To be or not to be: a non-Jewish citizen in a Jewish democracy

The influence of the international system on the domestic politics of Israel

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1. Introduction

In the summer of 2011 I visited Israel and the West Bank. During my stay in Jerusalem, I went to the Old City on a Friday, which is a holy day for both Muslims and Jews. Around 12 o'clock it was time for Friday prayer. Hundreds of Muslims tried to get to the Al-Aqsa mosque, which is one of the most important holy sites for Muslims, in the Old City. For some reason, still unclear today, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) decided at that moment, just minutes away from the start of prayer, that no men aged between 16 and 65 were allowed in. A chaotic scene unfolded before my eyes. No one knew why the IDF decided this and there was no room for a dialogue. Muslim men were pushed away and shouted at for no reason. After this incident I wondered how this minority would feel about incidents such as these. I talked to some women on my way out of the Old City and they told me it was quite normal and that they were used to it. I kept wondering why incidents like this were seen as 'quite normal', whilst everyone, according to Universal Declaration of Human Rights, has a right to practice his or her religion in his or her own way. Israel is a member state of the United Nations. The UN Charter is a binding document for all Member States, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights follows directly from this document. Besides that, Israel views itself as a democracy. So what justification, did the IDF have to refuse men to enter a holy site, thereby acting contrary to international law?

I decided it was safer to leave the Old City behind, but, of course, lost my way once outside the Old City walls. I wandered off and ended up in Silwan. Silwan, a village just outside East Jerusalem, is the Arab part of the city, and which is predominantly inhabited by the Palestinian minority. In recent years over forty Jewish settler families have taken over many houses in Silwan. Not by buying the houses of the Palestinians who live there, but by forcefully removing them with the help of the IDF (Israel Defense Force). People who have lived there for decades are thus forcefully removed from their homes, without any legal grounds. Again, this is contrary to any International Treaty concerning this subject. I talked to some Palestinians about their situation in Silwan and became more and more interested about the lives of the Palestinian minority that live in Israel.

All in all, this made me realize that Western media always talks about Gaza or the West Bank, but no one talks about the 1.500.000 Palestinians who live in Israel. They are often referred to as ‘the forgotten people’ of this conflict. In this thesis I want to bring these people under attention and
investigate what kind of effect the international system, but also the domestic policies, has on this minority group.

Besides that, the revolution that has taken place throughout the Arab world in the past couple of months could affect the whole region. People all over the Middle East, from Egypt to Bahrain, are demanding democratic reforms and want an end to the corruption and non-democratic ways their countries are governed. It is important to consider what effect these revolutions will have in the future on the domestic politics of the countries concerned, but also the relations that these countries maintain with the other states in the international system.

When, on the 7th of November 1917, the British government declared its support for the creation of a Jewish state, one of the longest and still ongoing conflicts in recent history started. The whole situation escalated when the Declaration of Independence was signed in 1948, declaring an independent state of Israel in former Mandatory Palestine. In the decades that followed the region was characterized by many conflicts between the Israelis and Palestinians, but also between the Israelis and neighboring countries, such as Egypt and Jordan who, in the beginning, did not recognize the existence of the State of Israel. Many wars and conflicts later, Israel still exists, and names itself as the only true democracy in the Middle East. In the next chapter a short historical outline will be given on how these events shaped the relationship between Israel, its neighboring countries and the Palestinians.

Traditionally, Comparative Politics looks at the domestic politics of any given state, whilst International Relations looks at interstate relations. In this thesis the focus will be on the concrete behavior and policies of the State of Israel (CP) on the one hand and the regional security concerns of Israel towards neighboring countries (IR) on the other hand. Hypotheses will be derived from the different IR theories. When it is found that these hypotheses are not verified CP might offer alternative explanations.

Within Israel lives a Palestinian minority. This minority has always lived on the land that is now Israel and they stayed there after the Declaration of Independence of the State of Israel in 1948. The research question that stands central to this thesis is that if Israel is viewed as a democratic state the minorities that live in Israel would have strong civil and minority rights and would be treated as equal to the Jewish majority. Then, how can it be explained that Israel limits the civil rights of this minority? This is a discrepancy between theory and empiricism and therefore will be
interesting to look into. For the Comparative Politics part of this thesis the author will elaborate on the definitions of an ethnic versus a democratic state and look at the Israeli institutions that are suppose to protect minority rights. Why are they failing? Is it because these institutions are too weak or is it because of the Israeli legislation which makes it hard for these institutions to enforce rights for the minority groups that live in Israel? Because of the Israeli political institutions, such as the low qualifying threshold of 2 percent the power of the small extremely religious political parties, who view Palestinian rights as a threat to Israeli security, is magnified. This will be elaborated upon further on in this thesis. In a bid to answer this question from an IR point of view, the second image reversed approach will be used to explain what influence the relationship between Israel and its neighboring countries has on the political and legal position of the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel. The line of reasoning in this case will be that Israel is surrounded by hostile Arab states and therefore needs to restrict the civil rights of the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel, because this minority is seen as Arab and therefore part of these enemy states. It are external security threats that drive domestic processes in Israel and not democratic variables that drive these processes. There are other examples of discrimination towards minority groups in countries. One could think of the discrimination of black people in the United States and the Roma’s in different European countries. However, what makes this case special is that the discrimination towards the Palestinians minority in Israel is driven by the domestic politicization of national security concerns. This is contrary to the situation of, for example, the black people in the United States and the Roma in Europe, who were discriminated against upon the grounds of domestic politics.
1.2 The research question

Where the international relations specialist wants to understand the dynamics of the international system, specialists that are concerned with domestic politics will try to find an explanation for the nature of the domestic structure of a state (Gourevitch, 1978: 881). This distinction between International Relations and Comparative Politics was not always made. The Greeks, for example, thought the two fields of knowledge informed each other. Thucydides, who is often thought to be the first analyst of International Relations, was centrally concerned with domestic politics (Russet, 2003: 9).

The main aim of this thesis is to show that the disciplines of International Relations (IR) and Comparative Politics (CP) need to interact so that more accurate and complete explanations to questions relating to IR and CP can be given. Where most researchers think of the two disciplines as being totally distinct, my aim is to bridge the two disciplines in a bid to find an answer to my research-question. In 1978 Gourevitch started his article with the sentence:

"Is the traditional distinction between international relations and domestic politics dead?"
(Gourevitch, 1978: 881)

Domestic politics and the impact of international relations on domestic politics has not been given a lot of attention. Besides bridging the two disciplines, there seems to be a discrepancy between theory and empiricism, as already stated above. Where theories on democracy would suggest equal rights among all citizens in a country, there is a distinction being made in Israel between Jewish and non-Jewish citizens. Non-Jewish citizens, and the Palestinian minority specifically, are treated in a different way than their Jewish fellow-citizens.

This discrepancy can be found within the highest regarded Israeli documents, namely the Declaration of Independence and the Basic Laws. The Declaration of Independence states that all citizens, regardless of their religion and background, will be treated equally in the newly created Jewish state. However, the Basic Laws, which is the highest form of legislation within Israel, is discriminatory against the minorities that live on Israeli ground. An example of this discrimination is the exclusion of Palestinian citizens of Israel to serve in the Regular or Reserve Forces of the Defence Army of Israel. Because they are excluded from this they do not have the right to any benefits that veterans of the Israeli army have. It is stated that:
“If the Minister of Defense considers that reasons connected with the size of the Regular Forces or the Reserve Forces of the Defense Army of Israel or with the requirements of education, settlement or the national economy, or family reasons, or other similar reasons, so require, he may by order direct --

(a) that a person of military age shall be released from the obligation of regular service or that the period of regular service of such a person shall be reduced”

(Defense Service Law, 1949)

Besides the benefits that come from the Israeli government, there are also private benefits awarded to military citizens, which are systematically denied to the Palestinian minority, because they are prohibited to serve in the army. This is just an example of the discriminatory practices laid down in the Basic Laws towards the Palestinian minority.

From the above the following research question can be formulated:

How can the concrete behavior of the State of Israel towards the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel be explained, despite the democratic values it claims to have?

For the International Relations part the establishment of the state of Israel, in 1948, is taken as the starting point. From this establishment onwards the relations between Israel and its neighboring countries will be covered. For the domestic politics part of this thesis the focus lays on the past 12 years (from 2000 – 2012). With a more detailed focus on the 2006 and 2009 elections.
1.3 Thesis outline

In the second chapter of this thesis an outline of the most influential historical events, that shaped the Middle-East region and the relationship between the Israelis and Palestinians, will be given. These events directly influenced the position of the Palestinian minority that lives within the Israeli borders. The first event that will be elaborated upon is the Balfour Declaration which was published in 1917 and later on gave a free way to establish a Jewish state in then Mandatory Palestine. The second event is the first Arab-Israeli War of 1948 (also known as the War of Independence), followed by a third important event, namely the Declaration of Independence. Furthermore, the Six-Day War (1967) will be elaborated upon, as well as the First Intifada (1987 – 1993), furthermore the Oslo Accords (1993), the Second Intifada (2000 – 2005) and finally the recent Arab Spring will be addressed (2011).

In chapter three, the second image reversed approach, elaborated upon by Gourevitch in his 1978 article, will be addressed. This is supplementary to the second image approach, in which it is argued that the basis for policy preferences abroad lies on the domestic level. It will be argued that international relations influence the domestic policies of the state of Israel. Besides that, the mainstream IR-theories will be discussed, namely realism, liberalism and constructivism. From these theories hypotheses will be derived and these will be tested in the analysis of this thesis.

In the fourth chapter the domestic identity of Israel will be elaborated upon. Should Israel be defined as a democracy or is it an ethnic state? Can it be both a democracy and an ethnic state at the same time? What are the consequences for the minority groups that live in Israel when the state is not defined as a democracy? In a bid to answer these questions different definitions of the concept democracy will be given. Some examples will be given to see whether the rights of minority groups in Israel are respected. Besides elaborating on the different concepts of democracy, the concept of an ethnic state will be elaborated upon. At the end of the chapter a conclusion will be drawn whether or not Israel is a democracy, and if so what kind of democracy? Or whether Israel should be seen as an ethnic state. What are the consequences for the minority groups that live in Israel? Furthermore, the political institutions of the state of Israel will be discussed. What effect does the qualifying threshold have on the political arena in Israel? What are the consequences of Israel’s system of proportional representation?
In the fifth chapter of this thesis the hypotheses derived from the IR-theories discussed in chapter three will be operationalized and an method of analysis will be chosen. Furthermore, the relevance of the literature used in this thesis will be discussed.

In chapter six an analysis will be made. The hypotheses derived from the IR-theories will be analyzed and the domestic politics of Israel and elections of 2006 and 2009 in Israel will be studied in-depth. How can the behavior of the state of Israel towards its minorities be explained? In the end, it will have to be seen whether the international system shapes the domestic politics of Israel and whether the influence of the international system on these domestic politics is dominant over the democratic identity of Israel.

In chapter seven a conclusion will be drawn. It will be seen if an answer to the research question can be formulated or whether further analysis and research is necessary to come to a conclusion. Furthermore it will be seen whether this case study provides outcomes that can be used in other cases as well.


2. Historical outline

In this chapter the most important historical events that shaped the relationship between Israel and the Palestinian Territories will be elaborated upon. The outline of these events will give a frame of reference towards the relationship of these two actors, but also the relationship between Israel and its neighbouring countries. More important for this thesis is the kind of effect these events had on the position of the Palestinian minority that lives within the Israeli territory. Firstly, the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and its consequences for the region will be outlined. Secondly, the first Arab-Israeli War will be elaborated upon. Thirdly, the Suez crisis that resulted in the 1956 war will be discussed. Fourthly, the Six-Day War and the consequences for the Palestinian minority that lives within Israel will be dealt with. Fifthly, the first uprising (intifada) of the Palestinian people against the occupation of Israel will be elaborated upon. Sixthly, the Oslo Accords will be outlined. Seventhly, the second intifada and its consequences for the minorities living within Israel will be addressed. And finally, the Arab Spring (2011) will be shortly dealt with and the possible consequences for the situation of the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel and the relationship of Israel with its neighbouring countries.

2.1. Palestinian Minority

Before this historical outline will be given, it is important to give a definition of the Palestinian minority. There are many different definitions that can be given to the Palestinian minority. In this thesis the Palestinian minority consists of the people who live within the Israeli borders and have an Arab background. Someone has an Arab background when he or his forefathers were born in an Arab country or in Israel, but to a father born in an Arab country (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2011). Israel considers a country to be Arabic when it is a Member State of the Arab League. As of 2011 the League consists of twenty-one Members. It has to be noted that this definition can be seen as an Israeli one. It is chosen because it is used in all official legislation and jurisdiction concerning the Palestinian minority. A percentage of the Palestinians that live in Israel do regard themselves as Israeli citizens and do not think of themselves as being Arab or Palestinian, but according to this definition are still part of the ‘Palestinian minority’.
The Central Bureau of Statistics states that the “Arab minority” (in this thesis referred to as the Palestinian minority) includes Moslems, Arab Christians and Druze. In 2009 the Palestinian minority consisted of a Muslim majority (82 percent), an Arab-Christian minority (9.5 percent) and a Druze minority (8.5 percent) (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2011). No distinction is made between Arab-Jews and Jews.

Where, after the first Arab-Israeli War in 1948 the Palestinian minority consisted of over 160,000 Palestinians, this number has grown significantly over the past decades. At the end of 2009 over 1,500,000 Palestinians were living within the Israeli borders (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2011).

### 2.2 Balfour Declaration of 1917

On November 7th 1917 the British government openly declared its support for the creation of a Jewish state by issuing the Balfour Declaration (Stork, 1972: 9). In this declaration the British government, which held a mandate over Palestine, stated that it favoured:

“...the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object...” (Balfour Declaration, 1917).

The Arab population, existing of Muslims and Christians, that lived in the, then, southern part of Ottoman Syria, and had nationalist aspirations, believed that there was a considerable chance for self-determination and statehood (Strawson, 2006: 10). However, when the League of Nations handed the British government a mandate over Palestine in 1922, which was formalised in 1923, the Arab population was not consulted by the British government (Milton-Edwards, 2006: 37). It can therefore be stated that Jewish nationalism was given priority over the aspirations of Arab nationalism (Lesch & Tschirgi, 1998: 8).

The Balfour Declaration had severe consequences for the Arab inhabitants of Mandatory Palestine. Although it was stated in the Declaration that:

“...nothing shall be done which will prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine...” (Balfour Declaration, 1917).
The Arab inhabitants had believed that they would be granted their own independent state, because they helped fight of the Turks during World War I (Strawson, 2006: 13). Because of the publication of the Balfour Declaration it became clear that the British government would not give the Promised Land to the Arabs. Many Jews saw the Balfour Declaration as the foundation of the Jewish state and started to immigrate to Mandatory Palestine.

2.3 Declaration of Independence and the first Arab-Israeli War

On the 29th of November, 1947 the General Assembly of the United Nations published Resolution 181, also called the Partition Resolution (Saban, 2004: 890). This Resolution partitioned Palestine into three entities (Strawson, 2010: 71). Within Mandatory Palestine two states were to be established: a Jewish state and an Arab state (Smooha, 1990: 394). The city of Jerusalem was granted special international status (Lesch & Tschirgi, 1998:12).

The formal representative of the Palestinian Arabs, the Arab Higher Committee, rejected this partition and stated that:

“...consideration of fundamental importance to the Arab world was that of racial homogeneity. ... It was illogical [to introduce] an alien body into the established homogeneity [of the Arab world], a course which could only produce new Balkans . . . The Arabs . . . would lawfully defend with their life blood every inch of the soil of their beloved country.” (Susser, 2009: 110)

As a result of the atrocities committed by the Nazi-regime during World War II, support for an independent Jewish State increased significantly in the United States, Europe and the Soviet Union (Lesch & Tschirgi, 1998: 9). On the 14th of May, 1948, the British terminated their mandate in Palestine. On the same day the Zionists declared the independence of the State of Israel. In its Declaration of Independence it was stated that the State of Israel:
“...will maintain complete social and political equality among its citizens with no distinction based on religion, race or gender.” (The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, May 1948).

On the same day that the Zionists declared the independence of Israel the first Arab-Israeli War started (Milton-Edwards, 2006: 41). Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, backed by Saudi Arabia and Yemen, invaded the territory in the former British Mandate of Palestine. In a statement the Arab countries motivated their intervention as followed:

“...the only solution of the Palestine problem is the establishment of a unitary Palestinian State, in accordance with democratic principles, whereby its inhabitants will enjoy complete equality before the law, [and whereby] minorities will be assured of all the guarantees recognized in democratic constitutional countries ...” (Arab League Declaration on the Invasion of Palestine, 1948).

According to the Arab League the main objection to the division of Palestine was that there was no respect for the rights of the Arab inhabitants of the area:

“The Zionist aggression resulted in the exodus of more than a quarter of a million of its Arab inhabitants from their homes and in their taking refuge in the neighboring Arab countries” (Arab League Declaration on the Invasion of Palestine, 1948).

At the same time David Ben-Gurion, who would become the first Prime Minister of the state of Israel, stated that:

"The Arabs of the land of Israel [Palestinians] have only one function left to them -- to run away." (Ben-Ami, 2008: 148).

After the first Arab-Israeli War the Arab state, envisioned in the U.N. 181 Resolution next to a Jewish state, was never established (Saban, 2004: 891). The internationalization of Jerusalem was also rejected by the parties involved. Both Israel and Jordan fought for control over the city. East Jerusalem remained Jordanian, whilst West Jerusalem was controlled by Israel (Albin, 1997: 121). In
the image below the difference in the divide of land between the initial UN Partition Plan and the actual partition of land after the 1948 War of Independence can be seen.

Image 1. The difference in proposed division of territory in 1947 and actual division after 1948 War

In 1949 the United Nations accepted Israel as a Member State under certain conditions, namely repatriating or compensating Palestinian refugees and internationalizing Jerusalem. However, the Israeli government did not repatriate or compensate any of the Palestinian refugees, and in 1950 proclaimed West Jerusalem as its capital and thereby ignored these conditions, without any consequences (Lesch & Tschirgi, 1998:12). Even today, 62 years later, Israel remains a member of the United Nations without having complied with the conditions set for obtaining membership status.

The Palestinian minority, which now lived in a Jewish state, was severely discriminated against during the decades following the establishment of the state of Israel (Ghanem, 2001: 17). The discrimination started directly after the state of Israel was established. An example of such
discrimination was the forced transfers of Palestinians, carried out by Israeli officials, from one village to another within the borders of Israel in order to facilitate colonization of certain areas (Boqa'í, 2010: 31). Since there was no organized Palestinian movement within Israel to demand equal rights for the Palestinian minority, attempts to achieve equality failed. There were several attempts to start a national Arab organization within Israel, but these attempts all failed because the Israeli authorities took measures to neutralize them (Ghanem, 2001: 19).

Other reasons for the failure to mobilize a unified Palestinian movement within Israel can be found in the Arabization of the Palestinian problem. The neighboring countries of Israel took the lead in an effort to find a solution, leaving the Palestinians that lived in the Occupied Territories and the Palestinians that lived within Israel, with only a marginal role to play. Only after the founding of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964, did the Palestinians themselves take on a bigger role in a bid to find a solution to the conflict (Ghanem, 1998: 430).

After the first Arab-Israeli war more than 160,000 Palestinians, who accounted for ten percent of the total Palestinian population at the time, lived within the Israeli borders (Bligh, 2003: 261). In dealing with this minority, the Israeli authorities were foremost concerned with the national security of the state of Israel. The Palestinians living in Israel were seen as a security threat, because they were part of the Palestinian people. Besides that, they were indirectly part of the Arab states that neighbored Israel and which were viewed as enemy states. In any future wars this minority would join Israel’s enemies to fight against Israel (Peleg, 2004: 417) Therefore, policies were adopted that discriminated against the Palestinian minority (Bligh, 2003: 264).

In 2006 the Future Vision documents were published by Palestinian intellectuals, political leaders and activists. This document began by elaborating upon the consequences which the War of Independence has had on the Palestinian population:

“The war of 1948 resulted in the establishment of the Israeli state on a 78 percent of historical Palestine. We found ourselves, those who have remained in their homeland (approximately 160,000) within the borders of the Jewish state. Such reality has isolated us from the rest of the Palestinian People and the Arab world and we were forced to become citizens of Israel. This has transformed us into a minority living in our historic homeland.”

(The National Committee for the Heads of the Arab Local Authorities in Israel, 2006: 5).
Besides the security issue, Israel was founded as a Jewish state. The objective of the state of Israel is to first and foremost serve the Jewish people (Ghanem, 2001: 27). This formed one of the cornerstones of the discrimination against the Palestinian minority. Discrimination against this minority was considered legitimate if it had as its objective to serve the Jewish people (Ghanem, 2001: 18).

It has to be noted that in this period of time (1948-1966) Israel viewed itself as a liberal democracy. One of the consequences should have been to treat all its citizens in an equal way, including the Palestinian minority. However, during this period of time, the Palestinian minority that lived in Israel was governed by a military Israeli administration. This military administration severely restricted and repressed the freedom of speech, association and political organizing of the Palestinian minority. Besides that, the Palestinian minority is not declared as a national minority in the Basic Laws of Israel (Adalah, 2011: 1). Whether Israel should indeed be viewed as a democratic state will be looked into in more detail in chapter four of this thesis.

2.4 Suez crisis (1956)

When Israel was established in 1948, Egyptian and Israeli forces made constant cross-border raids. As part of his nationalist agenda, Egyptian President Nasser, took control of the Suez Canal which was owned by British and French companies. Egyptian authorities subjected all cargo shipment to and from Israel to searches and seizures, when they passed through the Suez Canal. Furthermore, Egypt blocked the Straits of Titan, which is a narrow waterway that is Israel’s only outlet to the Red Sea. In 1951 the UN Security Council stated that Egypt should:

“...terminate the restrictions on the passage of international commercial ships and goods through the Suez Canal, wherever bound, and to cease all interference with such shipping.”

(Security Assembly, 1951, Regulation 95)

With continued clashes and tensions between Egypt and Israel, Britain and France, which colonized the territories for centuries, decided to jointly invade and occupy the Suez Canal. This was decided upon to reassert control of the Canal by the British and French companies which were affected by Nasser’s move of nationalization. Both countries furthermore decided that the whole affair was to be coordinated by Israel.
At the end of October, 1956, Israeli troops invaded Egypt. As part of the plan, Britain and France offered Egypt to temporarily occupy the Canal, with an extra 10 mile buffer zone to keep the Egyptian and Israeli forces from clashing. President Nasser refused this offer and as a consequence the next day Egypt was attacked by British and French forces. The Soviet Union threatened to intervene on behalf of Egypt. In the end, the 1956 War lasted for a week and the invading forces withdrew within a month. In the end Egypt firmly aligned with the Soviet Union. The Suez Crisis further deteriorated Israel's position in the region.

2.5 Six-Day War (1967)

In 1967 another war between Israel and its Arab neighbours started. Tensions began to build up after Israel started the construction of its National Water Carrier. The National Water Carrier is the largest water project in Israel and transfers water from the Sea of Galilee to the highly populated centre and south of the country (Cooley, 1984: 5). According to Israel this carrier was vital for its economic growth and settlements. For the Arab world this carrier was proof that Israel had become a state that would not cease to exist any time soon. The resulting diversion of water from the Jordan River has been a source of tension between Israel on the one hand and Syria and Jordan on the other hand ever since. The Arab League came up with a plan to divert water from the Jordan in order to stop the flow of water into Israel. This directly threatened Israel's existence and therefore the diversion work in the Jordan was bombed by the Israeli army (Lesch & Tschirgi, 1998:19). The situation quickly escalated. Israel annexed East-Jerusalem and occupied the remaining part of Mandatory Palestine, namely the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, but also the Syrian Golan Heights (Diener, 2010:93). Sinai was also occupied by Israel, but returned to Egypt in 1980 (Said, 1989: 23).

Until this war the Palestinians had expected the Arab states to liberate Palestine. After this War the Palestinians stopped relying on these Arab states and started to look more inwardly for a solution to their problem (Ghanem, 2001: 19).

After the Six-Day War the mindset of the Palestinian minority living in Israel changed as well. The minority started to demand equal civic rights and an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel. One of the reasons why they thought they could demand equality and an independent state was the significant demographic growth of the Palestinians that lived within Israel and in the occupied
territories. As was already noted above, the Palestinian population that lived within Israeli borders grew from a mere 150,000 in 1948, to over a million in 1994, to over 1,500,000 in 2009 (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2011). This minority group now makes up seventeen percent of the entire population that lives within the Israeli borders. Besides the demographic growth, the growing strength of the PLO gave the Palestinian minority greater self-confidence (Ghanem, 2001: 21). Furthermore, in the decades after the 1967 war, education was improved and modernised in Israel, so the Palestinian minority became more and higher educated. Finally, there was a rise of political awareness among the Palestinian minority:

“...The situation faced by the Arabs in Israel when they became a minority in the state, which ruled over them and was engaged in a violent confrontation with other segments of the Palestinian people and the other Arab countries, led to a gradual rise in their political awareness and willingness to act (Ghanem, 2001: 24).

Since 1967 the focus of the Palestinians within Israel shifted from a right of return to the Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Besides that, they demanded to be treated in the same way as the Jewish majority that lived in Israel and receive equal political and civil rights (Boqa’i, 2010: 38).

2.6 The first intifada (1987-1993)

The first collective Palestinian uprising (also known as intifada) against the Israeli occupation started in December 1987 (Hajjar, 2001: 26). The Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip had lasted for twenty years without a single change for the better for the Palestinian people (Said, 1989: 26). The uprising started in the Gaza Strip, but rapidly spread to the West Bank (Alin, 1994: 479). In this first intifada the Palestinian minority that lived within Israeli borders demonstrated their solidarity, namely with general strikes and sending relief to the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (Smooha, 1990: 398). However, the Palestinian minority did not actively participate in the intifada (Bligh, 2003: 168). Where Palestinians living in the Occupied Territories adopted the principles of shahada and fida (which can roughly be translated into martyrdom and self-sacrifice for liberation), the Palestinians that lived within the Israeli territory resorted to al-summud (steadfastness) in their bid to solve the problem (Boqa’i, 2010: 38).
In 1988 the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) renounced terrorism, acknowledged Israel’s right to exist, accepted UN Resolution 242 and declared an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza. UN Resolution 242 was adopted by the Security Council to establish principles and provisions which would lead to a solution of the conflict. The most important element from this Resolution for the Palestinian people was that Israel would withdraw from “territories”. However, there were two different versions of this Resolution, a French and an English one. The word “the” was left out of the French translation and this version was used by Israel. Because Israel used this version it technically did not have to withdraw from all territories. Declaring an independent Palestinian state was possible, because Jordan renounced its claim over the West Bank in 1988.

2.7 The Oslo accords

The first intifada ended when the Oslo accords, officially called the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, were signed in September 1993. These agreements opened a new phase in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Strawson, 2010: 168). These agreements marked the first legally regulated negotiations. An important reason why the agreements came about was the election process in Israel. In 1992 a Labour-led government was elected, with Rabin as its leader, and this government held as one of its prime principles to achieve peace with the Palestinians. The foundation of the accords was the mutual recognition of each party in the conflict. The core of the Declaration states that the two sides:

“...agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence...”

(Declaration of Principles, September 1993).

The signing of the accords between the Israeli authorities and the PLO changed the political life of the Palestinians that lived in Israel. There was a declared intention to find a solution to the conflict. However, the struggle for civil equality for the Palestinian minority in Israel remained a key issue and a missing link in this whole affair (Bligh, 2003: 265).
2.8 The second intifada

In 2000 the peace process collapsed at Camp David and the Taba Peace Talks failed. As a direct consequence the second intifada started (Diener, 2010: 97). The second intifada, also known as the Al-Aqsa intifada, broke out on the 28th of September, 2000. If compared to the first intifada there were important differences. Where, the first intifada was characterized by Palestinian youth throwing stones at Israeli soldiers, who reprimanded with armed force, the second intifada was characterized by terrorist attacks by Hamas and Jihad. The number of casualties was much higher than during the first intifada. Over a 1,000 Israelis and more than 3,500 Palestinians were killed (Shamir & Sagiv-Schifter, 2006: 570). More importantly for this thesis is the way the Palestinian minority that lived within Israel responded to this second intifada. They initiated unprecedented violent demonstration and riots, in where thirteen Palestinians that lived in Israel were killed by the Israeli armed forces (Palestinian Red Crescent Society, 2005). Because of these riots the Jewish majority was convinced of the connection between the Palestinian minority that lived within Israel and the Palestinians that lived in the Occupied Territories. In a survey carried out in 2001 44 percent of the Israeli Jews thought the main reason for the riots was the identification of the Palestinian minority with the struggle of the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. In this same survey 53 percent of the Palestinian minority responded that discrimination by the state of Israel was the main reason for the riots (Shamir, 2002). All in all, the Al-Aqsa intifada did not improve the situation of the Palestinian minority in the Israeli society.

2.9 The Arab Spring (2011)

In December 2010 the first protests started in Tunisia. This resulted in a wave of unrest throughout the whole region. Algeria, Jordan, Egypt and Yemen followed. Until today governments in three countries, namely Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, have been overthrown (Ghannam, 2011: 4). In Palestine the call for mass protest was present. However, the demonstrators clashed with the IDF, resulting into several deaths. Within Israel protests began in the summer of 2011. The first protests concerned the high living costs in cities like Tel Aviv. But over time more issues played a part, namely demographic structural factors, such as the high unemployment rate within the Palestinian minority group. A poll conducted by Israeli newspaper Haaretz showed that over 87 percent of the
Israeli population, including the Palestinian minority supported the protests. As of today it is uncertain what effects the Arab Spring will have on the region as a whole and on the specific situation of the Palestinian minority that lives within Israel.

In the next chapter the mainstream international relations theories, namely realism, liberalism and constructivism, will be addressed as well as the second image reversed approach. Can these theories help us get closer to an answer to the research question?
3. International Relations theories

For this thesis it is important to see which IR theories can explain the influence of the international system on domestic politics and policy outcomes within a state. In this chapter the mainstream IR theories will be elaborated upon. The author will start by elaborating on the notion of the three levels of analysis, which help to understand state behavior in the international system. After that the second image reversed approach will be addressed. Because the author will try to bridge the gap between International Relations and Comparative Politics, the second image reversed approach will be used in this thesis in an attempt to answer the research question. This approach does take into account the influence that the international system has on policy outcomes on the domestic level. This approach will be elaborated upon further on in this chapter. After discussing the second image reversed approach, an examination of the Realist paradigm will follow, its shortcomings and why it is not completely sufficient to explain the scientific problem that is researched in this thesis, namely the position of the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel. The focus will be on the neorealist strand of this paradigm. After that, neoliberalism and social constructivism will be discussed in the same manner.

3.1 Three levels of analysis

In order to understand state behavior in the international system, IR theorists have made a distinction among three broad levels of analysis, namely the systemic level (third image), the domestic level (second image) and the individual level (first image), corresponding to the three images of Waltz (1959). These levels of analysis can be used to find explanatory factors. For this thesis the three images of Waltz play an important role, although in themselves they will not be able to solve the research question. The second image reversed approach, which will be used in a bid to answer the research question, is directly derived from the second image elaborated upon by Waltz (Caporaso, 1997: 563).

The first image concerns human behavior on an individual level as an explanatory mechanism. International politics are driven primarily by actions of individuals. Wars result from selfishness or stupidity of men. Wars can be eliminated only when men will be uplifted and enlightened. In other
words, human nature needs to be altered (Carlsnaes et al., 2003: 432). As long as man is as he is, war may be anticipated as a natural inevitability (Singer, 1960: 454).

The second image explains international politics as being driven by the domestic characteristics of states. It concerns the internal structure of the state, rather than the external environment (Singer, 1960: 457). This is an important image for this thesis, because later on the second image reversed approach will be elaborated upon and as stated above, this approach is derived from the second image. In the second image, Waltz elaborates on the internal organization of states as the key to understand war and peace. Internal characteristics are used to explain external acts of a state. The second image, according to Waltz, is ‘inside-out’. This means that phenomena within the state are the basis for the state’s policy preferences in the international system (Panke & Risse, 2007: 90). This is contrary to the second image reversed approach. As the name already suggests, the second image reversed approach states that the basis for policy preferences on the domestic level are influenced by the international state system and not the other way around.

The third image describes the framework of world politics and is concerned with international anarchy. As stated by Waltz:

“On the one hand, the first and second images are necessary to provide the knowledge of the forces that determine these world politics. On the other hand the third image is a necessity to assess and predict results in order to describe the forces of world politics described in the first and second images” (Waltz, 2001: 238).

Because there is no body of governance that controls all agents in the system, states have to rely on their own capabilities in order to survive in the international system. Because there exists a condition of anarchy there is no automatic harmony. War occurs because there is nothing to prevent it (Singer, 1960: 458). There is a constant possibility that conflicts will be settled by force. Although there can be for example a balance of power against a hegemon, today’s friend and ally can be the enemy of tomorrow (Waltz, 2001: 240).

The above described levels of analysis are not sufficient to explain the research question in this thesis, because they do not account for the effects that the international system can have on domestic politics. Explanations, according to Waltz, are ‘outside-in’, which means that the structure of the international system accounts for the behavior of individual states (Carlsnaes et al., 2003: 238).
For example, one of the possible causes that Israel restricts the rights of the Palestinian minority is that it perceives to be surrounded by hostile states (Freilich, 2006: 635). With the help of the three images of Waltz the author will not be able to explain these causes adequately, because of the above described ‘outside-in’ approach. However, the three images of Waltz are necessary to elaborate upon, because, as stated above, the second image reversed approach is directly diverted from the second image of Waltz.

### 3.2 Second image reversed

As stated in the introduction of this chapter, in order to answer the research question of this thesis, a theory is needed that deals with the influence of the international system on domestic policy preferences of states. As suggested above, the three mainstream theoretical schools, namely realism, liberalism and social constructivism, do not sufficiently deal with this. Realists, liberalists and some constructivist scholars see states in the international system as unitary and rational, as will be elaborated upon further on in this chapter. These theorists assume this because in this way they are able to examine variances within the international system (Gourevitch, 2003: 309).

When looking at the three levels of analysis and three images of Waltz, elaborated upon above, the second level of analysis can be reversed. With this it is meant that instead of looking at aspects within the units of the international system and the way these shape behavior of states outwards, it needs to be seen how the international system induces behavior in the units of the international system. The second image reversed examines the impact of the international system, which means the distribution of power among states and the economic opportunities offered by the global system, on domestic politics (Krasner, 2010). Gourevitch, the founding father of the second image reversed approach, states that institutions and domestic interests are influenced by international forces, rather than only the other way around as many theorists think (Gourevitch, 1978). As was argued by Evangelista:

> “Actors interpret external events in different ways to build support for domestic policies they favor. Some actions by foreign countries support the positions of particular domestic forces over others.” (Evangelista, 1994: 156)
In the case of Israel this means that the state institutions and domestic interests are influenced by the fact that Israel feels it is surrounded by hostile neighboring states. Besides that, Israel is the only non-Arab country in the region and therefore it feels it has an inferior regional power position compared to the countries that it is surrounded by. The internal organization of the state is directly influenced by this. It could be argued that as a consequence the rights of the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel is limited, because the Palestinian minority is part of Palestine and the Arab world.

3.3 Realism

After the Second World War Realism became the dominant paradigm in the world of International Relations (Grieco, 1988: 485). It is important to note that there are many different strands within the Realist paradigm (Steans & Pettiford, 2001: 20). First, the core elements of classical Realism will be discussed shortly. After that the focus will be on neo-realism as elaborated upon by Kenneth Waltz and whether Realism can be used in some way to answer the research question formulated earlier in this thesis.

The core elements of classical Realism are statism, survival and self-help (Dunne & Schmidt, 2008: 93). Realists believe that states are rational and unitary actors. Realists do not look into states, but see them as black boxes (Nye, 2009: 44). A sharp distinction is made by Realists between domestic and international politics (Lebow, 2007: 55). Elements within a state, like domestic politics, do not play a role in explaining behavior of a state in the international system. Realists treat identity and interests of states as exogenous and given (Ruggie, 1998: 13). Within the Realist paradigm states are seen as the principal actors of the international system. This is referred to as the state-centric assumption of Realism (Stein, 1990: 5). Survival within the international system is the first priority of every state. Because there is a condition of anarchy, which means that there is no central authority above the state level that can force states to act according to certain rules, states are never certain of their survival (Mearsheimer, 2007: 73). Power plays an important, if not crucial, role for their quest of survival. This constant struggle for power is attributed, by the classical Realists, to human nature. For the most part Realists equate power with military capabilities (Lebow, 2007: 58). Because there is no existing body of governance above the state level one can speak of a self-help system (Hastedt, 1991:9). States have to ensure their survival in the
international system on their own and cannot depend on, for example, other states or international institutions to ensure their security and survival (Dunne & Schmidt, 2008: 93). Therefore it is important to have a substantial amount of power, but also to make sure that no other state in the international system gains a significant amount of power (Mearsheimer, 2007: 72).

Neo-realism, which is one of the many strands within the Realist paradigm, has a lot in common with classical Realism. States, especially the great powers, are the main actors in the international system, in accordance with classical Realism (Collard-Wexler, 2006: 4). Besides that, states are also seen as rational and unitary actors, who will be able to come up with strategies that maximize their chances of survival (Mearsheimer, 2007: 74). These states operate in an anarchic system. Kenneth Waltz, one of the founding fathers of neorealism, argues that anarchy is the organizing principle of the international system (Waltz, 1979). Anarchy defines goals, interests and behavior of states. However, this is not to say that the international system is characterized by chaos because it is anarchic (Lieshout, 2007: 131). Also in conformity with classical realism is the notion of states as black boxes. States are seen as unitary actors whose domestic politics are of no relevance to the international political system. Neo-realists see ideas and interests as exogenous and these are not clarified with the theory. States are seen as self-regarding units, with given and fixed identities and who are largely responsive to material interests that are specified by assumptions (Ruggie, 1998: 3). Neo-realists differ from classical realists in the role they give to power in the international arena. Classical Realists see power as the ultimate goal. Neo-realists see power as a way that states can increase their chances of survival in the international system (Stein, 1990: 85). It should be noted that there are different kinds of power according to neo-realists. Besides military capabilities there is the so called latent power. This refers to socio-economic factors, such as the size of the population and the wealth of a state. Money, technology and personnel are all needed to build a strong military force (Mearsheimer, 2007: 73). Where the constant struggle for power according to classical Realists is attributed to human nature, neorealists believe that it is not human nature, but the structure of the international system that makes states want to strive for more power (Nye, 2009: 7). In the words of Waltz:

“Structural theory assumes that the dominant goal of states is security, since to pursue whatever other goals they may have, they first must survive” (Waltz, 2003: 53).
And Mearsheimer:

“In essence, great powers are trapped in an iron cage where they have little choice but to compete with each other for power if they hope to survive” (Mearsheimer, 2007: 72).

Thus, the behavior of states can be explained by the structure of the international system. According to Waltz this structure can be uni-, bi- or multipolar. Change in the international system occurs when the number of poles in the system changes. Examples when change might occur are hegemonic wars or a shift in the balance of material capabilities (Lebow, 2007: 60). During the Cold War one could say there was a bipolar world with the United States of America on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other hand. The Soviet Union could not keep up with the United States in developing material capabilities and fell apart into several smaller states. After the Cold War the United States remained the lone super power (Little, 2007: 187).

In sum the core elements of neorealism according to Waltz are the following:

- the organizing principle of the international system is either anarchy or hierarchy;
- the units in the anarchic international system are very similar because they cannot differentiate. Therefore unit level variation is irrelevant in explaining international outcomes (Dunne & Schmidt, 2008: 98);
- in anarchic systems the distribution of capabilities, namely the relative distribution of power, plays an important role. This element is of fundamental importance in a bid to understand outcomes in the international system.

3.3.3. Balance of Power and the security dilemma

Another central concept that can be derived from the neorealists theory is the so called Balance of Power. A balance of power exists when there is stability between competing forces. Within the international system a state can either choose to bandwagon with or balance against the, potential, hegemon in the international political system. States will bandwagon with the potential hegemon when they think this will give them a greater chance of survival and when this is beneficial to them (Lieshout, 2007: 167). Balancing against any state will occur when this state becomes too powerful.
Other great powers will form a balancing coalition that will, try to, counter this, potential, hegemon (Mearsheimer, 2007: 75).

Waltz elaborates in his book *Theories of International Politics* (1979) on the so called balance of power. As stated above, states are not free to do whatever they want, but are constrained, to some degree, by the structure of the international political system (Little, 2007: 167). This structure remains rather unchangeable. As stated by Waltz:

“The texture of international politics remains highly constant, patterns recur and events repeat themselves endlessly” (Waltz, 1979: 66).

Waltz argues that politics is about power and about how this power is organized (Little, 2007: 174). How a state is ranked in the international system compared to other states depends, according to Waltz, on all of the following items (Waltz, 1979: 131):

1. Size of population and territory
2. Resource endowment
3. Economic capability
4. Military strength
5. Political stability and competence

When a state possesses all of these variables in high numbers it could cross the great power threshold. Waltz’s balance of power theory presupposes that the structure of the international system is defined by a limited number of great powers (Little, 2007: 191). He is primarily concerned with the shift from a multipolar system, where there are several great powers, to a bipolar system, with only two great powers in the international political system.

The balance of power in the international system can have consequences for the domestic politics of a state. In the specific case of Israel one could argue that it does not score high on the size of population and territory, as well as resource endowment. However, with one of the most advanced military systems in the world and a high score on economic capability and political stability and competence, Israel will rank high in the international system compared to its neighboring states. One could argue that there has been a shift in the regional balance of power between Israel and its
neighboring states after the 1948 and the 1967 Wars. These wars, in which Israel was clearly victorious, and the shift in regional power from several Arab states towards Israel had direct consequences for the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel. Because the Arab states were no longer in a position to counter Israel’s growing power and fight for a free Palestine. As a consequence the Palestinian minority was left on its own. Besides that, after these inter-state conflicts, the relation between Israelis and the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel changed as well. After the 1948 War it became clear that the state of Israel was here to stay. Over 150,000 Palestinians still resided on Israeli territory, but the majority of the Palestinians that used to live in Mandatory Palestine either fled to neighboring countries or were deported by the Israeli authorities (Lesch, 1979: 101). The Palestinians that remained in Israel was seen as a security threat by the Israeli authorities. Any attempts to form political forces were neutralized by the Israeli authorities (Ghanem, 2001: 19).

Another core element that can be derived from neorealist theory is the concept of the security dilemma (Herz, 1950). This dilemma is a direct consequence of the anarchy of the international political system (Lieshout, 2007: 147). In the words of John Herz:

“Groups or individuals living in such constellation (an anarchic society) must be, and usually are, concerned with their security from being attacked...Striving to attain security from such attack, they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst...power competition ensues and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on.” (Herz, 1950: 157).

The security dilemma could play a role in an attempt to explain the behavior of the state of Israel towards its neighboring countries and vice versa. All countries involved, but especially Israel, feared the attack of its neighboring countries. In order to prepare for such an attack it developed one of the most advanced military organizations in the world with one of the largest military capabilities. As an effect, the neighboring countries, like Syria and Jordan, invested in their military capabilities. This situation could be seen as an example of the security dilemma (Mearsheimer, 2007: 75). This security dilemma also affected the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel. Therefore actions were taken against them, to assure the Jewish citizens of Israel of their security.
For this thesis the entire Realist paradigm will not be able to sufficiently answer the research question. Within the Realist paradigm states are seen as black boxes. Domestic developments and politics are not taken into account when trying to explain international outcomes and behavior. Therefore realism will not be able to explain the position of the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel. Neo-realism in particular will not be sufficient to answer this research question, since the structure of the international system plays such a dominant role. This structure cannot be reduced to facts about the domestic political structure of the states in the international system (Caparosa, 1997: 563). Neo-realists try to explain the outcome of state interactions. It includes general assumptions about the motivation of individual states, but does not explain state behavior in detail (Rose, 1998: 145).

The security dilemma might be an explanatory mechanism when analyzing the research question. One of the possible explanations why Israel limits the rights of the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel is, because they are seen as a security threat. This minority is part of the Palestinian people as a whole and indirectly part of the Arab states that neighbor Israel and which are viewed as enemy states. It is believed that in any future wars between Israel and the Arab world this minority will join Israel’s enemies to fight against the State of Israel (Peleg, 2004: 417) Therefore, policies were adopted that discriminated against the Palestinian minority (Bligh, 2003: 264). However, this explanation cannot be derived from the Realist paradigm in general and neorealism in specific, because the influences of the international system on policy preferences on the domestic level are not taken into account. However, it can be related to certain balance of power situations.

Besides that, theories within the Realist paradigm are a-historical and problem solving theories. This means that they can only explain why certain things happen, instead of how they happen. Furthermore, because the theories within the Realist paradigm are a-historical they do not take into account the historical context of events (Powell, 1994: 318). In this thesis it is argued that the historical context of the situation is too important to leave aside, because it is history that shaped this conflict and the whole situation cannot be seen without all the historical events that created the situation as it is today. However, certain development in this ongoing conflict might be explained by the theory on balance of power and the security dilemma, as elaborated upon earlier in this chapter. When the balance of power shifts positively for a state, it affects not only the external powers of a state, but also affects the capabilities of a state to control its domestic minorities.
Although (Neo-)Realism as a whole cannot be used in a bid to answer the research question the balance of power theory might be useful. From the above the following hypothesis can be derived:

H1: when the international balance of power shifts positively for a state, it positively affects the capabilities of this state to control its domestic minorities.

### 3.4 Neoliberalism

The principal challenge to Realism came from liberal theories. As is the case within the Realist paradigm, there are many strands within the broad family of liberal theories. There are theories that argue that economic interdependence between states would discourage them to solve conflicts with force, because a violent outcome could threaten the prosperities of all parties involved. There is also a strand within the Liberal paradigm that argues that democracies are more peaceful than authoritarian states and that therefore democracies will not go to war against each other. This is also known as the democratic peace theory (Panke & Risse, 2007: 91). Another important liberal theory is the one in which it is argued that international institutions can encourage states to forego immediate gains for the greater benefits of enduring cooperation, for example in the International Monetary Fund (Walt, 1998: 33). First the similarities between Realism and Neoliberalism will be discussed. After that some differences will be elaborated upon. Finally, it will be seen whether neoliberals can give an answer to the research question that is central to this thesis and whether it can, in some way, be part of the second image reversed approach elaborated upon in the beginning of this chapter.

Basic premises are the same according to realists and neoliberals. Both realists and neoliberals agree that the international system is anarchic and that states are the central actors. Besides that, states are seen as rational and unitary actors. Because states are seen as rational actors, a core assumption of neoliberal theory is that states calculate the costs and benefits of different courses of action and choose the course of action that gives them the highest net pay-off (Martin, 2007: 112). Identities and interests of states are seen as exogenous, as given (Ruggie, 1998: 9).

However, there are certain core differences between the two theories. A first important difference lies in the role that liberals attribute to institutions and organizations of international politics (Martin, 2007: 110). Liberals believe that cooperation in the international political system is
possible, even when this system is anarchic. Neoliberals believe that cheating is the main problem that states fear in cooperating with one another. Institutions can provide the key to overcoming this problem by creating rules that prevent states from cheating, for example by making agreements to encourage trade by erecting protectionist barriers (Martin, 2007: 112). According to neoliberals, institutions can help states to cooperate by reducing uncertainty, linking issues, monitoring behavior and enhancing the importance of reputation. When states have mutual interests, cooperation will be possible to achieve, even when there is an anarchic system. However, because there exists no external enforcement in the international system, any agreement made about international institutions must be self-enforcing (Martin, 2007: 111). All the above is contrary to the believe that most realists share. Realist argue that cooperation in an anarchic system is difficult to achieve and even more difficult to maintain (Jervis, 1999: 2). Mearsheimer stated that institutions only exist for the great powers in the international system to advance their position:

“The most powerful states in the system create and shape institutions so that they can maintain their share of world power, or even increase it” (Mearsheimer, 1994/1995: 13).

Although realists do agree with neoliberals that institutions exist, they disagree over the claim that institutions are more than instruments of the powerful states. Neoliberals think that seeing institutions only as instrumental to powerful states is a too narrow and pessimistic view (Jervis, 1999: 51).

"Where common interests exist, realism is too pessimistic about the prospects for cooperation and the role of institutions" (Keohane, 1993: 271)

According to neoliberals cooperation can take place in international institutions. States are willing to shift some of their resources to these institutions when they believe it is mutually beneficially. These institutions can reduce transaction costs and produce reliable information about the behavior of one another (Ruggie, 1998: 8). International institutions play an important role in the distribution of wealth and power in the international system (Martin, 2007: 110). These international institutions influence a state’s preferences and strategies. Neoliberals believe that state preferences can change and that this change can lead to produce mutual benefits for all participating states. One of the possible reasons for preference change can come from the access to more accurate information about the other state’s preferences and about certain situations (Jervis, 1999: 51).
The international political economy and economics in general, play an important role for neoliberals (Ruggie, 1998: 9). Where within the realist paradigm the focus is on security and survival, neoliberals argue that economic issues play an important role in state preferences and decision-making (Lamy, 2008: 133). Neoliberals do not focus on power relations between the states in the international system, but focus on political market failure instead. They attribute many conflicts to the failure of states to make arrangements for the establishment of institutions, because institutions can facilitate secure and equitable agreements (Jervis, 1999: 50).

As seen above, realism does not look at domestic political factors and focuses solely on the international level. The neoliberals also have had a state-centric focus and neglected domestic politics in the past. States are seen as the dominant actors in international politics. However, in recent years domestic politics have been introduced in the neoliberal-theory. The democratic strand of liberal theory focuses on domestic politics, but in a bid to try to explain foreign policy behavior. Can a part of the liberal theories be used as a second image reversed approach? Although the central actor within the liberal theories is the state, international institutions do play an important role. These institutions can change state preferences and strategies. When making a cost-benefit analysis states will take into account their reputation in the international system. One could argue that when international institutions represent the case of the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel and Israel will not change its behavior towards this minority, the reputation of Israel can become under pressure and the Palestinian minority could use this in its advantage to demand equal rights. So, one could say that international institutions can have as an effect a change in domestic policy behavior of a state. In this case, the behavior of the state of Israel towards its minorities.

From the above the following hypothesis can be derived:

H1: When international institutions represent the interests of the minorities that live in a country and which are treated as unequal to the state’s majority, this state’s reputation will become under pressure when it does not comply in any way with these international institutions. As a consequence the minorities that live in that state will have more possibilities to demand equal rights, because the state concerned will fear a loss in reputation in the international arena.
3.5 Social constructivism

Social constructivism should not be seen as a substantive theory of IR, like realism and liberalism (Fearon & Wendt, 2003: 56). As is the case with realism and liberalism there are many different strands of constructivism. But where for example in the realist paradigm there is some sort of consensus on for example questions of epistemology, this debate about the nature of knowledge and truth, within the different constructivist strands is still much alive (Fearon & Wendt, 2003: 56).

Social constructivism was developed rather recently in a response to the shortcomings of the realist and liberal approaches. Examples of these shortcomings are the following: the first is that these theories take current identities, preferences and interests of states as a given, thus exogenous (Powell, 1994: 317). As a consequence these theories are not able to explain any change in identity, preferences and interests. The second shortcoming is that the realist and liberal theories do not have any analytical means for dealing with specific identities of states that shape their interests and thereby patterns of international outcomes. The third shortcoming is that these theories do not take normative factors into account. Social constructivists argue that normative factors shape identities and interests of states (Ruggie, 1998: 14). Social constructivism does take into account the importance of interests and identities of states. According to social constructivists, interests and identities are highly malleable products of specific historical processes (Walt, 1998: 40).

Besides that, social constructivism has a social ontology, in contrast to the individual ontology that is adopted by both realists and neoliberals (Fierke, 2007: 182). With this it is meant that realists and neoliberals see individuals (whether states or human beings) as the units of analysis. The social ontology emphasizes on the thought that they units of analysis (again, whether states or human beings) are social beings that cannot be separated from the normative meaning that is given to them. This normative meaning shapes and gives them certain possibilities (Fierke, 2007: 170).

Although there is still much debate going on between the different constructivist scholars there are some core elements that can be distinguished. Unlike realists and neoliberals, constructivist theorists acknowledge the importance of ideas and norms in the relationship between states in the international system and do not see them as exogenous (Ruggie, 1998: 13). All constructivists are
interested in the question how objects are ‘constructed’. The role of ideas in constructing social life is central to constructivists. These ideas have to be shared by various individuals, given these ideas a shared meaning. In order for these ideas to have social relevance they need to be initiated into practice. Constructivists do believe in brute facts, but the impact of these facts is mediated by the ideas that give them meaning (Fearon & Wendt, 2003: 57). Besides that, constructivists are concerned with problematizing the actors in the international system, contrary to realists and neoliberals. The actors in the system are not treated as given, but are socially constructed. In addition, a difference between the previous discussed IR theories and constructivism is that the latter does not see ideas, interests and identities as a given or translation of self-interest of the states. Another important element is that constructivism is able to explain change (Fierke, 2007: 170). Change in identity, interest, ideas and norms leave room for a historical context. This is contrary to realist and liberal theories that are a-historical and cannot explain change through historical processes. Besides that, constructivists (although some more than others) include more agents in the international system than only states. Constructivists try to explain the influence of norms and ideas on state interests and behavior. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play a role as well, because many international norms are adopted through these NGOs. Although norms play an important role for constructivists, they fail to explain why certain norms prevail over others and why certain ideas are dominant over others. This is the case because constructivists separate the material aspects of reality strictly from the ideational aspects.

Intersubjective meaning, norms, rules, collective identity and discourse play an important role for constructivists (Hopf, 1998: 173). Norms shape preferences (Gourevitch, 2003: 318). Where the previously discussed IR theories see a material world, constructivists see a material and ideational world. As Ruggie stated:

“…that ideational factors have normative as well as instrumental dimensions; that they express not only individual but also collective intentionality; and that the meaning and significance of ideational factors are not dependent of time and place.” (Ruggie, 1998: 33).

However, for this thesis constructivism as a whole will not be able to sufficiently solve the problem that is central to this thesis, because all strands within the constructivist theory have either a second image world view or a third image world view. Although it will be argued in this thesis that
identity, ideas and norms play an important role concerning the security identity of the state of Israel, constructivism as a whole will not be able to answer the research question, because a second image reversed approach is necessary to explain the domestic policies of the state of Israel as a reaction to events that happen on the international system level. Besides that, if one wants to understand why certain policies towards minority groups within Israel are adopted and changed, an answer to why certain norms and ideas prevail over others is necessary. Why is a particular set of norms dominant over others? Constructivists are not able to answer these kinds of questions (Hopf, 1998: 176).

However, parts of social constructivism can be used. The impact that international norms can have on domestic political processes and thereby on state behavior do play a role in this thesis (Cortell & Davis, 2000: 66). As an example, Israel is a member state of the United Nations. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was adopted in 1948 as a direct consequence of the Second World War, defines several concepts such as fundamental freedoms and human rights. These concepts appear in the United Nations Charter, which is binding on all member states of the United Nations. It is believed that the Declaration forms part of customary international law and therefore is a powerful tool in applying diplomatic and moral pressure to governments that violate any of the articles of the Declaration. The norms laid down in the Declaration range from freedom of expression to the right of a nationality. Why are many of the freedoms and rights as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights not incorporated in Israeli society? There seems to be a clash between international democratic norms and the domestic norms that Israel adopts. Because Israel is established as a Jewish state for its Jewish citizens, its national norms are formed towards this. Some of the international norms, like the freedom of religion, clash directly with this Jewish foundation of the state. However, for the Palestinian minority living in Israel the international norms could help stimulate more equal national norms and make them equal citizens compared to the Jewish majority.

There are different mechanisms to stimulate the change of national norms and the adaption of international norms. One of these mechanisms is the so called grafting of a new norm. This means that a new norm will be grafted with already existing domestic norms (Price, 1998). It will be easier for norm entrepreneurs to internalize an international norm on the domestic level, when this norm
is complementary with an already existing domestic norm and not contrary to the domestic identity of the state concerned.

When there is absolutely no support from within state actors to adopt and internalize a certain international norm it will not work (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 893). This could be why certain international norms, which contribute to a more equal position of the minority groups in comparison to the Jewish majority, are not internalized within Israel.

From the above the following hypothesis can be derived:

H1: When international norms correspond with national norms of a state, the chances of internalization of these international norms will be bigger than when international norms do not correspond with national norms. Most international norms will not be internalized within a state as long as they do not correspond with national norms.

In the next chapter the above mentioned hypothesis will be adjusted to the specific situation that stands central to this thesis, namely the behavior of the state of Israel towards the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel. The most important concepts will be operationalized and a method of analysis will be chosen. Finally, the sources that were used throughout this thesis will be reflected upon.
4. Methodological chapter

In this chapter firstly the hypothesis from the theoretical chapter will be elaborated upon. These will be reformulated in order to address the specific situation that is central to this thesis, namely the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel and the behavior of the state of Israel towards this minority. Secondly, several theoretical concepts will be operationalized in order to be able to measure and recognize them. Thirdly, the method of research will be discussed. Fourthly and finally, a reflection will be made about the sources that were used throughout this thesis.

4.1 Hypotheses

Realism: when the international balance of power shifts positively for a state, it positively affects the capabilities of this state to control its domestic minorities.

*For this thesis the above hypothesis can be rewritten as followed:* If a shift in the regional balance of power, (especially after the 1948 and 1967 wars) results in an improvement of Israel's regional power position, Israel will initiate domestic policies which limit the rights of its minorities.

Neoliberalism: H1: When international institutions represent the interests of the minorities that live in a country and which are treated as unequal to the state’s majority, this state's reputation will become under pressure when it does not comply in any way with these international institutions. As a consequence the minorities that live in that state will have more possibilities to demand equal rights, because the state concerned will fear a loss in reputation in the international arena.

*For this thesis the above hypothesis can be rewritten as followed:* When international institutions represent the interests of the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel and is treated as unequal to the state's Jewish majority, Israel's reputation will become under pressure when it does not comply in any way with these international institutions. As a consequence, the Palestinian minority has more possibilities to demand equal rights.

Social constructivism: When international norms correspond with national norms of a state, the chances of internalization of these international norms will be bigger than when international
norms do not correspond with national norms. Most international norms will not be internalized within a state as long as they do not correspond with national norms.

For this thesis the above hypothesis can be rewritten as followed: If international norms correspond with Israeli national norms the chances of internalization will be bigger than when these international norms do not correspond with Israeli national norms. Most international norms will not be internalized in Israel as long as they do not correspond with the national norms of the state. This means that certain national norms, that are discriminatory towards the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel, are complied with, instead of the international norms that focus on the equal treatment of all citizens.

4.2 Operationalization

The hypotheses derived from the different IR-theories discussed in the previous chapter were reformulated into more specific hypotheses above, so that they are applicable to the specific case discussed in this thesis. In order for the researcher to apply these hypotheses, several theoretical concepts within these hypotheses need to be operationalized. When theoretical concepts are operationalized the researcher will be able to measure them and recognize them. There are several concepts in this thesis that needs to be operationalized.

4.2.1 International institutions

As is the case with most theoretical concepts, there is not one clear definition, where all scientists agree upon, of what an international institution is. Mearsheimer defined an institution as followed:

"A set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each other. They prescribe acceptable forms of state behaviour, and proscribe unacceptable kinds of behaviour. ... These rules are negotiated by states... These rules are typically formalized in international agreements, and are usually embodied in organizations with their own personnel and budgets." (Mearsheimer, 1994/95, p. 8).

And Keohane defined an institution in the following way:
“When we ask whether X is an institution, we ask whether we can identify persistent sets of rules (formal and informal) that constrain activity, shape expectations, and prescribe roles.” (Keohane, 1988: 383).

In his book *After Hegemony*, Keohane states that institutions have four distinct components, namely principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures (Keohane, 2005: 59). According to Keohane these components proscribe certain behavior and proscribes others. Krasner states that principles and norms provide the basic defining characteristics of a regime (Krasner, 1982: 187).

Pevehouse et. al. claim that the concept of *institutions* should be defined broadly (2004). Institutions are formal entities, formed by internationally signed treaties. There is still a discussion among authors about how many member states an institution is required have. According to the *Union of International Associations* a minimum of three member-states is required. However, Wallace and Singer for example argue that two member-states are enough for an entity to be an institution (Wallace & Singer, 1970). Besides having Member-States, an institution needs to have a plenary meeting at least once every ten years, a secretariat and headquarters. These are elements that distinguish institutions from ad hoc conferences (Pevehouse et. al., 2004: 103). In this thesis all the above definitions can be put together into one definition and can be formulated as followed:

*An institution is a formal entity with states as its members. An institution is formed by principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures. These four components are laid down in an international treaty which is signed and implemented by all member-states. An institution has a minimum of two member-states and holds a plenary meeting at least once in every ten years. Finally, an institution will have a secretariat and headquarters.*

4.2.2. Norms

There is a general agreement on how a norm can be defined, namely as a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 891). To know what appropriate behavior is, one can look at the judgment of a community or society. In this case international norms and national norms can be seen as two different categories. Appropriate behavior according to the international community can have a different meaning from appropriate behavior within the State of Israel.
4.2.3. Palestinian minority

There are many different definitions that can be given to the Palestinian minority. There are the so-called Israeli definitions as well as the so-called Arab definitions. In 2006 documents were published by Palestinian-Arab intellectuals, which were dubbed *The future vision documents* (Rinawie-Zoabi, 2006). In these documents the Jewish supremacy of the state of Israel was challenged. In these documents the Palestinian minority of Israel is defined as part of the Arab nation and the Palestinian Nation. Besides that this minority is called a homeland minority or indigenous people by these intellectuals. It could be argued that to call the Palestinian minority a homeland minority would serve the Arab cause in the struggle for international moral support (Ram, 2009: 525).

According to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics the Palestinian minority consists of people who reside within the Israeli borders and have an Arab background. Someone has an Arab background when he or his forefathers was born in an Arab country or in Israel, but to a father born in an Arab country (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2011). Israel considers a country to be Arabic when it is a Member State of the Arab League. As of 2011 the League consists of twenty-one Member States. The Central Bureau of Statistics states that the “Arab minority” (in this thesis referred to as the Palestinian minority) includes Moslems, Arab Christians and Druze. In 2009 the Palestinian minority consisted of a Muslim majority (82 percent), an Arab-Christian minority (9.5 percent) and Druze (8.5 percent) (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2011). No distinction is made between Arab-Jews and Jews. The Israeli definition of the Palestinian minority is used in all official legislation and jurisdiction from the state of Israel concerning the Palestinian minority. Because official legislation and jurisdiction is used throughout this thesis this definition will be used. It has to be noted that a percentage of the Palestinians that live in Israel do regard themselves as Israeli citizens and do not think of themselves as being Arab or Palestinian.

4.2.4. Balance of Power & positive shift in the Balance of Power

The theory on Balance of Power was elaborated upon in the previous chapter. As was stated there, a balance of power exists when there is stability between competing forces. According to Waltz, politics is about power and about how this power is organized (Little, 2007: 174). How a state is
ranked in the international system compared to other states depends on all of the following items (Waltz, 1979: 131):

1. Size of population and territory (CIA Factbook)
2. Resource endowment (Correlates of War)
3. Economic capability (CIA Factbook)
4. Military strength (IISS)
5. Political stability and competence (World Bank Group)

When a state possesses all of these variables in high numbers it could cross the great power threshold and become a regional great power. A positive shift in the Balance of Power can be allocated when the variables above change positively for the state concerned. As was already elaborated upon in the theoretical chapter Israel does not score high on the size of population and territory indicator, as well as resource endowment. However, with one of the most advanced military systems in the world and a high score on economic capability and political stability and competence, Israel ranks high in the international and regional system compared to its neighboring states (The Military Balance, 2011). In this thesis it is argued that the military strength, as well as political stability play an important role in considering Israel as a regional power. After the 1948, 1956 and 1967 Wars, in which Israel was victorious, it became clear that the military power of Israel was well developed and strong and that it would be difficult for any state to defeat Israel. Politically Israel has been rather stable compared to its neighboring states, especially when considering last year’s Arab Spring in the region. Economically Israel is a well-developed country.

4.2.5. Reputation

A state’s reputation can be described as the general estimation in which a state is held by other states, the general public and the international arena. To measure reputation in this thesis the number of Resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations, which are critical towards Israel, will be addressed. Besides that, the opinion of the general public will be taken into account, by looking at surveys conducted throughout the world over the past years.
4.3. Research method

The aim of the author in this thesis is to generalize and discover something about a broader population of cases, namely the behavior of states towards minority groups living in that state. A case study will be used as the method of research. Seawright and Gerring (2008) chose to define a case study as followed:

“...the intensive (qualitative or quantitative) analysis of a single unit or small number of unites (the cases), where the researcher’s goal is to understand a larger class of similar units (a population of cases).” (Seawright & Gerring, 2008: 296)

A case study thus can be seen as an intensive study of a single case, in this thesis that is Israel’s behavior towards the Palestinian minority, where the purpose of that study is to shed light on a larger class of cases, namely other states where minorities have an inferior position compared to the majority living in that state (Gerring, 2006: 20). As is the case for all case study research it is important to specify clear hypothesis, which has been done at the beginning of this chapter. It is necessary to formulate what outcome the author will try to explain, in order to make this claim falsifiable (Gerring, 2006: 713-714).

In order to study the specific case in this thesis, document analysis is used as the technique to review existing documentation on this case and whether these documents are relevant for finding an answer to the research question. Many of the primary sources used in this thesis had to be historically interpreted, as these sources had to be put in the particular historical context of the situation.

4.4. The sources that were used in this thesis

The analysis of the events that took place in Israel, elaborated upon in this thesis, is based on extensive literature study and document analysis. Many primary and secondary sources are used throughout this research. The primary sources that are cited are chosen, because of the historical context they give to the situation. As secondary sources, scientific books and articles are the main source of information in this thesis, as well as reports and publications from non-governmental organizations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Also used throughout this
thesis are official government- and policy documents from the state of Israel. Information from different perspectives, mainly the perspective of the Israeli government on the one hand and the Arab minority and non-governmental organizations on the other, were acquired in this process.

In order to maintain the much needed objectivity, the primary and secondary sources are from different authors, magazines and publishers, from countries all around the world were used in this thesis. The author hopes that in this way the information given and the analysis made in this thesis can be seen as objective as possible.
5. The domestic identity of Israel

“In a Western, liberal democracy, the public realm is open and safe for all, men and women both, and neither harassment nor discrimination have any place there.” (Netanyahu, 2011)

This is what Prime Minister Netanyahu told his cabinet at the end of 2011 and how he sees an ideal Israeli society. In this chapter the focus will be on the domestic identity of the state of Israel and the influence that this identity has on the minority groups, with a focus on the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel. The identity of Israel, whether it is a Western liberal democracy needs to be seen, directly influences the ideology and political behavior towards its minorities (Rouhana, 1997: 28).

In the first part of this chapter the identity of the state of Israel will be elaborated upon. Two models will be discussed, namely the democratic model and the ethnic model. First, several definitions of the concept of democracy will be addressed. If Israel is a democracy, how could it be defined? What are the most important features of the Israeli democracy? For this thesis it is important to see what the position of the ethnic minorities within Israel is. Are they treated as equals to the Jewish majority or are there notable differences? Is Israel a so-called thin democracy or a thick democracy? Are there only free and fair elections or are minority rights on an individual and a group level respected as well? Secondly, the ethnic model will be elaborated upon to see whether this might be a better fit to describe the Israeli state. After it is concluded what kind of state Israel is, the second part of the chapter will focus on the political institutions of the state of Israel.
5.1. Democratic identity

Israel has been cited as the only true representative example of a democracy in the Middle East region since its establishment in 1948. When Israel was founded, it was established as a Jewish state, with the expressed objective of the ingathering of Jews from around the world (Milton-Edwards, 2006: 178). In the first part of this chapter the identity of the state of Israel will be discussed. As was already stated above, a division can be made between two models, namely a democratic model and an ethnic model (Ghanem, 1998: 429). Can a state that is established for a particular group of people, in this case the Jews, at the same time be a democratic state? Or can a state that favors a particular group of people not be called democratic and should it be labeled differently, for example as an ethnic state?

Within the democratic model no group of citizens is treated unequal on the basis of their ethnicity, religion etcetera. All groups have full equality at the group level as well as the individual level. This is contrary to the ethnic model where a deep ethnic division exists between ethnic groups and where a preference is given to a particular ethnic group. First, the democratic model will be elaborated upon (Ghanem, 1998: 429).

The concept of democracy can be defined in many different ways. Any consensus regarding the meaning of democracy is lacking (Diamond, 2003: 31). Therefore, different definitions and types of democracy that could possible fit the political system of Israel will be elaborated upon. After discussing the different types of democracy, the ethnic model will be addressed. The concepts of ethnic state (Ghanem, 1998) and ethnorepublic (Shafir and Peled, 1998) will be discussed to see whether this is a better fit to describe the state of Israel. It is important for this thesis to label Israel as one of the above types of states, because this can help explain why the minority groups in Israel are treated the way they are treated.
5.1.1. Electoral democracy

The first type of democracy that will be addressed is the electoral democracy, also known as thin democracy. This is a minimalistic form of democracy and defined by Schumpeter as followed:

“...for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.” (Schumpeter, 1947: 269).

Another minimalistic definition of democracy is given by Przeworski, who defines the concept as followed:

“...a regime in which governmental offices are filled as a consequence of contested elections” (Przeworski, 1996: 50).

In short this means regular, free and fair elections (Padilla & Houppert, 1993: 79). Israel has a parliament, the Knesset, with 120 seats. Candidates for the Knesset are elected from party lists every four years to serve their term in office. All Israeli citizens can be elected for the Knesset and have a vote. Free elections in this sense mean that elections must be openly competitive to political parties and multiple parties can compete for the vote of the public (Dahl, 2005: 188).

One has to keep in mind that electoral democracies can vary immensely in quality. When a state is labeled as an electoral democracy, this does not mean that there is, for example, no discrimination against minority groups, abuse of human rights or a weak rule of law (Diamond, 2003: 23).

From the above it can be drawn that Israel can be seen as an electoral democracy. As will be shown, when elaborating on liberal democracy and participative democracy further on in this chapter, this form of democracy is a very thin one.

5.1.2. Liberal democracy

Another form of democracy is the so called liberal democracy. As shown in the quote at the beginning of this chapter by Prime Minister Netanyahu, he believes that Israel is a Western liberal democracy. Robert Dahl is one of the scholars who elaborate on this type of democracy extensively. According to Dahl a liberal democracy has the following components (Diamond, 2003: 34):

- Control of the state and its key decisions and allocations lies with elected officials;
- Executive power is constrained by the autonomous power of other government institutions, such as independent judiciary and parliament;

- Not only are electoral outcomes uncertain, but no group that adheres to constitutional principles is denied the right to form a party and contest elections;

- Cultural, ethnic, religious and other minority groups are not prohibited from expressing their interests in the political process;

- Beyond parties and elections, citizens have multiple channels for expression and representation of their interests and values, including movements and associations which they are free to form and join;

- Individuals also have substantial freedom of believe, opinion, publication, assembly, demonstration etcetera;

- Citizens are politically equal under the law;
  - The principle of equality is nowhere to be found in any legislative document of the state of Israel.

- Individuals and group liberties are effectively protected by an independent, non-discriminatory judiciary, whose decisions are enforced and respected by other centers of power;
  - It could be said that this element is not always present in Israel. Although there are judicial Courts in the country, its judges deliver judgments that are often contrary to international law and treaties. Decisions taken by the different Courts in Israel are not always enforced and respected by other centers of power, for example the Israeli Defence Force. An example is a ruling of the Israeli Court in which it approved the deportation of citizens (Ajouri-case). This is contrary to article 49 of the Geneva Convention.
    - An example of where the rulings of the Court were not implemented by other centers of power is the decision of the Israeli Supreme Court from 1951. The Court confirmed the right of return for Palestinians to their villages, but was bypassed by the Israeli government. The IDF was given permission to demolish these Palestinian villages to the ground (Boqa’l, 2010: 32).

- The rule of law protects citizens from unjustified detention, exile, terror, torture and undue interference in their personal lives not only by the state, but also by organized non-state or anti-state forces.
The Israeli authorities hold citizens in administrative detention for as long as they deem necessary. The initial period is six months, but this period can be prolonged as many times as desired. This is contrary to many international laws and treaties that rally for free and fair trials for all citizens (Gross, 2001: 752).

From the above components a last one can be derived according to Dahl, namely that liberal democracies need to have a constitution that is supreme.

Israel does not have a written constitution. The only things somewhat like a constitution are its Basic Laws. A non-discrimination or equality provision cannot be found in these Basic Laws. Besides that, in several Basic Laws the state of Israel is referred to as a Jewish state, which directly excludes other ethnic groups, such as the Palestinian minority.

From the above the distinction between electoral democracies and liberal democracies becomes clear, namely whether freedoms are relevant to the extent that they ensure free and fair elections or whether freedoms are viewed as necessary for a wider range of democratic functions (Diamond, 2003: 36).

An important reason why Israel should not be seen as a liberal democracy is because the judiciary body cannot be seen as being completely independent from the other centers of power, namely the legislative and executive branch. Besides that, an equality provision for all the citizens of Israel is nowhere to be found in any legislative documents.

5.1.3. Participatory democracy

A political system is not democratic according to this definition of democracy when it does not ensure that there is substantial individual freedom of belief, speech, demonstration, assembly etcetera. Besides that, ethnic, religious, racial and other minority groups should be able to practice their culture and religion and to participate equally in political and social life. Furthermore, all adult citizens should be able to vote and run for office. The electoral arena should be open for all citizens and all citizens should be able to form a political party and contest for office. Another basic assumption is that all citizens are equal by law. This law has to be publicly known and non-retroactive. Besides this, there has to be an independent, and thereby a-political, judiciary that
applies the law and protects individual and group rights in a neutral and consistent way. The state institution should furthermore be checked and balanced against the court system, independent legislatures and other autonomous agencies. A thick form of democracy also entails a prominent civil society. In this case civil society means different sources of information and forms of organization independent of the state. The military and state security is controlled by civilians who are chosen through elections and therefore can be held accountable for their actions. The above attributes are not exhaustive.

Furthermore, in a participatory democracy opportunities for all citizens should be created to make a contribution to the decision-making process (Mutz, 2006: 10).

From all the above it can be drawn that Israel cannot be defined as a participatory democracy. Because Israel is established as a Jewish state for its Jewish citizens, other citizens are per definition not equal to this majority. Besides that, for example, freedom of speech and demonstration are restricted in such a way that the state of Israel forbids any citizen of Israel to act contrary to the interests and beliefs of the state. Israel is viewed as a Jewish state. Prime Minister Netanyahu stated the following:

"Israel is the nation-state of the Jewish people. This principal guides the government’s policy in foreign and internal matters. This is the foundation of Israeli legislation, and is reflected in the expression “Jewish and democratic.”" (Political Monitoring Report, 2010: 8)

5.2. Interim Conclusion

From the three types of democracy discussed above, namely electoral, liberal and participatory democracy, it can be concluded that Israel can at best be labeled an electoral democracy. Because the state of Israel is defined as a Jewish state for Jewish people, all non-Jews living in Israel are directly excluded. This is contrary to the definitions of liberal democracy and participatory democracy, because in these types of democracy all citizens of a state should be treated equally and no distinction is made between citizens on the basis of their ethnicity or religion. In the next section of this chapter the concept of an ethnic state will be elaborated upon to see whether Israel can better be seen as an ethnic state than an electoral democracy.
5.3. Israel as an ethnic state

In Israel’s Declaration of Independence it was stated that:

“...it will maintain complete social and political equality among its citizens with no distinction based on religion, race or gender” (Declaration of Independence, 1948).

5.3.1. The definition of an ethnic state

Within an ethnic state a certain group is propelled as the ethnic population of a state. They share a common language, culture and descent. This ethnic group considers a certain territory, in this case Israel, to be its exclusive homeland (Ghanem, 2000: 89). A crucial distinction is made between members and non-members of the state. Non-members are seen and treated as “outsiders”. In an ethnic state a division is made between citizenship and nationality. The latter is seen as ethnic rather than civic. The non-members cannot be full members of the society and state and thereby true nationals (Smooha, 2002: 477). Besides that, they are often seen as a serious threat to the survival of the ethnic state. Although the political system could be called democratic to some degree, whereas all citizens who reside in the ethnic state for example have a right to vote, a lack in equality of rights diminishes the democratic level to a thin-line (Peled, 1992: 440).

Before elaborating more deeply on the concept of an ethnic state, a couple of examples will be given that show this inequality of rights between members and non-members, namely Jews and non-Jews, in the state of Israel.

5.3.2. Equality

One of the basic principles of a democracy, when democracy is not defined in a too minimalistic way, is the equality of all citizens and the non-discrimination principle between all citizens of a nation. This principle can be found in international human rights law and in most democratic constitutions in the Western World.
Besides that, an equality principle can be found in Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which it is stated that:

“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights."

Although Israel is a Member State of the United Nations and the United Nations Charter is binding upon all Member States, it does not offer any such provisions in its domestic laws. Israel lacks a written constitution where these basic rights are enshrined. Lacking a constitution, Israel has Basic Laws. These Basic Laws are regarded to have the highest legal status in Israel, in the absence of a written constitution, according to a 1969 ruling of the Israeli High Court of Justice (Bergman v. Minister of Finance) (Woods, 2009: 812). These Basic Laws however do not contain a provision for equality of all citizens or a non-discrimination provision. The Basic Law that is considered a mini-bill of rights by legal scholars, namely The Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, does not ensure a right of equality, but ensures the Jewish character of the state, in this way directly excluding the non-Jewish citizens of Israel (Adalah, 2011: 8).

An example which shows the inequality between the citizens of Israel is that non-Jewish citizens of the state are not allowed to serve in the army, with the exception of the small Bedouin and Druze minority (which does belong to the Palestinian minority) (Saban, 2003-2004: 948). Only people who have served in the Israeli army are eligible for state benefits such as loans, mortgages and reduced university fees (Pappé, 2011: 65). As a consequence of not being able to serve in the IDF, regardless of the question whether the Palestinian minority would want to fight in this army, the Palestinian minority is excluded from many state benefits. Besides that, many jobs in Israel are offered with one of the criteria to apply is having served in the Israeli army. This is an inequality before the law on the basis of ethnicity and contrary to international law, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as described above. But not serving in the army can have consequences for employment as well. (Adalah, 2011: 4).

5.3.3. Citizenship rights

There are several examples in which it is shown that the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel is restricted in its movements and its future possibilities, because of different laws adopted by the Israeli parliament, the Knesset. A couple of examples will be given and after that it will be argued
that, because of the unequal treatment of the minority groups within Israel compared to the Jewish majority, Israel could be labeled as an ethnic state.

In 2008 the Knesset approved the Citizenship Law whereby Israeli citizens could be stripped from their citizenship on the grounds of “breach of trust or disloyalty to the state”. “Breach of trust” is defined very broadly and includes the act of residing in one of the nine Arab and Muslim states which are listed as enemy states by Israel, namely Iran, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Libya, Sudan, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and the Gaza Strip. No criminal conviction is needed to revoke someone’s citizenship (Adalah, 2011: 11).

Another example is when the Israeli state was founded as a Jewish state, one of the effects was that non-Jews could not buy land that belonged to the State of Israel. This prevented the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel to buy land on the basis of their ethnicity. Although their numbers have grown from 150,000 in 1948 to over 1,500,000 in 2010 they still only own about 2.5 percent of the land (Yiftachel, 2009: 57). This is commonly referred to as the demographic time bomb (Pappé, 2011: 3). Since 1948 over 600 Jewish villages have been established, whereas no new Arab towns were built (Adalah, 2011: 5). This again is a striking example how a minority group, on the basis of its ethnicity, is excluded from basic rights.

The above examples show that the Palestinian minority is not treated equally to the Jewish majority. On important issues, such as equality before the law and the possibility to buy land, the Palestinian minority finds itself in a position in which it is discriminated against, when compared to the treatment of the Jewish majority.

To come back to the question asked at the beginning of this chapter, whether Israel can be both a democratic and a Jewish state at the same time, the question has two answers. There are regular, free and fair elections in Israel where the Palestinian minority can participate in. But the quotation used at the beginning of this chapter by Netanyahu, where he describes Israel as a Western, liberal democracy has to be renounced. A state cannot be called a liberal democracy where liberal rights on the group level and individual level are not protected and given to all citizens in the society. The conclusion should be that Israel can be seen as a very thin electoral democracy, but should also be defined as an ethnic state at the same time, where one ethnic group is in a favorable position compared to other groups in that society.
5.4 The political institutions of Israel

In the second part of this chapter the political institutions of Israel will be addressed. Israel is a parliamentary democracy that consists of legislative, executive and judicial branches. Elections for the parliament, the Knesset, are based on a vote for a party rather than for individuals. Seats in the Knesset are assigned in proportion to each party’s percentage of the total national vote (Israeli ministry of foreign affairs, 2001). Surplus votes are redistributed among the parties according to their proportional size resulting from the elections (Barnett, 2002: 70).

Proportional representation lies at the center of the Israeli political system. The consequence of a system of proportional representation is that there is a need to govern through coalition-cabinets. The Knesset consists of 120 seats. In order to have a majority a political party therefore needs to win enough votes to receive 61 seats. No party in the history of Israel has been able to form a government on its own (Freilich, 2006: 639).

In a political system of proportional representation a qualifying threshold is set. This threshold stipulates the minimum percentage of votes that a political party needs to receive in order to obtain seats in the parliament. The qualifying threshold in Israel stands at 2 percent since 2003. This threshold used to be 1 percent before 1992. In 1992 it was raised to 1.5 percent and remained so till 2003 (Arian & Shamir, 2008: 1). All political parties that cross this threshold are represented in the Knesset in proportion to the number of votes they have received (Schultziner, 2006: 3).

There are pro’s and con’s to raising the qualifying threshold. When the qualifying threshold is higher, it can have as an affect that it is harder for smaller parties to receive enough votes for a seat in the Knesset. On the other hand, when the qualifying threshold is really low, this can result in many small parties passing the threshold, making it necessary to form a coalition with many parties. An example is the coalition that was formed in Israel after the 1999 elections. The coalition consisted of 9 political parties (Stinnett, 2007: 473). When the qualifying threshold is raised over and over again, smaller parties will be more likely to join forces in order to reach the threshold and win seats in the Knesset (Arian & Shamir, 2008: 181).

Because of the need to form a coalition, compromises and consensus are central to the political arena in Israel. This has often led to problems when trying to adopt decisive policies, because the ideologies of the political parties in Israel, as will be seen in the analysis, are different on central
issues such as the future of the Occupied Territories and the position of the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel (Freilich, 2006: 646). Especially, because of the low threshold of 2 percent, the smaller ultra-orthodox, right-wing parties often have a decisive position when a coalition is formed and they can stand their ground when it comes to certain issues, such as religion, the Palestinian conflict and Israel’s security situation (Hänsel, 2009: 146).

In the next chapter an analysis will be made about the influence of the external environment of Israel on political party competition and the policies these political parties adopt towards the Palestinian minority. Besides that, an analysis will be made on the influence of the above described political institutions on party competition within Israel and the adoption of certain policies by the political parties towards the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel. Before this analysis is made about the domestic politics of Israel, the hypotheses derived from the mainstream IR theories (chapter 3) will be analyzed. At the end of the analysis a conclusion will be drawn and it will be seen whether the research question can be (partly) answered.
6. Description and analysis

This chapter analyzes the impact of Israel's external security environment and political institutions and party politics on its policy toward the Palestinian minority. The chapter discusses different aspects of Israeli politics, such as the founding of Israel, its unique place in the region and its relations with its neighboring countries. This is done in order to create a complete picture on how Israel is perceived in the region and the influence Israel's position in the region has on its domestic politics and policies. It will be argued that the hostile external environment within which Israel exists and the structure of domestic politics in Israel interact to shape Israel's policies towards the Palestinian minority. The Israeli electoral system produces a multiparty system with a large number of parties. The external security environment of Israel directly influences competition between these political parties, creating incentives for center-right parties to favour restrictive policies towards the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel. This argument is captured by the following diagram:

Image 2.

![Diagram showing the relationship between external security environment, party competition, political institutions, and policies adopted towards the Palestinian minority.]

- External security environment
- Party competition
- Political institutions
- Policies adopted towards the Palestinian minority
In order to analyze the impact of Israel’s security environment and the role of Palestinian rights in electoral politics, the chapter first discusses Israel’s external security situation. The relationship between Israel and its neighboring states will be addressed and the position of Israel in the Middle Eastern-region as a whole will be discussed, from the year Israel was founded till now. An analysis will be made whether Israel’s position in the region changed after the 1948 en 1967 wars. These wars are addressed, because they dramatically changed the region, compared to the other wars fought between Israel and its neighboring countries. It will be seen whether these wars strengthened Israel’s position in the region and whether this improvement of its situation in the region has had consequences for the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel, because of the adoption of domestic policies which limit the rights of this minority.

Secondly, the reputation of the state of Israel will be analyzed. Resolutions from the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly, concerning the situation of the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel will be addressed. Furthermore, the public opinion on how Israel is perceived and its reputation will be discussed. The chapter investigates whether these U.N. Resolutions and public opinions have any influence on the domestic policies adopted by Israel towards the Palestinian minority or whether Israel will soften its already adopted discriminatory policies towards this minority.

Thirdly, in this chapter international norms and national norms of Israel will be compared. It will be seen whether international norms correspond with national norms. When this is not the case it is argued that the national norm prevails over the international norm.

The chapter then turns to the analysis of the domestic politics of Israel. The political institutions of Israel will be addressed and the three main political parties, namely Likud, Kadima and Labor will be discussed as well as the two smaller parties Shas and Yisrael Beteinu. Furthermore, the 2006 and 2009 elections and the results will be elaborated upon. This will be done in order to see whether the external environment, namely the hostility from Israel’s neighboring countries, has any effect on the domestic policies concerning the Palestinian minority, adopted by Israeli governments. The analysis emphasizes the 2 percent electoral threshold and the political system of proportional representation. The effects of these political institutions on domestic politics will be discussed. It is argued that political institutions, especially the low electoral threshold, magnify the power of the conservative, right-wing smaller parties in Israel.
6.1 The establishment of Israel and the reactions of its neighbouring states

In chapter 2, a historical overview of the establishment of the state of Israel was presented, so only a short outline will be given in this chapter. On November 7th 1917, Britain published the Balfour Declaration, stating that it was in favour of the establishment of an independent Jewish state. After the atrocities committed by Nazi Germany on the Jewish population, the call for the creation of a Jewish state became louder (Stork, 1972: 9). On the 14th of May, 1948, the Zionist movement declared the independence of the State of Israel, after the British terminated their mandate on Palestine on that same day. The declaration contained the following statement:

“Accordingly we, members of the people’s council, representatives of the Jewish community of Eretz-Israel and of the Zionist movement, are here assembled on the day of the termination of the British mandate over Eretz-Israel and, by virtue of our natural and historic right and on the strength of the Resolution of the United National General Assembly, hereby declare the establishment of a Jewish state in Eretz-Israel, to be known as the state of Israel.” (Declaration of Independence, 1948).

The first Arab-Israeli War started right away (Milton-Edwards, 2006: 41). Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, backed by Saudi Arabia and Yemen, invaded the territory in the former British Mandate of Palestine, from then on known as Israel. From the moment Israel declared its independence several wars have been fought between Israel and its neighbouring countries, making the policymakers in the Israeli government focus on national security and portraying Israel as a country isolated from the West and surrounded by the hostile Arab world (Merom, 1999: 410).

6.2 Israel’s security situation

The official authorities in Israel claim that the neighbouring states of Israel and their hostility towards Israel form a constant threat to Israel’s national security (Horowitz, 1993: 11). In 1995 a former Israeli Defence Minister stated that:

“Israel’s survivor, while constantly struggling against Arab aggression and terror in the hostile environment of the Middle East, seemed to me no less miraculous.” (Arens, 1995: 35).
National security has an internal and an external facet. Externally, national security means that the state, in this case Israel, does everything in its power to preserve political and territorial integrity. Internal security means the need to contain a perceived enemy within. This enemy within is seen as a potential fifth column, actively supporting the external enemy (Smooha, 1993: 105). On several occasions the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel has been labelled as such a fifth column. In the next paragraph, the external security of Israel will be discussed.

6.2.1. External security and the 1948 & 1967 Wars

In addressing Israel's external security the Balance of Power theory, elaborated upon in chapter 4 of this thesis, can help. The Balance of Power can be analysed with the help of the following variables, elaborated upon by Waltz (Waltz, 1979: 131):

1. Size of population and territory (CIA Factbook)
2. Resource endowment (Correlates of War)
3. Economic capability (Middle East Military Balance)
4. Military strength (Middle East Military Balance)
5. Political stability and competence (World Bank Group)

In this part of the chapter these variables will be elaborated upon. Ever since Israel declared its independence in 1948 it has been confronted with a hostile external environment. Several wars, but also hostilities on a lower level such as rocket attacks between Israel and Lebanon, made national security the most important issue in Israeli politics (Freilich, 2006: 635). To deal with the external security threats Israel built one of the most advanced military organizations and intelligence services in the world (The International Institute for strategic studies, 2012: 31).

In demographic terms, Israel is also under threat because it is surrounded by the 'whole Arab World' (Tapia, 2009: 8). Besides that, there are still countries that do not recognize the state of Israel and favour the destruction of the state. For example, this is the stated policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, since the signing of the peace treaties with both Jordan and Egypt, the immediate neighbouring countries of Israel do not form a direct threat anymore, making Israel less
threatened in the region (Merom, 1999: 422). However, recent developments in Egypt showed that it might not be as peaceful in the future. The Egyptian Parliament published the following:

"Revolutionary Egypt will never be a friend, partner or ally of the Zionist entity (Israel), which we consider to be the number one enemy of Egypt and the Arab nation. It will deal with that entity as an enemy, and the Egyptian government is hereby called upon to review all its relations and accords with that enemy." (Associated Press, 2012)

The 1948 War had a significant demographic effect on the territory that by then was known as Israel. Around 800,000 Palestinian fled or were forcefully expelled during this war to surrounding states, such as Jordan (Rouhana, 1997: 80). This development, together with the unrestricted Jewish immigration from all around the world, soon resulted in a Jewish majority population in the newly established state. The demographics changed again after the 1967 War (DellaPergola, 2001: 7). During this war Israel fought against Egypt, Jordan and Syria. Several countries such as Iraq, Algeria and Saudi Arabia provided these countries with arms and a small numbers of military troops. Israel was seen as the aggressor in this war by the Arab world, because it was the first country to strike. The Israeli government however claimed that Israel was faced with an immense external security threat of an attack coming from Egypt. This claim was also widely accepted in the Western world (Milton-Edwards, 2006: 108). Years later, several senior officials of Israel admitted that Israel should have been seen as the aggressor. One of them was future Prime Minister Menachem Begin. He stated that:

"The Egyptian army concentrations in the Sinai approaches do not prove that Nasser was really about to attack us. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him."

(The New York Times, 1982)

Demographically the 1967 War had severe consequences for the region. During these six days of war, Israel annexed Jerusalem, and occupied the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula (DellaPergola, 2001: 7). Israel withdrew from this last part in 1979, after a peace treaty was signed between Egypt and Israel. Under international law the other territories that Israel seized are seen as occupied. The United Nations tried to convince Israel to withdrawal from the territories. The Security Council of the United Nations unanimously adopted Resolution 242. In this Resolution it was stated that the Israeli armed forces should withdraw from the territories it
occupied after the Six-Day War.\(^1\) This Resolution was never accepted or implemented by Israel. The image below shows how Israel extended its territory significantly after the 1967 war. The areas that are green in this image are the areas which were seized and occupied by Israel.

Image 3. Changes in territory after the Six-Day War (www.mapsof.net)

After the 1967 War it became clear that Israel was a state that would not be wiped off the face of the earth (Gat, 2005: 616). The question remained whether a significant shift in the regional balance of power, especially after the 1948 and 1967 wars, has taken place. From the moment the state of Israel was established the size of its population has grown from a mere 1.000.000 Jews in 1948 to over 5.500.000 Jews in December 2011 (CIA Factbook, 2011). Besides that, Israel was able to expand its territory significantly. The image on the next page shows the difference between the U.N. Partition Plan in 1948 and the U.N. Resolution in 1967. It shows that Israel extended its territory significantly compared to the original 1948 plans.

\(^1\) For the full text of the resolution see: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/240/94/IMG/NR024094.pdf?OpenElement
Israel will never be a great player in the region when looking at the size of the territory only. Neighboring countries like Jordan and Egypt will always be several times bigger. Besides that, resource endowment does not play a big role for Israel, unlike in large part of the Middle East region. In this thesis it is argued that the size of the territory and population is not the most important variable. In this thesis it is argued that the military strength, as well as political stability and economic growth play an important role in considering Israel as a regional power. After the 1948 and 1967 Wars, in which Israel was victorious, it became clear that the military power of Israel was well developed and strong and that it would be difficult for any state to defeat Israel (Gat, 2005: 618). Besides that, Israel has a high score on economic capability and political stability and competence compared to its neighboring countries (The Military Balance, 2011). Politically Israel
has been rather stable compared to its neighboring states, especially when considering last year’s Arab Spring in the region.

The table below shows a comparison between Israel and its neighboring countries on economics and the size of the military organization in 2010 (Middle East Military Balance, 2010). Economically Israel is a well-developed country, compared to the other countries in the region. It shows that Israel has the highest GDP per capita compared to the other countries included in the table. Israel's GDP per capita is ten times as high as its direct neighbor Egypt. And although it seems that Egypt's regular army is about 2.5 times as big as Israel's regular army, it has to be noted that Israel only has 7.5 million citizens, of whom only 6 million can serve in the army based on their ethnicity, compared to over 85 million Egyptian citizens. Therefore, it can be concluded that relatively more Israeli’s serve in the army, compared to Egypt. On military equipment, like tanks and combat aircrafts, Israel ranks high as well. In the table below a comparison is made between Israel and its neighboring countries on economics as well as military aspects.

Table 1. Middle East Military Balance (2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>GDP (US$ Bn)</th>
<th>GDP per capita (US$)</th>
<th>Population (m)</th>
<th>Regular Army</th>
<th>Tanks</th>
<th>Combat Aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>152.6</td>
<td>4250</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>127.000</td>
<td>1080</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>217.2</td>
<td>2570</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>450.000</td>
<td>3380</td>
<td>505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lybia</td>
<td>79.3</td>
<td>12110</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>76.500</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>91.9</td>
<td>2842</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>198.500</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunesia</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>3732</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>35.500</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>217.1</td>
<td>28681</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>176.500</td>
<td>3340</td>
<td>516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>3570</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>100.700</td>
<td>927</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>7190</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>61.400</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>2688</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>289.000</td>
<td>3700</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The previous has shown that from the moment Israel was founded in 1948 wars and conflicts have changed the region. The above analysis shows that the 1948 and 1967 wars were significant when looking at the expansion of the territory of the state of Israel. The Arab inhabitants of Mandatory Palestine became a (unofficial) minority in a newly established state. The 1948 and 1967 wars did not influence resource endowment. Besides that, it cannot be stated that the wars influenced the economic capabilities of Israel. Israel, as shown in the table above, is the wealthiest country in the region, compared to its neighboring states. The table also shows that Israel is a military power with a highly developed military organization. Besides that, Israel has a relatively stable domestic political environment, which will be elaborated upon further on in this chapter.

In this analysis, the possible nuclear weapons owned and developed by Israel are not taken into account. Israel is not recognized as a Nuclear Weapons State by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The state has never officially admitted that it has nuclear weapons, although it is widely believed that Israel developed nuclear weapons. Internationally Israel is urged to sign the NPT, but it has refused to do so, because it would be contrary to its national security interests (Dong-Joon and Gartzke, 2007: 186). In 1981, the Security Council of the United Nations passed Resolution 487. In this Resolution the Council demanded Israel to open its secret nuclear facilities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Authority. Israel has refused to comply with this Resolution (Sadaka, 2002: 3). Because Israel is not complying with the Resolution, it is remains guesswork to write about the influence that the nuclear weapons of Israel have on the region.

The previous analysis has shown that after the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, a shift in the regional balance of power has taken place in favor of Israel. With the improvement of Israel's regional power position over the decennia, it can be stated that Israel is in a position to initiate domestic policies which limit the rights of its minorities. Israel can initiate these policies, because it would not provoke any attacks from its neighboring states, because these states now acknowledge that it would not be possible at this stage to defeat Israel's military power.

6.3 Reputation

In the methodological chapter of this thesis reputation was described as the general estimation in which a state is held by other states, the general public and the international arena. It will be
analyzed whether Israel regards its reputation in the international arena important enough to let it have an influence on its domestic policies. If the reputation is ranked highly, then a state would try to avoid loss in reputation in the international political environment. This would then influence policies on a domestic level. In this case that would mean that Israel would not adopt policies towards the Palestinian minority which are discriminatory or change discriminatory policies that are already adopted.

In order to measure the reputation of Israel, the number of United Nations Resolutions from the Security Council as well as the General Assembly on Israel, adopted from 2000 till now, will be looked into. Because the United Nations can be seen as the central political institution in the world it can be regarded as representative of how the international arena thinks about Israel’s behavior in the world. Furthermore, a survey about how the general public thinks about Israel's influence in the world will be addressed. In the end a conclusion can be drawn whether Israel’s reputation in the international arena has an influence on her domestic politics, because it is thought that when international institutions, like the United Nations, regularly report on the situation of the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel and its discriminatory policies towards this minority, Israel will soften its policies towards this minority in order to protect its reputation among the other states.

6.3.1. The international arena

In 1997 the U.N. Security Council published an opinion on Israel. It stated that:

“The repeated violation by Israel, the occupying Power, of international law and its failure to comply with relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions and agreements reached between the parties undermine the Middle East peace process and constitute a threat to international security” (U.N. Security Council, April 1997: ES/10/2).

The above quote shows that Israel is not viewed in a positive way by the Security Council. If Israel would mind its reputation in the international arena it would comply with the relevant Resolutions adopted by the different U.N. bodies in a bid to change the opinion held by the Security Council. However, Israel has not. From 2000 till now, the U.N. Security Council grafted 25 Resolutions concerning the situation in the Middle-East between Israel, the Palestinians and on incidents
between Israel and its neighboring countries.² Ten of these Security Council Resolutions were blocked by the United States. From the permanent members of the Security Council, namely China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and United States, the last state is the only state that has used its veto power in the past twelve years to block a Security Council Resolution which was critical towards Israel's behavior.³

Currently, 88 U.N. Resolutions of the Security Council, from the day it was founded in 1946 till now, are violated by the states concerned. Of these countries, Israel is the biggest violator. It is currently in violation with 32 U.N. Resolutions. After Israel, Turkey is the biggest violator (24 Resolutions), followed by Morocco (15 Resolutions) (Hammond, 2002: 5).

There are other official documents from the Security Council which condemn Israel's behavior. An example of one of these documents concerned the killing of ten freedom activists, which took place by the Israeli military in international waters, on the Flotilla boats. The Security Council stated the following:

“In the early morning hours of Tuesday, the Security Council expressed deep regret at the loss of life and injuries resulting from the use of force during the Israeli military operation early on Monday in international waters against the convoy sailing to Gaza, and condemned those acts which had killed at least 10 civilians and wounded many more.” (Security Council, 2010).

The violence used during this military operation was contrary to international law, because it took place in international waters, but was also contrary to Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

“There is clear evidence to support prosecutions of the following crimes within the terms of article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention: willful killing; torture or inhuman treatment; willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health” (Palmer, 2011: 56)

The above shows that Israel does not have a good reputation in the Security Council. Besides the Security Council, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a record of 330 Resolutions related to Israel from 2000 till now.⁴ Most of these Resolutions concerned the question on how to

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³ The Security Council Resolutions blocked by the United States can be found on this website: [http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/UN/usvetoes.html](http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/UN/usvetoes.html)
⁴ For an overview see: [http://www.un.org/documents/resga.htm](http://www.un.org/documents/resga.htm)
solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but also concerned the human rights violations of Israel towards the Palestinians living in the Occupied Territories and within Israel. An example is Resolution 55/133, where the General Assembly expressed its concern:

“...about the continuing violation of the human rights of the Palestinian people by Israel, the occupying Power, including the use of collective punishment, closure of areas, annexation and establishment of settlements and the continuing actions by it designed to change the legal status, geographical nature and demographic composition of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem.” (General Assembly, 2000, Resolution 55/133).

Most Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly are adopted without a vote. When a Resolution is adopted with a vote, it can be documented as a recorded vote or as a summary of the result. Only when a Resolution is adopted as a recorded vote it will show the opinion of a Member State about the issue. When reviewing the Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly over the past twelve years, it becomes clear that the United States as well as Israel vote against Resolutions that are critical towards Israel. The Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia vote against the Resolutions or abstain from voting (United Nations Documentation). Overall, it can therefore be stated that the majority of the Member States of the General Assembly agree with the Resolutions adopted in the General Assembly towards Israel.

Although different bodies of the U.N., namely the Security Council, the General Assembly, but also different Human Right Committees have urged Israel to enforce these Resolutions, it has not. Therefore the conclusion can be drawn that Israel is not influenced by the different bodies of the United Nations and does not adopt its domestic policies to save its reputation.

6.3.2. Public opinion

Between 2005 and 2007 the BBC, in cooperation with PIPA (Program on International Policy Attitudes), conducted a survey about countries’ influence in the world. The survey was held across 27 countries, with over 28,000 respondents. The people who participated were asked to rate 11

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5 The whole General Assembly voting procedure can be found at: http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/gavote.htm
6 For an overview of all the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly see: http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/gares1.htm
countries and the European Union on having either a positive or negative influence in the world. The countries that were rated are Canada, Japan, France, Great Britain, China, India, Venezuela, Russia, United States, North-Korea, Iran and Israel.

Most of the people who participated in this survey regarded Israel as having the most negative influence in the world of all the countries involved. Fifty-six percent of the respondents viewed Israel as having a mostly negative influence in the world and just seventeen percent viewed Israel as having a positive influence in the world. From all the countries evaluated, including North-Korea and Iran, this was the least positive rating. The countries where a majority of the citizens are Muslim were most negative about Israel’s position in the world. However, also large majorities in Europe had a negative view towards Israel. Seventy-seven per cent of the German respondents and sixty-six of the French participants thought negatively about Israel. The respondents in the United States of America were most positive about Israel, but still only forty-one percent of the respondents in the United States viewed Israel as having a positive influence in the world. In the table below the views on all the countries surveyed are summarized.

Image 5. Israel is viewed as having the most negative influence of the countries rated

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Mainly Positive</th>
<th>Mainly Negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7 For this survey a total of 28,389 citizens from Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Egypt, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Kenya, Lebanon, Mexico, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland,
The previous shows that Israel violates Resolutions adopted by the international community, namely different bodies of the United Nations. Despite several attempts of the Security Council, as well as the General Assembly, to urge Israel to comply with the Resolutions it did not (Gruenberg, 2009: 485). Therefore it can be stated that Israel does not regard its reputation in the international system as decisive, when making policies on a domestic level.

From the survey discussed above it can be derived that Israel, according to the respondents, does not have a good influence in the world. From this, it can be derived that a majority of the people interviewed do not regard the way in which Israel acts in the international system as something positive. It can be concluded that, although bodies of the United Nations regularly adopt Resolutions on the situation of the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel, Israel does not soften its policies towards this minority in order to protect its international reputation.

6.4. International norms versus national norms

In this part of the analysis it will be seen whether Israel's national norms comply with internationally accepted norms. It is argued that when an international norm does not correspond with a national norm, the international norm will not be internalized in Israel.

International norms can have important effects on the behavior of a state on the domestic level (Cortell & Davis, 2000: 66). International norms and national norms do not always correspond with each other. Research has shown that there are different conditions that can affect the compliance on the domestic level of international norms. One of these conditions is the structural context where the domestic debate about the international norm takes place. This domestic structure is important, because it can favor certain actors over others (Gourevitch, 1978: 900). Some researchers, like Jeffrey Checkel, argue that compliance of an international norm on the domestic level will take place, when there is a so-called cultural match. He argues that international norms have to correspond with domestic values, like domestic understandings and beliefs. Through these domestic values the international norm can get meaning and be internalized (Checkel, 1999: 86).

Portugal, Russia, South Korea, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and the United States were interviewed between 3 November 2006 and 16 January 2007. See for the full report: http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/mar07/BBC_ViewsCountries_Mar07_pr.pdf
According to Checkel international norms have to be empowered in the national arena of a state. These norms must change the interests and preferences of certain domestic agents. As long as there is no change in interests and preferences it will be difficult to implement an international norm on the domestic level (Checkel, 1999: 88). Different studies have shown that international norms are more likely to be implemented when they support important domestic interests, such as security (Cortell & Davis, 2000: 77). In this thesis it is argued that when the international norm does not correspond with the national norm, the national norm will prevail.

In this part of the chapter, an analysis will be made concerning the norm on equal treatment. This norm is chosen, because it is a widely accepted norm, by countries all over the world and it is laid down in different treaties and covenants, like the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights from the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations.\(^8\) Israel ratified this Covenant in 1991. In article 26 of this Covenant it is determined that:

\[
\text{All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status (Article 26, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights)}
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In short, the above article should provide all citizens of a state with an equal position before the law and in all aspects of daily life. In order to analyze whether Israel has implemented this international norm and whether an Israeli national norm corresponds with this equality norm, the legislation of Israel will be addressed.

Israel does not have a written constitution. It does have the so called Basic Laws, which are considered to be the highest written legislation in the state (Woods, 2009: 812). An equality principle has not been laid down in any of the Basic Laws, or any other Israeli law. In 1992 the Israeli Parliament passed two new Basic Laws. One of these Basic Laws was the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom (Woods, 2009: 811). Although this Basic Law is considered to be a mini bill of human rights it does not provide an equality or non-discrimination principle (Smooha, 2002:489).

\(^8\) See for the full text of the covenant: [http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm](http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm)
There are different kinds of rights that ought to be respected by the authorities, in order to gain full equality for all citizens, examples are civil rights and political rights. Civil and political rights are rights that protect the freedom of individuals from infringement by the government (Saban, 2003-2004: 906). Examples of civil rights in Israel are the right of return, the right to get married and the possibility to buy land. Examples of political rights are the right to vote and the right to a fair trial when prosecuted. As was shown in the chapter about the domestic politics of Israel there are many examples in which the Palestinian minority is treated in an unequal way compared to the Jewish majority, both concerning civil rights and political rights.

6.4.1. Civil rights

There are laws and policies in Israel that discriminate directly and indirectly against the Palestinian minority in Israel and the Palestinians in the world. An example of discriminatory and unequal treatment of the Israeli government towards the Palestinians who fled Israel in the past decennia, is the Law of Return (1959). The Law of Return gives all Jews, from around the world, but also their (non-Jewish) spouses and persons of Jewish ancestry, the right to settle in Israel and obtain citizenship. According to this law, the Israeli government is obliged to facilitate the immigration of these people. The Palestinians, who fled during the past decennia, have tried to claim a right of return as well, but the Israeli government argues that the refugees do not have a right to return to their former homes and that their claim is a political claim, which will only be resolved when a final settlement is reached. The United Nations General Assembly published a Resolution concerning the Palestinian refugees and their right of return:

“... the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible” (Resolution 194, article 11).

Despite this Resolution, the Palestinians that fled Israel are not allowed to return to their homes. From the previous it can be derived that a distinction is made, purely on the basis of religion and ethnicity. If someone would convert to Judaism, it would be easy to immigrate to Israel and gain
Israeli citizenship. If someone is not Jewish it becomes a lot harder or even impossible. This discriminatory policy has direct consequences for the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel, because the possibility of a Palestinian that lives in Israel to marry and then live with someone in Israel is limited. If a citizen of Israel, belonging to the Palestinian minority, wants to marry for example a Palestinian resident that lives in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip it is impossible for the spouse to gain residency or citizenship status in Israel. In 2003 the Knesset passed a law called The Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (Nikfar, 2005: 1). This law denies people from the Occupied Territories (OPT), namely the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, to gain citizenship in Israel as well as citizens from states who are branded enemy states (Adalah, 2011: 16). The ban only applies to Palestinians that live in the OPT and not to the Jewish settlers who live there. The law is contrary to the situation in which the Jewish majority lives in Israel. When a citizen of Israel, belonging to the Jewish majority, wants to marry a Jew from a foreign state, there is no problem gaining Israeli citizenship for this person. Therefore it can be stated that the law directly discriminates against the Palestinian citizens of Israel and the Palestinians who live in the OPT. It violates their rights to equal treatment and family life (Adalah, 2011: 17). The law is discriminatory since, as an example, a Spanish man or woman can gain Israeli citizenship by marrying an Israeli citizen, but a Israeli citizen belonging to the Palestinian minority cannot (Nikfar, 2005: 16). Despite many claims by human right groups, like Human Rights Watch, that this law is discriminatory, the Israeli Supreme Court has upheld it in many instances, with the most recent judgment given in January 2012.

Another example of unequal treatment in Israel can be found in the Basic Law: Israel Lands. In this Basic Law it is enclosed that the land of Israel cannot be transferred through sale or in any other manner. Besides that the Palestinian minority is often deprived access and use of the land that belonged to them on the basis of security threats (Bisharat, 1994: 509). There are several Israeli laws that uphold this practice, such as the Land Ordinance (2010). The Palestinian minority that lives in Israel possesses only 2.5% of the total territory of Israel and as a consequence live in overcrowded properties. Land is exclusively allocated to the Jewish citizens of Israel by the Jewish National Fund (Saban, 2003-2004: 948).

The previous has shown that Jewish and non-Jewish citizens of Israel do not have equal civil rights on all aspects of life. The above shows just two examples of the distinction that is made between the Jewish majority and the Palestinian minority that live in Israel.
6.4.2. Political rights

Political rights are there to ensure that all citizens can participate, either directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of the government. According to the annual report of Freedom House Israel scores 1 in 2012 on political rights, which is the highest possible score (Freedom House, 2012). The Palestinian minority that lives in Israel has a right to vote in local and national elections. Although members of the Palestinian minority are able to gain a seat in the Israeli Parliament, the minority group is underrepresented in the different bodies of the Israeli government. As an example, judges of the Supreme Court of Israel are appointed by the Judicial Selection Committee. This committee consists of nine members. Two Members of Parliament, two cabinet Ministers, two representatives of the Israel Bar Association and three Supreme Court Justices. Till this day, only one judge in the Supreme Court belonged to the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel (Edelman, 1994: 177). These selection committees make it less transparent on which grounds someone is chosen to fulfill a certain vacancy.

The right to a fair trial is not something that is lived up to by the Israeli authorities. Because of a perception of constant threat, the national security objectives and policies of Israel, internally as well as externally, have dominated Israeli politics and have led to several high-profile cases of Israeli mistreatment of Palestinians (Edelman, 1994: 183). The Palestinian minority is seen as an internal enemy and the neighbouring Arab states as the external enemy (Rouhana, 1997: 41). This constant threat to Israel’s national security is one of the reasons why the Palestinian minority is treated differently than the Jewish majority. This minority is seen as part of the Arab world and therefore as part of the hostile states surrounding Israel. Because of the environment of constant threat to Israel’s national security, policies are adopted to contain the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel (Smooha, 1993: 105). A recent example of the failure of Israel to provide all defendants with a fair trial is the captivity of Palestinian Khader Adnan. Israeli authorities kept him in prison for over ten weeks without making any formal charges against him or putting him on trial. The authorities said he was arrested for “activities that threatened regional security”, and they did not see the need to specify this. This so-called Administrative Detention procedure makes it possible to hold someone in prison for up to six months, but with the possibility to extend this, without the need of the Israeli authorities to make any charges or put the detainee on trial, all in the name of ‘national security’ (Gross, 2001: 273).
The previous has shown that a distinction is being made between Jewish citizens and non-Jewish citizens in the state of Israel on different aspects of life, civil as well as political. Examples are family reunification and the possibility to buy land. The international norm of equal treatment for all citizens does not correspond with the national norm of Israel, where the Jewish majority is given a favorable position. It could be said, in the words of Checkel, that there is no a cultural match between the international norm of equal treatment of all citizens and the national norm of Israel as a Jewish state for its Jewish citizens. Israel violates international norms that are laid down in different treaties and covenants, although it has signed and ratified these documents. The international norm of equal treatment for all citizens does not comply with a national norm in Israel. Therefore, this international norm will not be implemented.

6.5. Political parties and their position towards the Palestinian minority

Where the previous section looked at Israel's position in the international arena, this section investigates the role of the three main political parties in Israel, namely Likud, Kadima and the Labor party in domestic politics and on the domestic level. Background information is provided about their ideologies and where they are located on the so called ‘left-right scale’. Two smaller right-wing parties, Shas and Yisrael Beteinu, that have joined the coalition in the past governments, will be discussed as well. The focus will be on the standpoints that these parties have towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in general, the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel specifically and the external and internal security issues facing Israel. What are the main dividing lines between these political parties? Do these parties favor a two state solution or not? Do they want to extend the borders of Israel further? Should the Palestinian minority receive full equal rights? The section also discusses the 2006 and 2009 elections and whether the outcome of these elections have led to changes in the policies adopted that influence the situation of Palestinian minority that lives in Israel.
The Likud party can be seen as a political party to the right of the center on a 'left-right scale'. The party was founded in 1973 by Menachem Begin. In the elections of 1977 the party was victorious for the first time (Shlaim, 1994: 10). This victory was a major turning point in the political history of Israel. After ruling for more than a decade the party lost the 1992 Knesset election (Shlaim, 1994: 6). A major change for the party took place in 2005, when the leader of the party, Ariel Sharon, left the party and formed a new party, Kadima, which will be discussed later on in this chapter. This split resulted in a loss of seats in the Knesset during the 2006 elections (Arian & Shamir, 2008: 2). However, the party recovered from this loss and now leads the Israeli government, after the elections of 2009, with their leader Benjamin Netanyahu as the Prime Minister of the country (Diskin, 2010: 60).

Likud favors restrictive policies towards the Palestinian minority in Israel. Domestically Likud has pursued hard policies towards the Palestinian minority. An example of such a policy is the cuts in child allowances for all citizens of Israel. However, when one has served in the military these cuts are not applicable. Since the Palestinian minority is excluded from the possibility to enter into the military, they are directly discriminated against with this policy.

Likud’s party leader, Netanyahu, has referred to the Palestinian minority as the ‘fifth column’ of Israel and ‘the additional front’, seeing this minority as an internal security threat. In 1989 Netanyahu stated:

“Israel should have exploited the repression of the demonstrations in China, when world attention focused on that country, to carry out mass expulsions among the Arabs of the territories.” (Netanyahu, 24 November, 1989, speech at Bar-Ilan University)

Furthermore, Likud is not in favor of the establishment of a Palestinian state and remains in great favor of the construction of the separation barrier in order to gain more Israeli territory, although this barrier was deemed to be illegal by International Courts of Justice (ICJ). In its advisory opinion the Court ruled that:

“All states are under the obligations not to recognize the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall. Israel is bound to comply with its obligations to respect the rights of
the Palestinian people to self-determinations and its obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law.” (ICJ, July 2004, Advisory Opinion in the case concerning the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory)

Despite this Advisory Opinion by the International Court of Justice Israel continued construction of the barrier, in many instances on land that belongs to the West Bank, in that way enlarging its territory in an illegal way.

The division of Jerusalem is regarded by Likud to be both a threat to peace as well as security of Israel. The ‘natural’ expansion of Jewish settlements in the Palestinian Territories will continue under Likud. Furthermore, Likud is in favor of the continuing building and development of infrastructure of roads, power lines etcetera, which eventually makes the creation of an independent Palestinian state impossible. The Jewish character of the state stands central to the party politics of Likud and it focuses on further strengthening Israel’s military power. Besides that, Likud states that the Palestinian refugee problem is a problem that belongs to the Arab states.⁹

Likud members also do not hesitate to use defamatory language in their public statements about Palestinians. An example is the statement made by Member of Parliament and Likud member, Yehiel Hazan, in the Knesset on December 13, 2007 about the Palestinian minority:

“Just like worms, these Arabs are everywhere. Under the ground, on the land, by every method, these worms have been harming the Jewish people for the past hundred years”.

Another member of the Likud party, Moshe Feiglin, stated with regard to the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel:

“There is a state within a state growing here, and we have got to stop fooling ourselves. You cannot teach a monkey to speak and you cannot teach an Arab to be democratic. You’re dealing with a culture of thieves and robbers”.

In sum, the Likud party platform emphasizes the preservation of the Jewish character of the state of Israel and the protection against hostile Arab states provided by the highly developed military

power. In its election program national security is the central issue to attract votes. A core component of Likud’s political platform is the belief that the Palestinian minority is a fifth-column and needs to be controlled. Therefore, Likud is not in favor of giving the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel equal civil and political rights. Besides that, the conflict with the Palestinians needs to be settled without having to make big concessions (Barnett, 2002: 71). Jerusalem should remain the capital city of Israel. In other words, highly restrictive policies concerning the Palestinian minority are essential parts of Likud’s political program.

6.5.2. Kadima

On the 21st of November 2005, only 128 days before the 2006 Israeli elections, Sharon, Livni and Olmert left the Likud party and formed the Kadima party. On the same day Ariel Sharon held a press conference and stated that:

“After many misgivings, I decided to leave the Likud Party today. In its present form, the Likud cannot lead Israel towards its national goals. I established the Likud to serve a national idea, and provide hope to the people of Israel. Unfortunately, it no longer exists there... Staying in the Likud means wasting time on political struggles, rather than acting on behalf of the state. I prefer the good of the country to the comfortable and easy personal interest.”

(Ariel Sharon, November 2005)

The newly established party can be seen as a centrist, liberal party with a more moderate agenda on security issues and the Palestinian case (Shamir, 2006: 20). Where Likud believes in the strong influence of the Orthodox Jews and Haredi (extremely religious Jews) on state affairs, Kadima opts to promote a more secular civil agenda. From its establishment on, Kadima directly became the largest party in Israel after the 2006 elections (Diskin, 2010: 53). One of the explanations for its success right from the beginning is that there was a gap between what the voters wanted and what the established parties had to offer. It can be said that there was no real centrist party in the political arena before Kadima was created. Kadima was able to place itself in the center of the party system and in that way was able to attract the votes of a large group in the society that was looking for a party ‘in the middle’ instead of the left or right of the ‘left-right scale’ (Hazan, 2007: 281).
The party’s position on the Palestinian issue consists of the following: it favors a two-state solution, where the Palestinians will have an independent state. However, Jewish settlers are to remain in the West Bank, because this is deemed necessary to protect Israel’s national security. Furthermore, no concessions will be made concerning Jerusalem, which is to remain the undivided capital over Israel. The separation barrier is to be completed in order to protect Israel’s national security. Concerning the Palestinian refugees, the party states that the future Palestinian state is to solve this problem, which in essence means that the Palestinian minority that now lives in Israel will be banished to this newly established state. One of the political platform points of Kadima is to produce a written constitution where the ethnic character of the Israeli state as Jewish is implemented, thereby discriminating the minority groups that live in Israel.

In its 2006 elections ‘Action Plan’ on the issue of national security it was stated that:

“The Jewish people have a national and historic right to the Land of Israel in its entirety. The overall objective—a sovereign Jewish and democratic state that is a secure national home for the Jewish people—is the maintenance of a solid Jewish majority within the State of Israel. And the balance between allowing Jews to fulfill their historic right to live anywhere in the Land of Israel and maintaining the continued existence of Israel as the national Jewish should be pursued.” (Kadima, 2006).

The table below shows that during the 2006 elections Kadima received most of its votes from people who voted for Likud in 2003. It can be seen that Kadima attracted both voters from the right (Likud) and from the left (Labor). People who voted for Likud in 2003 and voted for Kadima in 2006 did so, because of their affinity with Sharon and because of the more moderate position on foreign affairs and security matters compared to Likud. Besides that, Kadima focused more on negotiations with the Palestinians, instead of socio-economic affairs, which made Labor voters switch to Kadima (Shamir, 2006: 15).

Table 2. Kadima voters based on who they voted for in 2003 (Hazan, 2007: 283)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Likud</td>
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<td>51</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>23</td>
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In contrast to Likud, Kadima does not favour restrictive policies concerning the Palestinian minority. Kadima shares with Likud the preference for a Jewish state, but in its advocacy of a two-state solution, Kadima acknowledges the Palestinians right to exist and to have their own homeland. Unlike Likud, Kadima does not politicize the role of the Palestinian minority for Israel’s national security. In other words, the key difference between the two parties is that Likud competes for votes based on its hard-line national security policy, including restrictions on the Palestinian minority, and Kadima competes for votes based on its appeal for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but without making too many sacrifices, as it, for example, does not talk about dividing Jerusalem.

6.5.3. Labor

From 1968 till 1977 Labor was the dominant political party in Israel’s party system and all Prime Ministers were affiliated with the party (Shlaim, 1994: 6). After 1977 a process of decline of seats of the Labor party can be observed (Andersen & Yaish, 2003: 402). After the 1977 elections Labor lost for the first time from the Likud party, established in 1973, and ended up being the opposition party (Inbar, 2010: 69). The Labor party can be seen as a left-of-center Zionist party on the ‘left-right scale’ and as the most leftist party discussed in this chapter. From 1977 till 2009 the Labor party only led the Israeli government for six years.

What was Labor’s position concerning the Palestinian minority? In the 1980s, Labor’s position was more restrictive than it is today. For example, former party leader and Prime Minister Rabin stated concerning the Palestinian minority:
“Israel will create in the course of the next 10 or 20 years conditions which would attract natural and voluntary migration of the Palestinian minority to Jordan.” (Rabin, April 4, 1983 New York Times).

However, after the decline in votes from 1977 onwards, the Labor party tried to gain votes by trying to get the votes of the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel (Inbar, 2010: 74). The 2006 Labor party platform included a section on the Palestinian minority in Israel. In this section it was stated that fundamental changes in government policies needed to be made, to create complete equality between the Jewish majority and the Palestinian minority. However, at the same time, military operations in Gaza were started when Ehud Barak, Labor party member, was the Defense Minister. And the extreme force used against the Palestinians during and after the second intifada resulted in a further loss of support and votes from the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel for the Labor party (Inbar, 2010: 76). Reasons for the decline in votes can be found in the changing demography in Israel, a poor choice in party leadership and struggles within the party between the members of Labor.

In comparison to Likud and Kadima, Labor has a same standpoint concerning how to deal with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as Kadima, which was elaborated upon earlier in this chapter. Like Kadima, Labor states that an independent Palestinian state needs to be established in the future. As with Likud and Kadima, the Labor party wants to maintain Jewish settlements in the West Bank and complete the separation barrier. However, more than Likud and Kadima, Labor does call for complete social and political equality between the Palestinian minority and the Jewish majority, which the other two parties addressed above, do not.

6.5.4. Shas

Shas is an ultra-orthodox right-wing political party in Israel. Voters are mostly extremely religious Jews, such as the Haredi, but also underprivileged Jewish immigrants from Middle-Eastern and North-African descent (Weissbrod, 2003: 80). Just as Likud, Shas does not want to make big concessions in a bid to reach a peace-agreement with the Palestinians. The party will never consider to divide Jerusalem and a two-state solution is not especially favored by Shas. Besides that, the party favors settlement activities in the OPT (Mossawa, 2009: 43). This is a different view
than the party had in the ‘70s, when it would consider returning territory to the Palestinians in order to prevent the spilling of Jewish blood. Its views changed to a more radical right-wing view when the Second Intifada started (Peled, 2008: 2).

The Jewish values, especially the religious norms, stand central to Shas (Weissbrod, 2003: 79). Israel is considered a Jewish state for the Jewish people, thereby directly discriminating against the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel. Over the years the party has been active in preventing the Jewish population to familiarise with the Arab culture of the Palestinian minority. This prevention keeps the Jewish majority segregated from the Palestinian minority and does not benefit the position of the minority group (Bermanis e.o., 2004: 168). According to the party the rights of the Palestinian minority should be constrained. The minority should not be granted equal citizenship rights as the Jewish majority (Peled, 2008: 21).

As was already addressed earlier in this thesis, the smaller parties can have major power when it comes to forming a coalition because of the low qualifying threshold in Israel. Shas has traditionally been able to exploit this advantage. An example of its power can be found in the 1999 government coalition of Ehud Barak. Shas was part of this coalition with Labor, Meretz Party, Center Party, United Torah Judaism and the NRP. Tensions arose in the coalition and in order to keep Shas in, three Meretz ministers resigned their cabinet posts. As a result Shas was put in an influential position. It used its position to influence the Camp David negotiations. However, when Ehud Barak left for another round of negotiations, Shas pulled out of the coalition, because it feared that Barak would make too many concessions to the Palestinians. This whole process, along with domestic problems, resulted in the early 2001 elections (Stinnett, 2007: 488).

In comparison to the three main parties previously discussed, Shas focuses more on the religious Jewish values that the state of Israel should possess. There are similarities between the main parties addressed earlier and Shas. Just as Likud, Shas does not want to make any concessions that are too radical, to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Jewish settlements in the West Bank are actively supported. Furthermore, Shas does not believe in granting the Palestinian minority the same rights as the Jewish majority and wants to keep the Palestinian minority segregated from the Jewish majority. Because of the political institutions in Israel, Shas can have an influential position and push its ideas when forming a coalition.
6.5.5. Yisrael Beteinu

Yisrael Beteinu was founded by former Likud-member Avigdor Lieberman in 1999 as a national movement. The party can be seen as a revisionist Zionist party with hard-line politics towards the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel. The core aims of the party are formulated on its website as followed:

“The Yisrael Beytenu party fulfills the three cardinal principles of Zionism: Aliyah (immigration), settlement, and defense of our homeland.”

In the 1999-elections the party won four seats in the parliament. In 2000 the party merged with the National Union. The National Union can be seen as an alliance between smaller parties. Before the 2006 elections Yisrael Beteinu split from the National Union and, independently, won eleven seats in the Knesset. Russian immigrants are the main followers of this party (Bermanis e.o., 2004: 172). It’s slogan for the 2009 election campaign stated: ‘No Loyalty, no citizenship’.

Regarding the peace process, Yisrael Beiteinu does not believe in the “Land for Peace” approach, derived from Resolution 242 which was elaborated upon earlier in this thesis, as this is contrary to its security and religious interests. Instead of that, the party proposes that an exchange of different areas of land should provide a correct outcome. This is also known as the Populated-Area Exchange Plan. Areas in Israel where the majority is from Palestinian descent should be handed over to the Palestinian Authorities. In exchange, Jewish settlements in the West Bank should be officially annexed to the State of Israel. One third of the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel would lose its Israeli citizenship if this plan would become reality. (Mossawa, 2009: 47).

The party believes in the Jewish character of the state of Israel. This directly discriminates against the non-Jewish citizens of Israel. According to Lieberman, the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel should pass a loyalty test in order to remain an Israeli citizen. Again, this is discriminatory against the Palestinian minority, which on the basis of its ethnicity has to fulfill different requirements to gain Israeli citizenship than the Jewish majority that lives in Israel.

In 2009, Lieberman wrote an article in the weekly newspaper The Jewish Week stating the following:

“I want the State of Israel to remain a Zionist, Jewish and democratic state. There is nothing ‘far’ or ‘ultra’ about those ideals.” (The Jewish Week, 26 November, 2009).

In the same article Lieberman also stated that he was in favor of ‘a viable Palestinian state’. However, in December 2011, Lieberman, acting as Israeli Foreign Minister stated that no peace agreement will be reached in the next decade and that the construction of Jewish settlements in the West Bank would continue, making the possibility of a two-state solution impossible:

“Construction [of Jewish settlements] in the West Bank is not an obstacle to peace and those who pose an obstacle to negotiations, and the opportunity for peace, are the Palestinians who refuse to negotiate with us.” (Ravid, 25 December 2011 at the Conference for Israeli Ambassadors in Jerusalem)

Just as most of the political parties discussed in the previous paragraphs, Yisrael Beteinu, focuses on the Jewish character of the state of Israel. The party is most famous for its populated-area exchange plan, which would strip one third of the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel from its Israeli citizenship. This exchange plan would be a final settlement of the conflict with the Palestinians. Besides that, the party favors policies that are discriminatory towards the Palestinian minority, such as the new citizenship law. The party discriminates against the Palestinian minority on the basis of ethnicity and is not in favor of giving this minority equal rights.

The previous has shown that the parties discussed in this chapter share some views, but also differ on certain points. The Labor party is the only party addressed that wants to give the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel full equal rights. However, the party agrees with the others that Jewish settlements in the West Bank are to be maintained and that the separation barrier should be completed.

How did these different standpoints concerning the status of the Palestinian minority affect elections in 2006 and 2009? The next section addresses this question.
6.5.6. 2006 Elections

The 2006 elections were the first elections in which the newly formed Kadima party participated. There were several events that shaped the elections of 2006, namely the victory of the Hamas party during elections in the Gaza Strip in January 2006, but also the unilateral disengagement of Israel from Gaza (Hazan, 2007: 281). Since 2003 the qualifying threshold for voting was raised in 2003 from 1.5 percent to 2 percent (Arian & Shamir, 2008: 1). This made minority participation in the Knesset harder for the smaller parties.

The dominant dimension during this election remained the maintenance of Israel's national security. When taking the 'left-right scale' into consideration, whilst looking at the party programs of the five parties discussed above, Shas can be placed furthest right, followed by Yisrael Beiteinu and Likud. Kadima can be placed more towards the center of the scale and Labor furthest left on the scale of the parties addressed (Hazan, 2007:271). The Labor party was one of the only parties to focus on the socio-economic dimension within the Israeli society, instead of the national security issue (Spyer, 2007: 289).

The difference in outlook to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during the 2006 election campaign between Likud and Kadima can be found in their campaign slogan. Where the slogan of Likud stated: “Likud: strong against Hamas”, the slogan of Kadima was: “Kadima: Forward to the 1967 Borders”. For Kadima the 2006 election campaign was disrupted by the medical situation of party leader Ariel Sharon when he suffered two strokes. Ehud Olmert took over the leadership role when it became clear Sharon would not be able to return to the political arena of Israel. In the course of the campaign, poles began to show that Likud was losing a lot of votes to Kadima. During the election campaign Likud party leader Netanyahu tried to regain support from these voters, that crossed over to Kadima, in stating that he would be more able to ensure the security of Israeli citizens than Kadima leader Olmert would be (Spyer, 2007: 291). However, he failed in this attempt.

After the 2006 elections, Kadima became the largest party (29 seats) followed by Labor (19 seats). Likud suffered a major loss. The party lost 26 seats in comparison to the 2003 elections and received enough votes for just 12 seats. This was the first time in 30 years that Likud was not the dominant party in the Israeli party system (Spyer, 2007: 289). This loss can be explained by the establishment of Kadima, the departure of party officials that joined Kadima instead and as a
consequence of the tension within the party. A coalition was formed by Kadima with Labor and three smaller parties, including the fundamentalist party Shas. At the center of the 2006 elections for the Palestinian minority stood the attempt to boycott the Knesset elections. The Popular Committee for Boycotting the Elections stated that voting for the Israeli Parliament is a waste of resources, and that efforts should be made to develop a representative institution for the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel. The Committee also called for direct elections for an Arab Parliament (Mossawa, 2009: 10). This emphasized the feeling of segregation between the Jewish majority and the Palestinian minority. The 2006 elections marked the lowest turnout of the Palestinian minority. Only 56.3 percent of the minority went to cast their vote (Rekhess, 2007: 15). Boycotting the elections has become a political tool for the Palestinian minority.

Overall it can be stated that the 2006 elections strengthened the position of the far-right and Jewish fundamentalist parties, such as Shas and Yahadut HaTorah. The Zionist Left, and especially the Labor party, further declined and weakened (Mossawa, 2009: 11). The far-right and Jewish fundamentalist parties were able to win a larger amount of votes compared to previous elections by focusing on Israel’s national security. The implications for the Palestinian minority were clear.

6.5.7. 2009 Elections

The elections of 2009 were originally planned for 2010, but because Olmert resigned as party leader of Kadima, and his successor Livni was unable to form a coalition government, the elections took place in 2009 (Hänsel, 2009: 144). These elections also have to be placed in the context of certain events that took place. The massive military operation that Israel started only two weeks before the elections in the Gaza Strip in 2008 was of significant influence on the election campaigns of the parties and the election results. The Palestinian minority that lives in Israel experienced increased tension between them and the Jewish majority. The Palestinian minority frequently demonstrated against the war in Gaza. These demonstrations were torn apart with extreme police force. Furthermore, two Arab political parties were banned by the Central Election Committee (CEC) on the grounds that they did not recognize the state of Israel. Although the Israeli Supreme Court of Justice overturned this ban the atmosphere surrounding these elections became more hostile.
Because of the war in Gaza the whole election campaign focused on security and military concerns. Reuven Hazan, a political analyst at the Hebrew University, stated that:

"We know that the operation in Gaza — and the way that it ends — will impact on who’s going to win these election results. And therefore, the politicians are making decisions with one eye looking at Gaza and the other eye at the public" (14 January 2009, on National Public Radio)

With the attention on the war in Gaza the political parties on the right and far right had a chance to win votes by focusing on the military and security issues that concerned Israel and the Israeli citizens. However, the election results showed that, Kadima unexpectedly won one seat more in the Knesset than Likud. However, in comparison to the 2006 elections, Likud regained its position as one of biggest parties in Israel, winning 15 seats more than in the 2006 elections.

Although Likud was not the largest party after the 2009 elections, President Peres of Israel did give Likud’s party leader Netanyahu the task of forming a government. He chose Netanyahu, because Peres thought that Netanyahu was in a better position to form a coalition, because potential coalition partners of Likud on the political right won more seats than potential partners of Kadima on the political left. In the end Netanyahu formed a coalition with some smaller parties, like the fundamentalist Shas party. As was already mentioned before, because the major parties are forced to form a coalition with minor parties, these minor, often religious, parties have a chance to enforce their own interests (Hänsel, 2009: 146). He also secured the support of the Labor party, although internally this party was extremely divided whether or not to participate in this coalition and the deal was only approved by 680 votes to 507 votes (CNN International, 24 March 2009).

The turnout among the Palestinian minority during the 2009 elections was again low, with just 54 percent of the Palestinian minority casting its vote. This low turnout can be attributed towards the divided attitude of the minority towards the Jewish state of Israel. On the one hand, as was the case during the 2006 elections, where the Popular Committee for Boycotting the Elections called for a boycott, a majority of the Palestinian minority saw the political system as being unable to assert their interests and demands and therefore did not cast their vote (Hänsel, 2009: 148). On the other hand there were calls to go out and vote, because Arab politicians claimed that a strong representation in the Knesset could prevent further discriminatory policies towards the Palestinian
minority. In the end for the Arab parties in the Knesset, there was no real change compared to the 2006 elections (Koren, 2010: 124). The Arab parties received 13 seats in Parliament, the same as during the 2006 elections.

The Labor party saw a further decline in its power and only received enough votes to obtain 13 seats in the Knesset and ended up being the fourth party after Kadima, Likud and Israel Beiteinu (Inbar, 2010: 69). This last party won a staggering 15 seats in the Knesset. The 2009 elections saw a further separation of the Palestinian minority from the Jewish majority. This can partly be explained by operation Cast Lead in 2008 in Gaza, but also by the disqualification of two Arab parties, mentioned upon above (Koren, 2010: 135).

Table 6 shows the 2003, 2006 and 2009 election results and the gain/loss in seats from the five largest political parties in Israel.

Table 3. Israeli Legislative Election results 2003, 2006 and 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>Loss/gain compared to 1999 elections</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>Loss/gain compared to 2003 elections</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>Loss/gain compared to 2006 elections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Likud</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>+18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-26</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>+15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kadima</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>-/+ 0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ysrael Beiteinu*</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-/+0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>+7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>+4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shas</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Ysrael Beiteinu joined an alliance of political parties in Israel, called the National Union in 2000. Before the 2006 elections it split from this alliance in order to run alone for seats in the Knesset. During the 2003 elections the National Union won 7 seats, of which 4 were given to Ysrael Beiteinu.

Security and peace both stood central to the 2009 elections. When analyzing the 2009 election results, one can see a turn to the right on the ‘left-right scale’. Parties on the right of this scale were given a majority in the Knesset. In general, these parties on the right believe that the security of the Israeli citizens should be prioritized above anything else, including peace with the Palestinians and granting the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel equal rights.
What does this review of recent electoral history and party politics tell us about the role of national security and the rights of the Palestinian minority in Israel? First, the discussion shows that national security is the most important election issue for the parties discussed in this chapter. The right-wing Likud competes for votes based on its hard-line stance concerning national security. Restricting the rights of the Palestinian minority is part of this strategy. Second, the electoral system gives Likud an advantage over Kadima and Labor in that Kadima and Labor are not large enough to form a government on their own. This makes Likud a party that nearly always needs to be included in the government. Likud's ability to make alliances with small, right-wing parties also enhances its power, because these smaller parties are gaining more territory when looking at past elections. These small, right wing parties are able to win seats because of the low qualifying threshold in Israel.
7. Conclusion

As I wrote in the introduction, the main aim of this thesis was to show that the disciplines of International Relations (IR) and Comparative Politics (CP) can, and maybe need to, interact. This has to be done in a way that more accurate and complete explanations to questions relating to IR and CP can be given. Where most researchers think of the two disciplines as being totally distinct, my aim was to bridge the two disciplines in a bid to find an answer to my research question. I tried to bring the two disciplines together by deriving hypotheses from the mainstream IR theories and use CP to support the IR theories when these were unable to explain the whole situation.

In the previous chapters an overview was given on the influence of the international system on the domestic politics of Israel. The establishment of the state of Israel, in 1948, was taken as the starting point. An historical outline on the events which influenced the position of Israel in the region the most from 1948 until now were given. It became clear that Israel and its neighboring countries found themselves in hostile positions towards each other. Israel felt it was surrounded by enemy states and thought of the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel as a fifth column. For the IR part of this thesis this whole period was of significance. For the CP part of this thesis the focus lay on the past 12 years (from 2000 – 2012) with an in-depth comparison between the political parties and there outlook on Israel’s security situation and the Palestinian minority in particular.

In the following chapter different International Relations (IR) theories were addressed as well as the second image approach, which stands central to this thesis. Most International Relations theories look at the influence that states have on the international system. The second image reversed however looks at the influence of the international system on the domestic politics of a state. In this case it was argued that the external environment of Israel influences Israeli domestic politics. The domestic politics and policies adopted towards the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel are influenced negatively by the external environment, because Israel sees this environment as hostile.

From the IR theories discussed several hypotheses were derived. Further on in the thesis these hypotheses were tested. This analysis has shown that from the moment Israel was founded in 1948, it has enhanced its position in the region and can now be considered as one of the most powerful states, especially military wise, of the region. It has also shown that Israel does not care about the reputation it holds in the international arena. This conclusion was drawn after analyzing Resolutions
adopted by the General Assembly and Security Council of the United Nations on Israel and its behavior in the region and towards its citizens. It became clear that Israel is the biggest violator of these Resolutions when compared to all the other Member States of the United Nations. Thus, an important conclusion that can be drawn is that Israel does not follow up with Resolutions adopted by the different bodies of the United Nations, although these bodies have strongly urged Israel to do so. Besides that, the general public does not think highly of Israel. It became clear that compared to other countries in the world, even Iran and North-Korea, Israel is seen as having the most negative influence in the world. It was also analyzed whether Israel has a national norm with is comparable to the internationally accepted norm of equal treatment. The international norm of equal treatment cannot be found in any written legislation in Israel. And given the examples above, it can be concluded that there is no national norm that corresponds with the international norm of equal treatment of all citizens. Israel still adopts discriminatory policies towards the Palestinian minority. Because Israel is founded as a Jewish state, it is the question whether per definition, this excludes all ethnic and religious groups that are not Jewish.

Besides analyzing the effect of the international system on Israel, the domestic identity of the state was addressed as well to offer alternative outcomes. After elaborating on different concepts of democracy, the conclusion was drawn that Israel has a thin form of democracy, namely an electoral democracy. Free and fair elections do take place in Israel. It has to be noted that during recent elections two parties were illegally banned from participating, which could jeopardize this thin form of democracy. It is only a thin form, because liberal rights and freedoms on the individual and group level are not respected in the state. Citizens are not treated in an equal way and there is no written form of legislation which adapts a norm of equal treatment or a non-discrimination principle.

Besides that, the political institutions were discussed

Furthermore, the main parties in the political arena of Israel were addressed. It became clear that national security is the central theme for these parties. Security plays a central role during the election campaign. Party leaders will all do their best to ensure the Jewish citizens of Israel that they are the best party to protect Israel’s national security. Because of the political institutions of Israel coalitions need to be formed. Because the qualifying threshold is so low, only 2 percent, smaller extremely religious parties are capable of winning seats in the Knesset and even play a role
in the forming of a coalition. Besides the fact that national security plays such an essential role for all political parties, they, except for the small Arab parties, also define Israel as a Jewish state.

The question that stood central to this thesis was the following:

*How can the concrete behavior of the State of Israel towards the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel be explained, despite the democratic values it claims to have?*

Although it is not possible to give a complete answer to this question some conclusions can be drawn. As was already mentioned throughout the thesis, Israel was founded as a Jewish state for Jewish citizens. This directly excludes the Palestinian minority and is contrary to the international norm of equal treatment. Furthermore, the behavior of the State of Israel towards the Palestinian minority can be found in the reasoning of Israel that it feels it is surrounded by hostile states. As the only Jewish country in the middle of the Arab world, Israel is indeed surrounded. Further research is necessary to determine to what degree this hostility can be used as an excuse to adopt discriminatory policies to a minority group that lives in Israel. The effect that the external environment therefore has on the domestic politics and policies of Israel are notable. Besides the external environment, internally the Palestinian minority is seen as a fifth column. Therefore this minority is defined as an enemy within the state that has to be dealt with. Again, further research is necessary in order to determine whether this minority is indeed an enemy within the state.

As the method of analysis document analysis was chosen. For the purpose of this thesis this seemed the most logical method, since the question that stands central in this thesis, finds its roots in history, with the establishment of the state of Israel. If the research done could have been broadened it would have been interesting for the CP part of this thesis to hold a survey in Israel with a significant amount of Jewish citizens and a significant amount of citizens belonging to the Palestinian minority. This would have added a more in-depth view on how the citizens themselves view Israel and it might have resulted in different answers.

In the end, the main conclusion that can be drawn is that further research is necessary to give a more complete answer to the research question formulated in this thesis. It would be interesting to analyze the history of conflicts between Israel and its neighboring countries, from the moment Israel was founded till today, but also conflicts between the Palestinian minority that lives in Israel
and the Jewish majority. The latter will enable you to see whether the Palestinian minority should be seen as a fifth column within the state. When analyzing the conflicts between Israel and its neighboring countries in depth it will become clearer whether Israel should indeed fear for its national security, or that it perhaps could focus its domestic and international politics and policies on different issues, such as socio-economic factors.
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