Analysing Intergovernmental Decision Making on Common Foreign Policy of the European Union. The Case of the European Union’s Anti-Piracy Mission

All for One, or One for All?

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April 2014
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Master’s programme Political Science; International Relations – 2012/2013
Thesis supervisor: dr. G.C. van der Kamp-Alons
April 2014

Word count (excluding appendices & references): 32.075
Preface

This thesis is the final element for obtaining my Master’s degree in Political Science at the Radboud University, Nijmegen. This element has proven to be quite a challenge, as can of course be expected when trying to obtain a Masters degree. Finding an interesting and relevant subject of research was difficult to start with. However, the subject of European Common Foreign Policy is very interesting, not only for theoretical development, but since the European Union has recently decided to send forces to the Central African Republic, it proves to be empirically relevant as well. The actual conduction of the research however, was not a walk in the park. Data that one would expect to retrieve easily, appeared to be impossible to find and thus new measurements had to be created. All in all, writing this thesis proved to be quite a final challenge of this Master’s programme.

I would like to thank my supervisor, Gerry van der Kamp-Alons, for the time and effort she invested in guiding me in this process. At times, when I was sure all was lost, she showed me that it really was not. Moreover, my friends and family helped me a lot at times when I thought this research would become a never-ending story. They cheered me up and encouraged me to keep on going. Without their support, this thesis would most likely not even be close to the finish now.

With this Master’s thesis, my time as a student is officially over and the time for job hunting will begin. I am confident that my academic skills and expertise obtained at this university form a fine basis for this next chapter in my life.

Nijmegen, the Netherlands,

April 2014

Josien Lodewick
Abstract

Since the collapse of the Somali government in 1990, piracy off the coast of Somalia has increased drastically. This development concerned many actors, including EU member states. In December 2008, the EU NAVFOR mission to counter piracy off the Somali coast came into being. However, contributions to the mission are decided upon by the member states themselves. Germany, France and the United Kingdom contributed to this European mission, but the British contribution was not as substantive as that of the other two states. To explain this difference and to find out what considerations these three states made, neo-liberal institutionalist theory, the domestic politics approach and constructivist theory are brought in to shed some light.

In the end, Germany and France contributed most substantively to the mission, which is a result of their substantive economic interests in the region. Germany primarily stressed the importance of humanitarian aid to Somalia. France endorsed this German concern, but emphasized the dangers of piracy in terms of regional insecurity as well. The British did not contribute as much to the EU-mission as Germany and France. However, the United Kingdom has strong economic interests in the region and, furthermore, perceived Somali piracy as a danger, relating the conflict to terrorism and regional instability. This apparent misfit is explained with the British preference to work with other partners. The United Kingdom contributed to other counter-piracy activities in the region. Hence, the constructivist variables of national role conceptions and reputation, combined with the neo-liberal institutionalist variables of economic and military interests are perfectly capable of explaining this development. The aspects of domestic pressure (in terms of public opinion and domestic norms) proved to be somewhat irrelevant in this research, since these variables could not be retrieved for these cases.

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### Abbreviations and Acronyms

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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defense Policy of the European Union</td>
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<td>CTF</td>
<td>Combined Task Force</td>
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<td>DG</td>
<td>Directorates-General</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Council</td>
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<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
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<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defense Policy of the European Union</td>
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<td>EU NAVFOR</td>
<td>European Union Naval Force Somalia</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUCAP NESTOR</td>
<td>Regional Maritime Capacity Building for the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUFOR ALTHEA</td>
<td>European Union Force Althea; oversees military implementation of the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td>EUTM</td>
<td>European Union’s Training Mission</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>Head Quarters</td>
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<td>HR</td>
<td>High Representative (of the Union for Foreign Affairs)</td>
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<td>IMO</td>
<td>International Maritime Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>MARCOM</td>
<td>Maritime Command (of NATO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNHQ</td>
<td>Multinational Headquarters (for EU-led military crisis management operations)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPRA</td>
<td>Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircrafts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSCHOA</td>
<td>Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO/OTAN</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation / Organisation du traité de l’Atlantique Nord</td>
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<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHQ</td>
<td>Operational Headquarters (in Northwood)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PJHQ</td>
<td>Permanent Joint Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Stabilization Force (NATO lead peacekeeping force to Bosnia and Herzegovina)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolutions</td>
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<td>VPD</td>
<td>Vessel Protection Detachment</td>
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<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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1. The Puzzle of Intergovernmental Decision Making on Common Policies

In 1951, Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands agreed upon the formation of the *European Coal and Steel Community*. This collaboration created a basis for the different European communities to cooperate deeper and on a broader range of issues. Since then, cooperation has indeed increased between a greater number of countries and on a broader range of issues. One of the areas where cooperation between the members of the European Union (or shortly “Union”) has increased in recent years is the security and defence area. Since the Lisbon treaty entered into force in 2009, the Union has developed its own Common Security- and Defense Policy, under which heading several missions have been deployed. What is interesting when considering such a common policy is how so many different states agreed upon these missions. Even though it is called a “common” policy, the individual member states are the ones working out what such a policy will entail. One can then wonder which factors are of influence for different countries when making decisions concerning common foreign policies. This is an intriguing subject, since it appears that EU-member states do not necessarily make similar policy decisions when facing a common challenge. This thesis tries to enlighten the process of common foreign policy making by identifying the variables that can account for the choices made by three different European Union member states in the policy making process towards the EU NAVFOR mission off the coast of Somalia. What makes this case interesting, is the contribution to this mission of the United Kingdom. All countries appear to have similar economical and geopolitical interests in fighting Somali piracy through this mission. However, the United Kingdom contributes less to this EU mission compared to Germany and France. Since rational theories cannot account for this development, other explanations are to be considered. This research aims to find out which theories can explain why states that are similar in many respects often part ways in their goals and actions, in this case in terms of their contributions to the EU’s anti-piracy mission.

When it comes to states’ decision making on common foreign policies, this research is highly relevant, since it contributes to furthering scientific knowledge on the subject. This research sets out to clarify decision making of states on common foreign policies in institutions such as the European Union by applying different IR theories. Since this has only been touched upon briefly by different authors, it is important to try and elaborate on this matter more thoroughly. Previous research focussed on other institutions (such as the NATO), but not in terms of analysing its member states’ decision making and explaining this on the basis of IR theories. The researches of, for example, Hartley & Sandler (1999) and
Khanna, Sandler & Shimizu (1998) focussed on the financial aspects of common missions that NATO deployed, not on the actual implementation of these missions. This sort of empirical (statistical) analyses did not aim to contribute to theory development.

Another author who concerned herself with the European Union is Eva Gross (2009). At first sight, the research conducted by Gross seems similar to the research done in this thesis. However, Gross focuses in particular on the extent to which member states of the EU have developed European preferences, because of European foreign and security institutions. Related to that is the question under which circumstances states decide to work within a NATO cadre, rather than within an EU framework. This thesis focuses on the variables influencing countries’ decisions on the implementation of common foreign policies. As Gross admits herself, she uses “theoretical lenses”, rather than real IR theories. She does not provide theory driven explanations for foreign policy decision making in the ESDP/CSDP (Gross, 2009, p. 170).

Even though quite some research into decision making in the EU has been conducted (for example by Mérand, Hofmann & Irondelle, 2011; Howorth, 2012; Stie, 2012), there is almost no focus on the intergovernmental implementation of commonly reached policies. Thus, in conducting research into state decision making on common foreign policy that is firmly founded on different IR theories, knowledge on this subject can be furthered. Exactly because such research has not been conducted yet, a range of theories should be used, in order to test multiple explanations for state decisions, and prevent premature exclusion of possible theories. Testing competing theories contributes to scientific knowledge. Moreover, a first glance into the empirical reality has already shown that it is unlikely that the traditional rational theories can provide explanations for the United Kingdom’s relatively low contribution to the EU mission, as will be elaborated on further along. Liberal and constructivist theories are tested on their explanatory power when it comes to international cooperation in the area of security: is the choice for a certain policy based on military or economic interests, or are more abstract considerations in terms of role perceptions or public opinion decisive? In addition, some intervening variables are incorporated which create conditions under which different theories have more or less explanatory power. These intervening variables improve the theories used by refining them. Clarifying and specifying the conditions under which theories are expected to work, makes it possible to prove relations between variables with more certainty. And proving relations instead of just assuming them because they are plausible, is something authors such as Legro (1997) advocate for.
As mentioned above, the topic of the CSDP as such has not yet been thoroughly researched. Policies under the CSDP and the previous European Security and Defense Policy have been described by different authors (for example by Grevi, Helly & Keohane eds., 2009) and the appearance of the common policy as such has been elaborated on and explained with different theories, for example in the special issue of the Journal of Common Market Studies (Vol. 49, January 2011) which dealt with explaining the emergence of common policies in the defence and security field. However, there has been no real elaboration on the implementation of those common policies reached and the process of EU policy making by the member states. This research will fill in this void in international relations research.

When it comes to societal relevance, this thesis contributes to making the European Union a more transparent institution. If processes of decision-making, policy formation and different considerations of member-states are analysed, it becomes clear how the common foreign policy of the EU comes about. At the moment, the EU decision-making process is not very transparent, to say the least. When a proposal is made in the European Council, for example to employ a military or a civilian mission, it is actually already agreed upon by member states. Such a proposal will only be tabled in the European Council, when there is certainty that member states will agree upon it; the different positions have been explored beforehand (Scalas, 2013). It is evident to people that institutions such as the EU have common policies, but it often remains unclear what these policies represent: are they really common policies, or are they accumulations of national interests? Furthermore, for all kinds of societal and interest groups, it might be interesting to learn whether there are possibilities for them to influence EU-policy making and if so, at what policy level these possibilities might present themselves.

1.1 The Research Question

So, what is of interest here, is not the decision making process at the European level on whether or not there should be a mission in a certain situation. It is evident that the decision-making on whether or not to employ a mission is not something that is subject to wide and open debate in the European Council. When there is a real crisis at hand, a proposal is made by a head of state or the EU’s High Representative, Catherine Ashton, in the European Council. The European member states accept the proposal since they have agreed upon the proposal through beforehand negotiations (Scalas, 2013). As has just been explained, what follows after agreement on the employment of a mission is reached, is more interesting. Even if there is agreement among EU members on the necessity to employ a mission, this does not automatically mean that every country is able and more important, willing to contribute
equally to this mission. Decision making on the exact contributions to CSDP missions is still a national matter for the EU members.

As mentioned before, this thesis will focus on what factors influence the decision making, and policy choices of individual member states of the European Union concerning the European Union’s common foreign policy, hence the general research question of this thesis is as follows:

“What factors influence the decision making of individual European member states when it comes to their contribution to the implementation of common foreign policies?”

Of course, this question is rather general and in its current form, not specific enough to be answered as such. The question is explored by doing empirical research into a particular common foreign policy under the CSDP of the Union. One of the domains the European common foreign policy deals with civilian and military missions, which the EU mostly employs under the heading of crisis management. The EU’s anti piracy mission off the coast of Somalia (the EU NAVFOR mission) is central in this research and can be seen as an example of a common foreign policy of the EU that is formed by individual member-states. Contributions to this mission are decided upon individually by the EU member states. For reasons that will be elaborated on later on in this thesis, the countries this thesis will look into are France, Germany and the United Kingdom. The contributions of these countries to the EU NAVFOR mission will be explained by employing multiple International Relations theories that concern themselves with explaining state behaviour, neo-liberal institutionalism, constructivism and the domestic politics approach. Since this research focuses on a relatively new terrain, theories covering the breadth of available approaches in the field have been selected. This implies that the theories used in this research can ultimately be assessed on their explanatory power in similar cases in this area of research. Neo-liberal institutionalism focuses on the national level: the government is the primary actor, focussed on its own interests. The domestic politics approach adds domestic groups to the possible variables of influence, while constructivism focuses on more abstract variables that might be of influence on state decision-making.

Bearing the information provided concerning the cases of this research and the theoretical background in mind, the specific research question is posed:

“Can neo-liberal institutionalism, the domestic politics approach, constructivism or a combination of the previous account for the national decisions of Germany, France and the United Kingdom concerning their contributions to the European Union’s common EU NAVFOR anti-piracy mission in Somalia?”
1.2 Design of the Thesis

Since the question of interest in this research is now clear, resolving this question is the next issue on the agenda. The structure of this thesis is as follows: Chapter two describes different theories that might provide plausible explanations for the behaviour of national governments when it comes to decision making on foreign policies. After that, hypotheses are drawn for each theory, stating what is expected in the empirical reality if the respective theory is right. The next chapter will deal with the methods used in this thesis. It explains the research methods followed and, most importantly, operationalisation’s are provided which explain what empirical findings can be connected to the different theoretical expectations. The reliability of the sources is addressed as well. The following chapter will deal with the actual empirical analysis. Some background on different aspects of the cases is provided, prior to the actual analysis of various relevant sources. This creates the possibility to test the hypotheses and will ultimately provide the answer to the research question. This answer is given and deliberated on in the conclusion of this research. Furthermore, the conclusion will reflect on some difficulties and restrictions this research has been confronted with. In addition, the generalisability of this research and its implications for theory development are addressed, while suggestions for future research are given.
2. Theoretical Framework

To answer the research question posed in the previous chapter, it is helpful to examine international relations theories focussing on foreign policy formation. In international relations theory, multiple theories (stemming from different periods) have concerned themselves with answering questions about state behaviour and they provide multiple explanations for it. Each theory allows a researcher to draw hypotheses from it, expectations about when a certain outcome is more likely. The following part of this thesis elaborates on three different theoretical approaches that provide explanations for state decisions in the EU’s common foreign policy. Each theory provides different variables that might help in explaining the common foreign policy choices of states. When elaboration on these theories has been provided, multiple hypotheses are drawn from each theory, providing a basis for the empirical analysis.

In this thesis, the theories that form the basis for further empirical analysis are neo-liberal institutionalism, constructivism and the domestic politics approach. These three theories capture a broad spectrum of IR theories. Since neo-liberal institutionalism is a systems theory, this theory will focus on different aspects compared to the other two theories, which are not systems theories. The other two theories add more variables to the research, since they take more factors into consideration. Combining these theories is relevant, since there has not been much research into this specific subject yet. Moreover, it has already become apparent that it is unlikely that the United Kingdom’s contributions to the EU mission can be explained with rational theories. One theory that is often used but not included in this thesis is the (neo-)realist one. Every research is limited in its space and scope and so is this thesis. Choices on what theories are used in this thesis have been made based on the idea of using a broad array of possibly important theories and the exclusion of (neo-)realist theory only limits this range somewhat, since its relevant aspects are shared with neo-liberal institutionalism.

The subsequent part of this chapter deals with the elaboration of the three theoretical approaches. Each theory will then allow for the extraction of hypotheses that express specific expectations in the empirical reality. Also, intervening variables are identified that are of importance when applying the domestic politics approach. These scope conditions are addressed after elaboration on the three theories has occurred. These scope conditions are consequently incorporated into the theory and its corresponding hypotheses.
2.1 When Countries’ Interests are at Stake: Neo-liberal Institutionalism

Neo-liberal institutionalism focuses on questions related to achieving cooperation among states and other actors in the international system. Now, as said before, neo-liberalism and neo-realism show some similarities and the first theory is often perceived as being complementary to the latter (Mearsheimer, 1994 - 1995, p. 7). Both theoretical schools perceive states as rational actors in an anarchical world system. The theories also agree that if states will cooperate, they will only do so when a sovereign authority that can make binding agreements is present (Jervis, 1999, p. 43). However, when considering the anarchical structure of world politics, liberalism clearly differs from realist assumptions. Liberals are not, in contradiction to realists, convinced that there will always be conflict and war because of the uncertain nature of the anarchical world system. Realists assume states only care for their own survival. The international arena is, therefore, characterized by fundamental conflicts of interests. Keohane and other neo-liberals, however, do not agree with this pessimistic view. For neo-liberals, various institutionalized patterns based on shared purposes of cooperation exist. This proves for them that realist assumptions are false, for such kind of cooperation would not exist if realist assumptions were to be true (Keohane, 1984, pp. 5 – 7). When focusing on neo-liberalism, Keohane argues that international cooperation occurs when actors “adjust their behaviour to the actual or anticipated preferences of others”. In other words, intergovernmental cooperation will happen when the policies one government follows, match the preferences and objectives of another state, or when states are willing to rethink their preferences. States can cooperate and negotiate in order to come to an agreement in which their own objectives and preferences are obtained (ibid., pp. 51 - 53). Hence, states cooperate to obtain particular collective interests. The definition of a state interest’s and changes in those interests are weak points in neo-liberal theory, for these are just assumed and not elaborated on. The interests are taken as a given, they exist, but where they originate from is not addressed. However, sophisticated versions of neo-liberal theory, as Nye (1988) calls them, do mention the way in which state interactions and the development of international norms interact with the domestic politics of states in the international system. This interaction influences the way in which states define their interests. According to Nye, transnational and interstate interactions and norms lead to new definitions of interests. However, neo-liberals assume there is interaction between domestic politics and state interests, but they do not elaborate on it (Nye, 1988, pp. 238 – 239). The domestic politics section of this thesis addressed this gap in neo-liberal theory.
Another idea that neo-liberalism has advanced, is the idea that the opening of trade systems offers a way for states to transform and (possibly) enhance their power positions through economic growth rather than through military conquest (Nye, 1988, p. 240). This implies that “power” can be held in two ways: in military terms and in economic terms. Where power in realist terms implies military power, for liberals it can be more than just that. Power in the neo-liberal way means that states can cooperate with each other, even if it appears they do not have a direct military power interest in doing so. Moreover, their motives for policy decisions are based on more than just military power interests. States might cooperate with each other because they see possibilities for reaching other, (economic) objectives in the future. Certain realists might accept economic interests as incentives to act, but these interests can never be more important than military power interests are. Neo-liberals emphasize the importance of the economy in international relations and explaining state behaviour. Keohane defines the international system as the world political economy, once again stressing the importance of economic interests in international relations for neo-liberals. The world political economy is then defined by Keohane as the dynamic interaction in international relations in the pursuit of wealth and power. Again, states in the international system strive for power and this power can be economic as well as military. Keohane does not try to understand how fundamental common interests of states come into existence. Just as the neo-liberals mentioned above, he takes the existence of (mutual) interests as given and examines the conditions under which they will lead to cooperation (Keohane, 1984, pp. 5 – 7, 18, 31).

Institutionalists, Keohane explains, perceive cooperation as essential in a world that is economically interdependent. Shared economic interests create a demand for international cooperation and thus influence what national governments can decide on (for states are still the most important actors in the world system).

In the end, two major arguments are derived from neo-liberal institutionalist theory that deal with power interests of states. Neo-liberals perceive power-interests as prominent in explaining state behaviour on foreign policy. However, where realists perceive power purely in military terms, neo-liberals take in the importance of economic power interests as well. Therefore, the first argument of neo-liberals relates to military power; countries act in accordance with their military power interests when it comes to decision making on policies. The second reasoning is that states consider economic (power) interests when they are contemplating on their foreign policy options. Economic concerns and interests countries have and might share, are important aspects that can help in explaining state behaviour, especially when it comes to cooperation. Economic interests might just be the trigger for a country to choose for a certain foreign policy instead of another. Where realism is convinced that
military concerns are decisive, neo-liberals are not univocal about which form of interest might matter the most. Both components of power interests matter equally to neo-liberals and the idea that authors such as Keohane (1984, pp. 7 – 9) presume that economic and military interests do not conflict but actually reinforce each other, is not that farfetched. Therefore, each motivation for state actions on itself can be decisive. Neo-liberals state that the presence of both, or just one of the two, forms of power interests is enough for a state to decide on an extensive contribution to a mission

Two aspects that influence state decision making on foreign policy according to neo-liberal institutionalists thus form the basis for the hypotheses;

1. Military power interests and
2. Economic power interests.

After this elaboration of the theory, the next step is deriving hypotheses from it. These hypotheses are tested in the empirical research. At first, general hypotheses are drawn, which are specified later on in the methodological chapter.

When deriving hypotheses, it is important to keep in mind what is going to be explained. In this case, that is the behaviour of EU-member states when it comes to foreign policy decisions on contribution to EU common foreign policy in the form of a mission. The hypotheses that are drawn from the neo-liberal institutionalist theory correspond with the two most important variables that were derived earlier.

It is essential to keep in mind that the hypotheses here are formulated in a positive sense, but this does not imply that they are not expected to have an effect once changed into their negative counterparts. On the contrary, the negative equivalents of these hypotheses can help in predicting state decision making as well. The hypotheses that can be formulated are the following ones:

“A EU member state is likely to contribute more to an EU mission if it has military interests that are at stake in the area of concern”

The second hypothesis deals with the economic aspect of a state’ power interests:

“A EU member state is likely to contribute more to an EU mission if it has economic interests that are at stake in the area of concern”
Figure 2.1 depicts the relation between the independent variables “X” and the dependent variable “Y”; state’s contributions to an EU mission under the CSDP.

**Figure 2.1: The Neo-liberal institutionalist Model**

![Diagram](image_url)

- **X**
  - Military (power) interests
  - Economic (power) interests

- **Y**
  - States' contribution to a EU mission
2.2 When the Inside gets to Play Along: the Domestic Politics approach

As indicated in the previous section, neo-liberal institutionalism can provide an explanation for the creation of common policies and cooperation between several countries. These common policies, such as the European Union’s common foreign policy, are based on shared interests. But, where these shared interests originate from, is not elaborated on by the neo-liberals.

However, a turn in international relations theory that took place around the 1990s, does concern itself with this issue. This return to domestic politics, after earlier efforts in the nineteen-sixties and -seventies in the branch of foreign policy analysis when theorists like Allison (1969) developed theories such as the bureaucratic politics model, focuses on explaining state behaviour and (foreign) policy choices of states as well. Where “old” theories such as (neo-)realism and (neo-)liberalism employed systems-theories, perceiving the world system as an anarchical playground for sovereign states, new theories focussed on more than just states trying to gain as much power as possible for their own survival. Other important actors, e.g. international organisations and, more importantly, domestic actors caught the interests of theorists.

As Finnemore argues, domestic politics play a large and sometimes determining role in defining national goals and interests (Finnemore, 1996, p. 2). Jeffry Frieden (1999) explains that analysing the debate at the national level is necessary in order to understand and analyse national foreign policy making. Interests of groups, bureaucracies and other participants in national debates help in forming these policies (Frieden, 1999, p. 39). Domestic actors that are of potential importance according to the domestic politics approach are interest- or lobby groups, individual leaders and politicians, “the public” at large. According to the domestic politics approach, mass public movements can constrain decision-makers (Finnemore, 1996, p.2). Domestic politics tried to combine the existing ideas of systems theory, with states as the primary actors that care predominantly about their own survival, and theories that suggest that domestic groups and their interests matter as well to (foreign) policy makers. Therefore, for the domestic politics approach, states are still important actors, but the formation of state interests is not just taken as something given. It is no longer just about power interests in relation to other states’ positions, but domestic concerns and pressures are identified as influential as well. Is it possible for domestic politics to influence the policy of an international institution such as the European Union through the policies of national governments? What are domestic factors that are of influence on state behaviour? These questions are addressed in this approach and a couple of different features of importance for this research are identified, by looking at the different actors that are of influence.
Political actors within countries are important when explaining why domestic actors matter for the formation of a country’s foreign policy. These actors, the decision-makers, consider the different policy options a state has concerning foreign policy and they decide on which one to choose. It is commonly believed that politicians make decisions based on their own interests and survival. Helen Milner (1997) for example states that the primary goal of these political actors is personal. Political actors want to gain and remain in power. Once elected, they will seek re-election. When considering their policy options, politicians bear in mind that the domestic constituency has to be satisfied in order to increase their chances of re-election. According to Milner, office seeking is thus the most important incentive for political actors to decide on (Milner, 1997, p. 34 – 36). Another factor, besides re-election, that might influence the decisions of political actors is whether they can ensure the implementation of their party programme. Moravcsik (1993) endorses these ideas and argues that statesmen try to realise their own personal goals, while being held back somewhat by calculations of their constituencies. The preferences and goals of the statesman himself do matter in policy-making (pp. 5; 15 – 16; 26; 30 - 33).

Societal interest groups or lobby groups are a first group of importance in this approach, as they can exert influence over state decision-makers. Milner (1997) has identified two ways in which these interest groups can exercise their influence. Firstly, these groups act as pressure groups that can influence decision-makers because they can provide funds and voters to political actors. Preferences of such domestic interests groups are often important to decision-makers to take into account when contemplating different policy options (Milner, 1997, p. 60). Interests groups might represent quite a significant part of the electorate in a constituency whose votes political actors want to attract. Or, as Garrett & Lange (1996) put it, preferences and power of domestic actors can influence policies, for decision-makers are sensitive to them (p. 51). A second way in which societal groups can have an influence on state decisions on foreign policy is through the provision of information. When groups provide certain information to a decision-maker, they might frame it in a way that makes it more likely that decisions are made in their preferred direction. Moreover, societal groups act as indicators for political actors when it comes to reactions to (possible) policy choices (Milner, 1997, p. 60).

The second group of domestic actors discussed in this approach and the second to be of influence on the decision-makers, is partly related to the previous one. However, this group is formed by the actual inhabitants of a state who together represent the “public opinion” of a country. The electorate proves to be an important incentive for political actors. Governmental officials are sensible to the public opinion in a country. When people disagree with certain policy choices and they protest against it, this is an
indicator for the government and its decision-makers that they might lose votes if they continue this policy. Hence, if there is a call for a certain direction in the foreign policy a government is to decide on, this call might be heard, or at least taken into consideration, by the policy makers. Thomas Risse-Kappen (1991) is one of the authors who endorses this idea. He explains that public opinion can influence policy-making in several ways. Public opinion can change policy goals, the prioritisation of these goals, or it can narrow the range of options perceived. In addition, the position of (political) actors can be strengthened or weakened by public opinion (ibid., pp. 482 – 483), similar to the influence of societal interest groups. Risse-Kappen mentions the importance of domestic structure when it comes to influence of groups on policy formation, but this aspect is considered an intervening variable in this research and will be elaborated on further on in this theoretical chapter.

Since the different aspects of importance when trying to explain foreign policy choices of states with the domestic politics approach have been addressed, it is possible to make predictions based on this theory in the form of hypotheses. This approach identifies two ways in which national decision-makers are influenced by domestic groups to take a certain direction. Again, the goal of elaborating on these different theories is to explain the behaviour of states when it comes to the foreign policy decisions of contributing to EU missions. Furthermore, as was the case with the neo-liberal institutionalist hypotheses, the ones stated below are formulated in a positive sense. However, the negative variant is expected to function as well, but instead of leading to contribution, these will not favour contribution. The hypotheses that are drawn then from the domestic politics approach are the following ones:

“A European member state is more likely to contribute more to an EU mission if the interest group pressure in favour of providing such a contribution exceeds the pressure against contributing”

The influence of public opinion on decision making concerning foreign policy follows a similar line of reasoning:

“A European member state is more likely to contribute more to an EU mission, if the public opinion overall is in favour of providing such a contribution”

Figure 2.2 shows the hypotheses based on the domestic politics approach.
Figure 2.2: The Domestic Politics Model

X

interest group pressure in favour of contribution

Public opinion in favour of contribution

Y

States’ contribution to a EU mission
2.3 What should be done? Considering Constructivism

The most recent turn in International Relations theory is the constructivist turn, which gained popularity since the early 1990s. Whereas theories such as realism and liberalism (the rationalist theories) often perceive international relations and actions as the inevitable consequences of human nature or other essential characteristics of world politics, constructivists assume that an important part of international relations can be attributed to historical or social construction. For constructivists, social phenomena have their own specific historical, cultural and political backgrounds, formed by human interactions in a social world. Consequently, a situation should always be placed in its specific context, which will differ for different actors at various moments in time and place. This view emphasizes the social dimensions in international relations.

Constructivism contains a broad range of ideas and variables concerning different aspects of International Relations theory. In this research, constructivist variables are identified that are expected to be of influence on the dependent variable of state decision-making on foreign policy. The first theory deals with national role conceptions, the second with reputation.

As Krotz (2002) explains, national role conceptions (or NRC’s) are a great contribution to neo-liberal institutionalist theory (either alone, or as part of a theory of domestic politics) when trying to define the interests state pursue internationally (pp. 32-33). NRC’s thus complement the theories that have been addressed so far and form a perfect part of the constructivist-institutionalist research agenda. Aggestam (1999) argued before that there is agreement among scholars that identity perceptions are of importance as a frame of reference in International Relations. She agrees with Krotz that role conceptions can predict foreign policy behaviour (Aggestam, 1999). A national role conception is defined by Krotz as an internal construction of the collective self and it represents what the nation state is and what choices it should make (Krotz, 2002, p.2): they are “domestically shared views and understandings regarding the proper role and purpose of one’s own state as a social collectivity in the international arena” (Krotz, 2002, p. 6). NRC’s are not the interest or ideologies of the dominant groups or parties in society, or an addition of said groups or individuals. NRC’s are shared among all kinds of groups and positions in a state: among national politicians, political elites, public organisational units, the foreign policy community, but with societal groups and within the civil society as well. Of course, for NRC’s to be influential on foreign policy behaviour, they need to be shared by a states’ decision-makers (ibid., p. 5-7).
National role conceptions are formed by a country’s past and are based on “lessons learned”. They are, as Krotz explains, products of history, memory and socialisations. NRC’s are changeable and at times they are disputed domestically, but mostly they are robust conceptions (ibid., pp. 5-9).

Once a NRC has formed and is accepted among the different actors in society, it can influence the interests and policies of states. A national role conception can motivate the goals and actions (prescribing preferences), rule out alternative options (proscribing preferences) and can lead to a preference in the style of decision making (inducing preferences). NRC’s thus show decision-makers what choices and behaviour are normal, right and plausible (ibid., pp. 8-9). Furthermore, they tell what role a state has in the world as well as domestically. The NRC’s form the national identity of the state and decision-makers will make foreign policy choices that fit these conceptions.

In cases as the one analysed in this research, national role conceptions can either create incentives for states to take a positive stance towards the deployment of, and contribution to such a mission, or their NRC can limit them in their willingness to contribute. For example, when a state sees itself as an advocate of human rights and has a positive stance towards humanitarian aid and development, it will be more inclined to contribute to a mission that is aimed at protecting human rights or tackling a humanitarian crisis. States that have a NRC that promotes freedom and does not condemn military intervention are likely to support a military mission that is directed at liberating a people that has fallen under occupation. On the other side, there are states that are only willing to contribute if military intervention is considered a last resource. National role conceptions thus influence the willingness of states to contribute extensively or to be somewhat more reluctant in their contributions.

When it comes to country comparisons on policy choices, national role conceptions can explain similarities as well as differences in these choices. The three states of interest here are Germany, France and the United Kingdom, each of which has its own national role conception that has potentially been of influence on the policy choices concerning their contribution to the EU NAVFOR.

Germany is identified by Krotz (2002) as a “civilian power”, a state whose foreign policy is tied to specific goals, values and principles. This national role conception is formed (partly) by the historical legacies of the Second World War and the Holocaust. German foreign policy is aimed at civilizing international relations (ibid., pp. 10-11). There are certain components that fit the German NRC. Firstly, the idea that foreign policy is not something that should be done alone. German decision-makers prefer a broad international legitimization of all important foreign policy and preferably work together with partners
and allies in such an international framework. And even within such a broad coalition, Germany perceives military force as a last resort towards non-selfish ends. Second, the rule of law matters a great deal and international rules and legal norms are high on the agenda, especially when it comes to human rights and other humanitarian concerns (ibid., pp. 11-12).

France has a different NRC, according to Krotz (2002) a conception of a “residual world power”. France sees itself as an active, independent regional leader with ambitions of global scale presence. This role conception originates from the eighteenth century, when France was (one of) the biggest power in Europe with a grande armée and later on, a model-republic (ibid., pp. 14-15). The French NRC entails that it sees itself as an independent actor, making its own decisions in as many foreign policy fields as possible, without having to account to others. La Grande Nation stands for a strong, independent Europe under French leadership (Van der Vleuten & Alons, 2012, p. 282). The French stance is quite activist, wanting to shape and participate in the management of international affairs and it sees this as its duty to act on a world scale. However, these international efforts take place on their own terms (ibid., pp. 14-15)

Krotz has not identified the NRC of the United Kingdom. Other scholars, however, have concerned themselves with this state and the topic of national identity. The British identify their self mostly in contrast to Europe as “the friendly other”, as Risse explains (2001, p. 199). According to Medrano (2003), the United Kingdom and the United States still enjoy a special relationship, based on a shared identity. He adds that the British fear a decline in their own politics and economy and fear losing their national identity and culture, due to Europe and the European Union (Medrano, 2003, pp. 216, 229-231, 255). Novy (2013) reaches the same conclusions; the United Kingdom still attaches great value to the Commonwealth and its special relationship with the United States. Further European integration is regarded as threatening to their own “Britishness” (Novy, 2013, pp. 93, 105). The United Kingdom values sovereignty of national governments and reserves options to act independently in close cooperation with the United States. The United Kingdom sees itself as a transatlantic bridge between Europe and the US (Soder, 2010, p. 12). What Macleod (1997) adds is that Britain sees itself as a promoter of defence and security. Is sees itself as a defender of the principle of free trade and economic liberalism, a country that wants to work towards peace and stability and good governance. He concluded that the United Kingdom saw an important role for the NATO in the European region as well (Macleod, 1997, pp. 173, 184).
The constructivist variable of reputation might help to explain state decision-making on foreign policies. The variable of reputation is employed by different theories. As was argued already by liberal theorists such as Keohane (1984; 2003) and Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger (1996), international cooperation creates expectations for self-interested states of what ‘the other’ will do. It makes behaviour of states more or less predictable, since all states are expected to follow their own interests. Reputation as an explanatory variable is thus employed by different theories, but this thesis uses the variable in a fashion that fits the constructivist train of thought. Constructivist theorists have elaborated thoroughly on the variable of reputation. As Wang (2006) puts it, “national reputations create either an enabling or disabling environment in which nation states pursue policy goals and policies in the global arena” (Wang, 2006, p. 91). It is a form of soft power (as opposed to hard, military power). In an institutional environment, such as the European Union, political actors are concerned about their reputation as members of this organisation. They worry about the legitimacy of their preferences and behaviour: if states are not consistent in their actions, their reputation might be damaged (Schimmelfennig, 2001, p. 48). States have to protect their credibility and reputation as community members (ibid., p. 77).

In the case of contribution to the EU’s anti-piracy mission, reputation might matter in two ways. Reputation deals with states “keeping their promises” and related to this, with previous contributions in similar situations. When a state has contributed to a similar mission previously, it has created expectations concerning future missions. As argued by different authors (Schimmelfennig, 2001; Keohane, 2003; Wang, 2006), states want to be reliable partners in their institutional environments. Doing what is expected of them (be it due to previous contribution or earlier promises) is a way of maintaining a reputation as a reliable, good partner for the other states in the organisation. After all, reputation damage might have negative effects on states’ partnerships, which might damage their relationships not only in soft power terms, but in economic or even military terms as well (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1996, pp. 185 – 188). Thus, what states have contributed to previous, similar missions matters for their contribution in this mission as well, as it can be seen as a way of safeguarding their reputation.

Special relationships are important for states in terms of reputation as well. States want to safeguard these relationships. For the United Kingdom, such a special relationship exists with the United States, as mentioned already (Dumbrell, 2004; 2009). This might just be a disruptive factor for the UK’s efforts in the European Union. France and Germany are considered as having a special relationship as well. They will thus try to be good partners in this Franco-German relationship.
The two different aspects of constructivist theory have led to the following hypotheses, which are formulated again in a positive fashion. Naturally, negative variants are possible as well. The question this research seeks to answer remains unchanged: how can behaviour of states be explained when it comes to the foreign policy decision of contributing to EU missions.

The first hypotheses deals with the influence of national role conceptions on countries’ contributions to the mission:

“A European member state is likely to contribute more to an EU mission if the goals and methods of a specific EU mission fit its’ national role perception”

A second hypothesis helps in explaining how reputation is important for state decision making:

“A European member state is likely to contribute more to an EU mission if it is concerned about its reputation as a good and reliable partner”

Figure 2.3 provides a graphic display of the hypotheses that have been derived from the constructivist theory.

Figure 2.3: The Constructivist Model
2.4 Scope Conditions

So far, some variables have been identified from different theories that will help answering the research question. Three different theories have been presented, but some intervening variables should be introduced now. The domestic politics approach provided expectations concerning state behaviour on making policy choices, but these expectations are not yet complete. As mentioned before, scope conditions need to be identified that are expected to influence the workings of this theory. The two intervening variables of importance in this research are the domestic structure of a state and the governmental sensitivity. These variables intervene in the relations between the dependent and the independent variables as expected by the domestic politics approach.

2.4.1 Domestic Structure

In the literature of the domestic politics approach, the domestic structure of a country is identified as an important intervening variable. The domestic structure can be defined with the help of Risse-Kappen (1994), who looked into the domestic sources of foreign policy and international politics. He defines domestic structure as “the nature of a state’s political institutions, its state-society relations, and the values and norms embedded in its political culture” (Risse-Kappen, 1994, p. 187). The differences in domestic structure can often explain the variation in policy choices between countries, for example when it comes to the impact of public opinion on foreign policy and security policy (Risse-Kappen, 1991, pp. 486 – 487). The organisation of the decision making authority (partly) determines whether there is a possibility for influence by other actors, such as societal organisations (Cortell & Davis, 1996, p. 454; Risse-Kappen, 1991). This is, very concise, how the domestic structure of a country is of importance for the formation of foreign policy.

Multiple authors have concerned themselves with the concept of domestic structures and they have identified different categories in which states can be placed. These theorists looked into the different features states can exhibit which, in turn, makes it possible to group states according to their domestic structures.

A first aspect of the domestic structure is the degree of centralisation in a country. States are identified as being either “weak”, with a low degree of centralisation when it comes to state institutions, agencies and the ability of political systems to control their society et cetera, or “strong”, exhibiting a high degree of centralisation (Cortell & Davis, 1996, p. 454; Risse-Kappen, 1991, pp. 484 - 486). Risse-Kappen checks whether the executive power is concentrated in the hands of one decision-maker (a president, prime minister, chancellor et cetera) or whether the government can control the legislative process. “Weak”
states have political institutions that are fragmented and open to pressures from societal groups and parties. States have limited possibilities to impose policies or extract resources from these groups. “Strong” states on the other hand, have centralised political institutions led by strong bureaucracies, leaving little room for public demand to ring through. The autonomy vis-a-vis society remains very high (Risse-Kappen, 1991, pp. 484-485). As Van der Vleuten (2001) puts it, a centralised (“strong”) state is characterized by an executive that dominates the decision-making processes. A decentralised (hence “weak”) state is not dominated by the executive. It is thus all about the degree of centralisation of state power (Van der Vleuten, 2001, pp. 37-40, 85-87). This aspect has some consequences for the workings of the domestic politics approach. When a state is "strong" (highly centralised), it is less likely that its decision-makers are sensitive to societal pressures or a public opinion favouring certain policy choices. A decision-maker does not have to take these other opinions into account.

The second feature relates to the structure of society; the relation between state and society. This relation can, simply put, vary from “close” to “distant“ in the way societal actors can get access to, and participate in policy-formulation (Cortell & Davis, 1996, p. 454). Risse-Kappen (1991) analyses whether a country has strong or weak organisations that can emphasize the demands of (societal) groups. Moreover, he considers the nature of coalition-building processes in so called policy networks. These policy networks link the state and the society in a country. Policy-networks are either state-dominated, society controlled or characterised by what Risse-Kappen calls democratic corporatism. State dominated policy networks are apparent in countries with centralised institutions and weak social organisations. Political elites posses state power and are able to exclude, to a certain extent, societal actors and the public opinion (ibid., pp. 484-486). As van der Vleuten (2001) explains, such policy networks are represented by a pluralist interest group system (Van der Vleuten, 2001, pp. 37-40, 85-87). When policy networks are society dominated, societies are likely to be rather homogenous with a high degree of social mobilisation, but with weaker state structures. The public opinion can play an important role in this society. The case of democratic corporatism is a middle ground between the previous two forms. When political institutions and societal organisations are of comparable strength, the actors of these groups are likely to be engaged in a continuous bargaining process to reach policy compromises (Risse-Kappen, 1991, pp. 484 - 486). Van der Vleuten endorses the description of this form of interest group system as corporatist (Van der Vleuten, 2001, pp. 37-40, 85-87). Risse-Kappen tests his propositions by analysing the responses of four countries to changes in Soviet foreign policies. In the end, as shown in table 2.1, Risse-Kappen concludes that Germany is a country in which mass public opinion sets broad and unspecified limits to the foreign policy choices. The public opinion defined the range of options
available for implementing policy goals. France is the country that is least sensitive to the public opinion (Risse-Kappen, 1991, pp. 510-512). France and the United Kingdom are both identified as states with a state dominated domestic structure, but there is still some difference between them. Although both countries are characterized by an executive that has centralised power and the government is mostly sheltered from societal demands, the British structure is identified as liberal, whereas the French state is identified as statist. This has to do with the difference in regulation: in a statist structure, the executive intervenes directly into society. In a liberal structure, state and society self-regulate (Van der Vleuten, 2001, pp. 37-40, 85-87). When focussing on the structure of society and the patterns of state-society relations, it is evident that these are of influence on the relations between the state and societal actors. A state with a state-dominated policy network is less likely to be sensitive to public opinion or other societal pressures than a state with a society-dominated policy network.

Evidently, ideas about the domestic structure are important when applying the domestic politics approach. The domestic structure of a country is of potential influence on the possibilities there are for the influence of public opinion and societal pressure on state decision-makers, and consequently, domestic structure (indirectly) influences foreign policy decision making. For example, in a state with a state dominated domestic structure, policymaking is less likely to be influenced by domestic groups or by the public opinion or societal pressure, than in a state with a society dominated structure. So, if a state is characterised by a society controlled domestic structure, domestic-politics theory concerning the influence of societal pressure and public opinion, is expected to have explanatory power. However, if a state has a state dominated domestic structure, it is less likely that the domestic politics approach provides explanations for differences in state behaviour, since this type of state does not leave room for societal pressure to influence state decision making.

When combining Risse-Kappen and Van der Vleuten’s research, an overview of the possible domestic structures states exhibit can be provided. These different possible domestic structures are summed up

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political system</th>
<th>U.S.A.</th>
<th>W. Germany</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>France</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decentralized</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate level of centralization</td>
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<td>Intermediate level of centralization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Centralized</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy network</th>
<th>U.S.A.</th>
<th>W. Germany</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>France</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Society-dominated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic, corporatist</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homogeneous, strong organizations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-dominated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Risse-Kappen, 1991, p. 492
by table 2.2. In addition, the three countries that are analysed in this thesis are placed in their respective categories. Their positioning is based on the combination of the identifications of the authors who have concerned themselves with case study research that uses domestic structure (Katzenstein, 1985; Risse-Kappen, 1991; Checkel, 1999 and Van der Vleuten, 2001).

Table 2.2; Characteristics of Different Domestic Structures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Society dominated:</th>
<th>State dominated:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic corporatism</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision making authority / degree of centralisation</td>
<td>- Decentralised (&quot;weak&quot;) state - Non-executive dominance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-society relations / policy networks</td>
<td>- Society dominated policy networks - Corporatist interest group system; centralised and concentrated - Continuous bargaining (via consultative mechanisms)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Represented in empirical reality by:

| Germany | United Kingdom | France |

As table 2.2 shows, the “big three” countries of the European Union, France, Germany and United Kingdom, can be divided according to their domestic structures. It is evident that France falls in the last category of a statist, state dominated state structure, for it is a centralised "strong" state, where societal groups are not that well organised and the state dominates the policy making process. France has a strong, centralised institutional structure with a polarized political culture and pluralist interest group system. In Germany, societal pressure on governing elites is stronger, Germany is much more decentralised, and hence a society controlled state. The society has strong organisations and there is room for continuous bargaining between societal groups and the governing elites through strong policy networks. The national government has rather limited leeway in pursuing solely the policies it prefers. The United Kingdom shows quite some similarities with France when it comes to the domestic structure, as Van der Vleuten argued (2001, pp. 84, 87). The United Kingdom has a state dominated domestic structure as well. However, as mentioned previously, in a more liberal fashion. There is some room for self-regulation that finds its way through the pluralist interest group system, but power is still

2.4.2 Governmental Sensitivity
A second scope condition influencing the relation between the independent variables of the domestic politics approach and the depend variable of state behaviour, is governmental sensitivity. Governmental sensitivity is most often related to national (parliamentary) elections. The idea is that when a government is more sensitive, it will attach greater value to the domestic concerns that are spread, since representatives do not want to lose votes. A government’s sensitivity increases when elections are nearby or when it finds itself in an unstable position (Van der Vleuten, 1002, p. 53; Alons, 2010, p. 36). Decision-makers and governments want to be re-elected, that is why their sensitivity to concerns other than their own become more important. When a government’s sensitivity has increased, societal mobilisation (in terms of societal pressure or public opinion) will more easily have an effect on a governments decision making.

Governmental sensitivity influences the expectations concerning the workings of the domestic politics approach. In a country in which elections are pending, it is more likely that the domestic independent variables influence decision-makers, then would be the case if elections had just been held. A state will attach more importance to domestic concerns and public opinion when its sensitivity is higher. So, this variable interacts with the other intervening variable. Even if a country exhibits a state dominated domestic structure, it might be the case that it is more sensitive to domestic concerns, since governmental sensitivity is heightened.

2.4.3 Renewed Expectations
Since the scope conditions that have just been identified have an effect on the earlier explained workings of the domestic politics approach, it is necessary to adjust the theories’ hypotheses to the newly gathered information. The neo-liberal institutionalist theory and the constructivist theory are not sensitive to the intervening variables, so those hypotheses remain unchanged. Since the theoretical framework becomes somewhat more complicated the more variables are added, it might be helpful to point to the graphical display of the framework in figure 2.4 at the end of this chapter.

Based on the domestic politics approach, two hypotheses were identified that showed the influence of societal pressure and public opinion on foreign policy decision making. This relation between the two independent variables and the dependent variable of foreign policy decision making, is influenced by the intervening variables (or scope conditions) of domestic structure and governmental sensitivity. Even
though the following hypotheses are formulated in a positive sense, this does not imply they do not have negative counterparts. The negative equivalents of these hypotheses indicate, that the effects of the domestic politics variables are unlikely to be present.

When we focus on the influence the domestic structure has, it becomes evident that it affects the relation between societal pressure and foreign policy making in the following manner:

“If a EU member-state exhibits a society controlled domestic structure, the effect of interest group pressure on foreign policy decision making will be even bigger”.

Moreover, the same intervening influence is retrieved when it comes to the public opinion in a state:

“If a EU member-state exhibits a society controlled domestic structure, the effect of public opinion on foreign policy decision making will be even bigger”.

The second intervening variable, governmental sensitivity, potentially influences the relation between the independent variables and foreign policy decision making as well:

“The higher the degree of governmental sensitivity of a EU member-state, the bigger the effect of interest group pressure on foreign policy decision making will be”.

The effect of the intervening variable is equal for the influence of public opinion, thus:

“The higher the degree of governmental sensitivity of a EU member-state, the bigger the effect of public opinion on foreign policy decision making will be”.

2.5 Chapter Summary

So far, three theoretical approaches have been identified which might provide answers on what the considerations of states are when deciding on common foreign policy; neo-liberal institutionalism, the domestic politics approach and constructivism. All three theories provide different independent variables that are expected to influence the depended variable of state decision making in international relations. Furthermore, two intervening variable (or scope conditions) have been identified which have an impact on the relations between the independent variables as identified by the domestic politics approach and the dependent variable. These two intervening variables, the domestic structure of a country and governmental sensitivity, impact the explanatory power of the approach when certain
conditions are or are not met. They thus influence the likelihood that this theory can provide answers to the research question.

In the end, the different variables and their mutual relationships that might explain the behaviour of states when it comes to decision making on foreign policy, are shown in figure 2.4 on the next page.
Figure 2.4; The Theoretical Framework

- Domestic structure is society dominated
- Governmental sensitivity is high
- National role conception in favour of contribution
- Reputation in favour of contribution
- Interest group pressure in favour of contribution
- Public opinion in favour of contribution
- Economic (power) interests
- Military (power) interests

Constructivist explanations

Neo-liberal institutionalist explanations
3. Methodological Framework

This section discusses the more practical aspects of this thesis. This methodological framework elaborates on the methods used in this study and the cases selected. The three countries of interest that were mentioned before, are more thoroughly discussed here, along with the specific mission that forms the subject of this research. Furthermore, some expectations are drawn which combine the theories used and the cases selected for this research. Moreover, hypotheses as derived from the addressed theories are operationalised. Finally, data selections and the reliability of the sources and the research in itself are discussed.

3.1 Research Method and Case Selection

This thesis aims to discover the underlying factors of importance for EU member-states when it comes to decision making on common foreign policies in intergovernmental settings. Hence, the focus lies primarily on foreign policy decision making. Different theoretical approaches provide different explanations for this phenomenon and this research aims to find out which of these are able to explain the case of the EU’s anti-piracy missions, since it became evident not all countries contribute equally to the mission, even though their interests are similar. The method used in this thesis is that of a case study methodology, using (multiple) cases. An intense analysis is performed of all types of sources, such as speeches, debates, policy-decisions (within a EU-context and within countries), newspaper articles etcetera, concerning the decision making on contributions of countries to anti-piracy missions, in order to grasp what factors mattered for countries to come to their decisions in this process.

Some choices already became evident in relation to the case selection for this thesis: the choice for a specific mission and three countries. The topic that is considered in the empirical reality is that of the European Union’s anti-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia, operation Atalanta, as an example of common foreign policy of the European Union. The operation consists of three missions: EU NAVFOR (2008), EUCAPNESTOR (2011) and EUTM (2013). Due to space and time limitations, it is impossible to consider all three missions. The case that is thoroughly analysed in this research is the EU NAVFOR mission. This mission has been ongoing for quite some years now, since it was launched in 2008. Moreover, this mission is of considerable strength, most of the time comprising 1.200 personnel, 4 - 7 combat vessels and 2-4 maritime aircrafts, which makes it even more interesting to look deeper into. For
the sake of data collection, it is also an advantage that the mission has been ongoing for quite a while. The most recent mission, EUTM, will not provide sufficient information to analyse, since decision making on this mission is still ongoing.

The process of selecting countries as cases for analysis is based on empirical as well as theoretical grounds. When performing research in the context of the European Union, it seems obvious and relevant to focus on “the big three” states; France, the United Kingdom and Germany. Academics as well as the broader public usually see these countries as the three member states that are the most powerful and matter the most. Other research with an EU-focus has often concerned itself with these three member states (Beyers & Dierickx, 1998; Börzel, 2001; Wagnsson, 2010; Lehne, 2012; Frontini, 2013 et al.). But, more importantly, a first glance into the contributions of the three countries to the mission has shown that, even though the countries appear to have similar interest in the mission, they do not contribute equally much to the EU mission. The United Kingdom contributes less to EU NAVFOR than France and Germany. The question as to why this happened, makes these cases interesting from an empirical point of view.

Still, the choice for the three cases is theoretically grounded as well, when the different domestic structures of these states are brought into play. The domestic structure of countries is a recurring topic in much research, especially in constructivism. This because the domestic structure of a country can determine to what extend possibilities exist for societal actors to influence the decision making of national governments. What matters when considering the domestic structure of a state, is the capability of a government to pursue a specific foreign policy against the will of dominant actors and groups in their society (Van der Vleuten & Alons, 2012, pp. 267 – 268), as explained in the theoretical chapter. To recall, France is identified as a strong, centralised, statist state. In France, the national government is unlikely to be influenced by domestic groups. Germany is identified as a country that is decentralised and has strong policy networks through which domestic factors can have a profound impact on the national decision making, a democratic corporatist structure. It is evident that the German domestic structure differs greatly from the French domestic structure, where the government appears more or less insensitive to public opinion. The United Kingdom is perceived as a state that takes a position in between the French and German domestic structures, but most scholars relate it to France. In the United Kingdom, societal pressure matters somewhat more than it does in France, but interest representation through societal groups is weakly organised in this centralised, liberal country. Because
the domestic structure matters, this is an important variable to take into account when considering case selection.

Another reason to select the bigger EU-countries is a more practical one; a country needs to put (military) equipment and/or troops at the mission’s disposal. Smaller (and poorer) countries of the Union might not be in a position that allows them to contribute equipment or troops to such a mission. France, the United Kingdom and Germany all contribute to the specific EU mission analysed in this thesis. The nature of these contributions is of course addressed in more detail later on in this work.

When it comes to the research design, it is evident that the cases differ on a couple of important variables, not in the least the dependent variable, but on the intervening variables as well. Selection of the cases is based on these variables. Since the states differ on their intervening variables, this research exhibits a most different systems design, as described by Gerring (2007, pp. 90; 139 - 142). It is expected that the variation on the intervening variables has an effect on the explanatory power of the other theories. Moreover, as mentioned before, these three countries are seen as the most important member-states of the Union.

In conclusion, three cases are analysed: the contribution to the EU NAVFOR mission of Germany, the United Kingdom and France. Now that the theories, the scope conditions and the cases have been defined, operational hypotheses, which formulate expectations based on the theories concerning the empirical reality, are developed. These hypotheses are formulated to be able to assess the explanatory power of the different theories. At the end of the empirical analysis, the hypotheses as formulated hereafter, are compared to the empirical findings. If the findings do not match, the hypotheses of the theories used (or parts of them) are falsified. If the hypotheses do match the findings, the theories explanatory mechanisms are supported, at least for these cases.

3.2 Operational Hypotheses
Since the goal of this research is to provide theoretically founded explanations for state behaviour in the empirical reality, operational hypotheses are created that are tested in the empirical reality. These specific hypotheses combine the empirical reality with the different theories and independent variables. By doing so, expectations are formulated. Since this leads up to a very large list, these expectations are presented clearly in table 3.1. for each case, the expectations each theory has provided are formulated, while taking the scope conditions into consideration.
### Table 3.1; Overview of the Operational Hypotheses and Expectations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Theory</th>
<th>Neo-liberal institutionalism</th>
<th>Domestic politics</th>
<th>Constructivism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Societal pressure</td>
<td>Public opinion</td>
<td>National Role Conception</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Germany | - If it has military interests in the Somali region → substantive contribution to EU NAVFOR  
      - If it has economic interests in the Somali region → substantive contribution to EU NAVFOR | Society dominated structure, so relatively much influence of domestic groups → substantive contribution if domestic groups favour EU NAVFOR mission  
      *(the effect is even stronger when governmental sensitivity is high)* | Society dominated structure, so relatively much influence of the public opinion → substantive contribution if the public opinion is in favour EU NAVFOR mission  
      *(the effect is even stronger when governmental sensitivity is high)* | Germany is a “civilian power” → substantive contribution to EU NAVFOR within a broad legal frame is expected, especially when the mission is framed in humanitarian terms | - If it has contributed to similar missions before → substantive contribution  
      - if its (EU) partners contribute (especially France) → substantive contribution |
| France | - If it has military interests in the Somali region → substantive contribution to EU NAVFOR  
       - If it has economic interests in the Somali region → substantive contribution to EU NAVFOR | State dominated domestic structure → relatively little influence of interest groups  
       - However, if governmental sensitivity is high, it is likely that domestic groups can be of influence → contribution if domestic pressure groups favour EU NAVFOR mission | State dominated domestic structure → relatively little influence of public opinion is not decisive for decision-makers  
       - However, if governmental sensitivity is high, public opinion can be of influence → substantive contribution if public opinion favours EU NAVFOR mission | France is a “residual world power” → a substantive contribution to EU NAVFOR due to its activist stance is expected, France is likely to take a leading role | - If it has contributed to similar missions before → substantive contribution  
       - if its (EU) partners contribute (especially Germany) → substantive contribution |
| United Kingdom | - If it has military interests in the Somali region → substantive contribution to EU NAVFOR  
- If it has economic interests in the Somali region → substantive contribution to EU NAVFOR | - State dominated domestic structure → relatively little influence of domestic groups  
- However, if governmental sensitivity is high, it is likely that domestic groups can be of influence → contribution if domestic pressure groups favour EU NAVFOR mission | - State dominated domestic structure → relatively little influence of domestic concerns, public opinion is not decisive for decision-makers  
- However, if governmental sensitivity is high, it is likely that public opinion can be of influence → substantive contribution if public opinion favour EU NAVFOR mission | The United Kingdom is a “reluctant power” → a substantive contribution to EU NAVFOR is less likely, since it prefers other partnerships over the EU | - If it has contributed to similar missions before → substantive contribution  
- If its partners contribute (especially the United States) → substantive contribution to the EU mission is less likely |
This table summarizes the theoretical expectations for each case based on the three theories and the identified intervening variables. Of course, these expectations are not yet measurable as such in the empirical reality. Therefore, the next paragraph deals with the operationalisation of the variables.

3.3 Operationalisation of the Variables

In order to analyse the different theoretical variables in the empirical reality, they need to be operationalised. A clear operationalisation also contributes to a higher reliability and validity of this research, as will be elaborated on in paragraph 3.4. The theoretical concepts are transformed to measurable ones that are retrievable in the empirical reality. This operationalisation takes place in the following paragraphs. To keep oversight, the different variables are discussed in the same order as the theories were addressed in the theoretical framework.

3.3.1 The Dependent Variable

Contribution to the EU NAVFOR mission is the dependent variable in this research. This can be a simple “yes-or-no” question, but since all three countries contribute to the mission, it is necessary to develop a way to measure the size of this contribution. This makes it possible to distinguish between levels of contribution of the different countries. When it comes to contributing to this particular mission, and to other EU missions as well, it is evident that different forms of contribution are possible. The European Union identifies two ways to contribute to the mission. The first one is operational contribution to the mission, with navy vessels, Maritime Patrol- and Reconnaissance Aircrafts and Vessel Protection Detachment teams. The second way of contribution consists of providing military staff to work at the missions Headquarters or onboard units (EU NAVFOR, 2013a). Counting the units that the states have deployed provides a good starting point for measuring the amount of contribution per country. However, one person sent to the headquarters is not the same as the deployment of a vessel: the person at the headquarters is less likely to be at risk and the deployment of one vessel entails the deployment of hundreds of personnel who work in a less safe environment. Therefore, the deployment of a vessel weighs more than the deployment of one person to a “save” headquarter.

Before any data collection can take place, it is important to decide on the period during which contributions are measured. For this research, the starting point for measurement is the beginning of the mission in December 2008, whereas the end point of the data gathering will lie at August of 2013. This allows for the biggest amount of data to be considered, without running the risk of constantly needing to update the already collected data to new information.
Another issue is the funding of the mission. The funding of the mission (€8.4 million for 2010, €8.05 million for 2011, €8.3 million for 2012 and €14.9 million for the costs until December 2014) comes from a shared budget that is funded by the EU member states based on their GDP, and is not “donated” by individual countries specifically for this mission. This budget covers the common costs such as the Headquarters in the United Kingdom and medical services and transport. However, the costs of military assets and personnel are shared by the contributing states according to their involvement in the operation. The states bear the costs for the resources they deploy (EU NAVFOR, 2013a). This means that, when the contributions of countries to the mission are measured by the units and personnel they deploy, this is also a representation of the costs they make. It is therefore not essential to find out what the countries contributed in terms of money. Indirectly, the amount of money contributed to the mission by a state, is already incorporated in the choice to deploy units and the fact that funding happens “automatically”, based on the GDP. Moreover, these data were not available. Only limited information concerning the units deployed was available on the website of the mission1. Thorough analysis of the different newspaper articles, retrieved through LexisNexis by using different keywords related to the leaving or returning of units combined with “Somalia” and “piracy”, provided an overview of units deployed. Moreover, the websites of the countries governments, their Ministries of Defence and their Navies2 provided such information as well. By collecting data at different moments in time, it is to provide an overview of the contributions over time, which allows assessing the influence of certain variables such as public opinion and societal pressure.

3.3.2 The Intervening Variables
Two intervening variables have been identified in the theoretical chapter of this thesis; domestic structure and governmental sensitivity. They will now be operationalised, to make them measurable in the empirical reality.

Domestic Structure
This variable requires the least attention in this part of the thesis, for it has already been addressed thoroughly in the theoretical chapter and the previous discussion on the case selection. Since multiple authors already described the domestic structures of the three countries addressed in this research, this

1 http://eunavfor.eu/deployed-units/surface-vessels/. Various attempts to gather the data (directly) from different official authorities were made, but those attempts proved futile.

thesis does not offer a re-doing of this classification. Germany is perceived as a decentralised state with a domestic structure that allows for influence of domestic (interest) groups and public opinion; a democratic corporatist, society dominated state. France is more or less opposite to the German structure; it is a centralised state with an independent government and ample room for domestic groups and opinions to be of importance to the government; a statist, state dominated state (Risse-Kappen, 1991; Van der Vleuten, 2001). In the United Kingdom, some room for influence of societal actors exists, but not as much as in the German case. The United Kingdom resembles the French system more, with a more centralised state; a liberal, state dominated domestic structure (Van der Vleuten, 2001). This intervening variable will interfere with the workings of the domestic politics approach in this thesis.

**Governmental Sensitivity**

This variable is strongly related to the elections in a country. When elections in a country are near, governments are more sensitive to domestic pressures and concerns, for they do not want to risk losing votes in the upcoming elections. Therefore, it is likely that societal pressure and public opinion matter more in periods prior to elections (even if states exhibit a state dominated domestic structure). In this research, governmental sensitivity is considered to be heightened in the six months prior to elections. Right after these elections, governmental sensitivity will decrease again. This information is derived from governmental websites[^3]. Furthermore, governmental sensitivity is related to the popularity of a government as well: the less popular a government is, the more inclined it is to take domestic concerns into consideration, in order to regain popularity. Opinion polls are used to provide insight into the popularity of a government[^4].

3.3.3 The Independent Variables

Multiple variables influencing the decision making of national governments on the contribution to the mission, were identified from the different theories as discussed in the theoretical framework. These variables are operationalised in order to measure them in the empirical reality.

**Military Interests**

Military interests are identified by analysing whether the pirates pose a realistic threat to the existing (balance of) power of the counties. The question is whether piracy has an effect on that power. As there is no standard method for measuring this, textual analysis of different sources is used to provide insight

[^4]: The three polling institutions provided the information concerning governmental popularity. For Germany, this was infratest dimap, for France TNS Sofres (in the “Baromètre Politique” of Figaro Magazine) and for the United Kingdom, ComRes delivered the data for the BBC Polltracker.
on this issue. Sources used for this purpose are academic literature on the issue, as well as news articles (from newspapers, magazines or press agencies, searched with LexisNexis) and expert groups concerning the issue are likely to be most helpful. Moreover, the governments may have made statements regarding the issue in terms of military interests, such as references to threats to security. This is of course relevant information when establishing the countries interests. Governmental statements are derived from their respective websites and in news articles (via LexisNexis).

Economic Interests

Economic interests are expected to be an important incentive for the countries in this research, since piracy is directly related to the maritime transport sector. When a country has a relatively large maritime transport sector that uses the waters off the coast of Somalia, it is faced with higher costs due to piracy. Either there is the risk of running into pirates who might hijack its vessels and crews, or the vessels need to change their routes, prolonging their journeys and thereby increasing costs. These economic interests can be identified by looking at the size of each country’s maritime transport sector. This information is derived from organisations such as the WTO, the IMO and UNCTAD as well as through (academic) literature and information of experts. The European (Eurostat) and national statistical databases provide information as well. The trading routes of the vessels are important as well; transport on inland waters is not affected by the Somali piracy. The preferred trade routes are found in the same manner as data concerning the size of the (maritime) transport sector. Furthermore, statements by governmental actors expressing economic concerns related to Somali piracy are studied. This can be found via the websites and archives of the governments. In short: if a country has a big maritime transport sector and that sector depends on the waters around Somalia, it is stated that their interests in economic terms to counter Somali piracy are significant.

Societal Pressure

When it comes to the variable of societal pressure, it needs to be clear which actors and groups are under investigation here. Different domestic actors, for example interest groups, exert societal pressure on governments. One way of defining these groups is identifying different interest- or lobby groups that exist and act within countries. These lobby groups have the means and knowhow to influence the governmental decision making. The groups that are studied in this research are lobby groups related to the maritime transport sector, anti-military lobbyists and human rights groups. These groups are found

in national lists of lobby groups\textsuperscript{6} and the European Transparency Register (ETR). The next step is to note whether these groups were active in the countries under investigation, and whether they tried to pressure the government to undertake certain actions considering piracy and the mission. This is quite a challenge, for interest groups do not always work “in broad daylight”. Certain groups might want the government to contribute to the missions, because they want to improve the situation for their sector of interest. Other groups might be against interference. When entering the different lobby groups in LexisNexis (with the keywords “Somalia” and “piracy”), it becomes evident whether these groups were indeed active. To make sure nothing is missed, national websites\textsuperscript{7} of lobby groups, such as Amnesty International, are checked on their position toward the EU NAVFOR mission as well.

\textit{The Public Opinion}

This aspect is strongly related to the previous one, as public opinion is a form of societal pressure as well. However, the focus here is on the opinion of “the people” instead of the lobby- and interest groups. Hence, different sources are analysed. Opinion polls of different institutions (such as British YouGov or the Eurobarometer) provide insight in the public opinion. The public opinion is not only voiced in opinion polls. Protests or gatherings in favour of or against the missions might have taken place. If so, this can be derived from news articles (of news papers, searched via LexisNexis) or be found in news magazines\textsuperscript{8}. News articles or expert organisations can provide the opinions of people as well. A relatively new method that can help in indicating whether people concerned themselves with the issue, is entering a search in Google Trends. This gives an overview of the number of searches on the issue.

\textit{National Role Conceptions}

The different national role conceptions the states exhibit have already been addressed in the theoretical chapter. To find out whether this mission “matched” the NRC of one or more countries, this research analyses how the mission is framed by the European Union. This framing is (potentially) done by High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton and in official documents concerning the decision to deploy and extend the mission et cetera. Potential frames the mission can have are those of a humanitarian, an economic or a security mission.

\textsuperscript{6} Only Germany requires lobby groups to register in the “Ständig aktualisierte Fassung der öffentlichen Liste über die Registrierung von Verbänden und deren Vertretern”. For France and the United Kingdom, the ETR is used.

\textsuperscript{7} http://www.amnesty.de/, http://www.amnesty.fr/ & http://www.amnesty.org.uk/

\textsuperscript{8} The websites of the following news magazines where searched for protests and issues related to Somali Piracy. Germany: Der Spiegel, Stern & Focus. France: l’Express, Marianne, Le Nouvel Observateur & Le Point. United Kingdom: The Economist, New Statesman, the Spectator & The Week.
To show that the states respective NRC’s do indeed matter for states’ decision making, speeches and statements of decision-makers of each country are analysed as to why they claim contributing more or less to the mission is the right thing to do. For the German case, that means that expressions that promote contribution due to humanitarian concerns are expected. Moreover, references to a broad legal frame in which the mission is deployed are expected. France is expected to take a rather activist stance. Perhaps the frame in which the mission is “fitted” is not that important to France. Rather, France’s NRC predicts that it will take the initiative and a leading role for the other EU-states to follow. For the United Kingdom, arguments that expresses concerns about free trade and concerns about security and stability are expected to be made. Moreover, emphasis on other partner(ship)s is expected. What should thus be found when the case studies are executed, are consistent references by the states’ decision-makers that fit their NRC’s, as legitimisations for contributing to the mission. Humanitarian concerns and references to the legal framework and cooperation with partner states- and initiatives are thus likely aspects derived from the German NRC. For France, it is thus important to identify whether it has played a leading role in the run-up to the mission. For the United Kingdom, expressions related to economic concerns and security are expected to be found. Moreover, as previously mentioned, the British are expected to refer to their other partner(ship)s.

Reputation

When it comes to reputational concerns, states assume others will expect them to contribute to this mission, if they have contributed to similar missions before. The analysis should thus show whether this had indeed been the case for the three countries. If they did contribute to previous mission, states feel obliged to contribute to EU NAVFOR as well. Moreover, if one country contributes (and has before), this is an incentive for other countries to contribute as well. This information is derived from governmental websites or EU sites and (newspaper) articles. Another indicator that a state tries to safeguard it reputation within the EU partnership are references to their European partners. Statements by different governmental actors, in which representatives of countries stress the importance of their (European) partnerships and emphasize the unity of the union, are thus derived from websites of governmental partners\(^9\) and through news articles (via LexisNexis) as well. Some states have been said to have “special relations” with each other, which means they will keep each other’s decisions and considerations in mind as well. The Franco-German relation is often perceived as a “special” one. It might be possible that

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the two countries try to make joint statements, or that they refer to each other’s arguments. References to other states in terms of “allies” or “friends” indicate such a relation.

3.4 Data Collection and the Reliability of Sources

As the operationalisation shows, data are collected from different types of sources. Multiple governmental sources are consulted, such as debates in parliaments and policy documents. These sources are quite reliable, for they are the representation of the considerations of the actors. Other sources such as news articles are not always equally reliable, as they might have an interest in reporting about a situation in one way or another. To gain a more or less reliable outlook, different national news magazines are used in this research that are considered leading in their branch. Furthermore, the database of LexisNexis contains many different sources. Public national news providers such as the BBC are also considered reliable sources. Of course, this will not guarantee that the found information is completely objective. The more or less “measurable” data (for example, the size of the maritime transport sector), are derived from (inter)national statistical bureaus, which are reliable. Overall, the sources that are used in this research are the ones best fit for the purpose of data collection. By using different sources to retrieve the required information, this triangulation of data increases the validity and generalisability.

Of course, every research that is of qualitative nature can be quite easily criticised on choices made and interpretations given to certain situations. It is therefore important to make grounded decisions and elaborate on why they have been made, and what their implications are. Concepts such as validity and reliability are used to evaluate the quality of a research. Validity deals with the tools of the research, whether one measures what one set out to measure. This research focuses on state’s considerations when making decisions on common foreign policy of the European Union. The independent variables that have been identified, can all be related to this goal: they are all possible explanations for state decisions. Since these considerations are not objectively measurable by looking at “the state”, different methods need to be used. The sources and methods used here, can help in providing possible and plausible motivations and considerations of the different actors concerned with state decision making. When it comes to reliability, the question is, whether another researcher would come to the same results. Since state motivations and considerations cannot be retrieved objectively from the empirical reality, and secondary sources need to be consulted to identify possible explanations, this is a matter of

interpretation. Possible explanations are retrieved from theories that are accepted as truthful. Combined with logical reasoning, explanations are likely to be reliable. Moreover, a clear operationalisation diminishes the possibility that other researchers focus on different aspects and reach different conclusions because of that. Qualitative research benefits greatly from clear operationalisations and explanations on how research is conducted. Since this is done well, it is easy for others to follow the same routes to other cases.

3.5 Chapter Summary

In this chapter, the focus has been on explaining how the theoretical insights that are gathered, are translated into everyday practice, for theory alone is not enough to provide an answer to the research question. The research-method has been exemplified and the different theoretical variables have been operationalised in order to make them measureable in the empirical reality. Subsequently, the reliability of the sources and the validity of the methods of the research in general are addressed. Hence, this chapter provides the basis for the empirical analysis that will take place in the next chapter.
4. The European Battle Against Somali Piracy

This chapter contains the empirical analysis of this research. Different sources, as discussed in the previous chapter, are analysed in order to find out whether the posed hypotheses are supported by the empirical findings. In other words, the question is asked whether the theories can explain what has happened in reality. First, some background information concerning the developments in Somalia and the international reactions towards these developments is provided. This information will make it easier to place this research in the “bigger picture”. Then, the actual empirical analysis is conducted and the different theories are tested by assessing their corresponding hypotheses.

4.1 Somali Piracy; a Renewed Version of an Old Phenomenon

The European Union launched the European Union Naval Force – Operation Atalanta in December 2008, as a part of the Comprehensive Approach to Somalia. This mission is, as mentioned before, employed within the framework of the CSDP and is in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions and international laws. These resolutions were adopted because the international community was concerned about the rising levels of piracy and armed robbery off the Horn of Africa and in the Western Indian Ocean. Operation Atalanta is thus the Union’s counter-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia (EU NAVFOR, 2013a).

4.1.1 The Development of Somali Piracy

When people think about piracy, they often think about it in a romanticized way. Ideas about pirates are based on the images provided by big Hollywood movies and historical novels that deal with rough looking men like Blackbeard, raising the Jolly Roger before high jacking vessels on the Seven Seas. Frank

Figure 4.1: Yearly Statistics of Piracy Incidents since 1984 (Worldwide)

Sherry (1986) argued that this sort of piracy unfolded itself in the 16- and 17-hundreds. The current form of piracy is not exactly the same as the one in the just mentioned “Golden Age” of piracy, but piracy itself still exists, as figure 4.1 shows. Even though the basic activities of “modern” pirates are not that different from the "old" ones, their impact and the reactions and judgements on these actions have changed. According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, piracy entails a couple of acts. First, holding the crew and passengers of a ship hostage for private ends on the sea (on either international or national waters) is an act of piracy. Furthermore, participating, inciting or facilitating voluntarily in capturing and turning a ship or aircraft into a pirate ship or aircraft, is an act of piracy as well (UNCLOS, 1982, pp. 60 - 61). Piracy in Somalia is characterised by criminals who take control of vessels and demand ransom money for the crew, the vessel and the cargo (EU NAVFOR, 2013a). The International Maritime Organization collects and provides data since 1982 concerning piracy and armed robbery. These data clearly show an increase in the number of incidents (of piracy and armed robbery) since 1994 worldwide (Figure 4.1). Since 2006, the number of incidents in East-Africa has increased the most of all the regions in the world (IMO, 2013, Annex 4; Treves, 2009). Although piracy has never been absent from the international scene, Treves (2009) and others noticed a massive development of pirate activities off the coast of Somalia since 2000 as figure 4.2 shows. Since the 1990’s, piracy attack happen frequently in the Somali area. This has led to a very serious threat for the maritime industry in the area between the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. Piracy has increased quickly, with ships being attacked from great distances off the coast (see Figure 4.3) and with cunning methods of capturing and dealing with money obtained. Navigation in this area has become very dangerous for international trade and affects maritime security, but it also affects the Somalia region, for their economic activities are disturbed and ships carrying humanitarian supplies to the Somali population are under attack as well (ibid., p. 400, EU NAVFOR, 2013a).

The causes for Somali piracy are multiple and interrelated. Illegal fishing activities posed a threat to the livelihoods of subsistence and commercial fishermen along the coastline. In the beginning of the 1990s,
Somali fishermen coexisted with illegal foreign fishermen in the Somali waters, but when the Indian Ocean fish stocks declined, Somali fishermen were forced to sail further offshore while foreign fishers came deeper into the inshore waters. This lead to violent clashes and the local fishermen started to chase away the illegal foreign fishing vessels (Weldemichael and Hassan, 2012). Kellerman (2011) explains “that many Somali pirates portray themselves as the nation’s unofficial coastguard, fighting against illegal fishing and waste dumping by foreign corporations” (Kellerman, 2011). Since there was no effective government that could undertake action, more and more people were drawn towards piracy (Treves, 2009, pp. 399 – 400). However, even though claims of illegal fishing and waste dumping are legitimate, they do not provide a complete explanation as to why piracy endured (Kellerman, 2011). As Pham (2010) explains, piracy is a crime of opportunity: it is economically motivated and as long as it remains profitable, it will not stop. Economic reasons, in terms of revenues of ransom money, have provided lucrative incomes to the Somali pirates (Anderson, 2009; Harding, 2009; BBC News, 2012). As mentioned before, the growth of piracy off the Somali coast is related to the failure of national politics (Pham, 2010, pp. 325 – 326). The explosion of Somali piracy correlates directly with the disappearance of a centrally functioning government in Somalia in the mid-1990s. Even though state collapse alone is not enough to cause an outbreak of maritime piracy, the failure of the state in Somalia created a situation in which piracy could flourish. Since the Somali state failed, no one exercised control over the countries’ territorial waters and only international waters are subject to the UNCLOS. Since the Gulf of Aden is one of the most important sea-routes for international transport, there are enough vessels to be hijacked (ibid., pp. 326, 330 – 331, 333 - 334).

4.1.2 International Reactions to Somali piracy

For the United Nations Security Council, piracy off the coast of Somalia is a threat to international peace and security, as is apparent from the resolutions the UNSC has adopted (UN, 1945, Chapter VII). Moreover, WFP food supplies were threatened by acts of piracy in 2007 and April 2008 and the EU also
called for international efforts to tackle piracy off the Somali coast. After a series of hijackings and attacks on vessels in October 2008, NATO agreed to despatch a naval force to patrol the waters around Somalia, in an effort to control piracy (BBC News, 2013). Since August 2009, NATO deployed warships and aircraft in the water off the Horn of Africa as part of “Operation Ocean Shield”. This operation provides a broader framework for different maritime forces and actors, such as the United States, the EU and other international actors, to operate together against the threat of piracy in the region (NATO, 2013b). UNSC Resolution 1816 was adopted in June 2008 and allowed for states to cooperate with Somalia’s transitional government to enter territorial waters and use “all necessary means” to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea. The security of the Somalia coast as well as the situation in Somalia itself was considered a threat to international peace and security (UNSC, 2008b; Treves, 2010, pp. 400 - 401).

On September 19, 2008, the Council of the European Union decided on joint action in support of UNSC resolution 1816. The aim of the EU military coordination was to support activities of EU member states who wanted to deploy military assets in the region (Kouchner, 2008a, p. 40). On December 8, 2008, the Council approved the EU’s military operation “Atalanta”, which aim is to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery of the Somali coast (Kouchner, 2008b, p. 19). On December 31, the EU and Somalia agreed upon the Union-led naval force in Somalia, EU NAVFOR. While the first Council decision stated the operation would terminate twelve months after the initial operating capability was declared (Kouchner, 2008a, p. 40), the mission has so far been prolonged three times and the end date of the EU NAVFOR operation currently lies at December 12, 2014 (Bildt, 2009, p.27; Reynders, 2010, pp. 49 – 50; European Parliament, 2012b).

Operation Atalanta is the first naval operation the Union has deployed under the heading of the CSDP. The mandate of the mission under the EU Council Joint Action is to protect the vessels of the WFP delivering aid to displaced people in Somalia and to protect the shipping’s of the African Union Mission in Somalia. Furthermore, EU NAVFOR has to deter, prevent, and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia. In addition, the operation contributes to monitoring fishing activities of the Somali coast. The operational area of the operation includes Somalia’s coastal territory and internal waters (plus the Southern Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, a large part of the Indian Ocean), an area that is 1.5 times the size of Europe’s mainland (EU NAVFOR, 2013a). The mission’s Operational Head Quarter’s (OHQ), the Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa (MSCHOA), is set up in Northwood in the United Kingdom. The MSCHOA provides monitoring of vessels in the area and the latest information concerning
anti-piracy guidance is constantly communicated to deployed units as well as to merchant ships (EU NAVFOR, 2013b).

Apart from the EU member states, other states deploy units and engage in missions in the region as well. Countries such as Norway, Croatia (not an EU-member at the time) and Ukraine have contributed to the EU NAVFOR mission. Furthermore, the United States coordinate the multinational Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151), established to conduct counter-piracy operations in the Somali area. Units from individual countries, such as China, India, Malaysia, Russia and others, which are not formally integrated into the CTF-151, Operation Atalanta or Operation Ocean Shield, provide additional vessels for these naval groups (Pham, 2010, p. 325; UK Royal Navy, 2013).

As the “bigger picture” is painted, the next part of this chapter contains the actual empirical analysis.

### 4.2 Contributions to the Mission

This paragraph elaborates on the different contributions each of the countries has made to the EU NAVFOR mission. One of the ways of contributing to the mission (as explained in the previous chapters), is by sending troops, mostly frigates, to the region in order to protect WFP shipments and contain piracy. An analysis of different newspapers and the websites of the different ministries of defence and the national marines provided insight in the amounts of contribution of France, Germany and the United Kingdom (see appendix B; Units deployed to the EU NAVFOR Atalanta Mission per Country). Data could not be retrieved directly from the EU NAVFOR Media and Public Information Office or the respective ministries of defence, since they did not respond or claimed to be unable to provide such information. Solely the British ministry of defence granted the request for information on their contribution to the mission. This information corresponded for the biggest part with the data already retrieved through other sources. Still, since data had to be collected in an indirect manner, the risk of incompleteness is present. Figure 4.4 shows the units the respective countries deployed from the start of the mission until the end of 2013. Every line represents a deployed frigate and shows the duration of its deployment. The more transparent line for the UNITED KINGDOM case represents the deployment of a helicopter on board of a French frigate in 2012.
When it comes to the deployment of units (mostly frigates) some differences between the countries are retrieved. As figure 4.4 above shows, Germany is the country that provided the largest number of frigates almost continuously since the start of the mission. Since the start of the mission, Germany has always been present with at least one frigate or a combat support unit in the operational area. These crews were always supported by a legal advisor, military police (“Feldjäger”), translators and medical teams. Moreover, on-board helicopters, surveillance aircrafts and vessel protection detachment teams are part of the German deployment (Presse- und Informationszentrum Marine, 2013). Since retrieving the information concerning deployed units of the countries of interest has proven to be quite a challenge, it is a possibility that figure 4.4 is somewhat incomplete, but the number is corroborated with different sources. It is evident Germany has provided a continuous, substantive contribution to EU NAVFOR. The French Ministry of Defence states that their participation to Atalanta consists of the permanent deployment of a frigate for the duration of the mission and the occasional deployment of a maritime patrol aircraft, based in Djibouti (Ministère de la Défense, 2013). This does not correspond fully with the information found and presented in figure 4.4, but it is likely that the French statement on permanent deployment actually entails the possibility of direct deployment, since their marine bases at the Seychelles and La Réunion are only a day’s travel away from the operational area of the mission. For example, the frigate “le Nivôse”, which is based in La Réunion, can join the mission within a day (Ministère de la Défense, 2011). Furthermore, the French deploy vessels in the region within the cadre of “ALINDIEN”, the maritime zone of the Indian Ocean and the French forces stationed there (Ministère de la Défense, 2010). The British contribution to the EU NAVFOR Atalanta mission appear to be lagging.
behind a bit compared to the other two countries. As the EU Committee of the House of Lords concluded in 2012, “only one Royal Navy ship was allocated to Operation Atalanta for three months in a two year period” (EU Committee, 2012). This is the frigate HMS “Richmond”, deployed from January 2011 until July 2011, with a month of pause in between. The British have however contributed vessels to other forces in the area, such as the Combined Maritime Force and Ocean Shield of the NATO operation. Within NATO’s Ocean Shield, no less than five frigates were deployed between August 2009 and June 2012 (MARCOM, 2013). The British are thus less committed to battling piracy through the EU mission than the other two. The British contribution towards this mission is lower than the French and German.

However, the British have accepted the task of running the Operational Headquarters in Northwood. The OHQ of Atalanta is established at the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) of the British Ministry of Defence. This PJHQ “commands joint and combined military operations” and provides military advice to the Ministry (Ministry of Defence, 2012). It accommodates the “Multinational Headquarters” - for European Union-led military crisis management operations. Although different countries have contributed to the HQ’s staff, the United Kingdom has provided the Operation Commander, the Chief of staff and a “significant proportion of the HQ staff” since the start of the operation. It has to be kept in mind though, that the costs of the HQ are covered by the budget for the mission (which was funded by the EU states based on their GDP’s). Currently, the British provide 65 out of a total of 165 people of the HQ staff. This number has been more or less the same since the start of the mission and is expected to be stable at least until December 2014 (Ministry of Defence, 2013). Since it is unclear who provided the other circa hundred members of the HQ staff, it is difficult to draw conclusions from this information, even though it is evident the British contributed a significant amount of the OHQ’s staff.

The command of the EU NAVFOR mission is executed by different people in various positions. There is an Operation Commander who leads the operation from the OHQ in Northwood. The Deputy Operation Commander exercises command in the absence of the Operation Commander. The Force Commander exercises command and control of all military forces in the area of operation since September 2013 (EU NAVFOR, 2013c). Since the start of the mission, the Operation Commander has always been British. The Deputy Operation Commander and the Force Commander on the other side, have never been British. Germany provided the Deputy Commander four times, France three times. The Force Commander, responsible in the Somali area, has been French three times and only one time was the force led by the Germans (see table 4.1. For the full table of commanders and their nationalities, see Appendix C: Chain of Command EU NAVFOR – ATALANTA (2008-2013)).
Table 4.1; Chain of Command EU NAVFOR – ATALANTA per Country (2008-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of commanders per country</th>
<th>Operation Commander</th>
<th>Deputy Operation Commander</th>
<th>Force Commander</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom 5x</td>
<td>Germany 4x</td>
<td>Spain 4x</td>
<td>Italy 2x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany 3x</td>
<td>France 3x</td>
<td>France 3x</td>
<td>Germany 1x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy 2x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Netherlands 2x</td>
<td>Sweden 1x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain 1x</td>
<td></td>
<td>Portugal 2x</td>
<td>Greece 1x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary

The above information has provided an overview of the contributions of the three countries to the EU NAVFOR mission. It has become evident that Germany provides the biggest operational contribution to the mission, in terms of deployed units. France continuously provided units to the mission as well and can quickly provide a frigate to the mission if necessary. In addition, there has been a French Force Commander three times, where only once, the Force Commander was German. The British have the lowest operational contribution to the EU NAVFOR mission. However, they provide a big part of the military personnel for the OHQ in Northwood and the Operation Commander is always British. The British do not provide as big as a contribution to EU NAVFOR as the other two, but as will be addressed later on, they do contribute to other activities in the Somalia region.

4.3 Military Interests off the East-African Coast

The first neo-liberal institutionalist variable of influence on state decision making concerns itself with military power interests. The question is, whether piracy poses a threat to the countries’ security or power position.

In the case of Somali piracy, various possible threats are identified. Some scholars have seen a threat to the regional stability because of this piracy, consequently posing a regional security threat (International Expert Group on Piracy off the Somali Coast, 2008, p. 34). This regional instability is a concern to three countries under consideration, but also for the international community as a whole, for it influences the safety (and economic security) of the world’s oceans. Piracy poses a threat to the international maritime security. Moreover, the Horn of Africa is a strategic location for international security (and commerce). Another aspect of importance here is the relation some have found between the pirates and terrorist groups like Al Shabaab (Congressional Research Service, 2011, pp. 12; 16 -18). The international community of course identifies these terrorist groups as a threat as well.
This thesis argues that the reasons for governments to contribute to the mission can be retrieved when analysing what the government’s delegates (ministers of, for example, defence and foreign affairs) say about the mission in (parliamentary) debates or in different media. They might speak about dangers to international security, or perhaps mention the danger of regional instability. However, since not all countries require parliamentary approval for the mission, debates or speeches in parliament are only found in those countries that do require such approval. These debates include arguments of the government for its choice to contribute. Only in Germany the parliament (the Bundestag) needs to approve of the mission, for troops can only be deployed after the Bundestag has given its explicit consent. The same goes for prolongation of the mission and significant changes to its mandate (Peters, Wagner & Glahn, 2011, pp. 5 - 7). The French and British governments are less restrained by their parliaments. In both countries, parliamentary approval for sending troops on a mission or approval of the mandate is not required. Nor is the duration of the mission subject to parliamentary approval. In the United Kingdom, the parliament has to approve of the budget of the mission, but even that is not required in the French case (Bono, 2005, p. 205). In France, the president is the head of the military and he decides on its deployment. Only a declaration of war needs to be approved by the parliament (Le Parisien, 2013). This explains why for the French case, debates in parliament could not be found, even though debates might have been conducted in the British and certainly in the German case. Further argumentations concerning contributions to the mission are retrieved through newspaper articles and through statements of heads of governments, Ministers of Foreign Affairs or Defence or other related cabinet officials (such as deputy ministers). These people represent the governmental positions on this issue.

In the German case, governmental approval of the mission is required, which means the topic is discussed in the Bundestag. The government (Bundesregierung) stated that the mission was necessary in order to protect WFP shipping’s and commercial shipping (Deutscher Bundestag 16/11337, 2008, pp. 1-2). Even though it is mentioned that the increasing amount of piracy destabilises Somalia as a country, no stronger argumentations, in terms of military interests, are mentioned in the Bundestag. The arguments of the government are endorsed by the opposition parties, when a party leader of “die Grünen” (a German green political party in the opposition at the time) emphasizes that the mission had nothing to do with the battle against terrorism (Usinger Anzeiger, 2008). This analysis indicates that the German government does not really have military interests in this mission; their motivations seem to be related to humanitarian and economic concerns (which are elaborated on further along the chapter).
The French government did not need the parliament (*Assemblée Nationale*) to approve of the mission and consequently, there has not been much debate in the parliament about this mission. Of course, different media provide insight in the reasoning of governmental representatives in this case (see appendix A: “Analysis of News Articles concerning Somali Piracy and Governmental Opinions”). They, as their German counterparts, primarily mention protection of the WFP shipping’s and the civil shipping industry, but there is also debate on state building in Somalia and thereby providing some stability. Moreover, the French Minister for European Affairs in 2009, Lellouche, warned for the danger that terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda could gain power in Somalia if stability was not created (AFP, 2009). The effect of countering piracy and stabilising Somalia would also create more stability for the region, French Minister of Defence Longuet explained (Europolitique, 2011). The French, much like the Germans, seemed to follow the official EU reasoning’s for employing the mission: countering piracy in order to protect WFP shipping and civil shipping industry. There might be, however, some interest related to military power interest at stake as well. The regional stability and the danger of terrorism are after all acknowledged by the governmental delegates.

The British parliament, the *House of Commons*, did not need to approve of the employment of the mission as such, but did need to approve of the mission’s budget. Again, the ministers of the state talked primarily in terms of protecting WFP shipments and other civil vessels in the region. However, in other media, the ministers emphasized the importance of stability in the region as a result of the mission as well. As Minister of Defence Hutton put it in 2008, restoring an effective government in Somalia would “*stop it from becoming a haven for terrorists*”. Continuing piracy would only increase the potential for terrorists, it was argued (AP International, 2008). Prime Minister Cameron emphasized that the security threat caused by terrorism, which is endorsed by piracy, “*is real and substantial*” (Press Association Mediapoint, 2012). The British government relates piracy directly with terrorism and the dangers that brings along. For the government, regional stability and international security are at stake when piracy is not successfully countered. Hence, somewhat in contrast to the previous two cases, but mostly in contrast with the German case, the government of the United Kingdom does identify its interest in somewhat clearer military terms, the danger of terrorism and international security.

Since piracy is not an activity that is conducted or supported by the state of Somalia, measuring the strength of this country in military terms, for example by looking at military expenditure, is of no use for this research. The fight against piracy is not really a battle between different countries, so comparing them on their military strength is not useful, even though it is stated that since France, Germany and the
United Kingdom respectively hold the 6th, 7th and 5th place in terms of military strength according to the Global Fire Power ranking, these countries are unlikely to perceive Somali piracy as a direct threat to themselves, apart from the geographical location (GFP, 2013).

**Summary**

In the case of the EU NAVFOR mission in Somalia, military interests are arguably present mostly for the United Kingdom, but do not seem to be very persistent. Since the group of pirates is relatively small compared to the military strength of the countries of interest, it is unlikely that the pirates are perceived as a direct military threat to the countries. It is not a “fight” between countries that are of comparable military strength. The dangers of terrorism, regional instability and insecurity can be seen as military threats and they do appear to concern decision-maker somewhat. It is more likely that other interests, or perhaps even other aspects than state power interests in military terms, are decisive when it comes to contributing to the mission.

**4.4 Economic Interests off the Shore of East-Africa**

According to neo-liberals, economic concerns guide states in making policy decisions. When it comes to the anti-piracy mission, it might very well be economic concerns that have made the three states decide to contribute to the mission. Of course, the most obvious economic interests are related to the maritime transport sector, since piracy has an impact on this sector. A logical claim to make is that the bigger the size of a countries’ sea transport sector, the more this sector is potentially affected by acts of piracy. All vessels in this maritime transport sector need extra on-board...
security, run the risk of being hijacked and, subsequently, have to pay ransom money or need to find alternative trade routes. All of these effects bring along higher costs. The United States institute of Peace (2009) endorses these findings; insurance rates for international shipping organisations have gone up and avoidance has added quite some miles to ship’s voyages. Moreover, piracy prosecutions cost money and secondary costs are present as a result of piracy’s impact on regional trade, tourism, fishing industries and food prices. (Gilpin, 2009, p. 11; Bowden, 2010). As figure 4.5 shows, the three countries of interest all have a relatively big sea transport industry in the period 2006 - 2011. Since this period includes the years prior to the mission, countries will take these numbers in consideration when it comes to decision making on mission-contribution. In 2007 and 2008, the United Kingdom had the biggest volume of sea transport of the European Union, followed by Italy and the Netherlands. After them, Germany and France were next in line (Eurostat, 2013b). It seems that for all three countries, sea transport is an important sector. For the United Kingdom, this sector might logically be the most important, for it is an island and the bulk of its transport will necessarily take place by sea.

Having such a big sea transport sector implies, as mentioned before, that this sector is likely to be affected by acts of piracy. Of course, this statement is only correct if some assumptions are checked, namely that there is a big amount of trade with Asian countries that takes place through maritime transport via routes of the Eastern African coast. A high level of trade with Asia implies a risk of running into pirates or needing to find more expensive alternative trade routes. It has to be checked whether it is in fact true that the route from Europe to Asia through the Suez Canal and the Strait of Malacca is in fact the most frequently used one and, secondly, whether Asian countries are indeed important trade partners for the countries under investigation. The more trade there is with countries in Asia, the bigger the amount of vessels that are potentially at risk of the Eastern coast of Africa. The claim that the biggest part of the trade between (Northern) Europe and Asia usually takes place through the Suez Canal, followed by the Eastern-African coast, seems right. As figure 4.6 shows, the route through the Suez Canal and of the Eastern African coast is the core transport route. This shows the importance of this route for trade between these two regions.
Moreover, Rodrique and Notteboom (2013) argue that the Strait of Malacca is one of the most important strategic passages of the world, exactly because it supports the bulk of the maritime trade between Europe and Pacific Asia (Rodrique & Notteboom, 2013). The German government endorses this idea, claiming it constitutes the most important trade route between Europe, the Arabian Peninsula and Asia (Bundestag, 2008, p. 5). Trade between Asian countries and Europe will most likely take place predominantly via sea transport. Only perishable goods might be transported by air.

The question remains whether Asian countries are indeed important trading partners for the three European countries. When we look into trade with these countries, the WTO can provide some information concerning the most important trading partners. For all three of them, the Euro-zone was the most important trading partner. In 2006, 2007 and 2008, China was the fourth biggest trading partner for Germany and since 2009, it is the third leading partner for Germany. For France, China and Japan are respectively the fourth and fifth trading partner in 2006 and 2007, in 2009 and 2010 China was the fourth leading trading partner and in 2011, it even became the third trading partner for France. For the United Kingdom, Japan and China have been important trading partners as well: in 2006, Japan was its fourth important trading partner, in 2007 Japan and China were respectively the 5th and 4th trading partners and since 2008, China has been the United Kingdom’s third biggest trading partner, with India being its 4th trading partner in 2011 (WTO, 2013).

Figure 4.6: Maritime Shipping Routes

Source: Dr. Jean-Paul Rodrigue, Department of Global Studies & Geography, Hofstra University.
Another important aspect that should be considered, is the amount of ships controlled by companies originating from the three countries. Since ships do not always sail under the flag of the country in which their company is based, the importance of this sector is at times bigger than it seems at first sight. It is important to note that this aspect will come back later on in this thesis: if a country has a big shipping industry in terms of companies who own ships, these companies are likely to unite and lobby for their industry, an aspect related to the domestic politics approach. The UNCTAD has computed that when it comes to deadweight tonnage in 2008, Germany is the third country in the world, controlling 9.7% of the world total tonnage. The United Kingdom takes a 12th place, controlling 2.5% of the world total. France is found at the 27th place, controlling 0.63% of the world’s total tonnage in 2008. At that time, Germany had the third biggest fleet (in number of vessels) with the United Kingdom and France taken the 10th and 25th place (UNCTAD, 2008, p. 39). Based on the total gross tonnage of fleets, the IMO has listed a top 20 of countries with the biggest fleets. In 2010, Germany took at a third place, the United Kingdom a sixth and France at the 19th place (IMO Maritime Knowledge Centre, 2012, p. 12). This information shows that, especially for Germany, the shipping industry is of great importance and the effect of piracy on this sector is highly likely to be a big economic concern for the country.

After collecting and analysing the hard facts dealing with the country’s economic concerns, the aspect of perception is brought in to complete the part on economic interests. Through the analysis of parliamentary debates and statements of different governmental representatives in multiple media, some insight in their motivations are retrieved. For all three countries, it becomes evident that economic interest matter to them, since governmental delegates of all three countries often mention the importance of free trade routes and protection of civil vessels (next to the WFP shipments). The importance of safe sea routes is endorsed by German Minister of Foreign Affairs Steinmeier (Frankfurter Rundschau, 2008). His French counterpart claims that the freedom of the oceans is essential (Le Figaro, 2008, p. 8). British Minister of Foreign Affairs Miliband is convinced that piracy threatens trade and prosperity and needs to be dealt with. According to him, “international order in seas that are vital to trade around the world” are established by the operation (AP online, 2008). What the United Kingdom aims for in this mission, according to Minister of Defence Hutton, is to work internationally to, among other things, ensure security for global trade (Press Association Media Point, 2009).

Summary
Taking all the acquired information together, it is evident that economic interest played an important role in the decision making of all three countries. The economic interests were biggest for Germany,
since it transports most goods to and from Asia, preferably through the Suez Canal and thus off the coast of Somalia. Piracy affects this trade and, therefore, threatens this economic sector. The same, but to a somewhat lesser extent, is the case for France and the United Kingdom. The sea transport sector is important to them and is harmed by the Somali piracy. Therefore, all three countries are likely to benefit (in economic terms) from resolving the situation off the coast of Somalia, which implies all three are willing to undertake action against piracy. The perceptions of the country’s governments seem to indicate that economic concerns are at stake when piracy is not addressed.

4.5 Societal Pressure: Demands for Action by Society

The domestic politics approach expects that societal pressure through domestic groups, such as lobby groups, influences a state’s foreign policy decision making. If this theory is combined with the scope conditions of domestic structure and governmental sensitivity, there are some implications for the cases analysed in this section. In Germany, domestic groups are expected to be of importance based on the country’s domestic structure, while in France and the United Kingdom, these groups are less likely to be influential. However, governmental sensitivity might play a role here as well.

The variable of governmental sensitivity influences the workings of the domestic politics approach. Since this intervening variable influences the next independent variable as well, it is now addressed thoroughly. Heightened governmental sensitivity is most often retrieved in the period prior to elections for government. In this thesis, this period in which governmental sensitivity is heightened due to pending elections, is set at six months prior to elections. In Germany, elections for the Bundestag took place at the 27th of September in 2009 (Deutscher Bundestag, 2013). Hence, the six months prior to this date (since March 2009), are said to be a period of heightened sensitivity of the government, due to these pending elections. In France, elections for the Assemblée Nationale took place on the 10th and 17th of June 2012 (Ministère de l’Intérieur, 2013a, 2013b), making the period of January to June of that year one of heightened governmental sensitivity. In the United Kingdom, elections for the House of Commons were held at the 6th of June, 2010 (Parliament.uk, 2013). Therefore, governmental sensitive was heightened in the period from December 2009 till May 2010. The following table 4.2 summarizes the above-mentioned information.
Another aspect that is introduced here, as an indicator for governmental sensitivity, is governmental popularity. The underlying idea is that when a government’s popularity decreases, governmental sensitivity is higher. Opinion polls are of help in identifying how governments’ popularity evolved. In Germany, the Bundesregierungen Merkel I and Merkel II were in office from the 22nd of November 2005 until the 17th of November 2013. Infratest-dimap, an electoral and political research organisation, has analysed the popularity of these two governments. They asked people how satisfied they were with the work of the Bundesregierung11 (infratest-dimap, 2013). In France, the government has changed more often. The Gouvernements Francois Fillon II and Fillon III were in office from June 2007 until May 2012. After that, the Gouvernements Marc Ayrault I and II were formed and Ayrault II ended on March 31, 2014. The opinion of the French on their government proved to be more difficult to find. The “Baromètre Politique” of Figaro Magazine, which is realised by polling institution TNS Sofres, indicates the popularity of the French “executives”. They have asked people whether they have confidence in (the president of the Republic and) the prime minister, asking them if they are confident (the president and) the prime minister can solve the problems France faces12. Even though it might be said that this is a personal measurement, it can be defended that this is in fact an indicator for the popularity of the government of the Prime Minister as such. In the United Kingdom, finding a measurement of the popularity of the respective Brown (June 2007 until May 2010) and Cameron (May 2010 – incumbent) Ministry’s has not proven to be easy either. The BBC’s “Poll tracker”, using data of ComRes, a polling and research consultancy service, measures the support per political party over time. In the case of the Brown Ministry, which was formed only by the Labour party, these data are seen as indicators for the popularity of the government as well. The Cameron Ministry however, is formed by both the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, making it more complicated to measure their popularity.

Table 4.2: Periods of Heightened Governmental Sensitivity (due to pending elections)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Periods of heightened governmental sensitivity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>March 2009 – September 2009 (elections Bundestag on 27-09-09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>January 2012 – June 2012 (elections Assemblée Nationale on 10- &amp; 17-06-12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>December 2009 – May 2010 (elections House of Commons on 06-06-10)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11 The precise question asked: “Wie zufrieden sind Sie mit der Arbeit der Bundesregierung?”, with the possible answers being “sehr zufrieden, zufrieden, weniger zufrieden” or “gar nicht zufrieden”.
12 The exact question asked, is the following: “Faites-vous tout à fait confiance, plutôt confiance, plutôt pas confiance ou pas du tout confiance à *Président ou Premier ministre* pour résoudre les problèmes qui se posent en France actuellement ?”
However, since polls on the popularity or satisfaction with the government as such could not be found, the poll tracker is used as an indicator of the governing parties’ popularity. The percentages of the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats are added, showing the support for both governing parties. Figure 4.7 provides a graphic representation of the information gathered.

**Figure 4.7: Governmental Popularity**

![Graph showing governmental popularity over time](image)

Of course this governmental popularity stills needs to be related to the variable of governmental sensitivity. It is said that, when there is a decrease in the popularity of a government, governmental sensitivity increases. Thus, when the popularity of the German government decreased in the period from September 2009 until September 2010, it is expected that the German government was extra sensitive to domestic pressures. Of course, this variable is most relevant in the French and British case, since they have state dominated domestic structures. When governmental sensitivity is high, they might take domestic concerns into consideration after al. In France, support for the government decreased somewhat in the period of January 2011 until January 2012, but decreased more significantly in the period from September 2012 until may 2013. Hence, this second period can be viewed as a period in which governmental sensitivity might have heightened. As the green line in the bottom of the graph indicates, elections were pending in the period from January until June 2012. This combination of events leads to an even higher governmental sensitivity. The British government knew a period of heightened governmental sensitivity from the end of 2009 until May 2010, not because of unpopularity of the government, but due to pending elections. Figure 4.8 on the next page shows the variation in the degree
of governmental sensitivity based on governmental popularity and by indicating the periods prior to elections.

**Figure 4.8: Variation in the Degree of Governmental Sensitivity**

![Graph showing variation in governmental sensitivity](image)

After this elaboration on governmental sensitivity, the focus turns to the aspect of societal pressure again. A first part of identifying societal pressure, is looking into the attention lobby groups and NGO’s have received in the period of interest. Potential groups of interest have been retrieved through lists of lobby groups (for Germany, these groups were found in the “Ständig aktualisierte Fassung der öffentlichen Liste über die Registrierung von Verbänden und deren Vertretern”, for France and the United Kingdom, the European Transparency Register had to be used since lobby groups are not obliged to register themselves at a national level). From these lists, groups have been selected based on their subject. They dealt with either the shipment industry or its personnel or with humanitarian rights and aid (for example food-aid). These groups, combined with the terms “piracy” and “Somalia”, have been entered into LexisNexis to find out whether they received attention in the countries newspapers. The same method has been applied for private military companies. They have been selected per country from the list provided by “the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers” and entered into LexisNexis following the same method. The articles and the relevant passages that were retrieved through this method can be found in appendix D: “Societal Pressure: Appeals of Interest Groups”.

In Germany, different groups pushed for an active role of the German marine in the battle against piracy in 2008. The most important one was the “Verband Deutscher Reeder” (a national ship-owners association), and these groups openly addressed the Bundestag to allow for the marine’s deployment and provide them with a fast and forceful mandate (Preuß & Stiller, 2008; VerkehrsRundschau.de, 2008). In 2009 the ship-owners called on the government to broaden both the mission’s mandate as well as its area, as happened in May of that year (Deutscher Bundestag, 2009). Still, German ship-owners claimed that more action was needed: if military protection had reached its limits, another solution in terms of armed guards or former Bundeswehr soldiers onboard ships should be considered. But, private security companies are forbidden in Germany and, even though the ship-owners underscored that they were pleased with the extensions of the missions’ mandate in 2012, they kept issuing the possibility of armed guards onboard their vessels. This call for private security might not have been in vain, since “the German government is considering a draft law allowing ship-owners to deploy private armed guards” (Utler, 2012). This analysis shows consonance between the demands of the shipment industry and the governments’ decisions on extending the mandate and agreeing to the enlargement of the missions’ area. The call by ship-owners for armed guards seems to be effective as well, since this issue is discussed now in parliament. Other groups have not really concerned themselves with the issue in Germany. The German section of human rights organisation Amnesty International did call upon people to appeal to Somali authorities to use their influence to ensure the release and good treatment of hostages held by Somali pirates in 2008, as did the British section of Amnesty (Amnesty International Sektion der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2008). However, calls upon the government to not undertake action against Somali piracy were not made.

In France, the call for international mobilisation against piracy is forwarded as well in 2008 (not a period of heightened governmental sensitivity), among others by the French ship-owners association “Armateurs de France”, who demand action by the international community and desire protection from their national marine (AFP, 2008a). However, even in 2008, the idea of private security initiatives was endorsed by this group, since they found the military mission unsatisfactory (AFP, 2008b). It is evident that the subject of Somali piracy and the EU NAVFOR mission received much less attention in French media than it did in Germany. While time passes, even less organisations seem to (openly) address the issue of Somali piracy. Between August 2008 and July 2012, nineteen articles dealing with calls for action were retrieved in Germany, while between September 2008 and October 2012 only six French articles dealt with such matters. The issue of private security onboard vessels is discussed in the analysed period, but the discussion focused mainly on the call for clear regulation of these organisations. Military
protection is, however, still preferred over private security protection for the ship-owners. All in all, there were some demand for action, even though the government has not been addressed and demands for action were aimed at the international community in the run up to the mission. It seems that societal pressure in France was relatively low.

In the United Kingdom, the topic of Somali piracy received more attention than it did in France. In the period of November 2008 until August 2012, twenty articles concerning the topic were retrieved. From the start of the discussion, the focus has primarily been on the issue of private security. Some consultancy firms in the shipment sector fear for escalation when private armed guards are active onboard vessels, others find they might be helpful if properly trained. Another issue that requires governmental interference, is the mandate of the mission. In 2010 and 2011 (periods of heightened governmental sensitivity), ship-owners associations are frustrated by the fact that the international community cannot disable mother ships and home bases of the pirates and they find more forceful action is required (Wyk, 2010; Redfern, 2011). Ship-owners still prefer military protections to private security and voice this preference again in May 2012 (not a period characterised by heightened governmental sensitivity), but, as private security companies emphasize, there are only so many military units that can be deployed and private security has proven successful as well. One human rights organisations, Global Witness, emphasizes in 2009 (a period of heightened governmental sensitivity) that piracy is at least partly the result of a breach of human rights, since it is a consequence of the illegal fishing practices of the economically strong countries (Phillips, 2009). The organisation condemns the fact that these economically powerful countries now push for strong anti-piracy activities. Amnesty UK backs up the idea that more should be done to protect the human rights of the Somali people and calls upon world leaders to concern themselves with this issue, and to respect the UN’s weapon embargo on Somalia. But they do not call directly for action against piracy (Amnesty International UK, 2012). The British branch of Amnesty, as well as the German one, did call upon people to appeal to the Somali authorities to undertake action to ensure the safety and release of hostage of pirates in 2008 (Amnesty International UK, 2008).

A further search through different media did not produce results for the countries of interest. Some articles mentioned that oppositions parties in parliament did not support the mission, as was the case in Germany at times (Gebauer, 2012), but apart from that, objections to the mission have not been voiced.
Summary

In all three countries, it seems that primarily the ship-owners and private security companies try to pressure governments. These companies base their demands on their economic interests in fighting piracy. Furthermore, it appears that Somali piracy was not an important case for human rights groups, since these groups have hardly voiced any concerns in these countries through the media. This has been double-checked by searching through the national websites of, for example, Amnesty International, but no position papers on Somalia concerning piracy were retrieved. The British branch of this organisation did call upon action concerning human rights issues and respecting the weapons embargo in Somalia, but this was no direct call for or against counter-piracy activities. Furthermore, it appears that French interest groups have been least active (on the surface) in pressuring the decision-makers, even in periods of heightened governmental sensitivity. In Germany, the interest groups directly addressed the parliament with their requests and the same goes for the United Kingdom’s interest groups. The clearest consonance between demands made by domestic groups and policy decisions is, however, found in Germany. After repeated calls by shipping companies and private security companies, the German government decided to allow private security onboard ships in 2011 (gxs/dapd, 2011). The periods of heightened governmental sensitivity do not appear to matter to the groups, since demands do not correspond with it.

4.6 The Public Opinion: What the People Want

As explained in the previous paragraph, the expected influence of the public opinion on a states’ government is higher or lower depending on a states domestic structure and the governmental sensitivity. The German decision-makers are more likely to be influenced by public opinion because the country exhibits a democratic corporatist, society-dominated domestic structure. However, even though France and the United Kingdom have respectively statist and liberal, state-dominated domestic structures, there is room for influence of the public opinion when governmental sensitivity is high. Countries with state-dominated societies might be inclined to take the public opinion into consideration (after all) in periods of heightened sensitivity. In Germany, governmental sensitivity was even higher in the period from March 2009 until September 2010, due to elections and unpopularity of the government. In France, from January until September 2011 and September until may 2012, governmental sensitivity was higher due to governmental unpopularity and in the period in between, from January until June 2012 this was also the case due to elections. In the United Kingdom, the periods from January until May 2009, September 2010 until January 2011 and January until may 2012 were
periods of heightened governmental sensitivity due to governmental unpopularity. The time span from December 2009 until May 2010 was characterised by pending elections.

When focussing on the public opinion, it appeared as though (even after multiple profound searches to recover the opinion of “the people” in the three countries of interest) the piracy mission has not really been a subject of interest for the everyday citizens. Different searches through diverse opinion polling institutions and media (such as newspapers and newsmagazines) in the three countries barely produced hits. As mentioned above, protests or manifestations against the mission have not taken place, or might have been so small no reports on them were made. The piracy problem has apparently not been an issue that people worried about. The only report of protest against the mission by “the people” was found in Japan, where some hundred peace activists protested when warships left for the anti-piracy mission in Somalia (AFP, 2009). International organisation promoting (internet) activism on all kinds of (global) issues such as avaaz.org did not contain petitions or demonstrations concerning the anti-piracy mission either.

The British opinion pollster “YouGov” asked British adults in 2012 and 2013 which international issues they regarded as the biggest threats to the British way of life. Providing them with multiple options, such as international terrorism, climate change and the development of nuclear weapons, the option failed and weak states such as Somalia (and Yemen & Pakistan) held a 10th out of 12 place in 2012 and in 2013 (YouGov; 2012, p. 10; 2013, p. 7). This information is said to support the idea that the state of Somalia is not considered a major threat or problem by British adults. Consequently, it is stated that, since piracy is so clearly intertwined with Somalia, people do not consider this to be a real threat either. Unfortunately, similar data are not available for Germany and France.

A search in Google trends can help in indicating whether the topic of Somali piracy has been a subject of interest to people. Google trends shows how often a particular search-term is entered in Google, relative to the total search-volume across specific regions. Since October 2008, the terms “piracy” and “Somalia” have gained in popularity when it comes to Google searches in the United Kingdom and in November of the same year the terms reached their maximum in popularity. Since then, interest in the subject has decreased. For Germany, the terms “Piraterie” and “Somalia” yield the highest results in April of 2009. In France, “piraterie” and “Somalie” had the highest number of searches in November 2008. However, in all three cases, it appears that some data are missing, for search results in certain periods are zero, which is the score given when there is not enough data available. A somewhat general trend that is discovered through these incomplete data, is that interest in the subject was highest at the
start of the mission, but soon after, it declined. These findings account for all three countries. The terms “EU NAVFOR” and “Atalanta Somalia/Somalie” did not yield any results (searching on just “Atalanta” only produced hits for Italian football club Atalanta B.C.). The retrieved information however, does not say anything about the public opinion towards the mission. It cannot be said whether the attitude of people who searched for it was positive or predominantly negative, just that some have interested themselves in the matter.

Summary

It appears the subject of Somali piracy and the EU mission that has been employed has not really concerned the inhabitants of the three countries analysed here. Polling institutions have not even measured the public opinion on the issue and people have not engaged themselves in protests or similar activities. The people have been somewhat indifferent when it comes to this subject. Since surveys have not been conducted concerning this topic, this might be done in all three countries under a representative group in order to find out what the public opinion on the subject was. However, it lies outside the scope of this thesis to conduct these surveys in this research. For now, it has to be concluded that the public opinion was ‘neutral’ towards the EU mission, therefore it has not influenced governments in either a positive or a negative fashion.

4.7 National Role Conceptions: Doing What is Thought Right

As explained in the theoretical chapter, constructivist theorists identify national role conceptions states exhibit. These NRC’s then guide these states in their foreign policy decision-making. The countries of interest here each have their own national role conception. Germany’s national role conception is one of concerns for others in humanitarian terms and reluctance towards military intervention. Furthermore, Germany prefers working together with other states in close partnerships such as the EU. For France as a “residual world power”, a leading role in a strong Europe is something to strive for. The British NRC dictates that economic interests and global security and stability are to be protected and preferably with other “special” partners as well, such as the United States.

The next question to be answered is how the EU NAVFOR mission was framed by European actors themselves; if the frame fits a countries’ NRC, it is more willing to contribute (substantively) to the mission. There are different actors within the European Union who can provide insight in the frame and goals of the mission. Archives of potentially relevant DG’s of the European Commission (Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection, Justice, Maritime Affairs and Fisheries) can provide statements on the EU mission, as can the databases of the EEAS. Also, statements and speeches of the HR on behalf of the EU,
by the HR herself and by the spokesperson of the HR are analysed on how she addressed the mission. Archives containing statements of former Secretary-General of the Council of the EU and EU High Representative for the CFSP Solana are checked as well, as are the General Affairs Council, Foreign Affairs Council and Agriculture and Fisheries Councils. Lastly, European Parliamentary documents are analysed. The mission can be framed in terms of humanitarian, economic or securitisation concerns. The sources that were used can be found in appendix f: “The European Frame of EU NAVFOR”.

Solana, the EU’s High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy until December 2009, stated that the operation contributed to protect vulnerable ships in the Somali waters, especially those of the World Food Programme (Solana, 2009). Ashton, who became the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy for the EU in December 2009, identifies piracy as a threat to peaceful commerce, undermining economies in the region and to the world’s shipping industry and its’ employees (Ashton, 2012a). Ashton states that the engagement of the EU in Somalia should “alleviate the consequences of the worsening humanitarian situation, restore security and contribute to peace, development and internal reconciliation” (Ashton, 2011). On other occasions, focussed on the situation in Somalia as a whole instead of just the anti-piracy mission, she emphasized the importance of improving security in the country, in order to create a more stable region. She underscored the importance of the comprehensive approach to tackle piracy, train the Somali army and build maritime security (Ashton, 2013). The focus thus lies on humanitarian aid, but securitisation issues in terms of (regional) stability are voiced as well. In the Council of the European Union, the protection of humanitarian aid to Somalia is most emphasized, followed by concerns of protecting commercial maritime routes and free trade. Peace and international security in the region can be advanced with this mission as well. The Council furthermore emphasized that the goals of the mission were in accordance with different UNSC resolutions (Council of the EU, 2008a; 2008b; 2008c). The European Parliament expressed its concern on the humanitarian situation in Somalia as well, but also mentioned the threat to security that piracy poses, which creates regional and potentially global instability due to lawlessness and extremism (European Parliament, 2009a; 2009b; 2010). EU Commissioner on Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Damanaki stressed the importance of the mission in terms of the negative effects piracy at sea has on the economy, threatening security and safety of citizens and undermining the economy (Damanaki, 2013). The official mandate of the mission is to protect vessels of the WFP delivering aid to displaced persons in Somalia and to protect AMISOM shippings. Moreover, EU NAVFOR is to deter, prevent and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery and protect vulnerable shippings on a case-by-
case basis. In addition, the mission should contribute to the monitoring of fishing activities of the Somali coast (EU NAVFOR, 2013a).

Taken all these concerns and goals of the mission as identified by different actors together, it is evident that the mission is framed first and foremost as one with humanitarian goals. The protection of the WFP and AMISOM shipments is the top priority of the mission. Still, economic interests form an important second concern for the European actors and concerns with security, even though not directly the security of the European states, are voiced as well.

For Germany, this frame of the EU NAVFOR mission as a humanitarian one fits the countries own national role conception. Germany sees itself as an advocate of human rights and humanitarian aid, thus contribution to this mission fits its perspective. That the humanitarian aspect of this mission is important to German decision-makers becomes evident when their speeches and statements are analysed. The articles and the relevant passages that were found can be consulted in appendix e: “National Concerns of Governmental Actors”. In Germany, where the government requires parliamentary approval to deploy the Bundeswehr, the different ministers in office emphasized the humanitarian aspect of the mission. Minister of Foreign Affairs Steinmeier emphasized in the Bundestag in 2008 that Somalia is one of biggest humanitarian crisis areas in the world and the people in Somalia should not be abandoned (Deutscher Bundestag, 2008b). His successor Westerwelle agreed with him and explained that the mission could help in preventing a new humanitarian catastrophe in the country, a solution for the suffering of the Somali people who depend on this mission (Deutscher Bundestag, 2010b). The protection of WFP-shipments and consequently, the idea of providing humanitarian aid to those in need was much emphasized by the German government (CDU, CSU & SPD, 2009, p. 158). Even though the aspects of free trade and economic interest are not directly related to the German NRC, the importance of free trade and protection of civil shipment was acknowledged by the different ministries as well. Minister of Defence Jung explained that it was in Germany’s economic interest as well to deploy this mission as it contributes to safeguarding Germany’s trade (Deutscher Bundestag: 2008b; 2009d), since the area is the most important trade route between Europe and Asia (Bundesregiering, 2011). Moreover, people onboard these civil ships have a right to protection as well, as the government explained (CDU, CSU & FDP, 2009, p. 113). In addition, the German government identifies the dangers of terrorism and the risks for regional stability. The decision-makers condemn terrorist acts, but also underline the importance of international justice for those committing crimes of this nature (Deutscher Bundestag, 2011c). Overall, a substantive German contribution to the EU NAVFOR mission is explained
corresponds with the humanitarian frame of the mission. Moreover, the mission is embedded in broader frameworks of inter alia the UN, and working within a broad legal framework is something German decision-makers prefer.

The French NRC predicts that France wants to play a vital role in crises around the world. France finds itself suitable to be the state taking initiative and playing a leading role in global crises. The French government, who did not require parliamentary approval for the mission, did mention humanitarian aid, but focused primarily on the norm of free trade and the idea of international security. As president Hollande put it in 2012, the National Defence guaranteed free maritime trade by countering piracy off the Somali coast. In addition, he stated, this allowed humanitarian aid to enter the country (Hollande, 2012). Moreover, the French want to make sure that criminal activities such as piracy and others related to terrorism are punished, according to the European Convention on Human Rights (Menard, 2010). Thus, the economic concerns mattered to the French, but that is not a specific reason that matches the French NRC and thus promote (or demotes) substantive contribution. The French NRC as identified by Krotz’s, perceives the state as an activist nation that strives for global presence, if necessary independently. France sees itself as having a leading role in the EU. The French launched actions to escort WFP shipments since 2007, under the heading of Operation Alcyon. Moreover, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs explains that the launch of the EU NAVFOR mission in 2008 was an initiative of France and Spain. Together with Germany, these countries became the first contributors to the mission, while the United Kingdom took the commando role and provided the mission’s headquarter in Northwood (Ministère des Affaires étrangères, 2013). Moreover, sources of the French Ministry of Defence explain how France, together with the United States, formed the basis for the 2008 UN Resolutions 1816 and 1838 as well. The first resolution allowed states to act against piracy in Somalia waters while the second called upon countries to act (Ministère de la Défense, 2010). Resolution 1838 was even drafted by French authorities (Maritime Journal, 2008) and in UNSCR 1846 it is stated that initiatives of multiple states to counter-piracy off the coast of Somalia, among which France and the United Kingdom, are welcomed by the UNSC (UNSC, 2008b). Moreover, Germond and Smith (2009) explained that the French wanted to strengthen the ESDP, in cooperation with Germany (Germond & Smith, 2009, p. 585). It thus appears that the NRC of France as an activist, leading state within the EU is in accordance with the development of the EU NAVFOR mission. France took an active and leading role in the run up to the European mission to battle piracy in Somalia.
The British NRC dictates that free trade, liberal values and global security and stability are important. Moreover, its position as a ‘transatlantic bridge’ between Europe and the US is an important part of the British NRC. When looking into reasons provided by decision-makers, it is evident that they are concerns with economic interests and the safety of seafarers. As the Foreign Affairs Committee put it in 2011, Somali piracy was perceived as “a major issue for the world economy” (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2011). But, the British government also worried about international security and related dangers of terrorism in Somalia and the region, as Foreign Secretary William Hague explained, and the Foreign Affairs Committee endorsed (Hague, 2012a; Foreign Affairs Committee, 2011). As Prime Minister David Cameron put it in 2012, violence and terrorism can thrive in a country with no hope and chaos, posing a threat to the security of the whole world (Cabinet Office, 2010, p. 20; Cameron, 2012). Of course, the crisis in Somalia in humanitarian terms is acknowledged as well, for example by Minister of Foreign Affairs Bellingham in 2011, when he points out that Somalia is characterized by humanitarian disaster, that the country is “in the grips of a terrible humanitarian crisis” (Bellingham 2011a, 2011b). Human rights are considered universal ones (Cabinet Office, 2010, p. 20). However, the British find that a broad range of states should take action to better the situation in the country in general, not necessarily just through reducing piracy through operation Atalanta mission, but through other combined initiatives on land as well. The United Kingdom supports NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield, the EU’s NAVFOR Operation ATALANTA and the Combined Task Force 151 in the Horn of Africa region. Moreover, it supports the UK Maritime Trade Operation (of the Royal Navy) and provides humanitarian and development assistance to Somalia to counteract the root causes of piracy (Foreign and Commonwealth Office & Ministry of Defence, 2012). That the United Kingdom prefers cooperation with other states outside the European Union, was expected following its’ NRC. Moreover, as the NRC predicted, they are concerned about economic and security issues. Since this is not the primary frame of the mission and other partnerships are important to the United Kingdom, a substantive contribution to the mission is not as self-evident as it is for Germany and France.

Summary
It appears that the frame of the EU NAVFOR mission as a humanitarian mission first and foremost, fits the German National Role Conception the best and thus provides a reason for German decision-makers to contribute substantively to the mission. The French substantive contribution was also expected following the country’s NRC: as an activist state that takes the initiative in the EU on a global issue. The British focus was on economic concerns, even though they of course where concerned about humanitarian issues as well. Moreover, it is evident that the British contribute to other counter-piracy
initiatives as well. This fits the countries NRC as a somewhat more reluctant member of the EU, at times preferring other partner(ships). Moreover, the British emphasized the importance of the mission for (international) security and stability more than the other two states. The British thus framed the mission more in securitisation terms, where the EU did not. This “mismatch” and the preference to other partnerships does not induce substantive contribution.

4.8 Reputation: Doing What is Expected

The variable of reputation in constructivist terms deals with expectations states have of others and presume others have of them. In this research, one of the main incentives that creates these expectations is contribution to previous EU (military) missions. The EU has deployed several military missions before, even though this is the first naval operation since 2004, EUFOR Althea is the EU mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina that replaced the NATO-led SFOR. All three countries contribute(d) to this mission. The same goes for Concordia in Macedonia (2003) and operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (2003). The United Kingdom did not contribute to EUFOR RD Congo (2006) and Germany did not contribute to EUFOR Chad/RCA (2008-2009). Overall, it is safe to say all three countries contribute more or less equally to these missions, with France standing out somewhat. As Soder (2010) emphasizes, France is the driving force behind the CSDP of the Union (as was confirmed already in the paragraphs on NRC’s). In comparison, the United Kingdom contributed somewhat more troops than Germany, but the difference is not significant (Soder, 2010, pp. 11-12). Since all three states have contributed to EU military missions before, all three of them feel obliged to contribute to EU NAVFOR again as well.

A second aspect that is of potential importance is feeling obliged to contribute since other states (already) do so as well. As elaborated on in the previous paragraph, France fulfilled a leading role in this counter-piracy initiative. It is plausible that Germany and the United Kingdom were inclined to follow the French lead in this case, since both countries have contributed to the mission from the beginning. These states do not want to lag behind, for this might damage their reputation as a good and reliable partner in the EU, but in other partnerships as well. The international community as a whole plays an important role in expectations of contributions by the three states. After all, the UNSC resolutions in 2008 call upon states to take an active part in combating piracy in Somalia (UNSC, 2008a; 2008b).

Related to being good partners are of course the relationships between the states. Constraints or encouragements for states to contribute can stem from these relationships. In the eyes of British Minister of Defence Hutton, the United Kingdom should be part of alliances such as the EU’s military
missions. Moreover, he calls France one of the closest allies of Britain in military terms and states that this implies that the United Kingdom should support French initiatives (Sunday Times, 2008, p.1). However, it is evident that the British contribution to the EU NAVFOR mission in operational terms, is lower than that of France and Germany. Still, the British have been contributing to other anti-piracy activities in the region. The United Kingdom prefers even broader international cooperation. The “special relationship” between the United Kingdom and the United States that has been identified in the past (Dumbrell, 2004; 2009) seems a logical explanation for this development, as mentioned previously. The countries still see each other as important partners (Brown, 2011; Marsh, 2012). The Franco-German special relationship is also relevant: the French prime ministers emphasize the importance of this relationship quite often (Ayrault, 2012 and Fillon, 2007; 2010). Germany also emphasizes its international duties within the UN, NATO and the EU (CDU, CSU, SPD, 2009, p. 154). It thus seems the special relationships provide incentives for contribution as well. For France and Germany, these incentives lead to the EU mission, for the United Kingdom they do not.

**Summary**

The concerns of the three states with their reputations in terms of expectations created by previous contributions, is more or less equal. All three states have taken part in previous military missions of the EU. Still, it is evident that the United Kingdom is somewhat more reluctant with its contribution to the mission analysed in this research. However, the British reputation in terms of special relationships with other states, shows a preference towards transatlantic cooperation. This can explain why it prefers to contribute less to the EU mission, in order to be able to contribute to other, US-led initiatives as well. France and Germany are willing partners in Europe, so their substantive contribution to EU NAVFOR can be traced back to this Franco-German relationship as well.

**4.9 Chapter Summary**

Piracy in Somalia has increased since the collapse of the Somali government in 1990. In 2008, the European Union decided to launch the EU NAVFOR mission to protect WFP shipments and deter, prevent and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast. Some EU and non-EU member states decided to contribute to the mission, among them (and of interest in this research) are Germany, France and the United Kingdom. Of those three states, Germany provided the biggest, most constant operational contribution to the mission, followed by France, which contributed regularly since May 2010. The United Kingdom had a lower operational contribution to the EU NAVFOR mission, but did
provide a big part of military personnel for the operational HQ’s of the mission in Northwood. More importantly, the British contributed to other counter-piracy activities in the region.

A first variable that might explain these contributions identified by the neo-liberal institutionalist theory, is that of military interests. However, such interest are not really present in this case. Since the Somali pirates are a relatively small group, they do not pose a direct military threat to the three countries of interest. However, the danger of terrorism is perceived as a threat in military terms, and the three governments do acknowledge this. Especially the British government wants to battle piracy to prevent that these pirates become terrorists and the Somali mainland becomes a haven for terrorist activities. However, since the states appear to perceive no real direct threats or have military interests in this issue, this variable cannot really explain the states’ contributions to the EU NAVFOR mission. The second neo-liberal institutionalist variable, however, proved to possesses more explanatory power. The economic interests are biggest for Germany, since it transports many goods through the area and all of this transport is (potentially) affected by piracy. The same goes for France and the United Kingdom. All three governments endorse the importance of economics when it comes to justifying the contributions to the mission.

The domestic politics approach shows how domestic pressure is important for the countries’ decisions on their contributions. Even though France and the United Kingdom are states with a state dominated domestic structure (which indicates they are less responsive to domestic incentives), periods of heightened governmental sensitivity (due to governmental unpopularity or pre-election periods), created room for domestic concerns to ring through anyway. In France, interest groups have been least active, while in Germany and the United Kingdom, interest groups directly addressed decision-makers and parliaments. This societal pressure was primarily exerted by interest groups of ship-owners and private security companies, who feared the negative effects piracy could have both economically and for their personnel. Human rights groups have not really concerned themselves with the EU’s mission, except for calling on Germany, France and the United Kingdom to respect human rights when dealing with the pirates. In correspondence with what was expected concerning the intervening variables, Germany appeared to have some consonance between societal demands and policy decisions when it comes to allowing private security onboard ships. The workings of the second variable in this approach, the influence of public opinion, was affected by the intervening variables as well. However, it soon became evident that “the people” within the countries of interest did not really concern themselves with the topic of anti-piracy missions. Calls in favour or against the mission have not been retrieved in
the countries of interest. This variable cannot account for the contributions of the countries to the mission.

The constructivist theory underscored the importance of national role conceptions of states and concerns about their reputation on their foreign policy decision making towards contributing to the EU mission. The mission was framed by different EU actors as predominantly humanitarian (even though there was room for economic and security concerns as well). This frame matches the German NRC the best. Since the German NRC predicts a preference to contribute to humanitarian missions in broad cooperation, it is evident this has contributed to the substantive contribution of the country to the EU mission. For France, its activist NRC has led to substantive contribution as well, as a country that likes to take the lead in (European) efforts to tackle (global) crises. The British national role conception already showed it was a somewhat reluctant EU-partner with a preference for transatlantic cooperation. The British NRC concerns itself with economic issues and security and defense matters. Since the EU mission was not framed in economic terms and the United Kingdom had the possibility to tackle piracy through other partnerships as well, it is logical it did not provide such a substantive contribution to EU NAVFOR as France and Germany did.
5. Conclusion: German, French and British Considerations Regarding Somali Piracy

5.1 Introduction
This research set out to analyse which factors are of importance for different EU member states, when making decisions concerning their common foreign policy. Since the topic is relatively new, this research contributes to extending our knowledge about the common foreign policies of the European Union. Furthermore, different theoretical ideas were used and combined that could account for the decisions of states concerning their contributions to the EU NAVFOR anti piracy mission. Indeed, even though Germany, France and the United Kingdom appeared to share similar (economic) interests in fighting Somali piracy, they did not contribute equally to the EU mission. Since rational theories could not account for this development, constructivist theory and the domestic politics approach were broad in. These theories were tested on their explanatory power, which also extends our knowledge on the workings of these theories.

The research question (“can neo-liberal institutionalism, the domestic politics approach, constructivism or a combination of the previous account for the national decisions of Germany, France and the United Kingdom concerning their contributions to the EU’s common EU NAVFOR anti-piracy mission in Somalia”) is answered in this chapter. First, the posed hypotheses are compared with the actual empirical findings. For each case, it has been discussed what variables played a role and which ones have not. Thereafter, the value of this research for the debate on this topic is considered: what do the discovered outcomes imply for the theories used, and, for the debate as a whole? Subsequently, some caveats of this research and suggestions for further research are addressed.

5.2 Comparing Theory and Reality: Evaluating the Hypotheses
In the theoretical chapter, hypotheses were formulated on the effects of different variables on countries’ decisions on their contributions to EU NAVFOR. Neo-liberal institutionalists expect states to contribute extensively when they have strong military or economic interests in the mission. The domestic politics approach identifies societal pressure by interest groups and the public opinion as variables of potential influence on states’ contributions. For constructivism national role conceptions and concerns with reputation have the potential to influence foreign policies. Since the two intervening variables, domestic structure and governmental sensitivity, are not the same for all three states, hypotheses for each state were formed. An overview of these hypotheses, compared briefly to the empirical findings, can be found in table 5.1, which is then followed by an elaboration for each state.
### Table 5.1: Evaluation of the Hypotheses

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<th>Hypotheses / Expectations</th>
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<td><strong>Neo-liberal institutionalism</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>If Germany has military interests in the Somalia region, it will provide an substantive contribution to EU NAVFOR</td>
<td><em>Expectation is not corroborated:</em> even though Germany provides an substantive contribution to the EU NAVFOR mission, this is not explained by military interests. Piracy does not pose a direct military threat, even though piracy is related to instability in the region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If Germany has economic interests in the Somalia region, it will provide an substantive contribution to EU NAVFOR</td>
<td><em>Expectation is corroborated:</em> Germany provided a substantive contribution to the EU mission and it has great economic interests to do so. Piracy is a strain on the country’s massive maritime transport sector. In comparison to the other cases, Germany has the biggest economic interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domestic Politics</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Since Germany has a society dominated domestic structure, it will provide an substantive contribution to EU NAVFOR if domestic groups favour this.</td>
<td><em>Expectation is partly corroborated:</em> the only active interest groups were groups related to the maritime sector, which pressured in favour of the mission. This pressure is in consonance with the neo-liberal institutionalist argument concerning economic interests. It can however not be assessed how much influence these groups had.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since Germany has a society dominated domestic structure, it will provide an substantive contribution to EU NAVFOR if the public opinion favours this</td>
<td><em>Expectation could not be corroborated:</em> Since the public opinion was ‘neutral’, it cannot be claimed it influenced the decision-makers in a negative of positive fashion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constructivism</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>The German NRC dictates it will provide a substantive contribution to EU NAVFOR, if the mission is framed in humanitarian terms within a broad legal framework, in cooperation with others</td>
<td><em>Expectation is corroborated:</em> Germany provided a substantive contribution to the mission. Since the mission was framed in humanitarian terms, this fitted the German NRC. Moreover, there was broad international support for the fight against piracy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If Germany has contributed to military (EU) missions before, it will provide a substantive contribution to protect its reputation. Again, If its partners contribute to the mission, Germany will feel inclined to do so as well.</td>
<td><em>Expectation is corroborated:</em> Germany provided an substantive contribution to the mission. Germany contributed to previous military missions. Moreover, since France took initiative for this mission, Germany felt inclined to follow its partner. Germany has a reputation of being reliable and predictable.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hypotheses / Expectations</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Neo-liberal institutionalism</td>
<td>If France has military interests in the Somalia region, it will provide an substantive contribution to EU NAVFOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>If France has economic interests in the Somalia region, it will provide an substantive contribution to EU NAVFOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Politics</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Since France has a statist, state dominated domestic structure, it will only provide an substantive contribution to EU NAVFOR if domestic groups favour this in times of heightened governmental sensitivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Since France has a statist, state dominated domestic structure, it will only provide an substantive contribution to EU NAVFOR if public opinion favours this in times of heightened governmental sensitivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constructivism</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The French NRC predicts it will provide a substantive contribution to EU NAVFOR since it wants to take a leading role in the EU.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>If France has contributed to military (EU) missions before it will provide a substantive contribution to protect its reputation. If its partners contribute to the mission, France will feel inclined to do so as well.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypotheses / Expectations</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>United Kingdom</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Domestic Politics</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>If the UK has military interests in the Somalia region, it will provide an substantive contribution to EU NAVFOR</td>
<td><em>Expectation is corroborated:</em> Even though, of the three states, the UK has contributed least to the EU NAVFOR mission, the UK did express some concerns related to military interest (in terms of terrorism and regional security and stability). This might be thought of as implying the hypothesis is falsified, but the UK has contributed to several other counter-piracy activities and this has to be taken into account.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If the UK has economic interests in the Somalia region, it will provide an substantive contribution to EU NAVFOR</td>
<td><em>Expectation is (partly) corroborated:</em> even though the UK has contributed least to the EU NAVFOR mission, the UK did express some concerns related to military interest (in terms of terrorism and regional security and stability). This might be thought of as implying the hypothesis is falsified, but the UK has contributed to several other counter-piracy activities and this has to be taken into account.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since the UK has a liberal, state dominated domestic structure, it will only provide a substantive contribution to EU NAVFOR if domestic groups favour this in times of heightened governmental sensitivity</td>
<td><em>Expectation is partly corroborated:</em> in the UK, concerns were voiced about the mandate of the mission, but even though this happened in periods of heightened sensitivity, no real action followed. Of course, this does not really relate to whether or not there should be (more) contribution to the mission. Interest groups thus laid low in the UK as well.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since the UK has a statist, state dominated domestic structure, it will only provide a substantive contribution to EU NAVFOR if public opinion favours this in times of heightened governmental sensitivity</td>
<td><em>Expectation could not be corroborated:</em> as was the case in Germany and France, the British have not concerned themselves with Somali piracy either. People did not consider it an issue of relevance (as turned out from an opinion poll), so pro or counter- contribution stances were not taken.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constructivism</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>The British NRC dictated it will only provide a substantive contribution to EU NAVFOR, if the mission focuses on economic interests. However, its NRC favours close transatlantic cooperation over EU-partners</td>
<td><em>Expectation is corroborated:</em> the mission was framed in humanitarian terms and this does not really match the British NRC. Moreover, as was expected, the UK prefers cooperation with other, transatlantic partners and this is what has happened.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If the UK has contributed to military (EU) missions before it will protect its good reputation and provide a substantive contribution. If its partners contribute to the mission, the UK might feel inclined to do so as well.</td>
<td><em>Expectation is (partly) corroborated:</em> the British have contributed to previous military EU missions before, as did Germany and France. The UK has however contributed less to EU NAVFOR and this is most likely due to its preference for cooperation with other partners(hips) such as the US. The US-UK relationship is after all identified as “special”.</td>
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</table>
German Considerations

Of all three countries, Germany provided the biggest contribution to EU NAVFOR. One of the main explanations for this fact, provided by the neo-liberal institutionalist theory, are the major economic interests Germany has in this region. Piracy has a profound impact on the huge maritime transport sector (and the people working in this sector). Moreover, there is quite some domestic pressure (a domestic politics variable) of interest groups from this maritime sector who demand action against piracy. On top of this, the EU NAVFOR mission, which is framed as a humanitarian mission by different EU actors, is a mission that fits Germany’s national role conception as a “civilian power” that concerns itself with humanitarian norms perfectly well. The mission is deployed in broad cooperation and within a broad legal framework. Furthermore, Germany strives to be a reliable partner in the EU setting to its French ally. Even though neo-liberal institutionalists expect that states who contribute extensively have military interests in doing so, this is not the case for Germany. Nor can it be said that the public opinion (domestic politics approach) has influenced the German decision to provide a substantive contribution, since there was no positive or negative pressure to do so.

French Considerations

France provided the second largest contribution to the EU NAVFOR mission. Of the three countries under investigation here, it had the smallest interests in (absolute) economic terms. Still, the transport sector is an important part of the French economy. Piracy is at times related by the French to terrorism and regional instability and can in such terms be perceived as a military threat. When it comes to the influence of domestic factors, these are only expected to be of importance when governmental sensitivity in France is heightened, since the state exhibits a state dominated domestic structure. However, only minimal domestic appeals to the government concerning the contributions to the mission were made. Therefore, it is unlikely these domestic factors played an important part in French decision-making on the contribution. The constructivist variable of the national role conception expected France to take a leading and active role and this actually happened. France wants to be present globally and have a leading role in the EU (preferably with its German partner). Moreover, the French had contributed to previous (military) missions as well, which created expectations to do so again this time.

British Considerations

The British provided the smallest contribution to the EU’s anti-piracy mission. However, it is very important to realise the British contributed to other counter-piracy activities in the region as well. The British have relatively big economic interests in combating piracy, due to the size of their maritime
transport sector. Moreover, the British identified military threats in terms of terrorism and (regional) security. A substantive contribution to the EU mission based on the neo-liberal institutionalist variables alone would thus be expected. But, when other counter-piracy activities developed as well, the United Kingdom evidently choose to contribute more to these initiatives. The constructivist variables of NRC’s and reputation can explain why this happened. The United Kingdom’s NRC shows the country is concerned about free trade and economic liberalism. Moreover, it committed to (global) security and stability. Since the EU mission was framed as a humanitarian mission, this did not ‘fit’ the British NRC that well. But most importantly, both the NRC and the reputation variable showed that the special relationship with the United States is still very important to the United Kingdom. The British obviously prefer transatlantic cooperation in this case. Perhaps its reputation as the “reluctant power” in the EU has also allowed the British to contribute less to EU NAVFOR. As for the domestic politics variables, the United Kingdom is categorized as a state with a state dominated domestic structure, so domestic influences will only ring through in times of heightened governmental sensitivity. But then again, interest groups or the public opinion have not really cared for the contributions to the mission.

5.3 Implications for the Theory
Since the hypotheses derived from the different theories have been tested to the empirical reality, some statements concerning the workings and explanatory power of these theories in this specific case and as theories within the field of IR-research can be made.

Even though the neo-liberal institutionalist variable of military interests was not corroborated strongly, this does not disqualify the theory. It is not necessary for both variables, so military and economic interests, to be present to lead to a substantive contribution in this case. Since for all three countries economic interest were present, this variable alone provided enough incentive to contribute to the mission. The fact that the British contribution to the European mission was smaller in comparison to the German and French contribution, despite the countries’ high economic interests and even some military concerns, does not disqualify the theory either, since the British contributed to other counter-piracy activities instead. The neo-liberal institutionalist theory can thus explain why countries wanted to act against Somali piracy, but it cannot explain why the British choose to contribute less to EU NAVFOR and contribute instead to other counter-piracy activities. Still, the neo-liberal institutionalist theory is corroborated by this research.

The domestic politics approach could not be corroborated in this research, but it cannot be dismissed either. As domestic pressure on member state governments barely been observed, theoretical
expectations could not be confirmed. There is however, some prove, especially in the German case, that domestic pressure has been exerted on the governments. It is, however, hard to say if economic interests or the demands of domestic groups convinced the German decision-makers to contribute extensively to the mission, since these two do not exclude but rather reinforce each other. This research cannot make any strong claims concerning the influence of public opinion on decision making, as people have not rallied in favour or against contributions to the mission. Hence, domestic support for this mission might not have been necessary. However, support can also be given tacitly by people choosing not rallying against contribution. In other words, there is no guarantee that mission-contribution would be different if public opinion would have rallied against it.

Whereas the neo-liberal institutionalist theory could not explain why the United Kingdom does not provide a substantive contribution to the EU NAVFOR mission, the constructivist theory can do just that. For all three countries, their national role conceptions proved to provide great explanations for their contributions to the EU mission. Combined with the variable of reputation, who’s hypotheses were corroborated as well, the constructivist theory explained that Germany was eager to provide a substantive contribution to EU NAVFOR because of its concerns with humanitarian issues and its special relationship with France, who in turn wanted to play an active and leading role. Moreover, reputation and the special relationship that the United Kingdom has with the United States explained why the British contribution to EU NAVFOR was relatively small. The constructivist theory as used in this thesis, can thus be corroborated by this research.

The two intervening variables that where identified in this research, which influenced the workings of the domestic politics approach, are the domestic structure and governmental sensitivity. Since the workings of the domestic politics approach could not be tested thoroughly in this research, the workings of the intervening variables could not be tested very well either. However, pressure by interest groups was evidently the highest in the German case. This may indicate that interest groups in France and the United Kingdom already know it is not useful to try to influence the decision-makers at the national level. Since these states exhibit a state-dominated domestic structure, they are less prone to take domestic pressure into account in their considerations. Such a statement cannot be made concerning the intervening variable of governmental sensitivity. However, since it is a very plausible relationship, it should not be put aside in future research.

Overall, this thesis has shed some light on the topic of state decision making on EU common foreign policies. Even though not all theories could be tested equally well in this research, it does provide a
broad theoretical foundation for further research. Moreover, this research is not a “sui generis” one that can only be applied to the European Union. Rather, the research model developed in this thesis can be used for other international organisations as well. This thesis therefore contributes to theoretical development in the field of decision making in international organisations as well as foreign policy analysis. Also, this research has addressed the relatively new topic of the CSDP of the EU, thereby contributing to knowledge on this subject.

5.4 Common Foreign Policy: Less Common than the Name Implies

It is evident that implementation of agreed upon common foreign policies of the EU is something that states decide upon themselves. The empirical results show that the United Kingdom has contributed significantly less to the mission compared to Germany and France. Common Foreign Policies are less common than the name implies, since every state decides for itself what it will contribute, or whether it prefers to work within the framework of other initiatives. However, this research focussed on just one mission in the field of Foreign Policy: hardly enough to make statements on all common European policies. Moreover, as with many European policies, it might be the case that the implementation of these common endeavours is discussed behind closed doors, where decision-makers negotiate who will contribute what to which policy and at what moment. It will always remain difficult to figure out what the exact consideration of decision-makers are.

When it comes to the topic of Somali piracy, this research does not provide a complete picture of the situation, since it only focuses on the side of the European anti-piracy mission. Other countries and partnerships have deployed counter-piracy activities as well. Moreover, countering piracy of the Somalia coast can only be successful if the problems on land are addressed as well.

5.5 Limitations and Recommendations

Of course, every research has its limits and in that respect, this research is no different. In this section, some caveats in this research are acknowledged and recommendations are made to improve future research.

The domestic politics approach could not be tested to its full extend, since data, especially concerning the public opinion, were not really retrieved. Since no data were found, this implies the public opinion was neither negative nor positive towards the mission, so people were ‘neutral’ on this issue. Since neutrality is not an attitude that prefers one or another direction, it is not possible to check its influence on decision-makers. Perhaps this neutrality was interpreted as tacit consent by the decision-makers. In
order to retrieve data on domestic concerns and domestic pressure, a broader time span of the research may provide more insight. Perhaps, there were calls for action prior to the decision to deploy the mission.

Broadening the range of the research in terms of the number of cases might be interesting as well. It is evident that the British contributed to other counter-piracy initiatives. If the total contribution of all three countries to all these activities would be compared, the research outcomes might perfectly explainable as well. All three countries had their interests to battle piracy in neo-liberal institutionalist terms, and the British preference to work with other partners would explain substantive contribution to the other counter-piracy activities, while the German and French national role conceptions could explain a preference for the European mission.

Research could also be expanded to include other European missions under a common heading. In doing so, missions that deal with more controversial issues can be addressed. More controversial issues might include cases in which not all variables point in the same (positive) direction, creating the possibility to test which variable influences states the most.

Overall, the theoretical framework that has been developed and tested in this research is quite promising. It provides multiple explanations for foreign policy formation of states in an organisational setting. Different variables at different levels appear to be important here and if this theoretical model were to be tested again, on a case that includes substantive scores on all variables, this provides a more complete test of the theoretical framework as such.

5.6 Conclusion

Concluding, a combination of neo-liberal institutionalism, domestic politics theory and constructivism can explain why Germany and France contributed substantively to the EU NAVFOR anti-piracy mission off the Somali coast and why the United Kingdom did not. Even though the importance of domestic factors is not proven within this research, they cannot be dismissed either. Hence, the theoretical model itself did stand this test, but since it was not tested to its full extend, other research should concern itself with cases that do allow for a full test of all variables. The process of Common Foreign Policy formation in the EU is still not very transparent, but this attempt to enlighten the process and identify variables of influence on states’ decision making has certainly contributed to the knowledge concerning the subject. Moreover, it has shown that the United Kingdom is still the “reluctant partner” in the European Union.
Appendices

A. Analysis of News Articles Concerning Somali Piracy and Governmental Opinions
B. Units Deployed to the EU NAVFOR - Atalanta Mission per Country
C. Chain of Command EU NAVFOR – ATALANTA (2008-2013)
D. Societal Pressure: Appeals of Interest Groups
E. National Concerns of Governmental Actors
F. The European Frame of EU NAVFOR
G. Literature
A. Analysis of News Articles Concerning Somali Piracy and Governmental Opinions

Table compiled by the author with information from different sources, retrieved through LexisNexis and governmental websites on parliamentary debates (keywords: “Somalia”, “piracy” and the names of the decision-makers in charge (in the respective languages).)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>European Council</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Council Joint</td>
<td>Head of gov(^{13}) = A. Merkel</td>
<td>Head of gov(^{16}) = F. Filon</td>
<td>Head of gov(^{19}) = G. Brown</td>
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<td>Action 2008/851/CFSP</td>
<td>Minister of F.A.(^{14}) = F. Steinmeier</td>
<td>Minister of F. A(^{17}) = B. Kouchner</td>
<td>Minister of F.A(^{20}) = D. Miliband</td>
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<td>- “to take action to protect shipping involved in the transport and delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia and UN-authorised activities”</td>
<td>Minister of Defence(^{15}) = F. Jung</td>
<td>Minister of Defence(^{18}) = H. Morin</td>
<td>Minister of Defence(^{21}) = J. Hutton</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Council Joint Action 2008/918/CFSP (based on UNSCR 1814 &amp; 1816)</td>
<td><strong>Taz, die Tageszeitung, s. 2, 11-11-08</strong></td>
<td><strong>Agence France Presse. 10-11-08</strong></td>
<td><strong>Hansard Volume (House of Commons Debates) Vol. 481, Column 192W – 193W. 21-10-08</strong></td>
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<td>- “affect humanitarian efforts” “secure the delivery of humanitarian efforts” “secure the delivery of humanitarian efforts”</td>
<td>- Verteidigungsminister Jung: “die Herstellung von Seesicherheit und die Gewährleistung des freien Seehandels.”</td>
<td>- Ministre français de la Défense Morin : - « L’opération Atalanta aura pour tâche &quot;la protection des bateaux du Programme alimentaire mondial (PAM)&quot; pour acheminer l’aide à plus de deux millions de Somaliens »</td>
<td>- Ainsworth: “The key task of the operation will be to ensure the safe delivery of World Food Programme and other vital humanitarian deliveries to Somalia, but also to deter attacks on European and other shipping”</td>
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<td>- Steinmeier: “Wir brauchen endlich wieder sichere Seewege am Horn von Afrika”</td>
<td><strong>Frankfurter Rundschau, 22-11-08</strong></td>
<td>- « ainsi que &quot;le convoyage et l’escorte des navires marchands »</td>
<td>- Ainsworth: “The ESDP operation will not</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Außenminister Steinmeier: “Wir brauchen endlich wieder sichere Seewege</td>
<td><strong>Usinger Anzeiger, 24-11-08</strong></td>
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13 “Bundeskanzlerin”
14 “Bundesminister des Auswärtigen”
15 “Bundesminister der Verteidigung”
16 “Premier ministre français”
17 “ministre des Affaires étrangères”
18 “ministère de la Défense”
19 “Prime Minister”
20 “Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs”
21 “Secretary of State for Defence”
aid to the Somali population
- “international maritime traffic in the region”
- “continued violations of the UN arms Embargo”
- “peace and international security in the region”

am Horn von Afrika.”
- Fraktionsvorsitzende der Grünen im Bundestag Trittin: “Der Kampf gegen Piraterie hat nichts mit dem Kampf gegen Terror zu tun.”

Die Welt, s. 2, 08-12-08
Steinmeier & Jung:
Aufgaben sind
- “die Gewährung von Schutz für die Schiffe des Welternährungsprogramms”
- “die Durchführung der erforderlichen Maßnahmen einschließlich des Einsatzes von Gewalt zur Abschreckung”
- “die Verhütung und Beendigung von seeräuberischen Handlungen”

Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 16/11337, 10-12-08
- “Dies ergibt sich sowohl aus Artikel 105 des VN- Seerechtsübereinkommens von 1982 als auch aus dem Völkerrechtsrechtsrecht.”
- “destabilisiert die zunehmende Piraterie die staatlichen somalischen Institutionen weiter”
- “humanitäre Hilfe für die notleidende somalische Bevölkerung sichergestellt werden.”
- “die Operation den zivilen Schiffsverkehr auf den dortigen Handelswegen sichern”

et le contrôle de la zone”

La Croix. 12-11-08
Ministre français de la Défense Morin :
- « Atalanta assurera aussi « le convoyage et l’escorte des navires marchands » »

solve the long-term problems of Somalia which are the root causes of piracy, and we will continue working with our international partners to restore governance”

The Sunday Times (London), p. 1. 26-10-08
- Hutton: “France is one of our closest allies, militarily. The French believe very strongly in this type of role. If we can support it, we should.”
- Hutton : “Britain’s role in the world is to be part of those alliances -that’s the best way to project power, strength and conviction around the world”

The Guardian (London), p. 29. 20-11-08
- Miliband: “Piracy threatens trade and prosperity”

The Independent (London), p. 10. 20-11-08
- Miliband: “the problem was "a grave danger to the stability in the region".”

States News Service. 04-12-08
- Hutton: “This makes it uniquely placed to respond to instability” (the ESDP and mission employed under its heading)

Associated Press Online. 08-12-08
- Miliband: "This operation (...) I hope will begin to establish international order in seas that are vital to trade right around the world"
Rede Außenminister Frank-Walter Steinmeier. 17-12-08
- “die Operation „Atalanta“ soll den Transport humanitärer Hilfsleistungen nach Somalia schützen und den zivilen Schiffsverkehr in der Region sichern”
- “für die Menschen in Somalia, für die Sicherheit in der Region und für eine internationale Solidarität.”

Hansard Volume (House of Commons Debates) Vol. 485, Column 288W. 11-12-08
- Minister of State for the Armed Forces Ainsworth: “providing deterrence in support of the World Food Programme”

Associated Press International. 14-12-08
- Hutton: “the world must help restore effective government in Somalia to stop it from becoming a haven for terrorists”
- Hutton: “It is a classic area where you have got ungoverned space, no effective state apparatus and criminality and potential terrorism.”
- Hutton: “Right now, our mission is dealing with the immediate problem that pirates pose to international shipping on the high seas”
- Hutton: “We don't want that money (red: the millions of dollars in ransoms being collected by pirates) to be used to fund insurgencies or terrorism around the world”

US Fed News. 16-12-08
- Miliband: “Among other things, combating piracy off the Somali coast was essential for the delivery of humanitarian supplies for the Somali people. All relevant actors were playing a role in seeking to secure World Food Programme (WFP) vessels...”
and, where possible, disrupting attacks”
- Miliband: “one should not look at the piracy issue through the prism of international trade, alone; the political, humanitarian and security situations in Somalia carried real risk”
- Miliband: Areas of uncertainty in Somalia political and security related; “political steps were needed to light the way forward, including an orderly transition to a government of national unity” and he has “major questions related to the security situation”

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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Minister of F.A. = F. Steinmeier (until 28-10-09)</td>
<td>Minister of F.A. = B. Kouchner</td>
<td>Minister of F.A. = D. Miliband</td>
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<td>2008/851/CFS of 8 December 2009</td>
<td>Minister of Defence = F. Jung (until 28-10-09)</td>
<td>Minister of Defence = H. Morin</td>
<td>Minister of Defence = J. Hutton (until 05-06-09)</td>
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2009

Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 16/13187. 27-05-08
Anpassung des Einsatzgebietes (same reasoning as previously in Bundestag)

Le Figaro, pg. 8. 09-03-09
- « Bernard Kouchner : « Nous sommes amis et alliés des Américains, mais pas suivistes »;
- “la lutte contre la piraterie et pour la liberté des mers est essentielle.”

News Press. 17-03-09
- “pour sécuriser l’acheminement de l’aide alimentaire aux populations déplacées

Hansard Volume (House of Commons Debates) Vol. 488, Column 1444W. 03-03-09
- Minister of State for the Armed Forces Ainsworth: “British vessel provided protection to vulnerable vessels, including World Food Programme shipping” (...) “The EU counter-piracy mission took on this
| Head of gov. = A. Merkel  
Minister of F.A. = G. Westerwelle (since 28-10-09)  
Minister of Defence = K. zu Guttenberg (since 28-10-09) | food aid to the Somali population by the WFP”  
- “pour dissuader et réprimer les actes de piraterie”  
*Le Figaro, pg. 14. 22-04-09*  
- “Aider les Somaliens à reconstruire un État : c'est le deuxième volet de notre action”  
- “Nous contribuerons aussi à la formation des forces de sécurité somaliennes”  
*Agence France Presse. 17-11-09*  
Ministre français de la Défense Morin :  
- « C'est en s'attaquant aux racines du mal en Somalie même que nous pourrons régler la question de la piraterie”, a-t-il expliqué. »  
- ministre français Affaires européennes Lellouche : “Mais quelle est l’alternative ? Laisser Al-Qaida prendre en main la Somalie ? C’est ça, le sujet”, a-t-il répondu. » | protection role as its primary objective””  
*Hansard Volume (House of Commons Debates) Vol. 493, Column 4-6. 01-06-09*  
Debate between MP’s and Minister of State for the Armed Forces Ainsworth concerning safety of forces and e.g. tourists in the waters and questions about prosecution of pirates  
*Press Association Media point. 04-06-09*  
- Hutton: “The UK would continue to work internationally in countering terrorism, promoting peacekeeping and ensuring security for global trade”  
*Head of gov. = G. Brown  
Minister of F.A. = D. Miliband  
Minister of Defence = R. Ainsworth (since 05-06-09)* |
**Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache 17/179. 09-12-09**

- “humanitäre Hilfe für die Not leidende somalische Bevölkerung sicherstellen”
- “zivilen Schiffsverkehr auf den dortigen Handelswegen zu sichern, Geiselnahmen und Lösegelderpressungen zu unterbinden und das Völkerrecht Durchzusetzen”
- “die wichtigste Handelsroute zwischen Europa, der arabischen Halbinsel und Asien”

---

**Council Decision 2010/766/CFSP of 7 December 2010**

“threaten shipping in the area and especially the delivery of food aid to the Somali population by the WFPe”

- **Head of gov.** = A. Merkel
- **Minister of F.A.** = G. Westerwelle
- **Minister of Defence** = K. zu Guttenberg

**Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 17/3691. 09-12-09**

- “humanitäre Hilfe für die Not leidende somalische Bevölkerung sicherstellen”
- “zivilen Schiffsverkehr auf den dortigen Handelswegen zu sichern, Geiselnahmen und Lösegelderpressungen zu unterbinden und das Völkerrecht Durchzusetzen”
- “die wichtigste Handelsroute zwischen Europa, der arabischen Halbinsel und...”

- **Head of gov.** = F. Filon
- **Minister of F.A.** = M. Alliot-Marie (since 14-11-10)
- **Minister of Defence** = A. Juppé (since 14-11-10)

- **Head of gov.** = G. Brown (until 11-05-10)
- **Minister of F.A.** = D. Miliband (until 11-05-10)
- **Minister of Defence** = R. Ainsworth (until 11-05-10)

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**Council Decision amending Joint Action 2008/851/CFS P. 07-12-10**

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**Council Decision 2010/766/CFSP of 7 December 2010**

“threaten shipping in the area and especially the delivery of food aid to the Somali population by the WFPe”

- **Head of gov.** = A. Merkel
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**Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 17/3691. 09-12-09**

- “humanitäre Hilfe für die Not leidende somalische Bevölkerung sicherstellen”
- “zivilen Schiffsverkehr auf den dortigen Handelswegen zu sichern, Geiselnahmen und Lösegelderpressungen zu unterbinden und das Völkerrecht Durchzusetzen”
- “die wichtigste Handelsroute zwischen Europa, der arabischen Halbinsel und...”

- **Head of gov.** = F. Filon
- **Minister of F.A.** = M. Alliot-Marie (since 14-11-10)
- **Minister of Defence** = A. Juppé (since 14-11-10)

- **Head of gov.** = G. Brown (until 11-05-10)
- **Minister of F.A.** = D. Miliband (until 11-05-10)
- **Minister of Defence** = R. Ainsworth (until 11-05-10)
2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Head of gov. = A. Merkel</th>
<th>Head of gov. = F. Filon</th>
<th>Head of gov. = D. Cameron</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minister of F.A. = G. Westerwelle</td>
<td>Minister of F. A. = M. Alliot-Marie (untill 27-02-11)</td>
<td>Minister of F.A. = W. Hague</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Defence = T. Mazière (since 03-03-11)</td>
<td>Minister of Defence = A. Juppé (until 27-02-11)</td>
<td>Minister of Defence = L. Fox (until 14-10-11)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 17/7742. 16-11-11**
- “den humanitären Zugang nach Somalia durch den Schutz von Schiffen des Welternährungsprogramms und der AMISOM sicherzustellen”
- “den zivilen Schiffsverkehr auf den dortigen Handelswegen zu sichern, Geiselnahmen und Lösegelderpressungen zu unter binden und das Völkerrecht durchzusetzen.”

**UK Government News. 22-03-11**
- Hague: “In Somalia, instability is fuelling the spread of terrorism and piracy”

**Guardian Unlimited. 27-07-11**
- Hague tweeted: “A glimpse of what Somalia could be - stability in the region is possible.”

**Europolitique (quotidient Français). 26-10-11**
Ministre français de la Défense Longuet:
- « l’opération de lutte contre la piraterie a été qualifiée de succès. ” Nous devons aller plus loin en développant des capacités supplémentaires et en définissant le traitement judiciaire des pirates »
Minister of F.A. = G. Westerwelle  
Minister of Defence = T. Mazière | Head of gov. = F. Filon (until 10-05-12)  
Minister of F. A. = A. Juppé (until 16-05-12)  
Minister of Defence = G. Longuet (until 16-05-12) | Head of gov. = D. Cameron  
Minister of F.A. = W. Hague  
Minister of Defence = P. Hammond |
<table>
<thead>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“threaten shipping in the area and especially the delivery of food aid to the Somali population by the WFP”</td>
<td>“generate financial flows against which further efforts need to be undertaken”</td>
<td>Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 17/9339. 18-04-12</td>
<td>iMaverick. XX-01-12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| | “die Not leidende somalische Bevölkerung sichergestellt werden”  
“zivilen Schiffsverkehr auf den dortigen Seewegen sichern, Geiselnahmen und Löse Gelderpressungen unterbinden und das Völkerrecht durchsetzen”  
“unterstützten von die Mission der Afrikanischen Union in Somalia (AMISOM) die ein Beitrag zur Stabilisierung Somalias und damit zur Bekämpfung der Wurzeln der Piraterie geleistet” | | Hague: “interception of pirate vessel is “a clear demonstration of Britain’s ability to tackle piracy that threatens our interests””.  
Cpt. Northwood (commander of the mission): “a clear message to other Somali pirates that we will not tolerate their attacks on international shipping”.  
Tanzania Daily News. XX-02-12 | Hague: “Introduce more effective |
| | “understützen von die Mission der Afrikanischen Union in Somalia (AMISOM) die ein Beitrag zur Stabilisierung Somalias und damit zur Bekämpfung der Wurzeln der Piraterie geleistet” | | Thai News Service. 09-02-12 | |
arrangements to tackle piracy and terrorism
- “Piracy off the Somali coast is an affront to the rule of international law”

Defence Web. 21-02-12
- Hague: “our engagement in Somalia is not a luxury, it is a necessity [...]” for terrorism e.g. Al Shabaab will spread.

Agence France Presse. 21-02-12
- Hague: “Somalia had been “the world’s most failed state for the last 20 years” and a potential base for terrorism.”

Press Association Mediapoint. 22-02-12
- PM Cameron: “warned of the “real threat” posed by extremism in Somalia [...] The risk could escalate unless significant action is taken to stabilise the failed state, according to the Prime Minister.
- PM Cameron: “The security threat is real, it is substantial,” (...) “It is based on the fact that al Shabab is an organisation that has now explicitly linked itself to al Qaida, and it encourages violent jihad not just in Somalia but also outside Somalia. (...) “So there is a terrorist threat that is current today, and if we are not careful, could get worse”.”
UK Government News. 27-06-12
- Minister for Europe D. Lidington: “the real advantage of this operation (red: counter-piracy in Somalia) is that it sits within a wider EU approach to the region.”
- Lidington: “CSDP missions make a real difference to international security (...) They are protecting international shipping and food aid from the scourge of piracy”

|--------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|

UK Government News. 14-02-13
- Hague: “Two years ago Al Shabaab controlled large parts of Somalia (red), piracy was booming and the threat from terrorism was growing”

Sources


House of Commons (2009b). *Hansard Volume (House of Commons Debates)* Vol. 493, Column 4-6. Published June 1, 2009


Ministère des Affaires étrangères et européennes (2009). Bernard Kouchner sur l'OTAN : "Le temps est venu de faire tout haut ce que les prédécesseurs du président Sarkozy ont fait tout bas". *NEWS Press*. Published March 17, 2009


Reuters (2012). In 'failed state' Somalia, instability is lucrative for some. *DefenceWeb*. Published February 21, 2012


### B. Units Deployed to the EU NAVFOR - Atalanta Mission per Country

Tables compiled by the author with information retrieved from multiple sources.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deployed units EU NAVFOR Atalanta Germany</th>
<th>Deployment period(s)</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Units</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigate “Rheinland-Pfalz”. Crew of 220 people plus 2 Sea Lynx MK 88 A helicopters and marine protection force. Took over from frigate “Karlsruhe”</td>
<td>21-01-09 – 22-07-09</td>
<td>22-08-09 (Deutsche Marine)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigate “Brandenburg”. Crew of 242 people onboard</td>
<td>15-06-09 – 02-10-09</td>
<td>02-10-09 / 16-06-09 (Deutsche Marine)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigate “Karlsruhe”. Boarding assurance team + medical team + military priest + legal advisor + military police + translator + 2 Sea Lynx helicopters. Crew of 220 people. Took over the role of frigate “Rheinland-Pfalz”</td>
<td>24-08-09 – 07-12-09</td>
<td>24-08-09 (ddp) / 05-12-08 (le Point) / 22-04-12 &amp; 02-11-12 (Deutsche Marine)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigate “Schleswig-Holstein” (crew of 219 people).</td>
<td>xx-03-10 – 01-10-10</td>
<td>01-10-10 (Deutsche Marine)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigate “Köln”。 Crew of 220 people</td>
<td>30-08-10 – 10-12-10</td>
<td>XX-08-11 (die Welt) / 16-11-11 (Bundesregierung) / 11-12-13 (EU NAVFOR) / 31-03-11 / 09-12-11 / 13-09-11 (Deutsche Marine)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime patrol aircraft Lockheed P-3C Orion</td>
<td>12-09-11 – 09-12-11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigate “Bayern” (crew of circa 236 people)</td>
<td>18-07-11 – 22-12-11</td>
<td>13-08-11 (Focus) / 16-11-11 (Bundesregierung) / 07-16 (Bayerische Staatsregierung) / 18-07-11 / 22-12-11 (Deutsche Marine)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Marine takes over commando of Atalanta</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigate “Bremen”. Crew of 220 people. Bremen is later replaced by frigate “Sachsen”.</td>
<td>07-05-12 - 08-10-12</td>
<td>05-09-12 (Focus)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigate “Sachsen”. Crew of 255 people, took over from “Bremen” in august 2012</td>
<td>23-07-12 – 07-12-12</td>
<td>23-10-12 (der Spiegel) / 31-08-12 (Bundesregierung) / 23-07-12 / 07-12-12 (Deutsche Marine)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigate “Augsburg”. Crew of 230 people, including juridical advisor, boarding assurance team, medical team, military priest and translators and a Sea Lynx helicopter</td>
<td>18-03-13 – 30-08-13</td>
<td>27-08-13 (Focus) / 12-03-13 (Focus)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigate “Niedersachsen”. Crew of 200 people. Replaces frigate “Augsburg”</td>
<td>29-06-13 – xx-xx-xx</td>
<td>24-07-13 (Focus)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frigate “Hessen”. Crew of 250 people.</td>
<td>18-11-13 – xx-04-14</td>
<td>13-11-13 (Focus) / EU NAVFOR (11-12-13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>replenishment ship “Berlin” (crew of 159 to 233 people)</td>
<td></td>
<td>26-03-12 (der Spiegel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sea Lynx Mk 88 A helicopter (currently deployed)</td>
<td></td>
<td>26-03-12 (der Spiegel)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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22 It is difficult to determine what the periods of deployment are precisely. The date of leaving the home-harbour until return there is considered the period of deployment in all three cases (so the journey to Somalia is included).
German sources:


Deutsche Marine (2010a). *Wieder zu Hause - Fregatte SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN von ATALANTA zurück*. Published October 1st, 2010

Deutsche Marine (2010b). *Einsatzpremiere für die Fregatte HAMBURG*. Published November 28, 2010


Deutsche Marine (2011c). *BAYERN wird ATALANTA-Flaggschiff*. Published July 18, 2011


Deutsche Marine (2012a). *Einsatzpremier für die „Sachsen“*. Published July 23, 2012


Deutsche Marine (2013). „Karlsruhe“ nach 40.000 Seemeilen wieder zurück in Wilhelmshaven. Published April 22, 2013


**Deployed units EU NAVFOR Atalanta France**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Deployment period(s)</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- 8 vessels and 2 surveillance aircrafts operational, for either Atalanta or ALINDIEN (other mission in the area)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Portail du Gouvernement (07-05-10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Maritime patrol aircraft (2009 &amp; 2010) → Atalanta</td>
<td>14-08-10 - 14-12-10</td>
<td>Portail du Gouvernement (17-08-10) / 16-12-10 (ministère de la Défense)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Frigate “De Grasse”. Circa 300 people onboard. → Atalanta</td>
<td>14-08-10 - 14-12-10</td>
<td>Portail du Gouvernement (07-05-10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Aviso “Jacoubet”. Crew of circa 90 people (deployed in January 2011) → Atalanta</td>
<td>xx-12-10 – xx-03-11</td>
<td>06-01-11 (Ministère de la Défense)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Frigate “Surcouf”. Crew of around 150 people (took over the frigate “Courbet” in August 2011 and “Le Floréal” in December 2012) → Atalanta</td>
<td>09-11-11 – 11-02-12 xx-10-12 – 02-12-12</td>
<td>Portail du Gouvernement (11-08-10) / 04-03-09 (France24) / 04-12-12 (Mer et Marine) / 25-11-11 (ministère de la Défense)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Frigate “le Floréal”. Crew of 86 people. → Atalanta</td>
<td>28-01-12 – xx-04-12</td>
<td>27-02-12 / 30-01-12 / 20-04-12 (Ministère de la Défense)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Frigate “Aconit”+ onboard Estonian protection team, took over from frigate “Floréal” (the “Aconit” has a crew of around 150 people). → Atalanta</td>
<td>16-04-12 – 16-06-12 10-04-13 – 14-06-13</td>
<td>28-06-10 / 20-04-12 / 28-06-13 / 25-06-12 (Ministère de la Défense)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**French sources:**


Mer et Marine (2012). *Piraterie : La frégate Floréal relevée par le Surcouf*. Published December 4, 2012

Ministère de la Défense (2010). *04/01/09 - Golfe d'Aden : le Jean de Vienne déjoue deux attaques et intercepte 19 pirates*. Published June 28, 2010


Ministère de la Défense (2012b). *Atalante : la frégate Aconit en lutte contre la piraterie*. Published February 27, 2012


Portail du Gouvernement (2010b). *Le Floréal au coeur de la lutte contre la piraterie*. Published August 11, 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deployed units</th>
<th>EU NAVFOR Atalanta United Kingdom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Units</td>
<td>Deployment period(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Frigate F85 HMS “Cumberland” → NATO</td>
<td>23-10-08 – 05-12-08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Frigate F238 HMS “Northumberland”. Crew of circa 185 people → Atalanta</td>
<td>08-12-08 – 28-02-09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Frigate HMS “Portland”. Crew of circa 185 people. → Atalanta</td>
<td>xx-02-09 – xx-06-09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The Royal Navy Type 22 frigate “HMS Chatham” → NATO Operation Ocean Shield</td>
<td>xx-02-10 - 02-08-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Royal Navy Type 23 frigate “HMS Richmond”. Around 185 people onboard → EU NAVFOR</td>
<td>05-01-11 - 15-04-11 11-06-11 – 10-07-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- HMS “Montrose” (back after 5 months in December 2010) → Operation Ocean shield / NATO taskforce</td>
<td>xx-08-10 - xx-12-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>/</td>
<td>HMS “Cornwall” → combined task force 151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2012, February 2012?</td>
<td>Royal Fleet Auxiliary “Fort Victoria”. With Royal Navy helicopter ad Royal Marine boarding teams → which operation is unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07-03-13 (Ministry of Defence) / 01-03-13 (Ministère de la Défense)</td>
<td>French frigate FS Surcouf + Lynx helicopter (3 month patrol) → Atalanta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-11-13 (European Union Naval Force) / 22-11-13 (Royal Navy) / 12-12-13 (Ministry of Defence)</td>
<td>RFA “Lyme Bay”. With Lynx Mark 8 helicopter and Marine Sniper Team (32 day tour) → Atalanta</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**British sources:**


Royal Navy (2013). RFA Lyme Bay heads home after counter piracy operations of Somalia. Published November 22, 2013
C. Chain of Command EU NAVFOR – ATALANTA (2008-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation Commander</th>
<th>Deputy Operation Commander</th>
<th>Force Commander</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2013</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Tarrant (GB) (15-01-13 - ?)</td>
<td>J. Martens (D) 19-07-13 - ? )</td>
<td>H. Bléjean (F) (06-12-13 - ?)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **2012**            |                           |                 |
| G. Mattesi (I) (13-07-12 – xx-01-12) | P. Garcia De Paredes (E ) (07-12-12 – 08-04-13) |
| R. Endres (D) (12-01-12 – 13-07-12) | E. Credendino (I) 06-08-12 – 07-12-12) |

| **2011**            |                           |                 |
| D. Potts (GB) (01-08-11 – 16-01-13) | C. Canova (F) (22-07-11 - 12-01-12) | J. Manso (E) (06-12-11 – 07-04-12) |
| G. Rando (I) (13-01-11 - 22-07-11) | T. Jugel (D) (13-08-11 - 06-12-11) |
| A. Correia (P) (14-04-11 – 13-08-11) |

| **2010**            |                           |                 |
| B. Howes (GB) (14-06-10 – 01-08-11) | T. Ernst (D) (04-06-10 – 13-01-11) | J. Rodriguez (E) (15-12-10 – 14-04-11) |
| P. Coindreau (F) (14-08-10 – 15-12-10) | J. Thörnqvist (S) (14-04-10 – 14-08-10) |

| **2009**            |                           |                 |
| P. Hudson (GB) (03-06-09 – 14-06-10) | B. Bauzá (E) (11-12-09 – 04-06-10) | G. Gumiero (I) (13-12-09 – 14-04-10) |
| T. Kaehler (D) (05-06-09 – 11-12-09) | P. bindt (NL) (13-08-09 – 13-12-09) |
| J. Carame (E) (06-04-09 – 13-08-09) |

| **2008**            |                           |                 |
| P. Jones (GB) (08-12-08 – 03-06-09) | J. Labonne (F) (09-12-08 - 05-06-09) | A. Papaioannou (GR) (12-11-08 – 06-04-09) |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commanders per country</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom 5x</td>
<td>Germany 4x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France 3x</td>
<td>France 3x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy 2x</td>
<td>Netherlands 2x</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain 1x</td>
<td>Sweden 1x</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal 2x</td>
<td>Greece 1x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain 4x</td>
<td>Italy 2x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France 3x</td>
<td>Germany 1x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Used Sources:


Council of the European Union (2009), Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, congratulates Rear Admiral Hudson on taking office as EU Operation Commander of Operation EU NAVFOR – ATALANTA. Published June 3, 2009


European Union Naval Force / EU NAVFOR (2009b). Italian Navy on its way to take over the lead. Published. December 2, 2009

European Union Naval Force / EU NAVFOR (2009c). New Deputy Operation Commander. Published December 11, 2009

European Union Naval Force / EU NAVFOR (2009d). Italian Navy takes over lead of EU NAVFOR. Published December 13, 2009


European Union Naval Force / EU NAVFOR (2010b). New Deputy Operation Commander. Published June 4, 2010

European Union Naval Force / EU NAVFOR (2010c). New Operation Commander. Published June 14, 2010


European Union Naval Force / EU NAVFOR (2012d). France Hands Over Sea Command of EU Counter Piracy Naval Force to Italy. Published August 6, 2012


### Tables compiled by the author with information from different sources, retrieved through LexisNexis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Source</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamburger Abendblatt, 27-08-08</td>
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<tr>
<td>VerkehrsRundschau.de, 25-09-08</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 19-11-08</td>
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<td>Spiegel online, 20-11-08</td>
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<td>Agence France Presse, 04-12-08</td>
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<td>DAPD nachrichtenagentur, 05-12-08</td>
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<td>SDA – Basisdienst Deutsch, 19-12-08</td>
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<td>--------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hamburger Abendblatt, 17-04-09</td>
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<tr>
<td>Verband Deutscher Reeder</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hamburger Abendblatt, 25-04-09</td>
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<tr>
<td>Verband Deutscher Reeder</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAPD, 11-06-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Die Welt, 11-08-11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Press releases and statements**

- Hans-Heinrich Nöll, der Hauptgeschäftsführer des Verbandes Deutscher Reeder, betonte: "Wir haben die Bundesregierung und damit die internationale Staatengemeinschaft aber auch gebeten, den Schutzschirm noch auszuweiten.
- "Die Reeder werden von den Küstenländern unterstützt, und die setzen die Regierung unter Druck."

**Transliteration**

- "zu einer deutlich größeren Sicherheit geführt", sagt Max Johns vom Reederverband.'
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zeitung / Nachrichtenquelle</th>
<th>Organisation / Reihe Neues</th>
<th>Zitat</th>
<th>Herausforderung / Lösung</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td></td>
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<td>A consultancy firm states that a political solution should be found for the Somali problem.</td>
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<td>Ship-owners applaud the decision to extend the mandate in terms of areal deployment.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ship-owners praise the extension of the mandate (again).</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>German ship-owners want to have private, armed security forces on board their vessels to provide protection.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Hamburger Abendblatt, 19-07-12 | Verband Deutscher Reeder    | „Die deutschen Reeder hätten bei der Passage durch gefährdete Gebiete am liebsten bewaffneten Schutz von Marine oder Bundespolizei an Bord. Dafür fehlen der Bundesregierung allerdings die Mittel. „Das geplante
|                           |                             | German ship-owners prefer protection by the marine or police forces, but since the means are not there to protect all

German sources:


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>France</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Article</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agence France Presse, 16-09-08</td>
<td>Les Armateurs de France</td>
<td>&quot;Les Armateurs de France ont demandé mardi &quot;la mobilisation de moyens internationaux&quot; et notamment militaires pour &quot;prévenir et réduire&quot; les</td>
<td>French ship-owners demand international mobilisation, in military terms, to prevent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Text</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agence France Presse, 19-11-08</td>
<td>Armateurs de France</td>
<td>Il faut que la communauté internationale se mobilise avec des moyens militaires en coopération avec les États limitrophes (…) pour prévenir et réduire considérablement le nombre d’actes de piraterie dans cette zone, a déclaré sur France Info Anne-Sophie Avé, délégué général d’Armateurs de France. “Dans l’immédiat, pour faire face à d’éventuelles attaques, les Armateurs de France demandent &quot;la protection de la marine nationale lorsque nous ne pouvons pas faire autrement que faire transiter par cette zone un navire particulièrement vulnérable&quot; “Les armateurs français de pêche au thon avaient réclamé une réunion avec les pouvoirs publics sur les moyens d’assurer la sécurité de leurs navires, après deux attaques de pirates dans la semaine contre des thoniers espagnols et français.”</td>
<td>French ship-owners think the current military mission in the Gulf of Aden is not enough and support the idea of private security initiatives.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Les Echos, 23-04-09</td>
<td>Armateurs de France</td>
<td>Ce qui revient à traiter de manière globale l’épineuse question de la piraterie. Cette approche, la déléguée générale d’Armateurs de France, Anne-Sophie Ave, la défendait déjà en novembre dernier : “Tout d’abord, il y a urgence à court terme à sécuriser la navigation. À plus long terme, il faut agir par la diplomatie, ce qui signifie qu’il n’y aura pas de solution sur mer tant que les problèmes sur terre ne seront pas réglés.”</td>
<td>French ship-owners emphasize that a long-term solution in Somalia lies in terms of political solution on the land (not in the sea).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sud Ouest, 05-05-11</td>
<td>Gallice Security</td>
<td>“Les juristes dissèquent la piraterie maritime”</td>
<td>Private security is a topic of interest, since jurists concerns themselves with it.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Télégramme, 03-10-12</td>
<td>Prorisk International</td>
<td>“Le constat est dressé par Thierry Houette, un ancien militaire brestois reconvertis dans la sécurité en mer, qui appelle de ses voeux la libéralisation de la lutte anti-pirates en France. «Actuellement, un navire battant pavillon français ne peut pas embarquer de personnel civil armé. Mais, avec un budget en baisse, l’armée française ne pourra plus assurer la</td>
<td>French private security company says France should legalise and regulate these companies since the French military alone cannot protect all vessels.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
sécurité de tous ces navires». Pour éviter que les armateurs «dépavillonnent» ou fassent appel à des sociétés de sécurité étrangères, Thierry Houette milite pour «un développement du savoir-faire français».

French sources:


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Source</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Associated Press Online, 17-11-08</td>
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<tr>
<td>Associated Press Online, 21-11-08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
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<tr>
<td>Business Insurance, 22-12-08</td>
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<tr>
<td>Business Insurance, 20-04-09</td>
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<td>EUobserver.com, 21-04-09</td>
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<td>AllAfrica, xx-02-10</td>
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<tr>
<td>DefenceWeb, 16-02-11</td>
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<td>The East African, ??-03-11</td>
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<tr>
<td>The East African, ??-03-11</td>
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<tr>
<td>ITAR-TASS, 17-03-11</td>
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<tr>
<td>DefenceWeb, 07-07-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Business Times Singapore, 31-08-11</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

²¹ It has to be noted that these are statements of the International Chamber of Shipping, therefore, their importance should not be overrated (since statements are not necessarily country-specific).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Quote</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DefenceWeb, 15-09-11</td>
<td>International Chamber of Shipping¹</td>
<td>“The (shipping) industry last week urged the United Nations to create an armed military force to be deployed on vessels to tackle Somali piracy. “The current military response -- with only a handful of navy ships available to provide protection on any given day -- has just been a sticking plaster on a gaping wound,” said International Chamber of Shipping chairman Spyros Polemis. “Governments have so far failed to protect shipping, and the smooth flow of world trade, from being literally held to ransom by Somali criminals,” he said on Wednesday.</td>
<td>Ship-owners find that more vessels need to be deployed by nations to battle piracy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associated Press Online, 30-10-11</td>
<td>International Chamber of Shipping¹</td>
<td>“Ships sailing under Britain's flag will be permitted to carry armed guards on some perilous routes to combat the threat from pirates, the prime minister said Sunday. David Cameron said Britain was reversing its opposition to the use of weapons aboard ships, amid mounting concern about the risks of vessels and crew being seized by pirates particularly off Somalia's coast. Cameron's office said the use of weapons on British-flagged ships is banned under firearms laws, but that new rules would be in place within a month. Britain’s announcement follows the decision in February of the International Chamber of Shipping, the major trade association of ship owners, to support members hiring private security companies to provide protection.” Earlier this month, the International Chamber of Shipping urged nations to also take additional military action to combat piracy. &quot;Private armed guards do not represent a long-term solution,&quot; the organization’s chairman Spyros Polemis said. &quot;Rather, their use actually signifies a failure on the part of the international community and those governments with significant military forces to ensure the security of maritime trade. &quot;Governments don’t like it when we say this, but the reality is that they have ceded control of the Indian Ocean to the pirates,&quot; he said.”</td>
<td>Private armed guards are now allowed onboard British vessels, something the International Chamber of Shipping pushed for vessels to take on private security guards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The East African, 06-11-11</td>
<td>Nautilus UK</td>
<td>“This is an issue that infuriates international trade unions, with Nautilus general secretary Mark Dickinson saying that if an agreed policy was not made then seafarers would boycott the entire Somali coast. &quot;At what point would it be considered reckless to send seafarers into the high risk area,&quot; he asked. &quot;Why do military forces not take out the pirate bases ashore and attack their business model? Lots of questions (but) no simple answers.”</td>
<td>This union finds that the military should be allowed to attack bases ashore, so a widening of the mandate is demanded.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Newspaper/Source</td>
<td>Section</td>
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<tr>
<td>DefenceWeb, 06-12-11</td>
<td>Neptune Maritime Security</td>
<td>“Neptune Maritime Security says that whilst this will not come as a surprise to anyone in the maritime security industry, it does reinforce the fact that so far, not a single vessel operating with an armed Vessel Protection Team has fallen into the hands of Somali pirates. With the UK government currently in discussion on how best to licence UK companies wishing to offer armed protection services to UK-flagged vessels, the success of such armed teams in November further proves the value of maritime security companies to the shipping industry.”</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>The Times (London), 07-12-11</td>
<td>UK Chamber of Shipping</td>
<td>“Gavin Simmonds, head of security and defence at the UK Chamber of Shipping, said: &quot;Going forward we must now be alert to the risks and be careful not to institutionalise the arming of our merchant ships. There is continued pressure for military and other complementary solutions to the piracy crisis and we need to be clear that arming our ships is only a small part of the wider solution.”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Independent, 08-04-12</td>
<td>Baltic Exchange</td>
<td>“But the Baltic Exchange claimed the UK had &quot;a particularly poor record in handling suspects. A statement to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee inquiry declared: &quot;The UK has gained a degree of notoriety within the international shipping community for its failure to prosecute those caught red-handed in the act of piracy.”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Guardian, 11-05-12</td>
<td>Nautilus International</td>
<td>As the union representing 23,000 maritime professionals, we read your report (Cuts force navy to drop Somalia pirate patrols, 9 May) with utter dismay. The UK's failure to honour its commitment to protect merchant ships and seafarers from the very real risk of pirate attack is appalling. It is unbelievable that an island nation that remains so dependent on the sea for more than 90% of its international trade can so dismally fail to provide essential support against a proven danger. We warned the European parliament last year that we need more warships, not less, in this area as the pirates are extending their range and becoming increasingly sophisticated in the way they attack merchant shipping. The UK must urgently reconsider its commitment to defending commercial ships and it is simply not good enough to rely on other countries' navies or to privatise protection by the deployment of armed guards.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Star Sunday, 12-08-12</td>
<td>Britannia Maritime Security</td>
<td>“Stuart added: &quot;Incidents have come down but it is a constant threat. The pirates are well financed and are getting more organised to counter ships that have armed security.”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**British sources:**
Africa News (2011). Somalia; Shippers Have Paid $110 Million in Ransom This Year. The East African, November 6, 2011

Brady, B. (2012). Navy frees four out of five suspected Somali pirates; Britain criticised for 'particularly poor record' in international crackdown on Indian Ocean piracy. The Independent, April 8, 2012


Hughes, D. (2011). Learning to live with piracy; Ship operators have to protect their vessels - with armed guards onboard, if necessary. The Business Times, Singapore, August 31, 2011


### E. National Concerns of Governmental Actors

*Tables compiled by the author with information from different sources (sources listed per country)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Source24</th>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Content of the source</th>
<th>Concerns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Koalitionsvertrag CDU, CSU &amp; SPD (11-11-05)</td>
<td>Governing parties</td>
<td>- „Die Bundeswehr ist eine Armee im Einsatz. Sie muss so strukturiert sein, dass sie im Sinne der außen- und sicherheitspolitischen Handlungsfähigkeit Deutschlands zur territorialen Absicherung der Grenzen des Bündnisgebiets eingesetzt werden kann, zur Erfüllung der gegenüber VN, NATO und EU eingegangenen internationalen Verpflichtungen fähig ist und auch in Zukunft den Schutz Deutschlands und seiner Bevölkerung gewährleisten kann.“&lt;br&gt;- „Zu den Prioritäten unseres Engagements in Afrika gehören die Bekämpfung von Armut, der Schutz der natürlichen Lebensgrundlagen sowie eine Politik, die auf Stabilisierung und Wiederaufbau von schwachen oder gescheiterten Staaten setzt.“</td>
<td>- The army should be protecting civilians&lt;br&gt;- humanitarian concerns are voiced&lt;br&gt;- African states have to be stabilized</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>195. Sitzung vom Deutscher Bundestag.</td>
<td>F. Steinmeier (Bundesminister des Menschen und Schifffahrt)</td>
<td>- Menschen und Schiffen in gewalt von Piraten&lt;br&gt;- Menschen sehn angewessen auf Hilfe. Wir dürfen das nicht gesehen</td>
<td>- humanitarian aid is indispensable&lt;br&gt;- violence should not be tolerated</td>
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</tbody>
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24 Sources retrieved through the search engine of the German Bundestag on the key words “Piraterie & Somalia”. News magazines such as der Spiegel, Stern and Focus where consulted as well.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOP 1 ATALANTA (video)</th>
<th>Auswärtigen</th>
<th>lassen</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Operationen Atalanta soll schützen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Somalia ist eines der grössten humanitären Krisen gebieten der Welt, 3 Millionen Menschen sind auf Hilfe von draußen an gewesen</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- humanitären Hilfen WFP kommt zum, 90% auf Seewegen und Redereien weigern en dar kein schütz ist“</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Zivilen Schifffahrt soll verbessert worden, Interesse von Deutschland für Handel zwischen Deutschland und Asien</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Gutes Mandat für Bundeswehr/marine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Ursachen Piraterie sind nicht zu kämpfen auf See,</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- weitere humanitäre Hilfe in Somalia soll befördert worden</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Staats Strukturen sollen herstellt worden, oder Piraterie würde nicht enden</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Kriminalität und Terrorismus geht allen an</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- für die Menschen in Somalia, für die Sicherheit in de Region und für die internationale Solidarität</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>F. Jung (Bundesverteidigungsminister)</th>
<th>- Notwendig und Interesse von Deutschland Piraterie zu bekämpfen,</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- freie Seehandel &amp; Seesicherheit und humanitäre Interesse</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>F. Jung (Bundesverteidigungsminister)</th>
<th>- Begleitung schiffen WFP, viele Tonnen Lebensmitteln sicher begleitet nach Häfen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Begleitung zivilen schiffen erfolgreich</td>
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<tr>
<td>- viele anfallen aufgewendet etc.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- terroristische Aktivitäten</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Piraten sein fürs Gericht gestillt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- deutsche Interesse freie Seehandel zu haben!</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(debate concerning the broadening of the mandate)


| - free trade |
| - piracy is one of the big themes |
| - EU should act as one |
| - Bundeswehr should protect civilians and international crisis prevention & conflict management |

25 Sources in the form of videos of parliamentary debates are not literally reproduced here, but the main arguments of the speakers are represented in the table.
- “Europa und die EU-Staaten sind international immer dann stark, wenn die EU geschlossen auftritt. Die Schaffung des Amtes eines Hohen Vertreters für die Gemeinsame Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik ist ein wichtiger Schritt zu mehr Geschlossenheit in der EU-Außenpolitik.”
- „Die Bundeswehr ist ein wesentliches Instrument deutscher Friedenspolitik. Wir wollen auch in Zukunft eine leistungsfähige Bundeswehr als unverzichtbares Instrument für den Schutz Deutschlands und seiner Menschen ebenso wie für die internationale Krisenvorsorge und Konfliktbewältigung erhalten.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deutscher Bundestag</th>
<th>Bundesregierung</th>
<th>„aufgaben:“</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drucksache 17/179</td>
<td>Gewährung von Schutz für die Welternährungsprogramm Schiffe</td>
<td>- Gewährung von Schutz für die Welternährungsprogramm Schiffe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Wahlperiode. 09-12-09</td>
<td>Schutz von zivilen Schiffen in den Gebieten“ (et. al)</td>
<td>- Schutz von zivilen Schiffen in den Gebieten“ (et. al)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Westerwelle (Bundesminister des Auswärtigen)</td>
<td>„Atalanta soll zum einen die durch Piratenüberfälle gefährdete humanitäre Hilfe für die Not leidende somalische Bevölkerung sichern“</td>
<td>- „Atalanta soll zum einen die durch Piratenüberfälle gefährdete humanitäre Hilfe für die Not leidende somalische Bevölkerung sichern“</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Rede des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen, Dr. Guido Westerwelle, VN. 15-09-10 | „Mit großem Einsatz arbeiten wir an der Bekämpfung der Piraterie am Horn von Afrika und für Frieden und Stabilität in Somalia.“ | - „Mit großem Einsatz arbeiten wir an der Bekämpfung der Piraterie am Horn von Afrika und für Frieden und Stabilität in Somalia.“ |

- free trade
- humanitarian aid
- protecting of civilians
- humanitar aid
<p>| 17. Wahlperiode. 10-11-10 (und Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache 17/7742 17. Wahlperiode. 16-11-11) |  |  |
| Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache 17/6789. 17. Wahlperiode. 09-08-11 | Bundesregierung | „Die Piraterie im Indischen Ozean bedroht, meist ausgehend von der Küste Somalias, die humanitäre Versorgung der somalischen Bevölkerung, welche vor allem durch das World Food Program (WFP) der Vereinten Nationen sichergestellt wird.‘‘ - „DARÜBER HINAUS BORDROHT SIE DIE SICHERHEIT DER INTERNATIONALEN | - humanitarian aid  - free trade  - protection of civilians |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Datum</th>
<th>Autor</th>
<th>Textinhalt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 16-11-11 | Die Bundesregierung | „Deutsche Streitkräfte unterstützen auch in Zukunft die Anti-Piratenmission Atalanta, um Hilfstransporte nach Somalia zu schützen.“  
„Humanitäre Hilfe für Somalia: Damit gehört das Land zu den größten humanitären Krisengebieten weltweit. Hilfe gibt es durch Lieferungen des Welternährungsprogramms und anderer Hilfsorganisationen. Sie führen die notwendigen Schiffstransporte ins Land durch.“  
„Die Bekämpfung der Piraterie auf See vor Somalia reicht aber nicht aus. Langfristig muss der Staat Somalia wieder funktionsfähig werden.“ |
| 23-11-11 | G. Westerwelle  (Bundesminister des Auswärtigen) | Sehr erfolgreich in 3 Jahren. Schiffstransporten WFP geschützt. 4 Million Menschen brauchen die Hilfe, eines der grössten Krisengebieten der Welt  
Ein humanitäre Auftrag, gebot de Mitmenschlichkeit um hilf Lieferungen zu schützen. Einer der nag denkt und sein Herz bewegt soll Mandate zustimmen  
geht um die not der Menschen.  
recht soll nicht verharmlost werden, weil Piraterie Kriminalität ist  
 Freiheit der Meeren und Sicherung Seewege sind von besondere strategische Bedeutung, aber das ignorieren wäre en fauler und soll das Internationale recht auf dem Kopf stellen  
 internationale Sicherheitspolitik. Plicht schiffen internationale Gemeinschaft zu schützen |
| 23-02-12 | G. Westerwelle  (Bundesminister des Auswärtigen) | „Armut, Gewalt, Terrorismus und Piraterie in Somalia gefährden das Horn von Afrika und die internationale Sicherheit.“  
„Zuvor hatte Bundesaußenminister Westerwelle erklärt, Deutschland werde weitere sechs Millionen Euro humanitäre Hilfe zur Verfügung stellen“ |
<p>| 23- | Bundesregierung | „Wenn mutmaßliche Piraten von Soldatinnen und Soldaten der Bundeswehr aufgegriffen, festgehalten und an Drittstaaten überstellt werden, finden |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>03-12</th>
<th>neben den internationalen und regionalen Menschenrechtsabkommen, wie dem Internationalen Pakt über bürgerliche und politische Rechte (IPbPR) und der Europäischen Konvention zum Schutze der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten (Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention – EMRK), auch die menschenrechtlichen Normen des deutschen Grundgesetzes (GG) ihre Anwendung</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **175. Sitzung vom Deutscher Bundestag. TOP 7 EU-Operation Atalanta (video). 26-04-12** | T. de Maizière (Bundesminister der Verteidigung) | - Hilfen bei WFP: gelungen  
- Seesicherheit: gelungen  
- Mandat robuster machen ist erfolgreich  
(„kleine“ Ausweitung der Mandate) | - humanitarian aid  
- free trade/safe seas |
| **178. Sitzung vom Deutscher Bundestag. TOP 5 EU-Operation Atalanta (video). 10-05-12** | G. Westerwelle (Bundesminister des Auswärtigen) | - Menschliche Verpflichtung Piraterie zu bekämpfen und deutsche Seeleute zu beschützen  
- Mission vermindert das Leid von hunderten Menschen  
- Aufbaur der somalischen statt  
- Mission der Sicherung Lebensmitteln Transporten  
- wichtigste und grösste Handelsnation der Europa, Selbst mitmachen, nicht überlassen an andere Nationen | - civilian protection  
- humanitarian aid  
- free trade |
| **Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel bei der 8. Nationalen Maritimen Konferenz. 08-04-13** | A. Merkel (Bundeskanzlerin) | - „Ich möchte die Gelegenheit nutzen um allen Soldatinnen und Soldaten, die in der Region um Somalia ihren Dienst versehen, ein ganz herzliches Dankeschön zu sagen. Sie helfen uns bei der Sicherung der Transportwege“ | - free trade |
- Weiniger anfallen und kapern  
- Noch ein fragile Staat: mit Engagement sollen Schifffahrtsrouten weiter Geschützt werden, auch die Staatsbürger und die von die Partner sollen weiter geschützt werden und als Handelsnation auch die Seewegen  
- Somalia ist auf den Weg nach ein stabile Staat (Verlängerung des Mandat, keine innerliche Veränderungen) | - humanitarian aid  
- stable region |
| **„** | T. de Maizière (Bundesminister der Verteidigung) | - EU Mission ist nicht nur ökonomisch, zivil oder militärisch: es ist alles zusammen | - free trade  
- protection of civilians |
| **Erfolgreich gegen Piraterie am Horn von Afrika Atalanta-Einsatz** | Die Bundesregierung | - „Hilfe für die somalische Bevölkerung: Die EU geführte Operation Atalanta soll die Piraten abschrecken und bekämpfen, die vor der Küste Somalias und im Indischen Ozean Schiffe in ihre Gewalt bringen wollen. Humanitäre Hilfsleistungen sollen ungehindert zur notleidenden | - humanitarian aid  
- protection of civilians |
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Datum</th>
<th>Titel</th>
<th>Text</th>
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</thead>
</table>
| verlängert. 16-05-13 | Die Bundesregierung | „Hilfslieferungen schützen: Die EU-Operation Atalanta soll am Horn von Afrika weiterhin die Piraten bekämpfen und abschrecken. Nur so können humanitäre Hilfslieferungen die Not leidende Bevölkerung Somalias erreichen.“
| 16-05-13 |  | - „Auch gilt es, den zivilen Schiffsverkehr auf den dortigen Handelswegen zu gewährleisten. Geiselnahmen und Lösegelderpressungen werden dadurch unterbunden.“
|  |  | - „Geschützt wird auch die seeseitige Versorgung der Mission AMSION, die von der EU unterstützt wird. Ein wesentlicher Beitrag zur Stabilisierung Somalias, denn so können die Wurzeln der Piraterie bekämpft werden.“

**German sources:**


http://www.bundestag.de/Mediathek/index.jsp?isLinkCallPlenar=1&action=search&contentArea=details&ids=186719&instance=m187&categorie=Plenarsitzung&destination=search&mask=search

http://www.bundestag.de/Mediathek/index.jsp?contentArea=common&isLinkCallPlenar=1&categorie=Plenarsitzung&action=search&instance=m187&mask=search&ids=431807

http://www.bundestag.de/Mediathek/index.jsp?contentArea=common&isLinkCallPlenar=1&categorie=Plenarsitzung&action=search&instance=m187&mask=search&ids=428089

http://www.bundestag.de/Mediathek/index.jsp?contentArea=common&isLinkCallPlenar=1&categorie=Plenarsitzung&action=search&instance=m187&mask=search&ids=237308


http://www.bundestag.de/Mediathek/index.jsp?contentArea=common&isLinkCallPlenar=1&categorie=Plenarsitzung&action=search&instance=m187&mask=search&ids=869732


http://www.bundestag.de/Mediathek/index.jsp?contentArea=common&isLinkCallPlenar=1&categorie=Plenarsitzung&action=search&instance=m187&mask=search&ids=1430622

http://www.bundestag.de/Mediathek/index.jsp?contentArea=common&isLinkCallPlenar=1&categorie=Plenarsitzung&action=search&instance=m187&mask=search&ids=1693113

http://www.bundestag.de/Mediathek/index.jsp?contentArea=common&isLinkCallPlenar=1&categorie=Plenarsitzung&action=search&instance=m187&mask=search&ids=1671166

http://www.bundestag.de/Mediathek/index.jsp?contentArea=common&isLinkCallPlenar=1&categorie=Plenarsitzung&action=search&instance=m187&mask=search&ids=2312021


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<tr>
<td>France</td>
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</table>

26 Sources retrieved through the search engine of the Assemblée Nationale on the key words “Piraterie & Somalie” (the site of the “gouvernement” did not provide any hits). Moreover, some sources where previously retrieved through lexis nexis and important news magazines (in France, L’Express, L’Observateur, Marianne and Le Point where searched for governmental norms)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Summary</th>
<th>Keywords</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>La déclaration de politique générale de François Fillon (03-07-07)</td>
<td>F. Fillon (Premier ministre de la République française)</td>
<td>“En défendant avec énergie et méthode l'idée d'un traité simplifié, le Chef de l'État n'a pas seulement replacé notre pays au cœur des enjeux européens, il a aussi renforcé le couple franco-allemand tout en nous rapprochant des européens de l'Est.”</td>
<td>- franco-german special relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piraterie: les Armateurs de France pour &quot;des moyens internationaux. 16-09-08</td>
<td>N. Sarkozy (président de la République française)</td>
<td>« Après la libération de deux otages français mardi, qui étaient retenus depuis quinze jours par des pirates somaliens, Nicolas Sarkozy a appelé la communauté internationale à se mobiliser, se déclarant favorable à la constitution d'une force de &quot;police de mers&quot; pour &quot;sécuriser la zone&quot;. »</td>
<td>- global security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Rapport d'information déposé en application de l'article 145 du Règlement par la commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées sur la piraterie maritime. 13-05-09 | Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées | « De l'escorte des navires du programme alimentaire mondial (PAM), le long des côtes somaliennes, jusqu'à l'engagement de la première opération navale de l'Union européenne, notre pays a fortement contribué à la mobilisation de la communauté internationale sur ce sujet »
- « Au-delà de ses conséquences les plus directes, la piraterie a mis en évidence l'importance des enjeux de sûreté maritime, aux frontières de la défense et de la sécurité. Alors que plus de 90 % du commerce mondial transite aujourd'hui par la mer et que celle-ci constitue une formidable réserve de ressources, l'économie mondiale est désormais étroitement liée à la maîtrise du milieu marin et sous-marin. »
- « Consciente de l'importance du phénomène de la piraterie et de ses enjeux en matière de sécurité mondiale et de sûreté maritime, la commission de la défense et des forces armées a décidé, le 28 mai 2008, de créer une mission d'information sur le sujet. » | - humanitarian aid - international aid - free trade - safe trade |
| Rapport fait au nom de la commission de la défense national et des forces armées sur le projet de loi (n° 2502) modifié par le sénat, relatif à la lutte contre la piraterie et à l'exercice des pouvoirs de police de l'État en mer. 09-11-10 | Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées | « La France est concernée au premier chef par cette menace. Premièrement, elle est le seul grand État occidental riverain de l'océan Indien. Deuxièmement, l'océan Indien est une zone vitale pour son économie, qu'il s'agisse du transit de marchandises ou de la pêche. Enfin, des ressortissants français ont été pris en otage à plusieurs reprises par des pirates somaliens, contraignant le Gouvernement à organiser leur libération par l'intervention »
- « Ces opérations, en particulier Atalante, ont fait leur preuve, démontrant une efficacité opérationnelle certaine en améliorant la sécurité de la zone. »
- « Le projet de loi entend adapter notre droit à la convention en identifiant une incrimination de piraterie dans le code pénal, en conférant aux tribunaux français la faculté de juger très largement ces crimes, mais aussi en habilitant les commandants des navires de l'État à entreprendre des actions de coercition, de contrôle et de consignation à bord des personnes, ou encore de saisir les objets ou documents concernés par la commission des faits. » | - free trade - protection of civilians - international security - international justice (justice for pirates that are captured) - (conformation to European Convention on) Human Rights - stable region |
- « Le projet de loi « se conforme également à l’évolution de l’environnement juridique, « chahuté » par la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme lors de la mise en œuvre des dispositions relatives à l’action de l’État en mer, qui touchent à la lutte contre les trafics de stupéfiants et contre l’immigration clandestine. »
- « Il s’agira aussi d’encourager la communauté internationale à rechercher des solutions « à terre », dans une optique régionale, sans quoi les difficultés actuelles pourraient fort bien persister de longues années encore. »

| Déclaration de politique générale (24-11-10) | F. Fillon (Première ministre de la République française) | « Il faut trouver avec notre principal partenaire européen, l’Allemagne, la force d’entraîner l’Europe et construire une gouvernance économique de la zone euro » | - Franco-German relationship |
| Discours de politique générale (03-07-12) | J. Ayrault (Première ministre de la République française) | « La relation franco-allemande occupe à cet égard une place centrale » | - Franco-German relationship |
| Intervention de M. le président de la République lors du 50e anniversaire de l’Union Africaine à Addis-Abeba. 25-05-2013 | F. Hollande (président de la République française) | « Or, aujourd’hui le terrorisme, les trafics, la piraterie ne concernent pas simplement l’Afrique, mais concernent l’ensemble du monde. C’est ensemble que nous devons combattre ces fléaux. C’est ce que nous faisons au Mali pour protéger le Sahel, et la France a pris, avec les amis africains de l’ouest, sa responsabilité comme l’avait fait l’Ethiopie lorsqu’elle est elle-même intervenue avec des pays de l’Union africaine en Somalie. » | - global security |

**French sources:**


**United Kingdom**

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<th>Endorsed Norm(s)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Speech PM Brown (24-09-07)</td>
<td>PM Brown</td>
<td>- “At all times we will stand up for the British national interest. And I accept my responsibility to write in detail into the amended</td>
<td>- commitments to US, EU, Commonwealth &amp; UN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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27 Sources retrieved through the search engine of the government’s website on the key words “piracy & Somalia” in the following departments: Cabinet Office, Foreign & Commonwealth Office & Ministry of Defence. Moreover, the Parliaments site provided some debates in the House of Commons with relevant actors on the issue. Some previously retrieved sources through lexis nexis and important news magazines like The Economist, The New Statesman and the Spectator provided additional governmental opinions.
European Treaty the red lines we have negotiated for Britain. And whether it's environmental, economic or security cooperation, we will hold fast to the partnerships with our closest ally America, our membership of the European Union, the Commonwealth and our commitment to the United Nations.”

- “You know, there is a golden thread of common humanity that across nations and faiths binds us together and it can light the darkest corners of the world. And the message should go out to anyone facing persecution anywhere from Burma to Zimbabwe: human rights are universal and no injustice can last forever.”

Programme for government Cameron Ministry (xx-05-10) Governing Parties - “FOREIGN AFFAIRS. The Government believes that Britain must always be an active member of the global community, promoting our national interests while standing up for the values of freedom, fairness and responsibility. This means working as a constructive member of the United Nations, NATO and other multilateral organisations including the Commonwealth; working to promote stability and security; and pushing for reform of global institutions to ensure that they reflect the modern world”

Announcement: Foreign Office Minister on Somalia. 10-03-11 H. Bellingham (Foreign Office Minister) - “20 years of instability that have brought conflict and humanitarian disaster to the people of Somalia, and threatened the people of the region and beyond with piracy and terrorism.”

Speech: Tackling piracy: UK Government response. 12-10-11 H. Bellingham (Foreign Office Minister) - “Here are some statistics to prove why Somali piracy matters: (provides numbers of trade in terms of money, tonnage, ship transits etc)” - “But I want to make my first substantive comments on the human impact of piracy. Too often this is neglected. But the suffering of innocent seafarers must not be ignored.” - “Somalia is in the brutal grip of senseless terrorism” - “And Somalia is also in the grips of a terrible humanitarian crisis.”

Foreign Affairs Committee - Tenth Report. Piracy off the coast of Somalia. 20-12-11. Foreign Affairs Committee - “Somali piracy is a major issue for the world economy.” - “Somali piracy also has the potential further to destabilize an already precarious situation in Somalia and affect the surrounding region.” - “Somali piracy may also pose a potential threat to international security. There are fears that piracy may contribute to further conflict and acts of terrorism.” - “Other witnesses and submissions drew our attention to the "human cost" of piracy” - “Piracy off the coast of Somalia has so far directly affected very few British citizens.”

- human rights
- freedom
- promote stability and security
- humanitarian aid
- terrorism has to stop
- protection of civilians
- free trade
- international security
- terrorism has to be stopped
- protection of civilians
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<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Text</th>
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</table>
| Piracy (Somalia) | W. Hague (secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs) | “Somalia as a whole not only cries out for compassion but is a point of great weakness in the long-term security and prosperity of the wider world. The people of Somalia deserve their country to be more stable and peaceful, and we in this country need it to be so. For reasons of national interest and our common humanity, we need to help Somalia get on its feet.”
- “We need to do so to reduce our vulnerability to terrorist attacks, to maintain the free flow of trade on which our economy depends, to limit our exposure to the effects of uncontrolled migration, to increase the support that we can give to education and economic development in Somalia and to support the stability of a part of Africa where our country has a great many interests and our nationals have been shown to be vulnerable.”
- “As I will describe, one of the conclusions that we hope for from the conference is to highlight those humanitarian needs. This is about much more than security, as I will describe.”
- “We are proud of the role that we play and the example we set to others. The UK also contributes 14% of all European Union spending in and on Somalia, including on development and humanitarian aid, and we actively support all three international naval operations in the waters around Somalia, including by providing the operational commander and the headquarters in Northwood near London for the EU naval mission Operation Atalanta.”
| | | compassion / humanitarian aid
- terrorism should be stopped
- international stability
- free trade |
| Speech: “Today is the next stage of a long journey for Somalia”. | D. Cameron (Prime minister) | “It’s natural to want to help any country in such distress” (the heartbreaking situation in Somalia). “But there’s another reason for the international community to help the Somali people. These problems in Somalia don’t just affect Somalia. They affect us all. In a country where there is no hope, chaos, violence and terrorism thrive. Pirates are disrupting vital trade routes and kidnapping tourists. Young minds are being poisoned by radicalism, breeding terrorism that is threatening the security of the whole world.”
| | | humanitarian aid
- terrorism has to stop
- international security |
| Speech: Foreign Secretary speech ahead of the London Conference on Somalia. | W. Hague (Foreign Secretary) | “Two decades of chronic insecurity have created in some places a breeding ground for piracy and terrorism which has a direct impact on our own national security here. Sailors from around the world have been kidnapped from the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean.”
| | | international security
- civilian protection
- terrorism has to be stopped |
Citizens from Europe and North America have been taken from Kenyan territory and held to ransom. And the terrorist tactics of Al Shabaab are a direct threat to our own security and to many other people around the world, as well as a source of suffering for Somalis.”

- “So tomorrow we hope to agree with our partners a more coherent, and better coordinated, international strategy for Somalia: including action to support the political process, to help eradicate piracy, to support human rights, justice and development and to help the recovery of Somalia.”

| Tenth report from the Foreign Affairs Committee of session 2010-12. Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. xx-03-12 | Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs | “The threat is not primarily to UK ships as very few have been captured. Rather, the threat is to the UK's economy and security. Piracy affects the UK's banking, insurance and shipping industries, and threatens the large volume of goods which are transported to the UK by sea.”
- “Terrorism and piracy emanating from Somalia threaten international security.”
- “Though Somalia's famine – the first of the 21st century – is over, the humanitarian situation remains grave.” |

| Westminster Hall. Piracy (Somalia). Commons debate. 14-06-12 | H. Bellingham (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs) | “In this globalised world in which millions rely on the 23,000 ships that sail through the Gulf of Aden and the Indian ocean each year, the impact of Somali-based piracy is felt here and throughout the global economy. The World Bank has estimated that the total cost to the world economy, through extra costs placed on shipping and higher insurance premiums, is about $7 billion.”
- “The cost of piracy is huge. Of UK gross domestic product, £10.7 billion comes from the shipping industry.”
- “It is rarely the case that UK nationals are affected by such attacks, but one of the first duties of a Government is to protect our citizens.”
- “one of the most important responsibilities and duties of the Ministry of Defence and the Royal Navy is the protection of British interests, but not only from a little Englander perspective.” |

| Policy: Preventing and reducing piracy off the coast of Somalia. 12-12-12 | M. Francois (Minister of State for the Armed Forces) | “These attacks affect the peace and security of the region.”
- “In response, the UK is playing a lead role in international operations aimed at stopping the pirates, and providing humanitarian and development assistance to Somalia.”
- “In order to ensure pirates (and the proceeds from piracy) are stopped, and that the shipping and travel industry can conduct its business as safely as possible” |

- free trade
- international security
- humanitarian aid

- free trade
- protection of civilians

- regional security
- peace
- humanitarian aid
- free trade
- protection of civilians
UK commits to help Somalia improve security and prevent famine. 07-05-13
J. Greening (International Development Secretary) - J. Greening: “Tackling the root causes of poverty, crime and instability in Somalia is also firmly in Britain’s national interest.”
- stable region

Plan for Britain’s success: speech by the Prime Minister. 10-06-13
D. Cameron (Prime minister) - “When a country like Somalia fractures and breaks, that affects us not just in the region, not just in the terrorism threatened on our streets or the flows of mass immigration, but in the piracy off the Horn of Africa that affects British trade.”
- terrorism has to stop

British sources:


### European Union

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2008/851/CFSP (10-11-08)</td>
<td>Council of the EU</td>
<td>“The UNSC expressed its concern at the threat that acts of piracy and armed robbery against vessels pose to the <strong>delivery of humanitarian aid</strong> to Somalia, the <strong>safety of commercial maritime routes</strong> and international navigation. - continue to take action to <strong>protect the World Food Programme (WFP) maritime convoys</strong>, which is vital to bring <strong>humanitarian assistance</strong> to the affected populations in Somalia. - the Council expressed its concern at the upsurge of piracy attacks off the Somali coast, which affect humanitarian efforts and <strong>international maritime traffic</strong> in the region and contribute to continued violations of the UN arms embargo. - <strong>secure the delivery of humanitarian</strong> aid to the Somali population. - help implement UNSC Resolution 1816 (2008) and for <strong>peace and international security</strong> in the region. - the <strong>protection of vessels of the WFP</strong> delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia, in accordance with the mandate laid down in UNSC Resolution 1814 (2008) - the <strong>protection of vulnerable vessels</strong> cruising off the Somali coast, and the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast, in accordance with the mandate laid down in UNSC Resolution 1816 (2008)”</td>
<td>- Humanitarian - Free trade/economic - Security of civilians - Security (weapons embargo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appointment EU force commander (12-11-08)</td>
<td>Council of the EU</td>
<td>“This operation will contribute to: (a) the <strong>protection of vessels of the World Food Programme</strong> delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia, in accordance with the mandate laid down in U9 Security Council Resolution 1814 (2008); (b) the <strong>protection of vulnerable vessels</strong> cruising off the Somali coast, and the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast”</td>
<td>- humanitarian aid - protection of vessels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COUNCIL DECISION 2008/918/CFSP (08-12-08)</td>
<td>Council of the EU</td>
<td>“to take action to <strong>protect shipping</strong> involved in the transport and delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia and UN-authorised activities. - its concern at the threat that acts of piracy and armed robbery against vessels pose to the <strong>delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia</strong>, the safety of commercial maritime routes and international navigation - to <strong>protect the World Food Programme maritime convoys</strong>, which is vital to bring humanitarian assistance to the Somali population.”</td>
<td>- Humanitarian - Economic/free trade - Security of civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP on annual report from Council to the EP on main aspects &amp; basic choices of the</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
<td>The EP: “Is gravely concerned by the dire <strong>humanitarian situation</strong> in Somalia; calls on the EU to consider how it can assist the UN, in close coordination with the African Union, in expeditiously tackling this security, political and humanitarian challenge; draws attention to the growing threats from piracy off the Somali coast and welcomes, in this regard, the decision taken by the”</td>
<td>- humanitarian concerns - security problem</td>
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<td>CFSP (27-01-09)</td>
<td>EU to launch a maritime ESDP operation</td>
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<td>European Parliament on work of ACP-EU JPA in 2008 (20-02-09)</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>The EP: “Calls on the JPA (Joint Parliamentary Assembly) to continue to address the situation in Somalia, which is endangering the lives of the Somali people, poses a threat to security in the region and is a source of global instability owing to the increasing occurrence of lawlessness, extremism and piracy”</td>
<td>- protection of civilians</td>
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<td>- security threat</td>
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<td>- regional stability</td>
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<td>- rule of law</td>
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<td>- piracy should be fought</td>
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<td>Appointment commander Hudson (03-06-09)</td>
<td>HR Javier Solana</td>
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<td>“This operation is an important contribution by the Union to the protection of vulnerable ships against acts of piracy in the waters off Somalia, including World Food Programme vessels and ships supplying the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).”</td>
<td>- humanitarian aid</td>
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<td>- protection of vessels</td>
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<tr>
<td>European Parliament on work of ACP-EU JPA in 2009 (09-11-10)</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>The EP: “Calls on the JPA (Joint Parliamentary Assembly) to continue to address the situation in Somalia, which is endangering the lives of the Somali people and poses a threat to security in the region and calls on the EU to maintain its commitments regarding the promotion of the rule of law, restoring stability in the region and fighting piracy”</td>
<td>- protection of civilians</td>
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<td>- security threat</td>
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<td>- rule of law</td>
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<td>- stability region</td>
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<td>- piracy should be fought</td>
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<td>Statement on Somalia’s transitions (09-09-11)</td>
<td>HR Catherine Ashton</td>
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<td>“I confirm the active role and engagement of the European Union in Somalia, in order to alleviate the consequences of the worsening humanitarian situation, restore security and contribute to peace, development and internal reconciliation”</td>
<td>- humanitarian concerns</td>
<td></td>
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<td>- security</td>
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<tr>
<td>Europolitics (30-04-12)</td>
<td>HR Catherine Ashton</td>
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<tr>
<td>“The Union will provide EUR14.9 million to pay for the extension of the mission, which aims at “tackling symptoms and root causes of piracy in the Horn of Africa”. High Representative Catherine Ashton noted that “despite pressure on defence budgets,” the EU member states demonstrated “their renewed commitment to this successful operation””</td>
<td>- The anti-piracy mission is important and successful</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>European Parliament resolution on maritime piracy (02-05-12)</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>The EP:</td>
<td>- Piracy is an appalling activity</td>
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<tr>
<td>- “Calls on the High Representative and Member States to urgently consider ways of liberating the 191 seafarers currently being held hostage, thereby ending their extended and appalling imprisonment at the hands of their captors and allowing these seafarers to return to their homes and”</td>
<td>- decrease of contribution is deplorable</td>
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<td>- “Deplores the fact that number of vessels the Member States have supplied to the EU NAVFOR ATALANTA operation has decreased from 8 to only 2-3 in the beginning of 2012; and therefore appeals to the Member States to provide more naval assets to enable the ATALANTA operation to succeed”</td>
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<td>Statement by spokesperson (15-05-12)</td>
<td>HR Catherine Ashton</td>
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<tr>
<td>“The High Representative welcomes the successful operation conducted by EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta to disrupt pirates’ logistical dumps in Somalia”</td>
<td>- free trade</td>
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<tr>
<td>“Piracy continues to adversely affect shipping in the region, threatening peaceful commerce, weakening and undermining the economy of neighbouring countries, and imposing additional costs on the world’s shipping industry as well as personal costs on the 200 mariners still in captivity.”</td>
<td>- security of seafarers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Statement related to Somalia’s transition (27-08-12)</td>
<td>HR Catherine Ashton</td>
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<tr>
<td>“I take this opportunity to assure the Somali people of the EU’s continued support, including support for the African Union in its mission to create the necessary conditions for the development of Somali security forces, and with EU Common Security and Defence Policy”</td>
<td>- development of security</td>
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(CSDP) engagement through the EU Training Mission (EUTM), Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) and its new capacity building mission (EUCAP Nestor). You are not alone”.

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<th>European Parliament on EU Strategy for the Horn of Africa (10-12-12)</th>
<th>European Parliament</th>
<th>The EP:</th>
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<td>“urges the Member States to ensure that EUNAVFOR ATLANTA is properly supported with adequate surveillance and patrol ships, since the current gains in the fight against piracy are reversible, as well as with the means for the international community to pursue pirates and their financiers and networks, recognising that the most effective counter-piracy measures have in fact been the on-board vessel protection measures introduced by shipping companies;”</td>
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<td>“calls on the International Maritime Organisation, flag states and the maritime industry to work together in order to further develop and implement clear, consistent and enforceable internationally agreed standards regarding the use of privately contracted armed security personnel on board ships”</td>
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<td>clear laws &amp; rules</td>
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<td>piracy should be fought</td>
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<tr>
<th>Speech for European Economic and Social Committee concerning maritime piracy (24-01-13)</th>
<th>EU commissio on Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Damanaki</th>
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<td>“The measures we have undertaken - comprehensive international approaches coupled with regional ownership - have been effective in at least curbing piracy. <strong>We must continue.</strong> We must find new ways, put in more means and multiply our efforts, hopefully with the help of all the actors represented here.”</td>
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<td>“Let’s be clear from the beginning: I think the opinion of this Committee is spot on: <strong>our fight against piracy must be relentless.</strong>”</td>
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<td>In parallel, the EU is active on many other fronts: external relations with countries and international organisations; <strong>development and cooperation aspects; maritime security and transport; legal affairs; judiciary, humanitarian and food aid;</strong> fisheries coordination and technical assistance.”</td>
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<td>“Quite logically, the more we recognize the <strong>importance of the sea for our economy, our way of life and our global role, the more we need to take into account the factors that threaten the security and safety of our citizens and undermine our economy.</strong> We should not forget that pirate attacks also hamper global sustainable development.”</td>
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<td>protection of civilians</td>
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<td>maritime security</td>
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<th>Remarks at press conference with Somalia president (30-01-13)</th>
<th>HR Catherine Ashton</th>
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<td>“We have seen that Al-Shabab has been considerably weakened but we recognize there are still a <strong>threat to peace and security</strong>”</td>
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<td>“That is why efforts to consolidate <strong>improvements in security</strong> must continue and why security must remain a priority. That means not only for Somalia but across the region. A <strong>stable region</strong> and a <strong>peaceful Somalia</strong> are interdependent, and it’s why it’s so important that we developed the Comprehensive Approach that involves political engagement, financial support to AMISOM, trade and development aid, and the work of our three missions in the region: to <strong>fight piracy, to train the Somali army and help the countries of the region build maritime security.</strong>”</td>
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<td>International security/anti terrorism</td>
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<th>Cooperation between EU NAVFOR &amp; Somali federal government (24-06-13)</th>
<th>EU NAVFOR</th>
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<td>“EU Naval Force <strong>deters, prevents and represses acts of piracy and armed robbery</strong> off the coast of Somalia. EU Naval Force ships <strong>protect World Food Programme vessels</strong> delivering aid to Somalia and AMISOM shipping. EU Naval Force ships also contribute to the <strong>monitoring of fishing activity</strong> off the Somali Coast.”</td>
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<td>humanitarian protection</td>
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<td>fishing</td>
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