

# The Ambiguous Public Security System of Sao Paulo

*Understanding the discrepancy of homicides decrease and police killings increase in Sao  
Paulo through the governance approach*



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Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the  
Requirements for the Degree of Master in Political Science (MSc)

Conflict, Power and Politics

Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands

Date: 17-08-2020

### **Abstract**

Security is one of the main concerns for Brazillians' citizens and government due to the high criminality that surrounds the country. The rapid urbanization process is part of the explanation for the criminality to growth. Sao Paulo is a great example of rapid urbanization causes and consequences. From the 1960s until the 1990s the city presented an extremely high homicide rate, yet, Sao Paulo managed to develop successful public security policies to decrease it. The outcome was an abrupt homicide drop in the 2000s. On the other hand, Sao Paulo has the second most violent police forces in the country, and differently than the homicide rate, the police killings rate only increases. The governance theory encounters answers for the discrepancy between the public security system measures in Sao Paulo. While for homicides there is a common goal that the government levels and private and public jointly work and invest, for police killings there are only ruptures in the system and uncoordination among the actors.

## Abbreviations

Infocrim:	The Criminal Information System
FIESP:	Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo
MP:	Ministério Público (Prosecutor Office)
PCC:	Primeiro Comando da Capital (First Command of the Capital)
OAS:	Organization of American States
SP:	Sao Paulo
SSP-SP:	Sao Paulo Public Security Secretary
TCE:	Tribunal de Contas do Estado (State Court of Auditors)
TCU:	Tribunal de Contas da União (Federal Court of Auditors)
TJ:	Tribunal de Justiça (Justice Tribunal)
UN:	United Nations
US:	United States
WWII:	World War II

## Table of Contents

### Contents

Abstract	2
Abbreviations	3
Table of Contents	4
1. Introduction	6
2. Theoretical Framework	11
Global Governance	14
Urban Governance	15
Brazilian Literature on Governance	18
Multi-Level	21
Societal Actors	24
Governance Modes	30
3. Research Approach	35
Hypotheses and operationalization	35
Case Design	39
Method of Inquiry, and Description of Sources	40

# THE AMBIGUOUS PUBLIC SECURITY SYSTEM OF SAO PAULO

5

Strengths and weaknesses of the research approach	44
4. Empirical chapter	46
Homicides, a Historical Overview	48
Governance patterns	51
Multi-level	51
Public-Private Cooperation	60
Governance Modes	66
Synergies and Dysfunctionalities	74
Police Killings, a Historical Overview	80
Governance Patterns	82
Multi-level	83
Public-Private Cooperation	85
Governance Modes	89
Synergies and Dysfunctionalities	91
5. Conclusion	95
Reference List	101

## 1. Introduction

The UN latest homicide report declared Latin America the world's most violent region. And urban violence is part of this chronic situation. The report concludes that the modernization, urbanization, and globalization of the region led to lethal urban conflicts. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, homicides in Latin America are considered an epidemic, and so it is to Brazil. Security is one of the main concerns for the Brazilian government and citizens, and it is not surprising, in 2017 the country reached its peak of violent deaths, with more than 60,000 homicides (SSP-SP, 2019). Moreover, Brazil is where the police kills the most, but also where it dies the most. The city of Sao Paulo is a representation of this urban violent scenario. The lack of public security and coordination in Sao Paulo results in a bloody battle, which costs many lives, lives of bandits, police officers, and civilians, where the periphery is the main battlefield.

Although Sao Paulo is recognized as one of the safest capitals of the country, with the lowest homicide rate since 2015, the city has the second most violent police forces(SSP-SP, 2019). While the homicide rate in Sao Paulo is relatively low, the number of police killings is astonishingly high. In 2019, the police force was responsible for 33,1% of the total homicide, hence police officers are in charge for 1 out of 3 violent deaths in the city (SSP-SP, 2019). According to the Public Security Secretary in SP, just in 2019, the police killed 867 people, and the situation in 2020 is less promising. Only in the first five months of the year, police officers killed more than 442 people, reaching their record for the period.

The city is known as one of the 'economical capitals' of the world. Therefore, SP's private actors are extremely important and powerful. The private sector is an essential part of public security aftermath. Private and public actors are jointly involved in security projects and sponsorships. However, Sao Paulo also accommodates an unusual private actor. The rapid urbanization process in Sao Paulo led to the rise of criminality in the city (Manso, 2012, p. 39). The Primeiro Comando da Capital, PCC, is the Brazilian biggest criminal organization, and, according to Manso (2012), it is part of the causes and consequences of criminality. Whether accepted or not, the faction is recognized by scholars such as Manso (2012), Feltran (2019), as a private actor in providing (in)security for the city.

Even though Sao Paulo is a negative example of effective public policies to reduce police killings, the city is an excellent case of successful policy measures to decrease homicides. The so-called 'Atlas of Violence 2018' shows that Sao Paulo was the Brazilian state with the lowest homicide rate and the biggest reduction in the rate per 100 thousand inhabitants in 10 years. The Infocrim, the Criminal Information System that maps violence in Sao Paulo, shows that the city follows this declining pattern. According to Infocrim, the homicide rate in the capital abruptly dropped, from 51.23 to 6.1 per 100,000 inhabitants between 2000 and 2017, respectively, hence, a reduction of 88 percent<sup>1</sup>.

Therefore, the research question of this thesis is:

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<sup>1</sup> Infocrim is part of the SSP-SP. The statistics are presented in the SSP-SP website

**How to understand the discrepancy between the decrease of homicides and the increase of police killings in Sao Paulo.**

The governance theory understands the updated complexity of contemporary societies, therefore it offers useful theoretical tools for this thesis. The governance approach reflects the need for (1) non-state actors to be included in decision-making (Dias & Matos, 2012). Horizontal layers of governance understood as (2) multi-level governance, (Finnemore, 2014). And (3) the interplay between different governance modes. Therefore, these dimensions serve as a heuristic lens to understand the contrast between successful homicide prevention and the fruitless measures that meet the high rate of police killings in SP. However, the governance approach is often used in the European context, thus, the theoretical framework of this thesis also acquires insights of different governance branches, from global (OCDE focus) governance to debates on urban governance. Moreover, the thesis also includes the Brazillian literature research that makes use of this approach, and for this thesis is mainly used as a counterpoint to the European governance.

In this thesis 'public security' is understood as a public good considering Samuelson's (1954) definition of a public good, which is a non-excluded, and non-rivalry commodity. In other words, no one should be excluded from accessing this good, and there should exist no rivalry for

it. Hence, no standard needs to be established, because the amount of public security should be provided equally everywhere to everyone.

For a long time, the provision of security had a Weberian idea that public goods were associated exclusively with the state and its monopoly of violence. More recent research shows that this Weberian archetype view is narrow. Although the operationalization of public security in Brazil is performed by police forces, which means that they are the responsible public body to apply the law and its policies with the possibility to use the force. Most public policies, politics, and programs in relation to public security do not require the use of force. Furthermore, according to the contemporary understanding of public security provision and expressed in the Brazillian constitution (1988, art. 144), security is not an exclusive role of the state, it is a shared responsibility between a broad range of actors across different government levels. Given that security as a public good is not exclusively provided by the state, the governance perspective seems to be a helpful approach to answer the research question.

Moreover, international organizations play an essential role in governance; it converges regulation of norms, and enforces compliance between actors. For instance, the understanding of the rule of law, or the application of democratic values and human rights into national policies. These elements attempt to comprehend how SP's public security is embedded in this global context, whether the international level is presented or not.

As Marco Petrelluzzi, a former secretary of the Sao Paulo's Public Security Secretary once said in an interview 2016 *"Public Security should be treated as science"*. Here I will treat it

as science, and give the importance needed to understand the public security system in Sao Paulo.

Finally, my contribution to the academic realm is to use the governance theory, which is mostly used in OECD countries, and apply its concepts into a global-south city. In addition, to accommodate some features of urban governance conjecture into the governance approach. Considering that urban governance deals with globalization, criminality, inequality and market expansion as correlations to governing (Ferreira & Moreira, 2000). While standard (global) governance might disregard these factors due to the focus in developed countries, not emerging ones. On the other hand, urban governance is often applied to least developed countries that lack a democratic system. Hence, my contribution to the urban governance approach, hopefully, is to merge some facets of governance into some urban governance lineaments.

The thesis is structured as follows. The next section, theoretical framework, will provide a compact literature review on governance theory. This section contains different governance branch approaches; global governance, urban governance, and Brazillian viewpoint of governance. Moreover, the theoretical chapter will present the three dimensions of governance, (a) multi-level, (b) societal actors, and (c) governance modes. The chapter three will explain the methodology and operationalization of the thesis, and will expose the hypotheses that this thesis aims to confirm or disconfirm. The fourth chapter will analyze the empirics of SP context using the three dimensions that governance theory entails. Furthermore, chapter four discusses the

hypotheses and attempts to confirm or disconfirm. The fifth chapter concludes the thesis with an overview analysis, final considerations and recommendations.

## **Chapter 2, Theoretical Framework**

### **Literature Selection**

The theoretical framework is the structure that can brace the theory to the research study. This thesis aims to analyze the discrepancy between the high number of police killings and the low homicide rate in Sao Paulo. The theoretical framework introduces and details the governance approach and its branches that will be used. The reasoning behind using the governance approach is that it affords a complete understanding of how the provision and operation of public policies work nowadays. Therefore, these theories present a fit in the current comprehension of governing values and aims, as well as give insights into who are the main actors in implementing and supplying public good. Firstly, I will define what a public good is, to understand who is entitled to receive and who is entitled to provide, based on governance perspectives. Secondly, I will briefly mention how European governance literature contributed to the governance approach and its new understanding of public good granting.

For the context of this thesis, it appears useful to understand public security as a public good. Economists, like Buchanan (1965); Samuelson (1954) and Cornes & Sanders (1996),

defined 'good' as a rivalry/non-rivalry and excludable/non-excludable asset. Hence, a public good is a non-rivalry and non-excludable good. Non-rivalry because an individual can consume the good without affecting the amount of good for the other, and non-excludable because no individual is excluded from acquiring this good. On the contrary, private goods are excludable and rivalrous in consumption. The consumption of a private good by a person enables the possibility of the same good consumption by another person. Thus, you cannot eat the same orange that I just ate.

Until the 1990s, it was widely assumed that public goods could not be delivered by private actors, because of the free-rider problem: If everyone stands to benefit from a public good, it is individually irrational to contribute to its provision. Therefore, for a long time, political philosophers, like Hobbes, and scientists argued that public goods should be delivered exclusively by the state. However, in the 1990s, political scientists started to challenge this traditional notion and believed that public goods and policies are embedded in more complex structures. Based on the corporatist literature of the 1970s, they argued that public goods should be supplied jointly with societal actors. As a result, this came as a shift in the concept of governing: From government to governance Scharpf (1997). According to Renate Mayntz (2001, p. 1), 'governance' are modes of coordination of actors to supply public goods. In other words, the engagement of state and non-state actors in supporting common interests to produce public policies.

The comprehension of 'governance' descends from the German notion of 'Steuerung,' steering. A terminology much used in the 70s and 80s when governance was simply considered as a synonym of governing. After WWII, the demands for public goods increased, jointly with democratic values, and the European welfare states. Yet, with globalization, and neoliberal politics, a lack of trust in the state provision of public goods occurred. Hence, many scholars started to believe that the public good provision should not necessarily be dependent on the state. Thus, it began the discussion of including other actors on this governing approach. The IR European academia was the pioneer in expressing this shift. Especially during the Europeanization process of the 90s, the governance literature explained this necessity to include other actors inside of the public administration to the national and international levels. Nevertheless, through the new European logic, 'governance' is the state and non-state actors (firms, interest groups, NGOs, IOs, and others) formulating public policies (Rhodes, 2007, p. 4).

The public good in vogue in this thesis is public security. Since the earliest writings available, security is perceived as a public good and should be provided as such (Baldwin, (1997); Engerer, (2011); Krahmman, (2003). According to European governance, new actors are inside of the governing logic. Posterior the European governance notion, other branches of the approach started to appear. Because the governance approach was very much European centralized, these new branches began to include new variables and take into account other cultures. The following subsections give a short overview of these branches which are important for this thesis; global governance, urban governance, and the Brazilian discourse on governance.

### 2.1.1 Global governance

The inner transformation of the concept of governance is the segregation between the product (governance) and the producer (government) (Rosenau 1969). Global governance addresses states (national and transnational), and also societal actors, which include individuals. The individual agency to the steering is distinctive. Especially regarding the Westphalian sovereignty notion, in which the actors of regulation, public policy financing, and implementation were states only. Therefore, global governance is mainly defined by the necessity to broaden the scope of collaboration among governmental and non-governmental actors, due to the complex and international society that globalization produced (Finnemore, 2014).

Global governance assumed a weakening pattern in the authority of the state vis a vis the market forces, considering political and economic matters (nationally and internationally). Consequently, the states continue to have a central role. Yet, a global diverse range of actors were required to participate in implementing and enforcing the rules and regulations to strengthen governance (Krahmann, 2003). Hence, international institutions have a new role in the current world, not only as monitoring organs, but also regulatory actors and authority bodies. They are the central actors to bring common interests among governments together, and to raise

universal ideals<sup>2</sup>. The UN is the most prominent example of a robust IOs. Since the 90s, the UN began to assimilate social development and equality into the public security perception, increasing human rights values, and the idea of the rule of law (Zurn, 2018). The rule of law stems precisely from the principle of governance, which embraces the fact that all entities are accountable for its laws and actions, strengthening the view of equality, security, and transparency, thus bringing the new actors, which the governance perspective expressed, into global norms and regulations.

This new paradigm presented by the UN (and other IOs like OAS<sup>3</sup>) was contrary to some historical vision in Latin America. The diffusion of the normative governance perspective led to substantial changes in the polity, politics and policy arrangements of Latin American states that traditionally strongly rely on state intervention<sup>4</sup>.

### 2.1.2 Urban governance

Urban governance is another branch of governance theory that consists of the basic premises of the governance itself, so the engagement of different actors in policies. Yet, this approach includes a key variable, urbanization. Then, urban governance recognizes the consequences of rapid urbanization on governance. Urbanization, therefore, may result in social

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<sup>2</sup> Especially considering European Union authority over European countries. *See more in Grande & Pauly, 2007.*

<sup>3</sup> Organization of American States. That also introduced the *American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man*, important human rights regulations.

<sup>4</sup> See more about polity, and policy in Treib, O., Bähr, H., & Falkner, G. (2007)

and economic inequality, poverty, power relations, labor market, and the (lack of) government capacity, (Marques, 2013, p. 30). The urban governance literature is often used to refer to the global-south countries. Additionally, the theory also discusses the relationship between urbanization and the developmental goals imposed by IOs and global north countries, to global-south countries. Hence, it understands that this rapid urbanization and its outcomes produce different empirical considerations to the actors when dealing with public security. For instance, unlike western countries, the urban area is extremely less homogenous. Therefore, actors need to conceive more diversity when producing public policies.

Consequently, urban governance mostly resides in the government level (federal, regional, and local) jointly with influential stakeholders to develop developmental goals and urbanization problem-solving policies, (Marques, 2013, p. 28). Those actors are responsible for deciding the rules and regulations that manage and finance urban areas. Thus, the cooperation between governments and private companies in the urban governance approach is crucial. Considering that privatization is often the strategy adopted to reach urbanization and developmental goals, private actors are compelling when deciding on urban security policies, (Nasser et. al., 2019, p. 206). Still, under the urban governance umbrella, the literature shows that to enhance social contact, urbanization creates public places. However, it also generates structural and social disorganization in global-south cities, distancing individuals belonging to different social groups, creating a social gap, which affects how actors are perceived, and

security is provided (Szabó & Risso, 2019, p. 52.) Börzel and Risse (2016) explain better this in the next subsection.

### **Limited statehood governance**

Börzel & Risse (2010, 2016) bring global and urban governance together, creating the idea of 'limited statehood areas,' which also contributes considerably to this thesis. The authors define these 'limited statehood areas' as regions of the country where the state does not have a monopoly of violence (Börzel & Risse 2016, p. 153). Thus, there is a huge lack of violence control. Or areas where there is limited capacity to enforce the law or binding rules. Besides, they conclude that, where there is an area that governance does not reach, it generates grounds for other actors to get involved in the provision of public goods, (Börzel & Risse 2016, p. 153).

Therefore, with the urbanization view that social disorder and rapid urbanization might affect the provision of public security in peripheral areas, the authors explain that this generates criminal actors' opportunism in draining this fertile soil. Thus, they provide security for the peripheric population in exchange for compliance, money, or silence. This is what Börzel and Risse call 'group-based trust in areas of limited statehood', when the state is absent in those areas, groups with the potential to provide what is lacking arise as actors<sup>5</sup>. Churches are also examples

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<sup>5</sup> Yet, these actors might not always be legal and willing to cooperate with other types of governance actors.

of group-based trust. They create a strong social bond, which generates an actor's power of demanding social policies, or accountabilities, (Börzel & Risse 2016, p. 153).

Following the trust group-based concept, according to the authors, the logic is to produce trust among the group, yet, prone to build this trust exclusively between this specific group. They are especially taking into account that these 'group-based trust' actors are likely to be illegal ones providing (in)security, which is the case of criminal actors. Therefore, this logic discourages cooperation with others, which discredits governance—considering that the very basic premise of governance is the cooperation between groups. Nevertheless, the perspective of limited statehood areas brings helpful elements to analyze the homicides discrepancy that this thesis concerns. For instance, the inclusion of different actors that many 'traditional' governance approaches disregard, like criminal actors. Or, the idea that governance might not reach all the areas of the city homogeneously. These matters will be further discussed in the empirical part.

#### 2.1.4 Brazilian research literature on governance

The Brazilian examination on governance entails pieces of elements from all the governance approaches described above and includes empirical foundations to it. To begin with, some historical conceptualization will be offered. With the re-democratization<sup>6</sup> by the early 90s,

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<sup>6</sup> Brazil was a democratic country from 1946 to 1964. In 1964 a military coup d'etat disrupted democracy for 20 years, until 1985. A new democratic constitution was proclaimed in 1988.

the Brazilian model of public provision came with the European model of governance (Bresser, 2008). This model consists of a more autonomous public administration, accountability premises, and social participation. Thus, governance is positively perceived as a democratic promoter of good values (Pires, 2016). Moreover, the incorporation of non-state actors in the public steering contributed to a fertile soil for private actors to engage in the provision of public goods. “More accountability from municipal governments concerning social policies and the demands of their citizens; the acknowledgment of social rights for all citizens; opening channels for broad civic participation by society”. (Santos & Souza 2017, p. 88)

On the other hand, there exists a position under the governance approach which explains the necessity of developing new institutions and inserting new actors into the provision of public goods, due to a state inefficiency, (Marques 2013). This was acknowledged by society and embraced in Brazil. Yet, throughout the years, scholars also refer to the possibility that governance may be dysfunctional or even produce “public bads”. In the country where most of the political (legal and illegal) financing comes from private companies, the public, and private coalition may lead to a large scale of public urban construction projects, and corruption and poor social policies are the possible "public bads" outcomes (Marques 2013).

Therefore, there is also a negative perception of the governance approach in the Brazillian literature. For this thesis, this specific Brazillian perception will serve as a counterpoint to the standard (european) view of the governance approach. A frequent Brazillian literature criticism is the transnationalization of security under the logic of governance.

According to Abrahamsen (2016), this transnationalization of security is simply the continuation of developmental practices matured by developed countries. In other words, the perpetuation of liberal and global-north power-dimension system, which disregards national context. Brazillian authors, such as Sassen (2006), warns about a contemporary paradox which is the association of security to development, and that governance tends to do. Hence, while in the European understanding of governance, based on liberal ideas, the inclusion of private actors are mainly positive, the Brazillian comprehension is rather less optimistic.

Concluding this section, there are some core governance elements and actors important for this thesis. This new (European) Governance model created a realm of governances. Global governance is one of its offsprings, in which some norms of public security were created by international (global) actors and implemented in national governments. Moreover, other branches of governance literature aimed to understand this new model of governance taking into account cultural, historical, and background differences. Therefore, governance literature explains that non-state actors now also provide, decide, and supply for public security. Brazilian scholars understand that the new governance logic provoked structural change on security provision politics and policies, and especially in accountability rules.

Finally, there are three basic concepts: 1) Governance takes place simultaneously at several levels, 2) Governance entails the cooperation of a broad range of state and non-state actors, 3) These governance actors use different modes to arrange their cooperation and

resources. This thesis brings these different kinds of governance literature together to compose a foundation for this work.

## **2.2 Multi-level governance.**

As it was mentioned before in this chapter, the disintegration of the traditional view of the state occurred and disassembled the unitary sovereignty model. As a result, the governance level became a central matter for governance scholars to understand<sup>7</sup>. The term "multi-level governance" was firstly designed to explain the different levels that European governments were then tied in with the European Union.

First of all, European academia presumed that the delegation of national competences had to be divided into higher and lower levels of the government, producing an infusion of national levels. Bache and Flinders (2004) found that the state maintained its power to control policy. European scholars argue that multi-level governance achieves its policy aims more effectively, (Bache & Flinders, 2004). Yet, they still conclude that multi-level decentralize the power of the state. Then, what the government produces is a room for negotiation rather than continuing with its solid hierarchization. The national-level delegations now have the power of bargaining and autonomy, (Peters & Pierre 2014, p. 27). However, it does not stop there, and the international level is also inside of the blend. This is especially the case when discussing the European Union,

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<sup>7</sup> See more in earlier section(2.1).

(Peters & Pierre 2014, p. 122). European governance scholars explain the European model is a result of state decentralization, the supranational and intergovernmental authorization power inside of the European Union are examples of it. They are nested into the government of several territories are examples of it<sup>8</sup>.

The global governance literature universalizes the vision that there is indeed a state decentralization. However, also a unification of countries by norms, regulations, and treaties<sup>9</sup>. Therefore, not only are European states embedded in the transnationalization of norms, but it is a general pattern since international organizations have the power to enforce values and regulations through treaties, such as the UN-charter. Hence, the importance to theorize about multi-level governance concerning how authoritative decision making is done (public policies), and state structure.

North American scholars have substantial research about this governance model. Multi-level governance is, therefore, not only adequate to theorize about European states but to define federalist states also. In fact, what Hooghe and Marks (2003) expose is that several authors, such as Inman & Rubinfeld (1992); Sbragia (1993); Scharpf (1988), when speculating about the multi-level of EU drawn concepts from federalist governments. Thus, American governance scholars initiated to refer multi-level governance to federalist models. Such scholars describe that the federalist model had created independent systems, via collaboration by power-sharing between the central government and the regional governments. Moreover, this

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<sup>8</sup> See more in Hooghe & Marks(2003).

<sup>9</sup> See more in section 2.1.1

multi-level governance also assumes multiple jurisdictions. Brazilian scholars endorse this definition to disclose the Brazilian federal mode, (Marques 2013). In sum, government levels(regional and local) inside of the state structure(national) embedded into international norms and values.

Consequently, there are multiple polity (institutional structure) and policies. In other words, the decision making permeates at different levels and in various jurisdictions. Finally, scholars concluded that if in the past, the image of the government to produce decision making could be pictured as a layer cake, the current multi-level governance can be imagined as a marble cake<sup>10</sup>. The decision making discussions are across all levels, being caused by the interactions of different actors and in the various government tiers. To put it differently, the decision making discussion takes place at different levels, and simultaneously, disregarding hierarchical levels that once were taken for granted.

On the other hand, despite recent findings of how fruitful and efficient multi-level governance can be, this matter is also filled with ambiguity. It is essential to consider that the same large room for negotiation that this horizontal model of policy-making produces also leaves room for contradicting policies. Since there are multiple levels of steering, all these levels provide policies; federal, regional, local, and in some cases, even international. Therefore, it is highly possible that while at the national level (for instance), the public security policy is X, at the local level, there is another public security policy, Y, that contradicts this X policy. Then,

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<sup>10</sup> This metaphor was first used by Joseph E. McLean in the 50s to explain the american federalism, and better developed by Morton Grodzins in the 60s.

possibly leading to a multiple-level state governance inefficiency. The point is: although this blend of perspective might be indeed positive, it also includes possible dysfunctionalities at different levels, (Bache & Flinders, 2004).

### **2.3 Societal actors' cooperation**

*“The more the Government works together with the private sector, the more we will gain in efficiency, add resources and strengthen Public Security in São Paulo”*

*Former Governor of SP, Alckmin, 2014*

The cooperation between state and non-state actors dates in history long before the conceptualization of governance. The labor movement and consequently, the trade unions of the post-industrial revolution in England in the 19th century, are examples of this. Their bargaining power towards the government resulted in significant public policy changes for the workers at the time. Another example dates as far back as 1850 when Emperor Dom Pedro II offered subsidies to railway companies in exchange for building parts of the Brazilian railway. This is probably one of the first Brazilian public-private partnerships. Although societal cooperation is not a contemporary activity, the partnership increased with the liberal approach (Peters & Pierre 2014, p. 347). This goes back to Rosenau (1969), with the conviction that societal actors had a role in domestic affairs and is followed by European IR scholars (such as Moravcsik, 1997) and

his bottom-up model that included individuals and other non-state actors in the political arena. Then finally, the conceptualization expanded significantly with the shift from government to governance conception of European governance (Peters & Pierre 2014).

European studies mostly defined governance as modes of social coordination by the engagement of different actors in policy making, (Bresser, 2008). In this case, it is important to distinguish these 'non-state actors'. There are many different types of societal (non-state) actors. Private organizations whose aim is to profit, similarly to any kind of private-private agreements. Thus, the cooperation of private companies with state actors to conclude a public service, will be done focusing on profit<sup>11</sup>. Moreover, there are public non-state organizations, which are allegedly committed to the public interest<sup>12</sup>. Then, public non-state organizations, for instance, NGOs, manage a specific topic that concerns the common good. Finally, there are corporate organizations, which are in between the two. It defends the interest of the group, which may or may not coincide with the public interest. In other words, they promote their common interest. Good examples of corporate organizations are trade unions and professional associations, (Bresser 2008). Consequently, the public non-state organizations, together with the corporate organizations, form what we call 'civil society organizations.'

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<sup>11</sup> Corporate organizations can reach their goal by either bargaining or arguing mode. Yet, NGOs should be solely by the arguing mode.

<sup>12</sup> Many 'supposedly' public non-state organizations are in fact private, so they effectively sponsor private interests. This can implicate serious problems and create big distortions. Without mentioning the lack of trust that generates in the population.

Nevertheless, why would societal actors be willing to engage in public affairs? From a governance perspective, societal actors accept that policy-making needs the inclusion of different actors, and they can also benefit from it. Public policy is, to western governance scholars such as Peters & Pierre (2014), and Rhodes from the European governance (2007), the result of bargaining among political institutions and societal actors, which can be done in many ways. For instance, providing input is already a form of public good contribution. Sharing expertise is a method that, direct or indirect, influences public policy. Knowledge and data sharing are highly valuable for public sectors and costs little for private actors. Such participation can be made by any societal actor mentioned above, from NGOs and universities (civil society) to private companies.

Besides, North American governance scholars began to investigate a new form of policy making governing by buying influence, (Peters & Pierre, 2014). American scholars in particular envisioned this because in the political campaign dimension, it was particularly interesting (in terms of money) for private actors. The private organizations finance large campaigns of political parties or candidates and therefore the parties or public officials benefit from the donation and by donating, private actors (in)directly buy influence towards the public sector (Strickland, (2018). All in all, societal actors want influence. Private actors ensure that their voices are being heard by monetary support, advisory, institutional relations and so forth.

The cooperation can happen on a larger scale as well. The public-private partnership, PPP, are agreements between private companies and the state to provide public services, for

example, building large infrastructure projects. The PPP is intensively addressed by the global governance approach, as a positive solution to state inefficiency, according to the OCDE recommendations of 2012. Yet, it is also discussed by the Brazilian governance academia. Consecutively, Brazilian scholars present the existence of two different types of PPPs, (Dias & Matos, 2012). In the administrative partnership, the payment to the private sector comes from the public safe. On the other hand, in a sponsored public-private partnership, part of the payment comes from government resources, while another part comes from the citizens who use the service. For instance, the government needs to build new prisons, then the state contracts private companies to build it.

Moreover, the PPPs are interesting for the state because the construction is less time consuming, and it is less state actuation demand. In turn, for private companies, the interest is basically profit and possible influence on public policies of their interests. This is a specific point of differentiation between Western governance and scholars and those from Brazil. Whereas the Western global governance scholars have a more positive standpoint about societal cooperation, Brazilian scholars emphasize the rather dubious role of private actors.

Although the Brazilian literature acknowledges that public-private interaction can be positive in several ways; increasing the plurality of voices, social participation in public affairs and enhancing the effective provision of public goods, the literature also recognises this may diminish its leverage to ensure the common good to produce public policies, because of the high consideration of private interests, (Nasser et. al., 2019, p. 209). Furthermore, it is notably

described as dubious because, according to Brazilian scholars, this partnership is likely to breed corruption (Nagamine, 2019). The private companies might mobilize their position of economic power to profit excessively. Consecutively, public officials might want to benefit themselves too, taking part in this profit to their pockets. Stretching the concept, this is also known as patrimonialism, when the government cannot distinguish what is private (individual) interest and what is public domain anymore. In other words, the government privately appropriates for its advantages.

Another important element that the Brazilian literature brings is the public-private collaboration in the police force. This was translated by Proença, Muniz, and Poncioni, (2013, p. 50), to *police governance*. The authors expressed how public security and police governance are comprehended under this governance approach. Therefore, logically, police governance has the same design as governance itself; cooperation between public and private to provide public policy. Yet, plurality is added to this shared responsibility. The news that police governance introduces is the art of politics in the exercise of government by the use of the police for specific purposes.

Therefore, agents or police groups have the power to bargain. They can use their resources for their own and private purposes, yet, private not as citizens, but as police individuals or groups. Thus, they can create their links with various instances of civil society; political parties, politicians, media, NGOs, and more, as long as it is for institutional goals. It is the idea of 'polity for the police', (Proença, Muniz, and Poncioni, 2013). The police force can even

bargain influence with private actors. For instance, if private company X is financing a public policy, and its implementation is in the interest of the police (as an institution) they can then exert pressure towards the legislative bodies.

To conclude, firstly, police governance is placed as one amongst several sources that subsidize decision making, establishing the structure and capabilities of the policy configuration. Secondly, police governance is invited to be a partner, albeit a subordinate partner, to make decisions about and implement security policies, (Poncioni, Proença & Muniz, 2013, p. 50). Thirdly, and mainly, it must openly inform about the exercise of the mandate. However, this literature also brings serious drawbacks. The police governance warns about the high chances of corruption, or clientelism, that can be the case if we analyze that the police now have the power of bargain, (Poncioni, Proença & Muniz, 2013, p. 53). Militias are typical negative examples of this corporation (Szabó & Risso, 2018, p. 96). Hence, this is entangled with what the Brazilian literature extensively urges; the danger of aiming intensively on institutions, and little for the common good. Therefore, it is questionable if, under police governance, the police agent becomes less of a state actor and more non-state actor, like corporate ones.

The blurriness aspect is, in fact, an intriguing manner of the governance approach. The line between societal actors and public actors can often be indistinguishable. Due to this active cooperation under the governance model, societal actors become important in financing, building, and implementing public policies and projects. For instance, there are some individuals among corporate organizations or even private companies, which are deeply embedded in the

public domain. As a result, they may become a public/political symbol, or who immensely and actively support a political party or leader, disregarding its original purpose, which is to ensure the common good. In return, these political parties or leaders may favor certain companies, corporate organizations, or consent with public policies that surplus private interests rather than the common good.

## **2.4 Governance Modes**

Since the traditional form of hierarchical command and control no longer holds for the current steering, European governance scholars identified new modes of social coordination as alternative explanations (Mayntz, 2001). Differently than the classical form, this version accommodates the new non-state actors now involved in the public policy provision. These modes were characterized as bargaining and arguing. Elster (1989) was the first to use these terms, and both of them are based on communication skills along with resources to negotiate. Nevertheless, bargaining is a form of compliance in which non-state actors, with or without the state, apply their power of bargain. Moreover, in the bargaining mode, the non-state parties engaged are openly defending their interests (Mayntz, 2006, p. 20). Thus, they reach negotiations by the involvement of side payment or some other material resource or legal ones. In the

bargaining mode, the non-state actors tend to be private companies. Besides, corporate actors are also typical examples of bargain agreements, and if they have private-private cooperation the outcome of these agreements often are benchmarking, or internal agreements.

In contrast, the arguing mode is mutual agreements in which all parties involved reach a consensus-based on internal consistency and impartiality. Therefore, arguing entails an in-depth understanding and appreciation of different actors' viewpoints, usually based on shared overarching norms (e.g., human rights). In the arguing negotiations, no material resource is implicated, only intangible resources, (Rosenau, 1969; Hérítier, 2002; Hérítier & Lehmkuhl, 2008). Hence, because it is a non-manipulative process, the non-state actors are usually public non-state organizations with government or corporate organization. This idea comes close to Habermas' ideal of deliberation, a dialogue in which power imbalances do not play much of a role, because all actors attempt to find a solution based on a shared notion of justice (Risse, 2000).

According to global governance (Mayntz, 2001), it is under this dimension of governance modes, that the shift from government to governance most discerns, due to the large room for negotiations that governance creates. In an ideal type of governance, the state and non-state actors need to collaborate to address common issues, and achieve the best outcome possible for everyone, managing their interest, as well as the common good.

However, what western governance scholars warn us is that some degree of consolidated statehood is required for non-state actors to engage in bargaining and arguing modes for public

policy provision. Thus, in a functional state, the government has enough resources and autonomy to perform the shadow of hierarchy (Scharpf, 1997). The shadow of the hierarchy is a concept used to explain that the state consciously gives incentives and political room for non-state actors to engage in policy-making<sup>13</sup>. In an ideal type, strong incentives create a strong shadow of hierarchy, which results in robust governance. In other words, because the whole objective of the governance model is to disaggregate the central authority and release this solely public burden from the public provision, the shadow of the hierarchy is the open door that the government unlocked.

Following this consolidated state image, what if there are limited statehood areas that not even consolidated state reach? As expressed earlier<sup>14</sup>, this concept was drawn by Borzel & Risse (2016), and it comes back to this section concerning the governance modes. Limited statehood areas are, according to the authors, a combination of high social heterogeneity and low encompassing formal institutions (Borzel & Risse, 2016, p 156). Hence, the shadow of the hierarchy may not fit because the state has neither autonomy nor authority in these areas. Accordingly, the authors explain that external statehood incentives might compensate for what limited statehood areas lack. When intervening into policies in the Global South, western countries often use international organizations or program-specific conditionalities as a substitute for the shadow of hierarchy.

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<sup>13</sup> Scharpf (1997) describes that the term shadow of hierarchy is utilized to portray administrative choices and official choices that steer majority rule legislative activity at the national and European levels. Moreover, it can involve legislative threat or inducements.

<sup>14</sup> see more in section 2.1.3

Finally, there is a discussion among governance scholars whether a "shadow of hierarchy" is necessary to ensure that bargaining and arguing contribute to the provision of public goods. In the Brazilian governance literature, scholars refer to the risk of corruption, with regards to bargaining, but also warn against the abuse of hierarchical steering, (Marques, 2003). Under the abuse of hierarchy, Brazilian governance scholars mainly refer to the police forces, (Nasser et. al., 2019). They argue the state itself may exacerbate the use of the shadow of hierarchy, ( p. 208).

Therefore, high autonomy may result in the misuse of the public good. The police, for instance, as an institution might prioritize their interests rather than the common good, due to its institutional bargaining power. However, because they have the legitimate use of force, this misuse might be by the exacerbation of the force, with a hierarchical power backing. These are alarming standpoints of the shadow of hierarchy and governance. Brazilian authors discuss the hierarchical steering with a particular focus on the legitimacy of hierarchical steering by the police.

To conclude this section, it is essential to understand that these new modes of governance might be a functional model, but it is no panacea. They may encounter ambivalences. Firstly, as stated before, with the societal actor<sup>15</sup> and also with multi-level,<sup>16</sup> the permeation of different actors under different modes taking their interests into account to produce public policy is likely

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<sup>15</sup> See section 2.2 of this thesis.

<sup>16</sup> See section 2.3 of this thesis.

to produce corruption or clientelism. Secondly, it is naive to believe that these modes are universally applicable. For instance, this model intrinsically disregards the diversity of dimensions under governance modes. Thirdly, concerning the external statehood compensation, it can be seen as a neo-imperialist act, or at least, a western neo-liberal imposition.

The governance perspective is a useful heuristic tool to comprehend the new governing system that is nowadays seen as a model to the international arena. However, a problem with the governance approach is that it fails to take diversity into account. Although governance attempts to describe universal patterns, it concerns global-north countries predominantly. That is the reason why the Brazilian literature, presented into this theoretical framework, usually brings a critical standpoint to governance literature. Another problem discussed in Brazillian literature and acknowledged by Mayntz (2001) is that governance scholars, in general, tend to disregard the impact of power imbalances.

This study aims, therefore, to contribute to governance literature by demonstrating if the governance logic that was based on the global-north with different settings can indeed be applicable to a global-south city. Therefore, the goal of this thesis is to attempt to understand public security under a governance logic concerning a global-south city.

## Chapter 3, Research Approach

*It is of the highest importance in the art of detection to be able to recognize out of a number of facts which are incidental and which vital. Otherwise, your energy and attention must be dissipated instead of being concentrated.*

*- Sherlock Holme*

### 3.1 Hypotheses and operationalization

This thesis aims to answer the following question: **How to understand the discrepancy between the decrease of homicide rates and the increase of police killings in SP?** The theoretical section of this thesis gave substantial information about the new form of governing, called *governance*. Nevertheless, all of the hypotheses were operationalized by including the three dimensions of governance; *multi-level*, *societal actors*, and *governance modes*. The theoretical framework gave the possibility to build the hypotheses that will serve as guidance to answer this thesis' research question.

Part of the operationalization of the hypotheses is the use of the term "effective," which can simply be translated as *successful cooperation*. Thus, the success of the effective collaboration is the dependent variable on the increase of public security, which is the outcome (Y). Because the hypotheses were built on the three dimensions of governance, each dimension

of governance will be tested to analyze if, with effective cooperation, it is more or less likely to increase or decrease public security in SP. These have been said, I will present the hypotheses.

The first approach analyzed is multi-level governance. Based on the governance approach, the multi-level relates to state decentralization, producing a fruitful public good policy-making through a horizontalization implementation. On the other hand, as also mentioned, this blend of levels perspective may be dysfunctional, leading to contradicting policies and leading to public bads. These aspects influenced the following hypotheses:

**H1a: Public security is more likely to be provided if policies are effectively coordinated across different governance levels in SP.**

**H1b: Public security is less likely to be provided if policies are not effectively coordinated across different governance levels in SP.**

The hypotheses will be confirmed if the results present effective coordination across the governance levels in which SP is embedded. Since this thesis concerns public security, to be confirmed, the results require good cooperation between levels culminating in better public security provision. In contrast, the absence of effective coordination decreases public security.

Moving to the next dimension of governance, this thesis expects to find ambiguous aspects in the involvement of societal actors in public security provision in Sao Paulo. The main aim of the governance approach is that the inclusion of different actors increases the public good provision. On the other hand, one of the interpretations of Brazilian scholars is that in a country where corruption is a huge concern, private actors' involvement can breed even more corruption. Then, because private interests are extensively, or primarily, taken into account, the empirical result may be that the common good for public policies is less of a concern. Finally, the thesis investigates the following hypotheses:

**H2a: Public security is more likely to be provided if public and private actors cooperate effectively in SP.**

**H2b: Public security is less likely to be provided if public and private actors do not cooperate effectively in SP.**

For the hypotheses to be confirmed, the empirical results need to show a strong causal-relation between the cooperation of public and private actors to the provision of public security. In other words, the findings must reflect positive public security that derives from an effective collaboration between public and private actors. Thus, if the empirical analysis can prove that the cooperation, in fact, strengthens public security in SP, while the absence of

cooperation weakness public security, the hypotheses can be confirmed. In contrast, to be disconfirmed, the empirical findings need to present that there is no causal relation between the collaboration of public and private actors to the provision of public security. Another possible disconfirmatory verdict might be if the empirics show that a public-private partnership results in an unstable security supply.

Finally, the last remark of the governance approach is the inclusion of different governance modes; bargaining and arguing, to increase cooperation in order to enhance policy-making, and the public good supply. However, it might also be the case that governance modes produce public bads, such as corruption, and clientelism, as explained earlier. Therefore, the negative public outcome of governance modes may be the failure of influencing and producing public security policies as a public good. To analyze whether or not this is the case, the following hypotheses were formulated:

**H3a: Public security is more likely to be provided if different governance modes are effectively coordinated.**

**H3b: Public security is less likely to be provided if different governance modes are not effectively coordinated.**

The hypotheses can be confirmed if the empirics present results of successful coordination of the governance modes and public security. Therefore, if the findings show that public security strengthened in SP in a determinant of effective bargaining and arguing modes, the hypotheses can be confirmed. If that is the case, private actors, when using their resources while bargaining and/or arguing, manage to produce or influence affirmative public security policies that increase public security. In contrast, to be disconfirmed, the empirics need to present that the governance modes fail to influence or produce effective public policies.

To conclude, it is important to mention that all the hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, this thesis attempts to learn more about the relative importance of the three pillars of governance and how they interact with each other.

### 3.2 Case design

The research design is a crucial component of a thesis. Depending on the methodology the research must be conducted under some specific recommendations and requirements. Moreover, it supports other researchers to comprehend the research better and possibly to reproduce some features or some methods. For this thesis, the most-similar case study was adopted. Therefore, there are two similar cases, *regular homicide* and *police killings* that both cases contain several related aspects. However, the main difference between them is the outcome.

The author Gerring (2007), who elaborated on the "case-studies methodology", argued that an exploratory most-similar case study is when there exists an abnormal outcome among two similar cases. In other words, there are enough similarities between the two cases to expect the result to be also similar. However, this is inaccurate. Thus, the researcher aims to explore this abnormal phenomenon. Moreover, the author also described a research guideline for such methodology. The first step for this specific most-similar case-study is to generate the hypotheses and then find empirical data. This data can be acquired through, for instance, document analysis, which was how this thesis operationalized. The explanations are possible in a later stage after finding evidence from hypothesis testing.

Having said that, this thesis concludes that this is the exact circumstance of the thesis' case study. On the one hand, the scenario of both  $Zs$ <sup>17</sup> (homicides and police killings) are the same; the city of Sao Paulo, with the same government, the same population, among many other similarities. On the other hand, the outcome (Y) is different. The anomaly, in this case, is what is intriguing to explore. While the numbers are decreasing for homicides, the police killings are increasing.

### 3.3. Method of inquiry, and description of sources

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<sup>17</sup> Vector of background factors that may affect X and/or Y.

Under the qualitative research realm, one of the most common ways of research conducting is through process tracing (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). This method unfolds a "black box" of the causal mechanism that the research entails. According to Beach and Pedersen (2013), there are three predominant process tracing; theory testing, theory building, and explaining the outcome. This thesis used the theory-building process tracing with the Y-centric theory building, because there is a known outcome but unknown causes, (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 16). Therefore, it firstly starts with this specific phenomenon determining the causes, and then moves to the investigation part, and tests. Moreover, in this type of methodology, the theory used, the governance approach, is also put into test. In other words, the theoretical causal mechanism is expected to present a systematic mechanism to support the unfolding of this black box of causal mechanism, (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 16). Hence, the governance theory was essential to seek possible reasons for the contrast killings rates in SP.

While evidence in the form of primary data can be extremely relevant, other types of evidence like pattern evidence, such as document data analysis, can be powerful for the testing part of the mechanism. This thesis used secondary sources. First, I will expose how the document analysis was conducted in the empirical chapter of this thesis.

A vast range of documents was analyzed, from journal articles to build some information basis, to books about public security in Brazil, and urban violence. To gather the number of homicide and police killings and their rates I have used, as the main source, the database that the Public Security Secretary of SP produces and makes available on the SSP-SP website. This is the

official public security database information about criminality in SP. This database began in 1999, but police killings only started to be described in the database from 2001 onwards.

Although some democratic features in Brazil are in check, the transparency about the numbers in public security, at least in the state of SP, is still truthful. Mainly because the state of SP jointly with SP municipality has advanced technological tools and a team to produce data, and since 1999 they understand the importance of it. It is also important to mention that these databases and methodologies are systematically checked by private actors, such as the "Sou da Paz" organization.

However, to be extra careful I decided to use other possibly less biased sources, like the 2019 Atlas of Violence database, and the Yearbook of Public Security. Both of them are analyzed by an acknowledged non-governmental-a-partidary institute, Public Security Brazilian Forum. The first one is partly financed by the Ministry of Economy research branch. However, both of the sources extract the data based on the Public Security Secretaries. The main difference is that the Yearbook of Public Security also gathers data from the Ministry of Health to evaluate if there are substantial differences between what the violent deaths secretaries present and what medical records contain. The conclusion was that there were no substantial differences, which means that what the public security secretaries database is trustworthy. On the SSP-SP website, the criminality database starts in 1999, thus for this thesis, it will be analyzed from this year onwards. For the above mentioned reasons, this thesis does not expect serious problems with reliability.

It is important to mention that the sources differentiate police killings from homicides, so it makes it possible to analyze police violence. There is another essential point to express; the database also accounts for the police killings who had killed people out of duty, but because they exacerbated their power of being policemen these murderers are correctly accounted as 'police killings'.

However, there is a possible dangerous bias on these numbers. Usually, the first institution to check if an exacerbation of police force was carried out is the police institution itself. Therefore, there is a likelihood that the police killing numbers are even higher. Although this is an alarming problem, this does not affect this research. In fact, because this research analyzes this rate contrast, if these numbers are higher, this thesis might be even more relevant. On the other hand, there may be, as in every research, some possible measurement bias. Yet, this thesis does not expect critical validity problems.

There is another factor to look at, SSP-SP excludes robbery, which is theft followed by death with intention. This is per-se not a negative element, however, some cases might be classified as robbery and which in fact should be as police killings, for instance. Finally, the last alarming aspect is the violent deaths with undetermined cause (VDUC). In the state of SP, the VDUC rate increased by 13.4% in the last year of 2019, and reached 5.8 people per 100 thousand inhabitants. Therefore, the homicides in SP should be analyzed with some caution.

### 3.4 Strengths and weaknesses of the research approach

In any kind of research, qualitative or quantitative, some problems arise. The authors, King, Keohane, and Verba (1994), expressed clearly that the investigation of causal inferences tends to be imperfect and the conclusions are often uncertain. Although this thesis aims to produce the most accurate and unbiased research, a qualitative approach is based on interpretations. Such interpretations can reflect the researcher's position, belief, and social construction. It is essential to make clear that being a Paulista (person from the state of Sao Paulo) and Brazilian researcher for this thesis has many positive factors, such as the background knowledge, being familiar with the ethnographic features of the city, the population, the structural political situation, and fluency in the language. Yet, I do not disregard the power of my perception of reflections. As this methodology is less controlled and more interpretative, I was aware of my potential bias and the thesis was conducted with full awareness of this problem in order to produce accurate results. Finally, the thesis was carried out in a qualitative way, without ever losing sight of the data and consequences of quantitative research that secondary sources allowed me to understand homicides in São Paulo.

One of the drawbacks of not using primary sources is that it is not possible to analyze some specific data, due to the lack of it. In my case, the type of 'informal' agreements that actors do with themselves was not captured with secondary data because these pieces of information are not easily accessible. Although I would like to have conducted some interviews and produced

primary data, the COVID-19 outbreak and geographical factors kept me from implementing it. However, it would be extremely valuable and interesting to conduct work on this topic but also with primary data.

Case study methods are more useful for identifying, analyzing, and characterizing a specific topic. Therefore, by itself, case-study is not ideal for making generalizable statements (Gerring, 2007). The empirics of this thesis acquires high internal validity, so conclusions are drawn based on empirical reality. As explained earlier, the high discrepancy between an increase of police killings but a decrease in homicides in SP is intriguing. However, the reasons for this contrast are yet unclear. There are many specific background conditions that this thesis encountered. For this reason, it might be difficult to generalize. This can be seen as both, positive and negative aspect.

Nevertheless, the governance approach is present in many countries, including some in Latin American. This region is considered the most violent continent in the world. Therefore, it might be possible to use this thesis as a template for other case studies, also because few studies about governance approach are conducted taking non-developed countries as case studies. Moreover, the USA might also be an interesting case study to analyze, due to its high rate of police killings.

## Chapter 4, Empirics

The violence in Brazil is a tangible and atrocious fact that Brazilians have to endure in their daily lives. Living in fear, or in the absence of security, is not normal. However, it is common in Brazil. Many precautions are within people's routines so they can feel safer and better prepared for potential criminality. Wistfully, homicides are also a recurrent fact in many families, whether part of the victim's family or the killer's. Or, even to be part of both.

Due to rapid urbanization, peripheral areas arose, and so did urban problems. The developed plan applied in SP resulted in the accession of criminality, but it does not stop there. Social, economic, and racial inequality increased as well. The inhabitants of these peripheral areas are the biggest homicide target, whether regular homicides or police killings, they are the ones most likely to be killed. The Brazilian Public Security Forum (FBSP) reveals that the highest incidence of injuries is among black men, from the periphery, aged 15 to 29 years, and who have not completed high school. According to the 2019 Violence Atlas, black people account for 75.5% of homicide victims in 2019, the highest proportion in the last decade. The Atlas presents that as in regular homicides, black people are the main target in police killings, 75% of the total homicide rate by police officers.

Although the numbers and facts presented above demonstrate a high number of homicidal incidents, Brazil is generally aiming at a change. This shift away from intense homicide towards

a decreasing homicide rate includes the improvement of public policies. According to the Public Security Forum, and the Atlas of Violence, in 2019, Brazil had the lowest homicide rate in the country's history. Nevertheless, almost 42.000 people violently died that year. This number is more significant than adding the total number of murders across Europe, the USA, and China altogether. The World Health Organization characterizes a rate above 10 homicides per 100 thousand inhabitants as epidemic violence. In 2019, the year that the pandemic Covid-19 broke out, and disturbed the whole world with an atrocious number of deaths, Brazil continues with its historical homicidal epidemic year after year, losing almost 30 people per 100 thousand inhabitants.

Fortunately for paulistas<sup>18</sup>, the reality is different. The state of Sao Paulo is the least dangerous in the country, and as safe as many developed capitals. The state dropped its homicide rate up to 74% in the last 20 years, (SSP-SP). The city of Sao Paulo follows this pattern, and in 2019 had its lowest murder rate in history, 5.9 per 100.000 inhabitants, against the national average rate of 29.9 per 100k, (SSP-SP). Therefore, Sao Paulo city is a successful case of decreasing homicides, not only at a national level but internationally. What is troubling, however, is that the police of SP is the second most violent in the country, which leads to a particularly precarious situation, since the Brazillian police is among the most violent and lethal police forces in the world, (According to the Washington Post [USA], and Public Security Institute [Brazil]).

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<sup>18</sup> People who are from the state of Sao Paulo

The numbers of 2019 present that in SP, while there is a decrease in the homicide rate, there is a significant increase in police killings. According to the 2019 Yearbook of Public Security, one in three murders in the city of São Paulo last year was committed by police officers, (Manso, 2012, p. 26). Nevertheless, the puzzle that remains to be solved is how SP manages to effectively decrease its homicide rate while, at the same time, increasing its police killings?

#### **4.1 Homicides, a historical overview**

Before understanding the homicide decrease, it is essential to provide a historical overview of the homicide pattern in the city. The decades of both the 1920s and 1960s marked turning points to SP. Both periods were robust industrialized ones, which led to a population boom outcome. The population in SP increased 6 times more from 1920 to 1960, (Manso, 2012, p. 26). However, even though an agglomeration of people occurred, the homicide rate remained low, around 5 per 100k inhabitants, as Manso (2012, p. 26) expressed. The rate increased after the second industrialized moment, in 1960, and 1970, when the city reached 10 homicides per 100 thousand inhabitants.

Scholars, such as Manso (2012), point out that the modifying homicide rate of the mid-60s is partly related to the military coup d'etat, when homicide appeared as a control

instrument to the urban chaos, especially in peripheries (p. 17). In other words, there was a moment in the urbanization period of São Paulo that homicides were understood not as a problem but as an instrument. Homicides allowed people to deal with the issues arising from the urbanization process as a rapid solution, mainly because the homicide was institutionalized. The state killed numerous people during the military authority government, as a tool to control power. Most of the killing happened within the borders of the city, turning the peripheries into a battlefield, and affecting many people's lives.

Moreover, what Manso (2012) explains is that in the 70s, the omission and the conniving public security actors led to homicidal choices of the population, generating a homicide cycle in the city. Individuals started to kill as a preemptive revenge action. In other words, people would kill to protect themselves and not to be executed first.

Therefore, killing became a banal act in peripheries. Manso (2012), named this as the multiplier social effect of homicides (p. 266) . However, this homicidal multiplier social effect slowly started to collapse after the re-democratization in the 90s, with the implementation of democratic values, such as the rule of law, human rights, accountability, transparency, the inclusion of other actors in the public good provision and implementation of public policies.

However, the 90s legislative reforms aimed once again at "fighting against the crime," with a generalized perception that violence had gone beyond limits, and this could only be solved with a "harsh fist." As a consequence, the reforms disregarded social inequalities and dismissed a coordinated strategy for social crime control (Azevedo 2003). The outcome of this perpetuation

was a tremendous imprisonment increase. And although the vast imprisonment was a result of effective public policies that led to competent police actions, the homicide rate in 1999 reached its peak, counting 65 homicides per 100 thousand inhabitants, most of them occurring in peripheries (SSP-SP, 2019).

Meanwhile, the boost of prisoners, brutal police pattern and prisons, which lacked human rights, resulted in the Carandiru Massacre, and that event shaped the public security system in SP. To elaborate, Carandiru was the largest prison in Latin America, located in a central area of Sao Paulo. The massacre happened in 1992 when police officers, in a military intervention, slaughtered a minimum of 111 inmates in one night. After the massacre, and thereby resulting in a negative national and international reputation of the act, decisive public and private decisions arose. However, the most recognized and influential Brazillian criminal group, PCC, borned with the motto to avenge the Carandiru Massacre and to change the prison system. Years later, the same criminal group is now considered to be an essential factor in the Brazillian public security, this will be further elaborated in the coming sub-sections. The beginning of the century brought some positive news, and the homicide rate began to decrease. Scholars, Such as Manso (2012); Szabó & Risso, (2018), determined several factors for this decrease.

- Crucial public policies and legislative reforms.
- Reconfiguration of the police.
- Inclusion of new public and private institutions.
- Inclusion of different actors in the public security provision of public policy.

- A significant investment in public security (by public and private actors).
- PCC.

These all above listed elements can all be translated into a reconfiguration of the Brazilian state. The reason is that the public security change process not only entails a variety of actors, but also a range of resource utilization by these actors, which both mark a potential decentralization of the country. These factors will be extensively explained in the next subsection.

#### **4.1.2 Governance patterns**

##### **Multi-Level Governance**

As this thesis explained in chapter 2, the governance approach aims to decentralize the power of the State; this is possible in many ways. By producing multi-level governance, introducing private actors into the public policies domain, and including other governance modes. Therefore, it is essential to first present the Brazilian multi-level governance before moving to other spheres of governance.

Brazil is a federal country, and as Hooghe & Marks, (2001) express, this model is per se a decentralization of the national power. Hence, Sao Paulo city is inserted into a federalist country, with a national government (national level). Moreover, the State of Sao Paulo holds power at the regional level. Finally, the municipality of SP is presented at the local level. Furthermore, the

city is also under transnational norms, like the UN charter of human rights, the rule of law, and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. All of those levels make essential contributions to the public security of the city.

Three powers constitute the public administration in Brazil at the three governmental levels; executive, legislative, and judiciary power. Regarding public security, in the **executive power**, regarding the national level, there is the Ministry of Justice and Public Security. Concerning the **regional level**, the Public Security Secretariat, and also the Penitentiary Administration Secretariat (SAP). When it comes to the **local level**, there is the Urban Security Secretariat who takes care of the public security regarding the urbanization causes and consequences, which works connected to the Urban Development Secretariat and the Human Rights Secretariat.

The executive power in the public security domain is the main administrative body responsible for taking into account the essential public policies that need to be institutionalized. An example of a multi-level governance cooperation was in 1992, when authorities of different levels of the country, shortly after the Carandiru massacre, decided to implement the Penitentiary Administrative Secretary, as a response to maintain the order inside of the prisons.

Concerning the **legislative power**, there are the auditor offices, which supervise and analyze the public accounts, respectively, to the authority level. Regarding **the national level**, the TCU. When it comes to the **regional level**, there is TCE, jointly, the Legislative assembly of the State of São Paulo, which elaborates and approves state laws for nearly 45 million paulistas.

Finally, at the **local level**, the local auditor office, TCM, and the Municipal Chamber, that discusses and implements public policies to the city. For the **judiciary power**, at the **national levels**, consists of the Federal Supreme Court, STF, which is the guardian of the Federal Constitution, and STJ, Supreme Court of Justice, which is the guardian of the federal laws. At the **regional level**, there is the TJSP, which is the Justice Court of SP.

Brazil also possesses the Public Prosecution Offices, which do not belong to any of the three powers but are entangled with them. The Public Prosecution Office is an independent body that contributes to good governance by controlling and inspecting the justice system. It is a national body that safeguards the democratic regime, the social interests, and, if necessary, individual rights. There is one at the **federal level**, the MP, and one at the regional level, MPSP.

In terms of public security, police bodies are the most important public actors. According to the Brazilian constitution of 1988 in the art. 144, the public bodies employ the preservation of public order and the safety of persons, properties, and public institutions. Furthermore, the same article expresses that public security is a duty of the State, but a shared responsibility. Therefore, regarding the main public actors under the public security realm, there is the federal police, who investigate criminal acts against the national political and social order. The civil police is the civic investigative body. Moreover, the Military Police is the patrolling force to ensure social order; the latter two operate at the local and regional level. Finally, at the municipal level, there is the municipal guard, guarding municipal institutions and residents.

### **The big step of the disarmament policy**

After presenting the different government levels that SP is embedded in, this thesis will discuss some successful cases of this blend of governance levels. Firstly it is the disarmament law public policy that influenced the decrease of homicides in Brazil. In the country where fire guns account for most of the homicidal incidents, the disarmament concept had a massive impact in Brazil. However, long before the 2003 Disarmament Statute, São Paulo adopted a policy restricting arms and withdrawing firearms from the streets. Between 1995 and 1997, the average firearm withdrawal from the streets was seven thousand per trimester, for the coming years, this number increased by an additional two thousand, reaching nine thousand per every three months (Manso, 2012, p. 8). The Civil Police had a strong influence in this scenario, since they restricted the entry of new weapons into circulation by drastically reducing the number of new weapons permitted.

To conclude, SP presented an excellent disarmament policy that inflicted the drop in the homicide rate over an extended period. The favorable outcome culminated in a federal level law, which marked a turning point to the decreased homicide level in the entire country. The disarmament policy is not only a successful case for the homicide decrease but also for multi-level governance, due to the positive collaboration between the federal and regional levels.

**Diadema, an effective multi-level cooperation**

To constitute how the multi-level can produce excellent results, the case of Diadema, a village of SP suburbs, is an adequate representation. However, before introducing Diadema, it is first vital to familiarize with a decisive historical moment for the village, the Favela Naval case. The Favela Naval is a slam in Diadema in which the population for many years, around the 90s, claimed to occur systematic force exacerbation by the Military police. Therefore, the community contacted SP media to expose the violent situation that they were in. Hidden cameras were installed by Globo,<sup>19</sup> which then released images of police officers beating to death and torturing civilians in the favela. After the Favela Naval case, the SP Governor, Mário Covas, sent a bill to the National Congress to demilitarize the PM, to attempt to revert the paradigm of police violence. Unfortunately, the demilitarization of the military police was never mentioned again.

The Favela Naval case led to the severe public realization, culminating in 2001 to the PIASP, a preventive violent national plan, articulated by secretariats, ministries and local authorities to combat violence in specific violent cities among SP. The aim was to establish agreements between the government and the national, state, and federal level, in which technicians from the federal government financed the projects, but the execution was local. This was also the case for Diadema and its "dry law."<sup>20</sup> The law prohibits the bars from selling

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<sup>19</sup> The biggest and most prestigious open channel in Brazil.

<sup>20</sup> Lei Seca

alcoholic beverages daily from 11 pm to 6 am, and it is among the measures that helped decrease the homicide rate in the city. Before the law, in 1999, Diadema had a rate of 113,4 violent deaths per 100 thousand inhabitants, (Oliveira, 2006, p. 22). In 2005, the rate dropped to 25,75 per 100 thousand inhabitants.

Diadema is, therefore, a successful case of how well-coordinated multi-level governance can decrease homicides and police killings. Nevertheless, Brazilian scholars, such as Manso(2012), point out that the "dry law" does not account for the entirely decreasing homicide rate. The disarmament statute is part of it as well. And later, the reconfiguration of the military police (influenced by NY) too. Besides, the population was closely included in public policies, jointly with local NGOs, presenting their input.

Concerning the regional level, the law n. 9.155 was a prominent law that got implemented in 1995 by the governor Mario Covas, (Manso, 2012, p. 248. The law consists of data collection, analyses, and transparency of criminal acts, including homicides. Based on a global governance understanding<sup>21</sup>, data helps to produce good governance. In the Brazillian context, it is possible to identify affirmative public policies to decrease homicides, and transparency. For instance, with Covas<sup>22</sup>, in 1999, FISP, the Public Security Incentive Fund, that was enforced, with the central aim of reducing homicides. The federal-level also arose efforts to

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<sup>21</sup> as expressed in chapter 2 of this thesis,

<sup>22</sup> And Marco Petrelluzzi the Secretary of Public Security during Mario Covas.

combat the high homicide level. The Disarmament Statute, as described earlier, was one of the essential ones.

### **International Embeddedness**

At the global level, the public security in SP growninly attempts to follow universal patterns of the rule of law and human rights institutionalized by international organizations. Brazil ratified the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights in 1992, recognizing the autonomous and transnational jurisdiction since 1998. There have been nine cases against Brazil, with eight convictions. It is an essential international judiciary body to safeguard human rights, yet still needs to interact closely with national, regional, and local levels of the country. Thus, many international organizations play an essential role for the city's safety in SP. in public security for the city.

The influence of the global level on SP municipality became more visible in 1997. When the homicide reduction in New York between 1992 and 1997 influenced the police of São Paulo. For the first time, the government assumed that the homicides paradigm needed to aim at short term decrease measures, in addition to the inclusion of the police under this logic. Until then, for the Military and Civil Police of São Paulo, the belief was that the police had nothing to do with reducing homicide public policy. Therefore, the NY-SP exchange of information was revolutionary to explain and to reverse this perception. NY-SP interaction is acknowledged by Brazilian scholars, such as Manso (2012, p. 50), to have had an extremely positive relationship with the homicide decrease that happened in the city at the beginning of the century. The

information connection that SP-NY had was informal, and based on elementary communication, exchange of data and results by the NY police to the SP government. Nevertheless, this interaction opened up other discussions such as mention shortly, for new public security policy implementations that helped this multi-level governance to flourish.

Among these new security policies, stood the formulation of the Department of Homicide and Protection of the Person (DHPP), created in 1996 to investigate unknown homicides and robberies authorship. This department is part of the civil police body, yet, it also works closely with the military police. The coordination of levels is essential according to the governance approach, and this collaboration was a new required feature for the SP police arrangement. The Homicide Combat Plan put into place in the department in 2001, with a mutual interaction of the police bodies. The resources used to identify homiciders, jointly with the investments in intelligence and information technology, resulted in an increase of 770 percent in the number of homicides arrests between 2000 and 2004, (Manso, 2012, p. 248).

Concluding, the city of SP is hugely interconnected with global institutions enforcing local projects jointly with local actors. For instance, the annual UNDP report explores the public security aims for the city, collectively with the state of SP, the municipality of SP, and private actors, such as Sou da Paz NGO. They collectively develop projects to decrease criminality in the city, many with positive international reputation based on the homicide decrease outcomes<sup>23</sup>. Another example of the international embeddedness of public security in SP is the legislative

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<sup>23</sup> The United Nations office on Crime and Drug acknowledged Sou da Paz projects in SP.

assembly partnership with UNICEF that defines strategies to reduce the homicide rate among adolescents, the highest people target in São Paulo. Furthermore, the human rights watch (HRW) is another essential international institution for public security in the city, especially when it comes to police killings. The HRW produces checks and balances the violation of the use of force, for instance. Moreover, they have cooperations with other NGOs, like the Igarapé Institute and Public Security Forum, to patrol and account for transparency. The image illustrates all the levels that the city of SP is embedded.




Image I: SP levels of governance and influence

### **Public-Private Cooperation**

After analyzing the multi-level governance sphere, it is adequate to move to the second sphere of the governance approach, **the societal actors**. Here, one of the essentialities of the governance model is the inclusion of private actors in the provision of the public good and implementation of public policies. Thus, this thesis pays prior attention to the analysis of the

public-private collaboration, in order to analyze whether the societal actors influence or not the public security provision in the city.

The societal actors in public security in SP have important roles and are acknowledged for the positive contributions of public security in the city. After the re-democratization when the governance approach was introduced to the Brazilian context, private actors as well the government jointly developed crucial public policies. Therefore, these actors are partially responsible for the good public policies concerning homicides that were developed, which led to a significant decrease in the decrease in homicidal incidents.

### **Societal collaborations**

The first eloquent public-private action was the radio patrolling in 1983, with TELESP, a public-private company at that time, that helped to consolidate a new number of military police, 190, free of charge. Among the same action, the people involved with this policy realized the importance of the use of cars to the efficacy of the police. The utilization of vehicles by the police forces forced the different police bodies, like the military and civil, to work together with the same line of radio patrolling and very often inside of the same car, increasing the communication among them. Radio patrolling action is a clear example of functional governance.

Another significant private contribution to homicide decrease was the vast expansion of investment in PS. According to the SSP-SP (2016) database, from 1997 to 2008, the public security investment increased by 170 percent. Most of the investment came from societal actors, and this number constantly rose in the past 10 years. An eloquent example of public-private collaboration to public security with private investment is the "reports" (disque denúncias), which is a telephone service created in 2000 to collect anonymous reports of crimes and operates 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The service is managed by the São Paulo Against Violence Institute (ISPCV), a civil society organization of public interest in partnership with the Public Security Secretariat (SSP), the state of SP, and the city of SP. The Disque denúncias helped to arrest murderers and to solve many criminal acts, and it is considered to be one of the most important public security policies for the city.

The acknowledgment of research and data was another turning point to public security in SP. In 1998, private actors started providing, elaborating, and helping with data and technology development. In fact, many corporate organizations, like CNI and FIESP, as well as private organizations, such as Ford, or Globo, implemented public security segments in their companies in order to assist public security in the city. Furthermore, there are specialized NGOs and think tanks in public security, such as, "Sou da Paz", "Public Security Forum", "Igarapé Institute". Universities also significantly contribute. Private universities such as FGV, based in SP, or public ones, such as USP and UNESP, all developed a segment to discuss, analyze, assist, and finance public security. Therefore, they all greatly shape public policies.

The pioneering spirit of the Ministry of Justice, through its normative bodies, Senasp and Sesp, together with the Police bodies and the National Public Security Council, represents a favorable advance in the process of promoting programs and policies for the integration and improvement of the current management model of public security in Brazil, and in SP. In fact, many of those projects are financed by private actors, or shared project cooperations with civil transnational society actors, like Igarapé Institute. Another institution is the reference civil police department in SP, the DHPP, that follows a shared data and technology movement with global references, and private implementations.

### **The other side of the coin**

On the other hand, while the police bodies working closely implies more efficiency, the result was an imprisonment boom. In the past 25 years, the number of people arrested has increased tremendously, according to the Administrative Penitentiary Secretary, a growth of 328.5 percent. Neither the government (judiciary and legislative powers) nor the prisons, and even less, the prisoners were ready for a strong increase in detainees. Mass incarceration became the problem in public security in SP, and one of the outcomes was already mentioned above, the Carandiru's Massacre, (Varella, 1999).

For a better understanding, the Carandiru Massacre generated also the First Command of the Capital, PCC, which was created by eight inmates in 1993 inside of the Venceslau penitentiary in Brazil, with the lemma of "Paz, Justiça e Liberdade contra opressão", meaning:

Peace, justice, and liberty against oppression. With this as their motto and intending to avenge Carandiru's massacre in 1992, PCC became the most significant criminal organization of the city, expanded to the state, and nowadays of the country. Controlling an enormous part of the drug traffic, the organization started operating inside of Sao Paulo's prisons but nowadays they are extremely powerful in ruling the slams in Brazil, especially in SP. However, it does not stop there; PCC are inside and out of prisons in neighboring countries, such as Bolivia, Colombia, and Paraguay, naming themselves now as Narco-Sul<sup>24</sup>.

Although PCC is a criminal gang, the faction represents contradictory consequences. Many relevant studies are demonstrating that PCC is probably the central contribution fact to the decrease in the homicide rate in SP, (Manso, 2012; Feltran 2012, 2020). The PCC managed to do what the government did not, control society. "Nobody kills without PCC's authorization" is a common phrase in SP peripheries, (Manso, 2012, p. 265). Moreover, they have a decentralized power, with many "coordinations" as they were named, working in a multi-level marble cake, (Manso & Dias, 2018, p. 114). What Manso (2012) concludes is that PCC managed to decrease the homicide rate in an obviously illegal manner, with threatening premises, but the fact is that they are pointed out to be the main element for homicide decreases.

Finally, PCC is an actor that rises in limited statehood areas. The organization is what Börzel and Risse (2016, p. 153) named "group-based trust in areas of limited statehood". They are, to the peripheric population, somewhat a security provider. Many people from peripheral

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<sup>24</sup> See more in A Guerra: a ascensão do PCC e o mundo do crime no Brasil.

areas of SP explicitly say that they feel safer with PCC gangsters than with the police. Hence, as the authors show, group-based trust increases the instability relation of the state towards the population.

Nevertheless, in reality, PCC also regulates the security in those areas of limited statehood, acting as a sort of private security. Although for the government PCC is somewhat a building that they often attempt to dismantle, it seems only to strengthen the bricks. PCC organizes a part of society that is forgotten by the authorities, therefore, in the end, the government is the one who mainly celebrates some PCC contributions to the homicide decrease. Then, directly or not, PCC influences public security policies, and it is one of the results of the shadow of hierarchy, a concept that will be further discussed in the next section.

Another group-based trust that Börzel and Risse (2016) acknowledge are the churches. Sao Paulo also possesses clear evidence of such a group-based trust. The city was considered the epicenter of the second neo-pentecostal wave in the world in the 60s, (von Sinner, 2012). This type of church gained prominence, especially in the lower classes, and peripheries. Furthermore, as presented earlier, the periphery suffered from family losses, and one of the scapegoats of prisoners is to be a member of a church. Feltran (2020) explains that churches appeared as a solution to bandidos to serve God as a life purpose, (p. 243). And to the bandidos' family, a reason to pray for the criminals' soul.

Moreover, this specific branch is often followed by police officers, who perceive some practices as a divine justification, based on religious discourses, or redemption. The result is that

the neo-pentecostal churches in Brazil are so influential that there are powerful "evangelicos" inside of every level of power in Brazil deciding public security policies; Legislative, judiciary, and executive. However, the churches also have close relations with local peripheric NGOs, and they are essentially safeguarding human rights, concerning homicides or police killings.

To conclude, many different actors provide or influence the public security in SP. Typical public ones are politicians, police forces, or prosecutors. Besides, private actors of all kinds, from standard ones, corporate organizations, private companies, and NGOs, to criminal actors, and churches. The curious fact is, however, that in the case of homicides, there are more private actors included in this aftermath than in the case of police killings. The following sub-section will analyze the case of police killings in the same operational form, in order to carve out differences and similarities.

### **Governance modes**

In São Paulo, the interactions are based on a particular mix of governance, therefore, this third sphere of governance, **the governance mode**, aims to understand how and where public and private actors interact, and under which modes. As indicated in the theoretical chapter, the new modes of governance are bargaining, and arguing. In the bargaining, the non-state parties collaborate but defend their interests, therefore, the negotiations involve side payment or some other material resource. Differently than in the arguing mode, which actors are jointly working for a common cause with impartiality. Thus, where do public and private actors argue? Where do

they bargain? And what is the role of the “shadow or hierarchy” in the paulistano<sup>25</sup> environment of homicides?

There are many types of partnerships in the Brazilian public-private collaboration as Dias & Matos (2012, p. 128) explain, some happen in the bargaining mode, some in the arguing one. The most popular, under the bargaining realm, is the PPPs, public-private partnership. According to the authors, this model is highly used in development countries. However, in Brazil, the PPPs are still in an early phase, (Dias & Matos 2012, p. 128). The PPPs are in between private companies and public actors, therefore, private companies aim to profit by providing goods or services. The government in order to have a qualified, efficient and innovative service, or because it lacks the budget to finance the public project, hire private companies. In Brazil, to be considered a PPP, or to realize a PPP, the partnership budget needs to be above R\$20 million.

Concerning PPPs in the public security domain in SP, as Lisot (2011) concludes, it is still in an embrionary stage, ( Lisot, 2011, p. 39). Yet, last year Doria started a new project. The imprisonment boost that was explained above, resulted in more prisoners than the prisons' capacity. As Varella stressed in an interview to an open channel, "if Brazil continues to imprison that many people, we should all give up on our jobs and start building prisons". Doria, started this year a PPP negotiation for prison building and maintenance. Therefore, the companies are part of the public policy process through bargaining. The side payment can be by public investment or payment on the privatized service. However, as Dias and Matos (2012) explain,

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<sup>25</sup> Paulistano: from the city of Sao Paulo

PPPs need legislative authorization of the respected government level. The PPP concept in Brazil is more restricted than in the international arena. It is more a finance concept than actually an administrative idea, (Lisot, 2011, p. 6).

The consortium is another type of bargaining model, it is similar to PPPs but on a lower scale. Any private actor can engage with public institutions in order to sell their goods and services to provide a common good, it is a mutual collaboration between parties. Covenant is a similar model, the difference is that in the covenant process the actors involved need to be from the same specific sector, differently than in consortium. The consortiums and covenants need no legislative authorization, therefore, they are fiscalized and embedded into the multi-levels corporations.

On the arguing level there are management contracts, from a public administrative approach, it is a social hybrid organization created by the public power in partnership with civil society to transform, reform or create a public service, ( Dias & Matos, 2012, p. 128). It can be, for instance, building prisons, police stations and training the police officers. In this case, there is no profit involved. Finally, after expressing possible formal models of bargaining and arguing types, the thesis will now analyze how these modes are in fact used in the public security arena in SP.

### **The arguing and the bargaining mode in SP**

There is an fundamental point that was discussed in the earlier sub-section<sup>26</sup> that is crucial for the bargaining and arguing (co)existence, the importance of the private sector. Sao Paulo is known as the financial capital of the country. Therefore, the private sector is decisive in the public aftermath, this holds regarding public security. Because violence and homicides are pointed as one of the main goals to combat, the entire society and different sectors come into action. It is very common to identify "public security" subdivisions in corporate companies. For instance, the Public Security Secretary of FIESP (Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo). Hence, there are many covenant bargaining processes that are agreed between these public security subdivisions and public actors. Such as the professional training courses in prisons that FIESP and the Ministry of Justice develop for prisoners' resocialization jobs. Moreover, According to Szabó, 2018, p. 40), discussions about the fruitless homicidal choices are often taken place among private actors within civil society.

Even more common is to observe the amount of NGOs, and think tanks that were created in SP just to master the subject of public security in SP. Or mass investments done by private companies, such as Ipiranga, AMBEV, to public institutions. However, how and where exactly do private and public actors cooperate?

First of all, it is essential to state that the bargaining and the arguing mode in reality is less obvious to demarcate than in theory, and it is not uncommon for them to correlate. For instance, the public-corporate collaboration is often blurry and difficult to characterize, but

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<sup>26</sup> See more in the "private-public cooperation" section of this thesis.

mainly they come in forms of bargaining mode, and are proceeded in formal forums<sup>27</sup>, or public arenas. Their agreements usually involve side payments, which is the main character for a bargain, therefore, the corporation to invest or donate to a public institution, then the corporate organization investment expects political influence in return. The same case holds for private companies when investing in public security sectors. The favor in return might be favoring some company over the other when implementing a PPP<sup>28</sup>, or political influence when implementing a public policy. However, the bargaining mode, through the logic of decreasing homicides in the city, appears to happen mainly jointly with a public actor. The public security domain in Brazil is still a very hierarchical sector. Differently than in the health realm for instance, the government and the municipality in SP are in most of the bargaining agreements, which means that the shadow of hierarchy in Brazil, regarding public security, does not hold.

On the other hand, while the arguing mode is less of a use for private or corporate organizations, this mode is the most influential one for public non-state organization. In the arguing mode the agreements are made based on mutual goal<sup>29</sup>, therefore, all the parties involved are committed to find a solution for a "greater good", and they also happen in formal forums, and some informal meetings inside of the private institutions. Hence, NGOs, think tanks, universities among others, are the leaders of the arguing mode in the city. And they produce a significant difference for public security in SP, this is especially due to their ability to produce and analyze

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<sup>27</sup> Mostly coordinated by public institutions.

<sup>28</sup> See more in the "public-private cooperation" subheading sector.

<sup>29</sup> See more in "chapter two" of this thesis.

data, and public security reports. This skill is one of the key points for the homicide decrease in the city, because through data and analysis precise goals and measuring achievements are developed.

Public non-state organizations can, however, engage in bargaining processes, for instance, the government may ask for a think tank to produce a public security data analysis. This is the case of "Atlas of Violence" made by the Public Security Forum with a public partnership. But, differently than in the bargaining mode, it is more likely to identify only private actors engaging with each other in arguing mode. This is due to the state inefficacy to deal with public security provision, especially in the outskirts of SP. The thesis will discuss intensively this point when examining governance modes under police killings.

### **Shadow of hierarchy and the governance modes in the limited statehood areas**

The shadow of hierarchy is seen as a positive factor under the European governance logic<sup>30</sup>. This is because the government gives incentives and induces private actors to engage with each other to bargain and argue in order to release the burden of solely providing for public good, (Scharpf, 1997). Yet, in security the result is that the government cannot reach, or even dismiss some peripheral areas, as Feltran (2019) acknowledges. Those areas, as Börzel and Risse (2016) named it, are "limited statehood areas", (p. 149). According to the authors, for governance to work the state does need to perform a shadow of hierarchy, yet, this is a concern for limited

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<sup>30</sup> See more in "chapter two" of this thesis.

statehood areas. Hence, in their article the solution is, fundamentally, external statehood actors to shade this shadow so governance can properly work, (Börzel & Risse 2016, p. 150). They present, however, another possibility, the "group-based trust". The gap that the state leaves, in these limited statehood areas, creates room for this kind group to use trust as the bonding factor to fill the absence of the state, like criminal actors often do, (Börzel & Risse 2016, p. 151).

*"group-based trust has the potential for providing the social basis of scaling up governance in the absence of functioning state institutions."*

Börzel & Risse 2016, p. 150

This thesis expresses that the criminal organization, PCC, is the conceptualization of a "group-based trust" that the authors characterize. PCC uses the absence of the state in the limited statehood areas to build an authority body so it can control the area to manage their illegal activities. The criminal organization works under different modes in the peripheral areas. First of all, the criminals establish power by the use of force, very similarly to a hierarchical mode. Having established the power domain, they offer the population safety and order, based on fear and threats, to create a safer environment. In exchange they ask for silence. Thus, although the population knows that they commercialize illicit drugs, and eventually use illegal guns, they maintain discretion and silence about their illegality towards outsiders, or the police. This is

because the population benefits from the order and the safety that PCC produces, hence, this can be understood as an arguing mode process. The criminals and the population have a common ground to work with, safety/order, and under this factor, both sides use their non material resources to make an agreement.

To explain in other words, PCC understood that for their criminal activities to prosper, some sort of order needs to be settled, (Manso, 2012, p. 264). The chaos, and the lack of authority that the peripheral areas where in was unproductive for their work. So, the operationalization is that PCC first conquers the peripheral area in vogue, then, they maintain the order by threatening the population that they are the authority bodies, meaning, PCC members are the only ones able to perform violence, otherwise, they need to give permission (hierarchical steering). Thus, if someone wants to kill, or use the force in any kind of way, PCC needs to approve first. Finally, the population accepts this form of governing order and authority body

In addition, after analyzing how PCC operates, Feltran (2012) states an important information to this thesis. According to him, PCC pays military police officers on a weekly basis, therefore, the side payment is to avoid unwanted problems, (Feltran, 2012, p. 243). From these factors, what it is possible to conclude is that public safety of peripheries is done mainly by criminal actors, due to the negative side of shadow of hierarchy. In the case of SP, the trust group-based is PCC, who works under different modes, hierarchical, arguing, and bargaining, but which, controversially enough, helps to decrease the homicide in the city.

To conclude, although there are many dysfunctionalities of this authoritative informal body, which will be discussed shortly, many scholars such as Manso (2012), Feltran (2010, 2020), present that especially in peripheral areas that PCC is in control, the homicide rate dropped significantly, ( Manso, 2012, p. 39). Hence, the result is that PCC helps to decline homicides in SP.

#### **4.1.3 Synergies and dysfunctionalities**

This section will discuss whether multi-level governance, cooperation between public and private actors, and the mix of governance modes have indeed contributed to the decrease of homicides in SP. Furthermore, the dysfunctionalities of the three governance dimensions will be exposed. Finally, and most importantly, this thesis's hypotheses will be analyzed and debated if confirmed or disconfirmed.

##### **Multi-level governance**

Firstly, multi-level governance's evidence presents that Brazil has a complex and well structured governing system. Concerning public security, the excellent collaboration between the levels partly explains the homicide decrease; this is because all the levels cooperate, reinforcing the same aim in the security sphere, which is the decrease of criminality. Although in the past,

the police forces, primarily the civil and the military police, had difficulties in exchanging information and cooperating, some public policies that were presented section 4.1.2, such as the "dial reports", helped to overcome this issue, leading to positive outcomes due to effectiveness of combined forces.

The most prominent example of how the multi-level properly functions to decrease the lethality in the city is the DHPP department<sup>31</sup>. This department was created by the state of SP just to deal with the high number of unsolved crimes in SP city. Therefore, the state jointly the municipality detected flaws within the system and decided to defeat the problem by gathering professionals of both levels to work together. Moreover, the international level also played a critical turning point for homicide decrease. The NY-SP connection re-shaped the police forces' and governing reasoning about homicides and police actions. The effective outcomes that NY police presented integrating the police forces into the public security policies transformed the result, and so it did in SP. Besides, international organizations' democratic and human rights values play also a role in influencing public policies in the city.

On the other hand, a considerable problem of multi-level governance is that the states generally have a limited budget. The criticism, according to Ignacio Cano from the Violence Analysis Laboratory, is that the federal level retains most of the public security budget for the national level. However, the central public security action bodies are at the regional and local level. For this reason, there is the presence of federal initiatives such as the National Public

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<sup>31</sup> See more in section 4.1.2 "multi level governance"

Security Fund<sup>32</sup>, which aims at financing policies of states and municipalities with private investments. Yet, this fund is long frozen, which also shows the incapacity of the government levels in cooperating to practical actions for public security

Therefore, it is possible to conclude that H1a and H1b are confirmed. The effective coordination of government levels increases the public security provision for the city. Moreover, the lack of coordination between the levels also affects the public security provision.

### **Public-private collaboration**

Regarding PP collaboration, DHPP is an excellent example of multi-level governance and private and public cooperation; this is because the public institution mostly gathers data produced by private actors, and implements their public actions. They also benefit from the technological tools and programs which private actors possess to better assist the public security in SP. In fact, societal actors inside of the public security provision aftermath evidenced to be the most decisive dimension concerning homicide decrease. The private investment, data collection, analysis, and expertise of different actors proved to be vital for the positive outcome of the homicide rate in the last decades. The private actors, jointly with public institutions, have had the same goal for the city, the decrease of criminality, leading to effective coordination between actors.

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<sup>32</sup> See more in section 4.1.2 "private-public cooperation actors"

As was already presented, a controversial but also decisive private actor for the homicide decrease in SP is PCC. However, there are two main dysfunctionalities with this actor. Firstly, the importance and power that PCC has in the city show the state's inefficiency to reach peripheral areas, leading to the second point, the violent authoritarian body. The PCC leaders, who also have among their goals reducing conflicts, do so by degrading punishments which can even lead to the death penalty. Hence, PCC mediates conflicts by using violent approaches. In other words, PCC persists in the effectiveness of homicides as a form of punishment. These raise questions about under what costs homicide decreases, or if this indeed is a public security provision.

Therefore, the hypothesis H2a becomes blurry to confirm or disconfirm. On the one hand, as H2a suggests, private actors cooperating effectively increase the public security provision. The evidence presented shows that may H2a holds, after all, the societal actors is the most influential dimension for homicide decrease and public provision. On the other hand, PCC is also a private actor and who vastly helped the homicide decrease, but this does not necessarily mean that public security is more likely to be provided, due to the insecurity feeling that may generate towards people. Hence, H2a is partly confirmed. The H2b hypothesis is also only partly confirmed. Although the empirical chapter presents that homicide begins to decrease partly because public and private actors cooperated effectively, PCC does not cooperate effectively with public actors but still is a prominent part of the explanation of homicide decrease.

### **Governance modes**

The governance modes entail the entire governance approach because it is about how societal actors and public actors, under all levels, cooperate, hence, it analyzes under which modes these interactions happen. Regarding private and public actors and their modes of collaboration to combat the homicide rate in SP, the modes function accurately. This is because private actors have a strong capacity to permeate in different modes to influence, or even develop public policies to decrease homicides. Private companies, corporations, and public non-state organizations have influence in the public arena to discuss, debate and unfold the system's flaws to change the situation. The outcome is successful, the homicide rate decreased in the city, and the ability to debate over the issue using the bargaining and arguing mode is part of the victory.

However, there is a specific dysfunctionality to be mentioned. The bargaining mode tends to dominate the governance mode of operation due to its material power; this is less of a problem concerning homicides because both of the modes' actors have the same aim. But still, the public non-state actors, who tend to use more the arguing mode rather than the bargaining, encounter this disadvantage.

Besides, the bargaining and the arguing modes are also used by PCC members to maintain the order in the peripheral areas of the city, and then this matter becomes more controversial. Considering that PCC members and public actors (police officers) bargain about security in limited statehood areas, the outcome is less clear whether it is positive or not. After all, bargaining, in this case, can be translated into corruption. Moreover, the criminal gang also

works under the arguing mode. Hence, a population versus criminals contract to secure the place in exchange for silence. As it was presented<sup>33</sup>, the performance is based on threats, violence, and fear works. Therefore, the ambiguity prevails, does PCC provide public security by creating order and decreasing homicides, even though they bribe and exploit social relations, possibly creating an instability?

Consequently, for the hypotheses, just as it was for public-private cooperation, it is possible only to partly confirm both, H3a and H3b. Considering the case of homicides in SP, the bargaining mode was an essential factor for the decrease, just as the arguing one, and the success is due to the coordination between these modes. To clarify, the arguing mode unfolded the homicide problem in the city, and this mode used between different private and public actors to solve the problem. However, the bargaining mode was crucial to incentivize the system to implement, invest, and improve public security so the homicides could decrease. On the other hand, effective coordination may also decrease public security provision, after all, PCC arguing mode entails insecurity, and PCC bargaining one encounters corruption.

To conclude this section, there is a synergy with regards governance dimensions and homicides in SP. Firstly, all three dimensions work closely together. The public actors and its levels are well delimited, and public actors jointly with private actors have had the same goal to achieve: decrease the homicides in SP. Therefore, each actor utilizes its resources (material or nonmaterial) to aid public security to decrease homicides. The outcome is successful, the 74%

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<sup>33</sup> See more in section 4.1.2

decrease in homicide rate in the last decades, according to SSP-SP. Section 4.1 has analyzed the empirical results of the different dimensions of governance concerning homicides. The next section will do the same, but regarding police killings.

#### **4.2 Police killings, a historical overview**

For a historical overview of police killings, it is important to date back in time. In the 1930s, Getúlio Vargas gained presidency, so Vargas, seeking for his political domain into effect, established within the police forces a body to annihilate the 'enemies of the State'. For the first time in Brazil, the possibility to exterminate the 'transgressors of the order', who at the time represented Vargas' political enemies, the communist, was instituted as a practice within the police. Some time later in 1964, when Brazil suffered its second coup d'etat, which this time was executed in the form of a military coup, the illegitimate government introduced an extermination logic and incorporated it into police activities. A famous name for this extermination logic was the "death squad", designed by the government but preceded by the civil police, with latter power being responsible for executing any kind of "enemies of the state".

The peripheries of SP emerged as the central location of the torture and killing civilians' act. In many of the cases, the death squad left an "E.M"<sup>34</sup> symbol in the victims' bodies, to show

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<sup>34</sup> Death Squad, Esquadrão da Morte in portuguese.

their successful deadly action. The Military Police, under the control of the Army, used, and still continues, to perform the patrolling behavior of the police on the peripheries of São Paulo. Such a police body is designed to fight against common crime, "the bandits". At that time, the government framed the "bandidos" as one of the (many) enemies of the state. With men scattered across the peripheries from the north to the south of the SP, and SP suburbs, members of the PM rose criminal homicides on another scale.

Shortly after, in the 1970s, another form of security body, namely the "justiciers" was created. This unit acted as a kind of private security group that began to kill the bandits. The justiciers were financed by local store owners and industrialists of the city. Although they also performed violent behavior, similarly or even more extreme versions than the bandits, the justices were seen as the "good guys", even in the eyes of the government, (Manso 2012, p. 172). Nevertheless, many of these justicers were military police officers, besides, at that time, the military police force started using homicides to exercise territorial control, as well as violence and homicides caused by territorialization in the outskirts of São Paulo. Nowadays, the practice of homicide is seen by Brazilian scholars, like Manso (2012), as a social cleansing that was systematically applied in São Paulo.

Even though the military dictatorship ended in 1984, the police killings continue. According to the 13th Yearbook on Public Security, the current situation is that police officers commit 33% of the killings in Sao Paulo. The battalion of Ostensive Rounds Tobias de Aguiar (known as Rota), an elite troop of the São Paulo Military Police, was the police force who killed

most people in 2019. According to the Yearbook of Public Security of 2019, there were 101 deaths caused only by this battalion police on duty last year. The number represents a 98% increase in Rota's lethality.

The lethality of the São Paulo police increased by 2.6% in 2019 compared to the previous year, as the Yearbook presented. In total, the data from the SSP-SP in 2019 presents 867 deaths of police intervention (with agents on duty or off duty): 845 related to the Military Police and 22 to the Civil Police. Moreover, the percentage of the São Paulo capital is 3 times higher than the proportion of deaths by the police in relation to the total number of murders in Brazil. Another important fact to mention is the "violent death with an undetermined cause" rate. According to the Yearbook, in SP, this rate increased by 13.4% in 2019, reaching 5.8 undetermined violent deaths per 100 thousand inhabitants. Therefore, SP is the safest capital in the country but contains the second most lethal police of the world, and still a high undetermined cause rate to explain. The remaining part of this chapter will investigate and provide the findings of such outrageous contrast homicide rates occurring in the city.

#### **4.2.2 Governance Patterns**

This section uses the governance patterns in order to expose the homicides and the police killings results in SP. Firstly, it shows how multi-level governance works related to police

killings. Secondly, it will be analyzed whether the existing public-private cooperation takes action against police killings. Thirdly, the thesis investigates how governance modes operate to improve, or not, the police killings situation in Sao Paulo. Finally, the thesis will present the synergies and dysfunctionalities of these governance patterns, to assist the finalizing hypotheses conclusions.

### **Multi-Level Governance**

As was presented earlier in this chapter, when a homicide happens, the civil police is the responsible body to investigate it. Then, the legislative actors mentioned above are responsible for judging, implementing the law and, if necessary, imprisoning. In theory, this also holds if a police officer kills a civilian, and he/she faces a 'normal' trial. Therefore, all of the same government levels, in theory, operate in identical manners for police killings acts; and all the three powers are involved, executive, legislative, and judiciary. However, when this theoretical equality of enforcement mechanisms gets applied to actual cases, the situation often looks differently. First, explanations of how a police officer would be subjected in a case of force exacerbation.

The Military Court of the State of São Paulo (TJMSP) is the competent regional body to prosecute military crimes defined by military law. Hence, it is an additional institutional body that only accounts for the military police. Yet, this institution is not intended to be involved in the case of killing acts. Furthermore, at the local level, there are the internal affairs offices, which usually is the first body to investigate the case.

The previous section will turn to the issue of how the police killings investigation proceeds in reality. In order to illustrate this procedure, an example will be presented. If the police officer X kills a civilian, the first institutional body to investigate this action will be the officer X battalion. There, X's supervisor or the internal affairs office, analyzes if this police officer killed this civilian, or if the situation was misinterpreted. According to Afonso Benites, a Brazilian journalist from El País, this "misunderstanding" usually comes in a "fraud package". Moreover, this journalist conducted interviews with anonymous police officers who then explicitly discussed how these "fraud packages" work. The interview exposes that the fraud is done when one or more policemen shoot a person and, before the arrival of the aid or the police expertise body, simulate shooting with an unregistered weapon and leave it next to the corpse. Besides, it is not uncommon for policemen to purposely place drugs next to their victims in order to claim that these victims were drug dealers, and allege self defense.

The problem is, according to the public security system specialist, Rafael Alcadipani, that little is known about how these battalions operate and analyze the facts. They tend to lack transparency and cover for their officers. A general critique of public security specialists is that the same fact regularly happens if the case is transferred to the TJMSP. Hence, the institutions, representatives, and the population are kept aside from essential pieces of information, or sometimes, the truth. In the meantime, people from the police corporation know the existence of fraud packages, and the facts behind cases. Nevertheless, differently than in a normal homicide scenario, the police killings situation is blurry and probably bloodier than it is publicly known.

### **Public-Private Cooperation**

Public security, as it was presented earlier in this chapter, is nowadays a domain in which there are many different kinds of actors who jointly assist the safety in SP. The investments in this area only rise, just as the society's awareness that public security is a duty of all. However, there is a black cloud surrounding the scenario of police killings and private-public collaboration. Some scholars and political scientists, such as Manso (2012); Feltran (2010); Szabó, Risso (2018); and Alcadipani, encounter historical facts that unfold this black cloud.

According to Szabó & Risse (2018), Brazil possesses an adverse history regarding police violence, and due to the lack of transparency of this historical violent behavior, society maintains the unproductive view that "bandido bom é bandido morto," meaning, "a good theft is a dead one", (p.15). As police forces replicate this popular clamor, the thesis examines the provenance of police killings in relation to the popular clamor, and then its link with private-public collaboration. Then, before presenting the public-private collaboration respecting police killings, it is vital to give a political overview of the SP government and private sector relations.

The Paulistas have elected the same political party, PSDB, for more than 26 years now, turning it into the most powerful party in the state. PSDB is also the most influential and most elected party in SP city. This party, and its politicians, have a close relationship with the private sector. In fact, many politicians of PSDB are from the private sector, such as the businessman Joao Doria, the former SP mayor, and now the current governor of SP state. Hence, the private-public alliance is a powerful institutional tool and due to positive outcomes in criminality

rates, such as homicides, public security is a crucial sphere to political campaigns. As the Globo newspaper put it, "public security is a political trampoline". Among many political issues in the PSDB-SP agenda, improving police officers' working conditions is one of the central points however according to the criminal analyst, Guaracy Mingardi, the police corporation, and its officers endure the decayed conditions.

Moreover, as Lima, R. S. de, Bueno, S., & Mingardi, G. (2016) and Szabó & Risso (2018) present, the poor working conditions and low salaries incite police officers to work as private security contractors in their free time. In the meantime, the deficit of public safety creates fertile soil for private security demand to rise, (Szabó & Risse, 2018, p. 63). Thus, the authors Szabó & Risso (2018) explain that working in private security, these police officers have better salaries, and this results in the prioritization of the second job over the police officer position (p. 63). Yet, private security companies take advantage of the policemen's firearm license and training, (Szabó & Risse, 2018, p. 63). Thus, the aftermath is flawed, public security aims to decrease criminality, but private security companies seek to profit. Hence, companies are more likely to benefit if public security is defected, (Szabó & Risse, 2018, p. 63). Moreover, police officers who are public actors also become partially private ones, with mixed perspectives on public safety.

Meanwhile, Doria, the governor in his campaign, incited that if the police could "shoot to kill" in case of confrontations, they would have the second-best salary in the country. According to Alcadipani, Doria's discourse does not only reflect his party perception, but it also indicates a

robust popular clamor for violent police. The speech is the institutionalization of such a clamor. The conclusion is that police officers are exhausted, enraged, exposed to death, incited to perform violence, with low popularity among society, and with the likelihood of being killed in criminal confrontations, ( Szabó & Risse, 2018, p. 63).<sup>35</sup>

After exposing the political scenario and police killings relations to the popular clamor, the thesis will relate to the private-public cooperation actions, which is interconnected to the political conjecture. Differently than section 4.1.2, where it regards homicide public policies and private-public cooperation, there are few substantial examples of public-private collaboration to decrease police killings. Concerning police killings, the public non-state actors, NGOs, universities and think tanks, are the central ones. They collaborate intensively to better assist the public security in the city to decrease police killings. For instance, the police training, based on universal values of good police governance, developed by "Sou da Paz." Also, in August 2001, the same institute, Sou da Paz, developed the III Municipal Security Plan for Diadema in partnership with the Social Defense Secretariat / Diadema municipality, intending to control violence and improve public security. The plan actively involved different actors, civil society, the State Government (through its Civil Police and Military, Judiciary and the Provisional Detention Center), Federal Government (through the Ministry of Justice and the National Public Security Secretariat), and the private institution.

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<sup>35</sup> The Brazillian police is the one who kills the most, but also the one who dies the most.

It is also worth mentioning other influential names for social policies and projects, regarding police killings, like the Igarapé Institute, FGV, Public Security Forum, and The São Paulo Institute Against Violence. They all take part in reducing the damage of police killings by conducting research and public debates about changing this popular view that an effective police is a violent one. However, it is possible to claim that most societal actors, in general, dismiss the police killings rate, or disregard the problem, this especially holds for corporate actors and private companies. Both private groups tend to be the most influential ones in the public arena due to their resource capacities and their close link with the SP government.

On the other hand, the less powerful ones, the institutes, universities, and NGOs are the ones working determinately to change this violent pattern that the city contains. Therefore, often the collaborations happen inside of the public non-state organizations' buildings, often including international organizations, like UNICEF, UN, human rights watch. Besides international gatherings that are either organized by international organizations, or national organizations, like Igarapé, who has a close relationship with the international community.

The problem is that even though there are public actors aiming to support good governance values and condemning harmful patterns, the governance levels and modes are uncoordinated regarding police killings. The hierarchical steering often reigns. For instance, the sociologist, Benedito Mariano was the São Paulo State Police Ombudsman, and he exposed the lack of transparency and justice in case of police killings. Mariano concluded that the PM

internal affairs office investigated only 3% of homicides committed by the police in 2017.

Mariano examined that,

*"We have an indication that in 74% of the occurrences in 2017, there was an exacerbation of force practiced by the police. In 48% of legitimate defenses, there was also an exacerbation in action, and in 26%, there is evidence that there was no confrontation, only the police fired".*

Moreover, in the same interview, he proposed to create a group in the Department of Internal Affairs that acts only to combat police lethality. Months later, the governor of SP, Doria, fired Benedito Mariano. Thus, the lack of transparency and impunity from police forces and corporations is enforced by public actors.

### **Governance modes**

It is possible to observe that in Sao Paulo, there is strong cooperation between public and private actors under different modes to decrease the homicides in the city, as presented in this thesis. There is, however, a lack of this cooperation regarding police killings. Under this section, the thesis will demonstrate which governance modes there are, even if on a smaller scale, public and private collaboration, and where these actors argue and bargain.

In section 4.1.2, the thesis outlined that under the homicide decrease domain, the principal governance mode is bargaining. Thus, private and public actors enter into a bargaining process to implement social projects and public policies to decrease homicides. This is different where police killings are concerned. The primary governance mode in this case, is the arguing mode, because the main societal actors are public non-state organizations, and their primary mode of governance, under the Paulista governance, is the arguing mode. Therefore, some influential public policies are mentioned here that attempt to revert this problem of police killings. One of them is the "Civilian Police," a project developed by "Sou da Paz " NGO, with a private budget, to train police officers to perform with a nonviolent approach and take into account more democratic values. Moreover, the project recognizes and disseminates good police practices by awarding and acknowledging police officers who helped solve public security issues or who accomplished positive social actions.

Moreover, another arguing strategy performed by Sou da Paz, and also Public Security Forum, is the active participation of spaces in the media, seminars, workshops, and other types of security services, both nationally and internationally. Both institutes have public access to public forums, or public decision-making arenas, to influence and bring crucial public security issues on the table, such as transparency. Besides, an important aspect is that these kinds of institutes have a close relationship with international human rights organization bodies. Therefore, they demand social policies in the national arena but have the power of outside (international) pressure.

### **Shadow of hierarchy**

Regarding the shadow of hierarchy, the theory developed by Scharpf (1997), societal actors are expected to engage in cooperation due to state incentives and the state's initiative of shadowing its hierarchical steering, (Scharpf, 1997). However, this does not appear to hold in the scenario of police killings. When concerning public non-state organizations, the actors realize the absence of the state regarding controlling and implementing affirmative public policies to decrease police killings. They engage in arguing and bargaining processes out of necessity. In other words, the state's inefficiency leads to the need for societal actors to argue and bargain to change the police killings scenario.

Nevertheless, it is possible to detect that differently from in the bargaining mode, where public actors always tend to be inside of agreements. In the arguing mode, this is less of a fact; thus, more private-private arguing processes are observed. However, the main point of this observation is that private-private collaboration is not due to successful state execution of the shadow of hierarchy, leaving a room and encouraging private actors to cooperate, rather on the contrary. Public non-state organizations are working together and attempting to build an alliance with civil society because of the lack of interest by public actors to revert this violent police logic.

### **4.2.3 Synergies and dysfunctionalities**

In this section the dimensions' synergies and dysfunctionalities of SP will be analyzed to determine whether or not they are able to effectively prevent police killings. Furthermore

similarly as section 4.1.3, this section will evaluate the hypotheses and discuss if they are confirmed or disconfirmed, and finally a debate about the dimensions interactions will be provided.

### **Multi-level governance**

It is important to start this section mentioning that the multi-level governance in the city of SP, in theory, is very well structured. The reformulation of the police bodies after the re-democratization, and the constitution that determined the public bodies functions are clear and well designed based on international democratic values and human rights norms. However, the empirics of this thesis present some different precedents. The most critical dysfunctionality is how the investigations of police officers are conducted. The lack of transparency between the government levels creates an unproductive relation that leads to poor public security provision. Furthermore, the lack of autonomy of some government levels, such as the case of Mariano, the former São Paulo State Police Ombudsman, who detected and exposed flaws in the system proposing reforms and was fired by the governor after declarations. These factors confirm hypotheses H1a and H1b, that if there is a rupture in the coordination levels, the policies are not able to provide public security effectively.

### **Public-private cooperation**

The multi-level governance and public-private relations are closely connected regarding police killings' functionalities and dysfunctionalities. The governing arena conjunction caters for private actors to engage in public policies jointly with public actors, just like the political structure of multi-level governance. However, what occurs is that the government of SP and the private sector have a symbiotic relationship, which is counter productive in dealing with police killings. This is because police killings are a highly politicized subject, and neither the government nor most private actors regard the fact as a problem to be combated.

On the other hand, there are some private actors, such as public non-state organizations who deal with the issue, but they do not have utter collaboration of other private actors or the government to combat police killings, like it is the manner for homicides. The result is known, the increase of police killings in the city. The aforementioned elements on police killings meet sufficient conditions to confirm hypotheses H2a and H2b. The actors may have different opinions over an issue, but if they do not cooperate effectively it is unlikely that positive public security results will be reaped.

### **Governance modes**

While arguing and bargaining modes are essential parts of public security provision, due to the bargaining resources' power that bring incentives for cooperation and the negotiations and

values that arguing exposes, the modes can also be fruitless for public security in SP. Corruption in Brazil is a burden that every public sector entails. Because the bargaining mode incentives are material, private interests may be preferred over public goods. Hence, private actors with bargaining power have a powerful instrument in their hands. In other words, in a bid to gain material resources to invest in public policies, or in the worst scenario, to bribe, public actors might settle private priorities rather than public ones. Therefore, this mode creates fertile soil for corruption and patrimonialism.

Relating to the factors mentioned above, another dysfunctionality is the matter of power-inequality under governance modes. The bargaining mode entails material resources and the arguing does not, hence, the bargaining mode has an advantage over arguing. This is a problem because, differently than bargaining, arguing aims to find a solution based on consensus and impartiality, thus, it is a more genuine mode for public good provision. The 4.2.1 section of this thesis presented that public non-state organizations are the main actors with regards to police killings issues, and because there is a lack of interest over this manner from private companies/corporations, the power inequality of governance modes becomes apparent. Nevertheless, the arguing mode alone does not appear to be effective for overcoming the problem of police killings in SP.

On the other hand, public actors in SP also appear to disregard the problem of police killings, and due to the lack of the shadow of hierarchy, this enables societal actors to improve their solely private interactions to prosper. In other words, the Brazilian government still

behaves under a rigid steering, difficulting the governance modes to flourish. Therefore, after the elements mentioned above regarding police killings, the governance modes if effectively coordinated are more likely to provide public security, meeting sufficient criterias to conclude that H3a and H3b are confirmed.

It is worth mentioning, that although the arguing mode alone cannot change the present scenario, progress is being made. Their close relation with the media, international actors and organizations serve as productive pressures for revising of structures.

## **Chapter 5, Conclusion**

The present study was designed to understand the discrepancy between an increase in police killings and a decrease in homicides in Sao Paulo. The governance approach was used as heuristic lenses to possible answers. Hence, the conclusion discusses whether the governance theory assisted or not for the disclosures. The governance dimensions will be examined jointly with a critical analysis of governance branches based on the empirical findings. Moreover, this chapter also presents the strengths and limitations of this study, followed by recommendations for further research and, finally, the last considerations.

The thesis found that a partial cause for the homicide decrease was the well coordinated cooperation of actors to influence and develop effective policies. In other words, public actors across all levels, and private actors had the same purpose in perspective. Moreover, the international level played an essential role setting human rights' values as top priorities to

decrease homicide. The positive collaboration of the NY police to SP authorities is part of the key policy transformation. Therefore, actors decided to gather their resources and abilities to promote effective strategies to reverse the scenario. Thus, it is possible to trace three decisive stages. (1) The acceptance of the problem, (2) the willingness to change the phenomenon, and (3) mobilization.

On the exact opposite resides police killings. The escalated number of deaths attributed to police reveals the uncoordinated and ineffective measures taken in the city. Although homicides and police killings are part of the same public security system, the public and private actors' goals inconsistency results in the situation that SP endures. Therefore, the three phases that characterize the success homicide decrease, does not bear for police killings. There is no acceptance of the problem(1) because it is a politicized subject, with sharp opinions<sup>36</sup> thus, no willingness to change the matter(2), and no mobility for such change(3). In fact, there is an absolute lack of partnership between public and private actors to combat this problem that spills into poor public security policies and concludes in fatalities.

The governance dimensions are intrinsically related to discrepancy of high police killings and low homicides. For homicides, the multi-level properly works, such as the exchange of information, and reinforcement of good governance by all government levels including the international one. For police killings, there is a rupture in the multi-level functionality, the lack of transparency, the impunity, and the lack of good governance incentives, to name a few

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<sup>36</sup> See more in section 4.2.1

examples. The same holds for public-private cooperation. There is a shared goal that actors work jointly to decrease homicides, using their capabilities and resources to solve the problem in SP. Even though the government does not perform a shadow of hierarchy in the security domain, regarding homicides policies there is a larger room for debates and public incentives.

On the other hand, to reverse the police killings scenario, no incentives are provided, and even the opposite may be claimed. Doria's campaigning discourse, inciting police violence, combined with the death record committed by police in the first semester of 2020, represents the unproductive policies for public security in SP.

Although multi-level and public-private cooperation dimensions symbolize the results' discrepancies of police killings and homicides, the governance modes dimension present similar outcomes concerning both scenarios. To illustrate, I will use the Brazillian literature, which is a counterpoint approach towards European governance. The governance Brazillian literature brings matters of corruption, clientelism, and private interests, and in the last chapter of this research, these issues uncovered part of the governance flaws in the city, ( Teixeira & Gomes, 2019). The bargaining dominance reflects the power inequality between the governance modes that European governance tends to disregard, and Brazillian literature often discusses, ( Lisot 2011; Nasser et al., 2019).

Even though the governance approach has transparency and democratic values as basic premises and it condemns defective governance practices like corruption, the reality in SP is that governance modes may inflame these harmful practices committed by private and public actors.

Nonetheless, the interlinkages between the different governance dimensions are essential for effective policies to provide positive security outcomes. The integration of the governance modes dimensions is crucial, but the awareness of governance modes' power inequality and public bads is also important for researchers to theorize and apply the governance approach.

Concerning the other governance branches, urban governance provides essential insights for this thesis. The branch regards that rapid urbanization produces inequalities. Hence, it realizes that when creating public policies, governance actors need to conceive more diversity and relate to the adverse outcomes that rapid urbanization causes. These factors just mentioned relate to the SP context, where most of the homicides and police killings reside in the peripheries, which are products of rapid urbanization. Moreover, Börzel and Risse (2016) present "limited statehood areas" and its possible informal actors. The peripheries of SP and the criminal organization PCC that this thesis presented are empirical descriptions of Börzel and Risse's work. Therefore, urban governance helps to unfold a more honest governance form that SP is embedded in. For instance, Börzel and Risse (2016) warn about criminal actors being possible public good providers, but also disrupters of governance coordination, which fits the SP context.

In contrast, global governance was less influential for this thesis due to its OECD countries' focus. Yet, the importance of international organization norms and values into governance that the theory brings are essential elements that the discrepancy reveals. On one hand, democratic values and international institutions are taken seriously regarding homicides. On the other hand, they are disregarded in the police killings scenarios, but influential for public

non-state organizations in SP to claim and work towards justice. Furthermore, the NY-SP exchange information about effective public policies, that was pointed as a crucial factor for the homicide decrease in SP, is a symbolization of global governance insights.

The thesis combined European theories and Brazilian empirics, and that is the greatest strength of this research. Introducing globalized European concepts into the ambiguity that SP represents regarding safety, is an interesting viewpoint. Even though governance theories were designed to comprehend European governing, the theories notably helped to understand the discrepancy of SP security. Another interesting point is that the thesis utilized different governance approaches; it was a resourceful procedure to acquire different tones of the theories to apply to my case study. Therefore, the thesis is believed to be academically relevant because it contributes to the use of an OECD approach to a third-world country case study. Moreover, the research discussed a relevant and contemporary topic, which is police violence.

On the other hand, a limitation of the thesis was possessing only secondary data. The thesis presented the danger that corruption can be for SP security governance. This could only be further inspected if interviews or close examination were conducted—the same holds regarding PCC, who presented a crucial role in the security aftermath. Therefore, the incorporation of primary sources is a recommendation for further research. For instance, interviews may capture some meaningful information that might contribute to the outcome, especially regarding the governance modes, where I suspect the arrangements of many informal interactions.

Moreover, according to some scholars, such as Baldwin, (1997) and Spiegel (2002), public security is a public good, and this thesis treated it as such. However, the empirics demonstrated that public security in SP is not homogeneously provided; hence, it is debatable if the term "public good" suits considering the safety in SP<sup>37</sup>. Therefore, it is appealing for other researchers to study this matter.

Finally, this thesis has not only the goal of answering a research question but to raise awareness of an urgent topic that is here exposed. Sao Paulo is changing the homicidal scenario with influential public policies based on international understanding of governance and human rights values, but appears to be distant from doing the same regarding police killings. Furthermore, the thesis presented how the governance of SP works, demonstrating many achievements to be inspired by, and flaws to be concerned for reconfiguration. Therefore, this research might be useful for practical actions in the SP context.

In May 2020, the George Floyd case in the US provoked debates and protests about police violence across the globe. The result was an entire public security reformulation in Minneapolis. In Sao Paulo only from January 2020 until May, Floyd's assassination, 442 people were killed by the police in SP, the highest number for the period since the database initiated in 2001. Thus, just as the international level influenced public policy reforms to reduce homicides in SP in the 90s, the same seems appealing for police killings in the current days. The final words of this thesis are Nelson Mandela's,

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<sup>37</sup> See more about public security tested as private, club or public good in Hella Engerer (2011).

*"Security and safety don't just happen, they are a result of collective consensus and public investment".*

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