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**[PEACE AND WAR FRAMES IN  
THE MEDIA  
REPRESENTATIONS OF THE  
LIBYAN CIVIL WAR]**

## Summary

The news media are an important source of information for many people. Readers expect news media tell them the truth. They are hardly aware of the process of selection, framing and the problems journalists face whilst doing their work. Reporting from a zone of conflict is particularly challenging. Despite this, media have become powerful conflict actors as their reports influence public opinion (Cachalia, 2011). And public opinion in turn is related to foreign policy, through the so-called CNN hypothesis, and/or the manufacturing consent paradigm.

Johan Galtung (1998; 2000), one of the founding fathers of peace studies, accuses media of 'war journalism'. The media focus on violence, highlight the differences between groups, present conflict as a zero-sum game and ignore the broad range of causes and outcomes of conflict. Audiences reading war journalism are served a simplified black and white image, which makes them more likely to support violent 'solutions' to the conflict. As neutral reporting on conflict is often impossible, Galtung suggests journalists opt for a bias towards peace: peace journalism. By using 'peace frames' peaceful solutions can be emphasised. Peace and war journalism theory has been operationalised, both in a practical way for journalists who want to write peace framed articles, but also for researchers who want to analyse existing articles. The theory has been applied to many intra- and international conflicts and cases of military intervention. Previous research by Lee (2009, p. 267) has shown that media are more likely to use war frames when their own country is involved.

This thesis uses Galtung's theory of peace and war journalism to examine the media coverage of the Libyan civil war in 2011. That year, a revolution took place in which Libya's former regime headed by Gaddafi was toppled by opposing groups. The conflict was intense and an international coalition got involved. The military intervention was initially aimed at upholding a no-fly zone. Later on, its character became more active as targets were bombed by the coalition. In October 2011 Gaddafi was killed, and the National Transitional Council declared Libya's liberation.

This research compares the media of intervening countries (The United Kingdom and France) with the media of a non-intervening country (Germany). From all three countries a leading newspaper was selected (*The Guardian*, *Le Monde* and *Die Welt*) from which a sample of 312 articles was taken. These articles were coded using a list of codes indicating peace and war journalism. The analysis consisted of two parts. First an analysis of the metadata, which determined the total number of articles published on Libya, the number of articles that made the front page, the average length of the articles and their location in the newspaper. The second part of the analysis concerned peace and war journalism. It looks at peace and war orientations, specific peace and war codes, and a score was calculated in order to be able to compare articles. The analysis also looked at accusations and examples of propaganda, and media attention for Libya before and after the conflict.

The analysis shows that media from the intervening countries indeed used significantly more war frames than the media from the non-intervening country. On average, articles from *Die Welt* were peace framed and those from *The Guardian* and *Le Monde* were war framed. But two important remarks need to be made: although peace journalism was dominant in *Die Welt*, war frames and examples of propaganda were present in *Die Welt* as well. And secondly: although *The Guardian* and *Le Monde* were both guilty of war journalism, there were also remarkable differences between these two papers, so they should not be lumped together easily. *Le Monde* mostly focussed on institutions and obscured peaceful solutions, whilst *The Guardian* presented an 'arena perspective' on the conflict and focused on killings and material damage.

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## 1. Introduction

“How can the Security Council and the United Nations make a resolution based on news that is 100 percent false?,” Muammar Gaddafi asked himself aloud during a speech on March 2, 2011. Whether or not the news really consisted of 100 percent lies is highly questionable, but Libya’s former dictator does acknowledge two important facts here. First, the links between the media and political decision making, and second, the fact that the media are not necessarily telling the absolute truth.

### 1.1 Media, influence and politics

People rely on the media for news. But both limitations and deliberate choices result in colored and distorted media representations. For example, the cultural background of a journalist and the amount of time to do research may influence his articles. The political leanings of the newspaper he works for may result in an edited, limited published version of his already distorted article. Being a journalist in a zone of conflict has even more limitations. People may be scared to talk, information is often absent or incorrect, and in some violent conflicts journalists have to fear for their lives.

Despite this, the media have become actors in conflict situations; powerful actors, given their power to influence politics and public perception (Cachalia, 2011). The media select and frame, and the words picked by the media influence the terms in which we think and talk. How the people think about things can influence foreign policy (the so-called CNN hypothesis). Influence can also work the other way around, the government can use the media to influence public opinion (propaganda and the so-called ‘manufacturing consent’ paradigm).

Johan Galtung, one of the founding fathers of peace studies, is also concerned with the relationship between conflict and the media. He has criticized the mainstream media for engaging in ‘war journalism’/ using ‘war frames’: overemphasizing violence, focusing on the elite, emphasizing the differences between parties, ignoring causes and consequences of conflict, failing to understand subjective reality and presenting conflict as a zero-sum game (Galtung, 1998, p. 2; Lee, 2009, p. 258; Keeble, Tulloch & Zollmann, 2010, p. 2; Ottosen, 2010, p. 262). The characteristics of war journalism have the implication that audiences are likely to support military intervention and believe violence is the only solution for conflict. Galtung proposes ‘peace journalism’ and ‘peace frames’ as an alternative. Peace journalism should correct the biases of war journalism and promote peace initiatives and reconciliation. There should be less emphasis on differences, no dichotomies and attention for the structural causes of the conflict and the structure of society (Lee, 2009, p. 258; Keeble, Tulloch & Zollmann, 2010, p. 2; Ottosen, 2010, p. 262). By approaching conflicts like this, peace journalism encourages society to think about, and value non-violent responses to conflict. Peace journalism offers practical plans and tips for journalists who report on conflict (Lynch & McGoldrick, p. 248). It also offers the tools to critically analyze existing war reports (see Galtung’s overview of peace and war frames orientations on p. 15).

### 1.2 The Libyan civil war and the media

The Libyan civil war, or Libyan revolution, was fought in 2011, between Gaddafi and his supporters and opposing groups, united in the National Transitional Council. Libya became the site of an international intervention. An international coalition got involved in the conflict, at first only to

enforce a no-fly zone and uphold the ceasefire, but after these did not work out the coalition stayed and participated in the conflict e.g. by bombing military targets. The conflict resulted in a change of regime, hundreds of thousands of refugees and the deaths of Gaddafi and 30,000 other Libyans (The Week Staff, 2011; Laub, 2011).

The media coverage of the Libyan civil war has been criticized, for example by Amnesty International that accused the Western media of presenting “a very one-sided view of the logic of events, portraying the protest movement as entirely peaceful and repeatedly suggesting that the regime’s security forces were unaccountably massacring unarmed demonstrators who presented no security challenge” (Cockburn, 2011).

Providing news on the Libyan civil war was rather challenging. Journalists were at constant risk, a number of journalists and photographers died trying to report on what was going on. Due to the risky situation, some journalists chose to work embedded with rebel groups (Cachalia, 2011). This method is well known to have major drawbacks and limitations. Due to security concerns, journalists often stayed in their hotels and relied on information from others, for example the press bureaus. Relying on information from others caused some journalists to report complete nonsense. A journalist reported the bombing of Mizda harbor by Libyan warships, but the town of Mizda is actually located hundreds of kilometers from the coast line (Cachalia, 2011). Al-Jazeera reported that a NATO plane had shot down a scud missile, but later experts claimed it is impossible for planes to shoot down scud missiles (“The triple-lie of”, 2011).

The Gaddafi regime worked hard to influence the reports of foreign journalists. The Economist (“Close your window”, 2011) describes the special tours for journalists organized by the regime. The journalists were taken to see funerals (but sometimes the coffins turned out to be empty), bombing sites (which were recycled) and hospitals (but not all the wounded were actually victims of the conflict). The Economist even suggests that the ‘rebel’ attack on a hotel frequented by many journalists was in fact staged. A *Guardian* journalist (Sherwood, 2011) describes the lack of freedom of journalists. They were not allowed to go out without a minder, they could be sent home at any time and the government summoned them for trips and conferences at every hour of the day (or night). Sherwood calls criticism on the work of foreign journalists ‘ironic’, considering the conditions in which they had to work.

In the end, the absolute truth did not really seem to matter. As the ‘Thomas theorem’ states: if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences. Politicians, civilians, rebels, NGO’s, soldiers, everybody acted on what they believed to be true. The distorted media representations were ‘real’ in their consequences. And one of those consequences was the intervention of Libya. This research focuses on the question if the media represented the conflict in Libya in such a way, that the military intervention seemed to be the only solution.

*The goal of this research is to find out if (printed) media (specifically being Le Monde, The Guardian and Die Welt) contributed to support for a military intervention in Libya in 2011 by using war frames, by doing a comparative content analysis of newspapers in both intervening states (France and the UK) and a non-intervening state (Germany).*

The hypothesis, based on Lee (2009, p. 267), is that a higher proportion of war frames will be found in the media from intervening countries than in the media from non-intervening countries.

The main research question is:

*Did the printed media from intervening countries (specifically being Le Monde, and The Guardian) contribute to support for a military intervention in Libya in 2011 more than the media from non-intervening countries (Die Welt) by using war frames?*

In order to answer this research question, two sets of sub-questions need to be answered. The first set relates to the characteristics of the articles in the sample. The so-called metadata need to be analysed. The second set of sub-questions investigates the characteristics of peace and war journalism in the articles.

#### *Quantitative exploration of the metadata*

- 1: How many articles in total were published by *Le Monde*, *The Guardian* and *Die Welt* on the topic of Libya between February 1, 2010, and November 1, 2012?
- 2: How often did news on Libya make the front page in *Le Monde*, *The Guardian* and *Die Welt* between February 1, 2010 and November 1, 2012?
- 3: What was the average article length of articles on Libya in *Le Monde*, *The Guardian* and *Die Welt* during the conflict (February 27, 2011 –October 31, 2011)?
- 4: Where in *Le Monde*, *The Guardian* and *Die Welt* are articles on Libya located (which section and page number) during the conflict (February 27, 2011 –October 31, 2011)?

#### *Qualitative analysis of the data: peace and war journalism*

- 1: Were there differences in peace/war orientation between *The Guardian*, *Le Monde* and *Die Welt* in their reports on the Libyan civil war (February 27, 2011 –October 31, 2011)?
- 2: Were there differences in peace/war score between *The Guardian*, *Le Monde* and *Die Welt* in their reports on the Libyan civil war (February 27, 2011 –October 31, 2011)?
- 3: Was there a difference between the specific peace and war codes present in *The Guardian*, *Le Monde* and *Die Welt* in their reports on the Libyan civil war (February 27, 2011 –October 31, 2011)?
- 4: Were articles in *The Guardian*, *Le Monde* and *Die Welt* reporting on the Libyan civil war (February 27, 2011 –October 31, 2011) propagandistic?
- 5: Which themes and topics related to Libya were discussed before (February 1, 2010 – February 1, 2011) and after (November 1, 2011 – November 1, 2012) the conflict in Libya by *The Guardian*, *Le Monde* and *Die Welt*? Were the newspapers proactive?

### **1.3 Social and scientific relevance of the research**

How does this research contribute to scientific knowledge? And in what way can society benefit from this research?

The scientific relevance of the research lies in testing and possibly contributing to Galtung's theory of peace and war journalism by applying it to a new case. Peace and war journalism theory has been applied to examine many different media outlets and many different conflicts of all scales and sizes. Researchers have found evidence that countries are more likely to use war frames when they are involved in a conflict, than when they are not directly involved (Lee, 2009, p. 267). Lee however based this finding on cases of civil war and interstate war. This research puts Lee's hypothesis to the test for the case of a military intervention involving multiple states. This has – as far as I know – not been done before.

Also new in this research is the combination of an analysis of the metadata and an analysis of the framing of the content of the articles. Most researchers only report on their metadata briefly when they discuss their methodology. Of course the characteristics of the sample matter for the research methodology. This research however assumes the metadata are a valuable source of information themselves. It actually matters how many articles were published and when, so this information is part of the research. Also, the metadata were combined with the analysis of the content of the articles. This resulted in the interesting finding that there was a correlation between the framing of an article, and its location in the newspaper.

And finally, this research contributes to theory by discussing the practical problems experienced when applying the theory of peace and war journalism. Chapter 6 offers an overview of situations in which the coding system was problematic to apply, and offers suggestions for improvement of the theory.

The societal relevance of this research lies in contributing to the information and awareness about the influence media have on their consumers. This is valuable and relevant for every person who occasionally receives information from the news media. Teaching the audience of the media to be critical about what they read, hear and see, means people will not be so easily manipulated by the use of war frames in the media. Looking back at framing in the case of Libya might make people aware of how this process of framing works. Hopefully, people will be critical and careful when receiving news on ongoing conflicts.

Besides encouraging readers to be critical and careful in general, this research can also set some common misunderstandings about the conflict in Libya straight. Paragraph 5.2.4 discusses cases of false reports. Many media reported on events like mass rape by soldiers of the regime, and large-scale air attacks on protesters. Amnesty International (2009) however did not find proof that these events actually took place. Nonetheless, many people have read these reports, but probably never found out they were untrue.

### **Outline of the following chapters**

After this first introductory chapter, Chapter 2 will discuss the relevant literature and theories that serve as a theoretical framework for the research. Chapter 3 provides some background information on Libya, and a chronology of the Libyan civil war. The methodology and the process of data selection and analysis are explained in Chapter 4. The analysis of the metadata and the analysis of peace and war journalism are presented in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 offers some reflections on the theory of peace and war journalism, and reflections on the research. Conclusions are drawn in Chapter 7.



## 2. Literature and theoretical framework

In this chapter an overview is provided of relevant theories, debates and findings present in the literature. Paragraph 2.1 deals with the practical problems faced by journalists working in conflict zones that restrict the quality of their work, like time pressure, the absence of statistics or a lack of witnesses. Also, some deliberate choices that affect the quality of journalism will be discussed, for example the decision to report as an embedded journalist, and the preference to report on excesses and 'exciting' stories. Paragraph 2.2 discusses how the media influence public opinion, for example by selecting stories and by their language use. Paragraph 2.3 links the media to foreign policy by discussing the 'CNN effect' and the 'manufacturing consent' school. Finally, paragraph 2.4 focuses on Galtung's concepts of peace and war frames/journalism.

### 2.1 Journalism – what is wrong?

It is simply impossible for people to be everywhere, hear everything and experience everything themselves. We let the media do it for us, and thereby put trust in them. Especially when listening to media with the same bias as the consumer, the consumer is hardly aware of the political agendas and value judgments behind the news (D'Alessio, 2003). The media have also gained the trust of people because they are seen as the public watchdog, the instrument that checks the honesty and accountability of institutions. In reality however, journalists face a lot of problems and choices in their attempts to provide us with news and background stories. And even if a journalist manages to more or less overcome these problems, the concentrated ownership and profit orientation of the mass media result in colored and filtered representations of the world.

#### **The challenges of journalism**

Whilst journalists are our people 'on the spot', they cannot be everywhere. Sometimes journalists are assigned immense regions and multiple countries. Indonesia correspondent Vaessen (2008) for example explains she had to cover all news for entire Southeast Asia, and correspondent Van der Aa (2008) points out most media have assigned the whole of Africa to a single journalist. As a result, journalists have to report on events they have not witnessed themselves, taking place in countries they have sometimes never even visited. In order to be able to report, journalists draw on their own knowledge, and they use reports from the large press bureaus (Reuters, Agence France Presse, Associated Press etc.). The result is a news report which is in fact a representation of a representation, and a selection of a selection.

Time is another problem. A scientist has months, sometimes even years to work on his research. He can check and double check, compare with other literature and find out if his results are representative. Journalists sometimes have to prepare their analysis in a couple of hours, sometimes even minutes. Russia correspondent Van Zwol (2008, p. 44-45) explains: "Time pressure or not, the reader expects you to write with knowledge, insights and accuracy about matters you often heard about for the first time that morning yourself. That is sometimes accompanied with bluff, failures and clichés."

The media often prefer reporting on excesses rather than human interest stories. Middle-East correspondent Luyendijk (2006, p. 37) observes how he "only seemed to report on conferences, attacks, bombings and diplomatic maneuvers". He argues "news is what deviates from the ordinary,

the exception rather than the rule” (2006, p. 40). He tried to compensate this focus on the abnormality by writing about daily life in the Middle East, but these articles often ended up in the ‘background’ sections of the newspaper which are often skipped by readers.

Some countries or regions are simply very difficult to report on/from, for example dictatorships or conflict zones. Luyendijk (2006, p. 82-86) reminds us of the journalism principle that published information should be verifiable, but in a dictatorship ‘facts’ are often hard to find. Fear prevents people from talking, there is a lack of statistics to check the representativeness of the story, sources are often vulnerable and can be endangered by publishing their names or whereabouts, but also a lack of ‘newsworthiness’ make journalists unable to publish their articles.

A practical solution for journalists to be able to report from conflict zones nonetheless is embedded journalism. Journalists can travel with the army for instance, but this type of journalism has a number of important drawbacks. The army determines where journalists go and what they see, and they have the right to edit or block the produced articles. Iraq correspondent Nijhuis (2008, p. 59) explains: “embedded journalism only tells a part of the story. In articles by journalists who stay with the army, the emphasis is on the military situation and the experiences of the soldiers on whose protection they rely. Embedded journalists are unable to show how horrible the war really is, and what the consequences are for the inhabitants of a country.”

In addition to the army, there is another group that offers journalists access to difficult regions: donor organizations. Africa correspondent Van der Aa (2008) explains it is common practice for journalists to work together with a donor organization. The journalist can use the network and the knowledge of the aid worker, and the donor organization receives free publicity. Donor organizations have an agenda of their own, and journalists are often not very much aware of this. Van der Aa describes how he traveled to Niger to report on the ‘famine’ of 2005, but locals told him there had been no famine at all. Donor organizations had shown ill children to journalists, who had blindly written a story about famine. Van der Aa argues donor organizations have a motive to overemphasize misery in order to collect funds. He also explains journalists are unlikely to write critical articles on development aid, as they were helped, guided and sometimes funded by development agencies. Luyendijk (2006, p. 50) also questions the objectivity of so called ‘donor darlings’, local human rights activists who are paid by foreign embassies.

The final problem I will discuss is the situation where the media become a stake in a conflict, an instrument for warring parties, a so-called ‘media war’. Middle East correspondent Mus (2008) says articles are like ammunition for the case of Israel-Palestine, and explains both sides try to charm the media into writing ‘their’ story. Luyendijk too writes about his experiences in Israel, where the media functioned like a stage on which the conflict was taking place. Press conferences for journalists were hosted by the Israeli government with information, footage, phone numbers, maps and flyers, in an attempt to influence journalists. Luyendijk received phone calls from the Israeli government press office, offering him ready-made scripts for articles, complete with phone numbers and quotations. In media wars news is sometimes staged as well. Indonesia correspondent Vaessen (2008) describes her experience filming ‘Islamist extremists’ who were issuing all kinds of threats, but when the camera was turned off, they were laughing because of so much silliness. In Gaza, Luyendijk witnessed someone putting baby clothes under the rubble of a flat that had been bombed (2006, p. 112) and Palestinian boys who only started throwing rocks after the cameras arrived (2006, p. 178).

## The drawbacks of the mass media

In addition to these practical problems faced by journalists, there are also some characteristics of the mass media that contribute to colored and distorted news reports.

Morley and Robins (1995, p. 13) and Herman & Chomsky (in Goodwin, 1994, p. 105) point out that the 'media order' is actually in the hands of a small group of global players. The production costs have long driven out all smaller newspapers, and the high production costs remain a barrier to all who do not have huge sums of investment capital to invest in their new, rival newspaper. Herman & Chomsky (in Goodwin, 1994, p. 105) also point out that this concentrated ownership by this select group of wealthy families and corporate boards, who have enormous vested interests, results in the hiring of staff who support these interests, and the firing of staff who do not.

Another important characteristic of the mass media is that they are profit oriented, and they depend on advertising revenues to make a profit (Herman & Chomsky in Goodwin, 1994, p. 105-106). In fact, the lion's share of the income of most media comes from advertising, not from individual consumers. This means the media are actually selling to advertisers, and the product they sell is an audience. Creating and conserving an audience results in certain editorial choices (e.g. a certain style of writing or a certain religious or political color) (Herman & Chomsky in Goodwin, 1994, p. 105-106) and in the shortening and simplifying of stories to keep the attention of the often distracted readers (Page, Shapiro & Dempsey, 1987, p. 24). Also, advertisers can directly influence the content of the media by buying or refusing advertising space. For example, a large investor from the fashion industry could encourage a newspaper to introduce a fashion section where they would buy a large amount of advertising space, but the same company could refuse to advertise in a newspaper that published an article on the exploitation of workers in a sweatshop. Political lobbies or the arms industry could also influence the content of a newspaper by subsidizing advantageous articles and providing 'experts' who support their cause. A critical article can result in lawsuits, boycotts and the harassment of journalists and editors.

So what is wrong with journalism as we know it? There is a discrepancy between the 'truth' presented in the media, and the 'truth' readers expect to find there. But most readers are not aware of this discrepancy, and simply believe what they read.

## 2.2 How the media influence public opinion

In the previous paragraph I have discussed some of the difficulties faced by journalists, and have concluded that as a result, news is colored and distorted but few people are aware of this. All these colored and distorted views end up influencing public opinion. Walter Lippman, in his book *Public Opinion* (1922) argues we do not base our opinions on the actual environment but on the environment constructed by the news media. He starts his book with Plato's allegory of the cave, to explain that we respond to representations rather than the actual world.

First of all, the media select what the public will discuss. McCombs (2004, p.1) and Livingston (1997) argue editors steer our focus and perceptions through their selection of items. The media have an active role in 'agenda-setting'. And part of putting things on the agenda, is keeping other things off the agenda.

Even if an issue is placed on the agenda, the media can choose to leave out relevant aspects or consequences, define a situation in such a way that the attention is drawn away from the gist of the matter, or cause confusion by being unclear or overly complex. These are ways of 'downplaying'

an issue (Rank, 1984). Rank also identifies ways to intensify a certain message or image in the media: repetition, association and composition (which includes all kinds of stylistic devices and writing strategies).

Secondly, the media shape our opinions on the selected topics by using frames. Many studies have demonstrated that the frame of an article influences the thoughts the reader has on its topic, and the way the reader presents information on the topic (e.g. Valkenburg, Semetko & De Vreese, 1999) but frames also influence decision making and public opinion (Price, Tewksbury & Powers, 1997). It is a debated topic whether frames are chosen intentionally or subconsciously, but as Lee (2009, p. 270) points out, framing in the case of conflict needs some extra attention because patriotism, national interests, censorship, propaganda and religious differences are involved.

Language use is another factor that subtly influences the perceptions of the reader. Middle East correspondent Luyendijk (2006, p. 128-129) mentions some of the choices he had to make when writing about Israel and Palestine. Do the Jews live in 'villages', 'settlements' or 'illegal settlements'? Should he call it 'occupied', 'disputed' or 'liberated' areas? Should he call them 'Jews' or 'Israelis' or 'Zionists'? Should he call the others 'Arabs', 'Palestinians' or 'Muslims'? Luyendijk concludes 'neutral' words often do not even exist. Yet the words picked by journalists determine how the public sees the situation, and which words are used to understand and discuss it.

## 2.3 The media and foreign policy

Two contrasting hypotheses exist that try to explain the relationship between the media and foreign policy. One argues news media influence foreign policy, the so-called CNN factor or CNN effect. The other hypothesis states things work the other way around: foreign policy influences the media. This has been called the 'manufacturing consent' school. Figure 1 provides an overview of the links of influence they presume.

### The CNN effect

The Vietnam war was a turning point for journalism. Journalists started to show the awful nature of the war to their audience, and played a crucial role in turning public opinion against the war (O'Tuathail, 2000, p. 171-172). During the 1980's, the media were equipped with technology that enabled them to broadcast events like the protests on Tiananmen Square and the fall of the Berlin Wall. The public was informed about important events around the clock. Persistent reports from zones of conflict – especially reports of severe human rights violations – made people feel morally responsible and obliged to help. This has put pressure on the policy makers who have to weigh this moral responsibility with calculated national interests (Nye in ÓTuathail, 2000, p. 172). The speed of the news has reduced the time policy-makers have to deliberate over policy (Robinson, 1999; Livingston, 1997, p. 2).

Two interventions – of Iraq and Somalia – triggered the debate on the influence of the media on foreign policy - the CNN-effect (ÓTuathail, 2000, p. 172; Robinson, 2006). Had media pressure forced the US policy makers to act without thinking properly? American diplomat and historian George Kennan argued "media coverage of suffering people in Somalia had usurped traditional policy making channels triggering an ill thought out intervention" (Kennan in Robinson, 1999, p. 302). *Foreign Affairs* editor Hoge observed "today's pervasive media increases the pressure on politicians to respond promptly to news accounts that by their very immediacy are incomplete, without context and sometimes wrong" (Hoge in Robinson, 1999, p. 302). Others disagreed, and argued it was a good

thing that non-political actors were now involved in the policy making process.

Some studies have tried to prove there is no such thing as a CNN effect. Studies like Gowing, 1994; Natsios, 1996; and Neuman, 1996 indicate there is no direct linear relationship between the media and foreign policy. ÓTuathail (2000, p. 172) argues these authors fail to acknowledge that, even if they may not directly shape foreign policy, they are certainly part of a network that selects, frames and narrates the news, and thereby envelopes world politics. Other studies do find evidence that the media influenced foreign policy, for example in the case of the military intervention in Kosovo (Bahador, 2007) and US foreign policy (Page, Shapiro & Dempsey, 1987). And finally, there are people like Robinson (2006) who consider the CNN effect to be a phenomenon from a certain period of time. Robinson argues we saw some cases of the CNN effect in the 1990's, but 9/11 and the war on terror resulted in more strict control of information by governments and thereby undermined the CNN effect.

### The 'manufacturing consent' school

In addition to the CNN effect hypothesis (which states the media influence foreign policy), there is also a school of thought that argues it is the other way around. The 'manufacturing consent' school claims foreign policy uses the media to influence public opinion. The 'executive' version of the paradigm holds that media report about topics on the official agenda, the 'elite' version claims the media report according to the interests of political elites (Robinson, 1999, p. 304). Pilger (2010, p. ix) for example, looking back at the media coverage of the Iraq war, blames the mainstream media for having become "the managerial arm of the established order", and he says we can be assured when reading a newspaper that "the news and opinion come from the top, however circuitous, almost never from the bottom". The media coverage of the Gulf War has been mentioned as an example of government (in this case Pentagon) controlled reports (Galtung, 1998, p. 3).

For researchers, it is extremely hard to truly understand the link between the media and foreign policy. Policy makers are not eager to have researchers critically review their decision-making process and do not easily admit any influence on/by the media. Journalists and editors on the other hand do not want to admit they were influenced or steered by the government. As a result, both the 'manufacturing consent' paradigm and the CNN effect remain disputed.




Figure 1: A visualization of influence according to the manufacturing consent school and the CNN effect

## 2.4 Peace journalism

I have discussed the many problems faced by journalists, the use of frames and the problems of language use, and the ‘manufacturing consent’ school (that argues the media are instruments of the elite to gain support for war and intervention). All these may cause one to lose faith in the media. Johan Galtung, one of the ‘founding fathers’ of conflict studies, has proposed an alternative for the regular media: Peace journalism.

Galtung criticizes regular ‘war journalism’ for presenting parties as combatants in a sports arena, overemphasizing violence, being influenced by a military command perspective, focusing on the physical effects of conflict, focusing on the elite, emphasizing the differences between parties, failing to understand the subjective reality of the ‘other’, focusing on the present (ignoring causes and consequences), and presenting conflict as a zero-sum game (Galtung, 1998, p. 2; Lee, 2009, p. 258; Keeble, Tulloch & Zollmann, 2010, p. 2; Ottosen, 2010, p. 262). These characteristics have the implication that the audience is more likely to approve of an intervention, and believe violence is the only solution for a conflict. Figure 2 visualizes how certain characteristics of war journalism induce support for violent responses to conflict. Galtung even argues the regular (war) media are “major contributing factors to violence” (2000, p. 162).



Figure 2: A visualization of the way war journalism induces support for military intervention

Galtung’s alternative ‘peace journalism’ should correct the biases of war journalism and concentrate on peace initiatives, by giving a voice to people, putting less emphasis on ethnic and religious differences, focusing on structural causes of violence and the structure of society, avoiding dichotomies, and promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation (Lee, 2009, p. 258; Keeble, Tulloch & Zollmann, 2010, p. 2; Ottosen, 2010, p. 262). By doing this, peace journalism encourages society to think about, and value non-violent responses to conflict. Peace journalism is an advocative,

interpretative approach. Galtung (2000, p. 164) compares war journalism with sports journalism; the focus is on who wins. Peace journalism on the other hand should be more like health journalism. Whilst describing the patient fighting the disease, causes of the disease, cures for the disease and preventive measures should also be mentioned.

It has often been said that 'the first victim in a war is the truth', but Galtung argues the truth is the second victim, the first victim is peace (1998, p. 2). Journalism should contribute to solving conflicts, and promoting peace. Galtung assumes journalists have agency, the media are not an entirely fixed structure. Peace journalism offers practical plans and tips for journalists who report on conflict (Lynch & McGoldrick, p. 248). It also offers the tools to critically analyze existing war reports, see Galtung's overview of the orientations which constitute peace and war frames in Figure 3 on p. 15. These tools have been used by various researchers to examine the news coverage of different conflicts, on an international scale (e.g. Ottosen, 2010, on Afghanistan; Siraj, 2007 on India-Pakistan), regional conflict (e.g. Lee & Maslog, 2005, on four regional Asian conflicts; Goretti, 2007 on Uganda), and local incidents (e.g. Yang, 2009, on the Malaysian 'keris' wielding incident). Comparing studies of war/peace frames in the coverage of different conflicts, Lee (2009, p. 267) finds newspapers are more likely to use war frames for a local conflict in which their country is involved. The same newspaper may use peace frames in reports of distant conflict, in which their country is not involved.

Peace journalism has been criticized. Peace journalism is not objective, it is more like an activist approach and has a bias towards peace. Even if one shares the preference for peace, we have to conclude that peace journalism fails to 'observe from the sideline'. Peace journalism has also been criticized for explaining and contextualizing violence, which has by some been mistaken for condoning it. Hanitzsch (2004) does not question the possibility that the media could contribute to peaceful solutions for conflict, but does wonder if this is a task for journalists; he thinks this task lies with politicians and the military. Ottosen (2010, p. 262) points out peace journalism underestimates the visual aspects of war journalism. Loyn (in Ottosen, 2010, p. 266) disapproves of the fact that the frames of 'war' and 'peace' journalism are so dualistic. And, finally, even if one regards peace journalism with sympathy, we have to conclude that it has failed to become a popular mainstream approach.

PEACE/CONFLICT JOURNALISM	WAR/VIOLENCE JOURNALISM
<b>I Peace/conflict-orientated</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• explore conflict <i>formation</i>, x parties, y goals, z issues, general 'win, win' orientation</li> <li>• open space, open time; causes and outcomes anywhere, also in history/culture</li> <li>• making conflicts transparent</li> <li>• giving voice to all parties; empathy and understanding</li> <li>• see conflict/war as a problem, focus on conflict creativity</li> <li>• humanization of all sides; more so the worse the weapon</li> <li>• <i>proactive</i>; prevention before any violence/war occurs</li> <li>• focus on invisible effects of violence (trauma and glory, damage to structure/culture)</li> </ul>	<b>I War/violence-orientated</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• focus on conflict arena, 2 parties, 1 goal (win), war general zero-sum orientation</li> <li>• closed space, closed time, causes and exits in arena, who threw the first stone</li> <li>• making wars opaque/secret</li> <li>• 'us-them' journalism, propaganda, voice, for 'us'</li> <li>• see 'them' as the problem, focus on who prevails in war</li> <li>• dehumanization of 'them', more so the worse the weapon</li> <li>• <i>reactive</i>: waiting for violence before reporting</li> <li>• focus only on visible effects of violence (killed, wounded and material damage)</li> </ul>
<b>II Truth-orientated</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• expose untruths on all sides</li> <li>• uncover all cover-ups</li> </ul>	<b>II Propaganda-orientated</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• expose 'their' untruths</li> <li>• help 'our' cover-ups/lies</li> </ul>
<b>III People-orientated</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• focus on suffering all over; on women, the aged, children, giving voice to the voiceless</li> <li>• give name to all evil-doers</li> <li>• focus on people peacemakers</li> </ul>	<b>III Elite-orientated</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• focus on our suffering; on able-bodied elite males, being their mouthpiece</li> <li>• give name to their evil-doers</li> <li>• focus on elite peacemakers</li> </ul>
<b>IV Solution-orientated</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• peace = non-violence + creativity</li> <li>• highlight peace initiatives, also to prevent more war</li> <li>• focus on structure, culture, the peaceful society</li> <li>• aftermath: resolution, reconstruction, reconciliation</li> </ul>	<b>IV Victory-orientated</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• peace = victory + ceasefire</li> <li>• conceal peace initiatives, before victory is at hand</li> <li>• focus on treaty, institution, the controlled society</li> <li>• leaving for another war, return if the old war flares up again</li> </ul>

Figure 3: Orientations and indicators of peace and war journalism (Galtung in Ottosen, 2010, p. 275)



### 3. The Libyan civil war

As this research examines media reports on the Libyan civil war, some basic knowledge about the country and the civil war has to be provided. This chapter serves to provide a background of Libya before the civil war, and provides a chronology of the conflict.

#### 3.1 Libya before the civil war

The One September Revolution of 1969 brought Muammar Gaddafi to power as the face of the Revolutionary Command Council, which declared the Libyan Arab Republic and sentenced former king Idris to death. In 1977 Libya became the 'Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya' and Gaddafi became the permanent 'Leader of the revolution' (Levy, 2011). A map of Libya can be seen in Figure 4.

International relations under his rule were characterized by tensions with the West, and (financial) support for authoritarian leaders and rebels in Africa and the Middle East. Under Gaddafi, Libya had links with several terrorist organizations and was implicated in the Lockerbie bombing (Levy, 2011). From 2003 onwards, however, Libya worked on better relations with the EU and US, and was praised for giving up its production of weapons of mass destruction.

Due to its large oil reserves – the largest in Africa, and the fifth largest in the world – Libya was wealthier and more developed than many of its neighbors. Its GDP was one of the highest in Africa, and the percentage of people living below the poverty line was relatively low (7,4% in Libya, compared to 23% in Algeria and 20% in Egypt). Also, Libya had no public debt, whilst neighbors Egypt and Tunisia had staggering amounts of debt (respectively 72% and 42% of their total GDP) (Cachalia, 2011).

The Libyan government provided free healthcare, and this resulted in the highest life expectancy of all African countries (78 years), and one of the lowest rates of infant mortality (20 per 1,000 births). Libya also had a well-developed education system, with free primary and secondary education. The literacy rate of Libya (90%) was the highest of Northern Africa (Cachalia, 2011).



Figure 4: A map of Libya (Source: Hoare, 2011)

Libya obtained less favorable scores in the fields of human rights and civil liberties. The Libyan government arbitrarily arrested people, and kept political prisoners for years without official charges or a fair public trial. Prison conditions were poor and torture was not uncommon. The freedom of speech, press, assembly, religion and association were limited (U.S. Department of State, 2009).

### 3.2 A chronology of the Libyan civil war

In December 2010 the Arab Spring started with a revolution in Tunisia, which was condemned by Gaddafi. President Ben Ali of Tunisia was forced to leave in January 2011. The Tunisian 'success' inspired protests in Egypt, and on February 11, 2011, Egyptian president Mubarak resigned.

The first protests in Libya started on February 15 in Benghazi after a human rights activist had been arrested. Over the next days, demonstrations were organized in many Libyan cities, the government tried to stop many of these protests by using violence. The remainder of February is characterized by increasing protests which also met with increasing violent responses, resulting in the Benghazi massacre (February 20), and the battles of Misrata (February 18 – May 15) and Zawiya (February 24 – March 9). The violent crackdown of the protests was condemned by the international community, and several governments explicitly distanced themselves from the Gaddafi regime (e.g. Italy, Canada, the UK, the US, and Belgium).

On February 27, the National Transition Council was established as the 'political face of the uprising'. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton offered it 'any kind of support'. At first the council rejected the offer of foreign intervention, but later it looked more favorably upon foreign help. On February 28, the US Navy positioned ships near the coast of Libya. UK Prime Minister David Cameron proposed a no-fly zone, and this plan was supported by the West but also by the African Union and the Arab League. The International Criminal Court started an investigation into Gaddafi's war crimes on March 3. In Libya the fighting continued as rebels and government forces fought over the control of cities like Brega, Misrata and Zawiya.

Initially, the rebels advanced and managed to take Ra's Lanuf (March 4) and Bin Jawad (March 5) and they prepared to capture Gaddafi's hometown Sirte. Government forces stroke back however, and between March 6 and 16 they managed to take back Ra's Lanuf, Bin Jawad, Zawiya, and Zuwara. On March 16, the UN called for a cease-fire. The next day, the no-fly zone was approved. The UN Security Council authorized member states "to take all necessary measures [...] to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding an occupation force" ("Security council authorizes", 2011). The intervention began on March 19.

From day one of the intervention, coalition forces bombed targets in Libya and positioned their navy off the coast of Libya. China, Russia and the Arab League condemned the violence. The end of March was characterized by a new rebel offensive, rebel troops recaptured Ajdabiya, Brega and Ra's Lanuf. NATO agreed to take control of the military operations. At first the rebels advanced again (March 26-28), but then Gaddafi loyalists stroke back (March 29-31). Throughout April the rebels, loyalists and coalition forces kept fighting, and cities changed hands over and over again. In May NATO bombed Gaddafi's compound in Tripoli several times. Throughout June, the rebels pushed forward towards Tripoli. Meanwhile more and more nations were officially recognizing the NTC as Libya's government. The rebels also received arms and financial support. On June 27 the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Gaddafi.

On August 21 the rebels reached Tripoli. Gaddafi had left for Bani Walid by then. After playing cat and mouse till mid-October, the rebels captured Gaddafi on October 20. He was shot and died the same day. On October 23, the NTC officially declared Libya to be liberated. NATO ended its military operations in Libya on October 31.

Elections followed on July 7, 2012. The elected assembly was entrusted the task of writing a new constitution, and trying Gaddafi officials. The NTC was dissolved. Remaining problems were the security threats posed by militias who had established their own little kingdoms and were fighting each other, and the proliferation of weapons in the region.

As this research focuses on biases in writing, I need to post a critical note here as well about this paragraph. I tried to provide a concise overview, and tried to 'stick to the facts' as much as possible. Yet, I also made a selection of the facts, and choose to present them in a certain way. Readers should feel free to compare their own selection of the facts with the one above. This chapter however is necessary to understand the different phases of the conflict distinguished in paragraph 4.3.

## 4. Methodology and data

This chapter introduces the methodology of content analysis in paragraph 4.1. Paragraph 4.2 clarifies the selection of the newspapers, and paragraph 4.3 the selection of the articles. Paragraph 4.4 explains how the data were analysed.

### 4.1 Content analysis

Content analysis is a systematic technique that determines the presence of certain words or concepts in any kind of recorded human communication (Busch et al., 2012; Babbie, 2001). The researcher quantifies and analyses if the words/concepts are present, what they mean and how they are related. The analysis enables the researcher to say something about the message of the text, the author, the audience and influences on the text, for example the time and culture in which the text was written (Busch et al., 2012).

Content analysis became a popular method after the 1930's, not coincidentally together with the rapid development of the mass media (Titscher et al., 2000, p. 55-56). In those early days, content analysis was a simple behaviorist stimulus-response model. There was a sender, a stimulus and a recipient: who says what in which channel to whom and with what effect (Lasswell in Titscher et al., 2000, p. 57; Babbie, 2001, p. 305). In the 1950's controversy developed; some researchers argued that the quantitative orientation of content analysis neglected the actual meaning of texts. In addition to the classical branch of content analysis, a more qualitative strand emerged (Tischer et al., 2000, p. 62).

Although some researchers have embraced qualitative content analysis, others argue qualitative content analysis is in fact impossible. Neuendorf (2002, p. 14) for example argues content analysis is always about counting, and is therefore quantitative. I would argue that counting is indeed quantitative, but once these counts are interpreted, and examined to find meaning, content analysis has become a qualitative method. In my research I will start by counting as well, but then use Galtung's interpretative framework of peace and war frames to add a qualitative dimension.

Content analysis has six stages (Audience Dialogue, 2012):

1. Selecting content for the analysis (in this case newspaper articles, see paragraph 4.2 for the arguments on the selection),
2. Selecting the unit of analysis (in this case articles as a whole),
3. Preparing the content for coding (in this case that means downloading the articles from Lexis Nexis, and making them ready for analysis by collecting them in a document for analysis),
4. Coding the content (that means identifying characteristics of peace and war journalism),
5. Counting and weighing (this means counting all characteristics and calculating a 'score' on the scale of peace/war journalism: the number of war characteristics minus the number of peace characteristics divided by the total number of identified characteristics),
6. Drawing conclusions.

## Problems and challenges

Content analysis has a number of disadvantages. I will discuss how I attempted to deal with them. First of all, content analysis is a very time consuming method. For this reason, I limited my research to three newspapers, and I did not analyze all articles, but samples of articles that appeared in certain phases of the conflict (see paragraph 4.3).

Secondly, Busch et al. (2012) point out content analysis often ignores the context of the text, and possible impacts of the text. This research takes the context of the texts into account. A profile of the newspapers they come from, which discusses the political colour and origin of that newspaper (see paragraph 4.2) is included. The context of the texts will be comparable, as they are all from quality newspapers with a liberal/progressive point of view, and they are all covering the same news event. The time phase in which the articles were published, and the newspaper section they appeared in are also part of the analysis. I will not ignore the possible impacts of the texts, in fact this is the specific point I am interested in.

Thirdly, Busch et al. (2012) complain about the fact that some analyses do not go beyond simply counting words. This analysis starts with counting, but only as a part of Galtung's interpretative framework of peace and war frames. So counting is a functional and theoretically grounded way to enable interpretations, counting is not a goal in itself.

Fourthly, Busch et al. (2012) and Titscher et al. (2000, p. 65) point out the problems of inference, the difficulty of drawing conclusions. The researcher has to show he or she really based the conclusions on the data and not on anything else. Thorough determination of the concept categories, accurate measurements, and a representative sample are essential for the researcher to be able to draw conclusions. This research uses concepts derived from Galtung's framework of peace and war journalism, which has been tested before by many researchers and which has a strong theoretical foundation. The data from which conclusions are drawn is present either in the analysis chapter itself (Chapter 5) or in the appendix, so readers are able to judge for themselves if conclusions were drawn in a prudent way.




Fifthly, Titscher et al. (2000, p. 65) point out the problems of reliability, and the trustworthiness of coding. Inter-coder reliability means different coders agree on the coding of the same text. Intra-coder reliability refers to the stability of coding by a single coder. Both were checked during the research process, as discussed in paragraph 6.2 'Reflections on research'.

## 4.2 Selection of the newspapers

For my research I have selected three newspapers, two from countries that intervened in Libya: *The Guardian* (UK) and *Le Monde* (France), and one from a country that did not intervene: *Die Welt* (Germany). *The Guardian* and *Le Monde* were my first choices, as they are leading, quality newspapers with a high circulation. For Germany, I originally wanted to include the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* which has a higher circulation than *Die Welt* and is well-known for its high quality journalism. It was, however, not available via LexisNexis, the newspaper library, and could therefore not be included in the research. All three newspapers are liberal/progressive newspapers, which makes them reasonably comparable. *Die Welt* however has been called conservative by some, and conservative papers are less likely to be using peace frames (Galtung, 2000, p. 162). But as the results and analysis chapter shows, this difference did not result in a rejection of the research hypothesis. Table 1 features 'portraits' of the three newspapers.

Why newspapers? Why not news broadcasts, since television can be a much more powerful medium? News broadcasts are very limited, they can only address so many items within their allotted time. This automatically results in a lack of depth, because providing backgrounds and complicated analyses simply takes up too much time. Newspapers are less restricted in that respect, so they are more likely to contain more variation, backgrounds, analyses and nuance in their news reports.

**Table 1: A portrait of The Guardian, Le Monde and Die Welt**

<b>The Guardian</b>	<b>Le Monde</b>	<b>Die Welt</b>
		
Circulation: 189,000 papers per day	Circulation: 323,000 papers per day	Circulation: 209,000 papers per day
Political colour: liberal centre-left	Political colour: socialist	Political colour: calls itself 'liberal cosmopolitan' but has been called conservative
Founded in 1821, by merchants and traders. News is accessible online for free, which has drawn an international audience for <i>The Guardian</i> of 3 million readers every day.	Founded in 1944. Has a reputation for not just bringing news but analysis and opinions on the news. 26% of the paper is owned by the French government, which has raised concerns about independence.	Founded in 1946, when Germany was occupied by the British. The idea was to have a quality newspaper that looked like <i>The Times</i> .
All three newspapers are loss-making, despite attempts at reorganization etc. They are owned by media groups which compensate the losses with the profit made off other publications.		

### 4.3 Selection of articles

How were articles selected for the analysis? A completely random sample over the entire time span of the conflict would obscure patterns in the use of frames over time. A sample of x articles per month would provide more insights into the use of specific frames over time. But then some months were characterized by a very rapid development of events (e.g. in February and March things developed rather quickly and there were a lot of 'newsworthy' events) whilst in other months the



conflict was like a tug of war and things progressed very slowly (e.g. April and June). In these periods where there were few developments, there is no reason to expect a change in the use of frames. As a solution, this research distinguishes a total of six phases during the conflict. The early period of the conflict and the end of the conflict, which were relatively eventful are split up in short phases, and the middle period of the conflict is a longer phase.

- Phase 1: From the first protests until the formation of the NTC (February 15 – February 26). This period includes the first protests and the violent response of the government.
- Phase 2: From the founding of the NTC until the intervention (February 27 – March 18). During this period the protesters become a more or less organized group and other countries prepare to get involved in the conflict.
- Phase 3: The first phase of the intervention (March 19 – March 28). During this period of time the intervention starts off and the rebels progress swiftly.
- Phase 4: The slow ‘tug of war’ phase of the conflict (March 29 – August 20). During this phase the conflict has a ‘two steps forward, one step back’ character, territories are captured, lost, and captured again. Slowly the rebels advance.
- Phase 5: The ‘cat and mouse’ game between the rebels and Gaddafi (August 21 - October, 22). During this phase the rebel forces capture Tripoli and trace Gaddafi, and finally capture and kill him.
- Phase 6: From the official declaration of the liberation of Libya until the end of the NATO mission (October 23 – October 31).

One of the characteristics of peace journalism is that journalists start paying attention long before the start of a conflict, and keep writing long after it has ended. That is why a small sample of articles from the year before the conflict and the year after the conflict has also been analyzed. These samples were not representative, but did give some idea of the topics discussed, and the general attitude towards Libya in those periods. This resulted in adding a ‘phase 0’, from February 2010 – February 2011, and a ‘phase 7’ from November 2011 – November 2012.

For each of these phases a number of articles has randomly been selected from each newspaper. Entering the name of the newspaper, a period of time and the search term ‘Libya’ (in English/French/German) resulted in a list of articles in LexisNexis, from which every third article was selected for the analysis. Appendix A contains a list of all the articles that were a part of the sample.

How many articles have been analyzed? Neuendorf (2002, p. 88-89) remarks there is no universally accepted set of criteria for the size of a sample for content analysis. Instead, it has become common practice to look at the samples used by other researchers in the area (Beyer et al., in Neuendorf, 2002, p. 88). I looked at the samples used by researchers who used a more or less similar approach. An overview is provided in Table 2 on p. 23. As the table shows, sample sizes varied a lot, but on average authors used 103 articles per newspaper per year. As this research monitors three newspapers over a period of a year, my sample should be around 309 articles. I analysed 13 articles for each newspaper per phase, which adds up to analyzing 13 articles for three newspapers for eight phases, a total of 312 articles.

**Table 2: Sample sizes used in similar research**

Author	Total sample size	Number of newspapers	Time span	Average no. of articles per newspaper per year
Lee & Maslog (2005)	1,338	10	+/- 1 year	134
Yang (2009)	34	1	3 months	136
Siraj (2007)	135	2	2 years	34
Goretti (2007)	425	2	3 years	71
Shinar (2009)	277	2	1 year	139
			average	103

### 4.3 Analyzing data

The analysis consists of two parts. The main part is the analysis of peace and war codes as operationalised in Galtung's theory of peace and war journalism. But besides this qualitative component, there is a quantitative analysis of the metadata. This analysis looks at the quantity of articles, their average length and location in the newspaper. Strictly speaking, this quantitative analysis is not a necessary prerequisite to look for peace and war frames. Articles can be declared examples of peace or war journalism without knowing their location in the newspaper, or whether they were long or short. But comparing the metadata of the newspapers first of all tells us if the newspapers were comparable, and if it is fair to compare their articles. Also, knowing the quantitative characteristics of the articles is valuable background information if we want to look at peace and war framing. For example, a large peace framed article on the front page will contribute more to peace than a small peace framed article on page 26. If a newspaper published only a few articles, the articles which were published will have more of an impact. So, in order to be able to take this kind of factors into account, the first part of the analysis focuses on the quantitative characteristics of the metadata.

The second part of the analysis is of a more qualitative nature. The sample of articles was coded for peace and war characteristics. The codes were directly based on Galtung's list of coding categories for peace and war frames (Figure 3 on p. 15). He distinguishes four characteristic orientations: peace/conflict oriented vs. war/violence oriented, truth oriented vs. propaganda oriented, people oriented vs. elite oriented, and solution oriented vs. victory oriented. Each of these four orientations can manifest itself in different ways. For example, concealing peace initiatives and leaving immediately after the war ends are both examples of victory orientation. In total, Galtung distinguishes 34 different ways in which the orientations can appear (see Table 3). Each different way for an orientation to appear was given a separate code name, also present in Table 3. All these different appearances of framing were identified, named and counted in every article.

The frames of 'peace' and 'war journalism' have been criticized for being dualistic (Loyn in Ottosen, 2010, p. 266). As a solution, this research will not classify an article as being 'peace' or 'war' framed in general, but rather count peace and war frames present in the text, and place the article on a scale from peace to war journalism. For each article a simple calculation has been made: war characteristics minus peace characteristics, divided by the total number of characteristics identified. For example, five war characteristics minus two peace characteristics, divided by the total number of



characteristics identified: (5-2)/7, results in a score of 0.4 on a scale from -1 (peace journalism) to +1 (war journalism).

**Table 3: Operationalisation of Galtung's peace and war frames** (adapted from Galtung in Ottosen, 2010, p. 275)

Peace/conflict journalism		War/violence journalism	
1.	Peace/conflict-orientated	1.	War/violence orientated
<b>P1a</b>	Explore conflict formation, x parties, y goals, z issues, general 'win-win' orientation	<b>W1a</b>	Focus on conflict arena, 2 parties, 1 goal (win), war general zero-sum orientation
<b>P1b</b>	Open space, open time; causes and outcomes anywhere, also in history/culture	<b>W1b</b>	Closed space, closed time, causes and exits in the arena, who threw the first stone
<b>P1c</b>	Making conflicts transparent	<b>W1c</b>	Making wars opaque/secret
<b>P1d</b>	Giving voice to all parties; empathy and understanding	<b>W1d</b>	'Us-them' journalism, propaganda, voice, for 'us'
<b>P1e</b>	See conflict/war as a problem, focus on conflict creativity	<b>W1e</b>	See 'them' as the problem, focus on who prevails in war
<b>P1f</b>	Humanization of all sides; more so the worse the weapon	<b>W1f</b>	Dehumanization of 'them', more so the worse the weapon
<b>P1g</b>	Proactive; prevention before any violence/war occurs	<b>W1g</b>	Reactive: waiting for violence before reporting
<b>P1h</b>	Focus on invisible effects of violence (trauma and glory, damage to structure/culture)	<b>W1h</b>	Focus only on visible effects of violence (killed, wounded and material damage)
2.	Truth-orientated	2.	Propaganda-orientated
<b>P2a</b>	Expose untruths on all sides	<b>W2a</b>	Expose 'their' untruths
<b>P2b</b>	Uncover all cover-ups	<b>W2b</b>	Help 'our' cover-ups/lies
3.	People-orientated	3.	Elite-orientated
<b>P3a</b>	Focus on suffering all over; on women, the aged, children, giving voice to the voiceless	<b>W3a</b>	Focus on our suffering; on able-bodied elite males, being their mouthpiece
<b>P3b</b>	Give name to all evil-doers	<b>W3b</b>	Give name to their evil-doers
<b>P3c</b>	Focus on people peacemakers	<b>W3c</b>	Focus on elite peacemakers
4.	Solution-orientated	4.	Victory-orientated
<b>P4a</b>	Peace = non-violence + creativity	<b>W4a</b>	Peace = victory + ceasefire
<b>P4b</b>	Highlight peace initiatives, also to prevent more war	<b>W4b</b>	Conceal peace initiatives, before victory is at hand
<b>P4c</b>	Focus on structure, culture, the peaceful society	<b>W4c</b>	Focus on treaty, institution, the controlled society
<b>P4d</b>	Aftermath: resolution, reconstruction, reconciliation	<b>W4d</b>	Leaving for another war, return if the old war flares up again

## 5. Analysis

In this chapter the data are analysed in order to provide an answer to the main research question. This chapter consists of two parts. Paragraph 5.1 analyses the metadata, the characteristics of the articles which were part of the sample. Subparagraphs concern the total number of articles published on Libya (5.1.1), how many articles on Libya made the front page (5.1.2), the average article length (5.1.3) and the location of articles in the newspaper (5.1.4). After looking at these characteristics of the articles, paragraph 5.2 presents the findings of the analysis of peace and war journalism theory. The articles were coded for characteristics of peace and war journalism. Subparagraphs discuss the orientations towards war and peace (5.2.1), the peace/war score (5.2.2), specific peace and war codes (5.2.3), propaganda (5.2.4) and media coverage before and after the conflict (5.2.5).

### 5.1 Reports on Libya: quantitative insights

This paragraph offers a quantitative exploration of the news reports on Libya published by *Le Monde*, *The Guardian* and *Die Welt* between February 1, 2010, and November 1, 2012. The subparagraphs discuss the total number of articles published (paragraph 5.1.1), how often Libya made the front page (paragraph 5.1.2), the average article length (paragraph 5.1.3) and the placement of articles within the paper (paragraph 5.1.4).

#### 5.1.1 How many articles were published?

First we look at the number of articles in total, published by *The Guardian*, *Le Monde* and *Die Welt* on the topic of Libya between February 1, 2010 and February 1, 2012. For all three newspapers, a search query was entered in LexisNexis, selecting articles which contained the word Libya (in English, French or German) from a specific period of time. Table 4 provides an overview of the total number of articles published.

**Table 4: Total number of articles published per newspaper**

Time period	<i>The Guardian</i>	<i>Le Monde</i>	<i>Die Welt</i>
Feb. 2010 – Jan. 2011	172	137	125
February 2011	163	121	95
March 2011	472	360	302
April 2011	223	209	170
May 2011	139	106	97
June 2011	131	112	95
July 2011	83	81	54
August 2011	188	116	121
September 2011	169	125	102
October 2011	154	100	73
Nov. 2011 – Oct. 2012	577	658	435

(This table presents the total per month. The total per phase can be found in appendix B)


Looking at the tremendous increase of articles during the conflict – in March alone all three newspapers published double the amount of articles they had published on Libya the entire year

before the conflict – all three newspapers are guilty of war journalism. The conflict sparked their interest in Libya. If we look however at the number of articles published in the year after the conflict, the newspapers have three to four times the number of articles they had before the conflict. The fact that they kept reporting on Libya even though the intervention had ended, is a sign of peace journalism. The papers could have abandoned Libya and focused entirely on Syria for more war stories, but they decided to report on the difficult matter of Libya’s reconstruction.

This comparison of the total number of articles published by the three newspapers shows the same pattern for all three newspapers: little attention for Libya before the conflict, interest rose sharply during the conflict, and remained heightened in the year after the conflict. There is no remarkable difference in this pattern between the intervening and non-intervening countries’ newspapers (as visualized in Graph 1).

What is interesting, however, is that when we look at numbers, *Die Welt* published fewer articles on Libya before, during and after the conflict than *The Guardian* and *Le Monde*. Hundreds of articles appeared, so this was not a case of obscuring the conflict. But as Libya received less overall coverage in *Die Welt*, the situation in Libya may have seemed less pressing to the German public, which in turn probably decreased support for a dangerous, costly military intervention.

**Graph 1: Comparison of the total number of articles on Libya published during the conflict**



### 5.1.2 How often did news on Libya make the front page?

This paragraph looks at the total number of articles on Libya that made the front page of *The Guardian*, *Le Monde* and *Die Welt* between February 1, 2010 and November 1, 2012. In LexisNexis a search query was entered for the three papers, that selected every article which contained the word Libya (in English, French or German) and which was published on ‘Pg. 1’ or ‘S. 1’ in a specific time period. The results are presented in Table 5 and Graph 2 on the next page.

**Table 5: How often did Libya make the front page?**


Time period	<i>The Guardian</i>	<i>Le Monde</i>	<i>Die Welt</i>
Feb. 2010 – Jan. 2011	4	2	2
February 2011	17	11	20
March 2011	46	25	41
April 2011	12	17	22
May 2011	14	4	9
June 2011	7	7	2
July 2011	5	7	5
August 2011	20	7	27
September 2011	13	6	4
October 2011	14	7	9
Nov. 2011 – Oct. 2012	42	37	31

(This table represents the total per month. The total per phase can be found in Appendix C)

This sub-question finds the same pattern as the previous question. Hardly any reports on Libya the year before the conflict, a sharp increase in the number of articles during the conflict, and heightened interest in the year after the intervention.

*Le Monde* deviates from *The Guardian* and *Die Welt* if we look at the number of times Libya made the front page. Libya received less space on the front page of *Le Monde*, and especially during March and August there is a striking difference. This is remarkable, considering the events during these months: in March there was intense fighting and the intervention started. In August the rebels reached Tripoli, and although Gaddafi's location was unknown, the intervention seemed to be coming to an end. France had such a leading role in the intervention, one might expect Libya to make the front page during these important events.

**Graph 2: Comparison of the number of front page articles on Libya**



### 5.1.3 What was the average article length of articles on Libya?

This paragraph discusses the average article length of the articles published on Libya. Using the articles from the sample, an average word length was calculated for each newspaper. Table 6 provides an overview. Phase 0 and 7 (the years before and after the conflict) are not included, as the samples drawn for those phases were not representative.

**Table 6: Average word count of articles on Libya**

Newspaper	Average word count
<i>The Guardian</i>	976.28
<i>Le Monde</i>	748.42
<i>Die Welt</i>	820.55

Although average differences in length are more than a hundred words, we cannot simply draw the conclusion that one paper decided to dedicate more words to Libya. The length of articles may be influenced by the layout of the newspaper. For example, there may be a fixed number of words for an article on the front page. Also differences in language may play a role. Reporting the same fact may simply take more words in one language than in another. For example, the German 'Unabhängigkeitserklärung' is a single word, which in English becomes three: declaration of independence. Due to these uncertainties, it is best not to draw conclusions here.

### 5.1.4 Where in the paper were articles on Libya placed?

This paragraph concerns the placement of articles on Libya in the newspapers, during the conflict. Numbers are based on the sample. Phase 0 and 7 (the years before and after the conflict) are not included, as the samples drawn for those phases were not representative. What was the average page number on which news on Libya was published? Table 7 provides an overview.

**Table 7: Average page number on which articles were published**

Newspaper	Average page number	Standard deviation
<i>The Guardian</i>	11	11,6
<i>Le Monde</i>	8	6,33
<i>Die Welt</i>	7	6,59

A reader in a hurry is more likely to come across articles if they are placed in the first pages. But Table 7 shows the differences in average page number are small. And the page number does not necessarily prove the article was given a high priority location in the newspaper, or guarantee that many people read it. The layout of the newspaper and the total number of pages are of influence. Also, many unknown variables may be of influence here. An accompanying photograph may have drawn more readers. Or a flashy advertisement next to it may have drawn attention away from the article. The high standard deviations indicate that articles were not limited to a specific page number, they appeared throughout the newspaper. The average page number on which the articles appeared therefore doesn't support the drawing of conclusions.

Looking at the sections in which articles on Libya were published does provide some interesting insights. Table 8 provides an overview of the sections in which articles appeared.

**Table 8: In which section were articles on Libya published?**

<i>The Guardian</i>	<i>Le Monde</i>	<i>Die Welt</i>
Home Pages 50x (64,1%)	International 36x (46,15%)	Politik 41x (52,56%)
International Pages 14x (17,95%)	Débats 8x (10,26%)	Forum 14x (17,95%)
Comment and Debate Pages 9x (11,54%)	Editorial – Analyses 7x (8,97%)	Titel 10x (12,82%)
Features Pages 2x (2,56%)	24 Heures 7x (8,97%)	Wirtschaft 6x (7,6%)
Financial Pages 1x (1,28%)	Contre – Enquete 5x (6,41%)	Finanzen 5x (6,41%)
Leader Pages 1x (1,28%)	Une 5x (6,41%)	Kultur 1x (1,28%)
World News Pages 1x (1,28%)	Economie – Entreprises 3x (3,85%)	Panorama 1x (1,28%)
	Culture et Idées 3x (3,85%)	
	Europe 1x (1,28%)	
	Planete 1x (1,28%)	
	En Ligne 1x (1,28%)	
	Page Trois 1x (1,28%)	

*The Guardian* published more than half its articles on Libya in the Home Pages. 18% was published in the International Pages, and 11,5% appeared in the Comment and Debate Pages. *Die Welt* published more than half of its articles on Libya in the politics section. 18% appeared in the debate section 'Forum' and 10% of the articles were on the front page ('Titel'). *Le Monde* mainly placed their articles on Libya in the International Pages. 10% appeared in the debate section, and 9% of the articles were in the editorial section.

From all three newspapers, at least 10% of all articles came from the debate pages. This might explain the wide range of war/peace codes: readers and experts had the option to publish their view on the situation, even if it was radically different from the general stance of the newspaper. In *The Guardian* and *Le Monde*, some letters to the editor criticized the intervention whilst the newspapers themselves were rather positive ("Nightly we bomb", 3-8-2011). Sometimes experts wrote letters to provide backgrounds, which they felt had been missing in the news (e.g. SIPRI researchers Bates and Wezeman ("Halte au cynisme", 21-4-2011). Also, new angles or perspectives were provided in the debate pages, which had not been present before. In *Die Welt*, a letter from a military inspector provided a military perspective on the pros and cons of intervention, which had otherwise been absent ("Und wass wenn", 12-3-11).

But the most remarkable is how the majority of articles of the three newspapers appeared in a different section. It tells us something about how news is categorized. *The Guardian* considers a meeting by British Government officials about Libya to be an British matter, and puts it in the 'Home Pages', whereas *Le Monde* considers a meeting by French officials about Libya to concern international affairs, and puts it in the international news section ('International'). And *Die Welt* considers a meeting by German politicians about the conflict about Libya a political matter, and publishes about it in the politics section ('Politik'). In all three newspapers, the section in which most articles on Libya appeared is a section in the front of the paper, so readers were very likely to come across it.

A final note here is that of course every newspaper is composed of different sections, one newspaper may have a section which another newspaper does not have. *Le Monde* for example has the section 'Europe', *The Guardian* and *Die Welt* do not have a European section. Some sections only appear occasionally. But the variation present in the presence of different sections, of course also partially explains the different sections in which news on Libya appeared.

## 5.2 Qualitative exploration of the data: peace and war journalism

This paragraph explores the differences in peace and war orientations between papers in paragraph 5.2.1. After the orientations, the peace/war scores are compared in paragraph 5.2.2. How specific codes developed over time is examined in paragraph 5.2.3. Paragraph 5.2.4 looks at accusations and examples of propaganda. And finally paragraph 5.2.5 discusses newspaper coverage in the year before, and the year after the conflict: which themes and topics were discussed, and were newspapers proactive (did they try to prevent violence, and give early warnings or did they only respond when the violence was taking place)?

### 5.2.1 Differences in peace and war orientation

Galtung's theory of peace and war journalism distinguishes four main orientations in peace journalism, and four in war journalism (see Table 3 on p. 24). These orientations are like umbrella concepts which contain multiple specific codes. An article can, for example, contain code W1h: a number of killed/wounded is stated in the article. This code is part of the orientation W1: war/violence orientation. Specific codes are closer to the text, and will be discussed in paragraph 5.2.3. But looking at orientations, shows us if there was a general overarching approach or focus in the way a newspaper reported on the conflict. The overall focus could for example be on the elite or on victory.

But looking at orientations is a little complex, as each article contains multiple specific codes and these may be codes from different orientations. For example, an article might contain codes P1a, W1h, W3b, and W3c. These codes belong to three different orientations (P1, W1, and W3). One option is to classify this article as W3: elite oriented, because more specific codes from W3 were present than from other orientations. But this would be a rather 'loose' way of classifying; after all, W3 is only dominant by a single code. Also, many articles would not be able to be classified if they contained an equal number of codes from multiple orientations (for example: P1a, P1b, P3b, P3c). So a different approach has been adopted. As each article contains different codes, it also contains different orientations. We can compare how dominant these orientations were compared to each other. To calculate the 'prominence' of an orientation, all codes from this orientation were added up. This number was then divided by the number of articles. The result is an average of how often an orientation was present in the articles from that paper. The results are shown in Table 9.

**Table 9: Conflict orientations throughout the conflict**

	<i>The Guardian</i>	<i>Le Monde</i>	<i>Die Welt</i>
<b>P1: Peace/conflict-orientated</b>	1	1,24	1,69
<b>P2: Truth-orientated</b>	0,35	0,24	0,42
<b>P3: People-orientated</b>	0,35	0,21	0,21
<b>P4: Solution-orientated</b>	0,65	0,28	0,5

<b>W1: War/violence-orientated</b>	2,04	0,79	0,69
<b>W2: Propaganda-orientated</b>	0,13	0,08	0,04
<b>W3: Elite-orientated</b>	0,54	0,65	0,59
<b>W4: Victory-orientated</b>	0,92	0,99	0,72

Table 9 shows which orientations were the most dominant for each newspaper. In *The Guardian*, W1, the orientation on war/violence was the most prominent (2,04 on average). The gap between W1 and other orientations is rather large. The second and third most prominent orientations in *The Guardian* were peace/conflict-orientated (P1: 1) and victory-orientated (W4: 0,92).

For *Le Monde*, the differences between orientations are smaller. The most prominent is the orientation on peace/conflict (P1: 1,24). Second and third are victory-orientated (W4: 0,99) and elite-orientated (W3: 0,65).

In *Die Welt*, the orientation on peace/conflict (P1) was by far the most prominent (1,69). Second and third were victory-orientated (W4: 0,72) and war/violence-orientated (W1: 0,69). The fact that both the second and the third most dominant orientations were part of war journalism is contrary to the hypothesis of this research.

These results show all three newspapers had multiple orientations, from both peace and war journalism. What is interesting is the large gap between the most dominant orientation and the second most dominant orientation for *The Guardian* (W1) and *Die Welt* (P1). In *Le Monde*, orientations were present more or less to the same extent, but *The Guardian* and *Die Welt* did have one orientation that was definitely the most prominent.

### How did orientations change over time?

Were there patterns in the prevalence of orientations over time? Appendix D contains the graphs and tables that compare the development of the orientations over time. Here, the most remarkable findings are discussed.

In *The Guardian*, the orientation on war/violence (W1) is high throughout the conflict. It is also high in comparison to the other two newspapers. P1, the orientation on peace and conflict, appears rarely in *The Guardian*, compared to the other newspapers. An exception is phase 6, when *The Guardian* suddenly discusses roads to peace, and emphasizes Libya experienced a messy conflict rather than war between two clear parties. In phase 5, the orientation on people (P3) suddenly peaks, indicating increased attention for the situation of ordinary Libyans. The orientation on solutions (P4) has an inverted U-shape over time. Before and towards the end of the conflict, solutions receive a lot of attention, during the intervention they seemed less important.

In *Le Monde*, the orientations on victory (W4) and on the elite (W3) are not dominant during the first protests, but they become very prominent in *Le Monde* when military intervention comes into the picture. Also interesting is the fact that the orientation on solutions (P4) is extremely low during phase 6 compared to the other newspapers. Apparently *Le Monde* thought solutions to the conflict were less important, or that problems had already been solved. The most prominent peace orientation in *Le Monde* was P1 (peace/conflict-orientation), which was high throughout the conflict,



although still less prominent than it was in *Die Welt*.

*Die Welt* had a high orientation on peace/conflict compared to the other newspapers. Orientation P2 (truth-orientated) was highest in *Die Welt*, especially during the intervention. Similar to *The Guardian*, P4 (solution-oriented) has an inverted U-shape over time, solutions were most discussed during the first and last phases of the conflict. Also interesting is the prominence of Elite-orientation in *Die Welt* compared to the other newspapers. At the start of the intervention, *The Guardian* and *Le Monde* became more focused on the elite, but *Die Welt* became less so. Maybe this is because the German elite was not involved in the intervention.

Remarkable is the peak of war/violence-orientation in phase 1 in all three newspapers. During that phase readers were forming their first impression of the situation, and they were served articles which concentrated on violence rather than on roads to peace. The conflict was presented as a clearly demarcated war rather than a complex and messy conflict.

### 5.2.2 Differences in peace and war scores

After identifying specific war and peace codes in every article, a calculation was made: war characteristics minus peace characteristics, divided by the total number of characteristics identified. The outcome was a score on a scale of -1 (peace journalism) to 1 (war journalism). Comparing these overall scores for the articles makes it possible to look at the variation between articles, for example: was almost every *Le Monde* article war framed, or did *Le Monde* contain a mix of peace and war framed articles? Also, taking the average of all the article scores, the newspaper as a whole can be positioned on the peace-war scale. Table 10 shows the peace/war scores of the three newspapers.

**Table 10: Peace and war frames per newspaper over the entire conflict**

	<i>The Guardian</i>	<i>Le Monde</i>	<i>Die Welt</i>
Average peace/war score	0,14 M: 0,23 S.D: 0,6	0,12 M: 0,17 S.D: 0,65	-0,18 M: -0,2 S.D: 0,59
Total number of peace codes	183 (39.3%)	154 (44%)	220 (58%)
Total number of war codes	283 (60.7%)	196 (56%)	159 (42%)
Total number of articles with score > 0,1 (war frames)	45 (35.1%)	40 (31.2%)	22 (17.2%)
Total number of articles with score between -0,1 and 0,1	10 (7.8%)	8 (6.2%)	14 (10.9%)
Total number of articles with score < -0,1 (peace frames)	23 (17.9%)	30 (23.4%)	42 (32.8%)
Frequency of peace/war score 1: absolute war-article	8 (6.2%)	15 (11.7%)	6 (4.7%)
Frequency of peace/war score -1: absolute peace article	8 (6.2%)	10 (7.8%)	16 (12.5%)

Comparing the average peace/war score for the three newspapers shows that the average peace/war score of articles from *The Guardian* (0,14) and *Le Monde* (0,12) were above zero, which means the average article was war framed. The average for *Die Welt* (-0,18) is below zero, which means the average article from this paper was peace framed. These numbers however are just averages. An independent samples t-test was conducted to see if there was a significant difference

between the peace and war scores of the articles from the newspapers. The SPSS output can be found in appendix E. There was a significant difference in the peace/war scores between *The Guardian* (M=0.14, S.D.=0.6) and *Die Welt* (M=-0.18, S.D.=0.6);  $t(154)=3.38$ ,  $p=0.001$ . There was a significant difference in the peace/war scores between *Le Monde* (M=0.12, S.D.=0.65) and *Die Welt* (M=-0.18, S.D.=0.59);  $t(154)=2.97$ ,  $p=0.003$ . There was no significant difference in the peace/war scores between *The Guardian* (M=0.14, S.D.=0.6) and *Le Monde* (M=0.12, S.D.=0.65);  $t(154)=0.26$ ,  $p=0.8$ .

The total number of peace codes was higher for *Die Welt* (220) than for *Le Monde* (154) and *The Guardian* (183). But again, these are just averages. An independent samples t-test was conducted to find out if there was a statistically significant difference in the quantity of peace codes in the articles from different newspapers. SPSS output can be found in appendix F. There was no significant difference between the number of peace codes in *The Guardian* (M=2.35, S.D.=2.26) and *Die Welt* (M=2.82, S.D.=2.2);  $t(154)=-1.33$ ,  $p=0.19$ . There was a significant difference between the number of peace codes in *Le Monde* (M=1.97, S.D.=1.65) and *Die Welt* (M=2.82, S.D.=2.2);  $t(154)=-2.72$ ,  $p=0.007$ . There was no significant difference between the number of peace codes in *The Guardian* (M=2.35, S.D.=2.26) and *Le Monde* (M=1.97, S.D.=1.65);  $t(154)=1.17$ ,  $p=0.24$ .

The total number of war codes was higher for *The Guardian* (283) and *Le Monde* (196) than for *Die Welt* (159). An independent samples t-test was conducted to see if these differences are statistically significant. SPSS output can be found in appendix G. There was a significant difference between the number of war codes in *The Guardian* (M=3.63, S.D.=3.04) and *Die Welt* (M=2.04, S.D.=1.81);  $t(154)=3.97$ ,  $p=0.000$ . There was a significant difference between the number of war codes in *Le Monde* (M=3.63, S.D.=3.04) and *Die Welt* (M=2.51, S.D.=1.91);  $t(154)=2.74$ ,  $p=0.007$ . There was a significant difference between the number of war codes in *The Guardian* (M=3.63, S.D.=3.04) and *Le Monde* (M=2.51, S.D.=1.91);  $t(154)=2.74$ ,  $p=0.007$ .


Table 10 also shows the total number of articles with a peace/war score above 0,1 (war framed) and below -0,1 (peace framed). *The Guardian* published 45 war framed articles, *Le Monde* 40, and *Die Welt* 22. There were also articles with a score between -0,1 and 0,1, a category in which war and peace frames were more or less balanced. *The Guardian* published 10 articles in this category, *Le Monde* 8 and *Die Welt* 14. And as Table 10 shows, *The Guardian* published 23 articles with a score below -0,1, which means these were peace framed. *Le Monde* published 30, and *Die Welt* 42.

Table 10 also shows how many articles had extreme peace/war scores of -1 or 1. These scores indicate that these articles contained either solely war codes, or solely peace codes. *Le Monde* published most articles with an absolute war frame: 15, compared to 8 in *The Guardian* and 6 in *Die Welt*. *Die Welt* published most articles with an absolute peace frame: 16, compared to 8 in *The Guardian* and 10 in *Le Monde*.

### **How did the peace/war scores develop over time?**

How did the framing of articles develop over time? Graph 3 compares the average frame of the peace-war variable of the three newspapers through the six phases of the conflict. Tables containing the exact scores, medians, standard deviations, ranges and frequencies can be found in appendix H.

**Graph 3: Average peace/war score over time**



Looking at Graph 3, we see that the red line representing *The Guardian* stays above 0, except in phase 6. So until the last phase of the conflict, the average article in *The Guardian* was war framed. During phase 1 and 2 (before and preparing the intervention) war frames are dominant, so the conflict was presented in a simplified violence inducing manner from the start. But although war frames were dominant in phase 2, note the difference here between *The Guardian* and *Le Monde*. This difference can be explained by Britain's initial hesitance to take part in the intervention. When it decided to take part however, and the intervention started off in phase 3, war frames skyrocketed in *The Guardian*. During phase 4, when the initial success and progress of the rebels stagnated, more critical articles were published and the use of war frames dropped. But during phase 5 the rebels approached Tripoli, the conflict seemed to approach its end, and *The Guardian* increasingly used war frames again. In phase 6 *The Guardian* comes closest to peace journalism. Articles critically reflect on the intervention and the human suffering it has caused, and discuss the options for Libya's future.

As the blue line in the graph shows, *Le Monde* used different frames in different phases of the conflict. In phase 1 (initial protests, violent government response) *Le Monde* generally used peace frames. A possible explanation is that due to France's colonial history and ongoing interest in African affairs, *Le Monde* simply had more background information to offer in-depth coverage. More journalists may have been present in Northern Africa. The French were possibly more concerned about how the unrest might spread in a region in which they are more involved than the English and the Germans. But then in phase 2 (preparation of the intervention) and phase 3 (start of the intervention) the articles in *Le Monde* are suddenly filled with war frames. This corresponds to the hypothesis of this research. The use of war frames in these particular phases created as simplified, black and white image of the situation in Libya which possibly contributed to public support for the intervention. But as the intervention failed to progress swiftly, *Le Monde* could not keep up the simplified coverage, and the use of war frames decreases during phase 4. In phase 5, *Le Monde* uses more peace frames. And finally in phase 6 (end of the mission, independence for Libya) the war

frames are dominant again as *Le Monde* focuses on institutions and emphasizes material damage.

*Die Welt* has mostly peace framed articles throughout the conflict. Using peace frames, especially during the first two phases corresponds with the hypothesis of this research: by creating a complex and nuanced picture of the situation in Libya, the public became familiar with the drawbacks of an intervention. Their framing is least peaceful during phase 3, which is the phase when the intervention has just started and seems to progress swiftly. The intervention seems to be successful (at least a massacre in Benghazi had been prevented) and the German paper filled with criticism: why did Germany not participate in this intervention? However, during phase 4 and 5 the intervention looks less successful, as there is a phase with little progress being made, and the rebels prove to be lawless people who brutally kill their former dictator and put his body on display. During these phases, peace frames are dominant again, as *Die Welt* shows the rights and wrongs of all those involved in the conflict. In phase 6 the use of peace frames slightly decreases again.

### More war frames on the front page?

Was there a relationship between an article's framing, and its place in the newspaper? At the back of the newspaper, there is more space for in-depth analysis than on the front page. A statistically significant correlation was found between page number and peace/war frame in *The Guardian* and *Die Welt*. SPSS output can be found in appendix I.

In articles from *The Guardian*, there was a significant negative relationship between page number and peace/war score,  $r(78) = -.328$ ,  $p=0.01$ . This means peace framed articles on Libya were more likely to be found at the back of the newspaper than at the front.

In articles from *Le Monde* there was no statistically significant correlation between page number and peace/war score,  $r(78) = -.130$ ,  $p=0.258$ . This means there was no relationship between the framing of the article, and its page number.

In articles from *Die Welt* there was a statistically significant relationship between page number and peace/war score in *Die Welt*,  $r(78) = -.286$ ,  $p=0.05$ . This means peace framed articles were more likely to be at the back of the newspaper than at the front.

### 5.2.3 Specific codes

After looking at peace/war scores in the previous paragraph, we will now look at the specific codes on which these scores were based. Table 11 below provides an overview for all three newspapers. It shows the total number of times a code was identified, and also how often the code appeared per phase.

**Table 11: Specific codes, totals and distribution per phase**

	<i>The Guardian</i>	<i>Le Monde</i>	<i>Die Welt</i>
P1a	16	33	29
	1:1, 2:2, 3:4, 4:6, 5:1, 6:2	1:8, 2:2, 3:7, 4:7, 5:8, 6:1	1:5, 2:5, 3:7, 4:7, 5:4, 6:1
P1b	23	24	53
	1:5, 2:5, 3:5, 4:1, 5:4, 6:3	1:12, 2:4, 3:1, 4:4, 5:3, 6:1	1:16, 2:10, 3:12, 4:6, 5:9
P1c	12	21	20
	1:5, 2:1, 3:2, 4:2, 5:1, 6:1	1:5, 2:10, 4:1, 5:4, 6:1	1:3, 2:7, 3:3, 4:4, 5:3
P1d	10	1	5
	2:1, 6:9	5:1	6:5
P1e	1	2	6

P1f	2:1	4:1, 6:1	3:2, 5:3, 6:1
	10	2	8
P1g	3:1, 4:4, 5:1, 6:4	5:1, 6:1	1:4, 3:1, 4:1, 6:2
	4	9	6
P1h	6:4	1:1, 2:1, 3:1, 4:4, 5:1, 6:1	6:6
	2	5	3
P2a	4:1, 6:1	4:2, 5:2, 6:1	4:1, 5:1, 6:1
	11	8	12
P2b	4:3, 5:1, 6:7	3:1, 4:1, 5:4, 6:2	2:3, 3:1, 5:5, 6:3
	14	11	23
P3a	1:2, 2:2, 3:2, 4:2, 5:3, 6:3	1:2, 2:1, 3:2, 4:1, 5:2, 6:3	1:3, 2:4, 4:9, 5:6, 6:1
	13	13	8
P3b	1:2, 2:3, 3:3, 4:2, 5:1, 6:2	1:4, 2:1, 3:3, 5:3, 6:2	1:2, 2:1, 3:2, 4:2, 5:1
	7	1	6
P3c	1:2, 4:1, 5:3, 6:1	5:1	1:2, 4:1, 6:3
	7	2	2
P4a	2:1, 5:3, 6:3	6:2	3:1, 6:1
	1	3	1
P4b	1:1	1:1, 3:1, 6:1	6:1
	24	4	18
P4c	1:15, 2:7, 3:1, 4:1	1:2, 2:1, 3:1	1:10, 2:3, 3:2, 4:2, 5:1
	9	4	4
P4d	1:1, 3:1, 4:2, 5:3, 6:2	1:2, 2:1, 6:1	2:3, 6:1
	17	12	18
W1a	1:1, 4:2, 5:7, 6:7	4:5, 5:4, 6:3	3:1, 4:3, 5:5, 6:9
	25	4	3
W1b	1:10, 3:3, 4:5, 5:4, 6:3	2:2, 4:1, 5:1	3:1, 4:1, 5:1
	32	11	9
W1c	1:9, 2:14, 3:4, 4:4, 5:1	1:5, 2:3, 4:3	1:4, 2:1, 4:3, 6:1
	10	3	6
W1d	1:1, 3:2, 4:5, 5:2	2:3	1:2, 2:1, 4:2, 5:1
	7	3	0
W1e	1:1, 2:1, 4:1, 5:1, 6:3	4:2, 6:1	N.A.
	14	9	5
W1f	1:6, 3:2, 4:2, 5:3, 6:1	2:2, 4:1, 5:2, 6:4	3:1, 5:2, 6:2
	29	12	20
W1g	1:7, 2:2, 3:3, 5:7, 6:10	1:5, 2:2, 3:2, 4:2, 6:1	1:7, 2:4, 4:2, 5:4, 6:3
	2	0	0
W1h	2:2	N.A.	N.A.
	40	20	13
W2a	1:13, 2:3, 3:6, 4:2, 5:6, 6:10	1:9, 2:2, 3:1, 4:1, 5:2, 6:5	1:6, 2:1, 4:3, 6:3
	10	6	1
W2b	1:2, 3:3, 4:1, 5:2, 6:2	2:1, 3:1, 4:4	6:1
	See paragraph 5.2.4	See paragraph 5.2.4	See paragraph 5.2.4
W3a	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
	1	3	1
W3b	6:1	2:2, 5:1	4:1
	3	5	3
W3c	1:3	2:4, 4:1	1:2, 4:1
	38	47	42
W4a	1:4, 2:12, 3:8, 4:6, 5:6, 6:2	1:3, 2:7, 3:16, 4:6, 5:8, 6:7	1:6, 2:4, 3:11, 4:7, 5:8, 6:7
	20	14	15
W4b	1:5, 2:2, 3:4, 4:2, 5:5, 6:2	2:5, 3:2, 4:4, 5:2, 6:1	1:1, 2:8, 3:2, 4:4
	23	16	14

W4c	1:7, 2:9, 3:6, 4:1	2:5, 3:6, 4:4, 5:1	1:3, 2:7, 3:3, 4:1
	25	42	27
W4d	1:4, 2:1, 3:7, 4:5, 5:5, 6:3	1:1, 2:9, 3:11, 4:8, 5:7, 6:6	1:1, 2:3, 3:9, 4:6, 5:4, 6:4
	1	1	0
	5:1	6:1	N.A.

(The number before the colon is the phase, the number after the colon the frequency. If a code was absent during a phase, it has been left out in the table).

Table 11 allows us to compare the presence of codes in the three newspapers. Which differences in the presence of specific codes are there between the newspapers?

*The Guardian* scored highest for code P1d, which indicates their articles gave a voice to a group that is normally ignored. However, these codes were concentrated in phase 6, so these groups were only given understanding when the intervention was over. *The Guardian* often described the conflict as a clearly demarcated arena, with two separate parties of which one had to be the winner (code W1a). This code appeared especially often in phase 1, before the intervention. Presenting such a simplified view may have contributed to public support for the intervention. *The Guardian* also made clear which of the two parties should win, code W1e (see ‘them’ as the problem) often pointed out the ‘bad guys’ of the conflict. *The Guardian* also created a feeling of time-pressure (code W1b), which may have created the impression that a quick intervention was necessary. This code was notably present during phase 1 and 2, so during the start of the intervention a feeling of urgency was created. When solutions for the conflict were discussed, *The Guardian* often did not discuss non-violent solutions (code W4b). *The Guardian* also emphasized material damage and the death toll the most often (code W1h).

*Le Monde* mentioned least peaceful solutions for the conflict in Libya (code P4b). *The Guardian* and *Die Welt* mentioned plenty of other possibilities than military intervention, but these were hardly mentioned in *Le Monde*. *Le Monde* often refers to treaties and institutions (W4c). NATO, the UN and UNSC resolution 1973 are referred to very often. This distracts the attention from France’s rather active and leading role in the intervention. Emphasizing treaties emphasizes correctness and fairness. *Le Monde* scored few P1f codes (humanization of all sides), and when it appeared, it was only in phase 5 and 6. So the human face of all parties in the conflict only appeared when the intervention was (almost) over. *Le Monde* also hardly ever wrote about evil-doers on the French side (P3b).

*Die Welt* looked at the causes and outcomes of the conflict with a broader perspective than *The Guardian* and *Le Monde* (code P1b). Also, this code appeared often in the early stages of the conflict, so this broad, peaceful perspective was there from the start. *Die Welt* was also more active in correcting false reports (code P2b). Code P1e, which sees war/conflict as a problem (rather than ‘them’), appeared more often in *Die Welt* than in the other papers.

Both *The Guardian* and *Le Monde* were much more active at exposing the lies of Gaddafi’s regime than *Die Welt* (code W2a).

All three papers were extremely focused on elite peacemakers (code W3c). Rather than reports about what was going on in Libya on the ground, reports appeared about statements made by politicians and world leaders. Of course, these people are important players, but it does create a rather distanced, clean image of the conflict.

## 5.2.4 Propaganda

This paragraph is concerned with a single specific code: W2b 'help our cover-ups/lies'. Other codes identify elements that are present in the text, but this code identifies things which were covered-up, so which were *not* present in the text. Several journalists and researchers spoke out after the conflict. They named events and situations which had been lied about, or which had been covered up by the media. These accusations of propaganda will be examined first. Second, some cases will be discussed in which the different newspapers provided remarkably different reports on the same topic.

### Accusations of propaganda

Bajec (2012) provides an overview of accusations of propaganda towards the mainstream media. The accusations are voiced by journalists Lizzy Phelan and Thierry Meyssan, and sociologist Mahdi Nazemroaya. They back up their arguments referring to a report by Amnesty International (2011). Using the sample of articles from *The Guardian*, *Le Monde* and *Die Welt*, the accusations will be put to the test.

*Accusation 1: The Gaddafi regime used military jets to fire on civilian protesters.* Many news media published reports that there had been aerial attacks on protesters. This event was used as the justification for the establishment of the no-fly zone over Libya. Amnesty International's fact finding mission (2011) however concluded that protesters had indeed been shot, but by soldiers on the ground, no planes had been involved.

*The Guardian* repeatedly published about the non-existent airstrikes ("Obama warns of", 24-2-2011; "Britain tells Gaddafi", 25-2-2011; "Inside Libya's first", 24-2-2011). *Le Monde* on the other hand does not make this mistake. One article ("A Toubrouk, l'espoir", 24-2-2011) addresses the possibility of protesters being bombed using planes, but *Le Monde* does not claim this actually happened. *Die Welt* does report on the alleged airstrikes several times ("Der Fantast als", 23-2-2011; "UN-Chef: Herr Gaddafi" 24-2-2011).

*Accusation 2: False reports were released about mass rape of women by soldiers of Gaddafi.* *The Guardian* did not publish an article on this event as such, but it is referred to later on in one of its articles ("NTC agrees to", 25-10-2011). *Le Monde* ("Avec l'OTAN ou", 5-7-2011) and *Die Welt* ("Angst vor Söldern", 7-3-2011) take great care to contradict the stories about mass rape.

*Accusation 3: The number of people killed during the first protests in Benghazi was grossly exaggerated.* Amnesty's investigation (2011) estimates around 110 people died in Benghazi during the first protests, but many media reported much higher numbers. What did *The Guardian*, *Le Monde* and *Die Welt* report?

On 21 February 2011, *The Guardian* ("Libya on brink") reports 230-500 people were killed. Three days later, this number is lowered to 230 ("Inside Libya's first"). 230 however is more than double the number of people killed according to Amnesty's fact-finding mission.

*Le Monde* reports between 233 and 1,000 people died in Benghazi ("Des centaines de") on February 22, 2011. Two days later, this number is adjusted to 300 ("A Toubrouk l'espoir", 24-2-2011).

*Die Welt* does not mention any number of deaths for Benghazi. It does mention numbers for Libya as a whole, and for Tripoli.

*Accusation 4: Newspapers conceal the fact that the rebels had racist attitudes and frequently tortured and killed migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa.* This accusation is unfair looking at *The Guardian*, *Le Monde* and *Die Welt*. *The Guardian* published several articles about the violence encountered by black migrants, and how they were often mistakenly taken for mercenaries (“Berber rebellion: Western”, 1-3-2011; “Has Africa lost”, 19-9-2011; “If this was”, 27-10-2011). Also in *Le Monde* several articles appeared which discussed discrimination and xenophobia. *Le Monde* also published on the history, rights and social position of Libya’s black population (“La legion Africaine”, 26-2-2011; “Migrants d’Afrique”, 25-2-2011). *Die Welt* reported on the mistreatment of African migrants as well (“Angst vor Söldern”, 7-3-2011).

*Accusation 5: Rebel groups were presented as representatives of the Libyan people, their ties to Al-Qaeda were covered up.* This accusation appears to be correct for *The Guardian* and *Le Monde*, but is unjust towards *Die Welt*. Both *The Guardian* (“Those who dare”, 7-3-2011; “The Gaddafi connection”, 9-3-2011; “Tripoli threatens retaliation”, 18-3-2011) and *Le Monde* (“Le colonel Kadhafi”, 4-3-2011) present the links to Al-Qaeda to be one of the fantasies of conspiracy thinker Gaddafi. *Die Welt* starts with similar reports (“Gaddafis Truppen haben”, 16-3-2011), but soon notices that it is actually a realistic option for Al-Qaeda to gain power in the ongoing chaos (“Arabiens Drama: Nicht”, 23-3-2011; “Al-Qaida-Terroristen wittern ihre”, 4-4-2011). In April *Die Welt* publishes an article which claims the rebels are linked to Al-Qaeda (“Obamas Dilemma: Geheimdienst”, 1-4-2011).

*Accusation 6: Media were covering up the hidden motives behind the intervention.* This accusation is false, all three papers reported on favourable trade deals and economic ties and interests. *The Guardian* reports on UK interests in Libya early on in the conflict (“Libya: UK interests”, 23-2-2011) and the role of petrochemicals company BP (“Death of Gaddafi”, 22-10-2011). *Le Monde* also publishes about French interests in Libya (“L’Italie craint de”, 30-6-2011). And *Die Welt* constantly discusses the relationship between oil prices and the ongoing conflict, and how this affects German car owners and German industry (“Abschied mit glänzenden”, 25-2-2011).

*Accusation 7: When NATO started the airstrikes in Libya, the media reported on quotes and meetings of Western leaders instead of reporting on the bombings.* *The Guardian*, *Le Monde* and *Die Welt* did not conceal the bombings, in fact they were mentioned quite frequently (“On the ground”, 21-3-2011; “The battleground: Tripoli”, 22-3-2011; “A les révoltes”, 24-3-2011; “En Libye on”, 25-3-2011, “Kampf gegen Gaddafi”, 24-3-2011; “Nightly we bomb”, 3-8-2011). But this accusation does make sense if it claims the media were to a very large extent focused on what was being said about Libya in conference rooms in the West, instead of what was actually happening on the ground in Libya. As Table 12 below shows, all three newspapers directed a rather substantial part of their attention towards events in the West. In *The Guardian* and *Die Welt*, more than half of its articles during the bombings were not about events in Libya at all.

**Table 12: Focus of articles during NATO bombings**

Newspaper	Focused on the West	Focused on Libya	Combination of both
<i>The Guardian</i>	22 (56.4%)	8 (20.5%)	9 (23.1%)
<i>Le Monde</i>	16 (41%)	6 (15.4%)	17 (43.6%)
<i>Die Welt</i>	21 (53.8%)	9 (23.1%)	9 (23.1%)



Not all allegations of propaganda/lies were true, but all three newspapers have made mistakes at the expense of the facts. As discussed in the introduction of this research, it is hard for journalists to check the facts in a chaotic war environment. It may be impossible for journalists to judge if the things they hear are true, or to count all the bodies personally. On the other hand, journalists are to blame when they present things as 'facts' when they did not confirm them personally. Especially if false reports are not corrected. But if a newspaper published incorrect information, how can we tell if this was active propaganda, or if the journalists and the editors were simply misinformed?

Nonetheless, some flagrant lies were published by the press. And what is remarkable is that the most blatant lies were published in the phase before the intervention, during the first protests. There is no proof that any airstrikes on protesters took place, yet the media reported about them, contributing to the support for the no-fly zone, which later evolved into the military intervention.

### **Presenting different truths**

In some cases, facts and events were presented rather differently by the three newspapers that are part of this research.

*Different truth 1: Libya's situation before the conflict.* The *Guardian* and *Le Monde* offer rather different backgrounds on Libya's economic development before the conflict. The *Guardian* on February 22, 2011 ("We can no"): "despite having the largest oil reserves in Africa, continues to allow two-thirds of its citizens to live below the poverty line". *Le Monde* on the other hand writes Libya is one of the richest countries in Africa, and explains Libya has free education and healthcare: "Très pauvre dans les années 1950, la Libye est le pays le plus riche de l'Afrique. Le pétrole a permis de développer l'éducation, le logement et la santé quasi gratuite pour tous. Du coup, la population libyenne est éduquée. Le statut des femmes est enviable avec une égalité de jure et de fait et l'interdiction de la polygamie. L'accès à Internet est limité mais l'ouverture au Monde, et notamment aux voisins immédiats, est assurée par l'importante migration du travail" ("Libye Bahraïn pourquoi", 22-2-2011). The first description makes the Libyan government look unjust and incapable, the second description outlines the opposite.

*Different truth 2: The role of oil in the conflict.* *Le Monde* published an article "Cette intervention n'a rien à voir avec le pétrole" which claims the West has no interest in obtaining control over oil resources, the intervention is purely political. As far as oil plays a role in the conflict, this is also a political role. *Die Welt* on the other hand approaches oil in an extremely practical way, and publishes about the effects the Libyan conflict will have for German car-owners at the petrol station. Rising oil prices are discussed very often in *Die Welt*, and often the events in Libya and the effects on oil prices for Germany are present in a single article. The link between the conflict and oil is apparently so obvious, *Die Welt* doesn't feel the need to explicitly state the connection, leave alone deny there is a connection.

*Different truth 3: Which countries should be considered in relation to Libya?* Different players are considered by different newspapers. The *Guardian* and *Die Welt* mostly consider Libya, the US, European countries and international organisations to be the main players. But *Le Monde* also discusses the ties Libya has with several African countries.

*Different truth 4: Accounts of a speech held by Saif Al-Islam.* Both *The Guardian* and *Die Welt* reported on a speech held by Muammar Gaddafi's son, Saif Al-Islam. Appendix J contains the relevant passages from the articles, which were too lengthy to include here. Both newspapers convey the general outline of the speech, which contains some threats but also promises dialogue and reform. There are some subtle differences however in how the two newspapers presented this speech. *The Guardian* uses inverted commas to emphasize certain words in the speech: 'tragedy', 'civil war' and 'clear'. These inverted commas are not part of a transcription of the speech, they are commenting on it. 'Tragedy' gets inverted commas because *The Guardian* considers it to be planned rather than a tragedy. 'Civil war' gets commas as *The Guardian* wants to emphasize it is not civilians fighting, but the government against civilians. And 'clear' suggests the plans are in fact not clear, Saif's offer is vague. Citing a speech like this will influence the impression of readers.

Another difference is the description of Saif while delivering the speech. *The Guardian* describes him as "rambling" and "wagging a finger at the camera", while *Die Welt* describes him as "ratlos". The journalists chose to describe the body language in a different way, which resulted in a different picture of Saif Al-Islam.

A third difference is the emphasis *The Guardian* places on Saif as a conspiracy thinker. *The Guardian* publishes his words "plot against Libya" and "occupation by imperialists". *Die Welt* however does not publish these lines from the speech.

*Different truths within a single newspaper: The NTC are capable and reliable... or not?* *The Guardian* initially defends the rebels, and emphasizes that the National Transition Council is capable of maintaining order. On October 3, *The Guardian* writes:

*"Mitchell was struck by the way the NTC was running Benghazi when he visited the rebel stronghold on 4 June with William Hague. "The NTC are much better than anyone thought they would be. The thing I noticed was how quickly, when they had driven out the Gaddafi forces . . . they stabilised Misrata, which was in a bad way. I saw it for myself in Benghazi - there was traffic control. Although the rubbish wasn't being collected, the fact was the police were evident and they were able to provide order." A senior government source echoed this view. "There has been a consistent tendency to underestimate the rebel leadership, a tendency to dismiss them as a rabble or a bunch of Islamists. At almost every turn thus far, they have surpassed expectations."'" ("Cameron's war: why", 3-10- 2011)*

But at the end of October 2011, that point of view suddenly changes. When the rebels kill Gaddafi and put his corpse on display, the Brits and the rebels become alienated. The NTC is suddenly deemed a lot less capable of ruling. Many people have died, and Libya's (near) future does not look so bright.

*"Much depends now on the NTC's ability to get a grip, first and foremost, on security - and then move quickly to form a transitional government, before greater freedom leads to an ever greater taking of liberties. Despite its recognition by the great powers, the council's authority is open to question and challenge. Some fear Islamists hold too great a sway. Its leaders seem divided and unconvinced by their own success. Prominent figures such as the acting Prime Minister, Mahmoud Jibril, are eager to throw in the towel and leave the job of nation-building to hardier souls." ("The wheel of", 21-10- 2011)*

### 5.2.5 Before and after the conflict: themes and topics

This paragraph examines the articles on Libya published in the year before the conflict, and the year after it. The samples drawn for these phases are not representative, but do enable us to take a look at the themes and topics that were in the news before and after the conflict. Did the newspapers see the conflict coming? And after the conflict, did they stay to report on the aftermath? Table 13 provides an overview of the themes and topics present in the media on Libya before the conflict, and how often they were mentioned in the sample.

**Table 13: Which themes/topics were covered before the conflict?**

<i>The Guardian</i>	freq	<i>Le Monde</i>	freq	<i>Die Welt</i>	freq
Lockerbie bombing <sup>1</sup>	6	Diplomatic relations	7	Swiss row	6
Diplomatic relations	4	Migration	4	Diplomatic relations	6
Swiss row <sup>2</sup>	3	Economy & investment	4	Economy & investment	5
Travel	2	Swiss row	3	Lockerbie bombing	3
Gaddafi family	2	Arab spring	1	Migration	1
Economy & investment	1	Human rights	1	Arab spring	1
		Plane crash	1	Plane crash	1
		Travel	1	Science	1

As Table 13 shows, all newspapers discuss a broad range of topics in relation to Libya. Specific events make the news, for example the Swiss row, the release of the Lockerbie bomber and a plane crash which occurred that year. Also, newspapers write about the general relations between their country and Libya, they discuss diplomatic relations, economic relations and migration. Newspapers did not foresee conflict in Libya, so they did not write peace frame articles in order to prevent it. Exceptions were two articles (one from *Le Monde* and one from *Die Welt*) discussing the Arab Spring, and speculating on possible unrest in Libya. Other articles were completely ignorant of what was going to happen, *The Guardian* and *Le Monde* even published travel stories on Libya, advising their readers to go on holiday there. So, looking at proactive writing in the sample articles, 0/13 of *The Guardian's* articles were proactive, and 1/13 of the articles in *Le Monde* and *Die Welt* were proactive.

Table 14 provides an overview of the topics present in the media in the year after the conflict. Topics prominent in all three newspapers are the political situation in Libya and the elections, the violence and security problems in Libya, and the attack on the US embassy. All of these topics and many of the other popular topics are related to the aftermath of the conflict. An optimistic interpretation is that the papers are staying to watch the reconstruction and reconciliation in Libya: peace journalism. A pessimist however would remark that little reconstruction and reconciliation are taking place. Reporting on violence and security problems indicates the media are staying to report on prolonged conflict: war journalism.

Compared to the year before the conflict, the topics from Libya have changed radically. Before the conflict, there was a lot of attention for diplomatic relations and the Libyan economy. These topics are far less prominent after the conflict. Most of the new topics are related to the

<sup>1</sup> Related to the release of Lockerbie bomber Al-Megrahi.

<sup>2</sup> Diplomatic crisis between Switzerland and Libya (2008-2010) which started with the arrest of Gaddafi's son Hannibal and resulted in damaged trade relations and a visa ban for all Schengen citizens traveling to Libya.

aftermath of the conflict. There are however some ‘peace’ topics as well, *Le Monde* and *Die Welt* report on Libyan athletes in the sports section for example. Also interesting are the articles which reflect on the conflict afterwards, published in *The Guardian* and *Die Welt*. *The Guardian* has even published on the role of journalism during the conflict.

**Table 14: Which themes/topics were covered after the conflict?**

<i>The Guardian</i>	Freq	<i>Le Monde</i>	Freq	<i>Die Welt</i>	Freq
Politics & election	9	Politics & election	5	Politics & election	9
Violence & security problems	7	Violence & security problems	4	Violence & security problems	3
US embassy attack <sup>3</sup>	4	US embassy attack	2	Saif al Islam trial	2
Reflections on military intervention	2	Saif al Islam trial	2	US embassy attack	2
Economy & investment	1	Senoussi	1	Reflections on conflict & military intervention	2
Corruption	1	US elections	1	Diplomatic relations	1
Reflections on journalism	1	Human rights	1	Sports	1
Saif al Islam trial	1	Sports	1	Economy & investment	1
Senoussi <sup>4</sup>	1	Mali hostages	1	Sarkozy election money <sup>5</sup>	1
				Conflict in Syria	1

<sup>3</sup> The US ambassador and three diplomats were killed in an attack on the US embassy in Benghazi.

<sup>4</sup> Libya’s former intelligence chief wanted by the ICC for crimes against humanity. He fled to Mauritania after the conflict in Libya.

<sup>5</sup> Allegations that French president Sarkozy received 50 million euro’s from Gaddafi to fund his election campaign.

## 6. Reflections on theory and research

This chapter offers reflections on the theory of peace and war journalism, and offers some suggestions for improvement. It also discusses possible shortcomings of this thesis, and suggestions for further research.

### 6.1 Reflections on theory

Whilst applying the theory of peace and war journalism to a great number of articles in this research, certain practical problems popped up. An overview is provided of these practical problems and more fundamental theoretical problems encountered while working with this theory.

One of the first problems was how to code quotes and citations. A newspaper may quote a statement which is not its personal opinion. Of course, it does choose quotes. Gaddafi's aggressive speeches were often quoted. Emphasizing his threats made him look like a dangerous madman who needed to be removed quickly. But if the papers entirely ignored his speeches, they would be covering up a part of reality. So, though the papers do not agree with Gaddafi, they do quote him, which results in war codes. It was also remarkable to see how newspapers got war and peace codes by describing the political deliberation on Libya in other countries. *Die Welt* for example got war codes on quotes of Mr. Sarkozy and Mr. Cameron. *Le Monde* got peace codes by discussing the careful deliberation of the German politicians ("La question Libyenne", 26-3-2011).

A second problem was that peace and war codes could overlap, and be present in a single sentence. An example is the following line from *Die Welt*: "*Der Weltsicherheitsrat und UN-Chef Ban Ki-moon haben den libyschen Machthaber Muammar al-Gaddafi zum sofortigen Stopp der Gewalt gegen Demonstranten aufgefordert.*" This sentence contains code P4b: 'highlight peace initiatives and trying to prevent war'. But also code W3c: 'focus on elite peacemakers'. This did not matter for the results, as all codes were combined to position the article on the peace/war scale. Working with a scale makes it possible to register mixed articles, not just dichotomize peace and war frames. But the fact that multiple codes were mixed, even within a single sentence shows it is just too simple to maintain a clear separation between peace and war framing.

There were some war codes that could indeed create support for violent solutions, but which could also contribute to peace. Code W1h ('focus only on visible effects of violence: killed, wounded and material damage') is an example. Newspapers often mention the number of deaths, which results in a war code. But is mentioning killings necessarily encouraging more violence? A report like: '20 Al-Qaeda terrorists were eliminated' may induce support for more military action, as it is apparently successful in eliminating dangerous terrorists. On the other hand, a report like: '20 schoolchildren were killed in the crossfire between the rebels and the army' is a tragedy that reduces the support for military action, if military action kills innocent people. How should researchers deal with this difference when coding? The researcher could let his own judgment prevail over the coding system, and decide not to stick a war code on a sentence which advocates peace. But the strength of the coding system is that it is universal and it should be applied in order to prevent arbitrariness and bias of the researcher.

Other codes that just did not always seem to fit very well were codes W3c and P3a. Code W3c indicates a 'focus on elite peacemakers' rather than people peacemakers. Of course media should not focus solely on elite peacemakers and ignore people peacemakers. But elite peacemakers

simply have an incredible amount of influence and means to contribute to peace, so why should mentioning their role automatically result in a war code? Code P3a ('focus on suffering all over') applies when articles report on the suffering of women, children, elderly people and give a voice to the voiceless. Showing their misery contributes to peace, as it shows war has horrible consequences for innocent people. On the other hand, reporting on the suffering of the innocent could also contribute to more violence, as a sense of urgency is created that these people need help. Even if help means more violence.

Code P1h indicates an article reports about the invisible effects of violence. These could be changes in culture for example, or traumas caused by violence. But cultures don't change overnight, and examining trauma takes time and careful research. Reporting on invisible effects takes a lot more time and work than reporting on visible effects. Of course journalists should try, but only after thorough investigation, and when enough time has passed to really be able to say something. It is not very surprising that this code rarely appeared.

Yet another problem was the fact that a rather large number of articles on Libya did not focus on the conflict itself, but about what politicians in other countries were saying about it. As discussed in paragraph 5.2.4, this type of clean reporting from a distance has been criticized for obscuring the violence on the ground. Finding a couple of these articles however does not strike me as worrisome, the attitudes and decisions of world leaders are sometimes extremely relevant to what is happening on the ground. But when the majority of reports on Libya are not from Libya, this is not a very good way to inform the audience about what is going on. Some reports were so distant, it was difficult to code them. These articles were not about the conflict, but about political disagreements or elections in Britain, France and Germany. Looking back, it may have been better to exclude these articles and select different ones for the sample.

And finally, there may be a rare case when war framed articles discourage violence. A rather remarkable article in *Die Welt* written by a former 'Generalinspekteur der Bundeswehr' approaches the conflict in Libya from a military point of view, and concludes that military intervention is a bad option, as its success would be unsure, it would be costly and the ending may be unclear. ("Und was, wenn", 12-3-2011)

Suggestions for improvement of the theory would be to include language use and word choice, or, for example, the use of military jargon. Word choice matters a lot (as discussed in the introductory chapter) but it not included in the theory at present.

Also, a code could be added for suggestive comparisons. There were articles which compared Gaddafi to Hitler, and Libya to North Korea. This type of comparisons is definitely an element of framing, which is not captured by the current coding system.

Repetition and emphasis should also be included in the coding system. Some things were repeated by the newspapers over and over again, e.g. calling Gaddafi a 'mad dog'. Adding a single code every time I came across these words, just did not reflect the real impact it must have had on readers.

Other researchers who want to use the theory of peace and war journalism could combine their coding analysis with an analysis of the metadata, as this research did. It is not absolutely necessary, but as this research proves, there are some interesting links. For example, the link between page number and peace/war score.

It would also be interesting to adapt this theory so it can be applied to visual material. Of

course, the text of a news report can be transcribed and analysed with the existing coding system, but the choice of images that accompany the text could be included as well.

## 6.2 Reflections on research

This paragraph reflects on the problems and choices that materialized during the research process. They are discussed in chronological order.

The selection of the newspapers was slightly problematic, as already discussed in the methodology chapter. The first choice paper for Germany was *Die Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, but this newspaper was not freely available on their website, or on a newspaper database like LexisNexis. *Die Welt* was used as a replacement, despite its more conservative political colour in comparison to *The Guardian* and *Le Monde*. In the end, however, I still found significant differences between the non-intervening and intervening countries' media. The fact that these differences were present even when the non-intervening country's media was represented by a more conservative media outlet only strengthens the conclusions of this research.

The next problem appeared whilst collecting the sample of articles. As discussed in the methodology chapter, the plan was to select a sample completely at random. But a quick screening of the resulting sample showed that a number of selected articles were unsuitable for the analysis. From *Die Welt* a number of texts had been selected which were not articles but a list of the headlines from the paper. Also, there were some articles which had nothing to do with Libya at all (e.g. an article on a nature reserve in Congo, which hosts a type of monkey which also lives in Libya). Looking for peace and war frames in this type of article would be a useless exercise. It would tell us nothing about Libya, and bring us no closer to answering the research question, so I decided to delete these articles and replace them with randomly selected articles. So the random sample had to be changed arbitrarily, which may be a point for discussion. In total, around 20 of the 312 articles were replaced.

After collecting the sample, the articles had to be prepared for coding. The original plan was to use the qualitative analysis program Atlas.ti. For practical reasons however, I chose to analyse the articles in Microsoft Word. This is because I was more familiar with this program, and because it is far more widely available. The advantage of this choice is that anyone who wants to reexamine my analysis can easily do so without first acquiring an Atlas.ti license and needing to learn how the program works. The disadvantage is that it was time consuming to manually enter the codes from word into SPSS for the statistical analysis.

The coding of the articles was problematic in more than one way. Paragraph 6.1 already provided an overview of the practical problems with the application of peace and war journalism theory. But besides problems with theory, language was a problem for me as well. English, French and German are not my first languages. To be able to code well, every word and sentence has to be understood correctly. I tried to do this to the best of my ability, but I am sure that I missed or misunderstood some things while coding. Personally I consider this to be the weakest point of this thesis.

In the methodology section, the problems related to the reliability of coding were mentioned. Different coders need to code the same text in the same way (inter-coder reliability) and one coder needs to code consistently across different texts (intra-coder reliability). Inter-coder reliability was tested by letting two people who were not involved in the research apply Galtung's

codes to three articles, and comparing the differences in coding. The differences were negligible, except for some codes of which the application is debatable (discussed in paragraph 6.1). Intra-coder reliability however was more of a problem. Some codes had been applied more strictly or differently at the beginning than at the end of the coding process, which resulted in recoding of the entire sample.

### **Suggestions for further research**

Concerning further research on this topic, I have a number of suggestions. It would be interesting to include more countries in the analysis. For example, what was the framing like in Chinese, Russian and US media on Libya? And how did Libya's African neighbours report? Another option would be to stick to the countries present in this research, but change the type of media outlet. Were news reports on television different from the newspapers? And how did tabloid newspapers compare to the quality newspapers examined here? Besides looking at Libya, another military intervention could also be the center of focus.

Something which I was unable to include in this research, but which is in fact rather interesting is looking at the authors and datelines of articles. Was the author a freelancer? As discussed in the introduction, freelancers may seem more independent than normal employees, but they too need to write what will sell. Was the author the chief editor? This was quite often the case in *Le Monde*. On the one hand, an article by the chief editor gives weight to a news item. On the other hand, we may wonder if the chief editor is always so well informed. It may be better to have an article from a journalist who is specialized in the issues that play in a certain region. But look at the dateline: a specialized journalist may be writing from his comfortable chair at home. Sometimes, articles don't even have an author, these articles are near exact copies of reports from the large press bureaus.

This point is related to my final suggestion: go beyond looking at articles and try to find out how they came to be. Editors and journalists could be involved in the analysis. Why did they report the way they did? Why did they make certain choices? Do they consider themselves to be biased or misleading in any way? Looking back, would they have done things differently?



## 7. Conclusion

Chapter 5 provided a detailed account of the research results, and Chapter 6 offered some reflection on the problems experienced during the research process. Taking all this into account, Chapter 7 concludes this research by using the sub-questions to answer the main research question.

All three newspapers hardly ever published on Libya in the year before the conflict. Only when the demonstrations and the violence started, the papers started to publish on Libya. The fact that violence drew their attention is a sign of war journalism. After the conflict however, all three newspapers published three to four times the amount of articles on Libya they had published before the conflict. Ongoing reports on Libya are a sign of peace journalism, the papers stayed and watched the reconstruction of the country. This pattern is the same for all three newspapers, there was no difference between the papers of the non-intervening and intervening countries. But unlike the pattern, the quantity of articles published on Libya differs between the three papers. *Die Welt* published less articles than *The Guardian* and *Le Monde* before, during and after the conflict.

Looking at how often Libya made the front pages, the same pattern appears as with the overall publishing. There was little attention before the conflict, a sharp increase in attention when the conflict started, and continued attention after the conflict. Looking at the numbers, Libya did make the cover of *Le Monde* less often than the cover of *The Guardian* and *Die Welt*. This may suggest that *Le Monde* seemed to attach less value to news on Libya. *Le Monde* however attached weight to the articles on Libya in a different way: a substantial number of the articles came from the chief editor of the paper.

A comparison of the average article length showed *The Guardian* wrote the longest articles on Libya, and *Le Monde* the shortest. Drawing conclusions from this is, however, problematic, as the length is influenced by layout factors of the specific newspaper, and by the language it is written in.

The three papers published the majority of their articles in Libya in different sections: *The Guardian* published mostly in the home pages, *Le Monde* in the international pages and *Die Welt* in the politics section. This is interesting, as the same event (e.g. a meeting of the heads of state to discuss the conflict in Libya) is about Britain for the English, international for the French, and politics for the Germans. But these three sections were in fact always the first or second section of the paper they appeared in. So although the three papers published news on Libya in different sections, it was still in the front of the paper, where people were most likely to read it. In all three newspapers, at least 10% of the articles was published in the debate pages, ensuring some variation in the points of view expressed on the conflict.

An average was calculated for the page numbers on which the articles on Libya appeared. An article on Libya in *The Guardian* would be on page 11 on average, on page 8 in *Le Monde* and on page 7 in *Die Welt*. But because this difference is very small, and influenced by other factors (e.g. total newspaper length), it is difficult to draw conclusions.

A statistically significant relationship was found between the peace/war score of the newspaper and its location in the newspaper in *The Guardian* and *Die Welt*. Peace frames were more likely to be found towards the back of these newspapers, and war frames towards the front.

Looking at orientations provided an idea of the overall focus of the newspapers. In *The Guardian* the focus on war/violence was clearly the most dominant, followed at a distance by peace/conflict orientation and victory-orientation. At the end of the conflict, the orientation on people,

peace/conflict and solutions also increased. *Le Monde* did not have one clear dominant orientation. The orientation on peace/conflict appeared most often, followed by the orientation on victory and elite. When the intervention started, the orientation on victory and elite increased remarkably. At the end of the conflict, *Le Monde* was much less oriented towards solutions than the other newspapers. *Die Welt* was clearly the most oriented towards peace/conflict, followed at a distance by victory orientation and war/violence orientation. *Die Welt* was the most oriented towards truth, especially during the intervention. Every newspaper had multiple orientations, from both peace and war journalism. For *Die Welt* however, the orientation towards peace was clearly the most prominent, and in *The Guardian* the orientation towards violence dominated. There was a peak in war/violence orientation in all three newspapers during the first protests, which probably shaped readers first impressions.

Every article was positioned on a scale from -1 (peace journalism) to 1 (war journalism), by adding and subtracting individual peace/war codes. There was a statistically significant difference in the position of articles from *The Guardian* and *Le Monde* and the articles from *Die Welt* on the peace/war scale. Also when we look at averages, the difference is visible: *The Guardian* scored 0,14 on average, *Le Monde* 0,12 and *Die Welt* -0,18. Over time, *Die Welt* constantly scores below 0. *Die Welt* and *The Guardian* fluctuate heavily, *Le Monde* drops below 0 in some stages, and *The Guardian* only slightly goes below 0 in the last phase. In *The Guardian* and *Le Monde*, most codes were part of war framing, whilst in *Die Welt* most codes were part of peace framing. Also, articles with an absolute peace score of -1 appeared the most in *Die Welt*.

An analysis of the use of specific codes provided insights in what kind of peace/war codes papers used, and when. *The Guardian* depicted the conflict as a clearly demarcated arena with two separate groups. A feeling of time-pressure was created, suggesting that a quick intervention was necessary. *The Guardian* emphasized material damage and the number of people killed in the conflict. *Le Monde* mentioned peaceful solutions least often. Institutions and treaties were overemphasized, obscuring France's own role. Evil-doers on one's own side were almost never reported about. *Die Welt* provided a broad perspective on causes and outcomes of the conflict from early on. *Die Welt* also was the most active in correcting false reports, and it pointed out not the 'other' but war itself was the problem.

The accusations of propaganda expressed by some journalists and researchers were tested using the articles from *The Guardian*, *Le Monde* and *Die Welt*. Some proved to be unjust, for example none of the three newspapers reported on the mass-rapes that did not take place. Other accusations were right, for example *The Guardian* and *Le Monde* grossly exaggerated the number of people killed in the first Benghazi protests. Remarkable is the fact that most untruths were told before the intervention, and 'mistakes' were made mostly at the expense of the regime. Also, newspapers sometimes presented an entirely different image of reality. For example, the same speech by Saif al Islam was edited and presented in an entirely different way by *The Guardian* and *Die Welt*. Also, newspapers changed their biases over time. *The Guardian* initially presented a very positive image of the NTC, but later on it became very skeptical.

All three papers discussed a range of topics, discussing both relations in general (economic, diplomatic) and specific events (Swiss row, plane crash). None of the papers foresaw the conflict, and wrote peace framed articles in order to prevent violence. The topics discussed after the conflict were different from the topics discussed before. Popular topics were the political situation in Libya, the elections, and violence and security problems. Most topics were related to the aftermath of the

conflict. It is debatable if the newspapers stayed to report on how Libya was being rebuilt, or if they were hanging around to write war framed stories on prolonged conflict.

Now we move on to the answer of the main research question:

*Did the printed media from intervening countries (specifically being Le Monde, and The Guardian) contribute to support for a military intervention in Libya in 2011 more than the media from non-intervening countries (Die Welt) by using war frames?*

**YES**, there is indeed a remarkable difference in the use of peace and war frames between the media from intervening countries and the media from a non-intervening country. A peace/war score was calculated for every article, which positioned the article on a scale from -1 (peace journalism) to 1 (war journalism). There was a statistically significant difference between the peace/war scores of the articles from *The Guardian* and *Le Monde* compared to *Die Welt*. The average peace/war scores of *The Guardian* and *Le Monde* were above 0 (0,14 and 0,12 respectively) in the war frame spectrum. The average score of *Die Welt* was -0,18 in the peace frame spectrum, and stayed below 0 during all phases of the conflict. *Die Welt* took care to explain the causes and consequences of the conflict, and often took up the point of view that it was not 'the bad guys' but war itself that was the problem.

**BUT**, there are two important side notes to this conclusion:

First of all, although peace journalism was definitely more common in *Die Welt*, this newspaper certainly wasn't flawless and purely oriented towards peace either. *Die Welt* made a serious mistake when it reported on airstrikes which had not taken place, contributing to animosity towards the regime. Especially during the first protests, *Die Welt* was very much oriented towards war and violence. The correlation found between page number and framing is another point for concern, because it indicates that peace journalism articles tended to be located towards the back of the newspaper, and war journalism articles more towards the front.

The second side note is that, although *The Guardian* and *Le Monde* are both guilty of war journalism, there are also major differences between these papers so it would be wrong to lump them together. Looking at their peace/war scores over time, *The Guardian* scored in the war journalism spectrum until the end of the conflict, but *Le Monde* shuttled back and forth between peace and war journalism. A comparison of the peace and war codes appearing in the articles showed *The Guardian* depicted the conflict as an arena with two clear parties, and created a feeling of time-pressure. Articles focused on material damage and the number of deaths. Articles from *Le Monde* on the other hand were quiet about peaceful solutions to the conflict, and obscured the role of France by focusing on international institutions.

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(Note: the articles from the sample are not included in this reference list. They are listed in appendix A.)

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## Appendix A

Newspaper	Title	Page	Date
<i>Die Welt</i>	“Alles Lügen, nur ein Trick“; Die libysche Gegenregierung wischt den Friedensplan der Afrikanischen Union vom Tisch - aber die will ihn weiter ausarbeiten	6	13-4-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	“Die Schweiz steht unter Schock“; Libyen-Krise und Bankdaten-CD: Ein Land im Kreuzfeuer - Ein Gespräch mit Außenministerin Calmy-Rey	7	6-3-2010
<i>Die Welt</i>	“Er glaubte, er sei ein Prophet“; Der Bischof von Tripolis über Gaddafis Tod und das Leid der Libyer	7	25-10-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	“Genug Probleme für eine Revolution“; Die arabischen Völker begehren auf gegen wirtschaftliche Stagnation, Perspektivlosigkeit und Unfreiheit	7	27-1-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	“Steinigung finden viele gerecht“; Werden sich der Islam und die Demokratie in Nordafrika versöhnen? Der amerikanische Politikwissenschaftler Daniel Jonah Goldhagen schwankt zwischen Hoffnung und Skepsis	13	30-10-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	“Welt“-Reporterin aus libyscher Haft entlassen; Clare Morgana Gillis auf dem Weg in die USA	7	20-5-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	“Wir setzen auf Diplomatie“; Außenminister Guido Westerwelle über die Eskalation in Syrien, die Rolle Russlands im Nahen Osten und den Israel-Besuch von Bundespräsident Joachim Gauck	6	1-6-2012
<i>Die Welt</i>	30 000 Chinesen sitzen in Libyen fest	6	24-2-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Abschied mit glänzenden Zahlen; Noch-BASF-Chef Jürgen Hambrecht legt für 2010 starke Zuwächse bei Umsatz und Gewinn vor	10	25-2-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Ägypten, Libyen, Tunesien, Jemen: In den Ländern des Arabischen Frühlings drohen die Knospen der Demokratie von neuem islamistischem Terror abgetötet zu werden. Er richtet sich gegen amerikanische diplomatische Vertretungen - bis jetzt; Eine Spur führt zu al-Qaida; Nach den Überfällen auf US-Botschaften rechnet die amerikanische Regierung heute mit einer erneuten Eskalation	5	14-9-2012
<i>Die Welt</i>	Al-Qaida-Terroristen wittern ihre Chance in Libyen; Geheimdienste registrieren Reisebewegungen von Afghanistan in	6	4-4-2011

	die Rebellenhochburg im Osten des Landes		
<i>Die Welt</i>	Angst vor Söldnern, Hatz auf Schwarze; Sind die Berichte über afrikanische Miet-Soldaten nur paranoide Gerüchte?	6	7-3-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Anleger greifen bei Rüstungsaktien zu; Luftschläge gegen Libyen rücken Branche in den Fokus - Krisenherde bescheren den Firmen glänzende Geschäfte	15	23-3-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Arabiens Drama; Nicht alle Umstürze in Nordafrika verlaufen so unblutig wie im Falle Ägyptens und Tunesiens. Schon ringen andere Kräfte um die Deutungshoheit, allen voran al-Qaida. Werden wir alle zu Geiseln der Konflikte dieser Region?	2	23-3-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Arabische Revolution: Ist Libyen der nächste Dominostein, der fällt? Ägypten könnte sich an Indonesien orientieren; Gaddafi-Sohn warnt vor einem Bürgerkrieg; Saif al-Islam schürt Angst vor Chaos und Anarchie. Dabei herrscht beides bereits: Armee-Einheiten desertieren, Stämme kündigen Gefolgschaft auf, Gebäude brennen	7	22-2-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Auf dem libyschen Waffenbasar; Tonnenweise werden Gewehre, Boden-Luft-Raketen und sogar Senfgas-Fässer geborgen. Viel Kriegsmaterial bleibt verschwunden	7	29-10-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Aufstand bedroht Ölversorgung; Unruhen in Libyen katapultieren den Barrelpreis auf 105 Dollar	9	22-2-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Ausland; Libyen: Außenminister Kussa genießt in London keine Immunität ++ Regierungstruppen steigen auf Zivilfahrzeuge um ++ Gaddafi-Sohn besuchte Akademie der US-Luftwaffe	6	1-4-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Bricht Libyen auseinander?; Muammar al-Gaddafi hat es sich mit allen verscherzt, auch mit denen, deren Loyalität er sich über Jahre hinweg erkaufte: die großen Stämme. Prediger al-Qaradawi fordert sogar die Ermordung des Diktators	6	24-2-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Clinton und Merkel wollen Gaddafis Ende; Konferenz in Berlin: Die Nato braucht mehr Kampffjets in Libyen, weil der Diktator Panzer in dicht besiedelten Gebieten stationiert hat	1	15-4-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Das Wikileaks-Imperium schlägt zurück; Sympathisanten legen Mastercard lahm. Neue Depeschen offenbaren: Gaddafi drohte London im Lockerbie-Fall	6	9-12-2010
<i>Die Welt</i>	Der Diktator und seine <i>Welt</i> auswahl; Äquatorialguinea ist die Überraschung des Afrika-Cups. Doch der Erfolg ist erkaufte, im	21	3-2-2012

	Team stehen nur zwei Spielers des Landes		
<i>Die Welt</i>	Der Fantast als Mörder; Vier Jahrzehnte hielt Muammar al-Gaddafi seine Terrorherrschaft durch und führte <i>Die Welt</i> an der Nase herum. Nicht zuletzt, weil der Westen von ihm heimlich ästhetisch fasziniert war	2	23-2-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Der ferne Traum von der Öl-Großmacht; Libyens Rohstoffe sind begehrt - aber die Industrie liegt am Boden	10	2-9-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Der Riss wird tiefer; Die Nato-Partner streiten weiter darum, in welcher Form der Libyen-Einsatz fortgeführt wird - Unvereinbare Positionen lassen nur noch einen Minimalkonsens zu	6	23-3-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Deutsche G36-Sturmgewehre im Einsatz	7	1-9-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Deutsche Nörgler; Die Bundesregierung lässt kein gutes Haar an der Intervention in Libyen	3	26-3-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Die erste Wahl nach Gaddafi; Heute bestimmen die Libyer, wer ihre Verfassung erarbeiten soll, Islamisten oder Demokraten. Der Libyen-Experte Hanspeter Mattes über die Zukunft der Revolution	7	7-7-2012
<i>Die Welt</i>	Die Welle rollt weiter	1	18-2-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Ein echter Sarkozy; Frankreichs Vorpreschen in der Libyen-Frage weckt unerfüllbare Erwartungen	7	12-3-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Ein letzter Blick auf "Bruder Oberst"; In Misrata stehen Menschen Schlange vor einem Kühlhaus, in dem Gaddafis Leiche aufbewahrt wird. Die Umstände seines Todes bleiben ungeklärt. Jetzt wollen die Rebellen nur eines: ein neues Libyen schaffen	9	23-10-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Eine freie Stimme ist verstummt; Der libysche Blogger Mohammed Nabbus stirbt im Feuergefecht	7	22-3-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Endspiel in Libyen; Im besten Fall gibt es einen Regimewechsel ins Ungewisse, im schlechtesten stürzt sich der Westen in ein Abenteuer ohne Ausgang. In Libyen gibt es nur die Wahl zwischen Pest und Cholera	3	25-3-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Endspurt in Istanbul; Libyen-Kontaktgruppe sucht nach Wegen für eine schnelle Lösung im Krieg gegen Gaddafi	7	16-7-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Es knirscht zwischen Briten und Amerikanern; BP, Afghanistan, Wirtschaftskrise: Die oft zitierte "besondere Beziehung" Londons zu Washington ächzt derzeit unter vielen Bürden	5	22-7-2010

<i>Die Welt</i>	Europa entdeckt einen aufstrebenden Kontinent; Afrika tritt längst nicht mehr als Bittsteller auf. Doch Gastgeber Gaddafi redet zwei Stunden ins Leere	6	1-12-2010
<i>Die Welt</i>	Familie in Libyen festgehalten; Mann soll Freundin und Töchter verschleppt haben	28	22-8-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Flüchtlingshilfe und Piratenbekämpfung	7	25-3-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Freie Menschen	2	25-10-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Gaddafi erobert Städte zurück; Strategisch wichtige Küstenorte Ras Lanuf und Brega wieder in der Hand des Regimes	6	31-3-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Gaddafis Ende lässt Anleger aufatmen; Sieg der Rebellen führt zu sinkendem Ölpreis und Börsen-Stabilisierung	13	23-8-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Gaddafis Freunde; Libyens "Revolutionsführer" imponierte Linken wie Rechten - und am Ende auch manchem in der Mitte. Der Westen muss sich daher fragen, was an seinem Wertefundament nicht mehr stimmt	2	11-3-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Gaddafis Schirm	23	23-2-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Gaddafis Sohn droht Todesstrafe; Libyen will Saif al-Islam nicht an das Haager Kriegsverbrechertribunal ausliefern, sondern selbst verurteilen. UN-Chefankläger Ocampo sucht in Tripolis nach Kompromissen	7	21-11-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Gaddafis Stadt erfindet sich neu; Die Rebellen haben Bani Walid eingenommen, aber nicht die Herzen der Menschen erobert	8	19-3-2012
<i>Die Welt</i>	Gaddafis Sturz und Deutschlands Beitrag; Die Bundesregierung rechtfertigt ihre militärische Enthaltung in Libyen und warnt die Verbündeten davor, den Erfolg zu "okkupieren"	4	23-8-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Gaddafis Tod wird untersucht; Übergangsrat beruft Ermittlungsausschuss	1	25-10-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Gaddafis Truppen haben freie Bahn; Während die Armee auf die Hochburg der Rebellen vorrückt, finden die mächtigsten Staaten der Erde keine gemeinsame Linie	10	16-3-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Geburtswehen; Tunesien und Libyen haben sich befreit, aber der Neustart ist beschwerlich	3	29-10-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Gericht in Libyen hebt Strafe eines Schweizers auf	5	1-2-2010

<i>Die Welt</i>	Gerüchte um Lockerbie-Attentäter überschatten Camerons US-Besuch; BP soll sich für Freilassung eingesetzt haben	5	21-7-2010
<i>Die Welt</i>	Honig aus der Oase; In der Sahara haben Forscher eine neue Bienenart entdeckt	19	5-7-2010
<i>Die Welt</i>	Jagd auf Gaddafi; Die ganze <i>Welt</i> fragt sich, ob der Ex-Diktator in ein Nachbarland geflohen oder noch in Libyen ist. Die Rebellen behaupten, sie hätten ihn eingekesselt. Aber wo?	8	8-9-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Kampf gegen Gaddafi: Koalition sucht Konsens über Führung; Alliierte nehmen Araber in die Pflicht; Wie bei der Afghanistan-Mission soll ein multinationales Gremium die politische Führung übernehmen, die Nato die militärische. Gaddafi gibt sich unbeeindruckt: Seine Gegner würden auf dem "Müllhaufen der Geschichte" landen	4	24-3-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Kampf gegen Gaddafi: Koalition sucht Konsens über Führung; Regierung tauscht Libyen gegen Afghanistan; Bundeswehr wird aus dem Mittelmeer abgezogen. Als Kompensation sollen Awacs-Flugzeuge an den Hindukusch geschickt werden	5	24-3-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Koalition der Willigen gibt Kommando ab; Die Nato übernimmt den Schutz der libyschen Bevölkerung. Im Zweifel bedeutet das auch den Beschuss von Gaddafis Soldaten	7	29-3-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Kopfschütteln über Guido Westerwelle; So mancher in der FDP fühlt sich zu Unrecht in Mithaftung genommen für die Libyenpolitik des Außenministers	4	26-8-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Libyen erzwingt Übergabe von Schweizer Geschäftsmann	5	23-2-2010
<i>Die Welt</i>	Libyen feiert seine Befreiung; Gaddafi-Sohn droht mit weiteren Kämpfen	1	24-10-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Libyen verweigert Europäern die Einreise; Mindestens 300 Menschen sitzen fest - Offenbar Strafraktion wegen Schweiz	1	16-2-2010
<i>Die Welt</i>	Libyen wirbt um Touristen; Die ITB startet und die nordafrikanischen Länder trommeln lautstark für sich. Das größte Potenzial sehen Experten ausgerechnet im untergehenden Reich von Gaddafi	14	9-3-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Libyen, allein mit Gott; Die Nato beendet ihren Einsatz, und das von Gaddafi befreite Land wendet sich der Scharia zu. Doch was bedeutet das?	7	31-10-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Libyen, Syrien?	1	28-4-2011

<i>Die Welt</i>	Libyen; UN hebt Flugverbotszone auf	7	28-10-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Libyen-Krise erreicht deutsche Verbraucher; Unternehmen wollen höheren Ölpreis an die Kunden weitergeben	9	10-3-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Libysche Rebellen auf dem Vormarsch; Aufständische nehmen wichtige Raffinerie-Städte im Westen ein. Nato berät über Regeln für den Militäreinsatz	8	28-3-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Mission erfüllt in Libyen und im Irak	1	23-10-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Moral muss klug sein; Sich in den libyschen Konflikt einzumischen ist gut gemeint, aber töricht. Afghanistan hat gezeigt: Zu Ordnungskriegen ist der Westen nicht in der Lage. In Libyen kann er nur verlieren	2	28-3-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Nach der Entscheidung des Sicherheitsrats jubeln die Rebellen in Bengasi; Deutschland im Abseits; Die Bundeswehr wird nicht helfen, Libyens Diktator Gaddafi militärisch zu bekämpfen. Die Regierung zweifelt am Erfolg der Mission. Bereitschaft für Beteiligung an Awacs-Einsatz	4	19-3-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Naher Osten: Ein Schritt vor, zwei zurück - Libyen hat einen Wahlsieger, Israel beklagt Tote und Syrien den Krieg in Damaskus; Libyens Liberale gewinnen gegen Islamisten; Bürger wollen nach Diktatur und Bürgerkrieg Wiederaufbau und Sicherheit	6	19-7-2012
<i>Die Welt</i>	Nato zum Eingreifen in Libyen bereit; Arabische Liga für Flugverbotszone. Spanien würde sich an Intervention beteiligen. US-Politiker für Waffenlieferung an Rebellen	1	8-3-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Neue Tiefseebohrung im Mittelmeer	12	26-7-2010
<i>Die Welt</i>	Nur die Sorgen wachsen; Nahost-Unruhen und Inflationsängste treiben Anleger aus den Schwellenländern. Wieder zeigt sich: Rendite ist nur mit Risiko zu haben. Dennoch gehören Emerging Markets ins Depot	47	20-2-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Obamas Dilemma: Geheimdienst statt Militär; US-Präsident erleichtert über Nato-Entscheidung. CIA-Agenten sollen für Klarheit an der libyschen Front sorgen	6	1-4-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Pentagon schickt Soldaten nach Libyen; Präsident Obama reagiert auf die Angriffe	8	13-9-2012
<i>Die Welt</i>	Plötzlich ganz viele Freunde; Konferenz in Paris über Libyens Zukunft	6	2-9-2011

<i>Die Welt</i>	Prozess gegen Saif al-Islam in Libyen	7	24-11-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Rebellen verschanzen sich im Osten; Der Vormarsch auf Gaddafis Heimatstadt Sirte ist vorerst gestoppt, die Aufständischen weichen vor den Raketen und Panzergranaten zurück. Jetzt warten sie auf die Unterstützung der Nato-Kampfbots	8	30-3-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Richtige Strategie	2	25-10-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Rohöl: Preisanstieg steht laut EU kurz vor Höhepunkt	15	1-3-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Run auf Rohstoffe wird zum Risiko; Preisschub bei Weizen, Öl und Gold droht Märkte zu destabilisieren - Notenbanken sind Mitverursacher der Krise	13	22-2-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Sanktionen aus Brüssel; Einreiseverbote und Kontensperrung	8	1-3-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Scharia oder Scharia light?; Demokratie wurde noch nie aus dem Mutterleib einer Religion geboren, sondern musste sich fast immer auch gegen die religiösen Autoritäten durchsetzen. Wählt Nordafrika nach dem hoffnungsfrohen Aufbruchsignal der Revolution jetzt wieder die Unfreiheit? Es steht zu befürchten	2	3-11-2012
<i>Die Welt</i>	Schmutziges Geld aus Tripolis; Schwere Vorwürfe vor der Stichwahl: Bekam Sarkozy 50 Millionen Euro von Gaddafi?	6	30-4-2012
<i>Die Welt</i>	Schweizer Kommandoaktion in Libyen; Bern wollte Gaddafis Geiseln offenbar mit Waffengewalt befreien - Heftige Debatte in der Alpenrepublik	5	24-6-2010
<i>Die Welt</i>	Schwere Auseinandersetzungen in Tripolis	7	5-3-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Selbst die Libyer trauen sich; Massenproteste in Gaddafis Republik der Volksmassen, in Bahrain, Jemen, Jordanien	6	19-2-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Senfgaslager in Libyen entdeckt; Nato beschließt Ende des Militäreinsatzes	1	29-10-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Später Sieg nach langem Zögern; Barack Obama unterbricht seinen Urlaub, um die Früchte seines umstrittenen Engagements in Libyen zu ernten. Den Republikanern fehlt nun ein Angriffspunkt	4	23-8-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Starke Worte; Die UN-Resolution 1973: Was sie erlaubt - und was nicht	4	21-3-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Sündenbock Westermächte; Republik der Heuchler: Plötzlich finden alle die Intervention in Libyen gut	3	30-8-2011



<i>Die Welt</i>	Syriens Präsident Assad lieferte Gaddafi ans Messer; Der ehemalige Verbündete gab die Nummer des Satellitentelefons an den französischen Geheimdienst	7	2-10-2012
<i>Die Welt</i>	Überlebender von Tripolis kann sich nicht erinnern	28	15-5-2010
<i>Die Welt</i>	UN-Chef: Herr Gaddafi, stoppen Sie die Gewalt!; Ban Ki-moon telefoniert 40 Minuten mit dem sturen Diktator. Der bleibt bei seinem Kurs	1	24-2-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Und was, wenn eine Flugverbotszone in Libyen nicht reicht?; Wer als Schutzmacht für die Rebellen eingreifen will, muss auch bereit sein zur Eskalation	10	12-3-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Untergang der Gaddafi GmbH; Libyens Diktator hatte die Wirtschaft seines Landes fest im Griff - mit dem Aufstand gehen ihm Öl und Auslandskonten verloren	10	5-3-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Von Bagdad bis Tripolis; Allen Kritikern der Intervention zum Trotz erzielt der Westen in Libyen nicht nur militärische, sondern auch politische Erfolge. Die Dynamik arabischer Umstürze lässt selbst den Irak-Krieg in neuem Licht erscheinen	3	27-4-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Was Europa tun kann; Die EU muss ihre Agrarmärkte für Produkte aus den arabischen Ländern öffnen. Das würde der Region mehr helfen als Geld und gute Worte. Denn ohne wirtschaftliche Dynamik dürften dort keine Demokratien entstehen	3	1-3-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Was folgt auf die arabischen Diktatoren?; Westerwelles kleine Erkundungstour durch Nordafrika: Die Maghreb-Staaten zwischen Aufbruch, Stagnation und Scheitern	7	10-1-2012
<i>Die Welt</i>	Weltpolitik für Jungs; Die G 8 setzen Zeichen für Demokratie in Nahost und Stabilität im Westen. Nur die Kanzlerin redet nicht immer mit	6	28-5-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Westerwelle bleibt vorerst Minister; Vor allem mit Blick auf die Landtagswahlen verzichtet die FDP auf einen Wechsel	5	29-8-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Westerwelle ist untragbar; Der Außenminister hat seine unwürdigen Äußerungen zur Nato-Mission in Libyen nicht ernsthaft korrigiert. Seine Ablösung wäre ein Zeichen, dass Deutschland seinen historischen Fehler in der Libyen-Frage einsieht	3	31-8-2011
<i>Die Welt</i>	Westerwelle: "Die Zeit der Appelle ist vorbei"; Libyen-Krise: Sanktionen der EU und der USA gegen Gaddafi - Spritpreis springt	1	26-2-2011

	auf 1,57 Euro pro Liter - Saudis steigern Ölförderung		
<i>Die Welt</i>	Zwischen Jubel und Blutvergießen; Während in Tripolis die letzten erbitterten Kämpfe toben, bewegt eine entscheidende Frage die ganze <i>Welt</i> : Wo ist Gaddafi?	5	23-8-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	”Prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires”	11	19-3-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	A Benghazi, les insurgés veulent “vaincre seuls”	6	2-3-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	A Benghazi, libérée, la création d’un gouvernement transitoire fait débat	5	1-3-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	a Les révoltes dans <i>Le Monde</i> arabe	2	24-3-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	a Les révoltes dans <i>Le Monde</i> arabe	2	23-3-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	A Tobrouk, l’espoir d’une nouvelle Libye	1	24-2-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	Analyse; Libye, année zéro	20	26-1-2012
<i>Le Monde</i>	Après Ben Ali et Kadhafi, un “printemps islamiste”?	19	27-10-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	Après la Libye, il faut repenser l’OTAN	18	31-8-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	Après la révolution, un difficile retour à la réalité pour l’économie tunisienne	2	2-4-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	Au Mali, les mystères du rapt des otages français	2	30-11-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	Au poste-frontière de Ras Jdir, l’exode pour fuir la Libye	8	25-2-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	Bataille pour juger le Libyen Abdallah Senoussi	8	22-3-2012
<i>Le Monde</i>	Berlin, hostile à une intervention, s’abstient à l’ONU	12	19-3-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	Ce que la révolution libyenne a d’unique	19	9-3-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	C’est quoi, une guerre juste ?	1	24-9-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	Des centaines de morts en Libye, pays au bord de l’implosion	4	22-2-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	Editorial; En Libye, la patience contre l’enlisement	1	17-4-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	Editorial; La ville martyre et le silence des Occidentaux	1	16-10-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	En Libye, la liberté a besoin	19	14-4-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	En Libye, les premières élections d’un pays divisé	1	7-7-2012
<i>Le Monde</i>	ENTRETIEN; “Avec l’OTAN ou sans l’OTAN, les rebelles vont	6	5-7-2011

	perdre” en Libye		
<i>Le Monde</i>	Entretien; “Cette intervention n’a rien à voir avec le pétrole”	10	25-3-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	Et si le colonel Kadhafi avait encore du gaz moutarde ?	3	10-3-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	Génération printemps arabe	8	1-10-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	Halte au cynisme! Il faut un commerce des armes plus responsable	17	21-4-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	Hommage à l’ami des Libyens, Christopher Stevens	17	15-9-2012
<i>Le Monde</i>	International; En Libye, on fait quoi demain et après-demain ?	21	25-3-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	International; Libye: les raisons de la non-intervention	22	18-3-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	International   Chronique; La Libye, la charia et l’embarras occidental	19	28-10-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	Kadhafi: coupables complaisances à l’Ouest	18	24-2-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	L’“ingérence”, une politique tributaire d’images chocs dans les médias	6	11-3-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	La bataille pour Tripoli continue	4	24-8-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	La boxe libyenne remonte sur le ring	4	25-8-2012
<i>Le Monde</i>	La Chine défend ses intérêts en Libye en discutant avec les rebelles	6	25-6-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	La coopération économique entre l’Italie et la Libye s’intensifie	7	31-8-2010
<i>Le Monde</i>	La France et l’OTAN risquent de décrédibiliser la responsabilité de protéger	16	27-4-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	La guerre de Libye et la tentation du “storytelling” français	24	14-9-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	La légion africaine de Kadhafi	3	26-2-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	La Libye déclarée officiellement “libérée” le 23 octobre	4	23-10-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	La Libye donne de l’air aux Chantiers de Saint-Nazaire	14	2-7-2010
<i>Le Monde</i>	La Libye n’entend pas livrer à la CPI Saïf Al-Islam Kadhafi	5	25-1-2012
<i>Le Monde</i>	La Libye refuse de livrer Saïf Al-Islam Kadhafi à la Cour pénale internationale	8	13-4-2012

<i>Le Monde</i>	La Ligue arabe commence à prendre ses distances	6	22-3-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	La micro-monarchie du Qatar jouera un rôle-clé dans la transition post-Kadhafi	6	27-8-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	La question libyenne divise la classe politique allemande	9	26-3-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	La recherche d'un "processus politique"	9	27-3-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	La révolution en Libye fragilise le Sahel	5	8-9-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	La soif de changement s'étend dans <i>Le Monde</i> arabe	6	18-2-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	La Turquie est fortement affectée par les révoltes touchant ses partenaires économiques du <i>Monde</i> arabe	16	30-4-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	La vie des entreprises Transports; Air France pourrait rouvrir une ligne Paris-Tripoli	12	24-8-2010
<i>Le Monde</i>	L'air du <i>Monde</i>   chronique; La Libye sous syndrome post-traumatique	22	18-4-2012
<i>Le Monde</i>	L'air du <i>Monde</i>   Chronique; Printemps arabe, automne occidental	18	30-10-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	L'attitude de la Libye suscite la méfiance des Tunisiens	6	21-1-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	Le "terrible bilan" de la Libye, selon Amnesty International	7	24-6-2010
<i>Le Monde</i>	Le calvaire des Africains subsahariens pris entre les pro-Kadhafi et les insurgés	12	19-3-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	Le colonel Kadhafi contre-attaque sur le terrain et sur les écrans	1	4-3-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	Le débat, acte III	2	24-10-2012
<i>Le Monde</i>	Le dialogue inter-libyen semble au point mort	8	19-4-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	Les arrivées de bateaux de migrants en Méditerranée ont considérablement chuté	7	24-6-2010
<i>Le Monde</i>	Les enjeux de la nouvelle Libye débattus à Paris	4	2-9-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	Les faits International; Appel à manifester en Libye lors d'une "Journée de la colère"	2	18-2-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	Les faits International; La Libye au bord de la guerre civile	2	22-2-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	Les faits International; La Libye et la Thaïlande élues au Conseil des droits de l'homme	2	15-5-2010

<i>Le Monde</i>	Les faits International; Libye: évacuations massives et déclarations fermes des Etats-Unis	2	25-2-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	Les Occidentaux évasifs sur le sort du Guide libyen	4	27-7-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	Les révoltes dans <i>Le Monde</i> arabe	2	1-3-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	Les révoltes dans <i>Le Monde</i> arabe	2	3-3-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	L'est de la Libye, marginalisé, réclame l'autonomie	5	11-3-2012
<i>Le Monde</i>	Libye: les Etats-Unis préparent plusieurs options militaires	5	5-3-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	Libye: les scénarios pour l'après-Kadhafi	4	24-6-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	Libye, Bahreïn: pourquoi l'effet	19	22-2-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	Libye, d'un dictateur l'autre ?	16	20-11-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	Libye: quels sont les risques économiques pour l'Europe?	6	25-2-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	LIBYE; Le crash de l'A330 ne résulte pas d'un problème technique	12	1-6-2010
<i>Le Monde</i>	Libye; Non-lieu pour l'un de deux hommes d'affaires suisses poursuivis en justice par Tripoli	8	9-2-2010
<i>Le Monde</i>	Libye; Tripoli ferme le bureau du HCR	6	10-6-2010
<i>Le Monde</i>	LIBYE; Un proche de Mouammar Kadhafi a été arrêté en France	7	3-12-2010
<i>Le Monde</i>	L'Italie craint de perdre, au profit de la France, sa place de premier fournisseur de la Libye	6	30-8-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	L'ONU accroît les sanctions contre la Libye	1	27-2-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	L'ONU manque de données sur la situation humanitaire	5	6-3-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	L'ONU met fin aux opérations de l'OTAN en Libye	4	29-10-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	L'OTAN annonce la fin de ses opérations militaires dans une Libye "libérée"	4	23-10-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	L'OTAN arrête sa mission en Libye contre l'avis du CNT	4	28-10-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	M. Obama définit la participation américaine	9	20-3-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	M. Sarkozy, à Benghazi: "Nous croyons dans la Libye unie, pas dans la Libye divisée"	5	17-9-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	Migrants d'Afrique: monnaie d'échange et arme diplomatique du	9	25-2-2011

	colonel Kadhafi		
<i>Le Monde</i>	Mouammar Kadhafi, Guide aux multiples visages	6	23-8-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	Paris n'exclut pas une interdiction de survol de la Libye	8	3-3-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	Paris refuse d'accueillir des réfugiés de la guerre en Libye	5	18-9-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	Pour une autre politique arabe de l'Europe	22	1-4-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	Règlement partiel de la querelle qui oppose la Libye et la Suisse	6	24-2-2010
<i>Le Monde</i>	REPORTAGE; A Misrata, visite macabre au cadavre du Guide déchu	4	25-10-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	REPORTAGE; Libye: "Syrte devait mourir, voilà tout"	4	28-10-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	REPORTAGE; Libye: à Misrata, des milliers de détenus s'entassent dans des prisons improvisées	4	30-10-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	Sans détour   Chronique; Le printemps, c'est fini ?	16	29-10-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	Syrte sera-t-elle rasée par la rage post-Kadhafi ?	1	28-10-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	Torture en Libye: le silence embarrassé de Paris	3	19-2-2012
<i>Le Monde</i>	Un fonds souverain opaque, présent surtout en Italie	7	25-2-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	Une coalition de pays volontaires, aux contours encore mal définis	6	22-3-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	Une résolution de l'ONU, mais plusieurs interprétations	8	23-3-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	UNION EUROPÉENNE; La Libye n'accorderait plus de visas aux ressortissants de l'espace Schengen	8	16-2-2010
<i>Le Monde</i>	Ventes d'armes: la France fait profil bas en Libye et veut diversifier ses clients	15	27-10-2011
<i>Le Monde</i>	Vingt ans de guerre: ça suffit !	13	10-8-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	After bullets, a bouncy castle - and a moderate poll winner in Libya: As Martyrs' Square turns into a playground, Luke Harding in Tripoli reports on the man bucking the Arab spring's Islamist trend	1	10-7-2012
<i>The Guardian</i>	And now let the desert consume him ...' Gaddafi is buried in an unmarked grave: Dictator given full Islamic rites, say authorities Relatives and sheikhs sent to wash three corpses	3	26-10-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Arab spring: A magic moment of joy at ending of Libya's tyranny: Liberation is announced in city where uprising began Elated crowds celebrate and salute their martyrs	2	24-10-2011

<i>The Guardian</i>	Arab spring: Dictator's will: Final wish to be buried at home	2	24-10-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Arab spring: Gaddafi's death: Decaying bodies normally repel - in Misrata, they do exactly the opposite	3	24-10-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Arab spring: Women sustained the uprising. But what can they expect in return?: Female protesters have had a key role in the tumult, but there are few signs that their rights will improve in an altered Arab world	24	23-4-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Armed Gaddafi loyalists seize Libyan town: Old regime's flag said to be flying over Bani Walid Blow to government as it struggles to take control	15	24-1-2012
<i>The Guardian</i>	Britain sends attack helicopters to Libya: Apaches will join French Tigers to hit Gaddafi forces Heaviest bombing of Nato campaign so far hits Tripoli	2	24-5-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Britain sends planes to help with mass airlift of refugees	1	3-3-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Britain tells Gaddafi loyalists: defect or face war crimes trial: SAS on standby to rescue trapped Britons: Leader says Libya will be 'red with fire'	1	26-2-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Britain's bill for Libya campaign could reach £1.75bn, expert warns: Analysis of RAF figures shows war might cost seven times government estimate:	1	26-10-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Call for inquiry into Libyan dictator's death	24	27-10-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Clarke: UK at risk of a new Lockerbie: Gaddafi revenge a threat, claims lord chancellor Tory big-hitter says Libya war goals remain unclear	1	26-3-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Death is everywhere': Gaddafi lashes out as power slips away: Diplomats quit over brutal crackdown: Pilots flee to Malta in fighter jets	1	22-2-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Death of a dictator: Gaddafi killed by rebels in wake of French air strike: Crowds cheer as body paraded through Misrata: Nato prepares to announce an end to Libyan mission	1	21-10-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Death of Gaddafi: Reconstruction: British business to benefit: States within a state	6	22-10-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Discord at the heart of Nato over who commands no-fly campaign in Libya: UK reluctant to take on leading role with France: US determined to end its control of air campaign	1	23-3-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Do not celebrate anniversary of Megrahi's release, UK warns Libya: Good relations would be harmed, says ambassador Lockerbie bomber 'could live another seven years'	17	20-8-2010
<i>The Guardian</i>	Dr Gaddafi's LSE thesis makes a good case for the action that crushed him: Military intervention is only justified by specific, extreme circumstances. Go beyond that, and you have a disaster like Iraq	41	1-12-2012
<i>The Guardian</i>	Ethics turn into logistics: Behind the leaders' joint statement on Libya lies desperation - and an ominous mission creep	31	16-4-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Fox reveals £260m cost of Libya campaign: Defence secretary says high cost of operation is down to advanced weapons used to cut civilian deaths	4	24-6-2011



<i>The Guardian</i>	Framing the debate: The stench of doublethink: How absurd for the west to fret about the fate of Gaddafi's corpse, as if war has noble outcomes	30	26-10-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	G2: America's floating fortress: It weighs 40,000 tonnes, carries 1,000 marines and boasts enough military hardware to invade a small country. Its aircraft are already in action over Libya, but aboard the USS Kearsarge, the biggest concern is spending enough time in the gym.	6	1-4-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	G2: Lost in Showbiz: Saadi Gaddafi's Hollywood adventure: Just remember to applaud and all will be fine	3	28-5-2010
<i>The Guardian</i>	G2: Return fire: Libya's arms trade blowback: Gaddafi amassed a vast collection of military hardware, much of which is now sitting virtually unguarded. Is it destined for the arms black market? By Andrew Feinstein	6	27-10-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Gaddafi bans most Europeans from travelling to Libya over Swiss row: Citizens from Schengen countries refused visas Move follows blacklisting of Libyans by Switzerland	18	17-2-2010
<i>The Guardian</i>	Gaddafi cannot escape justice, insists ICC: Hague plan to let dictator stay in Libya dismissed Arrest warrant cannot be ignored, says prosecutor	18	27-7-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Gaddafi's desperate bid to save regime revealed: Tripoli feared full US invasion: Libyan PM's letter to Obama: Fresh battles in heart of capital	1	26-8-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Gaddafi's fugitive son Saif 'must face justice in Libya': New regime says offers to surrender to The Hague court are merely a diversionary tactic, reports Martin Chulov in Tripoli	32	30-10-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Gaddafi's vow to turn new Libya into hell	1	2-9-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Has Africa lost Libya?: Gaddafi's overthrow has highlighted the country's Arab heritage and created divisions in the continent	28	19-9-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	If this was about saving lives, it was a catastrophic failure: Nato claimed it would protect civilians in Libya, but delivered far more killing. It's a warning to the Arab world and Africa	33	27-10-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	In a time of war, scepticism is the best weapon MPs have: Instead of cheering on Cameron, the Commons must reassert itself after its gung-ho disgrace over Iraq and Afghanistan	33	21-3-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Inside Libya's first free city: Martin Chulov is the first western journalist to reach Benghazi, where Libya's uprising began and where Gaddafi is now powerless	1	24-2-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Is this the start of civil war?: Martin Chulov reports from rebel-held Brega, eastern Libya, where at least six people died yesterday as the town fought off an attack by pro-Gaddafi forces	1	3-3-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Labour warns helicopters would be serious escalation of Libya conflict: Public and parliament 'left in the dark' about plan No decision has been taken, government says	4	25-5-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Letter: Questions remain over Lockerbie	31	23-7-2010
<i>The Guardian</i>	Libya claims victory in Swiss row	20	29-3-2010
<i>The</i>	Libya defiant as hundreds feared dead: Witnesses describe	1	21-2-2011

<i>Guardian</i>	'massacres as troops shoot unarmed protesters		
<i>The Guardian</i>	Libya Diplomacy: 'We're united and we will fight for this land,' Gaddafi loyalists warn: Talk of intervention sends many into arms of leader Messages of sacrifice and determination on state TV	2	19-3-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Libya on brink as protests hit Tripoli: Gaddafi's son warns of civil war in TV address: Hundreds killed as regime tries to halt uprising	1	21-2-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Libya still needs Britain: A year on from military intervention, we can help fight corruption with our institutional knowhow	32	21-3-2012
<i>The Guardian</i>	Libya: A year after Gaddafi's death Libya remains a land torn by conflict: Years of the dead hand of dictatorship have left a country unable to deal with security concerns and regional rivalries	32	20-10-2012
<i>The Guardian</i>	Libya: Berber rebellion: Western tribes seize chance to right ancient wrongs: Ghaith Abdul-Ahad meets the coalition of poets, doctors and web-savvy youths at the heart of a tribal uprising	16	1-3-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Libya: British links: UK firm defends military sales	4	22-2-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Libya: Defections: Pilots were 'told to bomb protesters'	2	22-2-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Libya: Financial pressure: US Treasury blocks \$30bn in assets held by Gaddafi and his officials	17	1-3-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Libya: Foreign policy: Dad's Army mission leaves panicked PM red-faced	7	7-3-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Libya: In no man's land, petrol for Gaddafi's regime is traded at smugglers' bazaar: Ghaith Abdul-Ahad joins a caravan of trailers and pick-up trucks on the Tunisian border, where guards turn a blind eye	23	11-8-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Libya: International response: World sends message to Gaddafi: it is time to end your regime	4	28-2-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Libya: 'It's descending into hell': Britons describe hysteria at airport as thousands try to flee: First UK-bound planes arrive from Tripoli Frigate leaves Benghazi after weather delays	6	25-2-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Libya: Military response: A war with sobering precedents	5	21-3-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Libya: Military response: Military families: Going into Libya is 'utter lunacy'	5	21-3-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Libya: Nato to control no-fly zone after France gives way to Turkey: Climbdown by Sarkozy ends infighting among western allies	26	25-3-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Libya: NTC agrees to investigate the killing of Gaddafi	13	25-10-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Libya: Obama warns of sanctions as pressure grows for no-fly zone: Bloodshed and suffering unacceptable, says US president, but Britain unlikely to back call until UK nationals are evacuated	6	24-2-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Libya: On the ground: Gaddafi calls on Libyans to resist the 'colonialists': The defiant leader promises to wage a long war as officials say 64 have died	2	21-3-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Libya: Refugees: Aid agencies face escalating crisis as foreign workers flee	10	2-3-2011
<i>The</i>	Libya: Strategy: Infighting dogs US bid to hand control to Nato:	6	23-3-2011

<i>Guardian</i>	Turkey accuses Sarkozy of exploiting situation as diplomats argue over command structure of operation Obama is adamant he will not lead		
<i>The Guardian</i>	Libya: Strategy: Split averted as Nato given military control: International coalition including Qatar and United Arab Emirates to share oversight of UN-mandated anti-Gaddafi campaign	6	23-3-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Libya: Suspicion, delight, threats, dire warnings: the world reacts to intervention in Libya	18	31-3-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Libya: The battleground: Tripoli: School where pupils under fire are strictly on message	3	22-3-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Libya: The future: Cameron looks to release cash for rebels - and steers clear of triumphalism: PM focuses on backing Libya's likely new leaders as he warns of difficulties ahead	6	23-8-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Libya: The perils of intervention	48	19-3-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Libya: 'They hung me from a wall in a cell. I was regularly tortured': Senior rebel commander demands apology after documents reveal UK and US role in his capture and brutal interrogation	6	5-9-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Libya: Tripoli threatens retaliation in the Mediterranean: Warning to sea and air traffic if foreign forces act Gaddafi says 'no mercy' will be shown in Benghazi	2	18-3-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Libya: UK interests	7	23-2-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Libya: US: Obama considers military options as no-fly zone gathers support	4	8-3-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Libya: View from the border: Sudden decline in outflow of migrant workers suggests thousands may be trapped	18	5-3-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Libya: 'What we need now is free speech and free thought': Luke Harding meets the people of Tripoli and finds two recurring themes: a desire for retribution, and a passion for democracy	4	27-10-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Libyan prime minister snubs Islamists with cabinet to please western backers: Captor of Saif Gaddafi given defence portfolio Hague prosecutor at odds with Tripoli's justice chief	19	23-11-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Libya's promised reconstruction boom fails to rise from the ruins: A year after Gaddafi was overthrown, British businesses are hardly packing their suitcases in a stampede to return. Are they missing a chance - or is the country still too fragile? Chris Stephen in Tripoli and Simon Goodley report	40	26-8-2012
<i>The Guardian</i>	Lockerbie bomber freed amid Gaddafi trade threats: Pan Am bomber freed amid trade threats	1	8-12-2010
<i>The Guardian</i>	Lockerbie: US steps up pressure on Salmond	2	21-8-2010
<i>The Guardian</i>	Media: Freelance coverage, full-time dangers	28	14-11-2012
<i>The Guardian</i>	Middle East: BP and Shell join British trade mission to Libya: Minister says visit is about dialogue, not contracts British officials nervous about implications of trip	16	27-9-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Middle East: Political dynasties: From father to son, the next in line: Across the Arab world, the scions of various political	27	28-1-2011

	dynasties are looking on in fear. Simon Tisdall profiles the men who would be king		
<i>The Guardian</i>	Middle East: US backs no-fly zone over Libya but rebels fear aid will come too late to stop Gaddafi: Uprising close to collapse as UN prepares to vote: Fleeing Benghazi residents head for Egypt	18	16-3-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Middle Eastern unrest: Libyan analysis: 'For Gaddafi it's kill or be killed. Now he's gone straight for the kill'	6	21-2-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Muslim protests: Libya: Tension and despair in Benghazi as regime looks reluctant to hunt ambassador's killers	32	22-9-2012
<i>The Guardian</i>	National: Fletcher killing: former security chief blamed: Libyan PM says Senussi was involved in murder: Tribute to police officer 'doing duty for both sides'	4	26-5-2012
<i>The Guardian</i>	National: Libya: Moussa Koussa: From 'envoy of death' to MI6 contact	4	1-4-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Nightly we bomb Tripoli. Bar death, what do we achieve?: Britain should never have got involved in Libya. But Whitehall constraint has been eroded, and none in power admit their folly	29	3-8-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Obama vows to find killers of US ambassador in Libya	1	13-9-2012
<i>The Guardian</i>	Oil price enters danger zone for global recovery: Rising costs of crude could push up interest rates: Markets fear unrest will spread to Saudi Arabia	24	23-2-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Qatar admits it sent troops to support NTC fighters	24	27-10-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Return to Tripoli: freed journalist tracks down his jailer	1	31-10-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Revealed: Gaddafi envoy in Britain for secret talks: Exclusive: Aide met officials amid hints regime wants exit strategy: Gaddafi envoy in Britain for secret talks	1	1-4-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Road Trip: Tea in the Sahara: Following an ancient trade route across Libya, Sara Wheeler encounters Berber life, and finds that trade and smuggling are still alive and well	5	4-9-2010
<i>The Guardian</i>	Shattered heart of Gaddafi's government: In a fallen city with few signs of formal control, Luke Harding finds the prime minister's deserted office an eerie symbol of Libya's collapsed regime	1	25-8-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Special report: Cameron's war: why PM felt Gaddafi had to be stopped: As the Tory leader readies himself for the party conference, Patrick Wintour and Nicholas Watt look at how the Arab spring in Libya transformed him from a reluctant to a passionate interventionist	13	3-10-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Swiss had plan to send commandos into Libya: Strategy was designed to free two detained citizens Submarine rescue was considered by government	17	22-6-2010
<i>The Guardian</i>	The Big Trip: Beyond the Valley of the Kings: Away from the famous sites and Red Sea resorts, stretches of Egypt's coast are opening up to tourism. Belinda Jackson drives beside the Mediterranean from Alexandria to Libya, while opposite, Liese Spencer visits the nearest beach to Cairo	2	10-7-2010
<i>The</i>	The Gaddafi connection: A full, open inquiry is needed to find out	29	9-3-2011


<i>Guardian</i>	why so many Libyans have been given control orders		
<i>The Guardian</i>	The new Libya: claims of beatings and human rights abuses as elections near: Leading ministry surgeon seized and tortured Government's anti-militia SSC is held responsible	12	4-6-2012
<i>The Guardian</i>	The only surprise is there aren't more violent protests: The Muslim eruption reflects a deep popular anger and blowback from US intervention in both Libya and Afghanistan	33	19-9-2012
<i>The Guardian</i>	The wheel of history turned yesterday: it won't turn back: Gaddafi was a liar, murderer and cheat. But he said he'd fight to the death, and for once, he stuck to his word	1	21-10-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Those who dare ... get trussed up by Libyan farm guards	1	7-3-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	Though the risks are real, the case for interventionism remains strong: Not to respond to Gaddafi's chilling threats would leave us culpable, but action in Libya is fraught with danger	31	23-3-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	US visit: Libya: Relations with Britain good, says minister	4	21-7-2010
<i>The Guardian</i>	US visit: No inquiry, but freeing bomber was wrong - Cameron: PM pins decision on Scottish government Cabinet secretary to study lobbyist's calls to Straw	4	21-7-2010
<i>The Guardian</i>	We can no longer live under Gaddafi's evil subjugation: Libya's oil has protected its regime from criticism abroad. But those who support democracy must back our fight for freedom	30	22-2-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	We will prosecute Gaddafi's killers, say Libya's leaders: Captors' gruesome images caused revulsion abroad Little sympathy in Misrata for leader's violent end	31	28-10-2011
<i>The Guardian</i>	World briefing Hague forced to give ground	18	27-7-2011

## Appendix B

During the conflict, how many articles were published in total during each phase of the conflict?

Phase	<i>The Guardian</i>	<i>Le Monde</i>	<i>Die Welt</i>
1	129	89	69
2	273	225	131
3	175	121	109
4	675	580	397
5	415	271	185
6	43	33	37

Total number of articles published during each phase of the conflict




## Appendix C

During the conflict, how often did Libya make the front page?

Phase	<i>The Guardian</i>	<i>Le Monde</i>	<i>Die Welt</i>
1	16	8	17
2	23	17	21
3	17	8	20
4	52	38	44
5	36	17	32
6	4	2	5

Total number of articles on Libya that made the front page during the conflict



## Appendix D

Changing orientations over time: per phase

### Orientations during phase 1

	<i>The Guardian</i>	<i>Le Monde</i>	<i>Die Welt</i>
P1	11	25	28
P2	2	2	3
P3	4	4	4
P4	18	4	8
W1	47	19	19
W2	2	0	0
W3	7	3	8
W4	18	1	5

### Orientations during phase 2

	<i>The Guardian</i>	<i>Le Monde</i>	<i>Die Welt</i>
P1	10	17	24
P2	2	1	5
P3	4	1	1
P4	7	2	5
W1	22	14	5
W2	0	1	2
W3	12	9	4
W4	13	23	18

### Orientations during phase 3

	<i>The Guardian</i>	<i>Le Monde</i>	<i>Die Welt</i>
P1	12	9	25
P2	2	1	1
P3	3	3	3
P4	2	1	3
W1	20	3	2
W2	3	1	0
W3	8	16	10
W4	17	19	14



#### Orientations during phase 4

	<i>The Guardian</i>	<i>Le Monde</i>	<i>Die Welt</i>
P1	14	19	19
P2	5	4	9
P3	3	0	3
P4	5	6	5
W1	19	10	11
W2	1	4	0
W3	6	7	9
W4	8	16	11

#### Orientations during phase 5

	<i>The Guardian</i>	<i>Le Monde</i>	<i>Die Welt</i>
P1	7	20	20
P2	4	6	11
P3	7	4	1
P4	10	4	6
W1	24	5	8
W2	2	0	0
W3	6	9	8
W4	11	10	4

#### Orientations during phase 6


	<i>The Guardian</i>	<i>Le Monde</i>	<i>Die Welt</i>
P1	24	7	16
P2	12	5	4
P3	6	4	4
P4	9	5	12
W1	27	11	9
W2	2	0	1
W3	3	7	7
W4	5	8	4

Changing orientations over time: per newspaper


### ***The Guardian*: orientations over time**

	P1	P2	P3	P4	W1	W2	W3	W4
Phase 1	11	2	4	18	47	2	7	18
Phase 2	10	2	4	7	22	0	12	13
Phase 3	12	2	3	2	20	3	8	17
Phase 4	14	5	3	5	19	1	6	8
Phase 5	7	4	7	10	24	2	6	11
Phase 6	24	12	6	9	27	2	3	5

### **Peace orientations over time in *The Guardian***




### **War orientations over time in *The Guardian***




### Le Monde: orientations over time

	P1	P2	P3	P4	W1	W2	W3	W4
Phase 1	25	2	4	4	19	0	3	1
Phase 2	17	1	1	2	14	1	9	23
Phase 3	9	1	3	1	3	1	16	19
Phase 4	19	4	0	6	10	4	7	16
Phase 5	20	6	4	4	5	0	9	10
Phase 6	7	5	4	5	11	0	7	8

### Peace orientations over time in *Le Monde*




### War orientations over time in *Le Monde*




### Die Welt: orientations over time

	P1	P2	P3	P4	W1	W2	W3	W4
Phase 1	28	3	4	8	19	0	8	5
Phase 2	24	5	1	5	5	2	4	18
Phase 3	25	1	3	3	2	0	10	14
Phase 4	19	9	3	5	11	0	9	11
Phase 5	20	11	1	6	8	0	8	4
Phase 6	16	4	4	12	9	1	7	4

### Peace orientations in *Die Welt*



### War orientations in *Die Welt*



## Appendix E

### Independent samples t-tests for peace/war score

Newspaper 1 = *The Guardian*, 2 = *Le Monde*, 3 = *Die Welt*

t-test peace/war score *The Guardian* and *Die Welt*

Group Statistics				
Newspapername	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
peacewarscore 1	78	,1441	,59977	,06791
3	78	-,1783	,59226	,06706

Independent Samples Test										
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
peacewarscore	Equal variances assumed	,074	,786	3,378	154	,001	,32244	,09544	,13389	,51098
	Equal variances not assumed			3,378	153,976	,001	,32244	,09544	,13389	,51098

t-test peace/war score *Le Monde* and *Die Welt*

Group Statistics				
Newspapername	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
peacewarscore 2	78	,1185	,65486	,07415
3	78	-,1783	,59226	,06706

Independent Samples Test										
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
peacewarscore	Equal variances assumed	2,167	,143	2,969	154	,003	,29679	,09998	,09929	,49430
	Equal variances not assumed			2,969	152,471	,003	,29679	,09998	,09928	,49431

t-test peace/war score *The Guardian* and *Le Monde*

Group Statistics				
Newspapername	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
peacewarscore 1	78	,1441	,59977	,06791
2	78	,1185	,65486	,07415

Independent Samples Test										
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
peacewarscore	Equal variances assumed	1,477	,226	,255	154	,799	,02564	,10055	-,17299	,22427
	Equal variances not assumed			,255	152,826	,799	,02564	,10055	-,17300	,22428

## Appendix F

### Independent samples t-test quantity peace scores

Newspaper 1 = *The Guardian*, 2 = *Le Monde*, 3 = *Die Welt*

t-test quantity of peace codes in *The Guardian* and *Die Welt*

Group Statistics				
	Newspapername	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
totalpeacecodes	1	78	2,3462	2,26106
	3	78	2,8205	2,19648

Independent Samples Test										
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
totalpeacecodes	Equal variances assumed	,250	,618	-1,329	154	,186	-,47436	,35693	-1,17946	,23074
	Equal variances not assumed			-1,329	153,871	,186	-,47436	,35693	-1,17947	,23075

t-test quantity of peace codes in *Le Monde* and *Die Welt*

Group Statistics				
	Newspapername	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
totalpeacecodes	2	78	1,9744	1,65124
	3	78	2,8205	2,19648

Independent Samples Test										
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
totalpeacecodes	Equal variances assumed	2,645	,106	-2,720	154	,007	-,84615	,31114	-1,46081	-,23150
	Equal variances not assumed			-2,720	142,965	,007	-,84615	,31114	-1,46119	-,23112

t-test quantity of peace codes in *The Guardian* and *Le Monde*

Group Statistics				
	Newspapername	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
totalpeacecodes	1	78	2,3462	2,26106
	2	78	1,9744	1,65124

Independent Samples Test										
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
totalpeacecodes	Equal variances assumed	,828	,364	1,173	154	,243	,37179	,31702	-,25447	,99806
	Equal variances not assumed			1,173	140,945	,243	,37179	,31702	-,25493	,99852

## Appendix G

### Independent samples t-test quantity of war codes

Newspaper 1 = *The Guardian*, 2 = *Le Monde*, 3 = *Die Welt*

t-test quantity of war codes in *The Guardian* and *Die Welt*

Group Statistics				
	Newspapername	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
totalwarcodes	1	78	3,6282	3,04131
	3	78	2,0385	1,80506

Independent Samples Test									
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means					
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference
totalwarcodes	Equal variances assumed	17,833	,000	3,970	154	,000	1,58974	,40045	,79867 2,38082
	Equal variances not assumed			3,970	125,259	,000	1,58974	,40045	,79723 2,38226

t-test quantity of war codes in *Le Monde* and *Die Welt*

Group Statistics				
	Newspapername	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
totalwarcodes	1	78	3,6282	3,04131
	2	78	2,5128	1,91198

Independent Samples Test									
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means					
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference
totalwarcodes	Equal variances assumed	14,321	,000	2,742	154	,007	1,11538	,40676	,31184 1,91893
	Equal variances not assumed			2,742	129,642	,007	1,11538	,40676	,31064 1,92013

t-test quantity of war codes in *The Guardian* and *Le Monde*

Group Statistics				
	Newspapername	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
totalwarcodes	1	78	3,6282	3,04131
	2	78	2,5128	1,91198

Independent Samples Test									
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means					
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference
totalwarcodes	Equal variances assumed	14,321	,000	2,742	154	,007	1,11538	,40676	,31184 1,91893
	Equal variances not assumed			2,742	129,642	,007	1,11538	,40676	,31064 1,92013

## Appendix H

### Average peace/war score per phase

Phase	<i>The Guardian</i>	<i>Le Monde</i>	<i>Die Welt</i>
1	0,12	-0,23	-0,22
2	0,07	0,45	-0,18
3	0,47	0,54	-0,04
4	0,07	0,07	-0,08
5	0,13	-0,19	-0,37
6	-0,01	0,07	-0,17

### Peace/war score descriptive statistics per phase

#### Phase 1

	<i>The Guardian</i>	<i>Le Monde</i>	<i>Die Welt</i>
Average war/peace score	0,12	-0,23	-0,22
Median	0,25	-0,14	-0,11
Std. dev.	0,75	0,74	0,66
Range	From -1 to 1	From -1 to 1	From -1 to 1
Frequency of peace/war score 1: absolute war frame	1	2	1
Frequency of peace/war score -1: absolute peace frame	3	5	4

#### Phase 2

	<i>The Guardian</i>	<i>Le Monde</i>	<i>Die Welt</i>
Average war/peace score	0,07	0,45	-0,18
Median	0,2	0,6	-0,2
Std. dev.	0,69	0,63	0,63
Range	From -1 to 1	From -1 to 1	From -1 to 1
Frequency of peace/war score 1: absolute war frame	1	5	1
Frequency of peace/war score -1: absolute peace frame	2	1	3



### Phase 3

	<i>The Guardian</i>	<i>Le Monde</i>	<i>Die Welt</i>
Average war/peace score	0,47	0,54	-0,04
Median	0,5	0,5	-0,2
Std. dev.	0,48	0,43	0,71
Range	From -0,6 to 1	From -0,5 to 1	From -1 to 1
Frequency of peace/war score 1: absolute war frame	4	3	2
Frequency of peace/war score -1: absolute peace frame	0	0	2

### Phase 4

	<i>The Guardian</i>	<i>Le Monde</i>	<i>Die Welt</i>
Average war/peace score	0,07	0,07	-0,08
Median	0,33	0,14	-0,2
Std. dev.	0,54	0,67	0,39
Range	From -1 to 0,71	From -1 to 1	From -0,6 to 0,67
Frequency of peace/war score 1: absolute war frame	0	2	0
Frequency of peace/war score -1: absolute peace frame	1	2	0

### Phase 5

	<i>The Guardian</i>	<i>Le Monde</i>	<i>Die Welt</i>
Average war/peace score	0,13	-0,19	-0,37
Median	0,27	-0,33	-0,33
Std. dev.	0,58	0,52	0,48
Range	From -1 to 1	From -1 to 0,67	From -1 to 0,33
Frequency of peace/war score 1: absolute war frame	1	0	0
Frequency of peace/war score -1: absolute peace frame	1	1	4

### Phase 6

	<i>The Guardian</i>	<i>Le Monde</i>	<i>Die Welt</i>
Average war/peace score	-0,01	0,07	-0,17
Median	0	0	-0,11
Std. dev.	0,52	0,59	0,68
Range	From -1 to 1	From -1 to 1	From -1 to 1
Frequency of peace/war score 1: absolute war frame	1	2	2
Frequency of peace/war score -1: absolute peace frame	1	1	3

## Appendix I

*Guardian* correlation page number and peace/war score

Correlations			
		Page nr	Peace/war score
Page nr	Pearson Correlation	1	-,328**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,003
	N	78	78
Peace/war score	Pearson Correlation	-,328**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,003	
	N	78	78

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*Le Monde* correlation page number and peace/war score

Correlations			
		Page nr	Peace/war score
Page nr	Pearson Correlation	1	-,130
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,258
	N	78	78
Peace/war score	Pearson Correlation	-,130	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,258	
	N	78	78

*Die Welt* correlation page number and peace/war score

Correlations			
		Page nr	Peace/war score
Page nr	Pearson Correlation	1	-,286*
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,011
	N	78	78
Peace/war score	Pearson Correlation	-,286*	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,011	
	N	78	78

\*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

## Appendix J

### Looking at propaganda: representations of the same speech by Saif Al Islam by *The Guardian* and *Die Welt*

#### Passage from *The Guardian* ("Libya on brink", 21-2-2011)

*But the regime went on the attack when Saif al-Islam appeared on state TV to say it was a "tragedy" that Libyans had died but warned of "civil war" unless order was restored. "There is a plot against Libya," said Saif, blaming "an Islamic group with a military agenda" for the bloodshed in Benghazi. Libya would see "rivers of blood", an exodus of foreign oil companies and occupation by "imperialists" if the violence continued, he said. In reality, there has been little sign of Islamist involvement in Libya's unprecedented unrest. Nor was there in the uprisings in Tunisia or Egypt. In a rambling speech Saif al-Islam repeatedly said Libya was "not Egypt or Tunisia", neighbouring countries whose leaders were swept from power in recent weeks. "Muammar Gaddafi, our leader, is leading the battle in Tripoli, and we are with him," Saif al-Islam said. "The armed forces are with him. Tens of thousands are heading here to be with him. We will fight until the last man, the last woman, the last bullet." Wagging a finger at the camera, he blamed Libyan exiles for fomenting the violence but also promised dialogue on the country's constitution, saying that the general people's congress, Libya's equivalent of a parliament, would convene today to discuss a "clear" reform agenda, while the government would also raise wages.*

#### Passage from *Die Welt* ("Arabische Revolution: Ist", 22-2-2011)

*"Libyen ist nicht Tunesien und auch nicht Ägypten", sagt ein etwas ratlos wirkender Saif al-Islam al-Gaddafi (38) in die Kameras des staatlichen Fernsehens. "Mein Vater wird von der Armee gestützt, wir werden bis zur letzten Minute und bis zur letzten Patrone kämpfen." Der zweitälteste von insgesamt sieben Gaddafi-Söhnen - die einzige Tochter Aischa ist Anwältin und war im Verteidigerteam von Saddam Hussein - machte gleichwohl Angebote an die protestierenden Massen: Reformen bei den Medien- und Strafgesetzen sowie eine Diskussion über eine neue Verfassung. Zugleich warnte er vor Spaltung und Bürgerkrieg und legte Wert auf die Feststellung, dass sein Vater nach wie vor alles kontrolliere.*