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
**MAKE THE UNITED NATIONS GREAT AGAIN:  
RE-DISCOVER PACIFISM IN THE AGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS**

Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master in Political Science (MSc)  
Specialization in Political Theory

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## **Abstract**

While peace could be considered a desirable goal in the international community, the normative framework of peace and peace movements have to face a significant number of challenges in the intellectual debate and practice. Normatively, while war and peace have always been seen as the two faces of the same coin, the phenomenon of war has continually gained more theoretical attraction than peace. Accordingly, many theoretical traditions have been used to justify the use of violence to resolve conflicts between political communities. Moreover, the dominance of realism in international relations contributes to the construction of the “realist world”, which would be normalized as the world. As a result, while peace would be considered more desirable, its pursuits both normatively and empirically gain limited success because of its idealist status. Academically, pacifism and its advocacy for peace are deemed too ideal to pursue, leading to its lack of visibility in the intellectual debate on war and peace. Empirically, while the United Nations (henceforth the UN) represents the almost-universal effort of international cooperation, it also has problems that could prevent it from fulfilling its mission as the peace guardian of the world. Nevertheless, the peace movement has new motivation from the human rights revolutions, which originated and motivated the United Nations. The new peace movement demands protection and nurtures human rights, creating an emerging source of pressure for change in the theoretical foundation of international relations and world governance. As the chief human rights regime, the United Nations should not only change to adapt to such desire, but it also should be the leader in the quest for a new goal, which is the pursuit of positive peace instead of negative peace. This thesis would argue that the United Nations should re-discover and re-apply pacifism in its peace-oriented operations.

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## Chapter I: Introduction

The adversarial relationship of war and peace could be demonstrated by the argument that peace has always been the desirable goal of humankind, while war should be restrained (Lee, 2012; Kellenberger, 2018). Indeed, as early as 1517, Dutch philosopher Desiderius Erasmus wrote *“The Complaint of Peace”* to praise peace, which is “the fountain, the parent, the nurse, the patroness, the guardian of every blessing which either heaven or earth can bestow” (Erasmus, 1795, pp. 2-3) as well as to ask for the abolishment of war as it is “the foul sink of sin as well as misery” (Erasmus, 1795, p. 91).

The argument against war could be originated from war’s destructive nature against “human welfare”, and its consequences could be long-lasting (Buckham, 1916, p. 89). Indeed, war “strips away our civilized adornments and reveals our nakedness. They describe that nakedness for us, not without a certain relish: fearful, self-concerned, driven, murderous” (Walzer, 2015, p. 4). Such destructive nature could be easily demonstrated by the vast number of deaths from mass killing, especially the murder of the innocents. Additionally, the practice of war also leads to human displacement and the demolition of economic resources, culture, and environment. Moreover, the end of the war may not lead to peace without suitable reconstruction and reconciliation resolutions. Indeed, the instability and injustices after war could plant the seeds for future armed conflict (Hedahl, Clark, & Beggins, 2017, p. 438). More importantly, the arms race to war not only asks for more financial investments on war instead of other social needs but also leads to the creation of higher destructive weapons. Hence, it is plausible to conclude that the practice of war is immoral and undesirable, asking for its restriction or even abolishment.

On the contrary, peace could be considered as morally desirable (King, 1968). Accordingly, the state of peace allows stability, cooperation, and mutual enhancement between societies. More specifically, Israeli diplomat and scholar Uri Savir argues that without the fear of violence, international actors can invest their resources in trade, culture, and sciences instead of military spending (Savir, 2008, p. 25). Moreover, he believes that once peace is planted in a society, more significant political and economic reforms, especially democratization, could start to develop (Savir, 2008, p. 202). The pledge to peace and objection of war could be found in pacifism principles (Fiala, 2018). Pacifist tradition morally denounces the practice of war as an effective means to resolve conflict. Moreover, pacifists actively promote peaceful alternatives to transform the culture of war into a culture of peace, leading to a more sustainable peace within the international community. Historically, pacifism enjoyed its development and popularity with the successes of the civil rights movement (1954-1968) led by American minister Martin Luther King Jr., the anti-Vietnam war demonstrations (1964-1973), and the feature in the UN Charter especially. However, since the 1990s, especially the 9/11 attack, pacifism has since lost its momentum.

It is plausible to argue that the study of pacifism and the promotion of peace have been neglected both theoretically and practically (Jackson, 2019, p. 213). On the surface, the underestimation of

pacifism could be seen as the consequence of it being misunderstood. Accordingly, pacifism is widely perceived as a utopian ideology demanding the absolute abolishment of war on the religious ground. Deepening the matter, however, it could be argued that pacifist tradition has been ignored intellectually because of the consequence of the First Great Debate in international relations theory between realism and idealism in which realism came out as the dominant in the discipline. Consequently, the normative debate within the discipline of International Relations revolves almost exclusively around the theoretical frameworks provided by realism and its variances (Smith, 2016, p. 1). Thanks to the gradual economic interdependence between international actors, liberalism has been allowed to demonstrate its normative power. Meanwhile, pacifism would be deemed as “intellectually inferior”, “politically unrealistic”, and “morally dangerous” (Jackson, 2019, p. 213).

Moreover, by the 1980s, the debate between realism, liberalism, and Marxism in international relations discipline has implied the existence of an “inter-paradigm debate” playing field where theories could compete equally (Smith, 2016, p. 4). British international relations theorist Steve Smith, however, argues that such intellectual pluralism could not exist because realism has always been controlling the debate. More specifically, he believes that the discipline of international relations focuses primarily on the practice of war, and thus, the theory which could offer the most pertinent explanations regarding war would be able to control the field. Such theoretical arguments could be found in the realist tradition, leading to its dominant position in the debate. In consequence, liberalism deals with secondary problems such as trade and institutions with the inclusion of Marxist arguments to explain relative economic power and systemic inequality (Smith, 2016, p. 4). Furthermore, the arguments of realist regarding war and peace have been rarely challenged by Western philosophers (Reader, 2000, p. 170). As a result, in such a war-based world without any open platform for competing theories, pacifist commitments are still considered to be inferior, ideal. Similarly, peace could not challenge its position in the relationship with war. Hence, it is merely referred to as “one point on the continuum of war” (Savir, 2008, p. 2). Generally, while the causes of war and the conditions of peace have always been the most critical topics in the study of international relations, the focus on the use of violence in the form of war seems to predominate the works of international theorists (Smith, 2016, p. 1). “*All these theories but the bodies keep piling up,*” which is the heading featured in the introduction of the book *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity (4th Edition)* by Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith (eds) represents such struggle in the study of international relations.

Historically, Savir observes how the peace-making process has been shaped by realist beliefs when “today’s peace-makers are yesterday’s war-makers” who believe in the use of force as a realistic way to “keep the peace” (Savir, 2008, p. 2). The on-going existence of war and the struggle for peace prove that war and peace are two universal problems more extensive than the nation-states could handle by themselves, and thus, an efficient supranational political order should be needed (Ryan, 2013, p. 978). The Concert of Europe (henceforth the Concert), the League of Nations (henceforth the League), and the United Nations could be seen as the three most well-known attempts to establish an international

organization that could promote peace among international actors. While the Concert and the League no longer exist, the United Nations has contributed to world peace more than its predecessors. Indeed, Sydney-based researcher Peter Nadin lists four main achievements of the United Nations, including norms diffusion, assistance for great powers cooperation, assistance for a state to independence, and humanitarian crises' mitigation (Nadin, 2019, pp. 13-14). Nonetheless, the United Nations also has to face many challenges, damaging its reputation as the peace-keeper, peace-maker, and peace-builder of the international community. According to the report "*Seven Opportunities for the UN in 2019-2020*" from the International Crisis Group, despite the UN-led effort, the situations in Libya, Yemen, and Mali gained little successes (International Crisis Group, 2019, p. 2). Moreover, the report also criticized the Security Council for their interest in competing for power: "The P5 members' manipulation of the Council to protect partners and clients and to keep the UN out of situations where they wish to have freedom of action, is not new" (International Crisis Group, 2019, p. 2).

Furthermore, the emergence of the human rights revolution, which is motivated by the United Nations itself, could pose a new problem to the United Nations' operation. According to Canadian academic Michael Ignatieff, the human rights revolution consists of the juridical revolution, the advocacy revolution, and the enforcement revolution (Ignatieff, 2001, p. 5). The juridical revolution was motivated by the birth of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (henceforth UDHR) in 1948, which recognized human rights internationally. Being equipped with such universal acknowledgment, oppressed people and groups could challenge their government, creating the conflict between political communities. Moreover, such universal recognition has been adopted by nations and regional organizations with the aim of enforcing human rights. Additionally, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights also inspires the human rights-based peace movements at different levels. Thus, it could be argued that the human rights revolution has been contributing to the erosion of the nation-state's sovereignty. The conflict between human rights and the right of sovereignty or the conflict between the human rights paradigm and the national defense paradigm could lead to civil war or internationalized civil war. The involuntary reaction to such conflict could be explained as the failure of realist restraint and liberal restraint, which was featured in the United Nations' normative framework. At the same time, the human rights revolution becomes the new motivation of which peace activists could take advantage to demand a cultural change from a culture of war to a culture of peace. According to Savir, a culture of peace prioritizes the equality between personages that could not exist in the culture of war (Savir, 2008, p. 3). As the almost-universal guardian of peace, security, and human rights, the United Nations had to find another alternative, which could balance out such conflict without minimum compromises. Such an alternative could be found in the pacifist principle.

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<sup>1</sup> The P5 consists of five permanent members of the UN Security Council, including China, France, Russian Federation (henceforth Russia), the United Kingdom (henceforth the UK) and the United States of America (henceforth the USA or the US)

This thesis would attempt to prove the following arguments. Pacifism is an ethically desirable and practical normative framework of peace. However, the value of pacifism has been neglected by the dominance of realism after the First Great Debate in IR discipline. Over time, such dominance of realism has led to the normalization of the logic that military use is inevitable and effective in resolving conflict. The United Nations would be used as a case study for how such an approach in world politics would constrain its success. However, the development of the human rights revolution would lead the United Nations to the moral dilemma between the rights of sovereignty and human rights. Both realism and liberalism could not resolve this structural conflict. Accordingly, such conflict could only be resolved when the culture of war is replaced by the culture of peace, in which both human rights and territorial integrity would be respected. Such characteristics could be found in the pacifist tradition, and thus, it should be re-discovered by the United Nations as the alternative theoretical foundation. Finally, some practical policies, which are inspired by American philosopher Steven P. Lee's *jus in abolitione belli* criteria and the Peace First model of Uri Savir, would be presented as the practical way to integrate pacifist principles into the UN system.

The thesis would be separated into six chapters as follows, except Chapter I and Chapter VI, which are Introduction and Conclusion chapters, respectively. The other four chapters are:

*Chapter II: Pacifism: An ethically desirable and non-ideal normative framework of peace* would introduce the pacifist theoretical framework. Accordingly, pacifism is argued to be morally desirable as follows. Firstly, the practice of war is not only evil but also ineffective in dealing with conflict. Hence, it should be restricted as much as possible except when there is a supreme emergency with greater evil nature. Instead, non-violent measures should be prioritised. Secondly, the commitment to peace makes pacifism morally desirable comparing to other theories in international relations. Despite its desirability, however, pacifism has not been received both intellectually and practically.

*Chapter III: Contemporary debate on war and peace: Re-examining the First Great Debate* aims to summarize the contemporary debate on war and peace in international relations discipline. It is plausible to argue that world politics is defined by war. Hence, any theory that put its main framework around war would be deemed as significant. Realism is such a theory. As a result, realism becomes the dominant theory in international relations discipline with widespread support. Overtime, realist assumptions about world politics become a reality as there are few challenges to its position within the field. Consequently, pacifism, which is a normative framework of peace, would be deemed utopian, non-ideal, and even morally dangerous.

*Chapter IV: The United Nations and Human Rights Revolution* would analyze the relationship between the United Nations and the Human Rights Revolution. Accordingly, the birth of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was the cornerstone of the Revolution. However, such a revolution would challenge the rights of sovereignty, which is protected by the UN Charter. The moral dilemma of the United Nations as the guardian of world peace, security, and human rights is to react to such conflict. Both realist restraint and liberal restraint could not de-escalate such conflict effectively. Moreover, the

use of force would intensify the conflict. Thus, it is reasonable for the United Nations to adopt a new approach. The alternative normative framework has to have the ability to neutralize the conflict between human rights the rights of sovereignty. Furthermore, it also has the ability to create positive peace, which could only be achieved when the culture of peace replaces the culture war. Such characteristics could be found in pacifist beliefs. Thus, it is argued that pacifism should be re-discovered and re-adopted in the UN system.

*Chapter V: Make the United Nations Great Again: Re-discovering Pacifism in the Age of Human Rights* would focus on three tasks. Firstly, the relation between pacifist commitment, positive peace, and human rights would be proven as a practical way to peace. Secondly, it would argue that human rights create the need for intellectual compromises in the normative framework of pacifism, liberalism, and realism. Lastly, some policy proposals inspired by Lee's jus in abolutione belli criteria and the Peace First model of Savir would be presented as the practical way to integrate pacifist principles into the UN system. Accordingly, the United Nations should re-identify as the legislator, the supervisor, and the sponsor in terms of peace, security, and human rights. As legislators, they would create binding international agreements that protect human rights without violating the right of sovereignty. As the supervisor, the United Nations should not enforce those agreements but give more power to international organizations, primarily regional organizations, to realize those binding international agreements. It should only use violence to enforce these agreements when there are serious violations. Lastly, they should play a sponsor of peace that could assist countries during reconstruction and reconciliation in the post-conflict.

## Chapter II: Pacifism: An ethically desirable and non-ideal normative framework of peace

[...]*Pax optima rerum,*  
*Quas homini Natura dedit*[...]  
[...] No boon that Nature ever gave to Man,  
May be compared with Peace [...]<sup>2</sup>  
- Silius Italicus (A.D. 26-A.D. 101)

Generally, pacifism denounces violence as an effective means of solving conflict and promoting non-violent alternatives instead (Hunt, 2010, p. 553). Pacifism consists of a wide range of theoretical frameworks and practical political activities, which could not be categorized effectively (Hermann, 1992, p. 875). Indeed, pacifist principles create a continuum from anti-violence in all conduct to the anti-war commitment and its commitment to peace through non-violent measures (Fiala, 2018). As this thesis focuses mainly on the practice of war and peace, their definitions should be mentioned in depth. Additionally, the perceptions of war and peace have a strong association with the understanding of sovereignty. Thus, it is essential to introduce these three concepts, including sovereignty, war, and peace.

### ***II.1. Terminologies: Sovereignty, War and Peace***

#### *II.1.1. Sovereignty*

While the notion of sovereignty could be perceived in different meanings due to the changing in the political systems over time, its core connotation could be comprehended as “*supreme authority within a territory*” (Philpott, 2020). Historically, two milestones, namely the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and the aftermath of the Second World War, could be considered as the two defining moments in the understanding of sovereignty. Accordingly, the former could be seen as the foundation of the nation-state system in which each actor is mutually recognized as the possessor of the highest independent power to rule over its residents within their borders (Ignatieff, 2004, p. 147). After the Second World War, however, such right of sovereignty, as well as its facets, have been challenged by the idea that the sovereignty also has the duty to protect and fulfill its inhabitants’ human rights (Weinrib, 2019, p. 21). human rights revolution motivated by a significant number of post-war documents, especially the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, would be proven later on as the new motivating force for the peace movement.

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<sup>2</sup> This reference is featured in *The Complaint of Peace* by Erasmus (1795, p. 23)

The transition between these two eras could be discussed through three facets, including the holder of sovereignty, the absoluteness of sovereignty, and the internal and external dimensions of sovereignty (Philpott, 2020). Firstly, after the Peace of Westphalia, the holder of sovereignty, which have the right of supreme authority was argued to be the nation-state or the leader of the state or both referring statement “*L’état, c’est moi*”, which means “*I myself am the nation*”, which is attributed to French King Louis XIV (Rowen, 1961, p. 83). It is important to note that the inclusion of right indicates the legitimacy of the sovereign through laws as “rights are fundamentally creatures of law” (Appiah, 2001, p. 112). The absoluteness of sovereignty represents the scope of matters within the territory under the power of the sovereign. Before the Second World War, every matter within the borders of a state would be of the absolute judgment of the sovereignty’s holder. The Peace of Westphalia acknowledges the “internal sovereignty” and the “external sovereignty” that stand for the absolute power of a state within its borders and its freedom from external interference. More specifically, nation-states could enjoy the territorial integrity and political independence, including the use of force (Alexandra, 2003, p. 591). At the same time, they also have the duty to respect each other’s sovereignty by not interfering in another state’s domestic politics (ICISS, 2001, p. 12). The right of sovereignty could be found in Article 2.1<sup>3</sup> of the UN Charter while the principle of “non-intervention” is regulated in Article 2.7<sup>4</sup> of the same Charter. The non-intervention principle and the principle of territorial integrity are under the national defense paradigm.

After the Second World War, however, the notion of sovereignty has been shifting from not only possessing the supreme authority within a territory but also the duty to not violate human rights as well as protect people from human rights violations. Accordingly, with the establishments of inter-governmental institutions such as the United Nations, the European Union, and so on, the absoluteness of sovereignty sometimes transformed into its non-absoluteness form as states have to follow the international standards, protocols and so on. While the holder of sovereignty could still be claimed by diverse authorities, such as kings, dictators, peoples ruling through constitutions, and so on, the existence of international organizations like the United Nations as well as the international recognition of human rights, however, could equip individuals with a normative framework to challenge and report

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<sup>3</sup> Article 2.1 of the UN Charter (1945): “*The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members*”.

<sup>4</sup> Article 2.7 of the UN Charter (1945): “*Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII*”.

<sup>5</sup> Preamble of the UN Charter (1945): “[...]reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and [...]”; Preamble of the UDHR (1948): “[...]THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY proclaims THIS UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction”.

immoral wrongdoings of the sovereign without considering the legality of the conducts (Ignatieff, 2001, pp. 4-5). Such ground on human rights could be called the human rights paradigm, establishing a new understanding of “external sovereignty”. Accordingly, this perception indicates “the freedom to interfere” in the domestic affairs of other states on the basis of humanitarian intervention (Lee, 2012, p. 114). As could be seen, sovereignty is the foundation for the emergence of rival paradigms, which are the human rights paradigm and the national defense paradigm. Due to its essential value, this conflict would be discussed in depth later on in chapter 4.

### *II.1.2. War*

In this thesis, war would be identified as the systematic and organized use of violent measures between structured political communities for political purposes (Lee, 2012; Fiala, 2018; Ryan, 2013). Traditionally, war was mainly used to indicate the large-scale armed conflict between internationally recognized nation-states (inter-state war) as nation-state is the sole recognized sovereignty within the international community. Overtime, intra-state war (civil war) between domestically political groups, which could include armed conflicts between state and non-state actors, conflicts between non-state actors only, is also granted the status of war. Such recognition was the result of the undeniably visible of instar-state wars after the Second World War. In 2019, for example, it was reported that 82 percent of armed conflicts are internationalized internal armed conflicts while only 6 percent are international conflicts (Escola de Cultura de Pau, 2020, p. 25). Arguably, civil war could pose a threat to world peace when they collapse, leading to large-scale human rights crises, asking for the reaction from the international community. As abovementioned, the human rights paradigm would suggest humanitarian intervention, which would be seen as an internationalized civil war. On the one hand, scholars like German researcher Peter Waldmann believe that violence could bring a better result to civil war than negotiation (Waldmann, 2004, p. 96). On the other hand, opportunistic state and non-state terrorists would take advantage of the situation to intervene, escalating the misery and bloodshed (Ryan, 2013, p. 994).

Generally, war is mainly operated by a hierarchically organized military system (Fiala, 2018), including the leaders/commanders, who could escalate or end the war by giving out orders and the soldiers, who follows the orders from the leadership groups (Lee, 2012, p. 7). Besides, it is fundamental to note that political actors join war for certain political purposes. Mostly, political communities decide to use violence in order to maintain, control or reconstruct the existing political system, which could not be achieved by non-violent measures. Such political purposes would disqualify terrorism as war because most of the terrorist acts do not threaten the attacked country with defeat of the collapse of the

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political system. (Ignatieff, 2004, p. 54). Thus, terrorism, which could be described as “a military tactic involving systemic violation of civilian immunity” (Lee, 2012, p. 233) would not be included in the definition of war even though some countries, such as the United States declared “the war on terror” (Bush, 2001). This interpretation of war would also not include its utilization for metaphorical purposes, such as “war on poverty”, “war on Covid-19” and so on.

### *II.1.3. Peace*

It is plausible to argue that there is no consensus on the definition of peace. Thus, there could be many ways to categorize peace<sup>6</sup>. Due to its emphasis on war and peace, this thesis would only separate the notion of peace into negative form and positive form. Firstly, negative peace reflects the absence of war as well as the fear of mass killing between states or other structured sectional groups (Lee, 2012; Groff, 2018). Such understanding of peace is insisted by another group of peace activists as limited as peace is merely connected to a war-peace relationship with the focus on the national security of the nation-state (Trent & Schnurr, 2018, p. 56). In other words, peace is understood merely as the period between wars (Savir, 2008, p. 2). Instead, the second group believes that peace should be understood in a positive meaning, which connects to cooperation, harmony, and positive human relationships (Fiala, 2018). More specifically, positive peace rejects the idea that peace could be reached when war is absent. Accordingly, the absence of war could be the implication for two kinds of society, namely the negative social order and the positive social order. The negative social order refers to society in which there are systemic violations of human rights despite the absence of war. On the contrary, positive social order implies a genuine society in which human rights are protected and fostered in mutual respect (Lee, 2012; Fiala, 2018). Generally, positive peace promotes social justice wherever possible (Groff, 2018, p. 430).

Since the two Great Wars, negative peace has been perceived as more popular than its positive form as it is argued to be easier to be achieved. The second perception of peace is positive peace/just peace is the peace that pacifist advocates pursue. While there are difference in the understanding of peace, one shared characteristic between them is the desirability of peace or “yearning for peace” like the way Savir describe it (Savir, 2008, p. 1).

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<sup>6</sup> See more: Linda Groff (2018) separates peace into seven subgroups, namely (1) Peace as absence of war or physical violence, (2) Peace as the result of the international institution’s balance of power; (3) Peace as the absence of systemic and physical violence on macro levels, (4) Gender/feminist peace, (5) Holistic intercultural peace, (6) Holistic Gaia peace and (7) Holistic inter/outer peace.

## ***II.2. Pacifism: An Introduction***

Generally, pacifism is known for its peace advocacy and “the moral renunciation of war” (Coates, 2016, p. 95). Accordingly, the word “pacifism” has its intellectual roots in the Latin combination of *paci-*, which means peace and *-ficus*, which means making (Fiala, 2018). While anti-war pacifism would be the main theoretical framework of this thesis, it is noteworthy to briefly mention other pacifist traditions, which are against violence, which could be defined as the action that carries out physical harm, damage or destruction to a person or an object (Cady, 2010; Reader, 2000). More specifically, violence could involve small-scale violence, including violence among individuals, small groups, and large-scale violence, including inter-state and intra-state war. As aforementioned, this thesis would only focus on the pacifist tradition that focuses on the practice of war as large-scale violence. Additionally, the terms, such as “war”, “large-scale violence conflict/dispute”, “large-scale armed conflict/dispute”, would be used interchangeably. This thesis would classify pacifism into absolute pacifism, which completely denounces violence and/or war and contingent pacifism, which accepts war when it is the only solution to tackle “greater evil”.

### *II.2.1. Absolute pacifism*

Firstly, absolute pacifist believes that violence in general and war in specific are morally wrong and thus, could not be justified under any circumstances (Lee, 2012, p. 23). Moreover, in order to constrain such moral wrongdoing, absolute pacifism promotes individual virtue and morality (Placidi, 2011, p. 2123). Some absolute pacifist scholars go even further by arguing that the use of force in self-defense could not be justified either (Khatchadourian, 1985; Fiala, 2018; Hermann, 1992; Stevenson, 1934). It is widely perceived that the moral foundation of absolute pacifism could be found in almost all great religions, especially classical Christianity. Before being officially recognized by the Roman Empire, Christian followers were taught that violence was hazardous to the soul, and thus, as Christ disciples, they should avoid engaging in violent conduct (Reichberg, 2008). Such Christian viewpoint regarding war could be summarized in these passage from the New Testament: “*If anyone strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also*” (Matthew 5:39). Pacifist advocacy could also be found in other popular religious beliefs, such as Hinduism, Buddhism, and so on. Both Hinduism and Buddhism believe that violence is originated from a disturbance in the structure of the soul-substance, leading to the suffering of the flesh (Sibley, 1943, p. 440). Besides, the Confucian tradition distinguishes two types of rulers. A wang literally means a king, who relies on moral force such as benevolence, righteousness, and propriety. A ba is originally a hegemon and relies on physical force. For Confucianism, moral force, not physical force, makes people submit willingly. Hence, wang-dao or the “kingly way” triumphs over the ba-dao or “the way of the hegemon” (Hu, 2006, p. 259).

However, there are also contradictions within religious texts regarding the practice of war. Thus, religious-based pacifism could be criticized harshly by pacifist critics. Furthermore, absolute pacifism also has a strong connection to personal pacifism in which pacifist principles are personal choices (Lee, 2012, p. 22). Morally, individual pacifists believe that evil should only be tackled by good, which is to transform the evil-will into the good-will. Using violent means to put an end to evil could be seen as double evil (Stevenson, 1934, p. 443). As a result, absolute pacifists could refuse to serve in the military or to support a political system that promotes war without condemning others who do not approach the same way (Fiala, 2018; Rosenwald, 2007).

However, absolute pacifism could be seen as an easy target for pacifist critics and opponents. According to British philosopher Alan Ryan, “it is easy” to question the absolutist tradition as the pacifist, who refuse to use violent means to protect people in need must take on the burden of seeing those people suffer from human rights violations or of letting them die at the hands of their enemies (Ryan, 2013, p. 999). Additionally, due to the contradiction within religious beliefs on war and non-violence, it is hard to defend the argument of absolute pacifism against its critiques (Fiala, 2018; Benjamin, 1973).

### *II.2.2. Contingent/conditional/pragmatic pacifism*

The concept of contingent pacifism is promoted by American philosopher Larry May: “Contingent pacifism is opposed to war not on absolute grounds but on contingent grounds, namely, that war as we have known it as has been, and seemingly cannot be, waged in a way that is acceptable” (May, 2008, pp. 25-26). Accordingly, unlike the universal rejection of violence in general and war in specific of absolute pacifism, contingent pacifism may accept the necessity or legitimacy of certain war and reject it in other cases. German theoretical physicist Albert Einstein and British polymath Bertrand Russel, for instances, supports the war against German Reich even though they consider themselves as a pacifist (Fiala, 2018). Additionally, contingent pacifism is more collective-oriented or even state-centered than absolute pacifism. Furthermore, the supporters of conditional pacifism also more secular and goal-oriented than absolute pacifism (Hermann, 1992, p. 878). Indeed, contingent pacifist scholars would justify or criticize war on the basis of empirical and historical shreds of evidence, which would vary from case to case (Fiala, 2018). In general, there are certain numbers of contingent pacifism, which could be distinguished by occasional/situational argument or argument against a certain type of war, the scope of the war, or the use of mass destructive weapons in war.

Thanks to its flexibility, contingent pacifism could be seen as more attractive than absolute pacifism. Indeed, this tradition gains more support than its absolute form. However, one of its weaknesses is the conflicting criteria, which are based on different grounds regarding the legitimacy of war. As the goal of this thesis would focus on the subject of war and peace, contingent pacifism would be of greater significance as the main normative framework. As aforementioned, under certain circumstances, the

use of the military is unavoidable. Thus, the argument of absolute pacifism would not be of great value (Noddings, 2012, p. 107). On the contrary, because of its conditional acceptance of war, contingent pacifism would make a better argument.

However, it is problematic to dissociate contingent pacifism from pacifism. More specifically, there are a certain number of contingent pacifist scholars who divorce their works with pacifism by renaming contingent pacifism as non-violence. For example, American scholar Dustin Ells Howes argues that while absolute pacifism is religiously and morally anti-war and anti-violence ideology, non-violence refers to a set of political commitments without asking for the adoption of absolute pacifism (Howes, 2013, p. 428). Nonetheless, both absolute pacifism and contingent pacifism originated from the same moral foundation that is war could not be seen as a moral and effective reaction to conflict. However, such an argument, itself, is not morally sufficient (Rosenwald, 2007, p. 96). Hence, the most significant difference between them is that contingent pacifist could offer a valuable political dimension to pacifist tradition: a clear vision of peace (Cady, 2010).

### ***II.3. Pacifism: An ethically desirable and non-ideal normative framework of peace***

#### ***II.3.1 Pacifism: An ethically desirable normative framework of peace***

Generally, pacifism consists of the moral rejection of war as war is “avoidable evil” (Teichman, 1982, p. 75) and the positive commitments to peace advocacy through promoting non-violent measures as conflict resolution. Morally, it could be argued that non-violence is more superior than violence (May T. , 2015, p. 161). Firstly, as aforementioned, it is feasible to argue that war is evil and immoral political mean. Indeed, persons have a certain moral status, and they have it because they are persons (Reader, 2000, p. 170). Historically, a large-scale armed conflict could lead to the violation of such moral status on a level that it should not be justified. Secondly, contingent pacifism rejects the belief that war is an acceptable reaction to conflict (Parkin, 2014, p. 631). In his work *On Duties*, Cicero observes: “There are two types of conflict: the one proceeds by debate, and the other by force. Since the former is the proper concern of a man, but the latter of beasts, one should only resort to the latter if one may not employ the former” (Cicero, 2003, p. 14). War, however, could only be justified when it is the only solution for a greater evil, such as the German Reich, genocide, ethnic cleansing (Parkin, 2014, p. 631). Such exception creates controversy towards contingent pacifist as there is no consensus on criteria for “greater evil”. The following comment from Dr.King's writings indicates such a moral dilemma challenges the commitment of pacifist supporters: “I am no doctrinaire pacifist, but I have tried to embrace realistic pacifism which finds the pacifist position as the lesser evil in the circumstances. I do not claim to be free from the moral dilemmas that the Christian non-pacifist confronts” (Ihara, 1988, p. 271). Similarly, Indian lawyer Mahatma Gandhi also shares such attitude: “As a matter of fact, the very same line of argument that persuaded me to take part in the Boer War had weighed with me on this

occasion. It was quite clear to me that participation in war could never be consistent with ahimsa (non-violence). But it is not always given to one to be equally clear about one's duty.” (Ihara, 1988, p. 272). Thirdly, pacifist activists do not only follow the life of non-violence but also pursue the goal of peace through non-violent means. The non-violent philosophies of both Dr. King and Gandhi demonstrate such pursuit of peace. Morally, the political successes against injustices, which used to need violence, through non-violent means, represent the practicality of pacifism.

Politically, from historical and empirical evidence, pragmatic pacifism denounces the practice of war as an effective way to tackle conflict. Instead, statements and scholars should aim for a peaceful resolution in order to maintain stability, which is more beneficial to all the parties involved. As a starting point for developing an alternative ethical approach, pacifism offers a more realistic, critical understanding of the nature, consequences, and limits of violence as an instrument of politics or protection. American philosopher Martin Benjamin argues that reliance on conventional military measures could not protect most countries around the world anymore (Benjamin, 1973, p. 274). More specifically, with advanced military technologies and weapons, such as nuclear power and drones, powerful countries/actors would have more advantages in large-scale armed conflict.

### *II.3.2 Pacifism is non-ideal normative framework of peace*

One of the main critiques against pacifism is the thinking that pacifist advocates are passive (Rosenwald, 2007; Benjamin, 1973; Buckham, 1916). On the contrary, due to pacifist commitments to peace, pacifist activists actively advocate against war or social injustices in non-violent protests as well as promote peace (Hermann, 1992, p. 883). In order to respond to such doubt on the practicality of pacifism, the best way is to show successful examples.

At the individual level, pacifist authors remain a clear minority, but their moral and political influence is considerable (Cahill, 2019, p. 171). Indeed, Dr. King, Gandhi, could be seen as the two most famous pacifists. From Christian beliefs, Dr. King was the pioneer of non-violent measures against injustices during the civil rights movement as well as the anti-Vietnam war. He argues that “the arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice” (King, 1968). Gandhi’s pacifism was also inspired by religions. His activism was not only for social justice, but they were also his experiments with the effectiveness of non-violence measures against injustices. Morally, he believes that non-violence, justice, and truth are the worthwhile ends. Thus, those who follow the moral point of view must accept the importance of these values (Ihara, 1988, p. 273).

At the national level, the civil rights movement and anti-Vietnam war movement in the 1960s and 1970s could be seen as two successful examples of pacifism (Hunt, 2010, p. 554). Japan’s denounce of militarism also could be seen as another success story of pacifism. It is feasible to argue that the Japanese public established an anti-militarist attitude after the Second World War. Glenn Hook argues that: “mass attitudes have been of crucial significance in constraining the normalization of the military

as a legitimate instrument of state power”. As a result, Japan denounced its military and followed pacifist foreign policy (Lind, 2004, p. 102). Another successful story happened during the Second Liberian Civil War (1999-2003). Accordingly, a coalition of Christian and Muslim women, who non-violently pressured former Liberian president Charles Taylor to attend the peace talks in Ghana, resulting to his exile and the election of Liberia’s first woman president, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (Cahill, 2019, p. 328).

It could be argued that pacifism had its most successful milestone at the international level when it was featured in the UN Charter. Indeed, chapter VI of the UN Charter was named “Pacific Settlement of Disputes”, in which countries in conflict are asked to use peaceful resolutions to tackle their conflict. Nonetheless, chapter VI has been facing challenges as there is no enforcement mechanism to demand cooperation from the UN’s member states. As a result, countries, especially great powers, tend to resort to the use of violence to resolve disputes. Meanwhile, the value of pacifism has been underestimated by the dominance of realism in the intellectual debate international relations discipline. Meanwhile, the value of pacifism has been underestimated by the dominance of realism in the intellectual debate international relations discipline. Thus, South African-born philosopher Soran Reader even calls pacifism “the most vulnerable party” regarding the normative debate on war and peace (Reader, 2000, p. 169). Indeed, American scholar Stephen Walt categories international relations into three main paradigms, including realism, liberalism, and constructivism, which includes all the other theoretical approaches. According to him, “realism is likely to remain the single most useful instrument in our intellectual toolbox”. Similarly, American academic Robert Keohane argues that alternative approaches to realism and liberalism could not be seen as legitimate social science unless “testable theories” regarding important issues in world politics are presented (Smith, 2016, pp. 5-6). Such dominance creates a hindrance to the development of pacifism both in theory and in practice. Thus, it is reasonable to discuss the theoretical constraint to pacifism in the next chapter.

### **Chapter III: The contemporary debate on war and peace: Re-examining the First Great Debate in IR**

During and after World War II, the intellectual exchanges between classical realism and idealism, which includes both pacifism and liberalism, creates the first great debate in international relations discipline. (Richmond, 2008; Kurki & Wight, 2016). This chapter would summarize this long-lasting theoretical debate on war and peace within the discipline of international relations. Accordingly, with the emergence of the Cold War, national liberation wars, and so on, realism would be seen as the most pertinent normative framework in the discipline of international theory. Afterward, it would be argued that because of the persistent dominance of realism in the field without little challenges, the “realist world” has been normalized as the “real world”. As a consequence, any other theories that fail to recognize the world as such would be deemed inaccurate, leading to their discredits. As a result, idealism would be classified as of little significance or even utopian theories. While liberalism could avoid such treatment thank the progressively economic interdependence between countries, pacifism could not escape its faith, especially when realism consider pacifist tradition as not only utopian but also morally dangerous. Moreover, as “realist reality” becomes a reality, world leaders also believe that violence in general and war in specific is reasonable mean to cope with conflict, leading to more large-scale armed conflict around the world. In turn, these collective violent escalations would confirm the classic arguments of realism, cementing the culture of war.

First and foremost, the normative framework of realism and liberalism would be introduced as follows.

#### ***III.1. Realism***

In order to understand the argumentation of realism on war and peace, it is essential to introduce its argument on the state of nature, self-interest, the struggle for power and the basis of morality in the domestic sphere as “both domestic and international politics are a struggle for power modified only by the different conditions under which this struggle takes place in the domestic and in the international spheres” (Morgenthau, 1985, p. 39). According to American political scientist Richard N. Lebow, realists believe that the differences between domestic and international relations are of degree, not of kind (Lebow, 2016, p. 39). In other words, classical realists believe that all politics are the product of human nature, which would share the same pathologies (Lebow, 2016, pp. 36-37).

In the Hobbesian viewpoint, the state of nature means the state without any political authority, which would lead to complete chaos and conflicts (Klosko, 2013, p. 59). Moreover, in the state of nature, there is no exclusive right. This could be interpreted in two ways. The first version is that no one has the exclusive right to anything, including one’s own body. This, however, could also be interpreted in the

second way that everyone has every right to everything, including the right to another's body. Thus, such a state of nature could also be seen as a self-help system in which everyone has to protect their own security. Self-preservation, thus, would overcome other moral standards as it is the highest morality in the state of nature. Accordingly, in the state of nature, the resources would also be limited as it is not reasonable to produce when one has no right over any property. The need for resources, as well as the protection of resources, would make people see each other as their primary obstacles. Thus, in order to overcome their obstacles to protect their security and resources, individuals would unstoppably try to gain power, which is physical and influential power. American scholar John Mearsheimer even argues that "virtually everyone is born with a will to power hardwired into them" (Mearsheimer, 2016, p. 51). Thus, power becomes human's self-interest while the struggle for power defines the behaviour of humankind in the state of nature, which would end up in eternal conflict and chaos (Korab-Karpowicz, 2018; Thompson, 1991). To avoid such destiny, individuals choose to surrender their rights, except the self-preservation one to a sovereign who, in turn, would direct and transform the struggle of power into more socially acceptable channels, which are based on laws, institutions, and norms.

Adapting the analogy between domestic and international realm, realists also presume that nation-states, which are the main actors in world politics, are concerned with their security, act in pursuit of their national interests, and struggle for power within the international anarchy (Korab-Karpowicz, 2018). Like the state of nature, international anarchy means that there is no central authority that could manage the international affairs between countries through common standards. Instead, they have to take responsibility for their national interest by trying to obtain power, including military and economic power (Korab-Karpowicz, 2018; Waltz, 1917). The practice of war would be seen as an effective way to prevent competing countries from becoming militarily stronger (Korab-Karpowicz, 2018).

Furthermore, realism claims that the behaviours of nation-states are immune to morality. More specifically, the realist tradition agrees about the existence of moral values. Those standards, however, are not applied to international relations (Lee, 2012; Korab-Karpowicz, 2018) as German international relations theorist Hans Morgenthau argues that "this realist defense of the autonomy of the political sphere against its subversion by other modes of thought does not imply a disregard for the existence and importance of these other modes of thought" (Morgenthau, 1985, p. 16). In other words, the right of sovereignty could be interpreted as the highest moral value that nation-states should pursue, while the enhancement of national power could be seen not only as a nation's right but also its duty (Korab-Karpowicz, 2018). By the same token at the domestic level, realists also assume about the end of the international community as "a perpetual war" with "the confines of battles", "frontiers armed" and "cannons planted against their neighbours round-about" (Hobbes, 1998, p. 142). Accordingly, the public connections are fragile and easily weakened by the unilaterally seeking power among individuals, groups, and states, leading to an increase in the possibility of domestic and international violent conflicts. Besides, while the efforts to deal with this phenomenon may succeed for a certain period, the balance of power would be eventually broken when an actor believes that its power is too

powerful to be limited by law and custom (Lebow, 2016, p. 35). This is also why the resolution for the international sphere could not use that of the domestic sphere.

However, American academic Bruce Russett observes that in realist world, the possibility of war is limited because of the following constraints, namely power ratio, allies, and distance and size. Firstly, the power ratio refers to the military power relation between countries. They argue that when that relationship is unbalanced, the weaker side would not choose to go to war as the risk of loss would be too high to risk. Second, realists also see that alliances could be established among countries that share mutual interest and strategy. Among allies, the possibility of military disputes would be reduced as such conflict could put the whole alliance in a more vulnerable position, jeopardizing their power position in world politics. Moreover, having allies would make countries less vulnerable when they have a conflict with a non-ally actor. Thirdly, distance relates to the argument that neighbours have a higher tendency to be in dispute while long-distance could make it harder and more costly to go to war, constraining such practice. Meanwhile, size could also contribute to the possibility of violent conflict in that a country with larger territory would be more likely to choose violence while a smaller country would not choose to do so (Russett, 2016, p. 74).

From such observation, classical realism proposes two principles of limiting the use of force in the international community, namely the principle of balance of power and the principle of equilibrium of power. It could be argued that the former is originated from the power ratio and allies. Accordingly, the hegemon, which is the most powerful country in the system, would use force towards any country that tries to change the status quo. At the same time, to avoid the power abuse of the hegemon, less powerful countries would create alliances to balance the power. In such a mechanism, the status quo would remain (Paul, 2004, pp. 4-5). Nevertheless, the balance of power has contradictory implications for peace, which would be discussed later on. Meanwhile, the equilibrium of power relates to the internal and external facet of sovereignty. According to the Peace of Westphalia, every single nation-state has the right to exist without interference from outside. Thus, the principle of equilibrium indicates that no actor could attack other countries, and no single state or coalitions could become too powerful, damaging the equilibrium (Paul, 2004, pp. 5-7).

### ***III.2. Liberalism***

Similar to realism, liberal scholars also believe that world politics happens in an anarchic international environment. Nonetheless, they disagree with the realist argument that countries would see each other as a potential enemy to be eliminated. On the contrary, history also records that countries could live peaceably without the fear of armed conflict, even when there are disputes between them. Moreover, co-operation between nations, especially in industrial areas, has gradually increased, leading to their interdependence. Hence, self-interest could be transformed into mutual interest, motivating countries in dispute to seek peaceful resolution instead of violent measures (Russett, 2016, p. 84). Underpinning

this is the optimistic argument that human nature is not intrinsically violent and, even if it is, social and political norms, regimes and organization could prevent violence (Richmond, 2008, p. 22)

Indeed, such a liberal point of view could be seen in Immanuel Kant's normative framework, which would be subsequently introduced. As a liberal, Kant believes in the rationality of human beings, the cooperative progress in social life, and the feasibility of a more peaceful and harmonious society. At the international level, such Kantian influences would reflect the thought that war and conflict could be surpassed through liberal restraints of a republican constitution, economic interdependence, and international organization (Russett, 2016, p. 69).

Firstly, classical liberals observe that democratic regimes would be more peaceful, especially to each other. Indeed, democracies rarely use force to tackle the conflict between them. One explanation for such a phenomenon is about norms. Russett argues that democratic governments are convinced that conflict should be managed by negotiation and compromise instead of force and violence. By acknowledging such mutual norms, they would have more trust in the procedure, preventing the practice of war. Another explanation could be linked to the institution. Democratic institutions evaluate war not only based on its nature but also based on costs and benefits. Democratic leaders would have to take responsibility when deciding to go to war, especially when the war is long and costly (Russett, 2016, p. 75). Thus, it is reasonable for American philosopher John Rawls to comment that "there is true peace among them because all societies are satisfied with the status quo for the right reasons" (Rawls, 1999, p. 47). Secondly, liberal scholars believe that economic interdependence would prevent countries from using military force against each other. Accordingly, through the commercial channel, information about interest and preference would be exchanged between countries, avoiding misunderstanding between them. Moreover, the benefits of trading could only be achieved in a peaceful environment, making world leaders more hesitant to think about violent resolutions when conflict appears. Thus, the larger the level of economic co-operations between countries, the stronger the peaceful foundation between them would be established (Russett, 2016, p. 76). Thirdly, liberalism assumes that armed conflict has more chance to happen when political communities could not trust each other or when war could be considered a more useful measure. By promoting international organizations into conflict resolution, more peaceful alternatives to war could be presented, while the lack of trust in each other could be reduced. Indeed, liberals do not underestimate the role of conflict within the international community. They also acknowledge that a single country could not resolve some conflicts or problems. At the same time, the emergence of a wide range of international organizations, including almost-universal one like the United Nations, regional one like European Union (henceforth EU), Association of South East Asian Nations (henceforth ASEAN) and non-governmental one like Greenpeace and so on offer more and more peaceful solutions for conflict as well as the advocacy of peace (Russett, 2016, p. 76).

### *III.3. Re-examining the First Great Debate in IR*

From the end of the First World War to after the Second World War<sup>7</sup>, the first Great Debate in IR was believed to have happened between realism and idealism, including liberalism and pacifism. Accordingly, after observing the destruction of the First World War, the idealists were motivated to find new institution system, mechanism as well as practice that could limit, or even abolish the practice of war in world politics as well as promote peace (Kurki & Wight, 2016, pp. 15-16). The main goal of idealism was to use reasoning to change the belief that international community conflicts are permanent. Such change should be started in the field of international relations theory. However, this effort was challenged both intellectually and empirically by the realist scholars, including Edward Hallett Carr, Morgenthau, and so on. Intellectually, realists denounce the un-systematic, moral-based approach to IR by the idealist. Empirically, the existence of the two World Wars proved that world politics could not be altered. Peace and morality were accused of being unattainable (Richmond, 2008, p. 47). As a result, the realism claimed the victory in the debates while idealism was deemed to be of little significant both in academia and reality. Still, the creation of the League of Nation and the United Nations were referred to as the historical successes of idealism as it demonstrates the firm belief in the possibility of change despite the two World Wars and the failure of the League of Nation to prevent the second one. Thanks to the gradual economic interdependence between countries, liberalism is still received much support.

On the contrary, pacifism has been neglected intellectually as realists see it as “morally dangerous” theory. Indeed, realism and pacifism consist of conflicting values. Two main rival arguments between realism and pacifism regarding war are whether war could be abolished and whether should it be abolished. Generally, pacifist commitments would argue that war could and should be rejected. On contrast, realist theorists would refuse such arguments as it is impossible to put an end to the practice of war. British political scientist Nicholas Rengger argues: “[T]he pacifist forgoes three particular goods which most people are not prepared to surrender. The first... is my person, which I cannot defend against attack; the second of these are my family and friends, whom, again, I cannot defend; finally, I cannot take up arms against an unjust political order, no matter what the circumstances. [...] pacifism, properly understood, must accept these three conditions and recognize, in doing so, that it is

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<sup>7</sup> There is no consensus on the exact period of the first Great Debate. Indeed, while Joel Quirk and Darshan Vigneswaran claim it is to be “in the 1920s and 1930s” (Quirk & Vigneswaran, 2005, p. 89), Peter Wilson assumes it around “the late 1930s and the early 1940” (Wilson, 1998, p. 1). Additionally, Milja Kurki, and Colin Wright suggest the duration “before, during and immediately after the Second World War” (Kurki & Wight, 2016, p. 15). This thesis would choose the time from after the First World War until after the Second World War.

<sup>8</sup> The term “idealism” represents the victory of realism in the first Great Debate as it was the name realist gave to liberalism and pacifism. British researcher Peter Wilson considers such action as “realist category of abuse” (Wilson, 1998, p. 1)

surrendering all hope of political success in the conventional sense” (Rengger, 2013, p. 43). Similarly, Jean Elshtain believes that: “Leaders charged with right authority within organized political bodies cannot withdraw from the world, of course, and thus are never pacifists. Anyone who accepts political leadership understands that he or she may be compelled to sanction the resort to force under certain circumstances” (Elshtain, 2003, pp. 55-56). Realists even blame the pacifist-based 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact for the death number in the Second World War. Accordingly, they argue that because of this pacifist-based treaty, countries hesitated to use the military to prevent the emergence of Nazism in Germany (Lee, 2012, p. 295). As a result, pacifism has been excluded from most of the teaching programs in an academic institution and the intellectual debate on war and peace (Richmond, 2008, p. 30).

After establishing its dominant position in the discipline of IR and meeting little challenges from other theories, realism has been normalized as the most significant explanatory theory in the field. Such normalization of realism would lead to some negative impact as follows. Firstly, it creates an unfair and unjust intellectual platform for international relations theories. More specifically, as no theory could offer the most comprehensive explanation of international affairs, theoretical pluralism should be encouraged so that different perspectives could contribute to finding the truth. However, students of international relations discipline and policy-makers have been taught about the “realist world” as the world. Over time, such a realist point of view has been normalizing by generations of IR academics (Smith, 2016, p. 10). By accepting realism as the most significant one while dismissing pacifism as an intellectual punishment, normative pluralism has been discouraged. Secondly, the dominance of realism also cements the legitimacy of sovereignty and their practices of war as an effective means to conflict (Yamane, 2010, p. 21). Indeed, political actors, who have been under the influence of realist beliefs, may not be aware of how their thoughts and behaviours could be shaped and influenced by specific normative frameworks (Smith, 2016, p. 2). Eventually, they would think of force and war as acceptable and effective means in international affairs, which would confirm the realist argument. On the contrary, Savir argues that while a large number of peace treaties have been signed in the past several decades, their shared struggle to maintain peace between political parties in conflict reflects the wrong direction of peace, which is a product of realism. Accordingly, instead of aiming for peace, the peace negotiators of peace treaties who are also the warmakers would try to maintain stability through the balance of power principle (Savir, 2008, p. 19). Moreover, Austrian scholar Sigmund Freud believes that humans have the “death instinct”, which could lead to the human race destruction when combined with the continuously industrialized warfare (Ryan, 2013, p. 997). Indeed, the philosopher Richard Norman is also concerned about the unpredictability of war: “A major war involves social upheaval on a huge scale, eluding effective human control, and its outcomes are almost bound to be unpredictable” (Lee, 2012, p. 25).

Such a realist spiral would lead to more armed conflict that even the balance of power or equilibrium of power could not control. Normatively, as peace is more desirable than war, such a prediction on

world politics should not happen. Indeed, it would not be likely to happen, especially with the intervention of international organizations. Among international organizations, the United Nations could be seen as the almost-universal and most potent one.

The establishment of the United Nations shows the strength of co-operation, which confirms the liberal arguments. Additionally, the inclusion of pacifism in the UN Charter also demonstrates the desire for peace of the international community. However, the United Nations has been facing many challenges while operating their peace-keeping, peace-making, and peace-building projects. Despite collective efforts, war and large-scale armed conflicts are still happening around the world. More seriously, the development of media creates the international flow of information in which news about war and armed-conflicts, which are now more destructive with the emergence of drones and mass destructive weapons, could reach every individual around the world. After 75 years since its creation, the United Nations could be seen as another failure of idealism if it could not adequately resolve armed conflicts and promote peace. Meanwhile, the United Nations has to cope with other collective demand from the public, including environmental problems, human rights, gender and race equality, and on.

Among them, it is plausible to argue that human rights would serve as the new political motivation for the United Nations as it is also the most prestigious human rights regime. The United Nations' human rights revolution was originated with the birth of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was the first universal recognition of human rights. Such recognition has inspired world citizens to stand up against injustices, which are not only domestic injustices but also universal injustices. The human rights revolution challenges the ultimate right of sovereignty, which is the core value of realism in many countries, leading to the emergence of civil war. The human rights revolution also led to the radicalization of liberalism when democratic countries take advantage of humanitarian reasons to internationalize intra-state conflicts, escalating both the scale and the brutality of war. Accordingly, many democratic countries try to impose their political model on other countries with the aim of a democratic world peace at "the end of the history", which American political scientist Francis Fukuyama believes to be when Western liberalism gains the final victory (Fukuyama, 1989, p. 3). Thus, the United Nations could not use realism or liberalism as the theoretical foundation for human rights resolution.

In the next chapter, such a dilemma of the United Nations would be explored. Accordingly, it is argued that neither state-centric nor individual-centric should take priority spot in enhancing peace. Instead, the United Nations should adopt a normative framework that could protect individual rights without violating territorial integrity. As an ethically desirable and practical theory of peace, the United Nations should re-discover pacifism values. Normatively, in an intellectually war-centric environment, the understanding of pacifism has been regularly misperceived as a merely anti-war tradition. However, while anti-war is one side of the tradition, pacifist commitments also focus on peace-centric arguments.

## Chapter IV: The United Nations and Human Rights Revolution

The United Nations could be regarded as the third attempt in inter-governmental cooperation with the aim of building a more peaceful world. The other two efforts are the Concert of Europe in 1815 and the League of Nations in 1920 (Trent & Schnurr, 2018, p. 22). The former is known for its inclusion of international non-governmental organizations, creating the foundation for the involvement of civil society in world politics afterward (Trent & Schnurr, 2018, p. 24). Meanwhile, the latter contributed to the development of democratic deliberation at intergovernmental, even though a high number of the League's members were colonies of Great Britain and France. Besides, international humanitarian cooperation was advocated by the League by helping Russian, Armenian and Greeks refugees in the 1920s (Trent & Schnurr, 2018, p. 28). John Trent and Laura Schnurr, however, claims that international relations is not only about the nature of relationships between nation-states, but it also reflects "the dominant ideas and desire for power" (Trent & Schnurr, 2018, p. 24). It could be argued that both the Concert and the League failed to succeed as their foundations were based on the national interests of the winners of the Napoleonic Wars and the First World War respectively instead of the interest of world peace. The same critique could also be applied to the current operation of the United Nations. Moreover, it is plausible to argue that liberal efforts towards broadening the democratic network by war leading to several controversies regarding humanitarian crises. These critiques would also overshadow the United Nations' reputation, which would be discussed in depth later on.

While its peace-oriented operations have been dominated by such realist-oriented culture, the human rights revolution, which was motivated by the United Nations, could be its decisive driving-force. Generally, human rights could be defined as "the language" that could embody the perception that human beings is one while "each of the individuals who compose it is entitled to equal moral consideration". (Ignatieff, 2001, p. 4). This chapter would attempt to prove that human rights would be both the means and the end of the UN's operation. Human rights were the moral foundation for the creation of the United Nations after the humanitarian crises caused by the two World Wars. Such language has been written in the UN Charter in 1945, as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. While all the signatories of the UN Charter agree to "*reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small*" (The United Nations, 1945), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states similarly that "*all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights*" (The United Nations, 1948). While the perception of human rights as the end of the United Nations, the argument of human rights as a means for the United Nations has not been received much academic attention.

Thus, in order to discuss the means and end correlation between human rights revolution and the United Nations, this chapter would (1) introduce the United Nations as well as its missions as not only the peace-keeper, peace-maker, and peace-builder but also the most powerful guardian of human rights; (2) discuss the positive-peace demand of Human Rights Revolution, which was motivated by the United

Nations' works; (3) present how Human Rights Revolution could intensify the weaknesses of realist and liberal theoretical foundation of the United Nations, leading to its moral dilemma position in world politics and (4) propose that the United Nations should re-discover the pacifist commitments as an alternative normative foundation that could liberate it from such dilemma.

#### ***IV.1. The United Nations and Its Missions***

The United Nations was founded in 1945 with the signatories of 51 countries<sup>9</sup>. Its main organs, which were all created at the beginning of the organization, are the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the UN Secretariat (The United Nations, 2020). Among them, the Security Council, which consists of five permanent members and ten non-permanent ones, could be seen as the core of the organization. Indeed, regarding international security, the Council was granted more executive power than other organs, making it the most influential body of the United Nations. More specifically, all the member states have to follow the Council's mutual decision when it comes to international politics<sup>10</sup>. Furthermore, five permanent members of the Council would be considered as the most powerful UN members as they are the only five countries with veto power<sup>11</sup>. Such power could give them the right to approve or reject any resolution presented at the Council in terms of international security. Thus, it is plausible to take them as accountable for the quality of the UN's missions later on.

The main missions of the United Nations are peace-keeping, peace-making, peace-enforcement, and peace-building. Firstly, peace-keeping is to attempt to stop the use of force between nation-states or political communities within a territory (Groff, 2018, p. 429). Secondly, the mission of peace-making is to assist involved parties to negotiate with each other in the aim of putting an end to the conflict between them<sup>12</sup>. Thirdly, peace enforcement refers to the coercive measures, including the use of the military when needed<sup>13</sup> (Trent & Schnurr, 2018, p. 65). Lastly, peace-building regards to a longer

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<sup>9</sup> Initially, only 50 countries presented at the San Francisco Conference where the United Nations was introduced. Later that year, however, Poland was also recognized as the 51<sup>st</sup> founding member of the institution.

<sup>10</sup> Article 25 of the UN Charter: "*The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter*" (The United Nations, 1945).

<sup>11</sup> Article 27.3 of the UN Charter: "*Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting*" (The United Nations, 1945).

<sup>12</sup> Article 33.1 of the UN Charter: "*The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice*" (The United Nations, 1945).

<sup>13</sup> Article 42 of the UN Charter: "*Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations*" (The United Nations, 1945).

process than that of peace-keeping or peace-making (Groff, 2018, p. 429). More precisely, it is argued that the tasks of peace-building “overlaps with development and good governance” and refers to “the broad, complex, and sustained process of creating, securing, protecting, and consolidating a peaceful order” (Cahill, 2019, p. 326).

After 75 years of operation, the United Nations has been contributing significantly to world peace. Since its establishment in 1945, as a peace-keeper, the United Nations has been contributing to the de-escalation of many conflicts, including the Berlin crisis in 1948-1949, the Middle east crisis in 1973 and so on (The United Nations, 2013, p. 96). Moreover, it also involved in the formation of more than 800 peace agreements and related documents (The United Nations, 2020). Additionally, peace-building operations has also been carried out in post-conflict countries, such as Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste, and so forth. Comparing to the Concert of Europe and the League of Nations, one crucial difference in its foundation could be that the world leaders all desire for an intergovernmental strong enough to advance international peace.

However, the United Nations’ reputation has also been tainted by failing to react to humanitarian crises such as the genocides in Cambodia (1975-1979) and Rwanda (1994). At the same time, the failure to protect the territorial integrity of Iraq, Syria against invasion, and external interference respectively also puts its name in question. While both situations cement the failure to respond to humanitarian crises of the United Nations, they are also the representation of the moral dilemma that challenges the operation of UN’s projects. Indeed, they embody the abovementioned conflict between the human rights paradigm and the national defense paradigm. Thus, the dilemma of the United Nations could only be tackled when there is a resolution of the conflict between the two paradigms. In order to so, it is essential that both paradigms would be introduced. As the national defense paradigm has been introduced in chapter II, the next segment would be dedicated to the human rights paradigm.

#### ***IV.2. Human Rights Revolution and the quest for positive peace***

Besides empirical peace-oriented operations, the United Nations also accomplishes a significant number of international agreements for the protection and development of human rights. Among them, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 could be seen as one of most crucial legal material regarding the juridical revolution, which in turn would pave the way for the human rights revolution in advocacy and enforcement (Ignatieff, 2001, p. 5). The juridical, advocacy and enforcement revolution would later be labeled three facets of the human rights revolution. It is important to note that the United Nations does not originate human rights. Its origins could be found across world cultures and religions (The United Nations, 2013, p. 127). Indeed, human rights embodies the discourse that humankind is one, and each member of the human race enjoys the privilege of having “equal moral consideration”. Meanwhile, moral progress could be made when human rights successfully impose its power on the behaviours of individuals and actors (Ignatieff, 2001, pp. 3-4).

Yet, before the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the right of the nation-state could be considered to be more superior than the rights of its citizens as it had international recognized rights (Laqueur, 2001, p. 128). Thus, as the first legal document that universally acknowledges the rights of individuals as well as asks for the protection of those rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights could be considered a cornerstone in the history of human rights. In other words, such universal acknowledgment of human rights proclaims that human rights also have international protection like the right of sovereignty. It restores the agency to individuals who are now equipped with internationally-recognized rights to stand up against structural injustices, oppression. Moreover, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights emphasizes the notion human rights should be shared equally regardless “race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status” (The United Nations, 1948). Indeed, nations should not be seen as “moral islands” where their ideas of human rights should trump that of the others (Ignatieff, 2004, p. 9). Instead, when they sign any international treaties and conventions, they should comply with the international principles that are created by those international agreements (The United Nations, 2013, pp. 128-129). Thanks to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, states now have responsibilities to protect human rights from being violated both domestically and internationally (Richmond, 2008, p. 33). Hence, states would be judged not only on how they treat each other but also on how they protect their citizens’ human rights. As aforementioned in chapter II, such duty of sovereignty negatively affects the supreme authority of sovereignty. Since the birth of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, states could no longer behave with impunity concerning their own people (Trent & Schnurr, 2018, p. 58). Indeed, “no government has the right to hide behind national sovereignty in order to violate the human rights or fundamental freedoms of its peoples. Whether a person belongs to the minority or the majority, that person's human rights and fundamental freedoms are sacred” (Annan, 1999). Such a universal effort to protect individual rights could be considered as the juridical revolution of human rights, establishing the moral foundation for the human rights paradigm, which would be the primary excuse for humanitarian intervention.

The birth of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights also inspired the revolution of human rights enforcement. For example, many countries, including Colombia, Japan, Vietnam, Canada, Belgium, and so forth, have legally recognized the rights of transgender. At the regional level, instead of appealing to a national court, any individual or groups could seek justice at the European Court of Human Rights (henceforth ECHR) as the decisions of ECHR would also be recognized by all EU’s members. Moreover, any new member of the EU has to adjust their domestic law to the European Convention on human rights. At the international level, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights could be seen as the first universal-binding treaty among nations (Gutmann, 2001, p. vii).

Moreover, thanks to the promotion of the United Nations, the advocacy revolution has also emerged with a continuously growing number of non-governmental human rights organizations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (Ignatieff, 2001, p. 8). Accordingly, this revolution

has evolved from mostly peace organizations responding to inter-state wars and conflicts, into a global movement that also against systemic human rights violations. The main functions of these organizations are to report structural human rights violations, expose the gap between promise and practice of states, pressuring them to fulfill the human rights commitments that they agree. Additionally, through their works, these organizations empower the individuals to make their cases visible, which is the essential foundation for moral progress. Ignatieff believes that without such continuously expanding network of non-governmental human rights regimes, it would be likely that the human rights revolution since 1945 is just revolution on paper (Ignatieff, 2001, p. 10)

It is plausible to say that the emergence of a human rights revolution demands a change in the perception of peace. Accordingly, human rights and positive peace have a reciprocal relationship. On the one hand, human rights has always been a vital driving-force of peace movements. Thus, “the extension of international law from the exclusive rights of sovereign states towards recognizing the rights of all individuals under their common humanity marks a significant normative shift in the character of world politics” (Dunne, 2016, p. 121). Historically, mass killing and human rights violations could revolt the moral conscience of human beings, leading to the establishment of anti-war arguments, peace-oriented institutions, peace movements, and so forth. On the other hand, only in the state of positive peace could human rights be protected. As aforementioned in chapter II, the absence of war could lead to the emergence of a negative social order or positive social order, which are the foundations of negative peace or positive peace, respectively. The absence of war in the negative social order, however, could not guarantee humans their defensible rights. In the first half of 2020, for example, there have been global-level protests regarding racial discrimination, gender injustices, social justice. Most of these protests are non-violent and peaceful. However, in some situations, they could escalate into violence with national security forces. Generally, it could be argued that the human rights revolution motivates the peace movement, demanding an intellectual and practical change in how peace should be perceived.

As the most powerful human rights regime, the United Nations has also been supporting such progress through its projects. Despite the creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, UN bodies were hesitant to criticize any member states concerning their human rights records. The apartheid regime of South Africa was the first exception. Afterward, the United Nations has been more active in such political activity, which could be seen in the criticism of the Greek junta in the 1970s and the Eastern bloc in the 1980s. Moreover, in the 1990s, the UN decided to expand its human rights advocacy through the creation of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (Ignatieff, 2001, p. 11).

However, while human rights revolution was motivated by the United Nations, this institution fails to come up with an enforcement mechanism to protect people internationally. Legally, it is a Declaration, which means that there is no abiding characteristic. Thus, it is plausible to assume that human rights is still inferior than the right of sovereignty. The main reason is that The Universal Declaration was created on state-centric perspective, which tries to convince as many countries as

possible to sign (Hollinger, 2001, p. 123). Ignatieff also supports such an approach as he argues that the notion of human rights would be perceived differently in different cultures, preventing the Universal Declaration from being agreed by all the members. As a human rights regime, the United Nations should be effective than comprehensive (Gutmann, 2001, p. x). However, such an approach fails to create a comprehensive legal-binding document, constraining the development of moral progress. Moreover, it could lead to more violent conflict between political communities. Indeed, the states remain the primary human rights violators, especially to their citizens. As a result, without an effective channel in a realist world, people choose violence as a means to pursue justice for their political groups. The political struggle of political communities like Kurds, Kosovar Albanians, and Tamils represents such a problem. These situations could lead to long-standing humanitarian crises that could affect international security, asking for international help. As there is no proper instruction on humanitarian intervention, there is no consensus on how the international community, especially the United Nations, should react to those crises. As a consequence, in a growing number of cases, great powers would take the matter into their hand and internationalize domestic conflicts, which could lead to a worse situation.

Historically, such a moral dilemma shows that both the realist and liberal constraints could not create a more peaceful international society. As the most potent inter-governmental agencies regarding peace and human rights, the United Nations need to take action to fulfill its promise to humankind. However, in order to overcome its moral dilemma, it demands a different approach based on a different theoretical foundation, which would be discussed below.

#### ***IV.3. The Moral Dilemma of the United Nations:***

In the previous chapter, it was demonstrated how the state has absolute power within its territory as well as how the culture of violence was normalized. As a result, the states, which are founded based on violence, hold the monopoly rights of violence in its hands (Gibson & Mollan, 2012, p. 8). While this power should be used to protect its citizens, more and more states use their rights of sovereignty to violate the human rights of their own people. Such violation could be seen through the genocide and ethnic cleansing in Cambodia, Rwanda, and Kosovo. More contemporarily, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) reported that the Syrian government dropped bombs with chemical weapons in the city of Ltamenah, Syria on 24, 25, and 30 March 2017 (OPCW Investigation and Identification Team, 2020). Meanwhile, without peaceful channels to seek for justice, people have the tendency to use violent means, which could be seen in Hong Kong protests, Black Lives Matter movement, 2020 Belarusian protest, and so on. Historically, such domestic conflicts could escalate into civil wars like in Syria, Libya, leading to large-scale humanitarian crises that ask for help from the international community.

This would create a moral dilemma for the United Nations, as there is no proper instruction on humanitarian intervention. On the one hand, the UN Charter protects the principle of self-determination,

prohibiting the violation of the territorial integrity of its member states. Nevertheless, the Security Council regularly violates such principles (Trent & Schnurr, 2018, p. 56). On the other hand, based on human rights paradigm, systemic violations of human rights should justify humanitarian intervention. Moreover, there is not any official legal document that manages the practice of humanitarian intervention, giving countries a loophole to interfere in other countries' affairs. Many human rights-based humanitarian operations have been executed by unilateral force such as the involvement of Vietnamese military in Cambodian genocide or multilateral forces in Syria, Libya. In the report "Alert 2020! Report on conflicts, human rights, and peace-building" by The Autonomous University of Barcelona, internationalized domestic conflict makes up 82 percent of armed conflicts around the world in 2019 (Escola de Cultura de Pau, 2020, p. 25). Moreover, the involvement of both the United States of America and Russia in Syria and Libya reflects how human rights has been taken advantage as an excuse for the balance of power between the great powers.

The UN's failure to propose a peaceful resolution for conflict also reflects the moral danger of liberal constraint, especially when it is radicalized. Accordingly, after the Second World War, the Americans and British leaders discussed how the post-war world should be according to their preferences. This vision comprised of the UN system, which was to serve as an international platform for cooperation in different issue areas (Sterling-Folker, 2016, p. 91). In other words, the UN system was the product of the Western idea of cooperation and peace. Thus, liberal constraints, including economic interdependence, global democratization, and network of international organizations, have been promoted by the United Nations. Both the economic interdependence and the role of international organizations have received success. However, the radicalization in global democratization could lead to more conflict. Indeed, while it could be plausible to argue that democratic countries are more peaceful with each other, the same argument could not be made about a relationship between a democratic and a non-democratic country. In 2003, President George W. Bush publicly argued that promoting liberal democracy could be seen as a just cause of the use of force in another country: "It is no accident that the rise of so many democracies took place in a time when the world's most influential nation was itself a democracy. The United States made military and moral commitments in Europe and Asia, which protected free nations from aggression, and created the conditions in which new democracies could flourish [...] And now we must apply that lesson in our own time. We've reached another great turning point — and the resolve we show will shape the next stage of the world democratic movement" (Bush, 2003). However, such a point of view put democratic countries against their value as it was against the rights of self-determination.

Generally, this chapter attempts to show the United Nations system, the development of the human rights revolution, the moral dilemma of the United Nations, as well as the problems of realist and liberal restraint. Still, the United Nations has the responsibility to fulfill its commitment to world peace and human rights. Indeed, as the most powerful human rights regime, the United Nations has an obligation to protect those international standards without betraying what they stand for. Because of its status as

the most powerful human rights regime, the United Nations should have foundations that suit its purpose (Gutmann, 2001, p. xxii). This foundation has to balance out the conflict between the principles of the national paradigm and the principles of the human rights paradigm (Ignatieff, 2001, pp. 29-35). It is essential to emphasize that “to respect human beings is not to worship them or to worship human rights in a way that does not permit any compromises in the enforcement of some human rights for the sake of protecting others, or for the sake of the social conditions that are prerequisite to the protection of any human rights” (Gutmann, 2001, p. xxv). Moreover, this foundation also has to promote the culture of positive peace instead of the culture of war as external actors could not impose peace. Additionally, such a foundation has to be built based on human rights, which demands the pursuit of positive peace (Savir, 2008, p. 173). As mentioned above, this foundation should not be dominated by realism or liberalism as they could be radicalized. However, such a moral dilemma could be found in the normative framework of pacifism, which shows the commitment to restrain the practice of war as much as possible and to promote the culture of peace. Thus, the next chapter would argue that the United Nations should re-discover pacifism in its system. Moreover, it would also propose some policies for such applications.

## **Chapter V: Make the United Nations great again: Re-discovering pacifism in the quest for positive peace**

*“We must not be dissuaded by the fear of war, nor by the fear of cooperation. Peace in our world is possible, and it is our great privilege and responsibility to usher it in”*

*- Uri Savir (2008, p. 212)*

While chapter II attempts to prove that pacifism should be seen as an ethically desirable and practical normative framework of peace, chapter III shows how pacifism has been neglected intellectually in international relations discipline, leading to its underrepresentation in the empirical decision-making process. However, one of its most notable achievements is to be represented in “Chapter VI: Pacific Settlement of Disputes” of the UN Charter. However, its applications have been constrained by the “realist reality”, which has been constituted by the dominance of realism in the theoretical debate of International Relations. However, in Chapter IV, it is argued that under the emergence of the human rights revolution, the protection of human rights asks for the change from negative peace to positive peace. Moreover, in this chapter, the moral dilemma of the United Nations was also discussed in depth. Accordingly, the absence of an internationally-recognized enforcement mechanism regarding human rights creates the conflict between the human rights paradigm and the national defense paradigm. Such conflict could not be tackled effectively by realist restraint or liberal restraint, constraining UN’s operations as the guardian of world peace and human rights. Thus, it is argued that the United Nations should adopt an alternative theoretical foundation that could restrain the use of violence as well as promote peaceful resolution for conflicts. Such characteristics could be found in the principles of pacifism. Hence, pacifism should be re-discovered as an alternative theory that should be used in the United Nations’ decision-making process to constitute a “new normal” in which positive peace is actively pursued instead of war.

It is important to emphasize that peace should not be seen as the result of other processes but the priority in both individual and international agenda. As aforementioned, if peace is still seen in a subordinate perspective, the conflict between human rights and the right of sovereignty would not be resolved peacefully. Moreover, international actors have been trapped in a realist point of view, which considers war is inevitable. Thus, the agenda of peace first should be constructed by the people and the international community (Savir, 2008, p. 6). As the most prestigious intergovernmental organizations, the United Nations have the duty to create a peace-oriented model in which its members play an equal role as “a United Nations that will not stand up for human rights is a United Nations that cannot stand up for itself” (Annan, 1999). Besides, such a model also has to encourage the involvement of world citizens through other legitimate channels, including governmental and non-governmental channels, as it is their right and duty to guarantee the protection of human rights.

The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to demonstrate the pacifist approach as the means to pursue that mission. Accordingly, by re-adapting pacifism, the United Nations, as the most fundamental human rights regime could not only restrict the use of war as much as possible, but human rights would also be respected without violating the territorial integrity. Ultimately, some policy implications would be proposed with the aim of realizing that aspiration.

### ***V.1. The cooperation of pacifism and human rights: a practical way to positive peace***

From chapter II and IV, it has been proven that both pacifism and human rights have a correlation with positive peace. Indeed, pacifist tradition believes that peace could not be only perceived as “the absence of war” as this negative peace would lead to the desire to maintain the status quo by any means available, including the use of violence. From chapter IV, it is proven that such a realist constraint could not create sustainable peace. Instead, pacifist tradition argues that the foundation for sustainable peace could only be achieved through a positive understanding of peace, which indicates that the struggle against injustices is channeled through non-violent means. In other words, pacifism is a principle that puts “humanity before all nations” (Buckham, 1916, p. 90) While non-violent means have been introduced, they have not been seen as standard or obvious in the culture of war. Indeed, the traditional responses to both cross-border conflict and structural domestic oppression are war and violent revolution, respectively. Thus, in order to make non-violence standard and distinct, the culture of war should be replaced by the culture of peace, which resolves conflict through cooperation and agreement.

It should be emphasized that human rights does not advocate violence. On the contrary, human rights is “the language of equality mandates” that mutually acknowledge and respect between reasonable moral standards (Ignatieff, 2004, p. 90). Human rights could only flourish in the state of positive peace instead of the state of conflict. However, there is a shortage of well-founded channels through which cross-border conflict could be resolved through peaceful resolution. Similarly, oppressed political communities are not equipped with peaceful channels to challenge the system.

As both pacifist commitment and human rights share the universal desirability of positive peace, pacifism could offer successful non-violent channels for human rights activists. A critical characteristic of non-violent means is that their successes are more sustainable than that of violent means. In turn, the application of non-violent means in human rights advocacy would validate the pacifist belief that violence is avoidable evil and peace is not utopian perception. Moreover, such validation could contribute to the visibility of pacifism in the contemporary debate on war and peace in IR, challenging the normalization of the First Great Debate’s outcome.

## ***V.2. The shared moral ground of pacifism, realism and liberalism***

The theories are not living alone in this world; they play a relational game of recognition and mutual interest” (Wæver, 2016, p. 301). Indeed, in chapter III, it is discussed how the outcome of the First Great Debate in IR led to the dominance of realism, the subordination of liberalism, and the abandonment of pacifism. Historically, political events during the First Great Debate proved the significance of realism as an explanatory theory. Moreover, without significant challenges, such domination has been contributing to the constitution of the reality that the use of force could not be avoidable in resolving conflict. As a consequence, a conflict could easily lead to violent conflict. At the same time, liberal restraint has been taken advantage of by the desire of a global network of democracies, leading to large-scale armed conflicts. In such a culture of war, pacifist tradition, which is against the idea of war as inevitable and productive, has been neglected in the intellectual debate on war and peace as realist scholars believe that it is morally dangerous.

However, these normative frameworks possess more common ground than it was recognized. While the emergence of the human rights revolution exposes the weakness of realism, liberalism, and pacifism, such revolution also amplifies such shared moral ground: the need for peace. The difference between them is how to achieve it. Both realism and liberalism have a state-centric theoretical foundation. For them, the state plays a central role in constructing peace. While realism focuses solely on the state, liberalism includes international organizations in the equation.

Meanwhile, pacifism is a peace-centric normative framework, which pursues peace at different levels, including individual, national and international levels. Like Danish international relations theorist Ole Wæver’s comment, theories are not alone. They have been evolving over time to adapt to a new reality. Due to the existence of genocide, ethnic cleansing, pacifism compromises its principle in these situations of “greater evil”. Thus, in this age of human rights, it is reasonable for both realism and liberalism to compromise in the same manner. In chapter III, realism and liberalism propose realist and liberal restraints respectively as principles to maintain the status quo and security. However, the human rights revolution indicates the need to change the status quo, which is based on the idea of negative peace. Apart from the traditional inter-state conflict, such intra-state conflict becomes the main threat to peace and security. In its core, such conflict represents the dispute between human rights and the right of sovereignty or between human-centric and state-centric. Such conflict could not be tackled by action that is based on the principle of balance of power or the principle of equilibrium of power. Such conflict could also not be resolved by the imposition of a democratic regime in other countries. Such conflict could only be neutralized through non-violent channels, which would demand the intellectual recognition of realism and liberalism towards pacifism in the intellectual debate on war and peace.

Liberalism and pacifism share some overlapping characteristics. Thus, the liberal tradition has generally considered conditional pacifism as one of its versions (Richmond, 2008; Zaidi, 2019). British scholar Oliver P. Richmond argues that pacifist could be connected to Kantian or cosmopolitan theory

as it envisions the replacement of the Westphalian sovereignty system with democracy and global citizenship, and accepts the use of violence under strict regulations (Richmond, 2008, p. 30). Moreover, in the age of human rights, liberal thinking also integrates such discourse into its tradition. More and more liberal theorists criticize the use of force to enforce democracy in other countries. Ignatieff argues that “we are intervening in the name of human rights as never before, but our interventions are sometimes making matters worse. Our interventions, instead of reinforcing human rights, maybe consuming their legitimacy as a universalistic basis for foreign policy” (Ignatieff, 2001, p. 47). Bruce Russett observes that instead of imposing democracy, the pursuit of peace could lead to democracy. Moreover, democracy would be preserved more efficiently in a state of peace as “states at peace need fewer restraints on democracy” (Russett, 2016, p. 79). Moreover, he also argues that both trade and international organizations’ efficiency also depends on a peaceful environment both at the national and international levels (Russett, 2016, p. 79).

On the contrary, the theoretical position of pacifism and realism make it harder for them to reconcile. Indeed, most realists would support the central government in the domestic level while the international community would remain a self-help system as they only focus on preserving the right of sovereignty. Furthermore, one of the most visible characteristics of political realism is that it tends to be radicalized, leading to the adoption of any policy that could secure the national interest of the state at the expense of other countries, or even their people (Korab-Karpowicz, 2018). Similarly, Lebow also argues that classical realists acknowledge that “great powers are often their own worst enemies”, especially when they are “blind to the need for self-restraint” (Lebow, 2016, pp. 35-36). As a result, peace-makers think of security as the most effective to achieve peace while it should be the peace that could help to create security (Savir, 2008, p. 77)

On the one hand, it is false to claim that realist tradition glorifies war and does not care about peace (Thompson, 1991, p. 75). Both Thucydides and Morgenthau recognize that justice is essential for developing a well-functioning community, which is essential to the intellectual formation and the realization of individual interests (Lebow, 2016, pp. 35-36). Hence, it could be argued that realist traditions, like other ideologies, want to constitute a more peaceful world. Unlike other ideologies, however, realism believes in the efficiency of the use of force. However, the use of force would not be successful in making or maintaining peace. Instead, peace should be pursued by non-violent means. On the other hand, classical realists understand that human beings were never entrapped by their culture, institutions, or language, but they continually reproduced, changed, and reinvented them. Indeed, among realist tradition, some scholars believe that the discourse of peace should focus on lessening the state of nature. Morgenthau insists that the problem of war would require a drastic change in the international system that makes it more like the situation in national societies. That is the reason why he engaged in the idea of some form of supranational authority by the 1970s (Lebow, 2016, p. 45)

It could be argued that the most favorable outcome of introducing realist characteristics into peace advocacy would be to mobilize a broader range of audiences (Hermann, 1992, p. 884). However, the

re-constitution of the world in the pacifist framework would not be without challenges. Still, many British scholars such as Ken Booth (1997), Steve Smith (1997) argue that theory could in itself be a form of practice. More precisely, it means that "if we accept that theory constitutes the world we live in, by advancing a theory one may either reproduce or change mindsets and, hence, social realities" (Kurki & Wight, 2016, p. 30). The next segment would attempt to realize the pacifist tradition in the UN system.

### ***V.3. Policy implication***

While analyzing the desirability, the practicality of pacifism as a normative framework for the United Nations to pursue positive peace is essential, it is also of equal importance to fortify the hesitant attitude toward war and commitment to peace in practice. Indeed, pacifism is not only a normative framework, its primary goal is to constitute change through policy. Understanding the complexity of war and peace, pacifist scholars acknowledge that pacifist-based policy has to be carefully deliberated and planned so that "friendliness" and "duties" would be given an equal place in "right" (Buckham, 1916, p. 90). Thus, some policy proposals would be presented below. The jus influences these policy suggestions in *abolitione belli*, which are principles regarding justice in the abolition of war of Lee and "Peace First" model by Uri Savir<sup>14</sup>. Accordingly, as pacifist commitments have two sides, namely anti-war and peace-oriented, while the former could be tackled by Lee's work, the model of Savir could benefit the latter.

Firstly, in the book "*Ethics and War: An Introduction*" (2012), Lee introduces the criteria of jus in abolitione belli, including (1) maximize feasible non-military alternatives to achieving justice, (2) bring greater legitimacy to international institutions, and (3) accept national sovereignty as a necessary moral fiction. Regarding the first criterion, Lee argues that the abolition of war is desirable. However, there are situations where the use of force is necessary when there is no alternative option. Thus, to balance this conflict, he proposes that the last resort criterion should be more challenging to achieve. Non-violent means should be tried more than once before resorting to the use of force (Lee, 2012, pp. 301-302). The next criterion is to bring greater legitimacy to international institutions. Accordingly, in the absence of active international institutions, there is a lack of mutual trust, and thus, every country has to secure its security. Lee believes that when international institutions have greater legitimacy, they would be able to break that distrust as actors would believe in the judgment of such institutions. Moreover, when the institution proposes a feasible resort, actors would also have more belief in the efficiency of such resolution by turning national interest into mutual international interest. Thus, the international institution should be included in the procedure to tackle conflicts between actors in conflict (Lee, 2012, pp. 302-304). The last criterion is to accept national sovereignty as a necessary moral

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<sup>14</sup> Both Lee and Savir do not identify themselves as pacifists. Lee is a just war theorist, while Savir, a dedicated Israeli peace negotiator, refuses to label himself as a pacifist. Their initiatives could be of high helpfulness to pacifist commitments to pursue positive peace.

fiction: One of the United Nations' dilemmas is the debate between the human rights paradigm and the national defense paradigm. They should be respected equally, and thus, states should acknowledge national sovereignty as a moral fiction, denouncing the primacy of sovereignty. This would mean that international respect for state sovereignty would not be without exception. Thus, states should respect the human rights of their citizens as well as other peoples. On the contrary, the international institutions would have to protect their members' integrity of sovereignty. Without worrying about the domestic violations of human rights, they could focus on assuring that no single member plays the role of international police (Lee, 2012, pp. 304-306).

Secondly, the Peace First model of Uri Savir was introduced in his book *"Peace First: A New Model to End War"* (2008). This model includes four main pillars, namely (1) participatory peace and glocalization, (2) peace ecology, (3) peace-building, and (4) creative diplomacy (Savir, 2008, pp. 8-9). The first pillar is participatory peace and glocalization, which includes local actors into global issues. Accordingly, Savir believes that the current process of peace-making and peace-building are most likely to include only a narrow group of leaders and diplomats who are also war-makers. To achieve sustainable peace, this group should be decentralized by including local government and civil society (Savir, 2008, p. 57). More specifically, he believes that it would be easier for local governments to see the overlapping consensus as they have to tackle similar urban problems, enhancing mutual understanding. Such mutual understanding could be taken advantage of to build trust between political communities, increasing the possibility of peaceful relationships. Similarly, civil society, especially youth communities, could exchange through mutual respect, building more reliable cooperative connections between societies in conflict.

The second pillar is peace ecology, which asks for the psychological and cultural transformation from the culture of conflict to the culture of cooperation. This transition should be created based on shared values, toleration, and coexistence. Savir argues that political communities tend to identify their relationship as "us and them", which would be intensified during conflicts. This identity should be changed into "us and us", which would leave more room for a peaceful resolution (Savir, 2008, p. 65). Such transition also asks for cooperation from media. Instead of reporting about negative events, they could also emphasize positive activities between political groups. Thirdly, in Savir's perspective, peace-building should be used to build more "bridges" in physical, financial, and social dimensions (Savir, 2008, p. 9). Accordingly, more affluent groups should try to assist their former enemies as potential future partners. In this way, when the gap between political groups is narrowed via cooperation, the peaceful environment would be more likely to be sustainable. Lastly, creative diplomacy suggests that negotiation should serve one goal that is "everyone feels like they've won" (Savir, 2008, p. 9). From his own experiences, Savir observes that most of the negotiating process is the competition about the struggle for interest. Creative diplomacy should focus on a win-win resolution for both sides.

It could be seen that there are some overlapping ideas between Lee and Savir, thus it is plausible to separate them according to the missions of the United Nations, including peace-keeping, peace-making,

peace-enforcement, and peace-building. In peace-keeping, the United Nations should work together to introduce more non-violent means to conflict resolution. Additionally, humanitarian intervention criteria should also be clarified to avoid human rights being taken advantage of for other purposes. Regarding peace-enforcement, the United Nations has to take a strong stand that no practice of war could be justified for humanitarian reasons if its fundamental premise is to prevent peaceful negotiation and deny the public (Ignatieff, 2004, p. 103). The United Nations has the responsibility to protect the right of sovereignty and human rights. Thus, it should condemn or even use the military to counter any use of force that takes advantage of these rights. In peace-making, the idea of creative diplomacy should be promoted during the negotiating process. Any actor who takes part in a negotiation should think of the others as potential partners instead of enemies. As partners, they share mutual interest instead of separate national interests. Thus, they should take the interests of the others into account so that a win-win situation could be pursued, opening more cooperative channels. As aforementioned, national governments are their worst enemies. Thus, the inclusion of international institutions, local government, and civil society should be advocated. Moreover, the United Nations should promote the inclusion of regional organizations to understand better the complexity of the dispute than international organizations like the United Nations itself. Lastly, in the peace-building mission, the United Nations has the responsibility to assure the right of sovereignty for its member states while demand them to respect human rights. To help them do so, the United Nations should sponsor political communities in conflict or post-conflict with any means that could help them implement globalization and peace ecology.

As aforementioned, the United Nations' current operations are being decided by the members of the UN Security Council, who also make wars or support wars in other political communities. Moreover, governments could use the media to shape their citizens' perception of their decisions, leading to most people's consent. As a consequence, human rights have been perceived with an indifferent attitude. The turnout of voters in some elections shows how people do not care about their rights, let alone the rights of other political communities (Ignatieff, 2004, pp. 52-53). Thus, it is not easy for the normative framework of pacifism to be adopted or those policy proposals to be implemented. However, as Savir comments, "We must not be dissuaded by the fear of war, nor by the fear of cooperation. Peace in our world is possible, and it is our great privilege and responsibility to usher it in" (Savir, 2008, p. 212)

## Chapter VI: Conclusion

In international relations, theories could be considered as toolkits to understand world politics, implying the independent existences between theories and world politics. Such a view is called an explanatory view. Realism and liberalism are grand theories that represent such points of view. On the contrary, the constitutional point of view reflects that theories should not be separated from the world. Theories are an intrinsic part of it, and thus, theories and events in world politics shape each other mutually (Smith, 2016, p. 8). Indeed, the culture of war is a product of world politics and the dominance of realism in the intellectual debate of IR theory. Accordingly, the use of violence to resolve conflict cements the realist argument, which, in turn, would constitute the behaviours of political actors. More importantly, realism has been radicalized into the belief that self-interest and national interest should be protected by the military, threatening world peace, and human rights. Historically, powerful countries have been using violence to oppress their people and violate their neighbours' territorial integrity. Building upon that realist foundation, while the United Nations demonstrates the desire of international cooperation, it is still a product of realist influence, constraining its promise as the peace-keeper, peace-maker, peace-builder of the international community.

The emergence of the human rights revolution not only intensifies such a moral dilemma of the United Nations, but it also amplifies the strength of human solidarity. For instance, compared to the past, anti-racial discrimination movements such as Black Lives Matter happen not only in the United States of America any longer. Such movements have also received support from other countries, including the Netherlands, France, Germany, Japan, and so forth. Another example of human solidarity could be seen during the Corona crisis. At the individual level, many people volunteer to help medical workers with traveling when they are too tired after a long shift in the Netherlands. At the national level, people are willing to sacrifice partially their rights to comply with the urgent regulations. At the international level, countries support each other with medical equipment, human resources. These behaviours of solidarity show that people could act morally by taking the interest of the other into account. Thus, it is plausible to argue that self-interest is not the dominant drive that constitutes human nature. The human also possesses positive moral values, which could be used to transform the culture of war into a culture of positive peace. However, in a realist world, they could not pursue such goals on their own. As the most powerful institution of peace and human rights, The United Nations should instruct them to construct the culture of positive peace under the normative framework of pacifism. The pacifist principles and measures are presented to alter the perception of war as an acceptable tool of politics and to constitute positive peace, which could protect and foster human rights without violating territorial integrity.

This thesis's arguments should not be interpreted as an argument about the superiority of pacifism compared to the others. Instead, firstly, this is another attempt to explain the misperceptions about pacifism as well as re-discover pacifism in the new era of the human rights revolution. As

aforementioned in chapters II and III, while pacifism could be seen as a peace-oriented tradition, its arguments have been misinterpreted as merely anti-war reasoning without exception (Richmond, 2008; Benjamin, 1973). Secondly, this is another attempt to contribute to the normative frameworks of peace movements, both from top-down and grassroots. Similarly, Lebow comments that "theoretical knowledge is not an end in itself, but a starting point for actors to work their way through contemporary problems and, in the process, to factor in key, and generally determining, features of context. Theory could shape but never fully determine, explanatory narratives or forecasts of future developments" (Lebow, 2016, p. 36). However, a change in the highest international institution like the United Nations would not only benefit the movements but also to the peace-building and peace-keeping operations of the United Nations itself. Indeed, international orders should not be perceived as a permanent fix. Instead, historical examples should encourage "ambitious visions about improving future world orders" (Plesch & Weiss, 2015, p. 2). Russett also agrees that humankind must learn from their own experiences as well as that of others, including the experience of war. From acknowledging the past lessons, they could collectively challenge the current norm and transform it into new and better ways. However, he also warns that the transition could only be effective when we also recognize the social relations that encourage people to think socially disempowered as well as self-interest way (Russett, 2016, p. 69). Thirdly, this is another attempt to contribute to the on-going theoretical pluralization in international relations, generating different answers to the questions regarding world politics, especially the question of peace.

Nonetheless, it is undeniable that there are some disadvantages. Normatively, one of the crucial obstacles of defending pacifism is that even a large number of scientists who defend pacifism could not mutually agree with each other to defend and advocate for pacifism, creating an intellectual conflict within the ideology. Like Uri Savir comments that "the enemy is not the Other." Indeed, while the perception of pacifism is still misperceived, non-violent means are often inconsistent, underdeveloped (Elliott, 1980, p. 28). The enemy challenging the development of pacifism is the difference in how pacifism could be defined and achieved. For example, Sonan Reader declines the arguments from pacifism like Richard Norman or contingent pacifism from John Rawls, Jonathan Glover, Jenny Teichman.

On the contrary, he believes that pacifist commitments could not be contingent, and thus, those arguments could not be strong enough for defending pacifism (Reader, 2000, p. 170). Reader himself generalizes pacifism as the "moral status of persons," which views war as "always morally wrong" (Reader, 2000, p. 169). Empirically, the culture of war is still visible that it would not be easy for pacifist beliefs to be a success. As could be seen, some weaknesses have not been resolved in this thesis. However, they could be considered as the foundation for further research.

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