

Globalization of populist party voting?

A statistical investigation into the effects of types of democracy, globalization and relative-deprivation on voting for populist parties

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Abstract

Two theoretical debates form the basis of this thesis. One debate is about globalization and relative deprivation. The globalization thesis argues that globalization created winners and losers and the losers are more likely to vote for populist parties. Relative-deprivation on the other hand argues that people perceive their situation as being worse than others in society and this increases the likelihood of voting for populist parties. The second debate is about majoritarian versus consensus democracy. On the one hand it is argued that consensus democracies have less accountability and are therefore more prone to the rise of populist parties. On the other hand it is argued that consensus democracies use proportional representation and therefore populist parties can get elected more easily. This assumes a direct relationship, but research has shown that types of democracies can also have a moderator effect. This thesis investigates this perspective and analyzes to what extent the model of democracy influences the relationship between the losers of globalization/relatively deprived and voting for populist parties. This is investigated by conducting a multilevel logistic regression analysis on the European Social Survey of 2012. The outcome is that the type of democracy does not have a moderator effect on the losers of globalization/relatively deprived. Another important finding is that the globalization thesis mainly applies to populist far-right parties, whereas relative-deprivation mainly applies to populist far-left parties.

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1. Introduction

Marine le Pen, the leader of the French party Front National, made a declaration to her supporters after she reached the second round of the 2017 presidential election:

It puts on me a huge responsibility to defend the French nation, its unity, its security, its culture, its prosperity and its independence. The main thing at stake in this election is the rampant globalisation that is endangering our civilisation (The Guardian, 2017).

Le Pen clearly identifies globalization as a threat to French society. A 2016 survey on attitudes towards globalization in the European Union showed that 45 percent of the respondents also see globalization as a threat to society (De Vries, Hoffmann, 2016, p. 3). This study found a clear correlation between fear for globalization and the support for far-right populist parties. The same applied to far-left populist parties, albeit less pronounced (ibid.).

The theoretical framework underlying this analysis is the globalization thesis. This thesis claims that the forces of globalization profoundly transformed European societies. In short, globalization created two groups in society, the winners and the losers. These groups form potential for political parties and can serve as a major explanation for the recent rise of populist parties (Grande & Kriesi, 2012).

Other studies pointed to different explanatory factors for the rise of populist parties. One prominent theory is the relative-deprivation theory. Proponents of this theory argue that negative economic effects do not necessarily translate into feelings of resentment. Rather, the less well-off compare their own socioeconomic circumstances to other groups (Urbanska & Guimond, 2018). So, economic factors such as globalization can have an impact on that judgement, however it is not guaranteed that less well-off will have a degree of resentment, it depends on comparisons with other groups (Burgoon, Van Noort, Rooduijn & Underhill, 2018). Contextual factors are thus important for the relative-deprivation theory. This is in contrast with the globalization thesis, since it argued that the consequences of globalization are profound across Europe. For relative deprivation the national socioeconomic and sociocultural context in a certain country matters and influence the relationship between being less well-off and voting for populist parties (ibid.).

Two theories trying to explain rising support for populist parties have been discussed. Both theories looked at economic factors in explaining populist party voting. In this thesis it will be looked at whether another factor can explain this phenomena. In the literature on causes of populist voting a debate emerged on the merits of majoritarian and consensus democracies. The majoritarian model emphasizes the accountability of politicians to its voters, whereas the consensus model aims to represent a diverse range of groups in government (Thomassen, 2014). Some argued that the latter

model fuels the rise of populist parties due to a lack of accountability (e.g. Katz & Mair, 1995; Andeweg, 2001). Others argued that populist parties fare better in consensual systems because it uses proportional representation and therefore it is easier for populist parties to get elected and pointed to the supposedly superior performance of consensus democracies in terms of gender and minority rights among other things (Lijphart, 2001).

This debate directly linked the political systems to voting for populist parties. Other researchers have tried to bridge the gap between solely political explanations and economic explanations for the rise of populist parties. Research on the effects of globalization has shown for instance, that even though globalization contributed to the rise of populist far-right parties Europe, the consequences of globalization are shaped by national political institutions (Swank & Betz, 2003, p. 238). In this thesis this perspective will be looked at, it will be analyzed if and how the model of democracy of a particular country, influences responses to globalization and how it influenced relative deprivation.

1.1 Research question

Research question

The previous discussion leads to the following research question:

To what extent did the model of democracy of a particular country influence the relationship between the losers of globalization/relatively deprived people and voting for populist parties in 2012 in the European Union?

In order to answer this research question a statistical multi-level logistic regression analysis will be conducted. Several hypotheses, outlined in the theoretical framework, will be tested. The choice was made to analyze the year 2012. The reason why this year has been chosen is because in 2012 the European Union was at the height of the Euro crisis. Governments implemented several policies to combat the effects of the crisis, for instance through austerity measures. In southern-European countries this had as a side effect that inequality increased in this period. Research on the effects of austerity measures in southern-European countries of Greece, Italy, Portugal and Greece showed that people who were poor became even poorer and that the unemployed also became poorer (Perez & Matsaganis, 2017, p. 203). Other research confirmed that this findings also applied to the entire Eurozone. This suggested that the policies had on average the effect of a redistribution from the bottom to the top (Schneider, Kinsella & Godin, 2016). This is evidence that the economic difference between groups in society have increased in 2012. It would not be far-fetched to assume that relative deprivation to have increased in this period and that the loser group of globalization also increased in

this period. So, in 2012 it can be expected that a sizeable part of the population voted for populist parties in Europe.

Scientific and societal relevance

Almost all of the earlier mentioned studies assumed a direct relationship between their explanatory concepts and the voting for populist parties. However, as Hayes & Rockwood (2016, p. 1) note: *“it is just as important to understand how such effects operate and the boundary conditions of those effects”*. The boundary conditions refer to the context or types of people for whom an effect exists. How the effect operates, and boundary conditions are known as mediation and moderation analysis. This is what will be conducted in this thesis. It will be researched if the type of democracy can have a moderator effect on the globalization and relative-deprivation thesis. There are indications that this might be the case. For instance, it has been found that the type of welfare state influenced the relationship between globalization and populist voting (Swank & Betz 2003). Furthermore, research showed that electoral system matter for the success of populist parties (Golder, 2003). The scientific relevance of this thesis is that it tries to link two debates together. On the one hand there is debate between the globalization thesis and relative-deprivation theory. On the other hand there is debate about the majoritarian versus consensus democracy distinction. Conducting moderation research could link these two debates together and lead to a more complete explanation of populist voting.

The societal relevance of this study is found in its contribution to the research on types of democracy. In 2017 the Dutch government instituted a commission to investigate the performance of the parliamentary system. One of the conclusions of this commission was that significant groups in society are not represented in government. The supposed solution to this problem was a set of reforms of the political system, for instance it proposed establishing a binding referendum (State Commission on the parliamentary system in the Netherlands, 2018). This proposed reforms tried to address supposed flaws in the ‘polder democracy’, as the Dutch consensus system is often called. This Dutch example is just one of the instances where political reform is proposed as a solution to discontent in society. Research on the type of democracy could contribute to the question whether political reform is needed, by attempting to link the type of democracy to populist voting. Another part of the societal relevance is that research on the political effects of globalization can highlight whether more effort needs to be devoted to combat the supposedly negative effects of globalization on certain segments of society.

1.2 Outline

After this introduction, chapter two will further introduce the theoretical framework of this thesis. The globalization thesis, relative-deprivation theory and the consensus versus majoritarian democracy debate have been briefly introduced in the introduction, chapter two will build on that introduction and further address these three theses. Hypotheses will be derived from the consulted literature.

Chapter three will introduce the methodology of this thesis. It will explain further issues about case selection. Also, the different concepts outlined in the theoretical framework will be operationalized.

Chapter four outlines the results of the statistical analysis. It will discuss the various statistical assumptions that need to be fulfilled to have confidence in the results of the various models. Subsequently, multi-level statistical models will be used to test the various hypotheses.

Finally, the conclusion will reflect on what the results means for the different theories and the research question will be answered. The conclusion will also discuss the limitations of this thesis and provide recommendations for further study.

2. Theoretical framework

2.1 Defining populism

2.1.1 Concepts of interest

Before outlining the different theoretical perspectives of this thesis it is important to properly define the phenomenon of interest. Populist party voting is the phenomenon that this thesis tries to explain and the theories that will be discussed also employed the term populism one way or another. Populist party voting in national parliamentary elections is used in this thesis, because most countries in the European Union have parliamentary systems and the national electoral arena is still the main venue for individuals to express their views about politics (Kriesi et al., 2006). This does not mean that other elections and arenas, such as protest politics, are per definition irrelevant. However, it is beyond the scope of this study to include them. Another important reason for the choice of populist party voting in national parliamentary elections is that the different theories that will be discussed later on all link their explanatory factors to populist party voting (e.g. Andeweg, 2001; Dolezal & Hutter, 2012, 2012; Lijphart, 2001; Kriesi et al., 2006; Rooduijn & Burgoon, 2018).

Before outlining the definitions that will be used in this thesis three issues with the studies on populism need to be discussed.

The first issue is that in the consulted literature there is some confusion on what terms should be used. Some studies did not define populism, even though it is used extensively (e.g. Kriesi et al., 2006; Grande & Kriesi, 2012). Other studies conflated populism with other terms. One study used anti-immigration parties as a synonym for far-right populist parties (Van der Brug, Fennema & Tillie, 2005), however these terms are not the same. An anti-immigration party is not necessarily a populist party and vice versa. Conflating populism with other terms leads to confusion and also increases the risk of drawing the wrong conclusions (Rooduijn, 2019, p. 369). Another issue of confusion is about the adjectives far, extreme and radical. These terms are confusing, because they are used interchangeably in some studies and are also attached to the term populism. However, when one looks at the parties different studies include in their statistical analyses, generally the same parties are used across different studies (e.g. Van der Brug et al., 2005; Hakhverdian & Koop, 2007; Burgoon et al., 2018). A consensus emerged that even though different terms have been used in the literature, these parties do indeed form one single party-family (Muis & Immerzeel, 2017, p. 910). For clarities sake, the terms that will be used in this thesis are populist far-right parties and populist far-left parties.

A second issue is that many studies only used populist far-right parties in their analysis and did not include populist far-left parties without clearly explaining why these parties should be excluded.

The reason for the focus on the populist far-right parties seems to be because these parties have (had) more electoral success than populist far-left parties in Europe in the last twenty years. Several studies started their introduction highlighting the electoral success of populist far-right parties in Europe as a reason why they should be studied (e.g. Van der Brug et al., 2005; Golder, 2003). A research project by the Guardian (2018)¹ showed that this generally has been the case in the EU during the 2000s, however more recently populist far-left parties gained some traction in elections. In terms of vote-share, another study found that in the period 2000-2011 populist far-left and far-right parties had a similar average support (March & Rommerskirchen, 2015, p. 40). This study will include populist far-left parties, because they are a relevant electoral factor in contemporary Europe.

One final issue is about centrist populism and populist parties that cannot be properly defined using the left-right scale. These types of parties can be centrist because they hold mainstream positions, but on the other hand are anti-establishment (Hanley & Sikk, 2016, p. 522). This has also been called ‘valence populism’, this means that these types of parties focus almost exclusively on issues such as corruption, democratic reform and transparency (Zulianello, 2020, p. 329). One well-known example of such a party would be the 5-star movement in Italy, which is often considered to be neither left- nor right-wing (Zulianello, 2020; Rooduijn et al., 2019). Explaining voting for this type of populist parties could be an interesting research topic, nevertheless they are excluded from the analysis for a number of reasons. First and foremost, the theories that will be discussed below attempted to explain the rise of parties that do take strong positions on the economic and cultural dimension and distinguished themselves based on these positions (e.g. Kriesi et al., 2006; Rooduijn & Burgoon, 2018; Andeweg, 2001; Lijphart, 2001). Since this thesis tries to evaluate these different theories it would be strange to judge these theories on a type of party that they have no hypotheses about. The issue of centrist or valence populist parties could well be an interesting avenue for research, however it is beyond the scope of this thesis. Secondly, the previously cited research project by the Guardian showed that centrist populism did not have the same electoral significance as populist far-left and far-right (the Guardian, 2018).

2.1.2 Defining populist far-left and far-right parties

In the previous part it has been established that both populist far-left and far-right parties should be included in the analysis. However, it is also important to define the different terms, which is the goal of this section.

The term that unites both far-left and far-right parties is populism. Populism is defined “*as an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic*

¹ This study by the Guardian was conducted under supervision of Rooduijn, M. and peer-reviewed by several academics

groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people" (Mudde, 2004, p. 543). This definition has been adopted by many researchers that will be discussed later on (e.g. Kriesi, 2014, p. 362). Research has shown the validity of this definition in prototypical cases of populist parties in different contexts. The lowest common denominator of these prototypical populist parties is people centrism, anti-elitism, homogeneity of the people and a proclamation of a crisis. Except for the proclamation of a crisis, all other lowest common denominators are captured in this definition (Rooduijn, 2014, pp. 591-592). This definition of populism is a valid and empirically tested concept, so therefore it is employed in this thesis.

Populism is defined as a thin-centered ideology and therefore it is almost always attached to a thick-centered ideology (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 6). In this thesis the distinction is made between populist far-right and far-left parties and both types of parties are included in the analysis. As mentioned before, the reason for this is the use of two theories, the globalization thesis and relative-deprivation theory, and they have expectations for both types of parties .

Populist far-right parties focus on ethnic and national issues (Hakhverdian & Koop, 406). Or in other words, populist far-right parties consider 'the people' from the above definition of populism as a nation (Kriesi, 2014, p. 362). Other studies pointed to immigration as the defining feature of these parties (Van der Brug et al., 2005). However, this definition of far-right as being anti-immigration reduces these parties to a single-issue. Moreover, it is also not suitable for countries which have significant ethnic minorities, such as the Roma people in eastern-European countries. These minorities are not always considered immigrants, so then the definition of anti-immigration does not apply to these parties (Muis & Immerzeel, 2017). Eastern-European populist far-right parties are included in the analysis, so it is important that its definition is also appropriate for that context. A definition that captures both the anti-immigration and the anti-ethnic minority sentiment is the concept of nativism. Mudde (2007, p. 19) defined nativism as "*an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group ("the nation") and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state*". This definition captures the core ideology of populist far-right parties. It is a broader definition than anti-immigration party, because it allows parties that are anti-immigration or anti-ethnic minority to be included.

Populist far-left parties focus on socio-economic insecurities (Hakhverdian & Koop, 2007, p. 406). 'The people' in the above definition of populism is conceived as a class by populist far-left parties (Kriesi, 2014, p. 362), or as the common man, the poor (Kriesi & Pappas, 2015, p. 5), as opposed to 'the people' as a nation for populist far-right parties. However, these definitions are not complete, they only define what the people entails. It does not identify what kind of ideology these parties adhere to. Only one study mentions an explicit definition on what far-left entails (Rooduijn & Burgoon, 2018, p.

1723). This definition is the definition that will be used: populist far-left parties are parties that are opposed to the structure of capitalism and see inequality as a major issue which needs to be addressed in the form of an alternative economic structure (ibid.). This definition goes beyond just defining 'the people' element of the definition of populism, it also captured the underlying ideology, so therefore this definition will be used.

2.2 Globalization thesis

In this part the globalization thesis will be discussed in more detail. Based on the discussion several hypotheses will be outlined.

2.2.1 Cleavage theory as the basis of the political space

Several assumptions guided the analysis of the globalization thesis. First, the political consequences of globalization will mainly be felt at the national level. The national level is still the main venue for political mobilization and is considered the most consequential (Kriesi et al., 2006, p. 921). This assumption is backed up when looking at the turnout of national elections compared to European elections for instance. In all EU members states turnout has been much higher in national elections than in European elections since 1979 (Clark, 2013, p. 350). Citizens attach more value to national elections and these elections also generate much more publicity than local elections (Morlan, 1984).

Secondly, the globalization thesis framework of analysis is based on the idea that societies are divided in cleavages. Cleavage theory assumes that national party systems represent societal conflicts (Hooghe & Marks, 2017). A cleavage exists when three conditions are fulfilled: people on either side of the cleavage share some characteristics, these people also have their own organizations and people are separated from the other side of the cleavage by having certain policy preferences (De Wilde, Koopmans & Zürn, 2014). Social revolutions are identified as the basis of the formation of societal cleavages (ibid.). This is what Lipset & Rokkan (1967) called critical junctures, revolutions that cause the party system to change. In the original formulation of cleavage theory, four cleavages were identified: center-periphery, state-church, land-industry and owner versus worker (ibid., p. 47). According to Kriesi et al. (2006) these four cleavages could be reduced to two: the cultural, based on religious conflict, and the economic dimension, based on class conflict. The rise of social movements in favor of cultural liberalism is thought to be another critical juncture which diminished the role of religion on the cultural cleavage, but added cultural liberalism on this dimension. It also reinvigorated the class cleavage, however it did not change the two-dimensional cleavage structure (ibid.). Globalization is also seen as a critical juncture and will have the same effect as cultural liberalism. It

will not change the two-dimensional cleavage structure, but it will change the issues associated with the two dimensions (Grande & Kriesi, 2012).

2.2.2 Socio-structural basis of the 'globalization cleavage'

There are three requirements for a societal conflict. One of these requirements is that there needs to be a socio-structural basis for the cleavage. Each group on either side of the cleavage need to have certain structural features (De Wilde et al., 2014). This part will outline what the socio-structural basis of the globalization cleavage is.

It is assumed that increased economic and cultural competition transformed European societies in different groups of winners and losers, satisfying the requirement that each group on either side of the cleavage needs to have certain structural features. Kriesi et al. (2006, p. 922) define these two groups as:

"The likely winners include entrepreneurs and qualified employees in sectors open to international competition as well as all kinds of cosmopolitan citizens. The expected losers, by contrast, include entrepreneurs and qualified employees in traditionally protected sectors, all unqualified employees and citizens who strongly identify themselves with their national community."

These winners and losers of globalization are assumed to form voter potential for political parties. Research has been conducted to check whether this was actually the case and to see if the losers of globalization are actually part of the constituencies of populist parties, since they are the parties that focus on the losers of globalization (ibid.). Between these studies there are some differences as to what group are the main voters for populist parties. On the one hand, one study found that people who lose the most due to globalization, measured in terms of class and education, do not vote at all and do not belong to the constituency of populist parties (Bornschier & Kriesi, 2013, p. 27). Their analysis on individual level characteristics showed that voters for populist parties have intermediate levels of education and belong to the manual working class, both skilled and unskilled workers. On the contrary, research on which positions on the cultural and economic dimensions in politics different groups occupy, found that low educated people and unskilled workers are opposed to cultural integration and economic liberalization (Dolezal & Hutter, 2012, p. 72). It could be that these differences in results are due to the fact the first study measured characteristics of voters of populist parties directly, whereas the second study measured the position of different groups in society on the political space. Nonetheless, the study of Dolezal and Hutter (2012) showed that people with intermediate education levels are much closer to the middle on both the cultural and economic level

than people with low levels of education. This is an indication that there are some discrepancies between the different globalization thesis studies which warrant further research.

2.2.3 Issues on the two-dimensional political space

It has been established that according to the globalization thesis society is divided into two groups: the winners and losers of globalization. The losers, which is the group more likely to vote for populist parties, are people with either low or intermediate levels of education. In this section it will be explained what type of issues this group holds, which in turn explains their vote for a populist party. The expectations of the globalization thesis about the socio-economic and cultural dimension will be discussed in this section.

On the economic dimension it is expected that the integration-demarcation conflict will *'reinforce the classic opposition between a pro-state and pro-market position while giving it a new meaning'* (Kriesi et al., 2006, p. 924). The former position will become more protectionist, whereas the latter will be more open to competition on the international economic arena. It is also expected that there will be opposition between support for the welfare state and support for economic liberalism (ibid., p. 938). Factor analysis confirmed that the issues about the welfare state indeed form one dimension (Dolezal & Hutter, 2012). The change of issues associated with cleavages should also have an effect on vote choice since the second requirement of a cleavage is that people organized based on that conflict, for example in the form of political parties (De Wilde et al., 2014). The link between issue positions and vote choice has been investigated. One study conducted a statistical analysis on issue positions and party choice and came to the conclusion that issues about the welfare state has a significant effect on party choice in national elections, except for populist far-right parties (Dolezal & Hutter, 2012). The authors still came to the conclusion that the economic dimension remains salient. Another study also found that economic issues such as market liberalization and job insecurity are not significant in determining vote choice for populist far-right parties (Bornschier & Kriesi, 2013). This contradicts their own expectations that the integration-demarcation cleavage will reinforce the opposition between pro-state and pro-market positions. However, these two studies only examined populist far-right parties and not populist far-left parties. So, they might have underestimated the strength and salience of the economic dimension by not including populist far-left parties. It is worth remembering that the ideology of these parties is that they reject the capitalist structure and seek major redistribution (Rooduijn & Burgoon, 2018). So, it could be that economic issues play an important role in determining vote choice for populist far-left parties.

On the cultural dimension it is expected that the losers of globalization will oppose immigration. One of the consequences of globalization is the increase of immigration and therefore cultural diversity is increased, which the losers of globalization oppose (Kriesi et al., 2006). Another

perspective as to why immigration became an important issue is that migrants failed to integrate into their new societies and that there was increased conflict between a new Muslim minority and the majority population (Ivarsflaten, 2008). Immigration is one of the issues that is consistently linked to populist far-right voting (e.g. Van der Brug & Van Spanje, 2005; Kriesi, 2014; Rooduijn & Burgoon, 2018). A second issue is about cultural liberalism. This is about gender equality, racism, abortion rights and cultural diversity (Kriesi et al., 2006). The opposition to cultural liberalism is expected to take a nationalist character, which means that the people who defend tradition will mainly view multiculturalism or cultural diversity as a threat to their (national) identity (Oesch, 2008; Grande & Kriesi, 2012). A final issue that is expected to be added to the cultural dimension is the issue of European integration. It is expected that losers will oppose European integration. This makes sense since the process of European integration essentially increases globalization by providing even more linkages between countries within Europe. Factor analyses on the issue positions confirmed the expectations that the new issues of immigration and European integration load onto a cultural dimension which already consisted of cultural liberalism (Dolezal & Hutter, 2012). So far, the discussion has only been about the new issues added to the cultural dimension. However, in order to call this conflict a cleavage it is required that people organize based on that conflict, for instance in the form of political parties (De Wilde et al., 2014, p. 3). Several studies clearly confirmed the link between issues on the cultural dimension and votes for populist parties (e.g. Bornschier & Kriesi, 2013; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Dolezal, Hutter, 2012; Oesch, 2008).

In terms of issue positions of voters research on the globalization thesis showed that the political space remained two-dimensional and that both dimensions are relevant for party choice. Furthermore globalization added new issues to the two-dimensional structure (Kriesi, 2006). However, this has been called into question. Another study analyzed whether the two-dimensional structure could actually be observed. This study found that attitudes of citizens to certain issues could indeed be structured by the two dimensions. However, the attitude of political parties to certain issues could not be structured by two-dimensions, rather it was one left-right dimension (Van der Brug & Van Spanje, 2009). The consequence of this mismatch between parties and voters is that there are people with issue constellations that are not reflected by political parties. For example, there are almost no parties that combined left-wing socio-economic positions with right-wing cultural positions. Van der Brug & Van Spanje (ibid.) concluded that the second cleavage requirement about organizing on the basis of a cleavage is not fulfilled and therefore that the integration-demarcation 'cleavage' cannot be called a cleavage yet. This analysis can be an explanation for the finding that the worst-off in society do not vote at all (Bornschier & Kriesi, 2013), it might be the case that this group does not vote because they do not have a party that matches their preferences. This is an indication that the analysis of Dolezal & Hutter (2012) on the issue positions of the losers of globalization and their party choice only

applied to a part of the losers group and not in its entirety. It would have only applied to losers of globalization who hold issue positions similar to political parties, but not to voters whose issue constellation is not represented by political parties. As indicated before, these results might be explained by the fact that Dolezal & Hutter (2012) excluded populist far-left parties. Van der Brug & Van Spanje (2009, p. 329) also hinted at a possible future role for populist far-left parties that combine left-wing socio-economic attitudes with anti-immigration attitudes in order to match preferences of voters.

2.2.3 Hypotheses

Before elaborating on the hypotheses it is important to note that the focus of this thesis will be on the core aspects of the globalization thesis. Two aspects of the thesis are considered to be a core aspect: the losers of globalization and the issue of immigration on the cultural dimension. The idea that globalization created a losers group is the foundation of the argument, it is the main explanatory factor of the thesis. The cultural dimension is also an important aspect, research showed that this dimension has become more relevant than the economic dimension (Bornschier & Kriesi, 2013). Furthermore, immigration is the factor on the cultural dimension that has been consistently linked to voting for populist far-right parties (e.g. Dolezal & Hutter, 2012; Van der Brug et al., 2005).

As mentioned one of the main arguments made in the globalization thesis is that globalization created a losers group of globalization. This losers group is deemed a major form of voter potential for populist parties (Kriesi et al., 2006). The losers have been hypothesized as people with low levels and education and belonging to the (unskilled) workers class. Based on this two hypotheses are derived:

H1: People with low levels of education are more likely to vote for populist parties.

H2: Unskilled workers are more likely to vote for populist parties.

On the cultural dimension opposition to immigration is hypothesized to be a major factor in determining the likelihood of a vote for populist far-right parties (ibid.). This leads to the following hypothesis:

H3: People who are opposed to immigration are more likely to vote for populist far-right parties.

2.3 Relative-deprivation theory

In the introduction the concept of relative-deprivation has been introduced. In this section relative-deprivation theory will be discussed in more detail. It will be contrasted with globalization theory and hypotheses about the expectations of relative-deprivation theory will be introduced.

2.3.1 Socio-structural characteristics

Relative-deprivation theory takes the economy as a starting point. An important prediction of relative-deprivation theory is “that in the context of a well-performing economy, those who are less well-off might well be more inclined to vote radical because they perceive themselves as being relatively even more deprived” (Rooduijn & Burgoon, 2018). In other words, these people fear they are missing out vis-à-vis other groups in society (Burgoon et al., 2018). Runciman (1960, p. 10) proposed one of the first definitions of relative-deprivation, it is a situation where one person wants to have a certain good X, but does not have it. That person believes that other people do have X and that it is realistic to also obtain that good X. If that expectation is not satisfied it can lead to frustration. In short, people evaluate their own successes and failures against other people’s successes and failures. The resentment of other groups can be expected to be linked to changes in household income of that person’s group compared to other groups in society (ibid.). This emphasis on group specific performance of the national economy is a major departure from the globalization thesis which argued that cultural issues are the main explanatory factor of voting for populist far-right parties. For instance, one study found that job insecurity and economic marginalization (measured in terms of (relative) income) played no role in vote choice for populist far-right parties (Bornschier & Kriesi, 2013).

Relative-deprivation theory has expectations about which groups are more likely to experience resentment vis-à-vis other groups in society. Rooduijn & Burgoon (2018) found that people with low levels of education are more likely to vote for populist far-right parties, but this was not the case for populist far-left parties. Whereas economic difficulty spurs the vote for both populist far-right and far-left parties. So, the less well-off are generally the voters for both far-left and far-right populist parties, however in terms of education these two types of parties differ. Another study concluded that “*There is no consistent proof that the voter bases of populist parties consist of individuals who are more likely to be unemployed, have lower incomes, come from lower classes, or hold a lower education*” (Rooduijn, 2018, p. 364). Or in other words, there is no prototypical populist voter. This could be another explanation as to why different studies end up with different groups that are more likely to vote for populist parties. Depending on the countries that the researcher selected for the analysis you might end up with different results. It does seem to contradict the results of Rooduijn and Burgoon (2018), however experiencing economic difficulty is not the same as having a lower income, being from a lower class and being unemployed. People can have a high income and still experience economic difficulty. The globalization thesis firmly located the losers of globalization in one group: the lower or intermediate educated and manual workers or unskilled worker class. In contrast, for relative-deprivation the definition of being less well-off is much more fluid.

2.3.2 Conditions fostering relative-deprivation

In the previous part it was outlined that, in contrast with the globalization thesis, the socio-structural characteristics of populist voters are not set in stone. In this part the conditions under which relative-deprivation are more likely to occur will be outlined and will also be linked to vote choice for populist parties.

On the role of economic issues/factors there are some differences between the globalization thesis and relative-deprivation theory. Kriesi et al. (2006) focused on the similarities of the political space between countries in Western-Europe in order to show that globalization had transformed European societies and therefore did not focus on contextual variables explaining differences between countries. In this study economic issue positions of voters were measured and not aggregate economic conditions. The literature on relative-deprivation, on the contrary, tried to explain differences between countries and also looked into the effects of aggregate economic circumstances. One finding is that populist parties are more likely to receive electoral support when the national economic context is favorable (Mols & Jetten, 2016; Rooduijn & Burgoon, 2018). The former study claimed that this is mainly due to the leaders of the populist parties who are able to *'shape voters' understanding of social reality and this to such an extent that perception of sociostructural conditions may no longer be aligned with 'objective' sociostructural conditions'* (Mols & Jetten, 2016). The latter study found that favorable aggregate economic conditions increase the likelihood that less well-off voters vote for radical right parties. Two competing explanations were offered, on the one hand it might be that people might experience even more relative-deprivation if they see that the economy is doing well and they still suffer economic hardship, on the other hand it might be that favorable aggregate economic conditions make it safe to experiment with voting for radical right parties (Rooduijn & Burgoon, 2018). This has to do with issue ownership, for example: radical-right parties *'own'* the issue of immigration and often do not have clear ideas on the socio-economic dimension. In times of economic downturn, voters doubt if these parties are capable of handling the crisis and will not vote for them. However, in times of economic prosperity, this becomes less of an issue, so it is safe to experiment and vote for that party (ibid.). This mechanism was confirmed for both radical-right and -left parties, whereas favorable economic conditions only lead to a higher likelihood of voting for radical-right parties. It should be noted that this study used voting for radical parties as an outcome, rather than populist far-left or far-right parties. This might alter the results, since there are parties that are radical but not populist.

Relative-deprivation theory is also relevant for the cultural dimension. Relative-deprivation can take place on a group level, people compare their group's status with certain, relevant out-group (Mummendey, Kessler, Klink & Mielke., 1999). This study showed that when people feel more deprived on a group level that they will try to compete with the out-group to improve their position (ibid., p. 234). Which out-group will be the main competitor for the group that felt relatively deprived can vary

across space and time (Burgoon et al., 2018). However, it is not hard to imagine that for some relatively deprived voters in the European Union the 'other' group would be immigrants. It would make sense that these people would be more likely to vote for populist far-right parties, because they feel relatively-deprived vis-à-vis immigrant groups. The populist far-right nativist ideology deems non-native elements to be a threat to society which should be removed (Mudde, 2007). Clearly the nativist ideology sounds similar to the idea that people feel relatively deprived against an out-group. A study on voters in the 2012 French presidential election found that group relative-deprivation was a significant predictor of voting for Marine Le Pen, the populist far-right candidate (Urbanska & Guimond, 2018). However, as is the case with many studies on immigration and populist far-right parties (e.g. Dolezal & Hutter, 2012; Van der Brug et al., 2005), there were many other survey questions relating to immigration that were also significant. In this study anti-immigrant prejudice and the desire to dominate other groups were also significant predictors of voting for Marine Le Pen (Urbanska & Guimond, 2018). Perhaps all these theories contain one piece of the puzzle on why immigration is so strongly linked to populist far-right voting. Determining which factor is the most important might prove difficult, if not impossible.

2.3.3 Hypotheses

The choice has been made to focus on the core aspects of relative-deprivation theory: the socio-structural characteristics of the relatively deprived and economic well-being. Socio-structural characteristics are discussed extensively in the literature and there are also differences in opinion which, if any, groups are relatively-deprived. The second core aspect is economic well-being, several of the mentioned studies all used this as indicators of relative-deprivation (e.g. Rooduijn & Burgoon, 2018; Urbanska & Guimond, 2018).

On the socio-structural characteristics of the relatively deprived it has been found that people with low levels of education are more likely to vote for populist parties (Rooduijn & Burgoon, 2018). On the other hand it was found that there is no consistent proof that the less-well off in terms of education and classes are more likely to vote for populist parties (Rooduijn, 2018). Hypothesis 1 and 2 in the part about the globalization thesis also covers these two aspects, so therefore no separate hypotheses have been made.

Research on relative-deprivation found that economic well-being, operationalized as income difficulty, is negatively associated with voting for populist parties (Rooduijn & Burgoon, 2018; Urbanska & Guimond, 2018). This leads to the following hypothesis:

H4: People with a negative score on economic well-being are more likely to vote for populist parties.

2.4 Types of democracy

2.4.1 The majoritarian-consensus debate

Another debate about explaining the voting for populist parties is about which type of democracy is more conducive to populist voting. In this section this debate will be linked to the previously discussed theories and it will be hypothesized that this debate can help to explain different responses to globalization or relative-deprivation.

The two types of democracies that will be discussed here are majoritarian- and consensus democracies. It is important to denote what is actually meant with these two terms and the differences between them. The main feature of majoritarian democracy is that power is concentrated in the hands of the majority, this is in contrast with the consensus model which prevents the concentration of power in one group (Lijphart, 1999, p. 185). Basically, in the majoritarian model *'elections are an accountability mechanism, where the sanctions are to extend or not to extend the government's tenure'* (Thomassen, 2014, p. 2). In a consensus democracy the main aim is representation. So, both parliament and the government should be as representative of society as possible. Government coalitions are formed in order to achieve this goal (ibid., p.4) . Lijphart (1984, p. 214) identified ten variables that distinguished majoritarian and consensual models of democracy, which were clustered into two different dimensions. These two dimensions are the executive-parties and the federal-unitary dimension. The former refers power-sharing within political institutions, whereas the latter refers to power-sharing between political institutions (Hakhverdian & Koop, 2007, p. 410). Lijphart (2012, p. 274) argued that countries that are more consensual on these two dimensions are a *'kinder, gentler form of democracy'* and are thus preferable over majoritarian democracies. His research showed that consensus democracy performs better than majoritarian democracies in terms of democratic quality, gender inequality, economic equality, political participation (ibid., pp. 274-285). Other research found that consensus democracy scores high on electoral turnout, but low on other forms of political participation, such as less group activities, less protests, less campaign activity (Weldon & Dalton, 2014, p. 126).

It has been questioned whether consensus democracy outperforms majoritarian democracy and is indeed the best option. One influential thesis is the idea that a new type of party has emerged, the cartel party. This type of party became an agent of state and uses its resources to ensure their own survival. The differences between parties are blurred and thus accountability to voters decreased (Katz & Mair, 1995). Voters no longer have the ability to reward or punish their representatives (Katz, 2016). According to Katz (2016, p. 21) several similarities exist between the consensus model and the cartel party: there are less policy differences between parties, distinguishing between winners and losers in elections becomes increasingly murky, the electorate is not able to exercise control over who is in

government. Essentially, the cartel party and consensus democracy are two sides of the same coin, whereas the former is the negative portrayal and the latter the positive portrayal of the phenomena (ibid., p. 21). It should be noted that the concept of consensus democracy is broader than just the type of competition between political parties. For instance, Lijphart (2012, p. 3) also distinguished consensus and majoritarian systems on the basis of judicial review and the level of independence of central banks which are part of the federal-unitary dimension. The overarching theme of the cartel party and its link to the majoritarian versus consensus debate is accountability. It is argued that consensus democracies have less accountability to voters because there is too little competition between elites. This issue has been used to explain the rise of anti-system or populist parties. Andeweg (2001) pointed to the fact that in the 1990s right-wing populist parties were more significant in consensus democracies than in majoritarian democracies. In similar fashion Katz and Mair (2018, p. 151) pointed out that in their original formulation of the cartel party they predicted the rise of anti-system parties.

Lijphart (2001, p. 133) acknowledged that majoritarian democracies, per definition, are more accountability than consensus democracies. However, the primary purpose of accountability 'is to keep the government in line with voters preferences' (ibid.). Majoritarian governments fail to accomplish this aspect according to Lijphart in two aspects. First, on a left-right scale the position of a median voter is further away from the government in majoritarian democracies. Second, even though it is clear who comprises the government, it is in practice difficult to change to government. The reason why consensus democracies see more successful populist parties is because proportional representation made it easier for these parties to get elected. He went even further and argued that it does not matter that populist parties are on the rise, because they should be allowed to be represented and if they gain representation in government it might even moderate their views (ibid., p. 135). What is missing from this argument is the link with voters, it entirely focusses on political parties. So, even though representation of populist political parties might moderate their views if they are included in government, it does not automatically translate to moderated views of their electorate. It might even be that the electorate would vote for even extremer parties because the populist party moderated their views.

Statistical studies have been conducted to check these different arguments, the results of these studies have been mixed. One study confirmed that populist parties had more success in consensus democracies (Hakhverdian & Koop, 2007). Another study confirmed that proportional representation is indeed positively associated with support for radical-right parties (Swank & Betz, 2003). Other studies found no variation of levels of support for radical-right parties between electoral systems (e.g. Carter, 2002; Van der Brug et al., 2005). The first study only included variables related to the electoral system, such as district magnitude, legal thresholds, electoral formulae and how

disproportionate electoral outcomes are (Carter, 2002). However, this only shows the effects of proportional representation and it does not look at the accountability argument. The second study claimed that the executive-parties dimensions is essentially a measurement of proportionality (Van der Brug et al., 2005, p. 553). A higher score on this dimension should mean that the system is more proportional, however proportional representation is only one element of the executive-parties dimension. So, it is hard to disentangle which elements are the causal factors of vote choice for populist parties. In summary, the evidence about the type of democracy and support for populist parties is mixed and based on these studies it is hard to draw any conclusions on whether accountability or proportional representation explains the greater voting for populist parties in consensus democracies. If that is even the case, since some studies found that there is not more support for populist parties in consensus democracies (e.g. Carter, 2002; Van der Brug et al., 2005).

2.4.2 Type of democracy and globalization versus relative-deprivation

It is important to explain why this debate is relevant for the debate between globalization and relative-deprivation.

First of all, the authors of the globalization thesis touched upon the consensus versus majoritarian democracy debate. Their claim is that proportional representation greatly facilitates the rise of populist parties (Kriesi & Grande, 2012, p. 23). The studies on the effects of globalization did not pay close attention to the contextual factors, because the main interest of these studies is to provide an account of similarities between countries and not why there are differences (Kriesi et al., 2006, p. 929). However, factors that might play a role in explaining differences between countries are, among other things, electoral systems and types of democracy (ibid.). Those two factors are discussed extensively in the majoritarian versus consensus democracy debate. Lijphart (2001) argued that consensus democracy is the best mode of democracy, the emergence of populist parties could be explained by the permissiveness of the electoral system. The counterargument is that consensus democracy suffers from accountability problems fueling the rise of populist parties (e.g. Andeweg, 2001; Katz & Mair, 1995; Katz & Mair, 2018). There are some indications as to what position the authors of the globalization thesis take in the consensus-majoritarian debate. Kriesi (2014, pp. 364-365) explicitly mentioned the cartel-party thesis and claimed that the European Union influenced a shift to 'non majoritarian forms of representation'. Echoing the idea of cartel parties it is argued that this leads to less accountability and therefore served as a precondition for the rise of populist parties (ibid.). There are also some hypotheses about what effects the effects of the national context on the transformative power of globalization are. Again, properties typically associated with consensus democracies are deemed favorable characteristics for the breakthrough of populist parties. Properties such as proportional representation, convergence between mainstream parties and the presence of

grand coalitions (Kriesi et al., 2008, p. 50). However, subsequent analysis on six cases in Western Europe showed that these hypotheses did not hold up in all cases which lead the conclusion that important elements of the national political contexts were missed. The results of the empirical analysis on the transformative power of globalization showed that the national political contexts mattered more than expected. For example, the electoral success of the populist parties was not as sweeping as was expected, there were significant differences between countries. It should be noted that this is mainly attributed to strategic responses by political parties and that these responses are not guided by type of democracy and electoral law (Grande, 2012, pp. 283-283). This does show that contextual factors and differences between countries with regard to the transformative power of globalization are more important than originally thought.

The connection between types of democracy and the relative-deprivation theory is less clear than for globalization theory. The consulted literature on relative-deprivation does not explicitly mention types of democracy as a factor that might play a role in voting for populist parties. One study supporting relative-deprivation as an explanation for populist parties mentioned that electoral system in Spain amounted to a sort of majoritarian rule and that this makes success for populist parties more difficult (Voss, 2018, p. 33). The idea that consensus democracies are more open to populist parties than majoritarian democracies is widely accepted, however that does not offer clues about supposed accountability issues in consensus democracies. Another study focusses on the less well-off and investigated whether the relationship between well-being and voting for populist parties is affected by the socioeconomic and sociocultural context of a particular country. This study found this to be the case and emphasized the relevance of different national contexts (Burgoon & Rooduijn, 2018). It also found a risk-aversion mechanism, this means that people only vote for a particular kind of populist parties if either cultural or economic issues that party does not focus on are not important at that time (ibid.). Suggesting , that people 'experiment' with voting for populist voting parties only in certain favorable conditions. Perhaps this logic can apply to the majoritarian-consensus democracy debate as well. In a consensus democracy a parties percentage of seats will roughly correspond to the percentage of votes they get, whereas in a majoritarian democracy the party with the most vote in a district will get the seats and all the other votes are lost. So, in a consensus democracy votes are less lost than in majoritarian democracies. Perhaps people vote more often for populist parties in consensus democracies because there is less risk that your vote is wasted. So, even though relative-deprivation literature does not posit any clear-cut hypotheses about the role of the type of democracy in the relationship between the less well-off and populist parties, it does not exclude types of democracies as a relevant variable and certain mechanisms identified by the literature might play a role in this debate as well.

The previous debate about majoritarian versus consensus democracies assumed a direct relationship between the type of democracy and voting for populist parties. However, as Burgoon & Rooduijn (2018) showed, contextual factors might not just have a direct effect on the voting for populist parties, but can also moderate the relationship between other concepts. In this study the socioeconomic and sociocultural context of a particular country is a moderating factor. However, there are indications that the same might be the case for the national-political context of a particular country. One statistical analysis found that the permissiveness of the electoral system mediates the effect of immigration on populist voting (Golder, 2003). Another study about the effects of globalization on the national level found that *'domestic consequences of international integration are themselves shaped by national political institutions'* (Swank & Betz, 2003). This study also noted that some features of consensus democracies caused policy convergence between parties and therefore created an opening for populist parties. Only proportional representation is mentioned explicitly as one of the features of consensus democracy, the other features are not defined. The observed variation between countries in terms of the effects of globalization was explained by looking at different welfare regimes. Even though welfare regimes are not a defining distinction between majoritarian and consensus democracies, it does show that contextual variables can have a moderating effect on the relationship between the chosen independent and dependent variable. As was mentioned in the introduction, contextual variables mediating or moderating the relationship between variables is also important in order to more fully understand how effects operate and what limits it has (Hayes & Rockwood, 2017, p.1). This thesis will attempt to shed some light on these contextual variables and their effect in shaping effects of globalization and relative-deprivation.

2.4.3 Hypotheses

Two core aspect of the majoritarian versus consensus debate are the focus of this thesis: accountability and proportionality. On the one side it is argued that consensus democracies are less accountable and therefore are more likely to see the rise of populist parties. On the other side it is argued that consensus democracies have proportional electoral systems, which makes it easier for populist parties. This leads to two hypotheses:

H5a: In an electoral system of proportional representation people are more likely to vote for populist parties

H5b: in a less accountable political system people are more likely to vote for populist parties.

As mentioned before there are indications that the type of democracy might moderate the relationship between the losers of globalization and voting for populist parties. One study found that effects of globalization on populist party voting are moderated by welfare state regimes (Swank & Betz, 2003). One study that argued in favor of relative-deprivation theory as an explanatory factor for

populist voting found that proportional representation makes it easier for populist parties to get elected (Voss, 2018). Although the literature on the majoritarian-consensus debate mainly focused on direct effects of the model of democracy it still provides some clues as to how the moderator effect might look like. Andeweg (2001) thought that people are more likely to vote for populist parties due to accountability issues. Lijphart (2001) argued that accountability does not account for the higher likelihood of success of populist parties in consensus democracies, but rather proportional representation is the reason why consensus democracies see more successful populist parties. The globalization thesis also linked consensus democracies to accountability issues and mentioned the role of proportional representation in the success of populist parties, whereas the relative-deprivation thesis only linked proportional representation to the success of populist parties. This leads to the following hypotheses.

H6a: The losers of globalization as well as the relatively deprived are more likely to vote for populist parties in proportional electoral systems.

H6b: The losers of globalization are more likely to vote for populist parties in a less accountable political system.

3. Methods

In this chapter the methods of this thesis will be discussed. First, it will be explained which cases are selected for the statistical analysis. Second, the different concepts of the theoretical framework will be operationalized.

3.1 Statistical method

The main method of this thesis is multi-level logistic regression. Multilevel means that individuals (level 1) are nested within a higher unit such as a country (level 2). Normal regression models cannot be used when the data is multilevel, because it will violate the independence of errors assumption (Sommet & Morselli, 2017). Multilevel models can account for variation between level 2 units. Since the main aim of this study is to explain differences between countries in voting for populist parties it is appropriate to use multilevel modelling. Logistic regression is used because, as will be explained further in the operationalization of the dependent variable, the outcome variable is dichotomous.

3.2 Case selection

As mentioned before, countries from the European Union serve as the cases for the analysis. The selection of which countries to include is based on data availability, since the European Social Survey 2012 edition did not include data on all EU members and not all countries that were included had populist parties (a full list of selected countries is available in Appendix Table 1). All in all, less than 20 countries have been included in the analysis, which is problematic for multi-level modelling. It can lead to biased estimates, for instance the standard errors are underestimated with a lower level of level 2 cases (Maas & Hox, 2005). This increases the chance that the reported p-value is too high. Therefore it might be that the statistical models do not find a significant effect, while in reality there is an effect. Although it should be noted that another study mentioned that a small-sample size does not always lead to biased estimates (Schmidt-Catran, Fairbrother & Andreß (2019).

Choosing most EU countries as cases also makes sense from a theoretical standpoint. Some authors limit themselves to six western-European countries (e.g. Kriesi et al., 2006; Grande & Kriesi, 2012). Other authors use a more broad selection of cases that also includes countries from eastern-Europe (e.g. Rooduijn & Burgoon, 2018; Lijphart, 1999). Since this thesis tries to explain vote choice for populist parties it makes sense to also include eastern-European countries and not to restrict the analysis to western-Europe. Populist parties are a phenomenon in eastern-Europe as well, as can be seen in Appendix table 1. This table shows the populist parties included in the analysis and a significant amount of the populist parties come from countries like Slovenia and Hungary. Theoretically there is no reason to assume that globalization does not affect countries in eastern-Europe to the same degree as western-Europe. Research on globalization in eastern and central Europe showed that since the fall

of communism and the opening of the markets in this region social and economic integration occurred in a significant degree (Capello & Perucca, 2013).

The 2012 edition of the European Social Survey has been selected to evaluate the arguments made by the different theories. This edition has been chosen because the Euro crisis was at its height in 2012. Research has shown that the Euro crisis had significant economic effects on society in the EU. For instance, one study came to the conclusion that the severe austerity measured in Greece, Portugal, Italy and Spain increased inequality (Perez & Matsaganis, 2017, p. 203). Another study confirmed that this was the case for the entire Eurozone (Schneider, Kinsella & Godin, 2016). So, it can be expected that there will be a high level of voting for populist parties in this year.

3.3 Operationalization

3.1.1 Dependent variable

The main dependent variable of this thesis is voting for populist parties. As mentioned in the theoretical framework both populist far-left and far-right parties will be included in the analysis. The selection of populist parties based on the classification of Rooduijn et al. (2019). They classified parties based on the definitions of populism, far-right and far-left parties outlined in the theoretical framework. All parties that are both populist and are either far-right or far-left from the countries present in the 2012 edition of the European Social Survey are included in the analysis (For a full list of the parties included in the analysis view the appendix , Table 1). Unfortunately only four populist far-left parties were present in the European Social Survey of 2012. So no specific populist far-left variable has been made, since the statistical power of such a model would be too limited. In the analysis differences between the models that include or exclude populist far-left parties will be discussed with the caveat that a sample size of four is too little to be able to draw valid conclusions.

So, based on the European Social Survey and the list of populist parties two dichotomous variables have been constructed: populist far-right parties and populist parties (both far-left and far-right parties). A score of 0 indicates that the party is not populist far-right or populist. A score of 1 indicates that this is the case.

3.1.2 Independent variables

The majoritarian versus consensus democracy debate

The main argument against consensus democracy is that these countries have less accountability, because people are not able to change governments, if they deem their performance to be inadequate. This makes consensus democracies more vulnerable for the rise of populist parties (Andeweg, 2001).

Lijphart conceded that consensus democracies see more populist parties, however argued that this is due to the effects of proportional representation.

The level of proportionality of a political system (level 2 variable) is measured by the so-called Gallagher index. This index is one of the most favored indexes measuring proportionality (Carter, 2002). It measures the level of (dis)proportionality of a certain election *'by taking the vote-seat share differences for each party, squaring them and then adding them. This total is then divided by 2. Finally the square root of this value is taken as the measure of disproportionality'* (ibid., p. 146). A low score on this index indicates that the election outcome is proportional, whereas a high score on this index indicates the opposite. The average score for each country included in the analysis in the last three elections before 2012 have been calculated and these averages are included in the dataset (based on Gallagher, 2019).

Generally it is held that voters should be able to hold the government accountable and should be able to change the government (Andeweg, 2001; Lijphart, 2001). Or in other words accountability can be measured through changes in government. There are disagreements in the literature about which system allows more change of government. Lijphart (1999, p. 289) argued that in consensus democracies governments change more often. Another view is that these changes in the cabinets composition are usually only partial and there is often only a weak link between election outcomes and government composition in consensus democracies (Andeweg, 2001). A variable that accounts that accounts for partial changes in government is the so-called government turnover index (GTI). This index calculated an average score for government turnover in the period 1945-2010. In this index government turnover occurs one of the three events: Prime-minister change, resignation of government after elections and change in the composition of a coalition. This index measured *'the government turnover as a ratio between the percentages of the party Government changes in the governments (percentages of parliamentary seats) and the percentages of the parliamentary support of the governments in the set'* (Ieraci, 2012, pp. 533-534). The scores range from 0 (no government alternation) to 1 (complete government alternation). These scores have been multiplied by 100 to make the coefficients more interpretable. This index accounts for the propensity of consensus democracies to only have partial changes of government, rather than wholesale alternation of government.

Losers of globalization and relatively deprived

One of the main concepts of the theoretical framework is losers of globalization and people who are relatively deprived. To measure these concepts three independent variables in the European Social Survey are used: education, occupation and economic well-being.

The first level 1 (individual level) variable is variable education, the European Social Survey 2012 version measured education using seven levels, but this variable has been recoded into three categories following Borschier & Kriesi, 2013. The values ranged from 1 (low education) to 3 (high education). Dummy variables will be created with high education as the reference category.

The second level 1 (individual level) independent variable is occupation. This thesis adopts a 5-class schema which distinguished between higher-grade service class, lower-grade service class, small business owners and skilled and unskilled workers (Oesch, 2006). This scheme allows a test of the hypotheses that unskilled workers are more likely to vote for populist parties. Dummy variables will be created with the higher-grade service class as the reference category.

The third level 1 (individual level) independent variable is about economic well-being. This variable asked respondents how they feel about their current household income on a scale of 1 (Living comfortably on present income) to 4 (Very difficult on present income). This variable allows a test of the relative-deprivation hypothesis that economic well-being negatively affects the likelihood of voting for populist parties. Other studies on relative-deprivation have also used feelings on household income as a proxy variable for economic well-being (e.g. Rooduijn & Burgoon, 2018; Urbanska & Guimond, 2018). So, it makes sense to use this variable as well. This variable is treated as a scale variable, even though it only has four categories. Rooduijn & Burgoon (2018) included the same variable and their analysis showed that treating this variable as a scale or dummy variable made no difference.

Issue positions on the cultural dimension

The globalization thesis argued that on the cultural dimension three issues would become dominant: immigration, European integration and cultural liberalism. As mentioned in the theoretical framework, only immigration will be analyzed.

Attitudes towards immigration are measured by constructing a scale that consists of three variables that were measured with the following statements: Immigration is good for country's economy, countries cultural life is enriched by immigrants and immigration make country better place to live. This variable is recoded so that a value of 1 indicates a favorable attitude to immigration and 10 indicates a unfavorable attitude to immigration (Cronbach alpha = 0,865).

3.1.3 Control variables

The decision has been made to focus on the core aspects of the different theories, because of data limitations. This study only has a maximum level two sample size of 17 countries, which can lead to biased estimates (Haas & Hox, 2005). Including many variables will only strain the statistical model even further. So, that is why this thesis omitted hypotheses about issues on the economic dimension, the issues of cultural liberalism and European integration and aggregate economic circumstances.

However, these factors still might play a role in explaining populist voting. That is the reason why control variables for two of these issues are included: the economic dimension and aggregate economic circumstances.

First, attitudes on the economic dimension are measured by an individual's placement on the left-right scale. The ESS measured the self-reported left-right placement on a scale ranging from 0 (Left) to 10 (Right). The left-right dimension will be used as proxy for economic attitudes so that perhaps a few inferences about the role of the economic dimension can be made. It would be preferable to use better indicators of economic attitudes, however adding more variables to the model decreases its statistical power, so that is why only left-right placement has been included. It should be noted that this variable is far from a good proxy of economic attitudes. Research in the Netherlands has shown that left-right placement is increasingly viewed in cultural terms. Especially immigration was found to be an important factor in left-right identification, whereas economic issues became less important (De Vries, Hakhverdian & Lancee, 2013). So, the inferences about the economic dimension based on this variable should not be seen as strong evidence for the effects of economic issues.

The second control variable, which measures aggregate economic circumstances, is the unemployment rate of a particular country. This is measured as the percentage of people that are unemployed compared to the total workforce. This variable is included in the models is because the argument has been made in the literature that economic circumstances have an effect on the likelihood that people will vote for populist parties (Rooduijn & Burgoon, 2018).

A final control variable is satisfaction with government. The ESS measured this on a scale of 0 (Extremely dissatisfied) to 10 (extremely satisfied). This values have been reversed for ease of interpretation. The reason why this variable has been included is because voting for populist party might well be seen as a protest vote voicing discontent for the government. So, this variable might explain a significant level of variation of populist voting.

4. Empirical analysis

In this chapter the results of the empirical analysis will be reported. The chapter starts with the descriptive statistics of the different dependent- and independent variables. Then the analysis moves to the statistical models. First, it will be explained the model building procedure and the different statistical assumptions will be tested. Second, the models will be estimated and the different hypotheses will be tested.

4.1 Descriptive statistics

In this part the descriptive statistics of the dependent- and independent variables will be discussed (the descriptive statistics can be found in table 1 below).

The case selection of 2012 is based on the expectation that due to the Euro crisis support for populist (far-right) parties would be at a decent level. The mean of both the dependent variables, populist parties and populist far-right parties reveal that despite this expectation voting for other parties is still the preferred option of the electorate with means of 0.07 and 0.08 respectively. This suggests that, for 2012, populist voting is not as relevant, electorally speaking, as it was expected to be.

As mentioned in the methods chapter having a low country level sample size can affect the results in the sense that it might lead to underestimated standard errors (2019). So as an addition to the statistical models with the level 2 independent variables, two graphs showing the mean score on the populist parties dependent variable on the Y-axis and the government turnover index/proportionality score of each country on the X-axis are shown in figure 1 and 2, which can be found on the pages below. Both graphs show that there is no consistent pattern in levels of government turnover/disproportionality and support for populist parties. A higher score on either of these two variables does not consistently lead to a higher mean for populist parties. Although for the government turnover index generally the countries that score the highest on government turnover index (scores higher than 46) are the countries with the highest populist voting mean. With disproportionality, this pattern cannot be observed. Both low and high scoring countries can have a higher mean score on populist parties. These patterns are actually contrary of what was expected from the different theories. Generally, it was expected that the more proportional a country is, the higher likelihood of success for populist parties (e.g. Andeweg, 2001; Lijphart, 2001). From these graphs, this does not seem to be the case. There seems to be no relationship between the level of proportionality and voting for populist parties.

Government turnover was used as a proxy for government accountability and it was expected that countries that score high on accountability (indicated by higher government turnover) would see less populist parties (e.g. Andeweg, 2001). However, from these graphs the relationship seems to be

the reverse: the countries that have higher scores on government turnover are the countries that see the highest number of votes for populist parties. As noted before, one should be cautious with this results, because it is not consistent.




Figure 1. Government Turnover Index and mean score on populist parties




Figure 2. Disproportionality index and mean score on populist parties

Table 1. *Descriptive statistics of all the variables in the analysis*

Variable	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Populist voting	.07	.26	0	1
Populist far-right voting	0.08	.27	0	1
Education	1.93	.70	1	3
Class	3.23	1.41	1	5
Anti-immigration scale	4.9	2.2	1	10
Income difficulty	2.03	0.89	1	4
Proportionality	5.88	4.74	0.95	17.74
Government Turnover Index	33.19	16.58	0	65
Left-right placement	5.20	2.18	0	10
Dissatisfaction with government	5.67	2.48	0	10
Unemployment percentage	8.65	3.07	3.21	15.40

4.2 Assumptions and model building

4.2.1 Model building

The model building of this thesis is based on an article by Sommet & Morselli (2017). A preliminary phase is to decide whether to center the different independent variables, this will be shown in the section on multicollinearity. The first step is to run a multilevel model with only the intercept and no predictors in order to calculate the intra-class coefficient, which shows if there is variation of the outcome variable (voting for populist (far-right) parties) between the different countries included in the analysis (ibid.). The second step is to estimate for each level 1 independent variable two models that test whether the effects vary between countries (excluding cross-level interactions). This shows whether it is appropriate to include the random-slope variance of a level 1 variable. Finally, the different models are run including cross-level interactions, the results of which will be shown in the tables 1 and 2.

4.2.2 Multicollinearity

An important assumption of multi-level modelling is that the independent variables are not multicollinear. In order to check for multicollinearity VIF and Tolerance values have been calculated using a simple regression model that includes all the independent variables and the cross-level interactions. The lower limit for tolerance scores is 0,1 and the upper limit for VIF is 10 (Field, 2013). The results indicate a high level of multicollinearity between the cross-level interactions and their associated level 1 and level 2 independent variables. This was expected, because the cross-level interaction is a function of the associated level 1 and level 2 independent variables. In order to correct this issue the independent variables have been centered. For the level 1 variables group mean centering is used, since this is appropriate when using cross-level interactions (Field, 2013, p.830). The level 2 predictors can only be grand-mean centered (Summet & Morselli, 2017). Centering reduced the VIF and tolerance levels, however for three cross-level interaction (Education x disproportionality/government turnover index and class x government turnover index) the values still remained outside of the VIF and tolerance range. The decision has been made to include these interactions anyway and to be more cautious about the conclusions from the models.

4.3 Preliminary steps for statistical models

In this section the main findings of the multilevel logistic regression models will be outlined using the three-step procedure outlined in the section on model building.

4.3.1 Intra-class coefficient

The first step of the estimation of multilevel logistic regression models is calculating the Intra-class coefficient by estimating a model that includes only the intercept and no independent variables. The intra-class coefficient for the model with the dependent variable vote for populist far-right parties is 0,42. This indicates that 42% of the likelihood to vote for populist far-right parties can be explained by differences between countries. For the model with vote for populist parties the intra-class coefficient is slightly higher with a score of 0,44. So, 44 % of the likelihood to vote for populist parties can be explained by differences between countries. So, there is decent amount of variation in likelihood of voting for populist (far-right) parties between countries.

4.3.2 Estimating random slope variance of level 1 variables

The second step of estimation of multilevel logistic regression models is to analyze whether the effects of level 1 independent variables varies between countries. This is done by running two models for each level 1 independent variable. One model without estimating the random slope variance and one model

that includes an estimation of the random slope variance. Then a likelihood ratio test is performed using the following formula (ibid.): $LR \chi^2(1) = deviance(\text{model without random slope variance}) - deviance(\text{model with random slope variance})$. The results showed a significant random slope variance for each of the level 1 independent variables in the cross-level interaction. However, including the random slope variance makes the results more difficult to interpret. So, the models are run without the random-slope variance. The trade-off is that in models without random slope-variance statistical significance is reached more easily than in models that include the random slope variance (Heisig & Schaeffer, 2019). So, caution is required in interpreting the results of the cross-level interactions.

4.4 Statistical models and hypothesis testing

The third step is estimating the models with the cross-level interactions and interpreting the results. The results of the statistical models can be found below.

4.4.1 Tables of the results

Table 2. Multilevel logistic regression models estimating populist far-right voting (Odds-ratios reported).

Model	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Education								
Low Education (ref: high education)	1.35** (.134)	1.35** (.134)	1.31** (.136)	1.77*** (.281)	3.76*** (1.12)	1.31** (.136)	1.35** (.142)	1.31** (.137)
Intermediate education (ref: high education)	1.49*** (.127)	1.49*** (.127)	1.44*** (.127)	1.85 (.265)	3.58*** (.981)	1.43*** (.127)	1.48*** (.133)	1.44*** (.127)
Class								
Lower-grade service class (ref: higher-grade service class)	1.13 (.117)	1.13 (.117)	1.18 (.128)	1.18 (.128)	1.18 (.128)	1.28 (.227)	2.16* (.768)	1.18 (.128)
Small business owners (ref: higher-grade service class)	1.35** (.157)	1.35** (.157)	1.22 (.149)	1.22 (.148)	1.22 (.149)	1.23 (.239)	1.73 (.660)	1.22 (.149)
Skilled workers (ref: higher-grade service class)	1.31** (.131)	1.31** (.131)	1.34** (.140)	1.33** (.140)	1.34** (.141)	1.54** (.250)	4.87*** (1.53)	1.34** (.140)
Unskilled workers (ref: higher-grade service class)	1.24* (.113)	1.23* (.133)	1.42** (.161)	1.42** (.161)	1.44** (.164)	1.58** (.280)	5.14*** (1.71)	1.42** (.161)
Immigration scale (centered)	1.26*** (.016)	1.26*** (.016)	1.24*** (.018)	1.24*** (.018)	1.24*** (.018)	1.24*** (.018)	1.23*** (.018)	1.24*** (.018)
Income difficulty (centered)	.97 (.034)	.97 (.035)	1.01 (.039)	1.02 (.039)	1.02 (.039)	1.02 (.039)	1.02 (.039)	1.04 (.068)
Disproportionality		1.04 (.088)	1.04 (.099)	1.08 (.105)	1.04 (.101)	1.05 (.103)	1.04 (.100)	1.04 (.099)
Government turnover index		1.05* (.023)	1.06* (.025)	1.06* (.025)	1.08** (.027)	1.06** (.025)	1.09** (.027)	1.06** (.025)

Education x proportionality						
Low education (ref: high education)	.94*					
	(.020)					
Intermediate education (ref: high education)	.95*					
	(.018)					
Education x GTI						
Low education (ref: high education)			.97***			
			(.006)			
Intermediate education (ref: high education)			.97***			
			(.006)			
Class x proportionality						
Lower-grade service class (ref: higher-grade service class)				.98		
				(.024)		
Small business owners (ref: higher-grade service class)				.99		
				(.026)		
Skilled workers (ref: higher-grade service class)				.97		
				(.022)		
Unskilled workers (ref: higher-grade service class)				.97		
				(.023)		
Class x GTI						
Lower-grade service class (ref: higher-grade service class)				.98		
				(.008)		
Small business owners (ref: higher-grade service class)				.99		
				(.009)		
Skilled workers (ref: higher-grade service class)				.96***		
				(.007)		
Unskilled workers (ref: higher-grade service class)				.96***		
				(.007)		
Income difficulty (centered) x proportionality						.99
						(.008)
Left-right placement (centered)	1.42***	1.42***	1.42***	1.42***	1.42***	1.42***
	(.019)	(.019)	(.019)	(.019)	(.019)	(.019)
Dissatisfaction with government (centered)	1.09***	1.09***	1.09***	1.09***	1.09***	1.09***
	(.013)	(.013)	(.013)	(.013)	(.013)	(.013)
Unemployment (grand mean centered)	.97	.97	.98	.97	.98	.97
	(.167)	(.167)	(.171)	(.167)	(.169)	(.167)

Constant	.025*** (.011)	.003*** (.003)	.002*** (.002)	.001*** (.001)	.0009*** (.001)	.002*** (.002)	.0008*** (.0009)	.002*** (.002)
Country-level variance	2.47 (1.07)	1.65 (.709)	1.77 (.755)	1.77 (.755)	1.83 (.782)	1.77 (.756)	1.80 (.768)	1.77 (.755)
Wald chi2	432***	438***	1019***	1023***	1024***	1020***	1042***	1019***
Individual N =	22698	22698	20483	20483	20483	20483	20483	20483
Country level N =	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	14

Standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed).

Table 3. Multilevel logistic regression models estimating populist party voting (Odds-ratios reported).

Model	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
Education								
Low Education (ref: high education)	1.24* (.107)	1.24* (.107)	1.23* (.109)	1.24 (.166)	1.30 (.298)	1.23* (.110)	1.23* (.110)	1.23* (.110)
Intermediate education (ref: high education)	1.36*** (.101)	1.36** (.101)	1.31*** (.099)	1.33* (.160)	1.25 (.255)	1.31*** (.100)	1.32*** (.100)	1.31*** (.100)
Class								
Lower-grade service class (ref: higher-grade service class)	1.04 (.093)	1.04 (.093)	1.06 (.097)	1.06 (.097)	1.06 (.097)	1.07 (.159)	1.06 (.283)	1.05 (.097)
Small business owners (ref: higher-grade service class)	1.10 (.113)	1.10 (.113)	1.04 (.109)	1.03 (.109)	1.04 (.109)	.86 (.144)	.66 (.203)	1.03 (.109)
Skilled workers (ref: higher-grade service class)	1.20* (.103)	1.19* (.103)	1.19* (.106)	1.19* (.106)	1.19* (.106)	1.21 (.165)	1.63* (.384)	1.19* (.106)
Unskilled workers (ref: higher-grade service class)	1.11 (.105)	1.11 (.105)	1.20 (.117)	1.20 (.117)	1.20 (.117)	1.14 (.171)	1.43 (.367)	1.20 (.117)
Immigration scale (centered)	1.20*** (.014)	1.20*** (.014)	1.17*** (.015)	1.17*** (.015)	1.17*** (.015)	1.17*** (.015)	1.17*** (.015)	1.17*** (.015)
Income difficulty (centered)	1.07* (.032)	1.07* (.032)	1.09** (.035)	1.09** (.035)	1.09*** (.035)	1.09*** (.035)	1.09*** (.035)	1.15* (.062)
Disproportionality		.92 (.068)	.93 (.071)	.93 (.072)	.93 (.071)	.92 (.072)	.93 (.071)	.93 (.071)
Government turnover index		1.05* (.023)	1.06* (.025)	1.06* (.025)	1.06* (.026)	1.06* (.025)	1.06* (.026)	1.06* (.025)
Education x proportionality								
Low education (ref: high education)				.99 (.019)				
Intermediate education (ref: high education)				.99 (.018)				
Education x GTI								
Low education (ref: high education)					.99 (.005)			
Intermediate education					1.001 (.005)			

(ref: high education)

Class x proportionality

Lower-grade service class (ref: higher-grade service class)	.99 (.022)
Small business owners (ref: higher-grade service class)	1.03 (.025)
Skilled workers (ref: higher-grade service class)	.99 (.020)
Unskilled workers (ref: higher-grade service class)	1.009 (.022)

Class x GTI

Lower-grade service class (ref: higher-grade service class)	.99 (.006)
Small business owners (ref: higher-grade service class)	1.01 (.007)
Skilled workers (ref: higher-grade service class)	.99 (.005)
Unskilled workers (ref: higher-grade service class)	.99 (.006)
Income difficulty (centered) x proportionality	.99 (.007)
Left-right placement (centered)	1.22*** (.014)
Dissatisfaction with government (centered)	1.10*** (.012)
Unemployment (grand mean centered)	.98 (.134)

Constant	.029*** (.011)	.007*** (.006)	.006*** (.006)	.006*** (.006)	.006*** (.006)	.006*** (.006)	.005*** (.005)	.006*** (.006)
Country-level variance	2.65 (1.02)	1.90 (.730)	1.85 (.712)	1.85 (.712)	1.85 (.712)	1.86 (.713)	1.85 (.712)	1.85 (.712)
Wald chi2	386***	392***	720***	721***	712***	724***	732***	722***
Individual N =	27918	29718	26731	26731	26731	26731	26731	26731
Country level N =	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17

Standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed).

4.4.2 Test of hypothesis one about Education

Hypotheses 1 for both the globalization thesis and relative-deprivation theory predicted that people with lower levels of education are more likely to vote for populist parties. This was measured with a recoded variable education consisting of three categories: low, intermediate and high levels of education. In the statistical models dummies have been created with a high level of education as the reference group.

Models 1-8 show that people with a low level of education are more likely to vote for a populist far-right parties compared to people with high-levels of education, this effect is statistically significant in every model ($p < 0,05$). The odds-ratios range from 1.31 to 1.77, this means that people with low levels of education are 31% to 77% more likely to vote for populist far-right parties compared to people with high levels of education (model 5 that includes the interaction GTI x Education has an odds-ratio of 3.76, but since the standard error is also much higher this odds-ratio is excluded from the analysis). The effect remained remarkably stable, even when controls about left-right placement and satisfaction with government were added to the model. This indicates that the propensity of people with low levels of education to be more likely to vote for populist far-right parties cannot be fully explained by the fact that they are right-wing and are dissatisfied with the government. The same picture generally holds for models 9-16, which have voting for populist parties as a dependent variable. In all models, except for the models that include the education cross-level interaction, the effect is statistically significant. Although the effect is less strong than in models 1-8 (OR range from 1.23 to 1.30). In these models four populist far-left parties are included. Even though four parties is not nearly enough to draw any valid conclusions, this could be an indication that in terms of education the electorate of populist far-left and far-right parties diverge.

The dummy variables to compare people with intermediate levels of education to people with high levels of education showed similar results as low education compared to high education. This dummy variable is statistically significant ($p < 0,05$) in all models except for model 13 that includes the interaction GTI x education. The odds-ratios are slightly higher than for the lower education dummy, indicating that people with intermediate levels of education are even more likely to vote for populist (far-right) parties than people with low levels of education. Again, including control variables reduced the odds-ratios, but the effects still remain significant. Furthermore, the models that also include four populist far-left parties had reduced odds-ratios, pointing to a difference between populist far-left and far-right parties. Running models with low level of education as a reference group revealed that there is no statistically significant difference in likelihood of voting for populist (far-right) parties between people with low and intermediate levels of education.

In conclusion, hypothesis one predicted that people with low levels of education are more likely to vote for populist (far-right) parties. The statistical analysis showed that this was the case, however people with intermediate levels are also more likely to vote for populist (far-right) parties. Also, the effect decreased when populist far-left parties were included in the analysis. This is a small indication that the effect of education mainly applies to populist far-right parties. Although a sample size of four populist far-left parties is too small to draw any valid conclusions. All in all, hypothesis one has to be amended in the sense that people with low and intermediate levels of education are more likely to vote for populist (far-right) parties.

4.4.3 Test of two hypotheses two about occupation

Hypotheses two for the globalization thesis predicted that unskilled workers are more likely to vote for populist parties. This was measured by a 5-class scheme, dummy variables were created with higher-grade service class as the reference category.

Models 1-8 reveals that unskilled workers are more likely to vote for populist far-right parties compared to the higher-grade service class, the effect is statistically significant in all the models ($p < 0,05$). The odds-ratios range from 1.23 to 1.54 (except for model 7, but that model also has high standard errors, so that odds-ratio is excluded), or in other words unskilled workers are 23% to 54% more likely to vote for populist far-right parties compared to the higher-grade service class. The addition of control variables about left-right placement and satisfaction with government did not change the effect, it remained significant and stable. So the effect of unskilled workers is not entirely mediated by these attitudes. In the models 9-16 which included four populist far-left parties the effects are not significant anymore ($p > 0,05$) and the effect also decreased. Although it should be noted that the effects were right above the p-limit of 0,05. This is a small indication that the unskilled workers are mainly more likely to vote for populist far-right parties as opposed to populist far-left parties. However, the caveat of small populist far-left party sample size still applies, so this should not be seen as a definitive conclusion.

Just like with the unskilled workers class the results showed that skilled workers are more likely to vote for populist far-right parties than the higher-grade service class, the effect is statistically significant in all the models ($p < 0,05$). The odds-ratios are slightly higher for the skilled workers compared to the unskilled workers. This indicates that the skilled workers are even more likely to vote for populist (far-right) parties than unskilled workers compared to the higher-grade service class. However, if the unskilled workers are used as the reference category there are no significant differences between these two groups. The skilled workers dummy remained significant in the models with populist party voting as a dependent variable (except for models 14 and 16). This is an indication

that the skilled workers are also more likely to vote for populist far-left parties, although a sample-size of only four populist far-left parties is not enough to draw a valid conclusion on this issue.

In conclusion, hypothesis two predicted that unskilled workers are more likely to vote for (far-right) populist parties. The statistical analysis showed that this is the case compared to the higher-grade service class, however skilled workers are also more likely to vote for (far-right) populist parties. Furthermore, the analysis showed that unskilled workers are not significantly more likely to vote for populist parties (which included four populist far-left parties). So, the hypothesis should be amended: workers are more likely to vote for populist far-right parties and skilled workers are more likely to vote for (far-right) populist parties.

4.4.4 Test of hypothesis three about issue positions

Hypothesis three predicted that people who are opposed to immigration are more likely to vote for populist far-right parties. This was measured by creating an immigration scale.

Models 1-9 with voting for populist far-right as a dependent variable shows strong support for this assertion. The odds-ratios range from 1.23 to 1.26, this means that a one unit increase of anti-immigration attitudes results in 23% to 26% increased likelihood of a populist far-right vote. The effect remains stable even when the control variables and the cross-level interactions are added to the model. The effect is also highly statistical significant ($p < 0,001$) in all models, indicating that this effect is not due to chance. In the models that include four populist far-left parties the effect remains highly significant ($p < 0,001$), however the odds-ratios are reduced. The values range from 1,17 to 1,20, showing a noticeable reduction when populist far-left parties are added. This indicates that the effect of immigration attitudes is indeed most applicable to populist far-right parties.

In conclusion, there is clear support for hypothesis three. Anti-immigration attitudes are a significant predictor for populist far-right votes. This effect applied less to the populist far-left parties included in the analysis.

4.4.5 Test of hypothesis four about economic well-being

Hypothesis four for the relative-deprivation theory predicted that people who have a negative score on economic well-being are more likely to vote for populist parties. Economic well-being is measured by a variable about income difficulty.

In all except two models with populist far-right parties as a dependent variable have an odds-ratio that would indicate that people who experience income difficulty are more likely to vote for populist far-right parties. However, in none of the models this variable is statistically significant. This shows that there is no statistical connection between income difficulty and voting for populist far-right parties. Models that include four populist far-left parties paint a different picture. The odds-ratios ratio

of models 9-15 ranged from 1.07 to 1.15 and were statistically significant in all models. This means that a one units increase in income difficulty results in a 7% to 15% higher likelihood of voting for populist parties. Since these models include populist far-left parties it would be an indication that it especially applied to populist far-left parties, although a sample size of four parties is too small to draw any valid conclusions.

In conclusion, hypothesis four predicted that people who have a negative score on economic well-being are more likely to vote for populist parties. For populist parties in general this hypothesis is adopted. Since all the models (9-16) that include both far-right and far-left populist parties showed that income difficulty was a significant predictor of voting for populist parties. In the models with populist far-right parties this effect was not significant. This indicates that income difficulty is most applicable to populist far-left parties. In conclusion, hypothesis four is partially adopted.

4.4.6 Test of hypotheses 5a and 6a about proportional representation

Hypothesis 5a predicted that in a system of proportional representation people are more likely to vote for populist (far-right) parties. Hypothesis 6a predicted that the level of proportionality moderates the relationship between the losers of globalization/economic well-being and voting for populist (far-right) parties. This was measured by the Gallagher index of proportionality of the last three elections before 2012. Cross-level interactions between this index and education, class and income difficulty were created.

Models 4, 6 and 8 for the dependent variable vote for populist far-right party and models 12, 14 and 16 for the dependent variable vote for populist party included proportionality as a direct effect.

Between the models with the two dependent variables there are differences as to how the effect looked like. However, in none of the models the effect are statistically significant. So, the differences between these models are most likely due to chance. This statistically backs up the finding from the descriptive statistics that there does not seem to be a (clear) relationship between proportionality and populist (far-right) party voting.

The cross-level interactions are not significant except in model 4. With populist far-right voting

as a dependent variable, the cross-level interaction Education x proportionality is significant. The marginal effects can be found in figure 3. This graph also shows the 95% confidence interval. The




figure 3. Marginal effects of education

marginal effects show that in disproportionate systems (indicated by a higher) score people are more likely to vote for populist far-right parties. However, since the effect is really small and has a large margin of error this cannot be stated with confidence. Further analysis confirmed that the slopes of the three education levels do not significantly differ ($p > 0,05$). If the random slope variance of education is added or robust standard errors are used the effect is not significant anymore. This is another indication that there most likely is no clear cross-level interaction effect between proportionality and education.

In conclusion, hypothesis 5a predicted that people are more likely to vote for populist parties in proportional electoral systems and hypothesis 6a predicted that the electoral system would moderate the effect of losers of globalization/economic well-being. The results from the statistical models show that hypothesis 5a should be rejected, no proof was found that people are more likely to vote for populist parties in a proportional electoral system. Hypothesis 6a should also be rejected, only the interaction education x proportionality was statistically significant. A closer look at that result shows that there most likely is not a moderator effect of proportionality.

4.4.7 Test of hypotheses 5b and 6b about accountability

Hypothesis 5b predicted that people are more likely to vote for populist parties in a less accountable political system. Hypothesis 6b predicted that the losers of globalization are more likely to vote for populist parties in a less accountable political system. Accountability was measured by the government turnover index. Cross-level interaction between the government turnover index and education/class were made to test hypothesis 6b.

Models 5-8 for the dependent variable vote for populist far-right party and models 13-16 for the dependent variable vote for populist parties included the direct effect of the government turnover index. In all the models the direct effect is statistically significant ($p < 0,05$). The odds-ratios range from 1.05 to 1.09, this means that a one units increase on the government turnover index increased the likelihood of voting for populist (far-right) parties by 5% to 9%. Or in other words, more government turnover increases the likelihood of voting for populist (far-right) parties.

Models 5, 7, 13 and 15 show the results of the cross-level interaction with government turnover. For the models with the dependent variable vote for populist parties the cross-level interaction is not significant, indicating that the effect of both education and class does not vary for different values of the government turnover index. For the models with the dependent variable populist far-right vote the cross-level interactions were significant. The interaction education x GTI was significant for both lower- and intermediate education (reference group: high education) and the interaction class x GTI was only significant for the skilled- and unskilled workers (reference group:

higher-grade service class). The marginal effect of the two interactions can be found below. These graph also shows the 95% confidence intervals.




Figure 4. Marginal effects of education




figure 5. Marginal effects of class

These graphs show that for all groups of education and class the effect seems to increase with a higher score on the government turnover index. However, the margins of errors are large and therefore it is not possible to say that a high score on government turnover significantly increases the effects of the different group on populist far-right voting. So, it is most likely that there is no clear-cut interaction effect between education/class and government turnover. Further analysis also showed that the slopes of the different groups for education did not significantly differ from each other ($p > 0,05$). For class it only differed significantly for both skilled and unskilled workers compared to the higher-grade service class. The resulting graph comparing the differences in slope of the four categories (lower-grade service class, small-business owners, skilled workers and unskilled workers) compared to the higher-grade service class seemed to indicate that (un)skilled workers were less likely to vote for populist far-right parties on higher scores of the government turnover index. However, the 95% confidence intervals for both categories also included the opposite effect, that (un)skilled workers are more likely to vote for populist far-right parties on higher scores of the government turnover index. So it cannot with statistical confidence be concluded that the government turnover index affects the relationship between class and populist far-right voting.

In conclusion, hypothesis 5b predicted that the less accountable a political system is, the more likely it is that a person will vote for a populist (far-right) party. The results from the statistical models do not show that this is the case. It rather is the opposite, the more accountable a political system is, the more likely it is that a person will vote for a populist (far-right) party. Hypothesis 6b predicted that the losers of globalization are more likely to vote for a populist (far-right) party in a less accountable

political system. The results from the cross-level interactions show that this is not the case, so this hypotheses has to be rejected.

4.4.8 Control variables

Three control variables were added to the analysis, one about how people place themselves on the left-right scale which is a rough indicator of economic attitudes, dissatisfaction with government, which is an indicator of protest votes and unemployment percentage, which is an indicator of aggregate economic circumstances.

The first control variable is left-right placement. The different models (1-8) showed that left-right placement is the most important predictor of a populist far-right vote. The odds-ratio is 1.42 in all models, this means that people who move 1 step to the right on this scale are 42% more likely to vote for populist far-right parties. This effect is highly significant ($p < 0,001$) in models 1 to 8. Models 9-16 also included four populist far-left parties and not surprisingly the odds-ratios and significance levels decreased in these models. However, the effects remained significant. This leads to the unsurprising conclusion that people who vote for populist far-right parties are more likely to have right-wing attitudes.

The second control variable is dissatisfaction with government. The odds-ratios for this variable is 1.09 in models 1-8 and the effect is also significant in all models ($p < 0,001$). This means that a one-point increase in dissatisfaction with government results in roughly 9% higher likelihood of voting for populist far-right parties. For the models 9-16 the effect is also significant and has an odds-ratio of 1.10. This indicates that dissatisfaction with government is also a predictor of voting for the four populist far-left parties included in the analysis.

The third control variable is unemployment percentage. In none of the statistical models (1-16) the variable is significant. This means that unemployment percentage is not a predictor of voting for populist (far-right) parties.

5. Conclusion

The growth of populist parties in Europe has led to a lot of research trying to explain who votes for these parties and why. This thesis has focused on two debates in the literature. On the one hand there is the debate between the globalization thesis and relative-deprivation theory. The globalization thesis predicted that globalization has created two groups in society, the winners and the losers. It has been hypothesized that the losers group is a major voter potential for populist parties (Kriesi et al., 2006). Relative deprivation theory argued that it is not absolute circumstances that is the explanation for populist voting, but rather that people fear that they are missing out compared to other groups and that this makes them more likely to vote for populist parties (Urbanska & Guimond, 2018; Rooduijn & Burgoon, 2018). On the other hand there is debate about majoritarian versus consensus democracy. Some authors argued that consensus democracy is more prone to populist voting because it suffers from accountability problems (e.g. Andeweg, 2001; Katz, 2016). Whereas others argued that consensus democracy does not suffer from accountability issues, but that the relative success of populist parties in consensus democracy can be explained from the fact that these democracies use proportional representation. This thesis tried to unite these two debates by looking at whether the majoritarian versus consensus debate can act as a moderator affecting the relationship between the losers of globalization or the relatively deprived and voting for populist parties. This led to the following research question:

To what extent did the model of democracy of a particular country influence the relationship between the losers of globalization/relatively deprived people and voting for populist parties in 2012 in the European Union?

In order to test the different hypotheses that were based on the different theories a multilevel logistic regression on the European Social Survey 2012 was conducted. Two dependent variables were created, a variable vote for a populist far-right party and another variable vote for a populist party, this variable also included four populist far-left parties. Several independent variables relating to socio-structural characteristics of populist voters, attitudes of voters and two variables relating to the majoritarian versus consensus debate were included in the analysis.

5.1 Main findings

In this section the main findings of this thesis will be summarized and their theoretical implications will be discussed. It consists of three parts: first the findings relating to the socio-structural characteristics of populist voters will be discussed. Second, the findings relating to issue positions of populist voters will be discussed. Finally, the findings relating to the link between the majoritarian/consensus divide and the globalization and relative-deprivation theory will be analyzed. In this part the research

question of this thesis will be answered. In each part the different theoretical expectations will be shortly summarized, then the results of the statistical analysis will be summarized and linked to these theoretical expectations.

5.1.1 Socio-structural characteristics of populist voters

Even though it was not the main goal of this thesis to look at differences between types of populist parties, the results of the statistical analysis showed that there were differences between the models that only include populist far-right parties and the models that also include populist far-left parties. These findings will be discussed below.

The globalization thesis predicted that the losers of globalization will be more likely to vote for populist parties. There was disagreement within the globalization thesis as to how this group looked like. On the one hand there was a prediction that the losers of globalization are people with low levels of education and who belong to the unskilled workers class (Dolezal & Hutter, 2012). On the other hand there was a prediction that people with an intermediate level of education who belong to the workers class are more likely to vote for populist parties (Bornschieer & Kriesi, 2013). Relative-deprivation theory also differed on what constitutes the relatively deprived, on the one hand it was argued that people with low levels of education are more likely to vote for populist parties (Rooduijn & Burgoon, 2018). On the other hand it was also claimed that there is no consistent socio-structural profile of populist voters (Rooduijn, 2018). The statistical analysis did reveal a distinct socio-structural profile of populist voters. Both people with low and intermediate education and people who belong to the unskilled and skilled workers class are more likely to vote for populist parties. However, the results also indicated that the effects are the strongest for populist far-right parties. Models that included four populist far-left saw reduced effects for both education and class. The implication of this is that the globalization thesis is most applicable to populist far-right parties. This could explain why one study found that there is no distinct profile of populist voters, it included both populist far-left and far-right parties (ibid.). If there is indeed a distinction in voter profile between these two types of parties there would indeed be not a clear pattern of a populist parties. So, in conclusion the results showed that the globalization thesis and relative-deprivation theory predictions about education and class mainly apply to the electorate of the populist far-right and less to the populist far-left. This implies that these theories are mostly applicable to populist far-right parties.

Relative-deprivation theory also argued that reduced economic well-being, measured in terms of income difficulty, unites the voter base of both types of populist parties (Rooduijn & Burgoon, 2018). Whereas the globalization thesis argued that this does not apply to populist far-right parties (Bornschieer & Kriesi, 2013). The results of statistical analysis found support for the latter argument. For populist far-right parties there was no significant effect of income difficulty, when populist far-left

parties were included there was a significantly, positive effect of income difficulty on populist voting. This is further evidence that the characteristics of populist far-left and far-right voters differ from each other. The implication of this is that this part of the relative-deprivation argument is most applicable to populist far-left parties.

To summarize, the effects of education and class were the strongest for the models that included populist far-right parties. Whereas the effect of economic well-being (measured in terms of income difficulty) was only significant for parties that included populist far-left parties. The implication of this finding is that the globalization thesis is most applicable to populist far-right parties and that the relative-deprivation thesis is most applicable to populist far-left parties.

5.1.2 Issue positions of populist voters.

In this part the issue positions of populist voters are discussed. This thesis focused on anti-immigration attitudes and controlled for left-right placement, which used as a rough indicator of economic attitudes.

There is a wide variety of literature, for both the globalization thesis and relative-deprivation theory, that linked anti-immigration attitudes on the cultural dimension to populist far-right voting (e.g. Burgoon, Rooduijn, 2018; Kriesi et al., 2006; Dolezal & Hutter, 2012; Van der Brug & Van Spanje, 2005). So, it is not surprising that the results from the statistical analysis indeed found this to be the case. Anti-immigration attitudes were indeed found to be a positive predictor of populist far-right voting. Also, the effect decreased, although it remained significant, when populist far-left parties were included. This confirmed the expectation that anti-immigration attitudes are most applicable to populist far-right parties.

The globalization thesis expected that the cultural issues would be more important than economic issues in determining vote choice in elections (Bornschieer & Kriesi, 2013). Even though no independent variables were included that measured economic attitudes directly, a control variable for left-right placement was included as a proxy for economic attitudes. It should be noted that one study found that left-right placement is increasingly viewed in cultural terms (De Vries et al., 2013). So, this is not a perfect proxy of economic attitudes. The results of the statistical analysis showed that left-right placement has the strongest effect on populist far-right voting, even stronger than anti-immigration attitudes. That would indicate that economic attitudes are still an important explanatory factor of populist far-right voting.

5.1.3 The majoritarian-consensus debate

One of the main expectations of this thesis was that the majoritarian-consensus divide could act as a moderator that affect the relationship between the losers of globalization/relatively-deprived and

populist (far-right) voting. The results of the statistical analysis on this issue will be discussed here and the research question will be answered.

The majoritarian-consensus debate assumed a direct relationship between the type of democracy and populist voting. Both sides of the debate acknowledged that consensus democracies see more successful populist parties, however they offered competing explanations (Andeweg, 2001; Lijphart, 2001). On the one side it was argued that consensus democracies suffer from accountability issues and therefore are more likely to see successful populist parties (Andeweg, 2001; Katz, 2016). On the other side it was argued that proportionality is the reason why consensus democracies see more successful populist parties. These arguments were analyzed by looking at the Gallagher index of disproportionality index and the government turnover index, which is a proxy for accountability. The results from the statistical analysis showed that there was no direct effect between proportionality and populist voting. This is in line with Carter (2002) who also found that proportional representation is no explanatory factor of the success of populist parties. It goes against Lijphart's argument that proportional representation is the reason why consensus democracies have more successful populist parties (Note: the idea that consensus democracies have more successful populist parties than majoritarian democracies has not been tested in this thesis). The government turnover index did have a significant effect on populist voting. However, the effect was contrary to the expectation: more government alternation was positively associated with the likelihood of voting for a populist party. This is an important finding because it is in contrast with the idea that less accountability increases the likelihood of a successful populist party (Andeweg, 2001).

In the previous part a direct relationship between the type of democracy and populist voting was assumed. However, there are indications that the type of democracy moderates the relationship between the losers of globalization/relatively deprived and populist party voting (e.g. Swank & Betz, 2003). The globalization thesis expected that accountability and proportionality played a role in populist voting, whereas the relative-deprivation theory only pointed to the effects of proportional representation. This thesis tried to test this by creating interactions between education, class and income difficulty (only for proportionality) on the one side and proportionality and government turnover on the other side. The results from the statistical models showed that there is no moderator effect of proportionality on education, class and income difficulty. It also showed that there was most likely no moderator effect of government turnover on education and class, although the picture was less clear than for proportionality. So, to answer the research question: the type of democracy did not influence the relationship between the losers of globalization/relatively deprived and populist party voting.

2.5 Limitations and recommendations for future research

This study has several limitations that will be discussed in this part, recommendations for solutions to these limitations will also be discussed. Finally, based on the findings of this study recommendations for future research will be provided.

A first statistical limitation is that this study only included a small amount of countries in the analysis. In the European Social Survey of 2012 there were only 17 countries that had populist parties (both far-left and far-right) and only 14 countries had just populist far-right parties. The general recommendation for testing cross-level interactions is that a study should at least have 50+ countries in order to have unbiased estimates of the statistical model (Maas & Hox, 2005). Although it should be noted that another study found a small level two sample size does not automatically lead to biased estimates (Schmidt-Catran et al., 2019). So, caution is required in interpreting the results of the moderator effect of proportionality and government turnover. A way to alleviate this problem in future research could be to pool data from multiple timepoints and conduct a time-series cross section study. If this method is used the country level sample size is increased which should lead to more unbiased estimates.

A second statistical limitation is that this study did not account for the random-slope variance of individual level predictors in the models that included the cross-level interactions. This can have the effect that the p-values are too low and that an effect is significant, whereas it really should not be significant (Heisig & Schaeffer, 2019). This is another reason why caution is required in interpreting the results of the moderator effect of proportionality and government turnover. Future studies on populism could take the random-slope variance of individual level variables into account, which would lead to a more robust test of cross-level interactions.

A third possible limitation is that the variable, the government turnover index, that was used as a proxy for accountability has a long measurement period. It calculated government turnover using data from 1945-2010. It might be that the political systems of the different countries changed in the more recent periods, so the government turnover score could be too low or too high for the most recent period which might affect the results. A recommendation for future research is to include data on accountability and government turnover that was measured in a more recent period. Further investigation into the effects of accountability and government turnover is also interesting, because this study found that, contrary to the expectation, higher government turnover leads to a higher likelihood of populist voting. Future research could look into this in more detail and could investigate whether this relationship also holds true for more countries and years and could investigate why this is the case.

A fourth possible limitation of this study is that it included only four populist far-left parties in the analysis. An important finding was that the globalization thesis mainly applied to populist far-right parties and relative-deprivation theory mainly to populist far-left parties. However, a sample size of only four parties is too small to draw a definitive conclusion. So, the results of this study should be seen as an indication that populist far-right and far-right voting need different explanations. However, more research that includes both types of parties is needed to be able to have confidence in this result.

One final recommendation is in order. In this thesis left-right placement was used as an indicator of economic attitudes, however another study found that left-right placement is increasingly viewed in cultural terms (De Vries et al., 2013). Since it was found that left-right placement was the strongest predictor of populist far-right voting it might be interesting to further investigate how left-right placement is framed in the electorate and how it can be linked to vote choice for populist parties.

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Appendix

Table 1. List of populist far-left and far-right included in the analysis

Country	Populist far-right	Populist far-left
Belgium	National Front Flemish Interest	
Bulgaria	Attack Order, Law and Justice IMRO - National Bulgarian Movement	
Denmark	Danish People's Party	
Estonia	Estonian Conservative People's Party	
Finland	True Finns	
France	National Front	
Germany		The Left
Hungary	Fidesz -- Hungarian Civic Party / Christian Democratic People's Party Jobbik Hungarian Justice and Life Party	
Italy	Lega Nord Fratellid'Italia	
Ireland		Sinn Féin
Netherlands	Party for Freedom	Socialist Party
Norway	Progress Party	
Poland	Law and Justice	
Slovenia	Slovenian Democratic Party Slovenian National Party	
Sweden	Sweden Democrats	
Switzerland	Ticino League	
United Kingdom		Sinn Féin

Sources: Rooduijn et al. (2019), European Social Survey (2012)

Table 5. Country level independent variable scores

Country	Disproportionality score	Government Turnover Index	Unemployment percentage
Belgium	3,84	21	7,2
Bulgaria	5,24	65	11,3
Denmark	1,35	31	7,8
Estonia	3,83	33	12,3
Finland	3,2	20	7,8
France	17,74	26	9,2
Germany	3,30	18	5,8
Hungary	8,07	50	11,0
Ireland	6,34	48	15,4
Italy	6.52	13	8.4.
Netherlands	0,95	26	5,0
Norway	3,14	49	3,21
Poland	5,99	46	9,7
Slovenia	3,30	47	8,2
Sweden	1,84	22	7,8
Switzerland	2,7	0 ²	4,41
United Kingdom	17,03	30	8,1

Sources: Gallagher (2019) & Ieraci & Poropat (2016) & Eurostat (2020).

Table 6. Collinearity diagnostics.

Variable name	VIF	Tolerance
Education	5.68	0.17
Class	2.78	0.35
Anti-immigration scale	1.17	.085
Income difficulty	2.60	0.38
Disproportionality	9.31	0.10
Government turnover index	9.88	0.10
Education x proportionality	10.44	0.09
Education x government turnover index	13.57	0.07
Class x proportionality	7.73	0.12
Class x government turnover index	10.28	0.09
Income difficulty x proportionality	1.07	0.93

² Switzerland is not in the Ieraci & Poropat (2016) dataset. It has been given a 0 score on the government turnover index, because it has never experienced government turnover (Pellegata & Qaranta, 2019, p. 428)