

Winter in Sudan, Spring in Libya

Unraveling the conditions under which the League of Arab States is willing to intervene in its member states when human rights are violated.

Master Thesis International Relations

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Foreword

Graduating always sounded magical to me. After years of preparation, the world would be at my feet. Graduating, however, is a verb, not a noun. In my case, it has been an iterative process of inspiration and motivation, a period of distraction and a kick under my behind by my conscience.

During research, moments occurred – let us call it the early morning hours - that I sifted through the index pages of books, looking for a clue or a sign to lead me to *the* answer. Not the most intellectual approach, although on one particular Friday morning in the University library of Amsterdam where I had gazed at the canals for days, there it was, on page 420: ‘compliance *see* internalization of culture’. Wendt’s Social Theory of International Politics in (1999) a second revived my hope of finishing my thesis in time.

Clearly, not even Wendt could provide a straightforward answer to my research question, as that would just be plagiarism – a death sentence in the land of students and scholars alike. And well, as you will notice after having read this thesis, it actually resulted useless. “Relevance?” was my tutor’s recurring and rhetorical question. Nonetheless, it was moments like these, that made me believe I could do it.

Yet what the verb graduating does not cover, is that it is not an individual process. Wendt’s (1999) conception of identity, which is constructed and sustained in interaction between the Self and the Other, reminded me that I could not have graduated without the trust of my partner Niels (thank you for your optimism), my friends (Dennis, thank you for teaching me not to take it all too seriously) and my parents (‘Is it already finished?’ means they think you actually *can* finish it). A special thank you for my cousin Thari, you are an angel. Last but certainly not least I would like to thank my supervisor, Anna van der Vleuten (‘I am glad you came by. Although you could have done that six months ago as well.’), without whose support I would not be writing these words. Maybe exploring Wendt was not that useless after all.

Thank you all for your patience and the effort to read my work. For those frightened by the excessive paperwork in front of you, I will not hold it against you if you skip the pages in between the introduction and the conclusion. Of course, secretively I hope you will not do so. After all, it took me quite some time to write it. But now I can say, it is finished. And, I will let you in on a last secret, I must admit that I have enjoyed writing it.

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1. Arab engagement in regional affairs

1.1 Unexpected support for intervention

'The Arab League has officially requested the UN Security Council to impose a no-fly zone against any military action against the Libyan people' (Aljazeera, March 12th 2011). These were the words that (now former) Secretary General Amr Moussa spoke at a press conference of the League of Arab States on March 12th 2011. Just days before, Muammar Gaddafi's government forces had violently attacked peaceful protestors who had taken the streets in the Arab Spring revolution to demand the protection of human rights (BBC, 2011). The no-fly zone was intended to shield the Libyans from air strikes operated by their government, as the latter attempted to oppress the popular demonstrations by means of dropping aerial bombs (Aljazeera, 2011). The news was striking. Although the violation of the human rights of Arab citizens by their own governments was not novel to the region, the League's history was clear of interventions in the internal affairs of its member states. The Darfur conflict for example, in which hundreds of thousands of Sudanese died as a result of government violence in 2004-2005, is possibly the most well-known and dramatic case of human rights violations on the League's territory. During this conflict, the Arab League abstained from support for intervention by the United Nations (UN) and even downgraded the gravity of the situation by openly denying the death of thousands of victims (Sudan Tribune, 2004).

Interventions in the name of safeguarding human rights by actors from within the Arab region, such as the League's support for a Libyan no-fly zone, have been studied far less than interventions by external actors. The latter undertakings have shown to be complicated expeditions. US-led Operation Iraqi Freedom serves as the clearest example of an intervention meant to force-feed western-style politics to Arab citizens. It failed miserably. Despite many international efforts to democratize the region and to protect human rights of the Arab people, most Arab states still face corruption, a lack of free elections and oppression of freedom of speech. Not a single member of the Arab League guarantees human rights protection, despite external pressure to do so. As Patten has stated eloquently, ¹ enforcing democracy – and as such the protection of basic human rights - on Arab soil, is not the best way forward:

'Democracy seldom arrives without external pressure, but Western countries should heed Robespierre's warning about "armed missionaries" – bringing democracy to Islamic countries on the tips of precision-guided missiles' (Patten, 2003).²

The lack of effective interventions from outside makes a focus on intervention from within, i.e. at the regional level, an interesting approach. Comprising twenty-two countries situated in North and

¹ From 1999 to 2004 Chris Patten served as the United Kingdom's European Union commissioner for external relations.

² *'La plus extravagante idée qui puisse naître dans la tête d'un politique est de croire qu'il suffise à un peuple d'entrer à main armée chez un peuple étranger, pour lui faire adopter ses lois et sa constitution. Personne n'aime les missionnaires armés; et le premier conseil que donnent la nature et la prudence, c'est de les repousser comme des ennemis'* (Eds. Bouloiseau, M., & Lefebvre, G., & Soboul, A., 2007).

Northeast Africa and Southwest Asia, the Arab League counts as the most important regional international organization (RIO) of the area. It remains unclear to what extent and why the Arab League is willing to support intervention in its region.³ Under which conditions does the Arab League stand up for the principles that are so passionately fought for by its people? To what extent is the League of Arab States willing to support intervention in its member states when those states violate human rights of their own citizens? Why did the Arab League request UN intervention in Libya, whereas it had refused to support UN intervention in Sudan? These questions will be addressed in this thesis. The rest of this chapter will provide a short background for the two cases this study will investigate, it will highlight the problem that the remainder of this thesis will discuss, provide a theoretical framework for this research as well as give a short summary of the methodology and the expected results.

1.2 Sudan 2004: The Arab League remains silent

Since becoming independent from Britain and Egypt in 1956, Arab League member state Sudan has been in a perpetual state of civil war, characterized by a divide between north and south. When in 1972 president Jaafar Numeiri agreed to give the southern region autonomy, the domestic situation remained relatively stable until war broke out again in 1983. The conflict between the northern based government and the southern rebels of Sudan's People's Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/A) would prove to be Africa's longest lasting conflict. In January 2005, both parties signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, establishing a ceasefire combined with the allocation of power and wealth between north and south Sudan (BBC, 2012). As will be shown later, the negotiations leading to this agreement ignited the conflict in Darfur between the Bashir government and the SPLM/A rebels. In 1989, current president Omar Bashir had seized power in a coup against the government of Sadiq al-Mahdi, which had been officially elected by the Sudanese people. Bashir replaced parliament and the political parties by the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation, of which he would become chairman. Suppressing every form of opposition, Bashir has won every presidential election since, causing the international community to accuse him of electoral fraud. Taking the lead in the grave violations of human rights in the Darfur conflict, the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague has warranted his arrest for several crimes against humanity and war crimes. The first allegation referred to 'murder, extermination, forcible transfer, torture and rape' and the second to 'intentionally directing attacks against a civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities, and pillaging' (ICC, March 2009).

When the UN Security Council issued military and economic sanctions against the Sudanese government and against president Bashir personally in 2004 and 2005, the Arab League refused to support the interventions (BBC, 2012). Later the League also condemned the ICC's charges against president Bashir and refused to extradite him (BBC, 2012). The League had left the Darfuri in the cold.

1.3 Libya 2011: Given the green light

In contrast to the lack of intervention from the Arab League in Sudan, the RIO did intervene when the human rights of the people in Libya were violated. Granted full membership in 1953, Libya has

³ That is, leaving the Israeli-Palestine conflict aside.

traditionally formed part of the Arab League. However, President Muammar Gaddafi's response to the popular uprisings in February 2011, which resulted in thousands of deaths of peaceful protestors, has spurred the regional organization to ban Libya from participating in its meetings (BBC, 2011). The only other case of a member state being kept out of the regional organization is Egypt, who was expelled between 1979 and 1989 in reaction to president Sadat's meeting and the following peace agreement with Israel – a delicate topic in the Arab world. One of the most interesting of recent changes in international relations with regard to the Arab region was, therefore, this apparent change in attitude of the Arab League towards one of its own members. Apparently, interference in the League's member states' internal affairs is no longer unthinkable. This change was intensified on the 12th of March 2011, when the League publicly beseeched the UN Security Council to endorse a no-fly zone above Libya in protection of the Libyan citizens (UN, 2011). The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Arab League's member states have thereby explicitly referred to the violation of human rights, postulating that Gaddafi's regime no longer possesses legitimacy towards its people (Le Monde, 2011). This demonstrates a clear-cut position of the Arab League on the behavior of the Libyan government, which makes for an interesting case with regard to the organization's willingness to support intervention in domestic affairs of its member states on grounds of defending human rights. Meanwhile the League's stance on intervention in Libya has been amended considerably, condemning military action on Libyan territory. Nonetheless, this does not change that initially the Arab League requested external interference and was willing to support violation of the sovereignty principle. Its positive attitude towards an intervention in Libya gave NATO the green light to execute the no-fly zone. Even though NATO is not dependent on the Arab League's permission to intervene, the latter's support certainly strengthened the legitimacy of the intervention. The Arab League is known for its ineffective decision making due to continuous disagreements between its member states. Nonetheless, the League was close to a unanimous decision this time, with Syrian and Algerian ministers as the only two expressing doubts (Le Monde, 2011).

1.4 The puzzle

The Arab League's support for intervention in Libya is remarkable. Non-interference in the domestic affairs of member states is a crucial part of the sovereignty principle that the Arab League laid down in its founding document; the Pact of the League of Arab States (1945). The Pact explains that the League of Arab States was established in 1945 in order to:

'(...) draw closer the relations between Member States and co-ordinate their political activities with the aim of realizing a close collaboration between them, to safeguard their independence and sovereignty, and to consider in a general way the affairs and interests of the Arab countries' (Pact of the League of Arab States, 1945).

To interfere with another country's domestic affairs, could – and most probably would – provoke retaliation of the 'host' country. Moreover, how is the endorsement of an intervention in its member states' domestic affairs justified on the grounds of safeguarding human rights, when none of the Arab League's regimes protect these rights? The Freedom House (2011) rates only four member states - Comoros, Kuwait, Lebanon and Morocco - as 'partly free', whereas the other eighteen are

indicated to be 'not free' at all. Why would non-democratic states want to put their own security at risk for others in the name of a principle they do not adhere to themselves? Despite the large number of regimes in the region that continuously violate human rights of their people, there are few instances where fellow Arab governments stepped in motivated by the protection of those citizens and thereby infringing the sovereignty of the other state. Hence, the moments that they do intervene in each other's business become even more interesting.⁴

However, beside referring to independence and sovereignty, the organization of states extended its principles fairly recently with the Charter on Human Rights (2004), which established a committee of experts to look into the state of affairs concerning protection of human rights in the member states (Reinalda, 2009). This in itself is already interesting, due to the League's member states' bad reputation regarding the matter while simultaneously adhering to an organization that explicitly addresses human rights principles as a core part of its policy: 'Citizens have the right to live in an intellectual and cultural atmosphere that reveres Arab nationalism and cherishes human rights' (Arab League, 2004, article 35). Despite this negative image and after years of preparation including seven rounds of ratifications, the document was finally ratified by the member states on May 24, 2004 (Reinalda, 2009).⁵

Despite the League's emphasis on national sovereignty, in 2011 it turned to the UN to request a no-fly zone over Libya to protect human rights (Reuters Africa, 2011). Although this is in line with the Charter on Human Rights, it had not taken the League more than three months to act in contradiction with the new-born Charter, when it did not accept economic sanctions or international military intervention in Sudan in 2004 (BBC, 2004). Against Bashir, the League took no serious measures and refused to extradite the president to the International Criminal Court were he to travel through its region. Put more clearly, he was granted a free travel pass on Arab League territory and diplomatic relations with Sudan were continued. Why did the Arab League ask for foreign intervention in the Libya case, while refusing its approval of sanctions against Bashir just a few years earlier, even though human rights were violated on a massive scale in Darfur?

It could be argued that when push comes to shove, the League's member states will pursue their own material and geopolitical interests. Charter or no charter, when things get tough, moral principles are left aside. It is therefore necessary to take a look at the interests at stake in both cases. However, by focusing solely on material and geopolitical interests, the ratification of the Charter on Human Rights would be ignored too easily. Why would these states jointly produce such a document if they do not care for it? Therefore, a more comprehensive explanation is needed for the conditions under which the Arab League is willing to support intervention justified by the protection of human rights. Did the member states yield to internal pressure from great regional powers, or rather from external pressure from within the Western world to support or refuse intervention? Or were they influenced by other actors, such as advocacy networks?

1.5 Theoretical framework

To answer the question under which conditions the League of Arab States is willing to support intervention in its member states in order to protect the human rights of its citizens, a broad range of

⁴ It is difficult to establish with certainty the 'real' motives of states. Nonetheless, what matters is that an intervention is justified on grounds of human rights protection.

⁵ The Arab Charter on Human Rights was reprinted in 2005 and finally entered into force March 15th 2008.

literature on regional institutions will be studied to obtain a framework for the Arab League's behavior. Ribeiro Hoffmann and Van der Vleuten (2010) have taken a closer look at interventions of RIOs in the domestic affairs of member states, undertaken to safeguard democracy. They point out an inconsistency in the behavior of RIOs as a response to the violation of democratic principles, as only in some cases these violations were addressed by the regional organization. With the aim of clarifying this tension, Ribeiro Hoffmann and Van der Vleuten (2010) have unraveled the necessary conditions for an intervention to take place:

'(...) the ideational costs of pressure by third parties and the interests of the regional leading power can explain the enforcement of democracy by regional organizations' (Ribeiro Hoffmann and Van der Vleuten, 2010, 737).

These conditions, namely third party pressure and interests of the main regional power, are constrained by a condition of a more constructivist character: 'Third party pressure remains ineffective, however, when there is a clash between regional identities' (Ribeiro Hoffmann and Van der Vleuten, 2010, 737). Their research has focused on case studies dispersed across the contexts of the European Union (EU), South African Development Community (SADC) and Mercosur. This theoretical model of RIO behavior, applied to the cases of Libya and Sudan, will hopefully provide insight into the League's motivations. To assess whether their findings also hold for the Arab League in the case of human rights violations, this research will focus on the conditions established by Ribeiro Hoffmann and Van der Vleuten (2010) under which regional organizations are willing to support intervention. A case in which an Arab League member state violated human rights and in which the League supported intervention must be studied, such as Libya. This should be compared to another case in which a member state violated human rights but where the League refrained from support for intervention; the case of Darfur. The first condition under which regional organizations are willing to support intervention refers to the interests of the regional hegemon, here to consist of Arab League's key players Egypt and Saudi Arabia (Ribeiro Hoffmann and Van der Vleuten, 2010). The second condition concerns compatibility of identities of the third party that exerts pressure and the Arab League itself (Ribeiro Hoffmann and Van der Vleuten, 2010). This third party in question is made up of Permanent Members of the UN Security Council: the United States (US), France, the United Kingdom (UK), China and Russia (see below in tables 1 and 2).

1.6 Qualitative analysis

Because this is a case study of the Arab League's non-intervention in Sudan and their intervention in Libya, this thesis will be based upon qualitative research focusing on textual documents. In addition to the findings of Ribeiro Hoffman and Van der Vleuten (2010) that will be used to construct a theoretical framework for this thesis, other theorization on RIO behavior will be analyzed.

The Pact of the League of Arab States (League of Arab States, 1946) will be studied, together with the Arab Charter on Human Rights (League of Arab States, 2004).⁶ Next to these founding documents, information from official Arab League sources, such as declarations by the member states and reports of summit meetings, will be studied, dependent on the availability of translated documents. In order to gather information on the intervention in Libya that the Arab League supported, as well as

⁶ Due to my lack of understanding of the Arab language, a translation of these documents will be studied.

the international sanctions on the case of Sudan, resolutions of the UN Security Council will also be consulted. The Freedom House provides clear and comprehensive indicators that establish the levels of protection of human rights in a country and will therefore be used in order to rank Libya and Sudan in comparison to other countries in the region. This will be complemented by additional information extracted from the UN, the BBC and the CIA World Factbook.

United Nations Security Council		
Permanent members	Non-permanent members	
2004/2005	2004	2005
China	Algeria	Algeria
Russia	Angola	Argentina
United Kingdom	Benin	Benin
France	Brazil	Brazil
The United States	Chile	Denmark
	Germany	Greece
	Spain	Japan
	Pakistan	Philippines
	Philippines	Romania
	Romania	Tanzania

Table 1. UN Security Council member states in 2004-2005

United Nations Security Council	
Permanent members	Non-permanent members
2011	
China	Uganda
Russia	Japan
United Kingdom	Mexico
France	Turkey
The United States	Austria
	South Africa
	India
	Colombia
	Germany
	Portugal

Table 2. UN Security Council member states in 2011

1.7 Research questions

The main question of this thesis is as follows:

Under which conditions is the League of Arab States willing to support intervention in its member states in order to protect the human rights of its citizens?

It will be attempted to answer this question by answering the following sub-questions in chapters four and five respectively:

- 1. Under which conditions was the League of Arab States willing to support non-intervention in Sudan in 2004 in order to protect the human rights of its citizens?*
- 2. Under which conditions was the League of Arab States willing to support intervention in Libya in 2011 in order to protect the human rights of its citizens?*

As previously stated, in contrast to the RIOs investigated by Ribeiro Hoffmann and Van der Vleuten (2010), the Arab League is by no means an organization composed of countries with a democratic identity. For this reason it is possible that theories do not hold, on which the conclusion of this thesis will elaborate further. If these hypotheses are not (completely) capable of explaining Arab League behavior in the case studies of Sudan and Libya, it will be determined how future research can find the missing piece of the puzzle presented in this thesis.

1.8 Content rest of the thesis

In chapter 2 the study conducted by Ribeiro Hoffmann and Van der Vleuten (2010) will be examined more thoroughly and will be put in the context of other research on RIO behavior with regard to interventions. Then, the different concepts that are of importance for the understanding of this topic will be explained. The chapter ends with the hypotheses that follow from this theorization, which will be tested to answer the main question of this thesis. With a focus on the scientific methods of research, chapter 3 will define and measure the variables to test the hypotheses on the cases of Sudan and Libya. It will also justify more explicitly why a case study design and the two specific cases were selected. Chapter 4 will elaborate on the history of the Arab League and provide a profile, in order to enter in chapters 5 and 6 into the case studies of on the one hand Sudan in 2004 where the League refused to support intervention, and on the other hand the League's support for intervention in Libya seven years later. Finally, chapter 7 will draw conclusions with respect to the main question: What are the conditions under which the Arab League is willing to support intervention in a member state when human rights are violated?

2. Explaining (non-)intervention by RIOs

'Torn by strife for the last half century, the Middle East has been the stage for, perhaps, the world's most notorious regional conflicts. It best fits the realist view of international politics, but despite this, it is also an area where international law and organization have played significant roles.' (Nye, 2009, p. 182)

2.1 RIOs play their part

Realist theories acknowledge that states at times grant other political organs, such as (R)IOs, the temporary autonomy to take decisions. Nonetheless, in this view a state never relinquishes its casting vote: when it comes to the crunch, domestic and foreign policies are matters of exclusive national character. In the end, sovereignty prevails. Yet the idea that besides national governments, (R)IOs too meddle in world politics, has gained ground in the field of international relations (IR). A (R)IO is not entirely defined by the power granted by states, but rather possesses a proper amount of capabilities of its own, at least in part independent from the states it comprises (Harders & Legrenzi, 2008).

Why then would states join RIOs and in what way can the latter influence international policy making and shape interactions? To begin with the first question, regional international organizations (RIOs) offer a channel through which state power can be put into practice. The structure it provides for member governments to cooperate on a multilateral basis, is a unique contribution to the workings of the international system and by definition cannot be provided for by states. For example, interference in the internal affairs of colleague member state, through the structures of a regional organization, is perceived less offensive than if it came from one state operating on a unilateral basis (Pevehouse, 2002). Moreover, the institution bears fruit for all the member states, if it provides stability within the boundaries of the organization's direct sphere of influence or strengthens their power vis-à-vis other regions. When compromises are made on an issue or colleague states need financial support, the members are pressed by the organization as a whole to give in a little. Nonetheless, compromises are concessions for the greater advantages membership creates. With regard to the second question, (R)IOs are autonomous because they dictate the opportunities and constraints that states face when cooperating with one and another (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999). IOs have official legislative bodies that can provide dispute settlement, and the IOs consist of professionals that are trained, experienced and in possession of information on a level superseding the states (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999; Haftel & Thompson, 2006).

As Andrew Hurrell reminds his readers, 'historically, the regional preceded the global' (Flemes, 2010). Still, analyzing RIO behavior is to enter new terrain, as fairly little scholarly work has been published so far on non-state actors in comparison to the more traditional subject of the state as an actor. It will be argued in this chapter, however, that by using a variety of theories used primarily to explain state behavior and applying them on RIO behavior, it is possible to generate insight on the workings of the latter as well. Therefore, before studying the mechanisms at work in a RIO, it is important to differentiate between RIOs and international organizations (IOs) in general. Both types of organization are:

'associations established by governments or their representatives that are sufficiently institutionalized to require regular meetings, rules governing decision-making, a permanent staff, and a headquarters' (Shanks, Jacobson, and Kaplan, 1996, p.3).

A *regional* IO poses further restrictions to membership than being or representing a state, with the condition of geographic proximity (Pevehouse, 2003; Ribeiro Hoffmann and Van der Vleuten, 2010). What then defines geographic proximity and as such a region? If we look at the case of Israel, it becomes clear that being physically in the heart of the Middle East and North Africa, it is far from being considered part of the region. There is more to a region than this physical aspect, for states who would like to join a RIO should share a substantial part of the history, culture and language with other members of the organization. In this sense, longstanding political relations and economic interaction contribute to the construction of a region. It is a process of 'building' a shared identity based upon these different elements that together with a shared greater territory contributes to a sense of "regionness". As if it were to anchor the "regionness", rules of accession based upon territory and identity are laid down in the founding treaties and agreements of the RIO (Pevehouse, 2003; Ribeiro Hoffmann and Van der Vleuten, 2010). A third factor that distinguishes a RIO from an IO, next to territory and identity, is the policy areas it exercises its power in. Contrary to an IO, a RIO's field of activity is not confined to one or two matters, such as the ILO's (International Labour Organization) focus on international labor standards. In principle, a RIO can be involved in *all* the affairs that touch upon its members as a whole (Ribeiro Hoffmann and Van der Vleuten, 2010). In this chapter, the question to be answered is as follows: which factors explain RIO behavior? In their contributions to *Closing Or Widening the Gap?: Legitimacy and Democracy in Regional Integration Organizations* (2007), Ribeiro Hoffmann and Van der Vleuten argue that it is not 'just' states that exert pressure on each other in order to effect certain behavior. By uncovering the behavioral mechanisms of different RIOs, the authors provide an understanding of what is required for a RIO to intervene in its member states, for the sake of safeguarding democracy. Weary of rashly pigeonholing the international system's complex reality, an eclectic approach is constructed to generate explanations of RIO behavior, without neglecting the particular contributions of the divergent strands of political theory.

In line with their approach, the purpose of this thesis is not to pick and choose a single theory, but rather examine which theories are most capable of explaining the outcome, by putting four theories to the test. Therefore, the following paragraphs will take a closer look at four different approaches in IR, ranging from constructivist and institutionalist theories to realist understandings of actor behavior on the international scene, and argue how these can be applied specifically on RIOs.

2.1.1 Social constructivism: the role of norms and identity

The first approach put forward by Ribeiro Hoffmann and Van der Vleuten (2010) stresses the importance of values and how over time these can become an integral part of an actor's identity, in this case a RIO. This is based upon the view Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) have formulated on the reasons for states to comply with certain norms and to ignore others. As 'a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity', a norm expresses the values an actor holds regarding to what is important in life (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p. 891). Not only does it take the shape of a

rule for appropriate behavior, but according to this constructivist approach it also contributes significantly to the creation of the actor's identity. The norm so to speak becomes part of the actor's DNA. In addition, others perceive of certain actions as belonging to a particular identity, whereby norms become constitutive of the actor's identity from an outsider's perspective (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). A shared understanding of specific norms, leads to a shared identity. To investigate whether a RIO's identity explains its behavior, as a reflection of the norms it values, the RIO will be analyzed in terms of what it values.

Finnemore and Sikkink describe norms in an evolutionary process of three stages, successively "norm emergence", "norm cascade" and "norm internalization", jointly referred to as the "life cycle of a norm" (1998, p.898). The drive behind the promotion of a norm in the first phase are 'norm entrepreneurs', who strive for others to adopt specific behavior as the norm, being convinced that the norm is right. In the second phase, at the speed of a norm cascade 'states are *socialized* [italics in original] to want certain things by the international society in which they and the people in them live' (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p. 90).

Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) point out how three different factors contribute to the socialization that occurs between the international actors in the phase of norm cascade. First, the need for international legitimacy facilitates norm compliance. Reputational costs weigh heavily on states, so they are careful not to spoil the image they have worked hard to build up. In this sense, the greatest value of international legitimacy originates from domestic legitimacy. Compliance with domestic rules is a measurement for other actors in the international system of the extent to which a people estimates its government to be legitimately in power and therefore let it remain in power. Second, just like individuals, states want to form part of a group and prove this conformity by complying to a norm others – with an identity appreciated by the states that want to belong – adhere to as well. Esteem is seen as the third advantageous factor for norm compliance, as states want to have a positive sense of self-worth and aim for other states to think likewise about them.

When the norm is integrated into daily life in a subconscious manner and its righteousness is no longer questioned, the norm cascade has reached its maximum size. One of the mechanisms that lead to this internalization phase, is the professional training of staff members who play a role in political decision making procedures, because preferences are taught for certain (normative) values of an organization. Repeated behavior and customs make up for the second mechanism producing internalization (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). By this time, the norm entrepreneurs have thus succeeded in convincing many others of the righteousness of the norm, and it becomes universal (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998).

On the international level, the three factors of legitimacy, conformity and esteem contribute to the socialization that results in norm compliance by states. First, just like a state needs to be legitimate in the eyes of its people to exercise power over them, a RIO needs to be regarded legitimate by its member states. If the RIO is not considered to be legitimately in power by its member states, it will not be regarded legitimate by other states or organizations either. Comparable to a state a RIO will not spoil the positive image that it has built up in the past. Because it does not want to damage the legitimacy it earned, a RIO, too, will show norm compliance. Second, the observation that states feel the need to be part of a group indicates that a RIO also experiences conformity. It is a group of states that functions in a greater group of states, i.e. the international community of states, to which it wants to belong. And, just as Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) argue for states, a RIO does not want to be seen as a pariah by its fellow units in the international system,

but rather wants to be esteemed highly. Professional training in international organizations, as well as habit and repeated acts were mentioned as two mechanisms that further strengthen norm compliance by states. A RIO, as a multilateral institution made up by national governments, moves like an actor with its own organization, professional experts and demands within the international structure. It is therefore expected to produce norm internalization in a comparable manner, namely by its professionalization and habits and repeated acts.

Summarizing, political actors are open to adopting norms, because they are sensitive to legitimacy, conformity and esteem. What other actors think of them is important to them, and they feel the need to belong. Then, the actual adoption of norms into an actor's identity, or internalization, is a consequence of professionalization of experts in organizations and the occurrence of repeated behavior in those organizations. There, they grow and learn to belief in the righteousness of the norm. The general hypothesis that can be deduced from this theory, is that when that actor has internalized a certain norm as a part of its identity, it will act according to that norm. In the context of interventions justified on the grounds of the protection of human rights, the hypothesis that follows therefore is:

H1. A RIO will support intervention when human rights are violated by a member state, if it has internalized human rights values as a part of its identity.

2.1.2 Realism: RIOs as puppets of the hegemon

Unlike constructivist thinking, realist theory departs from the assumption that state preferences are given, as opposed to constructed in interaction. States want to survive in the anarchical international system. With regard to international institutions, realists emphasize how national governments will use the RIO merely as an instrument to protect their own interests, only engaging in cooperation to achieve their individualistic goals. The second hypothesis expects that RIOs respond to government pressure meant to protect state interests in the region.

Mearsheimer (2007) and his fellow contemporary realists think of power as a tool to survive in the anarchic international system. Even if states do not necessarily enjoy competing for more power, the lack of an international world order that forces states to obey a set of rules, causes insecurity about other states' intentions and makes states err on the side of safety. Then, the more power a state possesses, the greater its chances to survive. According to classical realists Thucydides (1996) and Morgenthau (1948), on the contrary, to have power is a purpose by itself, with the need for power rooted in human nature. Tool or end, enough or ever more, balanced in great or smaller numbers, what binds all realist together is the assumption that power is at the basis of the workings of the international political community of states.

If it is the power that determines states' behavior, then what gives a state the power to the extent that it becomes the hegemon? What distinguishes a hegemon from other states, is that it wishes not only to survive in this international system, but also wants to maintain its relative position within that same system as the strongest actor. Van der Vleuten and Ribeiro Hoffmann refer to this as the 'geopolitical dimension' (2010, p. 157). This entails that the hegemon aims to protect its sphere of influence and is unwilling to let other actors interfere within that sphere. In this sense, it is a choice to behave like a hegemon (Keohane and Nye, 1977). A hegemon is not per se the absolute ruler of the game, but rather has the highest profile when it comes to the crunch: 'one state [that] is

powerful enough to maintain the essential rules governing interstate relations, and willing to do so' (Keohane and Nye, 1977, p.44). Nonetheless, as Keohane's (1984) account of the hegemonic stability theory underlines, material capabilities are needed, as the main source of state power. These capabilities are supported by socio-economic elements that provide a government the capability to increase its amount of material capabilities: 'Four sets of resources are especially important. Hegemonic powers must have control over raw materials, control over sources of capital, control over markets, and competitive advantages in the production of highly valued goods' (Keohane, 1984, p.32). This is the 'material dimension' that represents the maintenance or increase in wealth and resources (Ribeiro Hoffmann and Van der Vleuten, 2007). Last but not least, an 'immaterial dimension' also matters for the regional power, as it wants to maintain a high esteem by others (Ribeiro Hoffmann and Van der Vleuten, 2007).

When this state-centered theorizing is applied at the level of RIOs, in which states operate not only in a global structure but also in a regional one, a *regional* power that is in control of the rules of the *regional* game surfaces. This regional hegemon can strongly influence the RIO's behavior (Ribeiro Hoffmann and Van der Vleuten, 2010) up to the point where it mostly determines which regional matters qualify for action (Nel and Stephen, 2010). Like the global hegemon, the regional great power does not need to be overwhelmingly dominant in terms of its material and ideational possessions vis-à-vis its fellow RIO members, yet it is dominant *enough* to strongly influence the RIO's behavior and is willing to do so. The result is that the interests of the regional hegemon are protected in the RIO's decision making. In his article on regional leadership, Lemke (2010, p. 319) confirms the causal link between the balance of power and the actions that are chosen at the regional level: 'The balance of the pursued strategy at the regional level seems to depend widely on the relative material and ideational resources of regional powers (...)'. In this realist line of thinking, the expectation arises that the decisions of the RIO are based upon the needs of the regional hegemon, always aimed at the maintenance or enhancement of its relative position in the regional balance of power. From this understanding of the hegemon's interests it can be deduced that it is of importance for the RIO to support intervention when one of these three interests (geopolitical, material or immaterial) is at stake. The use of realist power politics theory then leads to this second hypothesis:

H2. A RIO will support intervention when human rights are violated by a member state, if it is in the interest of the regional hegemon(s).

2.1.3 Transnationalism: the role of non-state actors

Where the previous hypothesis concentrated on the interests of states, it is also crucial to examine non-state actors on the scene. It cannot be ignored that while states have traditionally been put at the forefront in IR, other actors have been given a back seat. Yet globalization has shifted relations among states and other actors, such as non-governmental organizations, IOs, advocacy networks and so forth. Scholars have enriched the field of IR by emphasizing today's influence of non-state actors on international decision-making:

'World politics will not be the sole province of governments. Both individuals and private organizations, ranging from corporations to NGOs to terrorists, will be empowered to play direct role in world politics.' (Nye, 2009, p. 235)

In their article on transnational advocacy networks (TANs), Keck and Sikkink (1998) provide an understanding of the way that non-state actors influence the political agenda of the international system of states and intergovernmental organizations. TANs are defined as: '(...) those actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services' (Keck and Sikkink, 1998, 89). What makes TANs as a specific constellation of non-state actors such an interesting phenomenon, is how the networks use information as a means of power to achieve ends that are not necessarily in the interest - and more often in conflict with the interests - of states. When states fail to accommodate popular demands, TANs come into action. The networks give voice to groups or individuals that face ineffective interaction with their government because of a lack of communication channels or restricted political participation. Surpassing the non-responsive national level, a TAN emerges around a specific issue for which it asks attention on an international level. The interconnection of advocates around the globe creates a momentum of political importance, causing the national government to pay attention to the issue domestically (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). After setting the agenda, TANs affect the official political position that states and organizations adopt on a specific matter as well as their decision making processes. In its most radical phase of impact, TANs shift regional or national policies (Keck and Sikkink, 1998).

Not only does this indicate there are more actors that matter than "just" states, it also shows a different approach to the relationship between the domestic and international spheres of politics (see also Putnam, 1988). TANs operate as *transnational* forces, while at the same time putting pressure on domestic politics. The networks do not possess material power in the same sense that states do, which activates the activists to use other means and methods to achieve their objectives. Keck and Sikkink (1998) suggest four strategies that TANs activate to move between the domestic and international level of politics in order to influence decision-making. First, TANs employ the right story, told by the right people, at the right time: 'information politics' consists of the effective timing and utilization of credible knowledge (Keck and Sikkink, 1998, p. 95). A witness' testimony, for example of physical torture by government officials, is sensitive information that can be called upon to change political opinions. A second strategy, is the use of symbols: an artificial construction of an image that is more vivid and easily grasped by the public than the actual situation itself. As such, a symbol is created by linking certain images strategically to specific situations (see also Edelman, 1996). A third tactic TANs employ, is appealing to other actors that have the power to norm compliance, which TANs cannot do themselves. In several ways, TANs persuade influential state officials with moral arguments, emphasizing the injustice of an issue. Issue-linking for example entails making the topic matter for a state actor by combining it with a matter that the state actor cares for. Shaming is another way, in which the TANs confront the state actor publicly with its acts, holding it accountable and thereby damaging its image. When employing these tactics, TANs attempt to point their arrows from a platform that supports their claims and augments their effects. International organizations and meetings have proven to be useful in that sense (Keck and Sikkink, 1998), as they are attended by powerful actors and often also the media.

The approach of TANs put forward by Keck and Sikkink (1998), has been applied by Van der Vleuten (2005) to the realm of regional organizations specifically. She highlights how a RIO is capable of letting non-state actors bypass the national government and of offering them room for maneuver regionally. A RIO that opens up political space for societal groups on a transnational level and provides them with resources, increases the opportunities for these networks to influence the

political agenda of their national governments to their advantage. Using the four strategies mentioned above, TANs thereby simultaneously exert pressure on the state and transcend the national sphere of control, putting their government 'in pincers' (Van der Vleuten, 2005). Critical voices suppressed within their own authoritarian regimes can find their transnational stage in regional organizations that thereby provide a 'low-cost voice opportunity' (Pevehouse, 2002, p. 523). TANs mobilize to protect the norms they value, while the RIO provides them room for maneuver at the regional level will act on their behalf. This results in the following hypothesis:

H3. A RIO will support intervention when human rights are violated by a member state, if non-state actors with access to the RIO mobilize at the regional level against these violations.

2.1.4 The system level: Self and Other

Just as states function in a system with other states whose behavior has to be taken into consideration, does a RIO not act in a vacuum. It *interacts* within another – global - system of states and organizations that act upon their own sets of ideas and preferences (Wendt, 1999). Consequentially, a theory should widen its scope from the actor – the RIO in this case – it is analyzing, to include the other actors on the scene. The fourth hypothesis therefore takes a closer look at the external factors that play a part in the construction of RIO behavior.

Focusing on RIO behavior, Ribeiro Hoffmann and Van der Vleuten (2007) demonstrate how other actors than the RIO's member states can influence the organization's behavior. When an actor violates certain norms, pressure will be exercised by other actors to restore norm compliance. The authors argue that when third party pressure – i.e. by an actor external to the RIO – is substantial, its chances of making the RIO act according to its wishes, is dependent on two variables.

First, the extent to which an external major power can credibly invoke a threat in the case the RIO does not comply with the former's demands (whether that means support for intervention or a lack thereof), determines whether a RIO will act accordingly. A threat is credible then, because the organization believes the third party will use its material capabilities against it and is more powerful in this sense. This entails the greater powers in the international system matter when it comes to investigating third party pressure.

Secondly, the effectiveness of external pressure depends on the extent to which the identities of the two parties in question match. When the identity of the third party that presses the RIO to act in a certain way is compatible with the identity of the RIO, the pressure will be taken more seriously (Ribeiro Hoffmann and Van der Vleuten, 2007). Because the shared identity stands for norms valued by both parties, the interference will be experienced in the context of a 'normative message' rather than as an isolated act in order to preserve or increase power (Ribeiro Hoffmann and Van der Vleuten, 2007, p. 742). To ignore this message, would be too costly for their relationship, as the actor that has internalized those norms into its identity – the RIO in this case – will be seen as an outlaw to the community that respects the norms and to which it wants to belong. The mechanism behind this external pressure is that of rhetorical entrapment (Schimmelfennig, 2001). The other actor confronts the RIO that breaks the normative rules, by emphasizing the contradiction between the latter's words and deeds. By naming and shaming, the RIO's reputation is damaged, which has negative consequences for its position in the global balance of power.

However, when the identities of both parties do not match, the normative message does not fit into its identity and will therefore not be accepted. If the reasons for inference are not considered

legitimate, there is no impetus to accept intervention. The external pressure will be regarded as a violation of sovereignty. The ideational appeal falls on deaf ears, and rhetorical entrapment results in an ineffective instrument.

Summarizing, the compatibility of identities works as a mechanism of legitimacy. When the third party in question shares the RIO's identity, external pressure will be effective, as the RIO wants to belong and therefore exhibit the same behavior. When the third party does not share the RIO's identity, external pressure will not be effective, for opposite reasons. The final hypothesis that arises from these theories is:

H4. A RIO will support intervention when human rights are violated by a member state, if a third party that shares the same identity as the RIO exerts pressure in favor of regional intervention.

2.2 In conclusion

In this chapter, four hypotheses have been deduced from four approaches posing expectations on RIO behavior concerning member state intervention.

Whereas realism sticks to the ever decisive role of major powers at the international and regional level, transnationalist theories emphasize how non-state actors increasingly meddle in world politics. Social constructivism emphasizes the role of norms and identity, which in a system level approach to IR is combined with balance of power politics. How can these theories help explain the Arab League's refusal to support intervention in Sudan during the 2004 mass human rights violations, as well as its support for intervention in Libya in 2011?

In the next chapter, the hypotheses derived from these theories will be operationalized into measurable concepts, in order to apply the hypotheses to the aforementioned cases. Also, it will be argued why a case study approach is considered the most fruitful method for this enquiry.

3. Methodological choices

In the previous chapter, divergent IR theories have been put forward as possible explanations for the behavior of RIOs. From these theories hypotheses were deduced, aiming to predict under which conditions an RIO supports intervention in its member states. When putting theories to the test, it is crucial not to strive for corroboration of the theory with a straightforward case, but rather to choose a difficult case for the theory (Van der Vleuten, 2001). In this chapter, the methodological design of this thesis will be explained. In the first place, the case study format and the choice for the case of non-intervention in Sudan and the case of intervention in Libya will be addressed. What follows, are the research procedure and the sources used to gather information. Finally, the hypothesis will be further operationalized into measurable concepts.

3.1 A case study format

The most suitable type of research is dependent on the desired results. In this paragraph it will be argued why a case study fits the analysis of this thesis. A large sample size is needed to conduct a large-n study, not in the least because of statistical significance that is necessary to make general statements stretching beyond the actual research data. Such an enquiry can indicate *whether* a theory holds, however not necessarily *why* it holds. For the latter a case study can be more helpful. A case study is a more in-depth examination of one particular case, as compared to the large-n analysis that studies a smaller amount of variables of a larger group of research units. When the goal is to provide statements concerning a large amount of data, a time-consuming case study is an inefficient approach. Moreover, generalizations can be difficult to make, as the statistical validity needed for such generalizations cannot be based on few data (Van Evera, 1997). However, the intention of small-n case studies is not to provide general statements about many other cases, but rather to reconstruct the conditions under which the phenomenon studied will occur. This then allows for predictions regarding other cases with equal background conditions (Van Evera, 1997). The point is not to generalize the results for a larger group, but rather to test the empirical validity of the theoretical statements (Van der Vleuten, 2001).

A thorough investigation examines at least two cases. The conditions under which a phenomenon will occur, as well as those under which a phenomenon will not occur, need to be specified. This is how multiple case studies can be advantageous over a single case study. Because of this advantage, two cases will be analyzed in this thesis.

Another positive characteristic of a case study is that it can diminish the effect of external variables. This is done through choosing cases that vary extremely on the dependent variable (Van Evera, 1997). For this research, the variable 'intervention' has either occurred (intervention = 1) or it has not (intervention = 0). Steady background conditions help rule out third variable influence on the explanation given, so that the independent variable can be recognized more accurately (Van Evera, 1997). In this study, the background conditions of extreme human rights violations are equal in both cases.

In conclusion, a case study is considered the most appropriate method for this thesis, as an in-depth explanation of a small-n study can reconstruct the conditions under which the support for intervention by the Arab League – or rather a lack thereof – occurs. Two cases of the same region will

be studied: in one case intervention has taken place, whereas in the other case no intervention occurred.

3.2 The League of Arab States

The first step to be taken when conducting case study research is to ask which case(s) best fits the purpose of the enquiry and at the same time offer a real test of the hypotheses (Van Evera, 1997). A great variety of RIOs is scattered over the Middle East and North Africa, so why opt for the Arab League? And, what makes the Arab League a RIO?

To begin with the latter question, the Arab League is made up of states that are located in the Middle East and North Africa. Dispersed over two continents that are only just touching, this is all but a naturally defined region. Also, Mauretania on the organization's western border might have little in common geographically with eastern co-member Oman. Nonetheless, as almost all member states border another Arab League member state, they pass the minimum test of geographic proximity.⁷ In comparison, based on this condition US or Russian accession to the organization would be impossible, as these countries are not bordering any Arab country.

The founding document of the organization does not, however, mention location as a condition for membership, except for the following statement: 'Any independent Arab state has the right to become a member of the League' (the League of Arab states, 1945, Article 1). Nevertheless, what actually constitutes an Arab state is not specified. Frequently, when this question arises, a circular argument is provided; 'No universally accepted definition of "the Arab World" exists, but it is generally assumed to include the 22 countries belonging to the Arab League (...)' (Seib, 2005, p. 604). Because of the vague conditions for membership, the founding states were free to accept or deny aspiring member states (An-Na'im, 2001). Interestingly, member Palestine is not an official state, and member state Somalia has had no official governance apparatus in place since 1992 (BBC, 2012).

Turkey is interesting in this respect, as it borders Arab League members Syria and Iraq but has not joined the organization itself, it only has observer status. Even though officially a secular state, like the League's member states the majority of Turkey's inhabitants adhere to the Islamic faith. Iran, which borders Arab League member state Iraq and whose people are predominantly Muslim, is not a member.

No religious reference whatsoever is made in the Pact, in fact, none of the words 'Muslim', 'religion' or 'Allah' appear in the document. Although the Pact does not explicitly mention adherence to the Islam as a necessary condition for accession, it cannot be ignored that the Islam is an official religion in all member states. A shared identity among the Arab League's members as such becomes apparent through a shared religion. Reaching 90% of the entire population, the League has an overwhelming majority of Muslim inhabitants (See Appendix, Table 3). Lebanon has the lowest percentage of Muslim population (63%), whereas Mauretania, Saudi Arabia and Somalia reach a 100% (CIA World Factbook, 2011). A footnote is in order here, as the Islam is experienced and practiced in various ways throughout the region. This is especially visible in Bahrain, with its Sunni majority, and also in Iraq this branch of the Islam is possibly dominant. Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria too have quite a large number of Shi'a adherents, even though they remain a minority there.

⁷ The small islands state of the Comoros make up for quite an extraordinary member, with a roughly estimated distance of 1500 kilometers to the closest other Arab League member (Somalia).

This diversity in religion is, however, still part of the greater unity formed by the Islam (An- Na'im, 2001).

Being 'Arab' does not, however, equal adhering to the Islamic faith. History has spoken of Arab peoples long before the holy Qur'an was written and not all Arabs are Muslims. What constitutes the 'Arabness' of states in this respect is the Arab language spoken by the majority of the states' inhabitants. This linguistic trait of Arab 'regionness' is the least contested. The Arab League states in its Pact that it departs from the Islamic holy book of the Qur'an and its official language is therefore Modern Standard Arabic; 'This Pact has been drawn up in Cairo in the Arabic language on this 8th day of Rabi'II, Thirteen hundred and sixty-four (22 March 1945)' (League of Arab States, 1945, article 20).

Spoken Arabic differs from its written counterpart and even more so, one version of spoken Arabic does not equal the other throughout the MENA region. In order not to over-complicate matters, this thesis will only speak of the Arabic language, referring to Modern Standard Arabic. In all Arab League member states Arabic is the official language, in some cases jointly with other tongues (See Appendix, Table 4) (CIA World Factbook, 2011).

On the basis of this linguistic condition for membership, only a few countries remain eligible for accession to the Arab League, were it to expand. Although Eritrea does not have an official language, Arabic is most commonly spoken, and in Chad Arabic is a national tongue. Even more so, roughly half of the populations in Eritrea and Chad are Muslim and both states border Arab League members, meeting the first three requirements of geographic location, religion and language. This also explains why Turkey is not an ideal candidate, since even though the majority of the population is Muslim, it is a secular state and Turkish is not Arabic. Finally, Israel, where Arabic is a national language and nearly a fifth of the population is Muslim, makes for a special case. Its turbulent and violent history with the Arabic world, rooted in the establishment of the 'Jewish state' itself and with it the negation of the Palestinian nation, causes membership of the Arab League to be a complicated, if not an impossible matter (CIA, 2011).

After religion and language, this leads to the third and last element that contributes to the construction of a shared identity, namely the recurrence of interaction between states over a longer period. The Arab League countries have experienced and solidified a shared history during centuries of political and economic cooperation. This was strengthened by the founding of the Arab League as a regional arrangement. 'Desirous of strengthening the close relations and numerous ties which link the Arab States (...)' (League of Arab States, Preamble).

In short, although the 22 states have developed particular customs, it is unmistakable that at the very least a common language, religion and history form the basis of a pan-Arab identity, upon which the Arab League is based (Khadduri, 1946).

Finally, as indicated in the second chapter, a RIO is involved in several policy issues rather than in just one (van der Vleuten and Ribeiro Hoffman, 2010). With the League's establishment the fields of interest were explicitly mentioned:

'Economic and financial affairs including commercial relations, customs, currency, and questions of agriculture and industry. (...),[c] ommunications (...), [c]ultural affairs, [n]ationality, [s]ocial affairs [and] [h]ealth problems" (League of Arab States, 1945, p. 148-149).

Few policy areas can be excluded beforehand departing from the list above and therefore grants the League room to meddle in all kinds of issues.⁸

The choice to study the Arab League in particular instead of another RIO in the MENA area is quite straightforward; it is the largest one in terms of members and territory. When the organization decides to support (or not support) intervention in one of its member states, its decision carries great consequences. Moreover, the remaining IOs of the MENA region are not a *regional* IO according to the definition applied here, because they consist of actors from a variety of regions as opposed to one region (EURO MED, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership). Organizations such as the Arab Monetary Union (AMU), the Pan Arab Free Trade Area (PAFTA) or the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) can be considered RIOs in terms of geographical proximity and shared identity, but these institutions are rather limited to the issue of economic or monetary integration.

3.3 The cases of the Arab League: Sudan & Libya

To explain the behavior of RIOs, case studies are needed to test the hypotheses. In this paragraph, it is argued that on the one hand the League's refusal to support intervention in Sudan in 2004 and on the other hand support for intervention in Libya in 2011 provide two suitable cases to achieve this goal.

Firstly, Sudan and Libya have shown extreme outcomes on the dependent variable, namely support for intervention by the Arab League and a lack thereof, and therefore make for strong tests of the theories presented in the previous chapter. The violations of human rights in the case of Sudan were of such a cruel sort, that it is impossible to conclude that refusing to support intervention in Sudan was a choice based upon the gravity of the situation.⁹ As one of the most severe cases of human rights violations, the non-intervention in Sudan is therefore chosen as the first case for this study. Libya follows as the opposite case. In this case, the League endorsed intervention in the name of protecting human rights.

Secondly, the consequences of the League's decisions are immense for the Sudanese and Libyan peoples, which make the cases intrinsically important. This is strengthened by the fact that the intervention in Libya appears to be the effect of a recent change in the League's policy and this possibly has effects on future decision-making and international relationships.

Thirdly, little research has been conducted on support of intervention by an RIO or on these specific cases.

The lack of readily obtainable information on these cases puts this enquiry at a disadvantage. The human rights violations in Sudan and Libya and the role of the Arab League in the conflicts have not been studied much, which makes it a complicated case to investigate. Moreover, many documents are written in Arab, causing a dependency on translations and other sources. To gain a comprehensive understanding of the cases, it will be attempted to study documents from both Western and Arab origins, either translated or written in English or French.

To control third variable influence, the background conditions of the cases need to be comparable. Sudan and Libya are *alike* cases, because of their membership in the Arab League and

⁸ Whether the League is actually effective in its efforts is another question, which will not be addressed here.

⁹ The past tense is used here to describe a situation that theoretically has a beginning and an end, to be able to speak of a case and draw conclusions. Clearly, this is not to say the violations of human rights in Sudan have come to an end.

the occurrence of extreme human rights violations. They are different because the cases differ on the dependent variable of intervention. For further research, it would be interesting to determine the background conditions of the cases more in detail with a larger number of cases, in order to carry out a stronger test.

Finally, as the length of this thesis is limited, the number of cases is in fact limited in order to secure the quality of the in-depth analysis of each particular case. As a result, the outcomes of the tests have their constraints with regard to the generalizations that can be made for other cases. More research is necessary to establish certainty concerning the background conditions, in order to limit the influence of other factors not considered in this enquiry.

3.4 Research procedure

Various methods can be applied to test theories with a case study. One is a congruence procedure, for which an expectation is formulated, based on theories and the observance of other possible cases, of what values the case should show on both variables. After the independent and dependent variables have been determined for the case, these are measured in other possible cases. The expected and the observed are then compared. A second form of congruence procedure is available when it is possible to measure the independent and dependent variables several times within a single case, across various occasions and locations. Although this can be a valuable method to gather more data, as it leans towards large-n analysis (Van Evera, 1997), the width of this thesis is too small for such a method.

Process tracing is a second variant to test theories with a case study in which sequences of historical incidents are unraveled through an analysis of cause and effect. If the theory is correct, in one case a comparable sequence should be recognized to that of another case (Van Evera, 1997). This is, however, not the most likely method to generate an understanding of RIO behavior concerning intervention, as there is no fixed time path for decision-making.

A third method is that of controlled comparison, for which two cases are compared on one variable, to be repeated for different variables. Based on variables deduced from theory, the central idea is that a lower *independent* variable of Case A as compared to Case B, should as well entail a lower *dependent* variable in Case A as compared to Case B. If this is indeed the case, the theory passes the test (Van Evera, 1997). Because of the variety of theories with contradictory predictions for RIO behavior, this method remains as the preferred option for this thesis.

Political economist and philosopher John Stuart Mill (Van Evera, 1997) developed research methods that are still frequently used as controlled comparison. His method of agreement compares cases with different background conditions and the same values on the study variable; either the independent, dependent or intervening variable. Departing from different contexts, this is the least strong test of theories as very few elements are equal and therefore it might remain unclear which factors actually affect the situation (Van Evera, 1997). A test becomes stronger with more comparable background conditions, diminishing the chance that an external factor influences the outcome. Mill's method of difference (Van Evera, 1997) examines cases with a comparable context – the background conditions – and a rather different study variable. This study variable is the variable that the researcher attempts to explain, whether this be the independent, dependent or intervening variable. Here, the method of difference will be used to clarify the mechanism causing the dependent

variable – intervention - to occur, and therefore at the same time explain why in some cases it does not occur (Van Evera, 1997).

The general context of the cases is much alike, as Libya and Sudan know the same Arabic-Islamic culture, are found in the same region of North Africa and are members of various regional organizations (GAFTA, the Council of Arab Economic Unity (CAEU) and the Arab League). And, crucial in this research, both cases are notorious for the occurrence of extreme human rights violations, which are part of the background conditions. The more alike the chosen cases are, the less possible other potential causes are that are not considered in the enquiry (Van Evera, 1997).

3.5 Information sources

As indicated above, the topics of this thesis are not extensively covered in primary and secondary literature. To the extent that this type of information is available, the following official documents and statements of the League's member states and the Arab League itself will be studied to test the hypotheses:

- The Pact of the League of Arab States (The League of Arab States, 1945);
- The Arab Charter on Human Rights (The League of Arab States, 2004);
- Additional statements on human rights by the Arab League's hegemons Saudi Arabia and Egypt;
- Agreements of the UN concerning human rights, signed by the Arab League as a whole or its individual members.

The Alexandria Protocol, signed by five Arab countries in 1944, is the agreement that led to the creation of the League of Arab States the following year. As a preparatory document for the Pact of the League of Arab States (The League of Arab States, 1945) and without any substantial differences compared to the Pact, it will be used in the analysis.

As the second hypothesis concerns the role of non-state actors, a different source than the national governments and the RIO will be needed and therefore secondary literature specifically on the Arab League based TANS advocating human rights protection in Sudan and Libya will be examined.

3.6 Defining intervention

To determine whether the Arab League supported intervention, Joseph S. Nye's (2009, p. 166) understanding of the concept, ranging from a minimal to an extensive definition, is useful:

'In its broadest definition, interventions refer to external actions that influence the domestic affairs of another sovereign state (...) and more narrowly to (...) forcible interference in the domestic affairs of another state.'

Low coercion implies that the government of the country in which the intervention takes place still enjoys a certain amount of autonomy in its decision-making. High coercion on the other end of the continuum of intervention indicates a high level of military operations whereby the norm of

sovereignty is ignored (Nye, 2009). These grades of intervention are operationalized for the cases of intervention by the League in Sudan and Libya, from a lesser to a greater extent:

1. Speeches:
The representatives of the Arab League or one of its members, speaking on behalf of the organization, referred to the violation of human rights concerning Sudan or Libya in an official speech.
2. Broadcasts:
The Arab League used (regional) government owned communication channels to express discontent on the violation of human rights concerning Sudan or Libya.
3. Economic aid:
The League provided economic aid to other actors than the government in Sudan or Libya. This can vary from supporting opposition rebels to non-governmental development organizations financially.
4. Military advisors:
The Arab League provided knowledge on military matters to other actors than the government in Sudan or Libya.
5. Support opposition:
The Arab League provided opposition groups in Sudan or Libya with funds, military personnel and/or equipment, or publicly showed support for their cause.
6. Blockade:
The Arab League isolated Sudan or Libya by setting up trade barriers, e.g. by imposing boycotts on petroleum.
7. Limited military action:
The Arab League attacked Sudan or Libya, or backed the opposition's attacks on the governments' forces, e.g. by air attacks.
8. Military invasion:
The Arab League sent military troops to Sudan or Libya with the aim of taking over control by force.

Where the League is mentioned concerning the operationalization of Nye's intervention scale, this refers to individual member states as well, provided they speak and act on behalf of and in agreement with the organization.

Much literature on intervention emphasizes the aspect of force, by focusing on military invasion of one state in another. The choice for Nye's comprehensive concept (2009) as a framework for understanding intervention by a RIO is related to the specific position RIOs have in the international structure. It is not very usual for a RIO to support intervention, because it usually lacks supranational powers, and in fact, even states tend to live by the principle of non-interference.¹⁰ Consequently, when a RIO expresses discontent with the internal affairs of one of its member states – even if it were 'just' a speech – this can be considered a high-profile undertaking.

A lack of support for intervention then means that the Arab League has not mentioned the violations of human rights in Sudan and Libya, or has explicitly referred to these acts as a matter of the governments of Sudan and Libya, emphasizing sovereignty. The first three forms, ranging from speeches to economic assistance, will be considered a low degree of intervention. The following levels, from military advice up to a blockade is regarded to be at a medium level of intervention. The actual use of force then, limited military action and military invasion, is a high level of intervention.

¹⁰ In 1648, what is known as the Peace of West-Phalia, the concept of sovereignty was established and accordingly the norm of non-interference in the internal affairs of one state by another was accepted by states (www.britannica.com).

The following paragraph will discuss the hypotheses and their meaning in detail.

3.7 The hypotheses operationalized

3.7.1 Human rights to the bone?

According to the first hypothesis a RIO will support intervention in the violation of human rights in its member states, if it has internalized human rights values as a part of its identity. Translated to the context of the Arab League, these hypotheses are as follows:

H1a

The League of Arab States will support intervention when human rights are violated in Sudan, if it has internalized human rights values as part of its identity.

The League of Arab States will support intervention when human rights are violated in Libya, if it has internalized human rights values as part of its identity.

H1b

The League of Arab States will not support intervention when human rights are violated in Sudan, if it has not internalized human rights values as part of its identity.

The League of Arab States will not support intervention when human rights are violated in Libya, if it has not internalized human rights values as part of its identity.

The RIO's constitutional documents and its rules for accession stress the regional identity (Ribeiro Hoffmann and Van der Vleuten, 2010). By examining these documents it will therefore be determined whether, and to what extent, human rights are a constituent part of the organization's regional identity. Additional declarations on human rights matter too, as they help to establish the strength of the regional identity concerning the internalization of human rights.

For example, if the League's member states have not addressed the protection of human rights in their constitutional documents, nor have they signed any other document of the League on the matter, this indicates a very weak – if not non existing – internalization of human rights into their identity. It can be further determined if the organization sees human rights as a part of its DNA by examining the operational bodies of the RIO. Assuming that the League acts upon what they consider to be most important, it needs procedures and personnel to protect and implement those values. It will be attempted to answer the following questions:

1. Does the protection of human rights belong to the range of duties of an Arab League representative?
2. Does the Arab League have a budget to perform that task?
3. Does the Arab League have a committee or body of policy makers that meet on a regular basis?
4. Have the Arab League members signed international agreements on the protection of human rights?
5. Does the Arab League support international agreements on the protection of human rights?

6. Is the protection of human rights by potential member states a prerequisite for accession to the Arab League?

The first two questions refer to professionalization, the third to internalization of human right norms into acts and habit, and the fourth to the sixth questions to conformity, esteem and legitimacy. When none of these questions are positively answered, this entails the Arab League has not internalized human rights and therefore the score on human rights regarding its regional identity is very weak. If not more than one or two questions are answered in the affirmative, then the internalization of human rights into the regional identity of the League is weak. Three to four times a 'yes', the internationalization level of human rights is mediocre. To have a strong internalization of human rights into the League's DNA, five to six questions have to be confirmed.

3.7.2 Hegemonic powers and interests

In the previous chapter, the realist approach to IR and its emphasis on the decisive role of the hegemon(s) for a RIO's behavior was explained. The following hypotheses were deduced and will be applied to the Arab League:

H2a

The League of Arab States will support intervention when human rights are violated in Sudan, if it is in the interest of the regional hegemon(s).

The League of Arab States will support intervention when human rights are violated in Libya, if it is in the interest of the regional hegemon(s).

H2b

The League of Arab States will not support intervention when human rights are violated in Sudan, if it is not in the interest of the regional hegemon(s).

The League of Arab States will not support intervention when human rights are violated in Libya, if it is not in the interest of the regional hegemon(s).

It is thus necessary to determine which Arab League member state is the preponderant power in the regional structure of relations. Lemke (2010, p.323) provide a suitable framework consisting of four main variables:

'(...) a regional power is (1) part of a geographically delimited region; (2) is ready to assume leadership; (3) displays the necessary material and ideational capabilities for region power projection; and (4) is highly influential in regional affairs'.

With regard to the Arab League, the hegemon should be found within its boundaries and should be willing to act as a hegemon vis-à-vis the other powers within the organization. The latter can be measured by the provision of public goods for the greater regional community (Flemes, 2010). The material capabilities of the hegemon will be measured according to the following elements (Nye, 2009; CIA):

1. number of inhabitants.
2. total size of territory according to international agreements.
3. economic wealth, translated into the Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
4. military expenses as a percentage of the GDP.
5. natural resources in production or export:
 - a. The total oil produced in barrels per day;
 - b. The total oil exported in barrels per day.
 - c. The total gas produced in cubic meters (cu m)
 - d. The total gas exported in cubic meters (cu m)

To be the state with the 'highest profile' in the region's affairs, means showing other member states determination when taking political decisions and also being prepared to deploy weaponry and soldiers (Flemes, 2010, p. 258). Whether states are capable of such determination and preparation depends on the availability of material and ideological capabilities. Nye's measurements will be used to establish the material capabilities. The ideological capabilities are the powers to 'formulate and diffuse a consensual idea-driven regional project' (Flemes, 2010, p. 313), which will be determined using secondary literature.

What remains for this paragraph, is to explain how to recognize instances in which the hegemon considers its interests threatened, as this threat could lead to intervention by the RIO. Threats to a hegemon's geopolitical sphere of influence arise in the form of political instability in neighboring states or strategically important territories in the region. Threats to the material powers of the regional hegemon are of economic nature, caused by crises in target markets for its own export products. The immaterial powers of a hegemon can come under pressure when a state in the region attracts negative attention, which undermines the region's image, and therefore also the hegemon's, as for example a stable area suited for foreign investment or a model region for certain values, such as the protection of human rights (van der Vleuten and Ribeiro Hoffmann, 2010, p.157). The cases of Sudan and Libya will be examined for the presence of these threats vis-à-vis the regional hegemon(s), based on secondary literature.

Chapter 4 will explain who were the hegemon(s) within the Arab League at the time of the two cases of Sudan and Libya, according to these criteria of regional hegemony. This will also be supported by secondary literature.

3.7.3 Transnational advocacy networks

The third hypothesis states that a RIO will support intervention in the violation of human rights in its member states, if non-state actors with access to the RIO mobilize at a regional level against these violations. This expectation, which resulted from theories on transnational actors, is applied to the context of the Arab League as follows:

H3a

The League of Arab States will support intervention when human rights are violated in Sudan, if TANS with access to the League mobilize at the regional level against these violations.

The League of Arab States will support intervention when human rights are violated in Libya, if TANS with access to the League mobilize at the regional level against these violations.

H3b

The League of Arab States will not support intervention when human rights are violated in Sudan, if TANs with access to the League do not mobilize at the regional level against these violations.

The League of Arab States will not support intervention when human rights are violated in Libya, if TANs with access to the League do not mobilize at the regional level against these violations.

To assess whether non-state actors influence Arab League decision-making, the access of TANs to the organization will be examined. TANs have access when:

1. the Arab League's meetings are open for non-state actors to attend, e.g. to send observers, set the agenda, participate in elections;
2. access to other Arab League's decision-making bodies and policy-making processes is open to non-state actors.

When none of these options are available to TANs, the level of access to the League is weak. The level of access is mediocre in the case TANs may be present at the RIO's meetings. With all forms of attendance, agenda-setting and voting available to them, the level of access for TANs in the League is high.

To the extent that TANs have any access to the League, it will be determined whether TANs are active within the boundaries of the League's region. To identify these groups that emerge around a specific issue and ask for attention on an international level for areas in this region, secondary literature on the topic will be examined. If the TANs have been identified, it will be determined which tactics they have employed to act on the level of the League. Primary and secondary sources will be assessed along these questions:

1. Which information channels did the TANs use to spread and use information on the human rights violations in Sudan / Libya to influence the Arab League?
2. Did the TANs use symbolic representations of the human rights violations in Sudan / Libya?
3. Did the TANs appeal publicly to states within or outside the Arab League to support intervention in Sudan / Libya when human rights were violated?
4. Did the TANs publicly blame state actors for the human rights violations in Sudan / Libya?

If the TANs employed none of these tactics, they are considered not to have mobilized regionally. Did they employ one tactic, this entails weak regional mobilization. The use of two of these strategies indicates a mediocre level of regional mobilization and consequentially, if the TANs used three or four strategies, the level of regional mobilization was high.

3.7.4 Effective external pressure

The fourth hypothesis emphasizes the positive influence of a shared identity on the effectiveness of external pressure. In the context of the Arab League this is translated into the following hypothesis:

H4a

The Arab League will support intervention when human rights are violated in Sudan, if a third party with an identity that does not clash with the Arab League's identity exerts pressure in favor of regional intervention.

The Arab League will support intervention when human rights are violated in Libya, if a third party with an identity that does not clash with the Arab League's identity exerts pressure in favor of regional intervention.

H4b

The Arab League will not support intervention when human rights are violated in Sudan, if a third party with an identity that clashes with the Arab League's identity exerts pressure in favor of regional intervention.

The Arab League will not support intervention when human rights are violated in Libya, if a third party with an identity that clashes with the Arab League's identity exerts pressure in favor of regional intervention.

External pressure by a third party will be identified as economic (boycotts, aborting financial support, limiting foreign direct investment (FDI)) and diplomatic (freezing membership in joint organizations, removing embassies) sanctions as well as measures of force (air strikes). These types of pressure fit into Nye's continuum of intervention, and indicate what kind of external pressure can be observed in the case of the Arab League concerning the situations in Sudan and Libya. From the perspective of the Arab League, interesting are the UK, France, the US, Russia, and China. These actors are capable of credibly invoking a threat by imposing binding resolutions, and therefore the compatibility of the identities of these great powers with the League's identity will be investigated. Later it will be assessed which great powers exerted pressure to intervene and as such whose identity will be assessed.

If any of these powers exerted pressure on the Arab League, their identity will be analyzed and compared to the League's identity. What matters in terms of compatibility of identities, is that the actors do not have a history of problematic interactions and that they acknowledge each other's existence. For example, a war in the past or present between the actors would entail a weak compatibility of identities, whereas a peaceful and cooperative pattern of interaction entails a strong compatibility of identities.

Finally, based on secondary literature, the effectiveness of external pressure will be examined by determining whether the Arab League has acted according to the demands of the other actor.

3.8 In conclusion

The theories of the previous chapter have been operationalized into measurable concepts, which in the next chapters will be assessed. In the fourth chapter, the Arab League as well as the two cases of Sudan and Libya will be put into the historical context, to prepare for the case analyses in chapters five and six.

4. The League of Arab States and its hegemons

With the methodological choices clarified in the previous chapter, the focus will now be put on the Arab League as a regional arrangement. First, an overview will be provided of the League's history, followed by an assessment of the internalization of human rights into its identity. Then, the hegemons will be identified, as well as the accessibility for TANs to the RIO's decision making bodies and processes. Finally, the compatibility of the League's identity with the intervening parties' identity will be determined.

4.1 Origins and activities of the League of Arab States

Inspired by a British vision of an Arab organization that could ally with the West against Nazi Germany, six states in the MENA region founded the League of Arab States in the spring of 1945 (BBC, 2011). After agreeing on the goals and workings of the League with the Alexandria Protocol (1944), Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen adopted the Pact of the League of Arab States (1945, preamble):

'Desirous of strengthening the close relations and numerous ties which link the Arab States; And anxious to support and stabilize these ties upon a basis of respect for the independence and sovereignty of these states, and to direct their efforts toward the common good of all the Arab countries, the improvement of their status, the security of their future, the realization of their aspirations and hopes' (Pact of the League of Arab States, 1945).

Conditions for accession to the organization were very limited, as '[a]ny independent Arab State has the right to become a member of the League' (Pact of the League of Arab States, 1945, article 1). Sixteen Arab countries joined the organization in this order: Jordan, Libya, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco, Kuwait, Algeria, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, the UAE, Mauretania, Somalia, the Palestinian Authority, Djibouti and the Comoros (see Appendix, Table 5). Even though the Pact explicitly states other fields of practice, the primary aim of the League in its first years was the economic integration of its member states (Reinalda, 2009).

Chosen by a minimum of two thirds of the Council for a period of five years, the Secretary General of the League's Parliament bears the financial responsibility for the organization, drawing up the League's budget (BBC, 2011). Not the easiest task, as the one hundred million dollar deficit in member contribution in 2004 shows (Harders and Legrenzi, 2008). The 88 members of Arab Parliament, four representatives per member state, are allowed to comment on matters but not vote (BBC, 2011). Every March and September the Arab Parliament gathers to discuss matters specified by the Council (Harders and Legrenzi, 2008). Policy decisions are prepared in the League's Council, made up by one representative of each member state's government. When issues come to a vote in the Council, every member state has an equal say, a construction designed to prevent the greater powers in the organization from suppressing their smaller counterparts (Reinalda, 2009). Generally, issues are decided upon by a majority vote; however, these are then only binding for those states that have voted in favor for them (BBC, n.d.).

Consequently, the organization's efficiency has proven to be limited. Moreover, although states are bound by their own vote, there is no legal authority on the regional level to enforce the policy decision. After the decision, a committee of representatives is created to deal with the question. Nonetheless, as these do not have an enforcement mechanism, the regional organization remains weak (BBC, n.d.). Decision-making on this regional level is also complicated by the value that the individual states attach to state sovereignty, also emphasized by the founding documents of the League (Barnett, 1993).

In close resemblance to the founding documents of the UN, article five and six of the Pact of the League refer to the use of force. The organization grants itself the right to interfere and mediate, but it thereby emphasizes national sovereignty of the state, as is also underlined in the introduction of the Pact (The League of Arab States, 1945). Throughout the decades, the League has often referred to sovereignty as a reason for adhering to the principle of non-interference in conflicts concerning its members. Intervention therefore has usually entailed interstate conflict mediation rather than hard core intervention, and individual state sovereignty was protected in most cases. Whenever outside actors decided to intervene in the internal affairs of Arab League member states, the League was quick to condemn such action (Reinalda, 2009). A clear example is the League's displeased reaction when the UN put an embargo on the sale of oil equipment to Libya in 1992 in demand for the two Lockerbie bombing suspects. The League urged the UN to put a halt to the intervention, or to opt for less extreme forms of interference (Reinalda, 2009).

4.2 The League's DNA: human rights

In the founding documents of the Arab League - which should indicate the extent to which human rights form part of the organization's DNA - the protection of human rights is not addressed as a general cause to strive for. The Alexandria Protocol, which served as the basis for the Pact of the League of Arab States, however, shortly refers to rights of the Palestinian people:

'(...) [T]here can be no greater injustice and aggression than solving the problem of the Jews of Europe by another injustice, i.e., by inflicting injustice on the Arabs of Palestine of various religions and denominations' (1946).

But, the concept of human rights does not appear in the Pact of the League of Arab States at all. Aspiring member states have not been denied access based on poor protection of these rights, quite the contrary, some of the world's most extreme human rights violators have been accepted as members. Apart from when it concerns the injustice done upon Arabs by Israel, human rights have rarely been an issue of debate.

In 1960, it was the Union of Arab Lawyers that gave the Arab League the first push towards an official stance on human rights, pressuring the organization to formulate an Arab Convention on Arab Rights (Al Midani, 2004). A few years later, for the twentieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the UN called upon its member states and organizations to direct their attention towards the protection of human rights. The League responded with Resolutions 2259 (December 12th 1966) and 2304 (March 18th 1967), which established two committees on the matter. A year later the Arab Human Rights Commission was born with the first international conference of Arab origins organized in Beirut on December 2nd. On the agenda were

the rights of the Palestinian people and the condemnation of Israel as a state on Palestinian territory. An appeal was made to the League's member states to establish their own national committees that could work closely with their regional counterpart (An- Na'im, 2001). A year later, the Council of the League clarified the tasks of the Permanent Arab Commission:

'(1) to support joint Arab action in the field of human rights; (2) to endeavor to protect individual rights, while emphasizing the human rights dimensions of Arab concerns; and (3) to promote awareness among the Arab People about human rights and the need for their protection'(Resolution of September 11th 1969).

Then, in 1970, the first official words of the Arab League were written on human rights, drafting the 'Declaration on the Rights of Citizens of Arab States and Countries' by the League's Permanent Arab Commission. Of the thirteen member states, nine responded, of which the majority negatively. With the exception of the subdivision on Palestinian rights, the organ working on human rights would remain asleep until the early nineties. In 1990 a new initiative was undertaken when the 'Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam' was adopted at the Islamic Ministerial Conference (An- Na'im, 2001). The emphasis was on the Islamic background of the document, as opposed to the Western concept of human rights: 'All the rights and freedoms stipulated in this Declaration are subject to the Islamic Shari'ah' (Arab League, 1990, Article 24).

However, in 1994, a new document – the Arab Charter on Human Rights - was adopted that only mentioned the Islamic law once: 'Having achieved the everlasting principles established by the Islamic Shari'ah and the other divine religions enshrined in brotherhood and equality amongst human beings (The League of Arab States, 1994, preamble)'. Not only did this document focus less on Shari'ah law, but what was earlier thought to be a truly Western concept of human rights, was embraced now:

'Reaffirming the principles of the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the provisions of the two United Nations International Conventions, on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam'.

Despite the fact that the Cairo Declaration implicitly refers to the importance of Shari'ah law, a change of tone - compared to the Cairo Declaration itself - is evident. This important addition to the official documents of the organization was signed by all twenty-two member states of the League in 2004 and it went into force in 2008 (Reinalda, 2009). A new operational body - the Department of Human Rights – was established, which would work on the execution of the document.

These developments notwithstanding, the organization refuses outside interference, even if the aim is to protect human rights of citizens within the region of the Arab League (Reinalda, 2009). Therefore, although intended as a guideline for committee members to examine the state of affairs concerning human rights in the League's member states, the significance of the Charter for the protection of human rights remains unsure. This is highlighted by a clause in the first part of article four:

'State Parties may, in times of public emergencies which threaten the life of the nation, take measures that exonerate them from their obligations in accordance with this Charter to the extent strictly required by the circumstances' (League of Arab States, 2004).

Although the document prohibits bodily harm and prescribes fair trial, governments can put individual rights second to what it deems necessary for the public good. What is more, the Charter's embracement of other declarations on human rights has not been confirmed by Arab states actually ratifying the UN treaties on the matter (see Appendix, Table 6). All the covenants were accepted and signed by every Arab League member state, but many have never gone so far as to let these enter into force. This renders the agreements void as the states cannot be held accountable by these documents for governmental misbehavior. Moreover, the Arab League member states had already written reservations into their constitutions, equal to those made in the Charter, granting them room to maneuver when it comes to the protection of human rights of their citizens. For example, concerning the Torture Convention, Saudi Arabia refers to its sovereignty when it comes to interference in states (An-Na'im, 2001).

In addition, the rules of their own Arab Charter are not followed either. Article twenty six of the Arab Charter on Human Rights states that '[t]he freedom of thought, conscience and opinion is guaranteed to everyone' (League of Arab States, 1994). The following article further emphasizes this right: '(...) No restrictions of the exercise of the freedom of thought, conscience and opinion can be imposed except through what is prescribed by law' (League of Arab States, 1994, article 27). However, many of the Arab League's member states are known for violating human rights (see Appendix, Figure 1) (Freedom House, 2012).

Only Lebanon can more or less be described as a democracy, whereas the other member states are autocracies, if not plain dictatorships. Freedom of expression, as 'the right of every individual to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers,' is also severely restricted in the region (Freedom House, 2012). The press is as much harassed as the individuals, with only 6 countries 'partly free', namely the Comoros, Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya and Tunisia, the overwhelming majority of the states severely limits news coverage (Freedom House, 2012).

In conclusion, the Arab League's internalization of human rights can be characterized as mediocre. The organization has professionalized human rights into operational bodies and personnel, with a budget to perform its tasks. The committee on human rights meets upon request of the League's Council. Although the League has not signed international agreements on human rights, most of its member state have done so. The League does not pose any other conditions on accession for potential member states; in principle being 'Arab' is enough to apply for membership.

4.3 The League's hegemons

Egypt and Saudi Arabia have generally been accepted as the League's most powerful actors, based on their material as well as ideological capabilities (Lemke, 2010). In this paragraph, the material capabilities of both powers will be measured by size of population and territory, GDP, military expenditure and gas and oil production and export. Comparing Egypt and Saudi Arabia to their Arab League co-members, these elements will be analyzed to determine whether the results correspond

with the image of Egypt and Saudi Arabia as the region's hegemons. Regional hegemony moreover becomes clear from determination in political decisions, preparedness to deploy the state's weaponry and soldiers, and the strength to lead a group in ideological projects. This depends partly on material capabilities such as military and economic strength, and furthermore on ideological powers, which are visible in the promotion and protection of a pan-Arab identity (Lemke, 2010).

4.3.1 *Material capabilities*

Egypt appears on top of the list (see below in table 7) of Arab League member states with the number of inhabitants, however Saudi Arabia has a smaller population than Algeria, Sudan, Morocco and Iraq. In square kilometers, Algeria reigns with Saudi Arabia as a runner up, and Sudan and Libya outrun Egypt. Saudi Arabia and Egypt have the highest GDP of all Arab League member states, Algeria and UAE follow first however at a great distance. Oman and Qatar are the two states to invest the most relatively in arms and military personnel, but Saudi Arabia follows. Although Yemen, Syria, Mauretania, Kuwait, Morocco, Bahrain, Libya and Djibouti spend more relatively, in absolute numbers Egypt's spending is still impressive. Saudi Arabia is the number one oil producing country in the world, while the UAE, Kuwait, Algeria, Qatar and Oman produce more than Egypt. Regarding oil export, again Saudi Arabia is at the top of the list and is followed by the same countries plus Kuwait, Libya, Sudan, Yemen and Syria. Egypt comes in quite a bit later. The greatest amount of gas is produced in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Egypt. However, the numbers are small, for which it is not surprising that the League's member states do not export much gas. Neither Egypt nor Saudi Arabia export gas, and although the UAE, Jordan, Oman, Tunisia, Kuwait, Syria, Morocco, Yemen, Lebanon and Libya (the remaining states export no gas at all) consequentially surpass them, the absolute numbers are low.

Assessing the levels of the material strength that characterize Egypt and Saudi Arabia, measured by these elements, shows that neither has the highest score on *all* material variables. However, all elements combined, both countries score very high. It is moreover evident that Egypt and Saudi Arabia have a considerable advantage over the other states in terms of economic welfare, which is a crucial element for hegemony. Both countries have as such been able to play a key role in the economic stability of the region and have invested much more financial resources into the organization than the economically less fortunate countries (BBC, 2012).

Two contenders for the position of hegemon in the region are Syria and Iraq (BBC, 2012). Like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, both were part of the founding club of states of the Arab League and these states are eager to take the leadership of the region. However, they greatly lag behind in terms of material resources.

4.3.2 *Conflict brokers for pan-Arab unity*

Determined to play a leading role in the region, Egyptian president Gamal Abdul Nasser had been on a quest for pan-Arab unity for some years, when the League of Arab States was established, amongst others with founding partner Saudi Arabia (BBC, 2012).¹¹ Apart from a time out between 1979 and 1991 when Egypt was expelled due to its cooperation with Israel in search of peace, Egypt has

¹¹ A fear of Egypt was that the creation of a pan-Arab institution would result to be of supranational character. The pan-Arab identity of the region that Nasser had in mind, still stressed the importance of individual state sovereignty (Barnett, 1993).

	Egypt 2011	Relative position in the Arab League	Saudi Arabia 2011	Relative position in the Arab League
1. Size of population	83.688.164	1	26.534.504	6
2. Size of territory in square kilometers	1.001.450	5	2.149.690	2
3. GDP (PPP) in billions	\$525.6	2	\$691.5	1
4. Military expenditure (% of GDP)	3.4	12	10.0	3
5. Total oil produced in barrels per day	711.500	7	11.15 million	1
6. Total oil exported in barrels per day	86.720	11	6.274 million	1
7. Total natural gas produced in cubic meters (cu m)	61.33 billion	4	99.23 billion	2
8. Total natural gas exported in cubic meters (cu m);	0	N.A.	0	N.A.

Source: CIA World Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>

Table 7. Relative material resources of Egypt and Saudi Arabia

provided for the headquarters of the League in its capital, including secretaries to fulfill the vacancy (Pinfari, 2009). As more members acceded to the organization, relations among them frequently became complex and conflict often hampered cooperation. Egypt and Saudi have taken the lead by brokering conflict solutions among their fellow Arab League members in order to maintain pan-Arab unity, such as when Lebanon and Syria were arguing in 1949 over the extradition of a Syrian politician who was to be executed in Lebanon (Macdonald, 1965). When in 1986 tensions rose higher between Bahrain and Qatar in the territorial dispute over Hawar, Saudi Arabia interfered (Pinfari, 2009). In 1992, Egypt interfered diplomatically in Saudi Arabia's border conflict with Qatar (Tow, 1990). Later, Saudi Arab Peace Initiative for restoring the Arab relations with Israel were welcomed at the Beirut Summit of 2002 (BBC, 2012).

In conclusion, the combination of the highest GDP levels and a strong military apparatus shows why Egypt and Saudi Arabia are the regional hegemons. This is further corroborated by the prominent role Egypt and Saudi have played in strengthening the pan-Arab identity of the League. Moreover, both Egypt and Saudi Arabia have shown leadership aspirations, were in possession of enough material and ideational power to lead the region and influenced regional issues.

4.4 Access for TANs to the Arab League

To establish whether TANs from Sudan and Libya that strive for human rights protection have mobilized regionally, this paragraph will investigate to what extent the Arab League is open to these actors. The Pact of the League of States does not mention access for non-state actors to the organization's meetings or decision-making bodies. This is not very surprising, as in many of its member states non-governmental organizations are denied official registration (An-Na'im, 2001). Arab states pose severe limits to the right to assemble, even after ratifying the Charter on Human Rights, which included the right 'to freely form and join associations with others' (the League of Arab States, 1994). The League did create the Department of Civil Society Observatory and Vocational Unions and an office for a commissioner general for civil society organizations (CSOs). The

commissioner general would serve as a portal between the CSOs and the League itself (ICNL, 2012). The Committee on Human Rights, which consists of member states representatives, gathers information from the Council of the League. With the commitment of a minimum of two states, the Commission then advises the Council, leaving the opinions and expertise of CSOs aside. The CSOs can attend the meetings and access the works of the League from their position as observers if invited by the committee:

Representatives of the other Arab countries may take part in the work of the aforesaid committees. The Council shall determine the conditions under which these representatives may be permitted to participate in the rules governing such representation (Charter on Human Rights, 2004, article 4).

Without any rights to actively participate, this condition makes TANs dependent on the good will of the Council. It extremely limits their influence on decision making, with naming and shaming as the only option left (ICNL, 2012).¹² This is vastly different from the consultative status granted by the UN to several non-state actors, such as civil society organizations (CSOs) (Samad and Mohamadieh, 2010). In addition, following from national restrictions on assembly rights by many states, the CSOs granted observer status are closely monitored by the Arab League and mostly not independent from their governments (Badran, 2011). The list of conditions CSOs have to fulfill to be granted observer status is long and imprecise, giving the League freedom to choose organizations that are beneficial to its cause (Badran, 2011).¹³ The result is that among the accepted CSOs there are no advocacy-oriented organizations, nor other groups that are opinioned about policy issues (Samad and Mohamadieh, 2010).

The above clarifies that the access to the League for TANs is weak. CSOs can attend the meetings, but only on invitation and those invited do not include advocacy organizations. Moreover, the CSOs with observer status cannot actually participate in or influence the League's decision-making. Moreover, the accepted CSOs are not independent from the League's member states. The tactics available for TANs are therefore restricted to the public realm, by naming and shaming the actors involved.

4.5 Compatibility of the League's identity with the identity of third parties

With the goal of clarifying the Arab League's compatibility with other actors in terms of identity, a closer look will be taken at the League's history with these actors. Problematic relations, exposed in for example wars or in the denial of each other's existence, indicate a weak level of compatibility. The Pact of the League of Arab States (1945) is not very explicit about the organization's foreign policy principles, apart from the Annex on Palestine that implicitly refers to the difficult relations with Israel. Most of the League's member states, with the exception of Egypt and Jordan, do not recognize the existence of the state of Israel. In fact, protecting Palestinian territory and preventing the creation of a Jewish state has always been one of the prime issues on the League's agenda (BBC, 2012). The Arab World and Israel are not friends, to say the least. Israeli occupation of Arab territory

¹² By holding actors publicly responsible and accountable for human rights violations, TANs can demand intervention by other, more powerful, actors on the scene, such as the Arab League.

¹³ It seems that the list with these criteria is not publicly available.

since the second half of the twentieth century has provided incentives for war, in which many Israelis and Palestinian Arabs have been displaced and killed. The Charter on Human Rights (the League of Arab States, 2004) is also clear on the matter in its preamble: 'Rejecting racism and Zionism, both of which constitute a violation of human rights and a threat to world peace.' The Arab World has great difficulty finding a way to cooperate with Israel, as the Jewish identity of the state is tied to territory that the Arab Palestinians claim too. According to former Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Arab League's (now former) Secretary General Amr Moussa 'the Palestinians need their own, viable state, and Israel has to withdraw from the occupied territories' (Der Spiegel, March 16th 2011). Apart from Israel, the Pact of the League of States promotes cooperation and peaceful relations, even to the extent that it affects the Pact itself:

This Pact may be amended with the consent of two thirds of the states belonging to the League, especially in order to make firmer and stronger ties between the member states, (...) to regulate the relations of the League with any international bodies to be created in the future to guarantee security and peace' (the League of Arab States, 1945, Article 19)

This is further emphasized in the Charter on Human Rights:

'Racial, religious and other forms of discrimination are rejected, while international cooperation and world peace are upheld' (2004, article 35).

4.5.1 The United States

History has shown a diverse pattern of cooperation with the Arab World and the rest of the international community. The relationships between regional hegemons Saudi Arabia and Egypt on one side and the US on the other have been cooperative and peaceful. Despite the sensitive matters of Israel and religious extremism, Egypt and the US have worked together on the Camp David accords, and Saudi Arabia has partnered with the US in its "war on terror". Amr Moussa stated on Egypt – US relations that he 'firmly believe[s] the relationship between Egypt and the US must be the best strategically and tactically, economically and politically (...)' (Der Spiegel, March 16, 2011). His statement reflects the friendly nature of US-Egypt relations.

4.5.2 The United Kingdom and France

The UK and France both have a colonial history of hegemonic rule over various states in the MENA region, a sensitive subject in their shared history. The UK has ruled over Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Sudan and the UAE, which is nearly half of the League's member states. The French ruled over Algeria, Djibouti, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia and Syria (BBC, 2012). Nonetheless, the Arab World increasingly cooperates with Western states, including the UK and France, by whom it is invited to participate in various meetings, such as those of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The following six states from the MENA region participate as Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and

Tunisia. In order to counter anti-western attitudes, Amr Moussa emphasizes a common history and shared goals of Western and Arab states:

'Don't belittle the West in general. There are many leaders who are genuinely pleased about the awakening of our democracy. I expressly count Chancellor Merkel among them. She has her own experience with lack of freedom and with the triumph of overcoming it. (Der Spiegel, March 16, 2011).

Assistant Secretary General of the Arab League Hesham Youssef made a comparable comment in 2012, referring to recently democratized Eastern European states: 'A number of countries in the OSCE have recently passed through their own transitional period. They know that it is hard' (OSCE, 2012, p.2). Experiencing also many difficulties with the West, despite the similarities, Moussa realizes that the two societies are not yet in agreement and emphasizes the need for a more friendly approach :

'(...) because the degree of misunderstanding between these cultural areas remains dangerously high, and because the need for the two to live and work together in our increasingly interdependent world has never been greater. We must enhance a climate of trust, and promote a better understanding of each other, create a shared vision, and relations built on understanding, not confrontation.' (OSCE, 2012, p. 5-6)

With this statement, Moussa underlines the danger of the actual enmity between the West and the Arab world and the need to promote a better mutual understanding.

4.5.3 Russia

With nearly fifteen percent of the entire Russian population, the current number of Muslim inhabitants of Russia is estimated between fourteen and twenty-two million, and continues to increase up to twenty-five percent in the next decade (Institute for National Security Studies, 2012). Facing a violent Wahabist movement in the Arab World as well as on Russian territory, these states have found each other in the same struggle. However, as Russia blamed the Saudis for this religious extremism during the last decade of the twentieth century, the relationship between the two states has been fragile. After 9/11, the perception of a need for a common approach to this issue increased (BBC, 2011).

Besides religious traits, parts of the Arab world also show ideological similarities. Both South Yemen and Somalia exhibit resemblances with Russia's communist past, as their governments were inspired by Marxist-Leninist thinking. However, this was not the case for Saudi Arabia, which experienced the Russian communist interests as a threat to their its leadership:

'Many observers regarded Soviet military support for Marxist regimes in (...) South Yemen (...) as ultimately aimed at surrounding the oil-rich Kingdom and bringing about the downfall of its US-allied ruling family' (Middle East Institute, 2009).

The governments of Algeria, the Comoros, Egypt, Iraq, Libya and Sudan have had socialist policies from the 1950s until the 1980s (Libya until the 2000s) as an alternative to Soviet communism (BBC, 2012). These states did not only distance themselves from Russia's political ideology, they also encouraged extremist parties like the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to rise in order to counter the power of the communist parties (Der Spiegel, 2011). This contributed to the already complicated Russian-Arab relations.

4.5.4 China

The Sino-Arab relationship is economic of character, originating from a common pragmatic approach towards a mutually beneficial cooperation in trade. Moroccan vice -premier Mohamed Yatim underlines the common peaceful approach that brought the relation to China, not just for exchanges in trade, but also in culture, without experiencing any conflicts (People Daily, 2012). Also, Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs Medelci emphasized the shared merchant history as the foundation of their relations, depicting China and Arab League member state Algeria as a solid matrimony: *'(...) toujours été aux côtés, l'un de l'autre, dans les moments difficiles comme dans les moments de joie'* (Jeune Afrique, 2008). China's aversion to interference in internal affairs, is part of the foundation of their relation: 'The two sides reiterated their determination to support each other in regard to safeguarding independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity' (Sino-Arab Co-operation Forum, 2004).

In conclusion, whereas Moussa stressed the *need* for mutual trust, the actual situation is one of distrust. The identities of the US and the Arab League are not compatible. The European and Russian identities face a similar position, the former due to the colonial history of French and British rule over large parts of the Arab World and the latter clash is of ideological character. The identities of China and the Arab League are the only two that do not clash, based upon their shared pragmatic approach and lack of violent interactions.

4.6 In conclusion

This chapter provided an overview of the history of the Arab League as a regional organization and of its activities, and the extent to which it has internalized human rights into its DNA. It has been made clear why Egypt and Saudi Arabia are considered the organization's hegemons in comparison to the less influential other members in terms of material and ideological capabilities. Moreover, the compatibility of the Arab League's identity with that of the world was established.

In the next two chapters case studies of respectively non-intervention by the Arab League in Darfur and intervention by the Arab League in Libya will be analyzed.

5. Arab League's 2004 Non-intervention in Sudan

'Between early 2003 and late 2004, the Sudanese government and government-backed Arab militias destroyed hundreds of African villages, killed and raped thousands of their inhabitants, and displaced more than a million and a half others. By December 2004, more than 70,000 people had died directly or indirectly as a result of the government's military campaign, hundreds of thousands more were at risk of death from starvation and disease, and security conditions throughout the countryside were still deteriorating' (Human Rights Watch, 2005, p. 26).

Sudan is known as an oppressive state that is tormented by civil wars, as its top three rating between 2005-2012 in the failed states index confirms (Fund for Peace, 2012).¹⁴ The Khartoum-based government had neglected large parts of its population, which lived on a territory with no water, food or other resources. In addition to this lack of care for basic needs, the atrocities the northern government committed towards the southern Sudanese and the people in Darfur developed into what the US termed genocide. Despite this, the international community was unable – or unwilling – to hold the Sudanese government responsible for its acts and to put a halt to the violence (Human Rights Watch, 2005). The Arab League abstained from intervention. It also refused to support any type of intervention by other actors. In this chapter, it will first be analyzed to what extent human rights were violated in Sudan's Darfur conflict. Thereafter, a closer look will be taken at the extent to which it was in the interest of Egypt and Saudi Arabia to support intervention in the matter. Then it will be determined if and to what extent TANs with access to the League mobilized at the regional level against these violations. Finally, which of the permanent Security Council members supported the intervention and to what extent their identity is compatible with that of the Arab League will be analyzed, to assess the compatibility of identities of the Arab League and the intervening third party.

5.1 The roots of the Darfur conflict

This paragraph will discuss the origins of Sudan's current troubles. From 1898 until 1956, Egypt had ruled the northern part of Sudan, whereas the south had been under the auspices of Great Britain's monarch. When both powers withdrew from Sudan as it gained independence on January 1st 1956, their distinct policies left the inhabitants of Sudan divided by religion and language. The power gap was filled by the northern Sudanese nationalists, who had previously been included in the former colonialists' policies, contrary to the southern people of the country. Although colonialism had

¹⁴ At the time of writing, South Sudan has separated itself from its northern counterpart. Nonetheless, as both countries were still united in national government in 2004-2005, in this thesis 'Sudan' refers to the former nation of both regions.

ended, the northern Sudanese took over control without including the southern Sudanese in the distribution of power, just as the UK and Egypt had done. This caused resistance from the southern population, who wanted to have an equal say in matters concerning the whole nation - and the south in particular - now that the foreign occupiers had left (Sharkey, 2008). This resulted in a civil war that would last until the early 1970s, when an agreement between the northern government and the southern opposition was signed. It addressed not only freedom of language and religion – a crucial matter as Khartoum had tried to impose the Islam and Arabic on those of other faiths and tongues - but also included issues on wealth and power sharing. Nonetheless, the document appeared to be cheap talk when Shari'ah was crowned to be the state's official law. This ignited John Garang's opposition forces, Sudan's People's Liberation Movement Army (SPLM/A), in 1983 to take up arms against the state, again. When Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir came to power in 1990, not only did he frame the conflict a matter of the state's identity, even more so, he declared a holy war on the SPLM/A by saying that his policies to impose Islamic law and Arabic were 'merely a reflection of divine will and that its war against dissidents was a jihad' (Sharkey, 2008, 42). It took over two decades of fighting before a new peace agreement would be reached in 2005. The two parties agreed that, first, the southern region would receive more power and, second, the south would be given a referendum for separation (Sharkey, 2008). It was the negotiations leading up to this peace agreement that ignited strife in Darfur. While the south and the north were dividing resources and power, the Darfuri feared they would not get their share of the pie (Human Rights Watch, 2005). The character of the civil war that arose in 2003 in Darfur– which was inhabited by an overwhelming Muslim majority, like the capital – was vastly different from what had been a power struggle over religion and culture between the north and the south:

'Unlike the decades-long struggle between successive Arab regimes in Khartoum and rebels drawn from predominately non-Muslim African communities in the south, the fighting in Darfur is of more recent origin—and all of the combatants and their victims are followers of Islam' (Human Rights Watch, 2005, p. 27).

The combatants of the SPLM/A's Darfuri faction that arose in February together with the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) rebels, did not fight the Bashir government over religion or culture, rather over the distribution of power and wealth (Sharkey, 2008). Khartoum retaliated by randomly attacking the Darfuri, employing all means of violence available (Human Rights Watch, 2005). The Sudanese government had assigned Janjaweed – a nomadic Arab tribe - the task to fight the southern population in their quest for independence and, when that battle was fought, to oppose the SLA and JEM in Darfur together with government forces (Human Rights Watch, 2005). Providing them with weapons and freedom to choose their methods, the Janjaweed were 'unleashed' (Human Rights Watch, 2005, p. 37). The first signs of human rights abuses by these groups were made public in the autumn of 2003 by Amnesty International, based on the refugees' accounts:

'(...) militias armed with Kalashnikovs and other weapons, including bazookas, often dressed in green army uniforms, raided villages, burnt houses and crops and killed people and cattle. They described deliberate killings and allegations of abduction and rape by the Janjawid. Some refugees described how villages were bombed by government planes. People detained by the military described

torture and appalling conditions of detention' (Amnesty International, November 28th 2003).

From other testimonies, it became clear that the government did not only intend to suppress the SLA's and JEM's actions to restore order, but mostly to clear Darfur of people with non-Arab roots, such as those belonging to the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa (Human Rights Watch, 2005). Bashir incorporated rape of the Darfuri women as an official war tactic, so their offspring would have a lighter – and so he believed 'Arab' - skin color (Boustany, 2007). Despite the fact that the people in Darfur were of darker – African – skin color, many among them practiced the Islamic faith and spoke Arabic, as their ancestors had done for centuries (Britannica, n.d.). Nonetheless, what had started as a fight over the distribution of power and wealth, turned into an ethnic civil war, in which thousands of people were raped, displaced and killed.

5.2 Responses to the human rights violations in Darfur

5.2.1 International response

As the atrocities in Darfur continued, the international community was slow to react, and even more hesitant to act. The UN was focusing on the progress of the north-south peace agreement in Sudan, fearing that intervention in Darfur would only complicate the matter and hoping a peace agreement would stop the violence in Darfur. Due to the severity of the situation, in May 2004 (before the peace agreement was settled), the first cautious steps were taken by the UN by requesting Bashir to disarm the Janjaweed. When the Sudanese government undertook no such action in the two months thereafter, the Security Council issued Declaration 1556 to put more pressure on the state:

'[The Security Council] demands that the Government of Sudan fulfill its commitments to disarm the Janjaweed militias and apprehend and bring to justice Janjaweed leaders and their associates who have incited and carried out human rights and international humanitarian law violations and other atrocities, and (...) expresses its intention to consider further actions, including measures as provided for in Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations on the Government of Sudan, in the event of non-compliance' (Resolution 1556, 2004, p.3).¹⁵

Although the UN acknowledged 'a humanitarian crisis and widespread human rights violations' (Resolution 1556, 2004, p.1) were going on, only the US referred to the conflict as genocide (Human Rights Watch, 2005). China (as well as Pakistan) abstained from the resolution, and some months later that would prevent an actual intervention by the UN (some say together with Russia). Moreover, when the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued a warrant for president Bashir in 2009 for crimes against humanity and genocide, China still invited him to visit (Human Rights Watch, 2012). As the situation deteriorated in Darfur, the UN Security Council reiterated its warnings in September 2004 with Resolution 1564, this time threatening with economic sanctions to the state's

¹⁵ This article comprises economic and diplomatic sanctions, i.e. not the use of force (UN, Chapter VII).

oil industry and permitting the African Union (AU) to send over troops for protection of the Darfuri. Leaving the threats of sanctions for what they were, the next document was drawn and adopted by all members in November that same year:

'In accordance with its previous resolutions on Sudan, [the Security Council] decides to monitor compliance by the parties with their obligations in that regard and, subject to a further decision of the Council, to take appropriate action against any party failing to fulfill its commitments' (United Nations, Resolution 1574, 2004)

This resolution was more hollow than the previous statements, supporting but not contributing to leaving intervention by the AU in Darfur. It took until March 2005 for the UN to send the 'United Nations Mission In Sudan' (UNMIS) - a peacekeeping operation established by Resolution 1590 - to Darfur. It supported the troops of the AU, for which Resolution 1564 had established the 'African Union Mission In Sudan' (AMIS) the year before. AMIS was able to mediate a peace agreement in 2005, starting with a no-fly zone and humanitarian assistance.

5.2.2 Arab response

Based on the mediocre internalization of human rights into the Arab League's identity, the first hypothesis expects the Arab League to support intervention in the violation of human rights in Darfur. The reaction of the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs Gheit in August 2004, however, demonstrated the negative Arab stance on intervention in the conflict. Although Egypt had not opposed the UN resolutions, Gheit denied allegations of ethnic cleansing of the Darfuri: 'There is suffering (...) [b]ut talking about serious violations of human rights or massacres or other accusations, I don't think that the issue is what it seems' (Sudan Tribune, August 2004). A few days later, Egyptian opposition party the Muslim Brotherhood defended the minister's statement by saying that the conflict had 'been exaggerated to find a pretext for foreign intervention (...) and to distract attention from what is happening in the Palestinian and Iraqi arenas' (Sudan Tribune, August 2004). The only Arab League member state with a (temporary) seat on the Security Council in 2004 was Algeria, who supported the Council's resolutions with the exception of Resolution 1564. Neither the other Arab states, nor the Arab League as a whole, showed interest in the violations of human rights in Darfur, leaving the matter to Bashir to handle. Unlike Egypt, Saudi Arabia had not publicly opposed the UN resolutions, but it refused to accept the prospect of military intervention or economic measures (Sudan Tribune, 2004). The League did not support any form of intervention.

The Arab League had remained relatively silent on the crisis in Darfur, until March 12 2011, when the organization requested that NATO establish a no-fly zone over Libya. The League's Secretary General, Amr Moussa, commented on the comparison between the non-intervention in Sudan as opposed to the intervention in Libya announced that same day: 'The situation in Darfur is a result of foreign intervention and there are exaggerations' (Sudan Tribune, March 2011).¹⁶ According

¹⁶ It is likely that Moussa was referring to American pressure for intervention within the United Nations, for the Bush government accused the Bashir government of committing genocide. Arab League member states have more than once accused the Western international community of dramatizing the violations of human rights in Darfur. The Western community supposedly used this tactic to keep quiet their negative impact and role in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Sudan Tribune, March 2011).

to Moussa, the Libyan government was no longer legitimately in power due to the 'serious crimes and great violations' it had inflicted on its people (Sudan Tribune, March 12th 2011). Contrary to his comments on Muammar Gaddafi, he has not spoken of human rights violations by the government of Omar Bashir. On March 12th, Moussa was supported by a statement of Youssef bin Alawi bin Abdullah, Oman's Minister of Foreign Affairs, emphasizing how the severity of the situation in Libya was new to the MENA region and hence needed interference from outside (Sudan Tribune, 2011).

In conclusion, even though the UN Security Council pressed the Arab League to support intervention, the latter's response to the situation in Darfur in 2004 was to refuse support for intervention, stressing Sudan's sovereignty in the matter. This does not confirm the first hypothesis, from which support for intervention by the League – even if it were intervention in its minimal form of speech – was expected. In the following three paragraphs, possible explanations for this behavior will be discussed, to gain better understanding of the League's behavior.

5.3 Hegemon interests: Egypt's lifeline and Saudi Arabia's food basket

Egypt's and Saudi Arabia's hegemonic interests – material and ideological - possibly provide an explanation for the League's lack of support for intervention in Darfur. Based on the hypothesis that the Arab League will support intervention in the violation of human rights in Darfur if it is in the interest of Egypt or Saudi Arabia, non-intervention would indicate that it was not in the interest of the hegemons to support intervention. In this paragraph these interests will therefore be analyzed in the context of the human rights violations in Darfur, to determine whether the hypothesis holds.

5.3.1 Threats to Egypt's and Saudi Arabia geopolitical sphere of influence

Egypt could have experienced Darfur's political instability as a threat to its own security. Not only did the inflow of people put pressure on the resources intended for the Egyptians, but also the religious radicalization in Khartoum was unwelcome in Egypt's sphere of influence (International Crisis Group, 2002). Simultaneously, the hegemon needed to remain friends with Sudan's government, in order to protect its access to the Nile (Høigilt and Rolandsen, 2010). Sudan has been one of the most strategically important countries to Egypt as it provides the better part of the country with water. This produced fertile land in an otherwise dry landscape, therefore the river was called 'Egypt's lifeline' (The National, 2012). Egypt shares the Nile with Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan and Eritrea, putting Egypt in a complicated position. Regional security is inextricably linked with water supply that it shares with these states. Therefore, while the south-north civil war was raging on, Egypt worried about the disruption of the water supply from the Nile that the conflict or secession could entail (Middleton and O'Keefe, 2006). Consequently, during negotiations over the peace agreement, Egypt admitted to being against secession. Possibly, the crisis in Darfur was quite convenient for Egypt, as the SLA's and JEM's rebels diverted Khartoum's attention during the south-north negotiations towards another issue than the access to the Nile (Shinn, 2006). Ending the Darfur conflict would only draw attention to the issue, forming a threat geopolitically.

With the Red Sea separating Sudan from Saudi Arabia, the latter has less to fear from instability in the region than Egypt. Refugees and rebels are less likely to enter into the oil-rich kingdom and it does not have to share its water or other resources with Sudan.

Thus, it turns out that Sudan falls within Egypt's geopolitical sphere of influence, and accordingly an intervention in the conflict is a threat to Egypt's interest. However, for Saudi Arabia, Sudan is not a matter of vital importance in this sense.

5.3.2 Threats to the material powers of Egypt and Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia's ties with Sudan are of a more economic nature. In November 2003, at the beginning of the crisis in Sudan, it became official that Saudi Arabia would invest a considerable amount of financial resources into Sudan's agricultural and animal sectors (Sudan Tribune, 2003). Also, both countries announced cooperation in 'political, security, education, higher education, banking, information, roads, electricity and other fields' (Sudan Tribune, 2004). Especially agriculture and stock supply were of importance to Saudi Arabia, for the kingdom is not well-accommodated in fertile lands. Khartoum's tax-free haven for Saudi crops and cattle would decrease Saudi dependency on import from countries outside the MENA region.

As the number one oil producing and exporting country in the world, Saudi Arabia has both plenty to take care of itself and to export. Egypt, on the other hand, does not possess enough oil fields to take care of its inhabitants, causing a dependency on other countries in the region (Albrecht and Schlumberger, 2004). As one of the greater oil producing and exporting countries among its immediate neighbors, Sudan is a potentially important contributor to Egypt's oil imports. Even though oil imported from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to Egypt exceeded Sudan's export to Egypt in 2004, investment in Sudan's oil sector could be beneficial to Egypt.

Concerning export, Egypt's main buyers are not situated in the MENA region, but rather in Italy and India, and the US and China are its main target markets (CIA, 2012). In this field therefore, Sudan is not Egypt's main concern.

Thus, on an economic level, Sudan was particularly interesting to Saudi Arabia due to its large investments in the Sudanese agriculture and animal sectors. For Egypt the economic ties were less, although the Sudanese oil export could provide a beneficial relationship.

5.3.3 Threats to the immaterial powers of Egypt and Saudi Arabia

Although it took the international community nearly six months to realize what was happening in Darfur, since then the region has attracted much attention, intensifying Sudan's negative image. Oil import and export have come under pressure because of the civil war in Darfur, undermining the region's image of an area suited for foreign investment. Also, the fact that the warring parties both have a large Muslim constituency can affect the region's image. According to the third hypothesis, the Arab league was expected to intervene in the conflict, if the negative attention would negatively affect Egypt's and Saudi Arabia's reputation, as the most influential states in the region.

Egypt was worried about the region's – and consequently its own - reputation with regard to religious extremism and was therefore not at ease with Khartoum's tendency towards it (Høigilt and Rolandsen, 2010).¹⁷ With Salafism as Saudi Arabia's biggest export product, this could have been a concern for Saudi Arabia too, as the conservative practice of the Islam has attracted negative attention worldwide due to involvement of Saudi Salafists in the 9/11 attacks. On the other hand, Arabia has always maintained a friendly relationship with Bashir.

¹⁷ Bashir's political party, the National Congress Party (NCP), was founded upon conservative Islamic principles.

Nonetheless, as beacons of stability in a region torn by civil wars and wary of religious extremism, both Egypt and Saudi Arabia were the US' greatest allies in the MENA region for decades. Egypt's contribution to the Camp David Accords demonstrated have led the US to support the state by providing it with ample economic aid and military equipment (Albrecht and Schlumberger, 2004). Saudi support for the American 'war on terror' strengthened US-relations considerably. Besides, the US has never shown much interest in the protection of human rights by its allies, as both Egypt's and Saudi Arabia's record of human rights violations confirm. Never truly criticized on this matter by the US, nor by their fellow Arab League member states, it is not likely that Egypt and Saudi Arabia perceive the conflict in Sudan to be a threat to the legitimacy of their leadership. Moreover, various actors from within and outside the Arab League have continued to see Sudan as a country well suited for foreign investment. Where Saudi Arabia has invested in agriculture, China is responsible for over forty percent of Sudan's oil export. Thus, regarding their immaterial powers, neither Egypt nor Saudi Arabia feels threatened by the Darfur conflict.

In conclusion, both regional hegemonies have downplayed the severity of the Darfur conflict. Geopolitics could explain Egypt's policy vis-à-vis Khartoum during the peak of the conflict. The former found itself in a difficult position as it did not want the extremist religious tendencies of the government in Khartoum (apparent in the Darfur conflict) to intensify or spread to its own territory, while at the same time intervention could endanger its water supply. Saudi Arabia's main concern were its material capabilities, as it needed Sudan to decrease its dependence on the countries it imports its food from to secure its relative power position in the region. Interference in the Darfur conflict would threaten this profitable relationship.

5.4 Transnational Advocacy Networks: from Sudan to the Arab League

In addition to the first two hypothesis that successively focused on internalization of norms and hegemon politics, the third hypothesis expects TANs to have influenced the Arab League's behavior. If they were capable of mobilizing at the regional level against human rights violations, the League would support intervention. The weak access of TANs to the League, in combination with the Sudanese ban on CSOs (An- Na'im, 2001) and continuing violence against the Darfuri, has led to an extremely harsh environment to operate from. This has caused many TANs to lobby from abroad.

5.4.1 *The Darfur Consortium*

Founded in 2004, the Darfur Consortium consists of African, Arab and international CSOs that lobby for the Darfuri at the transnational level.¹⁸ Its goal was to 'develop an analysis and pragmatic set of proposals which could contribute to (...) solutions' to the conflict in Darfur (Monim-Elgak, 2008). While the Arab League summit in 2005 took place in Algiers, the Consortium pressed the League at the African Commission on Humans and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) by advocating referral of the Darfur conflict to the ICC (Monim-Elgak, 2008).

On its website, the network has published a variety of open letters, position statements and press releases concerning the situation in Darfur, under the title 'Sudanese voices' (Darfur Consortium, 2005). In an open letter to African governments (among which several Arab League

¹⁸ The Darfur Consortium itself states on its website that Sudanese organizations joined the network, however, it is not shown which specific organizations are referred to. Moreover, many of the enlisted websites contain dead links.

members) gathering at an AU summit, the Bashir government is held responsible for the violence in Sudan:

'The government of Sudan since 2002, (... is exercising serious and organized violations against human rights and non-Arab African tribes in Darfur, that entered the Darfur issue to the corridors of the Security Council discussions at the United Nations, Arab League and Africa Union which is became [sic.] a central issue in all the global summits as the third genocide after Holocaust, Rwanda and Burundi, (...)' (the Darfur Consortium, January 30th 2010).

In the same letter the Consortium publicly appeals to the African leaders to counteract the Sudanese government's behavior. It asks them to pressurize the Bashir government 'to release all political prisoners, human rights activists and opinion expressionists (...) or to bring them to the fair trial and to transform the state into a democracy' (the Darfur Consortium, January 30th 2010.). The Consortium also underlines the importance of spreading knowledge about the human rights violations in Darfur (Darfur Consortium, 2010). Besides Arab governments, the Arab League is explicitly and publicly addressed as the most crucial actor for achieving change in Darfur: 'As an organization which includes some of Sudan's closest neighbors, the Arab League is a vital partner of the people of Darfur and all of Sudan in the quest for peace' (the Darfur Consortium, 2005). In another open letter to the League, it is asked to intervene in Sudan's affairs to end the ongoing violence:

'We look to the governments of Arab States to use your (...) to insist that all parties immediately comply with their obligations under international humanitarian and human rights law (...)' (the Darfur Consortium, October 28th 2007).

Providing first-hand information, the Darfur Consortium depicts testimonials of Darfuri refugees on its website, among which the following:

'Some were killed at the war, some of them killed when they attacked the village. They burned the village. All that means you are staying at the village and you have nothing. And then the horses attack you. You have nothing to do but run. They killed them without reason' (the Darfur Consortium, n.d.).

One photo depicts a man who died in the violence, other photos are taken at meetings and form less of a symbol for the crisis in Darfur, nor does the website show other symbolic representations of the human rights violations.

5.4.2 The Arab Coalition for Darfur

Another TAN that lobbies nationally and internationally against human rights violations in Darfur, is the Arab Coalition for Darfur which connects over a hundred CSOs from nearly twenty states in the MENA region and lobbies. Only fourteen members are mentioned on its website, among which two

of Sudanese descent: Al Khatim Adlan Center for Enlightenment and Human Development and the National Organization for Human Rights.¹⁹ According to the Coalition's website, it uses several methods to pressurize governments into taking action, such as media network building, informing media, engaging with the Arab League representatives and other government officials, and communicating from its own website (Arab Coalition for Darfur, n.d.).

The network's name gives away that it emerged around the Darfur conflict. Not only do the Darfuri have a lack of communication channels through which they can voice their opinions in the Arab League, it is also impossible for them to engage in a dialogue at the national level, as the Bashir government is heavily involved in the killings and mass displacement of the Darfuri. Therefore, the Arab Coalition for Darfur represents the Darfuri in their struggle and attempts to articulate their demands in the Arab League (Arab Coalition for Darfur, n.d.). In 2008 and 2009, the Coalition organized a conference called 'Darfur and the upcoming Arab summit', timed at and explicitly referring to the League's summit.²⁰ It forms a public appeal to the Arab League's member states to interfere in the Darfur conflict. Also, the Coalition joined the conference of the foreign ministers of Islamic countries and sent it an open letter (Arab Coalition for Darfur, 2008-2009).

The Coalition issued a press release in which it urged 'the League of Arab States to work hard[at the summit] to resolve the crisis in Darfur and the adoption of effective mechanisms to protect civilians from the residents of this region and save the humanitarian situation' (Arab Coalition for Darfur, n.d.). Although none of the League's member states are individually held responsible for the human rights violations, in this message it is implied that the League has the power to put an end to the conflict and should do so. The Coalition also sent representatives to the summit, but whether this group entered the international meeting could not be determined. The media network, through which the activities were communicated, is not further specified and the extent to which the media were used therefore remains unknown. Also, because of a lack of information about this conference, it remains unclear whether the Coalition used symbolic representations of the human rights violations in Darfur in its plea.

In conclusion, there is no dialogue between the Arab League on one side and the Darfur Consortium and the Coalition for Darfur on the other, but rather a unidirectional attempt to get a foot in the door at the regional level by the latter two. However, taking into account the weak level of access to the Arab League, the use of most of the regional advocacy tactics by Darfur Consortium and the Coalition for Darfur entails a high level of regional mobilization for both. This does not confirm the hypothesis that expects the League's support for intervention in Darfur when TANS mobilize regionally against the violations of human rights in Darfur.

5.5 Compatibility of the intervening party's identity

The last hypothesis focuses on the pressure by external parties on the League to intervene, which will be effective when that party shares the RIO's identity. As the League refused to support intervention in Darfur, it is expected that the intervening party does not share the same identity with the League. To determine whether this is the case, first it is necessary to find out which Permanent Members voted in favor of the resolutions concerning Darfur. As opposed to the rotating members whose votes are counted in a majority vote, the permanent members have the power to veto the decision

¹⁹ Dr. Al Baqer Al-Afif is a member of the Coalition's Executive Secretariat

²⁰ It has resulted not possible to trace the Coalition's activities before 2008.

to intervene and as such determine to a great extent the Council's decisions.²¹ Also, these are the greater powers on the international scene in terms of their capabilities and accordingly can exert a credible threat to intervene. Even though Israel and Turkey are interesting as regional powers, however, these will not be considered in further detail, as they are not Permanent Members.

When Resolutions 1556, 1564 and 1574 (UN, 2004) and Resolution 1590 (UN, 2005) were drawn up, China, Russia, the UK, France and the US were seated on the Council as permanent members (see table 1 on page 10). The first Resolution entailed the disarmament of the Janjaweed and the legal prosecution of the perpetrators. Furthermore, if the Bashir government would not act on these demands, the UN would take measures against it. This declaration was adopted by thirteen votes in favor to none against, with two abstentions, namely China and Pakistan. The threat of economic sanctions to Sudan's oil industry and the permission for an AU peacekeeping force that were written down in Resolution 1564, was supported by eleven votes in favor to none against and four abstentions, namely Algeria, China, Pakistan and Russia. Resolution 1574, which contained a threat from the Security Council that it would intervene if Sudan would not comply with the previous resolutions, was adopted unanimously. Thereafter, Resolution 1590, which gave green light to the UNMIS peacekeeping mission in Darfur, was also adopted unanimously.

Among the Permanent Members, Russia and China abstained from several resolutions, which left the UK, France and the US as the prime intervening third parties to analyze. As became clear earlier, because of their history of conflict, colonial rule and the issue of Israel's existence, the identity of the Arab League is not compatible with the identity of these Western great powers that wished to intervene. The Arab League does not want to belong to the same group as the intervening party and therefore the external pressure to intervene that is exerted by the latter, is expected to be ineffective.

In conclusion, the hypothesis, which expected the League only to support intervention if it shared the same identity with the intervening party, is confirmed in the case of Darfur. The UK, France and the US do not have the same identity as the Arab League, and thus external pressure would be ineffective, for the League does not want to belong to the same group as the third party. The intervention will be regarded illegitimate by the League, because it is not based on a shared understanding of norms, and it will therefore not be endorsed. This is confirmed by the lack of support from the League for the UN's resolutions.

5.6 In conclusion

To what extent can the hypotheses be confirmed based upon the case study presented here? First of all, even though the UN Security Council pressured the Arab League to support intervention, the latter's response to the situation in Darfur in 2004 was to abstain from support for intervention, stressing Sudan's sovereignty in the matter. This does not confirm the first hypothesis, from which

²¹ Algeria was the only Arab League member that sat as a non-permanent member in the Security Council at the time of the conflict in Darfur and as such had the possibility to vote against any type of intervention of the UN. Interestingly, the only declaration it abstained from was Resolution 1564; it supported the other resolutions. Another Islamic state that showed a critical attitude towards Darfur (supporting two resolutions), was Pakistan.

support by the League for intervention was expected, because the League had internalized the norm of human rights protection into its identity.

Both regional hegemons have expressed that human rights have not been violated by the government or other parties to the extent portrayed by Western states and organizations. Geopolitics has shown to explain Egypt's policy vis-à-vis Khartoum. Although the state did not want the extremist religious tendencies of the government in Khartoum to intensify or spread to its own territory, interference in Darfur could provoke Khartoum's anger, thereby threatening Egypt's water supply security. For Saudi Arabia, interference would threaten its profitable relationship with Khartoum and accordingly its hegemonic position in the region. These findings confirm the second hypothesis that predicted the League would not intervene if it were not in the regional hegemons' interests to do so.

The influence of TANs on the Arab League's decision concerning intervention in Darfur, which was addressed in the third hypothesis, was not confirmed. The League's lack of support for intervention in Darfur would indicate that TANs did not mobilize regionally. However, both the Darfur Consortium and the Coalition for Darfur used various advocacy tactics at the regional level.

Finally, this case confirms the hypothesis that predicted the compatibility of identities to determine the effectiveness of the external pressure for intervention. The League's identity clashes with the identity of the UK, France and the US as the intervening party, and therefore did not support intervention.

In a structure alike this chapter, the next chapter will look at the case of the Arab League's support for intervention in Libya in 2011. The same hypotheses will be tested, in order to see whether the two extreme cases provide equal results.

6. Arab League 2011 intervention in Libya

'Spiegel reporter: You support an international military intervention in a fellow Arab state?

Amr Moussa: 'You are calling it an intervention. I'm talking about a humanitarian campaign. The goal of implementing a no-fly zone is to support the Libya people in their struggle for freedom against an increasingly inhuman regime' (Der Spiegel, March 16, 2011).

During Muammar Gaddafi's forty-two year rule over Libya, the country knew very little political unrest and the economic situation of its people was well, compared to other states in the MENA region (UN, 2012).²² Whereas Sudan continuously appeared in the top three of the failed states index, Libya's 111th to 115th ranking during the last five years indicated the government had a strong grip on its territory. Even though it was an autocracy with few freedoms for the Libyans, the political situation was stable (Fund for Peace, 2010). Few suspected therefore that the popular protests in Tunisia and Egypt early 2011 would incite the Libyans to follow in their footsteps. Nonetheless, on February 15 2011, thousands of people marched in the streets of Benghazi (Human Rights Watch, 2012). The uprisings became violent when Gaddafi's troops opened fire at the protesters, thereby killing thousands. On the 12th of March of 2011, the Arab League requested the UN Security Council to impose a no-fly zone of Libya, while referring to the massive human rights violations.

In this chapter, it will first be analyzed to what extent human rights were violated during the popular uprisings in Libya in 2011. Thereafter, a closer look will be taken at the extent to which it was in the interest of Egypt and Saudi Arabia to support intervention in the matter. Then it will be determined to what extent TANS with access to the League mobilize at that regional level against these violations. Finally, the League's support for intervention will be assessed in the context of the incompatibility of identities of the Arab League and the intervening third party.

6.1 The roots of the Libyan conflict

What triggered the popular protests in Tunisia and Egypt to spill over into Libya was the detention of Fathi Terbil, the lawyer who represented the families of the 1996 Abu Salim prison massacre victims (Human Rights Watch, 2012). The underlying cause of the unrest was decades of neglect and oppression of Libya's masses. The peaceful protesters demanded a fair judicial system, fair elections and a halt to human rights violations by the government (Human Rights Watch, 2012).

In the first half of 2011, the military arrested thousands of protestors to quell the unrest in the streets of Benghazi, Zintan, Zuwara, Zawiya and Misrata (Human Rights Watch, 2012). Gaddafi's troops used live fire to shoot at peaceful protestors, resulting in thousands of deaths. Also, thousands of protestors, human rights advocates and reporters were detained. During

²² At number 169, Sudan currently ranks extremely low on the Human Development Index (HDI), whereas Libya at number 69 is fairly well developed.

imprisonment, 'frequent torture, including beatings with wooden sticks and plastic pipes, and the use of electric shock' was common (Human Rights Watch, 2012, p.596). Many of the detainees never returned after Tripoli fell in August. Also, 1400 people lost their lives in an attempt to reach Europe by sea (Human Rights Watch, 2012).

With the opposition forces gaining territory and access to arms, the government's answer to the unrest became more violent by the day. Not only were protests broken up violently, Gaddafi's forces also assaulted random villages by rockets, mortars and a trace of thousands of mines. Although the number of victims remains unknown due to the taboo surrounding sexual violence, women and men were raped in their homes and during detention. Furthermore, thousands of prisoners were executed by Gaddafi's forces and by his son's Khamis Brigade, later to be discovered in mass graves (Human Rights Watch, 2012).

In addition to violence by governmental forces, human rights were also violated by opposition militias that attacked people suspected to have supported Gaddafi during his regime. Many of the latter have been tortured and killed as a result. For example, 'thousands of sub-Saharan African migrant workers [were attacked] on the pretext that they were mercenaries for Muammar Gaddafi' (Human Rights Watch, 2012, p.28). Villages taken over by the opposition forces were raided and put on fire by insurgents, thereby harming the inhabitants. Afraid of pro-Gaddafi accusations, an estimated thirty thousand Libyans fled from opposition militias (Human Rights Watch, 2012). On October 20, Gaddafi himself and his son Muatassim have most likely been executed while imprisoned by the opposition's National Transition Council (Amnesty, 2012).

6.2 Responses to the human rights violations in Libya

6.2.1 *International response*

Whereas the international community remained silent for months during human rights violations in Sudan in 2004, the UN Security Council responded within ten days after the first day the Libyan government violently attacked protesters. On February 25 2011, Resolution 1970 was issued, which entailed that the Council, referring to 'the gross and systematic violation of human rights', imposed sanctions on Libya (UN Security Council, 2011). Several government officials and Gaddafi's family members were denied free travel, their financial possessions and means of income were frozen and the arms trade with Libya was prohibited. Also, the UN called upon its member states to help ensure the safe return to Libya and to provide protection in Libya. The resolution was adopted by the Council on February 26 2011. This gave the ICC the legal power to examine the crimes committed in Libya and to give a ruling in the matter (Human Rights Watch, 2012).

6.2.2 *Arab response*

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) attracted international attention on March 7th, when it approached the Security Council, urging to 'take all necessary measures to protect civilians, including enforcing a no-fly zone over Libya' (Bellamy and Williams, 2011). The GCC criticized Gaddafi's violent approach towards the Libyans. The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) - with 57 members that have a predominantly Muslim population and where in many cases the Islam is an official religion - publicly supported this act only a day later, emphasizing, however, that a military intervention on the ground was unacceptable (Bellamy and Williams, 2011). These acts by the GCC

and the OIC seemed to prepare for the League's support for intervention in the Libyan conflict on March 12th, when the latter requested the Security Council to impose a no-fly zone over Libya. There were only eleven members present at the Arab league meeting when the request for a no-fly zone was formulated. Six of these states were GCC members, which have traditionally been pro-Western and specifically pro-US.²³ And, while decisions in the Arab League need consensus, it was reported that Algeria and Syria had actually not supported the request (Bellamy and Williams, 2011). And, although Saudi Arabia condemned the human rights violations by publicly demanding the Libyan regime to put a halt to it, its attitude towards the intervention has varied (Human Rights Watch, 2012). On the one side, Saudi Arabia was among the GCC countries pressing for a no-fly zone. On the other side, on March 9th 2011, a few days before the request, Saudi Prince Saud al-Faisal was clear on intervention in Libya: 'The kingdom does not interfere in the affairs of others and will not allow for anyone to interfere in its own affairs' (The Independent, March 9th 2011). In the end, however, the Arab League as a whole requested the no-fly zone.

The request was not only intervention by speech, but rather it reached the level of limited military action. The Security Council's answer came in the shape of Resolution 1973 on March 17th 2011. It reiterated its condemnation of 'the gross and systematic violation of human rights' and voiced its concerns regarding the worsening situation (UN, 2011). The stance of the Arab League was explicitly mentioned in the document:

'Taking note also of the decision of the Council of the League of Arab States of 12 March 2011 to call for the imposition of a no-fly zone on Libyan military aviation, and to establish safe areas in places exposed to shelling as a precautionary measure that allows the protection of the Libyan people and foreign nationals residing in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (...).' (United Nations, 2011).

In Resolution 1973, the Security Council 'decide[d] to establish a ban on all flights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in order to help protect civilians' (UN, 2011). Thus, the Arab League's proposal of a no-fly zone was granted, as well as measures to shield the Libyans from further harm.

Based on the mediocre internalization of human rights into the Arab league's DNA, the first hypothesis expected the Arab league to support intervention when Libya violated human rights. In conclusion, the League's request for a no-fly zone, confirms this expectation.

6.3 Hegemon interests: preventing instability to spill over

6.3.1 Threats to Egypt's and Saudi Arabia's geopolitical sphere of influence

It has been shown how political instability in a neighboring state can put pressure on a state's resources or threaten its own political stability. Besides with war-torn Sudan, Egypt also shares a 1115 kilometers long border with Libya (CIA World Factbook, 2012) and a stable political situation in Libya is therefore in the interest of Egypt. As a result of the popular uprisings early 2011, Mubarak's government had been toppled on February 11th that same year, four days before the uprisings in

²³ Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Libya took off. When the question to support intervention arose on March 12th with the League's request for a no-fly zone, the new Egyptian government still faced a precarious situation. The government itself had not completely been installed yet and already had to deal with the consequences of the civil war Gaddafi's government had caused.

Also, Libya scored high on the list of oil producing countries and Egypt is dependent on the import of oil from its neighbor. Although Egypt could import the 'black gold' from Saudi Arabia, it was unclear whether Saudi Arabia could increase its production to such an extent that it would meet the worldwide increasing demand. Moreover, the quality of Saudi oil does not equal Libyan oil, as the former required a longer and more complicated process of refining, for which the current capacity of the oil refineries is insufficient (Al Jazeera, 2005).

Egypt has over a million migrant workers located in Libya, due to the relative prosperity of the Libyan economy (El-Essawy, 2011). Political turmoil would threaten the safety as well as the incomes of these workers, causing a flow of refugees back home, putting pressure on the Egyptian economy.

Although the Saudis have been determinant to preserve their influence in the region, geopolitically Libya is not of much interest for Saudi Arabia. Egypt and the Red Sea act as a buffer zone between the two states, for which the kingdom has less to fear in terms of political instability than Egypt. Due to the distance, conflict is less likely to spill over and the lack of a substantial amount of Saudi migrants in Libya prevents an influx of returning immigrants. Moreover, as Saudi Arabia does not import oil from Libya nor uses its refining facilities, a conflict in Libya does not threaten its own capabilities.

Thus, it has become clear that as Libya falls within Egypt's geopolitical sphere of influence and a conflict is a threat to Egypt's interests, intervention in Libya was in the interest of Egypt. For Saudi Arabia, however, Libya is not of vital geopolitical importance and intervention was not in Saudi Arabia's interest from this perspective.

6.3.2 Threats to Saudi Arabia's and Egypt's material powers

In terms of its material powers, the conflict in Libya could entail greater consequences for Saudi Arabia. As Libyan oil refineries were destructed, oil importing states need to look for alternatives. Although it was unclear in March 2012 whether the quality and production of Saudi oil could live up to expectations and meet the demands, Saudi Arabia could make a considerable profit from the lack of Libyan oil. At the same time, in order to counter rising oil prices and prevent an oil crisis, the OPEC countries agreed to increase production (Strahan, 2011). The investments Saudi Arabia would have to make to raise its oil production to a higher level, but also to decrease it in a later stadium, are considerable. In the perspective of the unstable oil market of 2011, it was realistic that Saudi Arabia would prefer to minimize any further investments and increase oil production within the possibilities of the already existing means of production.

With regard to investment, the Saudi and Libyan governments have not been much interested in each other over the last few decades, with only 51.2 million dollars' worth of joint investment in 2011 (Council of Saudi Chambers, 2012). Both states mainly export oil; transferring money is a complicated undertaking and a Libyan business partner is required if a Saudi wants to invest in Libya (El-Essawy, 2011). Combined with the difficult relations between the two – Saudi Arabia accuses Gaddafi of the assault on King Abdullah in 2004 - this could explain why none of the two states invested substantially in the other (Tripoli Post, 2012). A change of leader and government

in Libya could provide new opportunities for Saudi investments and consequentially increase its economic influence in the region and expand its material power.

These rules of investment and barriers to the transfer of money also impeded Egyptian investment in Libya's economy. Besides, the strict conditions for investment had caused illegal trade to grow, which caused concerns for Egypt. But, in September 2008, Mubarak and Gaddafi discussed opportunities to strengthen economic ties in the 'oil, gas and [the] investment sector' (Business Intelligence Middle East, 2008). Before the protests in Egypt, nearly 250 Libyan companies were situated in Egypt, Egyptian export to Libya counted 1.463 billion Egyptian pounds and its import from Libya exceeded 275 million US dollars.²⁴ The total amount of investment in Libya was around three billion US dollars. An unstable political situation negatively impacts these financial flows (El-Essawy, 2011).

As Saudi Arabia planned to improve relations with a new Libyan government, the Egyptian government had high hopes for a new investment structure provided for by Gaddafi's successor. Thus, a change in Libyan government was in the interest of Saudi Arabia. Egypt, on the other hand, gained economically by its relationship with Gaddafi and instability would threaten these profits.

6.3.3 Threats to Egypt's and Saudi Arabia's immaterial powers

As the Arab Spring spread from state to state, the MENA region increasingly attracted negative attention. Comparable to Sudan in 2004, the investment in and export of the vast amount of oil resources in the country has come under pressure as a result of the conflict, undermining the region's image of an area suited for foreign investment. Also, Saudi Arabia feared this would ignite alike protests on its own soil. The second hypothesis therefore expected the Arab League to intervene in the conflict, pushed by Saudi and Egyptian concerns, as the negative attention could also negatively affect the hegemons' reputations.

The relationship between Saudi Arabia and Libya was extremely complicated. Not only had Gaddafi offended Crown Prince Abdullah in 2003 by calling him 'a product of Great Britain and protected by the US', 'whose past is a pack of lies and who is facing death', he was also accused of plotting his murder various times (Bellamy and Williams, 2011, 842). In the 1980s, he had also offended King Fahd by blowing smoke in his face (Bellamy and Williams, 2011). Intervention in the conflict in Libya would increase the chance for a new government to replace Gaddafi's regime, opening up new opportunities for an improved relationship with Saudi Arabia.

Moreover, the Saudis feared that the Shia, a minority among government officials, would be inspired by the Libyan protests and cause Arab Spring to trickle into Saudi Arabia as well. Although the Sunni-dominated government does not permit protests, the Shia demanded equal treatment and respect of basic human rights. According to a local council chairman, this caused concern: 'The government realizes it has a major problem here, near the oil wells and office complexes that constitute the hub of an oil industry that brought in 300 billion dollars last year' (Sullivan, October 23th 2012).

Opposite from the Saudi-Libyan relationship, ties between Egypt and Libya have been strong over the last few decades. This was expressed, for example, in Egypt's promise to captivate opponents of the Libyan regime trying to flee to Egypt and hand them over to Gaddafi's forces (Al Jazeera, 2011). Gaddafi's ideology was not specifically Muslim, however, nor was Mubarak's.

²⁴ In 2011, 1 Egyptian pound was equal to approximately 0,18 US dollars.

However, new Egyptian government ruling party the Muslim Brotherhood was not pleased with Gaddafi's ideas and esteemed the National Transitional Council to be more legitimate.

In conclusion, Egypt did not perceive the conflict in Libya as a threat to its ideological powers in the region. Saudi Arabia, to the contrary, feared conflict would threaten its internal legitimacy. The unstable oil market caused both Egypt and Saudi Arabia to prefer intervention in the conflict in Libya. Moreover, the political unrest in Libya threatened to decrease the internal legitimacy of both hegemony, and intervention would decrease this possibility. Adding to these incentives for intervention, investment in Libya by Egypt and Saudi Arabia was limited under the circumstances provided by the Gaddafi government, whereas a new government could provide new opportunities. These findings, combined with the League support intervention in Libya, confirming the expectation of the second hypothesis that the Arab League would intervene if it were in the regional hegemony's interests to do so.

6.4 Transnational Advocacy Networks: from Libya to the Arab League

The third hypothesis expects TANS to have influenced the Arab League's behavior. If they were capable of mobilizing at the regional level against human rights violations, the League would support intervention. However, comparable to the situation in Sudan, civil society was not able to develop easily in Libya during four decades of Gaddafi rule, as CSOs were prohibited by the government (Foundation for Torture, 2011). In the search for TANS that originate from and operate in the Libyan context, while at the same time advocating the issue of human rights protection at a regional level, only one organization meets the criteria. The network 'Lawyers for Justice in Libya' (LFJL) advocates protection of human rights of the Libyans from within and across the borders of Libya, working from two offices, one in Tripoli and one in London. This TAN of Libyan descent will be analyzed to determine which tactics it has used in order to act on the level of the Arab League.

From the videos and publications that are put on its website it becomes clear that the LFJL publicly blames the Gaddafi government for the human rights violations. The LFJL mentions various ways in which it has appealed publicly to states to support intervention in this matter. First of all, it brought the subject under attention in meetings of the UN's Human Rights Council. Secondly, in a deliberation of the African Commission in April 2011 it has responded to the state report by the Gaddafi regime on behalf of NGOs. Thirdly, it appealed to a greater international audience with 'Eyewitness Libya', a program for which it cooperated with the British Foreign & Commonwealth Office, with presentations about the human rights violations in Libya.

Besides its own website, the LFJL used the BBC, Channel 4 News, the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) and the British Foreign & Commonwealth Office to spread and use information – in audio and video format - on the human rights violations in Libya (LFJL, n.d.). The LFJL did not use any symbolic representation of the human rights violations in Libya in these video images; the only image to be found is that of an exploding bomb on the website of the Answer Coalition (n.d.), from the organization that funds the 'Eyewitness Libya' program.²⁵

In conclusion, the LFJL used at least three out of four strategies of regional advocacy, i.e. the use of information channels, publicly blaming state actors for the human rights violations and

²⁵ However, the videos displayed are all fairly recent, i.e. none of them are from before the League's support of intervention in Libya. The lack of videos dating back to the conflict, may indicate that they did not use show comparable videos at the time, but these might also have been removed due to limited archive space.

publicly appealing to states to support intervention in the situation in Libya. Nonetheless, there is no indication that the LFJL directed its efforts towards the Arab League specifically, as it does not mention the regional organization on its website, as opposed to the AU for example. There seems to be no dialogue between the Arab League on one side and the advocacy network on the other, nor does the LFJL attempt to directly exert influence at the regional level. Thus, the LFJL has shown a high level of regional mobilization, but not within the framework of the Arab League. As the LFJL did not mobilize at the regional level of the League, the hypothesis does not expect the League to support intervention in Libya. As the League supported intervention, the third hypothesis does not hold in this case.

6.5 Compatibility of the intervening party's identity

The last hypothesis focuses on the pressure by external parties on the League to intervene, which will be effective when that party shares the RIO's identity. As the League supported intervention in Libya, it is expected that the intervening party shares the same identity with the League. To determine whether this is the case, first it is necessary to find out which Permanent Members voted in favor of the resolutions concerning Libya.

Resolution 1970, which entailed sanctions on Libya with regard to the sale and transfer of arms, froze the assets of certain government officials and referred the Libyan case to the ICC, was adopted unanimously by the Council. China, usually a firm opponent of intervention, stressed the 'specific circumstances in Libya' and condemned the violence against the Libyan citizens (UN, 2011). Emphasizing the need for a peaceful approach, Permanent Representative Li Baodong implicitly referred to the lack of Chinese support for military intervention. This was similar to Russia's stance towards the resolution, which is evident from Vitaly Churkin's remark that 'the purpose of the resolution was to end the violence and to preserve the united sovereign State of Libya with its territorial integrity' (UN, 2011). Contrary to Russia and China, the UK, France and the US did not speak of trenching Libyan sovereignty, but rather stressed that the Libyan people had asked for intervention. Permanent Representative of the UK Mark Lyall Grant said the resolution 'was a powerful signal of the determination of the international community to stand with the Libyan people as they charted their future' (UN, 2011). France's Gérard Araud recalled how the resolution confirmed an earlier appeal by the representative of Libya and US Permanent Representative Susan Rice framed the document as 'the empowerment of the Libyans future' (UN, 2011).²⁶

When the Security Council discussed Resolution 1973, Brazil, China, Germany, India and Russia abstained, whereas the other ten members voted in favor of the resolution. As permanent members, China and Russia could have vetoed the decision to impose a no-fly zone based on their preferences for non-interference in the internal affairs of states. Their abstention showed they were not pleased with intervention in Libya, but at the same time both expressed the necessity to end the violence. Moreover, China indicated it had not opposed the resolution because it was a request by the Arab League. Nonetheless, both China and Russia emphasized that too much was left unclear regarding the intervention, including the contribution of the participating parties as well as the actions permitted (UN, 2011).

²⁶ It is not clear from the document which Libyan representative is referred to.

China and Russia's abstentions leave the UK, France and the US as the three main intervening third parties in the case of Libya. As became clear in paragraph 4.5, the identity of the Arab League is not entirely compatible with the identity of these states that wished to intervene. On March 9th 2011, when the no-fly zone was discussed, one of Egypt's newspapers emphasized this difficult relation in light of the intervention, stating that the intervening parties were seen as 'opportunistic interventionists'. Moreover, it said: 'Why can't Turkey, Egypt, South Africa, Brazil, and India enforce a no-fly zone in Libya? Hasn't the time come for these countries to shape a new security order?' (The Independent, 2011).

Their difficult history with Arab League member states possibly explains why the UK, France and the US all emphasized the request of the Arab League for an intervention by the Security Council. According to Susan Rice 'the Arab League had subsequently called on the Council to take more stringent measures, and the current resolution was an answer to that call (...)' (United Nations, 2011). UK's Lyall Grant stated that besides NATO, the 'Arab League [was] now ready to act to support the text' (UN, 2011, par). With regard to the execution of the no-fly zone, French Minister of Foreign Affairs Alain Juppé also emphasized the role of the Arab League rather than its own; '(...) the current resolution, which authorized the Arab League and those Member States wishing to do so to take all measures to protect areas that were being threatened by the Qadhafi regime' (UN, 2011).

Fully supporting the resolution, France and the UK became the driving force behind the execution of the intervention, with ample support from the US. Interestingly, Arab League members Qatar and the UAE also played a significant role in the operation, especially with regard to the provision of military equipment and ground personnel, but also by supporting the opposition forces (Human Rights Watch, 2012).

In conclusion, as the identities of the UK, France and the US clash with the Arab League's identity, the hypothesis thus expected external pressure to be ineffective, for the League does not want to belong to the same group. However, the support from the League for the UN's resolutions in Libya does not confirm this expectation.

6.6 In conclusion

To what extent can the hypotheses be confirmed based upon the case study of support for intervention in Darfur by the Arab League? First of all, the League's request to the UN Security Council to impose a no-fly zone in Libya in 2011 in response to the human rights violations by the Gaddafi government, confirms the first hypothesis. Second, while for Egypt intervention in Libya was in its geopolitical interest, for Saudi Arabia intervention was preferred due to material interests. For both states, intervention could secure their ideological powers. These findings confirm the second hypothesis, as the League supported intervention in Libya. Third, as far as the regional influence of TANs is concerned, this was limited to another RIO than the Arab League. Accordingly, in the context of the League's support for intervention, the third hypothesis cannot be confirmed. Fourth, the clashing identities of the League on one hand and the UK, France and the US on the other, together with the former's support for intervention, indicates the hypotheses was not confirmed as it expected the opposite to occur.

In the next chapter, the conclusions and implication that arise from this case study, as well as that of the previous chapter, will be assessed, to provide a final answer to the question under which conditions the Arab League will intervene in its member states when human rights are violated.

7. Conclusions and implications

On March 12th 2011, the UN endorsed a no-fly zone over Libya, in response to Gaddafi's violent attack on peaceful Libyan protestors who joined the Arab Spring revolution. The measure had been requested by the Arab League, which had not interfered in the internal affairs of its member states before. By comparison, in 2004 the Sudanese government's involvement in the rape, wounding and killing of thousands of civilians did not trigger a similar intervention. Even though the UN Security Council had pressed the League to support intervention, the latter's response to the situation was to deny the severity of the conflict. Stressing Sudan's sovereignty in the matter, the Arab League abstained from any form of intervention and encouraged other parties to drive that same agenda.

By examining the inconsistency in behavior of the Arab League that these two cases represent, the main goal was to gain a better understanding of the conditions under which the Arab League as a regional arrangement would endorse intervention in its member states when they violated human rights. The cases of respectively Darfur and Libya have been studied through various theoretical approaches within IR. For this purpose, four hypotheses were deducted and tested in the two cases. In the following paragraphs, it will be ascertained for each case whether the hypotheses are confirmed or rejected, or determined that the hypotheses were not applicable (N/A). Based on the comparison of these results, it will be attempted to answer the main question, as well as indicate the implications for existing theory and future research. Also, the practical, social and political relevance of this thesis will be discussed, as well as its limitations.

7.1 Comparing Sudan and Libya

The cases of Sudan and Libya were tested using four hypotheses, providing the results shown in Table 8 below.

In the paragraphs that follow, the cases of Sudan and Libya will be compared and some conclusions regarding the conditions under which RIO intervene in their member states will be drawn from these results.

7.1.1 *Internalization of human rights*

The first hypothesis was derived from Finnemore and Sikkink's constructivist theory on 'norm internalization' (1998). It stresses the norms that an actor has incorporated into its DNA as a determinant of its behavior. The extent to which the Arab League has internalized the protection of human rights into its DNA resulted mediocre: although these norms have not been not internalized to the fullest, the Arab League does consider the protection of human rights as a part of its DNA.

Even though the UN Security Council pressed the Arab League to support intervention in Darfur, the latter refused, stressing Sudan's sovereignty in the matter. This case rejected the first hypothesis, in which intervention by the League was expected. In contrast, when Gaddafi's government violated the human rights of its people, the Arab League supported intervention in the internal affairs of Libya in 2011 by requesting the UN Security Council to impose a no-fly zone. This intervention therefore confirms the first hypothesis.

Hypotheses		Cases	
		Sudan 2004	Libya 2011
1a	The League of Arab States will support intervention when human rights are violated in its member states, if it has internalized human rights values as a part of its identity.	-	Confirmed
1b	The League of Arab States will not support intervention when human rights are violated in its member states, if it has not internalized human rights values as a part of its identity.	Rejected	-
2a	The League of Arab States will support intervention when human rights are violated in its member states, if it is in the interest of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or both.	-	Confirmed
2b	The League of Arab States will not support intervention when human rights are violated in its member states, if it is not in the interest of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or both.	Confirmed	-
3a	The League of Arab States will support intervention when human rights are violated in its member states, if TANs with access to the League mobilize at the regional level against these violations.	-	Rejected
3b	The League of Arab States will not support intervention when human rights are violated in its member states, if TANs with access to the League do not mobilize at the regional level against these violations.	Rejected	-
4a	The League of Arab States will support intervention when human rights are violated in its member states, if a third party with an identity that does not clash with the Arab League's identity exerts pressure in favor of regional intervention.	-	Rejected
4b	The League of Arab States will not support intervention when human rights are violated in its member states, if a third party with an identity that clashes with the Arab League's identity exerts pressure in favor of regional intervention.	Confirmed	-

Table 8. Results of the tested hypotheses.

7.1.2 Hegemonic interests

Derived from realist theory, the second hypothesis expected the Arab League to respond to the pressure member states exert in protection of their own interests. The Arab League would support intervention in Sudan and Libya, if it was in the interest of regional hegemons Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Likewise, if intervention was not in the latter's interests, they would refrain from endorsing intervention.

From a geopolitical perspective, it was not in the interest of Egypt to support intervention in the violation of human rights in Sudan, as fear for religious extremism was overruled by water politics. For Saudi Arabia, intervention in the Darfur conflict would threaten the profitable relationship it had with Khartoum. Therefore, it was not in Saudi Arabia's economic interest to support intervention in the matter either. While the Arab League did not endorse intervention, the case of Sudan confirms the second hypothesis.

As opposed to the situation in Sudan, it was in the geopolitical interest of Egypt to support intervention in Libya in 2011. An unstable political situation was unwanted, because of its own fragile political situation. For Saudi Arabia, the consequences of the Libyan conflict caused an unwelcome instability in the oil industry, affecting the Saudi demand and supply balance and as such its material

capabilities. Intervention, and as such a new Libyan government, would provide new business opportunities for both Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Interference would therefore be in the interest of both regional powers. The intervention by the Arab League in Libya, too, confirms the second hypothesis.

The geopolitical and material interests of the regional hegemons have shown to be crucial for the Arab League's decision not to endorse intervention in the case of Sudan, as well as for the decision to support intervention in the case of Libya.

7.1.3 Transnational advocacy networks

For the third hypothesis, Keck and Sikkink's (1998) theory on the strategies that TANs employ to influence the political agenda of the international system of states and intergovernmental organizations, was combined with Ribeiro Hoffman and Van der Vleuten's (2010) ideas on RIO access for those TANs. The two cases of Sudan and Libya were tested for the appearance of TANs that put their government 'in pincers', or in other words, acted at the regional level to pressure their governments to protect human rights (Van der Vleuten, 2005).

The effectiveness of the strong regional mobilization by the Darfur Consortium and the Coalition for Darfur resulted to be restricted by a lack of access to the Arab League for these TANs. As a result, there is no dialogue between the League and these networks, but rather a unidirectional attempt to get a foot in the door at the regional level by the latter. Hereto, both organizations have publicly addressed the League and its member states, demanding intervention in Sudan and Libya. The hypothesis does not hold in the case of Sudan, as the League has not endorsed intervention.

In the case of Libya, the LFJL showed a high level of regional mobilization, however, its efforts were not directed towards the Arab League. No other TAN was found that met the criteria of regional mobilization and operated at the level of the League. In the light of the search that was undertaken, it is unlikely that such a TAN exists. Like Darfur, this case therefore also indicates that the hypothesis does not hold.

7.1.4 Compatibility of identities and external pressure

The fourth and last hypothesis was derived from system level theorizing provided by Ribeiro Hoffmann and Van der Vleuten (2010). When the identity of the third party that credibly exerts pressure on the RIO to act in a certain way is compatible with the identity of the RIO itself, interference will more likely be tolerated because of the shared identity - and accordingly shared norms - by both parties. Because of the need to belong, the RIO will show similar behavior. In order to test this hypothesis, the Arab League's conception of the UK, France and the US vis-à-vis its own identity was analyzed, as well as the strength of their pressure in the cases of Sudan and Libya.

The identities of the Arab League on the one hand, and the UK, France and the US on the other, turned out to be incompatible with each other. Lacking the need to belong, the hypothesis did not expect the League to comply in either case. Nonetheless, the expectation was contradicted by the League's support for intervention in Libya. In contrast, the League's lack of support for intervention in Sudan confirms the hypothesis.

In conclusion, the hypothesis that the Arab League supports intervention, if a third party with a matching identity exerts strong pressure in favor of intervention, does not hold.

7.2 Theoretical implications

This paragraph will discuss the theoretical implications of the results obtained through this study. To summarize, hypothesis 1 and 4 hold for one case and was rejected in the other one, hypothesis 2 was confirmed in both cases and the 3rd hypothesis was rejected in both cases (see Table 8 on page 62). After having tested the two cases of Sudan and Libya, the second hypothesis is the only hypothesis that holds without any further amendments needed. This means that if it is in the interest of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or both, the Arab League will support intervention in its member states. Likewise, if it is not in the interest of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or both, the League will not support intervention. It was not in the geopolitical and economic interests of the regional hegemons to support intervention in Sudan in 2004. In contrast, it was in the geopolitical and economic interests of the regional hegemons to support intervention in Libya in 2011. Both cases confirm that regional hegemons Egypt and Saudi Arabia play a pivotal role in shaping the League's decisions.

The internalization of human rights into the Arab League's identity does not provide an explanation for the inconsistencies in the organization's behavior. Although the internalization of human rights into the identity of the League was mediocre in 2004 as well as in 2011, the case studies show different outcomes. Possibly, the hypothesis only holds if the organization has highly internalized the norms. A weak or mediocre internalization could indicate cheap talk: the organization has not really internalized the norms, but rather uses them for other purposes. Before entirely rejecting the expectation that a RIO supports intervention in its member states when human rights are violated if it has internalized human rights into its DNA, it is interesting to determine whether the level of internalization matters for the outcome. Also, Finnemore and Sikkink's theory (1998) – which served as a basis for this hypothesis - had not yet been tested on an organization composed of non-democratic member states. The character of the organization – i.e. democratic or autocratic – might entail different behavior in terms of norm compliance and as such explain why the hypothesis does not predict correctly the League's behavior. A test on an organization comparable to the Arab League could provide new insights for Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) theory. The consequence might be that the theory does not hold for non-free and non-democratic organizations.

The analysis of TANs with access to the Arab League indicates that the third hypothesis failed to pass the test. Based on the lack of regional mobilization at the level of the League by TANs from Libya, the hypothesis did not expect the League to support intervention, which it did. Furthermore, although Sudanese TANs mobilized regionally, this did not trigger the Arab League to support intervention in Darfur. However, it is likely that the restricted access to the League for TANs causes these outcomes. Although Sudanese TANs mobilized regionally, this did not entail physical access to the League. Therefore, the specific effects of the lack of possibilities for (physical) access to RIOs on the outcomes must be studied more closely, in order to determine whether an addition to the hypothesis is needed to pass the test.

Finally, clashing identities do not necessarily form an obstacle to the exercise of effective pressure on a RIO. The clashing identities of the Arab League and the UK, France and the US in both cases, only provide an explanation for *ineffective* pressure for intervention. The outcome of a lack of support for intervention in Darfur is not surprising as such, even more so in the light of the limited pressure. Nonetheless, the League supported intervention in Libya regardless of the clashing identities, which carries consequences for the theory, as it does not explain effective intervention when identities clash. Before the hypothesis as a whole is rejected, additional cases must be studied

in a RIO intervened in one of its member states even though no external pressure was exercised. This is complicated, however, by the fact that intervention by RIOs in their member states is scarce.

7.3 Reflection

When conducting research, the question ‘Were the tests of the smoking-gun, hoop, doubly-decisive, or straw in the wind variety?’ (Van Evera, 1997, p. 76) is a crucial one. The choices made with regard to choosing certain theories, defining concepts and selecting cases, affect the extent to which a test has been conducted well and as such influence the quality of the results. Therefore, and in light of the theoretical implications, some remarks have to be taken into consideration.

First of all, the analyzed cases are characterized by non-democratic governments; however, the theories used consider democratic states. As indicated earlier, it is necessary to realize the possible limitations of these theories for non-democratic states. With respect to the Arab League, which is composed of non-democratic member states, hegemon power politics seems to be crucial in determining its behavior, similar to the organizations studied by Ribeiro Hoffmann and Van der Vleuten (2010). However, the other hypotheses tested were not confirmed. The effects of norm compliance, the role of TANs at the regional level and the influence of third party pressure by compatible third parties might change – i.e. diminish or increase – dependent on the democratic identity of the RIO in question. In the same manner, there is a need to be rather careful to generalize the results of this study of non-democracies and use these as a blueprint for theorizing about democracies. The conditions under which the Arab League as a regional arrangement supports intervention in its member states when human rights are violated might differ from the conditions under which a RIO composed of democratic member states support intervention in its member states.

Secondly, with respect to TANs, access to the Arab League was mainly defined as *physical* access, indicated as the ability to be present at regional meetings of the League and its decision-making bodies. However, from the case study of Sudanese TANs it became clear that naming and shaming member states, as well as the RIO itself, by referring publicly to the matter of Darfur – and underlining their role in the conflict and responsibility to end it – is an important tool used by TANs. For this tactic, no physical access is required, although it is clearly a tool for ‘putting a government in pincers’, fitting Van der Vleuten’s (2005) observations.

Thirdly, the Arab Spring has caused many political changes in the Arab world to take place. This might have changed the mechanisms of Arab League as a regional arrangement and as such influenced the outcomes of this study. To determine whether this is the case, the Arab League’s policy processes could be studied more in detail by the method of process tracing.

Fourthly, the outcome of this study was influenced by limitations of access to material, both in terms of language and available information sources. Many documents that were written in Arab were also available in English. However, it was regrettable that some sources were only written in Arab. This especially caused the search for TANs in Sudan and Libya to be time complicated. To prevent a biased approach, information sources have been used that were written in several languages (English and French) and originate from different countries (both Western and Arab) and institutional backgrounds (scholars, newspapers, governments and NGOs).

Fifthly, another complicating factor was the frequent shutdown of websites of the Arab League and, at moments when these were online, the outdated and incomplete information

provision (see Appendix, Image 1). As a result, most information on the Arab League had to be gathered from secondary sources, which complicated the search. This lack of information is telling of the limited transparency of the Arab League as an organization, also for non-state actors such as TANS.

Finally, finding information on TANS turned out to be complicated. Websites of NGOs and secondary literature on TANS did not always deliver the information needed. To establish whether some TANS had gone unnoticed in the case of Sudan, various NGOs were contacted and some provided useful new insights. Moreover, the list of NGOs that have been rewarded observer status in the Arab League and of which was spoken in secondary literature remained undiscovered. Secondary literature, however, mentioned the character of these organizations was in fact governmental rather than independent from the states of origin. In the end, therefore, this did not influence the outcomes of this study.

In conclusion, the conditions under which the Arab League support intervention in its member states, had not yet been studied extensively. With this thesis, a first attempt has been undertaken with the aim of gaining a better understanding of the organization's behavior. Having tested various hypotheses, a piece of the puzzle has been found, but also many more questions have arisen as a consequence. The League has proven to be an interesting case for further research in this sense. The Arab Spring provides a unique opportunity to study the Arab League's behavior concerning interventions in its member states. Up until the moment of writing, the League has not (yet) interfered in Syria for example, although human rights are being violated on an increasing scale. The conclusions of this thesis underline that regional hegemon interests determine whether the League intervenes, but what does this mean for the revolutions? Can the Arab League cause the Spring to really set in? Or will the Arab states remain in darker and colder times, as has happened in Sudan?

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Appendix

Table 3. Religions in the Arab League's member states (in percentages)

State	Islam	Christianity	Other
Algeria	99	0.5	0.5
Bahrain	81.2	9	8.8
Comoros	99	1	n/a
Djibouti	94	5	1
Egypt	83	16	1
Iraq	95	4.3	0.7
Jordan	93	6	1
Kuwait	85	10	5
Lebanon	63	34	3
Libya	88	5	7
Mauritania	100	0	0
Morocco	98.7	1	0.3
Oman	92.5	5	2.5
Palestinian Authority	92	8	-
Qatar	77.6	11	11.4
Saudi Arabia	100	0	0
Somalia	100	0	0
Sudan	97	3	0.001
Syria	82	12	6
Tunisia	98	1	1
United Arab Emirates	76	9	15
Yemen	99	0.2	0.8

Table 4. Arab League member states with more than 1 official language

Country	Official languages
Comoros	Arab, French, Comorian
Djibouti	Arab, French
Iraq	Arab, Kurdish
Lebanon	Arab, French
Morocco	Arab, Berber
Somalia	Arab, Somali
Sudan	Arab, English

Table 5. Month and year of accession of Arab League member states


State	Date of accession
Jordan	March 1947
Libya	March 1953
Sudan	January 1956
Tunisia	October 1958
Morocco	October 1958
Kuwait	July 1961
Algeria	August 1962
Oman	September 1971
Qatar	September 1971
Bahrein	September 1971
United Arab Emirates (UAE)	December 1971
Mauretania	November 1973
Somalia	February 1974
Palestinian Authority	September 1976
Djibouti	September 1977
Comoros	November 1993

Table 6. Non-ratifications of UN document on human rights by Arab League member states.

Country	1. Civil Rights	2. ESCR	3. Racism	4. Women	5. Torture	6. Child	7. Protocol II	8. ICC	Total non ratification
Algeria								•	1
Bahrain								•	1
Comoros	•	•			•				3
Djibouti			•						1
Egypt								•	1
Iraq					•		•	•	3
Jordan									0
Kuwait								•	1
Lebanon		•						•	2
Libya								•	1
Mauritania									0
Morocco							•	•	2
Oman	•	•			•			•	4
Palestinian Authority									0
Qatar	•	•						•	3
Saudi Arabia	•	•						•	3
Somalia				•		•	•	•	4
Sudan				•	•			•	3
Syria							•	•	2
Tunisia								•	1
United Arab Emirates	•	•			•			•	4
Yemen								•	1

Source: http://escolapau.uab.cat/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=77&Itemid=97&lang=en

Figure 1. Freedom in the Arab League.



Source: www.freedomhouse.org)

Image 1. The Arab League's official website.



Source: image retrieved from <http://www.lasportal.org>