The Logic of Drug-Related Violence : A Case Study of Mexico from 2006 to 2011
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2011-11-15
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en
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Abstract
Mexico has experienced a dramatic escalation of drug-related violence under Mexican President
Calderón which has reached a level of intensity and atrocity transcending previous periods of
drug-related violence. How to explain the dramatic rise of drug-related violence since 2006? Why
are some states plagued with extremely high levels of drug-related violence, whereas others
remain largely unaffected? The thesis seeks to explain the variation of drug related violence
across time and space by using Stathis Kalyvas’ theory of selective violence.
The central propositions and hypotheses of Kalyvas’ theory will be tested by using data on the
Mexican case in general and Michoacán in 2009 in particular. The aim is to show whether or not
the theory correctly predicts drug-related violence in Mexico.
However, there have been some major impediments that complicated the use of Kalyvas
theoretical model on the Mexican case: (1) data is often lacking and incomplete; (2) the Mexican
“conflict” is a mixture of irregular and conventional warfare; (3) there is more than one conflict,
namely one between the Mexican government and the DTOs, and various other conflicts among
the different DTOs themselves; and (4) the relationship between DTOs and state officials cannot be
compared with the one that exists between incumbents and insurgents in a classical sense.
Although only a plausibility probe, the case of Mexico between 2006 and 2011 and of Michoacán
in 2009 in particular, provides strong evidence that Kalyvas’ theoretical model can even be
applied on this case: (1) civilian support matters for the outcome of the conflict and the actors
involved are eager to obtain it; (2) violence plays a key role in obtaining control and
collaboration; (3) Mexican DTOs use both types of violence, though selective violence seems to
be the predominant type of violence. A shift from indiscriminate violence to more selective
violence within the process of the conflict does not seem to conform to the empirical reality.
The measurement of territorial control on the case of Michoacán turned out to be difficult; in
some cases impossible. Furthermore, there was only little empirical evidence. It was therefore
not possible to make rigorous hypotheses testing. Despite these limitations there was evidence
that: (1) zone 1 and zone 5 are affected by low levels of violence; (2) zone 2 and 4 are affected by
high levels of violence; and (3) Kalyvas’ last hypothesis for zones of parity could neither be
confirmed nor denied because of the lack of empirical evidence. However, I assume that the
internal logic of DTOs must contradict this hypothesis. Instead I argue that they are equally
affected by violence like zone 2 and 4.
The following recommendations can be made: (1) the Mexican government has to put more
efforts to obtain civilian support which implies combating corruption, regaining trust of the
civilian population and winning the “war of perceptions” by preventing DTOs from spreading
their propaganda; (2) active or passive collaboration with a DTO does not necessarily mean
sympathy, it might also be the result of lacking alternatives and a will to survive; (3) the mere
reliance on the Mexican armed forces is counterproductive and has contributed to the escalating
levels in violence; as a result (4) Kalyvas’ theory of selective violence should be integrated into
the policy process. This bears practical contributions, namely to better interpret the varying
patterns of drug-related violence which could help to produce more subtle approaches how to
cope with DTOs.
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Faculteit der Managementwetenschappen