


**Attitudes toward globalization**  
*cross-country, cross-time study in the Visegrad group countries and  
Benelux Union countries*



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## **Abstract**

Attitudes toward globalization are of great importance. Not only do they represent what people of a country think about globalization, but they can play an active role in the political scene, especially in the case of democratic countries. In this thesis, the focus will be set on attitudes toward economic globalization. These attitudes were studied using surveys made in both the Benelux Union countries, as well as in the Visegrad group. These attitudes were compared with the survey's benchmark, within each group and between groups, in order to find out the differences. Finally, ordered probit models were used, in order to determine which variables influence the likelihood in different countries and for the different years, to facilitate different time periods comparison. The results have shown that mostly, attitudes toward globalization are influenced by the circumstances that people encounter in their lives, together with their capacity to take advantage of opportunities, which means that attitudes are not innate. Attitudes toward globalization became more negative within the Benelux Union and the Visegrad group countries during the first decade of the 2000's.

**Keywords:** globalization, attitudes, Benelux, Visegrad, ordered probit

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## Chapter 1- Introduction

Donald Trump, the president of the USA, stated in June 2015: „*I would build a great wall -- and nobody builds walls better than me, believe me - and I'll build them very inexpensively. I will build a great, great wall on our southern border. And I will have Mexico pay for that wall.*” „*Close the Dutch borders*” (Geert Wilders, 2017). In Twitter, a Slovak politician posted an image with the focus of his party: „*a Slovak Slovakia... against making benefits for foreign entrepreneurs instead of Slovaks...pursuing the self-sufficiency of Slovakia*” (Marian Kotleba, 2016). With statements as those on the rise, given by powerful persons it is impossible to deny that globalization does play a role in current policy-making. Globalization is something that concerns each one of us, no matter to what extent we are aware of it, and anti-globalization proposals in political parties, motivated by the attitudes of their constituency, are increasing.

Attitudes that are “against” globalization are not the result of one specific event or situation, they have diverse motives. One reason for anti-globalization attitudes to arise could be that due to the success of ever lower tariff barriers (WTO website, 2017; World Bank website, 2017) the focus has shifted toward lowering non-tariff barriers. This means that standards for quotas and subsidies, among others, must be equalized across countries, which makes people concerned and overly protective of their own ways. Another trigger for anti-globalization attitudes can be the income distribution effects (Milanovic, 2005). As trade increases, inequality raises as well. These changes seen along the twentieth and twenty-first centuries can explain part of the negative attitudes regarding globalization.

The “anti-globalization movement” can come as a surprise, because, since the end of World War II, there has been a marked tendency toward a world in which free trade, along with free movement of capital, goods and labor would be something obvious. At least in the case of the Visegrad group, that performed substantial efforts to become members of the European Union, and the Benelux Union countries, which were the pillars of the European Community, it might appear at first sight that attitudes against globalization are something new. Nevertheless, due to the growing popularity of social media, it is much easier to publicly utter one’s discontents today than it was decades ago. By the end of the past century, systems of world governance found themselves under great tension, as both the social and economic capability of countries

becomes constrained due to globalization. Moreover, international institutions were not yet able to solve the concerns that changes arising because of an increasingly globalized world had incited (Tisdell, 2000). The second part of the 1990's decade experienced an expanding, and in some cases, violent, movement against globalization, predominantly in the Western countries. This movement manifested itself via demonstrations that happened where the meetings of organizations closely associated with globalization, such as the International Monetary Fund, the WTO or the G7/8 assemblies. These demonstrations became increasingly easy to coordinate with the use of the Internet, and were motivated by the rising awareness of the economic and social inequalities that globalization causes (Robertson & White, 2007).

Abdelal & Segal (2007); Steger & Wilson (2012) claim that different historical events - financial crises, the current account deficit of the USA, outsourcing phenomena (firms deciding to relocate their businesses abroad), among many others, all have a certain degree of 'guilt' when it comes to the shift that we are witnessing nowadays, toward the re-erection of barriers and a new era of protectionism. Furthermore, the fact that there was globalization in the past does not, of course, mean that (all the) people agreed with it<sup>1</sup>. A difficulty that arises regarding globalization is that there cannot exist one single way to deal with it for a liberal country, since programs enhancing economic integration and liberalization are meant to increase efficiency and wealth, and mostly do. (Purdy, 2004). Globalization is needed the most by people in developing countries (as half of the world's population survives on less than 2USD per day) (IMF, 2008). It can be seen from newspapers, media, and even the outcomes of elections that a movement against globalization is on the rise, in contrast to what apparently was before. For example, the campaigns prior to the 2003 Dutch elections witnessed increasingly diverse attitudes of several political parties toward European integration, while years before the tendency was clearly toward a united, single-currency Europe, being the Netherlands as one of the oldest members (Jones, 2005).

As of today, many people identify themselves as having attitudes against globalization, as a large proportion of the population is excluded from the benefits that globalization entails (Held & McGrew, 2007). Globalization has lowered the feeling of isolation that many people felt, while giving them access to knowledge that just a century ago was not accessible even to the

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<sup>1</sup> Although a commonly discussed topic, it has been proven that globalization does not have a direct impact on inflation. The supposed impact of globalization on long-run levels of inflation, or on the Phillips curve, seem to be the result of fallacious calculations, at least in the case of the USA (Ball, 2006).



## Attitudes toward globalization

wealthiest. Nevertheless, anti-globalization feelings come from this increasing interconnectedness, as globalization has not been able to reduce poverty and neither increase stability. A clear example of this is Russia and other post-communist countries. Globalization had promised that the newly introduced economic system would bring unprecedented prosperity. Nevertheless, it brought unprecedented poverty. Globalization critics accuse “the west” from being hypocrites, by motivating other countries to lower barriers to trade while keeping their own and stopping third-world countries from exporting their agricultural products in order to support local farmers (Stiglitz, 2002). McAdam et al. (1996) suggest that the greed of corporations, concerns regarding job security, worries about the environment and national culture preservation, together with the debt of the “Third World,” and that all these problems together are due to globalization, suggest some of the reasons for the anti-globalization movement.

Attitudes toward globalization vary significantly depending on whether the country experimenting globalization processes is a developed or a developing country, and this can be seen mainly in the fundamental reasons for which demonstrations take place. In developed countries, people would like to restrict international trade to improve labor conditions, as well as to enhance environmental standards. In developing countries, the interests are more varied. Some people want to push forward their own interests, especially economic interests, while others do care about environmental issues (Tisdell, 2000). Over the last decade, people have been witnessing increasingly strong arguments against globalization coming not only from the media, but also from well-known economists. Almost three decades ago, Japan, allegedly protectionist, was set as an example for the US by Paul Krugman. In the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the economic rise of China and India was expected to have a negative repercussion on the US according to Paul Samuelson, which was understood by the media as a call for protectionism. More recently, in 2006, Alan Blinder published an essay stating that American jobs would be outsourced to India and China, making Americans lose their jobs. (Bhagwati & Blinder, 2009).

It is interesting to delve into the reasons behind what has apparently changed the attitudes of politicians toward political opportunism, on both sides of the spectrum-politicians wish countries to experience only globalization that benefits the country, and some see globalization a zero-sum game. The attitudes of the politicians represent more than their own attitudes; they proxy the changed attitudes of their constituency. The **research objective** of this master thesis

is to find out the attitudes toward globalization, what motivates them, and whether they have changed over time (and if so, why is it the case)-as defined by the attitudes toward migration, trade with other countries and attitudes toward globalization in general. The focus of this thesis will be on the Benelux Union and Visegrad Group countries, since my first-hand experience living and studying in three of the seven countries to be analyzed, as well as the knowledge of several of the languages spoken in them, can complement the outcomes flowing from the quantitative analysis.

Peoples' attitudes toward globalization matter from an economic point of view mainly because opinion of the public produces a certain level of pressure on policy makers, not only in democratic countries, but also in nondemocratic ones. Therefore, changes in said attitudes will be reflected in the political circles, which can implement policies that affect the lives of many. Especially labor regulations, taxation of corporations, and restrictions of the repatriation of capital implemented by the authorities are, to a high degree, influenced by the public opinion. Sassen (2006) states that the present times are of significant changes, comparable with the industrial revolution, with globalization being often (mistakenly) understood as a zero-sum game. Evidence has proven that public opinion tends to move earlier than policy, more than vice-versa, with public opinion being influenced or even manipulated by the policy makers (Page & Shapiro, 1983).

Lindert and Williamson (2003) suggest that national policies are derived from the attitudes people have toward intra-national globalization. This means that when the attitudes change, the policies are likely to change, as well, so it is useful to look at changes in attitudes as a predictor of changes in policy-making. There are two main reasons why it is fruitful to analyze changes in attitudes. The risk of "political contagion" is the first of them. This means that, with the rise of anti-globalization attitudes in the US and the UK, many other countries (especially in Europe) have followed suit. The second is that the de-globalization that is led by the US, makes the world poorer and increases instability (Yakabuski, 2016).

In order to fulfill the research objective, the following question will be answered:

**'Which factors determine a higher chance of having a negative attitude toward globalization?'**

It is a rather broad question, that will be narrowed down by focusing on the countries of the

Benelux Union and the Visegrad group. The differences between the Benelux Union and the Visegrad group in attitudes regarding globalization will be analyzed. The differences between each of the countries of the Visegrad group and the Benelux Union will be considered, as each country is unique. Despite having great linguistic, as well as moderate cultural differences, the Benelux Union countries have had the longest experience with integration among Europe's small countries. Nowadays more than ever before, the Benelux Union is a tightly connected group, as the countries are also members of the EU. Being in both groups shows a common identity of the three countries, that although is not more important than the national identity, might as well represent similar attitudes of their people (Jones, 2005). The Visegrad group countries, although having very different historical, cultural and linguistic backgrounds, represent a well-integrated group (Visegrad group website, 2017). Especially Slovakia and the Czech Republic, having strong ties in the past can be said to be the closest two countries among the group. Therefore, it is in place to consider that the attitudes within the Visegrad group might be similar. It is difficult to say whether the attitudes toward globalization differ (or differed) substantially between the Benelux Union and the Visegrad group, as the literature available does not provide a comparative study.

In order to answer the research question, the following sub-questions will be addressed. First, will be dealt with what globalization is: **What is the definition of globalization?**

The second sub-question will be: **What were the attitudes toward globalization in the 1990's?** This point in time is taken as first due to data availability, as well as comparison reasons. In the Benelux Union, this period followed decades of prosperity, with data on GDP in current US\$ showing a growing trend (World Bank, 2017), and unifying efforts with the intention of creating one Europe. For the Visegrad group countries, this period marked a new era- the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which had a strong influence over them, helped said countries move toward the 'west' and be more open. The Velvet revolution in Czechoslovakia can be said of representing the mentality of a great portion of its inhabitants, as protests against the socialist regime counted with above 500 000 of its 15 million population (Oslzly, 1990).

The third sub-question is going to be: **How did the attitudes toward globalization change over time?** In this part, attitudes toward international trade and migration will be analyzed. Between 1999 and 2002, the Benelux Union countries were forming a consolidated European Union with the use of a single currency. At this moment, Visegrad group countries were trying

to comply with the requirements of the European Union, in order to become members themselves. All this, before the millennium crisis. In 2008-the midst of the financial crisis, both the Benelux Union and Visegrad group countries were already full members of the EU. Therefore, the repercussion of the financial crisis could have a similar effect on their attitudes toward globalization. The year 2014 is the last for which a dataset on attitudes toward globalization is available, so will be the source of the most current data. The specific years were chosen due to availability reasons, while they also are interesting points in time.

The fourth sub-question to be addressed will be: **What are the potential determinants of attitude change regarding globalization?** To be used for hypothesis building, this question will deal with the aspects that are most likely to have changed the attitudes toward globalization. Factors found in the relevant literature, such as Hainmueller & Hix (2006), who state that increased schooling has an either positive or nonexistent effect on the probability of supporting free trade, will be discussed.

The fifth sub-question, namely, **Which of these factors can in practice affect attitudes toward globalization?** will be answered by means of empirical analysis of the available data. The last question will have to do with the most important determinants for changes in attitude toward globalization.

The possible factors that in practice affect attitudes toward globalization are suggested, and a conclusion with the likely implications that they have on international economics and business is established. The structure of the thesis is as follows: In chapter 2, a literature review on globalization and attitudes toward it is presented. Chapter 3 deals with empirical evidence on attitudes toward globalization. Chapter 4 presents the data and the methods of analysis. In chapter 5, the results of the analysis are stated. Chapter 6 concludes.

## **Chapter 2-The effects of globalization**

In this chapter, globalization will be defined, in order to be able to use this definition further in the thesis and to answer the first sub-question. Whether there is or not globalization will be analyzed, and the changes globalization has undergone since its beginnings a few centuries ago will be stated. The effects that globalization has had will be presented, as well.

### **2.1. The three steps to understand globalization**

#### ***Step 1: What is globalization?***

Defining globalization is a strenuous task. Different authors present different definitions, and consensus does not exist. Moreover, some of the authors do not achieve a definition in a positivistic sense (Stromquist & Monkman, 2014). The whole concept of globalization is, as of today, very general, and depends on the theoretical and political points people adopt. Moreover, this phenomenon can be interpreted in many ways. For some people, it means the idea of a better, more peaceful world, to others it is linked with the idea of global chaos (Hirsch, 1997). As of the year 2000, the world had already seen the flows of capital, people, goods, and even knowledge moving through national boundaries in a much faster way than before. An increase in the scope of these flows was also evident (Norris, 2005). There are many ways to look at globalization, but, for the purpose of this thesis, that is in international economics, I will use the definition that best accommodates- the one from the International Monetary Fund.

Globalization is the *“increasing integration of economies around the world, particularly through the movement of goods, services, and capital across borders”*. Globalization, in its economic sense, streams out of technological improvements and innovation, and this term also has to do with the movement of people due to job-related reasons, and even the movement of knowledge across international borders (IMF, 2008).

Globalization is usually a set of processes that takes place without any sort of “managing,” but they can be planned as well (in the case of government policy). Globalization leads to interactions at a higher, global level. The most important “players” in globalization are national companies, the most developed countries, and multinational organizations (Bahula, 2007). Furthermore, globalization is especially interesting for economists since it produces deep changes in the methods of production, distribution and sales (Kita, 2008). A ‘globalized’ human

being is one that is supposed to display behaviors, possess feelings and outlooks that outstrip the national boundaries they are subject to (Woodward, Skrbis & Bean, 2008).

### ***Step 2: Is there globalization?***

Nowadays, due to economic, cultural, and political changes, the world is becoming a “global village” (Tisdell, 2000). A hundred years ago, it was the same case, so it is not such a new phenomenon as people think today. Prior to WWII, in the year 1913, the world was already globalized. As a matter of fact, world trade had grown rapidly between 1870 and 1913, experiencing a lowering in the next few decades, and only got back to the levels pre-WWII in the 1970s. (Krugman, 2008). Therefore, it is possible to say that in a way, the world was as globalized in 1913 as it was in the 1970s. Garretsen, Peeters & de Vaal (2000) explain that between 1913 and 1994, the sum of UK exports and imports remained the same, although the trade pattern changed significantly—from importing primary products originated in the former colonies, to importing already manufactured products. Therefore, globalization does not have to mean a change in trade, but a change in trade patterns.

Nevertheless, the world is not as globalized as it is often thought of. Most of the economic activities still happen within the borders of each country. Our planet can be thought of as “semi-globalized,” since the frontiers are not ignorable (Ghemawat, 2013). Despite this, globalization occupies a stable position in both the agendas of policy-makers and the popular consciousness, especially when it comes to the possible disadvantages of it—such as worries about the effects of immigration, losing traditions and aspects of local culture, damaging of the natural and cultural environment and an increasingly unequal income distribution (Merino & Vargas, 2013). Nevertheless, Garretsen, Peeters & de Vaal (2000) find the impact of globalization is often overestimated in the European economy. It is much less of a threat than is commonly thought of. Krugman, Cooper & Srinivasan (1995) find that the expansion of international trade that took place after WWII was just a recovery to the levels prior to WWI, and even though, the USA are less dependent on foreign trade than most advanced countries were by the end of the 1800’s.

### ***Step 3: How has globalization changed?***

According to Friedman (2005), the history of globalization can be divided into three periods, specifically, Globalization 1.0, Globalization 2.0 and Globalization 3.0. This will be the classification to be used in the thesis. In the following paragraphs, empirical evidence on the guises globalization has taken, and how these have changed over the years will be presented.

Globalization 1.0 took place between 1492, when the continent of America was discovered by Christoph Columbus, and 1800- during this period, the world turned from large to medium. Countries became globalized in the search for resources and imperial conquest. The growth of maritime empires of some European nations (Spain, Portugal, the UK, and the Netherlands) enlarged the possibilities for trade of goods, as well as the movement of capital and people, not only between the Old and New continent, but also with Africa, Asia and Oceania. Globalization in this period was in the form of “expansionism” (Friedman, 2005; Hopkins, 2011).

Globalization 2.0 took place between 1800 and 2000, when the world changed from medium to small, with companies becoming globalized searching for markets for labor. The Industrial Revolution triggered the start of Globalization 2.0, which is determined mainly by a rapid increment in population, and the beginning of economies of scale. This was made possible by technical improvements, such as railways, instruments for communication like the telegraph and large steamships, which all facilitated the transport of goods and the movement of people across national boundaries (O’Rourke & Williamson, 2002; Friedman, 2005).

Globalization 3.0 is the one taking place since the year 2000 until nowadays, when the individuals are becoming increasingly globalized, and the world changes from size small to size tiny. Although it is only in its beginnings, is evidently marked by developments in telecommunications, lowering costs of transportation, and the past political events that have enhanced interconnectedness (Friedman, 2005). In this master thesis, I will focus on a part of the Globalization 2.0- the part taking place during the last decade of the past millennium, as well as on Globalization 3.0.

The creation of the World Trade Organization in the year 1995 is a clear example of increasing globalization- it is an organization that gives spaces for mediating trade disputes. It was preceded by the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), that began in 1948. Other trade agreements lead to the integration of some countries, by reducing the existing barriers to trade (tariffs, quotas), such as the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 or the NAFTA-North American Free Trade Agreement. These integration efforts favored a great increase in world exports (WTO website, 2017). The efforts of governments were aided by the development of telecommunications, which increasingly lowering cost allowed for easier and faster communication, as well as the development of information technologies and transport possibilities.

Globalization 3.0 is different from the previous ones- it does not only make the world “smaller,” but also gives individuals much power to be able to change things with all the new possibilities that were never available before. Furthermore, Globalization 1.0 and 2.0 were lead mostly by Europe, and later, America. In contrast with these, Globalization 3.0, despite being just in its beginnings, is expected to be driven mostly by non-Western individuals (Friedman, 2005).

What is interesting to note, is that the mass media considers a process of de-globalization is taking place, explaining it as the burst of a bubble, with falling port traffic, reducing exports and decreasing remittances-financial lifelines sent to the home country by its workers living abroad (Faiola, 2009). People around the world think that globalization has more negative sides than it has positives, giving place to populism, anti-globalization feelings, and people wishing to see sovereignty at a national level (Wagner, 2017).

Nevertheless, many academic economists, as well as historians, and other social scientists consider the collapse of globalization as imminent. “*The possibility is as real today as it was in 1915 that globalization, like the Lusitania, could be sunk*” (Ferguson, 2005). Jeffrey Sachs, a famous American economist, also considers the collapse of globalization a real possibility: “*The collapse of globalization . . . is absolutely possible, it happened in the 20th century in the wake of World War I and the Great Depression, and could happen again. Nationalism is rising and our political systems are inward looking, the more so in times of crisis*” (Faiola, 2009).

Anti-globalization feelings are being used by political rent seekers- the nationalist parties. Not only in the well-known case of Donald Trump assuming the presidency of the USA, but also in



smaller democracies, such as the Netherlands, Hungary or Slovakia. With the arising of nationalist parties<sup>2</sup>, it is in place to analyze the differences between the individual countries, as well as the differences that can be seen over time. Every single person holds their own set of attitudes toward globalization, which in turn, both shift and are constructed by the way they perceive the world itself.

### **2.2. What are the effects of globalization?**

Explaining trade theories can help explain the determinants of attitude change when it comes to attitudes toward globalization. Effects such as the income distribution effects can be useful, particularly because it has also high-lighted the income distribution effects of globalization. In international trade, several theories have arisen: from the first mercantilist theories, to Porter's diamond, all the theories that will be explained next are country-based. A chronological overview of trade theories will be given.

Mercantilism was a way of thinking that had great importance between 1500-1800. Thomas Mun put forward the idea that is necessary to keep a positive balance of trade, as well as that international trade is beneficial (since it would lead to greater accumulation of gold), but should be regulated by the government (Vaggi & Groenewegen, 2016). Adam Smith's model of absolute advantage shows that countries should focus on producing what can be produced more efficiently and then export it to other countries, while importing what cannot be produced as efficiently. Smith was an advocate of free trade, and of countries specializing in producing goods they have absolute advantage in (van Marrewijk, 2008).

The Ricardian model of comparative advantage shows how the differences between countries create gains from trade, with labor as the single factor of production. David Ricardo was a supporter of free trade. Comparative advantage determines the production pattern of the country (Krugman, 2008). The Heckscher-Ohlin theory is also based on comparative advantage. It assumes that technologies are equal across countries, as countries export the goods for which production the abundant factors can be used. Countries import the goods that would need their scarce factors of production to be used. This theory assumes free movement of capital and labor within a country (Hodd, 1967). In the decade of the 1990's, some applications of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory were developed: Krugman, Cooper & Srinivasan (1995), state that fixed wages

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<sup>2</sup> Which is not only due to economic globalization, although the focus of my thesis will be only on this aspect

tend to lead to unemployment, which implies that globalization can make unemployment rise. Wood (1998), explains that specialized trade can cause that the globalization effects (on low wages and employment in manufacturing) do not depend on what happens in the world market. Although many authors suggest that globalization causes labor market inequalities, other suggest that this is due to new technologies. According to the factor equalization theorem, when there exists free international trade in the case of products, prices of the factors of production tend to become equal (Stolper & Samuelson, 1941). This can obviously lead people to have negative attitudes toward free trade at an international scale, and therefore, be against globalization.

One model that is highly convincing in predicting trade flows empirically in international trade is the Gravity model. The Gravity model estimates patterns in the flows of commodities, migration and commuting, among others. These flows can be explained with the economic forces at the destination and origin of the flow, and the economic forces that disturb its movement (Bergstrand, 1985). The Gravity model explains much of the trade that takes place between bigger countries, especially when they are close from each other, but does not explain *why* is it the case, especially in content of trade and factors of production. Trade theory is necessary to explain the trade flows, based on country characteristics.

Later, in the 1970's, New Trade Theory puts forward the idea that through economies of scale, international trade may decrease the cost of goods available to consumers, while increasing the variety of said goods. Achieving economies of scale as the first producer gives a first-mover advantage, which can be thought of as a comparative advantage for firms. This means that countries, despite not differing in technology and/or resource availability, may still benefit from trade, for example, by focusing on the production of fewer products or having a "first mover advantage" (Hill & Jain, 2000).

Some models are based on economies of scale, which means that the unit cost is smaller when the output of production is bigger, and state that trade does not necessarily have to be a result of comparative advantages. Economies of scale can be either internal, which means at the firm level, or external, which means at the industry level. External economies of scale lead to specialization at the sector level (one industry in one country and another industry in another country), which determines the patterns of international trade (Krugman, 2008).

Internal economies of scale, on the other hand, lead to specialization at the firm level (with certain varieties in one country and other varieties in another country). Therefore, external and internal economies of scale lead to different income distribution effects. Intra-industry trade is supposed to not produce large income distribution effects. For example, if different car manufacturing companies come to one country, produces milder income distribution effects that if inter-industry trade takes place, where companies producing different sorts of goods arrive in a country, and workers must shift from industry to industry.

The Product life-cycle (PLC) theory by Raymond Vernon, developed in the 1960's, has the intention to explain the trade patterns that happen globally. He suggests that most products are developed in the United States of America, and after being introduced there, the demand for said products grows, then being demanded as well in other developed countries, so the USA can export to them. As those countries start producing said product, the USA can expand their production toward those countries and USA starts exporting less, reaching the point where the USA stops exporting and turns into an importer of the product they first developed "at home" (Hill & Jain, 2000).

Inventing a new product makes it close to consumers who are early adapters, since usually it has a low price elasticity due to the need for a specialized workforce and because it is made in small quantities, and has therefore a low price elasticity. After some time, the producer can standardize the production process, and the consumers also have had time to familiarize with the product. Different producers start to compete over the price, which brings down the prices. During this phase the production starts to be done abroad, in places where the costs are lower. The time for this process of outsourcing to take place depends on many factors, such as the income elasticity of the demand, the transport costs, tariffs, the income levels and market size abroad, among others. Once the prices have been lowered enough, the products start being sold in less developed countries (Jager, Jepma & Kamphuis, 1996). Each of the phases of the PLC theory can be related to particular trade theories. The first phase, when a novel product is created, can be related to the theory of Adam Smith of absolute advantage- a new product is developed by a country that counts with an absolute advantage in terms of technology, capital, knowledge, etc. In the phase when different countries start competing over the costs of production of said product, the Ricardian model of comparative advantage can be applied, because the country with the greatest comparative advantage might substitute the one that produced the product in the first place. The New Trade theory would predict that both countries

would export the good (intra-industry trade).

In the last decade of the past millennium, several theories regarding international trade were developed. Borjas and Ramey (1993), (theory about imperfect competition), suggested that competition being imperfect can cause too much profits, which would lead to changes in wages, even though prices remain equal. This is what happens with economies of scale, the impact that foreign competition has on an economy is correlated with its market structure-if the industry is highly concentrated, the impact will be greater, provoking wage inequality.

The National Competitive Advantage theory was perhaps the one with the greatest impact on international business from the 1990's onwards. This theory considers four attributes that explain why a country can reach international importance in a specific industry. The four attributes are the following: factor endowments (the resources that a country has and can be used for production, they are crucial for competitive advantage), related and supporting industries (if those are internationally competitive, suppose a competitive advantage), demand conditions (what do the consumers in the home country demand and in what quantities suppose a competitive advantage), and the strategy of the firm, coupled with its structure and rivalry, since all these can either help destroy or build competitive advantage. All these attributes together make the Porter's diamond. Moreover, government policies and innovation can as well influence this "diamond". (Porter, 1990) Porter's National Competitive Advantage theory is, in comparison with the previous trade theories mentioned, the one that explains into greatest detail how international trade flows are created.

From Mun in the 17<sup>th</sup> century, to Porter in the 1990's, globalization has probably changed significantly, in both size and scope. Trade theories have adjusted, what is seen from this review. Trade theory models suppose certain degree of openness (to trade, free movement of capital, labor) in the country is beneficial. Being open to trade, under perfect competition, expands the production possibility frontier, leading to Pareto efficient outcomes (Samuelson, 1939). The common advice given by economists to policy makers is to open borders, since it increases the possibilities of production, which in turn can repair the income distribution effects. Nevertheless, the current trends, to be analyzed next, suggest that people do not agree with said proposals.

## **Chapter 3 -Potential determinants of attitude change regarding globalization**

In this chapter, the potential determinants of attitude change regarding globalization will be analyzed. This will be done by first explaining in short what are, in general, the determinants of attitude formation. Afterwards, theory on how socio-economic attitudes are being shaped will be presented, as well as on how political attitudes are formed. The chapter will be concluded by finding out what were the (possible) specific determinants that played a role with the visible changes in attitude that is the central topic of the thesis.

### **3.1. On attitude formation**

Eagly and Chaiken (1998) define attitudes as *‘a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favor or disfavor’*. This means that attitudes are based on valuation, that can range from an extremely negative to an extremely positive affective value. Kahneman et al. (1999) suggest that it is better to describe people as having “attitudes”, instead of preferences, especially in the domain of public concerns.

It is important to look at attitudes as a predictor of future behavior. Glasman & Albarracín, (2006) explain that attitudes influence in a greater way behavior when they are easier to recall and more accessible over time. Ariely & Norton (2008) suggest that attitudes are an imperfect predictor of behavior, and this represents an imperfect relationship between the utilities people attribute to states of the world and their actual actions. That is why actions can as well create, and not only reflect, the attitudes of people.

Fazio, Eiser & Shook (2004) consider three ways how attitudes are formed. The first one is through general socialization. This approach is considered by other authors, for example, Woelfel & Haller (1971) explain that the group where a person is embedded is fundamental, as well as the people the person meets. The second way through which attitudes form is via *“inferential reasoning about the communicated attributes of the object”*. This means that the perception, and therefore the attitudes toward a determined object, depend in great measure on the beliefs about said object (Fishbein, 1963). The last way how attitudes are being formed is by considering the value other people attach to the certain object or event. Heider (1946) goes further and explains that the attitudes toward an event affect the attitude toward the

person/people who caused it, while, at the same time, the attitudes toward the person who caused an event influence the attitudes toward the event itself.

### **3.2. How are socio-economic attitudes shaped?**

Within the history of western philosophy, self-interest has been one of the motivators of human behavior, with well-known thinkers, such as St. Augustine, Thomas Hobbes and Adam Smith having considered the selfish behavior as natural for humanity. Nevertheless, it is not only in the past that self-interest had a strong position within what was considered to trigger the attitudes of people. As of today, it is widely considered to be one of the main triggers of human behavior by neoclassical economists (Sears & Funk, 1991).

Neoclassical economics, as explained by Colander (2000), was born in the year 1900, when the term itself was created by Thorstein Veblen. This current in economics considers humans as selfish beings, whose behavior is based on three assumptions: people wish to maximize utility, individuals have rational preferences between several possible outcomes, and they act independently-having access to information that is full and relevant (Weintraub, 2007). Since the neoclassical models were the main ones during the past century, some authors, as for example Frohlich (1974), explained that the concepts of rationality and self-interest had been considered as almost synonyms by economists.

Nevertheless, it is not only self-interest what guides the responses of people to socio-economic stimuli. As Reich (1990) explains, although people are more self-interested than altruistic, the “public good” or “public interest” represents the sum of individual preferences, and society can be improved when making sure the preferences of some of the people are fulfilled, without making worse off others. Other authors, as Wilson & Banfield (1964), go further and explain that some classes of people are more prone to take into account the concept of “public interest” or “welfare of the community.” These classes of people are defined as “subcultures,” on the basis of income and ethnic lines.

Trade liberalization attitudes are better explained by ideology and values, as well as gender, education and income, rather than by economic interests, as shown by a study made with Canadian citizens (Wolfe & Mendelsohn, 2005), and another study in which citizens of multiple countries were taken into account, using the World Values Survey data, (Kaltenthaler, Gelleny

& Ceccoli, 2004). In many parts of the world, globalization can be understood as a process of “Americanization,” since people think of globalization as a way through which they will be integrated into an American political, economic and cultural model (Wolfe & Mendelsohn, 2005).

Social identity and behavior are being shaped by social contexts (Reicher, 2004). Self-interest itself is not able to explain the preference for more or less redistributive politics; whereas the beliefs that a person’s economic condition is produced by self- or exogenous determination, does have a significant impact on supporting redistribution. This can be interpreted in the sense that people are reciprocal and have a rather strong sense of equity, as explained in the empirical study carried out by Fong (2001). A study carried out within the “American business elite” in the 1980’s found out that the economic attitudes of an individual were strongly influenced by the region of birthplace (as well as its size) and the religion of the parents (Barton, 1985). This group was homogeneous, in the sense that included the 120 top business leaders, who had a similar background-having an elite education, growing up in big-business families in urban areas of the northeast of the USA.

It is interesting to note that, when the public is being exposed to negative economic information, it triggers a much stronger reaction than when it is exposed to positive information. This reaction is being significantly increased by mass media, as people react to both the content of the mass media and economic information itself (Soroka, 2006). This enhanced reaction has an important implication for policy-making, as explained by Dua & Smyth (1993), who proved that when the public is being pessimistic about unemployment, the government, if it is a responsive one, will try to target it, which could lead to negative effects, as increased inflation.

The relationship between religious and economic attitudes is closer than it might seem at first sight. As being religious (or not being religious at all) impacts the attitudes toward many aspects of common life, it affects as well the socio-economic attitudes. The religious beliefs are commonly linked to “good” economic outcomes, such as higher income and growth per capita. Christian religions were the ones that lead more to economic growth (Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales, 2003).

Women tended to show more negative attitudes toward globalization than men, especially when it comes to economic globalization. This is probably due to the lower participation of women

in the labor market, and the specific job posts they occupy (Mayda and Rodrik, 2005). In a study performed in China it was found out that the urban population tended to demonstrate more positive attitudes toward globalization than their rural counterparts (Lee et al., 2009).

Economic risk is an area where people show attitudes that vary significantly. According to Zhong et al. (2009), genetic factors account for over half of the variation in risk attitude, as proved by a study performed in China. Other studies, as the one done in Sweden by Cesarini et al. (2009), suggest as well that genetics play a role in attitude formation. A person can be risk averse or risk preferring, and this has many implications, not only for their own personal decisions, but also in the public sphere, especially in social policy, as well as income and wealth redistribution.

An important part of the process of globalization is migration. Although increasing migration helps enhance the contributions for pension funds, as it delays the disequilibria that arise (in a demographic sense) within a country (Devesa et al., 2013), the attitudes toward immigrants are often negative. When it comes to immigration, three are the main concerns of people- welfare, the labor market, and racial/cultural concerns. In a study carried out in the UK, welfare concerns were of greater significance than those related to the labor market. Immigration attitudes were, as well, strongly influenced by racial and cultural prejudice, but only in the case of immigrants coming from countries where the population is ethnically different (Dustmann & Preston, 2007). Scheve and Slaughter (2001) explain that there is a positive correlation between the level of education of the population and having a positive attitude toward immigration. Edwards (2006) also finds that being more educated increases the likelihood that a person is in favor of economic globalization, as well as they would like to see increases in foreign trade.

A study carried out within the US has shown that certain demographic groups are more likely to favor immigration, specifically, the African-Americans, individuals of high skills and non-citizens. Those who identify themselves as rightist, as well as elderly people, would wish to see the number of immigrants reduced. From the religious groups, only the Jewish would like to see the number of immigrants increased. When it comes to limiting imports, the same study shows there are several demographic characteristics that people have and make them more likely to be pro-import limitation. These are, namely, being a union member, being a female and being African-American. Being religious also impacts the likelihood to be in favor of import limitation. Nevertheless, being a member of a religious group shows more significant



effects than being a believer- so, group affiliation is more important than faith in the case of attitudes toward globalization, while ethnicity does not play such an important role. Catholics, Baptists and Methodists were more likely to agree with import limiting policies (von der Ruhr & Daniels, 2003).

Also, attending college has a strong effect on people's attitudes, they become less materialistic and more idealistic (Astin, 1993). College and university students are more likely to be in favor of globalization than their less educated counterparts. This is especially true with the ones who have parents working in white-collar occupations (Peng & Shin, 2001). A study made in the US with American students suggests that the students who follow business-related majors tend to be more in favor of globalization than those who study non-business studies. This could be explained by Hecksher-Ohlin theory, as the students in business related majors tend to be considered as more skilled in several aspects in life (Janavaras, Kuzma & Thiewes, 2008).

Clark & Themudo (2006) state that trade union members feel concerned about the easiness of multinational corporations for changing countries, and farmers from the developing countries fear the exports of food products from the developed countries, where agriculture is often subsidized. These diverse reasons lead to consider whether they all do, in fact, motivate negative attitudes toward globalization, or if perhaps there are even more reasons.

Not only the attitudes of the locals toward the immigrants are important, but also the attitudes of the immigrants toward the locals. In a study done in the Netherlands, de Vroome, Martinovic & Verkuyten (2014) found out that the better educated immigrants tended to have worse attitudes toward the host society, as they perceived more discrimination to minorities from the Dutch majority, despite being more economically integrated.

### **3.3. How are political attitudes shaped?**

Political attitudes have much to do with attitudes toward globalization. In fact, many of the topics that are included in the questions to be analyzed within this thesis are related to politics. Literature suggests that political attitudes are shaped by numerous stimuli, and much debate is related to whether these attitudes are formed in earlier or later stages in life (Alford et al., 2005).

Throughout the years, different theories on what shapes attitudes toward politics have arisen.

The first authors that dedicated their works to this topic put forward the importance of events that happen early in the life of a person (Campbell et al., 1966; Jennings & Niemi, 1968). Nevertheless, the researchers that followed them, especially in the 1980's, considered questionable whether the impact in early childhood is transcendental to such an extent as was believed before. Cook (1985) and Fiorina (1981), acknowledged that events happening later in life, together with the changes in the conditions of life, could as well have a significant impact on political attitudes.

When analyzing how political attitudes are being shaped, not many studies consider the role that genetics plays. According to Alford et al. (2005), political attitudes are much more heavily influenced by genetics than they are influenced by socializing with one's parents. However, further in life, how tolerant (in terms of accepting different political views) people will be depends mainly on two factors: the "antecedent conditions" and the "contemporary information." The antecedent conditions are dependent on personal circumstances, such as the family environment, first group experiences, the regional context, among others. The contemporary information deals with the stimuli to which the people are currently being exposed, such as media and the perception of the current situation (Marcus et al., 1995). This means that, after all, genetics do not play a vital role in the formation of political attitudes.

Personal values determine to a large extent the political attitudes people present, as they shape the cognitive experience, and therefore the perception of the world that a person has, shifting and creating their attitudes (Smith, 1949). There exists a correlation between physiological responses to threat and political attitudes, which could be related to activity in the part of the brain that governs emotions (the amygdala), as found out in a study carried out in the USA. This could explain why political attitudes are difficult to be changed (Oxley et al., 2008).

One important factor that can produce changes in political attitudes are reminders of terrorist attacks that happened in the past. Specifically, reminders of mortality, and subliminal exposure to material related to the terrorist attacks of September the 11<sup>th</sup>, influenced people, making them more likely to vote for a leader considered "charismatic," as in the case of this study, George W. Bush (Landau et al., 2004).

The perception of the economic benefits of EU membership influence strongly the attitudes toward it. In a study from the 1990's, it was found out that people are more likely to show support for their own country to become a member of the EU in case the occupation they perform could benefit more, in terms of economic benefits, if their country would join the EU (Gabel, 1998). Within the EU, being skilled, produces diverse effects toward globalization. In countries where the number of skilled people is higher than is the average of the EU, an individual being skilled increases the probability he/she will support globalization. The opposite is true for EU countries where the number of skilled people is below EU average. There, being skilled reduces the possibility of being pro-globalization (Sanz & Coma, 2008).

### **3.4. Important determinants for changes in attitudes toward globalization**

In this section, the relevant determinants for attitudes toward globalization and changes in them, as literature suggests, will be explained. There exist several types of globalization, the most important being cultural, economic, and political (Steger, 2009). Cultural globalization is perhaps the most easily noticeable, and often associated with a certain form of, mostly western, "cultural imperialism" (Tomlinson, 2012). Political globalization puts forward the idea that politics is not being shaped by the nations alone, but rather they have become a multilevel issue that goes not only within state boundaries, but also above and across (Cerny, 1997).

For this thesis, I will focus on the economic aspects of globalization. Economic globalization is the increased economic interconnectedness between countries through trade and factor mobility. Economic globalization manifests itself via three ways, specifically, international trade, migration, and capital movement. It is a possible consideration that people's attitudes vary depending on the type of globalization they are being subject to. Nevertheless, most of the time they are so closely related that is impossible to tell them apart. For example, economic globalization might lead to both cultural globalization, due to the increased migration, as well as changes in the policies of international trade, leading to political globalization (Robertson & White, 2007). Regarding economic globalization, three are the main concerns of people, specifically, international trade, capital mobility, and the flow of migrants. When it comes to being pro-trade, the level of human capital of an individual has a high correlation, which means that people endowed with significantly less human capital, as well as those more attached to the geographical space where they happen to live, tend to be against trade. Trade attitudes of a certain population correlate highly with trade policies implemented. A higher level of inequality

## Attitudes toward globalization

relates to higher levels of trade protectionism. This is an important issue that should rise concerns, since among economists it is thought that free trade is desirable. (Mayda & Rodrik 2005).

Two considerations are made when it comes to why the attitudes toward globalization could have changed. The first consideration is that different attitudes toward globalization depend on the effects that policies that make markets more open have on the welfare of each person. Another thing to take into account is that it is considered that the current labor income influences the attitudes toward globalization a person will have (Scheve & Slaughter, 2001).

Moreover, it is apparent that people tend to judge the impacts of globalization at two different levels. The first one, is how it affects themselves and their families, and the second one is how it affects the nation. These perceptions are important, because models of political economy of trade must consider the public opinion, which does not only depend on their income, but also on how it affects the whole country (Mansfield & Mutz, 2009). An important part of globalization is the increased flow of migrants. When it comes to the attitudes of the “locals” toward the migrants, both non-economic and economic factors play a role. The increased flow of migrants provokes concerns related to security, culture and especially the labor market. Illegal immigrants and refugees cause special concerns (Mayda, 2006).

Globalization is not a very recent phenomenon. This was seen before, as is only during the last few decades that it has lowered by much both the costs of making capital more mobile, as well as the costs of trade. The costs of trade have been lowered mostly thanks to the improvements in communication and transportation, as well as the elimination of political barriers that had impeded its movement in previous times (Henninghausen, 2014). These changes, naturally, have led more people to acknowledge that globalization does have an impact over their lives. Changes in attitudes can arise due to several emotional factors, such as empathy, fear or positive moods. Moreover, attitudes can be changed by giving rational arguments, and this works better with people who are more analytical and/ or better educated. This means that attitudes of people are shaped mostly by the environment, since it is the environment (peers, educational institutions, mass-media) that provides individuals with arguments, as well as provoke emotional responses (Edwards, 1990).

***Supporting the EU*** can be considered as a proxy for supporting a more globalized world, as the EU considers free flow of labor, capital and people within the Union as one of its pillars. There are different amounts of support for integration across the first 12 countries that entered the EU. Mostly, the variation comes from different points in time when they entered the Union, what were the economic conditions, and how long they are members (Anderson & Kaltenthaler, 1996). In this thesis, it will be tested whether supporting the EU does actually mean supporting globalization.

In a study carried out in 2005, ***males*** showed more support for the EU than females (Fidrmuc & Doyle, 2005). It is interesting to note that the effects on the wages of low-skilled local workers by the increasing low-skilled migration is ambiguous at the national level. This ambiguity comes from the fact that the increasing flow of migrant women had the opposite effect on the wages of locals, in comparison with the effect of migrant men. In a study that took place during the 1980's and 1990's, was found out that increasing number of Hispanic female immigrants in the US tended to bring up the wages of non-Hispanic white women (Guhathakurta, Jacobson & DelSordi, 2007).

According to Ariely (2012), in the more globalized countries, the relationship between national identity and xenophobia are stronger. This might mean that being exposed to globalization can enhance the nationalist feelings. It is important to consider ***nationalist feelings***, because they are often predictors of negative attitudes to immigrants, foreigners and minorities. The "Nations in Transit 2017" index, that scores the state of democracy in several European and Asian countries, has found out that democracy has been on the decline in the 29 countries it monitors, with nationalism being on the rise. Nationalist feelings in these countries (mostly located in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as in Asia) are being strengthened by the new USA government, as well as the Brexit (Nations in Transit website, 2017).

More ***highly educated*** inhabitants, among them students, as well as those working in white-collar posts, tend to support more the EU than their less-educated counterparts (Fidrmuc & Doyle, 2005). *"There is no strong evidence that the greater labor market concerns sometimes believed to exist among unskilled and manual workers are reenacted in opposition towards further immigration. However, labor market concerns are an important channel for preference towards immigration among the better educated."* (Dustmann & Preston, 2007). Being highly educated does not only change the attitudes toward globalization of locals, but, at least in the

case of being an immigrant to a Western country, can mean that the attitudes of locals may vary depending on whether the immigrant is a skilled migrant or a student- these migrants tend to be more welcomed. This is in contrast with the less skilled (or even completely unskilled) migrants, who often come illegally, and are often marginalized by the society (Ritzer, 2007).

Attitudes to trade are determined by values, identities, attachments and the sociodemographic background of a person (Mayda & Rodrik, 2005). Increments in immigration tend to pull down the wages, due to a rising supply of labor, and that is why local workers have an incentive to be against immigration and therefore, globalization in a more general sense (Borjas, 2011). An interesting topic being widely discussed in France, that is a member of the EU, is the closing down of a Whirlpool Corp. production plant prior to its relocation in Poland, where wages are significantly lower. This event, among others, has triggered a response by the French citizens, and they shift political attitudes, favoring candidates who promise maintaining jobs (Nussbaum, 2017). In principle, three things can happen when a company closes (de Vaal, 2012). It could be due to international trade, since increasing competition can cause a company to close, which is a rather abstract reason and not understood very well by the workers. Another issue could be that a company closes in the “Home country,” in order to be relocated in a “Foreign country” where wages are lower/production is more efficient/costs are lower for the company. This, as in the case of Whirlpool Corp. in France, provokes a stronger reaction from the “Home country” inhabitants, and politicians use this trigger to amass popularity by promising to keep the jobs. Another issue that happens very commonly is that people from a “Foreign country” relocate to the “Home country,” and, as they are often willing to work for lower salaries than the locals, and do not demand the same (high) labor standards, are able to “take away” the jobs, especially from low-skilled workers. This is being seen in many countries. Nejedly (2016) states that Ukrainian workers see the Slovak republic as a stable country, where individuals with middle and high education are able to find work.

People’s attitudes toward globalization are, to a high degree, similar to the results predicted by Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory (O’Rourke, 2003). Countries tend to export those goods whose production can use their relatively abundant factors of production, while in turn, import the goods that they would need to use the relatively scarce factors for producing. This theory assumes equal tastes in different nations or equal technology in various countries. Moreover, it assumes that capital and labor can move freely across borders (Hodd, 1967). For globalization, it means that *people of lower skills* in the labor market would tend to have a rather anti-

globalization sentiment in the developed countries. Globalization is, as of today, helping those factors of production that are more mobile across borders, such as high-skilled labor and physical capital. On the other hand, factors that are predominantly immobile, for example, unskilled labor, face struggles in the increasingly globalized world (Rodrik, 1997).

People with **higher income** levels are more supportive of the EU than those with lower incomes (Fidrmuc & Doyle, 2005). Globalization does not affect everyone in society in the same way. While people who gain more from globalization tend to show cosmopolitanism, the ones who “lose” more during the process of globalization try to put forward their ethnic, national and religious identity. Attitude change can be due to becoming a “loser” or a **“winner” from globalization**. Especially the losers from globalization, at least in the Swiss case, are more likely to manifest their feelings about economic insecurity (Walter, 2010). Moreover, within countries that have a larger share of **unemployed** population, the anti-immigration sentiments tend to be more widely spread. This anti-immigration sentiment tends to grow with a growing share of the population that is unemployed (Golder, 2003). The EU had witnessed an increased number of foreigners; a worsening economic situation and right-wing populism saw its revival. All this set immigration and asylum-seeking as some of the most important policy issues to be dealt with in the 1990s. The opinions anti-immigration had a very high value in the 90s, but had decreased in the 2000s. When the **conditions were worse**, more people found themselves to be anti-immigration, and vice-versa. (Kessler & Freeman, 2005). More recent events, including the wave of refugees displaced to the EU due to the conflict in Syria, have triggered reactions in the EU. Debates whether or not to accept refugees, and if so, in what numbers, have become important in the agendas of politicians, as well as for the common people. The response of Europe to the refugee crisis has been considered **“limited and uneven”** (Fargues, 2014).

The issue of **fragmentation and offshoring** increases negative attitudes of people (in developed countries) toward globalization, as they feel worried about losing their jobs (Feenstra & Taylor, 2011). Fragmentation of the labor in the production chain means that goods can be produced in stages in different locations and then be assembled in a final location. Fragmentation leads to offshoring, which is the transfer of some production activities to another country, where the costs of production are lower. Moreover, with increasing frequency services are being offshored, since the costs of communication have dropped to historical minima. Offshored jobs range from lower-skilled to higher-skilled, in comparison with the country of origin of the company. The firms that are located within countries that have large proportions of skilled

laborers will tend to locate the parts of the production that require only low-skilled labor in those countries that have large proportions of low-skilled workers (Taylor, 2002). The offshoring of production activities has been proved to reduce the relative wages of unskilled workers, as well as the relative demand for unskilled workers (Feenstra & Hanson, 1996). This means that, especially people with lower skills feel pressured, so it adds to their negative attitudes toward globalization explained before. The Hecksher-Ohlin trade model suggests that countries will trade what they have in abundance, taking advantage of a greater elasticity in the demand when having access to global markets. Therefore, this trade model considered mainly the advantages of open trade, but, apparently, the effect in practice is not as expected.

*“More jobs are created than destroyed by international trade and capital mobility.”* Apparently, globalization has a positive effect on employment, which overcompensates the effect of an increasing dispersion when it comes to factor rewards (Henninghausen, 2014). It is interesting to note that, by transforming the attitudes of the public toward globalization, instead of against it, there may arise economic payoffs (Noland, 2005). On one hand, some authors consider that the increasing economic competition did not have an impact on inequality, at least in the OECD countries (Mahler, 2004); while on the other hand, several others show with empirical evidence that as there was more economic integration, the inequality in said countries grew as well (Dreher & Gaston, 2008; Bergh & Nilsson, 2010). Therefore, evidence in this case is mixed, and perhaps depends on the conditions of each country how it will cope with the challenges presented by globalization.

### **3.5. What can influence attitudes toward globalization?**

Attitudes toward globalization seemed to be influenced by a wide range of factors: religion of the parents and one-self, region where people live, ideology and values, a person's self-interest, the exposure to negative economic information, genetics, happenings in life, the family environment, group experiences, the media, one's perception of the current situation, physiological responses to threat and reminders of terrorist attacks. Moreover, the attitudes toward globalization are more likely to be negative when people have the determinants that appear in the next page in a table. A selection of this summary of traits will be used for hypothesis formation in the following chapter, using the ones that are most relevant and available for the selection of countries.



***Table 1-Hypotheses and sources***

<b>HYPOTHESES</b>	<b>REFERENCES</b>
H1: In the 1990's attitudes toward globalization were positive, in both the V4 and the Benelux Union.	WTO website (2017), Oslzly (1990), Jones 2005).
H2: Attitudes toward globalization became rather negative in the 2000's, "de-globalization" takes place in both the V4 and Benelux Union.	Faiola (2009), Wagner (2017), Held & McGrew (2007), Clark & Themudo (2006), Sassen (2006).
H3: Being older (as being one year of age older) will make a person more likely to be against globalization.	Mayda and Rodrik, 2005; von der Ruhr & Daniels (2003)
H4: Being a man will make a person more likely to be in favor of globalization.	von der Ruhr & Daniels (2003), Guhathakurta, Jacobson & DelSordi (2007), Fidrmuc & Doyle (2005)
H5: Having nationalist attitudes will make a person more likely to be against globalization.	Ariely (2012), Nations in transit (2017)
H6: Within the EU, being a supporter of the EU, will make a person more likely to be in favor of globalization.	Gabel (1998), (Anderson & Kaltenthaler, 1996)
H7: Identifying oneself as rightist will make a person more likely to be against globalization.	von der Ruhr & Daniels (2003)
H8: Being a union member will make a person more likely to be against globalization.	von der Ruhr & Daniels (2003)
H9: Having attained a high education will make a person more likely to be in favor of globalization.	Scheve and Slaughter (2001); Edwards (2006), Fidrmuc & Doyle (2005); (Dustmann & Preston, 2007); (Ritzer, 2007)
H10: Living in a rural area will make a person more likely to be against globalization.	Lee et al. (2009);
H11: Being in a low-skilled occupation will make a person more likely to be against globalization.	Rodrik (1997)

Furthermore, some additional hypotheses are presented. It was not possible, due to data constraints, to check for them, but they are interesting for future research. Considering oneself as a "loser" from globalization will make a person more likely to be against globalization, as explained by Ariely (2012) and Walter (2010). Also, being citizen of the country where he/ she lives in will make a person more likely to be against globalization, as stated by von der Ruhr & Daniels (2003). Being part of a religious group will make a person more likely to be against

globalization, explain several authors-Barton, (1985); Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales, (2003) and von der Ruhr & Daniels (2003). Being African-American has an ambiguous effect, on one hand, it makes more likely that people will be in favor of immigration, but as well that said person will be against imports, state von der Ruhr & Daniels (2003). Not being enrolled in college/university, and if enrolled, in non-business majors, will make a person more likely to be against globalization, as explained by several authors- Peng & Shin (2001); Janavaras, Kuzma & Thiewes (2008) and Astin (1993). Within the EU, being skilled has ambiguous effects-in countries where the number of skilled people is higher than the EU average, it increases the chances of being pro-globalization, whereas in countries where the number of skilled people is lower than the EU average, the effect is the opposite, as stated by Sanz & Coma (2008). Being non-Jewish will make a person more likely to be against globalization, explain von der Ruhr & Daniels (2003).

## **Chapter 4-Methodological approach**

In this chapter, the choice of countries will be explained, by giving a theoretical background on the clustering of the seven to be analyzed countries within groups, together with the reason for selecting specifically these two clusters of countries. Next, the statistical methods used will be stated, and in the last part the hypotheses will be explained.

### **4.1. Country choice**

In the European Union, there can be found examples of countries clustering within groups. Two remarkable ones are the Benelux Union and the Visegrad group (or Visegrad four). These groups have been selected to provide insights from both Central and Eastern Europe and Western Europe, with several countries clustered within each of the groups. Moreover, having origins in one of the Visegrad group countries, and living currently in one of the countries of the Benelux Union, I believe the data to be analyzed can be corroborated with a high degree of personal, first-hand experience.

The Visegrad Four, Visegrad group, or just V4, is, as explained in its official website (Official website of the Visegrad group, 2017) an alliance of four countries. Those countries are the following: Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. The Visegrad group represents the efforts of said countries for helping each other in several areas that are of interest for them. One of these efforts was to become members of the European Union, the event that took place in the year 2004. Therefore, it is possible to set the theoretical assumption that Visegrad group countries could have populations with similar attitudes toward globalization (this will be checked), and then compare the differences between them as well as with the Benelux Union.

As explained on the official website of the Benelux Union, (Official website of the Benelux, 2017) the Benelux Union is an intergovernmental partnership between Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The name was created by combining the first two or three letters of the names of the countries. Its history began in 1944, as a customs union. On June 2008, a new Benelux Treaty was signed, giving it the new name of the Benelux Union. From this time, the Union will focus on three key issues: internal market and economic union, sustainable development, and justice and home affairs. Therefore, I believe it is a rational assumption to consider the countries of the Benelux Union might have similar attitudes toward globalization (this will be checked) and compare the differences that arise between them, as well as with the

Visegrad Group countries. As the countries from both groups are rather small, and not self-sufficient in many aspects, it is common knowledge that they have benefitted from cooperation with others.

## **4.2. Statistical methods**

### **4.2.1. Theoretical model**

A cross-sectional study will be performed in the countries of the Benelux Union and the Visegrad group. This will be done by considering mainly two aspects that have been measured by surveys in the past, namely attitudes toward trade openness and attitudes toward immigration. It will be considered that the countries whose populations are against trade and/or against immigrants, present a negative attitude toward globalization.

First, it will be analyzed how the attitudes toward globalization changed over time, by comparing each of the countries, then within the clusters of countries and further with the benchmark provided by the total amount of countries, in order to understand several things:

1. Whether the countries differ from each other within their clusters
2. Whether the clusters differ from each other
3. Whether the countries are different from the benchmark
4. Whether there were changes over time

Further on, a model will be established in order to analyze the impact of different characteristics on attitudes toward globalization. This model will include the dependent variable, which is the change in attitudes toward globalization. This will be done by using several years of the same survey. In order to check the responses over time, I will use the questions related to attitudes toward globalization that remained the same over the different years of each survey. This longitudinal analysis will be done only for the multivariate analysis.

Using the insights from theory on attitude formation presented in the previous chapter, the explanatory variables to be analyzed are the following: Domicile, Education, Occupation, Political views, Sex, Age, Income, Attitudes toward the EU, Race and Nationalist attitudes. It will be analyzed how attitudes toward globalization have changed over time, what are the reasons for said changes over time, while addressing the differences between countries.

#### **4.2.2. Data**

The data to be used are the questions from 4 different surveys, listed below. The specific questions related to attitudes toward globalization deal with attitudes toward immigrants and toward free trade, and will be used in order to find an answer for the research question of this thesis.

A part of the data I intend to use is from the European Values Study, using information from the years 1990, 1999 and 2008. The European Values Study is '*a large-scale, cross-national, and longitudinal survey research program on basic human values. It provides insights into the ideas, beliefs, preferences, attitudes, values and opinions of citizens all over Europe. It is a unique research project on how Europeans think about life, family, work, religion, politics and society,*' as stated in their website (EVS website, 2017). This study has been performed every 9 years since 1981, and the last study, as of 2008, included about 70,000 respondents. The questions to be used are those related to "National identity" (Leibniz institute for Social Sciences, 2017). All the countries, except for Luxembourg, that did not participate in 1990, have taken part in the three years to be analyzed. The specific questions to be used from the EVS can be found in the Appendix I.

Other source of data I intend to use is the European Social Survey, specifically, the rounds from 2002 and 2014, that include questions on immigration and asylum issues. Most of the countries to be analyzed have taken part in said surveys. The specific questions to be analyzed can be found in Appendix I.

The World Values Survey is a study that analyses the changing values, beliefs and motivations of people and how those affect social and political life. These surveys have been carried out in 6 waves, starting in 1981. The questions to be used in my analysis can be found in the Appendix I. These questions deal with the educational level of the respondents, their professions, annual incomes, as well as with their attitudes towards free trade and immigration (World Values Survey Website, 2017). Immigration and free trade are topics of special importance when it comes to globalization, as was explained in the literature review.

Additional data is provided by the Identity Social Survey Program (ISSP) from 1995, 2003 and 2013. This is a cross-country survey that provides primary data on the topic of attitudes toward globalization in the countries of interest. The specific questions to be used can be found in Appendix I.

### **4.2.3. Methods of analysis**

First of all, I compiled the survey data, ending up with 4 different surveys with different years when they were taken. From every survey, I have chosen the available explanatory variables, as well as the dependent variables, and created tables that can be found in Appendix I. After this, in STATA, I tabulated the results of each of the relevant questions, first with the whole aggregate of countries, and, later, using the available countries from the Benelux union and V4. I averaged the results of the clusters of countries, to make it easier to compare them with each other. I present these results in tables in the next chapter.

Using STATA, I regressed with an ordered probit model the explanatory variables, in order to check whether there was any effect. I made this with all the European countries (and in the case of the WVS with all the available countries) in order to create a benchmark to show the differences between the EU average, and the particular countries. Then, the country averages were made, and the EU average was used as a benchmark to show whether the countries rank above or below average. The countries were compared within their own cluster (Visegrad Group and Benelux Union) and then the clusters were compared with each other.

Only a few of the questions are repeated from year to year in the survey (see Appendix I), so I will focus on those to create the cross-time comparison. Nevertheless, I will not create a time trend, but I will use the first year as a baseline and the following years will be compared to this first year. Not all the questions I intended to use in the first selection were possible to be analyzed, due to different issues- they either did not repeat over time, or were not available for the specific countries that this research is based on.

Since the surveys to be used employ a Likert scale, where answers are scored along a range (Likert, 1932), an ordinary least squares regression will not be sufficient. This scale is commonly used in psychology, and therefore, also in questions that relate to feelings, emotions, and attitudes. The Likert scale is not cardinal, but ordinal, and we only know the direction of

the gaps between the options, not the actual differences between them. This means that a jump from value 2 to 4 might not mean that the difference is of two units, whereas a jump from 4 to 5 might suppose a difference of three units, and this is due to the interpretation of people of the scale and its options.

To calculate to what extent do explanatory variables, such as the level of education or the age of a person, influence the chance that they will have attitudes in favor of globalization, regressions will be made. Nevertheless, when the dependent variable is measured at the interval level (such as in the case of the answers to the diverse questionnaires that will be used in the following analysis), the linear model is not sufficient. That is why this model is often inappropriate for social science uses. Therefore, a different model, the ordered probit model is necessary, since it considers that the distances between points in the interval might not be equal (McKelvey & Zavoina, 1975).

When the dependent variable is in the form of ordered categories, there are two models that can be used-an ordered probit model or an ordered logit model. In case of having more than two outcomes of the (ordinal) dependent variable, an **ordered** probit model is needed. An ordered probit model will be used to model the outcome variable for the question “**What increases the likelihood that attitudes toward globalization within a country are positive?**” In a probit model, the Inverse Standard Normal Distribution of the probability is modelled as a linear combination of the predictors. The results will be related to averages in the group of factors. This is a method of ordinal regression (Greene, 2000). An ordered probit is used because the distance between the answer categories varies in function of the starting position, a jump from 1 to 3 might be smaller than from 3 to 4 in the answer categories. The ordered probit model follows this equation, and this is the empirical model to be used:

$$y^* = x^T \beta + \varepsilon;$$


where  $y^*$  is the dependent variable (is exact, but unobserved),  $x$  is the vector of independent variables (age, attitudes toward the EU, education, domicile, race, sex, occupation, political views, nationalist attitudes and income) and  $\beta$  is the vector of regression coefficients that are to be estimated. As  $y^*$  cannot be observed, only categories of the response can be shown (Greene, 2012).

## Attitudes toward globalization

The processing of data in ordinal scales is problematic, and has been widely discussed. It has certain limitations, for example, it is prohibited to perform algebraic operations between ordinal data (Lalla, 2017). Education, income and occupation all bear a relation with skill, and that is why they should not all be included when doing a regression, since they could cause multicollinearity issues (Scheve & Slaughter, 2001). It was tested whether such multicollinearity issues appeared.

The countries were compared within their respective groups (the V4 and the Benelux Union). For the analysis of percentages the categories of agree strongly and agree have been put together, since the jump in between these two categories is rather subjective, as theories on the Likert scale suggest. The same was done for the categories of disagree and disagree strongly.

Graphic representation:





### **4.3. Hypotheses**

The hypotheses have already been presented in Chapter three, where they and their references are set in Table 1.

H1: In the 1990's attitudes toward globalization were positive, in both the V4 and the Benelux Union.

H2: Attitudes toward globalization became rather negative in the 2000's in both the V4 and Benelux Union.

H3: Being older (as being one year of age older) will make a person more likely to be against globalization

H4: Being a man will make a person more likely to be in favor of globalization.

H5: Having nationalist attitudes will make a person more likely to be against globalization.

H6: Within the EU, being a supporter of the EU, will make a person more likely to be in favor of globalization.

H7: Identifying oneself as rightist will make a person more likely to be against globalization.

H8: Being a union member will make a person more likely to be against globalization.

H9: Having attained a high education will make a person more likely to be in favor of globalization.

H10: Living in a rural area will make a person more likely to be against globalization.

H11: Being in a low-skilled occupation will make a person more likely to be against globalization.

The attitudes toward globalization will be considered as positive by having a positive attitude toward immigrants, as well as a more open economy (that does not protect itself from foreign imports).

## Chapter 5-Results

### 5.1. Changes in agreement with globalization

#### Percentage of agreement with globalization:

The following table presents the percentage distribution of agreement with globalization for one of the surveys, carried out in several years in both the V4 and the Benelux Union:

**Table 2-ESS 2002 and 2014 for the V4 and the Benelux Union**

	ESS 2002	Czechia	Poland	Hungary	V4	Netherlands	Belgium	Luxembourg	Benelux
Agree (agree+ agree strongly)	30%	14%	58%	11%	28%	10%	17%	29%	19%
Neither agree nor disagree	25%	21%	22%	20%	21%	15%	22%	22%	20%
Disagree (disagree+ disagree strongly)	39%	57%	12%	60%	43%	73%	58%	41%	57%
Rest-don't know, refuse, no answer	6%	8%	8%	9%	8%	2%	3%	8%	4%
	ESS 2014	Czechia	Poland	Hungary	V4	Netherlands	Belgium	Luxembourg	Benelux
Agree (agree+ agree strongly)	40%	20%	60%	23%	34%	31%	30%	-	31%
Neither agree nor disagree	28%	33%	26%	37%	32%	22%	25%	-	24%
Disagree (disagree+ disagree strongly)	29%	44%	9%	39%	31%	47%	45%	-	46%
Rest-don't know, refuse, no answer	3%	3%	5%	1%	3%	0%	0%	-	0%

This table relates to the following question, asked in the ESS survey, and related to immigration, specifically: *“Some people come to this country and apply for refugee status on the ground that they fear persecution in their own country. Please say how much you agree or disagree that: ‘the government should be generous in judging people’s applications for refugee status’.”*

Slovakia did not participate in these surveys. From the rest of the countries, the people who displayed the most favorable attitudes toward immigrants were the Polish, both in 2002 and 2014. The Hungarians showed the least favorable attitudes in 2002, but they became much more in favor by 2014. All of the analyzed V4 countries show that people became more in favor of immigrants between 2002 and 2014. Luxembourg did not participate in the ESS of 2014. They showed the most favorable attitudes toward immigrants in 2002, but the Netherlands and Belgium got better attitudes toward immigrants, similar to the levels of Luxembourg in 2002, by 2014. Nevertheless, the Benelux Union had worse attitudes than the rest of the European

countries in both years. The Benelux Union, in comparison with the V4, showed in both years less favorable attitudes toward immigrants and foreign workers.

The rest of the percentage tables, organized per survey and year, can be found in Appendix II. A brief interpretation of these tables follows:

**EVS survey Question 1:** In this survey, a question related to immigration was asked, specifically: *“(who you) don't like as neighbors: immigrants/foreign workers (not mention=0, mention=1)”*

Poland had the most favorable attitudes toward immigrants and foreign workers in the year 1990, in comparison with both the rest of the V4 and the European average. Nevertheless, a change happened over those nine years, and Poland became the country with the least favorable attitudes within the V4, and even was set below the European average. The Czech Republic became the country with the most favorable attitudes toward immigrants and foreign workers from the V4 by 1999, but still did not reach the levels of the European benchmark. In both years the Netherlands showed the most favorable attitudes toward immigrants and foreign workers from the Benelux Union, being, as well, over the European benchmark. Belgium presented in both years slightly worse attitudes toward immigrants than the European average. The Benelux Union, in comparison with the V4, showed in both years more favorable attitudes toward immigrants and foreign workers.

**Question 2:** In this survey, another question related to immigration was asked, specifically:

*“are you concerned with the living conditions of: immigrants (not at all 5, not so much 4, to a certain extent 3, much 2, very much 1)?”*

In both 1999 and 2008 the Czech Republic had the most favorable attitudes toward immigrants. Poland became much more concerned with the conditions of immigrants along the years. Nevertheless, all the V4 countries showed much less favorable attitudes toward immigrants than the rest of the European countries in both years this question was asked. From the Benelux Union, Luxembourg had the most favorable attitudes toward immigrants in both 1999 and 2008. Nevertheless, in all the three countries, the attitudes became less favorable between 1999 and 2008, and they went from being about the European average, to be less favorable. Despite this, in comparison with the V4, the attitudes toward immigrants in both countries were more favorable in both years.

**Question 1 WVS:** This question is related to attitudes toward immigrants, and says: *“If jobs*

*are scarce: Employers should give priority to (nation) people than immigrants (1 agree, 2 disagree, 3 neither agree nor disagree”*

This question was asked in different waves of the survey. At the aggregate level the attitudes did not change by much over the years, whereas in Poland (the only country of interest available for all the years), the attitudes became less favorable toward immigrants between 1995 and 1998, and never came back to the levels of the beginning of the 1990s. In general, the attitudes toward immigrants were more favorable in the Benelux Union than in the V4.

**Question 2 WVS:** This question is related to attitudes toward globalization in general, and says:

*“Do you see yourself as a global citizen?”*

This question about the perception of oneself as a globalized person, and was asked in two waves of the survey. At the aggregate level the attitudes became more extreme over the years, on both sides of the spectrum- people tended to agree or disagree more with seeing themselves as a world citizen. In Poland, people felt more as world citizens (and therefore, as part of a globalized world) between 2010-2014 than they did between 2005 and 2009, and they went from being below the benchmark level to be highly above it. They felt more as world citizens than their Dutch counterparts, at least in the 2010-2014 period, when this question was also asked in the Netherlands.

**Question 1 ISSP:** *“Immigrants are generally good for [Country’s] economy“*

People in the V4 considered in all three years of the surveys that immigrants are rather not good for the country’s economy, except for Poland in 1995. The attitudes changed toward people thinking that immigrants are good for the economy by 2003 and kept changing toward this way by 2013. The only exception was Poland, where people shifted by 2003 their attitudes toward thinking that immigrants are not good for the economy. The Netherlands showed attitudes that differed from the benchmark, in both 1995 and 2003, since people were less in favor of the statement stating that immigrants are good for the economy, although the attitudes became more positive by 2003. The Belgians, on the other hand, had in general attitudes more in favor of the statement, but this is only due to the Brussels region. Most of the people in Wallonia and Flanders did not agree that immigrants are good for the economy in 2013.

**ISSP- Question 2:** *“Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in [Country]”*

In all the years of the survey, most people in the V4 countries thought that immigrants take away the jobs from the nationals, as was the case for the benchmark. Nevertheless, this feeling

intensified in the Czech Republic and Slovakia between 1995 and 2013, although in 2003 it saw a decrease in Slovakia. This opinion was, in contrast, less popular after the years in both Poland and Hungary. The Netherlands and Belgium showed less attitudes in favor of the statement saying that immigrants take away jobs from nationals in their countries than the benchmark did. Moreover, this gap was even widened for the Netherlands by 2003. For Belgium, the least people agreeing with this statement were found in the Brussels region, in contrast with Wallonia and Flanders.

### **ISSP-Question 3:** *“Number of immigrants to [Country] should be increased”*

In contrast with the benchmark, more people in the V4 thought that the number of immigrants should be reduced than the people from the benchmark. Nevertheless, both Slovakia and Poland kept levels close to the benchmark. What can be seen is the number of people who thought the number of immigrants in the country should remain the same increased by much in the V4, while this was not the case in the benchmark. Attitudes toward this question in the Netherlands were similar to the benchmark in 1995, but people became less in favor of “new” immigrants by 2003, having a smaller number of people in favor of the question than the benchmark. In 2013, the region of Brussels had similar attitudes than the benchmark, whereas the region of Wallonia and Flanders had less people in favor of “new” immigrants.

### **ISSP- Question 4:** *“Large international companies are doing more and more damage to local businesses in [Country].”*

People in the V4 considered that large international companies damage the local businesses in their countries much more than the benchmark would suggest (see Appendix II). Nevertheless, this attitude became less extreme by 2013. There were not big contrasts between the V4 countries in neither of the year. In 2003, the Dutch agreed less with the statement than the benchmark. In Belgium, in 2013, the inhabitants of Brussels agreed with the statement similarly than the benchmark would suggest, while the ones from Flanders agree less. In contrast, those from Wallonia agreed much more.

### **ISSP- Question 5:** *Free trade leads to better products becoming available in [Country].*

As can be seen in Appendix II-in the V4, in 2003 the most people in favor of free trade were found in the Czech Republic, and the least in Slovakia. This changed in 2013, when the results were precisely the opposite. Hungary kept in both years levels similar to the benchmark. Within the Benelux Union, the Netherlands had very positive attitudes toward free trade in 2003. Belgium, in 2013, had less positive attitudes than the benchmark, with Flanders having the most

positive attitudes, and Wallonia the least.

Hypothesis 1 suggested that in the 1990's attitudes toward globalization were positive, in both the V4 and Benelux. Table 2 presents the percentage of people who agreed with globalization in each of the groups of countries in the different points in time. This table is based on the percentage tables that can be found in Appendix II.

**Table 3-Percentage of agreement with globalization**

Survey	Group of countries	1990's	early 2000's	late 2000's
ESS 2002 & 2014	Visegrad group		28%	34%
	Benelux Union		19%	31%
EVS 1990 & 1999	Visegrad group	82%	78%	
	Benelux Union	86%	90%	
EVS 1999 & 2008	Visegrad group		42%	48%
	Benelux Union		62%	58%
WVS-all waves	Visegrad group	10%	11%	
	Benelux Union		36%	
WVS-wave 5 & 6	Visegrad group		50%	79%
	Benelux Union			68%
ISSP 1995, 2003 & 2013	Visegrad group	17%	15%	16%
	Benelux Union	17%	27%	27%
ISSP 1995, 2003 & 2013	Visegrad group	24%	20%	2%
	Benelux Union	43%	47%	8%
ISSP 1995, 2003 & 2013	Visegrad group	29%	38%	35%
	Benelux Union	39%	30%	28%
ISSP 2003 & 2013	Visegrad group		10%	11%
	Benelux Union		24%	8%
ISSP 2003 & 2013	Visegrad group		61%	51%
	Benelux Union		71%	52%
	% agree with globalization	39%	40%	35%

As can be seen from this table, only 39% of the population in both the V4 and the Benelux Union agreed with globalization in the 1990's. In the beginning of the 2000's, the attitudes toward globalization became slightly more favorable, but in the late 2000's this number became much less favorable, therefore **hypothesis 1 is supported**. Next, hypothesis 2 states that: "Attitudes toward globalization became rather negative in the 2000's, in both the V4 and the Benelux Union", and, since attitudes toward globalization did become more negative during this period in most countries, as shown in Table 4, it is possible to conclude that **hypothesis 2 is supported** in general and for the Benelux Union in particular, although the V4 represents an exception, since the attitudes became slightly more positive during this period.

**Table 4-Changes in agreement with globalization**

	All	V4	Benelux
Change from 1990 to 2000	1%	0%	2%
Change from early 2000 to late 2000's	-3%	2%	-10%

## 5.2. Ordered probit models interpretation:

### ORDERED PROBIT MODEL –ESS 2002

**Table 5-ESS 2002 Ordered probit for the V4 and the Benelux Union**

Probit ESS 2002	Czech	Poland	Hungary	Netherlands	Belgium	Luxembourg	European Benchmark
Dependent variable: Pro-immigrants dummy (agree and agree strongly with immigrants)							
Age	0.0002937* (-0.00017)	-0.00499 (-0.0004)	0.001386 (-0.00223)	0.0109154*** (0.002135)	0.00007 (0.00017)	-0.0004734** (0.00023)	-0.0003*** (0.0001)
Male	0.021467 (-0.08634)	0.18909*** (-0.05518)	0.003451 (-0.08184)	0.000304 (0.071596)	-0.04516 (0.0679)	0.052317 (0.679476)	-0.0341*** (0.0128)
Rural	-0.127951* (-0.08978)	-0.06922 (-0.06218)	-0.325*** (-0.0921)	0.093119 (0.079333)	-0.177** (0.771132)	-0.11163 (0.078545)	-0.1453*** (0.0134)
Education (years of education)	0.007*** (-0.0028)	0.006516 (-0.00489)	-0.01462 (-0.01143)	-0.00121 (0.005463)	-0.00294 (0.003313)	0.0057319*** (0.002071)	- -
observations	1360	2110	1685	2364	1899	1552	42359

Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \*p<0.1

The rest of ordered probit model tables can be found in Appendix III; where they are organized by survey, question, and year.

### Attitudes toward immigration:

**ESS 2002, 2014-**As the European benchmark for 2002 shows, being one year older in age, being a male, and living in a rural area made people less likely to be in favor of immigrants. In the Czech Republic, being one year older and having more years of education made people more likely to be in favor of immigrants, while living in a rural area had, the same as in Hungary and Belgium, a negative effect on attitudes toward immigrants. In Poland, being a male had a positive impact on being in favor of immigrants. In the Netherlands, being of higher age made people more likely to be in favor of immigration, but in Luxembourg it had the opposite effect. Being highly educated had a positive impact on attitudes toward globalization in Luxembourg.

According to the European benchmark, in 2014 being one year older, being a male and living in a rural area made people more likely to be against immigration, while having one more year of education had the opposite effect. Living in a rural area had a negative effect on attitudes toward immigrants in Hungary, the Netherlands and Belgium. Having attained more years of education made people more likely to be in favor of immigrants in the Netherlands.

**EVS 1990, 1999-** Most of the results were according to the hypotheses. Nevertheless a few interesting outcomes could be seen in 1990-being a male made both the Poles as well as the benchmark to be more likely to be against immigration, while being rightist made the Poles more likely to be in favor of immigration. In the year 1999, being a male in Belgium and the benchmark made people less likely to favor immigration, while being rightist in the Czech Republic and in an unskilled job in Luxembourg had the opposite effect.

**EVS 1999, 2008-** Although most of the results were as expected in the hypotheses, in the year 1999 being male had the opposite effect than expected, that is, made people more likely to be against immigrants in Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and the benchmark. Being of higher age had the opposite impact in the Czech Republic. Being rightist made the Hungarians more likely to favor immigration. In the year 2008, being of higher age had a positive impact on attitudes toward immigrants in Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Luxembourg and the benchmark, the same as being rightist in Hungary. Being a male had a negative impact on attitudes toward immigrants in the Czech Republic.

**WVS-** Despite most results being in accordance with the hypotheses, in the third, fifth and sixth waves of the WVS, being of higher age had a positive impact on the attitudes toward immigrants. Being a male had a negative impact on the attitudes toward immigrants in the third wave in the Czech Republic and the benchmark in the fifth and sixth waves.

**ISSP 1995, 2003, 2013-** Although in most cases the results were as predicted by the hypotheses, some were not accordance with what was expected-in the year 1995, being nationalist had a positive effect on attitudes toward immigrants in the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, while being rightist had the same impact but just in the Czech Republic. Being in a trade union made people less likely to be against immigrants in the benchmark. Being of higher age had a positive impact on attitudes toward immigrants in both the Netherlands and the benchmark in both 1995 and 2003. Being rightist had the same effect in the benchmark and the Czech Republic. In 2013, being nationalist had a positive effect on attitudes toward immigrants in Slovakia, the Wallonian part of Belgium and the benchmark. Being rightist had the same effect



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in the Czech Republic, and being a member of a trade union had the same impact in Hungary, Slovakia and the benchmark. Being male had a negative impact on attitudes toward immigrants in Slovakia, and living in a rural area had the opposite effect in Hungary.

### **Attitudes toward globalization in general:**

**WVS-** Despite most results were in accordance with the hypotheses, some did not comply- being nationalist had a positive impact on the attitudes toward globalization in both Hungary and Poland in the fifth and sixth wave. In the fifth wave, being in an unskilled job made people more likely to be in favor of globalization (according to the benchmark). In the sixth wave, being of higher age had a positive impact on attitudes toward globalization in the Netherlands, while being a male had the opposite impact in the same country.

### **Attitudes toward economic globalization:**

**ISSP 2003, 2013:** Most of the results complied with the hypotheses, with some notorious exceptions: in the year 2003, being a male had a negative impact on attitudes toward economic globalization in Slovakia, Poland and Hungary. Being nationalist had the opposite effect on the benchmark, the Netherlands and the Czech Republic. The same effect as being nationalist had being rightist in the Netherlands and the benchmark. Living in a rural area had a negative impact on attitudes toward economic globalization on the benchmark, the same as having achieved a high education in Slovakia. Being in a trade union meant more positive attitudes toward globalization in the Czech Republic, Poland and the benchmark. In the year 2013, being a male had a negative impact on attitudes toward globalization in the countries of the benchmark, and being of higher age had the opposite impact in Belgium. Being nationalist had a positive impact in Slovakia, the Czech Republic, the Brussels area and Belgium. Being rightist had a positive impact on attitudes toward globalization in Wallonia, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Being in a trade union had the same effect on the benchmark. Being highly educated had the opposite effect in Slovakia.

Now that is possible to see that attitudes toward globalization *have changed*, comes in place to explain some possible reasons that have influenced this variation over time. For this, ordered probit multivariate regressions were performed with all the available independent variables together- being a male, being 1 year older, living in a rural area, having a high education, being nationalist, supporting the EU, being rightist, being a union member and being in a skilled occupation. In the case of categorical variables, dummies were used. The figures in Appendix III present the likelihood of being in favor of immigrants, using a dummy that considers the

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answers to the questions. To facilitate the analysis I have made summary tables, indicating per survey question and country whether a hypothesis was true, false, not tested for or not significant. These are the tables 7-9. Table 6 presents a summary of the results of tables 7-9.

***Table 6- Results of hypotheses testing-based on the amount of statistically significant results of the ordered probit models related to each hypothesis***

	T	F	N/A	N/S	% of true
H3	52	17	63	68	38%
H4	19	21	63	97	14%
H5	29	18	99	54	29%
H6	72	0	112	16	82%
H7	33	19	97	51	32%
H8	20	7	127	46	27%
H9	79	2	59	60	56%
H10	29	2	132	37	43%
H11	15	3	172	10	54%

Where T means true, F - false, N/A- Not available and N/S- not significant. The percentage of times the hypothesis was “true” (in the table as % of true) is the number of times a hypothesis was supported, counting as the total the amount of times it was available to be tested.

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**Table 7-Hypotheses 3-5:** Explanatory notes: S1-ESS 2002, S2-ESS 2014, S3-EVS 1990, S4-EVS 1999, S5-EVS 1999, S6-EVS 2008, S7-WVS wave 2, S8-WVS wave 3, S9-WVS wave 5, S10-WVS wave 6, S11-WVS wave 5, S12-WVS wave 6, S13-ISSP 1995, S14-ISSP 2003, S15-ISSP 2013, S16-ISSP 1995, S17-ISSP 2003, , S18-ISSP 2013, S19-ISSP 1995, S20-ISSP 2003, S21-ISSP 2013, S22-ISSP 2003, S23-ISSP 2013, S24-ISSP 2003 and S25-ISSP 2013; Cty-country, SK-Slovakia, CZ-Czech republic, PL-Poland, HU-Hungary, BE-Belgium, LU-Luxembourg, NL- the Netherlands. A “\*” is used to show the benchmark. T means true, F - false, “..”means the result was not significant and an empty space that the result was not available.

	Č	S1	S2	S3	S4	S5	S6	S7	S8	S9	S10	S11	S12	S13	S14	S15	S16	S17	S18	S19	S20	S21	S22	S23	S24	S25
Age	SK	..	..	T			T			..	..	..	..	T		T	T	T			T		T			
	CZ	F		T		F	F			..	..	..	..										T		T	
	PL			T	T		F	T	..	T		T	T			..	T	T	..	T		..		..	T	..
	HU			T	..		F	..	T		..	T	..	T			T					T			T	
	BE			T	T			..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	T-BR	..	..		..	..	T-BR	..		..	F
	LU	T	..	..			F	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
	NL	F		T	T			..	..		..	F	F	F	..	T	T	..	T	T	..		..		..	..
Male	*	T	T	T	T		F	T	F	F	F	T	T	F	F		T	T		T	T		T	T	T	T
	SK	..	..			F				..	..	..	..						F	T		F	F			
	CZ					F	F		F	..	..	..	..										T			
	PL	T		F					..			T		T		..			..			..	F	..	T	..
	HU				..	F		..		T	..		..										F		T	
	BE				F			..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	T	..	..		..	..		..		..	T-FL
	LU		..	..				..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Nationalist	NL							..	..		..	F	T	T	..	T			..			..		..	T	..
	*	F	F	F	F	F		T		F	F	T	T	T	T									F		T
	SK	..	..		..	..	..			..	..	..	..			F	T	T				F		T		F
	CZ	..	..		..	..	..			..	..	..	..	F			T		T				T		F	F
	PL	..	..		..	..	..		..			F	F	F		..	T		..	T		..		..		..
	HU	..	..		..	..	..	..			..	F	..	F	T		F			F						
	BE	..	..		..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	F-WA	..	..	T-FL	..	..	T	..	T	..	F-BR
Nationalist	LU	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
	NL	..	..		..	..	..	..	..		T	..	F			..	T		..	T		..		..	F	..
	*	..	..	T	..	..	..	T		T	T	T	T	T		F	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	F	F

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**Table 8-Hypotheses 6-8:** Explanatory notes : 1-ESS 2002, S2-ESS 2014, S3-EVS 1990, S4-EVS 1999, S5-EVS 1999, S6-EVS 2008, S7-WVS wave 2, S8-WVS wave 3, S9-WVS wave 5, S10-WVS wave 6, S11-WVS wave 5, S12-WVS wave 6, S13-ISSP 1995, S14-ISSP 2003, S15-ISSP 2013, S16-ISSP 1995, S17-ISSP 2003, S18-ISSP 2013, S19-ISSP 1995, S20-ISSP 2003, S21-ISSP 2013, S22-ISSP 2003, S23-ISSP 2013, S24-ISSP 2003 and S25-ISSP 2013; Cty- country, SK-Slovakia, CZ-Czech republic, PL-Poland, HU-Hungary, BE-Belgium, LU-Luxembourg, NL- the Netherlands. A “\*” is used to show the benchmark. T means true, F - false, “..” means the result was not significant and an empty space that the result was not available.

	Cty	S1	S2	S3	S4	S5	S6	S7	S8	S9	S10	S11	S12	S13	S14	S15	S16	S17	S18	S19	S20	S21	S22	S23	S24	S25
In favor EU	SK	..	..	T	..	..		..	..	..	..	..	..	T	T		T	T		T	T		T		T	
	CZ	..	..	T	..	..	T	..	..	..	..	..	..	T	T	T	T	T	T		T	T	T	T	T	T
	PL	..	..		..	..		..	..	..	..	..	..	T	T	..		T	..		T	..	T	..	T	..
	HU	..	..		..	..	T	..	..	..	..	..	..		T	T	T	T			T	T	T	T	T	T
	BE	..	..	T	..	..	T	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	T	..	..	T	..	..	T	..	T	..	T
	LU	..	..	..	..	..	T	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
	NL	..	..		..	..	T	..	..	..	..	..	..	T	T	..	T	T	..	T	T	..	T	..	T	..
	*	..	..	T	..	..	T	..	..	..	..	..	..	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T
Rightist	SK	..	..					..	..	..	..	..	..						T		F	T				F
	CZ	..	..		F			..	..	..	..	..	..		F	F	F	F	F	F	F					F
	PL	..	..	F				..	..	..	..	..	..			..		T	..			..	T	..		..
	HU	..	..		..	F	F	..	..	..	..	..	..					T					T	T		
	BE	..	..	T	T	T	T	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	T	..	..	T	..	..	T	..	F-WA, FL-T	..	F-WA
	LU	..	..	..	T		T	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
	NL	..	..	T	T	T		..	..	..	..	..	..	T	T	..		T	..	T	T	..		..	F	..
	*	..	..	T	T		T	..	..	..	..	..	..		F	T	T	F	F	T	T	T	F	T		
Trade Union	SK	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..			T								T	T	
	CZ	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..						T				T	T	F	T
	PL	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..			..			..			..	T	..	F	..
	HU	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..						F				T			
	BE	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..		..	..		..	..	T	..	T	..	T-FL
	LU	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
	NL	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..			..			..			..	T	..		..
	*	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	T	T	T	F		F	T	T	T	T	F	F	T

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**Table 9-Hypotheses 9-11:** Explanatory notes: S1-ESS 2002, S2-ESS 2014, S3-EVS 1990, S4-EVS 1999, S5-EVS 1999, S6-EVS 2008, S7-WVS wave 2, S8-WVS wave 3, S9-WVS wave 5, S10-WVS wave 6, S11-WVS wave 5, S12-WVS wave 6, S13-ISSP 1995, S14-ISSP 2003, S15-ISSP 2013, S16-ISSP 1995, S17-ISSP 2003, , S18-ISSP 2013, S19-ISSP 1995, S20-ISSP 2003, S21-ISSP 2013, S22-ISSP 2003, S23-ISSP 2013, S24-ISSP 2003 and S25-ISSP 2013; Cty-country, SK-Slovakia, CZ-Czech republic, PL-Poland, HU-Hungary, BE-Belgium, LU-Luxembourg, NL- the Netherlands. A “ \* ” is used to show the benchmark. T means true, F - false, “..” means the result was not significant and an empty space that the result was not available.

	Cty	S1	S2	S3	S4	S5	S6	S7	S8	S9	S10	S11	S12	S13	S14	S15	S16	S17	S18	S19	S20	S21	S22	S23	S24	S25
High education	SK	..	..			T	T			..	..	..	..					T				T			F	F
	CZ	T			T	T			T	..	..	..	..				T	T	T	T	T		T			T
	PL			T		T	T				T	T				..	T	T	..	T	T	..	T	..		..
	HU			T	..	T	T	..	T		..		..				T	T		T	T	T	T	T		T-FL
	BE			T		T	T	..		..	..	..	..	..	..	T	..	..	T	..	..	T	..		..	
	LU	T	..	..		T	T	..		..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
	NL		T			T	T	..		T	T	..	T	T	T	..	T	T	..	T	T	..	T	..	T	..
	*		T	T	T	T	T		T	T	T	T		T	T	T	T	T		T	T	T	T	T		T
Rural area	SK	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	T		..			..			T			
	CZ	T		..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..		T	..			..						
	PL			..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	T	..	..	T	..	..	T	..		..		..
	HU	T	T	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	T	T-WA	..	T		..	T	F			T	T
	BE	T	T	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..		..	..	T-WA	..	..	T	..	T-WA	..	
	LU	T	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
	NL		T	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
	*	T	T	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	T	T	..	T	T	..	T	T	F	T		T
Unskilled job	SK	..	..	T			..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
	CZ	..	..	T	T	T	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
	PL	..	..	T	T		..	..	..	..	..	T	T	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
	HU	..	..		..		..	..	..	..	..	T	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
	BE	..	..		T	T	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
	LU	..	..	..	F	F	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
	NL	..	..	T			..	..	..	..	..	..		..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
	*	..	..	T	T	T	..	..	..	..	..	F		..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..

Considering the hypotheses that were supported more than 40% of the time as **supported**, the conclusions below have been drawn. This 40% value has been chosen based on the fact that for most of the surveys that included the option “don’t know, no answer, neither agree or disagree,” which does not provide any clear results, the amount of people who chose this answer was around 25%. If this 25% is discounted from the 100% of people who took the survey, leaves a 75% of answers that can be considered. Provided that more than half of them (so, 40% of the total) are necessary to support the hypothesis, gives the percentage used in this research.

In order to test hypothesis 3, that suggests that being older will make a person more likely to be against globalization, ordered probit regressions were calculated, and, since only 38% of the results obtained supported the hypothesis, it is possible to conclude that **hypothesis 3 is not supported**, hence, being one year older in age will **not** make a person more likely to be against globalization. It is interesting to note that this was often the case in the Netherlands and Luxembourg, as well as at a more global scale, as the results of the WVS suggest.

Since only 14% of the results obtained did comply with the hypothesis, it is possible to conclude that **hypothesis 4 is not supported**, what means that being a man will **not** make a person more likely to be in favor of globalization. This was true for both attitudes toward immigrants, as well as for attitudes toward economic globalization and toward globalization in general.

As very few of the results obtained supported the hypothesis, it is possible to conclude that **hypothesis 5 is not supported**, hence, having nationalist attitudes will **not** make a person more likely to be against globalization, especially for feeling as a globalized citizen and for economic globalization.

As 82% of the of the results obtained supported the hypothesis, it is possible to conclude that **hypothesis 6 is supported**, which means that within the EU, being a supporter of the EU, will make a person more likely to be in favor of globalization.

As only 32% of the results obtained supported the hypothesis, it is possible to conclude that **hypothesis 7 is not supported**, hence, identifying oneself as rightist will not make a person more likely to be against globalization.

Only 27% of the results did comply with the hypothesis, which means that **hypothesis 8 is not supported**- being a member of a trade union will not make a person more likely to be against globalization.

Since 56% of the results obtained supported the hypothesis, it is possible to conclude that

**hypothesis 9 is supported**, so, having attained a high education will make a person more likely to be in favor of globalization. Only in Slovakia, in the case of attitudes toward free trade this hypothesis was rejected.

As 43% of the results obtained supported the hypothesis, it is possible to conclude that **hypothesis 10 is supported**, so living in a rural area will make a person more likely to be against globalization. It is interesting to note that this did not prove right in the case of Hungary in the most recent survey, from 2013 in terms of attitudes toward immigrants, and neither in the case of the ISSP benchmark for attitudes toward economic globalization in 2003.

Since 54% of the results obtained supported the hypothesis, it is possible to conclude that **hypothesis 11 is supported**, hence, being in a low-skilled occupation will make a person more likely to be against globalization. This did not prove right by the end of the 1990's in both Luxembourg and Hungary.

Tests for multicollinearity were performed, as can be seen in Appendix IV, by using the VIF command in STATA for each of the surveys. As all of the VIF results were smaller than 4 (as a matter of fact, they were around 1.05 in most cases) it is possible to state that there were no multicollinearity issues.

## **Chapter 6- Discussion and concluding remarks**

This thesis started with a literature review on attitudes toward globalization, their changes and what possibly affects them. After that, ordered probit models were used to find out the impact of different personal characteristics on attitudes toward globalization, as well as an analysis of the percentage distribution of attitudes toward globalization was used to determine whether attitudes changed between the 1990's and the first decade of the 2000's. In this section, a summary of the results is presented, together with a discussion, recommendations for further research and concluding remarks.

### **6.1. Summary of results**

During the 1990's, the attitudes toward globalization became increasingly favorable in both the Benelux Union and the V4 countries, seeing a peak in the 2000's. Nevertheless, around 2010, these attitudes became more negative, and this decrease was more prominent in the Benelux Union. It is interesting to look at the factors that make the attitudes toward globalization become more negative. In the V4 and in the Benelux Union, those were being older (although not always true in the Netherlands and Luxembourg), having nationalist attitudes, not being a supporter of the EU, living in a rural area and being in a low-skilled occupation. Having achieved a high education meant in all the countries, except Slovakia, rather positive attitudes toward globalization.

### **6.2. Discussion**

Attitudes toward globalization became more positive throughout the 1990's, as can be seen in the beginning of the 2000's, but experience a turn toward more negative attitudes in the mid 2000's. It is interesting to analyze the causes for this. On one hand, as discussed in the results, the characteristics of every person suggest to what extent they will be likely to agree or disagree with globalization. On the other hand, and what is more difficult to quantify, each human's personal experience with globalization will impact their attitudes toward it. Therefore, in this discussion, I would like to briefly suggest some of the experiences that could be common to many of the inhabitants of the analyzed countries. Although the general trend in attitudes toward globalization was to become negative, all of the analyzed V4



countries show that people became more in favor of immigrants between 2002 and 2014. This is interesting because nowadays it seems that these countries are opposed to immigration, as for example Hungary put a wall in its southern border to avoid the entrance of refugees. This could be due to the fact that the survey was before the refugee crisis of 2015-2016, and therefore does not reflect a change that might have happened within the last 2-3 years. Another interesting effect was the one of having achieved a high education on attitudes toward free trade in Slovakia. Although in general this effect should be positive, in the case of Slovakia it was significantly negative. Perhaps this was due to the fact that in Slovakia having a high education is skewed by the large availability of higher education institutions (39 universities for a population of about 5 million), which comes in contrast with the high unemployment in many regions, what might suggest that people would prefer to have trade barriers. It is curious that often, considering oneself as being rightist in the political spectrum did not always mean that people would have negative attitudes toward immigrants nor economic globalization, especially when it comes to free trade. Being a supporter of the EU meant always more positive attitudes toward globalization, but this might be an issue of reversed causality, that is, being in favor of globalization could condition people to be in favor of the EU.

The literature review suggested many possible hypotheses. From that set of hypotheses, a few were selected-those that could be tested with the available data from the analyzed countries. The hypotheses that were supported in this thesis, which means that they were supported in the V4 and Benelux Union, are those proposed by Gabel (1998), Anderson & Kaltenthaler, (1996), Scheve and Slaughter (2001); Edwards (2006); Fidrmuc & Doyle (2005); Dustmann & Preston (2007); (Ritzer, 2007) Lee et al. (2009); Rodrik (1997). There could be several possible explanations with regard to the fact that most of the hypotheses were not supported in this thesis. First of all, some of the hypotheses were tested in a different geographical area, such as North America or different European countries, having therefore different results. Using different methods of analysis and ways of performing calculations could, as well, yield different results. Moreover, the choice of specific surveys and questions within mean that some results might vary from the ones of other studies performed.

One issue to take into account is the framing effects that the way a question is asked in a survey has on the respondent. This could be clearly seen in the two questions asked as a part of the EVS, where one states if a person does not like immigrants as neighbors, and the other whether people are concerned with the living conditions of immigrants. Although only around 15% of the locals would mind having immigrants as neighbors, almost half of them stated not caring about their living conditions in each year, which is a rather big difference for an answer that implies not being in favor of immigrants in each case. This is probably because it sounds more “extreme” to say that one does not like to have immigrants as neighbors, or even due to availability heuristics (i.e. a local who has an immigrant as a neighbor and thinks that this immigrant is a nice person), whereas naming the conditions of the group in general gives more “anonymity” to the group as a whole.

One econometric issue was found during the calculations performed for this thesis. Often, the results of the ordered probit models were not significant, which meant that, although there were many answers from a certain country for a specific question, this did not mean they would be important for analysis, therefore a number of the responses were not taken into account.

### **6.3. Recommendations for further research**

It was not possible to test for some of the hypotheses that followed from the literature review, due to the fact that the questions from the surveys did not include those possible explanatory variables. Therefore, it would be useful for the development of further surveys, to include questions that would deal with such explanatory variables as in those stated in Chapter 3.

Moreover, it would be interesting to expand this research out of the limits of the V4 and the Benelux Union, in order to gain more insights from other countries. Another recommendation would be to create surveys that would focus specifically on attitudes toward globalization, since neither the European Values Study, the World Values Survey, the International Social Survey Program nor the European Social Survey focused specifically on attitudes toward

globalization, so the selection of the questions had to be very careful, as well as its interpretation.

#### **6.4. Concluding remarks**

Along this thesis, the changes in attitudes toward globalization in the V4 and the Benelux Union were analyzed, and, as expected, those have become more negative in the last couple of years. Having found out the personal characteristics that influence attitudes toward economic globalization are, it is possible to know what makes a person more likely to be against immigration, free trade and globalization in general. The applications of this knowledge are not few. Policy makers can benefit, political parties creating their proposals, further research and many others. Nevertheless, the most important conclusion to be taken from this thesis is the fact that is not the innate characteristics of a person that influence the attitudes toward globalization a person has (such as being a man), but that is more the combination of their level of skill and the opportunities they have encountered in life (and their ability to take advantage of them) what will make a person more likely to have either negative or positive attitudes toward globalization.

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## APPENDIX I-Questions used from each survey:

The questions highlighted with yellow color were used as dependent variables in the ordered probit models.

### 1.European Social Survey-2002

*Table 10-ESS 2002 questions*

Abbreviation	Description of the question	Question	Explanatory variable	Dependent variable
gvrfgap	Government should be generous judging applications for refugee status	D51		✓
gndr	Gender		gender	
agea	Age		Age	
domicil	Domicile, respondent's description	F5	Domicile	
eduys	Years of education	F6	Education	

### 2.European Social Survey-2014

*Table 11-ESS 2014 questions*

Abbreviation	Description of the question	Question	Explanatory variable	Dependent variable
gvrfgap	Government should be generous judging applications for refugee status	D15		✓
Gndr	Gender		Gender	
domicil	Domicile, respondent's description		Domicile	
eduys	Years of education	F15	Education	
agea	Age		Age	

CARD 35 Some people come to this country and apply for refugee status on the ground that they fear persecution in their own country. Using this card, please say how much you agree or disagree that: ‘the government should be generous in judging people’s applications for refugee status’. Agree strongly 1 Agree 2 Neither agree nor disagree 3 Disagree 4 Disagree strongly 5 (Don’t know) 8

### **3. European Values Study-1990**

*Table 12-EVS 1990 questions*

Abbreviation	Description of the question	Question	Explanatory variable	Dependent variable
q224i	don't like as neighbours: immigrants/foreign workers (not mention=0, mention=1)	Q216I		✓
Q719b	Age: respondent	Q717B	Age	
q650	how proud are you to be a ... (country) citizen	Q650	Nationalist attitudes	
Q716	Sex respondent	Q716	Gender	
q673	opinion on European Union	Q673	Attitudes toward EU	
Q478	Political opinion left-right	Q674	Political views	
q721	age completed education respondent	Q721	Education	
q725	kind of job respondent	Q725	Skill level	

### **4. European Values Study-1999**

*Table 13-EVS 1999 questions*

Abbreviation	Description of the question	Question	Explanatory variable	Dependent variable
v60	don't like as neighbours: immigrants/foreign workers (not mention-0, mention 1)	Q7I		✓
V185	Political view: left-right	Q72	Political views	
v274	are you concerned with the living conditions of: immigrants (not at all 5, not so much 4, to a certain extent 3, much 2, very much 1)	Q80C		✓
age	Age respondent		Age	
v291	sex respondent	Q84	Sex	
v303	age completed education respondent	Q93	Education	
v312	kind of job respondent	Q101	Skill level	



## **5. European Values Study-2008**

*Table 14-EVS 2008 questions*

Abbreviation	Description of the question	Question	Explanatory variable	Dependent variable
v262	European Union enlargement	Q74	Attitudes toward EU	
v264_LR	which political party would you vote for - left/right scale	Q75a	Political views	
v292	are you concerned with the living conditions of immigrants: immigrants (not at all 5, not so much 4, to a certain extent 3, much 2, very much 1)	Q84C		✓
v302	Sex respondent	Q86	Gender	
age	age: respondent (constructed)	age	Age	
v335	educational level respondent: age completed education	Q110	Education	

On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbours? \*immigrants, foreign workers

To what extent do you feel concerned about the living conditions of: immigrants in [COUNTRY] 1-very much 2 –much 3-to a certain extent 4-not so much 5-not at all

## **6. World Values Survey**

*Table 15-WVS questions*

Abbreviation	Description of the question	Question	Explanatory variable	Dependent variable
C002	Jobs scarce: Employers should give priority to (nation) people than immigrants (1 agree, 2 disagree, 3 neither agree nor disagree) (Waves 2-6)	C002		✓
G006	How proud of nationality	G006	Nationalist attitudes	
G019	I see myself as a world citizen (Waves 5 & 6)	G019		✓
X025	Highest educational level attained 1=Inadequately completed elementary education, 2=Completed (compulsory) elementary education, 3=Incomplete secondary school (technical/vocational type), 4=Complete secondary school (technical/vocational type), 5=Incomplete secondary (university prep type), 6=Complete secondary (university-prep type), 7=Some university without degree, 8=University with degree	X025	Education	
X047	Scale of incomes (1-lowest, 11-highest)	X047	Income	
X001	Sex	X001	Gender	
X053	Nature of tasks: Manual or cognitive (1=mostly manual, 10=mostly cognitive)	X053	Skill	

## **7. ISSP-1995**

*Table 16-ISSP 1995 questions*

Abbreviation	Description of the question	Question	Explanatory variable	Dependent variable
v26	Support their country even is wrong	v26	Nationalist attitudes	
v48	Immigrants generally good for economy	v48		✓
v49	Immigrants take jobs away from people (1-Agree strongly, 5-Disagree s	v49		✓
v51	Number of immigrants increase to (cntry)	v51		✓
v200	R: Sex	v200	Sex	
v201	R: Age	v201	Age	
V268	Trade union membership	V268	Trade union	
v205	R: Education II: categories	v205	Education	
V269	Party affiliation (being rightist)	V269	Rightist	
v68	Benefits from being member of (assoc)	v68	Attitudes toward EU	

## **8. ISSP-2003**

*Table 17-ISSP 2003 questions*

Abbreviation	Description of the question	Question	Explanatory variable	Dependent variable
v63	How proud are you being country national	Q16	Nationalist attitudes	
v41	Large international companies are doing more and more damage to local businesses in [Country].	Q7a		✓
v42	Free trade leads to better products becoming available in [Country].	Q7b		✓
v51	Immigrants are generally good for [Country's] economy	Q10b		✓
v52	Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in [Country]	Q10c		✓
v55	Number of immigrants coming to country	Q11		✓
v70_1	Benefits from being member of [European Union]: EU MEMBERS	Q21_1	Attitudes toward EU	
sex	R: Sex	Sex	Sex	
age	R: Age	Age	Age	
degree	R: Education II-highest education level	degree	Education	
Union	Trade union membership	Union	Trade union	
Party_lr	Part affiliation: left-right	Party_lr	Rightwing	
urbrural	Type of community: urban-rural self-ass	urbrural	Domicile	

## **9. ISSP-2013**

*Table 18-ISSP 2013 questions*

Abbreviation	Description of the question	Question	Explanatory variable	Dependent variable
V58	How proud are you of being: [Country nationality]?	Q12	Nationalist attitudes	
v40	Large international companies damage local business	Q6a		✓
v41	Free trade leads to better products in [Country]	Q6b		✓
V49	Immigrants generally good for economy	Q9b		✓
V50	Immigrants take jobs away from people born in [Country]	Q9c		✓
V56	Number of immigrants increase to country	Q10		✓
V66	Benefits from being member of [the European Union]	Q17	Attitudes toward EU	
SEX	Sex of Respondent	SEX	Sex	
AGE	Age of respondent	AGE	Age	
DEGREE	Highest completed education level: Categories for international comparison	DEGREE	Education	
UNION	Trade union membership	UNION	Trade union	
URBRURAL	Place of living: urban-rural	URBRURAL	Domicile	
PARTY_LR	R: Party voted for in last general election: left-right (derived from nat_PRTY)	PARTY_LR	Rightwing	

## APPENDIX II-Percentage distribution of attitudes toward globalization:

### II.1. European values study (EVS)

**Question 1:** In this survey, a question related to immigration was asked, specifically:

*“(who you) don't like as neighbours: immigrants/foreign workers (not mention=0, mention=1)”*

**Table 19-EVS 1990 and 1999 for the V4, question 1**

	EVS 1990	Czechoslovakia		Poland	Hungary	V4
Not Mentioned	84%	77%		90%	78%	81.7%
mentioned	16%	23%		10%	22%	18.3%
	EVS 1999	Slovakia	Czechia	Poland	Hungary	V4
Not Mentioned	85%	77%	81%	75%	-	77.7%
Mentioned	15%	23%	19%	25%	-	22.3%

**Table 20-EVS 1990 and 1999 for the Benelux Union, question 1**

	EVS 1990	Netherlands	Belgium	Luxemburg	Benelux
Not Mentioned	84%	91%	80%	-	85.5%
mentioned	16%	9%	20%	-	14.5%
	EVS 1999	Netherlands	Belgium	Luxemburg	Benelux
Not Mentioned	85%	95%	84%	91%	90%
Mentioned	15%	5%	16%	9%	10%

**Question 2:** In this survey, another question related to immigration was asked, specifically:

*“are you concerned with the living conditions of: immigrants (not at all 5, not so much 4, to a certain extent 3, much 2, very much 1)?”*

**Table 21-EVS 1999 and 2008 for the V4, question 2**

	EVS 1999	Slovakia	Czechia	Poland	Hungary	V4
Much, very much	19%	12%	13%	9%	5%	10%
To a certain extent	36%	38%	38%	30%	20%	32%
Not so much, not at all	45%	50%	49%	61%	75%	59%
	EVS 2008	Slovakia	Czechia	Poland	Hungary	V4
Much, very much	23%	11%	15%	14%	8%	12%
To a certain extent	34%	38%	31%	42%	34%	36%
Not so much, not at all	43%	51%	54%	44%	58%	52%

**Table 22-EVS 1999 and 2008 for the Benelux Union, question 2**

	EVS 1999	Netherlands	Belgium	Luxemburg	Benelux
Much, very much	19%	16%	19%	25%	20%
To a certain extent	36%	48%	36%	41%	42%
Not so much, not at all	45%	36%	45%	34%	38%
	EVS 2008	Netherlands	Belgium	Luxemburg	Benelux
Much, very much	23%	11%	16%	23%	17%
To a certain extent	34%	45%	38%	41%	41%
Not so much, not at all	43%	44%	46%	36%	42%

## II.2. World values survey (WVS)

**Question 1:** This question is related to attitudes toward immigrants, and says:

*“If jobs are scarce: Employers should give priority to (nation) people than immigrants (1 agree, 2 disagree, 3 neither agree nor disagree)”*

**Table 23-WVS, waves 2,3, 5 and 6 for the V4 and the Benelux Union**

	Wave 2- 1990- 1994		Czechoslovakia	Poland	Hungary	V4	Netherlands	Benelux
Agree	68%		87%	63%		75%		
Disagree	17%		7%	22%		15%		
Neither	6%		6%	9%		8%		
Other-NA	9%		0%	6%		3%		
	Wave 3- 1995- 1998	Slovakia	Czechia	Poland	Hungary	V4	Netherlands	Benelux
Agree	63%	85%	91%	88%	87%	88%		
Disagree	14%	4%	3%	4%	5%	4%		
Neither	9%	10%	5%	5%	8%	7%		
Other-NA	14%	1%	1%	3%	0%	1%		
	Wave 5 2005- 2009	Slovakia	Czechia	Poland	Hungary	V4	Netherlands	Benelux
Agree	64%			79%	77%	78%	40%	
Disagree	15%			8%	7%	8%	46%	
Neither	11%			10%	16%	13%	10%	
Other-NA	10%			3%	0%	2%	4%	
	Wave 6 2010- 2014	Slovakia	Czechia	Poland	Hungary	V4	Netherlands	Benelux
Agree	62%			71%		71%	36%	36%
Disagree	15%			14%		14%	36%	36%
Neither	16%			14%		14%	21%	21%
Other-NA	7%			1%		1%	7%	7%



## World values survey (WVS)

**Question 2:** This question is related to attitudes toward globalization in general, and says:

*“I see myself as a world citizen”*

**Table 24-WVS, waves 5 and 6 for the V4 and the Benelux Union**

	Wave 5 2005-2009	Poland	Hungary	V4	Netherlands	Benelux
Agree (agree+agree strongly)	62%	42%	59%	50.5%		
Disagree (disagree+disagree strongly)	17%	54%	25%	39.5%		
Rest-don't know, refuse, no answer	21%	4%	16%	10%		
	Wave 6 2010-2014	Poland	Hungary	V4	Netherlands	Benelux
Agree (agree+agree strongly)	70%	79%		79%	68%	68%
Disagree (disagree+disagree strongly)	24%	17%		17%	32%	32%
Rest-don't know, refuse, no answer	6%	4%		4%	0%	0%

## II.3. International Social Survey Program (ISSP)

### Question 1: *Immigrants are generally good for [Country's] economy*

**Table 25-ISSP, all years, for the V4 and the Benelux Union**

	1995	Slovakia	Czechia	Poland	Hungary	V4	Netherlands	Belgium			Benelux
Agree (agree+ agree strongly)	32%	11%	9%	37	9%	16.5%	17%	-	-	-	17%
Neither agree nor disagree	30%	26%	24%	30	28%	27%	45%	-	-	-	45%
Disagree (disagree+ disagree strongly)	38%	63%	67%	33	63%	56.5%	38%	-	-	-	38%
	2003	Slovakia	Czechia	Poland	Hungary	V4	Netherlands	Belgium			Benelux
Agree (agree+ agree strongly)	38%	9%	15%	22	12%	14.5%	27%	-	-	-	27%
Neither agree nor disagree	30%	40%	31%	42	38%	37.75%	38%	-	-	-	38%
Disagree (disagree+ disagree strongly)	32%	51%	54%	36	50%	47.75%	35%	-	-	-	35%
	2013	Slovakia	Czechia	Poland	Hungary	V4	Netherlands	Belgium- Brussels	Belgium- Wallonia	Belgium- Flanders	Belgium
Agree (agree+ agree strongly)	35%	14%	16%	-	18%	16%	-	46%	19%	17%	27%
Neither agree nor disagree	29%	36%	32%	-	40%	36%	-	22%	28%	34%	28%
Disagree (disagree+ disagree strongly)	31%	45%	50%	-	40%	45%	-	20%	39%	38%	32%
Don't know, no answer	5%	5%	2%	-	2%	3%	-	12%	14%	11%	13 %

**ISSP- Question 2:** *Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in [Country]*

**Table 26-ISSP, all years, for the V4 and the Benelux Union**

	1995	Slovakia	Czechia	Poland	Hungary	V4	Netherlands	Belgium	Luxemburg		Benelux
Agree (agree+ agree strongly)	41%	55%	42%	60%	64%	55%	28%	-	-	-	28%
Neither agree nor disagree	22%	22%	24%	18%	20%	21%	29%	-	-	-	29%
Disagree (disagree+ disagree strongly)	37%	23%	34%	22%	16%	24%	43%	-	-	-	43%
	2003	Slovakia	Czechia	Poland	Hungary	V4	Netherlands	Belgium	Luxemburg		Benelux
Agree (agree+ agree strongly)	41%	40%	59%	59%	56%	54%	25%	-	-	-	25%
Neither agree nor disagree	21%	35%	24%	21%	26%	26%	28%	-	-	-	28%
Disagree (disagree+ disagree strongly)	38%	25%	17%	20%	18%	20%	47%	-	-	-	47%
	2013	Slovakia	Czechia	Poland	Hungary	V4	Netherlands	Belgium- Brussels	Belgium- Wallonia	Belgium- Flanders	Benelux
Agree (agree+ agree strongly)	42%	60%	69%	-	52%	60%	-	20%	38%	41%	33%
Neither agree nor disagree	22%	25%	19%	-	31%	25%	-	22%	23%	26%	24%
Disagree (disagree+ disagree strongly)	32%	12%	12%	-	15%	13%	-	50%	30%	27%	36%
Don't know, no answer	4%	3%	0%	-	2%	2%	-	8%	9%	6%	8%

**ISSP-Question 3:** *Number of immigrants to [Country] should be increased*

**Table 27-ISSP, all years, for the V4 and the Benelux Union**

	1995	Slovakia	Czechia	Poland	Hungary	V4	Netherlands	Belgium	Luxemburg	Benelux	
Increased (a lot and little)	8%	3%	2.5%	8%	1.5%	4%	6%				
Remain the same	31%	30%	24%	29%	15%	25%	33%				
Decreased (a lot and little)	61%	67%	73.5%	63%	83.5%	72%	61%				
	2003	Slovakia	Czechia	Poland	Hungary	V4	Netherlands	Belgium	Luxemburg	Benelux	
Increased (a lot and little)	11%	12%	4%	7%	2%	6%	4%				
Remain the same	33%	33%	25%	39%	29%	32%	26%				
Decreased (a lot and little)	56%	55%	71%	54%	69%	62%	70%				
	2013	Slovakia	Czechia	Poland	Hungary	V4	Netherlands	Belgium-Brussels	Belgium-Wallonia	Belgium-Flanders	Benelux
Increased (a lot and little)	11%	3%	4%		2.5%	3%		14%	8%	3%	8%
Remain the same	31%	39%	27%		31%	32%		26%	20%	13%	20%
Decreased (a lot and little)	48%	48%	65%		62%	58%		41%	59%	74%	58%
Don't know, no answer	10%	10%	4%		4.5%	6%		19%	13%	10%	14%

**ISSP- Question 4:** *Large international companies are doing more and more damage to local businesses in [Country].*

**Table 28-ISSP 2003 and 2013, for the V4**

	2003	Slovakia	Czechia	Poland	Hungary	V4	Netherlands	Belgium	Luxemburg		Benelux
Agree (agree+ agree strongly)	60%	66%	67%	-	72%	68%	47%	-	-	-	47%
Neither agree nor disagree	21%	25%	20%	-	21%	22%	29%	-	-	-	29%
Disagree (disagree+ disagree strongly)	19%	9%	13%	-	7%	10%	24%	-	-	-	24%
	2013	Slovakia	Czechia	Poland	Hungary	V4	Netherlands	Belgium-Brussels	Belgium-Wallonia	Belgium-Flanders	Benelux
Agree (agree+ agree strongly)	53%	61%	71%	-	57%	63%	-	54%	71%	51%	59%
Neither agree nor disagree	22%	22%	18%	-	27%	22%	-	15%	12%	22%	16%
Disagree (disagree+ disagree strongly)	17%	12%	8%	-	12%	11%	-	10%	4%	11%	8%
Don't know, no answer	8%	5%	3%	-	4%	4%	-	21%	13%	16%	17%

**ISSP- Question 5:** *Free trade leads to better products becoming available in [Country].*

**Table 29-ISSP 2003 and 2013, for the V4**

	2003	Slovakia	Czechia	Poland	Hungary	V4	Netherlands	Belgium	Luxemburg		Benelux
Agree (agree+ agree strongly)	65%	48%	70%	-	66%	61%	71%	-	-	-	71%
Neither agree nor disagree	22%	34%	24%	-	27%	28%	19%	-	-	-	19%
Disagree (disagree+ disagree strongly)	13%	18%	6%	-	7%	11%	10%	-	-	-	10%
	2013	Slovakia	Czechia	Poland	Hungary	V4	Netherlands	Belgium - Brussels	Belgium- Wallonia	Belgium- Flanders	Benelux
Agree (agree+ agree strongly)	57%	57%	42%	-	55%	51%	-	52%	46%	57%	52%
Neither agree nor disagree	23%	28%	30%	-	33%	30%	-	20%	24%	22%	22%
Disagree (disagree+ disagree strongly)	13%	13%	24%	-	10%	16%	-	12%	13%	6%	10%
Don't know, no answer	7%	2%	4%	-	2%	3%	-	16%	17%	15%	16%

## APPENDIX III-Ordered probit models by survey and year:

### ORDERED PROBIT MODEL -ESS 2014:

*Table 30-ESS 2014 Oprobit for the V4 and the Benelux Union*

Probit	Czech	Poland	Hungary	Netherlands	Belgium	European
Dependent variable Pro-immigrants dummy (agree and agree strongly with immigrants)						Benchmark
Age	-0.00013 (-0.0005)	-0.00183 (-0.0017)	-0.00049 (-0.001854)	-0.0000785 (-0.0007587)	0.00159 (-0.001671)	-0.0003982*** (-0.0001297)
Male	0.029057 (-0.0617)	-0.00159 (-0.06362)	0.031775 (-0.069051)	0.0409788 (-0.063526)	0.024795 (-0.063056)	-0.0218009* (-0.0126765)
Rural	-0.03122 (-0.0662)	-0.08972 (-0.07201)	-0.20799*** (-0.074435)	-0.2639285*** (-0.0637617)	-0.336402*** (-0.073866)	-0.0725932*** (-0.0134413)
Education (years of education)	-0.00226 (-0.0026)	0.001039 (-0.00340)	-0.00274 (-0.006065)	0.0069037** (-0.003543)	0.003803 (-0.007478)	0.0030318*** (-0.0007849)
Observations	2148	1615	1698	1919	1769	40185

*Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ . Slovakia is excluded because it did not participate of the survey.*

**EVS QUESTION 1 PROBIT MODEL****Table 31- Ordered probit model EVS 1990**

Probit	Czechoslovakia	Poland	Hungary	Luxembourg	Belgium	Netherlands	European Benchmark
Dependent variable: Pro-immigrants- not mention not liking immigrants as neighbours							
Age	-0.0102796*** (0.0019914)	-0.011718*** (0.0041972)	-0.0053825* (0.0028623)	-	-0.00681*** (0.0017468)	-0.0183581*** (0.003652)	-0.006586*** (0.0004783)
Male	-0.043322 (0.0633602)	-0.2031632* (0.1187448)	0.0257913 (0.0907863)	-	-0.0416811 (0.0563335)	-0.0693391 (0.1244016)	-0.071189*** (0.0158137)
Proud of nationality	0.0971449 (0.0763269)	-0.2013887 (0.2599133)	-0.0234399 (0.1322822)	-	0.197566 (0.0658595)	-0.133818 (0.1496419)	-0.040366** (0.0210172)
In favor of the EU	0.1378448* (0.0640833)	-0.087154 (0.1184452)	0.0644705 (0.0933696)	-	0.136** (0.0577142)	0.0455362 (0.11966)	0.1424035*** (0.0169615)
Right-wing	-0.0002251 (0.0671159)	0.2555884* (0.1217401)	-0.0197214 (0.0912421)	-	-0.140431** (0.0572196)	-0.3412142*** (0.1355331)	0.0249167* (0.0160028)
Years of education	0.0041545 (0.0092603)	0.0597174*** (0.0206374)	0.0298822* (0.0166452)	-	0.019638** (0.008015)	0.0182392 (0.0147029)	0.0100692*** (0.0016257)
Unskilled	-0.1252908* (0.0790681)	-0.3906182*** (0.1527786)	0.0097505 (0.1070254)	-	-0.0521135 (0.697843)	-0.331552** (0.1474255)	-0.060919*** (0.0199143)
Observations	2102	974	990	-	2636	1012	37374

Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$



**Table 32- Ordered probit model EVS 1999**

Probit	Slovakia	Czechia	Poland	Luxembourg	Belgium	Netherlands	European Benchmark
Dependent variable: Pro-immigrants- not mention not liking immigrants as neighbours							
Age	-0.002651 (0.0024829)	-0.0020139 (0.0020185)	-0.009718*** (0.0027176)	0.0051692 (0.0036097)	-0.0085555*** (0.0022001)	-0.029314*** (0.0043383)	-0.0035272*** (0.0004481)
Male	0.0333208 (0.0767381)	-0.0557534 (0.0683887)	-0.039342 (0.0843424)	0.0339666 (0.1069533)	-0.1086227* (0.0732131)	-0.0814509 (0.1434903)	-0.0699994*** (0.0149544)
Right-wing	0.0701869 (0.0775695)	0.1944043*** (0.0758553)	-0.132564 (0.0858021)	-0.2180073** (0.1093511)	-0.2829992*** (0.0768747)	-0.287515* (0.1571849)	-0.041004*** (0.0151724)
Years of education	-0.017828 (0.0162643)	0.285179** (0.0092866)	0.0222779 (0.0132005)	0.19083 (0.1504548)	0.0436538 (0.0112217)	0.0109591 (0.0124972)	0.280443*** (0.0016577)
Unskilled	0.1247856 (0.106158)	-0.2076523*** (0.1023134)	-0.088673* (0.1131894)	0.019083*** (0.1504548)	-0.0451266*** (0.1061188)	-0.0752386 (0.2496158)	-0.0517826*** (0.0195591)
Observations	1331	1842	1091	1111	1819	998	39709

Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .

**Table 33- Ordered probit model EVS 1999 question 2**

Probit	Slovakia	Czechia	Hungary	Poland	Luxembourg	Belgium	Netherlands	European Benchmark
Dependent variable: Pro-immigrants-care about immigrants' living conditions								
Age	0.001177 (0.002251)	0.0032657* (0.0017333)	0.0020273 (0.0026758)	0.0005167 (0.0025287)	0.002505 (0.002543)	0.0007044 (0.001865)	0.0023734 (0.002658)	0.0001625 (0.0003827)
Male	-0.265*** (0.069475)	-0.209709*** (0.0588997)	-0.139485* (0.088958)	-0.0609814 (0.0781846)	-0.00878 (0.077405)	-0.0068743 (0.0609128)	-0.0909912 (0.0836109)	-0.084275*** (0.0127011)
Right-wing	0.098406 (0.070378)	0.0587754 (0.0673544)	0.1864896** (0.912054)	197648 (0.0792364)	0.050668 (0.078259)	-0.242737*** (0.0620072)	-0.3644896*** (0.0865471)	-0.004812 (0.128502)
Unskilled	-0.52714 (0.094236)	-0.1767681* (0.0944944)	-0.0217204 (0.1081638)	-0.1297774 (0.110588)	0.228734** (0.115263)	-0.1893178** (0.0910147)	-0.0527693 (0.1334662)	-0.214202*** (0.0171017)
Years of education	0.022965* (0.015002)	0.0147369** (0.0075511)	0.0174739* (0.0111345)	0.32539*** (0.121075)	0.107275 (0.010336)	0.08059*** (0.0094032)	0.0338937*** (0.0081535)	0.0108893*** (0.0013061)
Observations	1331	1842	986	1091	1111	1819	998	39709

*Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .*

**Table 34- Ordered probit model EVS 2008 question 2**

Probit	Slovakia	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Luxembourg	Belgium	Netherlands	European Benchmark
Dependent variable: Pro-immigrants- care about their living conditions								
Age	-0.0032584*	0.0031049*	0.0053469***	0.0037625*	0.0065535***	0.0009938	0.0028766	0.0012663***
	(0.0020551)	(0.0019022)	(0.001986)	(0.0021513)	(0.0020453)	(0.0020778)	(0.0020156)	(0.0002954)
Male	-0.0108562	-0.1349287**	-0.0706236	-0.0467631	0.0098273	-0.0129096	0.0078603	-0.0072401
	(0.0670372)	(0.0674107)	(0.0659174)	(0.0696895)	(0.0652735)	(0.0663636)	(0.0655471)	(0.0102292)
Right-wing	0.1147782	-0.0686436	0.1647059**	0.05552	-0.1570896**	-0.292578***	-0.0947187	-0.0241863**
	(0.0799028)	(0.0752493)	(0.0683612)	(0.0710522)	(0.0765626)	(0.0670393)	(0.0652106)	(0.0108335)
EU enlargement	0.0829613	0.2291573***	0.2112908***	0.0823741	0.1754968***	0.3802337***	0.2700537***	0.2017994***
	(0.066282)	(0.0670961)	(0.0658792)	(0.0702531)	(0.0671733)	(0.0676593)	(0.0666783)	(0.0102515)
Years of education	0.0284791***	-0.0057059	0.184347**	0.125458*	0.020822***	0.0664683***	0.0373672***	0.0023029**
	(0.0101495)	(0.00886)	(0.0087266)	(0.0073456)	(0.0073888)	(0.0103879)	(0.0070183)	(0.0008519)
Observations	1486	1453	1500	1331	1565	1496	1539	61919

Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$

**World values survey- Question 1 Ordered probit model:** Dependent variable- being in favor of immigrants

**Table 35-WVS, waves 2,3, 5 and 6 for the V4 and the Benelux Union**

	Wave 2-1990-1994		Czechoslovakia		Poland			
Observations	24558		924		938			
Age	-0.0038975***	(0.000636)	0.0001704	(0.004372)	-0.170398***	(0.0029769)		
Male	0.0359134**	(0.035913)	0.166659	(0.128438)	-0.087045	(0.0936205)		
Proud of nationality	-0.1588467***	(0.191251)	-0.1238483	(0.133242)	-0.235705	(0.1939105)		
High education	-0.1558545***	(0.024181)	0		0			
	Wave 3-1995-1998		Czechia		Slovakia		Hungary	
Observations	77129		1147		1095		650	
Age	0.0009212***	(0.000361)	-0.0059302	(0.00461)	0.002002	(0.0044771)	-0.008786*	(0.005034)
Male	-0.0064863	(0.011329)	0.3241843**	(0.121236)	0.313192	(0.1455796**)	0.021906	(0.1675259)
Proud of nationality	-0.4102717***	(0.132514)	-0.0094619	(0.190232)	-0.082438	(0.1830987)	-0.3036229	(0.2399237)
High education	0.1894846***	(0.011843)	0.5901848***	(0.160217)	0.041373	(0.1726264)	0.4289855***	(0.1684066)
	Wave 5 2005-2009		Netherlands		Poland		Hungary	
Observations	83975				1000		1007	
Age	0.0024214***	(0.000319)	0.0015186	(0.002224)	-0.007452**	(0.0035067)	0.0035941	(0.003759)
Male	-0.0219459**	(0.010597)	-0.1078582	(0.078977)	0.061847	(0.119559)	0.26450008**	(0.126512)
Proud of nationality	-0.2094145***	(0.014626)	-0.1384974	(0.09727)	-0.349207	(0.2382674)	-0.865224	(0.162846)
High education	0.1815491***	(0.011194)	0.5645389***	(0.097613)	-0.024301	(0.14094)	-0.1600425	(0.1507611)
	Wave 6 2010-2014		Netherlands		Poland			
Observations	86272		1902		966			
Age	0.0007127**	(0.000319)	0.0046388***	(0.001859)	-0.003372	(0.003026)		
Male	-0.0510521***	(0.105983)	-0.0669916	(0.060371)	0.110508	(0.1049125)		
Proud of nationality	-0.181604***	(0.015493)	-0.1606976**	(0.074838)	-0.17323	(0.2108477)		
High education	0.0889384***	(0.109818)	0.512355***	(0.06553)	0.344686***	(0.1146442)		

*Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$*

**World Values Survey Question 2- Ordered probit model:**

**Table 36-WVS, waves 5 and 6 for the V4 and the Benelux Union**

	Wave 5 2005-2009		Hungary		Poland	
Dependent variable: Seeing one-self as a world citizen						
Observations	83975		1007		1000	
Age	-0.0060105***	(0.0002694)	-0.0062581***	(0.0024509)	-0.0131646***	(0.0025477)
Male	0.04181312***	(0.0089918)	0.1057814	(0.08273)	0.1808757**	(0.0869791)
Proud of nationality	0.681613***	(0.0129724)	0.6660096***	(0.1193312)	0.8413875***	(0.1993162)
Unskilled job	0.0679967***	(0.0100531)	-0.1648486*	(0.0972801)	-0.22097673**	(0.1130019)
High education	0.1345105***	(0.0096775)	0.0967707	(0.0966612)	0.3618759***	(0.1075177)
	Wave 6 2010-2014		Netherlands		Poland	
Observations	86272		1902		966	
Age	-0.0052897***	(0.0002736)	0.0067556***	(0.0018506)	-0.0062788**	(0.0026458)
Male	0.0560821***	(0.009132)	-0.1979994***	(0.0606712)	0.1301411	(0.0939914)
Proud of nationality	0.4419448***	(0.0133865)	0.1229593*	(0.0755865)	0.4882119***	(0.1860868)
Unskilled job	0.0104655	(0.0099427)	0.0742599	(0.0762925)	-0.1898837*	(0.1032811)
High education	0.002698	(0.0094956)	0.2585589***	(0.0667507)	0.1157029	(0.1097077)

*Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$*

**ISSP Question 1- Ordered probit model:**

*Table 37-ISSP 1995 question 1*

ISSP 1995	ISSP benchmark	Czech	Poland	Slovakia	Hungary	Netherlands
VARIABLES	Immigrants are good for the economy					
Age	0.00538*** (-0.000458)	0.00476 (-0.00342)	-0.00317 (-0.00196)	-0.00982*** (-0.00306)	-0.00673** (-0.00327)	0.00830*** (-0.00211)
male	0.142*** (-0.0154)	0.183 (-0.114)	0.150** (-0.0678)	-0.0195 (-0.0985)	0.223* (-0.119)	0.176** (-0.0698)
proudnat	-0.0798*** (-0.0168)	0.216* (-0.118)	0.116* (-0.0675)	0.103 (-0.106)	0.484*** (-0.123)	0.129 (-0.106)
favEU	0.0843*** (-0.0158)	0.321*** (-0.12)	0.363*** (-0.0692)	0.345*** (-0.102)	-0.128 (-0.12)	0.271*** (-0.0721)
rightwing	0.0277 (-0.019)	0.133 (-0.12)	0.201 (-0.151)	0.0842 (-0.12)	-	-0.397*** (-0.0972)
tradeunion	-0.0469** (-0.0184)	0.171 (-0.129)	-0.027 (-0.0968)	0.0121 (-0.103)	-0.17 (-0.177)	0.0477 (-0.0821)
higheduc	0.308*** (-0.0178)	0.074 (-0.149)	-0.0705 (-0.1)	-0.0745 (-0.162)	-0.0843 (-0.19)	0.250*** (-0.0787)
Observations	30,666	1,096	1,598	1,388	1,000	2,089

Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*p<0.01,\*\*p<0.05,\*p<0.1

*Table 38-ISSP 2003 question 1*

ISSP 2003		Czech	Poland	Slovakia	Hungary	Netherlands
VARIABLES	Immigrants are good for the economy					
age	0.00523*** (-0.00037)	-0.000971 (-0.00319)	0.000602 (-0.00263)	-0.0000678 (-0.00427)	-0.00292 (-0.00312)	0.00855*** (-0.00216)
male	0.184*** (-0.0124)	0.0952 (-0.0917)	0.0178 (-0.0844)	0.149 (-0.11)	0.016 (-0.105)	0.147** (-0.0702)
proudnat	0.0168 (-0.0171)	-0.125 (-0.105)	0.042 (-0.133)	0.00479 (-0.133)	-0.314* (-0.188)	-0.00789 (-0.0765)
favEU	0.330*** (-0.0192)	0.442*** (-0.112)	0.347*** (-0.089)	0.377*** (-0.121)	0.192* (-0.111)	0.613*** (-0.0783)
rightwing	0.0671*** (-0.0157)	0.249** (-0.106)	0.029 (-0.126)	0.138 (-0.172)	-0.079 (-0.123)	-0.347*** (-0.0836)
tradeunion	-0.140*** (-0.013)	-0.0135 (-0.101)	0.117 (-0.0929)	-0.109 (-0.136)	-0.0612 (-0.206)	0.0203 (-0.0699)
higheduc	0.381*** (-0.0134)	-0.0311 (-0.133)	0.00256 (-0.117)	-0.126 (-0.129)	0.0924 (-0.132)	0.296*** (-0.0698)
rural	-0.167*** (-0.0147)	0.0818 (-0.106)	-0.208** (-0.091)	-0.308** (-0.123)	-0.327*** (-0.117)	-0.0713 (-0.086)
Observations	45,685	1,239	1,277	1,122	1,015	1,788

Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*p<0.01,\*\*p<0.05,\*p<0.1

*Table 39-ISSP 2013 question 1*

ISSP 2013	ISSP benchmark	Czech	PL	Slovakia	Hungary	NL	Belgium-Brussels	Belgium-Wallonia	Belgium-Flanders
VARIABLES	Immigrants are good for the economy								
AGE	0.0000121 (-0.000101)	0.0000113 (-0.00037)	-	-0.00581* (-0.0033)	-0.00126 (-0.0031)	-	-0.0100*** (-0.00317)	0.0007 (-0.0005)	0.000806 (-0.0007)
male	0.151*** (-0.0122)	0.0704 (-0.0706)	-	0.0366 (-0.0941)	-0.00194 (-0.0958)	-	0.301*** (-0.111)	0.225* (-0.128)	-0.011 (-0.0971)
proudnat	0.0276* (-0.0161)	-0.0796 (-0.0785)	-	0.322** (-0.136)	-0.0874 (-0.124)	-	0.0679 (-0.121)	0.309* (-0.174)	-0.00471 (-0.108)
favEU	0.248*** (-0.0149)	0.526*** (-0.0788)	-	-	0.321*** (-0.123)	-	0.554*** (-0.115)	0.289** (-0.131)	0.769*** (-0.102)
rightwing	-0.109*** (-0.0154)	0.199** (-0.0959)	-	0.0757 (-0.137)	-0.0858 (-0.0988)	-	-0.972*** (-0.35)	-5.537*** (-0.217)	-0.359*** (-0.0983)
tradeunion	-0.0806*** (-0.0128)	-0.0392 (-0.0741)	-	-0.243** (-0.11)	0.0246 (-0.114)	-	0.0114 (-0.112)	-0.0616 (-0.131)	-0.0782 (-0.0982)
Higheduc	0.284*** (-0.0126)	0.0756 (-0.0963)	-	0.107 (-0.124)	0.0959 (-0.12)	-	-0.13 (-0.113)	0.257* (-0.132)	0.314*** (-0.0985)
rural	-0.0797*** (-0.0133)	-0.212** (-0.0849)	-	-0.113 (-0.0939)	-0.0758 (-0.109)	-	-0.303 (-0.365)	-0.461*** (-0.13)	-0.0896 (-0.0965)
Observations	45,297	1,909	-	1,156	1,007	-	563	549	1,090

Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*p<0.01,\*\*p<0.05,\*p<0.1



**ISSP Question 2- Ordered probit model:**

**Table 40-ISSP 1995 question 2.**

ISSP 1995	Benchmark	Czech	Poland	Slovakia	Hungary	Netherlands
Immigrants DO take away jobs from nationals (agree, agree strongly)						
Age	0.00253*** (-0.000445)	0.00269 (-0.00239)	0.00694*** (-0.00193)	0.00643*** (-0.00204)	0.00543** (-0.00246)	0.00489*** (-0.00188)
male	0.00717 (-0.015)	0.0179 (-0.078)	-0.0782 (-0.0655)	0.0442 (-0.0689)	0.036 (-0.083)	0.118* (-0.0631)
proudnat	0.421*** (-0.0159)	0.328*** (-0.083)	0.330*** (-0.0649)	0.328*** (-0.0764)	-0.0712 (-0.0843)	0.517*** (-0.089)
favEU	-0.132*** (-0.0154)	-0.203** (-0.0815)	-0.0868 (-0.0675)	-0.233*** (-0.0711)	-0.261*** (-0.0865)	-0.197*** (-0.062)
rightwing	0.0241 (-0.0186)	-0.193** (-0.0867)	-0.0913 (-0.155)	0.0269 (-0.0872)	-	0.113 (-0.0785)
tradeunion	-0.112*** (-0.018)	-0.0932 (-0.0968)	-0.128 (-0.0951)	0.0178 (-0.0734)	-0.0695 (-0.114)	-0.0466 (-0.0769)
higheduc	-0.362*** (-0.0183)	-0.201* (-0.11)	-0.583*** (-0.101)	-0.185 (-0.117)	-0.682*** (-0.133)	-0.435*** (-0.0799)
Observations	30,666	1,096	1,598	1,388	1,000	2,089

Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \*p<0.

**Table 41-ISSP 2003 question 2**

ISSP 2003	Benchmark	Czech	Poland	Slovakia	Hungary	Netherlands
VARIABLES	Immigrants DO take away jobs from nationals (agree, agree strongly)					
age	0.00278*** (-0.000358)	0.00411 (-0.00251)	0.00575** (-0.00236)	0.00970*** (-0.0029)	0.00366 (-0.0024)	0.00397* (-0.00217)
male	-0.00528 (-0.0121)	-0.0202 (-0.0736)	0.108 (-0.0738)	0.11 (-0.0797)	-0.06 (-0.0816)	0.0808 (-0.0698)
proudnat	0.198*** (-0.017)	-0.0275 (-0.0853)	-0.0996 (-0.115)	0.178* (-0.0933)	-0.0673 (-0.159)	0.0312 (-0.0778)
favEU	-0.151*** (-0.0196)	-0.293*** (-0.0966)	-0.299*** (-0.0807)	-0.177* (-0.0949)	-0.267*** (-0.0906)	-0.193** (-0.0892)
rightwing	-0.0710*** (-0.0154)	-0.246*** (-0.0882)	0.293*** (-0.114)	0.0602 (-0.136)	0.241*** (-0.0932)	0.189** (-0.0765)
tradeunion	0.000111 (-0.0126)	0.0676 (-0.0812)	-0.00188 (-0.0846)	-0.0782 (-0.0917)	-0.0488 (-0.162)	-0.0511 (-0.0698)
higheduc	-0.342*** (-0.0136)	-0.291*** (-0.108)	-0.652*** (-0.109)	-0.262*** (-0.0912)	-0.668*** (-0.111)	-0.629*** (-0.0753)
rural	0.0838*** (-0.0139)	0.11 (-0.0849)	0.181** (-0.0781)	0.0704 (-0.0796)	0.192** (-0.0853)	0.0498 (-0.0833)
Observations	45,685	1,239		1,122	1,015	1,788

Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*p<0.01,\*\*p<0.05,\*p<0.1

*Table 42-ISSP 2003 question 2*

ISSP 2013		Czech	Poland	Slovakia	Hungary	Netherlands	Belgium- Brussels	Belgium- Wallonia	Belgium- Flanders
		Immigrants DO take away jobs from nationals (agree, agree strongly)							
AGE	0.000117 (-0.0001)	0.000236 (-0.000334)	- -	-0.000869 (-0.00098)	0.000214 (-0.00258)	- -	0.00081 (-0.000963)	0.000262 (-0.000527)	-0.00122 (-0.000858)
male	-0.00625 (-0.0121)	-0.0193 (-0.0609)	- -	0.245*** (-0.0768)	0.0811 (-0.0802)	- -	0.0176 (-0.125)	-0.0314 (-0.115)	0.105 (-0.0794)
proudnat	0.221*** (-0.0162)	0.278*** (-0.0672)	- -	0.0844 (-0.102)	0.156 (-0.106)	- -	0.22 (-0.139)	0.0727 (-0.143)	0.221** (-0.0903)
favEU	-0.177*** (-0.0151)	-0.374*** (-0.0721)	- -	- -	-0.158 (-0.113)	- -	-0.323** (-0.126)	-0.376*** (-0.118)	-0.387*** (-0.0914)
rightwing	-0.0676*** (-0.0151)	-0.263*** (-0.0857)	- -	0.247** (-0.115)	-0.0144 (-0.0824)	- -	0.364 (-0.28)	4.760*** (-0.251)	0.300*** (-0.079)
tradeunion	-0.119*** (-0.0127)	0.110* (-0.0645)	- -	0.0502 (-0.0775)	-0.173* (-0.0966)	- -	0.119 (-0.125)	0.209* (-0.116)	0.121 (-0.0809)
higheduc	-0.479*** (-0.0127)	-0.305*** (-0.0839)	- -	-0.0772 (-0.1)	-0.116 (-0.105)	- -	-0.289** (-0.128)	-0.552*** (-0.123)	-0.260*** (-0.0841)
rural	0.0555*** (-0.013)	0.0989 (-0.0712)	- -	0.174** (-0.0766)	0.0381 (-0.0903)	- -	-0.0834 (-0.474)	0.463*** (-0.114)	0.0728 (-0.0799)
Observations	45,297	1,909	-	1,156	1,007	-	563	549	1,090

Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*p<0.01,\*\*p<0.05,\*p<0.1

**ISSP Question 3- Ordered probit model:**

**Table 43-ISSP 1995 question 3**

ISSP 1995	Benchmark	Czech	Poland	Slovakia	Hungary	Netherlands
Number of immigrants should be reduced						
VARIABLES						
age	0.00305*** (-0.000439)	0.000157 (-0.00244)	0.00783*** (-0.00192)	0.00305 (-0.00202)	-0.00115 (-0.0026)	0.0101*** (-0.0018)
male	0.0228 (-0.0146)	0.0342 (-0.0791)	-0.137** (-0.0651)	0.0933 (-0.0685)	-0.0749 (-0.0923)	0.00851 (-0.0591)
proudnat	0.148*** (-0.0158)	0.106 (-0.0859)	0.133** (-0.0649)	0.0976 (-0.0756)	-0.250*** (-0.0952)	0.367*** (-0.0961)
favEU	-0.0874*** (-0.015)	-0.13 (-0.083)	-0.0536 (-0.0673)	-0.160** (-0.071)	-0.0705 (-0.0959)	-0.174*** (-0.0593)
rightwing	0.199*** (-0.0183)	-0.294*** (-0.0865)	0.108 (-0.15)	0.024 (-0.0875)	- -	0.618*** (-0.0803)
tradeunion	0.0404** (-0.0173)	0.0702 (-0.098)	-0.132 (-0.095)	0.0878 (-0.0732)	-0.0834 (-0.125)	-0.0805 (-0.0709)
higheduc	-0.344*** (-0.0173)	-0.240** (-0.106)	-0.356*** (-0.101)	-0.0328 (-0.115)	-0.299** (-0.138)	-0.531*** (-0.0688)
Observations	30,666	1,096	1,598	1,388	1,000	2,089

Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*p<0.01,\*\*p<0.05,\*p<0.1

**Table 44-ISSP 2003 question 3**

ISSP 2003	Benchmark	Czech	Poland	Slovakia	Hungary	Netherlands
Number of immigrants should be reduced						
VARIABLES						
age	0.00379*** (-0.000354)	0.000641 (-0.0026)	0.00381 (-0.00234)	0.00971*** (-0.00289)	0.00287 (-0.00244)	0.00570*** (-0.00205)
male	-0.0138 (-0.012)	-0.101 (-0.0763)	-0.0247 (-0.0744)	0.227*** (-0.0792)	-0.0565 (-0.0829)	0.00782 (-0.065)
proudnat	0.167*** (-0.0165)	0.0267 (-0.0887)	0.0825 (-0.116)	0.12 (-0.0912)	-0.0163 (-0.159)	0.174** (-0.0705)
favEU	-0.187*** (-0.0192)	-0.542*** (-0.0973)	-0.218*** (-0.0822)	-0.330*** (-0.0942)	-0.292*** (-0.0905)	-0.368*** (-0.0762)
rightwing	0.273*** (-0.0152)	-0.299*** (-0.0896)	0.123 (-0.112)	-0.241* (-0.141)	0.0672 (-0.0949)	0.552*** (-0.0781)
tradeunion	0.220*** (-0.0124)	0.0884 (-0.0837)	-0.122 (-0.085)	0.035 (-0.0914)	-0.0986 (-0.167)	-0.0452 (-0.0659)
higheduc	-0.294*** (-0.0132)	-0.332*** (-0.11)	-0.618*** (-0.118)	-0.04 (-0.089)	-0.450*** (-0.108)	-0.485*** (-0.0649)
rural	0.154*** (-0.0138)	0.0608 (-0.0888)	0.176** (-0.0774)	0.0307 (-0.0792)	0.186** (-0.088)	0.0811 (-0.0802)
Observations	45,685	1,239	1,277	1,122	1,015	1,788

Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*p<0.01,\*\*p<0.05,\*p<0.1

**Table 45-ISSP 2013 question 3**

ISSP 2013	Benchmark	Czech	Poland	Slovakia	Hungary	Netherlands	Belgium- Brussels	Belgium- Wallonia	Belgium- Flanders
Number of immigrants should be reduced									
VARIABLES									
AGE	0.000498*** (-0.000104)	0.00011 (-0.0003)	- -	0.0000818 (-0.0011)	0.00505* (-0.00267)	- -	0.0137*** (-0.0032)	-0.000547 (-0.00053)	-0.0000597 (-0.00067)
male	-0.0052 (-0.0119)	0.0872 (-0.0602)	- -	0.199*** (-0.0755)	0.0412 (-0.0821)	- -	0.0405 (-0.111)	-0.139 (-0.112)	0.0923 (-0.0873)
proudnat	0.170*** (-0.0158)	0.0758 (-0.067)	- -	-0.190* (-0.102)	-0.0648 (-0.108)	- -	0.165 (-0.122)	0.292** (-0.134)	0.377*** (-0.0952)
favEU	-0.185*** (-0.0148)	-0.590*** (-0.0715)	- -	- 	-0.386*** (-0.114)	- -	-0.320*** (-0.115)	-0.154 (-0.114)	-0.494*** (-0.0933)
rightwing	0.256*** (-0.0148)	-0.118 (-0.0859)	- -	0.215* (-0.11)	0.122 (-0.084)	- -	0.668** (-0.296)	4.183*** (-0.254)	0.602*** (-0.0885)
tradeunion	0.0212* (-0.0125)	0.0424 (-0.0629)	- -	0.135* (-0.0773)	-0.0043 (-0.0989)	- -	0.0102 (-0.112)	0.197* (-0.112)	0.0761 (-0.0885)
higheduc	-0.247*** (-0.0124)	-0.121 (-0.0846)	- -	-0.207** (-0.0998)	-0.181* (-0.107)	- -	-0.0263 (-0.112)	-0.274** (-0.116)	-0.230*** (-0.0889)
rural	0.0770*** (-0.0128)	0.117* (-0.0696)	- -	0.088 (-0.0756)	-0.165* (-0.0923)	- -	-0.107 (-0.4)	0.352*** (-0.11)	0.268*** (-0.0864)
Observations	45,297	1,909	-	1,156	1,007	-	563	549	1,090

Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \*p<0.1

**ISSP Question 4- Ordered probit model:**

**Table 46-ISSP 2003 question 4**

ISSP 2003	Benchmark	Czech	Poland	Slovakia	Hungary	Netherlands
VARIABLES	Large international companies damage local business- agree, agree strongly					
age	0.00373*** (-0.000353)	0.00752*** (-0.00255)	-0.00000484 (-0.00234)	0.00708** (-0.00304)	-0.00256 (-0.0025)	0.0031 (-0.00198)
male	0.0118 (-0.0119)	-0.153** (-0.0752)	0.314*** (-0.0748)	0.268*** (-0.0809)	0.151* (-0.0839)	0.0268 (-0.0631)
proudnat	0.219*** (-0.0163)	0.155* (-0.087)	0.0408 (-0.115)	0.078 (-0.0925)	0.0936 (-0.165)	0.113 (-0.0706)
favEU	-0.0351* (-0.0188)	-0.384*** (-0.0975)	-0.293*** (-0.0811)	-0.563*** (-0.0919)	-0.350*** (-0.0915)	-0.353*** (-0.0793)
rightwing	-0.0769*** (-0.015)	-0.146 (-0.0898)	0.208* (-0.115)	-0.177 (-0.13)	0.359*** (-0.0968)	0.0168 (-0.071)
tradeunion	0.0935*** (-0.0124)	0.252*** (-0.0831)	0.201** (-0.0851)	0.0493 (-0.0939)	0.383** (-0.161)	0.156** (-0.0636)
higheduc	-0.132*** (-0.013)	-0.238** (-0.111)	-0.361*** (-0.107)	0.0187 (-0.0894)	-0.205* (-0.11)	-0.251*** (-0.0646)
rural	-0.0124 (-0.0138)	-0.0558 (-0.0863)	0.117 (-0.0787)	0.315*** (-0.0822)	-0.134 (-0.0876)	-0.0619 (-0.0775)
Observations	45,685	1,239	1,277	1,122	1,015	1,788

Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*p<0.01,\*\*p<0.05,\*p<0.1

**Table 47-ISSP 2013 question 4**

ISSP 2013	Benchmark	Czech	Poland	Slovakia	Hungary	Netherlands	Belgium- Brussels	Belgium- Wallonia	Belgium- Flanders
Large international companies damage local business- agree, agree strongly									
VARIABLES									
AGE	0.000273*** (-0.000103)	0.0000654 (-0.00033)	-	0.00012 (-0.00132)	-0.00051 (-0.00263)	-	0.000352 (-0.00118)	0.000463 (-0.0007)	0.00149 (-0.0009)
male	0.0677*** (-0.0119)	-0.0434 (-0.0617)	-	0.0106 (-0.0767)	0.0962 (-0.0813)	-	0.153 (-0.109)	-0.108 (-0.118)	0.0344 (-0.078)
proudnat	0.148*** (-0.0157)	0.0495 (-0.0688)	-	0.277*** (-0.102)	-0.0464 (-0.106)	-	0.425*** (-0.118)	0.436*** (-0.135)	0.231*** (-0.0881)
favEU	-0.116*** (-0.0147)	-0.310*** (-0.0735)	-	-	-0.341*** (-0.113)	-	-0.377*** (-0.113)	-0.107 (-0.121)	-0.235*** (-0.0881)
rightwing	0.00639 (-0.0147)	0.0827 (-0.0913)	-	0.0717 (-0.114)	0.298*** (-0.084)	-	0.315 (-0.29)	-5.273*** (-0.26)	0.218*** (-0.0777)
tradeunion	-0.0547*** (-0.0124)	0.333*** (-0.0661)	-	0.204** (-0.0795)	0.0689 (-0.0986)	-	0.207* (-0.11)	0.427*** (-0.118)	0.211*** (-0.0794)
higheduc	-0.234*** (-0.0123)	-0.0263 (-0.088)	-	-0.0466 (-0.101)	-0.378*** (-0.107)	-	0.0626 (-0.11)	0.198 (-0.125)	-0.154* (-0.0826)
rural	0.0506*** (-0.0128)	0.0278 (-0.0709)	-	0.022 (-0.0767)	-0.111 (-0.092)	-	-0.26 (-0.394)	0.329*** (-0.117)	-0.0101 (-0.0784)
Observations	45,297	1,909	-	1,156	1,007	-	563	549	1,090

Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*p<0.01,\*\*p<0.05,\*p<0.1



**ISSP Question 5- Ordered probit model:**

**Table 48-ISSP 2003 question 5**

ISSP 2003	Benchmark	Czech	Poland	Slovakia	Hungary	Netherlands
Free trade leads to better products available in country						
VARIABLES						
age	-0.0101*** (-0.00255)	-0.0101*** (-0.00255)	-0.0106*** (-0.0024)	0.0015 (-0.00287)	-0.00659*** (-0.0024)	0.00141 (-0.002)
male	0.0181 (-0.0756)	0.0181 (-0.0756)	0.372*** (-0.079)	0.119 (-0.0787)	0.155* (-0.0822)	0.361*** (-0.0637)
proudnat	0.183** (-0.0864)	0.183** (-0.0864)	0.164 (-0.118)	0.145 (-0.0911)	0.0406 (-0.158)	0.301*** (-0.0703)
favEU	0.350*** (-0.104)	0.350*** (-0.104)	0.409*** (-0.0908)	0.461*** (-0.0925)	0.387*** (-0.093)	0.295*** (-0.0804)
rightwing	0.121 (-0.0922)	0.121 (-0.0922)	0.103 (-0.122)	-0.147 (-0.135)	-0.0279 (-0.0921)	0.176** (-0.0729)
tradeunion	0.142* (-0.0838)	0.142* (-0.0838)	0.297*** (-0.0898)	-0.214** (-0.091)	0.147 (-0.16)	-0.102 (-0.065)
higeduc	0.158 (-0.115)	0.158 (-0.115)	0.197 (-0.122)	-0.232*** (-0.0885)	-0.0289 (-0.111)	0.158** (-0.0657)
rural	-0.0803 (-0.0864)	-0.0803 (-0.0864)	-0.0786 (-0.0819)	-0.105 (-0.0791)	-0.233*** (-0.0856)	-0.0249 (-0.0783)
Observations	1,239	1,239	1,277	1,122	1,015	1,788

Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*p<0.01,\*\*p<0.05,\*p<0.1

**Table 49-ISSP 2003 question 5**

ISSP 2013	Benchmark	Czech	Poland	Slovakia	Hungary	Netherlands	Belgium- Brussels	Belgium- Wallonia	Belgium- Flanders
Free trade leads to better products available in country									
VARIABLES									
AGE	-0.000209** (-0.000101)	-0.000464 (-0.0003)	-	-0.00408 (-0.00264)	0.000447 (-0.00262)	-	0.00205** (-0.000869)	0.000182 (-0.0005)	0.00523** (-0.0024)
male	0.147*** (-0.012)	0.0582 (-0.0587)	-	-0.0619 (-0.0762)	-0.0288 (-0.0807)	-	0.143 (-0.109)	0.109 (-0.11)	0.182** (-0.0789)
proudnat	0.222*** (-0.0157)	0.0161 (-0.0658)	-	0.473*** (-0.107)	0.247** (-0.106)	-	0.267** (-0.116)	0.207 (-0.135)	0.0779 (-0.0882)
favEU	0.318*** (-0.0151)	0.456*** (-0.0744)	-	-	0.268** (-0.114)	-	0.383*** (-0.112)	0.286** (-0.112)	0.473*** (-0.0914)
rightwing	0.0884*** (-0.0149)	0.210** (-0.0871)	-	0.207* (-0.111)	0.0722 (-0.0828)	-	0.305 (-0.284)	-4.471*** (-0.251)	0.0939 (-0.0795)
tradeunion	-0.0964*** (-0.0125)	-0.157** (-0.0609)	-	-0.102 (-0.0865)	-0.0848 (-0.0977)	-	-0.101 (-0.109)	-0.0195 (-0.111)	-0.157* (-0.0807)
higheduc	0.0729*** (-0.0125)	0.150* (-0.0855)	-	-0.192* (-0.102)	0.103 (-0.107)	-	0.01 (-0.11)	-0.0194 (-0.115)	0.194** (-0.0872)
rural	-0.0968*** (-0.0128)	-0.0499 (-0.0669)	-	-0.0707 (-0.0767)	-0.218** (-0.0904)	-	-0.597 (-0.412)	-0.118 (-0.109)	0.0267 (-0.0792)
Observations	45,297	1,909	-	1,156	1,007	-	563	549	1,090

Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*p<0.01,\*\*p<0.05,\*p<0.1

## APPENDIX IV-Multicollinearity-using VIF:

*Table 50-Multicollinearity test for ESS*

ESS 2002 multicollinearity			ESS 2014	
Variable	VIF	1/VIF	VIF	1/VIF
eduyrs	1.01	0.989045	1.01	0.993752
agea	1.01	0.993201	1	0.995456
rural	1.01	0.994906	1	0.997963
male	1	0.998972	1	0.999733
Mean VIF	1.01		1	

*Table 51-Multicollinearity test for EVS*

EVS 1990 multicollinearity			EVS 1999			EVS 2008		
Variable	VIF	1/VIF	Variable	VIF	1/VIF	Variable	VIF	1/VIF
education	1.11	0.897652	education	1.1	0.905786	age	1.07	0.937625
unskilled	1.07	0.938686	unskilled	1.07	0.936493	education	1.06	0.943459
age	1.06	0.941705	age	1.06	0.94272	EUenlarg	1.02	0.984748
rightwing	1.03	0.974433	rightwing	1.01	0.991291	rightwing	1.01	0.994214
proudnat	1.03	0.975568	male	1.01	0.994286	male	1	0.995658
favEU	1.02	0.981948	Mean VIF	1.05		Mean VIF	1.03	
male	1.01	0.989994						
Mean VIF	1.05							

*Table 52-Multicollinearity test for WVS*

WVS multicollinearity Q1			Q2		
Variable	VIF	1/VIF	Variable	VIF	1/VIF
higheduc	1.05	0.952102	higheduc	1.05	0.952102
highincome	1.04	0.964838	highincome	1.04	0.964838
unskilled	1.02	0.980716	unskilled	1.02	0.980716
X003	1.02	0.983703	X003	1.02	0.983703
male	1.01	0.992993	male	1.01	0.992993
Proudnatio~y	1	0.998442	Proudnatio~y	1	0.998442
Mean VIF	1.02		Mean VIF	1.02	

**Table 53-Multicollinearity test for ISSP**

ISSP 1995 multicollinearity			ISSP 2003			ISSP 2013		
Variable	VIF	1/VIF	Variable	VIF	1/VIF	Variable	VIF	1/VIF
v201	1.04	0.962948	age	1.06	0.945458	higheduc	1.04	0.957708
higheduc	1.04	0.963859	higheduc	1.05	0.950851	tradeuni	1.03	0.972504
proudnat	1.03	0.969743	tradeuni	1.05	0.951443	favEU	1.02	0.981408
tradeuni	1.02	0.980002	rural	1.02	0.97846	proudnat	1.01	0.986467
male	1.02	0.983758	rightwing	1.02	0.984752	rightwing	1.01	0.987065
favEU	1.02	0.985092	proudnat	1.01	0.987828	rural	1.01	0.98925
rightwing	1.01	0.991132	male	1.01	0.990636	AGE	1.01	0.994785
			favEU	1.01	0.99297	male	1	0.995151
Mean VIF	1.02		Mean VIF	1.03		Mean VIF	1.02	