

The Influence of Transitional justice Processes on the Freedom of the Media within Post-Conflict Societies

Comparing the Maximalist, Minimalist, Moderate, and Holistic approach in their effectiveness on improving the Freedom of the Media in post-conflict societies.



Master Thesis

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The Influence of Transitional justice Processes on the Freedom of Media within Post-Conflict Societies

Comparing the Maximalist, Minimalist, Moderate, and Holistic approach in their effectiveness on improving the Freedom of Media within post-conflict societies

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Preface

Before you lays the end product of a five and a half year study process at the Radboud University Nijmegen, with which the last one and a half year at the Center for International Conflict Analysis and Management (CICAM). After experiencing ups and downs, I am now saying goodbye to my student life to enter a new phase of my life.

My student career began at the faculty of Social Sciences, where I completed my Bachelor in Sociology. Throughout my Bachelor's, I became interested in international conflict, so I completed two minors at the CICAM. I knew I wanted to complete my studies with the Master Conflicts, Territories, and Identities at the Nijmegen School of Management, and was thrilled when I got my letter of acceptance. Now, after one and a half year of studying at the CICAM, I can only look back at my student time with great, positive thoughts.

In March 2014 I started my internship at Free Press Unlimited, an NGO based in Amsterdam that is committed to bringing free press to all parts of the world. Here, my interest in freedom of the media was sparked, which led me to pursue this subject for my Master Thesis, even though I knew this was not going to be the easiest subject due to the lack of literature on the topic. From Free Press Unlimited I am grateful to my supervisor and mentor Mira Chowdhury. Mira, thank you very much for our interesting and insightful conversations, for letting me experience every aspect of the project management, and for trusting and believing in me. Also, Bram Truijen and Leon van den Boogerd of Free Press Unlimited, thank you for your support and expertise. Finally, my fellow interns at Free Press Unlimited: Esmee, Clara, and Marjolein, thank you for making my time at Free Press Unlimited very nice, fun, and 'gezellig'.

Furthermore, I would like to give a special thanks to my thesis supervisor Haley Swedlund for guiding me throughout this whole process. Haley, thank you for listening to me, for helping me to make my thoughts more clear, and for your helpful feedback. I have really enjoyed this experience, which is in part due to your infinite enthusiasm.

Finally, my thanks go to my friends and family who have helped me get through this experience in many different ways. Gemma and Sarita thank you for listening when I needed someone to talk to, for your distractions when I had to think of something else for a while, and for our endless yet interesting discussions. I like to also thank my parents, for always being there to aid me in any way possible. Finally, Fernando thank you for helping me to order my thoughts, for motivating me when I needed it, and for your patience and ability to always stay positive.

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Lisa Glasbergen

Abstract

Transitional justice is accepted throughout the world as an effective tool to deal with atrocities committed in a period of violent conflict. Not only has transitional justice been widely implemented globally, it is also widely researched by scholars and highly subsidized by foreign aid donors. At the same time, while media now possess the power to reach audiences all over the world, the status of the freedom of media within the world has reached its lowest point in over a decade. I aim to answer the question; to what extent is the freedom of media in post-conflict societies influenced by transitional justice processes? The research that I present synthesizes current theories on transitional justice, testing whether transitional justice mechanisms can affect the freedom of media within post-conflict societies. I do so by evaluating four different approaches to transitional justice mechanisms: the maximalist approach, which favours human rights trials as a transitional justice mechanism; the minimalist approach, which favours amnesties as a transitional justice mechanism; the moderate approach, which favours truth commissions as a transitional justice mechanism; and the holistic approach, which claims it is best to implement multiple transitional justice mechanisms simultaneously.

Using single and multiple linear regression analysis, I establish that there is a link between transitional justice mechanisms and the improvement of the freedom of media in post-conflict societies, concluding that the democratization process that takes place simultaneously cannot explain this link. I find initial evidence for the argument that human rights trials and truth commissions are the transitional justice mechanisms that explain the existence of the link between transitional justice mechanisms and the improvement of the freedom of media within post-conflict societies. However, more large-sample research should be done regarding the effectiveness of the different transitional justice mechanisms.

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List of Abbreviations

| | |
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| CPJ | Committee to Protect Journalists |
| EU | European Union |
| HRT | Human Rights Trial |
| ICAT | International Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment |
| ICTJ | International Center for Transitional justice |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| SE | Standard Error |
| TC | Truth Commission |
| TRC | Truth and Reconciliation Commission |
| UN | United Nations |

1. Introduction

One of the greatest threats to the freedom of media all over the world is the impunity regarding the murder of hundreds of journalists throughout the world (Committee to Protect Journalists [CPJ], 2014). The failure of governments to address the violence against journalists and media houses has become ever more present since the status of the freedom of media in the world has reached its lowest point in over a decade (Freedom House, 2014). One of the most dangerous countries in the world for journalists is Mexico, where more than 85 journalists have been murdered and some 20 have disappeared over the past decade (Human Rights Watch [HRW], 2014). Drug cartels, but also the Mexican authorities intimidate these journalists; and all this has been made possible by a climate of violence and impunity (Reporters Without Borders, 2013). As a result, journalists often use self-censorship out of fear for their lives or the lives of their loved ones.

Media provides the world with information from every corner of the world. Nowadays, almost everyone, even in remote areas, has access to (some form of) media; even within developing countries, about three quarters of households own a radio and thereby have access to radio broadcasts (ITU, 2010). Media can be used as a tool by the conflicting parties to get the people to believe in their 'important goal', and in the inconsiderable and trifling goal of 'the other'. How media report a conflict can therefore have extensive consequences on how people perceive this conflict (Goretti, 2007). In Rwanda for example, radio directly promoted the violence against the Tutsi in the genocide of 1994 (Thompson, 2007). Here, hate-radio thus had a catalysing effect on the key agents of the period of violence in Rwanda (Straus, 2007), which resulted in the death of 800,000 Rwandans (Thompson, 2007).

A recent development in peacebuilding is the focus on media-related peacebuilding. The goal of media-related peacebuilding is a reduction of conflict within society (Howard, 2002). An important aspect of media-related peacebuilding is thus to achieve freedom of media within a (post-)conflict society, due to the effects and impact that freedom of media has on people and society (Limpitlaw, 2013). Media are thus seen as an effective means to influence people in a good and in a bad manner. Because the status of the freedom of the media in the world has reached its lowest point in over a decade, and only one in seven people live in a country with a free media climate (Freedom House, 2014), it is important to address it through scientific research.

Transitional justice mechanisms have been implemented all over the world: from the Australian national 'Sorry Day' to the South-African Truth Commission (TC) to the Human Rights Trials (HRT) in Chile. The worldwide acceptance of transitional justice stems from the conviction that bringing peace and security to a society that has been torn by war and conflict does not end with a peace agreement. Contrarily to what might instinctively be thought, a peace agreement solely marks the beginning of a process of healing and reconciliation: the beginning of a transitional period. While there is general agreement about the need for transitional justice mechanisms, scholars and practitioners have differing theories and opinions on what this process of healing and reconciliation should entail, and disagree about what the actual effects of transitional justice

mechanisms are. However, scholars and practitioners do agree that the most effective mechanisms that can aid the process of healing and reconciliation are the mechanisms that can be placed under the common denominator of 'transitional justice'.

Throughout the world, autocracies have given way to (semi-)democracies after the signing of a peace agreement. This transition, highly encouraged by the countries in the Western hemisphere, has proven to be challenging when trying to establish a strong rule of law. Consequently, to help guide this transition, the international community has increasingly prioritized the processes of transitional justice within countries in a post-conflict stage, so the financing and supporting of these processes have never been higher.

The rationale behind this trend is that to achieve a stable and peaceful society, the rule of law needs to be (re-)established (Lundy & McGovern, 2008). Transitional justice has therefore reached an important position in academic debates addressing issues of reconstruction, state building, and democratization (Fischer, 2011). This widely implemented and researched process seems unquestionable; scholars and practitioners generally accept the theorized effects of transitional justice mechanisms. However, concrete evidence about the effects of the mechanisms of transitional justice is lacking in the empirical literature, despite being very important to the actual implementation of transitional justice mechanisms (Olsen, Payne & Reiter, 2010).

One of the most important goals or effects of transitional justice is to achieve democratization, reconciliation and peace in a (post-)conflict society (Thoms, Ron & Paris, 2010). Freedom of media can be seen as one of the many aspects of the broader democratization. When reconciliation and peace are established in a (post-)conflict society, there will be more safety within this (post-)conflict society, through the establishment of the rule of law and the absence of, or lessened, political violence. The transitional justice mechanisms could contribute to a freer media in two key ways. First, it could contribute to the **institutionalization** of the media. This institutionalization should affect the safety of journalists within this (post-)conflict society in a positive manner, for their safety can now be guaranteed (at least to a certain degree). The institutionalization of the media is essential for the establishment of a free media climate. Second, through a training effect in covering the transitional justice mechanisms in the media (because it has become a media event), the **capacity** of the media could be improved. A considerable capacity of the media is essential for a free media climate, and an improved capacity of the media therefore also have a positive effect on the freedom of media within a (post-)conflict society.

There is thus reason to believe that transitional justice processes could have an influence on the freedom of media. However, this link has not been tested yet. This is where my research will make its contribution. In particular, in this thesis, I address the following research question:

To what extent do transitional justice processes influence the freedom of media in post-conflict societies?

However, because transitional justice processes can entail multiple different types of mechanisms, the impact of these mechanisms on the freedom of the media is likely to vary. Therefore, this thesis will also address the question:

To what extent is there a difference between the influence that trial processes, amnesty processes, truth commissions, or a combination of transitional justice processes have on the freedom of media in post-conflict societies?

In particular, within this thesis, I will distinguish between four different approaches to transitional justice: the maximalist approach that favours human rights trials (HRTs), the minimalist approach that favours amnesties, the moderate approach that favours truth commissions (TCs), and the holistic approach that favours a combination of transitional justice processes. I expect that the holistic approach should have the greatest effect, because the effects of multiple mechanisms together is likely to have a greater impact than the effects of a single mechanism. Furthermore, I expect the minimalist approach to have the least impact on the freedom of media, because amnesties do not bring about a media event, and there is thus no increase in the capacity of the media.

1.1. Scientific relevance

Despite the fact that transitional justice mechanisms are one of the most researched topics in several fields of study, there are still great gaps within the literature about transitional justice. Scholars and practitioners often assume that transitional justice has great value in the context of a (post-)conflict society. They state that it improves the rule of law and solidifies the democracy. However, the first gap in the literature is that there is little systematic evidence about these effects of transitional justice, and whether or not it actually improves the rule of law and democracy.

The bulk of the literature is focused on case studies (for example: Gibson, 2004 & 2006; Akhavan, 1993; García-Godos & Lid, 2010), or small-sample comparative analysis (for example: Long & Brecke, 2003; Sikkink & Walling, 2007; Stromseth, Wippman & Brooks, 2006) and has conflicting evidence to what the effects of transitional justice are. Furthermore, this scientific literature often focuses solely on one specific transitional justice mechanism, rather than comparing the different approaches. Evidence regarding the effects of the different mechanisms of transitional justice across multiple cases is necessary to understand the broader impact of transitional justice mechanisms. Olsen, Payne & Reiter (2010) have been the first scholars to enter on this path towards an empirically proven theory and method in a convincing way. These authors investigate in a quantitative manner when countries adopt specific transitional justice mechanisms, what factors ‘facilitate or impede adopting these mechanisms’ (p.1), and whether these reached their desired effects. However, their research is only the beginning of the formulation of an empirically proven theory and method of transitional justice mechanisms, and thereby it needs to be complemented by more research into the effects of the different transitional justice mechanisms.

With this research I will attempt to help fill this gap in the literature by conducting research in a systematic, quantitative manner. This research will have some benefits over research that has been conducted until now: it will be a large-scale, cross-country comparative analysis, and it will

investigate multiple transitional justice mechanisms. The fact that this research is large-scale and cross-country allows for drawing general conclusions that will be valid throughout different contexts. Furthermore, the focus of this study will entail multiple transitional justice mechanisms, which will help in drawing broader conclusions; and thus enabling me to compare the different transitional justice mechanisms regarding their effectiveness.

Next to providing a more systematic study of transitional justice, this research focuses on the impact of transitional justice mechanisms on freedom of media. The importance of freedom of media has gained attention in the scientific literature across many disciplines. One of the reasons for this attention is that freedom of media has also gained importance within the field of practitioners and the international community. Freedom of media is perceived as an important prerequisite of a well functioning democracy. The link between transitional justice and freedom of media is therefore an important link to analyse because it is closely related to the most important goals of transitional justice: the establishment of a rule of law and the establishment of a democracy. The establishment of a strong rule of law also implies the establishment of laws regarding press freedom, as stated in international treaties.

Freedom of media is, as previously stated, also an important prerequisite of democracy and can thus be seen as part of the democratization process. Since democratization is a concept that contains many elements, a division in elements that might be affected by transitional justice can be helpful, starting with freedom of media in this thesis. However, it is not only the link between the democratization and freedom of the media that makes freedom of media important for post-conflict societies. Media has also been shown to be important for the de-escalation or peacebuilding of a (previous) conflict (Kempf, 1996).

Despite the potential importance of the link between transitional justice and the freedom of media, the relationship between these two concepts has not been researched extensively. The research that does address the link between transitional justice and the media, often focus on the role that media can play in the success of a transitional justice mechanism. These are often case studies solely covering one transitional justice mechanism (such as: Laplante & Phenicie, 2009). These researches state, for example, that a transitional justice mechanism, like TCs or HRTs, can provide capacity building in the media or constitutionally provide for a freer media climate. This research will therefore contribute to this gap in the literature by quantitatively establishing whether the relation between transitional justice mechanisms and the freedom of media is present or not.

1.2. Societal relevance

By filling these scientific gaps in the literature regarding transitional justice, practitioners such as policy makers in governments or international organizations can also benefit. These practitioners can base their policies on the scientific literature that scholars produce. However, without an adequate answer on the effects of the different transitional justice mechanisms, practitioners can at best guess what the effects of the different transitional justice mechanisms will be. That is why this research can help shape policies regarding the implementation of transitional justice mechanisms or policies and projects regarding the establishment of the freedom of media. Currently, the status of the freedom of media in the world is deteriorating and has already reached its lowest point in

over a decade: only one in seven people live in a country that could be characterized as having a free media climate (Freedom House, 2014). This shows that it is very important to study freedom of media as a possible outcome of diverse policy strategies, such as transitional justice. Furthermore, different types of organisations could benefit from the outcomes of this research, using it to design their policies and projects accordingly. Examples of actors that may find it useful to better understand the relationship between transitional justice mechanisms and freedom of the media include: states, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), international organisations, media houses, etc.

Looking from a broader perspective: post-conflict societies could also benefit from this research, because this research will enable policy-makers to consider better alternatives and make better decisions regarding the implementation of transitional justice processes. This research will thus add to the concrete evidence on this specific part of the transitional justice mechanisms, namely the relation between transitional justice processes and the freedom of media.

1.3. Outline of the thesis

Within this thesis I will argue that the implementation of a transitional justice process can have an independent effect on the level of the freedom of media within post-conflict societies. I will support this argument by performing a quantitative linear regression analysis, in which I find that between 1994 and 2006, countries that implemented one or more transitional justice mechanisms have experienced a significant increase in their scores on freedom of the media, as measured by the indicators of the Freedom House. This effect remains, even after controlling for the alternative explanations that state that region, wealth, and repression might be causing the increase in freedom of media within post-conflict societies.

The next chapter will provide the theoretical framework. First, theories regarding transitional justice and theories regarding the freedom of media are discussed. Thereafter, the link between transitional justice and freedom of media is explicated and a hypothesis is deducted. The last part of the theoretical framework will then elaborate on the differing approaches to transitional justice and the hypotheses that derive from these approaches are presented. The third chapter will discuss the data and methods that will be used in this thesis. This will include a description of the data set, a description of the method, and the operationalization of the variables. In chapter 4, I will conduct the actual analysis of the data in order to test the hypotheses. This will include a descriptive, bivariate, and multivariate analysis. The last chapter will provide a conclusion and discussion regarding the findings.

2. Theoretical Framework

In this section, an overview of theories that contribute to this research will be provided. The theories within this research will focus on two main subjects: theories of transitional justice and theories of media. Although media theories are very extensive, solely the theories of media that involve transitional justice and/or peacebuilding will be addressed. After addressing these two main subjects separately, an integration of these theories will be provided. Lastly, an overview of the most common approaches regarding transitional justice and their effects will be given, followed by the formulation of hypotheses.

2.1. Transitional justice

To be able to conduct this research about the influence of transitional justice processes on the freedom of media, a complete understanding of what transitional justice entails needs to be achieved. Therefore, this section will define transitional justice, provide an overview of the emergence of the term ‘transitional justice’, and elaborate on the underlying rationale and the goals of transitional justice.

The concept of transitional justice emerged at the end of the 1980s when scholars and practitioners from different fields such as human rights activists, lawyers, legal scholars, policy makers, etc. began to consider ‘*[h]ow to balance competing moral imperatives, reconcile legitimate claims for justice with equally legitimate claims for stability and social peace, and foster the relationship between justice and crimes of the past and a more just political order in the present.*’ (Arthur, 2009, p.323). International human rights organisations and movements were mainly focusing on the shaming of authoritarian and/or repressive regimes until the 1980s, after which it became harder to shame violations of human rights because these formerly repressive regimes were transitioning into a seemingly more democratic and political free society (Zalaquett, 1990). The rationale behind this was that if the domestic civil society was better able to deal with these violations, international human rights organisations and movements did not have to anymore. However, when it turned out that these transitions were more *de jure* than *de facto*, there was an emerging need for new framework to counter impunity and human rights violations (Arthur, 2009).

There is disagreement on the origin of the concept of transitional justice. The term was first used in 1992 to refer to justice processes in times of transition (from autocracy to democracy) (Palumbo, 1992). In 1995, Kritz (1995) wrote one of the most significant contributions to the literature regarding transitional justice that added to our understanding of the term ‘transitional justice’ now. After his publication, the term was used more and more often, both by scholars as well as by practitioners (Arthur, 2009). However, according to Teitel (2003), the Nuremberg Trials were already the beginning of the ideology behind transitional justice. Elster (2004) takes it even one step further, and sees transitional justice as a constant, which has had divergent understandings throughout history: a statement that has been criticised by other scholars.

Transitional justice has traditionally tried to contribute to social reconstruction, justice and peace in a (post) conflict situation. The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) is one of the

most prestigious international non-profit organizations that specialize in the field of transitional justice. Hence, in my Master Thesis, I will use the definition of transitional justice as posed by the ICTJ. The ICTJ defines transitional justice as follows:

'Transitional justice is a response to systematic or widespread violations of human rights. It seeks recognition for the victims and to promote possibilities for peace, reconciliation, and democracy. Transitional justice is not a special form of justice but justice adapted to societies transforming themselves after a period of pervasive human rights abuse. In some cases, these transformations happen suddenly; in others, they may take place over many decades.' (ICTJ, 2000, p. 1)

'Transitional justice' is made up of two words: transitional and justice. When the term 'transitional justice' first emerged, the word 'transitional', as mentioned above, referred to the fact that after a conflict, countries often were in a transition from autocracy to democracy (Arthur, 2009). Democracy was (and often still is) perceived as the ideal type of society that all societies needed to strive for. Furthermore, the idea that a democracy could be established in a society without specific socioeconomic conditions was new. Also, the term transition was now used with regard to a political transformation instead of a social transformation, and finally, the framework for individual human rights gained importance (ibid.). In this view, there is thus a period of political transition after a period of conflict (Teitel, 2003). However, some scholars say that the term 'transitional' changes the nature of 'justice', implying that there is a need for a lesser form of justice than in 'regular' situations (Olsen, Payne & Reiter, 2010). In this view, the term 'transitional justice' should not be used at all.

The word 'justice' is even more difficult to define. The Oxford dictionary refers to justice as 'just behaviour and treatment', which does not give us a complete picture of what justice might be. Justice is a subjective and normative concept; the normative views of the agents of transitional justice define the implementation of justice (Elster, 2004). For instance, Teitel (2003) argues that we have an intuition regarding what justice entails. It is the sense of rightfulness or lawfulness; a moral principle determining just conduct. Critics state that the term 'justice' in transitional justice is misleading: it can justify the absence of accountability and impunity in some transitional justice mechanisms (Olsen, Payne & Reiter, 2010).

However, I will use the term 'transitional justice' throughout this thesis, because despite the criticism, the term is commonly used throughout the scholarship to refer to a specific set of mechanisms. Furthermore, there is no alternative to the term that is commonly accepted and more satisfactory than 'transitional justice'.

Transitional justice is thus a means of a society to deal with their past (Roth-Arriaza & Mariezcurrena, 2006). As mentioned before, the rationale behind transitional justice is that the rule of law needs to be (re-)established in a (post-)conflict country to achieve a stable and peaceful society (Lundy & McGovern, 2008). Within societies all over the world there is a demand to stop atrocities and violations of human rights, and to hold the perpetrators accountable for what they have done. There is a demand for facts, for the truth, and to help the victims of those atrocities and violations of human rights. Transitional justice therefore is predicted to contribute to healing the

psychological wounds that were inflicted during the period of conflict, and therefore also promote reconciliation (Thoms, Ron & Paris, 2010). In short, there is a demand for justice in a context of transition (Roth-Arriaza & Mariezcurrena, 2006).

Next to justice for the past, there is a need for justice in the future; to build up institutions that can adequately and righteously deal with future atrocities, future crime, and that can prevent future violations of human rights from happening. Popular belief, especially in the Western hemisphere, is that a stable democracy and rule of law can provide that (ibid.).

Many scholars believe transitional justice is a precondition for reconciliation, which in turn is needed to achieve a stable and peaceful society. The underlying idea is that after a peace agreement, unresolved issues as a consequence of the former conflict still need to be resolved to make the peace agreement legitimate and lasting. Transitional justice would help people to come to terms with the past to resolve these issues, for justice has prevailed (Fischer, 2011). The field of transitional justice has incorporated different types of transitional justice mechanisms that have the goal of providing justice for victims and their relatives, and facilitating the transition to a more peaceful and democratic society (Arthur, 2009).

2.2. Freedom of the Media

The media are an often-studied subject within many different fields of study. Within conflict studies, the media –both as a cause of conflict and as a means to end conflict– are more and more taken into account within research (Howard, 2002). The focus in this research will solely lie with one aspect of media: freedom of media; which refers to the robustness of the coverage of political news, the safety for journalists, the amount of intrusion of the government, and the degree of legal and/or economic pressures. The freedom of media within a country can differ, and thus it can have multiple consequences. Within the next part I will therefore elaborate on the definition of freedom of media, and state why freedom of media is perceived to be important.

The first question that will be answered is what is actually defined as freedom of media; when can a country be qualified as having a free media climate? Within this Master Thesis the definition and classification of Freedom House will be used. Freedom House is a well-respected and independent watchdog organization that is committed to bring freedom around the world. Freedom House states that in order to be classified as having a free media climate, countries have to score sufficiently on the following points: a robust coverage of political news, guaranteed safety for journalists, minimal state intrusion in media affairs, and the press should not be subjected to demanding legal and/or economic pressures (Freedom House, 2014). The definition of freedom of media that will be used throughout this Master Thesis is the following:

‘The degree to which a country: has a robust coverage of political news, is safe for journalists, has minimal state intrusion in media affairs, and is subjected to demanding legal and/or economic pressures’

Freedom of media and expression is defined and established in several international human rights instruments. Within Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations [UN], 1948), freedom of media and expression are both established. This implies that states that do

not have a free media climate are violating the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. There are also more regional international human rights instruments, such as The European Union (EU) Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and The African Charter on Human and People's Rights.

Currently, in 2013, the status of the freedom of the media in the world has reached the lowest point in over a decade (Freedom House, 2014). This means that at this moment one in seven people from all around the world lives in a country that could classify as having a free media climate (ibid.). However, media do reach us and are able to provide us with information and news from all around the world. This influences multiple things, such as how people perceive a conflict (concerning both people who are experiencing a conflict, and those who are watching it from the outside) (Goretti, 2007). Often theorized is also the role that media play in escalating conflicts (for example when parties use propaganda), such as the 'hate-radio' in Rwanda (Thompson, 2007).

The role that media can play in de-escalating conflict is also gaining importance among scholars. A recent development in peacebuilding is therefore the focus on media-related peacebuilding. The goal of media-related peacebuilding is a reduction of conflict within society (Howard, 2002). People that live in a society torn by war often demonstrate some form of dualistic thinking and the contradictions that this generates. For peacebuilding to strengthen, these polarities have to be undermined (Kempf, 1998).

However, there are some difficulties regarding the acquirement of the truth, since the truth is relative and multi-interpretable. There are at least three different truths within a conflict: the (at least) two 'subjective realities' that every party involved within the conflict has, and the more 'objective reality' that can be observed from outside the conflict. Every different party within the conflict believes they are right, their goals are just, and that the threat comes from the opposing party (Walzer, 2006). Therefore, this process needs to be interrupted by showing the conflicting parties that they need to be critical about their own subjective reality (Kempf, 1998). Within every conflict, Bar-Tal (1996) argues, societal beliefs are important for the construction of society members' view of the conflict, they include:

1. Beliefs about the justness of one's own goals
2. Beliefs about security
3. Beliefs of positive self image
4. Beliefs of own victimization
5. Beliefs of delegitimizing the opponent
6. Beliefs of patriotism
7. Beliefs of unity
8. Beliefs of peace as the ultimate desire of the society

It may be clear that these beliefs will not be sufficient to end the conflict, but they are necessary for sustaining the conflict. The warring parties therefore all try to produce and maintain these beliefs by using propaganda with the goal of persuading citizens to perceive the war as something positive. As Lasswell (1927, p. 630) said about propaganda:

“...the problem of the propagandist is to multiply all the suggestions favorable to the attitudes which he wishes to produce and strengthen, and to restrict all suggestions which are unfavorable to them.”

When the media is thus controlled by a propagandist, it is used to only show attitudes and opinions that are in line with the ideas of the propagandist, while it refutes all attitudes and opinions that are not in line with those ideas (Lasswell, 1927). This can therefore easily sustain or spark conflict. In this case, the media is controlled and cannot be characterized as free.

But also without systemic propaganda within the media, the media can report on conflict in a way that will help sustain the previous mentioned societal beliefs, and thus sustain the conflict (Kempf, 1998). Namely, media often paint a black and white picture of the conflict and make it look like a zero-sum-game of good against evil, in order to make the news more exciting and easier comprehensible. Also, journalists in a conflict society often are embedded in the beliefs of the society they are part of, so their view on the conflict will be part of the societal beliefs. Furthermore, journalists feel the pressure of society to take an antagonistic position with regard to the side they naturally do not belong to, in order to keep their own social position. Finally, psychological processes make sure that these societal beliefs originate when a conflict is seen as competitive (win-lose) rather than cooperative (win-win) (Kempf, 1996).

Freedom of media is one of the goals, if not the most important goal, of media-related peacebuilding. Freedom of media brings freedom of expression to all people equally, which can have several benefits to the society and its individuals. First of all, freedom of media is important because it recognizes that human beings are essentially valuable (Limpitlaw, 2013). This is linked to the equality and the dignity of human beings, and to the autonomy to develop one's own personality. In this view, people are all equal, valuable, and free to think and say everything they want, as long as they do not get in the way of the freedom of another. Furthermore, because freedom of media allows people to express their different ideas about the 'truth', it supposedly brings us closer towards this 'truth'. Lastly, freedom of media is perceived to be essential for democracy, because people need to be informed about different (political) opinions and views to form their own balanced opinion (ibid.).

2.3. Linking Transitional justice and Freedom of Media

Within this thesis I argue that there is a relationship between transitional justice and freedom of media. Through the implementation of transitional justice processes, the media within the transitioning country might be affected. The media are an element within society, and can therefore be seen as more than a mere observer of transitional justice processes (Krabill, 2007). Moreover, Laplante and Phenicie (2009) argue that *'if reconciliation lays the foundation for preventing new cycles of violence, then transitional justice theory must begin considering how to attend to the media so that it exerts a positive influence on post-conflict recovery'* (p. 253).

There is some kind of interaction observed between the media and transitional justice processes in several case studies. They test a different relationship between these concepts than the relationship that I am testing within this thesis. However, it is useful to mention these studies, for they can help understand the connection between transitional justice and media that I am testing. Krabill (2001),

for example, investigated the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in South Africa, in which the role of the media has been essential for the success of this transitional justice mechanism. Within his research, the focus is on how mass media can complement or enhance the TRC of South Africa, and how the role of the mass media in the conflict was portrayed during the hearings regarding the mass media. The conclusion of this study is that the success of the TRC of South Africa is in part due to the ability of the mass media to make the TRC into a media event.

Laplante and Phenicie (2009) investigated the differing transitional justice mechanisms implemented in Peru, and concluded that these could have been more effective if the role of the media had also been addressed (Laplante & Phenicie, 2009). They also state that journalists are influenced and shaped by the context of conflict they are embedded in, which influences their objectivity and neutrality (for instance through threats, abuses, etc.).

Price & Stremlau (2012) try to '*fill a major gap in the transitional justice literature by exploring the role of media in transitional justice processes*' (p.1077). They argue that because transitional justice mechanisms have implicit and/or explicit media components, the role of media in the success of transitional justice mechanisms should be taken into account. Media can also influence the identity of people, which is essential to the way people perceive a (past) conflict (ibid.). In several cases, the authors find that the media is intentionally part of the transitional justice process, through media assistance, for example; trainings are given to journalists so that they can cover the hearings in the TRCs or HRTs. In Liberia, the European Union (EU) had invested in journalism trainings, to prepare them for the coverage of the TRC that would be implemented. This included a code of conduct specifically for the TRC: the TRC Journalists Code of Conduct (ibid.).

The implementation of transitional justice mechanisms can influence the media climate within post-conflict societies in three ways. First, when implementing a transitional justice mechanism, institutions such as the ombudsmen, arbitration councils, and press complaints commissions can be strengthened and created (Price & Stremlau, 2012). Second, transitional justice mechanisms can help making the 'market of media' more open to different voices, by supporting the voices that they view as improving reconciliation¹ (ibid.). This way, the transitional justice mechanisms make sure that the 'market of media' is freer, and different opinions are given a platform. Third, transitional justice mechanisms can use the rule of law to address the media environment in a (post-)conflict country, in order to aid the reconciliation process. For example, in the late 1990s, the international community crafted 'an architecture of media law' in the (post-)conflict countries as part of the transitional justice processes, in order to set formal rules to ensure the non-propagandist media content (ibid., p.1086).

There is thus an observed link between media and transitional justice, and therefore I hypothesize that there is a link between the implementation of transitional justice mechanisms and freedom of

¹ Note that there might be (post-)conflict settings in which a completely free media climate would not enhance the reconciliation in that society at first, due to the power of the media to also enhance divisions. However, it can be seen as a long-term goal in practically all contexts.

media that goes via the increased **capacity** and the **institutionalization** of the media. However, this link remains largely untested and barely theorized.

The **capacity** of the media can be enhanced by the implementation of transitional justice mechanisms, for these can be turned into a media event, and serve as a training tool for the media. Transitional justice mechanisms need media coverage in order to reach intended audiences and thus achieve their goals of reconciliation and coming to terms with the past. This demand for media coverage of the transitional justice processes might turn the transitional justice process into a media event (Krabill, 2007). A media event can be seen as a ceremony that requires '*an interruption to routine broadcasting; being live; being planned outside of the media; being pre-planned; being presented with reverence and ceremony; and enthralling very large audiences*' (Krabill, 2007, p.569). These media events have a training aspect to them, because they are live, pre-planned, etc. Thus they can enhance the **capacity** building of the media. The media is therefore better able to cover both transitional justice events, as well as future events, are economically in a better shape, and have become part of the everyday lives of the people.

Furthermore, the demand for media coverage of transitional justice mechanisms, can enhance the information environment within a society, and therefore aid the **institutionalization** of the media. As Price and Stremlau (2012) stated, institutions such as the ombudsmen, arbitration councils, and press complaints commissions are strengthened and created by transitional justice mechanisms. This enhances accountability and improves the rule of law, therefore providing reconciliation, a feeling of closure within a (post-)conflict society, and thus the **institutionalization** of the media (Thoms, Ron & Paris, 2010). This reconciliation and closure will enhance trust and ties within society and between groups, because the stigmatization of the other group is less present (Roth-Arriaza & Mariezcurrena, 2006). These effects, together with the deterrent effect of transitional justice mechanisms, could increase the feeling of safety within society, including the safety of journalists, which is essential for a free media climate. Also, this **institutionalization** can enhance the accountability and access to the media, which in its turn improves the safety of journalists, and thus the freedom of media within a (post-)conflict society.

The enhanced **capacity** of the media and its **institutionalization** are necessary, yet not sufficient, conditions for a free media climate. In short, transitional justice mechanisms can lead to an increased **capacity** of the media (through media events) and the **institutionalization** of the media (through the rule of law), which in turn can lead to an improvement of the freedom of media. The previous leads to the following hypothesis:

H1: The implementation of at least one transitional justice mechanism has a direct positive effect on the freedom of media within a post-conflict society.

One of the major goals of transitional justice is to bring about democratization in a (post-)conflict and usually authoritarian society. Theoretically, democratization could have a positive effect on the freedom of media within a society, since it often increases almost simultaneously. However, the causality of the link between democratization and freedom of media is debatable. Intuitively, it might be plausible that the democratization affects the freedom of media. One could argue that

when the process of democratization has taken place, it would increase all the aspects of freedom within society, including the freedom of media.

Within this thesis I will argue that the causality of this link is the following way: freedom of media has a positive effect on democratization. In order to explain why this causal chain is more plausible, it is important to define necessary elements of democratization. What democratization entails is difficult to define, however, there are some elements that are generally accepted by scholars: regular and competitive voting in elections for the government, a stable rule of law, the absence of discrimination against specific political groups or parties, no restrictions of citizen expression, and competition for working in a political position and the making of policy (Karl, 1990). A lot of these aspects require a free media climate to be fully considered as democratic: elections need a free media climate in order to be fair and fully competitive, for citizens to express themselves to the fullest without any restrictions a free media climate is also necessary, a free media climate would also provide a platform for all political groups and parties without discriminating, and the watchdog function of a free media climate would provide for competition regarding political positions and will provide publicity when one of the aspects of democracy is being disregarded or violated.

Therefore, I would argue that a free media climate is essential for a well functioning and de facto democracy (as opposed to a merely de jure democracy, which is possible without a free media climate). Although this link is essentially beyond the scope of this Master Thesis, it is important to acknowledge the connection between one of the most important goals of transitional justice (democratization) and the subject of study within this thesis (freedom of media). Therefore, I will test this link as a control variable in the analysis chapter of this thesis.

Besides the statement that proposes that democracy causes the improvement of the freedom of media, instead of the transitional justice mechanisms, there are several other ideas that should be kept in mind. There is an assumption that claims that the wealthier a country is, the more liberal and democratic this country will be, and the less violations of human rights (Przeworski, 2000). Therefore, this could also affect the freedom of media within a country. A prediction on basis of this theory is that the wealth of a country improves the freedom of media, and not the transitional justice mechanisms.

Furthermore, the level of repression before the transition could have an effect on the status (and improvement) of democracy, which therefore also could influence the freedom of media in a post-conflict society (Poe, Tate & Keith, 1999). Regarding this theory, the prediction is that the level of repression before the transition will have an influence on the freedom of media within a country, and not the transitional justice mechanisms.

Finally, there is a possibility that historical patterns and distinctive cultural features can influence the choice that a country makes regarding which transitional justice mechanism they implement, and thus regarding their effects (Olsen, Payne & Reiter, 2010). This argument would thus claim that it is region that has a predictive value on the level of the freedom of media, and not the transitional justice mechanisms. Given these possibilities, I will control for these variables in my

statistical analysis to establish whether these can explain the effects of the transitional justice mechanisms.

To conclude, the link between media and transitional justice remains unexplored. Especially the aspect of the freedom of media remains unsatisfying. The separate theories (about transitional justice, and about freedom of the media) will therefore provide for the theoretical framework within my thesis. It is clear, however, that the freedom of media is an important aspect of post-conflict peacebuilding, and that it is linked to transitional justice. In this thesis, I seek to test my argument that there is an empirical relationship between the occurrence of a transitional justice event and a country's scores on freedom of the media indexes.

2.4. Approaches to Transitional justice and Freedom of Media

Following the different approaches to transitional justice that Olsen, Payne & Reiter (2010, p.16-28) differentiate in their book *'Transitional justice in Balance; Comparing Processes, Weighing Efficacy'*, this research will distinguish four categories of approaches: a maximalist approach, a minimalist approach, a moderate approach, and a holistic approach. This is so mainly because there has not been convincing evidence that one of these categories of approaches is the most successful one. Different scholars believe that one of these different categories of approaches is the best way to implement transitional justice processes, because they have differing effects on society. Therefore, these different approaches could also have different effects on the freedom of media within post-conflict societies.

2.4.1. Maximalist approach

The maximalist approach favours the use of human rights trials (HRTs) as a means of transitional justice (Olsen, Payne & Reiter, 2010). HRTs are *'the examination of alleged wrongdoing through judicial proceedings within a legal structure'* (Binningsbø, Loyle, Gates & Elster, 2012 p. 734), and can be implemented on the domestic level, on the international level (for example the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia), and on a more hybrid level (for example the Special Court for Sierra Leone).

Adherents of the maximalist approach state that HRTs have certain benefits over the other mechanisms of transitional justice. First, they argue that HRTs can help unravel the factual truth, which can help victims and/or survivors to feel that justice has been done; perpetrators are being held accountable for the proven atrocities that they have committed (Kritz, 1996). Second, they propose the accountability that is established by HRTs will improve the sense of reconciliation and decrease the need for revenge or retributive violence (Thoms, Ron & Paris, 2010). Within HRTs individuals are being held responsible for their actions, which means that there is no stigmatization of an entire group (Roth-Arriaza & Mariezcurrena, 2006). It follows that HRTs thus might contribute to the prevention of further escalation of a conflict. Third, HRTs are said to function as a deterrent through the elimination of perpetrators, but also through the invoked change in the cost-benefit analysis of potential future perpetrators, and the creation of a norm of obeying the rule of law (Thoms, Ron & Paris, 2010). Finally, HRTs are theorized to promote the rule of law, forcing governments to adhere to the publicly known rule of law and stimulating the establishment of a democracy (Kritz, 1996).

Olsen, Payne & Reiter (2010) distinguish between three different types of imperatives to support the maximalist approach, namely the moral, political, and legal imperatives. The moral imperative is the moral duty to get justice by trials for the victims and survivors of the human rights violations, which cannot be subordinate to the political or strategic goals of the transitioning regime (Moore, 1991). The political imperative corresponds with the goal of democracies to restrain the power of the former authoritarian forces, and bring about a strong rule of law (Akhaven, 1998). The political leaders that were at the heart of the human rights violations or war crimes have to be stripped from their power, otherwise they could instigate further escalation of the conflict or vigilante justice (Olsen, Payne & Reiter, 2010). Finally, the legal imperative is the duty of countries to prosecute the perpetrators that have committed war crimes or violated the human rights under international law (Orentlicher, 1991).

One example of an international treaty in which this duty of holding trials, since trials are perceived as the only effective relief for victims or survivors, is defined is in the International Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (ICAT), among many others (Olsen, Payne & Reiter, 2010). Critics might state that this duty is a too heavy burden for a country that has limited resources, just came out of a conflict, and is still transitioning (Dickinson, 2003). A solution for this problem, proposed by the adherents of the maximalist approach, could be for the international community to help carry this burden, in the forms of hybrid courts (*ibid.*).

Adherents of the maximalist approach oppose the use of amnesties as a transitional justice mechanism, simply because the international law obliges countries to hold trials (Olsen, Payne & Reiter, 2010). Truth commissions are considered as valuable, but are not to be a substitute of HRTs, because truth commissions are not factual enough (*ibid.*). Overall, the maximalist approach values the capacity of HRTs to build a strong rule of law and therefore democracy, and to end impunity.

However, there are also critics of the maximalist approach. First, there is the accountability problem, which relates to the question of: who is to be held accountable for the atrocities and violations of human rights? Is it impossible to trial all perpetrators? And do you then only trial the most serious crimes? If so, a considerable amount of perpetrators will be walking around freely, so the chance of re-escalation might be increased (Theissen, 2004). Furthermore, as stated above, the local (justice) system might not have enough resources, capacities, and clear-cut procedural standards to provide for HRTs in a period of transition (Orentlicher, 1991). Claims of 'victors justice' are also easily made by the losing party, which can cause the portraying the losing party as martyrs (Theissen, 2004). Finally, HRTs are very time consuming and expensive, which could potentially undermine the need for immediate justice (*ibid.*).

HRTs as a mechanism for transitional justice also have the ability to improve the status of the freedom of media within a post-conflict society in two ways. First, the **institutionalization** of the media can be enhanced by the implementation of HRTs. Adherents of the maximalist approach state that accountability and justice are established by HRTs, which can create a sense of reconciliation in the post-conflict society (Olsen, Payne & Reiter, 2010). When reconciliation is

established, the out-group is no longer seen as the enemy one has to be afraid of, or that one has to harm. Furthermore, HRTs would hold individuals responsible for their actions, through which respect for the rule of law would be enforced, so a deterrent effect could be established through the changing cost-benefit analysis (ibid.). The costs for people to commit crimes could be increased, so the deterrent effect may make the post-conflict society a safer environment. These characteristics of HRTs can improve the status of the freedom of media, because they may increase the **institutionalization** of the media, and therefore also the perception of safety within a post-conflict society.

Second, the implementation of HRTs as a transitional justice mechanism can increase the **capacity** building of the media. The HRTs are made into a media event, because of the demand for these trials to be documented and made public. This could function as training for the weak media within a post-conflict society, in order to build their **capacity** (Krabill, 2007). This **capacity** building of the media will help the media to be economically stronger and to be technically more capable. On a societal level, the media has become more normal. Therefore, **capacity** building in combination with the **institutionalization** of media can enhance the freedom of media within a post-conflict society.

2.4.2. Minimalist approach

The minimalist approach favours the use of amnesties as a means of implementing mechanisms of transitional justice (Olsen, Payne & Reiter, 2010). Amnesties are *'a promise (or in some cases formal legislation) on the part of the ruling party to not prosecute or punish past violators'* (Binningsbø, Loyle, Gates & Elster, 2012 p. 735). Amnesties can be implemented in a conditional (only members of a certain group, or people in certain positions or ranks) and an unconditional form (all perpetrators) (ibid.).

Adherents of the minimalist approach put more emphasis on the 'transitional' part of transitional justice, in contrast to the focus on 'justice' of the maximalists. According to them, there are benefits to focusing on the 'transitional' part of transitional justice. First, there is still a possibility to hold negotiations with the opposition to provide a solution for the conflict when only negotiations will work. This is harder, if not impossible, when the opposition is imprisoned or under arrest (Van Zyl, 1999). In this case, the opposition thus needs to be appeased to prevent the occurrence of spoilers, or *'leaders and parties who believe the emerging peace threatens their power, world view, and interests and who use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it'* (Stedman, 1997, p. 5). To achieve institution building, and the strengthening of democracy and the rule of law, political bargains with the (potential) spoilers need to be made (Olsen, Payne & Reiter, 2010).

Second, supporters of the minimalist approach argue that it is important to forgive past crimes and move on as a society as a whole, without the losing parties entering a state of political and social isolation, for this could become a threat to democracy (Huyse, 1995). Democracy in transitioning states is frail, which makes tolerance over past abuses important. Furthermore, the political and social isolation of the losing parties could challenge reconciliation within society, which is essential for development (Weitekamp et al, 2006). This is thus a more forward-looking approach that focuses on the future rather than the past; to not open old wounds.

Third, proponents of this approach argue that the implementation of amnesties would constitutionally recognize the self-interest of the conflicting parties (Bell, 2009). With amnesties, the conflicting goals of the different parties could be overcome, because all goals are now seen as equally legitimate (ibid.). Finally, amnesties could prevent resentment among the conflicting parties that 'their people' are prosecuted or punished for their political actions, and therefore would instigate a 'victors justice' (Theissen, 2004), which can be related to the previous three points. In short, adherents of the minimalist approach claim it avoids spoilers, reduces violence, and concentrates on the future.

Adherents of the minimalist approach oppose the use of trials as a transitional justice mechanism, arguing that trials could lead to more violence and instability and undermine the restoration of society (Osiel, 2000). Also, when implementing trials as a transitional justice mechanism, the political reality of the period of transition is overlooked: spoilers are a part of this political reality (Stedman, 1997). Finally, they state that trials would maintain the differences between the (formerly) conflicting parties, because it can easily be seen as 'victors justice' (Theissen, 2004). Minimalists see truth commissions as less destabilizing than trials, but there is still a higher risk for spoilers to spoil the peace process (Olsen, Payne & Reiter, 2010).

Critics of the minimalist approach state that amnesties are not a form of justice, and that this will provide no closure or healing and restoration for the involved parties (Elster, 2004). Furthermore, the use of amnesties as a mechanism of transitional justice is incompatible with the obligations of a state under international law, which states that a state has the obligation to punish violators of human rights (Theissen, 2004). Finally, implementing amnesties as a transitional justice mechanism is the same as accepting impunity. Consequently, respect for the rule of law and democratic institutions is being undermined (Orentlicher, 1991).

Even though implementing amnesties as a transitional justice mechanism can bring about benefits for a post-conflict society, I will argue that amnesties will have relatively minor impact on the level of freedom of media within a post-conflict society. Amnesties can influence the freedom of media in the way that it establishes stability and reconciliation (Weitekamp et al., 2006), enhancing trust between groups, and ultimately the feeling of safety. This safety is essential for a free media landscape, because journalists can do their work without having to fear. Adherents of the minimalist approach furthermore argue that political bargains with spoilers can be made through the implementation of amnesties, so that the institution building and rule of law could be aided. This could imply that also the media will be more **institutionalized**, which is essential for the freedom of media. However, amnesties are not likely to become a media event, and therefore do not provide for the training aspect and **capacity** building of the media, a key aspect of my theory linking transitional justice mechanisms to increased freedom of the media.

2.4.3. Moderate approach

The moderate approach favours the use of Truth Commissions (TCs) as a means of implementing a transitional justice mechanism (Olsen, Payne & Reiter, 2010). TCs comprise of the following: '*officially sanctioned, temporary investigative bodies that focus on a pattern of abuse over a particular period of time*' (Binningsbø, Loyle, Gates & Elster, 2012 p. 734). These TCs are established to investigate the

truth about what happened during the conflict and hold war criminals that have committed crimes accountable to a certain extent (Thoms, Ron & Paris, 2010). For TCs to be effective, there are three conditions. They must be '*complete, officially proclaimed, and publicly exposed truths*' (Olsen, Payne & Reiter, 2010, p.23)

The use of TCs as a mechanism of transitional justice has considerable advantages according to the adherents of the moderate approach. It can be seen as a kind of middle ground between the maximalist- and the minimalist approach. First, from the maximalist approach, the moderate approach values the importance of accountability (Olsen, Payne & Reiter, 2010). TCs provide justice by acknowledging past atrocities that have been committed, but in theory do not cause democratic instability because they take the political reality into account (Theissen, 2004; Roth-Arriaza & Mariezcurrena, 2006). By establishing accountability in the aftermath of conflict, social trust can also be reconstructed, which can help in solidifying the rule of law and democracy (Brahm, 2007).

Second, because of the more narrative way of trying to find the truth, truth commissions have the ability to focus on the broad context, like structural and institutional factors, in which the perpetrations have taken place (Thoms, Ron & Paris, 2010). Third, finding the truth can in itself be a therapeutic action that can help an individual with psychological healing, and thus it can ameliorate reconciliation (Roth-Arriaza & Mariezcurrena, 2006). The truth can help restoring the dignity of victims or survivors, which in its turn can provide psychological healing. TCs give a forum to victims and survivors, which can increase their psychological wellbeing (Kritz, 1996). Finally, adherents of the moderate approach argue that TCs are more effective as a deterrent than HRTs, because it discredits the perpetrators (Brahm, 2007).

Adherents of the moderate approach see HRTs as a good mechanism to achieve justice. However, they argue that HRTs ignore the political reality and legal constraints. As a result, they can jeopardize the regime by allowing spoilers to mobilize and strengthen (Stedman, 1997). This can impede reconciliation, which they perceive as the number one moral duty of a government in a transitional situation. Adherents of the moderate approach see amnesties as a way a transitional society can work towards reconciliation while keeping in mind the political reality, but that still undermines the accountability of perpetrators (Olsen, Payne & Reiter, 2010). Amnesties do not condemn human rights violations, and are thus seen as not just enough by the moderates.

Critics of the moderate approach state that TCs are not effective enough in the establishment of a rule of law, or in destroying a culture of impunity (Olsen, Payne & Reiter, 2010). Besides, the risk of spoilers remains present, as (potential) spoilers could react negatively to inquiries into the past (Stedman, 1997). Finally, the fact that 'the truth' in TCs is more narrative makes it also more subjective and non-factual. Accordingly, 'the truth' could thus be manipulated by the winning party, which could cause a feeling of injustice with the losing party (Thoms, Ron & Paris, 2010). This thus could have the potential to increase the feeling of wanting revenge.

Implementing TCs as a mechanism for transitional justice can have a considerable effect on the freedom of media within a post-conflict society, for it increases the **institutionalization** and the

capacity of the media. TCs are implemented in post-conflict societies to search for the truth of what happened during the conflict, and hold perpetrators accountable for their actions to a certain extent (Thoms, Ron & Paris, 2010). Searching for the truth can be a therapeutic process that can help in establishing the reconciliation within post-conflict society (Roth-Arriaza & Mariezcurrena, 2006). When findings of TCs are being spread through the media, dialogue and reconciliation can be evoked through a collective memory (Laplanche & Phenicie, 2009). This collective memory is therefore being **institutionalized**. Furthermore, just like with the HRTs, reconciliation, accountability, and the rule of law can influence the freedom of media within post-conflict society in a positive manner, because it creates a feeling of safety. In short, the out-group should no longer be viewed as the enemy one has to be afraid of or has to do harm to, and the cost-benefit analysis of committing crimes likely changes. This all aids the process of the **institutionalization** of the media, which could cause a safer environment for journalist, and a freer media climate.

Also, just as with the implementation of HRTs, a TC can be made into a media event. It is essential for the success of a TC to be covered by the media through different channels, and thus becoming a media event. A media event can function as training for the weak media within a post-conflict society, in order to build their **capacity** (Krabill, 2007). Like previously stated, this will increase the economical stability and technical **capacity** of the media. Therefore, **capacity** building in combination with the **institutionalization** of media can enhance the freedom of media within a society, because of the demand and the capacity to cover this demand.

2.4.4. Holistic approach

Adherents of the holistic approach argue that one single transitional justice mechanism cannot address the difficulties of transitioning societies and governments after they have had a period of human rights abuses and/or conflict (Olsen, Payne & Reiter, 2010). Because there are many problems like the large number of victims, an inadequate legal system and a society that has been traumatized, one single transitional justice mechanism will always address just one single aspect in society and neglecting or worsening other aspects ([ICTJ], 2010).

HRTs to prosecute the perpetrators usually only affect a small number of perpetrators (basically breaking only the tip of the iceberg). Adherents of the holistic approach state that these HRTs can be viewed as political revenge if it is used in isolation. The holistic approach would combine HRTs with TCs or amnesties, to avoid accusations of political revenge (Olsen, Payne & Reiter, 2010). Furthermore, according to proponents of the holistic approach, TCs in isolation are also not sufficient, although necessary, to address the difficulties in a society after atrocities; TCs are then merely words (ibid.).

Adherents of the holistic approach argue that there is not one combination of transitional justice mechanisms that is most effective in all situations; the combinations of transitional justice mechanisms have to fit specific situations ([ICTJ], 2010). However, they do state that it is necessary to keep in mind that the individual should be the central actor within transitional justice processes. Therefore, truth telling and accountability are also necessary aspects of the mix of transitional justice mechanisms (Olsen, Payne & Reiter, 2010).

Critics of the holistic approach state that the holistic approach, with the ideal combination of transitional justice mechanisms, can never be realized and is an approach that was initiated merely to get funds for research (Hamber, 2002).

The implementation of the holistic approach can have beneficial effects on the status of the freedom of media within post-conflict society. The holistic approach advocates for the implementation of multiple transitional justice mechanisms. Because the effects of one transitional justice mechanism will not undermine the effects of another transitional justice mechanism that is implemented simultaneously, the holistic approach, so multiple transitional justice mechanisms, potentially has the most effect on the freedom of media within post-conflict society of the four approaches. In this logic, the more transitional justice mechanisms are implemented, the more beneficial effects they have on the status of the freedom of media within post-conflict society.

2.4.5 Predictions

On basis of the four approaches that I addressed in the previous part, I can hypothesize which of these transitional justice mechanisms is the most effective, and which is the least effective (see Figure 1). Following the theories regarding the approaches, I can deduct the following hypotheses:

H2: The implementation of amnesties as a transitional justice mechanism has the smallest positive effect on the freedom of media within a post-conflict society in comparison to the implementation of human rights trials, truth commissions, or multiple transitional justice mechanisms.

H3: The implementation of multiple transitional justice mechanisms has the largest positive effect on the freedom of media within a post-conflict society in comparison to the implementation of only one transitional justice mechanism.

H4: The implementation of human rights trials or truth commissions as a transitional justice mechanism has an equally large positive effect on the freedom of media within a post-conflict society, this effect is smaller than the effect of the implementation of multiple transitional justice mechanisms, but larger than the effect of the implementation of amnesties as a transitional justice mechanism.




Figure 1: Expected effects

3. Data & Methods

To test the hypotheses formulated in the theoretical chapter, this research will use quantitative methods. This approach will allow us to test whether transitional justice mechanisms can improve the status of the freedom of media within a post-conflict society, and which of the transitional justice mechanisms has the largest impact. In this chapter a description of the data and an elaboration of the specific methods that will be used will be provided.

3.1. Dataset

The dataset that will be used in this research is the Post-Conflict Justice Data Set (www.justice-data.com). This dataset provides the data for research that is aimed to set forth the ways that post-conflict societies have dealt with wrongdoings that are related to the past conflict (Binningsbø, et al., 2012). The dataset includes all extra systemic (colonial), internal and internationalized internal conflicts from 1946-2006, with at least 25 annual battle-related deaths. It also includes records of trials, truth commissions, reparations, amnesties, purges, and exiles. However, within this research only trials, truth commissions, and amnesties will be addressed, since these are the mechanisms that belong to the four contrasting approaches to transitional justice outlined in the previous chapter.

The dataset allows us to avoid several biases often found in research on transitional justice. First, by including multiple mechanisms, this research deals with the methodological errors that are often found in studies that solely address one transitional justice mechanism. When solely addressing one transitional justice mechanism, it could be that the researcher measures some external effect rather than in the transitional justice mechanism itself, such as contextual factors of the society. Second, the dataset includes 118 countries from all over the world, therefore excluding a regional and selection bias that is often found in qualitative or small quantitative studies.

The unit of analysis in the study is set as the post-conflict peace period: *‘the period lasting up to five years after the termination of an internal armed conflict’* (Binningsbø, et al., 2012, p.4). The post-conflict peace period has been coded in this way, to include all transitional justice processes that were implemented within five years after the termination of a conflict. This five-year period is set to make sure that the transitional justice processes are influencing the immediate post-conflict period (Binningsbø, et al., 2012), and is in accordance with the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2007 and their definition of conflict (Harbom, 2007). If one country has had multiple episodes of conflict, it could thus be coded multiple separate times as a part of the dependent variable. The complete dataset has an N of 357. The dataset only includes transitional justice processes in which the reference sources have explicitly mentioned: *‘the name of the rebel group, rebel leader(s), dates of conflict, crimes under evaluation or some other information that makes us certain about which conflict the process relates to.’* (Binningsbø, et al., 2012, p.5). All transitional justice processes that did not mention these sources, are thus not included within this the dataset and this thesis.

To test the hypotheses, a score will be given to the change of freedom of the media within the post-conflict societies, which is made up by the difference between the score at the year of the

occurrence of the transitional justice processes, and the score five years after that (in case of no transitional justice process, the score at the end-year of the conflict, and the score five years after the conflict has ended are used). To construct this variable, the data of Freedom House on the Freedom of the Press will be used, which includes the period from 1994 until 2014. This will be a ratio variable ranging from -25-25. However, because this data does not overlap completely in years, the data will be filtered to the years in which information is available for both variables: 1994-2006. The filter will be put on the year of the end of a conflict within the post-conflict peace period. After applying the filter, the N is set on 136.

In order to test hypothesis 2, a variable on the level of democracy will be created and added to the dataset. This variable is constructed through the data of Polity IV, which has data on the polity of 167 countries for the years 1946-2013. This data will cover the whole period included in this research: 1994-2006².

3.2. Method

In order to answer the research question, simple and multiple linear regression analysis will be used. Regression analysis is used to predict the value of the dependent variable under the influence of one or more independent variables (Field, 2009). Sir Francis Galton was the first to use the term regression analysis in 1877 in a study about peas, and the term means ‘traced back to’ (Weisberg, 2014). Multiple linear regression analysis means that there are multiple predictor (independent) variables in a model. This means that it predicts the effect of the first predictor, controlling for the other predictors (or holding the other predictors constant). Therefore, predictions regarding which TJ mechanism can influence the freedom of media in a post-conflict society and how strong this influence is can be made by sign multiple linear regression analysis.

This research uses linear regression analysis because it can test and predict to what extent the score on the different approaches (X) can influence the score on the change in the status of the freedom of media (Y). Methods that use a linear relation are preferred within social sciences because they are easier to interpret. In addition, it is usually more robust than more complex methods, as little changes within the data do not significantly affect the parameters, and, it will become clear from the analysis if a linear model does not fit the data (Lammers & Pelzer, 2009).

In this study, the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method of regression analysis will be used. This method tries to explain as much as possible to leave as little as possible to coincidence (ibid.). Because regression analysis uses linear models, the OLS is necessary to define the linear model that best fits the data. The following linear regression equation can be made within simple regression analysis:

$$Y_i = b_0 + b_{yx}X_i + e_i$$

Within this equation b_0 is called the intercept, which is the starting level of Y for every individual. The b_{yx} is called the slope, and refers to the regression coefficient of Y on X or the inclination the

² The Polity IV project is a project initiated by Ted Robert Gurr in the 1960s, and is a commonly used dataset in political science studies.

equation makes. The e_i represents the error score, which takes into account random deviations that we cannot explain. The i refers to the observed individual. The first part of the equation represents the part that we can explain on basis of our prediction, while the second part represents the unexplained part. We can only estimate the b_0 and the b_{yx} when we have a lot of scores, so multiple individuals, on both the Y and the X. The distance from the linear equation to the observed scores is the error score. Figure 2 shows the equation graphically via a scatterplot.




Figure 2: Regression Analysis of Y on X

Critics of regression analysis state that the use of proxies to define a variable can be misleading and over-simplified. They state that using proxies to represent reality is impossible and leads to conclusions that are rather artificial. However, in this research the use of proxies to define variables is limited, which implies that this criticism will be less present throughout this thesis. Furthermore, the proxies that are used are chosen with care as to represent reality in the best way possible. Only data from respected organizations are used after careful consideration.

Another challenge regarding regression analysis, or more broadly regarding quantitative studies, is the causality problem. It is difficult, even impossible, to establish causality with statistics. Quantitative studies using statistics can find a correlation, or coherence, between two variables, but cannot determine whether it is variable A that influences variable B or the other way around. Furthermore, it could be that there is a variable C that causes the correlation between variable A and B, but that this variable C is not measured (Field, 2009). It is therefore important to draw conclusions from quantitative studies regarding causality with caution.

The '*partialling fallacy*' is another challenge to multiple regression analysis. This means that the researcher puts two highly correlated variables in one model of regression analysis (Gordon, 1968). When two highly correlated variables are put in one model of regression analysis, three problems arise: the found b -s become untrustworthy, the size of the R^2 is limited, and it is harder to estimate the importance of the predictors (Field, 2009). The first problem arises because the standard errors of the b -s will increase, which means that the sample is less likely to represent reality. The second problem arises because two variables will largely account for the same variance of the dependent variable, which means that the second variable does not add much to the explanatory power. Lastly, the third problem is that it is difficult to assess the importance of the different predictors when their explained variance is overlapping, which makes them interchangeable. Multicollinearity exists

when two or more independent variables are highly correlated to one another (ibid.). A perfect collinearity is when independent variables have a correlation coefficient of 1; thus one variable is perfectly correlated to another (ibid.). Two variables that experience perfect collinearity are therefore interchangeable with one another, and do not add to the explanatory power of the model. Within this research this challenge will be addressed by testing the variables on multicollinearity, thus on the extent of their correlation. In case of multicollinearity, the decision can be made exclude a predictor from the model.

Problems can also arise in small-sample analyses, which can comprise the power of the statistical model (Gangestad, Haselton & Buss, 2006). This thesis contains a sample of 136 ($N=136$), and could therefore experience some problems regarding a small sample size. However, there are two rules regarding the minimum sample size when conducting regression analysis (Field, 2009). The first rule applies when you want to test the fit of your entire model (and thus focus on the R^2), while the second rule applies when you want to test the power of the individual predictors within your model (thus focusing on the b-values). Within this research, testing the power of the individual predictors within the model is the central aim, and thus the second rule applies. The rule regarding the sample size when your aim is to test individual predictors is the following: $104 + k$, with the k referring to the amount of predictors (ibid.). This thesis has a total of five predictors (see below), and thus needs a minimum sample size of $104 + 5 = 109$. Therefore, a conclusion on basis of this rule can be made that the N is sufficient, yet minimal, to test the hypotheses. However, the number of observations within this thesis is still far greater than the number of observations often used in qualitative research, which gives this thesis the ability to contribute with new insights regarding the global implementation of transitional justice³.

Furthermore, this study includes all post-conflict peace periods within the years 1994 until 2006, so there has been no selection at all. This means that this research overcomes a case selection bias often found in qualitative studies, for it includes a broad amount of contexts. Selection bias occurs when the researcher selects a specific case for any particular reason, which threatens the external validity (Berk, 1983). Also, this study will be able to generalize the findings, which is often problematic within qualitative studies, for it includes observations about almost the entire population⁴.

Lastly, adherents of qualitative research could state that within quantitative research it is not possible to answer the 'how-question' regarding a correlation (Brady & Collier, 2010). This is a fair critique. However, this research does not aim to explain how the link under investigation (transitional justice mechanisms and freedom of media) works. Instead, it seeks to test the relationship between the two variables. This is an important step in the research process, because before being able to investigate how a link works, it is necessary to establish that there is in fact a link.

³ Note that the research done about transitional justice has been almost all qualitative research.

⁴ The population being post-conflict peace periods within the years 1994 until 2006.

3.3. Operationalization

In the next section the different variables will be set forth, their definition will be given, and elaboration about how they were constructed will be provided.

Freedom of media: this is the dependent variable within this research. In this research, freedom of the media is defined as follows: ‘the difference between the score on freedom of media at the year of the occurrence of the transitional justice process(es), and the score on freedom of media five years later, or the difference between the score on freedom of media at the end year of the conflict, and the score on freedom of media five years later’. In case of multiple transitional justice mechanisms in multiple years, the year of the most recent implemented transitional justice mechanism is used, because at this point all the mechanisms are implemented and could show their effect on society. The bigger the difference, the higher the score on the variable, and the larger the improvement (or deterioration in the negative case) of the status of the freedom of media within a post-conflict society will be. The five-year period has been chosen to make sure that the measurement entails the influence of the implementation of the transitional justice mechanism on the freedom of media. The data from ‘Freedom House’ on the Freedom of the Press have been used for the construction of this variable. The range of the variable is 50 with a minimum of -21, a maximum of 29, a mean of 1.58, and a standard deviation of 9.08 (see Table 1).

Table 1: descriptive statistics for variables freedom of media, democracy, wealth, and level of repression

| | N | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Std. Deviation |
|---------------------|-----|---------|---------|---------|----------------|
| Freedom of media | 136 | -21 | 29 | 1.48 | 9.08 |
| Democracy | 127 | 0 | 10 | 4.18 | 3.59 |
| Wealth | 119 | 65 | 38175 | 2191.89 | 5414.81 |
| Level of repression | 136 | 2 | 14 | 9.71 | 3.19 |

A transitional justice mechanism: the first independent variable. This variable indicates whether one of the three theorized transitional justice mechanisms has been implemented and is defined as follows: ‘the use of one of the three transitional justice mechanisms in a post-conflict peace period’. A post-conflict peace period will have a positive score on the variable an approach when a country has implemented at least one of the three transitional justice mechanisms. This is a dichotomous variable, in which it is possible to score 1; there was a transitional justice mechanism implemented, and 0; there was no transitional justice mechanism implemented. As Table 2 shows, in 46 cases there was a score of 1 (33.8%), in 59 cases there was a score of 0 (43.4%), and in 31 cases there was a missing value (22.8%). Missing values are excluded from the research through listwise deletion. The implementation of a transitional justice mechanism has thus a valid percentage of 43.8%, while the absence of a transitional justice mechanism has a valid percentage of 56.2%.

Table 2: frequency table of variables an approach and no transitional justice mechanism

| | Frequency | Percentage | Valid Percentage |
|-----------------------------------|-----------|------------|------------------|
| A transitional justice mechanism | 46 | 33.8% | 43.8% |
| No transitional justice mechanism | 59 | 43.4% | 56.2% |
| Missings | 31 | 22.8% | |
| Total | 136 | 100% | 100% |

Human rights trials: one of the independent variables. Human rights trials, as favoured by the maximalist approach, are one of the most common transitional justice mechanisms, and it is intended to put war criminals to justice. This variable is defined as follows: *‘the use of human rights trials as a transitional justice mechanism within a post-conflict peace period’*. A post-conflict peace period will score positively on the variable maximalist approach if a country implemented HRTs as a mechanism of transitional justice within five years after the termination of an internal armed conflict. Within the dataset there are 22 cases in which human rights trials were implemented, this represents a percentage of 21%, excluding the missing cases (31; 22.8%), as Table 3 shows.

Amnesties: also one of the independent variables, implementing amnesties as transitional justice mechanism. The variable is defined as follows: *‘the use of amnesties as a transitional justice mechanism within a post-conflict peace period’*. A positive score on the variable amnesties will indicate that a country has implemented amnesties as a transitional justice mechanism within five years after the termination of an internal armed conflict. The most frequently implemented transitional justice mechanism is amnesties, with a score of 30 and thus comprising 28.6%, excluding the missing cases (see Table 3).

Truth commissions: another independent variable, using one of the more known transitional justice mechanisms: truth commissions. This variable is defined as follows: *‘the use of truth commissions as a transitional justice mechanism within a post-conflict peace period’*. To have a positive score on this variable, a case has to have implemented a truth commission within five years after the termination of an internal armed conflict. Within the dataset there are 8 cases in which truth commissions were implemented. The missing cases account for 7.6% of the total cases (see Table 3).

Holistic approach: the last independent variable. The definition is as follows: *‘the use of multiple transitional justice mechanisms within a post-conflict peace period’*. A post-conflict peace period will score positively on the variable holistic approach if a country has implemented multiple mechanisms of transitional within five years after the termination of an internal armed conflict. There are 11 cases of the holistic approach within the dataset. As Table 3 shows, the holistic approach comprises a percentage of 10.5% when the missing cases are excluded.

Table 3: frequency table of variables human rights trials, amnesties, truth commissions, and holistic approach

| | Frequency | Percentage |
|---------------------|-----------|------------|
| Human Rights Trials | 22 | 21% |
| Amnesties | 30 | 28.6% |
| Truth Commissions | 8 | 7.6% |
| Holistic approach | 11 | 10.5% |
| Missings | 31 | 22.8% |

Democracy: the first control variable. This variable is included in the analysis to test whether the effect of transitional justice mechanisms on the freedom of media can be explained by democratization; in other words, that any possible effect of the existence of a transitional justice

mechanism on freedom of the media can be explained by the democratization process that is going on simultaneously. The variable is constructed through the use of data from Polity IV database. Within this database, a score for democracy on a scale of 0-10, in which 10 is the most democratic and 0 is the least democratic is given to the different countries every year. They have been scored on the presence of institutions and procedures that allow citizens to express their opinions about leadership and policies, institutionalized power constraints for the leadership, and civil liberties to all citizens (Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers, 2014). The year of measurement will be five years after a conflict episode end in case of no transitional justice mechanism, or five years after the implementation of a transitional justice mechanism. This choice is not without problems, because it could be argued that countries that implemented a transitional justice mechanism are getting more time than countries that have not implemented a transitional justice mechanism. However, this choice is made because this is the only way to take into account the effect of the transitional justice mechanism. When choosing a measurement point of five years after a conflict episode in all cases, it is possible that a country that implemented a transitional justice mechanism has just implemented the transitional justice mechanism that year. In that case it is unlikely that the transitional justice mechanism has already shown an effect or is very small. The range of the variable is between a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 10, with a mean of 4.18, and a standard deviation of 3.59 (see Table 1). There are 9 missing cases to be found on this variable.

Wealth: the second control variable. There are theories that claim that the wealthier a country is, the more liberal and democratic this country will be (Przeworski, 2000). Therefore, this could have an effect on the freedom of media within a country. To control for this, wealth will be added to the model. The proxy for wealth will be the GDP per capita of a country (in current US dollars), which will be retrieved from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. The moment of measure of the GDP per capita will be at the end of a conflict-period, because it is at that moment that countries have to think about the transitional justice mechanisms that they are going to implement (or not). The definition that will be used is the following: *'the GDP per capita at the moment of the end of a conflict-period'*. The range of this control variable is 38,110 with a minimum of 65, a maximum of 38,175, a mean of 2191.89, and a standard deviation of 5414.81 (see Table 1). This indicates very large differences in GDP per capita in the different post-conflict countries. There are 17 missing cases on the variable wealth. 16 of these missing cases are due to the lack of data on Burma (Myanmar) and one is due to missing on data of Iran.

Level of repression: the next control variable focuses on the past level of repression within a country. The level of repression before the transition could have an effect on the status (and improvement) of democracy, which in its turn can influence the freedom of media in a post-conflict society (Poe, Tate & Keith, 1999). There is the possibility that the statistics will be skewed in cases when a country with a high level of repression shows a lot of improvement (because it does not have to do much), whereas a country with a low level of repression shows just little improvement (because the standard is already higher). This variable will be created through the data from Freedom House on the Freedom in the World. The moment of the measure of the level of repression will be at the end of a conflict-period, because this is the moment when the transition began. The following definition will be used: *'the score of the Freedom in the World at the moment of the*

end of a conflict-period'. The range of this control variable is 12, with a minimum of 2, a maximum of 14, a mean of 9.71, and a standard deviation of 3.19 (see Table 1). A higher score on the variable level of repression means a higher level of repression.

Region: the last control variable is the region where a country is geographically located. There is the possibility that historical patterns and distinctive cultural features influence a country's choice regarding what transitional justice mechanism to implement (Olsen, Payne & Reiter, 2010). Therefore, without controlling for region, a found effect of one of the transitional justice mechanisms might merely represent a regional effect. This control variable will be defined on basis of the UN Macro Geographical Continental Regions. The variable will include the following regions: Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe, and Oceania (UN, 2013). The following definition will be used: *'the region to which the country in which a post-conflict peace period has occurred belongs to'*. The region Asia has the most scores, with a frequency of 63 (46.3%), after which Africa has the most frequent with a score of 55 (40.4%). Europe has a frequency of 10 (7.4%), the Americas have a frequency of 7 (5.1%), and Oceania has the lowest frequency with a score of 1 (0.7%) (see Table 4). This variable will be made into several dummy variables to be able to conduct regression analysis. Dummy variables are variables that are created from a categorical variable. Every category (in this case: Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe, and Oceania) of the original variable is being recoded into a new dichotomous variable, in which code 1 (part of the category) or code 0 (not part of the category) is given. This is used to make it possible to include nominal or ordinal variables such as education, or in this case geographical location, in regression analysis. Regression analysis makes these types of variables difficult to interpret, because it is not possible to say that the variable 'region' increases with a number (Africa is not 1 more than the Americas, etc.), and dummy variables make this possible.

Table 4: frequency table of variable region

| | Frequency | Percentage |
|----------|-----------|------------|
| Africa | 55 | 40.4% |
| Americas | 7 | 5.1% |
| Asia | 63 | 46.3% |
| Europe | 10 | 7.4% |
| Oceania | 1 | 0.7% |
| Total | 136 | 100% |

4. Analysis

Within this chapter the analysis of the data will be provided in order to answer the research question, the sub-question, and to test the hypotheses. In the first section, the descriptive statistics will be provided. In this section, indications of the correlation between the dependent and the independent variables will be put forth. In the second section the regression analysis will be described, and a test of multicollinearity will be performed. Here, the value of the dependent variable under influence of the independent variables will be predicted. I find that the implementation of a transitional justice mechanism directly improves the score on the freedom of media. It is likely that HRTs and TCs are the transitional justice mechanisms that cause this effect.

4.1. Descriptive statistics

To examine the effects of transitional justice mechanisms on the freedom of media, the change over time needs to be examined. Here, I show what these changes in the score of freedom of media are for the different independent variables. This will help in getting a general idea of how the mechanisms compare to one another.

As established in the description of the dependent variable, the mean difference score of the freedom of media is 1.48 (see **Error! Reference source not found.** in the appendix). This means that within all the cases that are included in this study, the freedom of media improved on average with 1.48 points over five years, and thus shows a slight improvement regardless of whether or not a country has implemented a transitional justice mechanism⁵. However, after splitting the data in two –cases that have implemented a transitional justice mechanism, versus cases that have not implemented a transitional justice mechanism– there are reasons to think that implementing a transitional justice mechanism improves the freedom of media. Countries that implemented a transitional justice mechanism experienced an average improvement on their score on freedom of media of 6.02, while countries that did not implement a transitional justice mechanism experienced an average deterioration on their score on freedom of media of -0.78 (see Table 5). This indicates that implementing a transitional justice mechanism in post-conflict societies will improve the status of the freedom of media, while the absence of a transitional justice mechanism will deteriorate the freedom of media.

Table 5: difference in average change of freedom of media by different transitional justice mechanisms

| | Freedom of media |
|-----------------------------------|------------------|
| A transitional justice mechanism | 6.02 |
| No transitional justice mechanism | -0.78 |
| Human Rights Trials | 7.50 |
| Amnesties | 4.87 |
| Truth Commissions | 10.50 |
| Holistic approach | 8.00 |

⁵ A score of 0 would have indicated that there has been no change at all within the five-year period, a positive score will indicate an improvement in freedom of media, and a negative score will indicate a decline in freedom of media.

When looking at the average changes in the scores of freedom of media for the different approaches, all approaches seem to cause a positive change in freedom of media, but the moderate approach seems to bring about the greatest positive change. The claim of the moderate approach that TCs are the most effective transitional justice mechanism seems to be confirmed with an average improvement on their score on freedom of media of 10.50 (see Table 5). This is the greatest improvement of all of the approaches. The holistic approach has an average score of 8.00, which indicates that implementing multiple transitional justice mechanisms also improves the status of the freedom of media within post-conflict societies. The average score of the holistic approach did not differ a lot from the average score of the HRTs, as favoured by the maximalist approach, which is 7.50. Amnesties, as favoured by the minimalist approach, seem to have the least influence, with an average improvement of 4.87 (see Table 5).

4.2. Regression Analysis

This section will provide the linear regression analysis to test the hypotheses in a bivariate and a multivariate way. The simple regression analysis will test the hypotheses in a model with only the predictor variable (independent) and the dependent variable, so bivariate. The multiple regression analysis will include multiple predictor variables (independent) in the model with the dependent variable and the control variables.

4.2.1. Simple regression analysis

This research uses regression analysis because it can test and predict to what extent the score on the different approaches (X) can influence the score on the change in the status of the freedom of media (Y). First of all, a simple linear regression analysis is conducted to test the relation between the difference score on freedom of media and the use of (one of the) transitional justice mechanisms. This bivariate manner of testing hypotheses isolates the effects of a given predictor. The test will tell us how much of the variance in the score on freedom of media could be explained by the use of at least one transitional justice mechanism, and the separate transitional justice mechanisms. In this section a test for multicollinearity is unnecessary, because every model includes solely one predictor.

The first model (see Table 6) tests whether the implementation of one or more transitional justice mechanisms will lead to an improvement of the freedom of media within a post-conflict society. I find that the implementation of at least one transitional justice mechanism significantly increases the score on the freedom of media within post-conflict societies. Model 1 shows the estimates of the regression coefficients; the intercept of the model (the constant) is -0.780, and the slope is 6.801 ($p < 0.001$)⁶. This means that the score on media freedom will increase with 6.801 when the score on the predictor increases with 1 as well. Since the variable 'A transitional justice mechanism' is a dichotomous variable⁷, the intercept of the model can be seen as the mean value of Y ('freedom of media') when the score on the predictor is 0, in this case no transitional justice mechanism. The

⁶ The F-test of this model showed that the predictor variable in the model ('A transitional justice mechanism') is positively correlated with the dependent variable ('Freedom of media'); $F(1)=14.21$, $p < 0.001$.

⁷ A dichotomous or binary variable is a variable that includes solely two categories, for example gender (categories: male or female).

slope represents the mean value of Y ('freedom of media') when the score on the predictor is 1, thus a transitional justice mechanism. When there is no transitional justice mechanism, the average difference score on the freedom of media is -0.780, whereas when there is at least one transitional justice mechanism, the average difference score on the freedom of media is 6.021⁸. In short, on basis of the simple linear regression analysis, there seems to be a significant increase in the freedom of media when one or more transitional justice mechanisms are implemented in post-conflict societies⁹.

Table 6: bivariate linear regression models (*p<0.05; **p<0.01; *p<0.001)**

| | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 |
|----------------------------------|----------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Constant | -0.780 | 0.795 | 1.133 | 1.515 | 1.521 |
| A transitional justice mechanism | 6.801*** | | | | |
| Human Rights Trials | | 6.705** | | | |
| Amnesties | | | 3.733 | | |
| Truth Commissions | | | | 8.985* | |
| Holistic approach | | | | | 6.479* |
| R ² | 0.121 | 0.079 | 0.030 | 0.060 | 0.042 |

Model 2 (see Table 6) tests whether the implementation of HRTs as a transitional justice mechanism influences the improvement of the freedom of media within post-conflict societies. I find that the implementation of HRTs as a transitional justice mechanism significantly increases the score on the freedom of media within post-conflict societies. The intercept is 0.795, and the slope is 6.705 ($p < 0.01$)¹⁰. This means that when HRTs are not implemented as a transitional justice mechanism, the average difference score on the freedom of media is 0.795, while when HRTs are implemented as a transitional justice mechanism, the average difference score on the freedom of media is 7.5¹¹. To conclude, on basis of the simple linear regression analysis, the implementation of HRTs seems to significantly increase the freedom of media within post-conflict societies¹².

The third model (see Table 6) tests whether the use of amnesties as a transitional justice mechanism improves the freedom of media within post-conflict societies. I find that the use of amnesties as a transitional justice mechanism does not significantly increase the score on the freedom of media within post-conflict societies. The intercept of the model is 1.133, and the slope is 3.733 ($p = 0.076$)¹³. This shows that the effect does seem to be in the right direction, but is not strong enough

⁸ -0.780 + 6.801; since the slope represents the increase in the dependent variable when the predictor variable increases with 1. Note that this is the same number that was found in the descriptive statistics.

⁹ The R² of model 1 is 0.121, which measures the explained variance. The R² can take values between 0 and 1, and the higher the R², the bigger the explanatory value of the model. Model 1 thus explains 12.1% of the variance found in the variable 'Freedom of media'.

¹⁰ F(1)=8.867, $p < 0.01$.

¹¹ 0.795 + 6.705

¹² The R² of model 2 is 0.079, which measures the explained variance. Model 1 thus explains 7.9% of the variance found in the variable 'Freedom of media'.

¹³ The F-test of model 3 was also not significant with F(1)=3.216 ($p = 0.076$).

to be able to state that this effect is highly likely to be found in reality. Therefore, on the basis of the simple linear regression analysis, I find no evidence that the implementation of amnesties as a transitional justice mechanism influences the freedom of media within post-conflict societies significantly¹⁴.

Model 4 (see Table 6) tests whether the use of TCs as a transitional justice mechanism improves the freedom of media within post-conflict societies. I find that the use of TCs as a transitional justice mechanism significantly increases the score on the freedom of media within post-conflict societies. The model has an intercept of 1.515, and a slope of 8.985 ($p < 0.05$)¹⁵. This indicates that when TCs are not implemented, a post-conflict society has an average difference score on the freedom of media of 1.515, while when TCs are implemented; a post-conflict society has an average difference score on the freedom of media of 10.5¹⁶. In short, on basis of the simple linear regression analysis, the implementation of TCs as a transitional justice mechanism seems to significantly increase the freedom of media within post-conflict societies¹⁷.

The last simple linear regression model, model 5 (see Table 6), tests whether countries that implement multiple transitional justice mechanisms experience an improvement of the freedom of media within their post-conflict society. I find that this holistic approach towards transitional justice significantly increases the score on the freedom of media within post-conflict societies. The intercept of the model is 1.521, while the slope of the model is 6.479 ($p < 0.05$)¹⁸. When there are less than two transitional justice mechanisms implemented in a post-conflict society, the average difference score on the freedom of media is 1.521, while when there are two or more transitional justice mechanisms implemented, the average score is 8.0¹⁹. To conclude, after conducting a simple linear regression analysis, it seems that the implementation of multiple transitional justice mechanisms significantly increase the freedom of media within post-conflict societies²⁰.

These results tell us that the implementation of at least one transitional justice mechanism in a post-conflict society positively influences the freedom of media within that society. The implementation of amnesties as a transitional justice mechanism, as favoured by the minimalist approach, has the least influence on the improvement of the score on the freedom of media within post-conflict societies, regarding the non-significant effect. Furthermore, TCs seem to have the greatest influence on the improvement of the freedom of media within post-conflict societies,

¹⁴ The R^2 of model 3 is 0.030, which means that merely 3.0% of the variance of the variable 'Freedom of media' can be explained by the implementation of amnesties as a transitional justice mechanism.

¹⁵ $F(1)=6.631$ ($p < 0.05$).

¹⁶ $1.515 + 8.985$

¹⁷ The R^2 of model 4 is 0.060, which means that merely 6.0% of the variance of the variable 'Freedom of media' can be explained by the implementation of amnesties as a transitional justice mechanism. The limited power of the model could be due to the data limitations, since there are solely 8 cases in which TCs are implemented.

¹⁸ $F(1)=4.505$ ($p < 0.05$).

¹⁹ $1.521 + 6.479$

²⁰ The R^2 of the model is 0.042, therefore 4.2% of the variance in the variable 'Freedom of media' can be explained by the use of the holistic approach.

followed by HRTs and the holistic approach. Whether these effects remain after controlling for alternative explanations, I will set forth in the following section.

4.2.2. Multiple regression analysis

After analysing the hypotheses in a single regression analysis, the multiple regression analysis will be conducted in the following part. The multiple regression analysis will test models with multiple predictors, so it can control for other explanations than the hypothesised effects. There will be several models to test the hypotheses.

Before conducting the multiple regression analysis it is important to conduct a test for multicollinearity²¹, which I find no evidence of when the variables 'Level of repression' and 'Democracy' are not implemented simultaneously²². Almost all models do not include the variable 'Democracy', in which case there is no multicollinearity. However, in model 8 and 9 the variable 'Democracy' has to be included to test whether the effect of the transitional justice mechanisms is an indirect effect or a direct effect. The variable 'Level of repression' is therefore excluded from model 8²³. The variables 'Level of repression' and the dependent variable 'Freedom of media' show suspicious multicollinearity diagnostic numbers as well²⁴. However, after looking more closely into the correlation between these two variables, I find that it is unlikely to influence the results significantly, since the correlation is not significant²⁵. A non-significant correlation between two potential multicollinearity variables means that these variables do not correlate strong enough to be considered as multicollinear.

²¹ To detect whether there are collinear variables within the models, the method of Belsley will be used. This method starts from the data matrix of all predictors in the regression model. After the columns of this matrix are standardized (so all sum of squares per column are 1), the sum and squares matrix is calculated. There are a few adjustments on this matrix that lead to the collinearity diagnostics according to the method of Belsley (Lammers & Pelzer, 2009). To test for multicollinearity the condition number will be calculated and interpreted. If the condition number is higher than 30, there is multicollinearity. If the condition number is between 10 and 30, there is reason to look into the correlation between the possibly collinear variables. After establishing a condition number higher than 10, the variables that have variance proportions of which the effect can be explained for over 50% by the line in which this condition number is found, are possibly experiencing multicollinearity (ibid.).

²² The significant correlation between 'Level of repression' and 'Democracy' is theoretically not surprising, because both variables are describing the civil liberties within a country. The higher the civil liberty, the lower the score on 'Level of repression' (less repression), and the higher the score on 'Democracy' (more democracy).

²³ In model 8, the highest condition number has a value of 19.305, and thus is suspicious. The three variables that have variance proportions of which the effect can be explained for over 50% are again the dependent variable 'Freedom of media', and the control variable 'Level of repression', but also the variable 'Democracy'. The correlation between 'Freedom of media', and the control variable 'Level of repression' is not significant, and thus are not problematic. However, the variables 'Democracy' and 'Level of repression' have a correlation of $r(1) = -0.731$, $p < 0.001$, and is thus strongly significant. Also, the dependent variable 'Freedom of media' and the variable 'Democracy' have a significant correlation of $r(1) = 0.216$, $p < 0.05$. The correlation between the dependent variable and 'Democracy', is also not surprising since the freedom of media is one of the factors that a society gets a score on to measure their level of democracy.

²⁴ With condition numbers of 11.844 (model 6), 11.591 (model 7), 11.077 (model 10), 10.666 (model 11), and 10.822 (model 12), that thus lie between 10 and 30.

²⁵ $r(1) = 0.107$, $p = 0.214$ A possible explanation is because the variable 'Level of repression' is created through the score on Freedom in the World of Freedom House, and the variable 'Freedom of media' is created through the score on Freedom of the Press of Freedom House. Freedom House includes different aspects of societies to give them a score on the Freedom in the World, including their score for the Freedom of the Press.

Model 6 (see Table 7) shows that after controlling for the alternative explanations included in this thesis²⁶, there is still enough evidence to state that implementing at least one transitional justice mechanism in a post-conflict society has a positive effect on the status of the freedom of media within that society. All predictor variables together that are included in model 6 correlate with the dependent variable 'Freedom of media'²⁷. The intercept of model 6 is -4.659 with a standard error of 4.843²⁸, which means that when all variables in the model are held constant on their zero value (in this case: no transitional justice mechanism, no wealth, no repression, and in the region Africa²⁹), the mean of the difference score on freedom of media is -4.659.

To test whether the implementation of a transitional justice mechanism influences the freedom of media within post-conflict societies, the contribution of the predictor 'A transitional justice mechanism' needs to be estimated through the regression coefficient b ; the slope. In this model, the slope that belongs to that predictor is 5.670, and is significant ($p < 0.05$), with a SE of 2.341. This means that the mean score of the variable 'Freedom of media' will increase with 5.670 when there is a transitional justice mechanism implemented in a post-conflict society, under the condition that all other variables in the model are constant³⁰.

Furthermore, the standardized regression coefficient beta (β) is often used to make the interpretation of the model independent of the scale of the variables³¹. The β is especially valuable when comparing the relative power of different predictors (so in multiple linear regression analysis). Now the intercept is unnecessary, and the β represents the amount of standard deviations the dependent variable will change when the independent variable changes one standard deviation as well. Standardizing is beneficial when there is more than one predictor in the model, because all effects now have the same scaling unit so they are easy to compare. When trying to determine the relative importance of the predictors, the standardized regression coefficients are preferable.

In model 6, the β of the variable 'A transitional justice mechanism' has a value of 0.348, which means that when this variable changes one standard deviation, the dependent variable changes 0.348 standard deviations. To conclude, despite the control variables there still seems enough

²⁶ Note that simple linear regression models including only the control variables have been ran, but none of the control variables seemed to have a convincingly independent effect on the dependent variable. The only significant effect found in the simple linear regression models is the category 'Americas' of the variable 'Region', which indicates that there is a difference between the regions 'Americas' and 'Africa'.

²⁷ $F(7)=2.370$ ($p < 0.05$).

²⁸ The standard error (SE) indicates to what extent the value will be different in different samples; the higher the SE, the higher the variations across samples. The predictions are stronger if the variations across samples are smaller, for then the predictions will be less dependent on the sample and will probably reflect reality in a more sufficient way.

²⁹ Because the variable 'region' is a dummy variable, the '0 value' is the category that is not included in the model. In this case 'Africa'.

³⁰ Note that one control variable seems to have a significant effect; the region 'Americas' with a b of 9.979 ($p < 0.05$), a SE of 4.694, and a β value of 0.242. This means that the category 'Americas' significantly differs from the reference category 'Africa'.

³¹ Standardizing is to subtract the mean of the variable from all scores on the variable and divide the result by the standard deviation of the variable.

evidence to adopt the statement that implementing a transitional justice mechanism will lead to an improvement of the freedom of media within a post-conflict society.

Table 7: multiple linear regression models 6 & 7 (*p<0.05; **p<0.01; *p<0.001)**

| | Model 6 | | | Model 7 | | |
|----------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|----------|-------------|----------|
| | <i>b</i> | SE <i>b</i> | β | <i>b</i> | SE <i>b</i> | β |
| Constant | -4.659 | 4.843 | | -3.551 | 1.493 | |
| A transitional justice mechanism | 5.670* | 2.341 | 0.278* | 6.395*** | 1.760 | 0.339*** |
| Democracy | | | | 0.628* | 0.249 | 0.235* |
| Wealth | 0.000 | 0.000 | -0.118 | | | |
| Level of repression | 0.347 | 0.467 | 0.096 | | | |
| Region | | | | | | |
| <i>Africa</i> | <i>Ref.</i> | <i>Ref.</i> | <i>Ref.</i> | | | |
| <i>Americas</i> | 9.979* | 4.694 | 0.242* | | | |
| <i>Asia</i> | 2.623 | 2.353 | 0.122 | | | |
| <i>Europe</i> | 2.031 | 3.829 | 0.059 | | | |
| <i>Oceania</i> | 0.145 | 10.227 | 0.001 | | | |
| R ² | 0.167 | | | 0.175 | | |

Model 7 (see Table 7) attempts to test whether the effect of the implementation of a transitional justice mechanism as found in model 1 (see Table 6) is a direct or an indirect effect that can be explained by democratization. I find that the effect of the implementation of a transitional justice mechanism is a direct effect. The predictor variables together have a significant effect on the dependent variable ‘Freedom of media’³². The intercept of model 7 is -3.551 with a standard error of 1.493, which means that when there is no transitional justice mechanism and no democracy, the change in freedom of media will be -3.551 on average.

To test the effect of the implementation of a transitional justice mechanism, the *b* value of the variable ‘A transitional justice mechanism’ needs to be estimated. This *b* value is 6.395 and is significant ($p < 0.001$). This means that the score on freedom of media will increase with 6.395 when there is a transitional justice mechanism, opposed to when there is no transitional justice mechanism, under the condition that ‘Democracy’ is held constant. In this case, the variable ‘Democracy’ does not influence the effect of the implementation of a transitional justice mechanism, and I can therefore state that the found effect is a direct effect. Despite the fact that democracy does not seem to explain the effect that transitional justice mechanisms have on the freedom of media, democracy in itself also influences the freedom of media significantly³³.

When comparing the two predictor variables of model 7, it seems that implementing a transitional justice mechanism has a greater effect than the democratization process that takes place simultaneously³⁴. This is another indication that the effect of implementing at least one transitional

³² F(2)=10.056 ($p < 0.001$)

³³ The variable ‘Democracy’ has a *b* value of 0.628 ($p < 0.05$), with a SE of 0.249.

³⁴ The β for the variable ‘A transitional justice mechanism’ is 0.339, and the β for the variable ‘Democracy’ is 0.235.

justice mechanism in a post-conflict society significantly influences the improvement of the freedom of media within that society in a direct manner.

To get a more robust answer on whether or not the link between the implementation of a transitional justice mechanism and the improvement of the freedom of media is a direct link, I will add a model with the other control variables³⁵ to see what effect will remain. Model 8 (see Table 8) shows that the effect of the implementation of at least one transitional justice mechanism can neither be explained by the democratization process that takes place simultaneously, nor by the alternative explanation concerning wealth or region. The effect of the predictors together on the freedom of media is significant³⁶. The intercept of model 8 is -5.007 with a SE of 2.015. This means that the mean score on the freedom of media is -5.007 when there is no transitional justice mechanism, no democracy, no wealth, and the region is Africa.

The *b* value of the variable ‘A transitional justice mechanism’, which is necessary to test the effect of the variable, has value of 7.845 and is significant ($p < 0.001$). So when all other variables in the model are held constant, implementing a transitional justice mechanism still has a significant independent effect on the dependent variable. The average score on the freedom of media will increase with 7.845 when a transitional justice mechanism is implemented, and all the control variables are held constant (‘Democracy’, ‘Wealth’, and ‘Region’). This is thus an indication that implementing a transitional justice mechanism has a direct effect on the increase of the freedom of media.

Table 8: multiple linear regression model 8 (* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.001$)**

| | Model 8 | | |
|----------------------------------|----------|-------------|----------|
| | <i>b</i> | SE <i>b</i> | β |
| Constant | -5.007 | 2.015 | |
| A transitional justice mechanism | 7.845*** | 2.066 | 0.398*** |
| Democracy | 1.054** | 0.343 | 0.365** |
| Wealth | 0.000 | 0.000 | -0.202 |
| Region | | | |
| Africa | Ref. | Ref. | Ref. |
| Americas | 4.178 | 4.504 | 0.108 |
| Asia | -0.809 | 2.259 | -0.039 |
| Europe | -8.301 | 4.364 | -0.214 |
| Oceania | -3.666 | 9.065 | -0.040 |
| R ² | 0.265 | | |

The level of democracy within a post-conflict country also has a direct significant effect on the change in freedom of media³⁷. However, when comparing the β values, it seems that the effect of the implementation of a transitional justice mechanism is still slightly greater than the effect of the

³⁵ Note that the control variable ‘Level of repression’ is deleted from the models due to possible multicollinearity.

³⁶ $F(7)=4.027$ ($p < 0.01$).

³⁷ The variable ‘Democracy’ has a *b* value of 1.054 ($p < 0.01$), with a SE of 0.343.

democratization³⁸. Concluding, on basis of the linear regression analysis, there is a direct link between the implementation of a transitional justice mechanism and the improvement of freedom of media within post-conflict societies.

Model 9 (see Table 9) tests whether the found effect of the use of HRTs as a transitional justice mechanism (see Table 6) still remains after controlling for the alternative explanations. I find that the effect of HRTs still is positive, as hypothesized, but the effect is no longer significant. All the predictors together in model 9 do not correlate significantly with the dependent variable 'Freedom of media'³⁹. The intercept of the model is -4.711 with a SE of 5.025⁴⁰, indicating that when there are no HRTs, there is no wealth, no repression, and the region is Africa, the mean change of freedom of media will be -4.711.

The effect of HRTs is estimated with its *b* value, which is 4.260 and is not significant (*p* = 0.180). This means that I cannot state with certainty that this positive effect is not based on coincidence. The positive significant effect that was found in model 2 is explained by the control variables in this model. However, since model 9 shows no significant effects, there is a possibility that there is an individual effect of HRTs on the freedom of media, but the limitation of the small *N* within this dataset is too high to show significant effects. Concluding, there is not enough evidence to show that HRTs have a direct positive effect on the level of the freedom of media within a post-conflict society, on basis of this analysis.

Table 9: multiple linear regression models 9 & 10 (p*<0.05; ***p*<0.01; ****p*<0.001)**

| | Model 9 | | | Model 10 | | |
|---------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| | <i>b</i> | SE <i>b</i> | β | <i>b</i> | SE <i>b</i> | β |
| Constant | -4.711 | 5.025 | | -6.467 | 4.946 | |
| Human Rights Trials | 4.260 | 3.149 | 0.179 | | | |
| Amnesties | | | | 2.680 | 2.360 | 0.122 |
| Wealth | 0.000 | 0.000 | -0.099 | 0.000 | 0.000 | -0.068 |
| Level of repression | 0.563 | 0.466 | 0.156 | 0.674 | 0.453 | 0.186 |
| Region | | | | | | |
| <i>Africa</i> | <i>Ref.</i> | <i>Ref.</i> | <i>Ref.</i> | <i>Ref.</i> | <i>Ref.</i> | <i>Ref.</i> |
| <i>Americas</i> | 9.207 | 5.260 | 0.224 | 12.241* | 4.709 | 0.297* |
| <i>Asia</i> | 1.859 | 2.447 | 0.086 | 2.807 | 2.434 | 0.130 |
| <i>Europe</i> | 1.711 | 4.351 | 0.050 | 4.331 | 3.780 | 0.127 |
| <i>Oceania</i> | 4.534 | 10.280 | 0.046 | 2.881 | 10.455 | 0.029 |
| R ² | 0.127 | | | 0.121 | | |

To test what the effect of the implementation of amnesties as a transitional justice mechanism is under the control of the alternative explanations, model 10 (see Table 9) is compiled. I find that the implementation of amnesties as a transitional justice mechanism does not influence the average score on the freedom of media significantly. The predictors that are included in the model do not

³⁸ The β of 'A transitional justice mechanism' is 0.398, and the β of 'Democracy' is 0.365.

³⁹ $F(7)=1.727$ (*p* = 0.115).

⁴⁰ Note that the SE is quite high, which makes the finding less robust.

significantly correlate with the dependent variable 'Freedom of media'⁴¹. The intercept of model 10 is -6.467 with a SE of 4.946⁴², which indicates that when there are no amnesties, there is no wealth, no repression, and the region is Africa, the mean change of freedom of media will be -6.467.

The predictor variable 'Amnesties' has a b value of 2.680, and is not significant ($p = 0.259$)⁴³. This finding was to be expected after conducting the simple regression analysis with only the variable 'Amnesties' in the model also did not show any significant effect. Concluding, on basis of the linear regression analysis it can be stated that amnesties do not influence the status of the freedom of media within post-conflict societies.

Model 11 (see Table 10) attempts to test whether the positive significant effect of TCs found in model 4 (see Table 6) remains after the controlling for the alternative explanations provided in this thesis. I find that the effect of TCs is still positive after controlling for wealth, level of repression, and region, but is not significant anymore. All predictors together that were put in model 11 do not correlate significantly with the dependent variable⁴⁴. The intercept of model 11 is -6.631 with a SE of 4.906⁴⁵, which means that the mean increase of media freedom is -6.631 when there is no truth commission, there is no wealth, no repression, and the region is Africa.

The variable 'Truth Commissions' has a b value of 6.290⁴⁶, and is not significant ($p = 0.105$)⁴⁷. This seems to indicate that the effect of 'Truth Commissions' that was found in model 4 can be explained by the control variables, and thus that there is no direct effect of 'Truth Commissions' on the freedom of the media. However, the small N of 'Truth Commissions' ($N=8$) can be of great influence on these results. The limited N can thus be the limitation that causes the absence of a significant effect. Nevertheless, these results demonstrate that at least part of the effect of TCs on the freedom of media can be explained by wealth, level of repression, and/or region. Of the control variables, the level of repression and region seem to have the most influence when looking at their relative power, and even seem to have a stronger effect than the implementation of TCs⁴⁸. To conclude, there is not enough evidence to demonstrate that TCs have a direct positive effect on the level of the freedom of media within a post-conflict society, on basis of this analysis.

⁴¹ $F(7)=1.637$ ($p=0.136$).

⁴² Note the high SE, which indicates a not very robust finding.

⁴³ Note that the only significant b value in model 11 is the b value that corresponds with the category 'Americas' within the variable 'Region' ($b = 12.241$, $p < 0.05$), indicating that there is a difference in the region 'Americas' as opposed to the region in the reference category ('Africa') regarding their average change in freedom of media, on the condition of holding all other predictors in model 11 constant.

⁴⁴ $F(7)=1.861$ ($p=0.086$).

⁴⁵ Again the SE is quite high, possibly because of the limited N of the dataset.

⁴⁶ With a SE of 3.835, and a β value of 0.174.

⁴⁷ Note that the only significant b value in model 12 is the b value that corresponds with the category 'Americas' within the variable 'Region' ($b = 10.311$, $p < 0.05$), indicating that there is a difference in the region 'Americas' as opposed to the region in the reference category ('Africa') regarding their average change in freedom of media, on the condition of holding all other predictors in model 12 constant.

⁴⁸ The β value of the variable 'Level of repression' is 0.205, the β value of the region 'Americas' is 0.251 and significant ($p < 0.05$).

Table 10: multiple linear regression models 11 & 12 (* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$)

| | Model 11 | | | Model 12 | | |
|---------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| | <i>b</i> | SE <i>b</i> | β | <i>b</i> | SE <i>b</i> | β |
| Constant | -6.631 | 4.906 | | -6.375 | 4.963 | |
| Truth Commissions | 6.290 | 3.835 | 0.174 | | | |
| Holistic approach | | | | 3.042 | 3.602 | 0.097 |
| Wealth | 0.000 | 0.000 | -0.046 | 0.000 | 0.000 | -0.055 |
| Level of repression | 0.741 | 0.447 | 0.205 | 0.745 | 0.452 | 0.206 |
| Region | | | | | | |
| <i>Africa</i> | <i>Ref.</i> | <i>Ref.</i> | <i>Ref.</i> | <i>Ref.</i> | <i>Ref.</i> | <i>Ref.</i> |
| <i>Americas</i> | 10.311* | 4.843 | 0.251* | 10.750* | 5.123 | 0.261* |
| <i>Asia</i> | 2.396 | 2.395 | 0.111 | 2.252 | 2.435 | 0.104 |
| <i>Europe</i> | 4.198 | 3.748 | 0.123 | 3.667 | 3.967 | 0.107 |
| <i>Oceania</i> | 5.277 | 10.229 | 0.054 | 5.015 | 10.347 | 0.051 |
| R ² | 0.136 | | | 0.115 | | |

The last model, model 12 (see Table 10), tests whether the effect of the implementation of multiple transitional justice mechanisms that was found in model 5 (see Table 6) remains after controlling for wealth, level of repression, and region. I find that the found effect of the implementation of multiple transitional mechanisms is still positive, but lost its significance. All predictors of model 12 together do not show any significant correlation with the freedom of media⁴⁹. The intercept of model 13 is -6.375 with a SE of 4.963, which indicates that the average score on media freedom will increase with -6.375 when there is no holistic approach, no wealth, no repression, and the region is Africa.

The predictor variable ‘Holistic approach’ has a *b* value of 3.042⁵⁰, and is not significant ($p = 0.401$)⁵¹. This finding seems to indicate that the effect of the variable ‘Holistic approach’ that was found in model 5 can be explained by the control variables in model 12. However, the limitations of the dataset regarding the small N could contribute to the non-significance of the effect. These results show that at least part of the effect that was found in model 5 is because of the effects of the control variables. When comparing the variables, it is clear that the effect of implementing multiple transitional justice mechanisms is considerably smaller than the effect of the level of repression and region⁵². The conclusion can be made that there is not enough evidence to state that the implementation of multiple transitional justice mechanisms have a direct positive effect on the level of the freedom of media within post-conflict societies.

⁴⁹ $F(7)=1.545$ ($p = 0.164$).

⁵⁰ With a SE of 3.602, and a β value of 0.097.

⁵¹ Note that the only significant *b* value in model 13 is the *b* value that corresponds with the category ‘Americas’ within the variable ‘Region’ ($b = 10.750$, $p < 0.05$), indicating that there is a difference in the region ‘Americas’ as opposed to the region in the reference category (‘Africa’) regarding their average change in freedom of media, on the condition of holding all other predictors in model 13 constant

⁵² The β value of the variable ‘Level of repression’ is 0.206, the β value of the region ‘Americas’ is 0.261 and significant ($p < 0.05$).

4.3. Findings

These findings show that hypothesis 1 (*'The implementation of at least one transitional justice mechanism has a direct positive effect on the freedom of media within a post-conflict society'*) can be confirmed. I find that there is a direct positive effect of the implementation of a transitional justice mechanism and the freedom of media within a post-conflict society. The democratization process that occurs simultaneously is also positively linked with the freedom of media within a post-conflict society, but this is separate from the effect of the implementation of a transitional justice mechanism. Therefore, I can adopt hypothesis 1; the theorized link between the implementation of transitional justice mechanisms and the freedom of media seem to be accurate.

These findings show that the hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 that were deducted in the theoretical framework of this thesis cannot be confirmed. From the simple linear regression analysis it can be deducted that TCs have the largest impact on the status of the freedom of media within post-conflict societies. Second is the implementation of multiple transitional justice mechanisms, as preferred by the adherents of the holistic approach. HRTs have a similar effect to the implementation of multiple transitional justice mechanism, while amnesties do not seem to have a significant effect at all.

The multiple linear regression analysis, however, shows that there is a direct effect of the implementation of a transitional justice mechanism on the freedom of media within post-conflict societies, but the separate approaches cannot be confirmed. The favoured transitional mechanisms as stated by adherents of the maximalist-, minimalist-, moderate-, and holistic approach all do not show a significant effect after controlling for wealth, level of repression, and region. Therefore, it is not possible to accept hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 on the basis of this analysis. Further research with a larger dataset should look into this.

More specifically, hypothesis 2 (*'The implementation of amnesties as a transitional justice mechanism has the smallest positive effect on the freedom of media within a post-conflict society in comparison to the implementation of human rights trials, truth commissions, or multiple transitional justice mechanisms.'*) cannot be confirmed since there is no evidence that the implementation of amnesties as a transitional justice mechanism have a positive effect on the freedom of media within post-conflict societies. Amnesties did show the least effect of all the tested mechanisms. Therefore, I cannot confirm hypothesis 2.

Hypothesis 3 (*'The implementation of multiple transitional justice mechanisms has the largest positive effect on the freedom of media within a post-conflict society in comparison to the implementation of only one transitional justice mechanism.'*) can also not be confirmed, because there is only limited evidence that the implementation of multiple transitional justice mechanisms positively effect the freedom of media in post-conflict societies. Furthermore, the limited evidence that I find indicates that TCs are the most effective in positively influencing the status of the freedom of media within post-conflict societies. Therefore, I cannot adopt hypothesis 3.

Hypothesis 4 (*'The implementation of human rights trials or truth commissions as a transitional justice mechanism has an equally large positive effect on the freedom of media within a post-conflict society, this effect*

is smaller than the effect of the implementation of multiple transitional justice mechanisms, but larger than the effect of the implementation of amnesties as a transitional justice mechanism.’) also cannot be confirmed, for the same reason as hypothesis 3 cannot be confirmed; there is limited evidence that the separate transitional justice mechanisms have a positive influence on the status of the freedom of media within post-conflict societies. The influence of TCs, HRTs, and the implementation of multiple transitional justice mechanisms seem to have a similar effect on the freedom of media within post-conflict societies. This means that I cannot confirm hypothesis 4.

5. Conclusion and discussion

The last chapter of this thesis will provide the conclusion regarding the findings of this research. This research aimed to investigate whether empirical data shows that there is an actual relation between transitional justice mechanisms and the freedom of media within post-conflict societies, and which transitional justice mechanism is most effective for that purpose. In order to investigate this, a research question and sub-question were formulated. The conclusions will therefore be made by answering this research question and the sub-question, with the findings of this thesis. Furthermore, a discussion about the questions that remained or arose during the research will be provided, and suggestions for further research will be given. I found that implementing a transitional justice mechanism positively influences the status of the freedom of media within post-conflict societies between 1994 and 2006. However, due to data limitations it is unclear which transitional justice mechanism has the greatest influence on the freedom of media within post-conflict societies.

5.1. Conclusion

As stated above, the research question and the sub-question will be used to formulate the conclusions of this research. First, the research question will be answered, and second, the sub-question will be answered.

5.1.1. *The influence of transitional justice processes on the freedom of media*

Freedom House (2014) established that the state of the freedom of the media in the world is at the lowest point in over a decade, while it is an essential aspect of a *de facto* democracy. Democracy is often seen as one of the major goals of transitional justice processes, but there is little systematic evidence that the transitional justice processes actually improve democracy within (post-)conflict societies. Since democracy is a very broad concept and is multi-interpretable, this thesis focused on one crucial aspect of democracy that is highly important to address because of its deteriorating state in the world: freedom of media. Therefore, the observed gap in scientific literature and demand for evidence from the practitioner's world, led me to formulate the following research question that guided this thesis:

To what extent do transitional justice processes influence the freedom of media in post-conflict societies?

In the theoretical chapter of this research I tried to develop a complete understanding of theories regarding transitional justice and the freedom of media, and thereafter creating a synthesis of the two concepts combined. Here, I theorized that there is a link between transitional justice processes and the freedom of media in post-conflict societies. Transitional justice mechanisms can improve the **institutionalization** of the media and increase its **capacity**, which are both essential for a free media climate. The primary aim of this research was to establish whether this link exists in reality. To test this link, I used simple and multiple linear regression analysis on the Post-Conflict Justice Dataset in combination with data from Freedom House and Polity IV.

Within the analysis chapter of this thesis, I found that both on basis of the simple linear regression analysis and on basis of the multiple linear regression analysis, the implementation of one or more transitional justice mechanisms significantly increases the freedom of media within a post-conflict society. This means that despite the control measures that were adopted in this research, a link between transitional justice mechanisms and the freedom of media was found. However, some might argue that the link between transitional justice mechanisms and the freedom of media would go through the democratization process (transitional justice mechanisms improve the democracy, which improves the freedom of media).

In this thesis I have argued that this link does not go through the democratization process, since a lot of the aspects of the democratization process requires a free media climate to be fully considered as democratic. Here, amongst others one can think of elections that need a free media climate to be fair and fully competitive, also a free media climate is necessary to provide a platform for all political parties and groups without discriminating. Analysis with multiple regression analysis showed that there is a link between the democratization process and the freedom of media, but this link is independent and does not explain the relation found between the transitional justice mechanisms and the freedom of media. To conclude, transitional justice processes influence the freedom of media within post-conflict societies. This cannot be explained through the democratization process that takes place simultaneously.

5.1.2. Different Transitional justice processes and the freedom of media

Besides the overall research question, I have formulated a sub-question to establish whether the different transitional justice mechanisms influence the freedom of media differently. This sub-question was the following:

To what extent is there a difference between the influence that trial processes, amnesty processes, truth commissions, or a combination of transitional justice processes have on the freedom of media in post-conflict societies?

I found no conclusive answer on this sub-question, for the multiple linear regression analysis did not show any significant effects of the separate approaches. This could be due to the data limitations, and should be investigated in further research with a larger dataset.

Within the theoretical chapter of this thesis I have elaborated on four different approaches: the maximalist approach, the minimalist approach, the moderate approach, and the holistic approach. All these approaches state that another transitional justice mechanism will be most effective in achieving its goals. The maximalist approach favours HRTs as transitional justice mechanism, because it promotes accountability, which will improve the reconciliation. Furthermore, it can serve as a deterrent for possible future atrocities, for the cost-benefit analysis is adjusted. Finally, it promotes the establishment of a strong rule of law.

I argued that implementing HRTs as a transitional justice mechanism will have a positive impact on the freedom of media within a post-conflict society. The analysis showed that on basis of the simple linear regression analysis, there seems to be a link between the implementation of HRTs

and the increase of freedom of media within a post-conflict society. However, the multiple linear regression analysis, which includes control variables, did not show any significant results of the influence HRTs have on the improvement of the freedom of media within a post-conflict society. This means that on basis of this analysis, the initial found link between the implementation of HRTs and the improvement of the freedom of media within a post-conflict society can be explained through the control variables (region, wealth, and level of repression). It should however be noted that the lack of significant results regarding the influence of HRTs on the improvement of freedom of media within a post-conflict society could be due to the small N⁵³. The effect was in the right direction, so future research with a larger sample size could investigate whether the influence of HRTs on the improvement of media freedom within post-conflict societies indeed is minimal.

I argued that amnesties, as favoured by the minimalist approach, have a minor positive impact on the freedom of media within post-conflict societies. The minimalist approach favours amnesties as transitional justice mechanism, because it can provide negotiations to take place, which is important to deal with potential spoilers. These negotiations with all parties are important for institution building and the establishment of a rule of law that is respected by everyone. This way, society can move on as a whole, and reconciliation will be achieved. The simple linear regression analysis and the multiple linear regression analysis did not show any significant results of the effect of amnesties on the increase of the freedom of media within a post-conflict society. However, the found effect was in the right direction. This could imply that the sample size within this thesis was too small to find significant results⁵⁴, and further research with a larger sample size could investigate this. Concluding, on basis of this research, we cannot conclude that amnesties have a significant influence on the improvement of the freedom of media within post-conflict societies.

I argued that TCs, as favoured by the moderate approach, have a positive effect on the improvement of the freedom of media within post-conflict societies. The moderate approach favours the use of TCs as a transitional justice mechanism, because it promotes accountability, but does not forget to take into account the context of the (post-)conflict society. Furthermore, finding the truth is a therapeutic action in itself, which can restore the dignity of victims and survivors and ameliorate reconciliation. Finally, it can serve as a deterrent for possible future atrocities. Within the analysis, the simple linear regression analysis found that TCs do have a significant effect on the improvement of the freedom of media within a post-conflict society, despite the few cases of TCs within the dataset (N=8). However, the multiple linear regression analysis did not found enough evidence to state that TCs affect the improvement of the freedom of media within a post-conflict society, and thus the initial effect might be due to the control variables. Concluding, on the basis of this research I cannot state that TCs have an indisputable positive effect on the status of the freedom of media within post-conflict societies.

⁵³ Note that none of the control variables showed significant results as well, which also highlights their lack of explanatory power in the models.

⁵⁴ Note that the N for the variable 'Amnesties' was the highest (N=30) from all the different transitional justice mechanisms.

There seemed to be a regional effect regarding the implementation of TCs as a transitional justice mechanism; the region Americas in comparison to the region Africa seemed to explain the effect of TCs on the freedom of media within post-conflict societies. It could be that TCs are thus relatively more often implemented in the region Americas than in the region Africa, and that the improvement of the freedom of media is greater in the region Americas than in the region Africa. However, it should be noted, that this could be due to the limited sample size, so further research should investigate whether TCs affect the improvement of the freedom of media within a post-conflict society with a larger sample size.

The last approach, the holistic approach, favours the use of multiple transitional justice mechanisms, because one single transitional justice mechanism cannot address the difficulties of transitioning societies and governments after they have had a period of human rights abuses and/or conflict. Because there are many problems like the large number of victims, an inadequate legal system and a society that has been traumatized, one single transitional justice mechanism will always address just one single aspect in society and neglecting or worsening other aspects. Adherents of the holistic approach argue that there is not one combination of transitional justice mechanisms that is most effective in all situations; the combinations of transitional justice mechanisms have to fit specific situations.

I argued that the implementation of multiple transitional justice mechanisms would provide for the greatest positive effect on the freedom of media within post-conflict societies. The simple linear regression analysis showed that the implementation of multiple transitional justice mechanisms has a considerable positive effect on the improvement of the freedom of media within post-conflict societies. However, the multiple linear regression analysis, which included the control variables, did not find significant results regarding the implementation of multiple transitional justice mechanisms on the improvement of the freedom of media within post-conflict societies. The link did seem to go in the right direction, but was limited in power. Just like with the TCs, within the model of the holistic approach there seemed to be a regional effect of the Americas in comparison to the region Africa. To conclude, on basis of this research there did not seem to be a link between the implementation of multiple transitional justice mechanisms and the improvement of the freedom of media within post-conflict societies. This should, however, be investigated on basis of a larger sample in future research.

Another important observation that stems from this research is that the control variables that tested the alternative hypotheses did not seem to influence the improvement of the freedom of media within post-conflict societies significantly. There was only one significant result found in the control variables, namely the region 'Americas' significantly differs from the region 'Africa'. This could imply that the region Americas has a greater improvement of the freedom of media than the region Africa. Differences between other regions were not found.

Striking also was the limited impact, or even negative impact, of the control variable wealth on the improvement of the freedom of media within post-conflict societies. However, this could be due to the already higher level of freedom of media within the wealthier countries, which makes it more difficult to improve this freedom of media for these countries. When a country starts with a low

level of freedom of media, even minor improvements will be identified easier through the increase score of the level of freedom of media than when a country starts with a free media climate. This logic follows that the higher the status of the freedom of media (as a starting point), the less margin for improvement there is.

The level of repression was positive but not significant in any of the models. This means that there is an indication that the more repression at the end of a conflict, the higher the improvement in the freedom of media in post-conflict societies. However, it seems that the level of repression at the end of the conflict does not affect the amount that the freedom of media can improve thereafter, since there are no significant results. This might be counterintuitive, because the more repression, the less free the media climate. However, this explanation might follow the same logic as the explanation for the possible negative relationship between wealth and freedom of media; when countries experience more repression, there is more margin for improvement than when countries experience less repression. When interpreting this data, one should keep in mind that the dependent variable represents a difference score in the freedom of media, not a static score on a given point in time. The fact that these findings were not significant could be due to the relatively small sample size of the data.

To conclude, from this research I cannot conclude that one of the transitional justice mechanisms is without a doubt the most effective in improving the status of the freedom of media within post-conflict societies. It is clear, however, that amnesties have the least influence on the improvement of the freedom of media within post-conflict societies. HRTs and TCs seem to be best at explaining the improvement of the freedom of media within post-conflict societies, but this cannot be stated with absolute certainty, because the multiple linear regression models did not show any significant effects.

5.2. Discussion

After conducting this research, some questions remain and some others have arisen. In this part I will elaborate on those questions and give suggestions regarding further research on this topic.

5.2.1. Data and methods

The conclusions of this thesis have to be interpreted with some caution, because several obstacles have arisen during the research. First of all, there were some limitations to the data, especially to the sample size. The N of the eventual dataset was 136, which is minimal but sufficient, as argued in the data section of this thesis. However, the amount of cases of the individual predictors was a bigger challenge. The largest amount of cases on one of the predictors (amnesties) was 30, while the smallest (TCs) was even as low as 8 cases. The small amount of cases will limit the explanatory power of the individual predictors, which makes it harder to find significant results. However, this research includes the majority of the post-conflict peace periods that occurred between 1994 and

2006, which means that this research has a high external validity⁵⁵, and it should therefore be considered in the transitional justice scholarship.

Furthermore, within this thesis I have established that there is a link between transitional justice mechanisms and the freedom of media within a post-conflict society. However, the question about the causality remains. It is difficult, even impossible, to establish causality with quantitative statistics, or more specific, with regression analysis. This research has found a coherence between the two variables, but cannot be certain that it is actually transitional justice mechanisms influencing the freedom of media, or if it is the freedom of media influencing the transitional justice mechanisms (a more free media climate causes the demand for transitional justice mechanisms to grow).

Another question that remains unanswered throughout this research is how the found link between transitional justice mechanisms and the freedom of media actually works. The 'how-question' cannot be answered through quantitative research. However, this was not the aim of this thesis, since it is necessary to first establish whether there is a link, before investigating how the link works.

This thesis includes three transitional justice mechanisms: HRTs, TCs, and amnesties. A comparison can thus be made between these three mechanisms, but the effects of other transitional justice mechanisms are not included in this research. I have based the choice on the inclusion of these three transitional justice mechanisms on basis of the most common approaches to transitional justice, but I acknowledge that there are other transitional justice mechanisms that might also influence the freedom of media within post-conflict societies. Evidently, nothing can be said about the impact of these mechanisms that were not included in this thesis.

Finally, the option that there are other variables influencing the link between transitional justice mechanisms and the freedom of media should be taken into account. The possibility of a spurious relationship or an indirect relationship cannot be ruled out. Even though it is not theoretically likely, the findings have to be interpreted with caution.

5.2.2. Further research

Further research could draw on the findings within this thesis, while answering the questions that remain. First of all, to establish which transitional justice mechanism is most effective in improving the freedom of media within post-conflict societies (sub-question of this thesis), the same research with a larger dataset should be executed. This means that the dataset should include a larger period of time than this research (1994-2006), because this dataset is not a sample of the research population. More robust conclusions can then be drawn.

Secondly, further research should include more transitional justice mechanisms than the ones included in this research. The influence of other transitional justice mechanisms is unknown, for they were not included in this research. It could well be that there are other mechanisms, or

⁵⁵ External validity is the extent to which the results of a research can be true in other cases and thus in reality (Field, 2009).

combinations of mechanisms, that influence the freedom of media within post-conflict society as well or even more.

Finally, to answer the question of how the found link between transitional justice mechanisms and the freedom of media within post-conflict society works, it is important to conduct qualitative research. This could be for example through case studies or process tracing, and will also bring us closer to an answer on the question of causality.

Appendix

Syntax

**** filter set****

```
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1.  
USE ALL.  
COMPUTE filter_$=(conflict_end > 1993).  
VARIABLE LABELS filter_$ 'conflict_end > 1993 (FILTER)'.  
VALUE LABELS filter_$ 0 'Not Selected' 1 'Selected'.  
FORMATS filter_$ (f1.0).  
FILTER BY filter_$.  
EXECUTE.
```

****descriptives****

```
fre democracy.
```

**** creating dummies for region ****

```
do repeat dummy = africa americas asia europe oceania  
/value = 1 to 5.  
if (region = value) dummy = 1.  
if (region <> value) dummy = 0.  
end repeat.
```

```
fre region africa americas asia europe oceania.  
fre wealth.
```

**** creating the variables ****

```
RECODE no_approach_2 (1=0) (0=1) (-99=-99) INTO an_approach.  
VARIABLE LABELS an_approach 'an approach'.  
EXECUTE.
```

```
fre no_approach_2 an_approach.
```

```
COMPUTE no_approach_2 = 0.  
IF (trial = 0) AND (amnesty = 0) AND (truth = 0) no_approach_2 = 1.  
IF (trial = 1) OR (amnesty = 1) OR (truth = 1) no_approach_2 = 0.  
IF (trial = -99) no_approach_2 = -99.
```

```
COMPUTE holistic_approach = 0.  
IF (trial = 1) AND (amnesty = 1) holistic_approach = 1.  
IF (trial = 1) AND (truth = 1) holistic_approach = 1.  
IF (amnesty = 1) AND (truth = 1) holistic_approach = 1.  
IF (trial = 1) AND (amnesty = 1) AND (truth = 1) holistic_approach = 1.  
IF (trial = -99) holistic_approach = -99.
```

```
fre trial truth amnesty.  
fre no_approach_2.
```


fre holistic_approach.

****Simple regression analysis ****

model 1

```
REGRESSION
/MISSING LISTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT media_freedom
/METHOD=ENTER an_approach.
```

model 2

```
REGRESSION
/MISSING LISTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT media_freedom
/METHOD=ENTER trial.
```

model 3

```
REGRESSION
/MISSING LISTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT media_freedom
/METHOD=ENTER amnesty.
```

model 4

```
REGRESSION
/MISSING LISTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT media_freedom
/METHOD=ENTER truth.
```

model 5

```
REGRESSION
/MISSING LISTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT media_freedom
/METHOD=ENTER holistic_approach.
```

model 6

```
REGRESSION
/DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N
/MISSING LISTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN TOL
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT media_freedom
/METHOD=ENTER an_approach wealth repression americas asia europe oceania.
```

** individual predictors with control variables **

model 7

```
REGRESSION
/DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N
/MISSING LISTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN TOL
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT media_freedom
/METHOD=ENTER an_approach democracy.
```

model 8

```
REGRESSION
/DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N
/MISSING LISTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN TOL
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT media_freedom
/METHOD=ENTER an_approach democracy wealth americas asia europe oceania.
```

model 9

```
REGRESSION
/DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N
/MISSING LISTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN TOL
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT media_freedom
/METHOD=ENTER an_approach wealth americas asia europe oceania.
```

model 10

```
REGRESSION
/MISSING LISTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN TOL
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
```

```
/NOORIGIN  
/DEPENDENT media_freedom  
/METHOD=ENTER trial wealth repression americas asia europe oceania.
```

model 11

```
REGRESSION  
/MISSING LISTWISE  
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN TOL  
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)  
/NOORIGIN  
/DEPENDENT media_freedom  
/METHOD=ENTER amnesty wealth repression americas asia europe oceania.
```

model 12

```
REGRESSION  
/MISSING LISTWISE  
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN TOL  
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)  
/NOORIGIN  
/DEPENDENT media_freedom  
/METHOD=ENTER truth wealth repression americas asia europe oceania.
```

model 13

```
REGRESSION  
/MISSING LISTWISE  
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN TOL  
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)  
/NOORIGIN  
/DEPENDENT media_freedom  
/METHOD=ENTER holistic_approach wealth repression americas asia europe oceania.
```

*model with all variables *

```
REGRESSION  
/MISSING LISTWISE  
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN TOL  
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)  
/NOORIGIN  
/DEPENDENT media_freedom  
/METHOD=ENTER trial amnesty truth holistic_approach wealth repression americas asia europe oceania.
```

control variable models

```
REGRESSION  
/MISSING LISTWISE  
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN TOL  
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)  
/NOORIGIN  
/DEPENDENT media_freedom  
/METHOD=ENTER wealth.
```

```
REGRESSION
/MISSING LISTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN TOL
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT media_freedom
/METHOD=ENTER repression.
```

```
REGRESSION
/MISSING LISTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN TOL
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT media_freedom
/METHOD=ENTER americas asia europe oceania.
```

```
REGRESSION
/MISSING LISTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN TOL
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT media_freedom
/METHOD=ENTER africa asia europe oceania.
```

```
REGRESSION
/MISSING LISTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN TOL
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT media_freedom
/METHOD=ENTER africa americas europe oceania.
```

```
REGRESSION
/MISSING LISTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN TOL
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT media_freedom
/METHOD=ENTER africa americas asia oceania.
```

```
REGRESSION
/MISSING LISTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN TOL
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT media_freedom
/METHOD=ENTER africa americas asia europe.
```

** different approaches without control variables **

```
REGRESSION
/MISSING LISTWISE
```

```
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN TOL
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT media_freedom
/METHOD=ENTER trial amnesty truth holistic_approach.
```

```
REGRESSION
/MISSING LISTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN TOL
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT media_freedom
/METHOD=ENTER an_approach trial amnesty truth holistic_approach.
```

** complete models

```
REGRESSION
/DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N
/MISSING LISTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN TOL
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT media_freedom
/METHOD=ENTER an_approach trial amnesty truth holistic_approach wealth repression americas asia
europe oceania.
```

```
REGRESSION
/DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N
/MISSING LISTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA COLLIN TOL
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT media_freedom
/METHOD=ENTER trial truth amnesty holistic_approach wealth repression americas asia
europe oceania.
```

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