2016

Provincie Noord Brabant/Radboud Universiteit

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VOTER TURNOUT IN THE NETHERLANDS: THE CASE OF NOORD BRABANT

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Preface

This master thesis was written as the final part of the master program Human Geography, specialization ‘Europe: Borders, Identities, and Governance’ at the Radboud University. It looks at voter turnout in Noord Brabant and specifically why it is so low in this province in particular. I would like to thank the province of Noord Brabant for the time that I spent there on my internship and for helping me throughout the process. In particular, I would like to thank Willem de Graaff of the research department for supervising my internship at the province of Noord Brabant. Furthermore, I would like to thank my thesis supervisor, Jackie van de Walle, for her counsel during my thesis project. These two people have been invaluable to me during the entire period.

Joris Broekmeulen

August 2016

Summary

This thesis looks into the question of voter turnout in the province of Noord Brabant. For years and years, ballot attendance in Brabant has been exceptionally low, especially in comparison to other provinces in the Netherlands. What factors might explain this low voter turnout? What have previous scholars written about these phenomena? The thesis is subdivided into four sub questions, each of which tries to look into a different element of society that might explain voter turnout. These are the level of income, the level of education, religion, and voter participation. The entire research takes a positivist approach, which means that there is an objective world, in which certain things are true or not. Hard evidence and empirical data, derived from the municipal level within Noord Brabant, are at the basis of this approach. The statistical research in this thesis is based on regression analysis. The data are derived from the CBS and the Electoral Council of the Netherlands.

The first chapter looks at voter turnout and income. Webster, Smith, and Marx all three agree that vast inequality is bad for society. Marx even claims that it creates a wedge, while Weber is more skeptical. Buchanan points out that people do not like to be excluded, which would indicate that he agrees with Webster, Smith, and Marx. Most scholars agree and therefore, the hypothesis was that income is a variable that is able to explain voter turnout in Noord Brabant. the data indeed provided some evidence supporting this notion. Both the percentage of relatively low incomes and the average income provided an R square above 0,5. More or less the same can be observed in chapter two, which looks at education and voter turnout. Education is here divided into the percentage of people with a higher and those with a lower education. Parsons argues that education will promote democracy, which would mean that a higher education increases voter turnout. Therefore, it was to be expected that education does influence voter turnout in Noord Brabant and the data do indeed provide support for this claim. Higher education in Noord Brabant is able to explain 59 percent of the variance within the province, which is slightly higher than lower education. Municipal elections form the exception, because lower education does not tell anything about attendance during those elections.

The third chapter focuses on religion in combination with voter turnout. Durkheim claims that religion is highly social, while Weber indicates that this counts more for Catholics than for Protestants, who tend to be more individualistic. For many years, the Netherlands was characterized by pillarization, which divided society in pillars based on religion or social class. The Catholics were organized even more tightly than others. Depillarization marked the

end of pillarization in the 1960s, which struck Catholics harder than others. Most Catholics in the Netherlands live in Noord Brabant and therefore, the hypothesis was that religion indeed influences voter turnout in this province. In this chapter, religion is divided into religious attendance and religious affiliation. Religious attendance means that people visit a religious service at least once a month. Where religious affiliation explains more than fifty percent of the variance, religious attendance lags a little bit behind, with 35 percent. Because religion used to play such an important role in the Netherlands and in Noord Brabant, the fourth chapter looks at voter turnout and party preferences. As was already mentioned, pillarization marked society in the past and the Catholics were the most tightly organized pillar. The Catholics almost always voted for the Catholic party KVP. Initially, they also tended to support its successor, the Christian Democratic CDA. However, later this support dwindled and nowadays, it is just one of the many parties that people in Noord Brabant vote for. Support declined from more than forty percent in the 1980s to less than ten percent in 2012. The hypothesis for this chapter was thus that party preferences indeed influence voter turnout in Brabant. And again, the data support this hypothesis, because the percentage of the vote that the CDA received is able to explain more than fifty percent of the variance.

In the conclusion, the data used throughout this research are combined, to find out whether a combination of more than one variable would be able to explain voter turnout even better. It proves that income and education taken together are the variables that explain voter turnout the most, even more than the other variables. In the reflection, this thesis discusses some possibilities for further research in the future. It looks at the same data that are used in this thesis for education and income, but then in the provinces Gelderland, Limburg, and Utrecht. The outcomes provide some interesting ideas for future study. Another possibility put forward in the reflection is to look at the same data, but not on a municipal level, but at the differences between neighborhoods. A lot more about voter turnout in general, and in Noord Brabant in particular, can be studied.

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Introduction

Introduction

On March 18, 2015, elections were held in the Netherlands on the provincial level. There are twelve provinces and they all have their own directly elected legislatures and governments, but their impact on policy is limited. As the so-called middle government they rather deal with other governments than with individual citizens.[1] Through these provincial elections voters elect the members of the provincial legislature. These members than choose the deputies from their midst, who will then form the executive committee of the province. Because the tasks of the provincial legislature are most often restricted to providing the outlines of governance, they are less known to the public.[2] Once, during the times of the so-called 'Golden Age' of the Netherlands, they were the most powerful governmental institutions, but since then it lost nearly all its important functions.[3] However, they still have an important national function, because the provincial legislatures together appoint the members of the First Chamber. Despite the fact that this is a very important function, most people in the Netherlands did not feel the need to get out and vote: a mere 47,76 percent of the eligible voters did actually go to the ballot box.[4]



Figure 1.1: Turnout Provincial Elections 1999 - 2015

[1] R.B. Andeweg & G.A. Irwin, *Governance and Politics of the Netherlands* (Basingstoke 2014) 212.
[2] G.E. Breeman et. al., *De Bestuurlijke Kaart van Nederland: Het openbaar bestuur en zijn omgeving in nationaal en internationaal perspectief* (Bussum 2015) 78.
[3] M.S. de Vries, 'Institutional Fleecing: The Slow Death of the Dutch Provinces', *Public Organization Review*, Vol. 4, No. 4 (2004) 295.
[4] All turnout rates are derived from and available at: http://www.verkiezingsuitslagen.nl/Na1918/Verkiezingsuitslagen.aspx?VerkiezingsTypeId=4, accessed May 11, 2015.

Figure 1.1 shows the turnout rates of the provincial elections for the last sixteen years, since 1999. What is striking about them is that one can see that all the northern provinces, namely Groningen, Friesland, and Drenthe, as well as in the province of Utrecht, turnout rates are much higher than in the southern provinces, with the province of Noord Brabant having the lowest attendance numbers every year, except for 1999, when Limburg performed even worse. In 2015, only 43,64 percent of eligible voters in Noord Brabant took the effort to really go out and vote, so four percentage points below the national average.

This low turnout is not merely confined to provincial elections, but it applies to all sorts of elections. Figure 1.2. shows this in detail.

Province (EP)	1999	2004	2009	2014
Groningen	111,1592	110,1375	99,6463	101,3398
Friesland	112,7582	106,164	99,0748	103,4834
Drenthe	110,8594	110,3668	99,7279	100,1072
Overijssel	113,058	107,8197	97,8776	100,911
Flevoland	97,5683	94,4728	92,8163	92,4169
Gelderland	110,1599	104,4829	102,9388	104,9839
Noord Holland	91,6389	98,5227	102,3129	100,2412
Zuid Holland	95,1366	97,3255	101,3878	100,5627
Zeeland	102,998	103,6933	100,1361	107,1008
Utrecht	112,3917	110,8507	115,2109	114,4159
Noord Brabant	**90,4397**	**91,0596**	**90,449**	**91,1576**
Limburg	90,43971	89,4294	90,8027	90,0857
National Average	100	100	100	100

Province (GR)	2002	2006	2010	2014
Groningen	104,2142	104,7302	101,6996	104,1296
Friesland	109,5855	107,9064	103,1591	106,9259
Drenthe	103,4542	106,7452	100,739	104,8704
Overijssel	98,9465	107,0526	104,5816	104,7222
Flevoland	94,1105	92,0936	105,8932	96,6667
Gelderland	104,8014	104,0984	103,6579	105,5556
Noord Holland	94,9568	95,4235	97,6169	97,3333

Zuid Holland	97,2884	98,1216	98,9285	97,1667
Zeeland	106,1313	105,4133	107,3342	108,5926
Utrecht	106,2349	101,7418	104,5446	106,537
Noord Brabant	**97,6166**	**94,9795**	**93,6265**	**92,9074**
Limburg	104,266	103,8081	99,4643	98,0926
National Average	100	100	100	100

Province (PS)	1999	2003	2007	2011	2015
Groningen	113,2559	116,4847	109,9353	104,02	111,0343
Friesland	118,5145	121,4196	116,681	107,0752	111,0972
Drenthe	114,3514	117,8916	110,2586	104,8061	106,7211
Overijssel	110,2761	108,4838	107,5	103,1267	104,2504
Flevoland	97,305	95,3381	94,5043	95,712	95,4983
Gelderland	103,2428	107,5178	105,431	104,6453	104,5017
Noord Holland	91,17	95,6321	97,069	102,2691	98,8694
Zuid Holland	92,5504	94,8761	94,9138	96,4088	95,8124
Zeeland	106,7704	107,4339	113,944	105,1456	109,2965
Utrecht	104,3383	106,8039	107,9957	110,2198	110,1131
Noord Brabant	**99,6933**	**87,7153**	**90,6466**	**91,8885**	**91,3735**
Limburg	97,9185	93,7211	93,1035	92,3709	94,2839
National Average	100	100	100	100	100

Province (TK)	2002	2003	2006	2010	2012
Groningen	99,5067	101,9615	101,1574	99,73475	101,2874
Friesland	103,5796	104,4353	103,1238	102,2944	103,3391
Drenthe	101,2143	103,6607	103,2981	101,3395	103,0575
Overijssel	103,0483	104,5102	103,3852	101,618	102,5345
Flevoland	99,532	98,6257	98,1581	97,6923	96,9559
Gelderland	102,6562	103,3108	102,3771	102,4403	103,205
Noord Holland	99,6332	98,9380	99,2408	100,1724	100,1207
Zuid Holland	99,532	98,1259	98,5065	98,2729	98,1628
Zeeland	101,151	100,7621	100,7965	101,8302	101,4081

Utrecht	104,2246	103,6607	103,1736	105,1989	105,1629
Noord Brabant	**97,5209**	**97,7886**	**97,71**	**97,7321**	**97,4252**
Limburg	93,2583	94,1279	96,9508	96,7109	94,7834
National Average	100	100	100	100	100

Figure 1.2: Turnout All Elections 1999 – 2015

These authors only discuss the problems with provincial elections, but for the province of Noord Brabant, however, the problems lie much deeper. In figure 1.2 all the turnout rates for all elections held in the Netherlands since 1999 are given. These include elections for the European Parliament (EP), for the Second Chamber (TK), for provincial legislatures (PS), and for municipalities (GR). Because real percentages do not give a clear view of the problems with elections in Noord Brabant, all of these turnout rates have been converted into index numbers. This is because of the huge differences in attendance between the different sorts of elections. For instance, two percent below average in Second Chamber elections means less than when this happens with elections for the European Parliament, because general turnout with national elections is higher than for European ones. That is why the index numbers are used. The national average is then always 100, while the numbers per province are calculated through the following formula: (P/N)*100. P means the provincial turnout percentage, while N means the average national turnout percentage. One can thus clearly see that no matter what kind of elections are being held, Noord Brabant turnout rates are always among the lowest, most often even the lowest, in the Netherlands. It can be observed that the national average of 100 is never achieved in Noord Brabant. Turnout always falls below this average.

Research Goal

The previous paragraph showed that problems with electoral turnout in the province of Noord Brabant appear to be of a structural nature. To find out why voter turnout in Noord Brabant is as low as it is, is beyond the scope of this research. This research will therefore try to find out to what extent social-economic and social-cultural variables explain voter turnout in Noord Brabant. If it becomes clear which of the variables studied in this research best explain the variance in the province of Noord Brabant, it will help solve the larger problem of how to increase ballot attendance there. To find an answer to the question of to what extent the variables explain voter turnout will thus be the ultimate goal of this thesis.

Societal Relevance

These structurally lower turnout numbers signify a lower political involvement in Brabant. This may lead to a democratic deficit in the future, which means that political arrangements of governments "*fail the expectation that participation should elicit government responsiveness.*"[5] Voters do not abstain at random and therefore certain groups of citizens are more likely to vote than others. According to Dahl, politicians tend to represent those that vote for them and when people tend to abstain from the process at all, they will become marginalized in society. The democratic process is thus "*the most reliable means for protecting and advancing the good and interests of all the persons subject to collective decisions.*"[6] This might lead to exclusion of certain parts of society, who might end up feeling angry and alienated. In turn, this will lead to a divided society.[7]

Newspapers also picked up on this. Lower attendance numbers on election day lead to a lower representative value of the political governmental bodies. This, in turn, might lead to further alienation by the citizens of Noord Brabant.[8] The lower turnouts of the provincial elections have also been debated by various Dutch scholars. Breeman, Van Noort, and Rutgers for instance claim that the public does not know anything about provincial government, because they have almost no executive tasks. Their thesis is that because people do not know, they also do not care.[9] Andeweg and Irwin confirm this by stating that provincial governments more often deal with other governments than with individual people. Civilians are only getting interested when national politics is involved, like in 2011, when the majority for the governing CDA, VVD, and the PVV of Rutte I was at stake in the First Chamber.[10] Research conducted in 2005 showed that the majority of the Dutch had no idea what provincial government was about or what its tasks were.[11] This lack of knowledge about the institutions citizens are voting for will probably also hamper a high ballot attendance.

Scientific Relevance

This research will build further on theories about voter turnout, specifically tied to the case of Noord Brabant. More than literally using the theories mentioned above, it will use the suggestions put forward by these scholars as a guideline for the research questions. The

[5] M.E. Warren, 'Citizen Participation and Democratic Deficits: Considerations from the Perspective of Democratic Theory', In: J. DeBardeleben & J. Pammett, *Activating the Citizen: Dilemmas of Participation in Europe and Canada* (London 2009) 17.
[6] R.A. Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics* (New Haven 1989) 322.
[7] http://www.lfpress.com/2015/10/18/not-voting-self-fulfilling-alienation, accessed March 4, 2016.
[8] http://www.metronieuws.nl/binnenland/2015/03/lage-opkomst-kan-democratie-bedreigen, accessed December 1, 2015.
[9] Breeman et. al., *De Bestuurlijke Kaart van Nederland*, 83.
[10] Andeweg & Irwin, *Governance and Politics in the Netherlands*, 212-213.
[11] K. Peters, *Het Opgeblazen Bestuur: Een Kritische Kijk op de Provincie* (Amsterdam 2007) 57-58.

theoretical framework of each chapter will then look at the question of voter turnout from the perspective of sociology and human geography. This way, it will combine various approaches of different academic backgrounds. Later on in each chapter, these theoretical approaches are to be merged with historical and statistical analysis. This research will try to seek further explanation for the low turnout rates in Noord Brabant compared to other provinces in the Netherlands. The central scientific issue in this research is that voter turnout has been investigated and debated mostly on a national scale and mostly by researchers based in the United States. Examples of this are for instance the *Changes and Continuity* series by Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, or Dunham's *Electoral Behavior in the United States*. In 'Political Knowledge and Political Participation in the Netherlands: Comparisons with the Canadian Case' Howe looks into Dutch electoral turnout. What these studies lack is a regional analysis. This research wants to build further on their work by looking at their results and researching those on the scale of Noord Brabant. It will give a more regional dimension to studying and analyzing voter turnout numbers. By taking both a positivist and a structuralist approach, this thesis will try to look into social structures of Noord Brabant and more or less expose them with numbers based on statistical analysis.

Another reason why this research will prove to be scientifically relevant is that it will build further on sociological concepts concerned with poverty, exclusion, education, religion, and society developed by for instance Weber, Durkheim, Dilthey, or Parsons. It will then operationalize these theories and link them to Noord Brabant, thereby testing these concepts. The historical part is the third reason why this research will prove to be relevant, because it will look into the history of pillarization and will link it to the present. CBS statistics will be used in order to describe the depillarization of Noord Brabant and its influenced, combined with a historical analysis of Noord Brabant and the phenomenon of pillarization.

Research Questions

The main goal of this research is to find out what variables explain voter turnout in Noord Brabant. Therefore, the main question is: 'To what extent do social economic and social cultural factors explain voter turnout in Noord Brabant?' This question will be answered based on data per municipality within the province. The analysis will take a more positivist approach, which will be explained later on. All the sub questions are based upon this method. These sub questions, which will each individually study one variable that might explain voter turnout in Noord Brabant, based on previous research, should ultimately lead to an answer to

the main question of this thesis. The theoretical framework will provide hypotheses that will be used in the chapters dealing with the different sub questions.

The first sub question is: 'To what extent can income explain voter turnout in Noord Brabant?' This suggestion was put forward by voter theorists, but also by an inquiry conducted by the Dutch government's bureau for statistics CBS, and it fits the positivist hypothesis, because it is based on solid numbers as empirical evidence. However, the CBS report did not explicitly play a role in the Netherlands, but it did do so on a European scale.[12] Based on the sociologist David Easton's idea that there is one overarching model that can explain the workings of a political system, the same can be assumed for the provinces.[13] A possible other factor, although often closely related to income, is differences in the level of education. Therefore the second sub question is: 'To what extent can education explain voter turnout in Noord Brabant?' This suggestion was also put forward by both voter turnout theorists, like Smets and Van Ham, and the CBS inquiry.[14] However, the CBS analysis was based on a nationwide inquiry, so there is no proof yet that this factor alone will explain low voter turnout in Noord Brabant alone. On the other hand, the voter turnout theorists do produce a reliable hypothesis based on positivists' ideas that solid numbers and facts are the way to explain turnout numbers, just like with the data of average income.

The third sub question will focus on religion and voter turnout, based on Howe's notion that religiousness plays an important role in political participation.[15] Pillarization and depillarization were of great influence in the Netherlands, and in Noord Brabant too. Andeweg and Irwin claimed that one cannot understand politics in the Netherlands without understanding pillarization and the Catholics were the most tightly organized pillar in the Netherlands. Most of the Catholics lived and still live in the south, including in Noord Brabant.[16] The research question is: 'To what extent can religion and religious participation explain voter turnout in Noord Brabant?' Van Holsteyn and Den Ridder claim that cultural differences cannot be ignored, by stating that the history of pillarization in the Netherlands played an important role in transforming society.[17] They argue that this has also been visible in the changing attitudes of voters. Nowadays, more than before, people harbor sympathy for more than one political party, something which was inconceivable in the years of

[12] Ibid., 106.
[13] J.H. de Baas, *Bestuurskunde in Hoofdlijnen: Invloed op Beleid* (Groningen 1995) 86-89.
[14] H. Schmeets et. al., *Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek 2006-2012* (Den Haag 2015) 118.
[15] P. Howe, 'Political Knowledge and Political Participation in the Netherlands: Comparisons with the Canadian Case', *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 27, No. 2 (April 2006) 148-151.
[16] Andeweg and Irwin, *Governance and Politics of the Netherlands*, 33-39.
[17] J.J.M. van Holsteyn & J.M. den Ridder, 'Verandering in continuïteit', *Bestuurskunde*, Vol. 4, No. 3 (2008) 42.

pillarization.[18] The fourth and last sub question will go deeper into the choice for different political parties: 'To what extent can the changing patterns in party preferences in Noord Brabant explain voter turnout there?' This might be the case, which would confirm the hypothesis that depillarization since the late 1960s played an important role in reshaping the political landscape and voter turnout. Because pillarization was closely related to religion, the next sub question also has to do with the issue of religion in Dutch society, based on Howe's notion that religiousness plays an important role in political participation.[19] This aspect, however, is already dealt with in the chapter on religion and voter turnout. This chapter is therefore more focused on changing party affiliation in the province of Noord Brabant. The CDA will be at the center of attention here, because for a long time, the Christian Democrats and its Catholic Predecessor KVP dominate politics in Noord Brabant.

The penultimate chapter of this research will look at a combination of the data from the various sub questions. Will those results explain the variance even better? The last chapter will then look at the results, analyze them carefully, combine some data, and then, it will provide a conclusion based on a discussion of the answers on the various sub questions. In the end, all this should provide an answer to the main question of this thesis: 'To what extent do social economic and social cultural factors explain voter turnout in Noord Brabant?'

Methodology

This research will rely on various different sources. The most important are the data that are needed for statistical analysis. The data that this research is going to use will not be new data generated during the research process, but data that already have been assembled by the Dutch national bureau for statistics CBS. Their database is available online.[20] All the data used in this research will be derived from CBS, unless it is explicitly indicated in a footnote. The results of the previous elections form an exception, because these numbers will be derived from the website of Kiesraad.[21] This research will therefore only use other inquiries and statistics and it will not provide new data. These data will be used for statistical analysis based on SPSS and Excel. Most chapters are to use statistical analysis and the methods will be clearly accounted for, step by step. Andy Field's *Discovering Statistics Using IBM SPSS Statistics* will be used as a helpful tool during the process of statistical analysis.

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[18] Ibid., 43.
[19] P. Howe, 'Political Knowledge and Political Participation in the Netherlands: Comparisons with the Canadian Case', *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 27, No. 2 (April 2006) 148-151.
[20] CBS Statline, available at: http://statline.cbs.nl/Statweb/, accessed June 1, 2015.
[21] Kiesraad Database, available at: http://www.verkiezingsuitslagen.nl/, accessed June 1, 2015.

Regression analysis is a useful tool for this thesis, because the causal effect of one variable upon another can help find the causes of the lower turnout rates. This way, the causal relation between income and voter turnout, or education and voter turnout, can be tested. The results of a regression analysis can be read from the different figures throughout this report and in the appendix. There are several different factors within the results that need to be taken into account. The model summary gives a concise overview of the outcome. First of all, there is the R, which presents the correlation between the two variables. The R square indicates the percentage of cases that can be explained by this analysis. This number is between 0 and 1, so an R square of 0,5 means that fifty percent of the variance is explained by that analysis. Only the R square needs to be explained throughout this research, because this is the most precise number. In the ANOVA, one can find the significance of the model. This has to be below 0,05, because otherwise, it does not have any additional value. The significance per individual variable are found under 'Coefficients.'[22] These can be found in the appendix and any deviation is mentioned in the chapters themselves. The causal effects that are being researched in this thesis are voter turnout and other variables, as explained in the paragraph on the research questions. These are average income, the percentage of relatively low incomes, the percentage of lower educated people, the percentage of higher educated people, and the size of a municipality. Those numbers are investigated for both the provincial and the municipal level. How this was done is shown step by step in the next two chapters.

Unfortunately, this research will only be able to look at the data and results at a municipal level. Precise voter turnout data on a neighborhood level are not available for the province of Noord Brabant. This is unfortunate, because in Rotterdam, these are available, and an analysis of those numbers provides an interesting result in combination with average income. The CBS released such an overview of average income per neighborhood in May 2015, which was subsequently published on the website of NRC Handelsblad.[23] A regression analysis shows an R square of 0,79, which tells us that 79 percent of the variance is explained by voter turnout and income at a neighborhood level. This is a very high number, but, as was already mentioned, it will not be possible to conduct a similar research for neighborhoods in Noord Brabant.

[22] http://www.spsshandboek.nl/output_voorbeeld_regressie_analyse/, accessed December 1, 2015.
[23] http://www.nrcq.nl/2015/05/27/verdien-je-meer-of-minder-dan-je-buurman, accessed June 25, 2015.

Conceptual Framework



Theoretical Framework

Introduction

This chapter will look into the question of what elements explain voter turnout. It will first look at what various scholars wrote on these factors. The sub questions are based on four variables that generally influence voter turnout. These are income, education, religion, and party preference. Party preference is probably closely related to religion, because of the pillarization and depillarization in the Netherlands. These pillars dividing society meant that people belonging to one such group would almost always vote for the same political party. In Noord Brabant, this was most often the KVP and its successor, the current CDA. First, this chapter will explain the positivist approach of this research and what it means for the methods of this thesis. The next part of this chapter, the underlying sociology of the three factors here mentioned are discussed. The conclusion will summarize the findings and provide hypotheses for the subsequent chapters to build on.

Positivism

The basic sociological and geographical approach at the basis of this thesis is positivism. The first person to use the term sociology was Auguste Comte (1798-1857). He is also widely acknowledged as the father of positivism.[24] Comte thought that prior to the nineteenth century social research had been romantic and speculative. He therefore wanted to focus on empirical research, concentrating on facts and truths as data, because they are observable. For positivists, decision-making is also the result of "*the operation of a set of laws, to which individuals conform.*"[25] This agrees with Easton's concept, because he claims demographic figures play a very important role in measuring the functioning of a political system. These numbers are observable and easily measurable. Another characteristic of positivists is that "*there is an objective world, compromising individual behaviour and that the result of that behaviour which can be observed and recorded in an objective manner, on universally agreed criteria.*"[26] In other words, rules that apply to electoral turnout in the Netherlands, will also apply in Noord Brabant. This agrees with the three hypotheses based on Easton's idea, because they were instigated by reports on political participation on a national scale.

[24] R. Kitchin, 'Positivistic Geographies and Spatial Sciences', In: S. Aiken & G. Valentine, *Approaches to Human Geography* (London 2006) 20.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.

Positivism can also be divided into two different sorts of positivism. The first is logical positivism, which was developed by the so-called Vienna Circle in the 1920s and 1930s.[27] Experimental verification is the basis for knowledge and research.[28] This is thus the kind of positivism that is discussed above. Everything has to be verifiable. They differ from Comte in the sense that they think explanation is the goal of their approach, while Comte was looking for description.[29] The individual philosophers will be discussed in the relevant chapters. Critical rationalism was a skeptic response to logical positivism. The most well-known exponent of critical rationalism is the German philosopher Karl Popper (1902-1994). He claims that something is not true whether it is verifiable, because something can also be falsified.[30] One should not look for confirmatory evidence, but should look for the exceptions that undermine a theory. A theory can be proven a million times, but still one cannot be certain, while a single experiment can contradict a theory, making it thus redundant. The problem with this approach is that a theory can then almost never be verified; because there are always elements that one cannot take into account.[31] However, the notion of falsifiability is an important point. In his *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, which was the English translation of his *Logik der Forschung* from 1935, Popper goes further into the difference between verifiability and falsifiability. He criticizes the inductive reasoning of most experiments, which goes from singular statements to universal statements.[32] An example of such inductive logic is: "*The chair in the living room is red. The chair in the dining room is red. The chair in the bedroom is red. All chairs in the house are red.*"[33] Inductive reasoning is more or less what Easton's tries to achieve with his singular model for the political process. This research will use hypotheses based on inductive reasoning, because if something explained lower turnout on another scale, this research will also experiment with it on the provincial scale.

Voter Turnout in General

There are two basic factors of which various scholars acknowledge that they most often influence voter turnout. A meta-analysis conducted in 2016 studying various countries and all

[27] Stanford Encyclopedia Online, available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/vienna-circle/, accessed May 18, 2015.
[28] Brittanica Encyclopedia Online, available at: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/346336/logical-positivism, accessed May 18, 2015.
[29] A. Giddens, *Sociology* (Cambridge 2006) 11-12.
[30] Kitchin, 'Positivistic Geographies and Spatial Sciences', 22.
[31] Ibid.
[32] K.R. Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (London 1959) 3-4.
[33] This example was taken from: http://examples.yourdictionary.com/examples-of-inductive-reasoning.html, accessed May 18, 2015.

kinds of elections supported this. These two factors are income and education.[34] This means that turnout is higher in places where income is relatively high and where people are relatively well educated. In a study conducted by Smets and Van Ham, it was found that education was even mentioned as the best explanation for voter turnout in 74 percent of the ninety articles they used for their research.[35] Burden found that education is not only an important determiner for voter turnout, but also for civic participation in a more broader sense.[36] When it comes to income, Wichowsky found that income is an even better determiner for voter turnout in places that are less competitive. This means that the difference between higher and lower incomes is even bigger in terms of ballot attendance.[37]

Even though education and income are most often mentioned, other factors are also important when explaining voter turnout. Ignazi and Wellhofer, for instance, found an interesting relationship between voter turnout and religion. In Italy, they found out that secularization undermined a dominant party's authority and led to lower turnout percentages.[38] In some cases, the vacuum that was created because of this, was filled by other parties, and sometimes, this did not happen.[39] Penning conducted a similar study in the United States and also concluded that religious affiliation and voter turnout are closely related.[40] Association with fellow Catholics, Penning claims, stimulates political participation.[41]

Various studies have also been conducted to research the differences in regional elections across various regions throughout Europe. For instance, Sundstöm and Stockemer have found that, within Europe, the quality of regional government positively impacts voter turnout.[42] However, autonomy also plays an important role here. When a region is more autonomous, it will most likely have higher turnout numbers than when a region does not have any autonomy at all.[43] These are surprising findings, because not only in Noord Brabant, but throughout all of Western Europe, voter turnout has steadily declined over the last decennia, disregarding the autonomy or the government quality of a region. In 'The

[34] J. Cancela & B. Geys, 'Explaining voter turnout: meta-analysis of national and subnational elections', *Electoral Studies*, Vol. 42 (June 2016) 271.
[35] K. Smets & C. van Ham, 'The embarrassment of riches? A meta-analysis of individual-level research on voter turnout', *Electoral Studies*, Vol. 32 (2013) 356.
[36] B.C. Burden, 'The dynamic effects of education on voter turnout', *Electoral Studies*, Vol. 28 (2009) 547.
[37] A. Wichowsky, 'Competition, Party Dollars, and Income Bias in Voter Turnout, 1980–2008', *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 74, No. 2 (March 2012) 447.
[38] P. Ignazi & E.S. Wellhofer, 'Religion, Rurality and Voting: Secularisation, Landownership and Italian Electoral Behaviour, 1953-2008', *West European Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 5 (2013) 938.
[39] Ibid., 939.
[40] J.M. Penning, 'The Political Behavior of American Catholics: An Assessment of the Impact of Group Integration vs. Group Identification', *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 41, No. 2, (1988) 306.
[41] Ibid.
[42] A. Sundström & D. Stockemer, 'Regional variation in voter turnout in Europe: The impact of corruption perceptions', *Electoral Studies*, Vol. 40 (2015) 158.
[43] A. Henderson & N. McEwen, 'A comparative analysis of voter turnout in regional elections', *Electoral Studies*, Vol. 29 (2010) 405.

disappearing voters? Exploring declining turnout in Western European elections' Flickinger and Studlar explain that party de-alignment is an important factor in explaining decreasing voter turnout.[44] Party de-alignment means that an established order of political party affiliation is disappearing. Voters with fixed preferences are thus replaced by so-called 'floating' voters, who will make a decision from several parties, instead of always opting for the same party time and again.[45] Italy has known such deep changes before. Party mobility there has mostly become evident in local elections, where local parties, occupied with local issues, became more popular.[46]Also in the Netherlands, there is a clear example of such party de-alignment. Van der Brug conducted a research on floating voters in the Netherlands in the 1990s and he saw a clear decrease in the support for the Christian Democrats.[47] What is interesting about his findings, is that Van der Brug links this back to religion and the party affiliation that goes with ones religious beliefs. He thus connects party de-alignment to religion as factors explaining voter turnout, specifically in the Netherlands.

In conclusion, the factors that influence voter turnout are first and foremost income as well as education. Party de-alignment and religion are two other factors that need to be taken into account, perhaps even taken together, as Van der Brug suggested. There are of course more factors that might explain or influence voter turnout, but these four will form the basis of this research, because the necessary data are not available to this research. Also, other sources, which will be addressed later, also point in the direction of religion and party de-alignment as possible explanations for declining voter turnout in Noord Brabant specifically.

Sociology of Income Distribution

Noah Webster, an 18th century British political writer, once said that "*The causes which destroyed the ancient republics were numerous; but in Rome, one principal cause was the vast inequality of fortunes*."[48] This is quite an apocalyptic statement and of course it does not apply to Dutch society, but it again stresses the potential effects of inequality in income distribution. Many sociologists already wrote about the disruptive impact of inequality and poverty on society. Adam Smith already said that no society can be flourishing while a great

[44] R.S. Flickinger & D.T. Studlar, 'The disappearing voters? Exploring declining turnout in Western European elections', *West European Politics*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1992) 13-14.
[45] Ibid.
[46] A. Parisi & G. Pasquino, 'Changes in Italian electoral behavior; The relationships between parties and voters', *West European Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1979) 25-26.
[47] W. van der Brug, 'Floating voters or wandering parties? The Dutch national elections of 1998', *West European Politics*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (1999) 179.
[48] Quote derived from: http://inequality.org/quotes/, accessed June 15, 2015.

part of it is poor.[49] Karl Marx divides society into two layers, namely the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The former are the owners, or in this case the wealthy, and the latter are the workers. This creates a wedge in society that does not include age or sex.[50] For the purposes of this study, this implies that wealth and financial abilities are defining aspects of this society, thereby also indicating a difference in voter turnout among various different classes of income. Weber disagrees with Marx, whose pure focus on economic wealth as a marker of difference in society he denounces.[51] He also does not believe that unrest on a massive scale among the lower classes will result in coordinated action, such as Marx suggested.[52] His thesis would suggest that there is no correlation between income and voter turnout alone, but that different factors are involved.

Whether Marx or Weber is right remains unclear at this moment. However, what is clear is that poverty can have a polarizing effect on a society, without regard of social status or class. The poor are of concern not only because of their low standard of living, but also because of the threat that they might be socially excluded, because they fall out of the labor market or their family. As Jordan points out, the poor in France are referred to as 'les exclus,' which means 'the outcasts.'[53] The idea that poverty and inequality lead to social exclusion has been put forward by supporters of the so-called club theory, because it explains "*in detail how groups that form to supply each other with a range of collective goods respond to incentives to include or exclude members*."[54] It is a theory derived from economic sciences and it was developed by James Buchanan in his paper called 'An Economic Theory of Clubs.' In this study, Buchanan draws attention to a category in between public and private goods, called 'club goods.'[55] Efficiency and exclusion are important aspects and to clarify this, Jordan uses the example of the swimming pool. A swimming pool refuses people who do not contribute to the costs of maintenance. This is called exclusion. The efficiency is at stake here because there is no way to know whether their criteria are the most efficient for obtaining a maximal amount of profit.[56] However, the key notion here is that not the nature of the groups, but the interaction between members is the main feature.[57] In other words, the main feature here is the question how the group of the included and the group of the excluded interact. For the purpose of this research, this theoretical approach is important, because it points out the

[49] C. Gallo, *Economic Growth and Income Inequality: Theoretical Background and Empirical Evidence* (London 2002) 4.
[50] H.J. Laski, 'Introduction to the Communist Manifesto', *Social Scientist*, Vol. 27, No. 1-4 (Januari – April 1999) 65-66.
[51] S. Kalberg, *Max Weber: Readings and Commentary on Modernity* (Oxford 2005) 147-148.
[52] Ibid., 148.
[53] B. Jordan, *A Theory of Poverty & Social Exclusion* (Cambridge 1996) 3.
[54] Ibid., 62.
[55] J.M. Buchanan, 'An Economic Theory of Clubs', *Economica*, Vol. 32, No. 125 (February 1965) 1-14.
[56] Jordan, *A Theory of Poverty & Social Exclusion*, 8.
[57] Ibid., 63.

potential effects of social exclusion, which is a divided society. This connects to Colson's theory of collective action, which states that individuals become vulnerable to poverty when they are excluded from certain groups or goods.[58] Such a statement implies that one not only needs to look at income as an explanation for lower turnout rates, but that this income numbers will probably correspond with inequality and social exclusion. North concurs, because he claims that organizations structure collective actions.[59] This means that the more people are organized in groups, the less they are excluded from society. Therefore this will also be included in the analyses of the chapter on voter turnout and income in Noord Brabant.

However, the focus of this paragraph is still on income, inequality, and its effects on voter turnout. In order to be able to discuss this, first a few things need to be clarified. Income as it is used in this thesis is the salary that a person earns in absolute numbers. It will not be discussed in terms of the standard of living, even though this standard is the most important indicator of welfare.[60] The reasons for this are twofold. First, the standard of living in the Netherlands is more or less the same, because taxes and social security are determined at the national level and are thus more or less the same for all provinces.[61] Second, the standard of living is too hard to measure and it is beyond the scope of this research. Therefore, it is also not necessary to distinguish between real income and nominal income, as Wolff did in his *Poverty and Income Distribution*.[62] But how can the amount of income be linked to voter turnout? Various academics have already contributed to this subject. Most of these studies found that turnout rises as income increases.[63] The rationale for this can be that these people are more actively involved, but also that people with a higher income have more to gain or to lose during elections.[64] According to Jaime-Castillo, people with lower incomes do not go out to vote as often because they feel they have little influence.[65] However, he claims that it is still unclear whether inequality in income is an important factor. In other words, if high differences in income per neighborhood or municipality also influence voter attendance. Turnout among the more affluent is most affected by changes in inequality, Jaime-Castillo says.[66] Another result of his research was that polarization has a negative effect on voter turnout.[67] This connects to the exclusion theories of Buchanan, Olson, and Jordan that were

[58] M.L. Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Cambridge 1965).
[59] D.C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (Cambridge 1990) 5.
[60] E.N. Wolff, *Poverty and Income Distribution* (Oxford 2009) 24.
[61] Andeweg & Irwin, *Governance and Politics in the Netherlands*, 234.
[62] Wolff, *Poverty and Income Distribution*, 25.
[63] J.E. Filer et. al., 'Redistribution, Income, and Voting', *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 37, No. 1 (February 1993) 63.
[64] Ibid., 64.
[65] A.M. Jaime-Castillo, *Economic Inequality and Electoral Participation. A Cross-Country Evaluation* (Toronto 2009) 5.
[66] Ibid., 22.
[67] Ibid.

previously discussed. Put the idea of a correlation between turnout rates and income into practice, researchers in California found out that there indeed was a relationship between the two variables. In the 2008 elections that elevated Barack Obama into the Presidency, only 41 percent of the people with an income less than $ 15,000 per year voted, while 78 percent of those earning more than $ 150,000 found their way to the ballot.[68] However, these numbers are less relevant for turnout outside the US, and thus for the purposes of this research, because the US has numerous voting barriers that other countries do not have.[69] Horn also picks up on this in his paper 'Income Inequality and Voter Turnout.' His research took place in Europe and not in the US, which makes it a bit more relevant to the topic of this research. Horn states that inequality in Europe fluctuates much less than voter turnout.[70] This would imply that there is no relationship between the two. He found out that inequality at the bottom also does not affect the attendance at the ballot box. The factor that really made the difference according to Horn was the years that people spent in school increased turnout rates, but this will be the subject of the next chapter. What all these studies have in common is that they were not conducted in the Netherlands and that they involved the United States or the European Union as a whole. Research organized in the Netherlands and analyzing Dutch voter turnout related to income is much scarcer. As was mentioned before, Schmeets already mentioned that there was a possible correlation between income and voter turnout.[71] Van Egmond, De Graaf, and Van der Eijk claimed something similar, stating that having a higher income increases the chance of actually voting.[72] They also see income as a part of a greater, social cleavage in Dutch society. Education combined with income even proved to be a more successful indicator, but again, as with Horn's article, education will be dealt with in the next chapter.[73] A fundamental study for the purpose of this chapter is a research conducted in 2002 by Dekker et. al. They looked into the driving forces behind people who did not go out to vote. They also noticed the effect of income on voter turnout among those who did not vote, using a group of people who did actually vote as a control group.[74]

All of the previous literature combined points into one direction: that voter turnout is affected by the level of income. Marx mentioned economic possibilities as a social marker.

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[68] Results available at the Grizzly Bear Project, available at: http://www.grizzlybearproject.com/the-connection-between-lower-voter-turnout-and-rising-inequality/, accessed June 16, 2015.
[69] http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/01/income-gap-at-the-polls-113997.html#.VYAra9Uc670, accessed June 16, 2015.
[70] D. Horn, 'Income Inequality and Voter Turnout', *Gini Discussion Paper*, No. 16 (October 2011) 11.
[71] Schmeets, *Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek 2006-2012*, 106.
[72] M. Van Egmond et. al., 'Electoral Participation in the Netherlands: Individual and Contextual Influences', *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 34, No. 2 (October 1998) 284.
[73] Ibid., 287, 294.
[74] P. Dekker et. al., *Niet-Stemmers: Een onderzoek naar achtergronden en motieven in enquêtes, interviews en focusgroepen* (Den Haag 2002) 24.

This was again supported by Jordan, who pointed to the dangers of social exclusion based on income distribution and inequality, and by Buchanan, who thought that the interaction between different groups, in this case divided by income, would diminish, thereby creating a society of separate entities. Jaime-Castillo claimed that people with lower incomes feel that they are excluded anyway, so they do not go to the ballot box. People with higher incomes have more to gain or to lose, Filer et. al. asserted. In California, the correlation seemed to exist, although the voting barriers in the US made it less plausible for the Netherlands and Noord Brabant. Schmeets thought there was a connection between the two, which was also found by Van Egmond, De Graaf, and Van der Eijk, and by Dekker et. al. Only Horn disagreed with all of these studies, stating that education and the years spent in school were much better predictors of voter turnout.

Sociology of Education

When discussing the sociology of education, it is also necessary to look at the distinction between functionalist and structuralists, which was already covered in the first chapter. Functionalists see society as behaving like an organism. The larger system comes first and then the individual, because the individual functions within that particular system.[75] Structuralism is the concept that was developed by the linguist De Saussure. Language will also prove to be an important factor in the theory of Bernstein, who is also a structuralist. Structuralists say that society is prior to the individual, just like functionalists. The difference between the two is that functionalists look at how an individual or a group contribute to the main entity, while structuralists look at the basic elements of a person or a group and how these are related to the whole.[76]

One of the first functionalists to write about the sociology of education was Émile Durkheim, a French sociologist and one of the founding fathers of the discipline, who claims that education is sociological, not individual, as for instance Immanuel Kant claimed.[77] Through education, and learning history in particular, children learn about the common values in society. These values are part of what Durkheim calls 'social facts.'[78] In industrial societies, children also have to learn skills needed for specialized jobs.[79] Education prepares

[75] Gregory et. al., *Dictionary of Human Geography*, 265.
[76] K. Smith, 'Differences Between Functionalism and Structuralism', available at: http://www.ehow.com/info_8795967_differences-between-functionalism-structuralism.html, accessed June 30, 2015.
[77] A.K.C. Ottaway, 'Educational Sociology of Émile Durkheim', *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (September 1955) 214.
[78] Giddens, *Sociology*, 686, 14.
[79] Ibid.

children for membership of their own social group. This has two aspects, generally applicable to all societies. The first is that it is diverse whenever there is a division of labor in society, meaning that people specialize in one occupation. The second is that each society, despite differences and separate groups, has a core common culture.[80] This is a premise for a community to be able to continue with some form of unified life. All of this is based on Durkheim's core belief that a person consists of an individual and a social being.[81] The social being is the main aim of education. Another functionalist who spent a considerable amount of attention to education is Talcott Parsons. His view on the sociological and the individual aspect is radically different from that of Durkheim. He concurs with the Frenchman on the idea that people's actions are based on their values and the values of an individual are influenced and constrained by society.[82] However, he also wrote that education is about individual achievement and that one should be judged on his or her abilities.[83] His idea differs from that of Durkheim, who said that it is about the social aspect. Nevertheless, despite Parsons' focus on individual achievement in education, he also does pay attention to the social aspect of education, thereby reconnecting his beliefs with those of Durkheim. He did this by welcoming the expansion of access to universities in the United States, because he saw it as a growth of American democracy.[84] He thus added the university as a fourth layer to Marshall's three key institutions of society, namely the courts, the parliamentary system, and the welfare state.[85] He subsequently linked university, and thus education, to the value system of the American society. This connection can be universally applied. These values can be the Puritan values that Parsons says are dominant in the United States, but they can also be Catholic values, but religion will be discussed later on in this thesis. In sum, Parsons argues that education creates citizens.[86]

Structuralists have different ideas than functionalists like Durkheim and Parsons. One of these structuralists is Basil Bernstein, a British sociologist specialized in education.[87] Because of his research conducted in the 1970s, sociologists started to pay attention to school curricula as the reflection of society's interests.[88] In 1971, Bernstein wrote that "*Forms of spoken language in the process of their learning initiate, generalize and reinforce special*

[80] Ottaway, 'Educational Sociology of Émile Durkheim', 215.
[81] Ibid., 215-216.
[82] P. Knapp, *One World – Many Worlds: Contemporary Sociological Theory* (New York 1994) 191-192.
[83] Giddens, *Sociology*, 686-687.
[84] B.S. Turner, 'Talcott Parsons, Universalism and the Educational Revolution: Democracy versus Professionalism', *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 44, No. 1 (March 1993) 6.
[85] T.H. Marshall, *Sociology at the Cross Roads* (London 1963).
[86] Turner, 'Talcott Parsons, Universalism and the Educational Revolution', 8.
[87] A.R. Sadovnik, 'Basil Bernstein's Theory of Pedagogic Practice: A Structuralist Approach', *Sociology of Education*, Vol. 64, No. 1 (January 1991) 48.
[88] Ibid.

types of relationship with the environment and thus create for the individual particular forms of significance."[89] This means that the significance and meaning of certain language differs per group or social class, thereby providing an important link between people. In other words, a society's coherence is partly dependent on language and language is taught in schools. Social identity is closely linked to language.[90] Central to Bernstein's theory is the concept of code, which "*selects and integrates the relevant meanings, the form of their realization and the evoking contexts*."[91] In other words, this code is about a set of principles in a language that is being used by a certain group within society. Bernstein makes a distinction between elaborated code and restricted code. The former refers to a broader vocabulary and is more useful for communication across different groups, while the latter refers to the vocabulary and understandings within a certain club or class. How does this relate to education? Bernstein used his concepts of language to investigate inequalities in education. His argument was that children from varying backgrounds develop different forms of speech and this affects their experience of school.[92] Children from lower classes more often learn a restricted code of speech, while a school requires the elaborated code. He blames the academic culture of schools for this.[93] This would help explain why certain social and economic backgrounds tend to perform badly in schools. For the purpose of this research, Bernstein's concept would mean that people from lower classes are less involved in society, because they are being excluded on the basis of language and, subsequently, education. Previous research by UNESCO already concluded that social exclusion and (the lack of) education are intertwined.[94] This might also prove to be a factor in explaining voter turnout, because of the close relation to social exclusion. According to the *Dictionary of Human Geography*, social exclusion can be defined as "*a situation in which certain members of a society are separated from much that comprises the normal 'round' of living and working within that society.*"[95] Voting can also be seen as part of the normal round of living within a society. Another structuralist that deals with the sociology of education is Pierre Bourdieu, a French sociologist and anthropologist. He wrote that schools and other social institutions help perpetuate social inequalities. The concept he uses to explain this is called the theory of 'cultural

[89] B. Bernstein, *Class, Codes and Control. Volume 1: Theoretical Studies Towards a Sociology of Language* (London 1971) 76.
[90] Ibid.
[91] B. Bernstein, 'The Theory of Basil Bernstein', available at: http://essa.ie.ulisboa.pt/ficheiros/teoriabb_eng/bernsteinstheory_textprint.pdf, accessed June 30, 2015.
[92] Giddens, *Sociology*, 708.
[93] Ibid., 709.
[94] UNESCO, 'Quality Education and Social Exclusion', available at: http://www.ibe.unesco.org/International/ICE47/English/Organisation/Workshops/Workshop2CompENG.pdf, accessed June 30, 2015.
[95] Gregory et. al., *Dictionary of Human Geography*, 691.

reproduction.'[96] Like Bernstein, Bourdieu indicated that linguistic skills are also an important factor in explaining different results in school. The judgments and exams at school, but also the students themselves, thus create a system of social exclusion.[97] This also corresponds more or less with Bernstein's ideas on education and society. Both men differ from Durkheim and Parsons in that they add a negative connotation to education. Parsons actually sees universities as fundamental institutions for the growth of American democracy, while Bourdieu and Bernstein see them as institutions of social inequality. For the purpose of this research, this means that education could be fundamental for determining voter turnout. The social exclusion part would indicate that people that performed less in school have lower qualifications and that these people tend to vote less often than people with higher education. Parsons notion creates the idea that people with a higher education are indeed more involved in the political process and do tend to vote more often as well.

The CBS inquiry that looked into the elections between 2006 and 2012 indicates that the level of education is an important factor in determining voter turnout.[98] Higher educated people are thought to have more faith in both the political institutions and that their own knowledge of the political process is sufficient to participate.[99] Howe looked further into the correlation between political knowledge and participation. He claims that political knowledge does influence attendance numbers a little bit, and this number increases when people are not a member of a political party.[100] The effect of education on voting behavior is also larger for people with a lower education.[101]

Sociology of Religion

As Giddens claims, religion has dominated the lives of millions of human beings for thousands of years.[102] Religion even goes back to the times of the cavemen, thereby demonstrating that it is at the core of human life. For the purpose of this research, religion is defined as "*a cultural system of commonly shared beliefs and rituals that provides a sense of of ultimate meaning and purpose by creating an idea of reality that is sacred, all-encompassing and supernatural.*"[103] This implies that religion is part of a culture and that it provides a sense of purpose. Whether religious people are wrong or right is of no concern to

[96] Giddens, *Sociology*, 710.
[97] D. Reed-Danahay, 'Remembering Pierre Bourdieu 1930-2002', *Anthropological Quarterly*, Vol. 75, No. 2 (Spring 2002) 377.
[98] Schmeets, *Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek 2006-2012*, 57.
[99] Ibid., 57-59.
[100] Howe, 'Political Knowledge and Political Participation in the Netherlands', 148.
[101] Ibid., 145.
[102] Giddens, *Sociology*, 533.
[103] Ibid., 534.

sociologists.

The early sociologists, in this case Durkheim and Weber, already discussed religion at great length. Durkheim spent much of his career studying religion, mostly in small, traditional communities. In his *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* he concluded that religion is not about gods and the supernatural, but that it is highly social.[104] Religion is not primarily connected to social inequalities or power, it is more related to the general nature of society's institutions.[105] Looking at things from a functionalist perspective, Durkheim argued that religion formed a source of solidarity and recognition for individual human beings. All this was part of a larger organic system, namely society.[106] Another aspect of religion that is stressed by Durkheim, and which may prove to be very relevant to this research, is the fact that religion provides a society with norms and values. He even mentions enhanced cohesion as a consequence of strong shared beliefs.[107] Durkheim also accentuates the ceremonial activities that go with religion. In these collective ceremonies, a sense of harmony is created and individuals are taken away from their problems in life because of spirituality.[108] Durkheim mentions some aspects that are very relevant to this thesis. If the cohesion is larger, if the values and norms in a society are shared because of religion, this might also apply to the province of Noord Brabant, which, together with Limburg, has a different religious background than the rest of the Netherlands, but this will be explained more thoroughly in a later part of the chapter.

Max Weber also discussed religion at great length. Where Durkheim based his observations on a relatively small number of examples, Weber went on to research religion worldwide.[109] The impact of Christianity on the western world was the main subject of his studies and he presented most of his findings in his *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. He argues that the Protestant work ethic ignited and later inspired capitalism. Protestants even get higher grades in school, earn more money, and are more skilled.[110] According to Weber, the fact that they work harder finds its origins in the Middle Ages. Catholics could be good Christians by being submissive towards the clerical authority, but Protestantism removed this idea.[111] Weber also considers Protestants to be more individualistic. If his assumptions prove to be true, this means that the Protestants in the

[104] D.E. Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (London 1915) 10.
[105] Giddens, *Sociology*, 537.
[106] Durkheim, *Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, 47.
[107] Ibid., 399-405.
[108] Giddens, *Sociology*, 538.
[109] Ibid., 539.
[110] K.E.M.W. Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (New York 1930) 3.
[111] Ibid., 206.

Northern parts of the Netherlands and in Zeeland are more likely to be deciding on their own whether to vote and who to vote for, while Catholics are more likely to look at each other for guidance. This would imply that when the social cohesion of the Catholic pillar, which will be discussed in more detail in the next part of this chapter, declined during the late twentieth century, this also caused a decline in voter turnout.

An important difference between Catholics and Protestants is that the latter do not accept the Catholic notion that the church represents God. They consequently do not accept the authority of the pope. Confession of the sins is only done to Jesus Christ, not to priests.[112] Thus, the focus in Protestantism is much more on the individual, while communities are much more at the core of Catholicism. It is also very likely that, because of the position of the pope and the church, Catholics are more likely to follow their leaders and are thus more receptive to authority. Following this line of thought, Protestants do not want, nor do they need, such authority, because they answer to God directly, thereby taking more responsibility for themselves. This is also relevant to this research, because these intrinsic differences might also have an effect upon voter turnout, especially related to the process of pillarization, which will be discussed in detail in the next part of this chapter. If Protestants are inclined to focus on themselves and reject authority, they are also more likely to decide for themselves whether to vote or not. If Catholics, on the other hand, are indeed more prone to follow the rule, they would vote accordingly. Voting would then become a social activity. This would also imply that when depillarization started to take place in the Netherlands, the Catholics would also vote less often, because there was no authority left to tell them what to vote for. However, these are just ideas derived from the writings of Durkheim and Weber, they are not plain facts.

Conclusion

Almost all scholars agreed that voter turnout is influenced by the level of income. Weber argued that other factors had to be taken into account too, and that it had to be seen as a combination of elements that influence voter turnout. Horn disagreed with all of these studies, stating that education and the years spent in school were much better predictors of voter turnout. This was then supported by Bourdieu, Parsons, and Durkheim. However, they disagreed on the nature of the differences in education. Parsons actually sees universities as

[112] An article on these differences appeared in the Christian Post in 2008, available at: http://www.christianpost.com/news/what-divides-catholics-and-protestants-32006/, accessed July 31, 2015.

fundamental institutions for the growth of democracy, while Bourdieu and Bernstein see them as institutions of social inequality. This means that Parsons argues that the higher the level of education, the higher the voter turnout will be. This was supported by a CBS inquiry conducted in the Netherlands over a couple of years. On religion, Weber argued that Protestants have a better work ethic, while Catholics are more submissive towards the church. Because Catholics are inclined to follow, it is to be expected that the depillarization hit the Catholics harder than the Protestants, given the latter's inclination for individualism.

This chapter has led to two hypotheses for the next two chapters, regarding the different factors that possibly influence ballot attendance. In relation to the sub questions, these are:

1. Income is an important factor when explaining voter turnout in Noord Brabant.
2. Education is an important factor when explaining voter turnout in Noord Brabant.
3. Religion is an important factor when explaining voter turnout in Noord Brabant.

The third hypotheses will be related to the fourth chapter, which will look at the party preferences of voters in Noord Brabant.

Voter Turnout and Income in the Province of Noord Brabant

Introduction

This chapter will deal with income as a potential explanation of these turnout rates. It will go on to review previous literature on the correlation between voter attendance and income. We already saw that lots of authors argued that a relation between the level of income and voter turnout exists. In order to examine the correlation between the two in the Netherlands, several data will be used for statistical analysis. It is expected that income is an important factor when explaining voter turnout in the province of Noord Brabant. In the conclusion, this chapter will try to answer the sub question, which is: 'To what extent can income explain voter turnout in Noord Brabant?'

Voter Turnout and Income: Noord Brabant

This part will look at several simple analyses of correlation, with the use of two variables. In this case they are average income and voter turnout per province, which could be related in three ways. The first is that they are positively related, meaning that the higher the income, the higher the voter turnout. A second possibility is that they are not related at all, which would indicate that it does not matter how high the income is, because voter turnout would always remain the same. A third option is that they are negatively related, meaning that the higher the income gets, the lower the voter turnout becomes.[113] The data for the income per province are derived from a study conducted by the CBS, looking into regional economies.[114] These numbers were from 2012, so for the analysis, the turnout rates of the Second Chamber elections in the same year were used. The highest turnout in that year was in the province of Utrecht, where 78,42 percent of the eligible people went out to vote. In Noord Brabant this was 72,65 percent, while Limburg scored the worst with 70,68 percent. The national average was 74,57 percent, two percentage points above Noord Brabant. Utrecht also had the highest national product per person, namely 42,300 Euros. Noord Brabant has an average of 36,400 Euros, while Flevoland and Drenthe scored the lowest average with 26,100 Euros per person. The national average is 35,900 Euros, a little below Brabant's average.

These national numbers do not give us an explanation for voter turnout within the province of Noord Brabant however. They merely indicate that voter turnout in Brabant is

[113] A. Field, *Discovering Statistics Using IBM SPSS Statistics* (London 2014) 262-263.
[114] CBS, *De Regionale Economie 2012* (Den Haag 2013) 34.

lower than in the rest of the country, while average income in this province is at a similar level as the national average. Within Noord Brabant, there are also differences between municipalities. These can be observed in figure 2.1, in which voter turnout is combined with average income per municipality.



Figure 2.1: Turnout and Income per Municipality in Noord Brabant, 2015

If the average income per municipality were to predict voter turnout completely, there would be movement from the bottom on the left to the top on the right. However, there are some exceptions, like for instance Sint Anthonis, which does not have a very high average income, but it does have a relatively high voter turnout. Aalburg also does not have a very high average income, but a relatively high turnout. On the other hand, Rucphen does have both the lowest average income and the lowest attendance rate. Nuenen and Waalre perform well in both the turnout rates and the average income. This implies that these results have more predictive value than the average income numbers per province. A regression analysis of these data confirms this. However, these are still the results of one election.

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,430[a]	,185	,172	1842,425

a. Predictors: (Constant), Turnout Percentage per Municipality

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	49328357,842	1	49328357,842	14,532	,000[b]
	Residual	217249823,976	64	3394528,500		
	Total	266578181,818	65			

a. Dependent Variable: Average Income per Municipality

b. Predictors: (Constant), Turnout Percentage per Municipality

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	**(Constant)**	**20458,767**	**2387,317**		**8,570**	**,000**
	Turnout Percentage per Municipality	**199,179**	**52,250**	**,430**	**3,812**	**,000**

a. Dependent Variable: Average Income per Municipality

Figure 2.2: Turnout and Income per Municipality in Noord Brabant, 2015 (Regression)

The R square in this case is 0,185, which means that 18,5 percent of the variance is explained by income. The significance number shows us that our model contains at least some value for our research. The number of municipalities in Noord Brabant is 66, so the N was the same number. Jaime-Castillo suggested that the differences in income really made the difference, as was already discussed in the previous part. The CBS conducted a survey in 2014 investigating

income and participation per region.[115] They also looked at the percentage of relatively low incomes per region or municipality. Households earn a relatively low income when they earn 9,250 Euros per annum.[116] These data were also included into this research and the first results are visible in figure 2.3.



Figure 2.3: Turnout and Relatively Low Average Income 2015 Scatterplot

This one looks much more like a line from the top left to the right bottom, which would indicate the value of relatively low income percentages in explaining turnout rates. A regression analysis of these results confirm the implications of the scatterplot. Again, the outcome of the test shows the explanatory value of this model, because of the low significance. The R square is 0,362, so the relatively low income percentages explain 36,2 percent of the variance. But what happens when average income and the percentage of relatively low average income per municipality are combined into a multiple regression

[115] The entire research is available at: http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/themas/dossiers/nederland-regionaal/cijfers/incidenteel/maatwerk/2014-arbeid-inkomensbron-vermogen-opleiding-sociale-samenhang-mw.htm, accessed June 24, 2015.
[116] http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/methoden/begrippen/default.htm?ConceptID=888, accessed August 7, 2015.

analysis? The answer to this question is more or less the same as the previous ones, which were merely based on the percentage of relatively low incomes, without the average income per municipality, meaning that these added data do not contain extra value.

However, all these data were the results of one election year. Now that we have seen income and voter attendance at several different levels, it is time to go into depth. The next part will look what happens when the average income per municipality is combined with the attendance numbers of more than one election, but it will also take into account the data of other provinces, in order to compare the outcomes. For this reason, the data with the average income per municipality was combined with the turnout rates since the elections for the European Parliament in 2009. 2009 was used as a marking point, because it was the first election since the financial crisis. If this research were to include the data from before that crisis, so for instance the 2007 provincial elections, the average incomes that are used would become inaccurate. After all, these incomes do remain steady over the years and the financial crisis influenced this even more. The analysis tells that average income combined with multiple years of voter attendance provides a much better predictor than just the numbers for 2015. The average income is able to explain more than fifty percent of the variance on voter turnout, which is more than the 18,5 percent that we saw for 2015. It was also shown that the relative low incomes per municipality were more able to clarify the question of attendance at the ballots. What is also striking about the results is that the municipal elections seem to have a different status, because they do not fit into either model. This means that the regression analysis of these data can only tell us something about the European, national, and provincial elections in Noord Brabant.

Conclusion

As was shown in the discussion of the literature, there are multiple views on the influence of income on voter turnout. They all agreed that the influence exists, but not to the relevance of it. Jaime-Castillo argued that citizens who make less money feel that it does not matter whether they go out and vote or not, because they are in a sense excluded already. Filer et al. looked at it from the perspective of those who made a lot of money, because they would have more to lose and therefore went out to the ballot more often. And even though the results of this research do not point into that direction one hundred percent, they still make it very plausible that income plays a role when looking at turnout numbers. Noord Brabant scored a

little over 50 percent, with R squares of 0,55 and 0,51 for the average income and the relatively low income percentages.

Voter Turnout and Education in the Province of Noord Brabant

Introduction

The previous chapter discussed the correlation between lower voter attendance and people's earnings. This chapter will go on to look into something that is often associated with income, namely education. On average, higher educated people in the Netherlands make two times as much money as less educated people.[117] However, this does not mean that this is true one hundred percent of the time. Therefore, it is still relevant to look at the level of education and voter turnout, despite the fact that income and ballot attendance was already discussed. The research question of this chapter is: 'To what extent can education explain voter turnout in Noord Brabant?' This chapter will look at this question in further detail. It is expected that education will prove to be an important factor for explaining voter turnout in the province of Noord Brabant, based on the theoretical chapter. In the conclusion, the results will be analyzed.

Education and Voter Turnout in the Netherlands: Noord Brabant

The data used for this investigation into the level of education in the Netherlands, and Noord Brabant in particular, are derived from the CBS.[118] Again, the results can go three different ways. The first is that the numbers have positive correspondence with each other, meaning that higher education results in higher voter turnout. It is also possible, and this is the second option, that the numbers do not correspond with each other at all. A third possibility is that there is negative correspondence, which means that a higher level of education results in lower turnout. This last option would seem highly unlikely, given the previous section on the sociology of education. These authors' ideas all implied positive correspondence.

The attention of this chapter will be focused on the municipalities in Noord Brabant, just like in the previous chapter. The graph in figure 3.1 shows the percentages of people with a lower education per municipality, combined with the turnout rates for 2015.

[117] http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/themas/inkomen-bestedingen/publicaties/artikelen/archief/2011/2011-3352-wm.htm, accessed June 29, 2015.
[118] The results are available at: http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/themas/dossiers/nederland-regionaal/cijfers/incidenteel/maatwerk/2014-arbeid-inkomensbron-vermogen-opleiding-sociale-samenhang-mw.htm, accessed July 2, 2015.



Figure 3.1: People with Lower Education and Voter Turnout 2015.

The Municipality that stands out on the far upper left is Rucphen, which also did worse in terms of average income. Their turnout numbers are structurally lower than in any other municipality in Noord Brabant and this was no different in 2015. More than half of their population belongs to the category of people with a lower education. The one on the far upper right is Aalburg, a municipality that consistently performs well when it comes to voter turnout, but they also have a relatively large part of their population that has a lower education. In general, it looks like the percentage of lower educated people offers some clarification for the question of voter attendance.

In a little less than one quarter of the municipalities, lower education rates and turnout correspond with each other in some cases, but the R square is not incredibly high. However, the first results do offer some perspective and justify further research. When one looks at the results for multiple years one sees that the explanatory value of lower education increases: With an R square of 0,51, the lower education cannot be disregarded. It is a little bit lower

than what we saw when we combined these data with average income and it is exactly the same number as what we saw when the relative low income percentages were used. A look at the analysis of higher education numbers gives more or less the same result, with an even lower R square, namely 0,14.



Figure 3.2: Higher Education and Turnout 2015 (Scatterplot).

The municipalities that stand out are the same as with lower education. Rucphen has the lowest number of inhabitants that have had a higher education, namely 9 percent. Aalburg is the one in the right corner, with a low percentage of higher educated people, but a steady turnout rate. Nuenen and Waalre, for instance, do well in both categories. Higher education can clarify turnout for 59 percent of the variance.

Conclusion

In the theoretical section, several sociologists were discussed in relation to the value of education. Parsons saw universities as institutions that promote democracy, while Bourdieu

and Bernstein saw them as institutions of social inequality. These were visions of education in general. The CBS inquiry concluded that education does have an influence on voter turnout, while this was more or less contradicted by Howe. For Noord Brabant, it seems as though education influences electoral attendance in some specific kinds of elections, while it does not in the others. A lower education does not seem to influence attendance for municipal elections in Noord Brabant. Education can thus offer some clarification on this issue, but it is still not enough to make a definitive argument that this is the decisive factor for explaining turnout. The next chapter will look at religion and ballot attendance.

Voter Turnout and Religion in the Province of Noord Brabant

Introduction

The previous two chapters looked at income and voter turnout, and education and voter turnout. This chapter will focus on religion and its impact on ballot attendance. Pillarization had a profound impact on Dutch society.[119] Pillarization was the name for the divisional lines that ran through the Netherlands until the 1960s, based on religion or ideology. Because of Catholicism in the south, mostly in Noord Brabant and Limburg, the phenomenon of pillarization also created a distinction between these two provinces and the rest of the Netherlands. This distinction can also be seen in voting turnout numbers, because Noord Brabant and Limburg structurally have lower attendance. Therefore, this chapter will thus address the religious aspects of Noord Brabant and it will look at the impact of religious affiliation and religiousness on voter turnout. The sub question for this chapter is: 'To what extent can religion and religious participation explain voter turnout in Noord Brabant?'

Religion and Turnout in Noord Brabant

In a study looking at religion in the Netherlands, the CBS found out that depillarization touched Noord Brabant severely and that religious participation in the province is low. Based on figures 4.1 and 4.2, some interesting observations can be made.





Figure 4.1: Churchgoers per municipality 2010-2013. Figure 4.2: Percentage of people without affiliation to any church 2010-2013.[120]

[119] A. Lijphart, *Verzuiling, Pacificatie en Kentering in de Nederlandse Politiek* (Amsterdam 1968) 29.
[120] These are derived from the CBS: . Schmeets, *De Religieuze Kaart van Nederland 2010-2013*(Den Haag 2014)

The First thing that strikes is that because of depillarization, the number of churchgoers and the number of people affiliated to a church decreased rapidly. One hundred years ago, practically everybody went to church, but twenty years ago this was only 23 percent. This number is still in decline.[121] Especially among Catholics did depillarization hit hard and in the catholic regions of the Netherlands, the percentage of churchgoers dropped the most.[122] Figure 4.1 shows the percentage of churchgoers per municipality. As one can see, the number of churgoers in Noord Brabant is very low, except for some places. The figure on the right, figure 4.2, shows the number of people affiliated to a church. Again, Noord Brabant does worse than the rest of the Netherlands, except for the only other catholic province, namely Limburg. There, the number of citizens related to a church is even lower. This could imply that depillarization did play a more prominent role in Noord Brabant than in other parts of the country. It also seems like relatively many people are still affiliated to a church in certain parts of Noord Brabant, despite the fact that most are not active in the field of religion. According to research conducted by the CBS, the citizens of Noord Holland and Noord Brabant have the lowest religious participation in the Netherlands.[123] This means that for Noord Brabant, membership of a church and active participation do not go hand in hand. In the Netherlands, there are twelve municipalities where the percentage of people actually going to church dropped at least twenty percent since 1997. Five of these are located in Noord Brabant.[124]

Before looking at the exact data for religion and municipalities, one could already say something about religion and its relation to voter turnout during elections in Brabant. As can be derived from figure 4.1, there are still some municipalities where more than thirty percent of the inhabitants go to church quite regularly. Aalburg and Woudrichem are examples of such municipalities. Whether this is a coincidence or not, these are also places where turnout in Noord Brabant is relatively high. While the average turnout in 2015 was 43 percent for the provincial elections, attendance in Aalburg rose to almost 56 percent, while this was more than 50 percent in Woudrichem. The average income and the level of education were also not spectacularly high there. For Werkendam, this is true to a lesser extent, with almost 49 percent, still 6 percent higher than the average turnout, but not as high in Aalburg and Woudrichem. In other municipalities, like Boxmeer or Heeze-Leende, the average attendance is more or less similar to that of Aalburg, despite the fact that the percentage of churchgoers is

[121] H. Schmeets, *De Religieuze Kaart van Nederland 2010-2013*(Den Haag 2014) 4.
[122] http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/themas/vrije-tijd-cultuur/publicaties/artikelen/archief/2014/2014-4115-wm.htm, accessed August 9, 2015.
[123] H. Schmeets, *De Religieuze Kaart van Nederland 2010-2013* (Den Haag 2014) 6.
[124] Ibidem, 12.

lower there. However, these percentages are still higher than in other municipalities where the number of people attending church on a regular basis is even lower. The next paragraph will look into the data on a municipal level.

Religion and Voter Turnout in Noord Brabant: Municipal Data

The data that are used for this chapter are derived from CBS studies, which are available online on their website.[125] They were published in 2014, so they are pretty up to date, and therefore, they are supposed to be representative for the religious participation in the Netherlands on a municipal level. This paragraph will look at religious participation and religious affiliation in Noord Brabant. CBS measures religious participation by looking at the percentage of people that go to at least one religious service per month. It is striking that relatively many people in Brabant are religiously affiliated, but that very few of them actively visit church or other services on a regular basis. This is because a lot of people that are registered as Catholics because they were baptized, do not actively profess Catholicism.[126]

Still, the religious affiliation within Noord Brabant is a relatively good indicator of voter turnout. The R square is 0,526, which means that it is higher than, for instance, lower education.

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,725[a]	,526	,459	5,38820

a. Predictors: (Constant), Turnout PS 2015, Turnout GR 2010, Turnout EP 2009, Turnout GR 2014, Turnout EP 2014, Turnout TK 2012, Turnout PS 2011, Turnout TK 2010

Figure 4.3: Religious Affiliation Regression

Attendance to religious service once per month does not seem to be as much as good of an explanation for voter turnout, although an R square of 0,356, which means that still 35,6 percent of the variance is explained by this attendance.

Model Summary

[125] https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/maatwerk/2015/20/religie-en-kerkbezoek-naar-gemeente-2010-2014, accessed June 27, 2016.
[126] http://www.sila.nl/5-Pages/01-Aantallen2014.html, accessed June 27, 2016.

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,597[a]	,356	,265	5,58742

a. Predictors: (Constant), Turnout PS 2015, Turnout GR 2010, Turnout EP 2009, Turnout GR 2014, Turnout EP 2014, Turnout TK 2012, Turnout PS 2011, Turnout TK 2010

Figure 4.4: Religious Attendance Regression

It is not entirely clear why there are such big differences between religious affiliation and church attendance. The fact that some people are registered Catholics, but do not really profess that religion, offers a partly explanation. As was already mentioned, voter turnout is generally high in municipalities like Aalburg, Woudrichem, and Werkendam. Church attendance is also quite high in these municipalities. However, in Nuenen and Waalre, where ballot attendance is also generally relatively high, less than eleven percent go to a religious service on a monthly basis.[127] This is lower than in, for instance, Helmond or Rucphen, where voter turnout is traditionally low.

Conclusion

This chapter looked at the influence of religion on voter turnout in the province of Noord Brabant. Central to understanding this connection was the process of pillarization, followed by the depillarization from the 1970s onwards. Catholics were hit the hardest by this depillarization and Noord Brabant is a province that harbored many Catholics. Nowadays, less people in Noord Brabant are affiliated to any church than in most part of the countries, as could be seen in figure 4.2. Church attendance dropped massively in the last twenty years, which was shown by the CBS. Together with Noord Holland, Noord Brabant has the lowest religious participation in the country. Because turnout in Noord Holland is also quite low, it was expected that religion would influence voter turnout at least somewhat. Statistical analysis showed that in Noord Brabant, this is mostly true for religious affiliation, with an R square of 0,526. Religious attendance also offered a partial explanation, but scored less than affiliation. The results therefore are as expected, because one could never expect that one variable would explain one hundred percent of the variance. The next chapter will go deeper into religion in relation to voter turnout, by looking at party preferences that voters displayed throughout the years.

[127] https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/maatwerk/2015/20/religie-en-kerkbezoek-naar-gemeente-2010-2014, accessed June 27, 2016.

Voter Turnout and Party Preference in the Province of Noord Brabant

Introduction

As was already shown, Van Holsteyn and Den Ridder argue that the fact that society is changing is also visible in the changing attitudes of voters towards political parties. More people than ever are sympathetic towards more than just one political party, something which was inconceivable in the years of pillarization.[128] This also has to do with the process of pillarization and depillarization as discussed in the previous chapter. Only the CDA vote is analyzed, because they were the dominating party during the years of pillarization. A conclusion will sum up the results. The sub question for this chapter is: 'To what extent can the changing patterns in party preferences in Noord Brabant explain voter turnout there?'

Voters, Party Preferences, and Noord Brabant

It is very difficult to determine whether political preferences determine voter turnout. One can, however, look at changing patterns throughout the years. The contemporary political party system of the Netherlands emerged after the end of the Second World War. The three political giants of that time were the Katholieke Volkspartij (KVP), who represented the Catholics, the Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA), who represented the socialists, and the Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD), who represented the liberals. These parties were all founded between 1945 and 1948. In the first elections after the war, the KVP received almost 78 percent of the vote in Noord Brabant, while the PvdA finished second with 12,5 percent. When the KVP merged with two smaller denominational parties, the ARP and the CHU, to form the Christen Democraten Appèl (CDA), they immediately became the dominant party in Brabant. However, compared to their share of the vote in 1946, their support among Brabanders dropped in 1981, to 43 percent. Still, this was significantly more than the PvdA's 24 percent. Turnout rate in that year was slightly less than 86 percent, which is much higher than the 72,65 percent in 2012. The CDA's share of the vote, even in Noord Brabant, took a hit in the 1990s, when the PvdA and the VVD combined, something that had not happened before.[129] But even when the CDA reemerged as the largest party in the Netherlands, only 32 percent of the eligible voters voted for the Christian Democrats. This was far fewer votes than in the 1980s. The PvdA, for instance, remained relatively stable, around twenty percent. In

[128] Holsteyn & Den Ridder, *Verandering in continuiteit*, 42-43.
[129] J. de Vries, *Paars en de Managementstaat: het eerste kabinet-Kok 1994-1998* (Leuven 2002).

2012, the CDA experienced their worst result ever during the national elections. In Noord Brabant, once part of their core base, they received a mere 9 percent of the votes cast. During the last two national elections, the VVD overtook the CDA as the largest party in the province of Noord Brabant. In Utrecht, which is not a Catholic province, the CDA scored 28 percent in 1981, while they had 7 percent in 2012. Again, like in Brabant, the support for the PvdA remained much more stable over the years. This could also point towards the importance of depillarization.

For a long time, the CDA was also the most important party on the local level. In 1982, they received 32 percent of the vote, which made them the winner of that election. In 2002, however, they had dropped to 20,5 percent, despite the fact that Balkenende (CDA) became prime minister in that same year. The local parties seem to be taking over and their influence is growing. This is especially true for the provinces with the lowest voter turnout, namely Flevoland, Noord Holland, Limburg, and Noord Brabant. This could mean that in those provinces, people are more interested in their local community, without regard for what lies beyond there. This idea is supported by the fact that local parties tend to focus on local issues and these are the ones that are the strongest in those particular provinces. The popularity of the local parties rose in Utrecht too, but not to the same amount as in Brabant.

The earliest data that are available for the provincial elections are from 1991. The CDA was by far the largest back then, with almost 44 percent of the votes cast. In 2003, they were the largest in every single municipality. From 2007 on, their grip began to shatter. Nowadays the political landscape in Brabant is diverse when it comes to provincial elections. In 2015, the VVD became the largest with only 17,45 percent. This means that there is not one dominant party within Brabant, like the CDA used to be. The same is true for the local elections, but not for the national ones. There, the VVD won comfortably in 2010 and 2012. Figure 5.1 shows the decreasing support for the CDA in Noord Brabant throughout the years.

	CDA	**PvdA**	**VVD**	**Total Turnout**
1982	40,07	24,56	22,33	78,29
1986	44,24	**29,57**	15,39	**84,88**
1989	**45,09**	28,74	**12,12**	78,32
1994	27,12	20,98	18,13	77,20
1998	21,52	28,91	24,54	**70,52**
2002	32,54	**11,81**	15,90	77,10
2003	33,91	23,57	18,25	78,27
2006	31,84	17,84	14,49	78,51
2010	16,22	16,10	21,01	73,69
2012	**9,08**	21,46	**28,75**	72,65

Difference	**36,01**	17,76	16,63	14,36

Figure 5.1: Second Chamber Elections: Percentage of the Vote Support per Party

These numbers are from the Second Chamber elections since 1982, which are derived from the database of the Electoral Council in the Netherlands.[130] In the 1980s, the CDA received more than forty percent of the vote, while this decreased until an all time low in 2012, with 9,08 percent. The 1990s already show decline for the Christian Democrats, even though they shortly revived in the 2000s under Prime Minister Balkenende. However, despite this revival, they did not nearly approach the level of support they received before. Figure 5.1 shows the net difference between the CDA's record 45 percent in 1989 and their low point in 2012, with nine percent. For the other two large parties in the Netherlands, these net differences were much smaller: nearly eighteen points for the PvdA and nearly seventeen for the VVD. Besides these facts, it can also be argued that 2002, in which the PvdA received their lowest number of support, was a very special election year, different from any other in Dutch history.[131] The VVD reached their peak in 2012, when they became the largest party and took over from the CDA. In 2015, they confirmed their new status as Brabant's new largest party by winning the provincial elections, ahead of the Christian Democrats. This new trend is confirmed in figure 5.2, which shows the largest party per province after provincial elections.



[130] http://www.verkiezingsuitslagen.nl/, accessed June 30, 2016.
[131] J. Bosmans & A. van Kessel, *Parlementaire geschiedenis van Nederland* (Amsterdam 2011) 225.



Figure 5.2: The Largest Parties Per Province Per Provincial Election, 1987-2015.[132]

Statistical Analysis of the CDA Vote in Noord Brabant

It is clear that throughout the years, the CDA has lost a lot of support in the province of Noord Brabant. This research has taken the percentages of the vote that the Christian Democrats received in every election since 2009, just as in the other chapters of this thesis, and used them for a regression analysis, again like has been done before. The CDA was chosen as the most relevant party, because Noord Brabant once was the base of the KVP and later the Christian Democrats, as was discussed in the previous chapter.

When looking at the results, one can immediately see that the R square is quite high in most cases. This means that a relatively high percentage of the variance is explained by the percentage of the total vote that the CDA received during the election. Especially when people had to vote for the Dutch Second Chamber or for the European Parliament, the percentage of the vote that the CDA collected was able to explain voter turnout for more than

[132] Ibid.

fifty percent. The Second Chamber elections did a little bit better than those for the European Parliament, with an R square of over 0,6. The R square for ballot attendance combined with the share of the vote for the Christian Democrats was 0,57, which is still quite high. The regional and local elections fall a little bit behind. Especially the R square of the turnout for municipal elections connected to CDA votes is quite low compared to the R square for other elections. Only about 30 percent of the variance in Noord Brabant is explained by the Christian Democratic share of the vote. For the provincial elections, the R square stays a little under fifty percent, which means it still explains voter turnout for a substantial amount of the variance. One extra remark has to be added, because in two municipalities, Aalburg and Werkendam, there is a lot of support for the Christians, but they often support the CU or the social conservative SGP.

We might thus conclude that the support for the CDA is of influence on ballot attendance, except for the municipal elections, where it explains voter turnout only a little bit. Otherwise, it is often that the higher the percentage of the inhabitants that support the Christian Democrats, the higher the voter turnout.

Conclusion

This chapter has tried to clarify the show that the support for the denominational parties in Noord Brabant has significantly decreased and that this might have an influence on voter turnout. In the early post war years, the KVP received the lion's share of the vote, while its successor CDA was also dominant for many years. In recent years, however, their status as Brabant's number one was taken over by the VVD. In local elections, they lost their position to the local parties. In the meanwhile, voter turnout in general also decreased, while support for the PvdA remained more or less constant. Even support for the VVD has not increased enormously. This could point towards depillarization again, because support for the other two main parties stayed more or less constant, while support for the CDA declined dramatically. Statistical analysis showed that, especially during elections for the Dutch Second Chamber or the European Parliament, the share of support for the CDA was able to explain voter turnout for a substantial amount of the variance. The higher the percentage of the vote for the Christian Democrats, the higher the voter turnout. This does mean that the CDA sympathizers are also consistent voters, who rarely abstain from voting, if they do this at all.

Combined Data

Up until now, this thesis has researched a couple of factors that possibly influence voter turnout, based on various publications mentioned before. These factors were income, education, religion, and party affiliation. The data for Utrecht, Gelderland, and Limburg were included as a part of a comparison, thereby establishing the unique character of the province of Noord Brabant. It was found that within Noord Brabant, income explained a little over fifty percent of the variance. The same goes for lower education, while for higher education this was almost sixty percent. Support for the Christian Democratic CDA also proved to be of good explanatory value, especially in national and European elections, where the R square was above 0,6.

When some of these were combined, they provided some rather interesting results. A combination of education level, income, and the percentage of the vote that the CDA received proves to be a rather thin explanation of the variance, with an R square of less than 0,3. The lower education percentage proves to be even less useful than the higher education numbers. Both higher and lower income, however, do strongly correlate with the level of income per municipality. The number of votes that the CDA got during an election does not correspond with average income at all. A combination of higher education and income proves to be the best indicator of voter turnout, with an R square of 0,64. This is just a slightly higher number than for better education alone, as we have seen before.

These combined data show that there is a pretty high correlation between education and income, while the number of votes that the CDA received at the polls does not really count in combination with those. In other words, ones income or level of education does not tell anything about affiliation to the Christian Democrats. This goes for both the people with lower and with a higher education level. It is quite remarkable that CDA votes are able to explain quite a high percentage of the variance with voter turnout, but do not correspond with the other factors that also seem to be able to explain ballot attendance. The combination between higher education and average income seems to be the most successful explanation.

Conclusion

Conclusion

This research has tried to look deeper into possible explanations for the voter turnout within the province of Noord Brabant. The thesis took a more positivist approach, looking for factors that explain voter turnout in general, like average income, education, and religion. The research was mostly quantitative. The chapter on party preferences was derived from the chapter studying religion as a possible variable explaining ballot attendance in Noord Brabant. At the provincial level, the power of the once dominant CDA faded during recent years, which has apparently led to a power vacuum in the politics of Noord Brabant. While the population of Brabant used to automatically vote for KVP and later CDA, but this no longer seems to be the case. Religious participation in Noord Brabant also decreased over the years, despite the fact that lots of people are still member of a church. The maps in chapter four showed that it looks as though a correlation between the percentage of people actually going to church and voter turnout exists. Data more or less confirmed this idea. Religious affiliation and the CDA percentage of the vote consistently had an R square between 0,5 and 0,6. Only religious attendance was able to explain less than fifty percent of the variance, with roughly 35 percent.

The other statistical tests also showed some interesting results. Average income does have explanatory value in Noord Brabant, which the R square above 0,5 indicates. For Noord Brabant, municipal elections proved to be something of a unique case, because average income does not seem to influence ballot attendance there. The same phenomenon was observed when looking at education, because this factor did not explain voter turnout for municipal elections in Brabant. However, especially the percentage of higher educated citizens did offer explanatory value for voter turnout during the other elections. It can be concluded that Noord Brabant is a complicated province when it comes to voter turnout. The main question was: ‘To what extent do social economic and social cultural factors explain voter turnout in Noord Brabant?’ All the factors discussed in this thesis thus have explanatory value in Brabant, some more than the other. Religious attendance and religious affiliation, for instance, are high in municipalities like Aalburg and Woudrichem, while turnout is also high there. However, income and education are relatively low there. On the other hand, municipalities like Waalre and Nuenen have high levels of education and income, while turnout is also high. Religious participation and affiliation, however, is low there. Another example is the municipality of Rucphen, which has the lowest average income, the highest

percentage of people with a lower education, and the smallest percentage of people with a higher education. The voter attendance in this municipality has almost always been the lowest in Noord Brabant in the last fifteen years. The chapters on religion and political preference showed us some important things. For instance, religious participation in Brabant dropped dramatically over the years. Besides that, the political preferences of most citizens of Brabant changed, with the CDA no longer being the dominant political party. Their former supporters sometimes changed their allegiance, but it seems as though a lot of them have also stayed at home. The preference for the Christian Democrats proved to be a good explanation for the voter turnout within municipalities in Brabant. This political fragmentation might also prove to be an explanation for lower ballot attendance in Brabant.

The analysis of the combined data added some very interesting insights to the results mentioned above. While all independent factors explained the variance for fifty percent or more, this was not always true for a combination of two or more factors. For instance, a combination of education, income, and the percentage of the vote that the CDA received only explained thirty percent of the variance, while a combination of only higher education and average income explained more than sixty percent of the variance. This means that higher education and average income probably overlap in a lot of the municipalities within Noord Brabant. Such was certainly true for Waalre and Nuenen. The CDA thus probably did not really get more votes in municipalities with a higher income and a higher level of education. The Christian Democrats received most votes in municipalities, like Aalburg, Sint Anthonis, Alphen-Chaam etc. The level of education and average income are not necessarily high there. In fact, the level of education in, for instance, Aalburg, is quite low. The percentage of the vote that the CDA received did not correspond with any of the other data, which probably means that they do not really correlate with any of them within the different municipalities. This is striking, because it was expected that religion and party preference would correspond with each other. The answer to why this is the case perhaps lies within the fact that some very religious municipalities within the province of Noord Brabant, like Woudrichem and Werkendam, have turned towards more fundamental Christian parties than the CDA, like the SGP and the CU. The social-economic factors of education and income taken together thus seem to better explain voter turnout in Noord Brabant than the social-cultural factors of religion and party preference. When the factors were taken individually, there was no real difference between the social-economic and the social-cultural factors in explaining ballot attendance. Higher education and the percentage of the vote that the CDA received proved to be better explanations, while religious attendance fell a little behind with an R square below

0,4. On the other hand, religious affiliation did offer an explanation of 52 percent of the variance, which is quite high. Average income also reached above fifty percent. In the end, it can be concluded that all factors significantly influence voter turnout, but that a combination of the social-economic factors education and income do this to the largest extent.

Reflection

This thesis went deeper into the question of voter turnout, specifically in the province of Noord Brabant. Various different scholars have pointed towards factors that influence ballot attendance, including the ones studied in this research. It became clear that every element that was statistically analyzed, was able to explain voter turnout to quite a large degree. A combination of a higher level of education and average income proved to be the most successful recipe for explaining ballot attendance in Noord Brabant. This, however, is not a very surprising result, nor does it signify the uniqueness of Brabant as a province. It merely shows that in Noord Brabant, like in so many other regions, education and income influence voter turnout. The unique character of Noord Brabant was supposed to be shown through the factor religion, which in turn was supposed to be closely related to party preference, especially for the CDA.

For further research, it might also be interesting to look further into the data for Noord Brabant in comparison to other provinces. This paragraph also looks shortly at the provinces of Utrecht, Gelderland, and Limburg, which are bordering Noord Brabant. Utrecht was chosen because it is a province with one of the highest turnout rates, Limburg because it is also predominantly catholic, and Gelderland because it is a larger province with more or less the same number of inhabitants as Noord Brabant.[133] The first results show that for Noord Brabant, relative low incomes were a much better predictor than the average real incomes. A combined regression analysis of the four provinces shows that the average income per household iss able to explain 53 percent of the variance. However, one has to take into account the fact that it matters what kind of elections are being held. In general, it can be stated that municipal elections have less explanatory value than the other ones. The relative low average income percentages provide insight for only 43 percent of the variance when all the provinces are taken together. This is less than when these data were used for Noord Brabant alone, for both the average income and the percentage of relative low incomes.

[133] https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stcrt-2011-3346.html, accessed October 12, 2015.

Again, only for the municipal elections does income not have declarative value. In Limburg, it is however a useful analytical tool, because the average income is able to explain 83 percent of the variance, while the percentages of relatively low incomes do even better, with 85 percent, or an R square of 0,83 and 0,85. This is remarkable, because the ballot attendance in both provinces is more or less equal. For Gelderland, it is a little bit more useful to use these data than for Noord Brabant, with an R square of 0,59 when it comes to income, and an R square of 0,61 with the lower incomes. In Utrecht, the wages are only of value when it comes to elections for the European Parliament. When it comes to the other three, the regression analysis generates numbers that are insignificant. Further research might want to look further into what this means for voter turnout and what factors create the differences between the provinces.

The same provinces that were used for voter turnout and income, namely Limburg, Gelderland, and Utrecht, can also be used for studying ballot attendance and education. When the four of them are combined, it is striking to see that the number of higher educated people has a higher explanatory value than those with lower educated citizens: 59 against 50 percent. Again, the municipal elections are a bit different than the rest, because education does not seem to be explaining anything about voter turnout. It looks as though in municipal elections both education and income do not predict or explain anything, and that ballot attendance in these elections can be explained through other factors. We already saw that 51 percent of the variance was explained for voter turnout and the percentage of lower educated people per municipality. Within this province, a higher education plays a role during European and, to a lesser degree, provincial elections. A similar pattern can be seen in Limburg. The number of higher educated people is of a highly explanatory value there, namely 86 percent, or an R square of 0,86. The difference between European and municipal elections is not as big as in Noord Brabant, but it still exists. Higher educated citizens go out to vote more often than lower educated people when it comes to European elections. There is a difference in Gelderland, like in Noord Brabant, between the different kinds of elections. In that province, the level of education can only clarify attendance for European and provincial elections. In Utrecht, the same pattern can be seen as with income. The number of higher educated persons can only explain turnout at the European elections. This is also in accord with the turnout percentages, because at these kind of elections, Utrecht always has the highest attendance in the Netherlands.

All in all, a lot about voter turnout and the factors influencing it will still have to be studied. The ideas proposed in this reflection are just some possibilities of the many that are

out there. This research, which looked into the variables that influence voter turnout in Noord Brabant, was just a small part of the larger field of electoral studies and ballot attendance.

Appendix

Voter Turnout Numbers

In this part, all voter turnout rates used in this research are presented, both in real percentages and in index numbers. All these data are derived from the database of Kiesraad.[134] Kiesraad is an advisory body on elections and referenda. It also provides information on suffrage and previous elections.[135]

Elections for the European Parliament (Percentages)

Province	1999	2004	2009	2014
Groningen	33,37	43,23	36,62	37,82
Friesland	33,85	41,68	36,41	38,62
Drenthe	33,28	43,33	36,65	37,36
Overijssel	33,94	42,33	35,97	37,66
Flevoland	29,29	37,09	34,11	34,49
Gelderland	33,07	41,02	37,83	39,18
Noord Holland	27,51	38,68	37,6	37,41
Zuid Holland	28,56	38,21	37,26	37,53
Zeeland	30,92	40,71	36,8	39,97
Utrecht	33,74	43,52	42,34	42,7
Noord Brabant	27,15	35,75	33,24	34,02
Limburg	27,15	35,11	33,37	33,62
National Average	30,02	39,26	36,75	37,32

[134] http://www.verkiezingsuitslagen.nl/, accessed June 1, 2015.
[135] https://www.kiesraad.nl/, accessed June 10, 2015.

Municipal Elections (Percentages)

Province	2002	2006	2010	2014
Groningen	60,34	61,33	55,05	56,23
Friesland	63,45	63,19	55,84	57,74
Drenthe	59,9	62,51	54,53	56,63
Overijssel	57,29	62,69	56,61	56,55
Flevoland	54,49	53,93	57,32	52,2
Gelderland	60,68	60,96	56,11	57
Noord Holland	54,98	55,88	52,84	52,56
Zuid Holland	56,33	57,46	53,55	52,47
Zeeland	61,45	61,73	58,1	58,64
Utrecht	61,51	59,58	56,59	57,53
Noord Brabant	56,52	55,62	50,68	50,17
Limburg	60,37	60,79	53,84	52,97
National Average	57,9	58,56	54,13	54

Provincial Elections (Percentages)

Province	1999	2003	2007	2011	2015
Groningen	51,69	55,47	51,01	58,22	53,03
Friesland	54,09	57,82	54,14	59,93	53,06
Drenthe	52,19	56,14	51,16	58,66	50,97
Overijssel	50,33	51,66	49,88	57,72	49,79
Flevoland	44,41	45,4	43,85	53,57	45,61
Gelderland	47,12	51,2	48,92	58,57	49,91
Noord Holland	41,61	45,54	45,04	57,24	47,22
Zuid Holland	42,24	45,18	44,04	53,96	45,76
Zeeland	48,73	51,16	52,87	58,85	52,2
Utrecht	47,62	50,86	50,11	61,69	52,59
Noord Brabant	45,5	41,77	42,06	51,43	43,64
Limburg	44,69	44,63	43,2	51,7	45,03
National Average	45,64	47,62	46,4	55,97	47,76

National Elections (Percentages)

Province	2002	2003	2006	2010	2012
Groningen	78,67	81,61	81,28	75,2	75,53
Friesland	81,89	83,59	82,86	77,13	77,06
Drenthe	80,02	82,97	83	76,41	76,85
Overijssel	81,47	83,65	83,07	76,62	76,46
Flevoland	78,69	78,94	78,87	73,66	72,3
Gelderland	81,16	82,69	82,26	77,24	76,96
Noord Holland	78,77	79,19	79,74	75,53	74,66
Zuid Holland	78,69	78,54	79,15	74,1	73,2
Zeeland	79,97	80,65	80,99	76,78	75,62
Utrecht	82,4	82,97	82,9	79,32	78,42
Noord Brabant	77,1	78,27	78,51	73,69	72,65
Limburg	73,73	75,34	77,9	72,92	70,68
National Average	79,06	80,04	80,35	75,4	74,57

Correlation Between Size of Municipality and Voter Turnout

These graphs are derived from Willem de Graaff's previous research on this subject.

2011: Noord Brabant



2015: Noord Brabant



Voter Turnout and Income in Noord Brabant

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,430[a]	,185	,172	1842,425

a. Predictors: (Constant), Turnout Percentage per Municipality

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	49328357,842	1	49328357,842	14,532	,000[b]
	Residual	217249823,976	64	3394528,500		
	Total	266578181,818	65			

a. Dependent Variable: Average Income per Municipality

b. Predictors: (Constant), Turnout Percentage per Municipality

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	20458,767	2387,317		8,570	,000
	Turnout Percentage per Municipality	199,179	52,250	,430	3,812	,000

a. Dependent Variable: Average Income per Municipality

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,601[a]	,362	,352	3,52193

a. Predictors: (Constant), Relatively Low Average Income Percentage Per Municipality

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	449,542	1	449,542	36,242	,000[b]
	Residual	793,854	64	12,404		
	Total	1243,397	65			

a. Dependent Variable: Turnout Percentage per Municipality

b. Predictors: (Constant), Relatively Low Average Income Percentage Per Municipality

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	68,408	3,833		17,849	,000
	Relatively Low Average Income Percentage Per Municipality	-,733	,122	-,601	-6,020	,000

a. Dependent Variable: Turnout Percentage per Municipality

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate

1	,607[a]	,369	,349	3,52922

a. Predictors: (Constant), Relatively Low Average Income Percentage Per Municipality, Average Income per Municipality

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	458,707	2	229,354	18,414	,000[b]
	Residual	784,689	63	12,455		
	Total	1243,397	65			

a. Dependent Variable: Turnout Percentage per Municipality

b. Predictors: (Constant), Relatively Low Average Income Percentage Per Municipality, Average Income per Municipality

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,890[a]	,792	,773	2080,34778

a. Predictors: (Constant), Turnout Rate per Neighborhood

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	181470607,287	1	181470607,287	41,931	,000[b]

	Residual	47606315,789	11	4327846,890		
	Total	229076923,077	12			

a. Dependent Variable: Average Income per Neighborhood

b. Predictors: (Constant), Turnout Rate per Neighborhood

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	631,579	4600,215		,137	,893
	Turnout Rate per Neighborhood	607,895	93,877	,890	6,475	,000

a. Dependent Variable: Average Income per Neighborhood

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,743[a]	,552	,488	1457,30879

a. Predictors: (Constant), Turnout Rate Per Municipality 2015, Turnout Rate Per Municipality GR 2010, Turnout Rate Per Municipality, Turnout Rate Per Municipality GR 2014, Turnout Rate Per Municipality EP 2014, Turnout Rate Per Municipality 2012, Turnout Rate Per Municipality 2011, Turnout Rate Per Municipality TK 2010

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	146792214,125	8	18349026,766	8,640	,000[b]

	Residual	118929939,721	56	2123748,924		
	Total	265722153,846	64			

a. Dependent Variable: Average Income Per Municipality

b. Predictors: (Constant), Turnout Rate Per Municipality 2015, Turnout Rate Per Municipality GR 2010, Turnout Rate Per Municipality, Turnout Rate Per Municipality GR 2014, Turnout Rate Per Municipality EP 2014, Turnout Rate Per Municipality 2012, Turnout Rate Per Municipality 2011, Turnout Rate Per Municipality TK 2010

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,714[a]	,511	,441	2,68889

a. Predictors: (Constant), Turnout Percentages 2015, Turnout Percentages GR 2010, Turnout Percentages EP 2009, Turnout Percentages GR, Turnout Percentages 2014 EP, Turnout Percentages 2012, Turnout Percentages 2011, Turnout Percentages TK 2010

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	422,274	8	52,784	7,301	,000[b]
	Residual	404,887	56	7,230		
	Total	827,161	64			

a. Dependent Variable: Relative Low Income Per Municipality

b. Predictors: (Constant), Turnout Percentages 2015, Turnout Percentages GR 2010, Turnout Percentages EP 2009, Turnout Percentages GR, Turnout Percentages 2014 EP, Turnout Percentages 2012, Turnout Percentages 2011, Turnout Percentages TK 2010

Voter Turnout and Education in Noord Brabant

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,485[a]	,235	,223	4,69345

a. Predictors: (Constant), Turnout PS 2015

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	432,845	1	432,845	19,649	,000[b]
	Residual	1409,822	64	22,028		
	Total	1842,667	65			

a. Dependent Variable: Lower Education

b. Predictors: (Constant), Turnout PS 2015

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	62,503	6,082		10,277	,000
	Turnout PS 2015	-,590	,133	-,485	-4,433	,000

a. Dependent Variable: Lower Education

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,715[a]	,511	,442	4,00765

a. Predictors: (Constant), Turnout Percentages 2015, Turnout Percentages GR 2010, Turnout Percentages EP 2009, Turnout Percentages GR, Turnout Percentages 2014 EP, Turnout Percentages 2012, Turnout Percentages 2011, Turnout Percentages TK 2010

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	941,429	8	117,679	7,327	,000[b]
	Residual	899,433	56	16,061		
	Total	1840,862	64			

a. Dependent Variable: Lower Education Percentages

b. Predictors: (Constant), Turnout Percentages 2015, Turnout Percentages GR 2010, Turnout Percentages EP 2009, Turnout Percentages GR, Turnout Percentages 2014 EP, Turnout Percentages 2012, Turnout Percentages 2011, Turnout Percentages TK 2010

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,766[a]	,587	,528	4,10528

a. Predictors: (Constant), Turnout Percentages 2015, Turnout Percentages GR 2010, Turnout Percentages EP 2009, Turnout Percentages GR, Turnout Percentages 2014 EP, Turnout Percentages 2012, Turnout Percentages 2011, Turnout Percentages TK 2010

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	1339,968	8	167,496	9,938	,000[b]
	Residual	943,786	56	16,853		
	Total	2283,754	64			

a. Dependent Variable: Higher Education Percentages

b. Predictors: (Constant), Turnout Percentages 2015, Turnout Percentages GR 2010, Turnout Percentages EP 2009, Turnout Percentages GR, Turnout Percentages 2014 EP, Turnout Percentages 2012, Turnout Percentages 2011, Turnout Percentages TK 2010

CDA Percentage of the Vote Noord Brabant

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,758[a]	,574	,513	5,74238

a. Predictors: (Constant), Turnout PS 2015, Turnout GR 2010, Turnout EP 2009, Turnout GR 2014, Turnout EP 2014, Turnout TK 2012, Turnout PS 2011, Turnout TK 2010

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	2490,629	8	311,329	9,441	,000[b]
	Residual	1846,597	56	32,975		
	Total	4337,226	64			

a. Dependent Variable: CDA Voters Percentage 2009

b. Predictors: (Constant), Turnout PS 2015, Turnout GR 2010, Turnout EP 2009, Turnout GR 2014, Turnout EP 2014, Turnout TK 2012, Turnout PS 2011, Turnout TK 2010

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-52,563	31,688		-1,659	,103

	Turnout EP 2009	,020	,336	,010	,060	,953
	Turnout GR 2010	,485	,283	,334	1,715	,092
	Turnout TK 2010	,153	1,142	,066	,134	,894
	Turnout PS 2011	,464	,670	,253	,693	,491
	Turnout TK 2012	,925	,954	,400	,970	,336
	Turnout GR 2014	,408	,302	,276	1,351	,182
	Turnout EP 2014	-3,115	,626	-1,393	-4,973	,000
	Turnout PS 2015	,812	,790	,433	1,028	,308

a. Dependent Variable: CDA Voters Percentage 2009

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,600[a]	,360	,269	6,56835

a. Predictors: (Constant), Turnout PS 2015, Turnout GR 2010, Turnout EP 2009, Turnout GR 2014, Turnout EP 2014, Turnout TK 2012, Turnout PS 2011, Turnout TK 2010

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	1359,294	8	169,912	3,938	,001[b]
	Residual	2416,020	56	43,143		

	Total	3775,314	64			

a. Dependent Variable: CDA Voters Percentage 2010 GR

b. Predictors: (Constant), Turnout PS 2015, Turnout GR 2010, Turnout EP 2009, Turnout GR 2014, Turnout EP 2014, Turnout TK 2012, Turnout PS 2011, Turnout TK 2010

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-51,159	36,246		-1,411	,164
	Turnout EP 2009	-,070	,385	-,039	-,182	,857
	Turnout GR 2010	-,311	,323	-,230	-,961	,340
	Turnout TK 2010	,638	1,307	,294	,489	,627
	Turnout PS 2011	,803	,766	,468	1,048	,299
	Turnout TK 2012	,261	1,091	,121	,239	,812
	Turnout GR 2014	,880	,346	,637	2,544	,014
	Turnout EP 2014	-2,030	,716	-,973	-2,833	,006
	Turnout PS 2015	,103	,904	,059	,114	,909

a. Dependent Variable: CDA Voters Percentage 2010 GR

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,777[a]	,604	,547	3,49816

a. Predictors: (Constant), Turnout PS 2015, Turnout GR 2010, Turnout EP 2009, Turnout GR 2014, Turnout EP 2014, Turnout TK 2012, Turnout PS 2011, Turnout TK 2010

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	1045,181	8	130,648	10,676	,000[b]
	Residual	685,279	56	12,237		
	Total	1730,459	64			

a. Dependent Variable: CDA Voters Percentage 2010 TK

b. Predictors: (Constant), Turnout PS 2015, Turnout GR 2010, Turnout EP 2009, Turnout GR 2014, Turnout EP 2014, Turnout TK 2012, Turnout PS 2011, Turnout TK 2010

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-40,387	19,304		-2,092	,041
	Turnout EP 2009	-,044	,205	-,036	-,217	,829
	Turnout GR 2010	,201	,172	,220	1,169	,247
	Turnout TK 2010	,636	,696	,433	,913	,365

	Turnout PS 2011	,374	,408	,322	,916	,364
	Turnout TK 2012	,061	,581	,042	,105	,917
	Turnout GR 2014	,517	,184	,553	2,806	,007
	Turnout EP 2014	-1,503	,382	-1,064	-3,939	,000
	Turnout PS 2015	,072	,481	,060	,149	,882

a. Dependent Variable: CDA Voters Percentage 2010 TK

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,792[a]	,627	,574	3,98585

a. Predictors: (Constant), Turnout PS 2015, Turnout GR 2010, Turnout EP 2009, Turnout GR 2014, Turnout EP 2014, Turnout TK 2012, Turnout PS 2011, Turnout TK 2010

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	1494,631	8	186,829	11,760	,000[b]
	Residual	889,672	56	15,887		
	Total	2384,303	64			

a. Dependent Variable: CDA Voters Percentage 2011

b. Predictors: (Constant), Turnout PS 2015, Turnout GR 2010, Turnout EP 2009, Turnout GR 2014, Turnout EP 2014, Turnout TK 2012, Turnout PS 2011, Turnout TK 2010

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-51,990	21,995		-2,364	,022
	Turnout EP 2009	,014	,233	,010	,059	,953
	Turnout GR 2010	,209	,196	,194	1,064	,292
	Turnout TK 2010	,574	,793	,333	,724	,472
	Turnout PS 2011	,287	,465	,210	,617	,540
	Turnout TK 2012	,370	,662	,216	,559	,578
	Turnout GR 2014	,676	,210	,616	3,223	,002
	Turnout EP 2014	-1,773	,435	-1,070	-4,079	,000
	Turnout PS 2015	,026	,548	,019	,047	,962

a. Dependent Variable: CDA Voters Percentage 2011

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,791[a]	,626	,573	1,93118

a. Predictors: (Constant), Turnout PS 2015, Turnout GR 2010, Turnout EP 2009, Turnout GR 2014, Turnout EP 2014, Turnout TK 2012, Turnout PS 2011, Turnout TK 2010

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	349,482	8	43,685	11,714	,000[b]
	Residual	208,850	56	3,729		
	Total	558,332	64			

a. Dependent Variable: CDA Voters Percentage 2012

b. Predictors: (Constant), Turnout PS 2015, Turnout GR 2010, Turnout EP 2009, Turnout GR 2014, Turnout EP 2014, Turnout TK 2012, Turnout PS 2011, Turnout TK 2010

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-26,017	10,657		-2,441	,018
	Turnout EP 2009	,001	,113	,002	,012	,991
	Turnout GR 2010	,104	,095	,200	1,096	,278
	Turnout TK 2010	,320	,384	,384	,834	,408

	Turnout PS 2011	,215	,225	,326	,954	,344
	Turnout TK 2012	,118	,321	,142	,369	,714
	Turnout GR 2014	,288	,102	,542	2,832	,006
	Turnout EP 2014	-,837	,211	-1,044	-3,975	,000
	Turnout PS 2015	,018	,266	,026	,066	,947

a. Dependent Variable: CDA Voters Percentage 2012

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,545[a]	,297	,196	7,53373

a. Predictors: (Constant), Turnout PS 2015, Turnout GR 2010, Turnout EP 2009, Turnout GR 2014, Turnout EP 2014, Turnout TK 2012, Turnout PS 2011, Turnout TK 2010

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	1341,364	8	167,670	2,954	,008[b]
	Residual	3178,395	56	56,757		
	Total	4519,759	64			

a. Dependent Variable: CDA Voters Percentage 2014 GR

b. Predictors: (Constant), Turnout PS 2015, Turnout GR 2010, Turnout EP 2009, Turnout GR 2014, Turnout EP 2014, Turnout TK 2012, Turnout PS 2011, Turnout TK 2010

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-47,267	41,573		-1,137	,260
	Turnout EP 2009	-,018	,441	-,009	-,041	,967
	Turnout GR 2010	-,006	,371	-,004	-,017	,986
	Turnout TK 2010	,168	1,499	,071	,112	,911
	Turnout PS 2011	,942	,878	,502	1,072	,288
	Turnout TK 2012	,719	1,252	,304	,574	,568
	Turnout GR 2014	,424	,397	,280	1,068	,290
	Turnout EP 2014	-2,634	,822	-1,154	-3,205	,002
	Turnout PS 2015	,464	1,036	,242	,447	,656

a. Dependent Variable: CDA Voters Percentage 2014 GR

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,748[a]	,560	,497	4,39223

a. Predictors: (Constant), Turnout PS 2015, Turnout GR 2010, Turnout EP 2009, Turnout GR 2014, Turnout EP 2014, Turnout TK 2012, Turnout PS 2011, Turnout TK 2010

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	1372,422	8	171,553	8,893	,000[b]
	Residual	1080,335	56	19,292		
	Total	2452,756	64			

a. Dependent Variable: CDA Voters Percentage 2014 EP

b. Predictors: (Constant), Turnout PS 2015, Turnout GR 2010, Turnout EP 2009, Turnout GR 2014, Turnout EP 2014, Turnout TK 2012, Turnout PS 2011, Turnout TK 2010

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-48,937	24,237		-2,019	,048
	Turnout EP 2009	,040	,257	,027	,154	,878
	Turnout GR 2010	,427	,216	,392	1,976	,053
	Turnout TK 2010	-,070	,874	-,040	-,080	,937

	Turnout PS 2011	,764	,512	,553	1,491	,142
	Turnout TK 2012	1,070	,730	,615	1,467	,148
	Turnout GR 2014	,338	,231	,304	1,461	,150
	Turnout EP 2014	-2,085	,479	-1,240	-4,351	,000
	Turnout PS 2015	-,327	,604	-,232	-,542	,590

a. Dependent Variable: CDA Voters Percentage 2014 EP

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,703[a]	,494	,422	5,06895

a. Predictors: (Constant), Turnout PS 2015, Turnout GR 2010, Turnout EP 2009, Turnout GR 2014, Turnout EP 2014, Turnout TK 2012, Turnout PS 2011, Turnout TK 2010

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	1405,691	8	175,711	6,839	,000[b]
	Residual	1438,879	56	25,694		
	Total	2844,570	64			

a. Dependent Variable: CDA Voters Percentage 2015

b. Predictors: (Constant), Turnout PS 2015, Turnout GR 2010, Turnout EP 2009, Turnout GR 2014, Turnout EP 2014, Turnout TK 2012, Turnout PS 2011, Turnout TK 2010

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-50,254	27,972		-1,797	,078
	Turnout EP 2009	-,092	,297	-,059	-,311	,757
	Turnout GR 2010	,116	,249	,099	,467	,643
	Turnout TK 2010	,667	1,008	,354	,661	,511
	Turnout PS 2011	,645	,591	,433	1,091	,280
	Turnout TK 2012	,252	,842	,135	,300	,765
	Turnout GR 2014	,889	,267	,742	3,332	,002
	Turnout EP 2014	-1,442	,553	-,796	-2,608	,012
	Turnout PS 2015	-,713	,697	-,470	-1,023	,311

a. Dependent Variable: CDA Voters Percentage 2015

Religion

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,725[a]	,526	,459	5,38820

a. Predictors: (Constant), Turnout PS 2015, Turnout GR 2010, Turnout EP 2009, Turnout GR 2014, Turnout EP 2014, Turnout TK 2012, Turnout PS 2011, Turnout TK 2010

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	1806,606	8	225,826	7,778	,000[b]
	Residual	1625,830	56	29,033		
	Total	3432,435	64			

a. Dependent Variable: Percentage of People with Religious Affiliation

b. Predictors: (Constant), Turnout PS 2015, Turnout GR 2010, Turnout EP 2009, Turnout GR 2014, Turnout EP 2014, Turnout TK 2012, Turnout PS 2011, Turnout TK 2010

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	44,179	29,733		1,486	,143
	Turnout EP 2009	-,133	,316	-,077	-,421	,675
	Turnout GR 2010	,713	,265	,553	2,688	,009
	Turnout TK 2010	,111	1,072	,054	,104	,918
	Turnout PS 2011	-,911	,628	-,557	-1,449	,153
	Turnout TK 2012	,414	,895	,201	,462	,646
	Turnout GR 2014	,762	,284	,579	2,687	,009
	Turnout EP 2014	-1,119	,588	-,563	-1,904	,062
	Turnout PS 2015	-,004	,741	-,003	-,006	,996

a. Dependent Variable: Percentage of People with Religious Affiliation

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,597[a]	,356	,265	5,58742

a. Predictors: (Constant), Turnout PS 2015, Turnout GR 2010, Turnout EP 2009, Turnout GR 2014, Turnout EP 2014, Turnout TK 2012, Turnout PS 2011, Turnout TK 2010

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	968,331	8	121,041	3,877	,001[b]
	Residual	1748,279	56	31,219		
	Total	2716,610	64			

a. Dependent Variable: Percentage of Religious Attendance

b. Predictors: (Constant), Turnout PS 2015, Turnout GR 2010, Turnout EP 2009, Turnout GR 2014, Turnout EP 2014, Turnout TK 2012, Turnout PS 2011, Turnout TK 2010

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-50,705	30,833		-1,645	,106
	Turnout EP 2009	-,462	,327	-,302	-1,410	,164
	Turnout GR 2010	,056	,275	,049	,204	,839
	Turnout TK 2010	2,234	1,111	1,215	2,010	,049
	Turnout PS 2011	1,434	,651	,986	2,201	,032
	Turnout TK 2012	-1,612	,928	-,880	-1,737	,088
	Turnout GR 2014	,681	,294	,582	2,316	,024
	Turnout EP 2014	-,107	,609	-,061	-,176	,861
	Turnout PS 2015	-1,742	,769	-1,175	-2,266	,027

a. Dependent Variable: Percentage of Religious Attendance

Voter Turnout Multiple Data

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,542[a]	,294	,235	4,45445

a. Predictors: (Constant), CDA Percentage of the Vote, Number of Inhabitants, Average Income, Lower Education, Higher Education

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	495,126	5	99,025	4,991	,001[b]
	Residual	1190,527	60	19,842		
	Total	1685,653	65			

a. Dependent Variable: Turnout PS 2015

b. Predictors: (Constant), CDA Percentage of the Vote, Number of Inhabitants, Average Income, Lower Education, Higher Education

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	38,502	13,841		2,782	,007
	Number of Inhabitants	-,029	,018	-,254	-1,610	,113

Average Income	,631	,344	,362	1,831	,072
Lower Education	-,143	,196	-,173	-,727	,470
Higher Education	-,068	,195	-,104	-,349	,728
CDA Percentage of the Vote	,113	,086	,147	1,313	,194

a. Dependent Variable: Turnout PS 2015

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,659[a]	,435	,422	4,53648

a. Predictors: (Constant), Higher Education, Number of Inhabitants, Average Income, Lower Education

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	2755,764	4	688,941	33,477	,000[b]
	Residual	3580,866	174	20,580		
	Total	6336,630	178			

a. Dependent Variable: Turnout PS 2015

b. Predictors: (Constant), Higher Education, Number of Inhabitants, Average Income, Lower Education

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	35,806	8,624		4,152	,000
	Number of Inhabitants	-,041	,011	-,260	-3,755	,000
	Average Income	,774	,191	,383	4,042	,000
	Lower Education	-,252	,131	-,258	-1,924	,056

Higher Education	,014	,125	,018	,115	,908

a. Dependent Variable: Turnout PS 2015

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,541[a]	,292	,246	4,42226

a. Predictors: (Constant), CDA Percentage of the Vote, Number of Inhabitants, Average Income, Lower Education

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	492,713	4	123,178	6,299	,000[b]
	Residual	1192,941	61	19,556		
	Total	1685,653	65			

a. Dependent Variable: Turnout PS 2015

b. Predictors: (Constant), CDA Percentage of the Vote, Number of Inhabitants, Average Income, Lower Education

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	37,311	13,316		2,802	,007
	Number of Inhabitants	-,033	,013	-,291	-2,524	,014
	Average Income	,573	,300	,329	1,909	,061
	Lower Education	-,096	,144	-,117	-,670	,505
	CDA Percentage of the Vote	,110	,085	,143	1,296	,200

a. Dependent Variable: Turnout PS 2015

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,536[a]	,288	,241	4,43719

a. Predictors: (Constant), Higher Education, CDA Percentage of the Vote, Number of Inhabitants, Average Income

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	484,647	4	121,162	6,154	,000[b]
	Residual	1201,006	61	19,689		
	Total	1685,653	65			

a. Dependent Variable: Turnout PS 2015

b. Predictors: (Constant), Higher Education, CDA Percentage of the Vote, Number of Inhabitants, Average Income

Coefficients[a]

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		

1	(Constant)	30,355	8,086		3,754	,000
	Number of Inhabitants	-,032	,017	-,284	-1,873	,066
	Average Income	,675	,338	,387	1,998	,050
	CDA Percentage of the Vote	,106	,085	,138	1,250	,216
	Higher Education	,027	,144	,042	,191	,849

a. Dependent Variable: Turnout PS 2015

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,513[a]	,263	,215	4,51224

a. Predictors: (Constant), Lower Education, CDA Percentage of the Vote, Average Income, Higher Education

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	443,674	4	110,919	5,448	,001[b]
	Residual	1241,979	61	20,360		
	Total	1685,653	65			

a. Dependent Variable: Turnout PS 2015

b. Predictors: (Constant), Lower Education, CDA Percentage of the Vote, Average Income, Higher Education

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	36,565	13,968		2,618	,011
	Average Income	,908	,302	,521	3,007	,004
	CDA Percentage of the Vote	,119	,087	,155	1,371	,175
	Higher Education	-,281	,146	-,430	-1,926	,059
	Lower Education	-,225	,192	-,273	-1,175	,244

a. Dependent Variable: Turnout PS 2015

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,504[a]	,254	,205	4,53957

a. Predictors: (Constant), Number of Inhabitants, CDA Percentage of the Vote, Lower Education, Higher Education

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	428,585	4	107,146	5,199	,001[b]
	Residual	1257,069	61	20,608		
	Total	1685,653	65			

a. Dependent Variable: Turnout PS 2015

b. Predictors: (Constant), Number of Inhabitants, CDA Percentage of the Vote, Lower Education, Higher Education

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	56,138	10,131		5,541	,000
	CDA Percentage of the Vote	,130	,087	,169	1,495	,140
	Higher Education	,103	,175	,158	,589	,558
	Lower Education	-,206	,197	-,250	-1,046	,300
	Number of Inhabitants	-,045	,016	-,398	-2,863	,006

a. Dependent Variable: Turnout PS 2015

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