

# The Effect of Educational Attainment on Substantial Representation: A Comparative Analysis of Eight Western European Countries

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## Abstract

In this thesis I studied whether or not the lower educated citizens in eight Western European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Great Britain, France, The Netherlands and Sweden) are substantively underrepresented in the period 2006-2018 using data from the European Social Survey and the Chapel Hill Expert Survey. The theories that guide the analysis were informed by the new 'education cleavage' which entails that education is in contemporary Western European societies one of the dominant factors determining political preference as well as the finding by many authors that the lower educated are underrepresented in politics. In addition, I looked at whether or not the populist radical right improves the representation of the lower educated as they gain more influence in parliaments. The results are unexpected and while they confirm previous studies that have looked at the issue of European integration, the results predominantly invite discussion on the method by which data from multiple surveys are combined.

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## 1.0 Introduction

In order for democracy to function properly, the preferences of all citizens need to be taken into account equally. However, there are scholars who forcefully argue that the lower educated are descriptively underrepresented in the Netherlands (Bovens and Wille, 2010). Furthermore, because citizens with different levels of educational attainment have different political preference (Coenders and Scheepers, 2003; Coenders, Lubbers and Scheepers, 2008; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006, 2007; Hakhverdian, Van Elsas, Van der Brug and Kuhn, 2013; Stubager, 2010) this has in the Netherlands led to large differences in political views between the lower educated and local/national representatives (Hakhverdian, 2015; Schakel and Hakhverdian, 2018), leading some scholars to the conclusion that there is a substantive underrepresentation of the lower educated (Aaldering, 2017; Schakel and Van der Pas, 2020). Scholars that have done international comparative research on the effect of education on political representation in Europe also find an underrepresentation of the lower educated (Rosset and Stecker, 2019). These studies are examples of the political science literature that has concerned itself with the effect of education on politics. As political scientists we can thus reflect on a growing body of evidence that points to education as a primary explaining factor in politics, mainly in Western Europe. That being said, there are still some area's in the literature that are underdeveloped, of which I aim to address two in this thesis.

The first problem is that while the effect of education on political preference and representation in the Western European context is widely studied, but that the link with structural substantive underrepresentation is seldom made explicit. Most research has focused on differences in preferences between the educational groups and in some cases even concluded that there is a new 'cleavage' (Kriesi *et al.*, 2006, 2008; Kriesi *et al.*, 2012; Stubager, 2010). Based on the emergence of this new education cleavage authors that have concerned themselves with descriptive underrepresentation warn for an immanent substantive underrepresentation (Bovens and Wille, 2010). However, other scholars like Hakhverdian (2015) maintain that a difference in attitudes between citizen and representative does not necessarily mean a difference in representation between educational groups. Aaldering (2017) has also identified this gap in the literature and corrected it in the context of the Netherlands, but this gap still exists to same extent in Western Europe as a single subject of study. Even though some research exists that has focused on the effect of education on political representation across Western European countries, that research has not tested all theoretical relevant issues like immigration (Rosset and Stecker, 2019). That is why in this thesis I want to contribute on the understanding of the 'education cleavage' in Western Europe and how this relates to political representation by answering the following research question:  
*To what extent are the lower educated substantively underrepresented in Western Europe?*

At the same time, the political preferences that the lower educated are theoretically more likely to have are very similar to the ideology of the populist radical right party family (Kriesi et al, 2012). And indeed, research from the Netherlands shows that these parties result in a better representation of the lower educated (Aaldering, 2017). But by making the explicit link between the preferences of the lower educated and how the populist radical right improves this representation Aaldering is the exception rather than the rule. This is what I would consider the second problem in the literature. As we gain understanding of the political preferences of the part of the electorate that is underrepresented, the question arises if the party that should improve representation actually does improve representation. Especially since the effects of education on political preferences and the rise of the populist radical right party family are both Western European phenomena and often connected with each other in the literature, it is of great added value that they are studied in combination. That is why in addition to the previous research question I will also study:

*To what extent do the lower educated become better represented as **the** populist radical right party gains more influence?*

In this thesis I will employ the concept of policy congruence which uses the difference between the citizens position and the government position to measure political representation (Golder and Stramski, 2010). Theories of voting behavior (Downs, 1957) and societal cleavages (Rokkan and Lipset, 1967; Kriesi et al, 2006, 2008, 2012) will provide the starting point for the argument that education is indeed the factor that explains a difference in political preference. After that I will look to explanations on the micro-level that make the link between the cleavage and preference on specific issues explicit. After that an overview of the populist radical right party will follow and the mechanism through which these parties can improve the representation of the lower educated. The hypotheses will be tested with a multi-level analysis of eight Western European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands and Sweden) in the period of 2006-2018. In order to measure the preferences of the citizens I will use the European Social Survey (ESS) that measures the relevant policy issues as well as the educational attainment. In order to measure the policy of different governments I will use the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) that measures the position of different parties which can be used to estimate the positions of government responsible for the policy issues of income redistribution, European integration, and immigration. The influence of the populist radical right party will be measured by taking the seat shares. **In** will close with a conclusion and a rather in-depth discussion on the method of combining the above-mentioned surveys and its shortcomings that might have implications for future research.

The subject of this thesis is scientifically relevant in the sense that cross-European research on policy representation of educational groups is comparatively rare since most research focusses on preferences on issues instead of representation on these issues. The societal relevance lies in the evaluation of the narrative that while populist radical right parties are often seen as a threat to democracy, they can also be a boon by giving a voice to underrepresented groups (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2012). Although they certainly have different opinions on how the state should be organized, when they improve the representation of structurally underrepresented groups that discussion becomes more nuanced.

## 2.0 Theory

In this chapter I will start with an overview of what is precisely meant with political representation and how it should be studied. Then I will elaborate how representation is organized in terms of political demand and supply and what the effect of education is on political preferences. This will be followed by an explanation of how differences in education result in an underrepresentation of the lower educated. After that I will introduce theories that explain how the populist radical right can improve the underrepresentation of the lower educated.

### 2.1 Descriptive versus substantive representation

In this thesis I will look at the political (under)representation of the lower educated, but there are different ways of thinking about representation and for the purpose of this thesis I will prefer the substantive view over the descriptive view. After all, it might be tempting to argue that the populist radical right per definition improves representation for the lower educated based on theoretical reason (the education cleavage) in combination with the fact that these parties tend to have fewer higher educated parliamentarians (Van den Braak, 2017). However, this descriptive approach has its shortcomings.

The starting point of the descriptive view is that people who are similar in terms of gender, location, ethnicity or any other relevant characteristic will have similar preferences because preferences are believed to be shaped by these characteristics. Therefore, in order to improve representation of the lower educated, the number of representatives should mirror the number of lower educated in society. One of the most well-known defenders of this view is Mansbridge (1999) who has focused on the representation of women and people of color, but there is no inherent reason why these arguments could not be applied to education. The best (and for this thesis most relevant) argument she makes refers to the problem of ‘un-crystallized interests’ in politics. In between elections many new issues arise, so it is not always possible to cast a vote for a politician on all the relevant topics (since those topics are not known on the election date). When a new

issue does occur, having the same experiences likely results in the same policy preference and thus improved substantive representation.

Let's for example consider how Kriesi *et al* (2008) identified that cultural competition has increased in the contemporary globalized world. When we know from research that the lower educated have more ethnic exclusionary attitudes (Coenders *et al*, 2008) it follows logically that the lower educated perceive the influx of ethnic diverse immigrants as a threat to their collective identity (Kriesi *et al*, 2008). The descriptive logic would be that when the parliaments of Western European countries are filled exclusively with the higher educated who do not perceive this cultural threat, the lower educated will become underrepresented.

From research in the Netherlands we know that there are considerable differences in descriptive representation between different educational groups (Bovens and Wille, 2010, Hakhverdian, 2015). One of the main reasons for this finding is that when political participation is defined broadly (i.e. not just voting) the lower educated participate less, ranging from holding offices, to contacting politicians, to going to demonstrations (Bovens and Wille, 2010). A finding that is partly replicated by Dolezal and Hutter (in: Kriesi *et al*, 2012) who find that across several Western European countries the lower educated are far less likely to participate in protests. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that lower educated people are underrepresented when an 'un-crystallized' interest arises. This is especially problematic because the academic literature unequivocally shows that there are large differences in policy preferences between educational groups (Aaldering, 2017; Coenders and Scheepers, 2003, Coenders *et al*, 2008; Hakhverdian *et al*, 2013, Hakhverdian, 2015; Kriesi *et al*, 2006, 2008; Kriesi *et al*, 2012; Schakel and Van der Pas, 2020; Schakel and Hakhverdian, 2018; Stubager, 2010).

But still, even though these are interesting considerations, they fail to address the type of representation that ultimately interests scholars of politics, substantive representation. Substantive representation happens when the policy of the government matches the preferences of the citizen. And although Mansbridge addresses the potential benefits of descriptive representation she does this because "*The primary function of representative democracy is to represent the substantive interests of the represented through both deliberation and aggregation. Descriptive representation should be judged primarily on this criterion.*" (Mansbridge, 1999 p. 630). In other words, descriptive underrepresentation is only problematic because it might in some cases lead to substantive underrepresentation. Therefore, when researchers are concerned with the representation of citizens, they should be looking for indicators that measure citizen preferences versus government policy. Research that has done this in the Netherlands confirms the theory that the lower educated are less well represented than the higher educated citizens (Aaldering, 2017; Schakel and Van der

Pas, 2020; Schakel and Hakhverdian, 2018). This thesis expands on that research by investigating if these findings hold true across multiple Western European countries.

## 2.2 The two-dimensional political space and the new cleavage

In this thesis I will look at the substantive underrepresentation of the lower educated and how that might be improved by populist radical right parties. But this implies that being a member of a certain group (in this case defined by different levels of educational attainment) forms an individuals' political preferences and that some groups are better represented than others. In this section I will summarize the literature that gives us political scientists the tools to understand how political representation works and the theoretical reasons for why education has an effect on political preference.

First, I want to introduce the concept of 'the political space', the spectrum of political issues and the different stances on it. This concept was first introduced by Downs (1957) who borrowed the idea of rationality from economics to explain politics. Downs thesis was that people pursue their political interest in a rational manner, in other words they strategically cast their vote to maximize gain. It is important to understand that this 'gain' is a gain when it is perceived as such by the individual and not as an objectively superior choice. As long an individual makes a conscious choice that results in reaching that individuals objective, that is considered a rational choice. This creates a 'marketplace' where citizens have a 'demand' for certain policy and politicians have a 'supply' of policy alternatives to choose from (Downs, 1957). Therefore, we should understand politics as citizens forming a demand for a party based on their preferences and parties **who are** monitoring the electorate to transform this demand into a vote for their party (and consequently political power). This 'rational choice' perspective is what I will adopt for the rest of this thesis. However, this understanding of how political power gets distributed misses **two elements. The first is what causes a citizen to have a specific preference while the second is why this does not result in a market equilibrium where political power and therefore representation is perfectly equally distributed.**

The first missing element was addressed by research that showed that the political space in Western Europe was structured by so-called 'cleavages' (Lipset and Rokan, 1967). A cleavage can be defined as follows: It is a structural basis of opposition of societal groups, perceived as such by citizens, and finally it is mobilized into organization like political parties (Kriesi, 1998). In their original work Lipset and Rokkan identified a number of structural bases of opposition that where formed after 'critical junctures' (1967). Or more simply put, a number of events had such an enormous impact on society that they divided the citizens into either side of the cleavage. An example from their book would be how the process of nation-building after the French Revolution caused the cleavage between the secular state and the church about who had the '*control*



*of community norms*' (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, p. 15). Lipset and Rokkan saw these cleavage structures as the explanation for the emergence of the various parties and why citizens vote for them. Furthermore, these cleavages boiled down to two distinct political dimensions (Kriesi et al, 2006). An economic dimension which revolved around issues like income redistribution (i.e. taxation) or labor rights (i.e. the eight-hour workweek) and a cultural dimension which revolved around issues like lifestyle and religion (i.e. the role of the church in society). These cleavages were supposed to be fixed, meaning that political conflict was permanently rooted in these issues (Lipset and Rokkan, 1976, p.50).

Armed with the concept of 'cleavages in a political space' we can understand Western European politics as groups who are in opposition against each other on an economic and cultural dimension. And indeed, across Europe we can identify multiple 'party families' with a member present in each country. These party families are the Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, Conservative Liberals etc. who offer the supply for political demand that has formed along the earlier mentioned cleavages. Yet, ever since Lipset and Rokkan published their thesis in 1967, other authors have argued that these cleavages have been transformed. Recent contributions have argued that education is now one of the dominant factors explaining political preference/demand instead of income or religious denomination (Kriesi et al, 2012).

One of the most influential re-interpretations of cleavage structures was the thesis by Kriesi et al (2006) that the contemporary **process globalization** has transformed the two dimensions of the political space. The core of their argument is the *embedding hypothesis* which states that the new sources of political conflict will not become a third dimension but instead will become embedded in the already two-dimensional political space (ibid). As a result, any political challenge that results from the process of globalization should be understood in terms of its economic and cultural consequences. These new political challenges are first and foremost immigration (especially from non-European countries) and European integration (Kriesi et al, 2006, 2012). Subsequently, this means that as political scientists we should look at the characteristics that **places** people on either side of these dimensions. Kriesi et al (2012) have argued that among the most important of these defining characteristics is education.

The effects of globalization on the economic and cultural dimension are best defined as a push towards *integration* by the globalization 'winners' while there is resistance from the globalization 'losers' in the form of a call for *demarcation* (Kriesi et al, 2006; Kriesi et al, 2012). On the economic dimension this captures the difference between those that would like to see an increase in free trade policy among the European member states (including freedom of movement) and those that favor protectionism that ensures economic security (ibid). On the cultural dimension this difference is between those that hold universal or humanitarian values and are very open to the idea of multiculturalism (in other words cosmopolitan values)

and those that identify more with their own community and are wary of foreign influences (in other words nationalistic values) (ibid). And while Kriesi *et al* argue that the reason that someone might be a ‘winner’ or ‘loser’ can be multiple, education is one of the most important (2012). Furthermore, differences in educational attainment have a more pronounced effect on the cultural dimension than on the economic dimensions (Kriesi *et al*, 2008; Kriesi *et al*, 2012). This suggests that political conflict over cultural issues is fiercer than over the economic issues.

However, macro-level explanations of global processes that affect national politics, are not enough to explain micro-level political representation. After all, identifying education as a defining characteristic of someone’s position on the different dimension is one thing, but it gives no insight in what exactly happens to the individual. What is needed is the causal mechanism of how a process like globalization affects the individuals of different educational backgrounds. In other words, in this thesis I will adopt the perspective of methodological individualism which argues that explanations of social phenomena should include theories of individual action (Udehn, 2002). These explanations will be focused on several issues as opposed to the broad economic and cultural dimension. The reason for this is that research has shown that when the different political issues are lumped together in a general ‘left-right’ dimension, the degree of voter representation gets overestimated (Rosset and Stecker, 2015; Schakel and Hakhverdian, 2018). And while research has concluded that the issues in the two dimensions are closely related (that is after all why these are the dimensions in the first place) (Kriesi *et al*, 2008), it is better to be as precise as possible. In the end, the substantive representation is of interest here and that is per definition on the level of policy issues. There is also a methodological reason for focusing on these issues since for the selected countries and time frames there is limited data for the diverse spectrum of issues.

The economic dimension is formed by issues like economic liberalism, the welfare state, and budgeting (Kriesi *et al*, 2008). As globalization has led to increased neo-liberal policies low-skilled workers face more competition and economic insecurity, prompting them to adopt a *demarcation* position on economic issues (ibid). While this narrative makes sense intuitively, research that has focused on the individual level shows that education as a proxy for skill does not provide a satisfactory explanation (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006). Instead, Hainmueller and Hiscox provide even stronger evidence and suggest the effect of education on economic preferences can also be direct and does not need to manifest itself indirectly via skill acquisition. Their contribution to the literature consists of the observation that among people with the same skill level, there is no difference between the people that are employed and the people who are outside the labor force (i.e. retired). This contradicts the notion of Kriesi *et al* (2008) since in their model retired low-skilled workers should become more favorable to economic *integration* as a decrease in low-skilled wages is no longer a threat and instead even beneficial. The core of the argument is the that education, and in

particular the college-level, equips individuals with more economic knowledge and therefore more in favor of policies that be characterized as economic *integration* (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006). One caveat of their research is that they do not **drawn** their conclusion with exclusively Western European data and therefore their finding may not be applicable to the Western European case. However, I would consider the host of countries they included in the analysis similar enough to Western Europe to justify testing the found mechanisms in one with data from the other. Another caveat is that their analysis tested the effects of education on trade openness, which is not the issue tested in this thesis: income redistribution. Research from the Netherlands also finds that the citizens with a higher education are more reluctant to support income redistribution than the lower educated, even when taking income into account (Schakel and Hakhverdian, 2018). That being said, since research concerning the demand side finds that income redistribution and attitudes towards the openness of the economy are closely linked and part of the same dimension (Kriesi *et al*, 2008), I am willing to make this jump faced by the limitations in the available data.

The cultural dimension is formed by issues like cultural liberalism, immigration and European integration (Kriesi *et al*, 2008). While Kriesi *et al* (2006) originally thought that attitudes toward immigration were for a large part informed by the degree of economic competition that emanates from migration, other scholars have found that opposition to immigration is cultural (Coenders and Scheepers, 2003; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007). The reason that this anti-immigrant is indeed cultural lies in the fact that even as the higher educated face competition with higher-educated immigrants, they still support immigration (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007). Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) demonstrate that the widely found effect of education on migration attitude is more in line with ‘socialization theory’ which states that the institution of higher education instills norms about social equality and contributes to a social network that is more diverse. Coenders and Scheepers (2003) show, also in line with the ‘socialization’ theory, that being lower educated results in greater pride for the national community and a more negative evaluation of people that have a different ethnicity. Consequently, the lower educated are more in favor of radical policies like repatriation of legal immigrants to their country of origin (Coenders *et al*, 2008). To sum up, education affects someone’s attitude on immigration following a cultural logic around social norms and national identity. This makes higher educated citizens more likely to favor *integration* along the cultural dimension while the lower educated more likely to adopt a *demarcation* position.

Another central issue of the new ‘education’ cleavage is the issue of European integration. The EU symbolizes the process of globalization since it makes many important decisions that relate to both the economic and cultural dimension. As such it can be difficult to determine on what dimension it should be placed but in terms of the articulation of the interests of the lower educated it is mobilized as a cultural issue (Kriesi *et al*, 2012) The argument by Kriesi *et al* (2012) is that European integration takes power away

from the national sphere and moves it to the supranational sphere. In that sense its mechanism is very similar to those that are at work in the issue of immigration. When differences in education lead to differences in nationalistic attitudes, it follows logically that the political project that weakens the power of the nation-state is evaluated differently by citizens of different educational attainment as well. From an empirical standpoint it has indeed been found that education has an effect on Eurosceptic attitudes and that this effect has grown stronger over time (Hakhverdian *et al*, 2013). In addition, much research finds that the education effect is stronger on the cultural issues than on the economic issues (Kriesi *et al*, 2008; Kriesi *et al*, 2012; Stubager, 2010). The cultural dimension also encompasses the difference between libertarian and authoritarian values. Although this issue of libertarian versus authoritarian values is not tested in this thesis it is important to mention that the theorized effect of education on these attitudes have indeed been confirmed (Stubager, 2010).

However, the transformation of the existing political dimensions has changed demand first and supply second. This is exemplified by the finding that mainstream parties have converged on a pro-European position (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson, 2002), even while the new cleavage was starting to form. And because Europe represent the *integration* position, the mainstream parties are said to have adopted a ‘winners’ program (Kriesi et al, 2006). Other authors have come to the same conclusion that it is primarily the voter who has structured itself on two dimensions (Van der Brug and Van Spanje, 2009). More precisely these authors (*ibid*) show that the position on the political space that is most in demand for the lower educated voter remains empty. Although Kriesi et al (2012) do find that parties position themselves on the two dimensions, they also conclude that the economic and cultural demarcation position represent the ‘losers’ of globalization which had no corresponding supply. And indeed, it is the populist radical right party that has voiced the Eurosceptic and anti-immigrant position the most often (Kriesi et al, 2006).

To sum up the previous section, Western Europe has undergone some ‘critical junctures’ that have shaped the societal division along which politics is contested, these are cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). From a rational choice perspective (Downs, 1957) we can identify the social-cultural characteristics that places someone on either side of the cleavage, education being one of the characteristics that has gained in importance since the ‘critical juncture’ of globalization (Kriesi et al, 2006). Various scholars have provided evidence for the thesis that the lower educated are opposed to economic liberalism (Hainmueller, and Hiscox, 2006), immigration (Coenders and Scheepers, 2003, Coenders *et al*, 2008; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007) and the European Union (Hakhverdian *et al*, 2013) which represents the *demarcation* side of the new cleavage, vice versa for the higher educated who hold the *integration* position.

### 2.3 The education effect on political representation

Now that it is established that the lower educated have different policy preferences than the higher educated, it is important to map if this difference in individual preferences also translates into a representational difference on the national level. After all, it seems irrational of politicians to ignore the interests of a substantial number of voters, but at the same time this is exactly what happens. Subsequently, many authors have argued that in order to understand the equality of representation it is necessary to take education into account (Bovens and Wille, 2010; Hakhverdian, 2015; Schakel and van der Pas, 2020). As a result, a couple of mechanism can be identified as to why the lower educated might be structurally underrepresented.

The first reason relates to political participation. From research in the Netherlands we know that the lower educated are far less likely to participate in politics than the higher educated citizens (Bovens and Wille, 2010). This is especially the case for types of participation that requires a good social network or knowledge like contacting a politician or being a member of an interest group. Research that has looked at several Western European countries also finds that when it comes to political demonstration, the higher educated are far more likely to participate (Kriesi *et al*, 2012). It is important to note that this effect can be found even after controlling for other factors like income (Bovens and Wille, 2010) or social class (Kriesi *et al*, 2012), which suggests that at least some resulting underrepresentation that stems from a difference in participation is not produced by mere economic inequalities but by a difference in education. After all, when a group of people is not able (or willing) to articulate their interests, it follows logically that their interest will be underrepresented. Additionally, Kriesi *et al* (2012) have found that the effect of education on political participation is higher than the effect of social class. This finding emphasized the importance of studying educational attainment as a source of **inequal** representation. A further exemplifier of differences in **political** is that having an *integration* position makes an individual more likely to participate in national election and demonstrations, especially on the issue of immigration (Kriesi *et al*, 2012).

The expectation that a lack of political participation results in substantive underrepresentation is confirmed by other research (Hakhverdian, 2015). On the local level, representatives have different policy preferences than the electorate, and the difference is highest in comparison to the lower educated voter. Among the different topics this is especially the case for the issues that relate to the cultural dimension. This finding might not come as a surprise since Dutch representatives have received higher degrees of education than the average citizen. But what does seem surprising is that even within the same party, the higher educated are more progressive than the lower educated representatives (*ibid*), further demonstrating the strength of

education on political preference. Further exacerbating this representational gap is that Dutch politicians see themselves overwhelmingly as *trustees* meaning that they are free to act without continuously consulting the public (ibid). Based on this research of local representatives I expect that representatives on the national level also have a bias towards the higher educated.

A second explanation relates to ‘convergence’ which argues that mainstream parties have converged on a certain position because it produced electoral success in the past (Hooghe *et al*, 2002). In that sense the lower educated have the disadvantage that their preference is exactly the opposite of a decade’s old political agenda. As such it is unlikely that the existing parties that have had success with an EU integration position will shift to an EU demarcation position.

With **all these mechanisms** that could cause underrepresentation it comes as no surprise that many authors have found education to be an important factor to explain underrepresentation. Research based on the Netherlands finds significant differences on the policy issue of income redistribution, European integration, immigration and more (Aaldering, 2017). Other research has gone a step further and shown that when policy change happens it tends to be in line with the preferences of the higher educated disproportionately (Schakel and Van der Pas, 2020). Authors that have looked at representation in the Netherlands stress that the very proportional Dutch electoral system makes it qualify as a ‘least likely case’ to find underrepresentation (Aaldering, 2017; Schakel and Van der Pas, 2020). This means that I expect to find equal or greater underrepresentation in a cross- Western European sample.

Based on the body of research that finds substantial difference in representation between the lower and higher educated I will test the following hypothesis:

***H1: Political representation is higher for the higher educated than for the lower educated.***

Because research (Stubager, 2010) also finds stronger effects on the cultural issues than on the economic issues the following hypothesis will also be tested:

***H2: The education effect on political representation is higher on cultural issues than on economic issues.***

## 2.4 The populist radical right and representation of the lower educated

The question then becomes how this underrepresentation of the lower educated can be remedied and the populist radical right party family is widely believed to fill the gap in the political space. In the rest of this section I will examine the ideology of the populist radical right and how it forms the supply for the lower

educated demand. Then I will explore mechanisms through which this type of party can improve representation of the lower educated. As the name suggests the populist radical right party family is characterized by a combination of populist, radical and right-wing elements. The right-wing elements form the ideological basis while the radical and populist elements are the interpretation of that ideology and what I would consider the source of the appeal for the lower educated voter.

First, the populist radical right party is in its ‘rightness’ defined by its *nativism*. Nativism can be understood as a form of ‘advanced nationalism’ and it is argued to be the essence of the ideology (Mudde, 2007). After all, regular nationalism is a quite common attitude and most people would feel some sense of pride for their national identity (Coenders and Scheepers, 2003). However, nationalism turns into nativism when foreign influences are seen as a threat to the nation, and this threat is defined in cultural terms (Mudde, 2007). While nativism will thus surely lead to anti-immigrant sentiments, it can be the source of any standpoint that can be characterized as a *demarcation* of the cultural dimension. Very often this is accompanied by an ethnopluralist stance, the idea that other cultures are equal, but that it is better that all these cultures are confined to their own nation-state (Golder, 2016). This conception of nativism as the core of the populist radical right ideology gives us political scientist the tools to understand the sometimes hard to define party family. For example, Hooghe *et al* (2002) have employed the distinction between Green/ Alternative/ Libertarian values versus Traditional/Authoritarian/ Nationalist values to capture the cultural dimension. And yet, while the populist radical right across Europe can certainly be called authoritarian and nationalist, it is not always traditional. Sometimes these parties adopt cultural liberal position like acceptance of homosexuality and women’s rights. However, this position is adopted in opposition to foreign elements like traditional Islam and is thus best understood as a nativist position (Wilders, 2020).

The same nativist logic applies to the economic dimension. In fact, the classification of these parties as ‘right-wing’ refers to their cultural position, their economic position is only ‘right-wing’ when the preferred policy is based on nativism (Mudde, 2007; Golder, 2016). For example, it is argued that the populist radical right will only argue in favor for a ‘right-wing neoliberal’ policy like cuts in the welfare system if these reforms mean that the welfare system is less accessible to foreigners (Mudde, 2007). **However, this is aligned with right-wing economies only on accident, not because it has an ideological basis of economic principles.** In the age of globalization, the economic position can be classified as instrumental to policies that promote demarcation. In fact, Kriesi et al (2012) find that the populist radical right has indeed shifted from a neo-liberal position to a pro-welfare position between the 1990 and 2000. In that sense the ‘winning formula’ as conceptualized by Kitschelt (1995) in terms of cultural authoritarianism but pro-market economic policies, is antiquated. Another example of a culturally defined economic issue is that unemployment levels only affect the support for the populist radical right when there is high immigration



(Golder, 2003), suggesting that nativist ideas are at work. That is one of the reasons why the populist radical right caters to the lower educated voter, the economic issues are secondary to the cultural stance defined by the nativist ideology.

In addition, Mudde (2007) argues that there are two more features that form the ideology of this party family, authoritarianism and populism. Authoritarianism is the idea that people should respect authority and a strong belief in law and order. Several authors have identified that education has an effect on authoritarian attitudes (Stubager, 2010), further linking the lower educated voter to the populist radical right party. However, since I will not test hypotheses in this issue in this thesis I will not elaborate it further.

Populism does require more explanation because I believe that the populist ideology speaks to the lower educated voter very well by reinforcing the nativist ideology. The populist ideology is that the nation is divided in two homogenous and antagonistic groups, the 'pure people' and the 'corrupt elite' (Mudde, 2007). The narrative is that the political establishment uses its power for its own gain while paying no attention to the position of the 'average Joe'. In some way, this is actually correct. As discussed above, the lower educated are not as well represented as the higher educated. When lower educated are more likely to be in contact with people from their own group, the experience of perceived exclusion by an elite becomes understandable. Especially when the differences between them and the more influential higher educated result in an economic and cultural threat, as defined by the nativist ideology. The populist logic also assumes a homogenous, non-pluralistic view of society where common good exists that is beneficial to all (Caramani, 2017). Any challenge to the homogeneity can therefore be understood as a threat to the common good, and by the nativist ideology this includes immigrants and the deepening of the EU. The populist ideology also drives the radical character of these parties. Radicalism in politics can be defined as wanting dramatic and substantial changes. In the populist radical right this manifests itself as opposition towards established features of liberal democracy like the protection of minority rights (Mudde, 2007). This also comes back to the nativist agenda. After all, non-native elements (i.e. Islam) are likely related to minorities (i.e. Muslims).

To sum up, the populist radical right is a party family that claims to represent the 'pure people' while the mainstream parties represent the 'corrupt elite'. The core of the populist radical right party is *nativism*, the idea that the nation should be protected from foreign influence. This nativism defines the policies that are put forwards by these parties and they constitute an agenda of *demarcation* on both the economic and cultural dimension, although the latter is more important. That is why of all parties, the populist radical right is on the theoretical level the most closely aligned with the lower educated voter. And indeed, there is research that has shown the direct link between the lower educated citizen and the likelihood to vote for a



populist radical right party (Rooduijn, Burgoon, Van Elsas and Van de Werfhorst, 2017). Complementing this direct link is the indirect link that has shown that people with certain attitudes are more likely to vote for these parties, and these attitudes (like Euroscepticism) are in turn linked with being lower educated (Kriesi et al, 2012). The parties that I treat as populist radical right in this thesis are Freedom Party of Austria (Austria), Flemish Interest (Belgium), Danish People Party (Denmark), National Rally (France), Alternative for Germany (Germany), United Kingdom Independence Party (Great Britain), Party for Freedom (The Netherlands), Sweden Democrats (Sweden).

Now I will turn to the mechanisms through which populist radical right parties may improve representation of the lower educated. The obvious answer is that when these parties are in government, they represent their voters and thereby improve their representation. However, across the countries and time periods that I will be studying there has been only one instance where a populist radical right party has entered government, that case being the Freedom Party of Austria in 2018. There is also the case of the minority government for The Netherlands in 2010 that had a support agreement with the Party for Freedom, but that was a highly controversial decision at the time and the party didn't get any offices (i.e. ministers). This lack of coalition participation might be the consequence of ideological distance to the mainstream parties (see Hooghe *et al*, 2002) being exacerbated by the fact that the populist radical right parties often face a 'cordon sanitaire'. These parties are frequently shunned by the mainstream parties for their allegedly intolerant ideology that borders with racism. Following this logic, it is impossible for the populist radical right to affect political representation in any way. However, it is not necessarily the case that political influence can only be exerted by participating in the government.

Research has shown that mainstream parties can adopt an accommodative strategy in response to the emergence of other parties (Meguid, 2005). On the issue of immigration attitudes, mainstream parties in Western Europe have shifted their position to the right in response to the success of new parties (Van Spanje, 2010; Abou-Chadi & Werner, 2018). This shift where parties across the political spectrum become more anti-immigration would result in a better representation of the lower educated. Even though this strategy might prevent the populist radical right from entering office the 'intended' effect remains the same, a better representation for their constituency. Another study that strengthens the plausibility of how the populist radical right pressures mainstream parties is Kriesi et al (2012) who find that in countries that have strong populist radical right parties the issue of immigration is the most impactful predictor of party preference. Research from the Netherlands also shows that as the populist radical right enters the political stage the underrepresentation of the lower educated decreases on certain policy issues (Aaldering, 2017). This suggests that these parties are indeed the supply that the lower educated voter demands and is more confirmation that research on political representation should focus on issues and government policy.

Furthermore, Abou-Chadi and Werner (2018) show that this shift in position of more cultural protectionism on one side and the increased influence of the populist radical right on the other, is not merely a collinearity but a causality. That is to say that the change in party position is not just related to a change in political demand, but that it can partly be explained by looking at the different party strategies. More specifically, when the populist radical right gets representation in parliament, other parties perceive the new party as a threat and will employ strategies to counter it, including shifting their position (ibid).

Based on the research above, I expect that an increase in political support for populist radical right parties will have the effect of causing an accommodative strategy by the mainstream parties that will improve the representation of the lower educated voter. That only leaves the question how we should approach political support. There are two possible options for measuring political support in a quantifiable way, seat share and vote share. Research finds that having seats in parliament forms an important basis for the future survival of small parties (which is the case for the most populist radical right parties) and thus more opportunity to influence the strategy of mainstream parties (Dinas, Reira and Roussiass, 2015). In the light of the party strategy argument that causes mainstream parties to adapt their position, Dinas *et al* (2015) note that when a party has seats, they are far more likely to be a threat because a vote on the populist radical right is no longer a wasted vote. After all, a citizen might not vote for a party that is ideologically closer but has no change of gaining a seat. Moreover, because Abou-Chadi and Werner (2018) find that mainstream parties react to populist radical right presence in parliament, approaching success by using seat shares is more meaningful than vote shares. That is why I will test the following hypothesis:

*H3: Representation of the lower educated improves as the populist radical right parties gain more seats.*

Furthermore, since the populist radical right mobilizes more on cultural issues, I expect that any improvement in representation will be greater on the cultural issues than on the economic issues. That is why I will test the following hypothesis:

*H4: Congruence of the lower educated improves more on the cultural issues than on the economic issues as the populist radical right gains more seats.*

## 2.5 Overview of hypotheses

In the table below is an overview of the hypothesis.

Table 1: Overview of hypotheses

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H1	Political representation is higher for the higher educated than for the lower educated.
H2	The education effect on political representation is higher on cultural issues than on economic issues.
H3	Representation of the lower educated improves as the populist radical right parties gain more seats.
H4	Congruence of the lower educated improves more on the cultural issues than on the economic issues as the populist radical right gains more influence.

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## 3.0 Data and method

### 3.1 Quantitative analysis

In this thesis I will use the quantitative research method to estimate the effect of education on representation since it is the most suitable for analyzing large N survey data which in turn offers the possibility of checking for general trends across the countries of interest. Using a qualitative method would not allow the inclusion of this many countries within the scope of this thesis. It also allows for the addition of relevant control variables to ensure that the measured effect can indeed be ascribed to the independent variables. In this chapter I will describe the data that I have used and the operationalization of the variables. After that I will elaborate the different statistical models.

### 3.2 The data: European Social Survey and Chapel Hill Expert Survey

The European Social Survey (ESS), rounds 3, 5, 7 and 9 will be used to monitor the preferences of citizens with different educational levels. This will be done for the countries Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, The Netherlands and Sweden. I will focus on these countries because they can be considered Western European and most literature has kept its analysis to this country group. However, despite their similarities there are also many differences between these countries that might affect the analysis. Denmark as an example is often assumed to be more egalitarian in general, which makes it more

likely to have good representation of the lower educated. When it comes to the interaction of representation and populist radical right seat share it must be noted that Germany has a longstanding political struggle over national identity and the guilt of the Second World War which makes it reasonable to assume that nationalism (and especially nativism) will have a different meaning for the German citizens. This means that the data can be characterized as ‘multi-level’ since there are two distinct variable levels. The first level is that of the respondent that includes individual data like age, gender or education. The second level is the country level that captures data that is the same for every respondent who resides in that country like government policy. This introduces some statistical problems that need to be taken into consideration when designing the models, those concerns will be addressed more in depth in that section.

Another feature of the ESS data is that it includes multiple time points which is also a distinct level of its own. This is less of a problem on the country levels, but it should be noted that this does not mean that the ESS is panel data like other surveys that are repeated over multiple years. The respondents are different in each round so any effect that is found over time does not reflect a change in individual respondents but at best a change in respondents who are similar.

The data is typically collected from September of the survey year up to January of the following year. Table 2 presents an overview of some relevant statistics on the used data, a more detailed breakdown on the country level can be found in the appendix. This needs to be taken into account when elections are held in the survey period. In that case, the government position will be determined by the government that was in office at the start of the survey period (see Döring and Manow, 2020). Alternatively, I could have chosen the policy position of the government that was in office for the most days in the survey period. **But I judged that this would make the measurement less valid because it is unlikely that a government will produce meaningful changes in policy in the first days or weeks of being in office.**

The Chapel Hill Expert Survey is a survey where experts are asked to evaluate the position of political parties which can then be used to estimate the government policy. **The advantage of this data is that it offers a much more precise measurement of the government position than using the ESS question ‘How satisfied are you with government?’, which is very vague in its meaning.** The experts estimate the party positions by looking at party manifestos, television debates and voting behavior on legislation and are therefore a comprehensive measurement of a certain policy position. The authors of the CHES data argue that this is the best measurement for complex matters like party position since experts can evaluate the diversity of information very well (Hooghe *et al*, 2010). A potential drawback of this method is that the average amount of experts per country hovers around 11 which could be small enough to include bias (see the appendix for more details). Another possible source of bias is that since the experts are political scientists there might be

a ‘scientific consensus bias’. However, the CHES team published reports on the surveys that show that these concerns are nothing that significantly problematizes the validity of the CHES data (Hooghe *et al*, 2010).

Table 2: Data collection periods and response rates.

Wave	Data collection period	Total response N	Average response %
ESS round 3	01.09.06-07.04.07	10.094	54,42
ESS round 5	15.09.10-06.05.11	13.787	50,53
ESS round 7	01.08.14-07.12.15	16.002	49,39
ESS round 9	28.08.18-23.05.19	14.050	43,91
CHES 2006	Summer 2007	87	53,51
CHES 2010	Spring 2011	113	34,93
CHES 2014	Fall 2014	n/a	n/a
CHES 2019	Winter 2020	n/a	n/a

Source: ESS, CHES

What might also be a serious consideration when estimation validity is the timing of the surveys. As can be seen in table 2 the data collection periods only overlap closely in 2014 while for the other time periods the difference can be almost a year. Based on that, the argument can be made that this timing difference could introduce bias when a country experiences a specific event of that causes such an upheaval that governments have significantly shifted their position after the ESS data was collected (or vice versa). However, I do not consider this to be a problem since most governments are compromise-based coalitions that have predetermined goals for the governing period. In addition, in such short timespans the positions of parties are very stable and a substantial ideological shift is unlikely. Furthermore, there has been no dramatic event during the collection of the survey data. For example, the economic crisis happened in 2008 and the refugee crisis started in 2013 and was already on the agenda during the first administration of the 2014 surveys. Based on these considerations I do not believe that the timing-differences will lead to bias.

The method of combing the ESS data with the CHES data is one of several potential methods. Another method could be to take the government position by using the estimates of politically knowledgeable respondents in the same survey. There are scholars (Aaldering, 2017) who argue that this method has more benefits than drawbacks, but it is unfortunately not an option for this thesis. The reason for this is that there is no pan-European survey available that asks citizens for their position on certain topics as well as asking them to place political parties on these issues. A second alternative method would be to send citizens and

parliamentarians the same survey and calculate congruence based on those differences. This data is unfortunately also not available on the European level.

A third approach would be to quantify opinions and policy. For example, support for migration could be measured by the number of immigrants a respondent or politician would want to let in the country. This would remove any ambiguity about what a respondent would consider ‘many immigrants’ or what a 7,4 on a 0-10 scale means on ‘support for immigration’. In the light of using combining the ESS data with the CHES data this ambiguity could be a problem when political scientists (as a group) have a different take on the hospitality of their country’s government than the electorate. That being said, this data is not readily available and would be very context-sensitive which would fall beyond the scope of this thesis. That is why I consider the approach I am using in this thesis the best method available to compare the issue attitudes of citizens with the government position.

### 3.3 Operationalization of variables

The dependent variable will be operationalized as the difference between the policy preferences of the respondent and the weighted average of the policy preferences of the government parties, for the rest of the thesis referred to as *congruence*. This way of defining representation is argued to be among the most effective for measuring different levels of representation between citizens (Golder and Stramski, 2010). A score is produced where a small value means that the respondent is very well represented by the government policy, and where a large value means that the respondent is not very well represented.

As mentioned in the theory chapter, the political space is two-dimensional with an economic dimension and a cultural dimension, which are in turn comprised of various issues. Since I am measuring congruence based on the idea that representation operates on the policy level, those policies should be theoretically related to the dimensions of the education cleavage. To measure the economic dimension, I will simply look at income redistribution while I will look at immigration policy and European integration for the cultural dimension. Although the issue of European integration could relate to both the economic and cultural dimension, I will regard it as a cultural issue for the sake of interpreting hypothesis 2 and 4. In table 3 are the specific items from the data that I will be using. I will now discuss the extent to which these items can be reasonably assumed to produce valid results.

Table 3: Question wording of items in the ESS and CHES data

Issue	ESS item	CHES item
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Income redistribution	The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels. Answers range from 1 (agree strongly) to 5 (disagree strongly).	Position on redistribution of wealth. 0: Strongly favors redistribution, 10: Strongly opposes redistribution.
Immigration policy	Allow many/few immigrants from different race/ethnic group from majority. 1: Allow many, 2: Allow some, 3: Allow few, 4: Allow none.	Position on immigration policy. 0: Strongly opposes tough policy, 10: Strongly favors tough policy.
European integration	Now thinking about the European Union, some say European unification should go further. Others say it has already gone too far. Using this card, what number on the scale best describes your position? 0: Unification has gone to far, 10: Unification should go further.	Overall orientation of party leadership towards European integration. 1: Strongly opposed, 7: Strongly in favor.

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Source: ESS, CHES

Income redistribution is worded almost identical in both surveys. One difference is that the CHES item is worded in terms of ‘wealth’ instead of ‘income’. I do not believe that this disturbs the validity of the data since income and wealth are very intertwined and most often understood to be the same thing even though they are strictly speaking different. In order to harmonize the scaling, the ESS item was recoded from a 1-5 range to a 0-4 range and multiplied by 2.5. Immigration policy is worded quite differently but I will argue that they measure the same thing nonetheless. Immigration is politicized as the result of non-Western immigration. The fact that Germans are occasionally moving to France or Austrians to the Netherlands is hardly a political matter. The issue has been placed on the agenda because there have been groups of immigrants that bring different cultures, like Moroccan or Turkish labor immigrants. Or more recently, the influx of refugees as asylum seekers. Especially in the light of the theoretical argument in this thesis that opposition to immigration is related to the nativist ideology. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the CHES item on immigration policy covers this ‘non-Western’ immigration. The ESS item reflects this with the wording ‘different race/ethnic group’. In order to harmonize the scaling, the ESS item was recoded from a 1-4 range to a 0-3 range and multiplied by 3.33. Unfortunately, the European integration issue has been excluded from the ESS data in 2010. Although ‘unification’ and ‘integration’ are

differently worded, the ESS questionnaire specifies that it means integration and not enlargement. In order to harmonize the scaling, the CHES item was recoded from a 1-7 range to a 0-6 range and multiplied by 1,67. The reason that I have chosen to ‘blow up’ the smaller scales instead of ‘reducing’ the larger scales is that I want to keep the variance. Reducing scales means that respondents or government positions that are different will be put in the same category, thus removing relevant variance.

The first independent variable is the highest obtained educational level of respondents. The self-reported educational level is then harmonized by the ESS team along the ISCED scale which allows for comparison among countries. In order to make the interpretation more meaningful and increase the size of the educational groups, the ISCED scale will be reduced to a three-point variable where educational attainment can be ‘low’, ‘medium’ or ‘high’. Respondents who had completed an education up to lower secondary education were coded as having a ‘low’ education. Respondent who had completed a Bachelor level education were coded as having a ‘high’ education. The various educational attainments in between were coded as ‘middle’. These different educational levels were entered in the models as dummy variables where the ‘middle’ education is the reference category. The second independent variable is the seat share of populist radical right parties. This data is obtained from the ParlGov database (Döring and Manow, 2020). Control variables will include age and gender.

### 3.4 The multi-level model

In this thesis I will look at the effects of educational attainment on congruence and how this might change when populist radical right parties enter the stage. The variables that measure congruence can be characterized as an *interval* variable which would mean that normally a regression analysis can be used to estimate the effect. However, in order to correctly interpret the various results of a regression analysis, i.e. whether or not a variable is statistically significant, four assumptions need to be fulfilled. The first assumption is linearity and additivity. This entails that the relation between the dependent and independent variables can be expressed in a straight slope and that combining the effects of the independent variable improves the fit of the model. In order for this assumption to be true the fit of the model should keep increasing as the model is being build up per variable. The second assumption is that the sample means are normally distributed which is very unlikely to be a problem with the large N of the ESS data. The third assumption is that of homoscedasticity which means that the variance of scores should be the same at each point of the estimated slope. The final assumption is that the errors are independent from each other.

The data that I am using will violate the assumptions of homoscedasticity and independent errors because the units of analysis, individual respondents, are nested within countries and years. The data can therefore



be characterized as multi-level which means there is a high risk that there is intra-class- and serial correlation being present in the data. If this is not accounted for in the analysis it will result in underestimating the standard errors which will probably result in biased coefficients. But arguably more important is that it will lead to downward biased standard errors which will result in a t-value that is too large which in turn results in a p-value that is too small and therefore results in finding a significant statistical effect that is not really there (otherwise known as a type I error). Considering the data structure, I will address both of these possible sources of bias. A final source of bias could be the presence of outliers. However, this is not a problem because the scores are confined within scales where even the values at the extremes make perfect sense from a theoretical perspective.

One way to deal with the multi-level data structure on the country level is the use of dummy variables. This country dummy would then absorb all the variance that is specific to the country-level. However, this would not allow for an estimation of the effect of the seat share by the populist radical right since that is also a variable on the country-level. That is why I will use the random effects approach to multi-level modelling. In a normal regression there is only one error component, but the random effects approach allows for a second error component that captures the variance on the country level. The greatest benefit is that it allows for the inclusion of other country level variables like seat share, which are of course vital for the analysis. The random effect will be assumed for the intercept as well as the slope of the model. It is likely that countries have different intercepts since e.g. electoral systems that are more proportional are likely to be more congruent anyway. The slopes or betas of the variables may also be random because the effects of e.g. education or populist radical right might be different in each country, an effect that is known as heterogeneity. The latter could be the case since the socialization theory states that education has an effect on preferences because the institution shapes the individual (Coenders *et al*, 2008). Even for other issues beside immigration, it is not unreasonable to think that the education system in the United Kingdom instills different values on the European Union than Germany. Only the random effects approach can deal with this complexity in an adequate manner. For the concern of serial correlation, I will introduce dummy variables for the different years. In contrast to the intra-class correlation this is an adequate solution since I am not testing variables that are time invariant.

Because I will be testing congruence on three distinct policy issues, I will be using three different models as seen in the table below. Every model will then be run again to see if the seat share of the populist radical right improves the congruence of the lower educated. For hypothesis 1 to be confirmed there should be significant effect of the education dummies where the lower educated dummy has a positive sign while the higher educated dummy has a negative sign. After all, congruence was operationalized as distance towards the government and the higher educated citizens are expected to be closer to the government position while

the lower educated are further away. Hypotheses 2 and 4 will be confirmed or rejected based on comparing the coefficients of the different models instead of being interpreted directly from the models. From the literature it is expected that these coefficients will be larger on the cultural issues of immigration and European integration. Hypothesis 3 will be confirmed when the interaction effect of populist radical right seat share and the lower educated dummy is significant and has a negative sign, meaning that the distance towards the government has decreased and therefore an improvement in congruence.

Table 3: Overview of the models

Model	Hypotheses	Dependent variable	Independent variables	Control variable
1	H1, H3	Economic congruence	Education, populist radical right seat share*	Age, gender
2	H1, H3	Cultural congruence	Education, populist radical right seat share*	Age, gender
3	H1, H3	EU congruence	Education, populist radical right seat share*	Age, gender

\*Tested in the re-run only







## 4.0 Analysis


### 4.1 Descriptive statistics

The descriptive statistics of the various variables that I will be analyzing in this thesis are found in table 5. In order to give more insight into the differences between the educational groups in the different countries and waves I have included some graphs in which the means of the three educational groups are compared with the government policy position. There a few things that stand out and that is why I will discuss these in graphs in more detail. On a general note, the first thing is that across the three issues the scores of the citizens are fairly stable while the government has more substantial shifts in position. This is of course to be expected since governments can shift ideology when other parties form the government after an election. A second general trend is that the lower and higher educated represent opposite sides of the spectrum and that the middle educated usually hold the middle position. However, there are also some issue specific patterns that are worth some explanation before going to the results of the analysis.


For the issue of immigration, the results of the ESS data follow the predicted pattern, education has a negative relation with support for though immigration policy. However, governments seem more congruent with the lower educated voter than with the higher educated voter which is the opposite of what is expected. This seems to indicate that the measurement is not valid because it can be considered an ‘academic consensus’ that the underrepresentation of the lower educated on this issue is driving the rise of the populist radical right party family precisely because the parties that are usually in government allow too much immigration.







In spite of that, it may be too soon to draw the conclusion that the data is invalid. Although that argument can certainly be made, I will deal with that in the discussion section of this thesis and for now will argue why the data might still be considered valid. Let’s take the Netherlands as an example because that country has received substantial attention in the literature and is also the country I am most familiar with. First, we need to look at the meaning of the scores. A respondent would score a 3.33 when that person answered, ‘allow some immigrants’, a 6.67 when that person answered, ‘allowed a few immigrants’ and a 10.0 when that person answered, ‘allow none’. The comparative high support for a strict immigration policy is primarily caused by the VVD in the years 2006, 2014 and 2018. In 2010 the coalition was formed by the CDA and CU. I would consider the VVD as skeptic about immigration from non-Western countries. We must not forget that populist radical right politicians like Geert Wilders and Rita Verdonk came from the VVD. The real question would be ‘why is the VVD not in favor of a liberal immigration policy’ as it is in recent years the largest party in the Netherlands and should, when following the participation logic of Bovens and Wille (2010), be a stronghold of higher educated preferences. Furthermore, studies from the Netherlands show that by using other data the government is in some years closer to the lower educated voter on this topic than to the higher educated voter (Aaldering, 2017). Invalid data remains an option, but the dynamics are complicated.





On the issue of European integration, the positions of citizens and their governments are in line with the expectations from the literature. Higher educated citizens seem in every year and in every country more in favor of European integration than the lower educated citizens. Although it is unexpected that in some cases the middle educated seem less in favor of European integration than their lower educated counterparts. On the government side, the overwhelming support for EU integration is in line with research that found that mainstream parties have converged on support for the European Union (Hooghe et al, 2002). The only exception is Great Britain where EU support is very low but that finding should come as no surprise since as of this date Great Britain is no longer an EU member. At any rate, the importance of multi-level modelling becomes clear.





On the issue of income redistribution, the pattern is also as expected. Citizens with a higher education favor less income redistribution since they tend to have higher incomes than the lower educated (Schakel and Hakhverdian, 2018). Most governments tend to be conservative when it comes to income redistribution, which is also expected because politicians are mostly drawn from the higher socio-economic strata where incomes are higher. When the government becomes more socialist like France in 2014, the government shifts position in the expected direction and becomes more congruent with the lower educated.





Table 5: Descriptive statistics

	N	Avg./%	Min	Max	SD
Congruence on immigration policy	57968	2.78	0.06	9.14	1.92
Congruence on European integration	43541	3.38	0.00	9.18	2.34
Congruence on income redistribution	58262	3.12	0.06	7.56	1.82
Education (dummy)	51987		1.00	3.00	
Lower educated	13748	26.40			
Middle educated (reference)	26059	50.10			
Higher educated	12180	23.40			
Seat share populist radical right	59120	6.22	0.00	27.90	7.78
Age	58966	49.07	14.00	114.00	18.62



Gender (dummy)	59119	0.00	1.00
Female (reference)	30821	52.10	
Male	28289	47.9	

Source: ESS, CHES

## 4.2 Multi-level analysis

The results of the statistical analysis are shown in table 6 which will be discussed per hypothesis. The models have been built up one parameter at a time to check for an improvement of the model fit. Afterwards the parameters were entered as random effects in the model, also one at a time. In some cases, adding a parameter did not improve the fit of the model, those will be marked in table 6, which shows the results of the analysis. However, this also means that the coefficients in model 3 that tested the effect of populist radical right seat share and its interaction effect with the lower educated should not be interpreted.

Table 6: Multi-level analysis results of issue congruence

Model	Congruence on immigration policy		Congruence on European integration		Congruence on income redistribution	
Lower educated dummy	-.045 (.045)	-.189* (.065)	.014 (.035)	.048 (.040)	.054 (.039)	.082 (.049)
Higher educated dummy	.590*** (.133)	.591*** (.129)	-.592*** (.138)	-.595*** (.139)	-.126** (.042)	-.126** (.042)
Age	-.009*** (.002)	-.009*** (0.002)	.006* (.002)	.006* (.002)	.005** (.002)	.004** (.002)
Gender dummy	-.022 (.016)	-.023 (.016)	.037 (.023)	.034 (.025)	-.081 (.044)	-.081 (.044)
Round 5 dummy	.169 (.153)	.213 (.139)			.110 (.228)	.132 (.221)
Round 7 dummy	-.322 (.179)	-.307 (.194)	-.021 (.108)	.016 (.098)	-.257 (.331)	-.253 (.328)
Round 9 dummy	.536** (.185)	.626** (.214)	-.509 (.588)	-.615 (.612)	.445 (.234)	.537* (.221)
Populist radical right seat share		-.023 (.020)		-.035* (.017)		-.022 (.019)

Interaction PRR seat share x lower educated	.039*			-0.004		<i>-.004</i>
	(.015)			(.004)		<i>(.004)</i>
Intercept	3.126***	3.177***	3.359***	3.113***	3.099***	3.127***
	(.205)	(.184)	(.316)	(.306)	(.104)	(.308)

Source: ESS, CHES

\*: p<0.10 \*\*: p<0.05 \*\*\*: p<0.01. Standard deviations between brackets. Parameters that did not improve the model fit are in italics

From the tables above it becomes clear that there is a significant effect of education on policy representation. Hypothesis 1 stated that policy representation was better for the higher educated than for the lower educated and this seems to be the case on the issue of European integration and income redistribution. This finding is precisely what was expected based on the literature and in that sense corroborates the results of previous research that has studies the effects of education on political representation. Especially the study of Rosset and Stecker (2019) who found the same effect of education on the issue of European integration with the same data and method. Less expected was that there is no difference in representation between the lower and middle educated, except in a re-run of model 1 where the lower education dummy becomes significant after including the increase in political influence by the populist radical right.

However, based on the theory about political participation this makes sense because the highest echelons of political participation are occupied by the highest educated citizens. My findings could reflect that in comparison with the lower educated, the middle educated also cannot overcome the barriers of participation. Furthermore, because research on the ‘socialization’ theory (which is driving the explanation for the education effect) finds that this effect manifests itself most strongly on the college level, it does make sense that the differences between the lower educated and middle educated are marginal. Additionally, it could indicate that on the issue of income redistribution and European integration the ‘education’ cleavage has indeed produced distinct classes.

But what is surprising is that there is a positive effect of education on congruence on immigration, meaning that the distance to the government position increases as someone becomes higher educated. This is a very unexpected conclusion since immigration was the issue where the representational gap was assumed to be the highest, as it is a cultural issue. There are two possible interpretations of this findings. The first one is theoretical, which will be explained in a moment while the second is methodological which will be explained in the discussion section. The theoretical explanation is that in the time frame of the studied

period the electoral pressure was so high that the mainstream parties adopted (and maintained) an accommodative strategy on this single issue. For example, in the Netherlands the VVD was one of the government parties and this party had a fairly tough immigration standpoint. And still, in recent times there as emerged a second populist radical right party which might a writing on the wall of the electoral threat the mainstream parties were facing. At any rate, hypothesis 1 is partly confirmed since there is an education effect on congruence on the European integration and income redistribution issue while it is the opposite on the immigration issue.

Hypothesis 2 was that the education effect is higher on cultural issues than on the economic issue. This can be checked when looking at the coefficients of the education dummies between the different models. From that it is clear that there is a larger coefficient on the cultural issues (European integration and immigration) than the economic issue (income redistribution). However, this can only be concluded when comparing the higher educated with the lower and middle educated as a unified group because the difference in political representation between the lower and middle educated is not significant. After all, an important element of this hypothesis was that the coefficient between the lower and middle educated would also be 1) significant and 2) higher for the cultural issues than for the economic issues. This finding does seem to indicate that the most salient issues of the new 'education' cleavage are on the cultural dimension. That is why hypothesis 2 will be partly confirmed.

Hypothesis 3 was that the representation of the lower educated had improved in the years that the populist radical right gained more seats. This can be checked by looking at the interaction effect of the lower education dummy with the seat share of the populist radical right. When it is true that the populist radical right improves political representation there should be a negative coefficient (in other words, decrease the distance with the government position) that is statistically significant. On the issue of income redistribution, the addition of the populist radical right in the model did not improve the fit of the model meaning that these parties had no influence on improved representation. This can be interpreted as evidence that the populist radical right parties are indeed not mobilizing on the economic issues but instead focus on cultural issues in line with their nativist ideology. This conclusion is more drastic than what would be expected based on the theory, that argued that these parties still have some agenda on the economic dimension. However, this could be explained by the nature of the issue that I have chosen to represent the economic dimension. Income redistribution is not suited to be absorbed by the nativist ideology as other economic issues like the welfare state. On the issue of European integration there was an overall effect of improving representation, but not specifically for the lower educated (since that parameter is not statistically significant). This could possibly reflect a general trend that Western European societies have become somewhat more Eurosceptic, aiding the rise of the populist radical right which opposes European

integration based on, again, their nativist ideology. Another possible reason that the interaction effect of populist radical right seat share with the lower educated voter is not present in the results is that my analysis does not capture the complex dynamics of party strategies. As Kitschelt (1995) argues in the case of Great Britain, the probability of lower educated citizens being dissatisfied with their traditional social democratic representatives is far lower because the Labour party was in opposition in the years prior his analysis. When the lower educated are less likely to feel unrepresented by their traditional party, it is also less likely that they will vote for a new party like the populist radical right. On the issue of immigration, the results are again unexpected. The interaction effect with the lower educated is statistically significant but also positive meaning that the increased influence of the populist radical right has increased the distance to the government position. In other words, the populist radical right decreases political representation of the lower educated. **A finding that most likely indicates invalid data and will be discussed further in the discussion section. Suffice to say that hypothesis 3 needs to be rejected based on the results of the analysis.**

Hypothesis 4 was that the improvement of the representation of the lower educated by the populist radical right is higher on the cultural issues than on the economic issues. The expectation was that political representation would improve on all issues as the populist radical right gained more seats, but that the coefficient would be larger on the cultural issues of immigration and European integration. First, since the inclusion of the populist radical right seat share and its interaction with the lower educated did not improve the fit of the model on the issue of income redistribution the comparison cannot be made. However, since the interaction effect of the lower educated and populist radical right seat share on the issue of European integration was not statistically significant and even decreased on the issue of immigration, this hypothesis needs to be rejected any way.

Table 7: Overview of confirming/rejecting hypotheses

H1	Political representation is higher for the higher educated than for the lower educated.	Partly confirmed
H2	The education effect on political representation is higher on cultural issues than on economic issues.	Partly confirmed
H3	Representation of the lower educated improved in the years that populist radical right parties had gained parliamentary representation.	Rejected
H4	Congruence of the lower educated improves more on the cultural issues than on the economic issues as the populist radical right gains more influence.	Rejected

## 5.0 Conclusion

In this thesis I aimed to go beyond single country studies that have looked at the representation of different educational groups on a number of issues by employing a multilevel analysis of eight Western European countries in the period 2006-2018. The starting point for this analysis was the theory of Kriesi et al (2006, 2012) that argued that across Western Europe education is the defining characteristic of a new cleavage which centers around the new issues of European integration and immigration. These issues are defined by their impact on the cultural dimension that was argued to be more important than the economic dimension. Both dimensions are characterized by an *integration* position on one side and a *demarcation* position on the other side. In the contemporary academic literature, there is much research that has found that the lower educated are more likely to have a position on the economic and cultural issues that can be characterized as favoring *demarcation* (Aaldering, 2017; Coenders and Scheepers, 2003; Coenders et al, 2008; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006, 2007; Hakhverdian et al, 2013; Rosset and Stecker, 2019; Schakel and Hakhverdian, 2018). In addition, I analyzed whether or not the expected underrepresentation of the lower educated would improve when the populist radical right gains more political influence. After all, these parties are not only in theory closest to the lower educated voter, the lower educated citizens is more likely to vote on these parties (Rooduijn et al, 2017).

Based on the literature I expected that education would affect political preference because education socializes citizens to have certain attitudes, especially on the college level (Coenders and Scheepers, 2003; Coenders et al, 2008; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006, 2007). On the economic dimension being lower educated results in a favorable position towards income redistribution because citizens gain more advanced knowledge of the dynamics of economics which leads to more liberal attitudes as opposed to the citizens that did not receive higher education. On the cultural dimension there are two issues that I have analyzed, European integration and immigration. On both issues being lower educated results in a *demarcation* position because through higher education a person becomes more cosmopolitan while a lack of higher education makes an individual more nationalistic. As European integration means that own nation becomes more susceptible to European influence and loses political autonomy, it was expected that the lower educated are more hostile towards the process of European integration. The same logic applies to the issue of immigration where immigrants are seen as a cultural threat.

In addition, because having a higher education results in advantages to political participation the lower educated are worse represented than their higher educated counterparts. This mismatch of the political demand of the lower educated not being met with the correct supply has given room to the populist radical

right. The populist radical right party family can be characterized by a *nativist* ideology that combines nationalism with xenophobic elements. As a result, these parties pursue policies that can be defined as policies of *demarcation*, meaning they seek to exclude foreign elements from the nation-state. This particularly affects their cultural positions where they oppose European integration and immigration. Based on their ideology and the fact that the lower educated have a demand for *demarcation* policies there was a political opportunity, I expected these parties to improve the representation of the lower educated when they gained more traction and formed an electoral threat to the mainstream parties. After all, research has shown that when a new challenger arises, mainstream parties adopt a strategy that makes them shift their position, so it more resembles the ideology of the challenger in order to keep the challenger from getting votes.

The analysis showed that on the issue of income redistribution the higher educated are indeed better represented than the lower and middle educated, but that there is no difference in the representation between the lower and middle educated. This suggests that the representation effect starts **the** manifest at the level of higher education, in line with the ‘socialization’ theory. Since the lower educated do indeed face underrepresentation on this issue it was expected that the rise of the populist radical right would improve their representation. However, this is not the case and indicates that these parties do not have such a clear-cut economic agenda. This is possibly the result of operationalizing the economic issue as income redistribution which cannot be defined in nativist terms. A great further avenue for future research would be to compare the position of populist radical right parties of several economic issues of which some have the potential of ethnic exclusion. When the economic policies of the populist radical right parties are indeed defined by their nativism, there should be a difference between a more general issue like income redistribution and welfare austerity for immigrants. In that sense the economic issue of welfare would be defined in cultural terms.

The analysis showed that on the issue of European integration the higher educated are also better represented than the lower educated. However, contrarily to the expectations the representation of the lower educated did not improve as the populist radical right party gained more seats. That being said, the populist radical right did improve representation in general which indicates that the Eurosceptic position of these parties resonates in Western European societies as a whole.

On the issue of immigration, the results were very surprising and assuming the validity of the data (more on that in the discussion section) this can only be interpreted as the consequence of a strong accommodative strategy of the mainstream parties to the electoral threat of the populist radical right. What is even more surprising is that there was a statistically significant positive effect of the interaction between being lower

educated and the populist radical right seat share, indicating that the representation of the lower educated on immigration becomes worse. When assuming validity of the data this result in completely unexplainable.

## 6.0 Discussion

As mentioned earlier this is the section where I will explain the methodological reason for the unexpected finding, in particular that the higher educated are worse represented than the lower educated on the immigration issue and that the increased seat share of the populist radical right resulted in an decrease in representation for the lower educate. While I would consider the two surveys valid in their own right, I suspect that combining the two surveys does potentially lead to an invalid dataset. That is why in this section I will examine the data in more detail and critically reflect on the method of combining multiple surveys. After all, there are on paper several benefits to this approach so for further research it is necessary to understand the limitations. As a reminder, in table 3 is the precise wording of the questions and the range of possible answers.

When it comes to the reliability of the CHES data, a great reason of concern would be if the experts produce a large variance in their answer. However, this is not the case for the 2002 and 2006 surveys as the standard deviation is very small (Hooghe et al, 2010). When Hooghe et al, (2010) cross-validated the validity with other data of party positions they found that these datasets correlate highly with each other which indicates that the CHES data is indeed valid. This positive evaluation is reproduced for the 2010 dataset (Bakker et al, 2015) and leads me to the verdict that it can responsibly be assumed that the 2014 and 2019 surveys are also both reliable and valid. After all, I did not include questions from the years 2014 and 2019 that weren't present in the 2006 and 2010 data. When looking at the data of the various parties that where in government in the Netherlands the evaluation by the experts seems to reflect the debate at the time. The existing immigration policy was not very contested by the CDA and D66 while the VVD was a clear proponent of a stricter policy (see figure 4). For survey data like the ESS it is more difficult to evaluate reliability and validity, even though extensive reports exist. In academic research, the usefulness of this type of data is often assumed by virtue of large amounts of respondents. Furthermore, because the differences between the educational groups are in line with the literature on the effect of education on political preference, I have little reason to doubt the reliability and validity of the ESS data. However, I can give some methodological comments.

Simply put, the reason that the results on congruence where so surprising comes down to the fact that the experts have evaluated the party position way higher in comparison to the answers that the respondents have given. This raises the question how this discrepancy in values was reached. One possibility is that the

recoding of the variables to fit on the same scale was the culprit. However, I believe that this concern can be dismissed for the issues of income and European integration since these scales had enough values that they should have kept their meaning. The income redistribution item from the ESS had 5 answer categories which is considered adequate by most standards in the social sciences. The European integration item from the CHES had values ranging on a 7-point scale which is even better for capturing variance.



The same cannot be said for the immigration issue where the ESS respondents had only 4 answer categories for the item ‘Allow many/few immigrants from different race/ethnic group from majority’. What is more, the middle answer possibilities of ‘a few’ and ‘some’ are vague in their meaning. Furthermore, after these values were recoded there was no middle position for the respondents which might have caused the congruence measure to be warped. This lack of answer options could also lead to problems when it causes the respondent being unable to align him/herself with a party position. When we again consider the Dutch case, it was not possible for the CDA, D66 or VVD voter to hold the same value. Figure 5 reflects that very few people would go as far to say that no immigrants should enter the country, which effectively means that the wording of the question resulted in a ‘soft’ maximum of 6.67 for a respondent to score. In the context of this thesis research question it would have been better to have used survey data that asked for a specific number of immigrants instead of a vague ‘some’ or ‘a few’.

However, this leaves the researcher of political representation with a dilemma. Should he/she keep using attitudes to measure representation under the assumption that a citizen is best represented by someone that has similar values? Or should the researcher look for the ‘hard numbers’ with the risk that many respondents are not knowledgeable enough on these issues to produce meaningful answers? When it comes to substantive representation I would plead for the latter.

To sum up, in my thesis I tried to find data that best captures the dynamics of the economic and cultural dimension with the education cleavage and the ideology of the populist radical right. I firmly stand behind the decision to compare citizen attitudes and government policy as the best measure of representation. The notion that researchers should be focused on specific issues as clear operationalizations of the political dimensions is also something I would consider a superior approach compared to measurement of mere attitudes. Policies are the tangible outcomes of political process and power relations in society, and therefore representation should be measured on that level. This leaves the researcher with the difficult task of measuring the ‘objectively quantifiable opinions’ on these issues. Thus, when it comes to future research, we need better data that can unequivocally prove the existence of a representational gap in a cross-national research design. This data could take the form of expanding the ESS (or related surveys) to parliamentarians. However, the best approach would be to take more exact measurements of the policy



issues like a specific number of immigrants in the respondent's country/city/ neighborhood, or willingness to have an asylum-seeker-center nearby. In other words, policies should be directly measured with a broad spectrum of indicators. Only then can we make definite statements about the type of representation that matters, substantial policy representation. Although this data is hard to gather on a cross-national scale, it is the only type of data that can replace the words 'it seems' with 'it is' in the conclusions of research papers.



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## 8.0. Appendix

Appendix A1: ESS round 3 data collection period and response rate

Country	Data collection period	Response N	Response %
<b>Austria</b>	18.07.07-05.11.07	2 405	64.0
Belgium	23.10.06-19.02.07	1 798	61.0
Denmark	19.09.06-02.05.07	1 505	50.8
France	19.09.06-07.04.07	1 986	46.0
Germany	01.09.06-15.01.07	2 916	54.5

Netherlands	16.09.06-18.03.07	1 889	59.8
<b>Sweden</b>	21.09.06-03.02.07	1 927	65.9
<b>United Kingdom</b>	05.09.06-14.01.07	2 394	54.6

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Source: ESS Round 3: European Social Survey (2018)

Appendix A2: ESS round 5 data collection period and response rate

Country	Data collection period	Response N	Response %
<b>Austria</b>	24.05.13-10.10.13	2 259	59.6
Belgium	11.10.10-06.05.11	1 704	53.4
Denmark	20.09.10-31.01.11	1 576	55.4
France	15.10.10-06.04.11	1 728	47.1
Germany	15.09.10-03.02.11	3 031	30.5
Netherlands	27.09.10-02.04.11	1 829	60.0
Sweden	27.09.10-01.03.11	1 497	51.0

United Kingdom	31.08.10-28.02.11	2 422	56.3
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Source: ESS Round 5: European Social Survey (2018)

Appendix A3: ESS round 7 data collection period and response rate

Country	Data collection period	Response N	Response %
Austria	14.10.14-05.05.15	1 795	51.6
Belgium	10.09.14-01.02.15	1 769	57.0
Denmark	12.09.14-17.02.15	1 502	51.9
France	31.10.14-03.03.15	1 917	50.9
Germany	18.08.14-05.02.15	3 045	31.4
Netherlands	08.09.14-15.01.15	1 919	58.6
Sweden	01.08.14-30.01.15	1 791	50.1
United Kingdom	01.09.14-25.02.15 02.10.15-07.12.15	2 264	43.6

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Source: ESS Round 7: European Social Survey (2018)



Appendix A4: ESS round 9 data collection period and response rate

Country	Data collection period	Response N	Response %
Austria	18.09.18-12.01.19	2 499	50.8
Belgium	20.09.18-28.01.19	1 767	57.6
<b>Denmark</b>	Not collected		
France	19.10.18-01.04.19	2 010	48.1
Germany	29.08.18-04.03.19	2 358	27.6
Netherlands	28.08.18-22.01.19	1 673	43.3
Sweden	30.08.18-23.05.19	1 539	39.0
United Kingdom	31.08.18-22.02.19	2 204	41.0

Source: ESS Round 9: European Social Survey (2020)

Appendix B1: CHES 2006 data collection period, response rate and government parties during corresponding ESS survey

Country	Data collection period	Response N	Response %	Government parties
Austria	Summer 2007	8	40,0	OVP, SPO
Belgium	Summer 2007	17	46,0	PS, SPA, MR, VLD
Denmark	Summer 2007	9	45,0	KF, V
France	Summer 2007	9	36,0	UMP, UDF

Germany	Summer 2007	11	78,6	CDU, SPD, CSU
Netherlands	Summer 2007	12	57,1	CDA, VVD
Sweden	Summer 2007	11	68,8	SAP
United Kingdom	Summer 2007	10	56,6	LAB

Source: Hooghe *et al* (2010); Manon and Döring (2020)

Appendix B2: CHES 2010 data collection period, response rate and government parties during corresponding ESS survey

Country	Data collection period	Response N	Response %	Government parties
Austria	Spring 2011	14	46,7	SPO, OVP
Belgium	Spring 2011	16	35,6	PS, MR CD&V, CDH
Denmark	Spring 2011	11	31,4	KF, V
France	Spring 2011	9	23,7	UMP, NC
Germany	Spring 2011	18	36,0	CDU, FPD, CSU
Netherlands	Spring 2011	14	41,2	CDA, CU
Sweden	Spring 2011	15	30,0	MSCP, FP, C, KD
United Kingdom	Spring 2011	16	34,8	CONS, LIBDEM

Source: Bakker *et al* (2010); Manon and Döring (2020)

Appendix B3: CHES 2014 data collection period government parties during corresponding ESS survey. Background paper with response rates was not yet available

Country	Data collection period	Government parties
Austria	Spring 2011	SPO, OVP
Belgium	Spring 2011	PS, MR CD&V, O-VLD, SPA, CDH
Denmark	Spring 2011	SD, RV
France	Spring 2011	PS, PRG
Germany	Spring 2011	CDU, SPD, CSU
Netherlands	Spring 2011	PVDA, VDD
Sweden	Spring 2011	MSCP, FP, C, KD

United Kingdom      Spring 2011                      CONS, LIBDEM

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Source: Polk *et al* (2017); Manon and Döring (2020)

Appendix B4: CHES 2019 data collection period and government parties during corresponding ESS survey. Background paper with response rates was not yet available

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Country	Data collection period	Government parties
Austria	Spring 2011	OVP, <b>FPO</b>
Belgium	Spring 2011	N-VA, MR, CD&V, CDH
Denmark	Spring 2011	V, LA, KF
France	Spring 2011	REM, LR, MODEM, PRG
Germany	Spring 2011	CDU, SPD, CSU
Netherlands	Spring 2011	VVD, CDA, D66, CU
Sweden	Spring 2011	SAP, MP
United Kingdom	Spring 2011	CONS

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Source: Bakker *et al* (2020); Manon and Döring (2020), Austria's populist radical right party in bold