

# **The populist radical right and gender**

*How women and gender relations are framed within the populist radical right's ideology*

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## Summary

There exists an abundance of research on the populist radical right. However, when it comes to the populist radical right's ideology most literature solely deals with the party family's position on common subjects such as immigration, nationalism and economics. Very little attention is spent on other features of its ideology. This study explicitly examines a very under-theorized and under-examined aspect of the populist radical right's ideology: the populist radical right's ideology with respect to women and gender relations. Academic literature on this subject is scarce. Moreover, there exist a lot of non-academic popular assumptions about the populist radical right's ideology with regard to women and gender relations which are never challenged. Hence, what the populist radical right's ideology with regard to women and gender relations is remains an unanswered question.

It is hypothesized that the populist radical right will primarily frame its ideology on women and gender relations through its ideological core features, in particular nativism and the two folded "nativist struggle". Furthermore, a diverse case-method is employed since it is expected that variation in the populist radical right ideology may exist due to the different national political contexts in which populist radical right parties operate. However, a content analysis of the Dutch PVV and the Belgian VB showed that a distinction between two subtypes of populist radical right parties is not useful in order to explain the populist radical right's ideology with respect to women and gender relations.

The two cases showed some significant overlaps and hence three main conclusions are provided. Firstly, the populist radical right frames its ideology on women and gender relations primarily through nativism and in particular through its "nativist struggle" against Islamification. Secondly, *Frauenpolitik* as an independent policy area does not exist within the populist radical right. Finally, the populist radical right does not necessarily hold traditional positions with regard to the division of gender roles.

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## **Introduction**

Research on the populist radical right in Western-Europe has been blooming for quite some time now. Most research tries to give an answer on a variety of demand-side and supply-side questions; i.e. what explains the (relative) success of populist radical right parties and which features are core to the populist radical right's ideology? When it comes to the populist radical right's ideology most literature deals with the party family's position on common subjects such as immigration, nationalism and economics. Very little attention is spent though on other features of its ideology. For example, the relationship between gender and the populist radical right in Western-Europe is not a theme that has been the subject of a lively research field so far. However, if one really thoroughly wants to understand the populist radical right's ideology, one has to be willing to pay attention to its ideology in a comprehensive manner. Therefore, this thesis explicitly wants to examine a very under-theorized and under-examined aspect of the populist radical right's ideology: its ideology with respect to women and gender relations. Before I will present the findings of this study, I will address in this introduction the research question and scientific relevance. Furthermore, I will briefly outline the theory and methodology used in this study.

### **i.1 Research question and scientific relevance**

Mudde has noticed in his in his book about the populist radical right that most research on the role of women in populist radical right parties is seriously flawed with what he calls a "feminist bias" (2007: 91). According to Mudde research is on the one hand based on incorrect assumptions while on the other hand research suffers from a flawed research design. With regard to the former Mudde distinguishes two main erroneous assumptions. Firstly, it is incorrectly assumed that gender equality is the normal situation in party politics. Secondly, it is incorrectly assumed that all women hold modern (or even feminist) views on gender roles. Regarding the flawed research design Mudde argues that populist radical right parties are too often studied in isolation and then compared to the "normal" situation of gender parity in society. Moreover, only few authors on the subject follow conventional academic argumentation and methods. Neither do they start their research with an open and unprejudiced view. Mudde states that these biases have resulted in overstated claims of specific gender inequality and traditional gender views of the populist radical right (2007: 91). One of the popular assumptions currently flourishing is the statement that all nativists hold very traditional views on the division of gender roles. According to this popular assumption, women are in the populist radical right's view second-rate citizens and exclusively addressed to in their role of mothers and wives. So far, the non-academic popular assumptions concerning the populist radical right's ideology on women and gender relations has not been challenged. The academic literature on the subject is very

scarce. Hence, what the populist radical right's ideology with regard to women and gender relations is remains an unanswered question. This study's primary research question therefore is:

*“How are women and gender relations framed in the populist radical right's ideology?”*

This study could be an important contribution to the scientific literature. Firstly, this study addresses a question of which the answer remains unclear since it is so far not examined in an academic manner. Secondly, in contrast to most other studies, this study addresses with regard to the populist radical right's ideology an “unordinary” theme. Most research focuses on common themes like immigration and economics. The focus on women and gender relations could shed a different light on the populist radical right's ideology.

## **i.2 Theory**

There exist several approaches of the populist radical right. In this respect, Ignazi, Kitschelt and Betz are prominent scholars who have discussed the populist radical right. However, in my view, none of these approaches are fully able to capture the contemporary radical right phenomenon. For instance, Ignazi's theory of the populist radical right is problematic since it is questionable whether the contemporary radical right is truly rightwing on socioeconomic issues. Moreover, his statements concerning the perceived anti-system attitudes and beliefs of the new extreme right are too strong.

Kitschelt and Betz on the other hand overemphasize the importance of economy in the populist radical right's ideology.

In contrast, Mudde argues that the core feature of the populist radical right's ideology is nativism, which is according to him a combination of nationalism and xenophobia. Other important core features of the populist radical right are authoritarianism and populism. In my view, Mudde's theory of the populist radical right is on several respects a far more accurate approach than the earlier mentioned approaches. For example, “nativism” is a better term than “ethnocentrism” or “immigration” (terms mentioned in the former approaches) since only nativism is able to capture the several grounds on which one can be included or excluded; nativism is a concept that is able to “travel across time and space”. For instance, exclusion is in Western Europe increasingly based on culture and religion, i.e. Islam.

This study combines Mudde's approach of the core ideology of the populist radical right with the little literature that exists on the populist radical right's position towards women in order to derive several hypotheses about the populist radical right's ideology with regard to women and gender relations.

### **i.3 Methodology**

#### **i.3.1 Cases**

This thesis' aim is to clarify the populist radical right's ideology with respect to women and gender relations. In order to achieve this aim it is important that populist radical right parties are examined which are representative of the larger population of populist radical right parties.

However, when it comes to women and gender relations it is expected that it is hard to find a populist radical right party that is able to represent the whole population of populist radical right parties. The lack of a "typical" case is expected because the different populist radical right parties operate in different political environments. In this respect, one can especially make a distinction between a more national oriented populist radical right and a populist radical right that is more liberally oriented. For example, populist radical right parties like the *Partij voor de Vrijheid* and *Dansk Folkeparti* have to operate in countries with a particularly strong progressive liberal tradition. The parties must take this tradition in consideration in order for them to make a populist radical right program acceptable in their countries (Vossen 2011). On the other hand it is expected that more national oriented populist radical right parties, like *Front National*, *Vlaams Belang* and *Lega Nord* will frame their positions on women and gender relations in a more conservative-traditional manner. This type of populist radical right party does not operate in countries that are especially known for their liberal progressive tradition and the parties themselves often originate from a more conservative-traditional background. Furthermore, some of these parties are nationalists in the sense that they strive for a separate mono-cultural nation-state. It is expected that this aspect of the parties' ideology might intensify the parties' "nativist struggle for survival of the nation" and therefore also the positions these parties take on traditional values, which are in its turn related to positions on women and gender relations. The expected variance along the conservative-progressive axis provides strong arguments for the use of a diverse case method.

This thesis will examine two populist radical right parties on its ideology with respect to women and gender relations. Clearly, one party must be "typical" for the more national oriented populist radical right while the other must be representative with respect to the more liberal oriented populist radical right. This thesis will examine the *Vlaams Belang* (VB) as a typical case of the more national orientated populist radical right. The VB is considered to be typical case of the more national oriented populist radical right since the party has a particularly conservative-traditional background and it is a nationalist party in striving for an autonomous Flanders. This thesis will on the other hand examine the *Partij voor de Vrijheid* (PVV) as a typical case of the more liberal orientated populist radical right. The PVV is perceived to be a typical case since the party operates in a country with an outspoken liberal-progressive tradition. The PVV is even known for defending liberal Dutch policies as hard-fought for Dutch values (Vossen 2010).

### **i.3.2 Analysis**

This study's aim is to explore the populist radical right's ideology with regard to women and gender relations. In my view a qualitative approach is not able to study party ideology properly. Mudde has for example noticed that most quantitative methods more often measure policy initiatives rather than they really measure ideology (2007: 38). Moreover, an important part of studying party ideology is that one is able to examine the results in its proper context. For instance, quantitative methods are bound on forehand to chosen categories and coding schemes and are therefore in fact insensitive for contexts. In order to be able to examine context a more personal role of the researcher is required. Therefore, I argue that a qualitative content analysis is the best approach for studying the populist radical right's ideology towards women and gender issues. In a nutshell the argument is that a content analysis is a more valid method to study party ideology since the researcher can always interpret the data in its proper context. Or to state it in Mudde's words: "it provides the proximity to the data and flexibility in operationalization necessary for studying highly complex concepts" (2007: 39). In practice, the content analysis will be effectuated through a textual analysis in which a variety of sources will be read carefully, and in their proper context.

### **i.3.3 Sources**

The analysis of a party's ideology must focus primarily on the question of what parties *are*, instead of on the question of what parties *do* (Mair and Mudde 1998: 220). In other words, we are interested in analyzing the identity of a party rather than analyzing policies. It is argued that the analysis of ideology requires a comprehensive in-depth approach and it therefore also requires a wider variety of documentary sources. Hence, the analysis of a party's ideology should not only focus on electoral programs since these documents are designed in order to clarify potentially appealing policies in the context of election campaigns (1998: 219). The risk of being stuck at the "front stage" can be overcome by selecting literature that entails both externally and internally orientated literature.

The aim to focus both on externally and internally oriented literature appeared to be not feasible though when it comes to examining the PVV's ideology. The party only provides externally oriented party literature such as election programs and other party manifestos. In order to be able to provide a comprehensive in-depth analysis of the PVV's ideology I also examined several interviews with PVV MPs. Moreover, I have examined contributions of PVV MP's during a variety of parliamentary debates. All examined debates have in common that the addressed topics have special meaning to women. In contrast to the PVV, the VB provides a variety of externally *and* internally oriented literature. Because the VB already provides enough literature to realize a comprehensive in-depth study of the party's ideology it is not necessary to examine non-party literature.

## 1.4 Overview

The first chapter sets out the theoretical framework. I will argue that Mudde's (2007) theory of the populist radical right provides the proper starting point to examine the populist radical right's ideology. Furthermore, this chapter elaborates on what previous research on the populist radical right and gender has suggested so far. Both sections of the first chapter will form the basis for the hypotheses, which are presented in chapter two. Chapter three forms the methodological framework of this study. I will argue that the best way to study the populist radical right's ideology with respect to women and gender relations is to employ a qualitative diverse-case method; including the Dutch *Partij voor de Vrijheid* and the Belgian *Vlaams Belang*. Furthermore, it is argued that internally and externally oriented party literature provides the best basis to study party ideology. Next, in chapter four and chapter five the hypotheses are tested in a content analysis. Finally, chapter six discusses the results. Moreover, it provides three conclusions concerning the populist radical right's ideology on women and gender relations.

## **Chapter 1      Theoretical framework**

This chapter deals with two related subjects: the core ideology of the populist radical right and the ideology of the populist radical right with respect to gender. The first part of this chapter is dedicated to the debate in the literature about the proper term to label the radical right and the debate about which features constitute the core ideology of the radical right. Furthermore, this first part will briefly discuss three important approaches of the radical right. It is argued that although these approaches have made important contributions to the body of literature that exists on the radical right, none of them is fully able to capture the contemporary radical right phenomenon. Instead, it is argued that Mudde's theory of the populist radical right is for a variety of reasons a more accurate approach to study the populist radical right. The work of Mudde is also comprehensively discussed in the first part of this chapter.

The second part of this chapter focuses on the ideology of the populist radical right with respect to gender. There only exists little literature on this subject. Therefore I will primarily focus on an edited volume by Amesberger and Halbmayr called *Rechtsextreme Parteien –eine mögliche Heimat für Frauen* (2002). The book combines English- and German language chapters on the role of women in four populist radical right parties. Furthermore, I will mention the little other literature that has been published on the subject. The primary aim of this second part is to outline what we know so far about the populist radical right and its ideology with regard to gender issues.

In the first part of this chapter it will become clear there exists a “war of words” when it comes to labeling the party family under study. In other words, there exists a variety of different classifications to label the party family. For convenience sake I will label the party family in the beginning of this first part plain “radical right”. In my view it is in the beginning of this first part not appropriate yet to speak of the populist radical right. After the discussion of the “old” theories of the radical right I will keep using the term populist radical right.

### **1.1              Theories of the populist radical right**

#### *The war of words*

Mudde has noticed that not only do radical right parties rise in waves, but so do the studies on the subject (2000: 6). According to Mudde, the recent abundance of literature on the radical right can be explained through the still continuous “third wave” of radical right parties. The third wave of radical right parties starts from the 1980s with the upsurge of radical right parties in almost the whole of Western Europe. This wave of radical right parties has been the most successful period for radical right parties in both electoral and ideological sense (Mudde 1996: 227). The research of the third wave has undoubtedly brought us more knowledge about this type of party, though there has not been much

agreement about what exactly constitutes the ideology of the radical right. Consequently, what the ideology of this party type holds is subject to extensive scholarly debate. Most scholars involved state the radical right's ideology is constituted of a combination of several different core features. However, the number of features mentioned varies. All in all, Mudde has distinguished no less than twenty-six different definitions and fifty-eight different features of the radical right that can be derived from the literature (2000: 11). In addition, most scholars do not mention or mention only vaguely which features and what combination of features are necessary to constitute the radical right. The result is not only a lack of a generally accepted definition but also the lack of *one* generally accepted term to label the party type under study. This is due to the fact that scholars think differently about what constitutes the absolute core of the ideology of the radical right. In this respect, De Lange and Mudde state that the terms which are being used to label (what they call) extreme right parties can be roughly grouped in three main categories. They state that "the first category covers all combinations using the central term "right"; the second category includes all labels that focus mainly on the national or ethnic element of the parties, e.g. "nationalist", "racist", or "anti-immigrant"; and the third category consists of all concepts that include the term "populism"" (2005: 479). In addition, there are also studies which distinguish different types of subgroups within the party family. According to Mudde, these studies acknowledge the similarity of some features in radical right parties. However, they also see differences between them with respect to other features in the party ideology, or with respect to the importance of certain features of the party ideology (1996: 237). It is not the aim of this thesis to give an exhaustive overview of all the literature on the ideology of the radical right. Therefore, I will only briefly discuss three important contributions to the literature.

### *Theories of the radical right*

Ignazi has been one of the first scholars to systematically examine the third wave of radical right parties (Zaslave 2004). Ignazi (1992) identifies two types of "extreme right-wing parties", i.e. the "old" and the "new" extreme right parties. In Ignazi's view a combination of three criteria can identify the whole family of extreme right parties. The first criterion is the spatial criterion and takes into consideration the placement of the parties along the left-right continuum, identifying those parties which have been placed at the most far right of the national political spectrum. The second criterion is the historic-ideological criterion focuses on the self declared party ideology and its reference to fascism. The third and last criterion is the attitudinal-systemic criterion and involves the presence of anti-system political attitudes and beliefs. According to Ignazi, the "old" extreme right parties combine all three criteria while the "new" extreme right parties are selected on the basis of the first and third criterion. The "new" extreme right parties are therefore not (neo)fascist parties but merely anti-system parties, delegitimizing the democratic system by discrediting the parliamentary decision-making process, party government and the representative procedure (Ignazi 1992: 25). The "new"

extreme right represents a counter response to post-materialism by supporting authoritarian values and opposing mass-immigration (Zaslove 2004).

An alternative classification of the radical right is constructed by Betz. Betz (1993) is one of the scholars who introduced the concept of populism in the study of the radical right (Zaslove 2009). Betz distinguishes two “faces of radical right-wing populism”: neoliberal or libertarian populism on the one hand and authoritarian or national populism on the other. According to Betz, both types are a response to economic, social and cultural transformations in advanced societies, resulting from the transition to post-industrialized capitalism. For neo-liberal populist parties this response lies in stressing individualism and market-orientated liberalism. Less emphasis is placed on xenophobic attitudes towards immigration. In contrast, nationalist populist parties tend to have xenophobic attitudes towards immigrants and emphasize law and order and traditional moral values. The difference between the two types of radical right-wing populism is however relative. Betz states that “what ultimately determines whether a party should be characterized as a neoliberal populist party or a nationalist populist party is the relative weight it attributes to the respective elements in its program” (Betz 1994: 108 in Mudde 1996: 238). This means that parties can develop from one type to another over time. In this respect Betz has noticed that since the late 1980s there seems to be a tendency towards an increasing importance of national populist elements in the programs of several radical-right wing populist parties (Mudde 1996: 239).

Another important contributor to the literature on the radical right is Kitschelt. Kitschelt (1995) has tried to explain the success and failure of radical right parties in Western Europe. Kitschelt identifies three ideal type radical right parties. The parties that in Kitschelt’s view hold the “winning formula” are the new radical right parties. Kitschelt states that the large scale transformation to postindustrial capitalism has brought sociostructural changes which have created new political demands. The new radical right parties seem to have been able to successfully satisfy these new demands, which include a combination of market liberalism, authoritarianism and ethnocentrism. The other two ideal types that Kitschelt distinguishes are older than the new radical right. According to Kitschelt, these party types have a very limited support base since they have not been able to transform themselves into parties that contain the “winning formula”, i.e. the combination of market liberalism and authoritarianism. For example, the party type that Kitschelt has labeled welfare chauvinist parties do promote an authoritarian agenda, but are at the same time anti-capitalist and in favor of “welfare state chauvinism” and economic redistribution. The populist anti-statist parties, on the other hand, are market orientated and anti-welfare state, but hold at the same time anti-statist attitudes.

All three above mentioned theories concerning the radical right are classics in itself. However, none the approaches are fully able to capture the contemporary radical right phenomenon. For example, according to Ignazi the new extreme right is placed at the far right of the left-right continuum and holds anti-system political beliefs and attitudes. Ignazi is not explicit in his definition of “left” and

“right” but it appears that he uses the left-right continuum in a classical manner, i.e. pointing to the positions of political parties on socio-economic issues. Ignazi argues that (new) extreme right parties “ask for the total dismantling of the welfare state” (1992: 21). However, it is questionable whether contemporary radical right parties are truly rightwing when it comes to matters such as the welfare state. In fact, contemporary radical right parties rather seem to hold a “welfare chauvinist” position. Instead of dismantling the welfare state the contemporary radical right wants to limit benefits to its “own people” and therefore exclude immigrants from receiving benefits. Furthermore, it is questionable whether most radical right parties hold anti-system political attitudes and beliefs. According to Ignazi, the new extreme right “expresses antidemocratic values” and “intends to undermine the foundation of the system” (1992: 12 and 21). These statements are too strong though. The contemporary radical right is without doubt skeptical towards the political system. However, they do not have difficulties with the democratic system in itself, but with the way it currently functions. According to the contemporary radical right, representative democracy is no longer representative since power is in the hands of non-representative elites. The radical right holds a populist notion of democracy and wants “the people” to be back in power. The “general will” must be executed and policies should be based on “common sense”. Certainly, this populist notion of democracy can put liberal democratic values under pressure. However, it does not oppose to democracy in itself. In short, Ignazi’s approach of the new extreme right is problematic since it is questionable whether the contemporary radical right is truly rightwing on socioeconomic issues. Moreover, his statements concerning the perceived anti-system attitudes and beliefs of the new extreme right are too strong. The contemporary radical right does not oppose the democratic system in itself but opposes the way (representative) democracy functions. Betz has recognized the radical right’s populist tendencies and has therefore brought the concept of populism into the study of the radical right. This is the great asset of Betz’s approach. However, his approach is also problematic in a few respects.

For example, it is questionable whether a distinction between two types of radical right-wing populism is useful. Betz distinguishes between neoliberal populist parties and nationalist populist parties. It is not clear though in what respect the neoliberal populist parties differ from mainstream conservative right parties. Indeed, the mainstream conservative right also emphasizes neo-liberalism and individualism while it is at the same time not uncommon for them to be skeptical about immigration. Furthermore, one can wonder whether neoliberalism or individualism is really part of the radical right’s (core) ideology. With respect to individualism it must be noted that the radical right often refers to its “own people” and emphasizes the importance of community life and the family. In a way, the radical right is rather communitarianistic than individualistic. Moreover, it is doubtful whether the radical right truly holds neoliberal economic positions. The term “welfare chauvinist” appears to be a more proper term to label the radical right’s position. In short, Betz’s approach is problematic since it rests on the false assumption that neoliberalism and individualism is part of the (core) ideology of the

radical right. The focus on market liberalism is also one of the main errors in Kitschelt's approach. In my view Kitschelt also overestimates the importance of economics in the radical right's ideology, while at the same time he underestimates the importance of other ideological features, such as populism. In short, Kitschelt distinguishes three types of radical right parties but none of them really cover the contemporary radical right phenomenon. In sum, although the mentioned approaches contain elements that enable us to understand the populist radical right, none of them seem able to fully capture the current populist radical right phenomenon. In the following, it is argued that Mudde's theory of the populist radical is a far more accurate approach of the populist radical right's ideology. According to Mudde, populism is one of the core features of the populist radical right's ideology. The populist tendencies of the radical right are currently indeed one of the distinctive and widely debated characteristics of parties belonging to this party family. Moreover, Mudde argues that the populist radical right's position on socioeconomic issues proceeds from other core features of the populist radical right's ideology. Therefore, Mudde considers economics also not to be a core ideological feature of the populist radical right. This claim is correct since the populist radical right's position on economics is indeed not particularly rightwing. Instead, its main goal is to protect the nation's economy and welfare state from "foreign" influences. However, the main asset of Mudde's approach is his emphasis on nativism, which is a combination of nationalism and xenophobia. According to Mudde, nativism is the populist radical right's absolute core ideological feature. In my view, earlier approaches have not emphasized the impact of xenophobic attitudes of the populist radical right enough. Besides, "nativism" is a better term than "ethnocentrism" or "immigration" since only nativism is able to capture the several grounds on which one can be included or excluded. Therefore, nativism is a concept that is able to "travel across time and space". For instance, exclusion is in Western Europe increasingly based on culture and religion, i.e. Islam. Mudde's theory of the populist radical right is in my view the most accurate approach of the contemporary populist radical right. In particular his perspective on economics within its ideology and his emphasis on nativism and populism is an asset when compared to the approaches of Ignazi, Betz and Kitschelt. Therefore, Mudde's theory will to a large extent provide the theoretical base of this study. In the following, I will discuss Mudde's theory of the populist radical right in a comprehensive manner.

### *Mudde and the populist radical right*

In Mudde's view the populist radical right comprises three ideological core features. In the following I will address each of the three core concepts separately. In constructing the definition of the populist radical right, Mudde (2007) makes in his work a distinction between a minimal and a maximum definition. The maximum definition ultimately defines the populist radical right. However, the aim of the minimum definition is according to Mudde to describe the core features of the ideologies of all parties that are generally included in the party family. Moreover, these core concepts can be used as

“coathangers on which additional concepts may be draped” (Freeden 1997: 5 in: Mudde 2007: 15). Mudde claims that if one looks at the primary literature of the various political parties generally associated with the previously mentioned studies, as well as the various studies of their ideologies, the core concept of the populist radical right is the “nation” (2007: 16). Consequently, the core ideological feature of the party family under study is nationalism.

Mudde defines nationalism as “a political doctrine that strives for the congruence of the cultural and the political unit, i.e. the nation and the state” (2007: 16). The core goal of nationalists is therefore the formation of a monocultural state. The formation of a monocultural state can be achieved in various ways. Mudde refers to Koch (1991) and states that this can be achieved either through a process of external exclusiveness or through internal homogenization. The process of external exclusiveness aims to bring all members of the nation within the territory of the state. In a moderate form this can be done through population transfer, a radical form of external exclusiveness is territorial expansion. The process of internal homogenization also aims at ensuring that the state only includes people from its “own” nation. Strategies such as separatism, assimilation, expulsion and even genocide are ways to achieve internal homogenization. Study has shown that nationalism in practice always includes both political/civic and cultural/ethnic aspects. Therefore, Mudde argues that nationalism should be interpreted in a holistic way. Mudde makes in his definition no distinction between ethnic nationalism, on the one hand, and state nationalism, on the other. However, Mudde notices that the term “nationalism” might still be too broad to function as a core concept. Nationalism as defined here cannot make a distinction between what Mudde calls “moderate” nationalists, i.e. liberal nationalists, and “radical” nationalists. With respect to the populist radical right it is the radical nationalists with whom we are concerned. Therefore, Mudde introduces the term *nativism*.

In introducing the term *nativism* Mudde introduces a concept that is rarely used in research on European party families. However, in the American literature *nativism* as a concept is far more common. Moreover, other academic disciplines, like anthropology and history, are too more familiar with the concept of *nativism*. In the literature *nativism* is linked with pluralism. Michaels for example states that from the standpoint of the native every attempt to blur differences must be rejected (1995: 69 in Mudde 2007). In this sense “the essence of *nativism* is its preference for the native exclusively on the grounds of its being native” (Michaels 1995: 69 in Mudde 2007: 18). However, in Betz’s view cultural *nativism* seeks to distance itself from traditional forms of racism. Instead of promoting notions of ethno-cultural superiority, cultural *nativism* aims at “protecting its own ‘indigenous’ (in the sense of French, German, Norwegian or even European) society, culture and way of life, against what is seen as alien intrusion, contamination and subversion, whether under the guise of American popular culture or Islamic religious and religiously inspired lifestyle” (Betz 2004: 1). Mudde states that when the different anthropological and historical definitions are combined, and disconcerted from their particular spatial and temporal features, a definition can be constructed which closely resembles the combination

of xenophobia and nationalism. Mudde understands nativism in this way as “*an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (“the nation”) and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state*” (2007: 19). The nativist dimension as presented here thus includes a combination of nationalism and xenophobia and can therefore (instead of plain nationalism) exclude liberal forms of nationalism. Mudde stresses, furthermore, that this definition of nativism implies that inclusion or exclusion of nativists can be based on several grounds. Racist arguments, but also cultural or religious arguments are possible. The determination of native(ness) is subjective. It is “imagined”, like that of the nation (Mudde 2007: 19). Consequently, nativism does not reduce populist radical right parties to sole single-issue parties, i.e. anti-immigrant parties.

A second core feature of the ideology of populist radical right parties as distinguished by Mudde is *authoritarianism*. Authoritarianism is defined by Mudde “as the belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely” (2007: 23). This definition is based upon Adorno’s “The Authoritarian Personality” and Altemeyer’s definition of “right-wing authoritarianism” and therefore in line with the dominant tradition in social psychology and the Frankfurter Schule (2007: 22-23). Authoritarianism is strongly related with the belief in the importance of *law and order* and a strong state. Mudde has noticed in earlier work that populist radical right parties think the state should maintain a strict legal system and should enforce the rules actively and rigorously. In general, populist radical right parties support the expansion of law enforcement personnel and equipment, more sober conditions in prison and higher sentences (1999b: 189). The belief in law and order often includes a moral dimension as well. According to Mudde, several populist radical right parties stress the necessity of order and hierarchy in social and community life. They oppose what they see as “the degenerate effects of permissiveness” such as homosexuality, abortion and drugs (1999b: 189). However, Mudde also notices that while authoritarians may be more inclined to accept authority than non-authoritarians their submission to authority is “not absolute, automatic, nor blind” (Altemeyer 1981 in Mudde 2007: 23). Authoritarians can and will rebel under certain circumstances. Mudde does not make clear though under which conditions authoritarians are likely to rebel against authority.

The third and last core ideological feature of the populist radical right as distinguished by Mudde is *populism*. Mudde explicitly does not treat populism here as a political style. Instead, Mudde defines populism as “*an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous groups and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale, i.e. the general will of the people*” (Mudde 2007: 23). In Mudde’s view populism is a “thin-centered ideology” since “it does not possess the same level of intellectual refinement and consistency as, for example, socialism or liberalism” (Mudde 2004: 544). Instead, populism consists of a restricted core which is attached to a narrower range of political concepts. The core concept of populism is “the people”. Consequently, populism as defined

here opposes elitism and pluralism. In elitism politics should be the expression of the views of the moral elite, instead of the amoral people. On the other hand, pluralism rejects the homogeneity of both populism and elitism, seeing society as a heterogeneous collection of groups and individuals with often fundamentally different views and wishes (Mudde 2004: 543-544).

Furthermore, the ideological feature of populism when related to the populist radical right is often linked to the so called “politics of resentment”. The politics of resentment refers to different interrelated features, concerning anti-elitism, the appeal to the common sense of the people and the claim that the populist radical right is the only genuine defender of “true” democracy (Betz 2005: 30). In the eyes of populist radical right, power in liberal capitalist democracies is in the hands of self-serving political and cultural elites that pursue their own agenda without considering the will of the people (Betz 2005: 30; Betz and Johnson 2004: 313). Representative democracy has therefore become nothing more than a farce. In this situation, the populist radical right has generally promoted itself as the only voice that dares to challenge and make a stance against the self-interested ideas of the established elite by saying uncomfortable truths. Through this, the populist radical right says what the majority of the population thinks. Betz states furthermore that the populist radical right does not only want to say what people think, but also wants “to return the word to the people” (Betz 2005: 31; Betz and Johnson 2004: 315). The corrupt elites have to be replaced by genuine elite of citizens who think for themselves and act responsibly. Populist radical right parties are therefore often proponents of direct forms of democracy. In short, the populist radical right juxtaposes the corrupt established elites with the authentic, morally good civil society (Zaslave 2004: 74). Moreover, populist ideology reveres to the “common sense” of the people, or to “the heartland”. It is believed that in a populist democracy, nothing is more important than the “general will” of the people, not even human rights or constitutional guarantees (Mudde 2007: 23).

In sum, Mudde holds that the ideology of the populist radical right is a combination of three core features, i.e. nativism, authoritarianism and populism. These three core features together form Mudde’s maximum definition of the populist radical right’s ideology. However, nativism is in Mudde’s view the primary ideological feature of the populist radical right. Therefore, the minimum definition of the ideology of the populist radical right only consists of nativism. As mentioned before, Mudde considers the three core features also to be “coathangers” on which all other concepts can be draped. In the remainder of his book Mudde uses the three core concepts, but in particular nativism, as coathangers to interpret various political issues in a manner that is consistent with the populist radical right’s ideology. A nice example of Mudde’s use of nativism as a coathanger -on which I would like to spend a few words- is his chapter of the populist radical right’s view on (socio-)economic matters.

Contrary to much of the “old” literature Mudde takes a stand towards the conception that *economics in general* is key to the ideology and success of the populist radical right. In his view, (socio)economic issues are secondary to populist radical right parties. The socioeconomic positions that they take

proceed from other core features of the populist radical right's ideology. In Mudde's view the economic position of populist radical right parties are best termed "nativist economic" (2007: 122). Mudde makes a comparison with Christian democracy and states that "whereas the state involvement of Christian democrats is mainly informed by the Christian concept of charity, the populist radical right's prime motivation is nativist" (2007: 125). This nativist position means that the economy should be at the service of the nation and only the nation. An important characteristic of economic nativism is welfare chauvinism. This means that the benefits of the welfare state should be limited to the "own" people (2007: 131). Those who do not belong to this group, notably immigrants, are to be excluded from benefits. The same line of argument counts for the populist radical right anti-globalization attitude. The economy should not only serve the nation, it should also be controlled by it. In the populist radical right's view economic globalization means that foreigners (including the European Union) can influence the national economy. Furthermore, economic globalization is harmful to national interests, since low-wage jobs are for example exported to the Third World (2007: 187).

One of the questions that remain though is why Mudde has chosen for the term populist radical right. Why not (randomly) choose one of the terms already present in the literature on the third wave? In his book Mudde states that he does not want to contribute to the present "terminological chaos". By constructing a clear conceptual framework the appropriate term for the party family under study will follow by itself. The conceptual framework is created by Mudde by means of constructing a "ladder of abstraction" of the family of nativist ideologies (see figure 1). This ladder of abstraction is constructed through Mudde's own interpretation of the literature. The basis of this conceptual framework, and therefore at the bottom of the ladder, is nativism, the ideological core feature of the populist radical right. Mudde hopes to find the best-suited term for the party family under study by ascending the ladder. This means moving step by step upwards from nativism to, ultimately, the extreme right which is defined by Mudde as combination of nativism, authoritarianism, and anti-democracy (2007: 23).

*Figure 1 (Mudde 2007:24)*

Table 1.2 <i>Ladder of abstraction nativist ideologies</i>	
Ideology	Key additional feature
Extreme right	Anti-democracy
Radical right	Authoritarianism
Nativism	Xenophobia

According to Mudde, the party family best fits the term radical right. In this respect Mudde states that most definitions of radical are too relativist in the sense that what is considered to be radical largely depends on the political culture of the country. This means that the same type of rhetoric or position is perceived to be radical in one country while it can be mainstream or moderate in another. Therefore, Mudde comes up with an own interpretation of the term radical, i.e. an interpretation that can travel across space and time. Mudde defines radical as “*the opposition to some key features of liberal democracy, most notably political pluralism and the constitutional protection of minorities*” (2007: 25). Mudde believes that this interpretation of the term radical is not only useful in liberal democracies, but in other political systems as well.

However, this interpretation of the term “radical” can point to many different ideologies and movements. Therefore, Mudde qualifies the radical by interpreting the direction of the radicalization, i.e. the radical *right*. Mudde follows Bobbio (1994) by making the key distinction between left and right as being based on the attitude towards inequality. In this interpretation “the left considers the key inequalities between people artificial and wants to overcome them by active state involvement, whereas the right believes the main inequalities between people to be natural and outside the purview of the state” (2007: 26). Or, as Seidel states “right-wing discourse is a discourse of order grounded in nature” (Seidel 1998: 11 in Mudde 2007: 26).

In sum, Mudde states that in the ladder of abstraction of nativist ideologies the party family under study fits best with the ideology of the radical right. The term radical right *radical* is defined as opposition to fundamental values of liberal democracy, while *right* is defined as the belief in a natural order with inequalities. The key additional feature of anti-democracy, which makes the party family extreme right, is in Mudde’s view one bridge too far since the party family does not oppose democracy *per se*.

By means of the ladder of abstraction Mudde has captured nativism and authoritarianism in his conceptual framework. However, the question remains what to do with Mudde’s third ideological key feature of the party family under study, i.e. populism. Mudde acknowledges the inability of his conceptual framework to accommodate populism. Mudde notes that populism cannot be included between nativism and radical right since this would mean that the radical right, and therefore also all the types above it, cannot be elitist. The solution for this problem is however simple. Mudde states that in the view of this conceptual framework the party family under study best fits the ideology of the radical right. However, it concerns a specific version of the radical right, i.e. a populist subtype. Consequently, this leads either to the adoption of the term “radical right populism” or “populist radical right”. In Mudde’s view the choice between the two is not arbitrary though. Mudde states that in “radical right populism” the primary term is populism, while “radical right” functions merely to

describe the ideological emphasis of this specific form of populism. Meanwhile “populist radical right” refers to a populist form of the radical right (2007:26). In Mudde’s view nativism, and not populism, is the ultimate core feature of the ideology of the party family under study. Therefore, radical right should be the primary term in the concept.

Mudde’s theory of the populist radical right will for a variety of reasons form the basis of this thesis. First of all, I believe Mudde’s theory provides a more accurate description of most current radical right parties. For example, populism is not mentioned by the “old” theories of the radical right, while it is well understood that as a result of the contemporary populist *Zeitgeist* populism is nowadays an important feature of most radical right parties (Mudde 2004). Secondly, I agree with Mudde that economics is in general is not key to the radical right’s ideology. The (socio)economic positions of this party family are derived from other core features of its ideology, i.e. nativism. In fact, with introducing the term nativism Mudde has in my view been more able to catch the essence of the whole radical right, including possible subtypes within the party family.

Mudde argues that nativism, along other core features of its ideology like authoritarianism and populism, is used by the populist radical right as a “coathanger”. The party family frames various political issues in a manner that is consistent with these core features. In this respect, it can be argued that the various core features provide a stable starting point to examine the populist radical right’s ideology on women and gender issues. Moreover, I believe the distinguished core features provide a fertile starting point since it can be argued that especially nativism will influence the party family’s position on this issue (see chapter 2).

## **1.2 The Populist Radical Right and Gender: what do we know?**

As argued earlier, there exists only a minimum amount of literature that deals with gender and the populist radical right. Mudde (2007) gives in an overview chapter a comprehensive view of the existing literature considering women and gender relations in the ideology of populist radical right parties. From this overview it appears there is only a handful of academic research on the topic. Furthermore, the existing literature focuses mainly on demand-side questions or on the role of “party women” within the parties. There hardly exists literature that primarily focuses on the supply-side, i.e. the ideology of the populist radical right with respect to gender. Consequently, the ideology of populist radical right parties with regard to women is very under-theorized.

This section elaborates extensively on an edited volume by Amesberger and Halbmayr (2002). The book consists of four case studies of populist radical right parties including the French *Front National*, the FPÖ from Austria, the Czech SPR-RSČ and the Slovakian SNS. Each case study focuses on a variety of subjects relating the populist radical right party with gender issues. This variety of subjects contains supply-side issues as well as demand-side issues. For example, the case studies deal with the

role of women in party programs but also with (the motivation of) women voters and party women. In the end of the volume Amesberger and Halbmayr put the case studies in a comparative perspective. They try to draw some general conclusions about the populist radical right ideology with respect to women and gender related issues. It is mainly these generalized conclusions which are relevant for this study.

In the following, I will first pay attention to so called “demand-side” questions; addressing populist radical right voting and gender. In this respect, the section “demand-side” will especially focus on the persistent “gender gap” in populist radical right voting. Furthermore, this section will focus on women’s motivations when voting for the populist radical right. Attention is paid to demand-side issues since I want to provide a comprehensive overview of the literature regarding the populist radical right and gender. Furthermore, literature regarding the demand-side might also shed some light on the importance of gender issues in populist radical right’s ideology. After addressing the demand-side, I will discuss in detail what has been written about our main field of interest, i.e. the ideology of the populist radical right with regard to women and gender issues.

#### *Demand side*

One of the most recognized observations in the research on the populist radical right is that there exists a “gender gap” in voting for the populist radical right (e.g. Betz 1994; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Norris 2005; Givens 2004 and 2005). Women across all age groups tend to vote (far) less for populist radical right parties than men (Betz 2004). However, it is important to notice that women’s voting behavior does not only differ from that of men with respect to the populist radical right. In the following I will first shortly address to the general gender differences in voting behavior. Subsequently I will discuss why women vote differently in populist radical right voting.

It is long standing wisdom that gender differences exist in party voting. Although gender differences do not have the same impact on voting behavior as class and religion, it is proven to be a continuous and significant factor in voting behavior (Inglehart and Norris 2000). Mudde has for example noticed that women in general tend to vote more for “centre” parties than for “radical” parties (2007: 113). Furthermore, it is established wisdom that in the postwar era women tended to be more apt than men to support center-right parties in Western Europe (Inglehart and Norris 2000: 443). According to Inglehart and Norris, women in established democracies even tend to be more conservative in their ideology and voting behavior than often suggested. They claim that this “traditional gender gap” continued to be evident in many postindustrial societies up to the late 1980s (2000: 458). However, Inglehart and Norris also found that by the 1990s women in many postindustrial societies have shifted leftwards. Inglehart and Norris state that by the mid-1990s women in established democracies are no longer more conservative than men. There even emerges a “modern gender gap” meaning women are often more left-leaning than men (2000: 459). According to Inglehart and Norris the modern

gender gap persists after introducing a range of social controls but the size of the gap diminishes once cultural factors are taken into account. Consequently, Inglehart and Norris, have suggested that the modern gender gap is more strongly explained through cultural differences between women and men in their value orientations than through differences in their lifestyles. In this respect, women and men especially tend to differ in their attitudes towards postmaterialism and the women's movement. Since the modern gender gap is stronger among younger age groups Inglehart and Norris expect that generational turnover will continue to move women leftwards (2000: 459). This suggests a simple answer to the question why fewer women than men support populist radical right parties: fewer women than men hold populist radical right views (Mudde 2007: 113).

Givens (2004) and Betz (1994) are two of the scholars who have addressed this approach. Givens tested two explanations regarding the gender gap. The first explanation involves the differences in occupational structure between men and women. Givens hypothesized that "women are less likely to vote for the radical right because there are fewer women who are employed and work in the sectors (manufacturing/blue-collar) that are attracted to the radical right" (2004: 39). Contrary to her expectations though, controlling for blue-collar or employed did not decrease the gender gap in voting for populist radical right parties (2004: 47). Her second explanation for the occurrence of the gender gap involves attitudes towards immigration. Givens hypothesizes that "men are more likely to vote for the radical right than women because they have stronger anti-immigrant attitudes than women" (2004: 41). According to Givens these anti-immigrant attitudes of men stems from the fact that immigration is perceived to threaten male dominated work sectors. Besides, women in general still tend to work less than men. Also Givens' second hypothesis is not confirmed in the results. In short, her research shows that there is a persistent gender gap when controlling for social, economic and political variables (2004: 48). However, she does note that she was not able to control for political issues that may have special meaning to female voters, such as abortion (2004: 50).

An additional hypothesis with regard to women, immigration-issues and voting for the populist radical right is made by Betz. Like Givens Betz (1994: in Fetzer 2000) hypothesizes that men vote more for the populist radical right because their anti-immigrant attitudes are stronger than those of women. However, the argument that Betz makes for this hypothesis differs. Instead of making an 'occupational structure'-argument Betz points to the effects of marginalization, i.e. being female in a male-dominated society. Betz theorizes that "one reason for expecting that women might be more sympathetic to foreigners than are men is that women, like foreigners, have been the victims of discrimination" (Fetzer 2000: 8). Betz's hypothesis is partly confirmed by his empirical analysis. A gender gap emerges when men and women are asked about their approval to open intolerance of immigrants or xenophobic violence. Furthermore, a similar gender gap exists for respondents of the same age for less extreme forms of anti-immigrant attitudes (Fetzer 2000: 8). However, Betz's findings concern public attitudes, i.e. attitudes that are out in the open. Women may oppose public

intolerance, but that does not mean that they do not hold similar attitudes. In this respect, Mudde even states that “most survey data show that the difference between men and women in terms of nativist attitudes is far from striking, if at all present” (2007: 113). In other words, Mudde states that there is no significant gender gap in terms of populist radical right attitudes. Therefore, it cannot be stated that women vote less for populist radical right parties simply because fewer women hold populist radical right views.

A different approach to the puzzling gender gap is provided by Giddens et al. (2005). Giddens et al. do not only wonder why women vote less for the populist radical right but also turns the question around. Why do populist radical right parties attract more men? In this respect, Giddens et al. point to Esping-Andersen who explains the emergence of gender cleavages through the “decommodification” of the welfare state. With the decommodification of the welfare state white males became instead of beneficiaries net contributors to the welfare state. Giddens et al. argue that an anti-welfare state backlash could explain why populist radical right has a greater appeal to men. The populist radical right promises to “recommodify” the welfare state by restoring the connection between contributors and beneficiaries of the welfare state (2005: 1175). A second explanation is in line with Inglehart and Norris’ finding that women and men differ in their cultural attitudes and focuses on the so called authoritarian backlash. Giddens et al. state that shifts in cultural values and practices, such as the transformation of gender roles, have undercut the traditional dominance of white males (2005: 1176). Through emphasizing traditional values the populist radical right might appeal to men who resent this loss of status. The last explanation provided by Giddens et al. focuses on the populist aspect of the populist radical right. Populism is associated with political dissatisfaction. The populist rhetoric of the populist radical right might appeal more to men because politics is a more salient topic in the lives of men than it is in the lives of women (2008: 1176). The explanations provided by Giddens et al. seem plausible but they remain just theoretical since they are not empirically tested. However, a significant amount of the edited volume by Amesberger and Halbmayr is also dedicated to demand-side questions. In the four case studies of populist radical right parties the authors have addressed to several demand-side related questions. In the following I will primarily focus on the conclusions that are drawn when the cases are placed in a comparative perspective.

Amesberger and Halbmayr also come to the conclusion that a gender gap exists in populist radical right voting. However, they also notice that the gender gap varies in size per election. Sometimes the gender gap is hardly even present at all. Amesberger and Halbmayr do not provide an unambiguous answer in their explanation of the gender gap. In fact, due to a lack of data they do not come to a comprehensive explanation at all. Instead, they conclude with a couple of individual statements concerning gender and the populist radical right voter structure.

The most straightforward finding of Amesberger and Halbmayr is that gender should be modified with respect to other socioeconomic factors. It is correct that women in general vote less for populist radical

right parties. However, within the category there is a lot of variation. When gender is combined with other variables it has different effects. Amesberger and Halbmayr provide an example with respect to the “losers of modernization”-thesis. The data suggests that jobless voters or voters with a lower education were more likely to vote for a populist radical right party. However, this finding is stronger with respect to men than it is with respect to women. Therefore, Amesberger and Halbmayr conclude that men react more often to a loss of status with political statements than women. Amesberger and Halbmayr find too that religious affiliation and churchgoing are important variables in explaining support for the populist radical right. However, the effects differ between parties. For example, a strong religious affiliation in combination with being a woman correlates in the case of the *Front National* positively with support for the party. Concerning the case of the SNS the effect is however the other way around. Amesberger and Halbmayr also find that divorced women tended to vote far less for the *Front National* than divorced men.

Amesberger and Halbmayr were also hindered by a lack of data when they tried to answer questions concerning voter motivations. However, a few important statements concerning this topic can be made. An important finding is that the motivation for voting for a populist radical right party does not differ per gender. In other words, the ideological motivation for women to vote for populist radical right parties does not differ from that of men. These ideological motivations often include the core ideological features of the parties, i.e. nativism and authoritarianism. Again, one would be tempted to think the obvious: the gender gap can be explained simple through the fact that fewer women than men hold populist radical right views. The puzzling thing is however that Amesberger and Halbmayr find that the range of women and men that hold populist radical right views is about the same. Somehow, populist radical right parties are not able to attract women’s vote. Amesberger and Halbmayr acknowledge that they cannot explain this discrepancy yet. However, they do note that the cases provide indications that women may be deterred by the aggressive style or rhetoric of the party. Amesberger and Halbmayr state that women may prefer a more moderate style. Either way, a more explicit view on women or family politics is not likely to attract more votes of women since they play at most a subordinate role in women’s voter motivations. A similar argument is made by Mudde. Mudde (2007) argues that in this regard perception is more important than reality. According to Mudde, it is the “extremist image” rather than the “conservative positions on gender issues” that keeps women from voting for the populist radical right (2007: 116).

However, this is not Mudde’s main argument in explaining the gender gap in populist radical right voting. According to Mudde, the reticence of women towards populist radical right parties is not the result of being the “peaceful sex”, but rather of that their attitudes are expressed differently due to gender specific socialization (2007: 115). Mudde argues that with respect to populist radical right voting the main effect of different socialization is the significant lower level of policy efficacy among women. In other words: women know less about politics and are less interested in politics than men.

Mudde connects this “low efficacy theory” with Roth’s “delayed effect theory” and states that the more conservative voting behavior of women can be explained through “the lower level of political interest among women, which leads them to vote for established parties rather than for new parties” (Roth 1989 in Mudde 2007: 116).

It seems that for now the debate remains open when it comes to explaining the gender gap in populist radical right voting. Scholars have clearly come up with a variety of explanations. However, the data has not showed a consistent answer yet. The results so far are therefore at best provisional. When these provisional results and the persisting gender gap are taken into consideration though it is possible to generate some expectations about supply-side issues, i.e. the populist radical right’s ideology with regard to women and gender relations. In short, I expect on the basis of two lines of argument that gender related themes are not important to the populist radical right.

Firstly, it is expected that populist radical right parties may want to attract more female voters since there is still a lot of unrealized electoral potential within this group. However, in my view it is unlikely that populist radical right parties will change their ideology in a more “women-friendly” fashion in order to attract women’s votes. Indeed, Mudde and Amesberger and Halbmayr determined that the range of women and men that hold populist radical right views is about the same. It is just that women for some reason do not translate their political orientations into political actions, which is voting for the populist radical right. Whatever the reason may be that women consistently vote less for the populist radical right, it is not expected that a more explicit view on women or family politics will attract more female voters. Such issues seem to play a subordinate role in women’s voter motivations. Instead of a change in ideology it is more likely that the populist radical right will focus on an adjustment in its presentation in order to attract female voters.

Secondly, it is argued that gender issues are not important to populist radical right parties because the parties’ *current* female voters do not really care about the parties’ position on gender issues. The current female electorate of the populist radical right votes for the populist radical right simply because it holds populist radical right attitudes and beliefs.

In sum, it is expected that gender issues are not important to the populist radical right since it has not much to electorally to gain with emphasizing these issues. The question remains though what we do know so far about the populist radical right’s ideology with regard to women and gender relations. In the following, I will elaborate more extensively on the little literature there exists on the supply-side, i.e. the *ideology* of the populist radical right with respect to gender.

### *Supply side*

The work that has been published on the role of women in the ideology of the populist radical right can be differentiated in two separate categories. The first category concerns the non-academic literature and contains the largest amount of what has been written about the populist radical right and

gender. This literature mainly deals with the popular conceptions that exist about the populist radical right and its position towards women. For example, one of the claims of the often self-declared feminist authors of the non-academic literature is that all nativists have a very traditional view on gender roles. In this view women are by the populist radical right reduced to being wives and mothers and treated as second-rate citizens. However, Mudde has noticed that the “research” that supports these claims often suffers from a flawed research design. Moreover, the authors never start their research with an open and unprejudiced view (2007: 91). This type of literature is therefore considered to be non-academic. Hence, the academic literature is the second category of work that has been published on the subject. This type of literature is very scarce though. In fact, there only exists one elaborated piece of scholarship on the subject; the already mentioned edited volume by Amesberger and Halbmayr (2002). In the following I will primarily focus on their work and the general conclusions they have drawn on this subject. It appears that their work provides three general conclusions; one concerning the populist radical right’s view on the role of women in society, one regarding women and politics within the populist radical right and one about the ideological background of the populist radical right’s position on women and gender relations.

When it comes to the view on women’s role in society Amesberger and Halbmayr conclude that all populist radical right parties under study hold traditional views on the division of gender roles. Consequently, all parties see women first and foremost in their role of mothers (see also Mudde 2000: 94). Variations in viewpoints only exist to the point that the party emphasizes this mother-role. In this respect, a “traditional” and a “modern traditional” view can be distinguished. In the traditional view women are exclusively seen as mothers and wives. Their role is to ensure the survival of the nation by extending the native population with multiple children. Furthermore, they are ought to be responsible for the preservation of the native culture by being good mothers and wives. In this traditional view women are discouraged from working. Consequently, the populist radical right parties that hold this traditional view support policy measures that provide a favorable climate for women to become mothers and housewives. Both negative and positive policies are used as a means to come to this result. For example, these parties will not likely support measures concerning more generous child care provisions since these measures make it easier for women to work. On the other hand, these parties are likely to support certain tax breaks that benefit traditional families. The populist radical right parties that hold a modern traditional view on the division of gender roles also think that women are the ones primarily responsible for the family and the home. They too often support measures creating a favorable climate for women to stay at home. However, they accept that women may also have a career. It is not clear though to what extent women are encouraged to work. Accepting can mean nothing more than tolerating women on the work floor. It does not necessarily mean that the parties also support measures that help women to combine both tasks. Amesberger and Halbmayr notice that changes are often superficial. For example, the parties that hold a “modern traditional”

view often use a different discourse (parental leave instead of maternal leave), but do not discuss the possibility that men should take a bigger share of the housekeeping for their part to reduce the multiple obligations of women. In this respect, Amesberger and Halbmayr notice that all populist radical right parties consider the traditional division of gender roles to be a natural given division and not a historical or social construct. However, they also notice that this traditional view on the division of gender roles is not unique for populist radical right parties. Such viewpoints are common within a lot of conservative parties.

A finding consistent with the populist radical right's position on gender roles is Amesberger and Halbmayr's conclusion that populist radical right parties only address women in their *Familienpolitik* (family politics). It is women who should or should not do certain activities and not men. In this respect, Amesberger and Halbmayr have provided a couple examples. The ideal for all parties under study is a traditional family which includes a father and a mother with one or several children. Ideally, the parents are married. Within this traditional family the husband fulfills the role of breadwinner whereas the mother takes care of the children and the home. For the populist radical right the traditional family is the cornerstone of society. Consequently, the populist radical right also holds strong traditional ethical values (Mudde 2000: 175). According to Amesberger and Halbmayr, populist radical right parties blame social developments that might threaten the traditional family, such as an increase in divorce and the decline in birth's, on the increasing employment among women. In other words, women's increasing activity on the labor market has undermined the functioning of the traditional family, which is in its turn a threat to the survival of the nation.

Another important aspect of the populist radical right's *Familienpolitik* is the sustainability of the native population. For the nation to survive it is crucial that native women extend or at least preserve the population with multiple children. Amesberger and Halbmayr notice that women are in party programs nearly invisible. However, when it comes to maintaining the native population parties almost directly address to women in doing so. The *Front National*, for example, has stated "let us make French babies with French women". Furthermore, all populist radical right parties support measures that may increase the amount of births, like supporting artificial insemination. All parties under study also have a negative attitude towards abortion. However, not all parties oppose abortion with the same intensity. The *Front National*, for example, supports actively the Pro-Life movement and opposes abortion per se. The FPÖ on the other hand opposes liberal abortion policies, but it is not a salient topic in the party. Amesberger and Halbmayr also notice here that the ideal of the traditional family is not particular for the populist radical right. It is an ideal type that is supported among most conservative parties in Europe. However, the populist radical right is unique in given themes concerning *Familienpolitik* as *Bevölkerungspolitik* a nativist dimension.

It is evident that *Frauenpolitik* (women politics) is of subordinate importance to the populist radical right. *Frauenpolitik* as an independent policy area is therefore nonexistent. Women are exclusively

seen as mothers and wives. The populist radical right's policy proposals therefore only contain measures that improve the life of women in their role of mothers or wives. In other words, *Frauenpolitik* is in the populist radical right's perception mainly *Familienpolitik*. In this respect, Amesberger and Halbmayr notice though that women's rights are always being opposed the rights of the family. The needs of women are always subordinate to the needs of the family or the needs of society. In line with this is the populist radical right's aversion towards feminism. According to Amesberger and Halbmayr, the case studies show that populist radical right parties perceive feminism to be a threat to traditional values. Consequently, feminism is blamed for the various societal developments that threaten the ideal type of the traditional family as mentioned above. For example, feminism is to blame for the "devaluation of motherhood", the high divorce rates and women's enduring dissatisfaction. In the case of the *Front National* and the FPÖ the critique to feminism is also associated with critique on the social democrats and their women politics.

So in sum, three rough generalizations can be drawn from the volume edited by Amesberger and Halbmayr. Firstly, women and politics have no independent place within the populist radical right. *Frauenpolitik* is in the populist radical right's perception noting but *Familienpolitik*. Secondly, positions on gender are linked with nativism, i.e. native women are ought to have children in order to persevere the native population. Consequently, and thirdly, the populist radical right holds traditional views on gender roles. They promote the traditional family in which women's primary role is to be good mothers and wives. Amesberger and Halbmayr have clearly linked gender issues with nativism, the populist radical right's core feature. However, they have only done this with respect to the role of women in sustaining the native population. They have paid remarkably little attention to other aspects of the populist radical right's "nativist struggle". Several authors have noticed for example that the populist radical right also involves gender in their nativist fight against Islamification (Zúquete 2008; Mudde 2007).

Mudde also claims that gender relations are secondary to the populist radical right. Hence, Mudde states that the populist radical right frames gender through nativism, their core ideological feature. An obvious example is the populist radical right's nativist fight against Islam. In this respect, the populist radical right claims that the values propagated by Islam are incompatible with the superior values of Western civilization that strives for gender equality (Zúquete 2008: 333). The nativist fight against Islamification has brought populist radical right parties therefore to defend the equality of men and women as a key value of their ideology (Mudde 2007: 96). Mudde even notices that the populist radical right in their struggle for women's rights even criticizes feminists for doing too little for women. Zúquete adds to this discussion that in discussing the situation of women in Islam the populist radical right puts arguments forward that "in a not-so-distant past were considered to be positions exclusive to progressive and feminist groups in the West" (2008: 332). It is for example stated that the

real aim of headscarves and burqa's is to keep women apart from society and prevent them from obtaining freedom and equivalence.

So to conclude, it can be stated that gender is in somewhat conflicting ways instrumentalized in the "nativist struggle" of the populist radical right. In order for the nation to survive the populist radical right is strongly in favor of the ideal type traditional family. Consequently, most populist radical right parties will solely support policies that support women in their role of mothers and wives. Other policies concerning women, such as women's emancipation, are not likely to be supported by the populist radical right. On the other hand, in the context of its nativist fight against Islam, the populist radical right claims to be the great defender of Western core values, such as gender equality.

## **Chapter 2     The Populist Radical Right and Gender: the hypotheses**

The previous chapter outlined the core ideology of the populist radical right. Furthermore, the little literature that exists on the populist radical right's position towards women is discussed. This chapter combines the core ideology of the populist radical right with this literature in order to formulate several hypotheses about the populist radical right's ideology with regard to women.

The hypotheses can be categorized by feature. In the following I will distinguish four features of the populist radical right which relate in one way or the other to its position towards women. These features are: nativism, the nativist struggle with respect to the survival of the nation, the nativist struggle with respect to the populist radical right's fight against Islamification, and populism. Appendix I provides a rough overview per hypothesis of the statements or positions I expect to find in the examined documents. It must be noted that the appendix provides a guideline, not *all* expectations have to be fulfilled in order to confirm the specific hypothesis. It is argued though that in order to confirm a hypothesis it is necessarily that at least one expectation is fulfilled. Whether the fulfillment of one expectation is sufficient to confirm a hypothesis is dependent on the specific context. It is possible that other indicators are present that alter the total outcome.

### **Nativism**

The previous chapter emphasized that the absolute core feature of the populist radical right is nativism, i.e. the combination of nationalism with xenophobia. Mudde (2007) considers nativism to be the primary "coathanger" on which other concepts of the populist radical right are draped. In other words, the populist radical right uses nativism as a coathanger to interpret various political issues in a manner that is consistent with its ideology. The literature about gender and the populist radical right makes it clear that gender issues are most likely of subordinate importance to the populist radical right. Consequently, it is hypothesized that gender issues are for the populist radical right just another "political issue" on which they had to position in a way that is consistent with its core ideological feature, which is nativism. The edited volume by Amesberger and Halbmayer (2002) also implied that populist radical right parties primarily refer to women and gender relations with regard to the "nativist struggle". Therefore I hypothesize more specifically that the populist radical right frames its ideology on women and gender issues through the "nativist struggle".

### **Hypothesis 1**

*The populist radical right frames its ideology on women and gender relations primarily through the "nativist struggle".*

This hypothesis forms the core hypothesis of this research; all other hypotheses are linked with it. Therefore, I will examine this hypothesis at the end of the case studies. The hypothesis is renumbered and in the case studies it will be referred to as hypothesis 7.

### **The nativist struggle and the survival of the nation**

According to Mudde, nativism is “an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (“the nation”) and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state” (2007: 19). With respect to women and gender relations two aspects of the “nativist struggle” can be distinguished. On the one hand, the populist radical right is worried about the sustainability of the native population. If the nation wants to survive it is crucial that women extend or at least preserve the native population with multiple children. On the other hand, the populist radical right is hostile towards nonnative elements which are believed to be threatening to the values and beliefs of the nation-state. With the latter is dealt with in the next section.

Concerning the first aspect of the nativist struggle, the preservation of the native population, the populist radical right seems to hold positions of which they believe it supports childbearing and childrearing. One of the positions regards the populist radical right’s view on the division of gender roles. In order to be able to extend or at least preserve the native population it appears from earlier research that the populist radical right is strongly in favor of the traditional family (Amesberger and Halbmayr 2002; Mudde 2000). Within the traditional family, traditional gender roles are promoted. Amesberger and Halbmayr have distinguished a “traditional” and a “modern traditional” view. In the traditional view women are exclusively seen as mothers and wives, whereas in the modern traditional view it is not entirely rejected that women work, although they are considered to be the ones primarily responsible for the family and the home.

### Hypothesis 2

*The populist radical right holds “traditional” or “modern traditional” views on the division of gender roles.*

In addition to its traditional views on the division of gender roles it is hypothesized that, in order to preserve the native population, the populist radical right will favor socioeconomic policies that create a family friendly climate. A family friendly climate with respect to the populist radical right is considered to be a climate in which the formations of traditional families are stimulated through financial incentives. Policies are advocated which stimulate families to have children. Furthermore, a climate is created in which the preservation of traditional gender roles is supported. Women are stimulated to stay at home and take care of their children. However, it is important to note that the

supported policies will have another nativist (economic) dimension as well. Policies will be proposed or supported in a welfare chauvinist way, meaning that benefits will be limited to the native population.

#### Hypothesis 3

*Populist radical right parties favor socioeconomic policies that create a family friendly climate.*

Furthermore, it is hypothesized that another aspect of the populist radical right's fight for the survival of the nation is its tendency to oppose matters that can threaten the growth of the native population or the traditional family. Consequently it is hypothesized that the populist radical right will oppose permissive abortion or divorce policies.

#### Hypothesis 4

*Populist radical right parties oppose permissive abortion and divorce policies.*

It is already mentioned that *Frauenpolitik* is most likely of subordinate importance to the populist radical right. Consequently, *Frauenpolitik* as an independent policy area is practically nonexistent within the populist radical right's ideology. Furthermore, the little research that exists suggests that due to the predominance of nativism and the nativist struggle for the survival of the nation, women are first and foremost seen in their role of mothers and wives. As a result women are rarely discussed out of the private sphere, i.e. out of the family sphere. Therefore it is hypothesized that *Frauenpolitik* is for the populist radical right the same as *Familienpolitik*.

#### Hypothesis 5

*Frauenpolitik is for the populist radical right the same as Familienpolitik.*

### **The nativist struggle and the fight against Islamification**

A second aspect of the populist radical right's nativist struggle is that it is hostile towards nonnative elements that are perceived to be fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state. Mudde has noticed in this respect that each populist radical right party has its own "particular list of enemies, largely dependent upon its national context and ideological particularities" (2007: 64). However, in the case of Western-Europe it seems that the populist radical right nowadays especially targets "Muslims" and "Islam". Mudde has also noticed that "Muslims have been targeted most consistently and vehemently in the propaganda of populist radical right parties" (2007: 70). It is therefore argued that the populist radical right's current nativist struggle against nonnative elements is primarily focused on its fight against Islamification. According to the populist radical right, Islam is incompatible with the

values and beliefs of Western civilization. Or to put it in FPÖ leader Haider's words: "The social order of Islam is opposed to our Western values" (Mudde 2007: 84). Since gender equality is perceived to be a key Western value, it is hypothesized that the nativist fight against Islamification has brought the populist radical right to defend the equality of men and women as a key value of its ideology. This hypothesis seems somewhat at odds with the other, previously mentioned, nativist struggle of the populist radical right, i.e. the fight for survival of the nation through preserving or extending the native population. Indeed, in this respect it was argued that the populist radical right is in favor of traditional families, preserving traditional gender roles. However, I argue that the nativist fight against Islam is such a key issue to the populist radical right that it is willing to make an exception on this regard. It is therefore hypothesized that the populist radical right *exclusively* addresses gender equality in its nativist fight against Islamification. Moreover, it must be noted that defending gender equality in this respect is not the same as *actively* wanting to improve the lives of women. Indeed, it is not expected that the populist radical right is concerned with improving gender equality or women's emancipation whatsoever.

#### Hypothesis 6

*The populist radical right exclusively addresses gender equality in its nativist fight against Islamification.*

### **Populism**

As mentioned in the previous section, the ideology of the populist radical right includes a "politics of resentment". According to the populist radical right representative democracy is a farce since the power is in the hands of self-serving political and cultural elites that pursue their own agenda without considering the will of the people (Betz 2005: 30; Betz and Johnson 2004: 313). In this situation, the populist radical right has generally promoted itself as the only voice that dares to challenge and make a stance against the self-interested ideas of the established elite. The populist radical right presents itself as the only genuine defender of "true" democracy, i.e. it says what the majority of the population thinks and it addresses the common sense of the people. It is therefore hypothesized that the populist radical right will oppose policies concerning the positive discrimination of women or women quota since it perceives such policies to be undemocratic elite-driven projects.

#### Hypothesis 7

*Populist radical right parties oppose policies concerning the positive discrimination of women or women quota.*

### **Chapter 3      Methodological framework**

This chapter provides the methodological justification of this thesis. In the following, I will discuss which cases I have selected to examine the populist radical right's ideology with respect to women and gender issues. With respect to the selection of the cases it turns out that a diverse case method has to be employed since one has to distinguish between a more liberal oriented and a more national oriented populist radical right. Both the Dutch *Partij voor de Vrijheid* and the Belgian *Vlaams Belang* are selected. The PVV is a typical case of the more liberal oriented populist right whereas the VB is typical for the more national oriented populist radical right. Furthermore, I will discuss in this chapter my choice for a content analysis in studying party ideology. In this respect, it appears that a quantitative approach is for a variety of reasons not the proper method to study party ideology. Instead, a content analysis is a valid method to study party ideology since the researcher can always interpret the data in its proper context. Finally, I will discuss in this chapter which sources I have used to examine the populist radical right's ideology. The aim is to study a variety of internally and externally oriented party documents. However, in order to be able to provide a comprehensive in-depth analysis of the PVV's ideology I will also have to focus on other non-party literature.

#### **3.1      Case selection: which parties?**

This thesis' aim is to clarify the populist radical right's ideology with respect to women and gender relations. In order to achieve this aim it is important that populist radical right parties are examined that are representative of the larger population of populist radical right parties. Hence, parties cannot be "chosen" on the basis of a randomized selection procedure; the parties have to be actively selected on the basis of their representativeness with regard to the whole population (Gerring 2008a).

When it comes to women and gender relations it is expected that it is hard to find a populist radical right party that is able to represent the whole population of populist radical right parties. The lack of a "typical" case is expected because the different populist radical right parties operate in different political environments. It is still hypothesized that populist radical right parties primarily frame their positions on women and gender relations through nativism and hence their twofold "nativist struggle". However, the context in which this nativist struggle appears differs. In other words, populist radical right parties share without a doubt the same core features in their ideology but the broader national political contexts in which the parties operate are not homogeneous to one another. It is argued that particularly this context might affect the parties' positions on women and gender relations.

In this respect, one can make especially a distinction between a more national oriented populist radical right and a populist radical right that is more liberally oriented. For example, populist radical right parties like the *Partij voor de Vrijheid* and Dansk Folkeparti have to operate in countries with a particularly strong progressive liberal tradition. The parties must take this tradition in consideration in

order for them to make a populist radical right program acceptable in their countries (Vossen 2011). For example, Vossen has noticed that in the case of the PVV Wilders does not regard the undermining of traditional Christian values to be the main wrongdoing of the “progressive elite”. Instead the progressive elite are mainly criticized for its cultural and moral relativism which is the result of a refusal to make a distinction between the superior Western culture and the inferior Islamic culture. In this respect, the party regards liberal Dutch policies on for example euthanasia and gay marriages to be hard-fought for Dutch values (Vossen 2010: 27). Hence, it is argued that populist radical right parties from nations with a strong progressive liberal tradition might frame their positions on women and gender relations also in a more liberal fashion.

On the other hand it is expected that more national oriented populist radical right parties, like *Front National*, *Vlaams Belang* and *Lega Nord* will frame their positions on women and gender relations in a more conservative-traditional manner. This type of populist radical right party does not operate in countries that are especially known for their liberal progressive tradition and the parties themselves often originate from a more conservative-traditional background. Furthermore, some of these parties are nationalists in the sense that they strive for a separate mono-cultural nation-state. It is expected that this aspect of the parties’ ideology might intensify the parties’ nativist struggle for survival of the nation and therefore also the positions these parties take on traditional values, which are in its turn related to positions on women and gender relations.

The expected variance along the conservative-progressive axis provides strong arguments for the use of a diverse case method. Gerring has for example noticed that “when a sample encompasses a full range in variation on relevant parameters one is likely to enhance the representativeness” (2008b: 652). A side mark to this is that the inclusion of a full range of variation may not accurately display the actual distribution of the cases across the spectrum. For example, Gerring notices that “if there are more “high” cases than “low” cases in a population and the researcher chooses only one high case and one low case, the resulting sample of two is not perfectly representative” (2008b: 652). Apart from this disadvantage in the diverse case-method Gerring states that the diverse case-method has stronger claims to representativeness than any other small-N sample. Therefore, a diverse case-method will also be applied in this thesis.

This thesis will examine two populist radical right parties on its ideology with respect to women and gender relations. Clearly, one party must be “typical” for the more national oriented populist radical right while the other must be representative with respect to the more liberal oriented populist radical right. This thesis will examine the *Vlaams Belang* (VB) as a typical case of the more national orientated populist radical right. Mudde has explicitly stated in his book that he considers the VB to be a populist radical right party (2007: 43). Moreover, the VB is considered to be typical case of the more national oriented populist radical right since the party has a particularly conservative-traditional background and it is a nationalist party in striving for an autonomous Flanders. This thesis will on the

other hand examine the *Partij voor de Vrijheid* (PVV) as a typical case of the more liberal orientated populist radical right. The PVV is not yet mentioned in Mudde's work. However, the party clearly shares the ideological core features of the populist radical right, i.e. nativism, authoritarianism and populism (Vossen 2011). Hence, I perceive the PVV to belong to the populist radical right in the way Mudde's has outlined this party family in his book. With respect to the more liberal oriented populist radical right the PVV is perceived to be a typical case since the party operates in a country with an outspoken liberal-progressive tradition. The PVV is even known for defending liberal Dutch policies as hard-fought for Dutch values (Vossen 2010).

In sum, it is hypothesized that populist radical right parties primarily frame their positions on women and gender relations through nativism and hence through their twofold "nativist struggle". However, it is argued that the different broader national political contexts in which the populist radical right operates might affect populist radical right parties' positions on women and gender relations in different ways. In this respect, a more national oriented and a more liberal oriented populist radical right is distinguished. With regard to the more national oriented populist radical right it is argued that this party type might frame its positions on women and gender relations in a more conservative-traditional fashion. In contrast, the more liberal oriented populist radical right might frame its position on this theme in a more liberal manner. It is argued that the VB is a typical case of the more national oriented populist radical right while the PVV is a typical case with respect to the more liberal oriented populist radical right.

### **3.2 The choice for a content analysis**

Most comparative research on the ideology of parties adopts a qualitative approach. In the following I will argue why I will also use a qualitative method of analysis, more specifically a content analysis, in my analysis of the populist radical right's ideology with regard to women and gender issues.

This study's aim is to explore the populist radical right's ideology with regard to women and gender relations. In my view it is questionable whether quantitative methods are really able to study party ideology at all. Mudde has for example noticed that most quantitative methods more often measure policy initiatives rather than they really measure ideology (2007: 38). In this respect it is important to note that analyzing policies is very different from studying a party's ideology since the first focuses on what parties *do* whereas the latter focuses on what parties *are* (Mair and Mudde 1998: 220). Moreover, an important part of studying party ideology is that one is able to examine the results in its proper context. In my view a qualitative approach is not able to study party ideology in this respect properly. For instance, quantitative methods are bound on forehand to chosen categories and coding schemes and are therefore in fact insensitive for contexts. In order to be able to examine context a more personal role of the researcher is required. Therefore, I argue that a qualitative content analysis is the best approach for studying the populist radical right's ideology towards women and gender issues.

In a nutshell the argument is that a content analysis is a more valid method to study party ideology since the researcher can always interpret the data in its proper context. Or to state it in Mudde's words: "it provides the proximity to the data and flexibility in operationalization necessary for studying highly complex concepts" (2007: 39). In practice, the content analysis will be effectuated through a textual analysis in which a variety sources will be read carefully, and in their proper context. One of the reasons I have not and cannot choose for different more "structured" qualitative method, such as a frame analysis, is that there will not be a consistency in sources. Unfortunately, there is no abundance of (party) sources to analyze; therefore we have to work with what we have got. The next section will extensively discuss the different sources used to examine the populist radical right's ideology with respect to women and gender issues.

### 3.3 Sources

Mudde argues that party ideology includes both ideas on how society or man *ought to be* and ideas on how they *are* (2000: 19). In the following I follow Mudde and his definition of party ideology, i.e. party ideology is "a party's body of normative(-related) ideas about the nature of men and society as well as the organization and purposes of society" (2000: 19). Therefore, party ideology must be characterized as a belief system that directly affects the identity of a party. In this respect, it is again important to note that the analysis of a party's ideology must focus primarily on the question of what parties *are*, instead of on the question of what parties *do* (Mair and Mudde 1998: 220). In other words, we are interested in analyzing the identity of a party rather than analyzing policies. Indeed, Mair and Mudde argue that a party's ideological profile is very different from that of its policy profile since the latter is more short term and "soft", i.e. too circumstantial and coincidental to offer a stable reference point (1998: 224).

There are various sources through which party ideology can be studied. The literature points for example to the analysis of legislative behavior, mass survey data or formal policy statements (Mair and Mudde 1998: 217). However, the problem with a lot of these sources is that it is not clear whether their study truly reflects the party's ideology. For example, Mair and Mudde argue that party manifestos and election programs may reflect a party's ideological commitment, but that they are also designed in order to publicize and clarify potentially appealing policies in the context of election campaigns (1998: 219). Furthermore, election programs may exclusively emphasize the electoral relevant "dimensions of competition" and thereby not including information that is relevant for identifying the party's ideology (Mair and Mudde 1998: 219). Therefore, Mair and Mudde argue that such sources are better suited to analyze policy rather than ideology. According to Mair and Mudde, the analysis of ideology requires a comprehensive in-depth approach and it therefore also requires a wider variety of documentary sources.

Mudde argues in this respect that the political party is an actor in its own right and that only the party can truly represent itself (2007: 38). According to Mudde, the party represents itself through official party literature. However, three limitations have to be taken into account. Firstly, the analysis should only include official party publications. Publications by individuals or organizations “close to the party” should be excluded. Secondly, Mudde argues that only publications from the national party should be included. Since the national party is under study publications from local or other subnational publications cannot be representative for the national party. Last but not least, Mudde states that the selected literature should entail both externally and internally orientated literature (2007: 38). As argued earlier, externally orientated literature such as election programs may hide the “true nature” of the party since it wants to appeal to the whole electorate on issues that are at that time at the centre of competition. The risk of being stuck at the “front stage” of the party can be overcome by studying internal party documents such as party papers. Indeed, this type of literature is aimed at a different audience, i.e. the party’s members. Furthermore, it is assumed that they are officially supported by the collective party leadership (Mudde 2000: 21). Mudde argues that party programs and party papers provide a fairly broad and detailed insight into a political party’s ideology. However, Mudde also acknowledges that studying ideology in this manner has its restrictions. The fact that only the manifest party ideology is studied means for example that the “latent party ideology” which appears in unofficial documents like interviews with individual party members, is left outside the analysis (Mudde 2000: 21).

In this analysis of the populist radical right’s ideology with respect to gender Mair’s and Mudde’s remarks will be taken into account. However, this does not mean that I follow all their views concerning the study of a political party’s ideology. In my view it is correct that Mair and Mudde argue that studying ideology requires that our analysis should primarily focus on what party’s *are*, rather than on what they *do*. This means too that an analysis of a party’s ideology should focus on a wider variety of documentary sources, i.e. not a one-sided focus on electoral programs. In this respect it is evident that selected literature should entail both externally and internally orientated literature. However, I disagree with Mudde that this literature should only consist of official party literature. In my view unofficial literature, like interviews with party leaders or speeches, can also give insight into a party’s ideology, provided that they are analyzed within their context. Furthermore, it must be noted that in order to examine what party’s are, it is almost inevitable that (at least partially) one also has to focus on what a party does. In other words; one cannot study party ideology without also taking policy into account. Indeed, policies are not opposed or supported without reason. It is argued that ultimately an ideology is the driving force behind a coherent set of policy positions taken by political parties. Although not ideal in a few respects, policy is an important indicator for ideology. In my view, Mudde and Mair’s main goal is to warn for the “overuse” of policy to determine party ideology. In other words; party ideology should be determined through examining a variety of sources and not just policy

alone. In order to study the populist radical right's ideology with respect to women and gender relations I have formulated seven hypotheses, of which three particularly focus on policy. The aim of these hypotheses is not to examine policy, but to ultimately determine what the populist radical right's ideology on women and gender relations is. In this respect, policy is simply used as a resource to trace the origins of a party's position. Moreover, hypotheses focusing on policy are always used in combination with other hypotheses to determine (parts of) the populist radical right's ideology on women and gender relations. In sum, this study focuses partially on policy to determine ideology. However, policy in itself is used as a resource to trace the origins of a party's position and hypotheses concerning policy are only used in combination with other hypotheses to determine ideology. Moreover, this study uses a variety of sources to determine the populist radical right's ideology on gender; policy is only a part of the story. Consequently, it is argued that this study does not "overuse" policy to determine party ideology.

The aim to focus both on externally and internally oriented literature appeared to be not feasible though when it comes to examining the PVV's ideology. The party only provides externally oriented party literature such as election programs and other party manifestos. The lack of internally oriented literature is probably the result of the party's closed character. For example, the party's only member is the party's founder Geert Wilders. Since there are no other party members the party does not provide literature that is particularly aimed at party members. In order to be able to provide a comprehensive in-depth analysis of the PVV's ideology I had to search for other non-party literature. I primarily found this literature in interviews with PVV MPs and in the contributions of PVV MPs during parliamentary debates. Clearly, one has to be aware of the risk of being stuck "at the front stage". However, an advantage of this approach is that the "latent party ideology" is also taken into consideration. Consequently, I believe the PVV's ideology can still be derived from the literature as long as the variety of literature is placed within its proper context. Appendix II provides a comprehensive overview of the sources used to examine the PVV. From the appendix it also appears that the different sources are not all used in the same priority. For example, the *Gedoogakkoord* is given top priority in examining the PVV's ideology. The *Gedoogakkoord* is perceived to be the trade-off for the PVV in exchange of supporting a minority government of VVD-CDA in 2010. It is argued that this document reflects the party's ideology because the document not only provides an enumeration of new policies but it also explains *why* these policies are perceived to be necessary. In other words; it is argued that this document explains the PVV's point of view on a diversity of subjects. Contrary to one might expect the PVV's party documents are not given top priority. In my view the party does not provide truly elaborated electoral programs or other party documents. Instead, these party documents often just consist of a few statements or a couple of one-liners. In other words; the party does not truly *explain* in these documents *why* it supports or opposes certain policies. Therefore the PVV's contributions during parliamentary debates and interviews with PVV MP's are

given more priority. It is possible in these documents to examine the information in a certain setting. Besides, more often a “story” is told, explaining the origins of the party’s point of view. Newspaper articles have the lowest priority because they are often just informative. These articles are mainly used to provide additional information.

In contrast to the PVV, the VB provides a variety of externally *and* internally oriented literature. With respect to externally orientated literature the party does not only provide election programs but also a selection of party brochures. In general, the party brochures are dedicated to a specific subject and they provide a more elaborated view of the party on the issue. The internally oriented literature consists of party papers and articles that appeared on the VB’s website. These documents are specifically aimed at the VB’s party members or other party sympathizers. Because the VB already provides enough literature to realize a comprehensive in-depth study of the party’s ideology it is not necessary to examine other non-party literature. Appendix II provides again a comprehensive overview of the sources used to examine the VB. With respect to the sources used to examine the VB the electoral programs and party brochures are given top priority. It is argued that these documents express the VB’s core ideology in a consistent and comprehensive manner. The party elaborates, in contrast to the PVV, extensively in these documents why it opposes or supports certain policies. Party articles and other party related documents are given lower priority since they primarily provide additional information to what is already expressed in the electoral programs and party brochures.

Finally, it is important to note that I want to examine the populist radical right’s *current* ideology with respect to women and gender relations. Therefore, I will only examine recent sources, dating from 2005 until June 2012. Both the PVV and the VB were established around 2005. The focus on the populist radical right’s current ideology means that I will not examine the ideology of the VB’s predecessor; the *Vlaams Blok*.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> I would like to refer to the work of Veerle Vanden Daelen who examined the ideology of the *Vlaams Blok* with respect women and gender relations in her book “*Vrouwbeelden in het Vlaams Blok*” (2002).

## Chapter 4      **The Partij voor de Vrijheid**

This chapter consists of a comprehensive in-depth study of the PVV's ideology with respect to women and gender relations. The PVV is considered to be a "typical" case of the more liberal oriented populist radical right since the party operates in the Netherlands; a country known for its outspoken liberal-progressive tradition. Moreover, the PVV criticizes the progressive elite for its cultural and moral relativism and is known for defending liberal Dutch policies, such as gay marriages and euthanasia, as hard-fought for Dutch values (Vossen 2010). It is hypothesized that the divergent national context in which the PVV operates affects its position on women and gender relations. To be more specific; it is expected that the party might frame its position on this subject in a more liberal fashion.

The PVV's ideology regarding women and gender relations will be examined in the second section of this chapter, by testing the hypotheses which are formulated in chapter 2. The previous chapter made it already clear that a comprehensive in-depth study of a party's ideology ideally requires a variety of both externally and internally oriented party literature. It also became clear that due to the closed character of the PVV there is a lack of internally oriented party literature. Therefore, relevant non-party literature such as interviews with PVV MPs is also examined. Furthermore, the contributions of PVV MP's during a variety of parliamentary debates are examined. The examined debates concern very diverse topics, ranging from abortion to child care. However, all debates have in common that the issues involved have special meaning to women.

Before testing the hypotheses I will provide in the first section of this chapter a brief history of the PVV. It is important to be aware of the PVV's background because it helps to place certain statements of the PVV in its proper context. For example, the change in the PVV's position on abortion in 2011 is most likely not a result of an actual change in the party's ideology, but due to the fact that the party had become a *gedoogpartner*, supporting a minority government of CDA and VVD.

### **4.1                      A brief history of the PVV**

The PVV was officially found in 2005 by Geert Wilders. In the previous year Wilders was an MP for the conservative-liberal VVD. However, Wilders left the party after he refused to comply with the more moderate tone of the party. For example, Wilders refused to comply with the VVD's official position that Turkey can become, when it meets certain conditions, a member of the European Union. Wilders argued that Turkey cannot become a member of the European Union because the cultural differences are too big; regardless the official conditions to enter the European Union. When Wilders left the VVD he kept his seat and since then he operated under the name *GroepWilders*. After the elections of 2006 Wilders renamed his party's name into *Partij voor de Vrijheid* (Party for Freedom).

The elections of 2006 were very successful for the PVV since the party conquered nine seats in parliament. The party continued its success in the following elections. In 2010 the party even managed to get twenty-four seats in parliament and became the third party on the national level. Moreover, the party is now represented in the European parliament and on the provincial and local level. The PVV is especially known for its severe criticism on immigration, Islam and the European Union. This criticism is often accompanied by sharp rhetoric as well.

In 2010 the party agreed to become a *gedoogpartner*; supporting a minority government of VVD-CDA. By becoming a *gedoogpartner* the PVV did not officially become part of the government. However, in exchange of its political support the minority government agreed on fulfilling a variety of PVV proposals. In this respect, the *Gedoogakkoord* is perceived to be the tradeoff for the PVV. The political co-operation between the PVV and the VVD-CDA came in April 2012 to an end though when the PVV decided it no longer wanted to deliberate with the VVD and the CDA about new severe cutbacks that were necessary as a result of the ongoing economic crisis.

In March 2012 PVV MP Brinkman left the PVV. Brinkman often criticized the lack of democracy within the party and stated that it is wrong that Wilders is and continues to be the sole dominant figure within the party (*Volkskrant* 2012a). Party founder Wilders is not only the party's leader but also the party's chairman and the party's sole member. Sympathizers of the party can become a donor or volunteer but the PVV does not allow other individuals to become members of the party. Recently, three other PVV MPs also left the PVV. They too severely criticized the dominant position of Wilders and the closed character of the party. In an interview with the *Volkskrant* (2012b) dissident PVV MPs Hernandez and Kortenoeven stated that "the party is lead like a secret service" and that "Wilders is afraid to lose control". Furthermore, they stated "the fraction is a micro model for what they want for the Netherlands: a fence around it, everything locked. The outside world cannot come in." Wilders resents this criticism and states in a response that the statements of Hernandez and Kortenoeven felt like a "knife in the back" and that "it is a misconception that the party revolves around me" (*Elsevier* 2012). Moreover, Wilders suggested that both Hernandez and Kortenoeven may have left the party out of rancor since the party possibly would not placed them on a eligible place for the coming elections (*nu.nl* 2012).

## **4.2 The hypotheses tested**

### **4.2.1 The nativist struggle and the survival of the nation**

#### Hypothesis 1

*The populist radical right holds "traditional" or "modern traditional" views on the division of gender roles.*

It is hypothesized that, in order for the native population to survive, the populist radical right will hold positions of which they believe it supports childbearing and childrearing. In order to be able to extend or at least preserve the native population it appears that the populist radical right is strongly in favor of the traditional family (Amesberger and Halbmayr 2002; Mudde 2000). Within the traditional family, traditional gender roles are promoted. In this respect Amesberger and Halbmayr have distinguished a “traditional” and a “modern traditional” view. In the traditional view women are exclusively seen as mothers and wives, whereas in the modern traditional view it is not entirely rejected that women work, although they are considered to be the ones primarily responsible for the family and the home.

The examined party documents do not explicitly say anything about the division of gender roles. However, the PVV does emphasize repeatedly the importance of the family in various party documents. For example, in the ideological document *Klare Wijn* Wilders states that in modern social-liberal societies the “primary impulses” of a society such as order, safety and family are often neglected. Furthermore, he states in this document that the democratic rule of law supports a “fundament of virtues” which teaches us how we should deal with our rights and liberties. According to Wilders, democracy is not only about an external but also about an internal order of decency, respect and good manners which are learned in institutions like family, schools and associations (2006: 8). Moreover, Wilders states that currently it is schools that do most of the parenting. Wilders states this is not correct and that it should be the parents who should raise their children in a loving environment. Wilders states in *Klare Wijn* that “no political program can fix what goes wrong there” and that Groep Wilders/PVV therefore wants to strengthen the family’s position wherever possible. A similar statement is made in the party’s electoral pamphlet when it states that norms and values should return to the family. It was expected that the PVV would emphasize the importance of family. However, when one examines the context it appears that the party especially refers to the family in an authoritarian context. The PVV thinks the family is an important means to bring back order in society. It must also be noted that the emphasis on the family is only visible in these early party documents. The emphasis on the family is no longer visible in the electoral program of 2010 or in the *Gedoogakkoord*. Moreover, it cannot be determined from these documents that the PVV is especially in favor of the *traditional* family.

It turns out that the only time a party representative explicitly made a statement on the division on gender roles was (when asked about it) in 2007 in the Dutch feminist magazine *Opzij*. In an interview with *Opzij* Wilders made a few comments regarding this issue. Wilders stated: “I can be very enthusiastic about women who have a job, but this is also the case for women and men who stay at home to take care of the children”. Furthermore it can be noticed that “Henk and Ingrid” (the fictitious couple where the PVV stands up for) are partially defined as couple from which “one person works and the other *possibly* works part-time” (emphasis my own). The PVV is however not clear about the

gender division in this division of labor. It seems that the PVV is cautious in predetermining the division of gender roles. However, it can also be noted that according to Amesberger and Halbmayr (2002) this kind of discourse is often used in a superficial way, meaning that the party may actually have a position on the issue but tries not to be that outspoken about it. Therefore, we should also look at the contributions of the party's MPs in parliamentary debates closely linked towards this issue.

In October 2008 the parliament debated about income supported single parents and whether they should be obligated to apply for work when they have children under the age of five (*Handelingen* 2008-2009). Since most income supported single parents are women the debate primarily focused on income supported mothers. PVV MP Brinkman stated in this debate that the Dutch economy is in need of the labor participation of single mothers. Brinkman: "The labor participation of women after they had children is not yet sufficient. If a woman is able to run a household, do the groceries, raise children, pay the bills and also work a few hours in a week then she is a top women where our economy is in need of." Moreover, Brinkman noticed that an additional argument to obligate these women to apply for work is the fact that a lot of women, after a lot of years of not being employed, find it difficult to work again. Brinkman argued that the danger exist that some of these men and women become socially isolated when they do not work. Furthermore, Brinkman states that although the PVV thinks being employed should be norm the party does understand that this group of single parents is in a special situation. Brinkman: "The need to find a good balance between work and caretaking is emphatically there". Brinkman therefore states that the PVV thinks the obligation to find work should be lowered to a workweek of at least twenty hours, instead of one of forty hours which was at that time the case. When an MP of the conservative Christian *ChristenUnie* questioned whether a single father or mother that is obligated to work for at least twenty hours would still be able to take good care of its children Brinkman answered: "I do not know if a child is better off with a mother whose only task is caretaking. Actually, I think this is sometimes not the case at all. I think some children, who are used to three days of childcare, are able to be very good children. To be honest, I do not worry about that so much. For me it is essential that the role of the state in this is minimal; the individual should come to self-realization as much as possible". When the same *ChristenUnie* MP asked if Brinkman thinks it is just to deny parents the choice to take care of their children forty hours a week just because they are on welfare Brinkman answered that the liberty to choose between work and caretaking is secondary when you have to apply for welfare to make that happen. The debate seems to suggest that it is important to the PVV that one should work if one can. This message would also be in line with a measure the PVV proposed in its electoral program of 2010. In the program the PVV proposes to quicken the abolishment of a certain tax benefit which favors couples in which one spouse does not work or works very little. In popular speech this tax benefit is also called the "*aanrechtsubsidie*" (the kitchen counter benefit) since the benefit is perceived to be a financial

incentive for couples to decide that one spouse can stay at home. In practice, it is often women to which the *aanrechtsubsidie* is granted.

In sum, the evidence suggests that the PVV, at least in their early days, emphasizes the importance of the family as an institute. It must be noted though that the family is often emphasized in an authoritarian context; the family is a means to bring back order in society. The PVV never emphasizes the importance of family in the context of the survival of the native population. Moreover, there is no evidence that the PVV is in favor of the traditional family or holds “traditional” or “modern traditional” views on the division of gender roles. In fact, it appears that the PVV thinks this should be settled by parents in the private sphere and that state interference is not desirable. The party thinks parents are free to make their own choice but the ability to make this choice should not be financially supported by the state. As Brinkman states: “The liberty to choose between work and caretaking is secondary when you have to apply for welfare to make to make that happen”. The same line of argument counts with respect to the abolishment of the *aanrechtsubsidie*. Hence, the hypothesis must be rejected.

## Hypothesis 2

*Populist radical right parties favor socioeconomic policies that create a family friendly climate.*

It is hypothesized that, in order to preserve the native population, the populist radical right will favor socioeconomic policies that create a family friendly climate. A family friendly climate with respect to the populist radical right is considered to be a climate in which the formations of traditional families are stimulated through financial incentives. This means at the one hand that families are stimulated to have children and on the other hand that the preservation of traditional gender roles is supported. Women are stimulated to stay at home and take care of their children. However, it is important to note that the supported policies will have a nativist dimension as well. Policies will be proposed or supported in a welfare chauvinist way, meaning that benefits will be limited to the native population. The examined party documents say little about the party’s position on family politics. Only the paragraph of the electoral program of 2010 concerning social policies gives some insight in the party’s position towards family politics. In this paragraph the PVV proposes three measures concerning family policies. All three proposals concern cutbacks and two out of three proposals appear to have a nativist dimension as well. For example, the first proposal concerns the stopping of child benefits for Dutch children who live abroad. The majority of Dutch children who live abroad are children from former immigrant families.

Furthermore, the PVV also proposes to limit child benefits to a maximum of two children. This proposal will also mainly affect families of non-western origin since these families often consist of

more than two children. In this respect, the party's proposals are clearly welfare chauvinist; the party wants "non-natives" to be excluded from benefits. However, the proposal to limit child benefits also contradicts the expectation that the party will advocate policies that may increase birth rates. Indeed, such policies actually undermine family's wishes to have more than two children. It turns out that the PVV is in general not very concerned about measures concerning child benefits. The party hardly ever participates in debates concerning cutbacks on diverse child benefits.

The third and last proposal of the PVV concerning family policies is already mentioned and concerns the so called "*aanrechtsubsidie*". The PVV wants to quicken the abolishment of this tax benefit which favors couples of which one spouse does not work or works very little. The benefit is perceived to be a financial incentive for couples to decide that one spouse can stay at home. Especially, Christian oriented parties like the *ChristenUnie* and the SGP have always opposed the abolishment of the *aanrechtsubsidie* because it disfavors traditionally organized families. Apparently, the PVV is not bothered by that concern.

An important feature of family politics is child care. The PVV's position on this issue could also reveal if the party is truly in favor of the traditional family. When PVV leader Wilders was asked in an interview about his position with regard to free child care he stated: "Free child care? No, because what is for free? Nothing is really for free, because all tax payers end up paying for it. That is just cheap rhetoric." (*Opzij* 2007). Wilders furthermore stated that he thinks it is fine that woman and men who want to work are helped by state supported child care but that the same amount of money should be spent on people who choose to stay at home to take care of their children. According to Wilders, both groups should be treated equally. From the *Handelingen* it also appears that the PVV's position on child care is not very outspoken (*Handelingen* 2007-2008a and 2007-2008c). The party's contribution to these debates is small and often concerns technical details. It must be noted that in these debates the party does not question child care out of ideological motives. However, in the context of the recent cutbacks due to the economic crisis the party also does not oppose cuts on child care either. It must be noted though that the PVV prefers indirect measures that will not directly affect parents financially. For example, the party initially supported the proposal to reduce the state's contribution to the cost of child care to five euro's per hour. However, the party later on said it preferred alternative cuts on child care since the proposal would make child care too expensive for the lower incomes. PVV MP De Mos stated in this respect: "In order to prevent more financial burdens for parents I urgently appeal to the minister to look within the sector for money" (*De Volkskrant* 2011d). The PVV alternative cuts concerns the enlargement of toddler groups from fourteen to sixteen children. Furthermore, the party wants employers to contribute more to the costs of child care (*Trouw* 2011). PVV MP De Mos claimed with respect to cutbacks on child care that "the pressure of cuts will make child care more innovative" (*Trouw* 2012). Although the PVV's position on child care is not very outspoken it still contradicts the expectations. Indeed, it was hypothesized that the party would

favor a climate in which the formations of traditional families are stimulated. However, the evidence indicates by no means that the PVV opposes to generous child care policies out of ideological motives. The party is does not explicitly favor traditional families and is fine with a dual-earner-model as well.

In sum, family policies do not seem to be a priority to the PVV. The party does not explicitly express a view towards family politics in any party document. Moreover, the party does not propose any measure concerning benefits for traditional families. To the contrary, the party only proposes cutbacks on family policies. It must be noted that two out of three proposals appear to have a nativist dimension. However, the proposal to limit child benefits and the proposal to quicken the abolishment of the *aanrechtsubsidie* also affect native (traditional) families. The evidence suggests that the PVV does not explicitly favor traditional single-earner families over modern dual-earner families. In this respect it must be noted that the party also never referred to the preservation of native population. Therefore the hypothesis must be rejected.

### Hypothesis 3

*Populist radical right parties oppose permissive abortion and divorce policies.*

It is expected that the populist radical right has a tendency to oppose matters that potentially threaten the growth of the native population. Hence, it is hypothesized that the populist radical right will oppose permissive abortion and divorce policies

#### *Abortion policies*

For a long time the PVV did not seem to have taken an official position towards abortion. The first time abortion was extensively mentioned by the party was in March 2008. PVV MP Fleur Agema questioned in a debate on medical ethics the justification of the current abortion term of 24 weeks (*Handelingen 2007-2008b*). The term is based on the so called “capability of living”-criterion; abortion is allowed when the fetus is not able to live outside the women’s body. Agema wondered in the debate if it is just to abort a fetus that is not ready to live on its own, but is able to do so a couple of weeks later. According to Agema, a more objective criterion than the “capability of living”-criterion should be handled. In Agema’s view the abortion term should be reduced from 24 weeks to 8 weeks since by that time the embryo has evolved into a fetus. Agema states in this respect that the PVV wants to allow abortion and also recognizes the right of self-determination. However, the party also wants to protect the unborn life. Besides, the party wants to prevent women from having “negative mental reactions, such as depression and regret”. Agema stated that exceptions are justified when life threatening danger for the mother exists or when the life expectation of the fetus is reduced to a few days due to severe medical conditions. Furthermore, Agema states in the same debate that abortion is a

private affair and that the costs of abortion should therefore be for the women involved, instead of society.<sup>2</sup> According to Agema, it is “inappropriate” to let opponents of abortion indirectly pay for abortion through taxes. Moreover, Agema noted that there may be some additional advantages in letting women pay for their own abortion. For example, the number of abortions may decline since the use of contraceptives will rise. According to the *Reformatorisch Dagblad*, Agema has also argued that this measure may discourage “dissolute behavior” (*Reformatorisch Dagblad*, 2008). Agema stated that exceptions are justified for women who are the victims of rape or incest.

In an interview with the evangelistic Dutch newspaper *Nederlands Dagblad* in August 2008 Agema repeated most of her previously mentioned statements. Furthermore, she elaborated on the party’s position with regard to the maximum abortion term. According to Agema the current criterion cannot be finished since it does not ask the right questions. Agema argues that question “when does the heart beat, when does the fetus experiences pain” should be relevant. She states that the fetus should be protected increasingly during a pregnancy. The curious thing though is that Agema in these interview pleas for a maximum term of 12 to 14 weeks, instead of the 8 weeks she pleaded for in the previously mentioned debate a few months earlier. Furthermore, she noticed that women should pay for their own abortion since pregnancies are in most cases preventable. Contraception is a personal responsibility and the state should therefore not be responsible for the consequences when not applied. When asked about young girls getting pregnant she stated that “When you are adult enough to have sex you should also be adult enough to foresee the consequences. We all had sex education, had not we?” The more striking part of the interview is however Agema’s critique on the Christian Democratic Party CDA and the more conservative Christian party *ChristenUnie*. In the interview she blames the two parties for not daring to make proposals to reduce the maximum abortion term to 20 weeks. According to Agema, the CDA and the *ChristenUnie* do not even want to approach these issues since they do not want to fight the battle against the powerful pro-choice movement.

The outspoken view of Agema on abortion did not result in amendments by the PVV. In fact, after Agema’s statements the PVV was for a while notably quiet with regard to abortion policies. Even when the CDA came with a detailed proposal to tighten current abortion policies, the party refused to take an “official” position on the issue. The PVV did not even participate in a few debates concerning the CDA’s proposals. However, the PVV did participate in one debate in which it more or less confirmed its earlier position (*Handelingen* 2009-2010). Agema emphasized in this debate that the PVV has great difficulties with late abortions of healthy fetuses and with abortions of fetuses that have handicaps that are not (immediately) life threatening like the Down syndrome. Furthermore, Agema not only emphasized that the maximum abortion term of 24 weeks is arbitrary, but also that the “capability of living”-criterion is in itself not just.

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<sup>2</sup> Abortion is in the Netherlands paid for through a more general state fund.

During the same time as the CDA presented its plan to tighten current abortion policies, a book was published about abortion and abortion policies. The book included some statements of the PVV's new spokeswomen of medical ethics, PVV MP Karen Gerbrands. Gerbrands stated that it should no longer be the woman who decides that she needs an abortion, but her doctor (*De Volkskrant*, 2011a). In the Netherlands abortion is formally only tolerated when the woman is in an 'emergency situation'. However, in practice it is the woman who decides if she is actually in such a kind of situation. Furthermore, Gerbrands thinks that the term "emergency situation" should be restricted. She claims: "Self-determination is beautiful, but so is responsibility. It should be clear what we consider to be an emergency situation and what not." (*De Volkskrant*, 2011a). According to Gerbrands, the prospect of having a severely handicapped child is not a reason for abortion per se. With the comments of Gerbrands becoming public it was thought that the PVV had taken an official standpoint on the issue. However, the day the statements of Gerbrands became public the PVV came up with a press release stating that the statements expressed by Gerbrands resembled a personal opinion and that the PVV had not yet taken an official position on the issue. Two months later the PVV did come up with an official, but too provisionally, position with regard to abortion. In short, the PVV states that committing an abortion should be less easy when there is no medical reason involved. In these cases, women should fully or at least partially pay for their abortion. Furthermore, the maximum term for committing an abortion without a medical reason should *perhaps* be decreased. The maximum abortion term of 24 weeks should not be decreased when there is a medical reason involved (*De Volkskrant*, 2011c). According to Gerbrands, the party's position is provisional since the party wants to gather more current data concerning the social reasons involved in the choice for abortion. With this provisional though official standpoint, the PVV seems to have moderated their tone in the abortion debate. It is especially striking that the PVV no longer opposes late abortions when there are medical, though not immediately life threatening, reasons involved, e.g. the prospect of a handicapped child. Indeed, Agema stated in an earlier debate that it is especially these kinds of abortions that the PVV finds difficult. When Gerbrands was asked about this change in course she stated that the party increased from 9 MPs to 24 MPs in the latest election and that the new MPs have caused a change in the party's position. However, a more accurate explanation may be that the change in course was a trade off for the PVV who in the meantime had become a *gedoogpartner*, supporting a minority government of CDA and VVD. The liberal VVD originally opposed any tightening of current abortion policies. In the meanwhile, the VVD minister of Health Edith Schippers also made clear that she did not want to decrease the current maximum term of 24 weeks (*Volkskrant* 2011b). A strong indicator for the hypothesis that the PVV changed its position out of compromise is the fact that the CDA also no longer wanted to decrease the maximum term, a plan that they initially presented themselves.

It is clear that the PVV opposes very permissive abortion policies. However, it is not clear what the ideological motives behind the party's position are. In general, the PVV does not elucidate its position.

In an interview with *Nederlands Dagblad* (2008) Agema stated that in the case of medical ethical issues she trusts “logic and common sense”. When she was asked if it is not a bit lean to answer medical ethical questions on the base of logic and common sense she answered: “I know where you are getting at: are we conservative or liberal? We just look at such matters from a factual point of view: we just do not want crazy things to happen. I am pushed into the ultraconservative corner because I said: should we really continue with these late abortions? A healthy fetus of 24 weeks can be aborted just like that! In am severely attacked on this issue by Femke Halsema (leader of the Green party *Groenlinks*). (...) I said: we are talking in this Chamber about no longer castrating piglets without anesthesia, but a fetus of 24 weeks old that a few weeks later can be born healthy is unprotected! Our position does not arise out of conservatism, but out of factual study. This means that at one time we are more conservative while at the other time we are more liberal.” Agema also stated that her in depth study on the issue functioned as a starting point for the discussion within the party. Agema: “Yes, I make a proposal based on an in depth study which is followed by an intense debate in the party. After that, the position is part of the party’s policy. In general, this position will not change unless there are new developments”. So in sum, Agema states that no specific ideology forms the base of the party’s position towards the issue. The PVV’s position is purely based on “logic and common sense”.

However, according to some political scientists the PVV’s motivation for its current abortion position is not as straightforward as Agema claims. In an interview with *Reformatorisch Dagblad* (2011) political scientist Koen Vossen stated that the PVV is currently in a strange split when it comes to ethical dilemmas. Vossen: “On the one hand Wilders is a former member of the VVD and is clearly the product of a progressive-liberal tradition. He embraced the emancipation of women and gays while he opposed Christian paternalism. However, the conservative Christian tradition has never been alien to him as well. Just like Bolkestein, Wilders likes to emphasize our Jewish-Christian roots. At a certain point the American neoconservatists and their Christian coalition fascinated him as well. The way they deposit themselves from the progressive hegemony of the nineteen sixties appeals to him.” Furthermore, Vossen notes Wilders will for now avoid a resolute choice between progressive-liberal or Christian-neoconservative. According to Vossen, Wilders likes “select shopping” and often borrows arguments from both sides. Either way, more in general Vossen thinks that the conservative reaction on the progressive consensus is an aspect that has become part of the PVV’s ideology. However, Vossen also notices that there is little chance that the PVV in the future will come up with measures to tighten current abortion policies. Vossen states: “The PVV has to consider the cleavages in Dutch politics. Now and then a firm antiabortion quote is possible, because it generates attention to news blog *Geen Stijl*. However, I do not think that the party will appreciate it to be named on medical issues in one breath with the *ChristenUnie* or SGP.”

In the same interview with *Reformatorsch Dagblad* (2011) political scientist Paul Lucardie also stated that it is unlikely that the PVV will take concrete measures in an attempt to tighten current abortion policies. Lucardie: “Electorally there is not much to gain with such actions. Polls seem to indicate that the majority of the liberal part of the party’s followers is against tightening current policies”. Furthermore, Lucardie notices that medical ethical issues are not the core business of a populist party like the PVV. The fact that a couple of PVV MPs seem to have difficulties with current abortion policies says in fact little about the party’s position on medical ethical issues. Lucardie states: “It are not important themes to Wilders and Bosma. You can say at the most that they let the MPs who wanted to say anything about it in public speak out freely”.

In sum, the evidence suggests that the PVV does not oppose abortion per se but that they party does oppose very permissive abortion policies. It is not clear what the ideological motives for the party’s position on this issue are. PVV MP Agema stated that the party’s position is based on “logic and common sense”, which is indeed in line with the “anything goes” attitude of most populist parties. However, it can also be the case that Wilders has not really decided yet what the ideal ideological starting position of his party on medical ethical issues is. Either way, the evidence never suggests that the PVV’s position on this theme is based on the party’s “nativist struggle for survival of the nation”. None of the party’s MPs ever referred to abortion in the context of the growth or preservation of the native population.

### *Divorce policies*

The PVV’s position on divorce policies is also not that straightforward. In 2007 the government coalition including the social democratic PvdA, the Christian democratic CDA and the conservative Christian *ChristenUnie* proposed to no longer permit the possibility of the so called “*flitsscheiding*” (divorce in a flash); a procedure in which a divorce is very quickly and easily settled without the intervention of a judge. Initially the PVV opposed the plan since the plan in all cases, regardless of its context, no longer permitted the *flitsscheiding*. PVV MP Agema stated in a debate “We think that the *flitsscheiding* should be abolished when there are children involved. However, when there are no children involved we think that the *flitsscheiding* should continue to exist.” (*Handelingen* 2006-2007b).

Agema adjusted her position though in a debate concerning the amended bill three months later (*Handelingen* 2006-2007c). During the debate she stated that initially it had her preference that, provided that there are no children involved, the *flitsscheiding* should continue to exist. However, she adjusted her opinion since the cabinet had made it clear to her that the main disadvantage of the *flitsscheiding* is that the divorce is often not recognized abroad. Therefore, it would be wise to no longer allow such a procedure at all. Furthermore, Agema stated that it would be very handy to swap

the *flitsscheiding* for a simplified divorce procedure. Agema: “I hope that we do not leave tonight without a clear timeline and firm promise that the simplified divorce procedure will be there”. Apparently, the PVV has still no difficulties with simplified divorce procedures when there are no children involved. The party also supported a proposal of the VVD to make a so called “administrative divorce”, a procedure comparable with the *flitsscheiding*, possible (*De Volkskrant* 2007). This initiative bill was however rejected by a majority of the parliament. In the end, the cabinet’s proposal was admitted with the support of the PVV although no alternative simplified divorce procedure returned into place of the *flitsscheiding* (*De Telegraaf* 2007).

In this context it is curious that during a debate in 2011 PVV MP Bontes, when asked about it, opposed an initiative of the PvdA including a simplified divorce procedure (*Handelingen* 2010-2011). In this plan spouses do not have to settle their divorce by a judge when both agree on the terms and conditions of the divorce. Bontes answered that it was “one bridge too far” to leave the judge out of the procedure. However, it did not become clear why the party thinks it is unacceptable to leave the judge out of the procedure. It is possible that the PVV objections are purely practical. Their objection to such a plan could be the same as with the *flitsscheiding*, meaning that a divorce without a judge is not always recognized abroad. On the other hand it is also possible that the PVV has nowadays more principal objections towards a “divorce in a flash”. The evidence does not confirm either explanation.

In sum, it cannot be stated that the PVV opposes permissive divorce policies in itself. The party only opposes such policies when children are involved. When no children are involved, the party has even called for a simplified divorce procedure. The party’s support for abandoning the *flitsscheiding* too seems purely practical instead of principal. The evidence does not clarify why the party is against simplified divorce procedures in the case of children. Therefore it cannot be judged if the party thinks liberal divorce policies are a threat to the traditional family and therefore also a threat to the nativist struggle for the survival of the native population. Hence, this part of the hypothesis cannot be confirmed.

#### Hypothesis 4

*Frauenpolitik is for the populist radical right the same as Familienpolitik.*

It is hypothesized that since women are in the populist radical right’s view exclusively seen as mothers and wives the populist radical right will therefore also only propose or support measures that will improve the lives of women in their role of mothers or wives. Women are rarely discussed out of the family sphere and *Frauenpolitik* as an independent policy area is therefore nonexistent within the populist radical right. This hypothesis can be answered in the light of the previous hypotheses 1 and 2

and the later to come hypotheses 5 and 6. Since I do not want to fall in repetition or elaborate too much on what is yet to come I will primary refer to these hypotheses in answering this hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2 already showed that the PVV does not explicitly favor traditionally organized families over modern dual-earner families. It also appeared that the party does not have an outspoken preference on the division of gender roles either (hypothesis 1). The evidence shows that the PVV thinks such family matters should be handled in the private sphere and that state interference is not desirable. Hence, the assumption underlying this hypothesis, meaning that the PVV sees women exclusively in their role of mothers and wives, is also incorrect. Indeed, the evidence does not suggest that the party only proposes or supports measures that improve the lives of women their role of mothers and wives. Therefore, the hypothesis that women are rarely discussed out of the family sphere is incorrect. Actually, it is quite the contrary. It appears that *Frauenpolitik* is hardly a point of discussion for the PVV at all. This means that the party hardly initiates or participates in debates about gender related themes in neither the private nor the public sphere. This statement is consistent with the conclusion of hypothesis 6. However, there exists one big exception. When it comes to gender equality and women's emancipation the PVV appears to be very much concerned about the perceived influence of Islam and Islamification (hypothesis 5).

In sum, the hypothesis that *Frauenpolitik* is for the populist radical right nothing more than *Familienpolitik* is not supported by the PVV. The party does not hold traditional gender views. In fact, *Frauenpolitik* whatsoever is hardly ever an issue for the party at all.

#### *Sub-conclusion*

It turns out that the PVV does not support any hypothesis regarding the populist radical right's nativist struggle for survival of the nation. The evidence never suggests that decreasing birth rates are a concern to the party. In fact, this part of the "nativist struggle" just turns out to be a nonissue for the PVV. It is hard to discover from which ideological point of view the party takes its position on issues regarding this theme. Due to the closed character of the party there are no internal party documents available. PVV MPs are in parliamentary debates also not very explicit about the ideology affecting their point of view. With regard to liberal oriented populist radical right parties it was especially thought that a nation's strong progressive liberal tradition might bring this party subtype to frame its position on women and gender relations in a more liberal fashion. One could argue that the PVV does not seem to care about higher birth rates because doing so, at least in a traditional manner, is not really acceptable in a society such as the Netherlands. For example, Vossen is right in stating that the PVV has to consider the cleavages in Dutch politics; advocating increasing birth rates or emphasizing the importance of the *traditional* family is only done by conservative Christian parties like the *ChristenUnie* or the SGP. Moreover, the support base for such positions is in general small. However,

the presence of a strong progressive liberal tradition is not able to explain why the PVV does not really have a position on *Familienpolitik* or *Frauenpolitik* whatsoever. For example, the party could also have argued that it wants favorable policies for dual-earner families in order for them to combine work and caretaking more easily. In other words; the party could have framed its position in a different (non-traditional) manner. Instead, it seems that the preservation of the native population is just not of any concern to the PVV. Thus, the distinction of a liberal oriented populist radical right party is not useful since it cannot explain the PVV's position on these issues. In other words; the "liberal" in the *liberal* populist radical right does not help us to improve our understanding of the populist radical right's ideology with respect to women and gender relations.

#### **4.2.2 The nativist struggle and the fight against Islamification**

##### Hypothesis 5

*The populist radical right exclusively addresses gender equality in its nativist fight against Islamification.*

According to the populist radical right, Islam is incompatible with the values and beliefs of Western civilization. Since gender equality is perceived to be a key Western value, it is hypothesized that the nativist fight against Islamification has brought the populist radical right to defend the equality of men and women as a key value of their ideology. However, since defending gender equality is also somewhat at odds with the populist radical right's nativist struggle for survival of the nation it is hypothesized that the populist radical right addresses gender equality exclusively in its nativist fight against Islamification. In the following I will provide a comprehensive overview of the party's statements towards gender equality. Since gender equality is also closely linked with the theme of women's emancipation, this overview will also contain the PVV's position with regard women's emancipation in general. The party's position on specific policies like positive discrimination and women's quota will be discussed in the next hypothesis since these issues are not placed within the party's theorized fight against Islamification.

It is notable that in none of the three examined party documents a single paragraph is explicitly dedicated to some kind of gender theme, i.e. gender equality or women's emancipation. It can be argued that the Statement of Independence and the electoral pamphlet result from the PVV's early days, a time where the party still had to figure out a comprehensive ideology on different themes. Concerning gender equality and women's emancipation, the party's electoral program of 2010 does offer a little more insight. It turns out that in its electoral program the PVV indeed frames gender equality *exclusively* in the context of the party's fight against immigration and Islamification. The electoral program for example states that Islamification "flushes decades of women's emancipation

down the toilet” (PVV 2010: 6). Furthermore, the PVV claims in its program that the Koran supports the discrimination of women and that mass immigration has led to violence against homosexuals and women (PVV 2010: 13). The PVV also states it wishes to protect the essential values of Dutch culture; “the freedom of homosexuality and the equality between men and women” (PVV 2010: 33). The PVV’s proposals to improve women’s emancipation are limited to suggestions to forbid the burqa and tax headscarves (PVV 2010: 15).

Interviews with Wilders and prominent PVV MPs Agema and Bosma in *Opzij* also reveal that the party primarily speaks of gender equality in the context of Islamification. For example, in 2007 *Opzij* asked PVV MP and spokesman of emancipation Bosma about his primary intentions with emancipation for the coming four years. Bosma answered that one of his main goals is an immigration stop for non-western immigrants. Bosma: “Nothing is more threatening for the position of women than Islamification.” Bosma also noticed that his party is in support of the emancipation of immigrant women but that the party does think they have to emancipate on their own (*Opzij* 2007b). Moreover, Agema stated in an interview with *Opzij* that contemporary feminists should fight against the subordination of women by Islam. Therefore, Agema also wonders why not every feminist votes for the PVV. Agema claims that it was due to women’s rights that she decided to join the PVV. Agema: “Really, if Islamification in our country continues, things are not going to get any better for woman”. When the interviewer noticed that there also exists an Islamic feminist movement, Agema stated that it is impossible to be a feminist and wear an oppressive symbol such as a headscarf at the same time (*Opzij*, 2009). When Wilders was asked in another interview (*Opzij*, 2007) if the proposal to ban the burqa was initiated out of emancipator motives he answered that this was indeed the case. According to him the burqa is a “medieval symbol” emphasizing the inequality of women. Wilders continued his comment with stating: “If you wear such a thing, you know one thing for sure: you will never integrate because such clothing is just a big “no” to Dutch society”. Although Wilders claims that the proposal to ban the burqa is initiated out of emancipator motives his argumentation especially seems to focus on the incompatibility of the burqa with Dutch society. This explanation would also be more in line with earlier statements of Wilders in the same interview. Indeed, when *Opzij* asked Wilders why the PVV’s electoral pamphlet of 2006 contains five positions on animal rights but none on women’s emancipation Wilders answered: “Do you want an honest answer? We just did not think about it and besides: we really just choose for themes on which we would score best in electoral times. Moreover, we have chosen for themes of which we think are of great importance”. In the same interview Wilders also opposed state interference towards women’s emancipation. Wilders stated that “it will work out on its own”. If Wilders really thinks women’s emancipation will work out on its own than one can wonder why he thinks that in the case of the burqa state intervention is needed.

It is also striking that during debates on emancipation policies the party always turns the subject to Islam. For example, in a debate in July 2011 about women and the labor market PVV MP and

spokesman of emancipation Van Klaveren stated that “freedom” in a women’s choice to work is essential to the PVV (see hypothesis 7). However, his contribution to the debate soon shifted towards the negative influence of Islam on the emancipation of women and homosexuals. Van Klaveren: “Although the emancipation of women is going well in a few respects (..) it is striking that the crucial word (..) is missing, namely the word Islam.” (*Handelingen* 2011-2012a). According to Van Klaveren, the emancipation and the freedom of women suffers from the growing influence of Islam in the Netherlands. In this respect, Van Klaveren points to numerous situations in which the influence of Islam is visible. For example, Van Klaveren notes that ninety percent of the loverboys has a non-Western background while sixty percent also has got an Islamic background. Furthermore, he noticed that recent research shows that a majority of the Turkish men thinks women in the Netherlands have too much freedom. According to Van Klaveren it is “an illusion to think that the emancipation can be completed as long the influence of an ideology, which wants to make the inequality of men and women and of gay and straight political, is only growing.” Van Klaveren notes that the PVV will continue to struggle for the recognition that Islam is the biggest structural obstacle in the emancipation of women and homosexuals. In this respect, Van Klaveren also pleads “for an immigration stop from Islamic states, for the closing of mosques where is called for violence against women and homosexuals, for the closing of all Islamic schools, and for education of Islamic youth in order to confront them with normal ideas about the relationship between men and women and gay and straight”. When a MP of the Green party *Groenlinks* asked Van Klaveren which other concrete measures his party wants to take with regard to gay- and women’s emancipation he noted that he already proposed the previously mentioned measures and that his party thinks limiting immigration will “provide a structural contribution to the improvement of the living climate of homosexuals and women since the influence of Islam will therefore be reduced”.

The PVV’s line of argument in a debate on emancipation policies in April 2012 is similar to the previous debate (*Kamerstuk* 30 420, no. 170). First, PVV MP and spokesman of emancipation Van Klaveren briefly explains the party’s position on the subject in question, in this case women’s position on the labor market, but soon his contribution to the debate shifts towards the influence of Islam. In this debate Van Klaveren points to the circumcision of women, forced marriages and honor revenges as being threats to women’s emancipation. According to Van Klaveren these threats are in essence not Western problems, but the result of mass immigration. Furthermore, Van Klaveren states that the Western vision on gender equality is by definition superior to those of “states where women and gays are being treated as second-rated citizens”.

In sum, the PVV indeed exclusively addresses gender equality in the context of its nativist fight against Islamification. In fact, the PVV never mentions gender equality without mentioning Islam at the same time. However, it was also hypothesized that the party exclusively addresses gender equality

in the context of its fight against Islamification because gender equality is somewhat at odds with the other struggle of the populist radical right, i.e. their struggle for survival of the nation. However, the preservation of the native population turned out to be a nonissue for the PVV. Hence, this part of the hypothesis cannot be confirmed. Instead, the evidence suggests that gender issues are just not important to the PVV. For example, Wilders admitted in *Opzij* that women's emancipation is secondary to the PVV. So in a nutshell, the evidence confirms the hypothesis although a part of the hypothesis' argumentation is not supported.

### 4.2.3 Populism

#### Hypothesis 6

*Populist radical right parties oppose policies concerning the positive discrimination of women or women quota.*

The populist radical right holds a “politics of resentment”; it perceives representative democracy to be in the hands of self-serving elites that are out of touch with the wishes and beliefs of ordinary people. It is therefore hypothesized that the populist radical right opposes policies concerning the positive discrimination of women or women quota since it perceives such policies to be undemocratic elite-driven projects. The PVV's position towards the positive discrimination of women or women quota has always been unambiguous and straightforward: the party always opposed such policies. In order to trace the party's motives I will provide in the following a chronological overview of the party's statements towards these issues.

The first time the PVV revealed its position towards positive discrimination was in a debate about emancipation policies in March 2007 (*Handelingen 2006-2007a*). PVV MP and spokesman of emancipation Bosma stated people are responsible for their own emancipation and that the government is not able to do so. According to Bosma, positive discrimination is “odious” since “in that case people are not seen as individuals but as being part of a group”. Therefore, it would not be just to strife for the proportional representation of women. Furthermore, when the Dutch feminist magazine *Opzij* asked Bosma about his primary intentions with emancipation for the coming four years he answered that he thinks more women should be positioned at leadership positions but that the PVV is not in favor of positive discrimination. Bosma: “As long only seventeen percent of the women work fulltime they should not be complaining when they are not asked for top leading positions.” (*Opzij 2007b*).

In April 2008 a majority of parliament supported an initiative including that in the future at least twenty-five percent of the leading positions in business should be occupied by women. The PVV strongly opposed the plan. PVV MP Van Dijck called this quota for women “preposterous” and stated

that “We are against every form of discrimination. The best men or women should fulfill a position, irrespective of religion, gender or color.” (*NRC Handelsblad* 2008). A similar statement was made by Bosma when *Opzij* asked him about the party’s position on women quota. Bosma: “Quota is for fish. Positive discrimination reduces people to being a member of a group, instead of seeing them as individuals. When it comes to leading positions you should look at quality. More women in leading positions would be wonderful, but a lot of women work only part-time. If you are ambitious you should go for it for the full hundred percent” (2008).

The party is also an opponent of positive discrimination in official party documents. The PVV’s electoral program of 2010 explicitly states that the party opposes positive discrimination (PVV 2010: 23). The party’s position is not further elaborated in the text though; the party does distinguish between different target groups of positive discrimination. It must however be noted that the statement appears in a paragraph of the electoral program in which the PVV claims that the welfare state is being threatened by immigrants from Muslim countries. Thus it could be that the party’s opposition towards positive discrimination mainly applies for immigrants. A strong indicator for the PVV’s aversion towards positive discrimination in general appears however from the *Gedoogakkoord*. This is the agreement in which the VVD, CDA and PVV opt for a political co-operation in which the PVV is not officially part of the government, but accepts to support a minority government of VVD-CDA. The *Gedoogakkoord* is the tradeoff for the PVV; a lot of proposals especially support PVV positions. In this agreement it is stated that: “The cabinet ends the diversity/preference policy based on gender and ethnic origin. Selection should be based on quality”. Apparently the PVV opposes positive discrimination in general, including the positive discrimination of women. This is also in line with a survey from *Opzij*. This survey also shows that nearly all PVV Members of Parliament oppose women quota in politics, government or business (*Opzij*, 2011). Since almost a hundred percent of PVV MPs oppose women quota it can be argued that this survey is representative for the PVV’s position on women quota.

In a debate on emancipation policies in July 2011 PVV MP and new spokesman of emancipation Van Klaveren stated that when it comes to women’s emancipation “freedom” is most important to the PVV (*Handelingen* 2011-2012a). Van Klaveren: “Women should be free to choose whether they want to work or not. Discrimination of women on the labor market should be tackled severely. However, this does not mean that the government should work with quota or monitor interviews. Fortunately, we are not in quasi-communist Norway”. Furthermore, Van Klaveren noticed that according to the Human Development Index of the UN the Netherlands is the best place on earth to live for women. The Netherlands scores the best on gender equality in education, health care and the labor market. During a debate on emancipation policies in April 2012 Van Klaveren repeated these statements in a similar manner (*Handelingen* 2011-2012b). In addition to these statements Van Klaveren also stated that quality and free choice should be central and not “gender or a by the state imposed view of what

gender studies are”. Indeed, Van Klaveren too noticed that according to recent research ninety-eight percent of the women who work part-time do not want to work fulltime. Van Klaveren: “The PVV says: let people, men and women, choose freely”.

In sum, it is clear that the PVV opposes policies concerning the positive discrimination of women or women quota. However, it does not become clear whether the party’s position on the issue is a result of the populist nature of the party. It was hypothesized that due to its “politics of resentment” populist radical right parties will oppose policies concerning the positive discrimination of women or women quota since it perceives such policies to be undemocratic elite-driven projects. The evidence does not confirm this explanation though. The PVV has never stated that it perceives policies concerning the positive discrimination of women or women quota to be elite driven. In a nutshell the party’s argument against such policies is that it is discriminating and that people should be selected on quality. Furthermore, the PVV seems to imply that the discrimination of women on the labor market is not that bad. The party does not think discrimination keeps women from leading positions in business or government, but their unwillingness to work fulltime. If women really want to get leading positions they should (and can) take care of it themselves by working fulltime instead of part-time. Therefore, the hypothesis is supported but not on the hypothesized arguments.

#### **4.2.4 Nativism**

##### Hypothesis 7

*The populist radical right frames its ideology on women and gender relations primarily through the “nativist struggle”.*

Mudde’s theory of the populist radical right emphasized that the absolute core feature of the populist radical right is nativism. Mudde (2007) considers nativism to be the primary “coathanger” on which other concepts of the populist radical right are draped. This means that the populist radical right uses nativism as a coathanger to interpret various political issues in a manner that is consistent with its ideology. The existing literature on gender and the populist radical right suggest that gender issues are most likely of subordinate importance to the populist radical right. Consequently, it is assumed that gender issues are for the populist radical right just another “political issue” on which they had to position in a way that is consistent with its core ideological feature, which is nativism. In addition, the edited volume by Amesberger and Halbmayr (2002) also indicated that populist radical right parties primarily refer to women and gender relations with regard to the “nativist struggle”. Therefore it is hypothesized that the populist radical right frames its ideology on women and gender issues through the “nativist struggle”.

With respect to women and gender relations two aspects of the “nativist struggle” are distinguished. With regard to the hypotheses a distinction is made between the nativist struggle for survival of the nation and the nativist fight against Islamification. Consequently, the PVV’s ideology on women and gender relations is at the one hand examined with regard to the party’s hypothesized struggle for the survival of the nation, while at the other hand the party’s ideology is examined in the context of the party’s fight against Islamification.

With regard to the first aspect of the “nativist struggle” it turns out that none of the hypotheses are supported. The party does not hold explicit views on the division of gender roles. Instead, the evidence suggests that the PVV thinks such matters should be settled by parents in the private sphere and that state interference in such matters is not desirable. Furthermore, family politics do not seem to be a priority for the PVV. When the party does talk about family policies, the party does not favor traditionally organized families over modern dual-earner families. In this respect it is notable though that the party tends to add a nativist dimension to its proposed family policies. The hypothesis that *Frauenpolitik* is for the PVV nothing more than *Familienpolitik* also turned out to be incorrect. *Frauenpolitik* is neither discussed in the private nor in the public sphere. Indeed, *Frauenpolitik* in general is nonexistent within the party and it therefore also has no place within the party’s *Familienpolitik*. Moreover, the party does not oppose permissive divorce policies. The party does seem to be skeptical towards permissive abortion policies, though this position turns out not to be related with the hypothesized nativist struggle to preserve the native population.

In the end, this also appears to be the difficulty within this case. It was hypothesized that part of the nativist struggle is the populist radical right’s struggle for survival of the nation, i.e. the preservation of the native population. However, this part of the nativist struggle turns out to be a nonissue for the PVV. Consequently, it has not framed its ideology on women and gender issues in a coherent manner. In fact, the party hardly mentions women at all. It appears that the only time women and issues like gender equality or women’s emancipation are a concern to the PVV is when these themes are linked to the party’s nativist fight against Islam(ification). Therefore, the hypothesis holding that populist radical right frames their ideology on women and gender relations primarily through the “nativist struggle” can still be confirmed.

#### *Sub-conclusion*

It is clear that the PVV frames its ideology on women and gender relations primarily through its nativist fight against Islamification, and hence through nativism. It must be noted though that with regard to the “nativist struggle for the survival of the nation” the party neither holds a comprehensive nor a coherent set of positions. The evidence shows that the nativist fight for survival of the nation is just not important to the PVV. Therefore, *Frauenpolitik* as well as *Familienpolitik* are practically non-

existent within the party. Regarding the division of gender roles a striking conclusion is that the PVV does not hold traditional gender views. The party does not really seem to care whether women work or stay at home. The question remains though how the PVV's position on issues regarding the nativist struggle for the survival of the nation can be explained.

In the sub-conclusion of section 4.2.1 it was stated that the distinction of a liberal oriented populist radical right party is not useful since it is not able to explain the PVV's position on issues regarding the nativist struggle for survival of the nation. Or, to put it in other words; the "liberal" in the *liberal* populist radical right does not help us to improve our understanding of the populist radical right's ideology with respect to women and gender relations. Is Agema right then in stating that the party primarily relies on "logic and common sense"? In my view, the "anything goes" attitude of the party on the issues affecting the growth of the native population is mainly the result of a lack of electoral importance. The party's success is the result of the party's focus on immigration and Islamification. The literature concerning "demand-side" issues also suggests that the party has not much to gain with an outspoken view on issues concerning women and gender relations. In this respect, the party applies at best ad hoc positioning with regard to women and gender relations.

In my view, moreover, the party has lacked in general to develop a "thick" and sophisticated ideological base on which it is able to position itself regarding gender related issues. In this respect, Freedman (1998) has argued that nationalism is in itself a "thin-centered" ideology. According to Freedman nationalism is "thin-centered" because it "arbitrarily severs itself from wider ideational contexts by the deliberate removal and replacements of concepts" (1998: 750). In other words; nationalism as a distinct ideology is not a "full" ideology but has a restricted core which is attached to a narrow range of political concepts. The consequence is "a lack of capacity to put forward a wide-ranging and coherent program for the solution to crucial political questions" (Stanley 2008: 95). It is argued that nativism, which is a combination of *nationalism* and *xenophobia*, is in itself also a "thin centered" ideology. In my view, the monotonic focus of nativism on the nation and xenophobia has left little potential for the nativist ideology to offer answers to a broad range of political questions. Hence, the dominance of nativist ideology in framing women and gender relations is the reason why the populist radical right has so far turned out to be unable to provide a comprehensive view on gender related themes.

This thesis employs a diverse-case method since it is expected that the different national contexts might affect the populist radical right's ideology with respect to women and gender relations. In the following, the case of the VB will be examined. It is questionable whether the main conclusions about the PVV also hold for the VB since it is expected that the party will frame its position on women and gender relations in a more conservative-traditional manner.

## Chapter 5     **The Vlaams Belang**

This chapter consists of a comprehensive in-depth study of the VB's ideology with respect to women and gender relations. The VB is considered to be a "typical" case of the more national oriented populist radical right. The party operates in Belgium; a country that is not especially known for its liberal progressive tradition. In fact, Belgium has a strong a Catholic background. Furthermore, the VB is a nationalist party in striving for a separate mono-cultural nation state; an independent Flanders. It is expected that these aspects of the party's ideology might intensify the VB's nativist struggle for survival of the nation and therefore also the positions this party holds on traditional norms and values, which are in its turn related to positions on women and gender relations. To be more specific; it is expected that the party might frame its position on this subject in a more conservative-traditional fashion.

The VB's ideology regarding women and gender relations will be examined in the second section of this chapter, by testing the hypotheses which are formulated in chapter 2. The methodological chapter made it already clear that a comprehensive in-depth study of a party's ideology ideally requires a variety of both externally and internally oriented party literature. Fortunately, the VB provides through its website both types of literature. With respect to externally orientated literature the party does not only provide election programs but also a selection of party brochures. In general, the party brochures are dedicated to a specific subject and they provide a more elaborated view of the party on the issue. The internally oriented literature consists of party papers and articles that appeared on the VB's website. These documents are specifically aimed at the VB's party members or other party sympathizers. Before testing the hypotheses I will provide in the first section of this chapter a brief overview of the history of the VB.

### **5.1     A brief history of the Vlaams Belang**

The predecessor of the VB entered the political arena in the parliamentary elections of 1987. The party was named *Vlaams Blok* and consisted of two dissident factions of the *Volksunie* (Coffé, Heyndels and Vermeir 2007). The *Volksunie*, the dominant Flemish regionalist part at the time, had participated in the Egmont agreement of 1977 concerning the federalization of Belgium. Hardliners within the party were angry over the concessions that were made to French-speakers in Brussels and the Flemish Brabant (Erk 2005). Initially, the Vlaams Blok strove primarily for the independence of Flanders. However, in the mid-eighties the party discovered immigration as a new party issue. In the 1987 parliamentary elections the party conducted a fierce anti-immigration campaign using the slogan "*Eigen volk eerst!*". The party doubled its seats in parliament from one to two seats and also won for the first time a seat in the Belgian Senate (Coffé, Heyndels and Vermeir 2007). Coffé, Heyndels and

Vermeir note that at the same time tensions within the party began to grow over the choice between prioritizing the immigration issue over the original Flemish-nationalist ideology. In the end, the *Vlaams Blok* chose to continue to prioritize the more electorally rewarding issue, which was immigration, although it did combine it with the original nationalism.

However, the party's fierce anti-immigration rhetoric combined with its growing electoral success was an incentive for other parties to establish a *cordon sanitaire* around the *Vlaams Blok* in 1992. With the *cordon sanitaire* all other parties committed themselves to not enter into coalition or collaborate with the *Vlaams Blok* (Erk 2005). The *cordon sanitaire* still exists today. Despite the established *cordon sanitaire* the party continued to grow. In 2004 the party even got 24.2 percent of the vote in Flanders (Coffé, Heyndels and Vermeir 2007).

In November 2004 the Belgian Court of Cassation found the *Vlaams Blok* to be in breach of the law against racism. In order to still be eligible for government subsidies the party was forced to disband itself and establish a new party. The political heir of the *Vlaams Blok* was named the *Vlaams Belang* and although party president Frank Vanhecke stated that the new party was not going to be a "Vlaams Blok light", the party did come up with a more moderate party statue (Erk 2005). Coffé, Heyndels and Vermeir note that in order to attract more votes the party nowadays adopts more moderate positions while at the same time it has moderated its rhetoric.

## **5.2 The hypotheses tested**

### **5.2.1 The nativist struggle and the survival of the nation**

#### Hypothesis 1

*The populist radical right holds "traditional" or "modern traditional" views on the division of gender roles.*

It is hypothesized that in order to be able to extend or at least preserve the native population the populist radical right will strongly be in favor of the traditional family (Amesberger and Halbmayr 2002: Mudde 2000). Furthermore, it is hypothesized that within the traditional family, traditional gender roles are promoted. Amesberger and Halbmayr (2002) have distinguished in this respect a "traditional" and a "modern traditional" view. In the traditional view women are exclusively seen as mothers and wives, whereas in the modern traditional view it is not entirely rejected that women work, although they are considered to be the ones primarily responsible for the family and the housework.

The VB is when it comes to the composition of the family clearly strongly in favor of the traditional family. In several party documents the party explicitly states that the cornerstone of society consists of the *traditional* family. In this respect, it can be noted that the party states in its *Beginselverklaring* that

“the value of the traditional family is acknowledged en protected by the marriage between men and women”. The party also argues that marriages between man and women should stay the norm; the party strongly opposes gay marriages and the adoption of children by gay couples. The party states that this principal rejection has nothing to do with discrimination but everything do with “our concern for a healthy society and a healthy upbringing”. Furthermore, the party states that “In an ideal situation children are being raised by their biological mother and father. If this is not possible children should grow up in a stable environment as much as possible. However, under no circumstances should children be the subject of experiments with gay marriages.” (*Vlaams Belang* n.d.). In an article that appeared in 2005 the party even stated that everyone with a minimum amount of common sense knows that a child needs a father and a mother. The fact that scientific research shows something different is according to the party due to “ideological blinded scientists” that “submit to prevalent political dogmas” (*Vlaams Belang* 2005b).

It is clear that the VB strongly favors traditional families that consist of one man, one woman and multiple children. However, when it comes to the division of gender roles the party seems to be less outspoken. In several pieces of party literature, including two electoral programs, the party states that it strives for the true freedom of parents to choose between working and caretaking. According to the VB, it is not up to the state to actively influence this choice for the one or the other. From the variety of measures that the party proposes it also appears that the party does not explicitly wants to benefit the stay-at-home parent over the working parent (see hypothesis 2). However, the party does note that the dual-earner-ship model should not be the *only* norm. The party states in this respect: “Parents, neither man nor woman, should be forced to work against their will. To be obligated to trust their children to daycare. To do the housework totally stressed out in their scarce free time.” (*Vlaams Belang* 2005a: 17). In this respect, the VB states that it is the party’s norm that there exists a free choice when it comes to work and caretaking. This applies from men as well as for women.

It appears that the VB does not explicitly hold “traditional” or “modern traditional” views on the division of gender roles. The party never explicitly states that women should stay at home or are the ones primarily responsible for caretaking within the family sphere. However, the party is skeptical about the perceived current social and financial pressure for women to work. For example, the VB states in its electoral program of 2005-2006 that “a new kind of constraint on freedom has emerged” The party welcomes gender equality but notes that it is often no more financially possible for one parent to stay at home, although one would often like to. In this respect the party states that “We can safely assume that a great part of the women who work outdoors want more children, but do not realize that wish out of lack of time or financial motives.” (*Vlaams Belang* 2005-2006: 14; see also *Vlaams Belang* 2012a). Another example appeared in March 2012 when the party strongly opposed a statement of a socialist minister stating that more women should work for their own financial security (*Vlaams Belang* 2012b). The VB stated in this respect that it finds such statements to be “short sighted

and unworldly” since a lot of women just prefer fully or partly caretaking at home over paid labor. The party states in this respect that as long that choice is made in freedom, it is not up to the state to intervene in the organization of families. VB: “It is up to the spouses or partners within a family to come up with fair agreements about the division of work within the household.” Furthermore, the party states that it is time that leftwing minister’s stop telling men and women what their needs are. It is interesting to note that when it comes to the subject of women and work the VB too explicitly refers to immigrant women. For example, in an article that appeared in 2006 the party noted that only eleven percent of the Turkish and Moroccan women have paid jobs. The party repeated its position in stating that it thinks that women should not be forced to work outdoors and that working outdoors is not per se liberating or emancipating. Furthermore, it also explicitly stated that women should have the right to decide on their own whether they want to work or not. According to the VB, this is however not the case in immigrant families. The party states that women in immigrant families do not stay at home because they prefer caretaking, but because their husbands do not allow them to work outdoors (*Vlaams Belang* 2006).

In sum, it is clear that the VB is indeed in favor of the traditionally composed family. It perceives such families that consist of one man, one woman and multiple children to be the cornerstones of society. However, the party does not necessarily promote traditional gender roles. The party is fine with a dual-earner ship-model in which both man and women work outdoors if that is what one really wants. However, the party questions whether families nowadays truly have a free choice when it comes to work and caretaking. The party believes there are a lot of financial and social pressures that force both parents into paid labor. In this respect, it is nowadays especially women who feel this pressure. The VB states that it is not up to the state to actively intervene in the organization of families. However, in order for families to have a “truly free choice” the party pleads for measures that make staying at home for one parent a financially more realistic possibility. Therefore, the evidence suggests the party is at least a sympathizer of traditional families in which one parents stays at home to take care of the children. However, the party never makes the division in gender roles explicit. Besides, the party also supports measures that benefit dual-earners (see hypothesis 2). Hence, it is too big of a step to state that the party holds traditional or modern traditional views concerning this issue. The hypothesis must therefore be rejected.

## Hypothesis 2

*Populist radical right parties favor socioeconomic policies that create a family friendly climate.*

It is hypothesized that the populist radical right will favor socioeconomic policies that create a family friendly climate because they want to preserve the native population. A family friendly climate with

respect to the populist radical right is considered to be a climate in which the formations of traditional families are stimulated through financial incentives. This means at the one hand that families are stimulated to have children and on the other hand that the preservation of traditional gender roles is supported. In this respect it is also important to note that it is hypothesized that the supported policies will have a nativist dimension as well. Policies will be proposed or supported in a welfare chauvinist way, meaning that benefits will be limited to the native population.

The VB calls the traditional family in several party documents the cornerstone of society. For the VB, the traditional family seems to be one of the cornerstones of the party's ideology as well. This appears from the abundance of party literature that exists on the subject. Although this literature has often a content that is very much alike, the traditional family is of great importance to the VB. For example, the importance of the traditional family is emphasized in the party's *Beginselverklaring*. The *Beginselverklaring* states that "the traditional family is the absolute core of society" and that "the value of the traditional family is acknowledged en protected by the marriage between men and women". According to the VB the family should be the central theme in politics. Moreover, "instead of trying to take over the role of the family" politics should be in service of protecting families with children.

According to the VB, a strong emphasis on family politics is necessary to stop the phenomenon of *denaliteit*<sup>3</sup>. For example, the party stated in its *Beginselverklaring* that only when the family is granted a central role in politics something can be done about "the alarming appearance of *denaliteit*". In its electoral program of 2005-2006 the party also stated that "If we do not get this phenomenon under control it will not only undermine our social security, but it will even threaten the core existence and survival of our people" (*Vlaams Belang* 2005-2006: 14). This seems especially the case since the party notes that the majority of the births is due to the growth of the immigrant population in Flanders (*Vlaams Belang* 2007b). In this respect, the party also repeatedly states that immigration is undesirable to solve the problem of *denaliteit*. Especially in two brochures the party published about immigration the party states that a "dared *nataliteitspolitiek*" is the solution in preventing new mass immigration. According to the party, the birthrate of the "own population" should be increased (*Vlaams Belang* 2010a: 53). The birthrate per women should increase from an average of 1, 73 child per women to at least 2, 1 child per women; a rate that is necessary to sustain the own population. Furthermore, the party notes that families are "the best framework to pass on norm and values" (*Vlaams Belang* 2005-2006: 14). The party also expects that families will provide intergenerational solidarity within the own population. VB: "It is very questionable whether that solidarity will exist when we continue to import young immigrants" (*Vlaams Belang* 2011a: 36). In a recent speech VB prominent Phillip Dewinter too

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<sup>3</sup> *Denaliteit* is the phenomenon that the amount of deaths transcends the amounts of births of (the native population) in Flanders.

stated that Flanders should choose for “a *nataliteitpolitiek* instead of importing backwardness” (Dewinter 2012). In the following, I will refer to the phenomenon of *denaliteit* when stating there is a decline in birth rates.

In several documents the party puts forward proposals to increase birth rates. One of the party’s key measures consists of a “parenting fee”. The party states that raising children is a fulltime job and that a parent that chooses to stay at home to do so should not be financially punished. Therefore, the party proposes to introduce a parenting fee of twenty-four months per child that is available from birth to the age of twelve (*Vlaams Belang* 2012a). A second key proposal concerns child benefits. According to the VB child benefits is a right that comes to the child. Therefore, child benefits should be the same for every child regardless of the parents’ income (*Vlaams Belang* 2005a). Furthermore, the size of child benefits should be increased. In the party’s view child benefits should be able to cover at least the minimum expenses of raising children (*Vlaams Belang* 2005-2006 and 2012a). Third, different types of parental leaves should be expanded. A proposal that appeared in the party’s electoral program of 2005-2006 but is no longer present in their social-economic program of 2012 is the proposal to make the size of other benefits, like the unemployment benefit, dependent on the beneficiary’s family size. The party also pleaded in this respect for more favorable tax rules for parents with multiple children and so called effects-on-families- reports. In the VB’s view these reports must analyze new government policies and its effects on families. Hence, with regard to families politicians can always be confronted with the consequences of their policies (*Vlaams Belang* 2005-2006).

So far the proposed measures especially seem to support traditional families. However, the party also consistently supports measures that benefits dual-earner families. Apparently, the VB does not want to limit its family friendly policies to traditionally organized families. For example, in different programs the party pleads for payable high quality child care (*Vlaams Belang* 2005a, 2005-2006 and 2012a). Furthermore, the party it wants daycare to become more flexible. According to the VB, flexible opening hours are necessary to provide for common but unexpected situations like overwork or traffic jams (*Vlaams Belang* 2005-2006). The party too thinks that business can and must play an important role in combining work and caretaking. The party pleads for a child friendly corporate culture in which flexible working hours or working at home is a possibility (*Vlaams Belang* 2005-2006 and 2012a). Moreover, the party states that women who work outdoors should get better legal protection against dismissal when they get pregnant (*Vlaams Belang* 2012a: 81).

In sum, it is clear that the VB favors socioeconomic policies that create a climate in which heterosexual couples are stimulated to have children. In fact, family politics is really one of the cornerstones of the party’s ideology. The party often argues that the aim of its proposals is to secure a “truly free choice” between work and caretaking (see hypothesis 1). It is clear though that the party’s objectives must be seen in a wider context. In the end, the party’s true aim is to increase birth rates.

The party wants to preserve the native population and in order to do so it proposes family friendly policies that support traditionally *as well* as modernly organized families. In the end, the party does not really seem to mind whether couples choose a single-earner-model or a dual-earner-model, as long as they are stimulated to *become* families and have *more* children. The proposed policies are not presented in a welfare chauvinist way although it is obvious that the party is keen on achieving a growing birth rate of the native population in order to protect the nation against a growing number of immigrants.

### Hypothesis 3

*Populist radical right parties oppose permissive abortion and divorce policies.*

It is expected that the populist radical right has a tendency to oppose matters that potentially threaten the growth of the native population. Hence, it is hypothesized that the populist radical right will oppose permissive abortion and divorce policies

#### *Abortion policies*

The VB's position towards abortion has always been straightforward; the party opposes abortion. In the party's *Kennismakingsbrochure* (introduction brochure) the party even states that the party wants to bring back abortion in the penal sphere. The party's program of 2005-2006 devotes a paragraph to the issue in which it further clarifies its position. In this paragraph the VB states that abortion is unacceptable because the unborn life in the womb is human life and that innocent human life should not be killed. Furthermore, the party thinks there are alternatives to abortion. The party states that although it opposes abortion, it does not shut its eyes for the painful situations in which girls and women find themselves when they turn out to be unexpectedly pregnant. The program states that "a society which chooses to protect the unborn life should also be willing to support this policy with concrete measures" (*Vlaams Belang* 2005-2006: 17). Therefore, the party supports measures including centers for pregnancy counseling "which support women with an unexpected pregnancy at the psychological, material, financial, social and practical level" during their pregnancy and also after they have given birth with raising their child. Moreover, legislation concerning adoption and foster parenthood should be loosened. The party states furthermore that abortion has become nowadays a "trivial operation" and that there is no form of legal control on it. The program states that for the VB human life is untouchable and that the rule of law should above all protect the weakest in society, i.e. the unborn child. The party states in its program of 2005-2006 that it has initiated a bill to acknowledge the unborn child as a legal person. Similar statements are made by the party in the resolutions of a congress committee concerned with the theme "norms and values" (*Vlaams Belang* 2007a). The committee stated that the VB is a principal defender of the right to life and the defenseless

in society. Therefore the committee states that the party “condemns the further medicalization and trivialization of abortion”. According to the committee’s resolution the government should promote alternatives to abortion such as adoption.

The VB also points to abortion in the context of declining birth rates. For example, in an article that appeared on the party’s website the party refers to research that shows that “the normal population structure in Europe is falling apart” (*Vlaams Belang* 2007b). The party notes that research has showed that more than eighty percent of the population growth in Europe is due to immigration and that the residual is mainly due to the population growth of the non native population. In this respect, the VB notes that these numbers are especially alarming for Belgium since Belgium also has to deal with a rising number of abortions in the last decade. The party also emphasizes in diverse party literature on family politics that those women who deal with an unwanted pregnancy need to be supported when they choose to keep their child, instead of an abortion (*Vlaams Belang* 2005-2006 and 2005a).

The party’s position on abortion today seems unchanged since the abortion paragraph of their program anno 2012 is almost literally the same as the paragraph the party used in its program of 2005-2006. This is also in line with a short article that appeared on the VB’s website (*Vlaams Belang* 2010b). The article was written on the occasion of the “march for life” which was in its turn held on the occasion of the twentieth birthday of the current abortion act. Several VB- members participated in the march and the author again emphasized that the VB thinks it is unacceptable that abortion has become nowadays nothing more than a trivial measure and that the unborn child should be protected in a constitutional state.

In sum, it is clear that the VB not only opposes permissive abortion policies, but also abortion per se. It can be argued that this position is just the result of the conservative status of the party. However, the evidence also suggests that the party’s position on abortion policies is at least partly the result of the party’s struggle to preserve the native population.

### *Divorce policies*

From the party literature it appears that divorce policies are not a big issue within the VB. The major party documents like the programs and several brochures published by the VB do not express an explicit view on this theme. In fact, outside the context of Islamification, like the perceived practice of Sharia law on the divorces of immigrants, the party hardly mentions divorce. There are three exceptions though. In an article which concerns an initiative from the government to ease the current divorce procedure by introducing just one reason on which couples can divorce (permanent disruption of the marriage) the author seemed skeptical about the introduction of this “guiltless divorce” (*Vlaams Belang* 2005c). According to the author this initiative means that “severe insults like adultery will no longer play a role in the granting of alimantation”. In an earlier mentioned article the party also

connects divorce to declining birth rates (*Vlaams Belang* 2007b). The party notes that Belgium has an exceptionally high divorce rate; seven out of ten marriages end up in a divorce. The article suggests that a high divorce rate, among other developments, has “disastrous consequences” for the nation’s population structure.

A very outspoken view on divorce is expressed in the Christian orientated magazine *Peper & Zout* which is published by former VB MP Alexandra Colen. The article appears on the VB’s website but it must be noted that it is not clear to what extent the article really represents the VB’s position on divorce policies. In my view, the party must at least be sympathetic to the content of the article, since they would otherwise not post it on their website. The article strongly opposes the “guiltless divorce”-proposal. According to the magazine it is wrong that the government makes it easier for couples to divorce. Instead, the government should make it harder to divorce so “people take their responsibility and put more effort in their marriage instead of rolling off the costs of their own misbehavior” (*Peper & Zout* 2010: 7). The magazine stated moreover that a divorce always causes suffering to children and that “divorce is a breach of contract and that a breach of contract should be punished”. It is furthermore suggested that politicians primarily approve this bill because a lot of politicians are unfaithful to their spouses, are divorced or are getting divorced. Finally, the article notices that it is surprising that feminists do not oppose the “guiltless” divorce, since it is often women who are the victims of a divorce.

In sum, there exists little VB party literature on the subject of divorce. However, the existing party literature is unambiguous in its content; the party is always negative in its coverage on the subject. The evidence also suggests that the party’s position on divorce is at least partly framed within the context of declining birth rates. In this respect, it is also important to note that the previous hypotheses have made it clear that the party is also strongly in favor of the traditionally composed family. When both are taken into account it is justified to conclude that the party opposes permissive divorce policies.

#### Hypothesis 4

*Frauenpolitik is for the populist radical right the same as Familienpolitik.*

It is hypothesized that since women are in the populist radical right’s view exclusively seen as mothers and wives the populist radical right will therefore also only propose or support measures that will improve the life of women in their role of mothers or wives. Women are rarely discussed out of the family sphere and *Frauenpolitik* as an independent policy area is therefore not existent within the populist radical right.

The first two hypotheses made it already clear that the VB perceives the family to be the cornerstone of society. The party’s primary aim with its family politics is to encourage couples to have (more)

children in order to increase birth rates. In order to achieve this goal the party does not only support measures that benefit traditional families, but it also is in favor of policies that favor modern dual-earner families. The party supports both types of families because its primary goal is to increase the birth rate of the native population and not the preservation of traditional gender roles. It seems that as long as couples are stimulated to have children, the party is fine with either way. However, the party does note that it is important that parents have a “truly free choice” in choosing between work and caretaking. The party thinks that there are nowadays a lot of financial and social pressures that especially force women into the labor market. Therefore, it appears that the party is at least sympathetic to traditionally organized families. Either way, it is clear that the party favors measures that improve the lives of women in their roles of mothers and wives, although not necessarily in the expected traditional way. In the end, the party thinks it is important that women can balance work and family since this is necessary to increase the birth rates of the native population.

Indeed, women are rarely discussed out of the private sphere of the family. The party does think that measures should be taken to prevent women from being discriminated on the work floor. However, this is too closely linked with *Familienpolitik* since this discussion is placed within the context of pregnancy and maternal leave. Therefore, it seems that *Frauenpolitik* is for the VB indeed nothing more than *Familienpolitik*. *Frauenpolitik* as an independent policy area is nonexistent within the party. However, also in the case of the VB one significant exception must be made. With regard to gender equality and women’s emancipation the party seems to be very much concerned about the perceived influence of Islam. I will elaborate extensively on this issue in the next hypothesis.

In sum, *Frauenpolitik* is indeed for the VB nothing more than *Familienpolitik*. Any concern about gender equality or women’s emancipation should be placed within the party’s nativist struggle against Islamification.

#### *Sub-conclusion*

The VB supports all hypotheses regarding the populist radical right’s nativist struggle for survival of the nation. It is clear that the declining birth rates are a major concern to the party. In fact, family politics is really one of the cornerstones of the party’s ideology. However, the party wants to fight decreasing birth rates in some unexpected ways. The party wants to preserve the native population and in order to do so it proposes family friendly policies that support traditionally *as well* as modernly organized families. In this respect it must be noted that it was expected that due to their background and national political context, national oriented populist radical right parties might frame their position on women and gender relations in a more conservative-traditional fashion. This turns out not really to be the case. The VB is indeed in favor of traditionally composed families but does not especially seem to favor traditionally organized families over modernly organized families. In the end, the party’s just

wants to increase birth rates. As mentioned earlier, as long as couples are stimulated to *become* families and have *more* children the party does not really seem to mind whether couples choose a single-earner-model or a dual-earner-model. Consequently, although the nationalist wish to form an autonomous Flanders may have intensified the party's emphasis on the preservation of the Flemish population, it cannot be concluded that national oriented parties like the VB frame their ideology on women and gender relations in a particularly conservative-traditional fashion.

Thus, the distinction of a national oriented populist radical right party is not useful since it cannot explain the VB's exact position on these issues. In other words; the "national" in the *national* populist radical right does not help us to improve our understanding of the populist radical right's ideology with respect to women and gender relations.

### **5.2.2 The nativist struggle and the fight against Islamification**

#### Hypothesis 5

*The populist radical right exclusively addresses gender equality in its nativist fight against Islamification.*

According to the populist radical right, Islam is incompatible with Western values en beliefs. Since gender equality is perceived to be a key Western value, it is hypothesized that the nativist fight against Islamification has brought the populist radical right to defend the equality of men and women as a key value of their ideology. However, since defending gender equality is also somewhat at odds with the populist radical right's nativist struggle for survival of the nation it is hypothesized that the populist radical right only addresses gender equality in their nativist fight against Islamification.

The VB refers in a variety of party documents to gender equality or women's emancipation. However, this is indeed exclusively done in the context of Islam(ification) or immigration in general. For example, the party's *Beginselverklaring* states that Flanders should make it clear to immigrants that they should respect the nation's laws and that they should adapt to the nation's "culture, its norms and values, habits and important principles of civilization that have developed on European soil, including (...) the equivalence between man and woman". The party's *Programma* too explicitly sets Western values against Islamic values. This party document states that basic Western values like gender equality are often alien to immigrants with an Islamic background. A similar statement is made about the incompatibility of Western and non-Western values are made in the VB's electoral program of 2005-2006. Furthermore, the party stated in this document that Islam fosters a climate in which so called "crimes of honor" are committed against women who are perceived to be immodest.

The VB also published three brochures on Islamification and/or immigration and these brochures contain similar messages (*Vlaams Belang* 2010a; 2011a; 2011e). In the brochure about the costs of

immigration the party states that Islam is a “totalitarian, medieval religion that is full of intolerance towards women (...)”. Furthermore, the party states that Islam propagates the inferiority of women and that the headscarf is the symbol of this inferiority (*Vlaams Belang* 2011a: 13). The party also states that the headscarf is political symbol throughout: “it is an instrument that is there to mark the influence of the orthodox Islam” (*Vlaams Belang* 2011a: 15). In 2011 the party also published a brochure called “How to survive in an Islamic society” in which the party says it wants to illustrate how severe the impact of Islamification on Flemish society can be when its potential is fully realized (*Vlaams Belang* 2011e). Three out of ten “guidelines” to survive in an Islamic society are particularly linked with the perceived submissive position of women within Islam.

The VB’s party paper and website are also often used platforms to express the party’s aversion against the perceived sexist values of Islam and the perceived increasing process of Islamification in Flanders. In a party paper the party argued that the headscarf should be forbidden in public functions (*Vlaams Belang* 2008b). According to the party, the headscarf is not just a cultural symbol but a phenomenon that is in line with the regulations of the Sharia, a system that is fundamentally incompatible with Western democratic values like gender equality. VB: “If one admits to Islamic demand to allow headscarves in education and government, one legitimizes the Sharia as a whole.” Furthermore, the party notes that a lot of women do not wear the headscarf voluntarily, but because they are forced to do so by their husbands, the imam or the Muslim community in general. Therefore, the headscarf is a symbol of the inferior position of the woman within Islam. A similar message contains the column of the party’s chairman that appeared on the party’s website in September 2009 (Valkeniers 2009). In this column the chairman stated that it is time that the government sets boundaries and is willing to protect Western values and liberties. According to the chairman “there is no negotiation possible when it comes to (...) the equivalence between man and women”. Furthermore, the chairman endorsed a statement of some Flemish journalists that “The headscarf is a symbol of suppression that is introduced by them who do not have good plans with liberty. It is a tactical weapon in a crusade against modernity.” According to these journalists, the headscarf is in the vision of Muslim fundamentalism “a flag, planted in the heart of the West”. In an article that appeared on the party’s website in March 2011 the party also endorsed a statement saying that wearing a headscarf is not the same as wearing a Catholic cross or a skullcap since “these symbols do not particularly discriminate women” (*Vlaams Belang* 2011c). The party even stated in an article that appeared on the party’s website that the comparison between a headscarf and a swastika is not that farfetched (*Vlaams Belang* 2008a).

It is also notable that the party in several articles criticizes feminists and the left for not sticking up for Muslim women. For example, recently the party criticized the female Belgian minister of Justice for not minding that the Moroccan prime minister refused to shake her hand at an official meeting. VB MP Barbara Pas stated: “It is a shame to find out that the government does not think the equal

treatment of men and women is important anymore when therefore an Islamic friend has to be reprimanded.” (*Vlaams Belang* 2012e: 14). The column of the VB’s chairman also stated that “feminists look the other way when women are being suppressed, forced to marriage, abused or genitally maimed as long as this occurs in the name of some exotic culture or macho out-of-desert religion” (Valkeniers 2009). The party also resents the leftwing position that not the headscarf itself but a prohibition on headscarves hinders the emancipation of Muslim women (*Vlaams Belang* 2009a). The party states in this respect that it suspects that with the “integration with the preservation of identity”-slogan the left wants to attract the votes of conservative Muslims (*Vlaams Belang* 2007c).

The above mentioned party literature has made it already clear that the party often tends to refer to gender equality in the context of Islamification. However, the most striking way in which the party demands attention for this issue has not been mentioned yet. Recently, VB senator Anke Vandermeersch presented her book named “*Hoer noch slavin*”. The book deals with Islam and Islamification in Flanders and its effect on women’s lives. Vandermeersch stated that she has written the book in order to “awake women and warn them against Islamification of Europe, because when that process continues, women will be the first victims” (*Vlaams Belang* 2012c). Furthermore, she stated that “the emancipation strived for by our mothers and grandmothers cannot be roll backed by an Islam that disrespects women” (*Vlaams Belang* 2012f). Although the book is written on private capacity the VB clearly supports the content. For example, the book is promoted on several occasions in the party’s paper and on the party’s website. Moreover, Vandermeersch stated in an interview that with this book she wants to disprove for once and for all the prejudice that the VB is a women unfriendly party (*Vlaams Belang* 2012d). VB senator Vandermeersch also initiated the movement “Women against Islamification” (VTI). This movement is explicitly linked with the VB and spreads a similar message as Vandermeersch’s book.

The movement’s main platform is its website<sup>4</sup>. The movement’s charter states that if the current democratic developments continue, large areas of Western-Europe will be the victim of a “hostile takeover by Islam” (VTI 2012a). Islamic regulations will dominate Flemish society: “If Europe does not resist, it threatens to be colonized by Islam.” The movement’s charter notes that women will be the first victims of Islamification since women are perceived to be inferior to men. According to the movement, Islam discriminates and humiliates women. Furthermore, women in Islamic communities are the victims of “discrimination, suppression and violence”. The party’s website also contains the “latest news” concerning this issue; this news includes exclusively negative coverage. For example, the website contains an article about female Western journalists that were raped during the Arabic Spring (VTI 2012c). The website also reports about a bill that is proposed in Egypt after the Arabic Spring. The bill makes it legal for men to have sex with their wives until six hours after her death. According to the movement, the bill is “another piece of evidence that shows that the result of the

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<sup>4</sup> [www.vrouwentegenislamisering.be](http://www.vrouwentegenislamisering.be)

“Arabic Spring” is Islamification of the Middle-East” and that “women’s rights and Islam(ification) are incompatible” (VTI 2012b).

In sum, the VB indeed exclusively defends gender equality and women’s right in the context of Islamification. In this respect, gender equality is often used as a means to show that Islam is incompatible with Western values. It is striking that there are no examples present in which the party notes gender equality or women’s emancipation in another respect. In other words; gender equality and women’s emancipation are never mentioned without mentioning Islam at the same time. The evidence did not make clear though whether this is due to the hypothesized explanation that defending gender equality is somewhat at odds with the party’s other nativist struggle for survival of the nation, its fight against declining birth rates. This part of the hypothesis is in my view no longer in line with the expectations though. Indeed, the previous hypotheses showed that the VB’s struggle to preserve the native population does not necessarily mean that the party holds traditional gender views. Therefore, it must be concluded that the evidence supports the hypothesis although it is not likely that the party frames the issue *exclusively* in this manner out of traditional conceptions on gender roles.

### 5.2.3 Populism

#### Hypothesis 6

*Populist radical right parties oppose policies concerning the positive discrimination of women or women quota.*

The populist radical right holds a “politics of resentment”; it perceives representative democracy to be in the hands of self-serving elites that are out of touch with the wishes and beliefs of ordinary people. It is therefore hypothesized that the populist radical right opposes policies concerning the positive discrimination of women or women quota since it perceives such policies to be undemocratic elite-driven projects. From the examined evidence it becomes clear that the VB is unambiguous in its position towards women quota or the positive discrimination of women; the party strongly opposes such policies. When the Belgian minister of work and equal chances proposed women quota for top positions in business the party wrote on its website that it considers such policies to be “political correct nonsense” (*Vlaams Belang* 2009c). The article also repeatedly referred to an article in the Dutch conservative magazine *Elsevier* stating that there is no evidence for the systematic discrimination of women. This article stated furthermore that the lack of top women could also be due to their own free choice. A lot of women are satisfied with a part time job and do not feel much for a fight to the top. Similar arguments are endorsed by the party in an article that appeared a day later (*Vlaams Belang* 2009d). The author of the VB- article implied furthermore that the negative

consequences of this kind of positive discrimination is already visible in politics in stating that “you can only wonder how some women were ever able to become a minister” (*Vlaams Belang* 2009c). The party’s aversion towards quota and positive discrimination also emerged in an article that appeared around the same time (*Vlaams Belang* 2009b). In this article the party called “the correct reflection of society” “a dogma of the leftwing church”. The party also endorsed a statement of a journalist working for *Elsevier* which stated that a system of positive discrimination is unacceptable since “it has negative consequences for individuals belonging to the majority who are not to blame for those who are in a disadvantaged position.” The party stated furthermore that quota and positive discrimination confirm target groups in their role as victims.

A more elaborated but also somewhat divergent view of the VB’s position on this issue appeared in an article on the party’s website in 2011 (*Vlaams Belang* 2011d). In this article VB senator Anke Vandermeersch wondered: “How many quotas are they going to find out, after the immigrant quota now the women’s quota. Later on the gay-lesbian-bisexual quota or who knows, the stupid blonds quota? Maybe we should provide for a maximum quota against leftwing patronizing (...)”. The party argues in this article that there are a lot of fundamental objections against women quota in business. According to the party women quota are a paternalistic and patronizing interference of government in free entrepreneurship. Furthermore, the party questions whether diversity (whatever that means) has any added value in business. The party argues that the board of a company should consist of competent directors, and that is it. According to the VB the reality is that the reason for the small number of women in boards is not due to gender in itself but due to the fact that men as well as women are being recruited from a very selected club in society. The party states that imposing women quota is like “fighting the symptoms of a disease without fighting the disease in itself”. Therefore the VB states that politics should do something about what the party calls the “elevator of glass”. The party notes that in their early career men tend to make promotions faster than women. The party states that “thereby very capable women are put behind while this is also disastrous for the early family life of the men in dispute”. According to the party it is often family life that keeps women away from the labor market or restricts them in striving for a top function within business. Therefore the party argues that concrete measures must be taken to improve the conditions of working women in tuning labor and family, i.e. better child care and parental leave. Only when those measures do not work, one can possibly consider introducing voluntary quota.

In articles concerning positive discrimination (of women or foreigners) that appeared in 2010 and 2011 the VB too strongly opposes positive discrimination. In a column the chairman of the party called policies concerning positive discrimination “stupid, politically correct, patronizing and especially contra productive” (Valkeniers 2010). The chairman also wondered how women or immigrants must feel since it is questionable whether they really got the job on the basis of their qualities. The party also repeated that it should be the most capable persons who should get a top

function (*Vlaams Belang* 2010a). Finally, VB prominent Phillip Dewinter added a nativist dimension to the debate in stating that it is scandalous that target groups like the disabled and women are being abused as “lubricants to provide a policy of positive discrimination for immigrants” (*Vlaams Belang* 2011f). According to him, positive discrimination is primarily used as a means to disadvantage Flemish candidates over immigrants.

In sum, the evidence shows that the VB strongly opposes women quota or the positive discrimination of women. It was hypothesized that this position is a result of the party’s “politics of resentment”; populist radical right parties will oppose policies concerning the positive discrimination of women or women quota since it perceives such policies to be undemocratic elite-driven projects. The VB motivates its position with a variety of arguments; sometimes the party suggests that women are just not that ambitious while at other times the party argues that it is better to “fight the disease instead of the symptoms”. Either way, in both lines of arguments the VB argues that quota’s and positive discrimination are the result of the patronizing intentions of the left. Therefore, it is correct that the party’s position is a result of the party’s “politics of resentment”.

#### **5.2.4 Nativism**

##### Hypothesis 7

*The populist radical right frames its ideology on women and gender relations primarily through the “nativist struggle”.*

Mudde’s theory of the populist radical right emphasized that the absolute core feature of the populist radical right is nativism. Mudde (2007) considers nativism to be the primary “coathanger” on which other concepts of the populist radical right are draped. This means that the populist radical right uses nativism as a coathanger to interpret various political issues in a manner that is consistent with its ideology. The existing literature on gender and the populist radical right suggest that gender issues are most likely of subordinate importance to the populist radical right. Consequently, it is assumed that gender issues are for the populist radical right just another ‘political issue’ on which they had to position in a way that is consistent with its core ideological feature, which is nativism. In addition, the edited volume by Amesberger and Halbmayer (2002) indicated that populist radical right parties primarily refer to women and gender relations with regard to the “nativist struggle”. Therefore it is hypothesized that the populist radical right frames its ideology on women and gender issues through the “nativist struggle”.

The previous hypotheses make a distinction between two elements of the populist radical right’s nativist struggle. At the one hand the VB’s ideology on women and gender relations is examined in the

context of the party's struggle for the preservation of the native population, while at the other hand the party's ideology is examined in the context of the party's fight against Islamification. When all hypotheses are taken into consideration it is clear that the VB uses nativism as a "coathanger"; the party's ideology on women and gender relations is primarily framed through "the nativist struggle".

The section that deals with the VB's ideology on women and gender relations made it clear that the party is strongly in favor of the traditionally composed family; a family that includes one man, one woman and multiple children. It appears that the party is also sympathetic to the traditionally organized family but the party does not explicitly favor such families over dual-earner families. In this respect the party often argues that it wants families to have a "truly free choice" in choosing between working and caretaking (hypothesis 1). However, hypothesis 2 made it clear that the party's position on this issue must be seen in a wider context. In the end, the party's true aim is to fight declining birth rates. The party wants to preserve the native population and in order to do so it proposes family friendly policies that support traditionally *as well* as modernly organized families. As long as couples are stimulated to *become* families and have *more* children the party does not really seem to mind whether couples choose a single-earner-model or a dual-earner-model. The party's aversion towards abortion and divorce is also linked to the VB's aim to increase the birth rates of the native population. In this respect, abortion and divorce are seen as phenomena that threaten the achievement of this goal (hypothesis 3). Hypothesis 4 showed that women are rarely discussed out of the VB's increasing birth rates-driven *Familienpolitik*. The party is keen on improving the lives of women when it comes to combining work and caretaking but it is not really concerned about women out of the family sphere (in line with hypothesis 6).

However, an exception must be made when it comes to Islam(ification) and its incompatibility with core Western values such as gender equality. In this respect, hypothesis 5 made it clear that in the VB's nativist fight against Islamification gender equality is often used as a means to show that Islam is incompatible with Western values. It is striking that there are no examples present in which the party notes gender equality or women's emancipation in another respect. It is important to note that the party's struggle against Islamification also seems to be closely linked with the previously mentioned nativist struggle for survival of the nation. The VB has emphasized on different occasions that a higher birth rate of the native population is necessary to prevent new mass immigration (*Vlaams Belang* 2010a and 2011a, Dewinter 2012), to restore the "normal population structure" (*Vlaams Belang* 2007b) or to protect Flanders against a "hostile takeover by Islam" (VTI 2012a). In this respect, it can be stated that the party's fight against declining birth rates is also a part of the party's fight against Islamification.

In sum, the hypotheses have shown that the VB indeed frames its ideology on women and gender relations through the two interrelated nativist struggles. The party exclusively mentions women in this

context. The party either uses women as a means to show that Islam is incompatible with Western civilization or it only supports policies that create a better environment for women to become mothers and have multiple children.

#### *Sub-conclusion*

It is clear that the VB frames its ideology on women and gender relations primarily through the two folded “nativist struggle”. Hence, *Frauenpolitik* is never mentioned by the party without mentioning *Familienpolitik* or Islam at the same time. However, in contrast to popular assumptions, the VB does not hold traditional views on the division of gender roles.

Although the “national” in the *national* populist radical right does not help us to improve our understanding of the populist radical right’s ideology with respect to women and gender relations it seems that the VB, in contrast to the PVV, holds a coherent set of positions on this theme. Nativism is always the leading ideological feature on which the VB positions itself and ad hoc positioning seems out of order. The question still remains though whether there is a comprehensive and sophisticated “thick” ideology on which the party is able to position itself regarding gender related issues. It is argued that the monotonic focus of nativism on the nation and xenophobia has left little potential for the nativist ideology to offer answers to a broad range of political questions, i.e. questions regarding women and gender relations. The evidence suggests that result of the party’s focus on nativism is that women and gender relations are never really discussed out of the context of nativism; *Frauenpolitik* is for the party the same as *Familienpolitik* and gender equality is only mentioned in the context of Islamification.

## Chapter 6 Discussion and conclusion

This final chapter's aim is to provide a general overview of this study's results. Moreover, it wants to discuss the results in a larger theoretical framework. The first two sections are focused on recapitulating the theoretical background and the empirical results of this study. The latter two sections are primarily focused at discussion. For instance, the third section addresses whether the distinction between a liberal and national oriented populist radical right turned out to be useful. Furthermore, the fourth section discusses the main conclusions of this study. Finally, the chapter ends with a few remarks on future research regarding the populist radical right.

### 6.1 Theoretical background

This thesis' builds on the basic idea that since women and gender relations do not belong to the populist radical right's core ideology, the populist radical right will frame its ideology on this issue primarily through its core ideological features, in particular nativism. In this respect, it especially hypothesized that the populist radical right will frame its position on women and gender relations through its twofold "nativist struggle" (Mudde 2007: Amesberger and Halbmayr 2002). On the one hand, Amesberger and Halbmayr's edited volume showed that populist radical right positions on gender are heavily linked with nativism, i.e. native women are encouraged to have children in order to preserve the native population. The nativist struggle for survival of the nation has in this respect also brought the populist radical right to defend the traditional family and traditional norms and values. Amesberger and Halbmayr have noted that the populist radical right is unique in giving *Familienpolitik* as *Bevölkerungspolitik* a nativist dimension. On the other hand, Mudde and others have noticed that the populist radical right also tends to involve gender in its nativist fight against Islamification. According to the populist radical right, Islam is incompatible with the values and beliefs of Western civilization (Mudde 2007: Zúquete 2008). Since gender equality is perceived to be a key Western value, it is hypothesized that the nativist fight against Islamification has induced the populist radical right to defend the equality of men and women as a key value of its ideology.

Although it is hypothesized that the populist radical right frames its ideology on women and gender relations *primarily* through nativism and hence through its twofold "nativist struggle", it is also argued that different national political contexts might influence the *exact* position of populist radical right parties on this issue. Therefore, a diverse case method is employed in which the PVV is perceived to be typical for the more liberal oriented populist radical right whereas the VB is perceived to be representative for the more national oriented populist radical right.

## 6.2 The results

It turns out that the case of the VB largely supports the hypotheses. The party frames women and gender relations primarily through its twofold “nativist struggle”. When it comes to the survival of the native population an important goal of the party is to increase birth rates. In this respect, the party is strongly in favor of the traditionally composed family and opposes permissive divorce and abortion policies. However, the party also wants to fight decreasing birth rates in some unexpected ways. The party wants to preserve the native population and in order to do so it proposes family friendly policies that support traditionally *as well* as modernly organized families. As long as couples are stimulated to *become* families and have *more* children the party does not really seem to mind whether couples choose a single-earner-model or a dual-earner-model. In this respect, the evidence also showed that women are rarely discussed out of the VB’s increasing birth rates-driven *Familienpolitik*. The party is keen on improving the lives of women when it comes to combining work and caretaking but it is not really concerned about women out of the family sphere. An exception counts though when it comes to the “other” nativist struggle, i.e. the nativist fight against Islamification. The VB often claims to defend gender equality in its fight against Islamification. However, this part of the nativist struggle seems in the case of the VB also closely linked with its nativist fight for survival of the nation since the VB has emphasized on different occasions that a higher birth rate is necessary to protect Flanders against immigration and Islamification. Consequently, the VB frames its ideology indeed primarily through the twofold “nativist struggle”.

In contrast, the PVV hardly supports any hypothesis. In fact, with regard to the first “nativist struggle”, i.e. the survival of the nation, the PVV supported none of the formulated hypotheses. It appears that this part of the nativist struggle is not of any concern to the PVV. Consequently, it has not framed its ideology on women and gender issues in a coherent manner. It even turns out that the party neither has an explicit view on *Familienpolitik* nor on *Frauenpolitik*; it are just nonissues within the party. However, an exception must be made with respect to the PVV’s nativist fight against Islamification. This part of the “nativist struggle” is very much present within the party. Moreover, the issue is often linked with a variety of women’s issues such as gender equality. The PVV perceives immigration, Islam and the perceived Islamification of the Netherlands to be a threat for gender equality and the party emphasizes the suppressive tendencies of Islam. Consequently, the PVV primarily frames its ideology on women and gender relations through a one-sided “nativist struggle”, i.e. its nativist struggle against Islamification.

## 6.3 The liberal versus the national oriented populist radical right

Although both parties appear to frame their ideology on women and gender relations primarily through nativism and hence “the nativist struggle”, it is clear that there remain some significant differences between the parties. The main difference is that the VB frames its ideology through the two folded

nativist struggle, whereas the PVV only frames its ideology through one aspect of the nativist struggle. The question remains whether the differences between the VB and the PVV can be explained through the different broader national political contexts in which the parties operate, which was suggested in chapter 3. With respect to national oriented populist radical right parties it was assumed that its background and national political context might frame its position on women and gender relations in a more conservative-traditional fashion. This turns out not really to be the case. The VB is indeed in favor of traditionally composed families but does not especially seem to favor traditionally organized families over modernly organized families. In the end, the party just wants to increase birth rates. As mentioned earlier, as long as couples are stimulated to *become* families and have *more* children the party does not really seem to mind whether couples choose a single-earner-model or a dual-earner-model. Consequently, although the nationalist wish to form an autonomous Flanders may have intensified the party's emphasis on the preservation of the Flemish population, it cannot be concluded that national oriented parties like the VB frame their ideology on women and gender relations in a particularly conservative-traditional fashion.

With regard to liberal oriented populist radical right parties it was especially thought that a nation's strong progressive liberal tradition might bring this party subtype to frame its position on women and gender relations in a more liberal fashion. One could argue that the PVV does not seem to care about higher birth rates because doing so is not really acceptable in a society such as the Netherlands. However, the presence of a strong progressive liberal tradition cannot explain why the PVV does not really have a position on *Familienpolitik* or *Frauenpolitik* whatsoever. For example, the party could also have framed its position in a non-traditional manner; stating it wants favorable policies for dual-earner families in order for them to combine work and caretaking more easily. Instead, it seems that the preservation of the native population is just not of any concern to the PVV.

When these conclusions of the VB and the PVV are taken into account it appears that making a distinction between the more national oriented populist radical right and the more liberal oriented populist radical right is not useful. The VB's nationalist character might have intensified the party's struggle for the preservation of the native population but it does not make the party particularly traditional with regard to women and gender relations. Moreover, the particular strong liberal progressive tradition of the Netherlands cannot explain why the PVV does not worry about the decline of the native population or why the party has no explicit view on *Familienpolitik* or *Frauenpolitik* whatsoever. In other words; the "national" in the national populist radical right and the "liberal" in the liberal populist radical right is not able to explain (the difference between) the parties' position on these issues. Hence, the distinction between the two subtypes does not contribute to our understanding of the populist radical right's ideology on women and gender relations.

#### 6.4 Three main conclusions

Apart from the obvious differences, the cases of the PVV and the VB showed some significant similarities. In my view, three main conclusions must be derived from the hypotheses. Firstly, the populist radical right frames its ideology on women and gender relations primarily through nativism and in particular through its “nativist struggle” against Islamification. Secondly and closely linked with the first conclusion, both cases showed that *Frauenpolitik* as an independent policy area does not exist within the populist radical right. Finally, the populist radical right does not necessarily hold particular traditional gender views. In the following, I will discuss each conclusion separately.

With regard to the first conclusion, hypothesis 7 of each case study showed that both parties indeed primarily frame its ideology on women and gender relations primarily through nativism, the populist radical right’s core ideological feature. The VB frames its ideology on women and gender relations through the twofold nativist struggle. Hence, through “the nativist fight for survival of the nation” and through “the nativist fight against Islamification”. However, with regard to the PVV the party frames its position on women and gender relations only through the latter “nativist fight against Islamification”. This part of the conclusion is at odds with the earlier findings of Amesberger and Halbmayr (2002); they concluded that the populist radical right gives its *Familienpolitik* a particular nativist dimension by highlighting the importance of *Bevölkerungspolitik* in this respect. The PVV, however, does not seem to hold a comprehensive or coherent set of positions with respect to the issues affecting the preservation of the native population. I have argued that the lack of a view on issues regarding the survival of the native population is most likely the result of a lack of electoral importance. The PVV has always been a party that at its core is opposing immigration and Islam. It is also the focus on these issues that has brought the PVV electoral success. It is not expected that the party has much to gain with an elaborated view on the issues concerning the growth of native population. So, the party just has not come up with such a view.

The second main conclusion is closely linked with the former and concerns the lack of *Frauenpolitik* as an independent policy area within the populist radical right. One could wonder if this is such a striking result since women politics in general does not appear to be a “hot topic” within a lot of (notably right wing) party families. However, it must be noted that nativist ideology has a distinctive role with regard to this second conclusion. The hypotheses showed that the VB always puts *Frauenpolitik* in a nativist perspective since either *Frauenpolitik* is for the VB the same as *Familienpolitik*, or *Frauenpolitik* is only a concern to the party when it comes to the party’s fight against Islamification. Moreover, the only occasion the PVV is concerned about *Frauenpolitik* is when it is placed in the context of the party’s fight against Islamification. Consequently, both parties primarily frame their ideology on women and gender relations, as far as this goes, through nativism. Nativism, however, is in itself a thin-centered ideology. It is argued that nativism is a thin centered ideology since “it lacks the capacity to put forward a wide-ranging and coherent program for the

solution to crucial political questions” (Stanley 2008: 95). Or, to put it in other words: the monotonic focus of nativism on the nation and xenophobia leave little potential for the nativist ideology to offer answers to a broad range of political questions. In my view, the dominance of nativist ideology in framing women and gender relations is the reason why the populist radical right has turned out to be unable to provide a comprehensive view on gender related themes. By focusing on the core concept nativism, alongside other concepts like populism and authoritarianism which are in itself also “thin” concepts, the populist radical right can only comprehensively address issues which are related to its restricted core.

Finally, a remarkable conclusion concerns the populist radical right’s position regarding gender roles. Amesberger and Halbmayr particularly found that the populist radical right holds traditional gender views. However, this finding is neither confirmed by the PVV nor by the VB. Both parties do not particularly prefer traditional single-earner-families in which men are breadwinners and women take care of children and the household over dual-earner-families. This is a rather remarkable result since it is in total contrast with flourishing popular conceptions about the populist radical right’s ideology on women and gender relations. Therefore, I conclude that the populist radical right does not necessarily hold traditional positions regarding the division of gender roles. Was Kofman right then in stating that “there is not a single and consistent attitude to the family and its social relations among Far Right movements” (Kofman 1998: 91 in Mudde 2007: 92)? In my view, this statement is correct. As long as nativism (alongside other thin concepts like populism and authoritarianism) remains the dominant concept within the populist radical right’s ideology the populist radical right will continue to be flexible in how it addresses a variety of themes, including women and family politics.

## **6.5 Future research**

I would like to end this study with a few remarks regarding future research on the populist radical right. It is argued that the populist radical right is not able to provide a comprehensive view on women and gender relations because the populist radical right holds a “thin-centered” ideology in which nativism is the dominant concept. Future research could examine from which point of view the populist radical right addresses other themes, like environmental politics. Is the populist radical right also on other themes hindered by the dominance of nativism in providing a comprehensive and sophisticated set of positions?

With regard to the demand-side there is also a lot to discover. For instance, what are the exact reasons for the persisting gender gap? If it is true that the range of women and men that hold populist radical right views is about the same then why do women not translate their political orientations in political actions? The literature has already provided some answers to these questions, but the answers remain so far provisional. It appears there is still a lot to discover when it comes to understanding the populist radical right.

## Appendix I

Hypothesis	Expect to find
<p>Hypothesis 1</p> <p><i>The populist radical right holds “traditional” or “modern traditional” views on the division of gender roles.</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Party emphasizes the importance of (traditional) family, i.e. perceives families to be the “cornerstones of society”.</li> <li>• Party speaks positively about stay-at-home mothers, i.e. cheering the benefits of stay-at-home mothers on child development and family stability.</li> <li>• Party speaks negatively about working mothers, i.e. addressing the ‘risks’ of working mothers on child development and family stability.</li> </ul>
<p>Hypothesis 2</p> <p><i>Populist radical right parties favor socioeconomic policies that create a family friendly climate.</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Party emphasizes the importance of (traditional) family, i.e. perceives families to be the “cornerstones of society”.</li> <li>• Party states family politics are key to the party.</li> <li>• Party supports policies that benefit traditional families, i.e. supporting generous child benefits or tax benefits.</li> <li>• Party opposes policies that support working mothers, i.e. opposing generous child care provisions.</li> </ul>
<p>Hypothesis 3</p> <p><i>Populist radical right parties oppose permissive abortion and divorce policies.</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Party opposes policies that will loosen current policies on abortion and divorce.</li> <li>• Party wants to tighten current (liberal) abortion and divorce policies.</li> </ul>
<p>Hypothesis 4</p> <p><i>Frauenpolitik is for the populist radical right the same as Familienpolitik.</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Party mentions women often in its view on family politics, i.e. party wants to improve the conditions for women to have (more) children.</li> <li>• Party does not mention women outside a family-context, i.e. party is not concerned with improving the lives of women outside the family sphere.</li> </ul>
<p>Hypothesis 5</p> <p><i>The populist radical right exclusively addresses gender equality in its nativist fight against Islamification.</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Party states Islam is a threat to key western values, like gender equality.</li> <li>• Party never defends gender equality or women’s emancipation outside the context of Islam.</li> <li>• Party is not concerned with <i>improving</i> gender equality or women’s emancipation, i.e. party does not propose or support policies that are aimed at improving gender equality or the emancipation of women.</li> </ul>

<p>Hypothesis 6</p> <p><i>Populist radical right parties oppose policies concerning the positive discrimination of women or women quota.</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Party opposes policies including the positive discrimination of women or women quota.</b></li> <li>• <b>Party supports the abolishment of policies concerning positive discrimination or women quota.</b></li> <li>• <b>Party states positive discrimination or women quota is a result of leftwing elite ruling/leftwing patronizing.</b></li> </ul>
<p>Hypothesis 7</p> <p><i>The populist radical right frames its ideology on women and gender relations primarily through the “nativist struggle”.</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Party’s view on women is determined by its wish to increase current birth rates, i.e. party thinks women’s place in society should be the one that is most favorable to childbearing and childrearing.</b></li> <li>• <b>Party only defends gender equality or women’s emancipation in the context of its fight against Islam, i.e. party is not <i>actively</i> concerned with improving the lives of women.</b></li> </ul>

## Appendix II Sources coding scheme

### *Coding scheme PVV*

<i>Sources</i>	<i>Priority</i>
<b>Gedoogakkoord</b>	
‘Gedoogakkoord VVD-PVV-CDA’ (n.d.)	<b>1</b>
<b>Parliamentary debates</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Handelingen Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal (2006-2007a), vergaderjaar 2006-2007, Kamerstuk 30 420 no. 39 (2007, March 5).</li> <li>• Handelingen Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal (2006-2007b), vergaderjaar 2006-2007, Kamerstuk TK 51 (2007, March 21).</li> <li>• Handelingen Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal (2006-2007c), vergaderjaar 2006-2007, Kamerstuk TK 76 (2007, June 5).</li> <li>• Handelingen Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal (2007-2008a), vergaderjaar 2007-2008, Kamerstuk TK 66 (2008, March 20).</li> <li>• Handelingen Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal (2007-2008b), vergaderjaar 2007-2008, Kamerstuk 31 200 XVI no. 127 (2008, March 26).</li> <li>• Handelingen Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal (2007-2008c), vergaderjaar 2007-2008, Kamerstuk TK 83 (2008, May 14).</li> <li>• Handelingen Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, vergaderjaar 2008-2009, Kamerstuk TK 17 (2008, October 29).</li> <li>• Handelingen Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, vergaderjaar 2009-2010, Kamerstuk 32 123 XVI no. 101 (2009, December 14).</li> <li>• Handelingen Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, vergaderjaar 2010-2011, Kamerstuk TK 58 (2011, March 9).</li> <li>• Handelingen Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal (2011-2012a), vergaderjaar 2011-2012, Kamerstuk 30 420 no. 158. (2011 July 13).</li> <li>• Handelingen Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal (2011-2012b), vergaderjaar 2011-2012, Kamerstuk 30 420 no. 170 (2012, April 10).</li> </ul>	<b>2</b>
<b>Interviews</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Beverman. G. and A. Geluk (2008, August 23) “Fleur Agema; Wilders’ nummer twee vertrouwt ook bij ethische kwesties op logica en gezond redeneren”, <i>Nederlands Dagblad</i>.</li> <li>• Dresselhuys, C. (2007a, March 1) ““Ik wil die extreem-rechtse stemmer echt niet”; Geert Wilders, fractieleider PVV, langs de Feministische Meetlat”, <i>Opzij</i>.</li> <li>• Van Lambalgen, J. (2008, June 1) “Vrouwenquota: durft de politiek het aan?”, <i>Opzij</i>.</li> <li>• Van Lambalgen, J. (2007b, October 1) “Poortwachters van de emancipatie”, <i>Opzij</i>.</li> <li>• Manschot A. en Schoon, M. (2011, April 1) ‘Gezocht: minister van</li> </ul>	<b>3</b>

emancipatiezaken', <i>Opzij</i> .	
<b>Party documents</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• GroepWilders (n.d.) <i>Onafhankelijkheidsverklaring</i>.</li> <li>• Partij voor de Vrijheid (n.d.) <i>Een Nieuw-Realistische Visie</i>.</li> <li>• Partij voor de Vrijheid (2006) <i>Verkiezingspamflet</i>.</li> <li>• Partij voor de Vrijheid (2010) <i>De agenda van hoop en optimisme. Een tijd om te kiezen: PVV 2010-2015</i>.</li> <li>• Wilders, G. (2006) <i>Klare Wijn</i>.</li> <li>• Wilders, G. (2006). <i>Een Nieuwe Gouden Eeuw</i>.</li> </ul>	<b>4</b>
<b>Newspaper articles</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• "Baas is meer kwijt aan kinderopvang" (2011, June 24), <i>Trouw de Verdieping</i>.</li> <li>• "Flitsscheiding blijft populair" (2007, July 18), <i>De Telegraaf</i>.</li> <li>• Gunst, J. (2011, May 28) "Veel woorden, weinig daden", <i>Reformatorisch Dagblad</i>.</li> <li>• Herderschreê, G. (2011c, April 27) "PVV is eruit: abortus moet soms moeilijker", <i>De Volkskrant</i>.</li> <li>• Herderschreê, G. (2011b, April 20) "Wet op abortus onveranderd", <i>De Volkskrant</i>.</li> <li>• Hoedeman, J. (2011a, Februari 10) "PVV heeft een standpunt over abortus, en toch ook weer niet", <i>De Volkskrant</i>.</li> <li>• "Kamer: 25 pct vrouwen in top" (2008, April 24), <i>NRC Handelsblad</i>.</li> <li>• "Kamp: geen verplicht uurtarief kinderopvang" (2011d, May 19), <i>De Volkskrant</i>.</li> <li>• Meerhof, R. (2007, June 6) "Kabinet beslist 'flitsscheiding' af te schaffen", <i>De Volkskrant</i>.</li> <li>• "Ook kinderopvang niet buiten schot in Catshuis" (2012, March 9), <i>Trouw de Verdieping</i>.</li> <li>• 'PVV: Vrouw moet zelf abortus betalen' (2008, Februari 7), <i>Reformatorisch Dagblad</i>.</li> <li>• "Snelle scheiding blijft mogelijk" (2007, March 22), <i>Reformatorisch Dagblad</i>.</li> <li>• "Vaderschapsverlof naar vijf dagen, tenzij PVV terugkrabbelt" (2010, November 11), <i>Trouw de Verdieping</i>.</li> <li>• Vrijsen, E. (2012, July 7) "Ik moet de eerste nog tegen komen die zegt: wat een vervelende vent", <i>Elsevier</i>.</li> </ul>	<b>5</b>

Sources	Priority
<b>Electoral programs</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Vlaams Belang (n.d.) <i>Programma</i>.</li> <li>• Vlaams Belang (2005a) <i>Een socialer Vlaanderen</i>.</li> <li>• Vlaams Belang (2005-2006) <i>Programmaboek</i>.</li> <li>• Vlaams Belang (2012a) <i>Sociaaleconomisch programma</i>.</li> </ul>	<b>1</b>
<b>Party brochures</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Vlaams Belang (n.d.) <i>De beginselverklaring van het Vlaams Belang</i>.</li> <li>• Vlaams Belang (n.d.) <i>Kennismakingsbrochure. De kracht van een overtuiging</i>.</li> <li>• Vlaams Belang (2010a) <i>Immigratie. Problemen en oplossingen</i>.</li> <li>• Vlaams Belang (2011a) <i>Immigratie. Financiële en maatschappelijke kostprijs</i>.</li> <li>• Vlaams Belang (2011e, November) <i>Hoe overleven in een Islamitische samenleving?</i></li> </ul>	<b>1</b>
<b>Party articles</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “Filip Dewinter dient racismeklacht in bij het parket en CGKR tegen minister Geert Bourgeois (N-VA) en Vlaamse regering” (2011b, December 15).</li> <li>• “Het belang van het kind” (2005, Februari 1).</li> <li>• “Méér kinderen!” (2007, May 13).</li> <li>• “Na de vreemdelingenquota, nu ook de vrouwenquota... (2011a, June 30).</li> <li>• “Quota en positieve discriminatie” (2009a, July 21).</li> <li>• “Scheiden doet leiden” (2010) <i>Peper &amp; Zout. De nieuwsbrief van de vrijheid</i>, 14(2), p. 7.</li> <li>• “Schuldloze echtscheiding?” (2005b, December 24).</li> <li>• “Twintig jaar abortuswet” (2010, April 2).</li> <li>• Valkeniers, B. (2009) “Meer dan een lapje stof”.</li> <li>• Valkeniers, B. (2010) “Waar ‘positieve’ discriminatie toe leidt”.</li> <li>• Vlaams Belang (n.d.) <i>Wat zegt het Vlaams Belang over ... holebi's?</i></li> <li>• Vlaams Belang (2005b, Februari 1) “Het belang van het kind”.</li> <li>• Vlaams Belang (2005c, December 24) “Schuldloze echtscheiding?”.</li> <li>• Vlaams Belang (2006, April 3) “Werk weigeren”.</li> <li>• Vlaams Belang (2007a) <i>Resoluties congreswerkgroep 6 “Waarden en</i></li> <li>• Vlaams Belang (2007b, May 13) “Méér kinderen!”.</li> <li>• Vlaams Belang (2007c, May 16) “Van hoofddoek tot boerka”.</li> <li>• Vlaams Belang (2008a, January 20) “Afshin Elian over burkini's en islamisering”.</li> <li>• Vlaams Belang (2008b) “Onze toekomst?”, <i>Vlaams Belang Magazine</i>,</li> </ul>	<b>2</b>

<p>nr. 5, p. 14.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Vlaams Belang (2009a, July 4) “Debat onder gelijkgezinden”.</li> <li>• Vlaams Belang (2009b, July 21) “Quota en positieve discriminatie”.</li> <li>• Vlaams Belang (2009c, November 19) “Vrouwenquota: politiek correcte onzin”.</li> <li>• Vlaams Belang (2009d, November 20) “Vrouwenquota, deel 2”.</li> <li>• Vlaams Belang (2010b, April 2) “Twintig jaar abortuswet”.</li> <li>• Vlaams Belang (2010c, December 11) “Weg met ons”.</li> <li>• Vlaams Belang (2011b, February 27) “Links vóór multiculturele apartheid”.</li> <li>• Vlaams Belang (2011c, March 19) “BH’s en hoofddoeken”.</li> <li>• Vlaams Belang (2011d, June 30) “Na de vreemdelingenquota, nu ook de vrouwenquota...”.</li> <li>• Vlaams Belang (2011f, December 15) “Filip Dewinter dient racismeklacht in bij het parket en CGKR tegen minister Geert Bourgeois (N-VA) en Vlaamse regering”.</li> <li>• Vlaams Belang (2012b, March 27) “Vlaams Belang kant zich tegen uitspraak van Minister De Coninck dat “meer vrouwen meer moeten werken””.</li> <li>• Vlaams Belang (2012c) “Hoer noch slavin”, <i>Vlaams Belang Magazine</i>, 3, p. 28.</li> <li>• Vlaams Belang (2012d) “Vrouwen tegen islamisering”, <i>Vlaams Belang Magazine</i>, 4, p. 20.</li> <li>• Vlaams Belang (2012e) “Islamminister weigert hand”, <i>Vlaams Belang Magazine</i>, 6, p. 14.</li> <li>• Vlaams Belang (2012f) “Hoer noch slavin”, <i>E-magazine</i>, 610.</li> </ul>	
<b>Articles related to party ideology</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Vrouwen tegen Islamisering (2012a) <i>Charter</i>. Retrieved from <a href="http://www.vrouwentegenislamisering.be">www.vrouwentegenislamisering.be</a>.</li> <li>• Vrouwen tegen Islamisering (2012b, April 26) “Arabische Lente: seks met dode vrouw toegestaan”. Retrieved from <a href="http://www.vrouwentegenislamisering.be">www.vrouwentegenislamisering.be</a>.</li> <li>• Vrouwen tegen Islamisering (2012c, June 29) “Arabische ‘Lente’: recht op verkrachting”. Retrieved from <a href="http://www.vrouwentegenislamisering.be">www.vrouwentegenislamisering.be</a>.</li> </ul>	<b>2</b>
<b>Speech</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dewinter, F. (2011, April 10) Speech at congres “Kordaat immigratiebeleid werkt”.</li> </ul>	<b>2</b>

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