation ....................................... 17
    2.3.2 Risse-Kappen – Democratic Allies in a Pluralistic Security Community ................................... 20
    2.3.3 The influence of norms on alliance behavior ........................................................................... 21
    2.3.4 Conclusion Constructivism and Hypotheses ........................................................................... 23

Chapter 3. Methodology .......................................................................................................................... 24
  3.1 Case Selection and Method of Inquiry .............................................................................................. 24
  3.2 Operationalization of Concepts ....................................................................................................... 26
## Chapter 4. Empirical Findings .................................................................................. 32

### 4.1 Korean War (1950-1953) .................................................................................. 32

- **4.1.1 Background** ................................................................................................ 32
- **4.1.2 Effect of the Korean War on Burden Sharing in NATO** ............................... 33
- **4.1.3 Rationalist Interpretation of Changes in Burden Sharing** ......................... 37
- **4.1.4 Constructivist Interpretation of Changes in Burden Sharing** ................. 41
- **4.1.5 Conclusion Korean War** .............................................................................. 45

### 4.2 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (December 1979) ........................................... 46

- **4.2.1 Background** ................................................................................................ 46
- **4.2.2 Effect of Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan on Burden Sharing in NATO** ....... 46
- **4.2.3 Rationalist Interpretation of Changes in Burden Sharing** ......................... 51
- **4.2.4 Constructivist Interpretation of Changes in Burden Sharing** ................. 54
- **4.2.5 Conclusion Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan** ................................ .............. 56

### 4.3 Post 9/11 “War on Terror” (2001-2009) ............................................................... 57

- **4.3.1 Background** ................................................................................................ 57
- **4.3.2 Effect of the “War on Terror” on Burden Sharing in NATO** ..................... 58
- **4.3.3 Rationalist Interpretation of Changes in Burden Sharing** ....................... 62
- **4.3.4 Constructivist Interpretation of Changes in Burden Sharing** ................. 65
- **4.3.5 Conclusion “War on Terror”** .................................................................... 68

## Chapter 5. Conclusion .............................................................................................. 69

### 5.1 Summary of hypotheses ..................................................................................... 69

### 5.2 Conclusion Rationalism ...................................................................................... 70

### 5.3 Conclusion Constructivism .................................................................................. 70

### 5.4 General Conclusion ........................................................................................... 71

### 5.5 The Rationalism/Constructivism debate ............................................................. 72

### 5.6 Reflection on theory ........................................................................................... 73

### 5.7 Reflection on methods and case selection .......................................................... 74

### 5.8 Burden Sharing in NATO now and the Future of Alliance Theory ....................... 75

## Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 76

## Appendix 1 – List of NATO members and year of accession ..................................... 86

## Appendix 2 – SIPRI definition of Military Spending .................................................... 87

## Appendix 3 – Total Defense Expenditures of NATO Countries (1949-1963) ................ 88
**List of Abbreviations and Acronyms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CPC</td>
<td>Communist Party of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRA</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDC</td>
<td>European Defense Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>International Organization <em>(journal)</em></td>
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<td>INF</td>
<td>Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNF</td>
<td>Multinational Force <em>(Lebanon)</em></td>
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<td>MNF-I</td>
<td>Multinational Forces - Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NKPA</td>
<td>North Korean’s People Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRF</td>
<td>NATO Response Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDPA</td>
<td>People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDJTF</td>
<td>Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPRI</td>
<td>Stockholm International Peace Research Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTIU</td>
<td>Terrorism Threat Intelligence Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNC</td>
<td>United Nations Command</td>
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<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>WWII</td>
<td>World War Two</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Figures

Figure 1: Military Expenditure of NATO members as % of GDP 1993-2013................................................. 2
Figure 2: Wendt's model of multiple realization of international culture ......................................................... 19
Figure 3: Change in Military Expenditure 1950-1956 (% Compared to Previous Year) .................................... 36
Figure 4: Change in Military Expenditure 1978-1990 (% Compared to Previous Year) ..................................... 49
Figure 5: Military Expenditure per country as % of GDP 1976-1985 ............................................................. 50
Figure 6: Military Expenditure of NATO members as % of GDP 1993-2013 .................................................. 61

List of Tables

Table 1: Armed forces contributions to the UNC (bold = original North Atlantic Treaty signatory) .......... 33
Table 2: NATO member states defense spending (1953, % of GDP) ............................................................ 38
Table 3: NATO Contributions to ISAF (January 2007, bold = candidate NATO member) ......................... 60
Table 4: Contributions to MNF-I by NATO (bold = candidate NATO member) ...................................... 61
Table 5: Summary of hypotheses .................................................................................................................. 69
Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION

Our security environment has changed fundamentally. To the South, violent extremism is at our borders, spreading turmoil across Iraq and Syria and bringing terror to our streets. To the East, Russia has used military force to annex Crimea, destabilise eastern Ukraine, and intimidate its neighbours.

Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General
The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2014 (NATO, 2015a)

NATO must have sufficient resources – financial, military and human – to carry out its missions, which are essential to the security of Alliance populations and territory.

NATO Strategic Concept 2010 (NATO, 2010a).

1.1 BACKGROUND

Recent security turmoil in Eastern Europe and the Middle East has stirred up a recurring discussion within NATO: that of burden sharing, more specifically a lack thereof on the part of many European member states as well as Canada. Burden sharing in an alliance such as NATO can be defined as the distribution of the economic and political costs of maintaining the collective security that an alliance provides. A brief look at the history books seems to suggest that there has hardly been a time in which burden sharing was not a source of diplomatic entanglement within NATO, with intermittent American outbursts of frustration with regard to the lack of burden-taking by its allies.

The resurfacing of the discussion occurred due to the fact that the past two years have been turbulent for NATO. Many of its members, such as the Baltic states, feel directly or indirectly threatened by the Russian annexation of the Crimean peninsula in March 2014 and the ongoing conflict situation in Eastern Ukraine. This is exacerbated by the advance of extremist rebel group Islamic State throughout the Middle East and the continuous threat of transnational terrorist groups. In response, NATO is engaged in several active missions to counter these threats, while simultaneously building up troops on its periphery to maintain a high degree of operational readiness in case of further escalation. This requires increasing amounts of material and financial resources. Resources that United States officials insist must come substantially from their European allies, with US Secretary of State John Kerry remarking in April 2014 that “we cannot continue to allow allied defense budgets to shrink” (Atlantic Council, 2014).

‘Continue’ is the operative word here, because since the inception of NATO the United States has willy nilly been the primary financier of its operational responsibilities and by far the biggest spender
on defense in NATO. In 2014, United States’ defense expenditure was 4.4 percent of its GDP, equaling 73 percent of NATO’s aggregated defense expenditure (NATO, 2015b). Other member states are trailing far behind; most of them fail to reach the norm of spending two percent of GDP on defense expenditure that was agreed upon in 2006 at the NATO summit in Riga. This norm was reaffirmed at the Wales summit in 2014 when the compliance record turned out to be quite pale. Recent figures indicate that in 2014 only four NATO member states managed to pass the two percent threshold. Besides the United States these countries were the United Kingdom with 2.4 percent, Greece with 2.3 percent and Estonia with 2.0 percent (NATO, 2015b). Although the norm is not set in stone (officially it is a “guideline”) and its usefulness and functional sensibility can be debated, it has become an important benchmark for determining the willingness of member states to contribute to the goals and operations of NATO. The defense expenditure trend line is revealing: figures from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) indicate that defense spending amongst non-U.S. NATO members has, on average, decreased from 2.4 percent of GDP in 1993 to 1.4 percent in 2013. The United States followed a slightly more non-linear path and went from 4.5 percent to 3.8 percent in the same period (SIPRI, 2015a).

Figure 1: Military Expenditure of NATO members as % of GDP 1993-2013 Source: SIPRI (2015a)

1.2 COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND COLLECTIVE GOODS THEORY

The discrepancy between the defense expenditure of the US and their allies is noteworthy because NATO is an alliance based on collective security for its members. Its significance is often said to lie primarily in article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the founding treaty of NATO. This article states inter alia that “an armed attack against one or more [member states] […] shall be considered an attack against all.” (NATO, 2008a). The commitment herein is important for two main reasons. First of all it has
been the source of a strong solidarity amongst NATO’s members. This is evidenced by the extent of their military and political cooperation and coordination, as well as the fact that the alliance still endures despite many turbulent periods (Thies, 2009). Second, it has acted as a strong deterrent for non-member states to display aggressive behavior towards the territory of NATO members, considering the fact that this has seldom happened to the point of escalation. Article 5 has only been invoked once in the history of the organization; by the United States, after the attacks on the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001.

Collective security can be viewed in terms of a collective good. Collective goods are defined by Krahmann as goods that are non-excludable and non-rival in nature. Non-excludability means that it is impossible to “exclude a potential user or beneficiary from a good”, whereas non-rivalry is defined as “goods that are not diminished by consumption or use” (Krahmann, 2008: 383). Classic examples of public goods include clean air, a fireworks display, streetlights, and national defense. In the case of NATO, under the current agreements and expectations none of the member states can reasonably be excluded from having ‘access’ to the security it provides. This satisfies the criterion of non-excludability. Also the utility of NATO security for e.g. the Netherlands arguably does not reduce the utility of NATO security that can be used by France. This satisfies the criterion of non-rivalry. It could be argued that collective security in NATO does not perfectly align with collective goods theory because it is hypothetically possible that allies withhold aid to a country under attack, that they either circumvent or ignore standing commitments. This would indeed violate the criterion of non-excludability, and make collective security in NATO a so-called club good. However, a situation such as this would most likely mean the end of the alliance and the collective security it offers because the political credibility of both NATO and its largest member states on the global scene would be severely damaged (Breaking Defense, 2014). As it currently stands it appears reasonable to treat collective security in NATO as a collective good, albeit an impure collective good. In theory, the main problem with non-excludable and non-rival goods is that there is an incentive for rational group members to contribute less than their fair share, or even nothing at all, towards the provision of it (Krahman, 2008). In consonance with public goods theory, this is called free-riding.

1.3 The Puzzle

Through its activities, NATO provides security as a collective good for all of its members, regardless of size or capacity. Considering every member benefits from this security, one could expect that each contributes to the collective burden proportionally in relation to its capacity. However, as suggested
above this has been the case in neither theory nor practice. This might in part be due to the fact that NATO does not have the administrative powers to enforce any action in terms of material, political, or financial contributions from its member states:

On signing the Treaty, countries voluntarily commit themselves to participating in the political consultations and military activities of the Organization. Although each and every signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty is subject to the obligations of the Treaty, there remains a certain degree of flexibility which allows members to choose how they participate (NATO, 2009a, emphasis added).

There is only a mandatory financial contribution for each member state to fund the organizational structure of NATO. This is calculated through an allocation formula based on Gross National Income, and concerns expenditure worth 2.1 billion Euros (NATO, 2015b). The “degree of flexibility” that NATO members have on practically all other terrains might be the reason why so many of them ostensibly lack in their defense spending. United States policy makers already considered before signing the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 that the provision of collective security by NATO could lead to incentives for other countries to not pull their weight, according to among others Thies (2009):

U.S. policy toward Europe in 1948 was still based on an expectation that American forces would be withdrawn within a few years, and U.S. officials feared that any hint of American willingness to stay longer and/or do more would be taken by the Europeans as an excuse to do less (p. 99).

At first glance it seems that these fears have been validated by the events that unfolded since then; indeed, the disproportional ‘consumption’ of security as a collective good in proportion to the material contributions by many NATO member states could be classified as ‘free-riding’. However, this has never led the United States (or any other member) to withdraw from the Alliance. This does not mean that the United States has not tried to influence the balance of burden in NATO. Indeed there is abundant evidence for this. And it also does not follow that their never have been successes with regard to this endeavor.

It does beg the question under which circumstances these efforts are most likely to be effective. One might expect that in crisis situations, such as external security threats to the NATO area, countries that normally spend a low proportion of their GDP on defense are willing to allocate more resources to defense, whether or not encouraged or pressured by their allies. Likewise, one would expect that changes to NATO’s institutional structure and official policy is also easier to attain during times of

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1 The common funding concerns three parts: the civil budget for the International Staff at NATO headquarters, the military budget for operating and maintenance costs of the NATO Command Structure, and the NATO Security Invest Program that covers certain investments in construction and command and control systems.

external security threats. But if this is truly the case, or whether even in crisis situations states rely on the alliance leaders to incur the economic and political costs of collective security, remains to be investigated.

1.4 Research Aim

The aim of this research is to find out how external security threats to the NATO alliance have impacted (deficiencies in) collective burden sharing. What is also examined are the underlying mechanisms. This is carried out by analyzing three historical time frames in which the countries of the Atlantic Alliance are said to have faced an external security threat: the Korean War (1950-1953), the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979+), and the post 9/11 “War on Terror” under U.S. President George W. Bush (2001-2009). These time frames are compared to the preceding and subsequent periods of stability to see whether there are notable discrepancies in burden sharing and under what circumstances these came about. This leads to the following research question:

*What has been the impact of external security threats on collective burden sharing in the NATO alliance?*

This research question is tested from two perspectives. a) First of all the rationalist approach of alliances and threats is employed. Rationalists would look at burden sharing in NATO as the result of conscious and strategic behavior by individual states, which continuously make cost-benefit (means-end) calculations with regard to their contributions to NATO to maximize their own preferences. Down to its core, rationalism embodies the idea that “individuals want things, and they act in such a way as best to obtain what they want” (Jupille et al., 2003: 12). Notable rationalist authors include Mancur Olson and Stephen Walt. Mancur Olson has written influential literature on collective action and alliances. One of his claims is that in small groups with common interests, e.g. collective security, there is a “systematic tendency for exploitation of the great by the small” (Olson, 1965: 29). In the case of security in NATO, the ‘great’ would be illustrated by the United States (and perhaps the United Kingdom and France) and the ‘small’ by the other European allies and Canada. In one of Olson’s economic models he shows that since the United States, as the greatest player in NATO, attributes the highest absolute value to collective security it ends up with the heaviest burden of all (ibid.: 29).

Stephen Walt is famous for his balance-of-threat theory. Contributing to the realist notion that national capabilities and the balance of power are the primary mechanisms in International Relations outcomes, he asserts that also geographic proximity, aggressive intentions and offensive capabilities decisively determine when states view other states as threatening (Walt, 1990).
b) Rationalist thought is juxtaposed to a constructivist approach. Is burden sharing in NATO indeed the result of pure strategic considerations, or are other factors also in play? After all, how can we know “that a self-interest explanation of cooperation is true if we do not know whether an actor was in fact self-interested?” (Wendt, 1999: 240). A constructivist lens applied to NATO looks at burden sharing not solely through materialism and individualism but more expressly as the result of intersubjective concepts such as shared identities, ideas, culture, and norms. These are seen as primary causal factors that lead to events in international politics.

The most famous exponent of the constructivist school in International Relations is Alexander Wendt, who published *Social Theory of International Politics* in 1999. He draws upon sociological insights to explain how and why actions of states vis-à-vis other states “continually produce and reproduce conceptions of Self and Other” and hence can “undermine egoistic identities and generate collective ones” (ibid.: 36). In the constructivist approach situations or parties are never threats in themselves (as objective entities) but only by identification and shaping as a threat by key actors.

Furthermore, Finnemore and Sikkink have written highly influential literature on how norms influence the behavior of states. They are well-known for their ‘norm life cycle model’, in which an emerging norm can ‘cascade’ into broader acceptance if a critical mass of actors adopt the norm, after which internalization of the norm practically assures automatic conformance (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Ideas such as ‘one for all, and all for one’ (Article 5) and a ‘fair’ distribution of material contributions are norms that NATO member states might not comply with out of self-interest, but because they could consider them as legitimate norms that fit into their broader identity. Whether this model can provide more understanding towards burden sharing practices in NATO is among the things investigated in this thesis.

Essentially, the aim of this research is threefold; to find out to what extent external security threats are cause for NATO member states to cooperate closer and share the burden more evenly; what the underlying mechanisms are for this decision-making in terms of rational vs. social; and in which forms cooperation takes place in terms of military, economic, and/or political endeavors.

1.5 JUSTIFICATION

The scientific relevance of this thesis is that it investigates how external security threats to alliances can influence the behavior of states and governments beyond the extent to which a cost-benefit analysis can explain this. This way the divide in International Relations between proponents of rationalist theories and proponents of constructivist theories is tested for collective security affairs.
The societal relevance of this thesis lies in the fact that for the most part defense capacity is publicly financed via taxation. The decision to invest in defense capacity usually conflicts with investing in other public goods, such as social security, development aid, the environment or infrastructure. This is pre-eminently a political decision and thus grounds for considerable societal debate. The thesis aims to contribute to this debate by analyzing how the burden is divided by different societies with a common goal: to feel secure.

1.6 Structure

The structure of this thesis is as follows. In chapter 2 the theoretical framework is outlined. It contains an overview of existing literature on rationalist and constructivist approaches to International Relations. Furthermore, the manner in which these approaches have conceptualized external security threats and burden sharing within alliances is discussed. At the end of the chapter the hypotheses that the thesis tests are put forward. Chapter 3 is the methodological section, which contains a description of the analytical tools that are employed for testing the hypotheses. In chapter 4 the theoretical and methodological findings are used to do extensive empirical research with regards to the way external security threats to NATO have influenced collective burden sharing in the alliance. In chapter 5 conclusions from the empirical findings are drawn and the research question is answered: What has been the impact of external security threats on collective burden sharing in the NATO alliance? The implications of these findings is also used to give a short analysis of the current situation in which both Russia and Islamic State (IS) seem to challenge the cohesion and effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance.
Chapter 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

As explained in the introduction, this thesis draws on two approaches that may help explain variation in burden sharing during times of external security threats: rationalism and constructivism. These have been pitted against each other in the academic debate in International Relations many times. This chapter examines how both identify different perspectives on alliances and burden sharing. As such, it constitutes the theoretical basis for this research. First of all a historic overview of rationalism and constructivism is given in the context of the Great Debates in International Relations. Second, the rationalist framework is outlined. Relevant theories that can help assess state behavior in alliances are put forward, after which rationalist hypotheses are formulated with regard to burden sharing in NATO. Third and last, the constructivist framework is outlined and hypotheses are formulated.

2.1 RATIONALISM, CONSTRUCTIVISM AND THE GREAT DEBATES IN IR

The roots for the ‘clash’ between rationalism and constructivism can be found in the famous Great Debates that have taken place in International Relations in the past hundred years. Although the intensity and scope of these four debates (as well as the supposed debate ‘winners’) is contested to this day, they provide a general and useful description of the evolution the field has gone through.

2.1.1 The first and second Great Debate

The first Great Debate was between Idealism/Liberalism and Realism and largely took place in the twentieth century interwar period and in the immediate post-WWII period. Idealists focused in their research on “the potential role of institutions in improving the human condition and mitigating conflict between states” (Lake, 2013: 569). Realists on the other hand attempted to explain more clearly “actual patterns of world politics and to identify pragmatic steps leaders might take to improve diplomacy and world order” (ibid.: 569). Although the demise of the League of Nations and the outbreak of World War II did no favors to the arguments of the Idealist/Liberalist camp (and bolstered those of the Realist camp), it experienced a significant resurgence after WWII with the establishment of organizations such as the United Nations (UN), the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The second Great Debate was between Traditionalism and Behaviorism. Proponents of Traditionalism advocated a historical, more intuitive view of International Relations. They asserted that the scientific method as proposed by Behaviorism, coming up with (law-like) generalizations, “requires
high precision and measurement and [is] therefore incapable of coping with the most important elements of international politics” which instead requires “understanding, wisdom or intuition” (Kaplan, 1966: 1). Proponents of Behaviorism on the other hand argued that “unless scientific procedures are followed [...] intuitions cannot be falsified and science cannot grow” (ibid.: 4).

2.1.2 The ‘Neo-Neo’ debate and the rise of Rationalism

Behaviorism gained significant ground, and its progress spawned two new fields of scientific inquiry in International Relations. As such, it set the scene for the Third Great Debate: between Neorealism and Neoliberalism (also called the ‘Neo-Neo’ debate). Neorealism was advanced by Kenneth Waltz in his 1979 book *Theory of International Politics*. In this book he puts forward the assumption of an anarchical international system (meaning an absence of a superordinate structure wielding authority over states) in which the distribution of capabilities among states determines the manner in which these co-act (Waltz, 1979). In such ‘self-help systems’, state survival is the primary objective for all states and one state’s gain is the other state’s loss. This is why “competing parties consider relative gains more important than absolute ones” (ibid.: 195). Neoliberals such as Robert Keohane on the other hand, while not denying the decentralized nature of the international system and even adopting the Realist assumption of state egoism, contend that cooperation in the form of international regimes (or institutions) can emerge on the basis of shared interests and reciprocal action in the form of tit-for-tat. “This”, says Keohane (1984: 78) “makes common action to produce joint gains rational.” Hence, Neorealism views IR mostly as a world of competitive relations and relative payoffs, whereas Neoliberals also advocate mutual benefits for states through greater cooperative relations and absolute payoffs.

Both theories represent a positivist approach and assume rational-choice behavior by states who are the primary, unitary, actors in world politics. The focus lies on state survival and material gains and losses. This is why some authors have pointed out that, with the application of game-theory, the two theories have been bridged to a considerable degree by “integrating cooperation and conflict in a unifying framework [...] dubbed as rationalism” (Stein, 2008: 205). How identities and interests are formed, issues put at the center of sociological theories of International Relations, is bracketed by rationalists; they are treated as ontologically given.

2.1.3 The advent of Reflectivism and Social Constructivism

In response to rationalist dominance a growing field of reflectivist thinkers emerged in the late 1980s that questioned the positivist methodology of Neorealism and Neoliberalism. This was the beginning of
the Fourth Great Debate in International Relations: between Rationalism and Reflectivism. Reflectivism gained a large amount of momentum when the Cold War ended in 1991. This was a major event in International Relations that rationalists had much trouble with accounting for in their theories. It was also a time in which particularly realists wrongfully predicted the end of NATO, as with the dissolution of the Soviet Union the primary threat to the alliance also dematerialized:

As coalitions of states aggregating their capabilities to cope with common enemies, alliances should have no purpose beyond deterrence or defense, and no resources beyond the power and purpose of their members. When threats disappear, allies lose their reason for cooperating, and the coalition will break apart. Consistent with the theoretical underpinnings of realist theory, early in the post-Cold War period many scholars predicted NATO’s demise (Wallander, 2000: 705).

According to realist logic, the fact that NATO did not dissolve was a significant event in itself. Scholars increasingly sought alternative explanations of events in international politics, and the reflectivist turn appeared to be a return to methods proposed by Traditionalists some twenty-five years earlier. Reflectivism emphasizes the importance of intersubjective meanings of international institutional activity (Keohane, 1989). It might best be described as that what it is not: starkly anti-positivist, the “mirror-image [...] of rationalism” (Christiansen et al, 1999: 532). Kratochwil and Ruggie point out that rational choice as the basis for regime theory has a major flaw. International regimes inescapably have an intersubjective quality, because they are constituted on the basis of shared expectations. However, the dominant epistemological position in regime analysis is positivism, which focuses on “objective forces that move actors in their social interactions” (Kratochwil & Ruggie, 1986: 764: emphasis added). This implies a fundamental contradiction between ontology and epistemology. Conversely, rationalists criticized reflectivists for not being able to come up with a research program (Wendt, 1992). This is because their epistemological and ontological assumptions are not compatible with the hypothetico-deductive model. However, this is exactly what reflectivists do not want, and makes the discussion a tautological exercise.

‘Anti-positivism’ implies a broad focus, and indeed reflectivism does not constitute a wholly coherent alternative to rationalism as the basis for research in International Relations (although this is also evidently true for rationalism). Reflectivism is an umbrella term that has been associated with among others critical theory, postmodernism, feminism, and social constructivism. All of these approaches have been developed to a significant extent in the past decades. However, it was particularly social constructivism that progressed significantly in the 1990s and beyond in an attempt to
form a middle-ground between rationalism and reflectivism. In much of the literature the rationalism-reflectivism divide even came to be replaced by a rationalism-constructivism divide (Wight, 2002).

2.1.4 Critical vs. Conventional Constructivism

According to Keohane, Katzenstein, and Krasner (1998: 647-648), constructivists confronted rationalists with “epistemological challenges rooted in sociological perspectives emphasizing shared norms and values.” Constructivism is also a divided field, and a distinction must be made between critical constructivism and conventional constructivism. Both try to reveal “how institutions and practices and identities that people take as natural, given, or matter of fact, are, in fact, the product of human agency, of social construction” (Hopf, 1998: 182). As such, each asserts that agents and structures are mutually constituted. Where they differ is that conventional constructivism wants to discover identities, how they reproduce social practices, and ultimately imply certain actions. Critical constructivists on the other hand also want to problematize identities and “elaborate on how people come to believe in a single version of a naturalized truth.” (ibid.: 183-184). Critical constructivists thus want to “[explode] the myths associated with identity formation” and “claim an interest in change, and a capacity to foster change, that no conventional constructivist could make” (ibid.: 184). In other words, conventional constructivists do not reject science or causal explanations and generally uphold a positivist epistemology (Checkel, 1998). Contrastingly, critical constructivism “analyzes social constraints and cultural understandings from a supreme human interest in enlightenment and emancipation” (Hopf, 1998: 185).

The scholars studied in this thesis mostly subscribe to a conventional constructivist stance, which has the downside that it inevitably bears the cost of “the practical exclusion of a body of [constructivist] scholarship of a different epistemological bent” (Jupille et al, 2003: 25). Constructivism is not without its critics, and its position as a middle-ground between rationalism and reflectivism puts itself open to attacks from both flanks. Hopf (1998) observes that many rationalists consider constructivists still leaning too much towards anti-positivism while failing to advance an alternative research program. Diametrically opposed to this view is Steve Smith (1999: 683), who claims that “most social constructivism is far more ‘rationalist’ in character than ‘reflectivist’.” He goes as far to say that the methodological and epistemological assumptions of “social constructivism in its dominant form [are] very close to the neo-liberalist wing of the rationalist paradigm” (ibid.: 684). Smith hereby specifically refers to Alexander Wendt, one of the leading constructivist authors in International Relations. Indeed, Wendt can be considered a conventional constructivist whose social theory of international politics even explicitly uses many insights from Neorealism and Neoliberalism. His theory is explained on pages 17-20.
In the next section rationalism is applied to alliances and collective burden sharing, after which constructivism is applied to these concepts.

2.2 **RATIONALISM AND ALLIANCES**

In this section several authors are discussed who have made important contributions to the rationalist framework with regard to alliances and collective action. First, Peter Abell’s perspective on rational choice theory and its fundamental assumptions is examined. Second, Stephen Walt’s balance-of-threat theory is explained. Third, the theory of collective action as put forward by Mancur Olson Jr. is discussed. Fourth, an appraisal of Glenn Snyder and the security dilemma is provided. The security dilemma is a noteworthy variant of the prisoner’s dilemma. To conclude this section, the rationalist hypotheses that this thesis tests are discussed.

2.2.1 **Rational choice theory**

Much of ‘rational’ state behavior can be captured by rational choice theory. The goals, utilities, and preferences of individual actors are central to the establishment of causal mechanisms in what Abell calls rational action theory. He outlines its four major assumptions. The first assumption is methodological individualism, meaning that it is “individuals that ultimately take actions” (Abell, 1992: 189). In security alliances, these individual actors are states. Rational choice theorists would not deny per se that NATO member states are unconstrained from system level mechanisms, but would generally argue that “the connection between two system level variables must ultimately imply a mechanism involving individual actions” (ibid.: 190) The second assumption is optimality, which means that “[i]ndividual actions are optimally chosen” (ibid.: 189) This means that NATO member states choose a course of action of which the consequences are preferred above all other available options. The third assumption is self-regard, which means that the actions of individuals are “entirely concerned with their own welfare” (ibid.: 189) That is, NATO member states are indifferent to the utility of individual others (NATO members) or collective others (NATO as an alliance) when determining their preferences. The fourth assumption is paradigmatic privilege, which means that rational choice theory considers itself the “necessary starting point with which to compare other types of theory” (ibid.: 189). Rational choice theory does not disregard the utility of other theories, with different assumptions from those put forward above, but would rather contend that these can only come into play after a rational choice analysis has been performed. As becomes apparent later in this theoretical framework, many
constructivists would argue the other way around: it is only after a ‘social’ analysis has been performed that the material perspective would come into play.

2.2.2 Balance-of-threat theory

One of the most important scholars who has written about alliances from a rationalist perspective is Stephen Walt, a realist author. In his 1990 book *The Origins of Alliances* he attempts to discern when and why alliances form in the international realm. He more or less builds on the assumptions of balance-of-power authors such as Kenneth Waltz. As explained on page 9, Waltz puts a heavy emphasis on anarchy, state survival and relative capabilities. The reason his model of International Relations is considered by many to be so powerful is because of its parsimony. It incorporates only a small number of variables and assumptions while still allowing for a large amount of inferences with regard to the international system. However, Walt believes that knowing the total relative capabilities of states (as far as one can ‘know’ this) is not enough to make accurate empirical predictions. Although he recognizes that “all else being equal, the greater a state’s total resources [...] the greater a potential threat it can pose to others” (Walt, 1990: 22), Walt adds three variables to the balance-of-power model, even though this compromises its parsimony.

The first variable Walt adds is geographic proximity. When states are geographically close to each other it is easier to project power to one another (i.e. pose a threat) than when they are far removed from each other (ibid.). The second added variable is offensive capabilities. More than just the aggregated resources of a state, this specifically refers to the “ability to threaten the sovereignty or territorial integrity of another state at an acceptable cost” (ibid.: 24). The third and last added variable is aggressive intentions. When states are considered as aggressive, other states are more likely to balance against them (ibid.). Walt hereby changes the concept from balance-of-power to balance-of-threat.

Walt considers a limited range of state action when states have to deal with external security threats. To prevent other states from becoming dominant and forming existential threats, states can either balance or bandwagon. Balancing comes in two forms. The first form is the formation of alliances with weaker states to counterbalance a preponderant power as a source of danger. This is external balancing. The alternative is for the state to unilaterally increase its economic and/or military power. This is internal balancing. Bandwagoning on the other hand means to ally with the preponderant power (Walt, 1990). This either happens when there are insufficient balancing options, or when the preponderant power is deemed too dominant to ally against. From a material perspective, Walt recognizes free-riding as an optimal policy for weak states with powerful allies when the weaker side has
“excessive confidence in allied support” (ibid.: 30). If states truly balance against threats, this should not only explain alliance formation but also alliance continuation and intra-alliance behavior. External security threats are then likely to provoke external balancing (e.g. alliance expansion) and/or internal balancing (augmentation of the capabilities of existing members). Considering this, it is indeed unsurprising that realist scholars predicted the end of NATO when the Soviet Union dissolved. After all, NATO primarily came into existence as a counterweight to Soviet power.

It could be argued that concepts like ‘threat’ and ‘confidence’ are highly intersubjective. Indeed, Checkel (1998: 329) recognizes that rationalist scholars sometimes “smuggle into their analyses sociological and cultural variables emphasized by constructivists” but are “nonetheless united in a common commitment to rationalism and materialism.”

2.2.3 Collective action theory

Another influential author who has studied alliances from a rational choice perspective is Mancur Olson, who has written seminal works on collective action. Olson, like many others, treats security in NATO as a collective good. This means it is a good that is non-excludable and non-rival in nature. Non-excludability refers to the inability to exclude a potential user or beneficiary from a good. Non-rivalry refers to goods that are not diminished by consumption or use. A non-rival good has the same benefits regardless of the number of people that benefit from it (Krahman, 2008). It is true that NATO member states could hypothetically withhold support when an allied country is under attack. However, this has not been witnessed empirically. One can only imagine the damage such an event would inflict on the political credibility of the alliance (even though this edges towards the intersubjective again). Thus this thesis also assumes that the collective security provided by NATO is a collective good, albeit an impure one.

In The Logic of Collective Action (1965) Olson explains why without incentives to encourage participation, it is unlikely that collective action occurs optimally even when there are many individuals in a group with a common goal. This is because individual group members obtain only part of the benefit of extra resources they spends on the good, since part of it goes to the public benefit. Furthermore, the higher the amount of a public good that a group member acquires for free, the lower his incentive to provide more of it himself. It is then an optimal strategy for individual actors to become a free rider; “to benefit from the public good without bearing the costs connected with its supply” (Maré, 1988: 10). However, the strategy is not optimal from a collective, reciprocal perspective since “if all individuals were to choose to free ride, the goods in question would not be produced” (ibid.: 10). Olson shows in one of his economic models that the group member that attributes the highest absolute value to a
collective good ends up paying the lion’s share of the collective cost. They are most likely to take the lead in both initiating and maintaining the good, giving group members who place less absolute value on the collective good ample opportunity to withhold contributions and “free ride” on group efforts.

In Olson’s article ‘An Economic Theory of Alliances’ (1966) these ideas are tested against the costs of collective security in NATO. Indeed, Olson shows that United States, as the alliance member that attaches the largest absolute value to the collective good, at least at the time bore a disproportionate share of the burden. When investing in collective defense, Olson asserts that NATO member states will at one point value extra contributions less than its marginal returns and cease further investments.

Where small groups with common interests are concerned, then, there is a systematic tendency for “exploitation” of the great by the small (Olson, 1965: 29). More generally, Olson’s research explains why states have to resort to mandatory taxes: because it is impossible to withhold elementary services, such as defense and police protection, to people who do not contribute towards maintaining these services. As already noted in the introduction, there is no official authority in NATO to demand resources from the member states other than the funding for the organizational structure. It seems from Olson’s perspective that the alliance leader(s) can only change the balance of burden when they are able to alter the cost-benefit analyses of their allies.

2.2.4 The Security Dilemma

An important addition to what has been outlined above is the security dilemma in IR. This is a variant of the prisoner’s dilemma that assumes (major) states in the international system cannot be certain that the intentions of other states are peaceful (Snyder, 1984). Therefore, they must gain power for defense. However, the other party cannot know whether these powers are only intended for defense or also for attack. Therefore, they too will start to accumulate power. Power accumulation can come in different forms. The first is armament, or what Walt would call internal balancing. The second is alliance formation, or external balancing. The third is through territorial expansion. The security dilemma comprises a general theoretical underpinning of the Cold War, with arms races (captured in terms such as ‘missile gap’, ‘bomber gap’, nuclear capacity), alliance formation (NATO), and counter-alliance formation (Warsaw Pact). It can not only explain alliance formation, but also alliance behavior. This is the case because alliances are not indefinite entities, or as Snyder puts it: “Whatever the text of the written agreement, [...] the fear of being abandoned by one's ally is ever-present” (ibid.: 466). Indeed, there are two general options for alliance members: cooperate or defect. Both have positive and negative consequences for the actors involved. Cooperation is likely to enhance collective security, but
too much commitment to the common cause might lead to entrapment. Entrapment involves “being dragged into a conflict over an ally's interests that one does not share, or shares only partially” (ibid.: 467). A strong commitment to the alliance reduces bargaining leverage over your allies. Defection on the other hand diminishes the fear of entrapment for a state, but might lead to abandonment by one’s allies and thus an increased vulnerability to other parties in the international system.

The key to the intra-alliance security dilemma then “requires chiefly a comparison and trade-off between the costs and risks of abandonment and entrapment” and “a strategy of weak or ambiguous commitment” (ibid.: 467). Threatening to abandon the alliance might then be the “incentive to encourage participation” mentioned by Mancur Olson, that can be used by alliance leaders (e.g. the United States in NATO) to coerce its allies to spend more on defense. And what better timing for the alliance leader to do so during a time of an external security threat, to expeditiously shift the cost-benefit analysis of the smaller states in its favor?

2.2.5 Conclusion Rationalism and Hypotheses

The basis of rationalism applied to NATO is that security preferences, threat perceptions, and material gains of individual member states, mediated through continuous cost-benefit analyses, lead to outcomes like burden sharing (or lack thereof). Member states perform these cost-benefit analyses to estimate what, how, and how much they should contribute to NATO to maximize these preferences.

In line with rational choice theory and game theory, member states that contribute less than their ‘fair share’ of the collective burden in NATO do not automatically contribute more resources in times of external security threats. Only when the benefit of an additional marginal unit of security equals or exceeds the marginal costs of this unit this will be the case. Although exact calculations of this kind are difficult to perform, similarly to estimating the magnitude of the ‘threats’ that states face or the capabilities that states possess, one can at the very least make an educated guess and act accordingly. States could be more inclined to provide more for their own safety when they estimate an external security threat to the alliance as very high and/or proximate. Alternatively, or concurrently, alliance leaders can threaten to abandon the alliance unless smaller allies contribute more resources to alliance security. Of course, smaller allies might anticipate the possibility of abandonment and take more initiative themselves. Since free-riding implies that you obtain something you would rationally want for nothing or at very low marginal costs, one would need to prove that countries behave consciously and strategically when ‘branding’ them as free-riders.

The rationalist framework as outlined above leads to the following hypotheses:
Rationalist Hypothesis 1: In line with balance-of-threat theory, NATO member states increase burden sharing to boost their individual security during times of external security threats.

Rationalist Hypothesis 2: If the NATO alliance leader makes threats of abandonment, the other NATO member states increase burden sharing efforts during times of external security threats.

In the following section the constructivist view of alliances is discussed, and to what extent it differs from the rationalist point of view.

2.3 CONSTRUCTIVISM AND ALLIANCES

To reiterate, constructivist scholars question “the materialism and methodological individualism upon which much contemporary IR scholarship is built” and instead seek to examine issues such as identity and interest formation that are bracketed by neoliberalism and neorealism (Checkel, 1998: 362). Alexander Wendt recognizes that intersubjectivity is already an integral part of rationalism, and asserts that rationalism is not only about preferences but about preferences plus beliefs or expectations. After all, common knowledge helps solve games with multiple equilibria (Wendt, 1992). However, he thinks that rationalists at best consider concepts like norms that emerge from interaction “as rules and behavioral regularities which are external to the actor” (ibid.: 417). What he and other constructivists try to do is endogenize concepts such as identity and norms, meaning that they view it as something generated through social interaction rather than an ontological given. Thus, alliance formation and intra-alliance behavior is not only strategic but should also be studied in sociological terms.

In this section several authors are discussed that have made important contributions to the constructivist framework regarding collective action and alliances. First of all, Alexander Wendt and his view on collective identity formation in the international realm. Second, Thomas Risse-Kappen who has performed research on the formation and endurance of the NATO alliance from a constructivist perspective. Third, the influence of norms on alliance behavior is discussed alongside Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm lifecycle.

2.3.1 Collective identity, shared knowledge and international cooperation

In his article ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics’ (1992) and his book Social Theory of International Politics (1999), Alexander Wendt problematizes the rationalist notion of anarchy. He believes anarchy is not an exogenously given feature in international politics that implies a self-help system. Rather, he believes anarchy is socially constituted through interaction between
states. Wendt thinks a cooperative security system is possible, “in which states identify positively with one another so that the security of each is perceived as the responsibility of all” (Wendt, 1992: 400). This is not self-help, because the interests are defined in terms of the community in which national interests are also international interests. While Wendt admits that the distribution of power has an effect on state behavior, he argues that this is mediated through “intersubjective understandings and expectations, on the distribution of knowledge, that constitute their conceptions of self and other” (ibid.: 397). By claiming this, he also problematizes the rationalist notion that the world is full of self-interested states that want to maximize their egoistic preferences. Wendt questions the empirical validity of such explanations by asking how we can know “that a self-interest explanation of cooperation is true if we do not know whether an actor was in fact self-interested?” (Wendt, 1999: 240). Wendt thinks that states care about their self-interest, but that their understanding of self-interest are broader than rationalists would assume. In fact, Wendt (ibid.) asserts that states have four objective interests. The first is physical survival. Realists like Waltz would make the assumption that this is the only interest of a state, but Wendt thinks this is empirically false. The second interest Wendt claims states have is autonomy. States do not only want to survive, but also exercise a certain degree of self-control. The third interest is economic well-being. States want to maintain a certain mode of production, and as such a resource base. The fourth is collective self-esteem. States want to sustain a positive Self-image vis-à-vis Other states in the international system.

Along these lines Wendt develops a systemic constructivist theory of international relations. The identity of states and shared ideas between states are constituted through a sociological process. Wendt distinguishes three possible types of relations between the Self and Other which he calls ‘degrees of society’: Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian.

In a Hobbesian society Self and Other see each other as enemies. They do not recognize each other’s right to exist autonomously and will not constrain themselves from violent behavior towards each other (ibid.). In a Lockean society Self and Other are rivals. They recognize each other’s sovereignty and mostly refrain from revisionist action. Limited violence might still be used to solve disputes (ibid.). In a Kantian society Self and Other are friends. They will not use violence, nor threaten with violence, to solve disputes. Furthermore, they will work together when an external party threatens either of them (ibid.).

All cultures can be internalized by states to different degrees. The culture might be involuntarily accepted by a state due to external circumstances. This is the first degree; force. Alternatively, they might see it in their best interest to maintain the culture, as part of a cost-benefit calculation. This is the
second degree; price. The third possibility is that both states think of the culture as legitimate, and are therefore committed to it voluntarily. This is the third degree; legitimacy. When a Kantian culture is internalized to the third degree, the cognitive boundaries of the Self have expanded to include the Other and now form a single “cognitive region”; a collective identity has developed (ibid.: 305).

![Figure 2: Wendt's model of multiple realization of international culture](image)

The likelihood for relationships to move from a Lockean to a Kantian society (and stay there) is greater when states score high on four master variables. The first master variable is interdependence. States are interdependent when “the outcome of an interaction for each depends on the choices of the others” (ibid.: 344). Wendt criticizes Realists and Liberals for using the prisoners dilemma to demonstrate that stable cooperation in the international realm is either very problematic (Realists) or that it can only be reached by a reciprocal, tit-for-tat strategy (Liberals). He especially challenges the assumptions of non-verbal communication amongst actors and a lack of complex learning. Wendt argues that actors have the capacity to socially interpret their own behavior and the behavior of others, and can discursively communicate a “shared representation of interdependence and the “we” that it constitutes” (ibid.: 346). This enables the generation of enough trust for the Self to overcome a fear of exploitation by the Other.

The second master variable is common fate. States share a common fate when their “survival, fitness or welfare depends on what happens to the group as a whole” (ibid.: 349). An external security threat can be a salient example of a common fate. When there is a an external security threat to NATO, one could speak of a socially constituted mirror image of enmity. The third master variable is homogeneity. States are homogeneous when their political authority is organized similarly (ibid.). In the contemporary world order the two most noticeable continua are democracy-autocracy and capitalism-communism. The fourth master variable, self-restraint, is a necessary condition for collective identity formation. States practice self-restraint when the Self overrides “their fear of being engulfed, physically or psychically, by the Other” as well as their desire to engulf the Other themselves (ibid.: 357). Identifying with other actors has its benefits, but also carries a potential threat when you put the needs of Others on par with
your own. States need to “know” that Others will “respect their individuality and needs” (ibid.: 360). This requires trust, and according to Wendt trust between states is generated in at least three different ways. First, through repeated compliance with international norms to show good intentions. Second, by transposing domestic, democratic, ways of resolving conflicts to the international realm. Third, by unilaterally committing themselves to put constraints on their behavior to show goodwill (e.g. non-proliferation or disarmament).

The Kantian society is not the exclusive domain for security alliances. Between countries that are in a Hobbesian culture one should expect no meaningful cooperation. Indeed, Wendt argues that “the Hobbesian structure is a truly self-help system” (ibid.: 247). Countries in a Lockean culture generally do not assume worst-case scenarios with respect to each other’s intentions, which might allow them to enter into security alliances. However, there is no guarantee that countries will honor their commitments: they can defect if they consider this strategically advantageous. Hence, the Kantian culture seems the most obvious environment for extensive collaboration between countries, especially when the crunch comes in the form of an external security threat. However, collective identities are not inherently ‘there to stay’. The scores on the master variables might change. Group identification may depend on the issue at hand and affect behavior accordingly (ibid.). Furthermore, whereas this thesis tests whether collective identity leads to improved burden sharing, Wendt also hypothesizes that “arguments about free riding and burden sharing, [...] should they remain unresolved, may undermine collective identities” (ibid.: 306).

Although NATO member states seem to share the master variables to a considerable degree, this does not mean that they are, have been and/or will be in a Kantian culture with each other. What this thesis researches is whether the NATO member states were in a Lockean or a Kantian culture with each other at the time of an external security threat, to what degree they internalized this, and what the implications were for burden sharing efforts during the threat.

2.3.2 Risse-Kappen – Democratic Allies in a Pluralistic Security Community

Risse-Kappen offers a constructivist account of NATO’s endurance after the Cold War, when Waltz claimed that the Atlantic Alliance was ‘a disappearing thing’ after the Soviet Union withdrew from Eastern Europe. Risse-Kappen especially focuses on the democratic nature of NATO members, which has two fundamental implications. The first implication is that democratic countries face a large number of domestic institutional constraints (checks and balances) which makes for a very voluminous decision-making process. The second implication is that this democratic decision-making process itself is subject
to socially embedded norms (Risse-Kappen, 1996). Risse-Kappen sees no reason why the domestic state of affairs cannot be transposed to the international realm also.

Risse-Kappen also contends that perceptions of external security threats do not “emerge from a quasi-objective international power structure” like rationalists would argue. Instead, states “infer external behavior from the values and norms governing the domestic political processes that shape the identities of their partners in the international system” (ibid.: 297). Furthermore, Risse-Kappen thinks that the security dilemma (see page 15-16) is less applicable to alliances of democratic countries. Through social identification, democratic states know that they are unlikely to fight each other in the future. Wendt agrees with him on this point, stating that democracies are “predisposed by their internal constitutional structure to limit the instruments they use in their disputes with each other to peaceful means” and thus “tend to observe security community norms almost naturally” (Wendt, 1999: 361). Conversely, Risse-Kappen (1996: 298) thinks that the security dilemma is a very compelling theoretical underpinning of cooperation amongst autocratic countries. Their leaders are more prone to work together based on narrowly defined self-interest because they lack “values that would prescribe mutual sympathy, trust, and consideration.”

2.3.3 The influence of norms on alliance behavior

A key area of constructivist research in International Relations is the influence of international norms on state action. Even though neoliberals incorporate concepts such as norms into their analyses, Checkel (1998: 327) argues that for them they are “a superstructure built on a material base [...] helping actors with given interests maximize utility.” Constructivists would argue that the effect of norms reach deeper. They do not simply regulate behavior, but rather are constitutive of actor identities and interests.

There are a number of definitions of what a ‘norm’ entails in constructivist terms. Wendt (1999: 242) calls norms “simply […] practices upheld by many others”, implying that states tend to view the behavior of a majority of other states as the norm. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) go for a more comprehensive definition and refer to norms as standards for the appropriate behavior of states, that extend beyond the consequential logic of rational choice theory. They embody ‘oughtness’ and ‘shared moral assessment’, which means there is an intersubjective and evaluative dimension to norms. Norms regulate behavior, limit the range of choice of states, and constrain action. Norm-breaking by states generally leads to disapproval by other states. Norm conformance either leads to praise, or to no reaction at all if the norm is internalized to the degree that conformity is deemed unexceptional. Tim
Dunne observes that when a state breaks an accepted norm, it “tries to justify its actions with reference to another norm or gives reasons why the action constitutes a legitimate exception” (Dunne, 2002: 75). Indeed, the existence of norms is often clearest when they have been broken (Ba, 2005). Ba claims that much theorizing about norms in alliances has revolved around “appropriate and less appropriate kinds (and styles) of interference and uses of force” (ibid.: 258). In this thesis the analytical value of burden sharing as an security alliance norm is investigated.

From a constructivist perspective, international structure is determined by the international distribution of ideas. [...] In an ideational international structure, idea shifts and norm shifts are the main vehicles for system transformation. Norm shifts are to the ideational theorist what changes in the balance of power are to the realist (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 894).

How then, do Finnemore and Sikkink explain change in the international realm? They see this as a three-stage process called the norm life cycle. In the first stage there are norm entrepreneurs who give prominence to certain issues. They might even create issues through language that names, interprets, and dramatizes them. Norm entrepreneurs have to persuade a critical mass of states to adopt new norms and become norm leaders. Persuasion is key, as it is “the process by which agent action becomes social structure, ideas become norms, and the subjective becomes the intersubjective” (ibid.: 914). The importance of each individual state depends on the issue at hand, but generally “critical states are those without which the achievement of the substantive norm goal is compromised” (ibid.: 901). The norm must be institutionalized in international rules and organizations. This clarifies what the norm exactly entails and what it means to violate it, as well as provides procedures that coordinate disapproval and sanctions for violation. International socialization is intended to encourage “norm breakers to become norm followers” (ibid.: 902). This involves diplomatic praise or censure, and can be reinforced by material sanctions and incentives. When a critical mass is reached, the norm reaches a tipping point.

In the second stage states comply with norms because this relates to their identity as members of international society. This is like peer pressure among countries. Finnemore and Sikkink give three motivations why peer pressure works: legitimation, conformity, and esteem. States and state leaders adhere to norms to avoid losing reputation, trust, and credibility among their international peers.

In the third and last stage of the norm life cycle, norms become internalized by actors and achieve a "taken-for-granted" quality that guarantees almost automatic conformity. States that are insecure about their international status and seek to enhance it are expected to embrace international norms eagerly. Norms that are held by states that are considered successful and desirable are more likely to diffuse widely.
Critical junctures (what Finnemore and Sikkink call ‘world historical events’) such as wars or economic depressions in the international system often provoke a search for new norms, as sometimes norms that were associated with the negative events have been discredited. One could hypothesize that external security threats then might open the door for improved (burden sharing) norm conformance.

Despite the comprehensiveness of the model, there are many emergent norms that do not reach the tipping point. This means that if burden sharing norms emerge in NATO, completion of the life cycle is not inevitable. This research uses the different stages of the norm life cycle (norm emergence, norm internalization) to characterize the state of affairs with regard to burden sharing in NATO during the external security threats.

### 2.3.4 Conclusion Constructivism and Hypotheses

The basis of constructivism applied to NATO is that shared identity, ideas, culture, and norms can be constitutive of actor’s interests. These interests can both implicitly and explicitly supersede or undermine cost-benefit analyses and lead to burden sharing (or a lack thereof). The constructivist school does not force one to exclude material and strategic considerations, but rather asserts that it should be interpreted through the social context of international politics. This is the reverse order of what rational choice theory would prescribe.

In the constructivist view, states free-ride when they fail to adhere to existing alliance norms that prescribe mutual aid and a ‘fair’ distribution of the financial, military and political burden. The notion that NATO member states ought to share the collective burden equitably can be classified as a norm, especially when it is unambiguously agreed upon. When this norm has not been internalized by the NATO member states, the question is what kind of justifications (e.g. other norms), if any, have been given for not contributing adequately to the collective burden. This leads to the following hypotheses:

**Constructivist Hypothesis 1**: The more an alliance is based on a Kantian culture internalized to the third degree, the more its members contribute towards providing the collective good in times of an external security threat.

**Constructivist Hypothesis 2**: Critical junctures for NATO in the form of external security threats encourage burden sharing norm compliance by its members.

In the next chapter the methodological tools that are used to test both the rationalist and constructivist hypotheses are provided.
Chapter 3. Methodology

This chapter discusses the methodology for this thesis. The first part explains and justifies how the hypotheses that were put forward in the previous chapter are researched. The second part provides an operationalization of the concepts that are used. The third part pertains to the ways in which data is collected. The fourth part deals with the limitations of the methods that are used.

3.1 Case Selection and Method of Inquiry

For this research, the method of structured, focused comparison is employed. Following George and Bennett (2005: 67), the word “structured” means that general questions reflecting the research objective are formulated (see chapter 2) to “guide and standardize data collection to make systematic comparison possible.” The word “focused” means that only certain aspects of the historical cases that are examined are dealt with; in this case burden sharing. Appropriate for the purposes of this research, this comparative method was developed to “study historical experience in ways that would yield useful generic knowledge of important foreign policy problems” opposed to the “noncumulative character” of individual case studies (ibid.: 68).

While the thesis is theory-informed, using rationalist and constructivist ideas to formulate “general questions,” it aims to provide a thorough description of the cases under investigation. As such, it will gravitate towards thick description. Thick description means that there is a “central reliance on detailed knowledge of cases”, in contrast with the “more limited knowledge of cases” that is often typical of statistical research (Collier, Brady & Seawright, 2010: 179). For every external security threat a within-case analysis is performed, to sequence “who knew what, when, and what they did in response” (Bennett, 2010). As such, the presence of external security threats constitutes the independent variable and burden sharing constitutes the dependent variable.

This approach is considered most suitable for this thesis because what the research attempts to demonstrate (i.e. the mechanisms through which external security threats lead to changes in NATO burden sharing) is highly context sensitive to the degree that this is difficult to capture in either quantitative research or in Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA).

Three cases are used to study the effect of external security threats on burden sharing in NATO. The first case study is the Korean War. This conflict took place between 1950 and 1953 and, for reasons specified in the case study, raised concerns in the North Atlantic Area that the Soviet Union could move against Western Europe. The second case study is the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan of 1979, which
raised concerns in the NATO area that the Soviet Union could undermine Western interests in the Persian Gulf. The third and last case study is the attacks of 11 September 2001 on the World Trade Centre, the subsequent threat of transnational terrorism, and the “War on Terror”. How burden sharing develops as a result from the threats is mapped out.

There are several reasons for choosing these three cases. First of all, they are selected to provide the “control and variation required by the research problem” (George & Bennett, 2005: 83). The chosen cases are among the most notable external security threats to NATO countries, and as such constitute most-likely cases for the chosen hypotheses. According to Gerring (2007), a most-likely case is a case that is likely to validate the predictions of a model or hypothesis. If a most-likely case is found to be invalid, this may be regarded as strong disconfirming evidence. In other words, if the selected rationalist and/or constructivist theories and hypotheses are not capable of explaining developments in burden sharing in NATO during these periods, it would “provide strong support for the expectation that [they] will fail even more clearly in less hospitable circumstances” (Odell, 2001: 166). Furthermore, the cases represent threats to NATO from a) the beginning of the alliance, b) the ‘mid-point’ of NATO’s existence until now and c) recent history, allowing for comparative insights in the development of burden sharing in NATO and show trends over time.

The three cases are structured as follows. First, a short background to the external security threat is given. The direct cause of the conflict, the primary parties involved, and how it constituted a threat to the security of the NATO member states are explained. Second, how this affected intra-alliance behavior (burden sharing) is researched. What is included in the definition of burden sharing is explained on page 26-27. Third, the rationalist and constructivist predictions (hypotheses) are empirically tested for every case. Fourth, an evaluation of the outcomes is given.

These methods should give the findings a high degree of both internal validity and external validity, even though the number of cases is limited. Internal validity is defined by Seawright and Collier (2010: 330-334) as “the degree to which descriptive or causal inferences from a given set of cases are correct for those cases”, whereas external validity is “[t]he degree to which descriptive or causal inferences for a given set of cases can be generalized to other cases” (i.e. other external security threats to NATO). Considering NATO is a unique security alliance with unparalleled degrees of cooperation, this thesis does not aim to provide generalizations for intra-alliance behavior in other security alliances such as the CSTO, the Arab League or the African Union.

The aim of the empirical chapter is to find evidence for rational and social components of burden sharing. Furthermore, it intends to elucidate necessary and sufficient variables for the
development of burden sharing in NATO, and to explore both the ‘if’ question (did something occur) and the ‘why’ question (reasons for the occurrence).

Both the rationalist and constructivist theories that were outlined in chapter 2 take on a highly state-centric view, and thus this thesis will do so also. Gerring (2007: 19) calls the nation-state “the archetypal case” and the “dominant political unit of our time.” Although it is recognized that political authority is not always “territorially organized and thus circumscribed by the state’s borders” (Lacher, 2003: 521), security policy is eminently a state affair (especially in an alliance such as NATO). This is why state-centrism is not considered an obstacle for reliable research in the security domain. Any domestic factors included in this thesis are limited to the actions of state-leaders or government decisions, as these are directly representative of the state.

3.2 OPERATIONALIZATION OF CONCEPTS

In order to effectively empirically test the rationalist and constructivist hypotheses, the definition of the concepts that are used need to be made clear. Whenever concepts are used in both theoretical approaches, both definitions are given.

Alliance leader (rationalism)

NATO is an asymmetrical alliance, which means the difference in capabilities of the member states are relatively large. In other words, NATO consists of major and minor powers (Palmer & David, 1999). Concretely, the alliance leader is quite simply the largest power in terms of economic and defense capabilities. They are able to contribute the most to the burden of collective security in absolute terms, and are expected to have most leverage to influence decision-making.

Indicator: NATO member state with the largest economic and defense capabilities.

Burden sharing (rationalism/constructivism)

An important question is what exactly ‘counts’ towards burden sharing, and how this can be studied empirically. Burden sharing and defense spending are not synonyms, since the latter is only a segment of the former. Cimbala and Forster (2010: 1) define burden sharing as “the distribution of costs and risks among members of a group in the process of accomplishing a common goal. The risks may be economic, political, military or other.” According to these authors, particularly force contributions have “always been viewed as an indication of a country’s loyalty and commitment to the Alliance” (ibid.: 4).
Cimbala and Forster rightly recognize that the political and the economic are not always mutually exclusive areas, since costs and risks in one area can constitute costs and risks in another. Hence, to only look at defense spending is to take an overly narrow approach of burden sharing. However, some delineation must take place for brevity’s sake. Since a more state-centric theoretical approach is taken in this study, most (often elusive) domestic political factors are already bracketed. What remains are macro-economic indicators of burden sharing and indicators of political support for NATO on the international level.

With regard to macro-economic indicators, national defense expenditure in real terms and as a percentage of GDP are studied. Furthermore, material and troop contributions to NATO operations are included.

With regard to indications of political support, what is included are changes to NATO’s institutional structure that require enhanced burden sharing, as well as the addition of new members to the alliance. These events constitute a good opportunity to assess how all member states have contributed to the outcome, since such decisions are made by consensus since the creation of the Alliance in 1949 (NATO, 2014).

These indicators allow for an assessment of the tangible (measurable) changes in NATO’s strength and the distribution of both economic and political costs and risks.

**Indicators:** changes in defense spending (absolute/relative), contribution of troops and material to NATO operations, institutional changes in NATO requiring enhanced burden sharing, addition of new members to NATO.

**Critical junctures (constructivism)**

The concept of critical junctures is an inherent part of path dependency theory. It is used to give causal explanations for enduring institutional change. Critical junctures are periods of time “marked by heightened contingency, or increased causal possibility,” where structural constraints are loosened to “allow for agency or contingency to shape divergence from the past” ((Soifer, 2012: 1573-1574). From a norms perspective, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) claim that critical junctures in the form of ‘world historical events’ such as wars can provoke a search for new norms. On this basis, three external security threats that can be considered critical junctures to NATO and its member states are researched, to see if these have led to increased burden sharing norm compliance.

**Indicators:** external security threats (see next paragraph).
External security threat (rationalism/constructivism)

For rationalists, an external security threat for NATO member states is when a security situation anywhere in the world is deteriorating to the point where security interests for that member state are in danger. When a threat affects more NATO member states, more collective action will occur.

**Indicators**: reference of NATO member state leaders in statements to a security situation potentially harmful to the individual security interests of their nation.

For constructivists, external security threats for NATO member states occur when a security situation is deteriorating to the point where they perceive that at least one NATO member state is in danger. Following collective identity logic ('one for all, and all for one'), each state feels responsible to assist in countering the threat.

**Indicators**: reference of NATO member state leaders in statements to a security situation potentially harmful to the collective interests of all NATO member states.

Kantian Culture and Collective Identity (constructivism)

As explained in the theoretical chapter, when two countries ('Self' and 'Other') are in a Kantian culture they are friends. This means that they will not use violence, nor threaten with violence, to solve disputes. They will work together when an external party threatens either of them. The Kantian culture can be internalized by states to different degrees. The culture might be involuntarily accepted by a state due to external circumstances. This is the first degree; force. Alternatively, they might see it in their best interest to maintain the culture, as part of a cost-benefit calculation. This is the second degree; price. The third possibility is that states think of the culture as legitimate, and they are committed to it voluntarily. This is the third degree; legitimacy.

When the Kantian culture is internalized to the third degree, the cognitive boundaries of the Self have expanded to include the Other and now form a single “cognitive region”; a collective identity has developed. They see each other's security “not just as instrumentally related to their own, but as literally being their own” (Wendt, 1999: 305).

The collective identity of states is difficult to measure empirically. In an attempt to do so, Wendt's master variables (homogeneity, interdependence, common fate, self-restraint) are used to assess whether the countries of NATO were in a Kant 3 culture at the time of the external security threat under research. Although Wendt (1999: 342) uses the master variables to “explain why states in a Lockean world would engage in prosocial security policies and thereby spur collective identity
formation,” the conceptual usefulness of the master variables is also tested here for variations within and between cultures.

**Indicators:** Indications that NATO member states consider themselves to have a common fate, to be homogeneous, to be interdependent and/or to have self-restraint.

**NATO member states (rationalism/constructivism)**

Countries that have signed the North Atlantic Treaty are considered NATO member states. Countries that are in the various NATO partnership programs are not considered NATO member states. Although in the case of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program cooperation can take on extensive forms, the partnerships in this program have been “formed individually between each Euro-Atlantic partner and NATO, tailored to individual needs and jointly implemented at the level and pace chosen by each participating government” (NATO, 2014). This means that within this program there is too much variation to take into account to adequately assess in this thesis.

**Indicators:** Every country that is a full member of NATO. NATO started the alliance with twelve member states. At the time of writing, it has 28 member states. A list of NATO members and the years of their accession can be found in appendix 1.

**Norms (constructivism)**

For rationalists, norms are only complied with when it is in the strategic interest of the country in question (logic of consequences). The one-for-all-and-all-for-one logic of Article 5 is then invoked out of strategic considerations, but allies will only come to aid when they consider this in their best interest.

For constructivists, norms are social, logic of appropriateness. Norms are complied with because they are considered as legitimate, because if fits into the broader identity of states (see Kantian culture), rather than because they consider it to be in their narrow individual interest.

**Indicators:** NATO member states complying with NATO burden sharing norms when not under direct pressure to do so. When burden sharing norms are broken, other norms are offered as justification.

**Threat of abandonment (rationalism)**

In its most extreme form, a threat of alliance abandonment can be defined as a warning or consideration by an alliance leader to realign itself and break all defense commitments (Kupchan, 1988). However, it may also take more moderate or implicit forms, like “the alliance leader moving closer to
the adversary, imposing sanctions on its weaker allies, or ignoring the interests of small powers in the designation of alliance policy and strategy” (ibid.: 325).

**Indicators:** statements made (by state leaders) or actions undertaken by the alliance leader indicating that they intend to withdraw to a greater or lesser extent from their commitments to the alliance.

### 3.3 Data Collection

To research the cases, a combination of primary sources (archival data) and secondary sources (academic books and articles) is used. To determine how external security threats impacted policy coordination in NATO, a range of literature is used to find out which implemented NATO policies were the result of these threats. To determine how external threats impacted defense expenditure of NATO member states, data from SIPRI is used. SIPRI is the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, an “independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament” (SIPRI, 2015b). The reports and data that SIPRI publishes are widely used in the academic community. SIPRI’s definition of defense expenditure can be found in appendix 2. Where SIPRI’s records are incomplete, data from NATO is used instead to illustrate changes in defense expenditure.

To test the rationalist hypotheses an individualist approach is employed, where NATO members are considered to conduct their own balance-of-threat assessments. Primary and secondary literature is used that attempts to assess the level of threat to the NATO area and subsequent changes in burden sharing. To test the constructivist hypotheses indications of collective identity both prior to and as a result from external security threats are researched. Indications of increased norm compliance without direct sanctions hanging over the heads of the states involved are researched, as well as state representatives justifying their actions in statements.

Since burden sharing in NATO is a norm that has been well-documented, literature and policy documents can be used to trace an accurate picture of the influence of external security threats. Possible sources for research include academic literature, i.e. books and peer-reviewed articles from journals. Furthermore, government reports and NATO reports on burden sharing. NATO’s official website contains information on a wide range of topics including NATO reviews, opinions, press releases, declarations and general information. Reports and briefings from think tanks and similar institutions that specialize in defense and security can be used, as well as statements made by (former) state leaders in speeches or memoirs.
3.4 LIMITATIONS

NATO is a security organization with differing levels of confidentiality. There are many unclassified documents that are accessible to the public, but there are also many restricted documents which cannot be accessed at all. It is entirely possible that there is a difference between that what takes place behind door away from the public eye (i.e. ‘hard bargaining’), whereas diplomatic tales of cohesion and solidarity are communicated to the public. By using memoirs of prominent figures involved in the decision-making process, an attempt is made to (partially) neutralize this limitation.

In much of the literature on NATO (in many cases even in documents published by NATO itself) the European member states are treated as a rather homogeneous group vis-à-vis the United States and Canada. Although this thesis often does the same, in some instances this might not entirely do justice to the political, military, and cultural differences of the European countries.
Chapter 4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

4.1 KOREAN WAR (1950-1953)

4.1.1 Background

From 1910 until 1945 Korea is a Japanese colony. When Japan surrenders to the Allies in September 1945, effectively ending WWII, Korea is geographically divided along the 38th parallel north. North of the parallel the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), under the leadership of Joseph Stalin, aids in establishing the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) “a satellite state under Kim Il-Sung” (Farrar Hockley, 2001: 481). South of the parallel the Republic of Korea (ROK) forms “under an autocratic right-wing coalition, elected under UN supervision” (ibid.: 481). The division of Korea is supposed to be temporary until unification can take place. However, since the USSR and the US fail to agree on the terms for unification the division becomes perpetuated (Stueck, 1995). Leaders on both sides make their own plans for reunification by force, but no major escalation happens until 1950.

According to Farrar-Hockley (2001), in February of that year the USSR perceives that US support for the ROK is in decline. This prompts the USSR and the DPRK to plan an invasion of the South with the approval of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), where the Communist Party of China (CPC) assumed rule the year before. The invasion goes ahead with a surprise offensive on Sunday morning, 25 June 1950, when communist forces cross the 38th parallel into the ROK. Having the benefit of the surprise attack, the ‘communist alliance’ quickly makes significant progress. Allied forces, under leadership of the United States, scramble troops and equipment to stop them in their tracks. On the day of the invasion, the United Nations Security Council adopts Resolution 82, calling for “the immediate cessation of hostilities” and calling upon “the authorities in North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38th parallel” (UNHCR, 2015a). North Korea shows no intention of ceasing hostilities, and two days later the Security Council passes resolution 83 recommending “that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area” (UNHCR, 2015b). These resolutions are possible because the USSR, who has veto power, boycotts the Security Council over the Taiwan issue. The multinational force that forms, the United Nations Command (UNC), is placed under the command of United States General Douglas MacArthur. Countries providing military and humanitarian aid to the UNC include all signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty the year before (except Iceland) as well as South
Korea, South Africa, Colombia, Thailand, Philippines, Ethiopia, New Zealand, Australia, India, and Sweden. They oppose a coalition of Soviet, Chinese, and North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) troops.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Contributions to UNC</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Contributions to UNC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>590,911</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1,263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>302,483</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1,204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>14,198</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1,119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>6,146</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1,068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>5,453</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>2,282</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1,496</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1,385</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1,271</td>
<td>Denmark, India, Italy, Norway, Sweden</td>
<td>Humanitarian aid</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Armed forces contributions to the UNC (bold = original North Atlantic Treaty signatory) Source: USFK (n.d.)

After repeated defeats, UNC forces are pushed back to the Pusan perimeter in August 1950. The Pusan perimeter encompasses an area of fifty miles wide and a hundred miles long in the south east of Korea.

However, a number of counter-offensives, including the strategically momentous Battle of Inchon, turns the tides and the front moves northwards again. In October 1950 it is the UN forces’ turn to cross the 38th parallel to the north and advance towards the Yalu river at the Chinese-North Korean border, which triggers the distressed Chinese to send in hundreds of thousands of troops and force the UN forces back (ibid.). By late spring 1951, fighting stabilizes along lines “similar to those that today mark the Korean demilitarized zone” (Cumings, 2010: 41). What follows is a two year long stalemate marked by bloody trench warfare. The death of Stalin in March 1953 precedes the signing of the Korean armistice in July of that year, marking the end of the Korean war.

4.1.2 Effect of the Korean War on Burden Sharing in NATO

The year is 1949, one year before the communist invasion of the ROK. West European countries are still recovering from WWII. They are assisted in this process by the Marshall Plan, a comprehensive economic aid plan by the United States. Cooperation also extends to the security area, when on 4 April 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty is signed by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States. It more or less supersedes the Brussels Treaty signed the year before by Belgium, Britain, France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.

Initially averse to big security commitments to Europe, the United States signs the North Atlantic Treaty primarily to assure the worried Europeans that they are not left to their own device in case the
Soviet Union strikes against their countries. The most notable articles of the treaty are article 4 and article 5. Article 4 proclaims that “[t]he Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened” (NATO, 2008a). Even more importantly, article 5 states that an armed attack against one member is an attack against all, and triggers the possibility of collective self-defense (ibid.). According to Sandler (1999: 18), the treaty is put into effect as a result of the “great lesson of the 1930s: that a concerted, binding, timely, public stand against the aggressors before the war might well have prevented the Second World War.” In line with Article 9 of the treaty, the North Atlantic Council is set up. In this council Foreign Ministers of the treaty members take place to consult with one another on a regular basis. Additionally, at the first meeting of the Council, it is decided that a Defense Committee and a Military Committee (composed of respectively defense ministers and chiefs-of-staff of all treaty members) must be set up. The Council and the Committees are to meet on a periodic basis in Washington D.C. to discuss points of common interest.

Then, in the summer of 1950, the Korean War breaks out. The invasion of the ROK by the DPRK, USSR and PRC increases both in the United States and Europe a fear of “a similar Communist thrust into West Germany and beyond,” with twenty-seven Soviet divisions and sixty thousand German military police “facing twelve poorly equipped and uncoordinated divisions in western Europe” (Stueck, 1995: 54). When the United States tries to assemble a large multinational force to counter the invasion of the ROK, they immediately turn to their new NATO allies. Consequently, a substantial military build-up is set in motion in which all NATO members (except for Iceland, which to this day does not have a standing army) participate in the form of land, sea and/or air forces (Sanders, 1999). It is agreed among the treaty members that it is necessary to resist the North Korean move as well as to collectively build up their own armed forces (Stueck, 1995). However, being in the process of economic recovery, the European NATO members rely heavily on contributions by the United States for both endeavors. In September of 1950, President Truman announces that four to six divisions extra U.S. military divisions are stationed in Western Europe. In return he expects not only that the Europeans increase their own military capacity, but also that a considerable amount of West German armed forces is formed (Lafeber, 1989). All units are to be integrated into a European defense system under a supreme commander and with an international staff. However, German rearmament is a highly sensitive issue for the French who, after two destructive world wars still fresh in memory, fear the “rebirth of German militarism” (Goormaghtigh, 1954: 99). Nevertheless, the United States sees military contributions by West Germany as pivotal for the creation of a solid defense for Europe (ibid.).
The United States is determined to speed up the formation of Western defense. In October 1950, Greece and Turkey are invited by the North Atlantic Council “to be ‘associated’ with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the defense of the Mediterranean area” (IO, 1951a). As can be seen from table 1 on page 32, both countries contributed extensively to the UNC. In 1951 General Dwight Eisenhower becomes NATO’s first Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) to head the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). SHAPE is originally located in London, but when the decision is made for the North Atlantic Council to meet in permanent session it moves to Paris in 1952. In that year, General Eisenhower proposes to the North Atlantic Council to increase European military production by 33 percent compared to 1951 (IO, 1951c). By then, Europe’s economic recovery had “proven both sustained and powerful; the Europeans were much better situated to contribute to their own defense and American officials were not shy about asking them to do so” (Thies, 2009: 111). Indeed, the Americans ceaselessly insist on increased defense efforts by their NATO allies (Megens, 1994) which was a “considerable [source] of resentment among the Europeans.” Despite this resentment, the average increase in defense spending for the European NATO members is 35.7% over 1952 compared to 1951 (based on NATO figures that can be found in appendix 2). Furthermore, numerous joint military infrastructure programs are initiated that include among other things airfields, fuel pipelines, and communications equipment (Ismay, 1960). In 1952, Greece and Turkey are admitted to NATO as full members.

Concurrent with developments in NATO institutionalization, plans are made for a European Army (European Defense Community; EDC). The idea is to create a supranational institution to which France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and West Germany would provide troops under an integrated command, which are in turn to be placed under NATO command. France sees it as a way of integrating German contributions into the defense of Western Europe to accommodate the United States (Goormaghtigh, 1954). Extensive disagreements arise over whether the EDC should be one of military integration or coordination (IO, 1952). Furthermore, in the proposed plans decision making over financial contributions and spending is to be relinquished to a supranational agency. Although the plan initially triggers fierce objections over loss of sovereignty, a European Defense Community treaty is signed in 1952 stating that “[b]y the present Treaty the High Contracting Parties institute among themselves a European Defense Community, supranational in character, consisting of common institutions, common armed Forces and a common budget.”
However, matters in Korea stabilize over 1952. When this happens, the European nations want to return to the status quo ante, meaning a return to the pre-Korea conception of the alliance: “to commit the United States to stand with them in any confrontation with the Soviets” (Thies, 2009: 113). What this effectively means is that the Europeans are keen to rely on the American nuclear deterrent (ibid.). This is significantly affected by the fact that rearmament in the West, sparked by the Korean War, greatly stimulates demand for strategic raw materials. This creates shortages and fuels inflation. This threatens the economic recovery of western Europe “and foster[s] resentment over America’s advantage in competing for scarce resources” (Stueck, 1995: 199). Defense spending stabilizes across the board in 1953.

In 1954 the French Assemblée Nationale effectively rejects the EDC treaty, mostly inspired by a fear over loss of sovereignty and fear of German rearmament. Furthermore, Stalin’s death and the Korean Armistice of 1953 fade fears over future conflicts. This indicates the end of the EDC altogether. However, only months later the West European Union (WEU) is formed, a treaty for military cooperation that ultimately primarily serves as the basis for German integration in NATO (NATO, 2005). Defense in Europe from that point onwards is internationalism rather than supranationalism with arrangements under NATO and the WEU.

When the Korean War began, NATO countries only had fourteen undermanned and poorly equipped army divisions, only two of which were American. Despite burden sharing squabbles, the armed forces of NATO member states increased by three million men between 1950 and 1953 to a total
manpower of seven million (Stueck, 1995). The United States committed six divisions to Europe, while an elaborate organizational and material infrastructure was constructed to support manpower increase. NATO members spent more than 12 percent of their gross national products on defense. Furthermore, Greece and Turkey were admitted to NATO, and a significant move towards West German rearmament had begun (ibid.). According to Thies (2009: 109), the build-up that was put in motion by NATO during the Korean war “fell short of the goals set for it during the war, but it still accomplished a great deal.”

**Summary (1950-1953)**

**Political cooperation.**

- Permanent sessions of the North Atlantic Council
- Institutionalization of NATO. Extensive policy coordination.
- Eventual inclusion of West German in NATO.

**Economic cooperation.**

- Joint establishment of new infrastructure (military bases, pipelines, communications networks)
- Establishment of Defense Committee

**Military cooperation.**

- Contributions to the UNC by all NATO members (except Iceland)
- Appointment of SACEUR, establishment of SHAPE
- Establishment of Military Committee

### 4.1.3 Rationalist Interpretation of Changes in Burden Sharing

**Rationalist Hypothesis 1:** In line with balance-of-threat theory, NATO member states increase burden sharing to boost their individual security during times of external security threats.

From the previous section there are plenty of indications that action in NATO occurred that corresponds to the expectations from balance-of-threat theory. The threat to the countries that signed the North Atlantic Treaty came primarily from the USSR, even though the DPRK and PRC were also adversaries in the Korean War. Both the actual capabilities and the potential capabilities of the Soviet Union were feared by the signatories, compounded by the geographic proximity since NATO and the USSR bordered on each other. This means the two blocs could easily project power towards the opposing side on their periphery. Prior to the Korean War, altercations had already occurred between the USSR and the western countries, such as the Soviet attempt to limit the ability of the American, French, and British to
travel to their sectors in Berlin in 1948. Indeed, Secretary of State Dean Acheson (1969: 259) states in his memoirs that “[f]our years of increasingly purposeful effort had brought the beginnings of recovery in Western Europe, but at the same time had intensified Soviet control of Eastern Europe and produced dangerous action further west, of which the most ominous was the blockade of Berlin.” It was not until the aggressive intentions of the USSR were displayed in the Korean War that the North Atlantic Treaty signatories truly started a joint military build-up.

Whether scenarios of Soviet invasions of West Europe truly reflected the threat that the Soviet Union posed is largely a matter of interpretation and has been the cause of extensive historical discussion. However, the fact that all NATO members considered it as such was enough to cooperate extensively, leading to a high degree of internal balancing. This does not mean that agreeing to the terms of cooperation was easy, especially not with regard to financial contributions for joint projects.

Lord Ismay, representative to NATO on behalf of the United Kingdom and later its first secretary general, recalled a meeting in the early days of NATO in which the costs of a $150 million infrastructure package was to be divided:

Needless to say, there was scarcely a country whose estimate of what it could afford bore any relation to the sum which the other partners thought reasonable: and it was found that to induce a country to increase its contribution was as difficult as getting blood out of a stone. Eventually, however, after a wrangle that extended over sixteen hours in all, the target was reached, and we dispersed as fast as we could lest anyone should have second thoughts (Ismay, 1960: 460).

Although the European NATO members made significant increases in defense efforts at the time when the threat was deemed highest, this a) fell far behind the US (and Canada) and b) was limited considerably after they perceived the threat to be diminished. In December 1953, the NATO secretariat revealed that the member states spent around $65.5 billion on defense in 1953, nearly 10 percent above 1952 spending. Of this amount, the United States accounted for about $52 billion (about 80 percent), Canada for $2.1 billion, and the European countries for the remaining $11 billion (IO, 1953). As part of Gross Domestic Product, making it easier to compare, these amounted to the following percentages:

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<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>13,1%</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>4,9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>9,9%</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>4,0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>9,0%</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>3,8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>7,5%</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>3,4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>5,1%</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>2,9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>N/A (estimated 5-6%)</td>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: NATO member states defense spending (1953, % of GDP) Source: SIPRI (2015a)
While planning for 1954 included a ten percent increase of total NATO defense expenditure, actual figures noted a ten percent decrease (IO, 1955).

These numbers and developments indicate a significant degree of buck-passing by some European countries. While seeing the need for rearmament for their national safety, they refused to allocate portions of their national budgets to defense anywhere near that of the United States. That the United States was unhappy about this situation becomes apparent under rationalist hypothesis 2.

The Soviet threat also prompted NATO countries to external balancing by accepting Greece and Turkey (and eventually West Germany) as new members in early 1952. In reports published at the time it became apparent that while both France and the United Kingdom were in favor, other members had reservations. The Scandinavian and Benelux members felt that “extension of membership to Greece and Turkey might 1) involve them in military action in an area in which they possessed no vital interest; 2) lower the existing arms priorities for NATO members with a consequent delay in building up military potential; and 3) might contribute to a belief by the Soviet Union that NATO was in fact an encircling movement directed aggressively against Soviet interests” (IO, 1951b: 630).

There is much evidence that their eventual admission was indeed motivated by strong strategic geopolitical considerations, not only from the side of leading NATO member states but also from the perspectives of Greece and Turkey. When these two nations pledged combat forces to the UNC, each wanted defense commitments from the United States. This was due to the fact that both had extensive concerns over “the attack of Soviet-armed forces in Korea” since they “faced similarly equipped units on their own borders” (Stueck, 1995; 73). These commitments were indeed honored through NATO in 1952, with “Turkey having a reported potential of a million men capable of being put under arms and Greece a quarter of a million” (IO, 1951b: 630). Politically, there existed some concern among NATO members that Turkey, when not admitted to the fold, “might possibly be drawn toward an attitude of "neutralism" because of its proximity to the Soviet Union” (ibid.: 630).

Balance-of-threat theory can to a significant degree explain how individual interests of the North Atlantic Treaty signatories influenced military cooperation and the joint military build-up after the Korean War started. Therefore, the hypothesis is accepted.

Rationalist Hypothesis 2: If the NATO alliance leader makes threats of abandonment, the other NATO member states increase burden sharing efforts during times of external security threats.

As outlined in the methodological chapter, a threat of alliance abandonment does not necessarily mean that the alliance leader puts it membership on the negotiating table. It also includes
instances in which “the alliance leader [moves] closer to the adversary, [imposes] sanctions on its weaker allies, or [ignores] the interests of small powers in the designation of alliance policy and strategy” (Kupchan, 1998: 325). In the post-war period the United States emerged as a superpower, and was by far the Treaty member with the greatest capabilities in economic and military sense. France and the United Kingdom were never able to truly uphold their previous status of Great Power after WWII (Lundestad, 1986).

Concerning the European Defense Community, which the United States saw as pivotal to include West Germany in the military structure of the Western European defense, Secretary of State Dean Acheson responded to French objections in September of 1950 by demanding that “the Allies agree immediately and publicly to create a European defense force that had to include several German ground divisions or they would not receive additional American financial and military assistance” (Creswell, 2002). Similarly, in February of 1951 the Economic Cooperation Administrator, William Foster, announced that the “emphasis of United States aid to Europe had shifted from economic rehabilitation to rearmament and that priority would be given to defense production in the distribution of scarce defense items in Europe” (IO, 1951c: 629). Although the US believed that France and the United Kingdom were “near the point of maximum effort” the other nations were not “fully living up to what they could do.” This prompted the United States Secretary of the Treasury to declare “that Europe could not expect increased aid from the United States” (IO, 1951c: 814-815).

Despite warnings such as by Dean Acheson, attempts to come to definitive arrangements regarding West German military inclusion were consistently thwarted or delayed by France. In late 1952, United States Secretary of State Dulles called the lack of any German units in Western Europe’s defense forces “the missing element in making Europe defendable.” He added that if there were “no prospect by June 1953 of creating a solid defense for Europe by including a German contribution, the United States congress might have to review its European aid program” (IO, 1953: 437).

It seems then that the United States and the European countries were generally concerned over different strategic considerations. The United States was a state with global interests and ambitions, while the Europeans were mainly concerned with their own safety. Stueck (1995: 96) claims that the Europeans had fully backed the United States in Korea not so much out of conviction, but out of fear that anything less could “compromise the achievement of critical objectives in Europe.” They recognized that events in Korea “could lead to U.S. commitments in Asia which would drastically reduce resources available for Europe, or even to a spreading of the military conflict to that continent long before NATO forces were capable of defending themselves.”
Thus the Europeans faced the intra-alliance security dilemma: either opt for non-cooperation and face backlash in the form of decreased American contributions, or cooperate fully and potentially get in ‘over their head’. Their efforts to accommodate the United States seem to reflect a pragmatic middle-ground. In later years, and when economic circumstances permitted, France and the U.K. were inspired to pursue their own nuclear deterrent. As believed by Goldstein (1995: 45), each did so to “provide for its own interests should alliance security based on nuclear deterrence turn out to be essentially the superpower’s private good from which others might be excluded.”

Although there is no proof that the United States threatened their European counterparts with defection during the Korean War, there is abundant proof that it often made its economic and military assistance programs contingent on Europe’s cooperation in NATO. Since this was at least some of the times effective, the hypothesis is accepted.

4.1.4 Constructivist Interpretation of Changes in Burden Sharing

**Constructivist Hypothesis 1**: The more an alliance is based on a Kantian culture internalized to the third degree, the more its members contribute towards providing the collective good in times of an external security threat.

It is true that an important reason why the signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty cooperated was the hope that “there would be efficiencies and economies of scale to be found in a NATO-wide collective effort that would make possible greater defense capabilities at less cost than if they were purchased separately by members pursuing separate national defense efforts” (Thies, 2009: 115). This makes the rationalist explanation as described above quite salient. However, the nations involved did this knowing that the ambitions displayed in the Treaty could lead to extensive collaboration, coordination, and interaction. Not only were these intentions communicated, but they were also lived up to when the Korean War started. That the forging of an alliance does not by logical consequence entail compliance and cooperation becomes abundantly clear when looking at the history of alliances. Members of alliances prior to 1939 “often sought to keep each other in the dark regarding their capabilities and their intentions” (ibid.: 108). This was because often they feared their allies as much as their enemies. On the other hand, NATO members “opted for integration and transparency in their defense efforts,” setting for themselves “standards of transparency and intrusiveness that were without precedent in the history of alliances” (ibid.: 108).

So how can Wendt’s view on collective identity help us understand why this happened? From a Wendtian point of view, two countries (a ‘dyad’) have a “collective identity” when the “cognitive
boundaries of the Self are extended to include the other” (Wendt, 1999: 305). Although NATO is a multilateral arrangement, Wendt’s theory is still applicable for he recognizes the social effects of one dyad on others and the possibilities for the formation of collective identity beyond dyads. We can tentatively assess whether the treaty members were in a Kantian culture internalized to the third degree when we use Wendt’s master variables as indicators (even though Wendt does not explicitly use them this way). They scored high on the four variables even before the Korean War started. First of all, they had considerable interdependence. This was especially economic in the form of trade and the mutual economic benefits of the Marshall plan. Interdependence increased after collective action was necessary to deter the USSR from invading their territories. Second, they had considerable homogeneity, since they were all roughly speaking capitalist democracies (with the exception of ‘Estado Novo’ Portugal). This sense of alikeness is also discussed further under the second hypothesis. Third, a significant common fate existed in the form of Communism, which became exponentially more urgent when the Korean War started for reasons discussed. Lastly, the signatories had (self-professed) self-restraint. To underscore their homogeneity and self-restraint, their foreign ministers referred to their respective countries in their signatory speeches as among other things “morally and spiritually” alike (United States), the “Western civilization” (Portugal), pacific democracies (Belgium), having a “common heritage of social and political thought” (Canada), “peace-loving nations” (United Kingdom), a “free community of free nations” (Iceland), and “economically, culturally, and ideologically [related]” (Norway).

Thus, there is no obvious argument why the initial signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty were not part of a Kantian culture internalized to the third degree, even in the very beginning of the alliance. However, the threat by the Communist countries only became absolutely central to the Western security policy after the start of the Korean War. Countries of the two camps had low interdependence with each other, as well as low homogeneity (capitalist democracies vs. communist autocracies), low common fate (non-aligned countries were not really a threat) and low self-restraint towards each other. Whether the two camps were broadly speaking in a Hobbessian or Lockean culture with each other during the Korean War is difficult to definitively establish. A case for a Hobbessian culture can be made considering the Korean War was very intensive, the DPRK and the ROK did not recognize each other’s sovereignty, and some historians have argued that there was a considerable impact of “[American] nuclear threats on Communist negotiators” (Crane, 2000). However, it ultimately remained a proxy war, and although nuclear bombs were available these were not actually used. This points more in the direction of a Lockean culture.

3 These quotes are from the magazine Vital Speeches of the Day (1949: p. 386-392) which contains all full signatory speeches.
Had the Western countries been rivals to each other (i.e. in a Lockean culture), they would have been unlikely to engage in the extensive interactions that occurred, since they could not be certain that their alliance partners would put their security needs on par with their own. Indeed West Germany, excluded from NATO was, from a Wendtian point of view, in a Lockean culture with virtually every NATO member in a ‘live and let live’ manner. More importantly, especially the French appear to have been afraid that West Germany had only internalized the Lockean culture to the first degree (force) rather than the second or third degree, and did not lose their fear of being engulfed by the Germans. The control of the United States, France and the United Kingdom over Berlin and West Germany illustrates this point, as well as the fact that Germany was initially excluded from NATO membership and from contributing militarily to the aims of the alliance.

With regard to alliance enlargement, trust between members of NATO and Greece and Turkey was built during the Korean War. According to Dean Acheson, the two countries were agitated that they were not invited to sign the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949: “No assurances, explanations, or other forms of words eased [Turkey’s] painful sense of abandonment, soon shared in Greece. Their joint lamentations continued until, two years later, both countries were received into membership” (Acheson, 1969). Greece and Turkey made significant military contributions to the UNC in the Korean War, cooperating with the NATO countries and showing sympathy to the Western cause. Although not all NATO members were convinced that membership should be extended to Greece and Turkey, their commitments and contributions made the standing application hard to reject. This was especially after U.S. president Eisenhower regularly referred to the two countries as “free nations,” stressing their democratic nature and thus drawing them into the identity that connected the countries of NATO.

As such, burden sharing that took place in NATO can be explained with reference to the Kantian culture its members were in, as indicated by Wendt’s master variables. When the common fate diminished, so did the sense of collective identity and the extent to which further integration took place. Hence, the hypothesis that Kantian culture spurs burden sharing during external threats is accepted for the Korean War.

**Constructivist Hypothesis 2:** Critical junctures for NATO in the form of external security threats encourage burden sharing norm compliance by its members.

According to Finnemore and Sikkink, critical junctures in the international system such as wars or economic depressions often provoke a search for new norms. The Second World War was such an event. Many countries hoped that the 1945 United Nations Charter, including the establishment of a
Security Council, would be the basis for a durable preservation of international peace through collective security. Compliance to the charter by the signatories was an indispensable aspect of this. However, in the words of Belgium foreign minister Spaak in a speech at the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty: "[...] the abuse of the veto and refusal to collaborate have so often rendered ineffective the decisions of the Security Council or the recommendations of the Assembly" (VSOTD, 1949: 387).

In other words, the repeated violation of norms greatly diminished faith in the United Nations Charter. It prompted a search for alternative security arrangements by a number of Western countries which resulted in the drafting of the North Atlantic Treaty. The signatory speeches indicate that there was a general view at the time that the new norms that were laid down in the treaty would be respected by its signatories, considering the democratic nature of their governments and their desire to build and maintain a reputation of trustworthiness and credibility.

The Korean War, which started a year later, also constituted a critical juncture for the signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty. The question was whether the norms that were laid out in the treaty would indeed be lived up to. As has been described throughout this case study, this happened to an unprecedented degree when the North Atlantic Treaty evolved into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and a significant military build-up took place. The effect of norms hinges on trust: trust that the other party will commit to them, also in times that it may be advantageous to break them. Norm compliance in turn enables, in principle, further norm compliance. Indeed, NATO’s first Secretary General Lord Ismay (1960: 463) remarks that during the formative years of NATO a “remarkable degree of unity has been built up between the partners of the Treaty at all levels, and in all spheres. For myself, I believe that this unity is our most precious and powerful asset.” He further adds that “[w]ho would have believed that that sovereign States would entrust their precious armed forces to the command of nationals other than their own in times of peace?” To further underscore their friendly and constructive relationship, US Secretary of State Dean Acheson (1969: 272) reflects on his time in (early) NATO by saying that it was “my good fortune during my time in office to work with colleagues from other countries who inspired both respect and affections” and that “[s]ince the best environment for diplomacy is found where mutual confidence between governments exists, relationships of respect and affection between the individuals who represent them furnish a vitally important aid to it.”

A compelling question is why the United States was relatively tolerant towards decreases in burden sharing efforts at the time that matters in Korea stabilized. It could be explained by the fact that they considered the justifications that the European members offered for non-compliance to be legitimate. Justifications were offered in the form of economic recovery norms over security norms. In
other words, burden sharing as an emergent norm did not reach a tipping point because of concerns over economic reconstruction on the part of the European NATO members. Norms thus certainly played a role in the development of NATO in its early stages, albeit an implicit one. Since a norms perspective can provide useful insights towards explaining the mixed successes in NATO with regard to burden sharing during the Korean War years, the hypothesis is accepted.

4.1.5 Conclusion Korean War

The Korean War convinces the members of the Atlantic Alliance that “a new form of political/military organization was necessary to make the most efficient use of the increased resources that they were devoting to defense” (Thies, 2009: 108, italics added). It also overrides French fears of German rearmament. What was conceived as a political arrangement is transformed into NATO, “a political-military organization overseeing an integrated defense force under the control of unified military commands” (ibid.: 108).

Despite the saliency of the rationalist explanation to explain why the countries in question looked for better security arrangements for themselves (balance-of-threat), the constructivist school seems better able to account for the reasons why they cooperated with each other in such a far-reaching and relatively successful way (collective identity and norm compliance). Both approaches also have something important to say about the disproportionate contributions by the United States and the other NATO member states. Rationalists could point at the fact that the United States paid more because it fit in their balance-of-threat conception and because they were simply able to do so considering their capabilities. The European contributions were lower because they were unwilling to sacrifice economic reconstruction and forced the Americans to accept this. Constructivists could point at the level of collective identity and contend that American aid and multilateralism reflected solidarity and trust with regard to their ‘homogeneous’ European ‘counterparts.’ This is largely in line with the view of Hemmer and Katzenstein (2002: 596) who assert that “[t]he stridency with which proponents of NATO stressed a pre-existing community and common civilization can be seen as part of a deliberate construction of fit, drawing on both identity and material factors.” From a norms perspective, the European member states successfully convinced the United States that priority needed to be given to economic reconstruction.

The next case study starts two decades after the end of the Korean war, beginning with events leading up to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.
4.2 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (December 1979)

4.2.1 Background

Afghanistan has had an involvement in international conflicts that goes back centuries, which includes serving as a buffer state in the 19th century in the “Great Game” between British India and the Russian Empire. There is an extensive history of Soviet-Afghan relations when on 27 April 1978, during the Saur Revolution, a military coup brings to power the communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) under the leadership of Hafizullah Amin (Yapp, 2001). The country is renamed the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). After the coup, ‘Moscow’ increases its economic and military assistance and sends advisers to help the new Marxist government (Hilali, 2007). Though the USSR, under its leader Brezhnev, sympathizes with the revolution and its aims and gives help, it becomes “convinced that the PDPA was too radical” (Yapp, 2001: 7). Hence, the USSR decides at some point between September and December of 1979 to “intervene with military force, overthrow Amin, and establish a broad-based government under Amin’s rival, Babrak Karmal, leader of the Parchami faction of the PDPA” (ibid.: 7).

What the USSR expects to be a short-lived intervention, however, proves much more complicated when the Afghan army disintegrates and the resistance, supported by international condemnation of Soviet action, gains in strength (ibid.). The resistance comes in the form of the Mujahedeen, a group of guerrillas who had started by opposing reforms of the (later deposed) Afghan king five years earlier (Grau, 2010). They fight against the occupying Soviet forces and remaining DRA military forces, and are financially supported in this by among others the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, China, and Pakistan (Hughes, 2008).

4.2.2 Effect of Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan on Burden Sharing in NATO

Despite major security incidents such as the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, there is a move towards smoother relationships between NATO and the USSR in the late 1960s. When U.S. President Nixon speaks of “the winds of détente blowing across Europe”, he refers to efforts by France, West Germany, Italy and Britain to improve relations with the Soviet Union combining “political, military, and economic openings” (Leffler & Westad, 2010). In 1972 and 1979 the United States and the Soviet Union sign SALT I and SALT II, two arms reduction treaties (SALT = Strategic Arms Limitation Talks). Though France left NATO’s integrated military command in 1966, it remains a member of NATO and the Lemnitzer-Aillert Agreements it makes with the United States in 1967 lay out “in great detail how French forces would
dovetail back into NATO’s command structure should East-West hostilities break out” (Washington Post, 2009).

The 1970s are not only marked by arms limitation talks, but also by an increasing Soviet arms build-up (primarily in the form of SS-20 missiles). This leads to increasing international tensions. In response to a perceived vulnerability to the Soviet Union, NATO adopts a policy in 1977 formally requiring “each member of the integrated military command to augment its contributions to the common defense by increasing its defense spending 3 percent per year after adjusting for inflation.” (Fiscarelli, 1990: 1).

In 1979 NATO member states adopt the double-track decision. This means that they reaffirm their commitment to arms limitation as agreed in SALT I and II, but simultaneously agree on an expansion of NATO’s nuclear arsenal should these treaties fail. The double-track decision is initially seen as “a resounding success reflecting Atlantic Alliance solidarity” (Garthoff, 1983: 179). However, in December 1979 the Soviet Union invades and occupies Afghanistan. This marks the end of détente and, at least for the time being, the chance of implementing the SALT treaties. The invasion is not an isolated incident. For the United States, it coincides with events in Iran where its embassy is occupied by Islamic revolutionaries. Later, the Iran-Iraq war also comprises a source of regional instability.

Although many historians contend that Soviet goals in Afghanistan were relatively limited, that is “preserve the pro-Soviet disposition of the government,” the United States suspects that the USSR has bolder objectives (Lahey, 2013: 24). Similar to how the Communist invasion of the Republic of Korea sparked fears in the Atlantic Alliance over Soviet intervention elsewhere, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan “raises new fears as to whether the move into Afghanistan would be limited to that country or whether it was the first step in an attempt to extend Soviet control over Pakistan, Iran, and ultimately the Arabian peninsula” (Thies, 2009: 223). Not only was the United States afraid of losing the amount of control it had over the Persian Gulf region, it also saw the need for (collective) action necessary to “safeguard the interests of the West in the oil resources of the Persian Gulf” (ibid.: 223). This was reflected in U.S. President Jimmy Carter’s famous words in his State of the Union address of 1980, later dubbed the Carter Doctrine by political commentators:

Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force (The American Presidency Project, 2015).
Since the Europeans had a similar stake in the situation, the United States wanted them to assist in this endeavor. However, a large number of West European leaders preferred continued détente efforts with the Soviet Union over possible confrontation. Furthermore, the European allies, including larger member states like Great Britain and France, cut their armed forces during the détente years, resulting in forces that had hardly excess capabilities to devote to the Persian Gulf (Thies, 2009).

In response to the Persian Gulf issues, the United States develops the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) in 1980 without prior consultation with its NATO allies. The RDJTF is a special military unit that is designed, in line with the Carter Doctrine, to deter “possible Soviet or proxy invasion, conflict among the states of the area and subversion and insurrection within the states and thus help maintain regional stability and the Gulf oil-flow westward” (Antill, 2001). A report by the United States Congressional Budget Office confirms that the primary function of the RDJTF is to “safeguard U.S. interests in Southwest Asia and deter Soviet aggression in the region” and that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan can be construed as “evidence of a Soviet intent to strengthen a position in Southwest Asia” (CBO, 1983: xiv). The same report indicates that, were the RDF deployed to the Middle East, the decline of U.S. troops available for reinforcing Europe would decline by 20 to 33 percent. Thus, in case of an attack on the Persian Gulf, the Americans would have to shift their attention “away from Europe toward that region, and the Europeans ought to know this and be prepared for it” (Carter, 1982: 587-588). At this point there are serious doubts in the United States “that some of the European governments will keep their present commitments on defense budgets, [...] much less make additional commitments for improved cooperation and defense capability” (ibid.: 588).

In the NATO consultation sessions that follow, the United States attempts to incorporate the European allies into the structure of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, who refuse. There is resentment amongst the Europeans who do not feel taken seriously because they were not included in the initial planning, met by an equal resentment on the part of the Americans who feel they shoulder too much of the burden (Kupchan, 1988). Eventually, after two years of diplomatic deliberation, the European NATO member states agree to facilitate US action in the Persian Gulf and compensate the United States for the diversion of their assets. In return, the United States drops the proposal for a Rapid Deployment Force. This is communicated through the Bonn Summit declaration in June 1982 (at exactly the same time that Spain is admitted to NATO after lengthy accession negotiations):

Steps which may be taken by individual Allies in the light of such consultations to facilitate possible military deployments beyond the NATO area can represent an important contribution to Western security – Bonn Summit Declaration (NATO, 2000b).
Although this shows the “results of over two years of intra-alliance bargaining and compromise”, these agreements do not lead “to any tangible change in force levels or burden sharing” (Kupchan, 1988: 322). Although several European states marginally expand their programs in said areas, these efforts do little to address the problems that a U.S. operation in Southwest Asia would present for conventional deterrence and defense in Europe (ibid.).

Indeed, throughout the 1980s the norm of 3 percent annual defense expenditure increase is rarely met by the European countries. In the time period 1978-1990 the average increase in defense expenditure is 1.71 percent in Europe, compared to 2.85 percent in the United States and 3.08 percent in Canada. Year-to-year changes can be seen in figure 4.

![Figure 4: Change in Military Expenditure 1978-1990 (% Compared to Previous Year) Source: SIPRI (2015a).](image-url)

This is not because the 1980s is an era marked by international stability. Between 1982 and 1984 there are Multinational Forces (MNF) in Lebanon with American, French, Italian, and British contributions. In 1983 and 1984 there are attempts to place nuclear missiles (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces) in Europe, leading to mass-demonstrations in most countries in question. Ultimately most European NATO members manage to hold off placement long enough for East-West relations to normalize again, even leading to the implementation of arms reduction treaties in 1987. In 1986, the USSR announces the “eventual withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan” which is only finalized on 15 February 1989 (Grau, 2010: 141).
The high defense expenditure of Greece and Turkey stems in large part from longstanding bilateral tensions, which in 1974 reached a zenith when Turkey invaded Cyprus and led to a Greek withdrawal from NATO’s integrated command structure until 1980. This was not a wholly coincidental timing. According to Rizas (2008: 63), there is no doubt that Greek reintegration “came after important developments beyond the agenda of Greek–Turkish differences: the fall of the Shah of Iran in February 1979, the Soviet nuclear and conventional forces’ build-up in Europe, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and the death of Tito in May 1980.”

**Summary (1979-1982)**

**Political cooperation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bonn Summit declaration</th>
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<tr>
<td>Out-of-area policy</td>
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<td>Admission of Spain to NATO</td>
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Figure 5: Military Expenditure per country as % of GDP 1976-1985 Source: SIPRI (2015a).
4.2.3 Rationalist Interpretation of Changes in Burden Sharing

*Rationalist Hypothesis 1*: In line with balance-of-threat theory, NATO member states increase burden sharing to boost their individual security during times of external security threats.

Notwithstanding the geographic remoteness, the United States saw the Persian Gulf as an area in which both itself as well as its NATO allies had vital interests because of Middle Eastern oil. At the time of the Soviet invasion, the capabilities of the Soviet Union were credited as potentially large enough to widen its sphere of influence in the Persian Gulf further by a possible invasion of among others Iran.

In his State of the Union address in 1980, U.S. President Jimmy Carter said that the implications of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan “could pose the most serious threat to the peace since the Second World War,” and his National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski regarded the USSR’s actions as “inherently aggressive”, concluding that Moscow was after regional hegemony (Hughes, 2008: 333). Their concerns were met by U.K. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who writes in her memoirs that “what had happened in Afghanistan was only part of a wider pattern.” Thatcher states that the Soviets “had been working to further communist subversion throughout the Third World” and “had built up armed forces far beyond their defensive needs” (Thatcher, 1993: 74).

In the same month, after some consultations with NATO allies, the United States “unilaterally announced a series of punitive measures directed against the Soviet Union for its intervention in Afghanistan” including “severe economic sanctions” (Lahey, 2013: 27). However, other European member states adopted a less alarmist view of Soviet intentions. Although most of them “deplored the USSR’s intervention in Afghanistan”, they generally “concluded that Moscow’s aims were limited to stabilizing the PDPA regime” (Hughes, 2008: 333). The difference in American and European attitudes was demonstrated by disputes over sanctions against the USSR. The US boycotted the 1980 Moscow Olympics and cut grain sales to the Soviets, and expected their allies to reduce trade and cultural contacts with the Eastern bloc. However, the West Europeans, in particular the French, were unwilling to sacrifice both continental détente and their commercial links with the USSR and Eastern Europe (ibid.: 334). Another American response is the creation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force:

The fundamental assumption [for the effectiveness of the RDJTF], of course, is that the United States and its allies will view a Persian Gulf crisis situation in a way that results in similar threat assessments. One might like to think that since approximately 60% of Western Europe’s imported oil comes from the Persian Gulf, a crisis in the area would results in compatible views between the United States and its Western European allies and, moreover, lead to prompt and decisive action by the latter (Fabyanic, 1981: 352).

As has become apparent by now, these threat assessments were almost diametrically opposed.
Over a year later, when Ronald Reagan was inaugurated as U.S. President in January 1981, administration officials still saw the occupation of Afghanistan as only a first step by the Soviets, and predicted that Iran and Arab oil-producing countries would be the next victims of their aggression (Lahey, 2013). All in all, it seems that the United States had a broader conception of the threat posed by the USSR than most European NATO members. This is why the former announced sanctions “calculated to cause genuine damage to the Soviet economy, even if this involved exacerbating America’s own troubled economic situation” (Lahey, 2013: 27) while the latter were extremely hesitant to sacrifice economic resources by imposing sanctions against the USSR.

The United States was not the only actor who considered itself to be carrying an unfair share of the collective burden. Thatcher writes in her memoirs that the 3 per cent commitment of 1977 “meant that Britain, spending a substantially higher proportion of its GDP on defense than other European countries and going through a peculiarly deep recession, found herself bearing an unfair and increasing burden” (Thatcher, 1993: 104).

Although cooperation in NATO was arduous, the European member states recognized a number of dilemmas that were in their best interest to solve. The first dilemma was that ultimately, they too were dependent on oil from the Persian Gulf and had to make some sort of contingency plan. The second dilemma was that American efforts in the Persian Gulf would undermine European defense efforts, since the Americans still maintained a large presence in Western Europe. The third dilemma was that allowing the United States to unilaterally take action would also give them full strategic autonomy. On the other hand, the United States could have continued unilaterally but did not. It needed the help of its allies to effectively take action in the Persian Gulf, especially in a logistical sense. What followed was NATO consultation, in which the Americans dropped the proposal for a NATO quick strike force and the Europeans promised to facilitate and compensate the Americans and consider out-of-area policy coordination.

At exactly the same time Spain was admitted to NATO. This could be construed as an example of external balancing, especially considering the geographic position of Spain. Shortly after Spain’s accession to NATO, Salusburg (1983: 20) notes that "[...] relatively safe Spanish bases could become important for staging and recovery purposes, particularly for US forces en route for the Middle East" (emphasis added).

According to Kupchan (1988) there was consensus within NATO by the end of 1982 that Soviet danger to the Persian Gulf had decreased because the Soviets had become tangled up in Afghanistan. From a balance-of-threat perspective, this could be the reason that the implementation record of the
European member states regarding increased defense efforts has been rather poor throughout the 1980s. From a free-riding perspective, one could ask whether the Europeans deliberately profited from the action of the Americans. They might have benefited from the “large amounts of defense capability that Washington makes available to NATO [...] [but] they are not passing along to the United States a burden that they would otherwise assume themselves” (ibid.: 342). Whether a mismatch of preferences still means ‘free-riding’ has occurred in the strategic sense of the word is then not clear-cut.

In conclusion, the hypothesis that NATO member states boost alliance security insofar they consider their personal security interests threatened is, on the basis of this case, accepted.

Rationalist Hypothesis 2: If the NATO alliance leader makes threats of abandonment, the other NATO member states increase burden sharing efforts during times of external security threats.

In the late 1970s, the United States was (still) by far the NATO member state with the most capabilities with regard to economic and military resources and no doubt can be called the alliance leader. More than any other member they were able to set the agenda in NATO. Similarly to events surrounding the Korean War, there are a number of occasions where the United States indicated that it would use its (military) programs to Europe to leverage cooperation from the European NATO members.

In 1982, several members of Congress openly questioned whether American intervention forces should be used on behalf of the economic interests of other (Salusbury, 1983). They wondered why the Americans would allow the Europeans strategic influence without contributing financially and militarily.

Frustrated with muddling cooperation in NATO, U.S. President Ronald Reagan writes in his personal diary, regarding sanctions against the Soviet Union, that “NATO allies and others [must] join us in such sanctions or risk an estrangement from us” (Reagan, 2007: 57). This was six months before the Bonn Summit declaration which reflected considerable compromise and agreement amongst NATO members. Indeed, the Europeans appeared to fear that the United States might abandon them by ignoring or neglecting European policy concerns. This was not an ungrounded suspicion. If they hoped to influence policy, they “had to engage the United States in a constructive dialogue” whereas stonewalling the issue “was to give Washington complete freedom in formulating policy towards Southwest Asia” (Kupchan, 1988: 322). Furthermore, there was the possibility that by matter of contingency United States efforts in West Europe would decrease.

However, the lack of implementation shows to a large degree “weak or ambiguous” commitment by the European NATO members: pragmatically make promises to cooperate when feeling compelled to do so, yet hardly deliver on them when strategically able to do so. Therefore, the
hypothesis that threats of abandonment leads to increased burden sharing efforts during times of external security threats is rejected.

4.2.4 Constructivist Interpretation of Changes in Burden Sharing

*Constructivist Hypothesis 1*: The more an alliance is based on a Kantian culture internalized to the third degree, the more its members will contribute towards providing the collective good in times of an external security threat.

The question is whether the NATO countries were in a Kant 3 culture when the USSR invaded Afghanistan: in other words, whether they considered Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty as legitimate, and thus fulfill their obligations of collective help. Using the master variables again as indicators, it seems that diverging perspectives on a common fate disconnected the United States with its European allies at heart when it came to their security policies. Both saw the alliance still as worthwhile, acknowledging their interdependence, but from a Wendtian point of view slid back to Kant 2 by becoming more preoccupied with the costs and benefits of alliance cohesion than its legitimacy.

That the European allies were divided over their relationships towards the United States is illustrated by U.K. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in her memoirs. Thatcher’s government was very committed to the United States, writing in her memoirs that she considered it “vital to maintain western unity behind American leadership. Britain, among European countries, and I, among European leaders, were uniquely placed to do that” (Thatcher, 1993: 201). Thatcher’s government had a “fierce anticommmunist disposition” (Lahey, 2012: 24). On the other hand, she wrote that “some European countries, most importantly the Germans, were hostile to President Reagan’s economic policy and mistrustful of his rhetoric on defense and arms control” (Thatcher, 1993: 213), underscoring problems of collective identity.

The addition of Spain to the alliance, at the same time that the NATO allies concluded two years of diplomatic negotiations, can be seen in the context of identity since Spain was a newly democratic state in Europe. Although Turkey and Greece have mixed qualifications with regard to democratic rule and highlight that it is not a necessary condition for NATO membership, “the emotional satisfaction of having a democratic Spain inside the Alliance should not be underrated [...]” (Salusbury, 1983: 20). Spain’s accession to NATO is also testimony to the fact that the alliance was still cohesive enough to enlarge. Indeed, in the Bonn Summit declaration it is stated that “[t]he accession of Spain to the North
Atlantic Treaty, after its peaceful change to parliamentary democracy, bears witness to the vitality of the Alliance as a force for peace and freedom” (NATO, 2000b).

Divisions over perceptions of common fate and the response in terms of burden sharing appear to have undermined the collective identity of NATO member states. However, this was not nearly enough to cause a lasting rift in NATO as evidenced by eventual policy coordination and the admission of Spain. In the case of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the inverse of the hypothesis appears to be true (less Kantian culture, less burden sharing). However, since a lack of Kantian culture and a lack of burden sharing seem to be mutually constitutive in this case, the hypothesis is deemed inconclusive.

**Constructivist Hypothesis 2:** Critical junctures for NATO in the form of external security threats encourage burden sharing norm compliance by its members.

It is clear from the previous section that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was not considered by all NATO members to be a critical juncture. This highlights the intersubjectivity of concepts such as ‘critical juncture’ and ‘security threat’, which are necessarily contingent on the recognition by relevant actors.

From a norms perspective, the fact that the United States (under President Carter) unilaterally initiated the RDJTF in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a violation of alliance norms in the eyes of its European allies, which was met with disapproval and an uncooperative stance. It also reflected a difference of opinion between the United States and the European allies on two competing norms: the desirability of sticking to détente over intervention, and burden sharing.

The 3 percent defense expenditure increase norm did not suffer from ambiguity, considering the text from the ministerial communique after the 1977 NATO summit in London:

“Against the background of adverse trends in the NATO-Warsaw Pact military balance and in order to avoid a continued deterioration in the relative force capabilities, an annual increase in real terms in defence budgets should be aimed at by all member countries. This annual increase should be in the region of 3% [...]” (NATO, 2000a).

However, following later circumstances the European NATO members did not internalize the norm as the alliance became divided over strategic issues. This is illustrated by later formulations of burden sharing commitments, for example in the Bonn Summit Declaration of 1982:

Steps which **may** be taken by **individual** Allies in the light of such **consultations** to **facilitate possible** military deployments beyond the NATO area **can represent** an important contribution to Western security [...] “[W]e will continue to give **due attention** to fair burden-sharing and to **possibilities** for developing areas of practical co-operation from which we can all benefit.” (NATO, 2000c, bold added).
The words in bold reflect a considerable degree of open-endedness and ambiguity. Indeed, the text indicates that burden sharing was not internalized by many NATO member states at the time, and neither did it prove to be a foot between the door for future compliance. Therefore, the hypothesis is rejected.

4.2.5 Conclusion Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

Although the Soviet Union was considered a potential threat throughout the whole Cold War by the countries of NATO, there were several distinguishable time frames in which this was extra salient. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was one of these time frames. However, whereas the Korean War was an occasion to unify NATO members, the Soviet invasion sparked a big division between them. Burden sharing was an important aspect of this, and failure to implement many arrangements is indicative of a troubling episode in NATO's history. Fiscarelli (1990: 1) summarizes that the three percent norm was “rarely met by any of the European allies, much less maintained on a consistent year-to-year basis. In contrast, during that same period, the United States engaged in an intensive military build-up aimed primarily at beefing up NATO defenses.” Interestingly, also according to Fiscarelli, after the end of the Cold War “factors as the [NATO] member-state's geographic proximity to the likely points of engagement were considered in determining its fair share of the burden” (ibid.). This decision was made two years after Stephen Walt wrote The Origins of Alliances in which geographic proximity was one of four pillars of his balance-of-threat theory.

What did come out of the external security threat in terms of policy coordination was that until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, NATO had not addressed out-of-area operations. According to Dimitrakis (2012: 527) the invasion “acted as a catalyst in drafting military studies for such operations.”

Both from an individualist point of view (balance-of-threat, or “am I in danger?”) and a collective point of view (common fate, or “are we in danger” or “is one of us in danger?”) the European nations did not share the perspective of the United States on events in the Persian Gulf. Add to this the problems with identity and legitimacy and one can understand why the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was not NATO’s finest moment in terms of burden sharing.

The next (and last) case study picks up after the end of the Cold War, and then fast-forwards to one of the most prominent events of the 21st century so far: the attack on the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001 and the start of the “War on Terror”, and NATO’s response to this challenge.
4.3 Post 9/11 “War on Terror” (2001-2009)

4.3.1 Background

As explained in the theoretical section, many academics expect NATO to disintegrate after the Soviet Union collapses. However, rather than calling it a day NATO takes the opportunity to expand eastward by admitting the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in 1999.

In the years in between there are important security situations in which NATO becomes involved. In 1990 there is an international intervention in the Gulf region after Iraq under Saddam Hussein invades Kuwait, an effort to which most NATO members contribute. In 1995 NATO becomes engaged in the Bosnian War, when it leads the Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) to carry out the Dayton accords. In 1998 the organization becomes involved in the Kosovo War under Operation Allied Force.

In hindsight, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Gulf War in Iraq are important precursors to events in the 21st century. The Soviet–Afghan war was ultimately “not only a catalyst for the USSR’s collapse and the end of the Cold War,” but the Western involvement “also encouraged Bin Laden and his peers to declare a holy war against the world’s remaining superpower [the United States] and its allies” (Hughes, 2010: 346). Indeed, on 11 September 2001 terrorist group Al-Qaida successfully attacks American soil by flying several planes into the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon.

The next day, NATO invokes article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty to indicate that the attack on the United States is considered an attack on all NATO members. This is the first time article 5 is invoked in the history of the alliance. Two days later, the United States Congress passes a Joint Resolution that:

“[a]uthorizes the President to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations, or persons” (US Congress, 2001).

US president George W. Bush proclaims at the first national security meeting after the attacks that “[w]e are at war against terror. From this day forward, this is the new priority of our administration” (Bush, 2010: 120). In the same meeting, he is informed by CIA director George Tenet that intelligence indicates that it is terrorist group Al-Qaida that is responsible for the attacks (ibid.). In the following years there are other notable attacks in the NATO area by terrorists affiliated with Al-Qaida, including the Madrid train bombings of 2004 and the bombings on the London public transportation system of 2005.
The term “War on Terror” has been highly controversial since the day it was announced. What falls under it is also frequently debated. However one demarcates it spatiotemporally, it inevitably leads some researchers to include elements that another would exclude and vice versa. The time frame used in this case study is the presidency of George W. Bush (2001-2009), under whose authority the War on Terror took shape. Particularly intra-alliance behavior with regard to the international missions in Afghanistan and Iraq are researched because, as is explained in detail below, these were cause for significant altercations within NATO.

4.3.2 Effect of the “War on Terror” on Burden Sharing in NATO

Terrorism, being centuries old, was not a new concept for NATO. In 1982, in the Bonn Summit declaration, NATO already recognized terrorism as a “threat to the conduct of normal international relations” requiring “the need for the most effective co-operation possible to prevent and suppress this scourge” (NATO, 2000b). The 1999 NATO Strategic Concept recognized terrorism as a prominent threat in the post-Cold War era, but the alliance did not give much collective attention to this issue until 9/11. The response of the Alliance to this event “saw NATO engage actively in the fight against terrorism, launch its first operations outside the Euro-Atlantic area and begin a far-reaching transformation of its capabilities” (NATO, 2005). This transformation includes among other things:

- Enhanced intelligence-sharing on terrorism; assistance to Allies and other states subject to increased terrorist threats as a result of their support for the campaign against terrorism; increased security for facilities on NATO territory; backfilling of selected NATO assets required to support operations against terrorism; blanket overflight clearances for military flights related to operations against terrorism; access to ports and airfields for such operations; deployment of NATO naval forces to the Eastern Mediterranean; and deployment of NATO’s airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) aircraft to the United States (ibid).

On the military front, the United States invades Afghanistan in October of 2001 with the aid of the United Kingdom under ‘Operation Enduring Freedom.’ The objective is to secure the capital Kabul, remove the Taliban regime, and install an interim regime. The Taliban filled the power vacuum in Afghanistan after the end of the Cold War and are accused of harboring Al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden. Thus, ‘Enduring Freedom’ is “designed to punish a regime that supported terrorists [and to] remove a safe haven that could be used again to launch future attacks” (Williams, 2009: 77).

The invasion objective is achieved two months later, after which an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is established by UN Security Council resolution 1386 to “assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment”
The resolution also states specifically that the operation in Afghanistan is meant to support “international efforts to root out terrorism” (ibid.: 1).

Virtually all NATO countries contribute to ISAF under their national flags. A possible NATO contribution to the Afghanistan operation raises questions within the alliance with regard to the out-of-area debate in NATO. Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty, pertaining to the area of treaty applicability, mentions “the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.” However, at the NATO summit in Reykjavik in 2002 foreign ministers conclude, in the context of the fight against terrorism, that NATO operations could also be conducted outside this area. In the final communiqué of the summit, it is noted that “[t]o carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives” (NATO, 2002). Later in 2002 there is another summit in Prague, where 9/11 is explicitly linked to changes in NATO’s institutional structure:

Recalling the tragic events of 11 September 2001 and our subsequent decision to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, we have approved a comprehensive package of measures, based on NATO’s Strategic Concept […] so that NATO can better carry out the full range of its missions and respond collectively to those challenges, including the threat posed by terrorism and by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery (Prague Summit declaration, NATO, 2002).

These measures include a proposal to create the NATO Response Force (NRF), “consisting of a technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable force including land, sea, and air elements ready to move quickly to wherever needed, as decided by the Council” (ibid.). The NRF is indeed created a year later and operative since 2006. In 2003 the Terrorism Threat Intelligence Unit (TTIU) is established, a “joint NATO body composed of officers from civilian and military intelligence agencies, having as its main task the assessment of the terrorist challenges, risks and threats to NATO and its member nations” (NATO, 2015c).

In August 2003, NATO takes over the military command of ISAF. By 2007, the military contributions from NATO members to ISAF is roughly 40 percent United States and 60 percent Canada/NATO Europe, with large discrepancies between the European contributions as can be seen below in table 3.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Contributions to ISAF (January 2007)</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Contributions to ISAF (January 2007)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>5,200</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1,950</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: NATO Contributions to ISAF (January 2007, bold = candidate NATO member) Source: NATO (2007).

That 2003 is a complicated year for NATO is exponentially compounded by American plans to invade Iraq, suspecting that Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein has developed Weapons of Mass Destruction. Although Iraq declared “time and time again that it was being completely open with regard to its arms programs”, the United States regarded Iraq as “one of those countries which possessed Weapons of Mass Destruction [WMD’s] and which were prepared to place these weapons in the hands of terrorists” (Netherlands’ Ministry of Defense, 2009: emphasis added). These plans are not well-received in NATO Europe. While the United Kingdom is a prominent supporter of intervention in Iraq, continental European countries show less support. France and Germany are among those who are not prepared to support an invasion without a mandate from the UN Security Council. Interestingly, as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council France is able to block precisely such a mandate.

The United States is not willing to wait for a mandate and seeks partners for a ‘Coalition of the Willing.’ In March 2003 the United States goes ahead with the invasion of Iraq under ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom.’ The invasion is supported by the United Kingdom with 46,000 troops under the Multinational Force Iraq (MNF-I), as well as 200 Polish troops (Carney, 2011). Later in 2003 Spain, the Netherlands, and Italy are the only NATO countries that contribute more than a thousand troops to MNF-I (see table 4), but withdraw in 2004, 2005, and 2006 respectively. NATO’s new members and candidate members in Eastern Europe (admitted in 2004 and 2009) all contribute military forces, that are generally withdrawn in 2007 and 2008. In the meantime it becomes clear that there are no WMD’s in Iraq, but the instability in the country as well as the wider region caused by the invasion makes U.S. withdrawal impossible until 2011.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Contributions to MNF-I (Peak Strength)</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Contributions to MNF-I (Peak Strength)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>165,000</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>46,000</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
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<td>Italy</td>
<td>2,600</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>240</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>1,345</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>126</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>496</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Contributions to MNF-I by NATO (bold = candidate NATO member) Source: U.S. Army.

In the post 9/11 world, the United States also organizes military missions against terrorist groups in the Philippines, the Horn of Africa, and Saharan Africa. These missions all fall under Operation Enduring Freedom and are (far) smaller than those in Afghanistan and Iraq. They are supported by varying ad hoc coalitions including NATO countries and local governments.

Most missions under Operation Enduring Freedom went on beyond 2009. However, the change in presidency in the United States indicated an end to the official use of the term “War on Terror”. Since March 2009, two months after the presidency of George W. Bush ended, the U.S. Department of Defense uses the term Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) for its counterterrorism efforts.

![Figure 6: Military Expenditure of NATO members as % of GDP 1993-2013 Source: SIPRI (2015a).](image)

As can be seen from figure 6, 9/11 and the “War on Terror” does not encourage the countries of NATO Europe to reverse the decline in defense spending that started at the end of the Cold War. Conversely, for the United States the attacks are a catalyst for a huge rise in defense spending. In an attempt to reverse the general decline in defense spending, the ‘two percent norm’ (defense spending as
percentage of GDP) is agreed upon in 2006 at the NATO summit in Riga, Latvia. According to NATO (2015), the guideline serves primarily as “an indicator of a country’s political will to contribute to the Alliance’s common defense efforts. Additionally, the defense capacity of each member country has an important impact on the overall perception of the Alliance’s credibility as a politico-military organization.” However, ostensibly the norm does nothing to improve defense spending among non-US NATO members.

Summary (2001 – 2009)

Political cooperation.

| 2004 enlargement: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia |
| 2009 enlargement: Albania, Croatia |
| Extension area of North Atlantic Treaty applicability |

Military cooperation.

| Enhanced intelligence sharing (Terrorism Threat Intelligence Unit) |
| Establishment of NATO response force |
| ISAF mission in Afghanistan |

4.3.3 Rationalist Interpretation of Changes in Burden Sharing

*Rationalist Hypothesis 1: In line with balance-of-threat theory, NATO member states increase burden sharing to boost their individual security during times of external security threats.*

Walt’s balance-of-threat model, that is used extensively throughout this thesis, is intended as a methodological tool to assess the extent to which ‘conventional’ state actors can pose a threat to other states. However, there seems no obvious reason why the concepts of total capabilities, offensive capabilities, aggressive intentions and geographic proximity cannot be also applied to explain state behavior as it plans policies against transnational terrorist groups. An interesting contribution to rationalist thinking pertaining to the fight against terrorism is that it is no longer simply a security dilemma, but a complex security dilemma. Williams (2009: 1) explains this well when he observes that what drives national security policy in the transatlantic area nowadays “are terrorists that might be planning another catastrophic attack, unsavory regimes that may be developing nuclear weapons, and the possibility that the two may collude” (emphasis original). Though “the capabilities of the 9/11 terrorists remain largely unknown” (ibid.: 72), the attacks on the World Trade Centre demonstrated both the aggressive intentions and the geographic proximity of terrorist groups such as Al-Qaida and the
“very real possibility of terrorist attacks of great magnitude.” In that light, the campaign in Afghanistan “entailed a preventive component, motivated by a real virtuality of future terror scenarios” (ibid.: 75).

The United States tremendously increased its own defense spending after 9/11, in large part to fund the missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Europeans NATO member states realized that terror could also strike in their countries and offered “major help” right after 9/11 (Pond, 2004: 1). However, the United States initially opted to operate outside of NATO structures. With the mixed successes of NATO operations in Bosnia and Kosovo relatively fresh in mind, the United States considered unilateralism would work most effectively in Afghanistan (Webber, 2009). However, when they removed the Taliban from power, the United States saw that support from their NATO allies was “indispensable in the more protracted business of stabilizing the country” (ibid.: 55).

Having been left out of the initial decision-making, the Europeans were not overwhelmingly enthusiastic about helping the United States. However, all European member states and the candidate member states of Eastern Europe opted for cooperation by sending (some) troops to Afghanistan under ISAF. This was possible after alliance policy was, rather pragmatically, changed to enable NATO operations beyond the North Atlantic area. However, at no point were these contributions sufficient to adequately fulfill the aims of the mission. Not only were force contributions generally meager, many countries also imposed restrictions (‘national caveats’) on what their troops could do. According to U.S. President George Bush, “[s]ome were not allowed to patrol at night. Others could not engage in combat. The result was a disorganized and ineffective force, with troops fighting by different rules and many not fighting at all” (Bush, 2010: 178). In fact, “many countries were sending troops so heavily restricted that our generals complained they just took up space” (ibid.: 179).4

In 2003 the United States made plans to invade Iraq with the help of the United Kingdom. In response, Germany, France, and Russia warned that they would block a Security Council resolution permitting the use of force against Iraq. According to Pond (2004: 45), European intelligence agencies were not given “convincing evidence by their U.S. counterparts of a new threat of imminent Iraqi acquisition of nuclear weapons, attack on neighbors, or any direct link between Iraq and al Qaeda that might require near-term military blocking action” and therefore saw “no urgency in incurring the enormous risks of an invasion of Iraq in 2002 or 2003.” Despite major concerns, some European NATO members and Canada end up sending troops to Iraq under the MNF-I, but no official NATO action takes place. With regard to the division in NATO, U.S. President George W. Bush remarks in his memoirs that

4 For a comprehensive perspective on national caveats and its influence on the effectiveness of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, see Saideman & Auerswald (2012).
NATO had “turned into a two-tiered alliance, with some countries willing to fight and many not” (Bush, 2010: 179). The countries that did participate generally did not increase their defense budgets and, like in Afghanistan, imposed restrictions on their troops. The clear exception is the United Kingdom, delivering at its peak 46,000 troops to the MNF-I. Prime Minister Tony Blair writes in his memoirs that “as the impact of 11 September reverberated around the world, and I as a leader contemplated the future potential for risk, the possibility of terrorists acquiring WMD was at the forefront of my mind” (Blair, 2010: 385). He concludes: “but for 11 September, Iraq would not have happened” (ibid.: 383).

A notable area in which more NATO cooperation started to take place is intelligence sharing, although these efforts should not be overstated according to some. After 9/11, NATO’s intelligence services were criticized for their “lack of coordination and inability to connect the intelligence dots on the Islamist hijackers” (Seagle, 2015: 558). Although significant steps were made to harmonize intelligence systems, including the establishment of the TTIU (in 2011 absorbed by the new Intelligence Unit), NATO member states to this day have considerable difficulty “volunteering their national intelligence within the Alliance, due first to technological incompatibility and thereafter from considerations related to the importance of the intelligence” (ibid.: 569).

NATO enlarged to the East in 2004 and 2009. However, there is not much evidence that this constituted external balancing as a result from the fight against transnational terrorism. NATO enlargement already started in 1999 with the admission of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, prior to the attacks of 9/11. However, some attribute the ease of expansion partially to the “warming of the bilateral US–Russian security relationship” that followed 9/11 (Webber, 2009: 53). The willingness of the Eastern European countries to politically and militarily contribute to the MNF-I also played a role, perhaps comparable to the influence of UNC contributions by Greece and Turkey in the early 1950s.

An individualist perspective on the War on Terror offers a good understanding of the reasons why the United States initially opted for unilateralism, as well as the reasons for why they ultimately sought more international partners to help in Afghanistan and Iraq. Member states like France and Germany (and others) might have helped more in Afghanistan than they eventually did if they would have been involved from the very start, since their sense of urgency was much higher right after 9/11 than after the Taliban was removed from power. On these grounds, the hypothesis is accepted.
**Rationalist Hypothesis 2**: If the NATO alliance leader makes threats of abandonment, the other NATO member states increase burden sharing efforts during times of external security threats.

By 2001, not much had changed with regard to the distribution of capabilities in NATO. The United States outnumbered all of its European allies combined in terms of economic and military power. This is why the United States could afford to operate outside NATO structures, encapsulated by Defense Secretary Rumsfeld who dismissed the importance of within-NATO consensus by remarking that “the mission determines the coalition, and the coalition must not determine the mission” (Washington Post, 18 October 2001). Many European NATO members, most importantly Germany and France, resented this opportunistic U.S. unilateralism.

When the United States ultimately understood that it needed the help of its NATO allies (as well as other countries), they were not in a position to leverage much to enforce assistance but had to rely on persuasion instead. When George W. Bush tried to increase allied troop contributions for Afghanistan in 2006, he remembers he had to “urge [his] NATO allies to match our commitment by dropping caveats on their troops and adding more forces” (Bush, 2010: 179, emphasis added). This is not really a threat of abandonment, but rather norm referential behavior. It did not help by much; only a few countries increased their already limited contributions.

While fiercely objecting to American measures in Iraq, Germany and France did not do much to oppose it much further after the invasion and occupation was a *fait accompli*. On the other hand, they still refused to support the intervention with troops and material.

Although the fight against transnational terrorism caused significant confrontation within NATO, with the alliance leader often disregarded the interests of its allies, there is hardly any proof that their allies increased burden sharing as a direct result of this. In conclusion, while the unilateralism of the United States could be construed as ‘abandonment’, this did not lead to a substantial increase in burden sharing. The hypothesis can therefore be rejected.

**4.3.4 Constructivist Interpretation of Changes in Burden Sharing**

**Constructivist Hypothesis 1**: The more an alliance is based on a Kantian culture internalized to the third degree, the more its members contribute towards providing the collective good in times of an external security threat.

Rumsfeld’s statement about how missions would determine the alliance and not vice-versa communicated to the NATO allies that the United States intended to select future partners in the global
struggle to defend democracy not on the basis of shared democratic values and existing institutions, but on the basis of geography and the ability of others to contribute instrumentally to the achievement of U.S. aims (Pond, 2004: 61-62). This was despite the fact that the whole western world stood with the United States after 9/11. NATO invoked article 5, meaning the attack on the United States was considered an attack on all NATO members. This was not merely a formal declaration of a common fate and a recognition of the interdependence that they shared with one another; it was actually truly felt by many. On September 12, the first call with foreign leaders that Bush made was with Prime Minister Tony Blair, who said he was “in a state of shock” and that he would stand with America “one hundred percent” in fighting terror (Bush, 2010: 124). Tony Blair indeed writes up in his memoirs that he considered not “America alone who was the target, but all of us who shared the same values. We had to stand together” (Blair, 2010: 345). When he later spoke to leaders such as German Chancellor Schröder, French President Chirac, Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi, and even Russian Premier Putin, Blair had a feeling that the “the collective sense of solidarity was absolute” (ibid.: 351). Like Thatcher saw herself as an intermediary between Reagan and European leaders (see page 53). Blair saw it as his role to galvanize “the maximum level of support” since he “knew that when the immediate impact of the event diminished, there was always a danger of backsliding” (ibid.: 351). Blair saw his suspicion confirmed when, as 2001 wore on, “the world consciousness of a menace needing to be confronted slowly melted, losing its shape and its prominence, as life got back to and seemed normal” (ibid.: 362).

Although all NATO member states contributed to the international intervention in Afghanistan in the context of the War on Terror, these contributions reflected a moderate attempt towards solidarity after the United States only came to the Alliance when it was time for reconstruction of Afghanistan. Many NATO members supported intervention in Iraq, but importantly Germany and France did not. This is in large part due to the fact that the leaders of the United States, France, and Germany (respectively Bush, Chirac, and Schröder) had a difficult relationship with each other. A notable confrontation occurred between Bush and Schröder in 2002 regarding German support for invading Iraq. Bush claims in his memoirs that Schröder promised to back the United States in Iraq but reneged on this offer later (Bush, 2010). Schröder responded by saying that he only promised German support for an invasion of Iraq when the country was proven to “to have provided protection and hospitality to al-Qaida fighters,” a connection which according to him “as it became clear during 2002, was false and constructed” (Spiegel Online, 2010). Whoever was right, Bush remarks that “as someone who valued personal diplomacy, [he] put a high premium on trust. Once that trust was violated, it was hard to have a constructive relationship again” (Bush, 2010: 194).
During this period there were severe problems of identity. When discussing their different perceptions on international events and the best approach to handle them, Americans and Europeans seemed to be “coming from different planets and […] talking past each other” as “Americans accused Europeans of anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism [while] Europeans charged Americans with Euro-bashing and a wantonly pro-Israel bias” (Pond, 2004: 39).

Despite this, the common fate of transnational terrorism spurred continued cooperation on a more practical level. The increase in intra-NATO intelligence sharing (exemplified by among other things the establishment of the TTIU) indicates that there was still a high enough level of trust between NATO countries to cooperate, even though intelligence coordination was far from perfect. That intelligence sharing requires high levels of trust is best explained by Cimbala and Forster. They recognize that among states fighting transnational terrorism, burden sharing requires information deemed very sensitive to be shared with foreigners. Even when this information is "scrubbed of its most sensitive domestic political content, it may still cause the heads of foreign intelligence and internal security to shed tears as their state secrets migrate across international borders" (Cimbala and Forster, 2010: xv).

The incorporation of Eastern European countries into NATO can be seen in the context of their increasingly democratic nature. Although the process of enlargement started before 9/11, and it is unclear whether the event even accelerated accession process, the fact that these states supported both the Afghanistan and Iraq interventions (especially in the context of a disapproving Russia) did at a minimum not hurt this process either.

Summarizing, both the failures and successes with regard to burden sharing after 9/11 can (at least partly) be attributed to collective identity. The hypothesis is therefore accepted.

**Constructivist Hypothesis 2:** Critical junctures for NATO in the form of external security threats encourage burden sharing norm compliance by its members.

It is quite clear that the attacks of 9/11 constituted a major ‘world historical event’ for NATO that significantly influenced alliance dynamics, and facilitated a shift to a different form of cooperation to combat international terrorism.

There are notable parallels to be found when comparing the response of the United States to the attacks of 9/11 with their response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. On both occasions, the United States decided to act unilaterally to a considerable degree. In both cases, this was this was not received well within the North Atlantic alliance and construed as a violation of cooperation norms. And
in both cases, when the United States realized that help was needed, their European NATO allies (and Australia) were the first that were turned to.

In the case of Iraq, the United States and the United Kingdom invaded Iraq without a UN mandate. From a norms perspective this was a move that alienated some important NATO allies. The United States was well aware of this, considering President Bush recalls in his memoirs that in the preparation process for the Iraqi invasion “almost every ally [he] consulted […] told [him] a UN resolution was essential to win public support in their countries” (Bush, 2010: 196). Two weeks before the invasion of Iraq, the foreign ministers of France, Germany, and Russia issued a joint statement saying that considering the circumstances "we will not let a proposed resolution pass that would authorize the use of force. Russia and France, as permanent members of the Security Council, will assume all their responsibilities on this point" (UNISPAL, 2003).

The fact that Germany and France continued to contribute to the Afghanistan effort even when the United States ‘illegitimately’ invaded Iraq is an indication that burden sharing was in fact an internalized norm in NATO, but not one that would supersede all other (international) norms.

In conclusion, international norms have played a role in the outcomes of burden sharing in NATO after 9/11. Therefore, the hypothesis is accepted.

4.3.5 Conclusion “War on Terror”

The 9/11 attacks and the ensuing ‘War on Terror’ have had a significant impact on NATO’s approach to terrorism at several levels, since it “raised important questions of burden sharing among the United States, America’s NATO allies and other states” (Cimbala & Forster, 2010: xv). A problem with the War on Terror is that terrorism is not an entity but a method. It is not about “inflicting defeat on conventional armies, air forces and fleets in battle.” Terrorism itself cannot be eradicated, but a "strategic crimp could be put in the size, speed and lethality of major terrorist networks […]” (ibid.: xiv). NATO efforts towards this have shown mixed results as witnessed by the (ongoing) action in Iraq and Afghanistan, although there have been several institutional changes to accommodate cooperation against transnational terrorism. When it comes to the matter of free-riding, the European NATO member states generally do not seem to be passing along to the United States a burden that they would otherwise assume themselves. Why they would not do this can both be put in the context of rationalism (in the sense that they would not be willing to sacrifice the resources) and constructivism (in the sense that they considered the intervention in Iraq as insufficiently legitimate).

In the next chapter the general conclusions from the case studies are drawn.
Chapter 5. CONCLUSION

5.1 SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES

To reiterate, this thesis has investigated whether the following four hypotheses could provide meaningful perspectives on burden sharing in NATO.

Rationalism:

Hypothesis 1: In line with balance-of-threat theory, NATO member states increase burden sharing to boost their individual security during times of external security threats.

Hypothesis 2: If the NATO alliance leader makes threats of abandonment, the other NATO member states increase burden sharing efforts during times of external security threats.

Constructivism:

Hypothesis 1: The more an alliance is based on a Kantian culture internalized to the third degree, the more its members contribute towards providing the collective good in times of an external security threat.

Hypothesis 2: Critical junctures for NATO in the form of external security threats encourage burden sharing norm compliance by its members.

The following table contains a summary of the hypotheses and if they have been rejected, accepted, or deemed inconclusive following the empirical analyses.

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<thead>
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<th></th>
<th>Korean War</th>
<th>Soviet invasion Afghanistan</th>
<th>“War on Terror”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Accepted</td>
<td>Accepted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rationalist hypothesis 2</td>
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<td>Rejected</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constructivist hypothesis 2</td>
<td>Accepted</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
<td>Accepted</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Summary of hypotheses
5.2 Conclusion Rationalism

Although constructivism thrived after the end of the Cold War, there are also rationalist accounts for NATO’s endurance. Risse-Kappen gives one such possible explanation of NATO’s ‘survival’ after the Cold War by suggesting “[...] the Russian landmass might still constitute a residual risk to Western Europe, thus necessitating a hedge against a potential reemergence of the threat” (Risse-Kappen, 1996). With the benefit of hindsight, this was perhaps a good estimation considering the resurgence of NATO-Russia hostilities and some authors even claiming the comeback of the Cold War (see also 5.7). As such, any writing off of rationalist theories was premature (although the attention given to alternative explanations was surely an enrichment of the academic debate).

When looking at NATO and the effect of external security threats on collective burden sharing from a rationalist perspective (material and individualist), all three cases indicate that member states generally looked to NATO when they considered the North Atlantic association an added value for their own security. This is true for the smaller countries, who often contributed significantly less in both absolute and relative terms than the larger countries. However, these larger countries often sought to dominate the decision-making process and impose their strategic vision on handling external security threats, thereby giving ample opportunity for other NATO countries to argue that their contributions would only add marginal extra security. This significantly influenced intra-alliance negotiations and burden sharing outcomes to the point where the United States had to actively encourage their European allies to contribute, with mixed results, and the European allies tried to exert more influence over the choices of the alliance leader, with mixed results.

Mutual dependence resulted in the outcome that the United States kept paying a larger share of the collective burden because even non-optimal cooperation in NATO met the needs of the US, e.g. because it gained international legitimacy from its allies and/or it found the geopolitical benefits satisfying enough to warrant the extra costs. This does not mean that the United States was necessarily comfortable with this situation, or that it did not want its NATO partners to contribute because this would give it less influence in determining the strategy to counter the threat. This is reflected by the extensive difficulties that the United States have gone through to induce their allies to cooperate more.

5.3 Conclusion Constructivism

Although rationalism has traditionally dominated political debates with regard to NATO, the constructivist perspective has much to contribute towards a sound analysis of NATO’s history. Regarding
the democratic nature of the NATO members, Wallace J. Thies (2009: 1) perhaps gives the most succinct yet accurate description of why NATO cooperation in the last 66 years has been confrontational, yet lasting and relatively successful: “Democracies can and do disagree with one another, but they do not fear one another.”

In Wendtian terms, the high homogeneity of the NATO countries in the form of democratic state systems made them identify with each other and overcome their fear of being engulfed by the Other. A constructivist point of view (social and collective) explains furthermore why NATO members only made efforts to bolster the alliance when they deemed that there was high interdependence and common fate (in the form of external security threats) that emphasized the legitimacy of the Kantian culture.

From a norms perspective, whenever European NATO members did not adhere to burden sharing norms during ‘critical junctures’, they offered justification in the form of other norms. During the Korean War this constituted economic reconstruction norm. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan this was consultation norms (violated by the United States). In the case of the war in Iraq, the norm that international intervention requires a mandate from the United Nations Security Council. This means burden sharing as a norm exists in NATO, is widely recognized and at times even internalized. However, it is not a norm that overrides all others.

5.4 GENERAL CONCLUSION

The history of cooperation within NATO is rich and complex. On the basis of these three cases it becomes clear that both the rationalist and constructivist perspective on alliances can offer compelling insights into intra-alliance behavior.

One burning question before writing this thesis was whether the United States indeed spends (and has spent) a disproportionate amount of resources on the Europeans’ security. The answer to this question is complex, but verges on the yes. However, whether the European NATO members have deliberately ‘free-ride’ on the United States, that is strategically withhold contributions to NATO to make the United States pay for them, is not as clear-cut from these cases. One of the main expectations was that external security threats could act as an ‘equalizer’, i.e. make the contribution differences of NATO members in terms of financial contributions smaller. However, it has generally augmented the differences in burden sharing. On the other hand (despite the fact that the North Atlantic Treaty itself was a peace-time arrangement) it is clear that external security threats were the main catalysts for the development of the organizational elements and cooperation in the political, military, and sometimes
economic realm. In rational terms this is balance-of-threat (Walt), in constructivist terms increasing common fate and interdependence (Wendt) and/or critical junctures (Finnemore and Sikkink).

Norms play an important role in alliance politics. Burden sharing norms appear to emerge and disappear along with the intensity of the threats, sometimes hinting towards strategic social interaction but sometimes reflecting genuine concerns with the legitimacy of certain policies. From a strategic social interaction point (see also 5.5), one could say that the European countries have generally undertaken the minimum effort (rational) to retain a credible alliance cohesion (constructivism). On the other hand, the United States needed its European allies for their policies to be effective (rational) and were afraid of alienating them (constructivism).

The cases confirm that rationalist concepts often must rely on intersubjective concepts, and that many constructivist concepts (at least conventional constructivism as applied in this thesis) incorporate a positivist epistemology. Hence, the two approaches are not mutually exclusive, and both have offered plausible narratives on changes in burden sharing in the cases that were researched. One must in any case be careful not to fall in the trap that every behavior is rational, or that every behavior is social. Especially the former has the inherent danger of succumbing to a tautological world-view that breeds cynicism in international politics and inhibits academic and political progress.

5.5 The Rationalism/Constructivism Debate

From the academic literature of the past 25 years it becomes obvious that constructivist and rationalist scholars have learned many things from each other’s insights. Because others have studied this more methodologically, I take one general conclusion from Reus-Smith and Snidal (2008: 31) who analyze that “constructivists have incorporated collective action and principal—agent relations into their analyses [and] rationalists have increased their attention to norms to deepen their analysis of institutions.”

Furthermore, Finnemore and Sikkink made some excellent points with regard to the rationalism-constructivism divide in their article ‘Norm Dynamics and International Change.’ First of all, they empirically and theoretically reject the notion that the issues constructivists study (such as norms and identity) are not also rational, and the notion that rationalists cannot incorporate norms and identities in their research. Nothing about rational choice requires a material ontology; utility of actors can come in both the social/ideational as well as the material. Likewise, exclusively using a social ontology “ignores the strategic character of social construction,” because ““instrumental rationality and strategic interaction play a significant role in highly politicized social construction of norms, preferences, identities, and common knowledge by norm entrepreneurs in world politics” (Finnemore and Sikkink,
Thus: “One could model rational choice as producing social knowledge as easily as one could model social context as a background for rational choice, depending on the empirical question being researched” (ibid.: 911). Although Finnemore and Sikkink explicitly advocate a synthesis of the two fields, for the sake of conceptual clarification there is nothing wrong with keeping the two approaches theoretically separate, to keep studying separately the extent to which they can explain empirical occurrences and then see where the two cross-over.

5.6 Reflection on theory

Using other theoretical perspectives on burden sharing would have undoubtedly generated different outcomes. Critical theory in all its forms and variations could have problematized many aspects of burden sharing that have been taken for granted in this study, including but not limited to questions regarding the state system, capitalism, (neo)colonialism, imperialism, the legitimacy of international interventions, and the legitimacy of NATO expansion. While acknowledging the potential value of such perspectives, the priority of this research was to discover underlying patterns of state behavior rather than critically evaluate this behavior.

Furthermore, this research has focused more on NATO as a multilateral initiative than on NATO as an institution. Sjursen (2004: 689) sees a wider pattern regarding International Relations studies on NATO since the 1990s. According to her, too much fascination has been shown for the constructivist turn, leaving a “[g]eneral academic neglect of NATO as an institution and institutionalized cooperation within it.” Unfortunately, her article does little to bridge this gap. Instead she takes a critical theory approach problematizing “the links made between NATO and the Kantian idea of a pacific federation, as well as the definition of NATO’s core identity as democratic” since NATO (as an institution) does not “have a democratic mandate from below, nor […] commit to an overarching cosmopolitan framework” (ibid.: 698, 702). This thesis does not do much either to bridge the institutionalist gap, instead focusing on how a certain group of countries reaches certain conclusions facing certain dilemmas.

One last theoretical perspective that could have been taken in this research is neoclassical realism. According to Kitchen (2010: 139), what is central to neoclassical realism is the assumption that both systemic variables as well as domestic variables play a role in international outcomes, with ideas by Foreign Policy executives as the “key intervening variable.” Similar to the conclusion from section 5.4, Kitchen believes that ideas cannot be reduced to interests and interests cannot be reduced to ideas. When following a neoclassical realist perspective, this thesis would perhaps have put more emphasis on
the foreign policy processes of the NATO member states as a result of external security threats, thereby opening up the black box more.

5.7 REFLECTION ON METHODS AND CASE SELECTION

There is a tendency to refer to European NATO members as one group (Americans and ‘the European allies’). This thesis has generally done the same, which admittedly is a reflection of pragmatism rather than a genuine belief that European NATO members are all similar in constitution. This brings us to the dilemma of the state as a unitary actor. Although states are internally very diverse, this thesis has generally treated them as unitary actors. The ‘black box’ has only occasionally been opened up to take a look at how the most prominent representatives of the state viewed the situation. Domestic aspects such as public opinion, party politics, and budgetary constraints were virtually neglected. Although it became apparent throughout this research that these are oftentimes very important factors in an alliance of democracies, rationalism and constructivism still accounted for many of the changes in alliance politics.

With regard to case selection, most security crises in NATO’s history have at a minimum been mentioned in passing in this thesis. In hindsight, some may have deserved a more in-depth analysis, such as the Suez crisis, the Gulf War, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Cyber threats could also have been an interesting case study. However, the three cases that were chosen seem to have provided a useful cross-section of burden sharing in NATO. The recent crisis with Russia and ISIS is still ongoing. Since sweeping changes in the situation take place regularly, any general academic assessment of the situation would run the risk of swift irrelevance. This is why it is only briefly assessed in the following section.

Lastly, one important question remains. This pertains to the generalizability of the findings to security alliances other than NATO. In other words: what can we say, on the basis of this thesis, about the likely effects of external security threats on burden sharing in alliances such as UNASUR or CSTO? A number of authors have suggested that NATO is unique because of the democratic nature of (most of) its members and the high levels of trust between them. To an extent, they might be right. However, rationalism and constructivism do not necessarily perpetuate the status quo. From a rationalist point of view, more cooperation should take place in any alliance when more members feel threatened by a similar origin. The existence of the alliance itself is already a testimony of this. The larger countries (Brazil, Russia) will be likely to pick up most of the slack, as they have most to gain from responding to a crisis. From a constructivist point of view, recognition of interdependence and common fate should spur more cooperation in any alliance, forcing states to trust one another to live up to the terms of
cooperation. Norm compliance can build trust and make states overcome their fear of being engulfed by the “Others” in the alliance. Feelings of mutual self-restraint can then act as a catalyst for further cooperation.

5.8 Burden Sharing in NATO Now and the Future of Alliance Theory

In the last year-and-a-half, the situation on the European periphery with crises in Ukraine and Syria and Iraq has forced NATO and its members to rethink their defense policies. The Ukraine crisis has even prompted extensive comparisons to the Cold War by political commentators, among others Stephen Walt who wrote in an article for Foreign Policy that “the bad old days are back” (Walt, 2014). Although most NATO countries have taken this as an impulse to increase defense spending, some countries continue to trim their budgets. In response to this, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel stated in June of 2014 that “[i]f the American people do not see European nations stepping forward to invest in their own defense when their own security is threatened, we risk eroding U.S. support for the alliance” (Defense One, 2014).

One of the NATO members that was triggered to spend more was The Netherlands. Its government instigated a domestic trend reversal in 2014 by allocating 100 million Euros more to defense rather than further cut resources as was planned. In 2015 the (independent) advisory council Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken (Advisory Council International Issues) even recommended the Dutch government to increase defense spending by 3,5 to 5 billion Euros on an annual basis to improve operational readiness. This would be an increase of nearly 50% of the existing budget. Although such a figure will likely to be proven unattainable, it was announced by the government in 2015 that an additional 375 million Euros would go to defense. Likewise, in Germany, the government announced in March 2015 that it would upgrade its defense budget by several billions in direct response to financing operations in Eastern Europe (Reuters, 2015). Lithuania reintroduced conscription in 2015, which can be construed as a sign of the country investing in its own security as a direct result of the altercations between NATO and Russia (BBC, 2015). In relationship to this, the United States announced in June 2015 it was contemplating placing heavy weaponry in Poland and the Baltic states (New York Times, 2015).

In the same month, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg made a plea to all member states to increase defense spending (NATO, 2015d). And as if the NATO Response Force was not ‘responsive’ enough to counter urgent threats to NATO, it was announced in February 2015 that a so-called Spearhead Force was in construction. The Spearhead Force is a “very high readiness force” consisting of a land brigade of around 5,000 troops supported by air, sea, and special forces (NATO, 2015e).
Bibliography


Appendix 1 – List of NATO members and year of accession

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member state</th>
<th>Year of Accession</th>
<th>Applicable in</th>
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<tr>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
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### Appendix 2 - SIPRI definition of Military Spending

According to SIPRI, military expenditure encompasses:

| **• The armed forces, including peace keeping forces;** |
| **• Defence ministries and other government agencies engaged in defence projects;** |
| **• Paramilitary forces when judged to be trained, equipped and available for military operations;** |
| **• Military space activities.** |

**Such expenditures should include:**

| **• Personnel;** |
| o All expenditures on current personnel, military and civil; |
| o retirement pensions of military personnel; |
| o social services for personnel and their families; |
| **• Operations and maintenance;** |
| **• Procurement;** |
| **• Military research and development;** |
| **• Military construction;** |
| **• Military aid (in the military expenditures of the donor country).** |

**Excluded military related expenditures:**

| **• Civil defence;** |
| **• Current expenditure for previous military activities;** |
| o Veterans benefits; |
| o Demobilization; |
| o Conversion of arms production facilities; |
| o Destruction of weapons. |

**Source:** [http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database/definitions](http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database/definitions)
Appendix 3 – Total Defense Expenditures of NATO Countries (1949-1963)

<table>
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<td>357</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>889</td>
<td>992</td>
<td>956</td>
<td>1,012</td>
<td>1,062</td>
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<td>2,767</td>
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<td>4,225</td>
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<td>557</td>
<td>637</td>
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<td>857</td>
<td>864</td>
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<td>Million Guelfa</td>
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<td>357</td>
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<td>676</td>
<td>889</td>
<td>992</td>
<td>956</td>
<td>1,012</td>
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<td>47,598</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

**Africa**

| Total Europe (a)         | Million US Dollars       | 4,625| 5,145| 7,027| 10,231| 12,103| 11,245| 11,028| 11,137| 11,317| 11,324| 11,293| 11,168| 12,193| 13,608| 15,285|
| Total NATO (b)           | Million US Dollars       | 18,777| 20,247| 24,096| 55,704| 53,750| 56,303| 54,018| 56,538| 59,872| 59,760| 60,835| 61,225| 61,760| 71,306| 73,666|

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**Notes:**

a. Before it acceded to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (May 1955), the Federal Republic of Germany contributed to the defense budgets of certain NATO countries by the payment of occupation costs; moreover, it bore certain other costs which also fall within the NATO definition of defense expenditures. The total given in the column for 1955 represents the expenditures made under these various heads for the fiscal year 1954/55 (April 1 - March 31). The figures for the years prior to fiscal year 1954/55 have not been communicated to the Secretariat. In addition to defense expenditures (NATO definition), the German authorities are obliged to levy large annual expenditure for Berlin owing to the exceptional situation of that city and the need, in the interests of the defense of the free world, to ensure its viability. These expenditures, which are not included in the figures given above since they do not come within the NATO definition, amounted to RM 1,412 million in 1945.

b. The totals for Europe and for NATO do not include defense expenditures of the Federal Republic of Germany for the period prior to 1955, and for this reason they are not directly comparable to the totals for the following years.