

Justifying Occupation?

A strategic frame-analysis of the way India & Israel have rhetorically justified their military annexations (1961-1981)



Abstract:

Besides using military power to attain new territories, framing plays an important part in holding onto them, as it enables the occupier to 'sell' the idea of a new post-conflict reality. Using postcolonialism as background theory, this thesis researches what historical frames were used, and what the effect of these frames were on (1) the domestic audience of the occupying country, (2) the audience of the occupied territories, and (3) the international community. It looks at the annexation of Goa (1961) and the Golan Heights (1981) as similar design case studies, where the former was accepted by more audiences. Frames that refer to national identity and safeguarding the existential safety of the occupying country, proved to be most successful across the audiences to gather support, or avoid serious sanctions from the international community, during 1961-1981.

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Date: June 28, 2020
Wordcount (excl. sources): 27661

“Occupation, curfew, settlements, closed military zone, administrative detention, siege, preventive strike, terrorist infrastructure, transfer. Their WAR destroys language. Speaks genocide with the words of a quiet technician.

Occupation means that you cannot trust the OPEN SKY, or any open street near to the gates of a sniper’s tower. It means that you cannot trust the future or have faith that the past will always be there.

Occupation means you live out your life under military rule, and the constant threat of death, a quick death from a sniper’s bullet or a rocket attack from an M16. A crushing, suffocating death, a slow bleeding death in an ambulance stopped for hours at a checkpoint. A dark death, at a torture table in an Israeli prison: just a random arbitrary death.

A cold calculated death: from a curable disease. A thousand small deaths while you watch your family dying around you. Occupation means that every day you die, and the world watches in silence. As if your death was nothing, as if you were a stone falling in the earth, water falling over water.

And if you face all of this death and indifference and keep your humanity, and your love and your dignity and YOU refuse to surrender to their terror, then you know something of the courage that is Palestine.”

-- Suheir Hammad,
Jordanian- born American author, poet, performer, political activist.

Acknowledgements

“Pantha Rhei”

- *Heraclitus*

I would like to dedicate this thesis to my mother. Without her, I would not have been born, and been able to write this thesis. The circle is now complete.

I would like to thank my supervisor, prof. dr. Bertjan Verbeek. His expertise and empathic, skillful guidance has been paramount to the vision and execution of this work before you. During my internship in Jordan, he made sure I was “still alive” and performing on a high level, worthy of being a representative of his teachings. Knowing that he has been on television; it made me feel like a news correspondent, when we would discuss regional Middle Eastern politics, during our monthly check-ins. I’m extremely grateful for his teachings, patience and light-heartedness.

With this document, my time as a university student has come to an end. If there has been anything my (almost) eight years of Nijmegen university-experience has taught me, it is that (1) it is quite expensive and (2) cognitive dissonance tells us that we’re inclined to believe that it was therefore worth it.

Most of all, I am grateful for having had the opportunity to expand my knowledge, and discover my strengths and weaknesses during these dynamic years. I am aware this privilege is not for many.

As I close this chapter of my life, I wonder where the currents of destiny will float me to next.

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1. Introduction: Global Occupation

The rich history of this world has undoubtedly been written in ink and blood. Many wars have been waged over every part of the world –forest and desert alike– and many lives have been lost over God, freedom and ideology; many emperors, kings and queens have fallen; and many borders have been redrawn with little to no consideration for the many different kinds of people and cultures that have been thriving there for years.

It seems that, no matter how eloquent or diplomatic the discourse may have been between peoples, leaders and countries, it is ‘the size of the stick’ which have historically determined the shape of global borders. Military occupations and annexations of territories have been common in our recent history.

But how have invaders of foreign land publicly justified their actions i.e. justified military occupations and annexations? Do different gradations of military occupations exist? What kind of rhetoric- and strategic frames have been used to defend these actions vis-à-vis (1) their domestic population; (2) the population of the occupied territories and, most importantly, (3) the international community? Do these frames work, and why? How do we define and measure this ‘success’ if there exists any? These questions are central in this thesis.

This thesis will analyze these questions on the background of postcolonialism, and focus on two historic cases that have shown signs of colonial relationships between the occupiers and their occupied territories.

Reading Guide

This chapter provides a short introduction into subject of this thesis, starting with post colonialism. Afterwards, I will provide an overview of the terms ‘military occupation’; ‘success/failure’ (in military occupations) and ‘strategic frames’. Then, I will shortly describe the cases used in this thesis, which are: The Annexation of Goa by the Republic of India (1961, following Operation Vijay) and the Annexation of the Golan Heights by Israel (1981, after passing the Golan Heights Law). Afterwards, the societal/scientific relevance will be discussed, and the main research questions will be formulated. At the end of this chapter, there will be a reader’s guide, outlining the next chapters of this thesis.

1.1 Postcolonialism

‘Postcolonialism’ refers to the broad theoretical approach which investigates the “*past and present impact of colonialism and racism on social, political, and economic systems*” (Sherry, 2008, in: Givens, 2008, p.650). Not only does it focus on the peoples who have been colonized; it also focuses on the impact colonization had on the colonizer, and the ways they have benefited from it such as dispossession, violence, and the spread of racist ideology (idem). It aligns with constructivist principles of ontology, holding that reality is constructed by collective experiences that people endure, and that this shapes how we think, feel and reflect on that same reality. It is part of the post-positivist school of thought.

Major contributors to the field have been Frantz Fanon, who wrote about the psychopathology of colonization; Edward Saïd, who coined the term ‘Orientalism’ to describe the patronizing way in which Western countries depict Middle Eastern-, Asian-, and African societies and cultures; Gayatri Spivak, who is known

for her work regarding the 'Subaltern' and her translations of Jacques Derrida's work, and Homi Bhabha, who introduced many neologisms to describe the ways in which colonized peoples have adapted their ways of living to resist the rule of their colonizers; such as 'hybridity', 'mimicry', 'difference', and 'ambivalence' (Huddart, 2006).

Postcolonial theory assumes that the West (or 'Occident') has played a major role in constructing our perception of global realities. It challenges these realities as being fluid, through the lens of those who were not heard or 'Otherized' during the totality of colonial rule and its associated favoritism of Western epistemology, tradition and Christianity. Incorporation of postcolonial theory to the frames of military occupation/annexation, will prove useful in identifying additional 'guidelines' for an increased chance of a successful frame, to a specific target-audience. By looking at the discourse used in the justification of military occupations and annexations, through the added lens of postcolonialism, this thesis aims to link the effectiveness of certain frames to historical influences, implying that shared identity and historic context are important mechanisms in frame acceptance. But first, we will take a closer look at the basic definitions used in the thesis.

1.2 Military occupation

What constitutes a 'military occupation' has been judicially defined in the 1907 Hague Convention, which was (alongside the 1899 Hague Convention) one of the first formal statements of the Laws of War and the Crimes of War. According to the 1907 Hague Convention, Art. 42, a territory is considered occupied "*when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army.*" Furthermore, the occupation "*extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.*" Because this thesis concerns itself only with military occupations, I will focus on the ability of an 'occupier' to effectively force obedience by the use - or threat of- violence towards the people of the occupied territories.

One of the authors who has written about the success or failure of military occupations is David Edelstein (2004). In his article, he defines military occupation as "*the temporary control of a territory by another state that claims no right to permanent sovereign control over that territory*" (p.52).

'Temporary' refers to the fact that an occupying force must intend to eventually vacate the occupied territory, and return its control to the indigenous government after the conflict has de-escalated. Even though a specified date of leaving is not needed beforehand, it must be clear that the occupier is not planning on remaining in the occupied territory indefinitely. This temporary nature distinguishes a military occupation from an annexation. Where in the latter, the intention of the occupying power is to permanently acquire and incorporate the occupied territory into the annexing states' homeland (Edelstein, 2004).

1.3 The Spectrum of Success

Before discussing (the different kinds of) framing, a few things need to be put into consideration about the perception of success. Military interventions are complex political- and military endeavors, and involve a dynamic, unpredictable human factor. This makes it difficult to dichotomize success vs. failure. In reality, they coexist on a more continuous spectrum, meaning that most occupations

might show signs of success and failure at the same time; making a total judgement difficult (Edelstein. 2004).

Also, occupiers rarely withdraw from occupied territories before achieving a certain degree of stability; allowing them to retreat safely and (psychologically) without loss of face. This prevents the need for a costly future intervention. Therefore, the occupational achievements to be held in light of its cost. Otherwise, Edelstein warns, *“we might risk overly optimistic conclusions”* (Edelstein, 2004, p.56). These occupational costs can be divided into direct-, and indirect costs.

Direct costs refer to *“the financial costs of the troops that must be deployed to keep the peace in the occupied territory and the occupation administration that must be established”* (idem). Also, any lives that result from occupational resistance, be it from the indigenous population or that of the occupying country, are counted as the direct costs of the occupation. **Indirect costs** are more difficult to calculate, as they are the opportunity costs of occupation. *“An ongoing occupation may preclude an occupying power from pursuing other national interests”* (idem). Any rivalry with a third party (or on the international stage) which might come from an occupation, is also considered to be an indirect cost of occupation.

Furthermore, the goals of an occupying force might change during the occupation, making it even more difficult to determine whether or not the occupation can be considered a success or failure.

It is inherently difficult to say when an occupation has succeeded or failed, as Edelstein (2004) notes: *“an occupation must ensure the security of an occupying powers’ interests well after the occupation concludes,”* (p.57) which makes it difficult to determine a sufficient time frame which allows for such conclusions. However, differences do exist between the forceful act of ‘occupying’ (e.g. effective short-term military control over an area, as part of a military campaign strategy) and the ongoing process of ‘occupation’.

In the latter- as life goes on in the occupied territories- political-, judicial- and administrative tasks have to be taken care of as well. The occupier could then expand the intensification of the occupation to not only physical occupation, but to a more ‘societal occupation’ as well. This means that the occupying force could either be effectively taking over important governmental tasks, allowing them to continue untouched, or shaping them in its own image. Choosing to allow existing social infrastructures to continue as they were before the occupation is therefore a conscious decision, mandated by the occupier, and most likely influenced by the occupier’s own interests, rather than that own the occupied territory.

So, in short: A **successful occupation** needs to be sustained for an indefinite amount of time to be called an annexation; or be temporarily sustained to be called an occupation, whilst the occupying forces are able to exercise military-, judicial-, political- and administrative authority. This makes effective military control of any area the most important requirement for later expansion of the sphere of influence. Finally, in this thesis, ‘success’ also has a military dimension, as well as a strategic frame dimension, allowing successful military occupations to co-exist with failed strategic frames – and vice versa (see Table 1).

1.3.1 Definition of Annexation

Based on the above, **annexation** will be defined as:

The successful military occupation of a foreign sovereign territory, by an occupying force, with the proven intent to increase administrative-, judicial-, physical-, and political control of the occupied territory, to the point that the occupied territory is *de facto* incorporated as part of the sovereign territory of the occupier; thereby 'annexing' it.

1.4 Strategic Frames

The records of history show many self-proclaimed righteous causes for a military occupation. Territories have laid claim to others on ethnic- or religious grounds; historical reunification; humanitarian intervention; or simply claimed the territories as 'fruits of war'. These different perspectives could be strategically used as frames. But then, what is a 'frame'?

The 'founding fathers' of the concept of framing have been Tversky and Kahneman¹. In 1981 they wrote 'The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice' which, since then, has been cited over 19,000 times² as of February 2020. They describe a 'decision-frame' as being:

"The decision-maker's conception of the acts, outcomes, and contingencies associated with a particular choice. The frame that a decision-maker adopts is controlled partly by the norms, habits, and personal characteristics of the decision-maker." (1981, p.453)

A 'frame' could be seen as a carefully constructed narrative, based on certain ideas and norms, through which the 'framer' is trying to influence a second party into either performing an action, and/or into adopting the 'framer's' way of looking at a certain part of reality. Framing is a popular rhetoric tool, broadly used by charismatic politicians and marketing-savvy companies alike. A good frame 'sticks'; it resonates with those who see or hear it; and ideally it does not feel forced or fabricated, but rather organic and easy - or plausible- to accept as the 'truth.'

A popular contemporary 'framer' is the current U.S. president Donald Trump, who very much relies on his businessman-like overselling of 'products' and ideas to resonate with his target audience: mainly the populist American voter. Donald Trump has framed immigrants as being "*dangerous drug dealers*" and "*rapists*"; he has called impoverished, non-white countries "*shithole countries*" and he is famous (or notorious) for having unflattering nicknames for all his political opponents, e.g. 'Lying' Ted Cruz, 'Pocahontas' Elizabeth Warren, 'Rocket Man' Kim Jong Un and (ironically) 'Crooked' Hillary Clinton.

Tversky and Kahneman show that are many different points of view which could be 'nudged' into public perception (p.453), and that people will react differently to them, depending on how positive/negative they perceive it to be for them. But then, what is to be considered a 'successful' frame, when used in the context of a military occupation?

¹ Kahneman has won a Nobel Prize in Economics in 2002 for his work with Tversky regarding the psychology of judgement and decision-making, as well as behavioral economics. Sadly, Tversky had passed away in 1996 before the award was issued, and the Nobel Comity does not award the prize post-humorously.

²Based on Google Scholar citations: https://scholar.google.nl/scholar?cites=2435774719980842746&as_sdt=2005&sciodt=0,5&hl=nl

1.5 Three target-audiences of framing.

When taking this into consideration, it should be noted that any military occupation will most likely evoke a response from any of the three involved levels of community- or audiences. It would therefore be reasonable to distinguish them when researching the used frames. The three target-audiences consist of:

1. The population of the occupying force

This includes the native population of the occupying force. They constitute the electorate of, and are primarily represented by, the sovereign government that chose to invade, - occupy, - or annex a foreign territory. This means the population of the occupying force could voice their feelings of misrepresentation to their government, in the invasion, occupation or annexation of a foreign territory. In that case, the target-audience will be described as being the internal 'pro-occupation population' or 'contra-occupation population'.

2. The inhabitants of the occupied territories

This includes the people that live in the territories part of the permanent scope of the military occupation. They are affected most directly by the occupying party's military-, political- and administrative rule. They are primarily represented by their sovereign government, unless- as with the population of the occupying force- there also exist parts of the population that would welcome foreign invasion.

3. The international community

This includes the sovereignly recognized members of the United Nations. The member states represent themselves, and only represent the international community as a collective, when a Joint Statement is being brought forth.

It is also quite possible that different target-audiences do not adapt/accept the same frames as being a legitimate representation of reality. Therefore, what might be considered to be a successful military occupation -in the sense that the occupant has effectively, militarily occupied a territory- can be accompanied by a 'failed' strategic frame; in the sense that any of these three communities reject (or do not adopt) the self-proclaimed justifications given by the occupier, and view the occupation as being illegitimate. Therefore, it is important to note that the definition of success or failure has a military dimension, as well as a separate frame dimension. This leads to the following possible outcomes of strategic frames in combination with military -invasions, -occupations, and -annexations. These are shown below with some examples in Table 1.

Table 1: Possible outcomes of strategic frames in combination with military invasions, - occupations, and annexations

	Successful frame	Failed frame
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Successful occupation

Complete success:

India's Annexation of Goa (1961)

Military success:

Israel's Annexation of the Golan Heights (1973)

Failed occupation

Rhetoric success:

Western Coalition's Occupation in Afghanistan (2002)

Complete

failure:

Indonesia's Annexation of East-Timor (1975)

strategic

A **complete success** might then be seen as a set in which a military occupation has been effectively put in place, while at the same time being able to win the 'hearts and minds' of the involved communities. An example of this is the annexation of Goa, carried out by the Republic of India in 1961 (more on these cases in §1.5). Note, that this does not necessarily mean all the communities: It might be possible for an occupying force to have domestic support for its occupation, but face resistance from the occupied territory and the international community. The success will then only apply to that 'level' of communal scope. There are a lot of factors that decide whether or not an occupation is a military- and strategic frame: more on this in the theoretical chapter.

Those communities that do not share the frame of a complete success, will then at least see it as a military success for the occupant, provided the conditions have been met as described in §1.1. An example of this is the Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights, located in Syria, following the Six Days' War (1967; effective annexation in 1981): The international community never recognized Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, and maintains that its claims to the territories are void (more in Chapter 4).

If the occupation has failed, but used frames resonated within certain communities, causing them to (fundamentally) change their views on certain territories, it could be seen as a (partial) **rhetorical success**. An example of this is the war in Afghanistan; which has not succeeded in reaching the original goals of the Western coalition, namely: dissolving the Taliban - or Al Qaeda for that matter. It has, however, succeeded in viewing the region as a training site for global Islamist terrorism, and maintains to be an unstable region, and a thorn in the eye of the remaining coalition forces.

If the military occupation has proven to be a failure, and the used frames failed to resonate within crucial (or any) communities needed for a success, then the whole ordeal would be deemed a **complete strategic failure**. An example would be the secession of East-Timor, after the 1974 Portuguese Revolution left Portugal unable to exercise any military authority there. After the withdrawal of the Portuguese, political parties in East-Timor erupted into civil war in 1975. Indonesia quickly invaded the territory and declared it its 27th Province. While at the time the U.N. also did not approve of Indonesian intervention, it was clear that the end-consensus was leaned more towards decolonization, rather than maintaining the colonialist status quo for Portugal.

1.6 Brief overview of the cases

As seen in the previous paragraph, there could be four different combinations of military occupation 'success/failure', and strategic frame 'success/failure'. However, for practical reasons, I only will be able to examine two of these cases.

Because I am primarily interested in the conditions of successful strategic framing, I have selected cases that vary only on the acceptance of this variable, but are still comparable as they were both successful military occupations. Seeing how the focus lies with the success of strategic frames- and the ability to which occupiers are able to 'sell' their frame to as many communities as possible- this thesis will focus on the upper half of the matrix: the annexation of Goa, and the annexation of the Golan Heights. These cases will be concisely described below, and will be further expanded upon in the Method/Case chapter.

1.6.1 The Annexation of Goa

The Annexation of Goa, carried out by the Republic of India in 1961 refers to the swift military operation in which the Indian Armed Forces carried out an armed action on the former Portuguese Indian territories of Goa, Daman and Diu.

At the beginning of the '50s, after the Indian government was declined (multiple times) an audience with the Portuguese government in which it was hoping to discuss the future of Goa, tensions quickly rose between both countries. Portugal maintained that Goa was historically part of Portugal, and refused to consider any negotiations.

Diplomatic ties were cut off between India and Portugal in 1953, and in 1955 thousands of protestors, hoping to enter Goa, were forcefully shut down by Portuguese police. As tensions were reaching the level that India was starting to seriously consider military interventions in Goa, prime minister Salazar of Portugal asked the international community for help. The United Kingdom was asked to mediate, then Brazil, and eventually an appeal was made to the United Nations Security Council to intervene. Diplomatic solutions, however, failed for multiple reasons, which will be discussed in Chapter 4.

In November 1961, fearing an Indian invasion force, Portuguese troops fired at a ship passing between the Portuguese-held island of Anjidiv, and the Indian port of Kochi- killing two. It turned out to be a civilian passenger boat. The attack raised widespread public support for Indian military action against Goa. Nine days prior to the attack on Goa, Jawaharal Nehru- India's first prime minister- publicly declared that "*Continuance of Goa under Portuguese rule is an impossibility*" (Chandar, 2018). In December 1961, armed action (known as operation 'Vijay') by the Indian Armed Forces commenced, and ended after 36 hours with an undeniable victory for India; outnumbering the Portuguese soldiers 30:1. The integration of Goa was viewed in India as being a liberation of historical Indian territory, while Portugal argued that it was an act of aggression and a breach of overseas national soil.

1.6.2 The Annexation of the Golan Heights

The Golan Heights consist of a region of 1800 square kilometers, located in the Levant between Syria and Israel. Historically a part of Syria, but after the Six Day War in 1967, Israel was able to militarily occupy two-thirds of the Golan Heights while the Syrian Arab Republic retained control over a third.

Strategically located, the high grounds give Israel a military advantage against possible attacks from Syria. Also, located near the fresh water Sea of Galilee, the Golan Heights ensure Israel has access to a steady supply of drinkable water, while also partly able to control that of neighboring Jordan.

In 1981 the Knesset passed the 'Golan Heights Law', in which it extended its administrative influence to cover the Golan Heights, effectively annexing the area. The international community has never recognized Israel's claim to the

territory, with the U.N. passing multiple resolutions condemning Israel's actions. In 2019, the U.S. became the first country in the world to openly recognize Israel's claim to the Golan Heights, leading to a renewed rejection of Israel's claim by 28 European member-states. As of 2020, Israel does not intend to ever return the Golan Heights to the Syrian Republic.

Research Questions

The main research question of this thesis is :

What frames have proven successful with specific target-audiences, regarding the Annexation of Goa- and the Golan Heights- in justifying successful military occupations- and how do we account for this success?

The sub-questions are:

1. What strategic frames can be used to influence (which) target-audiences of military occupations, as defined above?
2. Which context-specific circumstances contribute to the acceptance (or refutation) of a specific frame, by the aforementioned target-audiences?
3. Which strategic frames have been used during the Annexation of Goa, and the Golan Heights?
4. What accounts for the success/failure of these used frames?

1.7 Societal & Scientific relevance

As Edelstein (2004) notes, most of the research concerning military occupations center around *nation building* theories as their primary subject, and focus on the impact of bringing liberal democracies to occupied territories, as well as having Occident-centric free market economies as their key objectives (p.48-49). This thesis, however, focusses on the impact of strategic framing on the perceived legitimacy of military occupations- and annexations, by three target-audiences. More importantly, both cases involve domestic populations that were subjected to either colonialism, or a different form of identity-separation. It would be interesting to see if, in any way, this impacts how successful certain strategic frames are.

From an IR-perspective, military occupation touches on the concept of Westphalian sovereignty – which has played an important role in the development of international law since the 17th Century. When the Peace of Westphalia was signed, it arguably laid the foundations for the international system as we know it today- with a heavy focus on the self-determination and within-border sovereignty of nations- meaning that external forces should not intervene in domestic matters. However, there have been scholars who disagree with the importance of the Westphalian Peace Treaty, most notably Oisander (2005) who argues that the fixation on 17th Century Westphalia is merely a 19th and 20th Centuries' fixation on the concept of sovereignty- and that this romanticizing has led us to hold onto this definition so dearly. Nevertheless, the concept of sovereignty has been implemented in the United Nation's Charter of 1945, which states, in article 2 (7), that "*nothing should authorize intervention in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State.*"

This could, however, be in some sort of 'moral breach' with the realities at hand, and this is where postcolonialism comes in: why shouldn't former colonies reclaim what is rightfully theirs, based on a Western concept?

Understanding and recognizing the rhetoric, and frames, that might be successfully used by states in breaching this sovereignty is therefore important for understanding how impactful public discourse is in International Relations. It might help identify ill-intended interventions, masked as being 'righteous' or 'just' or 'helpful' and shed a light on eventual 'soft spots' the international community has for certain frames or justifications. The question then becomes: are certain frames more prone to acceptance by the international community than others? Can we be sure that countries using these frames are not simply trying to minimize (reputational) damage, while still having bad intentions?

It therefore follows that there also must be clear signs from the international community which could tell us when the frame of a military occupier has failed. This thesis will also look at those formal, and informal signs, and present them. The scientific literature shows that frame-research is still a vastly unexplored territory, and the focus on colonial discourse applied to large, geo-political military events, will hopefully provide useful insight in the context-specific construction of political language, and its implied frames and frame-effects.

When speaking on theoretical advancements, I believe that the literature on postcolonialism could benefit from the intersectionality with International Relations as a discipline, and vice versa. Postcolonialism is useful in painting the picture of historical events, that have set the stage for modern day power struggles in former colonies, and it emphasizes which there are less-visible - or 'hidden'- assumptions that we make of non-Western countries that are very much reliant on Western epistemologies. We therefore tend to explain even the most remote regions, who look nothing like the West, as following certain Western logic and concepts.

Even though postcolonialism might explain why (for example) India *felt* it responded correctly the way it did vs. the Portuguese, IR-theory can explain *why* India responded *the way it did*. The connection between historical understanding, and political instrumentation, is central in this thesis. Hopefully, (as strategic framing is very much a psychological term) more disciplines will research the (ideological) connection between micro-level 'stickiness' of frames, and the macro-level political waves they could bring about. In that sense, this thesis abides to the constructivist notion that 'ideas shape the world'.

Summary

This chapter has served as an introduction, in which the context of this thesis, as well as the cases have been laid out. In the second chapter (Theory) the notion of strategic frames will be expanded upon, together with post colonialism and its relation to- and influences on- International Relations.

In the third chapter (Methodology), I will justify my methodology and cases. Important notions from the Theoretical chapter will be operationalized, and made indicative and suitable for testing. In the fourth chapter (Results) I will analyze the cases through an in-depth analysis, and present the results in a manner which clears the way for an answer to the main research question. Finally, in chapter five (Conclusion) I will answer the main questions, and summarize the research.

2. Theory

In this chapter, the theoretical backgrounds of framing & postcolonial theory will be discussed. On framing, framing effects, and the variety in frames- these will consist of the articles by Mintz & Redd (2003) *Framing Effects in International Relations*, and Druckman (2001) *The Implication of Framing Effects for Citizen Competence*. From these articles, I will extract conditions that increase the chance of accepting a frame, per audience (domestic population of the occupier; people of the occupied territory; state-members of the international community). From these conditions, testable hypotheses will be formulated for each separate audience.

First, I will say a few words about the context within which we define success of a military occupation, which is the larger context in which frames are being used. Second, I will expand on the notion of strategic frames. In particular, I will describe the different ways in which a frame can be labeled, recognized, and successfully applied in international relations, based on Mintz & Redd (2003). Finally, postcolonial theory will be discussed. Based on the literature, a separate hypothesis will be generated, which includes the expected effect of historical context on narratives.

2.1 Strategic Frames: success and failure

“A frame provides “a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events, weaving a connection among them. The frames suggest what the controversy is about, the essence of the issue.” (Gamson and Modigliani, 1987, p. 143)

This definition highlights the important role that ideas play in the constructed narrative of events, which encompass a frame. Controversy is also assumed to play a role, as these are more exciting, and thus more likely to be remembered. Mintz (2003) has a more simplistic view on framing, which he defines as:

“When an actor targets a decision maker and attempts to influence attitude and behavior” (p.194)

This allows for a broader array of different frames to be considered effective. It also outlines what can be considered ineffective frames. According to Mintz & Redd (2003), these would be frames that fail to influence attitude and behavior. In this thesis, a **failed frame** is, then, a frame which did not bring about the intended desired effects among its target audience.

I'd also like to spend a few words on the 'actors' and 'decision makers' mentioned in the definitions above. Seeing how in this thesis I focus on the aforementioned three-level communities as being the target of frames; they will then also be regarded as the 'decision makers'. The variety of politicians, media, etc. that try to influence the convictions of these audiences, or their perception of a certain event, are to be regarded the 'actors'.

2.1.1 Types of Frames

Mintz & Redd (2003) focus on *the “capacity of leaders to strategically frame and market their policies and/or to counter-frame the positions of their opponents” (p.194)* in their article *Framing Effects in International Relations*, and identify a

multitude of frame-types. These include: purposeful framing; thematic framing; evaluative framing; (counter-) productive framing; successful framing; failed framing; counter-framing; loss-frames; gain-frames; interactive frames; structural frames; revolving frames; sequential frames; third-party frames- as well as an examination of framing vs. priming (p.194). What will follow is a short expansion on the frame-types listed by Mintz & Redd (2003). These will later-on help identifying the used frames in the discourse-analysis.

We will begin with describing **purposeful framing** which refers to *“an attempt by leaders and other influential actors to insert into the policy debate (...) organizing themes that will affect how the targets themselves as well as the public and other actors perceive an issue”* (idem).

Thematic framing refers to *“content-based communication and/or marketing, which is generally directed by national leaders towards the public, that concern policy or products, attributes and/or the introduction of “organizing themes” into the policy debate”* (p.195). A thematic frame is able to influence popular opinion by prioritizing *“the content considered during the policy debate”*. An important theme is: nationalism. Levy (1988) writes on the influence of public opinion on a politician’s decision to take their country into war, in his article Domestic Politics and War.

Nationalism creates a sense of common interest, and holds national interest as the highest value, often accompanied with a large commitment to the wellbeing of the state. Also, this *commitment “is strengthened by the myth regarding the omniscience and omnipotence of the nation and congruence of one’s national morality with a supranational ethic”* (p.665). These ‘myths’ and ‘doctrines’ might then be used by the political elite, to further their own view of national interest, or simply their own.

By contrast, **Evaluative framing** aims to manipulate the reference point to which the external environment – or the focus of public debate- is compared to. It is able to shift the way we look at the meaning of possible outcomes. For instance, Jervis (1992), Stein (1993) and Tversky and Kahneman (1986) conclude that frames that focus on the possible gains, increase *“risk-acceptant behavior and the choice of risky courses of action”* (Mintz, 2003, p. 195). **Productive framing** encompasses all frames *“that bring about the initially intended outcome”*. Mintz & Redd (2004) use the example of rival political leaders, where one successfully frames the other as being unfavorable, to the intended domestic audience. Note, that a productive frame is a successful frame, which is successful for its premeditated target audience. If, say, the same frame did not resonate with the target audience, or in a different way than originally intended, we would call it a **counterproductive-** or **failed frame**.

A **counterproductive** frame produces effects that are the opposite, or contrary of those originally in mind. The frames productive/successful and counterproductive/failed are not necessary mutually exclusive; it can be regarded as a spectrum. Political leaders are often busy with (sometimes preemptively) **counter-framing** certain issues, so that their frames are perceived to be more favorable (p.195), and so opponents will have to ‘step into’ their frame as a reference point to defend themselves or spin public opinion. This does not always imply that leaders attempt to depart from **loss frames to gain frames**.

Mintz & Redd (2003) state that, in certain situations, it is favorable for a leader to maintain a loss frame. For example, when a leader frames the situation as being at a loss, he/she might be able to use that to justify more risk-acceptant behavior to his/her electorate (e.g. 'It is now or never'). Or, when involved in serious negotiations, a loss frame can influence how big your negotiating partner perceives your own domestic win-set to be (the minimum amount you need to 'win' in international negotiations, otherwise it will not be accepted domestically). Putnam's notion of two-level games touches on this subject, when talking about level-II negotiations (e.g. "*I'd like to accept your proposal, but I'd never get it accepted at home*" in: Putnam, 1988, p.440.)

The likelihood of a frame sticking, increases when multiple frames are being used to describe the same. This is the tactic of a **revolving frame**, which entails the sequential use of different frames, over time. If only a single frame is being re-used consistently, we speak of a **sequential frame** (e.g. 'Lying Ted'). Interesting to note is that sequential frames allow for **aggregate frame-effects**, where multiple outcomes are framed. While most of the literature on framing centers on "single, one-shot frames," in reality, many of the crucial choices in international relations involve "compound outcomes that can either be sequential or simultaneous" (Mintz & Redd, 2003, p.198; Levy & Jack, 1996).

In the same fashion, politicians are able to add different narratives to an already existing fabricated 'base assumption' in which people interpret them. For example; Donald Trump's characterization of Hillary Clinton as "*crooked*", opened the gates for him to use different events for him to 'justify' his frame. Accepting speaker fees at a speaking event becomes an example of 'being bought, as crooked people do', and having an unsecure mail-server becomes 'breaking the law, as crooked people do', etc. The use of sequential frames also incorporates repetition which might help the general public with memorizing them (e.g. 'Lock her up!'). Mintz & Redd (2003) discuss certain 'tactics' that might be used with frames. They mention the 'Salami Tactic'. It is based on the assumption that decision-making individuals have short-sightedness when it comes to comparing alternatives. A politician wanting to achieve radical policy change, would then do best to break them down into smaller, less-impactful policy changes, but build up the severity as time moves on.

Mintz & Redd (2003) use Israeli PM Sharon's gradual intensification of military interventions against Palestinians as an example (p.198). Perhaps a more recent example would be Donald Trump's foreign policy on the Israeli-Arab conflict, in which the pillars of the Palestinian negotiations were individually dismantled: the recognition of Jerusalem as being Israel's capital, came when the U.S. embassy was shifted from Tel Aviv; followed swiftly by the recognition of the Golan Heights as being Israel's rightful territory, which made it possible to recognize the illegal settlements on Palestinian grounds as being "*not per se contrary to international law*" (Al Jazeera, 18 November 2019).

Then came budget-cuts to UNRWA, which saw \$360m. be reduced to zero in two years (2016-2018); the closure of PLA (Palestinian Liberation Authority) offices in Washington- it could all be exemplary for a controlled escalation of frame, and action, meant to incrementally achieve radical change. As I hope to show, India's discourse and acts towards Portugal, in the 1950's and vice-versa, showed a same escalation in discourse and military action.

Intrinsic variables of the framer (or framed) are not the only factors accounting for a successful frame. External factors might also have influence. A popular example of external influence is the media; as a frame is more likely to succeed if media-outlets agree with it as well, thereby repeating and enforcing it. This makes the media a popular vehicle used by framers to reach their target-audience. A possible danger of using mass-media might be that a frame reaches non-target audiences, who might disagree with the message, to the point that they actively start opposing it with their own frames. There are ways in which frames might be resisted, altered, or replaced altogether. Third parties might try and **counter-frame** existing ones, in an attempt to sketch an alternative (biased) vision or outcome (e.g. U.S. intervention in framing the policy debate between Israel and the Palestinians). By taking into account the framing-party, the target-audience, and the many variables that constitute the context in which the framing is taking place, a likely successful strategy can be formulated.

Frame-strategy is likely to differ, depending on who is framing and/or who is being framed—however, Mintz assumes that the most common targets of framing in International Relations are opposing nation-states (2003). Democratic leaders are more likely to succeed in negatively framing leaders from non-democratic countries, and thereby getting approval for their foreign interventions. Mintz and Geva (1993) also indicate that public approval is higher for military interventions against non-democratic countries.

Finally, the (in)ability of states/institutions to frame or counter-frame heavily influences the success/failure of a frame. Money also plays a role, as some actors might have more resources to their disposal and will be better equipped at fighting certain frames than others.

2.1.2 Frames in Communication & Frames in Thought

Druckman (2001) distinguishes between **frames in communication** and **frames in thought**. They differ in that the *former* “focuses on what a speaker says (e.g., the aspects of an issue emphasized in elite discourse), while the latter usage focuses on what an individual is thinking (e.g., the aspects of an issue a citizen thinks are most important)” (p.228).

These two forms of framing also have a different relationship, as communicative frames influence thought-frames. This process is called a **framing effect**, or rather, the (sum of) influences that frames have on each other and/or on the personal opinions of the target-audience, regarding policy issues (idem). In the cases of Goa and the Golan Heights, we will be interested in the used frames in communication, found in relevant public discourse.

As a final addition to the framing-literature, I will shortly discuss different **framing-effects**. There are **equivalency framing-effects** where the use of different, but logically equivalent, words or phrases lead individuals to alter their assessment of a given situation³ (p.228). There are also **emphasis framing-effects**, whereby “emphasizing a subset of potentially relevant considerations, a speaker can lead individuals to focus on these considerations when constructing their opinions” (p.230).

³ Think of ‘loss-’ and ‘gain’- frames

In these effects, elite-interaction plays a larger role in persuading public opinion. For example, when a politician makes sustainability a large issue in his/her campaign, voters will tend to judge other candidates based on their sustainability plans. The electorate’s frame of reference will therefore be largely influenced by the emphasized frames of the politician. Emphasis framing theories have recently focused on identifying the systematic limits of political manipulation. Are there any factors that contribute to the successful adaptation of an emphasis frame?

Druckman (2001: pp. 240-247) summarizes these moderating variables of framing-effects into:

- **Predispositions:** People are more likely to reject a strategic frame if does not correspond with their own personal predispositions on the matter.
- **Citizen deliberation:** Research done by Prince and Na (2000) shows that citizens deliberating on policy matters are less sensitive to sequential framing-effects, than those that did not participate in deliberation.
- **Political information:** People with less access to political information are more likely to be sensitive to frames, as more informed people will often have made up their mind – or have a frame of their own- and be more resistant to a frame imposed on them from the outside.
- **Source credibility:** People are more willing to accept a frame from a source which they deem to be honest.
- **Competition of frames:** The more competing frames there exist on a certain issue, the less likely it is that framing effects will be successful.

2.2 Hypotheses & answering the first research question

Table 2: Hypotheses on the influence of strategic framing in the acceptance of military occupations

Variables	Hypothesis for target-audiences
The predispositions of each of the three audiences, on The Annexation of Goa and The Golan Heights	<p>The more frames overlap with the predispositions of the target-audiences, the more successful a frame will be. Therefore:</p> <p>H1: Actors will aim to make their frames coincide as much as possible with existing predispositions of the target audiences. Assuming that the predispositions referred to, are relevant for the annexation.</p>
The role that source credibility plays in the persuasion of each of the three audiences to accept a certain frame	<p>The more reliable a source is perceived to be by the three audiences, the more successful that broadcasted frame will be in convincing the audience of its validity. Therefore:</p> <p>H2: Actors will try to spread their frames through (perceived) credible sources, or – if they perceive there to be none- create their own forms of information sharing.</p>

The number of competing frames

H3: The more frames there are competing in persuading the target-audiences, the less effective any of them will be, unless they are part of a sequential frame.

Based on the above, in light of the time limitations on this thesis, I will select three out of five moderation effects, which I believe to be the most accessible and influential in successfully framing a military occupation, or annexation, and use these to formulate the hypotheses, and focus the source-analysis. Combined with the above literature on frames, framing-effects, and strategic framing- these moderation effects will lead the analysis of the independent variable. Based on the earlier readings, I believe the **predispositions, source credibility, and competition of frames** of the different target-audiences to be the most important. The available literature shows no real consensus on what exactly makes a frame successful, and even shows that macro-variables might have an influence on micro-level assumptions. However, extensive research has been done on identifying what- and how- certain frames, frame-effects, and strategies in framing can be formulated for testing.

Based on the above, the first research question: 'What strategic frames can be used to influence target-audiences of military occupations, as defined above?' - has been extensively described, and based on that information, a selection of moderation effects will be further used in this thesis.

This thesis will focus on frames in communication, targeted towards the domestic population, the population of the occupied territory, and the international community- and assume a great importance of emphasis framing-effects used by actors involved in the Annexation of Goa and The Golan Heights. It assumes that (1) predispositions (2) source credibility, and (3) competing frames are crucial variables which help explain a success or failure of a frame used in justifying military occupation.

2.3 Postcolonialism & its influence on discourse

This paragraph touches on postcolonial theory, and how it has shaped the discourse of colonial occupiers. In combination with the previous literature, it will help explain India's relations with Portugal, and the use of Portugal's language regarding Goa, as Portugal has been colonizing Goa since the 17th Century.

In Israel's case with the Annexation of the Golan Heights, the post-colonial theory will help us understand how a colonizing/ illegitimate territory expanding force is able to rhetorically justify its interventions in the Middle East, as the area has been a classical example of Edward Said's Orientalism (1978). By purposefully misshaping the reality of the Middle East in speeches, text and art, a nation is able to self-determine the context in which it frames its justifications (i.e. Edward Said starts the first chapter of Orientalism by analyzing the British presence and attitude towards Egypt.

He shows a series of self-sustaining arguments as to why the British should remain in Egypt- none of which incorporate any critical Egyptian input.) Post-colonial theory will also aid in distinguishing certain theme's or axioms used by occupying forces as part of their military justifications, as post colonialism focuses on the relation between a dominant colonial invader and its (cultural)

influence on the subjected population. In that sense, Israel's annexation of the Golan Heights, alongside its prolonged colonization of the West Bank and numerous illegal settlements, qualify to be viewed through the lens of post colonialism- as the rhetoric for the expansion of the 'Land of Israel' has remained a constant theme in Israeli politics since the '50s.⁴

2.3.1 Postcolonialism in literature

As mentioned in § 1.1 post colonialism is a critical theory which is part of the post-positivist (or: phenomenological) school of thought, where (ever-changing) ideas, norms and theory are central in shaping our ideas of reality, and how we are able to explain - or understand it. Critical theory focuses on utilizing "*a wide range of approaches*" centered around the idea of "*freeing people from the modern state and economic system*"- a concept known as: **emancipation** (Ferreira, 2018).

Postcolonial theories draw on social-constructivism for its understanding of the world around us.

Early postcolonial theory found its inspiration in Marxism, and takes on jargon from many disciplines to describe the ways in which external influences have altered the economic, cultural and sociological compositions of colonized territories (Young, 2003). It focuses on analyzing and critiquing the ways in which western knowledge- systems have come to dominate (Sharp, 2009). Sharp (2009) distinguishes between three different forms of the use of postcolonial theory in her book *Geographies of Postcolonialism* (p.7):

1. Colonialisms that consider "*(...) the ways in which understanding of the rest of the world were incorporated into European knowledge, from the period prior to exploration of the lands beyond Europe's boundaries until the present*"
2. Postcolonialisms that emphasize the evolved, continuing relations between former colonizers and their colonies;
3. Postcolonialisms that think about post colonialism as "*a critical theoretic project which challenges western assumptions, stereotypes and ways of knowing and offers its own alternatives.*"

The distinctions make for a more nuanced debate when we mention postcolonial theory. In the case of framing, we wander into the area of all three, but mainly post-colonialisms. The emphasis lies with the continuing (assumed) superior position of European countries vis-à-vis 'the Other'; be it economical, diplomatic or military- on which former colonizers will appeal to, as a justification for their prolonged occupation. Postcolonial theorists share that the colonizer is in the wrong, for an array of reasons, but might differ in the road to decolonization.

Certain historical figures have had different interpretations in how to best achieve decolonization. Ghandi, for example, was well known for his peaceful protest against the British Empire. But peace is not necessarily the only option to achieve liberation from a colonizer. Some postcolonial authors believe that a violent resistance against the colonizing force is inevitable, and crucial for liberation.

⁴ David Ben-Gurion, "Israel among the Nations", in *State of Israel, Government Year-book*, 5713 (1952), page 15

Fanon, in his famous *Wretched of the Earth* writes that: “Hostile nature, obstinate and fundamentally rebellious, is in fact represented in the colonies by the bush; by mosquitoes, natives, and fever, and colonization is a success when all this indocile nature has finally been tamed” (1963, p.250). This perception on freeing oneself from foreign oppression might explain any (overly-) aggressive standpoints coming from politicians of former colonies involved in war. It might be used to emphasize a sense of urgency, threat, or risk of being ‘recolonized’.

2.3.2 Influence of colonial discourse on framing

Alongside the notions of a dominant state-force being present to (oppressively) administer their authority in a foreign territory, comes also the influence of their used rhetoric; be as a direct justification of their actions, or a sub-conscious priming, found in a certain phrasing or framing.

This is referred to as ‘colonialist discourse’. Colonialist discourse has been used to historically reflect Euro-centric norms and ideas, which would be viewed as a blueprint for the colonies in the eyes of the colonizer, based on the assumed supremacy of Western philosophy. Anand’s dissertation-article *Western Colonial Representations of the Other: The Case of Exotica Tibet* (2007) identifies rhetorical strategies that characterize Western representations of the non-Western Other (p.23).

Anand states that: “Cultural representation of the non-Western Other lies at the core of Western colonial and neo-colonial discourse” (p.1). His critical political analysis was made on two levels:

1. The practices which through the West have stereotyped and essentialized the Other, which according to Anand (2007) serves as “a backbone” to;
2. Apply various rhetorical strategies to.⁵

Colonialist discourse has been used to mask the true intentions of the colonizing force, and hide the relations of inequality and domination (p.24). The Other has a special position in Western eyes, where it is simultaneously ‘frozen’ – or imprisoned- in certain periods of time, and is seen as backwards, or slow; and ‘outside of history’ where it does not seem relevant for global developments and major decisions. Whereas the West is seen as “the present and the now” whereby it feels that it has the right/duty “to bring progress” to the Other (p.36).

Famous examples of this discourse in practice are the ‘civilizing missions’ between the 15th – 20th century, undertaken by large colonial forces (such as France, Portugal, and the Netherlands) in which it was morally acceptable to conquer new territories and people- under the justification of bringing ‘civilization’ to, so-called, ‘backward’ and ‘unenlightened’ people. In all cases, they were non-Christians- such as the case of Goa.

Another famous example of colonial discourse is the poem *The White Man’s Burden: The United States and the Philippine Islands* (1899) by Rudyard Kipling. This poem encourages the United States to expand its imperial control of the world, and take control of the Philippine’s. The phrase ‘white man’s burden’ would be used by imperialists to justify the American continental expansion, in much the same way as the ‘civilization missions’ were used. Instead, the Americans referred to a ‘Manifest Destiny’ in which they were responsible for

⁵ He mentions: infantilization, eroticization, debasement, idealization and self-affirmation. These strategies would then “put flesh on the imagined Other” (p.23)

reshaping the lands they conquered in an agrarian sense, as this was perceived as being superior to urbanism (Miller, 2006).

2.3.3 Decolonization & its influence on frames

As postcolonial theory emphasizes, the context in which political discourse is made is important to note when analyzing frames. Taking into account the 'trend' of the 60's to 80's (or more generally: after WWII) regarding the holding of foreign territories, or colonization- we find that actually decolonization was the generally held view by the international community, on future self-determination of previously occupied territories.

Decolonization broadly refers to the emancipation from colonial rule (Rothermund, p.24). It marks the "*historic shift from world of colonial empires to a world of nation-states*" (Dane, p.1). These added nation-states are measurable today; as the United Nations went from 51 members at its founding in 1945, to 193 today. During the decades after WO II the sense of defeat and oppression at the hands of the Germans, reminded wealthy European colonizers that the exertion by a foreign power of direct rule over another people was a thing of the past, and that the international community should strive towards a total liberation of peoples still suffering from the old regime of colonies (idem). The U.N. adopted resolution 1514 in 1960, and declared *colonialism "as a serious abuse of human rights"* and declared that the right to self-determination was legally binding (idem).

It would be safe to say that at the international stage, it was clear that former colonies were given new momentum to push for independence. and any state giving the impression that it still was holding on to the old system, could now be seen as 'backward', 'oppressive' and perhaps economically (and physically) 'enslaving'. This also entails the intervening effect that postcolonial theory has on the use of frames; it would more than likely cause agents to refrain from using colonialist discourse, whereby a perhaps patronizing tone of voice would be used to describe the 'Other' as being in need of domination, or incapable of self-determination or independence. This would likely decrease the chance of having your frames accepted within the international community. On the other hand, it could also be used to counter-frame colonizers by the colonies in their way to independence, and gather the international community to support their cause. The added hypothesis would then be formulated as follows:

Table 3: Colonial discourse as moderation-effect, and its associated hypothesis

Variables	Hypothesis for target-audiences
4. Colonial discourse	<p>Avoiding colonialist discourse increases the chances of getting a frame accepted in the international community. Contrarily, framing the other as a colonizer, will increase the chance of gaining audience support. Therefore:</p> <p>H4: Perceived military occupiers will refrain from implying a (neo-)colonization in justifying their occupation/annexation.</p> <p>H5: As a possible intervention of counter-framing, occupied areas will actively frame the occupier as a colonizer.</p>

Summary

This chapter has shown an overview of the used literature on framing, framing-effects and framing strategy. It distinguishes between an array of different, identifiable frames which could be used by agents into persuading the three target-audiences into accepting their justifications for military occupation or annexation. This thesis employs the assumption of frames in thought, which assume that agents may influence individual perceptions on given situations by emphasizing certain aspects of a case, in the hopes of swaying the center of attention on these details. There are limits, however, to how effective these emphasizes may be. These are influenced by so-called moderation effects, which are summarized in table 2 (p.18). Taking the literature into account, three hypotheses have been formulated which would need to be applied by agents to the three target-audiences, to increase the chance of having a frame accepted (also table 2).

Furthermore, postcolonial theory has been discussed; particularly its influence on colonial discourse and its implications on successful framing. Postcolonialism is a post-positivist school of thought which focuses on how imperialism and colonialism influenced the way the West historically looked at the Orient. This has generally been in a demeaning way, which assumed Western superiority in education, tradition and philosophical thought.

The reality of colonization has been gruesome and belittling to the colonies, who have had different peaceful and non-peaceful approaches to achieve emancipation. Important for this thesis is the way political discourse has been affected by these notions, or predispositions. In the context of International Relations, we find that the period after WO II was characterized by waves of decolonization, with the focus on self-determination of peoples of occupied/colonized territories being huge in the international community. The United Nations declared that the former imperialist ways to be in violation of human rights, and the global order shifted towards a community of nation-states. From this follows the final adjustment to the earlier formulated three hypotheses; that agents would want to refrain from being framed as (neo-)colonizers when occupying or annexing foreign territories. The next chapter will delve deeper into the operationalization of the hypotheses, to make them suitable for testing. It will also discuss the pros and cons of the used methodology.

3. Methods

In this chapter, an overview will be given of the used methodology. This thesis makes use of two case studies: The Annexation of Goa and the Annexation of the Golan Heights. Both will be subjected to a discourse analysis in the next chapter. The research design consists of a qualitative comparative case study, based on a most-similar case design. In the next paragraph, a short introduction will be given to qualitative research as well as to the benefits and drawbacks of case study research. Also, the most-similar case design will be explained. Second, the Case Selection will be presented, in the light of a most similar case study design. Third, the hypothesis formulated in the theoretical chapter will be operationalized for testing. Finally, the reliability and validity of this research will be discussed.

3.1 Research Design

This research consists of a comparative case study, based on a most-similar case design. In identifying the possible cases for this thesis, based on the criteria '(un)successful military occupation' and '(un)successful frames', four possible cases are considered. These are shown below in Table 4:

Table 4: Possible outcomes with Strategic frames in combination with Military Occupation

Strategic Frames	Successful	Failed
Military occupation		
Successful	Complete success: India's Annexation of Goa (1965)	Military success: Israel's Annexation of the Golan Heights (1973)
Failed	Rhetoric success: Western Coalition's Occupation in Afghanistan (2002)	Complete strategic failure: Indonesia's Annexation of East-Timor (1975)

However, due to time and resources constraints, research on all four possible cases was infeasible. I thus limited my research to two cases. Rather than including cases which include a differing dependent-, and independent variable; I have opted to control for military success and to aim for explaining the difference in success of strategic frames. As elaborated in the theoretical chapter success or failure in framing is expected to be explained by successful tailoring frames to different, crucial audiences. The degree to which they, in historical public discourse, resonate with a different frame, will determine success or failure.

The dependent variable is:

- The level of public acceptance of the successful military occupation/annexation - by the three target-audiences, respectively.

The independent variable is:

- The extent to which identified strategic frames used by domestic opinion-leaders, influential actors and elites, to describe their successful military occupations/annexations, are aimed at, and stick with, the three target-audiences.

This could be visually represented in the following conceptual model (figure 1):



The cases within this case study are part of a qualitative research design. Seeing how they are unique, historical events, no large-*n* cross-cases can be analyzed, on the phenomenon I'm interested in researching. This means that a quantitative test cannot explain the **causal inferences** which play a role in frame acceptance. For this reason, I will be using a most-similar case research design, because this allows the researcher to uncover an explaining, differing variable- in this case; the fit (or stickiness) of frames. Within the cases, however, multiple qualitative tools, such as: historical documentation and interviews, will be used; as well as quantitative data- such as surveys on public opinion.

Gerring's (2008. pp. 645-684) definition focusses on the external validity of a case-study, and he describes a couple of "caveats" that must be considered when using quantitative supplements: (1) the inference must only pertain to more than a few dozen cases; (2) relevant data must be available for the population which is being researched, and all the standard assumptions of quantitative statistical research must be met (Gerring. 2008, p.646). Seeing how annexation, as defined in this thesis, is rather rare, no large-*n* (or at least no more than a few dozen) cases exist. As for the second caveat, I will focus on keeping my thesis as valid as possible, and take the standard assumptions of proper quantitative research into consideration.

As mentioned in figure 1, this thesis is a hypothesis-testing research, in which the four earlier-mentioned hypotheses in the Theory will be tested. These hypotheses will first be operationalized in §3.3 (p.25).

3.2 Case selection justification

But first, the case selections of the Annexation of Goa and that of The Golan Heights will be presented and justified. These involve the political context of the annexation and the military conflict. Further detailed case descriptions, as well as the reactions of the target-audiences will be part of the Analysis in chapter 4.

3.2.1 The Annexation of Goa (1961)

The territory of Goa is a former Portuguese overseas territory. It was colonized in the early 16th century, and remained under Portuguese administration until the annexation by the Republic of India in 1961, together with the enclaves of Daman and Diu. After the Portuguese monarchical system was abolished in 1910, hopes were raised that self-determination was going to be granted to the Portuguese colonies, but this proved to be wrong. This had led to the rise of many resistance movements in the early 20th century in India which advocated for the liberation of Goa from 400 years of Portuguese colonial rule. Non-violent protests, inspired by Gandhi and the Indian independence movement, were held by the Goa liberation movement during the 40's till the 60's.

The Portuguese government, claiming sovereignty over Goa, saw these protests as being ungrounded, and regularly dispersed them, while arresting its leaders. Because of the violent nature of these arrests, the Liberation Movement steadily gained more support for its cause from the Indian population. The Republic of India, viewed the territory as being a historical, geographical, ethnic and legal part of India, and demanded the Portuguese to hand over control of the territories and leave. Small armed fractions in Goa, who called themselves 'revolutionaries' carried out attacks on Portuguese police stations and infrastructure, and sometimes successfully attacking military patrols. As their success grew, the Portuguese government brought in extra troops to eventually abolish the insurgency. However, the common message from the Goans to the colonizers was clearly anti-colonial, as it was the same message Gandhi and his August movements had told the British: "*Quit India!*"

As noted earlier, the international community was shifting towards a nation-state system post- WO II where decolonization was apparent around Goa (with the Dutch East Indies declaring independence, Western New-Guinea aspiring independence as well, and many Asian countries rapidly claiming their own self-determination), this might explain the reactions of the international community, as we will analyze further in the next chapter. Diplomatically, the Indian government had asked the Portuguese government on multiple occasions to reconsider its role in Goa, but the Portuguese declined again and again. Afterwards, tensions quickly rose between the countries, eventually leading to Operation Vijay, which proved that the Indian military was too powerful for Portugal to handle. The nearly bloodless victory introduced Indian authority and administration into Goa.

In short, Goa was a long-colonized territory of Portugal, and geographically part of the Republic of India which prominently spoke about unification. After independence in 1947, the Republic of India sought Goan independence from Portugal, in an anti-colonialist sentiment. After diplomatic solutions failed, the Republic of India used military intervention to achieve that goal on their own. This identity driven escalation on world scale, makes the Goa case interesting for my research.

3.2.2 The Annexation of the Golan Heights (1981)

The Golan Heights are located in the Syrian Arab Republic. They were militarily occupied by the Israelis after the Six-Day War in 1967. During the fights for the Golan Heights, the Israeli's lost 115 men, with 306 wounded- while the Syrians lost an estimated 2500, with over 5000 wounded (Slater, 1992). As a result of the capture and annexation, over 100.000 inhabitants of the Golan Heights have left the area. Whether they 'fled' (as Israel states it, alongside the U.S.) as a result of

war, or were 'expelled' (as Syria puts it) remains a topic of discussion. The Golan Heights is a strategic vantage point, allowing the Israeli army to oversee the east in case of attack from the east, as well as providing a steady supply of drinking water to Israeli territories. Settlements arose soon after occupation, with Merom Golan being founded as a kibbutz in July 1967.

Over the course of history, the Israeli government suggested to return the Golan Heights to Syria in exchange for a peace agreement. This was rejected in The Khartoum Resolution; which was issued after the '67 Arab League Summit after the Six-Day War. Heads of State from eight Arab countries: Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, Algeria and Sudan rejected any cooperation with the Israeli government which they famously summarized as: *"No peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it, and insistence on the rights of the Palestinian people in their own country."*⁶ Since then, settlements have only increased in Israel's occupied territories. In 1981, Israel passed the 'Golan Heights Law' in which it extended its administrative influence to cover the Golan Heights, effectively annexing the area. The Law was passed in the Knesset with 63 MP's in favor, and 21 against (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1981).

The international community has never recognized Israel's claim to the territory, with the U.N. passing multiple resolutions during multiple decades condemning Israel's actions. In these Resolutions, the U.N. calls for a return of the illegally annexed Golan Heights to Syria, but Israel has stated that it would remain Israel's *"forever"*. This stance vis-à-vis the international community, the shared history of (Israeli) Jews, and the constant perceived threat influencing its Foreign Policy, makes the Golan Heights-case interesting for my research.

Summarizing the cases:

The analysis will consist of examining sources which can accurately reflect the used strategic frames by domestic opinion-leaders, influential actors and elites to describe the successful military occupations, and annexations of the Golan Heights and Goa, aimed at influencing the three target-audiences. Why is it that the Annexation of Goa was, eventually, received with less resistance than the Annexation of the Golan Heights? How do the used strategic frames influence this acceptance? Based on chapter 2, Theory, a selection of relevant strategic frames has been identified, which consists of the working-hypothesis of this study. These will be discussed in the next paragraph.

3.3. Hypothesis Testing & Operationalization

In this section, the four hypotheses discussed in the Theory will be further conceptualized and be made suitable for testing. To recap, the five hypotheses were:

- H1:** Actors will aim to make their frames coincide as much as possible with existing predispositions of the target audiences
- H2:** Actors will try to spread their frames through (perceived) credible sources.
- H3:** The more frames are competing in persuading the target audience, the less effective any of them will be.
- H4:** Military occupiers will refrain from implying (neo-)colonization in justifying their occupation/annexation.
- H5:** In an attempt of counter-framing, the occupied area will actively try to frame the occupier as a colonizer.

⁶ (Arab League Summit, 1967, article 3)

The next step is to take the moderation-effects, which indicate the limits of influence that elite's using emphasis-frames have, and determine which factors would possibly indicate their existence. These will then be analyzed in the next chapter, through a discourse analysis. The following tables show the operational definitions and indicators for the variables, as well as the type of data used to describe them.

Table 5: Operationalization of the moderation effects in the strategic framing, regarding the Annexation of Goa

Annex. Goa Moderation effect	Target (audience) Domestic Population	Occupied Territories	(consensus of the) International Community	Sources
Predispositions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Independence of India ● Anti-colonialist sentiment ● Waves of colonization 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Goa Liberation ● Anti-colonialist sentiment ● Waves of colonization 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Concept of sovereignty ● Waves of decolonization ● Self-determination 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● News coverage ● Speeches ● Protests / activism ● Politicians/ diplomats ● Scientific literature
Source-credibility	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Contemporary news ● Speeches of credible politicians 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Contemporary News ● Speeches of credible politicians 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Resolutions declarations ● Speeches of Heads of State 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● News coverage ● Speeches ● Legal articles ● Scientific literature
Competing frames	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Colonization vs. Liberation ● Media discourse 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Goa Liberation ● Colonization ● Portuguese frames 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Portuguese frames ● Waves of decolonization ● Self-determination ● Resolutions ● Declarations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Printed media ● News coverage ● Speeches ● Protests/ Activism ● Scientific literature
Avoidance of (Neo-) Colonization frames	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Blame diversion ● 'Helping hand' - frame ● 'Reunification'- frame 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Order restoration-frame ● 'Helping hand'- frame ● (Symbolic) shared ruling over occupied territories 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Blame diversion ● Appeal to self-defense ● 'Helping hand'- frame ● 'Reunification'- frame ● (Symbolic) shared ruling over occupied territories 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Legal proclamations ● Government statements ● Speeches ● Politicians/ diplomats ● Scientific literature ● Protests/ activism
Actively counter-framing the other party as a neo-colonist	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Referring to historical, judicial or religious claim to territory • Highlights of perceived oppression caused by other party 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Referring to historical, judicial or religious claim to territory • Highlights of perceived oppression caused by other party 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Concept of sovereignty • Referring to historical, judicial or religious claim to territory • Highlights of perceived oppression 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Politicians/ diplomats • Speeches/ government statements • Legal proclamations • Resolutions & Declarations

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • oppression caused by other party • Waves of decolonization • Self-determination • Resolutions • Declarations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Speeches • Scientific literature
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Table 6: Operationalization of the moderation effects in the strategic framing, regarding the Annexation of the Golan Heights

Annex. Heights	Golan	Target (audience)	Occupied Territories	(consensus of the) International Community	Sources
Moderation effect		Domestic Population			
Predispositions		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Solidify its military position in the region ● Legitimacy of Israel's authority ● Sovereignty of state ● Anti-colonialist sentiment ● Historical right 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Anti-colonialist sentiment ● Waves of colonization ● Loss of freedom 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Concept of sovereignty ● Waves of decolonization ● Self-determination 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● News coverage ● Speeches ● Protests / activism ● Politicians/ diplomats ● Scientific literature
Source-credibility		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Contemporary news ● Speeches of credible politicians ● Religious texts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Contemporary news ● Speeches of 'credible' politicians • Authority appeals (i.e. religious text, selective judicial text, historical text) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Resolutions ● Declarations ● Speeches of Heads of State ● International jurisprudence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● News coverage ● Speeches ● Legal articles ● Scientific literature
Competing frames		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Colonization vs. Liberation ● Media discourse 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Syrian territory ● (Neo-)Colonization ● Arab unity ● Religious texts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Israeli/Arab frames ● Waves of decolonization ● Self-determination ● Resolutions ● Declarations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Printed media ● News coverage ● Speeches ● Protests/ Activism ● Scientific literature
Avoidance of (Neo-) Colonization frames		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Blame diversion ● 'Helping hand'-frame ● 'Reunification'-frame ● Counter-framing colonization 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Order restoration-frame ● 'Helping hand'-frame ● (Symbolic) shared ruling over occupied territories ● Counter-framing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Blame diversion ● Appeal to self-defense ● 'Helping hand'-frame ● 'Reunification'-frame ● (Symbolic) shared ruling over occupied territories 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Legal proclamations ● Government statements ● Speeches ● Politicians/ diplomats ● Protests/ activism ● Scientific literature

<p>Actively counter-framing the other party as a neo-colonist</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Referring to historical, judicial or religious claim to territory • Highlights of perceived oppression caused by other party 	<p>colonization</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Referring to historical, judicial or religious claim to territory • Highlights of perceived oppression caused by other party • 'Helping hand'- frame 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Concept of sovereignty • Referring to historical, judicial or religious claim to territory • Highlights of perceived oppression caused by other party • Waves of decolonization • Self-determination • Resolutions & Declarations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Politicians/ diplomats • Speeches/ government statements • Legal proclamations • Scientific literature • Resolutions • Speeches
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3.4 Validity & Reliability of the research

This paragraph touches on the validity and reliability of the research. According to Joppe (2000, p.1, cited in: Golafshani, 2003, p. 598) 'reliability' can be defined as: *"(...) The extent to which results are consistent over time and an accurate representation of the total population under study (...)"*

Reliability says something about the stability of the results, and ultimately about its generalizability. When it comes to this research: when using the same hypothesis, the same conceptualization, and the same sources; the reliability will be high. Seeing how the historical events under consideration have passed, and the results have been documented, it is retrospectively explaining certain events, and the matter of its plausibility will then determine if it would be generalizable. If this research is an 'accurate' representation of the population under study, however, may be subject to the researcher's bias.

To effectively conduct this research, I will have to hypothesize what might have influenced the opinion of three (historical) audiences, based on a collection of literature on strategic framing. Each cog in the wheel might turn differently, if seen through another researcher's eye. Therefore, the generalizability of this research will depend on how much consensus there exists in the academic community, that historical discourse, opinion, and thoughts are a representation of sentiments of entire populations. Epistemological discussions aside, this thesis is meant to contain a qualitative research- and within the 'real world', as Patton (2001, p.14) notes: *"the researcher is the instrument."*

To further increase the reliability of the research, I will make use of data-triangulation, by using historical interviews, existing research-literature on military occupations- and annexations, and an array of primary- and secondary historic sources that describe the context in which both annexations took place on the basis of document analysis.

The validity of research, in quantitative research, touches upon the question: *"does the research truly measure that which it was intended to measure or how truthful the research results are?"* (Joppe, 2000, p.1, cited in: Golafshani, 2003, p.599). This touches on the accuracy of the measurement instruments, and if they really measure what they are supposed to be measuring. Much as to what has been written above, the inter-subjectivity of the matter being researched, makes it difficult to say -or at least be sure- that, at the end of the day, what was being sent out to be researched, has actually been measured. However, by meticulously defining the research question, ensuring that the used terminology is exhaustively described and operationalizing the hypothesis; I have tried to raise the validity of this research. This means that it is possible for future researchers to find any errors in my reasoning, questioning, or definitions, if they were to find that my results differ from any new insights.

3.5 Measuring frame-acceptance

Last, but not least, some words will be used to further expand on how the dependent variable will be measured: The level of public acceptance of the successful military occupation/ annexation - by the three target-audiences, respectively.

As the concept of 'acceptance' might be subjective, and therefore hard to determine; nevertheless, some indicators could be used. For instance, in the case of the target-audience 'international community' - a good general indicator

would be any United Nations Security Council voting on the Annexation of Goa and the Annexation of the Golan Heights. Furthermore, a close examination of any important countries involved in- or around the annexations could be reviewed as well, as to indicate if there exist any difference between the official international stance, and the reality of bilateral relations. These indications will most-likely be public remarks of high-level state officials from aforementioned countries.

In the case of the peoples of the occupied territory and their acceptance of the annexation; a more inter-personal source is needed. This allows the researcher to compare and filter possible government-biased reporting from national news- and media agencies. The sources should be able to present individual, and communal consensus or criticism. This could be found in media, radio and television.

Also, public letters aimed towards the occupied, or occupying government could be used to accurately reflect acceptance - or legitimization- in this target-audience. Finally, in the case of the peoples of the occupying territory, much will be measured the same as the peoples of the occupied territory; but on the opposite side of the occupation. Media, radio, television and other correspondence will be used to reflect the degree of acceptance and the peoples of the occupying territory.

Summary

This chapter has expanded on the used methodology, its strengths and weakness, and has provided an overview of the (to be used) concepts, and their operationalization. The next chapter will delve deeper into the used source-documents, and provide an analysis of the strategic framing found in these documents, based on the hypothesis. The final chapter: 'Results' will summarize the findings of this research, and answer the research question.

4. Analysis

This chapter will present the used documents, articles, speeches, and other discourse influential- and historical- documentation on the Annexation of Goa & the Annexation of the Golan Heights. This chapter aims to convincingly expand on the dependent, and independent variables, and identify strategic frames that have attributed to the acceptance or denial of legitimacy of military occupations and annexations, amongst the three identified target-audiences.

The first step is to present and analyze the historical sources for both annexations. Then, I will determine the degree in which the identified frames (if any) can be regarded a success or failure, based on the operationalization table from chapter 3, for both annexations. How many frames can be identified? How similar are they to each other in both cases? What does the context tell us? Do any frames stand out, or are being used differently? Is there a difference in acceptance between the three target-audiences, in both annexations? Finally, an analysis of the findings will take place, focusing on contributing factors of frame 'stickiness'.

4.1 The Annexation of Goa

The dependent variable touches on the level of public acceptance of the three target-audiences of the Annexation of Goa. In this case, the target-audiences consist of: 1. the inhabitants of the Republic of India; 2. the Goans, and 3. the international community.

What will follow next, is an overview of each target-audience, and first analyze their level of acceptance of the Annexation of Goa. Sources which illustrate the sentiment of these audiences will be presented and analyzed. Second, I will look at the independent variable, which is the extent to which identified strategic frames used by domestic opinion-leaders, influential actors and elites, to describe their successful military occupations/annexations, are aimed at, and stick with, the three target-audiences. I will then, again, describe the different target-audiences and their used frames.

4.1.1 The dependent variable

- a) The inhabitants of the Republic of India

Inhabitants of the Republic of India, in 1962, were represented by the government of the (relatively young) Republic of India. As mentioned in § 3.2.1 the Indian government was experiencing rising diplomatic tensions with the Portuguese government over the territory of Goa during the 1950's. This escalation was based on the notion of the Indian government (among others), that the era of global colonizers had come to an end. A realization that Portugal, according to the Indian government, wasn't willing to accept. Mr. Triloki Nath Kaul, a seasoned Indian diplomat, formerly having served as India's ambassador to Moscow, as well as being appointed India's Foreign Secretary twice, was interviewed in 1961 on the decision of the Indian government to invade Goa. When asked for the direct motivation, he answered;

"Because, as the Prime Minister said a few weeks ago, India's patience has exhausted, after trying for fourteen long years, since our independence, to settle

this problem peacefully.” He also mentions direct escalations from Portuguese side in the weeks leading to the Indian invasion: *“In the last few weeks, Portuguese reinforcements were increased, they were concentrated along our border, they fired at our fisherman craft, they intruded into our territory on several occasions, and the last straw was on December 17th in the morning, when about 300 Portuguese soldiers invaded up to 500 yards inside our territory. There they were committing brutalities, atrocities inside Goa and across the border at our people. No government can tolerate this.”* (BBC, December 18 ,1961, digital source.)

He accused the Portuguese government of *“living in the Middle Ages”* for not abstaining from their old colonial ways. Mr. Kaul explained that he didn’t worry that the United Nations would interfere in the invasion by asking India to withdraw, nor would it actually condemn the action, because it had been condemning colonialism for two successive years when the invasion took place. To him, that seemed against all the United Nations stood for regarding decolonization. Mr. Kaul concludes the interview by claiming that *“every citizen of Goa is behind this action. If this action did not had been taken [sic], there would have been bloodshed and greater violence.”*

India’s first Prime Minister, and former independence activist, Jawaharlal Nehru, had made many comments regarding Portuguese presence in Goa, before authorizing the use of force. Allegations of Portuguese persecution of pro-India nationalists in Goa, was headlining Indian newspapers and raising – not only- awareness under the Indian population, but also evoking direct responses from PM Nehru. During a Bombay speech on Oct. 23 1961, Nehru spoke of incidences of *“terror and torture”* by the Portuguese authorities in Goa (an allegation which both the Goan authorities and Portuguese government denied), and declared that *“the time has come for us to consider afresh what method should be adopted to free Goa from Portuguese rule.”* (Keesings’s Record of World Events, 1962). After two separate incidents involving passing by vessels being shot at by Portuguese troops (killing one member of its crew), the Indian Ministry of External Affairs announced that it was mobilizing troops to the border with Goa, in light of the recent *“aggressive action taken by the Portuguese against Indian shipping and fishing vessels”* (idem).

Finally, it is important to note that, as mentioned in § 1.5.1 & § 3.2.1, thousands of Indian protestors hoping to enter Goa were forcefully shut down by Portuguese police in 1955. This caused wide-spread sympathy and support for the Goan nationalists in India, and market a renewed escalation of the conflict, eventually resulting in the Operation Vijay. This would, as one can image, symbolize a strong overlap between public opinion and government action.

Based on the above, it is safe to say that the inhabitants of the Republic of India, as represented by their government, were favorable in their opinion on the annexation of Goa, Daman and Diu.

b) The inhabitants of Goa, Daman and Diu

Goa, Damman, and Diu consisted of approximately 650.000 people, mainly ethnic Indians. The majority of the inhabitants in these territories were Hindu (60.9 %) and Christian (36.8%) - with a small minority of Muslims (2.2%) present (Korman, 1996). However, as early as 1928, the Goa Congress Committee was

formed, and represented the first attempt to connect on an organizational level with the inhabitants of Goa, and the Indian independence movement (Desai, 2000, pp. 469-476)

An interesting insight into the Goan Liberation movement, is the life of Tristão de Bragança Cunha, also known as 'the father of Goan nationalism'. He is widely accredited as being the organizer of the first Goan civil-movements against the oppression of Portuguese colonialism, and envisioned a cultural and political unification with greater India. He has published many pamphlets, articles and books concerning the colonial rule in the early 20th century.

The most famous work is, arguably, *The Denationalisation of Goa* (1944), in which he describes the loss of national identity Goans have experienced under hundreds of years of colonial rule. He argued that Goan culture, language and religion was radically altered. Indeed, the Portuguese had converted large amounts of Hindu Goans to Christianity, sometimes forcefully, and promised the Portuguese nationality to any Goan that would convert. In a historical analysis of the Christianization of Goa during the 16th century, Dèlio de Mendonça (2002) writes:

"Conversion was a result of various forces at play that kept changing according to historical demands and several other considerations. It is clear that even a superficial reading of the sixteenth century documentation can give us the impression that most Hindus converted because they received, or better they had been promised, favors or material benefits from the Portuguese; or that they were forced to convert due to harsh anti-Hindu legislation, and that they did so for convenience rather than for the love of the new religion; or that the converts were saved from relapsing due to the privileges they received from the Portuguese, or threats from the ecclesiastical authorities. In short, these decrees and privileges in favor of conversions may appear to us today as mere enticements to conversion or discouragement to falling back and nothing more." (p.165)

Not only was Christianization there to spread the Portuguese identity, but it also made them docile to their oppressors, and subservient, according to Cunha. Converted Hindu's also enjoyed preferential treatment and protection from the Portuguese, so there were also social incentives for Goans to convert and further 'alienate' themselves from their historic-cultural identity. This denationalization, as he called it, was *"the main obstacle for the development of nationalism in Goa"* (Desai, 2000, p.469).

After the Indian invasion and 'liberation' of Goa on 19 December 1961, Goans rushed to the streets to welcome the soldiers, and cheered in the streets. The Portuguese practically immediately surrendered to the 30.000 marching Indian troops. A witness from that time, who was the 'Voice of Freedom' radio broadcaster, remembers announcing the news in Goa: *"Go and rejoice, because Goa has now been united with the motherland after 450 years."* (BBC, 2017, digital source).

Based on the above, it would be safe to say that the inhabitants of Goa were also favorable in the opinion on being reunited with India⁷.

⁷ For an impression on how Goans received the Indian soldiers: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I59lqLVKMol>

c) The international community

The International community, as gathered in the constellation of the United Nations Security Council, have gathered twice to discuss the Annexation of Goa in the 60's. Governmental leaders from many countries made clear in their individual statements that they condemned India's Invasion, including: the Netherlands, Spain, Western Germany, New Zealand, Australia, Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom. On the other hand, full support was expressed by the Soviet Union and all Soviet-bloc countries; the Arab States, Ceylon, Ghana, Indonesia and Yugoslavia. (Keesing's Record of World Events, 1962, p.1)

Ruys et al. (2018) have written an extensive analysis on the legal implications and consequences of the Indian Invasion of Goa, from the perspective of International Law, in the book *The Use of Force in International Law: A Case-based Approach*. They portrait an image in which Liberation of Goa was seen as an event of great historical value in the existence of the United Nations.

It noted the first time, in which the Security Council was unable to condemn a case of aggressive territorial annexation, even though it was at complete odds with the UN charter and its explicit prohibition on the use of aggressive force. Also interesting was the fact that some members of the Security Council even agreed with the Indian expansion, and voted against condemnation. These were almost all countries that experienced some form of previous occupation. Those voting against, were often (former) colonizers, hoping to avoid a spread of nationalistic wildfire. For example, in the Netherlands, the Dutch press expressed its fear of Indonesia attacking West New Guinea, in the same fashion in which India attacked Portugal (Keesing's Record of World Events, 1962: 2).

As Ruys et al. (2018) state, the most significant legal development in support of the intervention was the adoption of "(...) *Resolution 1699 (XVI) condemning the continuing non-compliance of Portugal with its obligations under Chapter XI of the UN Charter in respect of the non-self-governing territories under its control. Even states that disagreed with the way in which India had (militarily) (re-)asserted control over Goa appeared to acknowledge that the outcome was not completely undesirable, as the intervention had 'rectified an injustice, by eliminating a vestige of colonialism'.*"

The international community was therefore largely divided to India's use of force, and lack of diplomatic resolve, even if India had tried, with no success, to bring Portugal to the negotiating table since 1950. It also seemed to be ideologically connected to the Cold War, as the Soviet Union - a hegemon- was fully in support to India's invasion, while the United States - the antithesis to the U.S.S.R. - publicly condemned the Republic of India for the use of force.

More interesting might be that the United Nations had adopted the 'Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples' in 1960, which effectively marked an important milestone in the process of decolonization, as it formally allowed granting independence to colonial territories. Out of the 97 votes, 89 voted in favor of adoption, and nine countries abstained from voting: Australia, Belgium, the Dominican Republic, France, Portugal, Spain, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States. With the exception of the Dominican Republic, all of those who abstained,

were at the time acting colonial powers (United Nations General Assembly, 14 December 1960).

In the years surrounding the Annexation of Goa, many resistance movements were already active in voicing their need for independence from their colonizers around the globe. When looking at the United Nations list of 'Former Trust and Non-Self Governing Territories' (United Nations, 2020), we can see that in the five years before 1960 (1955-1959), many of France's colonies were already independent; Morocco, Tunisia, Gold Coast (Ghana), the Malayan Union (Malaysia), Togoland and French Guinea. In 1960, almost the entire former French African colonies were granted independence, two years after the Constitution of 1958, made in the wake of the controversial 1954 Algerian War.

This momentum continued in the 1960's, with 1962 (the year in which Goa was Annexed) simultaneously experiencing independence for: Kenya, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Jamaica, Western Samoa and São João Batista de Ajudá. (United Nations, 2020). Many of these independence movements were accompanied with bloodshed, and the former colonizers- being presented with numerous examples as the years went along- were no longer clinging as much on to these territories as they had done before WO-II, often opting for an as non-violent transfer of power if possible- at least, one in which they would face minimal casualties of their own.

The frame of colonization had become an evil one, possibly because - in the wake of WOII - many Western colonizers were shocked by the experience of a foreign, German occupation, or the atrocities connected to forceful territorial expansion. This marked for an interesting discussion during the United Nations, which formally opposed the Annexation of Goa- but, as with other territorial feuds that time, was unable to authoritatively resolve them. The difference being that there existed a broad support base for the idea of independence. In other words, for most member states, the output was fine, even though the process by which it came to be, was not.

Salazar did, however, try to enlarge the stakes at hand by claiming the annexation of Goa has been also a defeat for British and American diplomacy and authority 'at the gates of Goa' (Keesing's Record of World Events, 1961: 10). Portugal had also requested British support to stem the Indian aggression, based on an old 1899 Treaty. The government of H.M. Queen Elizabeth II had, however, made clear that it would not be able to come to aid, as it constituted a conflict another member of the Commonwealth (idem).

4.1.2 The independent variable

In this section we will take a closer look at the strategic frames that were used by domestic opinion-leaders, influential actors and elites to describe the Annexation of the Golan Heights; and the extent in which they were aimed at- and resonated with- the three target-audiences.

In light of time, and resources, I will only consider specific public statements on the occupation, and annexation, starting from the first diplomatic efforts between the Indian government and the Portuguese in negotiating the independence of Goa, in 1950- until the recognition by the Portuguese government of the annexation in 1979.

Based on the hypotheses (§2.2), we expect to find framing with regards to existing **predispositions, source-credibility**, or the source of intelligence; **competing frames** on the legality and necessity of the Annexation; **avoidance of neo-colonization frames** by the perceived military occupier- in this case, Portugal- and **active counter-framing** by the occupied territory **as neo-colonist**, by - in this case -primarily the inhabitants of Goa, and the Republic of India.

a) Inhabitants of the Republic of India

As represented by the sovereign government of the Republic of India, the inhabitants were subjected to many frames from their government, on the importance of the reunification with Goa. More generally; the eradication of any colonial influence was a dominant theme in the Nationalistic media (Mathur, 2015). It is important to note that India itself (and what is now known as Pakistan) had gained independence from the British Empire in 1947. Since then, Goa remained the only geographical location in India not under domestic control. As the wish for Portuguese withdrawal grew, and politicians voiced their support- so did the media join in relaying the politician's message, as the struggle of Goa, Damman and Diu reminded them of their own struggle for emancipation not too long ago.

Indian news media had a strong influence on popular opinion during the Indian independence movement, and as the state was breaking free from the British Empire, so were the local journalists aspiring to achieve press freedom. This meant that journalists and media had a natural alliance with the Indian authorities as nationalist press came to light; defying British censorship and regulations, and expanding the language of the newspaper to include Hindi. As the newspapers became more inclusive, more intellectuals joined the public debate against their alien oppressors (Natarajan, 1962:152). As Chandrakanta K. Mathur (2015:54) writes in her book *Media in India* :*"As nationalism evolved so did the idea that the freedom of the Press was a basic right to the cherished and fought for. Indian industrialists started their own newspapers with a clear anti-colonial stance. Most nationalist leaders were involved in activist, campaigning journalism, none more than Mahatma Ghandi (...)."*

From the above, we could assume that the media and politicians, during the development of the conflict between India and Portugal, were generally same-sided, as the media in India has historically been strongly pro-Hindi and anti-colonial. Any media in India likely to report against an Indian annexation, would be colonial British-owned, which there were none of in 1961, or in the years leading to the invasion (1950-1961). This would also mean that the Indian population was likely subjected to a plethora of dominant narratives, or **predispositions** regarding the promotion of the independence of India and the freedom-mentality; anti-colonialist sentiment aimed against Portuguese occupation; and the resentment of the waves of colonization that the world has seen until the invasion in December 1961.

Not uncoincidentally, these predispositions are directly linked to the **shared identity** between Indians and Goans. As it would be difficult to measure the predispositions themselves, it would be better to rationalize what might have caused them. As nationalism grew large in India, eventually resulting in its independence, and the media was reporting from a nationalistic motive, it would

be reasonable to assume that the predispositions of the average Indian would be similar to the average Goan- when it came to the Independence of Goa.

Barnett (1999: 9) defines identity as: *“the understanding of oneself in relationship to others”*. When it comes to national identity, it would consist of a common, shared understanding of the nation vis-à-vis its surroundings. State identity and national identity are not static, but rather *“always in negotiation,”* and can be expected to be especially intense during rapid shifts and changes in international and domestic politics.

This tension on national identity can also lead to identity conflicts, for example, when there exist multiple ideas on the national identity, which require different, opposing actions to be performed. Or when the definitions of the *“collective self are no longer acceptable under new historical conditions”* (Dittmer & Kim, 1993: 7, in: Barnett, 1999). These definitions are useful for this thesis, as in both our cases, the relationship between the domestic population of the occupier, and the population of the occupied, is crucial to explain public perception towards intervention.

Working with this definition, I would argue the average Indian understood themselves as being similar to the average Goan. As mentioned before, Goa, Damman and Diu, shared a common language, culture and ethnicity for as long they have been inhabited; and even after many hundreds of years of colonization by Portugal, only a mere 25% identify themselves as being Christian in 2011 (Indian Government Census, 2011) – in contrast to a different former colony of Portugal, East-Timor, where the influence of the colonizer is still clear today: over 99% still identify themselves as being Christian (CBS News, 2020). The same argument goes for the language spoken in Goa and East-Timor; Konkani remained the dominant language spoken by Goans, during Portuguese colonization, and is still the common tongue. However, in East-Timor, Portuguese to this day remains one of the official languages.

There were also political sympathies and representations between India and Goa. By the late '20s, the Indian National Congress had admitted the Goan Congress Committee to the All-India Congress Committee; the overseeing, decision-making committee of India where all its state-representatives hold a seat. Meaning that, before India even had achieved its own independence, it recognized that Goa was suffering from the same fate.

In terms of the (in)tangible common denominators between Goa and India, I would argue that there were many, and that they birthed many of the same predispositions among both inhabitants.

When it comes to the **source-credibility** of these frames, there was no reason for Indians in 1961 to believe that the news they were receiving from state-run media, or otherwise, was false, when it came to the invasion and annexation of Goa, Damman and Diu. Often, articles were repeats of the words of Prime Minister Nehru. However, the Indian government did adopt the Criminal Law amendment in 1961, after the Annexation of Goa, which explicitly forbids *“Questioning the territorial integrity or frontiers of India in a manner prejudicial to the interests of safety and security of India.”* (Criminal Law Amendment, 1961). It also includes the territories of Goa, Damman and Diu in the amendment, as being unquestionably part of the Indian frontier. Censorship as it

may be, it does not necessarily mean that the facts that were presented, were false.

Finally, the **competing frames** at play aimed at the inhabitants of India during the Annexation of Goa, were the frames of 'colonizer vs. colonized' (e.g. Portugal vs. the historically colonized territories of Goa, Damman and Diu) as brought forth by India; and 'attacker vs. attacked' (e.g. India invading Portuguese sovereign territory) coming from Portugal. This also shows a clear attempt of India, to frame Portugal as the sustained colonizer- the one that has been effectively doing so for 450 years. However, Portugal did not directly try and frame India as a **neo-colonizer**, per say, but as an "*occupier*" of Portuguese sovereign territory, as the indicated multiple times during his speech to the Portuguese National Assembly in 1962. (Keesing's Record of World Events: 9-13). Regarding this frame, Mr. Kaul said: "*(...) We are not there to conquer the territory because the territory is part of india. We are not there to dominate a foreign people, because the people are our own kith and kin. We have gone there to only help them liberate themselves*" (BBC, 18 December 1961),

b) The inhabitants of Goa, Damman and Diu

The inhabitants were naturally also subjected to the same frames as the inhabitants of India. The geographical closeness, shared language and culture, availability to same media and aspiration for independence from a colonial force, would make conflicting public opinion between the inhabitants very improbable, as Goans also viewed themselves as being more Indian than Portuguese. Seeing how it was their independence from Portugal on the line, inhabitants of Goa therefore viewed Indian media as more trust worthy than Portuguese, as it also confirmed their own preferred worldview. In this case, the predisposition existing in these areas was that they were being stopped from unification with the greater India, by military oppression from the Portuguese army, as they had tried to do in 1953 and 1955 during the violently surpassed revolts. The Goa Liberation movement had been a significant force since the 1940's, and they had their own sources of information (e.g. Radio 'Voice of Freedom') with they deemed credible. The competing frames were the same as those for the inhabitants of India.

In the same fashion, the frame-acceptance of Portugal being a colonizer, was high. The frames of neo-colonization are doubtfully relevant for Goa. Even though Goa did not view itself being 'colonized' by India, it voted against assimilation in the Indian State of Maharashtra in 1967 by referendum, and then became the smallest Indian State. This allowed them to own the highest degree of executive autonomy, after hundreds of years of being a colony. Seeing how the idea of autonomy is of much importance to Goa, one could argue that even an Indian liberation is just the switch of rulers, if that does not include complete independence.

The Indian government had made clear, before the annexation, that the inhabitants of Goa would be consulted when deciding the future status of their land. After the annexation, the Indian National Congress - India's first nationalistic movement and prominent political party- indicated in its Election Manifesto that the inhabitants of Goa, Damman and Diu would have a say in deciding if they would merge into the neighboring Indian territory of

Maharashtra- or not. Indian PM Nehru then pointed, during a public meeting in 1963, that Goa would remain a Union Territory for at least ten years, before the choice would be put before the Goans in the form of a referendum. Due to civil pressure from within Goa, the referendum – the only one in India’s history- took place after only 5 years, in 1967 (Sakshena, 1974: 121). The precautions the Indian government took with focusing on the intended preservation of Goa’s identity and culture, could also be seen as an avid attempt to prevent any counter-framing as neo-colonizer. For this thesis, it is important to note that no evidence was found of a significant Goan anti-movement claiming neo-colonial motives for the Indian liberation of Goa.

c) The International community

as gathered in the constellation of the United Nations Security Council, have gathered twice to discuss the Liberation of Goa in the 60’s. As noted earlier, much was discussed in the build-up to the military action in 1961, and many remarks were made between India and Portugal. The occurring frames at hand were first, from 1947 onward, the attempted integration of Goa into the Indian Union through diplomacy. As that did not prove to be successful, only then did the frame shift towards the attempted integration of Goa, through armed intervention (Fernandes, 2000: 345).

The Portuguese Prime Minister (1932 – 1964) Salazar had told Nehru that if India were to use force to expel Portuguese troops from Goa, Damman and Diu, that its pacifistic image ‘would disappear’. In fact, the use of violence to end the Portuguese rule was the most important point of criticism of the United Nations, as India had been – until then- a strong proponent of pacifistic resolve of conflicts, in the same spirit it gained its own independence with the non-violent protests of Mahatma Gandhi. In a well-known interaction between President Kennedy and India’s ambassador to the U.S. Braj Kumar Nehru, (the Indian PM’s cousin,) president Kennedy made it clear he was annoyed with the way things went, as India had invaded Goa, Damman and Diu less than a month after Prime Minister Nehru had visited him in Washington D.C. – where he only briefly mentioned Goa to the president. As Kennedy told the ambassador:

“My only point is why didn’t you do it before, 15 years before? But Mr. Ambassador, you spent the last 15 years preaching morality to us, and then you go ahead and act the way any normal country would behave and now that you have done what you should have done long ago, people are saying, the preacher has been caught coming out of the brothel. And they are clapping, And Mr. Ambassador, I want to tell you, I am clapping too” (Kux, 1992: 198).

From Portuguese perspective, the attempted integration of Goa into the Portuguese Union had been historically the only frame they had used. Goa had been under colonial rule for centuries, and Salazar had argued that there was no colonial-relationship between Portugal and Goa, as there was no form of economic exploitation benefiting the colonial power; discrimination between citizens and subjects, unequal rights, or a discrepancy in political and military power: *“Financially, Goa has always been a burden on the metropolitan treasury [...] From the economic point of view neither the metropolitan people nor the metropolitan capital exploit Goa [...] the Goans enjoy all rights and have access to all posts”* (Salazar, 1956: 8, in Fernandes, 2000: 344).

Politically, Salazar had made the case that Goa was an integral part of the Portuguese nation, as Goans were able to participate in Portuguese government on equal footing with native Portuguese citizens. Most importantly, Salazar argued that Goan inhabitants did not feel the need to be liberated, as they felt a strong Portuguese patriotism and for *“reasons of their own interest”* (Fernandes: 344). It therefore was the moral and judicial obligation of the Portuguese government to decline any form of separation from Goa, as it was self-obliged to defend it. As Fernandes comments, the Portuguese, therefore, had effectively associated a loss of territory – in this case Goa- as being synonymous with:

“loss of empire with contraction of dominion, power, national pride and stroke of self-flagellation, little realizing that the process (of decolonization) could not be halted or reversed [...] it was only possible to secure reasonable delay but clearly the pace was determined by nationalist feeling and development of political consciousness within the territory...” (idem)

In the end, after the United Nations had made clear its disappointment in the Indian Union, for reaching out to violence to end its conflict with Portugal, Prime Minister Nehru commented that India did not receive any joy from the invasion, but rather that *“the Portuguese, ultimately, left no choice open to us”* (New York Times, 28 December 1961).

Recapping the variables

When it comes to the level of acceptance, or support base, measured of the three different target-audiences, it is fair to conclude that there existed a consensus on the necessity (and validity) of military intervention, between the inhabitants of India, and those of Goa, Damman and Diu. Both territories had been formerly colonized, and faced struggle to emancipate themselves; suffered from identity- suffocation by the colonizer, and had grounded ideological ‘freedom movements’, spearheaded by vocal academics who were able to organize and gather public protests. As the momentum of the liberation movement grew; with shifting Indian public opinion in the 50’s - after Portugal had violently repressed attempted protests in Goa- stalling diplomatic efforts, and with the post WO-II era ushering a new, decolonized world; armed conflict between India and Portugal seemed inevitable.

As India believed it was liberating – rather than annexing – Goa, and at the same time defending its borders against foreign aggression, the frames were congruent with the predispositions of both inhabitants. National media in India was seen as credible and Goans had their own clandestine pirate-radio, which was successfully used to inform Goans. This allowed for little competing frames from Portugal, which saw no significant following in India, Goa, Damman and Diu. Seeing how both territories were formerly colonized, the frame of being a neo-colonizer was not used by the Portuguese, but the frame of India being an occupier of its ‘sovereign’ overseas territory was used by Salazar. However, it did not help Portugal on the world stage, as no significant aid was provided by the international community, and India only faced minor, unilateral economic sanctions as a result of the annexation. India did frame Portugal as a colonizer, and as itself was an example of pacifistic liberation, unsuccessfully brought Portugal to the negotiating table. India’s biggest ‘loss’ was arguably its international reputation as an ‘eternal pacifist’, in reference to its method of self-emancipation by Mahatma Gandhi.

For the United Nations, the case of the Annexation of Goa proved to be a challenging dilemma, as it was painfully exposing the lack of any real powers of intervention, resulting from varying degrees of support from member states. As more former-colonies became members of the UN, they were able to show support for India, regardless of the UN Charter prohibiting the use of force. This, perhaps, forced a reflection on the intended spirit of the Charter, and the changing global paradigm of sovereignty, first set in motion with the acceptance of Resolution 1514 in 1960, granting independence for former colonies.

Portugal eventually recognized the Indian ownership of Goa in 1975, after the 'Carnation Revolution' in 1974, in which a military coup overthrew the Estado Novo regime. The new Portuguese government quickly thereafter restored diplomatic relations between India and Portugal.

4.2. The Annexation of the Golan Heights

The dependent variable is concerned with the level of public acceptance of the three target-audiences of the Annexation of the Golan Heights. In this case, the target-audiences consist of: 1. the inhabitants of the State of Israel; 2. the inhabitants of the occupied Golan Heights and 3. the international community.

What will follow next, is an overview of each target-audience, and first analyze their level of acceptance of the Annexation of the Golan Heights. Sources which illustrate the sentiment of these audiences will be presented and analyzed. Second, I will look at the independent variable, which is the extent to which identified strategic frames used by domestic opinion-leaders, influential actors and elites, to describe their successful military occupations/annexations, are aimed at, and stick with, the three target-audiences. I will then, again, describe the different target-audiences and their used frames.

4.2.1 The dependent variable

Formal annexation of the Golan Heights was declared by the Israeli Knesset in December 1981, with the adoption of the Golan Heights Law. The occupation had de facto been going on for 14 years, since the 1967 Six Days' War. This meant that the **inhabitants of Israel**, as represented by their elected government officials, had been subjected to a plethora of **predispositions** on territorial integrity and North-border safety issues many times before the annexation.

a) Inhabitants Israel

One could say the inhabitants of the State of Israel had been confronted with territorial disputes since its self-proclamation in 1948. Israel has had a turbulent history with its surrounding Arab neighbors, and the occupation of the Golan Heights after the Six Days' War was generally regarded as a strategic advantage for Israel, which could then position warning stations in the North, control Jordan's water flow, and provide the best possible defense against a Syrian ground force invasion (Bar-Joseph, 2014).

Yishin (1985) analyses the annexation of the Golan Heights is a much similar division as this thesis; he approached the annexation from the angles of 'external factors', 'domestic factors' and 'elite factors'. As the Syrian forces posed a threat for Israel in the North before the annexation of the Golan Heights, so did rising tensions with Egypt in the South, as Israel was preparing to evacuate the Sinai area, contribute to the annexation in 1981. *"Facing adamant domestic*

opposition, the government decided to test Egyptian intentions before the critical date by taking a provocative measure, namely, by annexing what was claimed to be Arab land” (p. 50).

Domestically, the necessity of holding on to the Golan Heights, after the war had ended, proved to be more difficult to ‘sell’ to the Israeli population, by the Israeli government, than the simultaneous annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967. Moshe Dayan- former commander of the Jerusalem front in 1948, and Minister of Defense in the 1967 War- was Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel in 1979, when he stated that the Golan Heights was not part of Israel’s ‘ancestral land’, and therefore did not hold as much historical or religious value as Jerusalem did. It merely functioned as a political asset, which Israel was possibly willing to trade in negotiations with its enemies, if it were to help secure its future peace and stability. However, in the domestic pro-annexation movement, the significance of the Golan was expressed in the Hebrew saying ‘Let’s not lose the North’, which was also synonymous for *“losing one’s reason and direction”* (Yishin: 51).

The emotional attachment to the Golan Heights, represented by the bloodshed in the 1973 October War, alongside a victory over Israel’s most hated enemy, only reinforced the idea of possessiveness among the pro-annexation inhabitants of Israel. The reasoning became that Israel should have a best possible defense from attacks in the North (idem). Historical accounts show that the majority of the Israeli inhabitants were *“very favorable”* toward annexing the Golan Heights. A poll was conducted before the first legislative attempt to annex the Golan Heights, which showed 71.7 percent of the respondents supported annexation (Haaretz, 12 November 1980, in: Yishai, 1985). Four days after the final approval of the Golan Heights Law, 70.6 percent of the responders were pro-annexation (Yediot Ahronot, 18 December 1981). Yishin (1985) writes that it was not only the ‘pro-Golan mood’ which affected the initiation and conclusion of the annexation, but also *“an explicit demand presented by the Golan Settlement Committee (GSC)”* (1985: 51-52).

Yishin (1985) describes the efforts of the GSC- campaign as *“an illuminating example of a group acting to promote foreign policy issues”* (p.52). The GSC consisted of members of the settlement community, who came together as a well-organized group, directly targeting the Knesset, the government and public, in the hopes of persuading the politicians into never letting go of the Golan Heights, and allowing the settlers (who had settled as soon as five weeks after the end of the war) to remain there indefinitely. Despite being a small group, they were able to garnish wide-spread support. They saw the statement of Minister of Foreign Affairs Moshe Dayan, concerning the status of the Golan and his willingness to return it in future negotiations, as reason to worry- as well as the peace negotiations with Egypt in the 1970’s, and their implications for the occupied territory. The GSC deployed a scale of lobbying tactics, and regularly met with high-ranking government officials in the Knesset, influenced politicians to instigate a bill to formally annex the Golan, and- if all else would fail; threatened to apply sanctions unless its demands were met. *“The settlers warned that they would return their ID-cards (implying a rejection of the political community), to cease payment of taxes, to impede ministerial visits to the area, and to divert the water of the Jordan River”* (1985: 53).

Yeshin (1985) attributes the success of the GSC to three factors (p.53). First, as their popularity and image grew, the Golan settlers were seen as 'defenders' of Israel's frontiers in the North, and -in the original settler spirit- transformed the bare lands of the Golan into green hills and fertile grounds, which only added to their status as exemplary pre-state pioneers (Yishai, 1982: 171-85). Second, the GSC was able to effectively expand the issue of the annexation of the Golan Heights, to the complete spectrum of Israeli society, and cut across Israeli "*partisan and social boundaries*" (Yeshin, 1985: 53). Third, the settlers were able to profit from circumstances which arose during the peace treaty with Egypt.

As the Gush Emunim⁸ launched a massive campaign known as 'The Movement to Stop the Withdrawal from Sinai' - they tried to undermine the Israeli government's decision to withdraw from the territory captured in the Yom Kippur War in 1973. By accepting, and committing to the GSC's request, the Israeli government was instead able to show its "*commitment to the national cause, without violating international treaties. The combination of popular public image, political heterogeneity and circumstantial conditions thus contributed to the group's [GSC] ability to influence decision-makers to adopt their cause*" (idem).

This all, perhaps, paints a rather one -dimensional picture of a successful lobby from the GSC, vis-à-vis the Israeli government, which, in light of Moshe Dayan's remark of Israel's willingness to use the Golan Heights as a form of political leverage in future negotiations with Syria, seemed reluctant to immediately annex the Golan Heights. However, the societal context of this annexation should also be considered.

Michael Barnett (1999) analyses the Israeli foreign policy change which culminated in Israel signing the Camp David Oslo Accords. He uses a mix of constructivist- and institutionalist assessments, to analyze the concepts of evolving Israeli identity, narratives and frames. Israel's Jewish-, Zionist-, and Holocaust-surviving national identity is, according to Grossman (1998: 55) linked to a view in which Israel views itself in existential isolation, whilst facing perpetual hostile threats from various domestic and foreign actors. This also translates into the Israeli political party system, which plays an important role in activating group action, defining policy options, and articulating alternative paths for the future (Barnett, 1999: 16). Relevant to note, is that Israeli political parties do not agree on a common definition of the Israeli 'national identity', and might differ on their priorities, and the severity of threats.

Barnett (1999: 17) writes that:

"if the Israeli identity is defined by an explicit preference of democracy and Zionism over Greater Israel (defined in both religious and security terms) and there exists a coalition that rank orders these values in a similar way, then there exist the cultural foundations for a peace process that allows for the withdrawal from the occupied territories. These possibilities are not already present and readily available to the first willing politician. Instead, actors are actively creating these possibilities through the appropriation of cultural and symbolic resources."

⁸ The Gush Emunim was an Israeli Orthodox Jewish, ring-wing activist movement which was dedicated to establish Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. They were formally established in the wake of the Yom Kippur War (1973), in early 1974.

Together with Yashin's (1985) writings on the context of the annexation of the Golan Heights, Barnett allows for an insights in the dynamics between political ideology, and how it relates to Israeli domestic public opinion.

To illustrate this point, Barnett (1999: 17) claims that parties on the political right and left in Israel differ *"dramatically"* when it comes to the amount of value they place on concepts as democracy and Greater Israel. The leftist parties lean more towards democracy and liberalism, and the right-wing parties towards the opposite. In this spectrum, the Labor party *"articulates a narrative that can be sustained without the territories and offers a more hopeful appraisal of progress and peaceful co-existence"* meaning, that the narrative Labor used to contextualize their policies, would be better responsive to changing, modern geopolitics, than right-wing parties, such as Likud. Their narrative *"is based on the saga and unceasing nature of Jewish persecution, the redemption and protection provided by Jewish military power, and a mission to settle the whole of Israel and the occupied territories"* (Barnett, 1999: 17, Ezrahi, 1997: 12-14).

Considering all of the above, and the fact that the Israeli PM during the formal annexation – Menachem Begin- was the founder of Likud, and a former leading of the Zionist militant movement Irgun, it is not unreasonable to assume that, whilst on the international stage the Israeli's did not seem eager to annex the Golan Heights, the Israeli government was likely ideologically acceptant of this idea. However, the way it was to be framed, would be in term of strategic, military benefits (e.g. overlooking Syria, strategic military vantagepoint, water supply from the Jordan river) instead of historical Judean ancestry. *"As Benjamin Netanyahu, then the leader of the opposition to Yizhak Rabin's Labor government, put it, the presence of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in the Golan is the 'cork' that prevents the outburst of a massive Syrian attack against Israel"* (Bar-Joseph, 2014: 46).

During the formal adoption of the Golan Heights Law, PM Begin used the frame of fear and a sense of insecurity, when referring to the kibbutzim and towns that were shelled by Syrians on the border:

"Spurred on by their deep and abiding hatred, they would open fire, from the heights, on our towns and villages, instituting a reign of blood and terror throughout the area. Their targets were man, woman and child- and the attacks took their toll in killed and wounded. In those days, which can under no circumstances be forgotten, it was said that the children being born were 'children of the shelters'" (New York Times, 'The Golan Heights Annexed by Israel in Abrupt move', 15 December 1981).

During the same meeting, he also called Syria's control of the Golan Heights pre-1967 the result of arbitrary decisions, made after WO II by Britain and France (in the form of British-ruled Palestine, and French-ruled Syria). Not only did Begin make use of an **emphasis- framing effect**, by laying the focus on the implied hatred, terror-bringing, fear-invoking Syrian hostilities; he also provides the annexation of the Golan Heights as an answer against it.

More recently, marking the 50-year anniversary of the Six Day War in 2017, Israeli's were asked on their opinions of the further formal annexation of all the territories that were captured. 45.3% supported this action, while 44.8% opposed (Jewish Virtual Library.org, 2020). When asked if they see the claim, that

settlements are an obstacle in future peace negotiations with the Palestinians, as being right- the majority of Israeli Jews (55.8%) did not agree, while 68% of Israeli Arabs agreed⁹.

b) Inhabitants Golan heights

The inhabitants of the occupied Golan Heights in 1967, consisted almost entirely of approximately 12,500 Arab-Israeli Druze, concentrated in four villages (Yeshin, 1985: 54). The Druze are an unique ethnic minority and religious community, located mainly in Lebanon, Jordan, Israel and Syria. The Druze residing in the Golan Heights, had been offered Israeli citizenship after an effort of the Israeli government to further integrate them culminated in the Knesset adopting a law granting them to apply for citizenship. However, in general, many have declined. As of 2011, only 10% of Golan Druze were registered Israeli citizens, the others remained 'permanent residents'. After the Syrian Civil War, an influx in applications could be seen (New York Times, 2012). The Druze had historically empathized with Syria, as they share the same language and are religiously close.

The annexation of the Golan Heights in 1981, meant that the Druze population of the Golan Heights had to rethink their loyalties. It was reasonable to assume that a formal annexation would enable the Druze to also judicially enjoy the benefits and security of full Israeli citizenship. Also, an urge to reunite with the Druze already living in Israel before the annexation, was also tempting in their collective consideration. But some feared that, just like the Egyptians returning to the Sinai, the Syrians too, would one day return to the Golan Heights. Any Druze collaborating with the Israeli government, would possibly be in danger from the Syrians, or so was the reasoning. Certainly, the Syrians were not on good standing with Israel. This uncertainty of the future, effectively put the Druze in a difficult dilemma.

Whether or not they accepted the occupation was no question; they had no choice. The fact that many did not opt for neutralization to Israeli citizens might be a good indicator of the amount of recognition the Druze in the Golan had for the Israeli's. Modern interviews and articles, conducted and written in the Golan Heights, still portray a picture of a people who were overwhelmed by the annexation, and still have strong feeling towards reunification with Syria (Mort, 2012; New York Times, 2011).

c) International community

Until the unilateral recognition of the United States in 2019, none in **the International community**, as being represented by the member of the United Nations General Assembly, had historically recognized the occupation of the Golan Heights as being legitimate in 1967, nor the formal annexation in 1981 (Al Jazeera, 2019; Korman, 1996). In the direct aftermath of the 1967 war, on 22 November 1967, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 242, proposed by British ambassador to the UN Lord Caradon. The Resolution called for:

⁹ For more public opinions polls in Israel throughout the years, please see: <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/israeli-public-opinion-polls>

- (i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
- (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force (UN Security Council Resolution 242).

Remarkably, Israel had accepted this resolution in 1967, on the basis of a different interpretation, made possible by the grammatical differences in the English and French text. The French text calls for a withdrawal from “*des territoires occupés*” - “the territories occupied”. As English and French were both the official languages of the United Nations, they both equally hold judicial legitimacy. The English definition implied a complete withdrawal from all occupied territories in 1967. The French definition, Israel argued, did not definitively exhaust ‘all’ territories, nor ‘the’ territories occupied during the 1967 War, meaning that they were not obliged to do so unconditionally- or would only have to negotiate ‘some’.

While the Arab world embraced the English text, and emphasized the first part of the resolution- namely the complete withdrawal from occupied territories, and the respect for and acknowledgement of borders and sovereignty- Israel embraced the French text, and emphasized the second part of the resolution, maintaining that secure boundaries which were free of threats, was the most important issue. This meant that the Israeli’s were of the opinion that the aforementioned call for withdrawal is relevant, only when combined with an establishment of secure and recognized boundaries by agreement (Lapidoth, 2007). When it came to the Golan Heights, Syria had been quick to decline any form of peace talks with the Israeli’s, following the Khartoum Resolution in Sudan (29 August - 1 September 1967) where eight Arab Heads of State - including Syria - had agreed to the famous ‘three no’s’: no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, and no negotiations with Israel. This effectively meant that any direct dialogue between the Arab world and Israel was made impossible. However, the Jarring Mission¹⁰ (1967-1973) saw indirect talks between Egypt and Israel, and a futile effort towards a peace treaty between Jordan and Israel.

Israel justifies its occupation in 1967 on the grounds of self-defense, which according to the provisions of the United Nations Charter, would be a valid claim, this would also, as Korman (1996:265) writes, entitle Israel to:

“(...) exact as a condition of withdrawal from the territory the imposition of security measures of an indefinite character- such as perpetual demilitarization, or the emplacement of a United Nations force- which would ensure, or tend to ensure, that the territory would not be used for aggression on future occasions. But the notion that Israel is entitled to claim any status other than that of belligerent occupant in the territory which it occupies, or to act beyond the strict bounds laid down in the Fourth Geneva Convention, has been universally rejected by the international community (...).”

¹⁰ The Jarring Mission refers to the attempts by Swedish diplomat Gunnar Jarring in trying to achieve a peaceful resolve of the conflict between the Arab world and Israel, following the Six Day war in 1967. As Special Envoy, he was tasked with the negotiations regarding the implementation of Resolution 242.

After the Knesset had adopted the Golan Heights Law, the United Nations Security Council came together and unanimously adopted Resolution 497, which declared the Golan Heights Law “null and void and without international legal effect”, calls Israel an “occupying Power” [sic] and demands that Israel reverses its decision (UN Resolution 497). After Israel failed to comply with the Resolution, the United States vetoed a Resolution in January 1982 (which called the Israeli action ‘annexation’ and referred to the ‘occupied Golan Heights’), which would have allowed the international community to intervene against Israel, in order to stop the annexation. Eventually, on 5 February 1982, a Resolution was adopted by the UN, calling the action “an act of aggression”, which called on all member states to boycott Israel (Korman, 1996: 265).

As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the Golan Heights has still been relevant on the world stage, post the year 2000. Rumors of secret, American-brokered discussions between Israel and Syria in 2010, have been confirmed by the New York Times in 2012. According to the article, PM Netanyahu was willing to consider a full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights, to steer Syria away from the “radical axis of Iran-Syria-Hezbollah” whereby the next step would be a pursual of peace with Lebanon (New York Times, 12 October 2012). However, due to the outbreak of the Arab Spring in early 2011, no agreements were made. As of 2020, no signs of renewed bilateral talks were found.

4.2.2 The independent variable

In this section we will take a closer look at the strategic frames that were used by domestic opinion-leaders, influential actors and elites to describe the Annexation of the Golan Heights; and the extent in which they were aimed at- and resonated with- the three target-audiences.

In light of time, and resources, I will only consider specific public statements on the occupation, and annexation, starting from 1967, until 2010, which will end with the 2012 New York Times article on renewed talks between Israel and Syria. Based on the hypotheses (§2.2), we expect to find framing with regards to existing **predispositions**, **source-credibility**, or the source of intelligence; **competing frames** on the legality and necessity of the Annexation; **avoidance of neo-colonization frames** by the perceived military occupier -in this case Israel- and **active counter-framing** by the occupied territory **as neo-colonist** - in this case, primarily, the inhabitants of the Golan Heights, and the Republic of Syria.

a) The inhabitants of Israel

To understand the existing predispositions of the inhabitants of Israel, we will have to - much like with the inhabitants of India¹¹- take a closer look at what constitutes the national identity of the average Israeli. As Barnett (1999: 10-12) states, the Israeli shared identity is composed of four major factors:

1. Its Jewish identity;
2. Its own version of nationalism: Zionism;
3. Its collective experience-, history and shared understanding of the Holocaust;
4. To a lesser degree: its positioning as a liberal democracy in the Middle East

Barnett states, that ever since the emergence of Zionism, the Jewish and the secular Israeli population have always argued about the role of liberalism and

¹¹ See page 46-47 on shared identity

religion in shaping the national identity, and its politics. Barnett states that, particularly after the 1967 War, this debate was renewed, in part due to the capture of occupied territories, the decline of Labor Zionism and the collapse of the Cold War (1999: 12). Assuming these **predispositions**, it would be reasonable to explain domestic pressure to keep the Sinai, annex the Golan Heights, and a general 'us vs. them'-mentality with regards to Israel's foreign policy.

When it comes to the **source credibility**, of Israeli media between 1967-1981, I was not able to find surveys on public opinion of Israeli media. However, when we look at media trust, Tsfati & Cohen (2013: 2) state that there are *"three important types of attitudes toward media [that] have been identified by previous research; they relate to trust in media (...) perceptions as to whether media favor or are hostile toward specific topics or groups (...), and beliefs about how powerful media are and how they affect the self, other individuals, and society."* Data regarding Israeli public trust in media between 1960-1981 was not found. Research from 1985 suggests that people tend to view news outlets who, paint an unsympathetic picture of 'their side', as being less trustworthy, and more hostile towards their own views. This is known as Hostile Media Phenomenon (HMP) (Tsfati & Cohen, 2013:6). Also, recent surveys conducted among the Israeli population, paint a rather untrustworthy attitude towards the media; in 2019, 58% of the surveyed Israeli's described the media as being 'corrupt' (Jerusalem Post, 10 January 2019).

When taking into consideration the diverse demographics in Israel, each with, perhaps, differing opinions on the ideal national identity and 'news-worthy' priorities, it might explain a lack of shared trust in Israeli media. The Jerusalem Post-article mentions increasing partisanship as being a large factor in the decline in public trust, as many journalists are perceived by the population as having a partisan political agenda. Of course, the media was not the only source of information in Israel during the annexation, and especially during times of war, the government would be considered important in conveying an accurate representation of the matters at hand. Research shows, however, that *"the shocks of the 1967 and 1973 war left a strong imprint in Israeli society (...)"* (Galnoor & Blander, 2018: 817).

After the 1967 war, the old political system -which was seeing a shift away from Labor Zionism- was restored and reconstructed. However, after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, a deep-rooted mistrust of Israeli politics and politicians was aroused, with new discussions arising about the objectives of Zionism, how to meet them- and the dissolution of the broad political consensus which so far had served the political stability (idem). Based on the above, I would conclude that the source credibility might be dubious, depending on who you would ask, but that does not necessarily relate to the actual events of the Annexation of the Golan Heights.

When it comes to the domestic **competing frames** on the necessity of the annexation of the Golan Heights, it has been made clear that certain pressure-groups within Israel were eager for a territorial expansion, while the government was still open for using the occupied territory as diplomatic leverage, in possible negotiations with Syria - even if it knew from the end of the war, after the Khartoum Resolution, that Syria would never do so. In a larger sense, Barnett (1999:6) carefully explains the dominant- and essentially dilemmatic- frames in Israel, on its road to the Oslo Accords;

“For a vocal segment of ultranationalist and religious Israelis, Judea and Samaria are part of Israel and connected to its Jewish soul; these lands are no less a part of Israel than is Tel Aviv. For centrist, secular and leftist constituencies, Israel must rid itself of these territories if it is to maintain a Zionist and liberal identity; to absorb these territories would give Israel the painful choice of extinguishing either its liberal or its Zionist character depending on whether the Palestinian population was denied or granted full citizenship. Greater Israel versus Eretz Ysrael [Land of Israel].”

Besides the large, historic frames, there were also the more mass-appealing frames used by the Israeli government when it offered the Druze inhabitants of the Golan Heights to apply for Israeli citizenship – thereby emphasizing itself as a frontrunner of Rule of Law, and a guarantor of Western-inspired, social and economic rights in the Middle East.

Finally, traditional views of Israeli history have recently been challenged by the ‘New Historians’, a term coined by Israeli historian, and professor, Benny Morris, to describe himself and fellow-historians Avi Shlaim and Ilan Pappé (Wilson, 2007). This school of thought, emerging in the 80’s and which eventually gained traction in the 90’s (Bronner, 2003), significantly differs in view on the ‘official’ history, and focusses on Israel’s role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israeli assistant-professor Ben-Josef Hirsch (2007, pp. 241-258) argues that the ‘New Historians’ have changed the narrative of the Israeli population on the Palestinian refugee problem. As the official story held the Palestinians fleeing their home of their own free will (as was the story with the redux in the Druze population in the Golan Heights); the ‘New Historians’ refer to ‘Plan Dalet’¹² to argue that it was the Israeli government either expelling them, or chasing them out. For the sake of this thesis, and its word-limit, I will not delve much deeper into the ‘New Historians’, but I would argue that the shift in public opinion is a positive development, which might make future un-nuanced, one-sided framing by nationalist actors, less effective during the peace process.

When it comes to the **avoidance of neo-colonist framing**, and Israeli **counter-framing of** the Arab states as neo-colonizer, Israel has been an interesting case. Again, against the backdrop of time and resources in this thesis, an extensive investigation into the colonial tendencies of Israeli occupation is not possible. However, I would recommend reading Reuveny’s (2008) 55-page essay, in which he analyses the Arab-Israeli conflict on the backdrop of settler-colonialism. In essence, even though Israel has never admitted to being a colonizer (instead calling them ‘administered’ territories,) it has claimed holding on to these territories for resources, economics, safety- or heritage- which are classical colonial relationships.

I would argue that these traits alone, would classify certain external behavior as being colonizer-like, without further delving deeper into the history of Israeli-Palestinian relations. Reuveny (2008:359) expects that:

“(…) Israel will probably decide eventually to decolonize and leave the Territories, as essentially all colonials rules have left their colonies, evacuating most if not all of the settlements it has built there since 1967. The Palestinians will then establish their own independent state. Whether this outcome happens

¹² For more information, please see: David Tal (2004). *War in Palestine, 1948: strategy and diplomacy*. pp. 165-

sooner rather than later will depend primarily on the timing and intensity of the next Palestinian uprising should the colonial status quo continue and on the position of the United States.”

b) The Druze inhabitants of the Golan Heights

The Druze, historically, never had nationalistic ambitions and have been forced to adapt their loyalty to the countries in which they have found themselves living in (Global Post, 16 November 2017). The Druze **predispositions** on Israel are mixed, in the sense that; in Israeli and its occupied territories 125.000 Arab-Israeli Druze reside, who identify as Israeli, serve in the army, and even have their own Druze Zionism -while the minority of 23.000 Druze live in the Golan Heights, and identify as being Syrian. After the formal annexation in late 1981, the Druze in the Golan Heights have held National days of Protest against the Israeli occupation since 1982. The protestors claim the *“annexation decision is illegal and violates the international laws”*, and a result of ‘terroristic Zionism’. They view the Druze who left the Golan and moved to Israel *“mercenaries that sold their homeland for some dollars to achieve of the US-Zionist goals in our region”*. (Syrian Arab News Agency, 13 February 2020).

These conflicting views make it difficult to write about ‘the’ predispositions of the Israeli/Golan- Druze, but it would be reasonable to assume that the annexation has been accepted differently by Arab-Israeli Druze vis-à-vis the Druze in the Golan. A shared interest between them both might be the possibility of joining the other community in rights, and not physically, as there exists no physical border between (pre-1967) Israel and the Golan Heights, and both communities can travel to each other freely.

When it comes to **source credibility**, it was difficult to find literature on the media-relationship between the Druze in the Golan Heights. The Druze community is tight-knit, and elects elders as local authorities. This makes it difficult to document any of their speeches, frames or narratives. As the Golan Druze mainly speak Arabic, and identify as Syrian, they would likely follow Syrian news, and agree with those frames on the annexation- as they also match their existing predispositions. Years of Arab-connectivity would have primed the Golan Druze, and made the spreading, and acceptance of anti-Zionist messages easy, resulting in a strong support base anti-annexation.

This makes it difficult for Israeli **competing frames** to gain any acceptance. The opposing frames were that of ‘occupier/occupied’ and, based on the lack of shared understanding between the (non-Druze) Israeli and the Golan Druze, these frames can be considered a failure. Only a very small fraction of Golan Heights Druze has ever accepted Israeli neutralization, and the only slight increase was measured after the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, with some Druze opting to leave the Golan Heights and seek Israeli protection, in case ISIS would reach the Golan, in their quest of ‘destroying Zionism’. The **neo-colonizer frame** has been used by the Druze from the start, and after the formal annexation in 1981, there have been yearly protests specifically marking the anniversary of the Israeli Annexation (Reuters, 2019). The Golan Druze have never been (publicly) **accused** of being **neo-colonizers** themselves.

c) The International Community

The United Nations General Assembly, and Security Council, regularly adopt Resolutions in which they recall concern at the *“suffering of the Syrian citizens in the occupied Syrian Golan due to the systematic and continuous violation of their fundamental and human rights by Israel since the military occupation of 1967”* (UN/RES/37/33, 2018)¹³. Since the occupation in 1967, no sovereign state has accepted the annexation as being legitimate. That is, until Donald Trump’s unilateral declaration of recognition on 25 March 2019, which was generally seen as a political gift to his ally PM Benjamin Netanyahu, who was facing close elections two weeks prior to the announcement.

The latter even naming new settlements in the Golan Heights ‘Trump Heights’, after President Donald Trump (CNN, 2019). The U.S. recognition was met with universal criticism from many countries, with UN-SG Guterres firmly stating that *“the status of Golan has not changed”* (Reuters, 2019b). Israel’s claim of having won the Golan in *“a just self-defense war”* is adamantly opposed by the Syrian Republic, which refers to its sovereignty being breached in the wake of the 1967 War (Washington Post, 25 March 2019). As of 2020, the status of the Golan Heights is still disputed.

Summary

When it comes to the acceptance of the Annexation of the Golan Heights, there seems to be a majority of audiences (the inhabitants of the Golan Heights, and members of the international community) who do not accept the **predispositions** of the Israeli government, namely, that -based on the principle of defensive territorial expansion- the military occupation, and legal annexation of the Golan Heights is justified. The inhabitants of Israel seem to be divided on the necessity of holding onto the Golan Heights, based on their definition of national identity, and how they see the role that the Golan Heights, and other occupied territories, play in future prospects for a two-state solution. The ideological, historical, religious and cultural differences between secular Israeli’s and orthodox; Israeli Jews and Arabs, make it a divisive issue.

The Israeli government, while trying to maintain legitimacy and the national interest, has trouble navigating the best approach, but seems adamant in justifying the expansion on self-defense reasons, and the value it holds from a strategic point of view: the control over the Jordan water flow, the military outposts, and economic added value of an expanded market. The inhabitants of the Golan Heights have been protesting the occupation ever since the wake of the 1967 War, and while there is definitely pressure from Syrian-leaning Druze to not give in to Israeli efforts of nationalization, the Druze generally strongly oppose any Israeli presence in the area, and fully reject the frame of the government. As far as they are concerned, they are simply ‘Druze’ and -if they have to choose- more Syrian, than Israeli.

A visible protest has been held yearly since the formal annexation in 1981, and shows no promise of fading away. The international community also has not accepted the Israeli frame based on international treaties, and has called upon Israel to forfeit any claim it has on the Golan Heights and its territories. The difference in interpretation, has led to Israel claiming to be willing to negotiate a ‘peace for land’ -deal with Syria, but since the Khartoum Resolution in 1967, no

¹³ See: <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/golan-heights-israelsyria/>;
<http://golan-marsad.org/wp-content/uploads/Security-Council-Documents-67.pdf>;
<http://golan-marsad.org/wp-content/uploads/General-Assembly-Documents-67.pdf>

significant negotiations have been had since- until just before the start of the Arab Spring.

Further commitment by U.S. president Donald Trump to the idea of the Golan Heights belonging to Israel, has further reduced any chance of negotiations. This proclamation by the U.S. also touches on the matter of **source credibility**, with Israeli's being a bit suspicious of their news reporting, depending on what their perceived political agenda is; Druze likely following Syrian/Arab news, and therefore more primed towards anti-Zionist frames; and the International community being grounded in international Treaties and Resolutions. The **competing frames** have been identity-related within Israel, and of a defensive-nature outside Israel. The question of sovereignty and the upholding of international treaties has been used by the Syrian Republic, and echoed by the Arab world, who see it as an example of the same occupation and oppression the Palestinians go through. The Druze were faced with the frame of being 'a traitor' if you were to seek Israeli nationalization, by those who felt loyal to Syria.

The international community has used the frame of 'occupier' in its Resolutions, and continues to do so today, to no avail from the Israeli's. The **avoidance of neo-colonization** frames by Israel has been apparent, with government leaders publicly denying any colonist motives, as they describe their annexation as an 'administration' and rely on defensive-, economic- and Zionist rhetoric to justify their presence in the Golan Heights. Actively offering Druze in the Golan Heights nationalization, also serves to further legitimize the annexation, and portray itself as being a 'bastion' of democratic social and economic rights in the Middle East.

Even though, arguably, the typical symptoms of colonization are present,¹⁴ The inhabitants of the Golan Heights have, on multiple occasions, described the Israeli presence as being an occupation, and annexation. However, the literal term of '**(neo-)colonialist**' has not been found during my research, in online articles, or public speeches by the Golan Druze community leaders. Nevertheless, many Druze feel they do not have a say in their own fate, as they also do not have any significant political presence in Israeli politics; another characteristic of power relations in colonization.

¹⁴ See: settler-colonialism

5. Conclusion

By analyzing the used strategic frames in the Annexation of Goa, and the Golan Heights, this thesis has shown how they influenced the acceptance by three target-audiences. The main question is:

What frames have proven successful with specific target-audiences, regarding the Annexation of Goa- and the Golan Heights- in justifying successful military occupations; and how do we account for this success?

The sub-questions are:

1. What strategic frames can be used to influence (what) target-audiences of military occupations, as defined above?
2. Which strategic frames have been used during the Annexation of Goa, and the Golan Heights?
3. Which context-specific circumstances contributed to the acceptance (or refutation) of specific frames, by the aforementioned target-audiences?
4. What accounts for the success/failure of these used frames?

The first sub-question has been answered in the Theoretical chapter, please see §2.2 (p.20). I will continue with answering sub-questions 2-4.

5.1 Contextual circumstances & frame acceptance

First of all, when looking at both cases, we can see nationalism, and national identity as a shared factor, which has played an important part in the escalation of both the annexations; with the Goans struggling for their independence from a physically and culturally colonizing force; and the Druze in the Golan Heights identifying themselves as being Syrian, rather than Israeli; and as Arabs rather than Jews. Also, Israeli domestic nationalism- or Zionism- played an important role in the decision of the Israeli government to annex the Golan, as the peace negotiations with Egypt stirred domestic renewed interest for territorial integrity. In much sense did the shooting of fishing vessels by Portuguese troops stir domestic support for the annexation of Goa. We can see that perceived existential threats being faced by the occupying force, also are a shared factor in both cases. When looking at the theory, this relates the most to the use of **purposeful, thematic framing** (p. 16) in which elite actors are capable of injecting a frame that surrounds a certain theme, in this case nationalism, to center the debate around, and to use in their speeches. In both cases, we see many examples of decision-making being done by mostly governmental, and military elites.

Also, in both cases, the occupied inhabitants have **voiced their concerns**, in the form of protest. These protests forced the occupying force to respond publicly, and offered a 'battle of frames'. Often more than not, the protests sketched a grim image of life under occupation; a loss of freedom, lack of rights, active oppression, and cultural suffocation. These **evaluative frames**, contrasted the life under occupation with the possibility of life under liberation. It is safe to say that, for example, the Indian media was biased towards Goan 'Liberation' and served as a vessel for transmitting anti-colonialist information, much in the same sense as the Goan underground 'Radio Liberation' was before Operation Vijay. In this sense, internalized **counter frames** became part of the **predispositions** of

the Indian, Goan, and Golan Heights Druze inhabitants: Druze were being 'traitors' for accepting Israeli neutralization, and India could not let relics of the colonial-age 'linger on at its borders', or control its 'brethren' in Goa, Damman and Diu, which shared a same ethnicity, history and language with the Indians.

The influence of the Indian population on the Goan liberation, however, is much more clear than the influence of the Syrian population on the Golan Heights Druze, and their struggle for recognition. Bear in mind that the Syrian regime has been a life-long enemy of Israel- so reasonable assumptions could be made that the Syrian-identifying Druze would also be against Israeli expansion.

On the contrary, colonial forces argued that India would lose its 'pacifist' image if it were to use violence instead of continuously stalling diplomatic efforts to resolve their problem- or, as President Kennedy told ambassador Nehru: "*the bishop has been caught leaving the brothel*"; and the international community (to this day) remains adamant that the post-1967 borders are invalid, and the claim to the Golan Heights by Israel, is illegitimate. In the same sense that a 'zero-sum' mentality existed within Israel, as opposed to those that supported some sort of 'land for peace' initiative. The historical out-casting and scapegoating of the Jewish people, also led to the idea of Israel being a solitary state, continuously under existential threats from its Arab neighbors. This predisposition made any offer in which Israel were to lose a possibly military buffer, or geographical advantage, nearly impossible. Seeing how in both cases the cards were stacked against the occupying force, from an internal logic, they would have to use frames which would be mass-appealing, in order to claim internal validation for their actions.

The result show that general justifications, such as: **safeguarding existential security** and **national reunification** were the shared themes in both annexations. In Israel's case, the added increase in economic opportunity with the expansion of its domestic trade market to the Golan Heights, and the possibility of using the Golan Heights as an external validation of democratic values, by offering the Druze neutralization, also were used as post-annexation justifications.

The most successful Indian frame, based on the results, would be the frames of 'anti-colonialism' and 'self-defense' - in which India used Portuguese provocation as an opportunity to hyperbole the existential threat, and invade Goa. The earlier failed diplomatic efforts forced India's hand to resort to other means of conflict-resolution. After the fact, the United Nations were caught by surprise, as member states (mostly former colonies themselves) accepted India's frame on the base of shared-identity, and the momentum by which decolonization was occurring around the world. 1960 marked a special year for decolonization as the U.N. adopted resolution 1514, and declared *colonialism "a serious abuse of human rights"* while declaring that the right to self-determination is legally binding.

The failed Indian frame was a subtle one, in which they implied that of the resort to violence was a substitute for failed diplomatic efforts, no matter how long they take. While the emotional argument of 'standing up against unjust occupation' did resonate with member states, the international community prides itself in upkeeping Resolutions and sees resorting to violence as an *ultimum remedium*. However, much as Western (colonizing) member states were opposed to India's invasion of Goa, none aided the Portuguese in any meaningful way. Domestically

speaking, the Indian government enjoyed full legitimacy to invade Goa, and according to eye-witnesses, people were accepting the Indian army as liberators.

The most 'successful' Israeli frame, based on the results, would be the seemingly **productive frame** of territorial expansion for existential safety. Keep in mind that his frame did not resonate with the international audience, nor with the occupied Golan Druze.

As the theory has mentioned, Israeli politicians regularly make use of **aggregate frame-effects**, in which smaller outcomes are framed, adding up to already existing ones. In this case, it started with the post-1967 framing of Syria as being 'unwilling to negotiate' peace for land, and thus presenting itself as the reasonable party; the 'acceptance' of Resolution 242 on the basis of a different interpretation; the offering of Israeli citizenship to occupied Druze; and- in modern times- the slow deterioration of Palestinian peace talks by U.S. reaffirmation of the Golan Heights belonging to Israel, while the annexation of the West Bank continues, and the budget-cuts to UNRWA effectively make the refugee crisis further unsustainable. Slowly but surely, Israel is getting what it wants, and that is what makes it a productive frame, rather than successful. Domestically, the ideological divide on nationalism, made the best course of action with the occupied territories unclear; the government chose to 'balance the scale' by formally annexing the Golan Heights, after the Camp David Accords in 1978, in which they returned the occupied Sinai to Egypt. Confronted with accusations of giving away the Holy Land, the Israeli government decided to show its commitment to the growing number of orthodox Jews, who see the Land of Israel as being theirs. When it comes to failed frames, as defined in this thesis, however, nearly all of Israel's frames fall under this category. Finally, when it comes to both cases, it seems both India and Israel assessed the **direct costs** of their military occupations and annexation to be worthwhile, compared to the **indirect costs** of International backlash, reputational loss and sanctions.

In conclusion: what accounts for the success/failure of the used frames? It is important to note that in both India & Israel's cases of forceful occupations and annexations, the international community was adamantly opposed, no matter how 'just' the arguments seemed to be. It is very unlikely that the U.N would react any differently in 2020, seeing how non-aggression is a strong pillar of the U.N philosophy. So it seems that the most important audiences - at least back then- were the domestic ones, and those of the occupied territory. Much like today, the frame of the U.N. lacking means of enforcing its own Resolutions was still relevant back then. It seems that the loss of international reputation, did not have enough consequences for India & Israel to be intimidated.

For the most chance of successfully occupying and annexing territories between 1961-1981, an occupation based on the notion of national identity and safeguarding existential threats, seemed to be best, as the former proved effective in uniting domestic predispositions, and the latter was effective in dragging the international community in long, high-level diplomatic- and judicial disputes; effectively solidifying the status quo.

5.2 Methodological- & Theoretical reflection

Both case studies overlapped on the fact they were both successful military annexations, with the difference being the amount of acceptance of the used frames. Both cases had a substantial amount of literature available, however, in

India's case, it was not possible to research Hindi sources- which might have given more insight into the inner political workings behind the decision to annex Goa. It also proved to be difficult to find scientific articles on the way Golan Druze have experienced the Israeli occupation. When it comes to the transferability of this research, it is rather small, as case studies are generally not meant to conjure cause-/effect relationships, but are idiosyncratic. In the case of this research, however, there were similar variables that proved the success of certain frames in India & Israel. Future research might be useful in further exploring why these *specific* thematic variables resonated with the audiences, as they did between 1961-1981.

The theory on military occupations and strategic framing proved to be helpful in analyzing the cases. Certain 'occupational frames', such as 'the helping hand frame' or the 'reunification frame' were found in the annexation of Goa, and - to a lesser degree- during the annexation of the Golan Heights. Blame diversion tactics were also found on the high level political debate in the U.N. Perhaps the theory could emphasize more on the effect of framing in a more modern, *post-truth* digital age, whereby the availability of media increases the chance of misinformation; something less of an issue during the 60's. In combination with *identity politics*, as seen between the Indians and the Goans, or the Israeli Jews and Arab- perhaps specific frames could be identified which would resonate more with the target audiences.

When It comes to the existing frame theory in international relations, it proved useful in identifying the strategic frames. Perhaps, certain limits in applying frame theory might come from the researchers themselves; if a researcher is not able to find crucial sources, or does not recognize certain phrases to be part of a strategic frame; it might be difficult to correctly estimate the added value of the theory.

As a researcher, I do not fall under any of the target-audiences, and am therefore unaware of any -more obscure references or frames, which are being targeted at them. I am also limited by my own desk research abilities. Applying frame theory to political science is not straightforward, as the underlying principles originate in psychology and the political analysis relies on extrapolating individual responses to legitimate group action. When researchers are not nuanced enough in their assumptions, they are in danger of committing an ecological fallacy. When cultural- and national identity are added as intervening factors, it also decreases the generalizability of the results. However, as both cases are case studies; this limitation has been taken into consideration.

The postcolonial perspective proved valuable in focusing the search on certain frames in Goa, Damman and Diu and, to my surprise, these frames were also somewhat prevalent in Israeli discourse. The theory helps the researcher prime their attention, and focus their scope on the immaterial impact of culture, history, language and identity- on international relations.

However, perhaps a more decolonization-focused approach might be best suited for further research, as the post-1960 world is one where the political, economic and administrative realities differed greatly in their complexity, from the first waves of anti-colonial sentiments in the late 19th/ early 20th century. This requires

a theory which takes these different realities into consideration, and how that affects the impact of framing.

When it comes to further research, I would recommend a further broadening of postcolonial/ decolonization-theories with more consideration given to the interaction between modern day individual-, and societal identity issues. An interesting combination would be Postcolonial theory with Identity Politics, and in particular how often populism appeals to historical identity in former colonies.

Countries might be able to research what 'trigger words' - or issues - lead to what (relative) increase in diplomatic response from a specific country, and use this to increase their intercultural sensitivity during negotiations, increasing bilateral - and therefore human- understanding. Or, perhaps, use it to manipulate the international community, to justify their occupation.

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