

# Migration, development, and European policies

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# Migration, development, and European policies

Master's thesis Human Geography

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August 2015

# Radboud University



*Curiosity was a continual urge, even though only that  
spasmodic and uncontinued curiosity that a modern man  
may study in the antics of the monkey-cage. Beyond the  
next forest, the next line of hills, went a dim reasoning,  
there might be something new.*

(Mitchell & Grassie Gibon, 1934/2001)

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## Summary

In the Age of Migration there is an increased inequality between and within parts of the world, an increase in conflicts and in trade, leading to (inter)dependency and people on the move in search of better living standards. Next to these phenomena the public discourse in many (European) countries is making a U-turn towards migration pessimism, while the academic world is still swinging towards migration optimism. States, with politicians trying to tap into the xenophobe feelings, perceive migration as a threat and are claiming they can control or even stop it by linking it with security and (short-term) security measures. This securitisation of migration can weaken the values that Europe likes so much to preach and in the end it can even undermine the prosperity of the society it tries to secure.

The dynamics in the world order are also changing. Once the Europeans were colonising large parts of the world. Nowadays, these parts are independent countries, but at times still feel subordinate. They consider those countries the periphery of the world, and a threat to their modern societies. The European Union is using the economic barriers it created to force neighbouring countries to reform its economy so it will better suit the European companies. Also the EU is using development assistance to make the neighbouring countries protect the European borders. This externalisation of does however not take the human rights of migrants into account, and abuse of the migrants' rights are abundant but invisible to the Europeans.

International migration is not a threat, rather it is a process that offers refugees and other migrants the possibility to improve the living standards of themselves and their households. States do have influence on international migration, but have to acknowledge that it impossible to stop people that are willing to take any risk. And states have influence not only through migration policies. Therefore migration should be an aspect of other policies, especially since academics argue that migration is essentially part of development, and not a separate domain. Taking this into account opens up ample opportunities for the European Commission to alleviate the migration-oriented policies.

Currently, migration policies are directed in the European Commission by the Home Affairs department, with a dozen other departments involved in one way or another. However, as migrants are 'agents of development' the field of migration should rather be under supervision of foreign or development affairs, or get its own just like the department of Environment. Security measures, taken by the Home Affairs department, are palliative remedies and the rather short-term solutions do not seem to help anyone as the migration is not stopped, and certainly not controlled, and the societies behind the borders still require certain kinds of labour.

To delimit the vast fields of the migration and development communities the study focused on a case study of the process of international migration to the European Union. The EU is a key actor in development assistance and the case study has also societal relevance with the ongoing 'migrant crisis' being in the news every day. International migration to the EU thus makes a good and relevant choice to focus on. This research has found several trends in EU policies on migration, development and territory. For migration, the Europeanisation of the policies is evident. Since the incorporation of the Schengen Agreement in the *Acquis Communautaire* of the EU the Commission has been working on a Union-wide asylum system called the CEAS. Together with foreign policies such as the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) the migration policies are more and more made on a supranational basis.

European Development policies have been common since the creation of the European Community with a dedicated fund for development assistance for the former colonies of the member states. The policies have changed a lot over time. On the one side, as more states joined the European project, the focus came to be on all developing countries rather than just the former colonies. On the other side, the contents of the policies changed as well. After WWII the Washington Consensus was dominating the development community, with a focus on poverty eradication and neoliberal ‘modernisation’. In the EU, a movement away from this consensus has been deployed with the introduction of a European Consensus on development. This places the focus on good governance, improving living conditions, and sustainable development in general.

European Territorial policies are neatly tied with the increase in competences for the European Commission over time. The Schengen Agreements gave the Commission a territory to ‘rule’ over. And the Commission is since then trying to come up with programmes to build a certain identity or representation of the European Union both for the people living inside the Union as well as the outside world. This shows the importance of language in policies, as it can define the way people perceive phenomena such as ‘Europe’ or ‘migrants’ in different lights.

Current migration policies seem to fail because they are based on the wrong assumptions and justifications. The policies, or the rationales behind them, see migration as a sign of failure of development and migrants as victims but these are myths. They also tend to oversimplify the view of the international structures of trade, mobility and transnationalism. And up to now the migration governance in Europe is in its infancy. However, the soon to be adopted Sustainable Development Goals (the successors of the Millennium Development Goals) and the recently finished CEAS are examples that it is possible to let states cooperate and (re)group their influence on international migration through governance.

On this basis it can be concluded that migration as part of development should be an aspect to be taken into account in all policies that are affecting international migration towards the EU and the issues should not be securitised.

An important concept worth revitalising in policymaking is circular migration. Provided that the policies play a facilitative rather than a forcing role, the concept could be promising for both the sending and receiving countries as well as the migrants. For sending countries the remittances will be helping with development. For receiving countries it is beneficial as there is less scarcity on the labour market. For migrants it is a win for it is improving the livelihood of themselves and their households. The concept of circular migration fits quite well in the ‘third way’ discourse of the migration-development nexus (alongside migration optimism and pessimism).

At the end of the research a synthesis will equip policymakers with six different policy options that can be implemented together or separately and are ranging from relatively easy to implement to long-term political investments. In short, these options include: European migration centres, a revision of the Dublin regulations, a differentiated inclusion citizenship, reception in the region, ensuring access to counselling, and a migration policy platform for the EC departments. Although six recommendations are probably not exhaustive, they illustrate that improvement of European migration policies is possible and doable. The EU owes it to the people on both sides of the border and to the values it likes to practice so much.

## 1. Introduction

The public discourse on both migration and development has changed over the last decade as we enter the ‘Age of Migration’ (Castles, De Haas, & Miller, 2013; Rigg, 2007; Van der Meer, 2004). Increasing inequalities between and within parts of the world, conflicts and trade have led to an increase in (labour) migrants and refugees (Castles *et al.*, 2013). Over the twentieth century migration is increasingly being seen as “a challenge to state sovereignty” (Castles *et al.*, 2013), but protests (see figure 1) against this argumentation are gaining resonance in EU member states (Back & Vis, 2015). So far, irregular migration has led to a need for more surveillance along the borders. This in turn has led to an increased sight of irregular migrants and therefore to an increase in rescue operations. It is obviously positive that migrants are rescued before they drown, but surveillance is not a long-term investment in the wellbeing of people. Many authors acknowledge that migration is mistakenly being understood by governments as a problem or defying their sovereignty (Bakewell, 2008; Castles *et al.*, 2013; Collyer, 2006; De Haas, 2010a; Keijzer, Héraud, & Frankenhaeuser, 2015; Lindstrom, 2005; Pécoud & de Guchteneire, 2006). Leaders from France, Italy and the UK called for a new EU-wide development policy in which aid and cooperation are tools for reducing the migratory pressure on the European borders, by “investing in countries before they get broken” (Gotev, 2013). The European Commission decided for now not to do this. According to the EC, the “tracks” of migration and development aid should be kept separately; the aim of aid should be the promotion of good governance and achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) (Gotev, 2013). Because of this view of the EC and because the EC has a limited mandate regarding migration and asylum the individual EU countries sign agreements on their own with African countries (Adepoju, Van Noorloos, & Zoomers, 2009). The Dutch government decided to invest 50 million euro in ‘Africa’ to improve the employment and stop migration (Du Pré, 2015). Investing in order to stop migration is not the way to undertake development, as this research will point out. Moreover, 50 million euros in a whole continent is not going to make a huge impact, although the Dutch government acknowledges this and argues it is a political signal to the rest of Europe that destroying the boats is not enough (Du Pré, 2015). Moreover, the influence of states on migration is mainly through policies that are not specifically migration policies (Castles *et al.*, 2013). Therefore this research will try to understand what alternatives there are for European policies, in particular development policies, to integrate the aspect of migration. To get to this,



FIGURE 1. PROTESTS AT THE UN PALAIS DES NATIONS IN GENEVA

the next sections will delve deeper into the context of the research, the research objective and questions and the roadmap for the entire thesis. First of all, it is important to disclose the misunderstandings and myths about migration that underlie the assumptions of policymakers (and others) and are an anticipation to the analysis of why migration policies fail (in chapter eight).

## 1.1 Myths about migration

There are quite some misunderstandings about (international) migration, also within governments and NGOs. Especially governments and politicians tend to see migration as a problem, a threat or as a signal that development aid is not working. Hein de Haas, professor Migration Studies in Oxford, made a clear overview of these myths (De Haas, 2005). These myths, together with the ongoing troubles at the European borders, form the motivation for this research to look at how migration policies are currently performing and how it could be improved.

One of the myths is that poverty supposedly is at the foundation of migration. Although migrants often search for better living conditions, it is not those who are the poorest that migrate simply because they cannot afford it to migrate. Instead, those households who earn some money will send one of the members abroad. The migrant will then try to support the rest of the household through remittances. Related to this is the notion of the ‘migration hump’ or the ‘migration band’ which tries to explain that there is a relation between the economic development of a country and the number of emigrants (De Haas, 2005; Olesen, 2002). The poorest countries often have a very young population, which is more willing to migrate but migration to another country is not affordable for everyone; the poorest people cannot afford to move (De Haas, 2005; Olesen, 2002). When the economy grows, more people become part of the middle- or high-income class and can thereby afford to migrate. (Berthélemy, Beuran, & Maurel, 2009; De Haas, 2005, 2010b). Statistical proof that the number of emigrants will increase with more economic development has been found as well (see figure 2).




FIGURE 2. THE MIGRATION HUMP ACCORDING TO STATISTICAL ANALYSIS (SOURCE: BERTHÉLEMY, BEURAN, & MAUREL, 2009)

The statistical analysis of the, in this case economic, explanatory factors of migration is very much related to the relation between migration and development. That is the more political side of the narrative, the link between the two is paradoxical. The European governments strive towards a more just and globalised world. To support that (to the public) they often take up the flag of human rights, after all, no one will deny that everyone should have enough food, shelter and safety. This is what makes the MDGs and SDGs laudable and relevant. To establish good governance and access to services and resources in developing

countries European organisations and governments invest a lot of time, money and people. This, as demonstrated by the MDGs, does improve the welfare of many people and the economies of many developing countries. As a result, more people will be able to afford emigration to places where they believe to be better off. Europe has such an image and therefore attracts quite a number of migrants. This is where the dilemma lies: Europe wants to improve the situation of (neighbouring) developing countries, and rightly so, but when for people that improved situation is to be in Europe, do they have to be stopped?

Remittances are involved in another myth. For a while, researchers thought that migrants' families would waste the remittances on consumption instead of useful investments in the community that could stimulate economic growth. NGOs and governments therefore thought they had to step in to make sure the migrants would spend their money 'well' on investments. This is quite moralistic, as migrants and their families have the same right as Europeans to spend their money according to their own desires. Furthermore, the consumption is usually used to improve the living conditions, such as improvements of the house. These expenditures might have spillover effects on those who cannot afford to migrate.

A third, tenacious, myth is that governments are able to control migration, or even bring it to zero (De Haas, 2005). However, completely closing the border is more utopian than the idea of more or less open borders (Van Houtum & Van Naerssen, 2002). The large numbers of irregular migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea is one example that the Fortress Europe policies do not work. Instead, if states want to maintain an overview and have some level of control of the migration towards Europe, they should give migrants the possibility to apply for asylum or permits without the legal requirement to be on European soil first.

## **1.2 Research objective and questions**

The aim of the research is to formulate recommendations to EU institutions and member states with regard to improving the integration of migration in policies on development. This will be done by making an assessment of current policies through a case study and making an analysis of the factors which have led to the current situation.

This ambition will then be translated into adequate research questions, the main question being: "How can migration play an integrated role in policies aimed at official development assistance?" To answer this question and achieve the research objective, the central question is divided into sub questions. The first one links to the migration-development nexus and reads as follows: "To which extent are migration and development linked?" To get an understanding of the interplay between migration, development and (inter)national policies the second sub questions deals with the current Millennium Development Goals and their successors after 2015: "What lessons can be learned from the integration of migration in the Sustainable Development Goals?" Lastly it is compelling to look into the migration-human rights nexus and study whether migration should be seen as a fundamental human right.

### 1.3 Thesis roadmap

Building on literature from the migrant, development and border studies, this study will link insights from these academic communities to the operationalisation and integration of migration in European policies. Until now migration is, in governmental and supranational policies, separated from policies on official development assistance (ODA), and is usually placed under the justice departments of governments. Research should point out whether it would be better if migration would be more integrated in ODA policies and see less involvement from the Department of Justice and its framework of thinking in criminal and non-criminal terms, which adds to the unnecessary criminalisation of migration (Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2014). This research focusses therefore on the operationalization of the debates on migration and development into policies of governments and organisations such as the European Union. The results could be useful for policymakers to successfully integrate migration in policies on development. This could also help to further the interaction between the migration and development communities and continue on the linking of insights from both. Through reflecting on current practices and policies from governments, the EU and the UN the results will be useful to inform policymakers in the fields of migration and development on the making of future policies.

The next chapter will outline the theoretical framework behind the research, followed by the methodology in chapter three. Chapter four will be a historical narrative of the European migration, development and territorial policies. There will be little analysis of the twists and turns in these timelines, this can be found in chapters five to eight. First, in chapter five, there will be an analysis of trends found in the individual policy histories. Next, chapter six will point out several interplays between the three timelines, which are mirrored in a migration-development nexus and a migration-territory nexus. Chapters seven and eight will move beyond the analysis of the timelines. Chapter seven will explore the right to migrate as a human right and the relation between mobility and citizenship. This chapter is a little bit an interlude, as it is not focused on the three timelines. Rather it looks at a foundation for improved policies to rest on, based on human rights and international law. It does however require understanding of the evolution of the policy fields, as it also functions as the prelude to the improvement of European migration policies, which is further developed in following chapter and the synthesis in chapter ten. Chapter eight will delve into the failure of current migration and development policies and the role of the migration-development nexus and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in current and future policies. This will be followed by the final conclusions and a reflection based on the theoretical framework. Lastly, a synthesis will refine the conclusions into six concrete policy options to address the research objective.

## 2. Constructivist and post-colonial theory

This chapter will outline the theoretical framework of the research. The thinking about development, migration and the relations of countries have influenced greatly from the colonial times. By using post-colonialism as a background, this research tries to continuously stay aware of the past to analyse the present and in the end provide options for the future. The post-colonialism field is a large one, of which section §2.2 only selects some relevant elements. As the next section will argue, the position of this research is not in the anti-camp of the field, but in the branch that borrows heavily from constructivist theories. Section §2.3 explains the conceptual model of the research, with constructivism being the basis for the post-colonial theoretical framework.

### 2.1 Political constructivism

While post-colonialism has its roots partly in Marxism, it also borrows heavily from (political) constructivism. Constructivism is seen as a middle ground between Marxism on the one hand and liberalism on the other. Basically, constructivists study the non-material world, which they argue is a social reality constructed by human interactions. Constructivists especially look into the concepts which seem to be a given, and try to understand why and how it came to have that certain meaning. For this research, constructivism is important and useful because of the constructivists' focus on language and speech acts. It is exactly this that gives social constructs their meaning. The performative power of speech acts can not only constitute a reality but also change it; important in this regard are the contextual conditions (Appadurai, personal communication, June 2, 2015). It takes for example a huge difference if a state is put on a 'blacklist' by a student from Nijmegen or the US government. While it is possible to point at the speech acts that constitute a social construct, it is much more difficult to know which speech acts lead to a performative change. It might take time and a complex chain of causality before the context is shifted and a reality has changed (Appadurai, personal communication, June 2, 2015).

One of the constructs often analysed by constructivists, and relevant for this research, is the notion of security and coupled with this the process of securitisation. Security is a social construct and certain issues are linked to it through speech acts, originally mainly military capabilities of the own state and of other states, which are sometimes framed as a threat to the own security and sometimes not. For example, for the Netherlands the possession of nuclear weapons by the faraway country of Iran is considered more as a threat than nuclear weapons located in the neighbouring UK. Another example is, on a more individual level, how Frontex is a reality of safety for the Europeans versus a reality of obstruction for (poor) non-Europeans (Rumford, 2008). Security is constructed as such that everything that is placed in its realm is dedemocratised in order to speed up decision-making and keeping information out of the public. Roughly since the 1990s state actors and institutions have engaged in speech acts to securitise migration that is framed as 'unwanted' migration. This has led to a so-called security discourse in migration, or the migration-security nexus (see §6.2).

Illegal, Irregular, Undocumented or Unauthorised migrants?

The use of language in a text can reveal a lot. Take for example the use of ‘genetic engineering’ versus ‘genetic manipulation’. The latter has a negative connotation to it compared to the former. In a same way, migrants without the right papers in a country can be called ‘illegal’, ‘irregular’, ‘undocumented’ or ‘unauthorised’ migrants. And different institutions and organisations use different terminology. The UN and the EU speak of ‘irregular migrants’ while most states refer to ‘illegal’ or ‘unlawful’ migrants. NGOs tend to use the term ‘undocumented migrants’ and ‘unauthorised’ seems the least used term, but it does pop up here and there. The UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants argued that:

**“** *Migrants may be irregular or in an irregular situation, but they are not “illegal”. Incorrect terminology contributes to negative discourses on migration, reinforces negative stereotypes against migrants, and legitimates a discourse of the criminalisation of migration, which in turn contributes to further alienation, marginalisation, discrimination and violence against migrants.”* (Crépeau, 2013)

NGOs started campaigns to promote the use of ‘undocumented’ instead of ‘illegal’, including a dedicated Twitter hashtag (“#DropTheIWord”). While several press agencies adopted the new terminology, institutions such as the European Commission did not, but kept away from the use of ‘illegal’. However, others responded in favour of staying with ‘illegal’ migrants. In an article in The Telegraph, journalist Freeman asserts that migrants themselves also use ‘illegal’ and do not say something like ‘I am an unauthorised migrant’ (Freeman, 2013). Furthermore:

**“** *If the word “illegal” carries certain connotations, does the word “irregular” not also do so? An “irregularity” with someone’s immigration status suggests a simple, easily rectifiable problem, a glitch in one’s paperwork perhaps. As opposed, perhaps, to having no paperwork at all. It suggests something that is not a big deal.* (Freeman, 2013)

And of course, it is a big deal, for the migrants, the local population along the Mediterranean shores and societies as a whole. In the end, the term ‘illegal migrant’ just refers to the way of entry, which in the case of the Mediterranean Sea or the US-Mexico border is most of the times an illegal way of entry, not an undocumented one. Lastly, it is important to not shy away from the debate on immigration, because the use of irregular versus illegal are mere attempts at Orwellian Newspeak, “if you’re going to have an honest debate with people about immigration, at least let them choose their own terms” (Freeman, 2013).

While some of the migrants enter another country in an illegal way there are of course also migrants who do not. And frequently they are also referred to as ‘illegal’ migrants. This is where the opposition by the NGOs come from against the words. Refugees for example have the right to seek asylum and therefore cannot be defined illegal as it is the states’ obligation to provide refuge, or at least process the refugee’s application fairly.

There is also a difference between nations. European states have clearly formulated that anyone that enters or stays in their country without the required rights (visa or residence) is an illegal or unlawfully residing person. The US on the other hand does not state that residing in the US without papers is a crime. In that case the use of ‘undocumented’ is the only suitable term to use.

To conclude, the term ‘illegal’ is generalising the wider context of the situation the migrant is in. It would be better if (European) legislation, institutions and organisations distinguish the way of entry from the (often changing) status of migrants. Derived the glossary of the IOM (2011) the following distinctions can be made:

- The term ‘illegal migration’ refers to the smuggling and trafficking of migrants.
- ‘Irregular migration’ means that the movement has taken place without the proper authorisation or documents from either the sending or receiving country. In short, the migrant does not comply (anymore) with administrative requirements.
- Lastly, ‘undocumented migrants’ indicates the migrant has, for whatever reason, no papers such as a passport, visa or permit.

So, while ‘irregular’ can point to both the process of migrating as well as the people migrating, ‘undocumented’ only specifies the people that migrate outside the framework of regular way of migration. ‘Illegal migration’ then is reserved solely for the process where people are smuggled across borders.

## **2.2 Post-colonialism**

Post-colonialism emerged, as the name suggests, at the time of the decolonisation of the European empires. The end of European colonialism ended the economic exploitation by the imperial nations of Europe but did not necessarily end other colonial forms of power (Kothari, 2005). Colonialism includes more than economic exploitation, namely the exercise of cultural power over subordinated populations to denigrate the traditions of non-western cultures, and to celebrate the superiority of particular versions of western culture. This is also called the colonisation of the mind, which involves assumptions about the superiority, normality and privilege in the way of thinking European (Aitken & Valentine, 2006).

European development assistance started in the 1960s and was at the beginning mainly focused on sending aid and funds to former colonies (Olesen, 2002). De Haas (2010) builds on this and sets forth that the past colonial ties are still evident in a post-colonial context to assist in the interpretation of migratory trajectories. This proposition also is backed by statistical analysis by Berthélemy, Beuran and Maurel (2009). Others, such as Adepoju, Van Noorloos and Zoomers (2009) argue that the linking of the ‘Fortress Europe’ policies to development aid is unfair as it involves the power differences that are often remaining from past colonial times.

Franz Fanon and Edward Said

This section will develop the post-colonial theoretical framework that tries to shed light on migration and development. Two key figures regarding post-colonialism are Frantz Fanon and Edward Said.

To start with Fanon, he argues that colonies striving to independence should not do so only to escape the economic exploitation but also for the decolonisation of the mind: “In decolonisation, there is therefore the need of a complete calling in question of the colonial situation” (Fanon, 1963, p.37). In one of his books, *The Wretched of the Earth*, Fanon states that “Europe is literally the creation of the Third World” (1963, p.107), meaning that the enormous wealth that nations like France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have accumulated was only possible because of the economic, cultural and political subordination of the world outside Europe. Derived from this is the Eurocentric notion of historicism, the thoughts that the European historical development is the only model of successful development for other nations (Aitken & Valentine, 2006). This includes the linguistic pattern of the First World versus the Third World, developed versus less developed countries and Western vs non-Western cultures, which continue to follow the colonial practice of giving superiority to the European culture and practices (Aitken & Valentine, 2006).

The other key figure is Edward Said and in his work on Orientalism he questions the Western representations of the identity and civilisation of ‘the Orient’ as he calls the non-West: “The real issue is whether indeed there can be a true representation of anything” (Said, 1978, p.272). Said defines Orientalism not only as the academic field that studies the Orient but also as “A Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient” (Said, 1978, p.3). According to Said, the imaginaries the West has of the Orient are not based on factual knowledge but rather used to frame the desire for the imperial quest for territory (Aitken & Valentine, 2006).

Part of the ideas of Orientalism is othering, the process of defining one’s own identity by putting it against the other’s identity. And an extension of othering is bordering, the “ongoing strategic effort to make a difference in space among the movements of people, money or products” (Van Houtum & Van Naerssen, 2002, p.126). In many of his articles, Henk van Houtum argues that this bordering and othering leads to the denigration of migrants, whose right to live seems inferior to the Westerner’s desire for his authentic and local culture (Van Houtum & Pijpers, 2007; Van Houtum & Van Naerssen, 2002; Van Houtum, 2010). These concepts are relevant since they describe the practices involved with framing the migrants and driving inclusion and exclusion. Migrants are not harmful to either the country of origin or the country of destination (De Haas, 2005). However, in most countries in the Global North there still exists a need to stop the people from fleeing their homes because they would harm their economy and culture (Van Houtum, 2010).

#### Post-colonialism and imperialism

A broader theme in post-colonialism is imperialism, and its modern version of modern imperialism. Post-colonialists argue that the domination of the European imperial colonisers has not disappeared after the decolonisation but was remodelled into a new structure, as elaborated above by Fanon. This has partly to do with globalisation. As the European economies evolved, there was an increasing need for new markets. The colonial structure could not cater this and thus it was in the empire’s interest to remodel the structure and strive towards a world of independent, neoliberal markets (Hoogvelt, 2006). This view became the basis for the post-colonial critiques of the Washington Consensus (see §4.2 and §5.2).

Hoogvelt (2006) summarises the origin of post-colonial discourse concerning (modern) imperialism in a few lines:

“ Thus, in historical succession, the periphery served first, in the mercantile period, as a source of primitive accumulation, financing the industrial revolution in the core. Next, in the colonial period, it served as supplier of raw materials and foodstuffs, and subsequently, in the neo- colonial period, it graduated to become modernizing ‘developmental’ states, providing export markets for late industrialism’s producer goods.” (Hoogvelt, 2006, p. 160)

So while the configuration of ideas, material forces and institutions seems to have drastically changed, the new world order was still a framework for imperialism and its economic and political agents (Hoogvelt, 2006). For Richards (1977), imperialism is the transnational process of profit-oriented realisation of surplus value. In the modern (or post-modern) version of imperialism, the economic dimension is expanded with other views to describe a relation of control (Wolff, 1970). One of these views is militarism, which is strongly interlaced with imperialism as being a justification for large investments in the military and as a protective force for making profits abroad (Richards, 1977). The militarism in imperialism was ubiquitous during the colonial era to exert control over the colonies, but is again gaining importance through the issue linking of security with many other policy fields.

The (partial) control by one economy over another is not only possible through colonisation. Imperialism linked to humanitarianism and development assistance results often in the conclusion that the core power is promoting the underdevelopment of the periphery to maintain a relation of dependency rather than interdependency (Kothari, 2005; Richards, 1977; Six, 2009; Wolff, 1970). This conclusion follows from the argumentation that the investments in infrastructure in the developing country and the introduction of neoliberal policies make way for (more) private flows of capital, which often originate from developed countries and in the end the inflow of capital and outflow of goods results in the cherished surpluses (Richards, 1977). Furthermore, the privatisation process has reached the domain of security and the military and the domain of development assistance. NGOs and private military contractors (PMC) are increasingly becoming the frontrunners of imperialist agendas (Hoogvelt, 2006). For example, the US agenda against terror is targeted at ensuring the security of the US and American companies (Nardin, 2005). This is done through humanitarian and military operations, which are partially conducted by NGOs and PMCs (Hoogvelt, 2006). For NGOs this might get problematic as they can get accused of working for a government and lose their neutrality.

Furthermore, the non-material aspect of imperialism, cultural imperialism in particular, is the dominant latent feature of the relationships that the EU maintains with developing nations (Six, 2009). The concept of development has emerged from the Enlightenment and although its association with evolution of societies has become unacceptable, it has always been defined by Western theorists (Six, 2009). They tend to use dichotomies (North-South, West-East, developed-developing) to describe not only the future but also the past. This makes the West the directors of history and the establishers of the ‘right’ path for countries to follow to become ‘modern’ (Mignolo, 2000; Six, 2009). When the evolution of societies as a theory

became unacceptable due to racism and fascism, the new definition of development could fill the theoretical gap that justifies the meddling of the West with the affairs of other countries. Moreover, the development paradigm is enabling the West to keep other countries within their world order and (capitalist) economical system and thereby sustain a market and a source of labour and resources (Kothari, 2005).

Post-colonial theory is important to explain the developments in development aid. Several authors relate to post-colonialism and modern imperialism to describe the roots of (European) development aid and argue that the EU's relations with developing countries were a continuation of the old colonial ties from the very start of the European project (Klaasse, 2014). The roots of development lie in the colonial era, with many colonial officials working in the development industry after the colonies gained independence (Bakewell, 2008; Kothari, 2005). Touching on migration, post-colonial theory suggest that the colonial administration feared migration as it might lead to disruptions or even revolutions (Bakewell, 2008). For a long time, development projects were deemed a failure when they led to an increase in outmigration, which probably originated in the fear of migration of the colonial administration (De Haas, 2007; Olesen, 2002). However, with renewed interest in migration as part of development, the discourse has changed, and continuous to change (see §6.1).

### 2.3 Conceptual model

On the basis of the concepts amplified in the previous sections a general conceptual model can be developed (see figure 3). This conceptual model is the framework for the research process and the final outcomes. It illustrates the research questions and the theoretical context wherein they are manifested. The hypothesis that is developed from the literature is that the process of international migration has an influence on the development of countries of origin. The European policies then are able to affect this relation, to a certain extent. The post-colonialism of chapter two is in the conceptual model, and thereby the research, the background on which the manifestations of migration, development, human rights, governmental policies, etc. takes place and a way to shed some light on the practices going on in the conceptual field.




FIGURE 3. THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL

Each of the three concepts in the conceptual model are broad concepts that require some extra explanation in how they are viewed in this research. First of all, 'International migration' is delimiting the concept of 'migration' but still a broad concept. It does leave out internal migration, which does have some consequences (see the third way in §6.1 and Skeldon, 2008). In this research the focus is on the process of international migration towards the European Union. But different aspects of international migration will be used, such as circular migration and migrant rights. Next, 'Development' is quite possible one of the broadest concepts, with different meanings throughout time and space. Different entities (states, organisations, etc.) define development differently (Lélé, 1991). Derived from a review of the literature, Lélé (1991) comes to the conclusion that a definition of development entails "a process of directed change" (p.609) with objectives (basic needs, rise in GNP, etc.) and means (expertise, financial, etc.) to pursue this in a place that lacks or has limited (directed) change. As it will become clear, the development aid or assistance from Europe comes primarily from the EU and its member states. NGOs do find funds outside the states' frameworks, but also act as their executives. Furthermore, in discussing the evolution of European development policies there will be attention for different understandings (from a European standpoint) of development, such as sustainable development.

The relation between international migration and development is since 2002 often referred to as the migration-development nexus. This relation has throughout time, also before 2002, experienced several phases of optimistic and pessimistic attention, both outside and inside academia. Section §6.1 will elaborate further on this nexus as an analysis of the empirical findings in the interplays between the two policy fields of migration and development.

'European policies' is arguably not a concept like the other two. However, it is essential to describe the influences of the European Union and its policies on the link between migration and development. It encompasses more than just the paperwork, things that are more deemed concepts such as Europeanisation, security and governance. The research will look at the different European policies that are connected to migration, development and the EU itself, in an attempt to understand how migration could play an integrated role in development policies. This would mean that the intervening variable 'European policies' in the conceptual model is not constraining the relation between migration and development in the countries of origin. To get to a bedrock on which these policies could rest, chapter seven will be dedicated to a right to mobility for migrants, based on human rights and (international) law. To further operationalise how all of this will be done, the next chapter will show the methodology of this research.

### 3. Methodology

This chapter is structured as follows; the first section gives an overview and justification of the methodological choices, after which the other sections elaborate the distinct aspects of the methodology of this research. Section §3.2 specifies which data is collected and where it is found. Section §3.3 will expand on how the collected data is processed. Lastly, section §3.4 discusses in a reflective manner the methodological choices and what the consequences imply for the research and the conclusions.

#### 3.1 Methodological choices

The case study will be used as the primary research strategy, because the ‘systems’ of international migration and development aid are too broad to get a good in-depth understanding as it can be done through a case study (Creswell, 2013). The case study as an approach could be defined as “an intensive study of a single unit with an aim to generalize across a larger set of units” (Gerring, 2004). From the larger set of units available around this research the case of the European Union is selected. The exact unit of analysis that will be studied are the European policies that have influence on the process of international migration to the European Union. These are predominantly migration policies, but there are interesting linkages with development policies and territorial policies.

The process of international migration to the EU is chosen as the case to be studied. It is chosen because the whole set of units (i.e. the world) is too large for one study. However, the selection of the EU does still leave multiple actors to study. Also the EU as a whole has a remarkable border regime with no internal borders and the stimulation of internal movements between different member states, and multiple external borders with labour-exporting countries and the stimulation to stop (irregular) movements towards the EU. Therefore the EU and its territorial-, development- and migration-related policies are the unit of analysis as a single instrumental case.

The availability of different forms and sources of data makes for the triangulation of sources and methods that is characteristic to case studies (Verschuren & Doorewaard, 2010). Another characteristic of the case study is that the case, or unit, is studied within its natural context (Verschuren & Doorewaard, 2010). This will be met by this research through an internship at the Global Migration Centre in Geneva. Desk research of the European policies and related data will act as the cornerstones of the analyses. On a smaller scale, talks of and with experts and recordings of European Parliament Committee meetings will provide background information and further clarification. Just like the ethnography the case study analyses this data by describing the unit and the themes of the unit (Creswell, 2013). But the case study also involves cross-unit themes, which the ethnography does not (Creswell, 2013). This cross-unit analysis might be a weakness of the case study, because it could distract the research(er) from its intensive and in-depth study of one unit and instead turn into a broad analysis (Gerring, 2004). This should be addressed by sticking to the choice of the unit and keeping the focus on it throughout the research process, only focussing on other units at one point in the research. Also it is criticised that the case study does not lead to conclusions that can be applied to the larger set of units. Gerring (2004) argues that as long as a case study can be linked to a larger topic, and the study is about the occurrence of this general topic in a specific setting, the derived conclusions can be generalised.

### 3.2 Research material

This case study uses (policy) documents as primary source for the data collection. Additionally, secondary sources are included to put the primary sources into context. A few talks by, and with, experts were very fruitful to advance or verify certain propositions.

The previous section described the unit of analysis (the European policies that have influence on the process of international migration to the European Union). The data collected within this unit of analysis are policies (and proposals) of the European Union in the fields of migration, development assistance and territory. The last field includes, in this research, the aspect of security-related policies and the policies related to regional identity-building. This is necessary because the identity of the EU refers to the ways it makes policies and how it creates representations of itself and how it deals with other states and countries.

The EU maintains an extensive archive of all policies, directives, press releases and communications between the European Commission, the European Parliament and the European Council at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/>. The archives allow for easy access to every released document per policy field. For this research the policies, Commission proposals and communications of the following fields were primarily used to construct the historical background of chapter four:

- Culture
- Development
- Foreign and security policy
- Human rights
- Institutional affairs
- Justice, freedom and security
- Regional policy

The documents were chosen based on their relevance with migration, development or territory, which form the three focal points of the European policies that influence the process of international migration and development in the country of origin (as in the conceptual model, §2.3). It should be mentioned that the categories mentioned above were not functioning as delimiters for this research, but rather that they are solely the place within the archives where the relevant documents were found after carefully skimming through each category and the secondary sources.

The internship at the Global Migration Centre in Geneva provided an opportunity to get in touch with experts who are continuously reflecting on the functioning of the EU, UN and states regarding migrants and with special attention to the human rights. The presence of the Centre in the middle of the international district is perhaps a good way to illustrate how the Centre tries to keep a close eye on their practices. During the internship, a video stream of the European Parliament enabled the collection of views from experts and MEPs during several Committee meetings. Most of these meetings were organised in a response to current events at the European external borders. The next section will take this further and describe the strategy to process all of the collected data.

### 3.3 Research strategy

The previous section described which data is collected and where it is found. What remains is a strategy to process the collected data. The policy documents were the principal source of data. The documents have been processed by composing three different timelines for the evolvement of the fields of migration policies, development policies and territorial policies. These will all start after the end of WWII, because then a European Community started to come into existence, and thus the rudimentary forms of European policies. In advance of building the timelines, this ‘flowchart’ was made to guide the process of preparing the data for analysis:

1. Skim each EU archive category
2. Find relevant documents
3. Save document based on year and theme (migration, development, territory)
4. Research secondary sources for missing policies and proposals and add them
5. List for each theme the documents in chronological order to create a timeline
6. Write an elaboration of the timelines and the events on them

The found policies are structured based on the year of publication and the main theme (migration, development, territory). First of all, the policies and proposals that were found in the archives or the secondary sources were simply put in chronological order. Then a graphical timeline was created with attached to each timeline the different documents. This was a guide to structure the more in-depth elaboration of each document and the outcome was a historical narrative of the European policies, ready for the next step. This was the analysis and started with the identification and analysis of paradigms and ideology changes throughout time. Interesting cross-timeline influences, conflicts and frictions are after that the focus before jumping onto the conclusions and a synthesis, which could find places for improvement in today’s policies. The expert talks and European Parliament Committee meetings were mainly used to come to this synthesis and to find possible dimensions in the data or literature that were not exposed enough yet.

The secondary literature has been used during the analysis of the trends and interplays to pull in different interpretations and contexts for the events on the timelines. To make sure to not get lost in the vast amount of literature, a set of labels was used to organise the literature. Some of the labels divided the literature according to their relevance to one of the three timelines, to certain concepts (such as Europeanisation, or the migration-development nexus) or the type of source (such as a literature review or a theoretical piece). The primary sources were not organised with these labels, they were kept separate in distinct folders, depending on their link with either the field of migration, development or territory. There were only minor overlaps, which were manageable and only led to a few duplicate documents.

### **3.4 Methodological reflection**

The use of policy documents as the primary source of data sounds logical for a reconstruction and analysis of the influence of European policies on migration. It does however place the focus on the states and supranational organisations that make the policies and places, for example, the migrants and their individual stories aside. Therefore it would be a valuable practice for further research to inquire with individuals (migrants, politicians, etc.) about their experiences with current policies and their visions on the policy options (in chapter ten). Furthermore, a historical reconstruction (which forms the first part of the analysis) is by definition a reconstruction by those who recorded the data and retrieved it. This research did not only include actual events and policies, but also proposal, because they show the intend of certain actors apart from the outcomes. This does still leave open the factor of those who recorded the data. It is very likely that not every proposal raised within the European Commission has seen the daylight to get recorded in any archive.

As an extension of this the internship in Geneva, in the middle of all the UN organisations and international NGOs, was suitable for finding and analysing the large set of documents, but less suitable to touch upon the experiences of individual migrants. Moreover, Switzerland is not part of the EU. Still, it was a valuable internship because the knowledge that was present at the Global Migration Centre (predominantly on international law and human rights) helped guiding parts of the research and opened up the dimension of a legal right to mobility (see chapter 7). It became clear that a geographer has a different way of looking at migration compared with an expert on international law. Lastly, the internship in Geneva would make sure the research stayed in perspective with the wider, global, context.

## 4. Historical background: timelines

This chapter will explicate the evolvment of three branches of policies in the European Union: migration (§4.1), development assistance (§4.2) and territorial policies (§4.3). To make these timelines more vivid, a visualisation of the three timelines is included at the end of the chapter. As §3.3 already explained, these narratives are created from the archives of the EU and secondary sources. The result is a rather ‘clean’ chronological series. This is partly due to the way the creator of the documents constructs the documents in a specific, sometimes almost utopic, manner. But it is also done this way because it enables a clear analysis in the next chapters, without ending up with a mingled narrative of events and interpretations.

### 4.1 Timeline: the field of migration

Because of the many refugees in Europe during (and after) the Second World War, the (western) world leaders congregated in Geneva for a special UN conference to discuss a draft resolution that will state the rights that refugees should have. In 1951 they signed what became to be known as the Geneva Convention on the Protection of Refugees, although officially it is called the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (CRSR). This treaty sets out the rights that refugees have, but gives states a clear definition of who should be labelled as ‘refugee’ (and who not). Until today, Europe’s migration and asylum policies still favour refugees and asylum seekers (OECD, 2008). Following this trend, the Temporary Protection Directive allowed the EU to come up with a collective response to a mass influx of displaced persons that were unable to return to their country of origin (refugees). However, by speaking of a ‘mass influx’ the European Commission already seems to orient towards the discourses surrounding migration nowadays.

After the establishment of the Schengen Area (see the territorial timeline) and the incorporation of the Schengen Treaties in the *Acquis Communautaire* the European Commission started to work out the common rules for asylum, visas and (external) border controls. To accomplish this, the Commission set out a Common European Asylum System (CEAS), to be established in two phases. The first phase started in 1999 and was round up in 2005; the second phase was launched after a series of working papers and policy plans in 2008 and the CEAS was finished in 2013. The CEAS is a remarkable example of the style of EU policymaking as it is done step-by-step (over a period of 14 years) and surrounded by many working papers, white papers, policy plans and reports.

In 2002, the EU introduced legislation that penalised the facilitating of illegal entry to Europe in any way. This not only meant that people like smugglers are now criminalised, but also anyone who helps the migrants in Europe (called ‘facilitating residence’). This could be seen as the next step away from the refugee-friendly discourse to the Fortress Europe discourse. However, the EC proposed in the same year that it wants to view migration in a broader light, and incorporate migration issues in their relations with third countries. By stating that “migration is not to be seen only as a problem but as a positive factor for the growth and success of both the Union and the countries concerned” (European Commission, 2002), the Commission seems to go off to a good start. In hindsight however, the good intentions turned into not-so-good outcomes, especially through a post-colonial lens (see §9.1).

In 2003 the EU adopted the Family Reunification Directive, which, as the name already suggests, sets out the general rules and rights for third country nationals living (legally) in the EU to let their direct family members migrate to the EU as well (the directive does not apply to the UK, Denmark and Ireland). Also in 2003, the EU created a single status for third country nationals that (want to) live in the EU on the long term. This long-term residence status is granted when a third country national is living legally in the EU for at least five consecutive years.

In 2004, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, or FRONTEX for short, was established. In the same year the EU also launched the Aeneas Programme for a period of three years. This programme was dedicated to fund projects that promote cooperation between EU member states and third countries on migration related issues. At the start, this programme was filed under the EU's development aid agency EuropeAid. This is remarkable, as it highlights the linkages between migration and development. However, as it will become clear, the migration related policies and agencies shifted very often between the different EU Directorate-Generals.

In 2005, the EU launched their Global Approach to Migration (GAM). This seems the first attempt to follow the Commissions desire (from 2002) to view migration in a broader light. The Global Approach was created as an encompassing framework towards asylum and external migration. According to its website; "The framework defines how the EU conducts its policy dialogues and cooperation with non-EU countries, based on clearly defined priorities and embedded in the EU's overall external action, including development cooperation" (European Commission, 2015a). Yet, it has received criticism from member states and NGOs (Martin, 2013). Member states, at least at that time, were sceptical of dealing with migration on a European level. Others argued that the GAM is used to restrict mobility to the EU. It also puts forward the 'more for more' style of international relations that can also be found in the ENP. The Commission presented a revised Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) that included also short-term migration (such as students and businesspeople) and gave more importance to refugees. In the end the results of the GAMM depend greatly on member states, as they have to want to participate in Mobility Partnerships with third countries. Finally, the Asylum Procedures Directive was adopted in 2005, which lays down the obligations for states and rights of migrants to take into account during the procedure of asylum seekers. This directive is based on the 1951 CRSR and acts as the glue between a range of other EU legislation (such as the Dublin Regulations, Temporary Protection Directive and other directives targeted at standards for the asylum procedure).

Perhaps because of a lack of interest of member states to participate in Mobility Partnerships (the first ones were to be agreed in 2008, with Moldova and Cape Verde), the EC comes up in 2006 with a new plan to assist third countries to manage migration (to Europe). In the same year the EC also calls for an 'enhancement' of the mandate of FRONTEX. One of the enhancements would be a border surveillance system, a large system of connected satellites, cameras and border patrols to monitor and intercept illegal migration at the external borders of Europe. In 2007, FRONTEX is expanded with the ability of forming Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABIT). These teams should be deployed within five days after a

member state requests extra support because of “urgent and exceptional situations resulting from a mass influx of illegal immigrants” (European Commission, 2007b).

In 2008 the EU adopted the Return Directive (but it became operational in 2010). While the EU prefers that migrants return voluntarily to their country of origin, this directive gives member states the rules regarding the return or removal of (irregular) migrants using coercive methods. The directive presents also clearly the (human) rights that the migrants have during the procedures. For example, the state is obliged to either give the migrant legal status, or return the migrant to the country of origin. Any removal or detention measures should not be disproportionate and be preceded by a period for the migrant to depart voluntarily. The directive also mentions that states have the obligation to provide the migrants with basic rights (basic health care, education for children) while their removal is pending.

Derived from the US Green Card, the EU launches its Blue Card with the Blue Card Directive in 2009. Its main goal is to attract third country nationals that either are highly educated or earn 1.5 times the average income of the EU country they want to reside in. Also the EU starts with the Eurema project. Through this project the other EU member states voluntarily accommodate (small numbers of) irregular migrants arrived at Malta to release the pressure on the small island. The EU established its related organisation on Malta, the European Asylum Support Office (EASO). The EASO is founded within the framework of the CEAS to support Member States under pressure. The EC also appoints an Anti-trafficking Coordinator to improve the coherence between different international, European and national institutions regarding the eradication of human trafficking. This was further elaborated in the 2011 Anti-Trafficking Directive and 2012 Strategy towards the Eradication of Trafficking in Human Beings. The EU also introduced in 2011 a single permit for third country nationals to both work and reside in an EU country, making it easier for migrants and giving them more transparency about their rights in the EU. 2012 also brought the Resettlement Programme (proposed by the EC in 2009). This voluntary programme support member states with the accommodation of refugees. In essence it provides member states with help from the EASO and financial incentive to accommodate refugees.

2013 brought the finishing of the CEAS. The EC took the opportunity to propose a plan to harmonise all policies regarding the migration of students, trainees and researchers from third countries. Apparently unsatisfied with the results of the Eurema project, the EC held the first Relocation Forum to stimulate member states to accommodate refugees that seek international protection. EUROSUR, the large border surveillance that the EC wanted since 2006 (and was being built since 2008), became operational in 2013.

In 2014 the EU founded the Asylum, Migration, and Integration Fund (AMIF) for a period of six years. The AMIF contains 3.1 billion euros to spend on efficient migration management and a common European asylum and integration approach. The four pillars of the fund are therefore: Asylum (to further strengthen the CEAS), Legal Migration and Integration, Return (effective return strategies and fighting illegal migration) and Solidarity (between EU member states). Also the EU revised the regulations regarding border surveillance, enabling border patrols to immediately return intercepted migrants at the high seas to the country they are assumed to be embarked. If this is not possible, the border patrol can bring the migrants to the member state in whose territorial waters the interception takes

place or from where the patrol departed. Thus bypassing the Dublin Regulations and putting the pressure more on the southern EU member states.

In 2015, as of the time of writing, the EU has thus far decided to increase the budget of Frontex from 94 to 114 million euros. Also the EU member states, in an emergency meeting after large numbers of drowned migrants in the Mediterranean, agreed to a package of measures consisting of an immediate deployment of marine vessels, helicopters and other equipment to increase patrolling in the Mediterranean and a temporary EU-wide resettlement programme of 5000 refugees from southern EU member states. The EC has followed this up with a plan to continue the resettlement of refugees across Europe. Lastly, the EU member states look for a UN mandate to launch a military mission to destroy smugglers' vessels, similar to the mission off the coast of Somalia.

#### **4.2 Timeline: development assistance**

The development timeline starts at more or less the same point as the migration timeline. The in 1957 signed Treaty of Rome did not only create the European Economic Community but also provisioned a European Development Fund (EDF). This fund was created to maintain the special relationship between Europe and its former colonies, referred to as the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) and Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT). Not only did the Europeans provide funds, they adopted several treaties which in practice led to a free trade area between the European Economic Community and the ACP and OCT. These agreements became known as the Yaoundé Conventions and the subsequent Lomé Conventions.

With the accession of more member states, there rose a need to broaden the European development assistance beyond the former colonies. Countries such as the Netherlands, Germany and the UK had no relationships with their former colonies in the same way that France and Italy had. And their former colonies could join the agreements that were made with ACP and OCT, but not renegotiate it. For countries such as Canada and India, their interests were almost incompatible with those of the ACP and OCT. Therefore the European member states started carefully expanding their development and foreign policies to include all (developing) countries in the world.

In 1989, the term Washington Consensus was coined to point out the discourses of the Bretton Woods Institutions (World Bank, IMF, US Treasury). The focus that the Washington Consensus put on neoliberal policies aimed at deregulation, privatisation and the free market did make its way into development assistance. While people like Joseph Stiglitz argued that this Consensus ignores issues of inequality and living standards, it became the way of thinking in development assistance for many years (Kennedy, 2003). In European development thinking, 2005 brought the turning point with the European Consensus on development. This Consensus outlines a new framework of common principles for the EC and the EU member states to place their policies in. The Consensus thereby promotes a spirit of complementarity between policies and policy fields, such as development and peace.

In 1995, the EU started a series of negotiations called the Barcelona Process. It included the EU member states and 12 other countries bordering the Mediterranean with the goal of laying the groundwork for future bilateral or multilateral relations in the Mediterranean region. The Barcelona Process became the basis for not only the Euro-Mediterranean

Partnership (EMP) but also the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and continues to date as a forum for dialogue.

Five years later, in 2000, the EU and the ACP countries signed the Cotonou Agreement, which normalises the special relationship the EU had until now with the ACP countries. The non-reciprocal free access the ACP countries had to the European markets was revoked and together with all the other trade preferences the EU has given over the years replaced by Economic Partnership Agreements. These EPAs did provide the ACP countries with barrier-free access to the European market, but it now also gave the EU access to the markets of the ACP countries. Since the EPAs are agreed with individual ACP countries, the EU is much more flexible with allocating development aid and involving local non-state actors.

Furthermore, 2000 marked the start of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) with the adoption of the Millennium Declaration by the UN General Assembly. In Europe, these goals were used to align all related objectives in European policies with the broader MDG discourse. This was probably a kick-start for the European Consensus in 2005, according to which issues such as good governance were brought onto the negotiation table next to poverty reduction and trade preferences; hence it shows similarities with the MDGs. The kick-start is exemplified by the, in the same year announced and started, reform of the EU's 'external assistance policies'. With this reform the EC wanted to bring all related policies under one banner to revise the European development strategies and enhance the effectiveness of development aid. In fact, 'aid effectiveness' became a buzzword that led to more reforms and policy coherence in the next years. One being the establishment of EuropeAid, which worked separate from the Directorate-General on development. The main objective of EuropeAid was to implement and oversee the external aid programmes of the EU. It made sure that funds such as the EDF maximised their value and impact and complied with the EU overall development objectives (which were in line themselves with the MDGs).

In 2005 the European Commission introduced eleven policy fields where non-development aid policies could affect and stimulate the achievement of the MDGs. However, these areas were quite general, and seem to encompass the entire scope of competences of the EC, such as fisheries, agriculture and environment. The structure of the eleven priority areas also coincide with the structure of many ENP Action Plans, raising some interesting questions (see §9.1). In 2005 the European member states also signed the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. The main message was that all aid, at least from Europe, should be harmonised and transparent, and coordination should be improved. This thus adds to the European Consensus and the competence of the Commission to create a common framework for development assistance. The EC also launched measures to "improve the impact of migration on development" (European Commission, 2005a). While migration has been a frequent topic in the debate on policy coherence regarding development, it has always been mentioned together with other fields, ranging from environment to security. The new measures mentioned by the EC are solely targeted at the migration-development nexus. For example, the EC wants to make sending remittances easier and cheaper for migrants. More interesting is that the EC wants to promote circular migration. Although the subtle focus is still on the return of migrants to their country of origin, the EC should have known that circular migration requires a different strategy towards border management (this seems not to be developed beyond a proposal).

In an effort to further expand the scope of European development assistance the EU launched in 2007 the Instrument for Development Cooperation (IDC) for Asia, the Middle East, South Africa and Latin-America. In essence the IDC is complementing the EDF. The IDC is one of the largest funds with over 16 billion euros for the period 2007-2013 alone. Any actor, ranging from EU states or agencies to municipalities or NGOs is eligible to get financing from the IDC as long as the project is working towards the achievement of the



FIGURE 4. THE EIGHT MDGs  
(SOURCE: UNITED NATIONS, 2015)

IDC's goals. The themes of the IDC are the usual suspects in EU foreign policy: environment, migration and asylum, food security and 'investing in people' (education, poverty reduction, etc.). Programmes such as the Aeneas Programme and projects with individual countries all went up in the IDC. The Commission also proposed, within the framework of the European Consensus and the Paris Declaration, a 'Code of Conduct on Complementarity and the Division of Labour in Development Policy'. The Code of Conduct consists of principles that should guide member states (and other actors) that have projects operating in the same third country. The idea is that all resources are used in the most effective way, and "each actor focuses its assistance on areas where it can add most value, given what others are doing" (European Commission, 2007a). The Code of Conduct tries to make sure that everyone does only what they do best, without interfering with others, and that no country is left behind.

The EU continues to reform its development agencies and policies. In 2008 the EC held a High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, to continue the elaboration of the 2005 Paris Declaration. In 2011, a shift of names and competences took place within the Commission. EuropeAid (officially called AIDCO) merged with the Directorate-General for Development and Relations with ACP States into the Directorate-General Development

and Cooperation – EuropeAid (DG-DEVCO). Apparently they were quite fond of the name 'EuropeAid' as it is added at the end of the new name. In 2015 there was again a revision of DGs, DG-DEVCO kept its short name, but its full name dropped the 'EuropeAid' part: Directorate-General International Cooperation and Development. However, EuropeAid is now used as the name to refer to DG-DEVCO in online and offline communication, perhaps because to show that is the European counterpart of organisations such as USAID and UKaid. Nonetheless, the contents of EuropeAid have, like the ACP-related programmes, been integrated into a wider development-oriented Directorate-General.

More important than a revision of the institutions is the deadline of the MDGs in 2015. The Millennium Development Goals will likely be succeeded by the new Sustainable Development Goals for the next 15 years during the UN General Assembly in September

2015 (see §8.3). The MDGs have had a huge impact on the European development thinking and the goals were the next big step in the UN's progress in international law and policy after the success of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The MDGs steered NGOs, governments, institutions and their flows of capital and knowledge into the eight directions of the MDGs (see figure 4). While attempts had been made in the 60's and 80's to come up with some targets, they often lacked good monitoring or action plans (Hulme, 2009). The aforementioned Washington Consensus did also not help, as economic policies were seen as the logical path and with economic growth the other issues would get solved as well, thus tempering the desire for comprehensive goals and targets. In the 90's the UN got back into the picture with a series of summits as well as the Human Development Report to put poverty reduction and other non-economic issues on the map, and with the World Bank expressing the same message the support grew for the improvement of lives as an ultimate goal (Hulme, 2009). The UN got momentum after a World Summit for Children (Hulme, 2009). UNICEF proved that it is possible to keep governments accountable for the promises they made at the summit and a majority of countries implemented action and monitoring plans. During conferences taking place from Rio to Cairo, the UN started to assemble, although fragmented, the building blocks for the MDGs. However, aid fatigue was rising and budget cuts were rooming the OECD states' governments (Hulme, 2009). In order to overcome this, and find new support for development, an OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) meeting in 1995 was held to turn the tide. It was agreed that more focus and clear targets, as in any other government department, could help to adapt development assistance to the new context (Hulme, 2009). This led in 1996 to the formulation of the International Development Goals (IDGs). Because it came out of the OECD's sleeves, it was a purely rich country-led initiative. The IDGs suffered from this, as poor countries viewed the rhetoric about partnership rather sceptical and NGOs too saw the IDGs as unambitious and narrowly focused (Hulme, 2009). Nonetheless, with the DAC showing it was possible to form a list of concrete plans and monitoring abilities and the UN consolidating the conclusions from a decade of conferences, plans started to get drawn up for the "mother of all summits" (Hulme, 2009, p.25) at the Millennium Assembly in 2000. Knowing that it would take a thousand years before a summit with a similar resonance could be held, the UN was keen to make it a historic Assembly with a Millennium Declaration that would not end up in a dusty drawer (Hulme, 2009). What was called the 'Millennium Consensus' should re-energise the discourse on development and on the UN itself. The Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, decided to pick up the IDGs and the consolidated conclusions of the previous UN summits and make them the base draft for the Millennium Declaration. While the lobbying machinery of governments, NGOs and others was at full speed to get 'their' goals included, a joint report by the UN, IMF, World Bank and OECD further affirmed that everyone would be on the same page and that the Millennium Declaration would focus on goals for development assistance. Negotiations about the final Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals started in 1998 and continued until the General Assembly in September 2000, when they were adopted. While the final indicators and road maps still had to be worked out, the MDGs would prove to be a concrete tool for governments and NGOs to pursue the improvement of lives around the globe.

### 4.3 Timeline: territorial policies

The European territorial timeline starts in 1985 when Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands signed the first Schengen Agreement, followed by the Single European Act in 1986 to create a single internal market (as of 1993). The first Schengen Agreement was followed by a second in 1990. Until the incorporation of the Agreements in the EU legislation (in 1999) the two agreements laid down the rules for the internal market and the external borders (regarding asylum, visas, and border checks).

In 1999 the European Union held a special summit in Tampere, Finland. This summit covered the ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ as set out in the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 to ensure that the “free movement of persons [is] assured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime” (European Union, 1997, p.5). The summit covered the core themes of this area: a common asylum and immigration policy (CEAS), police cooperation (EUROPOL), justice cooperation (EUROJUST) and stronger (more coherent) external action. The thought behind the area of freedom, security and justice is that free movement and European citizenship cannot exist without the proper tools to ensure its safety. Therefore most EU member states (exceptions are Denmark, and partly Ireland and the UK) work together to fight crime, terrorism and for secure borders. It was reasoned at Tampere that these freedoms and security should not be exclusively for the Europeans, but also for nationals of third countries. Of course this goes together with cross-border cooperation against crime and terrorism. To put all of this into practice the Tampere Programme was the first of its kind, followed later by the The Hague Programme and the Stockholm Programme.

In 2001, the European Commission published two lists, one containing all the countries whose citizens would not need a visa to visit the Schengen Area and a list with countries where people have to apply for a visa. The first list consists of 105 countries, the second of 60, see figure 5 for a map of where these countries are. This visa policy has been accused of promoting a Global Apartheid (Van Houtum, 2010). At the border checks, a far too simple risk analysis is made on the basis of where the entering person is born. This dichotomy of the world in welcome and less welcome is a form of “chronopolitics as it slows down, illegalises, or immobilises the mobility of a significant part of the world population and prioritises and mobilises the travelling speed of a select human segment” (Van Houtum, 2010, p.964). Besides the Global Apartheid, this policy also boosts irregular migration, as migrants from the blacklist have less chance of gaining access to the EU through a regular way. This does not mean they stay at home; instead they have to rely on networks of smugglers to reach the European continent.




FIGURE 5. THE EUROPEAN VISA REQUIREMENTS POLICY (SOURCE: EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2015B)

In 2004, the European Commission also launched the The Hague Programme, to fund projects aimed at “strengthening the area of freedom, security, and justice” (European Commission, 2005b). The programme consists of 10 priorities, such as anti-terrorism measures, migration, citizenship and organised crime. The EC also presented their strategy called ‘a stronger partnership for the outermost regions’, which will try to involve the overseas territories of EU member states with the EU. The EC also proposes to create a similar strategy for the countries directly bordering the EU (the ENP). The goal of the ENP (launched after the 2004 EU enlargement, and renewed in 2011) was to prevent ‘sharp edges’ between the EU and surrounding non-EU countries (the ‘European neighbourhood’). The EC made Action Plans for each ENP-country to work on; it consisted of calls for action and promises of (financial) support in a wide range of policy fields. Building on this framework is the in 2008 launched Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). Brought forward under the French Presidency of the European Council, the first proposal was to create a union of countries surrounding the Mediterranean. After rejections of other countries the UfM now includes all EU member states, coming to a total of 43 member states in the UfM. The possibility of overstretch is overcome by the Variable Geometry Principle, every project the UfM undertakes only requires a minimum of two member states to get involved, which gives the UfM greater flexibility and requires less bureaucracy and compromises as only those with an interest are participating.

Two years later, in 2006, the Europe for Citizens Programme was launched for the 2007-2013 period. The goal of the programme was to involve ‘the public’ in the process of Europeanisation. The language is rather vague with objectives such as “bringing together people” and “giving citizens the opportunity to interact” (European Parliament, 2006). Overall, the goal of the programme seems to be an attempt of the EU at identity-building for a region (more on this later on). As it is already mentioned in the migration timeline, the EC

called for an enhancement of the mandate of FRONTEX in 2006 and an improvement of the surveillance of the external borders.

In 2007 the EC introduced the External Borders Fund (EBF), with close to 2 billion euros in it. The purpose of the EBF was to improve the effectiveness of the management of the external borders. It was mainly focused on administrative organisation and coherent implementation of EU policies regarding the exchange of information from different systems (for example, from surveillance cameras and border checks). With the funding of the EBF the plan of the EC to launch a Union-wide system of surveillance systems for the external borders came one step closer. In fact, in 2008, the framework for EUROSUR was presented. To create an efficient border surveillance system, EUROSUR did not consist of launching new satellites or other expensive programmes, but rather worked towards connecting different systems from different member states with each other, thereby improving the monitoring of the external borders.

The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (the Treaty of Lisbon), adopted in 2009, restructured a range of treaties and agreements signed over the years in Europe. Regarding territoriality, it provisioned the creation of a fund for regional development that should promote territorial, economic and social cohesion. In so far the EU still continues with its attempt at nation identity building across the Union.

The Hague Programme was succeeded in 2010 by the Stockholm Programme. This programme shifted the focus, or at least the language, to a more abstract level. Instead of mentioning organised crime or citizenship, it speaks of a “Europe of Justice”, “Europe of Solidarity” or “Europe that protects” (European Commission, 2010). It thereby seems to move beyond the initial intentions that resulted from the Tampere summit (police, justice and border guard cooperation) to a practice of building an image of a European identity, or at least an identity of the European Union. The next section on trends will further elaborate on the region-building for the European Union.

Lastly, in 2011, the Commission proposed measures to further improve the management of the internal borders. This was in practice a reaction to the Arab Spring in the same year. The revolutions in the northern African countries led to an (expected) increase in migration to Europe across the Mediterranean. Although in hindsight the numbers were much lower than the expectations, EU member states already acted firmly. Italy granted residence permits to 22.000 migrants, to allow them to move beyond the Italian borders (Migration Policy Institute, 2011). France therefore reintroduced checks at its border with Italy. To prevent cracks in the internal trust between member states, the European Commission introduced legislation that improved the inspections of member states compliance with the Schengen rules. Also the legislation gave the Commission the possibility to reintroduce border controls, for periods of 30 days. Previously this was only possible by national governments themselves (as part of the Schengen Agreement) and only for a period of 5 days. This new measure could remove any distrust between member states (as it is a Commission’s decision, not a national one) and make sure the internal solidarity would stay intact.




FIGURE 6. THE MIGRATION TIMELINE




FIGURE 7. THE DEVELOPMENT TIMELINE




FIGURE 8. THE TERRITORIAL TIMELINE

## 5. Analysis: trends throughout time

The previous chapter described the historical development of European policies; this chapter will build on that with an attempt at extracting the trends flowing through and across the three timelines. Bringing back the conceptual model (figure 3), this chapter is focusing on the 'European policies' box. Following the line of the previous chapter, it looks at each individual policy field (migration, development, territory) and point out trends in those fields. The next chapter will then take this further and look at interplays between the (trends in) three fields.

### 5.1 Migration

The trends in the field of European migration policies are characterised by a process of communitarisation, as it is the case in more policy fields. For migration policies, cooperation between EU member states started with internal supranational governance, followed by a shift outwards and upwards (Lavenex, 2006). Not only grew the EU in terms of size, it also gained more competences. By linking migration to foreign policy, border management and development aid the European Commission got more influence on the migration policies, such as through the formation of the CEAS. However, the decision-making is to a large extent still in the hands of the European Council.

Adepoju *et al.* (2009) argue that there are four phases that EU migration policies went through. First, the focus was on battling human trafficking and deporting irregular migrants towards countries of origin. Second, there came more attention for dialogue with the sending countries and attention for a humane treatment of deported migrants. However, the fortress around Europe was also erected and the outsourcing of border protection began. Third, the focus was put on cooperation and partnership with sending and transit countries. Policies such as the ENP linked migration with a wide range of other fields to pressurise the countries to take the measures regarding border protection and migration management. Fourth, the waterbed effect came in the spotlight as the EU started to realise that completely stopping irregular migration is impossible. However, this realisation has not always reached the member states and the current events in the Mediterranean Sea show that there are no concrete solutions put in place yet.

Europeanisation is a key term, as already mentioned the process of European communitarisation is one of the trends in the field of migration. Europeanisation has no simple, precise, definition. It can be seen as an addition to globalisation because it is intertwined with globalisation and in that sense is an interaction of processes from within and outside of the state (Wallace, 2000). Or Europeanisation could also be defined as the development and conservation of systematic European legislation so that the framework of politics and policy in (European) countries get a European dimension build into it (Wallace, 2000). Europeanisation is an extensive institutionalised process in which formal procedures rely on informal agreements, as is often seen at European summits, the result could be characterised as governance without government (Wallace, 2000). Olsen (2002) describes five sub-processes of Europeanisation:

1. Changes in the borders, the expansion of the political space and the system of governance.
2. The development of formal European institutions. These strengthen the possibility to take decisions together and act with sanctions if needed.
3. The adjustment of the national to the European system. A balance should exist between local autonomy and central coordination.
4. The finding or forming of a place in the world for Europe, the relations with non-European actors and institutions and in international forums.
5. The political unification, a process in which Europe will be a political entity influenced by and with influence on developments outside of Europe.

Besides the deepening of European integration of migration policies, there is also a trend of shifting outwards beyond the borders of the EU. For the member states this is an opportunity to maintain the national sovereignty. It is therefore also called the “Escape to Europe” (Lavenex, 2006, p. 331). Because of less national resistance, this branch of widening of Europe went faster than the deepening. The European Commission had full competence regarding the Single European Market, and could expand that influence by tying other fields to this core competence. To increase its leverage in the field of migration, the EC tied trade agreements with migration readmission agreements, such as in the ENP. In the end this resulted in more grip on the field of migration by the ‘Community method’ (decision-making through the European Commission and Parliament instead of the European Council). The EC, but especially the EP saw in this their chance to push their desire for a comprehensive approach on migration. The governments that once thought this shift outwards was a way to maintain their sovereignty over the issue now see that it is eroding their sovereignty instead.

## 5.2 Development

The field of European development assistance has three clear paradigms: the Imperial Consensus, the Washington Consensus and the European Consensus. The first lasted roughly until the Second World War, after which many colonies went through decolonisation and gained independence. Development assistance then transitioned towards the Washington Consensus with the establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions. In Europe, the European Consensus on development was ‘declared’ in 2005 by the European Commission.

The Washington Consensus was first mentioned in 1989 by John Williamson to label a set of policies that were seen as needed in the developing world and of which the major flag bearers were located in Washington, both in the political way (Congress) and in the technocratic way (the Bretton Woods institutions and think tanks) (Williamson, 2008). The initial ten policies that were framed as the Washington Consensus were:

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| 1. Fiscal discipline                          | 6. Trade liberalisation                               |
| 2. Re-ordering public expenditures priorities | 7. Liberalisation of inward foreign direct investment |
| 3. Tax reform                                 | 8. Privatisation                                      |
| 4. Liberalising interest rates                | 9. Deregulation                                       |
| 5. Competitive exchange rates                 | 10. Property rights                                   |

The Washington Consensus marked the end of the paternalistic approaches and the strict Cold War division in First, Second and Third World (Williamson, 2008). However, this new way of thinking led to new problems and opponents: “In many ways, the Washington Consensus was a consensus for liberalisation and globalisation rather than a consensus for equitable growth and sustainable development” (Serra & Stiglitz, 2008, p. 6). Thus, the notions of a First World and Third World were kept alive in the new notion of the Global North and the Global South. The following decades, the Washington Consensus became interpreted in different ways. Partly because the Bretton Woods institutions evolved their perspectives and visions and thus the Washington Consensus evolved. Other, more sceptic, interpretations of the Washington Consensus associated it with ‘market fundamentalism’ and developed it beyond a set of policy instruments to a broader view of the world. This has partly to do with the ‘Washington’ part of the terminology, which makes it easy to associate it with the US government and its standpoints. In a review of the history of the term, Williamson (2008) argues that the last interpretation might be what put the policies more in a bad light than attempts at empirically underpinning counterarguments. For example the tenth instrument on the list, ‘property rights’ was from the beginning elaborated as providing the informal settlements with capital as it is also explained by Hernando de Soto. Nonetheless, the concept of sustainable development and the migration-development nexus brought new perspectives on development and led in Europe to a new consensus.

With the change in the discourse in migration & development (see §6.1), in Europe the Washington Consensus made way for the European Consensus on development. It marked the shift towards sustainable development in European development policies, although the shift is taking place very gradually.

Sustainable development endogenises issues into development that previously were only very limited linked to development and economic growth, such as the environment (Hopwood, Mellor, & O’Brien, 2005). When awareness rose that economic growth is not (only) the way to eradicate poverty, a range of environmental and social issues were linked to the initial economic-driven development thinking. The renowned Brundtland Report is one of the first to bring all issues under the terminology of sustainability. However, an exact definition of sustainable development has not yet emerged, which leaves the concept open for interpretation as seen in figure 9 (Lélé, 1991). The figure places the EU in the Status Quo part of the debate on sustainable development. This does not mean the EU is aiming at going down the old path. Instead, Status Quo proponents see no problem in (their) society that has to be fixed. This is why no governmental-related institution is outside the Status Quo section, as it is in their interest to maintain their current stable way of policymaking. The environmental and social dimensions are not elevated to the same level as the economic dimension but the economic dimension is the crucial backbone behind development and as such has to carry with it the other dimensions. To make this more concrete, Status Quo proponents argue that consumer power will push the market towards environmental and social sustainability. The development policies should therefore be aimed at providing technology, information and impact assessment structures for consumers, businesses and states to pursue their economic growth with a sustainable mind and tools.

In contrast, Reform proponents argue that while the world political economy is unlikely to collapse, a major shift in policies and lifestyles is required in order to cope with the big

environmental and social problems. Like the Status Quo, the Reform proponents place their faith in technology and the spread of knowledge. Based on rational arguments and taking time into account, governments will be persuaded to implement the large reforms. The Transformation proponents take it from there and speak of a crisis that is imminent. They argue that a change of the political structure is needed to make space for the underrepresented to be heard. There is a division in the Transformation section between the human-centred and the eco-centred advocates. Both strive for justice, either in the environmental or the social sense. Interestingly, the Transformationists seem not to be interlinking the economic, political, social and environmental dimensions into one vision. This does not mean that for example the eco-fascists and the anti-capitalists disagree, but they do not necessarily incorporate the other's perspective in their own one.




FIGURE 9. THE DIFFERENT VIEWS ON THE CONCEPT OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (SOURCE: (HOPWOOD ET AL., 2005))

To understand how actors such as the EU come to their interpretation of sustainable development, figure 10 shows the broad vagueness of the ‘sustainable development’ buzzword. Of the two interpretations provided in the figure, the EU is arriving at the left one of sustaining economic growth. The wide landscape of definitions and meanings of sustainable development is to some extent also the strength of it for policymaking because “anyone driven by *either* long-term self-interest, *or* concern for poverty, *or* concern for intergenerational equity should be willing to support the operational objectives of SD” (Lele, 1991, p.612, emphasis in original). For policymakers this means that placing their policies under the sustainable development umbrella will increase their ability to obtain societal support for it (if they are compatible with the objectives of course).




FIGURE 10. AN LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (SOURCE: LELE, 1991)

It is now clear that although there is a European Consensus on development, the ideas of sustainable development and the migration & development discourse are not thoroughly integrated in EU policies. The economic self-interests of the EU continue to dominate the framework for external relations, including development assistance. The securitisation discourse that entered policymaking since the 1990's (see §6.2) continues to be ubiquitous in European external relations. It is the essential element that glues the others - ranging from migration to the environment and development - together. This dominance of the economic self-interests means that the European development policies still try to adopt a one-size-fits-all approach to third countries, with poverty alleviation still being the priority. This approach is accompanied by a 'more-for-more' model, where development aid and trade preferences are used to reform the third countries to the European view on modern countries. This then results in the use of development aid money for migration management.

Altogether, the interpretation of migration & development, sustainable development and even the own Consensus by the European Commission and member states seems rather interesting. Although they often claim to strive for sustainable development and comprehensive, coherent policies, there remains a logic that allows the use of development money for the building of fences and border patrols instead of improving the livelihoods of people. While the EC made policy coherence a priority, the departmentalisation seems not to allow it. As it became clear from the timeline, the institutional features of the EU changed every now and then, placing development in different contexts each time. It went from a free trade agreement based on old colonial ties to several overlapping Directorate-Generals. Figure 11 shows all the DGs of the European Commission as listed on its website (<http://ec.europa.eu>). A red arrow indicates that the DG has something to do with development assistance and the relationship between the EU and the Global South. For example, DEVCO handles cooperation with developing countries, but not with countries

bordering the EU (which is the competence of NEAR), nor in the field of migration (HOME) or trade (TRADE) or humanitarian aid (ECHO). This of course opens up the question to which extent the EC takes its Consensus on policy coherence and a comprehensive approach to development really serious.



FIGURE 11. THE DEPARTMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION (SOURCE: [HTTP://EC.EUROPA.EU](http://ec.europa.eu))

### 5.3 Territory

The evolution of the EU's governance can be divided into three phases (Tsebelis & Garrett, 2001). During the initial phase (1958 to 1987) the Council was the central actor in EU decision-making as any member state could veto any proposal. The second phase (1987 to 1992) started with the signing of the Single European Act, which established the internal market and during this phase a new voting system was introduced, which led member states to give up their vetoes. The third phase was begun with the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam, giving the European Parliament more power and introducing the euro. Since Tsebelis and Garrett (2001) wrote their article, the EU's governance has evolved further, namely with the Treaty of Lisbon, which could be defined as the fourth phase.

The EU has internally a continuous tension between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. Until the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, the EU was divided into three

pillars. Decision-making in the first pillar, consisting of the European Community, was completely supranational. Decisions in the second (Common Foreign and Security Policy) and third (Justice and Home Affairs) pillar were made mainly intergovernmental. The Treaty of Lisbon turned the EU into a legal person, able to become part of international treaties and organisations like any other state. The pillars were deemed too rigid to work with, and the Commission got a categorisation of competences in 'exclusive competences', 'shared competences' and 'supporting competences'. For the EC this was a very communitarising move, as few would argue 'support' is a bad thing and there is no 'no competence' category. The second and third pillar decision-making in this way became closer towards the supranational Community method of decision-making.

The Commission as the primary envoy of Europeanisation is continuously adding an element of Europeanness to create a different and distinct region that will give it its legitimacy (Manners & Whitman, 2003). This has two dimensions: the identity of Europe and Europe's roles, which are elaborated by Manners and Whitman (2003). The identity of Europe is constructed through the way its governance works:

- Network polity, there is no real hierarchy but rather a network of technocrats from the EU institutions and member states.
- Meta-regionalism, it is not a nation-state but does have its own form of sovereignty and territoriality.
- Boundedness, policies are not always (completely) targeted at the internal or external world.

The second dimension, the roles of Europe, refers to the forms of power the EU possesses:

- Civilian power, this relates mostly to the strongly developed economic policies and the internal market, which can be used in external relations.
- Military power, although an EU army is not existing, the CFSP is enabling the EU to harness some military capabilities, such as for Frontex.
- Normative power, the institutionalisation in Europe has led to common norms than can be used as a mirror in international politics.

The combination of the identity and roles make the EU greater than the sum of its policies. The use by the EC and other actors of the identity and roles has led to the construction of certain representations of 'Europe' such as the employment Walhalla for the labour migrant or the bureaucratic colossus for the Eurosceptic. These representations can reinforce or diminish further advancement of the EU's identity and roles. For example, with a widespread representation of bureaucratic colossus it might get more difficult for the EC to expand its competences. Besides that, the identity and roles are not isolated but are influencing each other.

The EU, or the Commission to be more specific, is following to some extent the same path as the European nation-states did centuries ago. The goal of this path is to create a sense of community that will legitimise a political unit with sovereignty over a territory (Laffan, 1996). Nation-states constructed themselves as imagined communities with the following elements (Laffan, 1996):

- A historic homeland
- Common myths and histories
- Common political culture
- Common legal rights and duties
- Common economy and mobility

This process essentially is the difference engine through which a community is created (Manners & Whitman, 2003). And the EC is since a few years actively fuelling this engine to create a sense of a European community. Out of Laffan's list, the EU already has its common economy and mobility and to a large extent legal rights. The first two elements, a historic homeland and common myths and histories, cannot easily be put in a Commissioner's directive. But by adding an element of Europeanness to certain national stories and monuments, a common European identity seems to be constructed. Examples are the objects put on the currency and the rhetoric used by politicians against the Turkish candidature for EU membership. Regarding the currency, it is interesting that Cyprus is 'moved' hundreds of kilometres to make it really part of Europe, and place Europe farther from Turkey and the Middle East.

At the time the EU's earliest predecessor was founded, there was a lot of uncertainty in Europe and a yearn for security after two World Wars and a starting Cold War. The founding of the European Community of Coal and Steel was an attempt at taking some of the uncertainties away and stabilising the region (especially between France and Germany). Although the context is different, there is again a lot of uncertainty and a yearn for security in Europe and perhaps even more at its frontiers. This yearn for security is brought back in the migration-territory nexus in the next chapter, together with the migration-development nexus.

## 6. Analysis: interplay throughout time

Analysing the trends in the different fields on their own was the first step, since they are also influencing each other or are addressed by certain policies. This particularly counts for the fields of migration and development. This will be covered by section §6.1 on the migration discourse in development (also called ‘migration & development’ or the ‘migration-development nexus’). However, there is also synthesis between the fields of migration and territoriality in the form of the security discourse on migration which will be clarified in section §6.2.

Before diving into the specific policy fields, a more general exploration is appropriate. There are numerous treaties and declarations signed between the countries that are nowadays members of the European Union. It would be interesting to see how migration, development and security got intertwined in the big treaties that founded and dramatically altered the workings of European cooperation. These are the following treaties:

- Treaty of Paris, 1951, establishing the European Coal and Steel Community
- Treaty of Rome, 1957, establishing the European Economic Community
- Treaty of Maastricht, 1992, establishing the European Union and the Eurozone
- Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997, reforming the European Union
- Treaty of Lisbon, 2009, further reforming the European Union

To start off, each treaty has been searched for the three key terms ‘migration’ (including derivations such as immigration and emigration), ‘development’ and ‘security’. The results are displayed in figure 12. Next, each treaty has been searched for concurrences of the three key terms with each other in the same paragraph or article, thus in a simplistic way revealing the presence of the different theoretical nexuses (figure 13). At a first glance, it is apparent that each term on its own has seen an increase in usage in the European treaties. Also, when looking for interplays between the terms, the treaties seem rather security-focused as there are no occurrences of migration and development together. But the focus on security has also changed in a definitional way. In the Treaty of Paris the usage of ‘security’ is used referring to the member states’ own internal social security, instead of the more physical security at the borders in later treaties. The same goes for ‘development’, which at first is usually referring to the development of Europe’s own industries and regions, with the exception of the articles related to the EDF in the Treaty of Rome. With the Treaty of Maastricht (and Amsterdam and Lisbon) the usage is mostly referring to the (sustainable) development of non-European countries and the development of European institutions. The increase of the use of ‘migration’ in the treaties could be explained by the fact that until the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Schengen Agreements (and thus everything related to migration, asylum and borders) was not incorporated into the *Acquis Communautaire* of the European Union.

Paris	2	1	9
Rome	10	1	30
Maastricht	59	2	63
Amsterdam	78	8	32
Lisbon	184	14	55

FIGURE 12. THE NUMBER OF OCCURRENCES OF SECURITY, MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN FIVE EU TREATIES

	Security-migration	Security-development	Development-migration
Paris	1	0	0
Rome	1	2	0
Maastricht	0	1	0
Amsterdam	2	6	0
Lisbon	3	2	0

FIGURE 13. THE CO-OCCURRENCES OF SECURITY, MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN FIVE EU TREATIES

### 6.1 The migration-development nexus

The term ‘migration-development nexus’ was first coined by Nyberg-Sørensen, Van Hear and Engberg-Pedersen (2002). However, the interplay between the fields of migration and development has been going on much longer. Ever since the European empires colonised much of the world, migration (especially internal, but also international) has been looked at through a lens of development. Whether this lens was rose-coloured or not depended largely on the economic and political circumstances and the general paradigms in the (social) sciences (De Haas, 2012). Over time this has induced several migration myths (see 1.1), which did not come out of the blue. They sprang up in a paradigm in development and migration studies that changed over the years. Figure 14 gives a quick overview of the different phases that the development discourses went through in the research and policy-making communities. As you can see, it is a continuous swing between the optimistic and pessimistic views. The optimistic view is rooted in neoclassical thinking and also called the balanced growth approach. The pessimistic view on the other hand is called the asymmetrical growth approach and is rooted in neo-Marxism.

Table 1: Main phases in migration and development research and policies		
Period	Research community	Policy field
Before 1973	Development and migration optimism	Developmentalist optimism; capital and knowledge transfers by migrants would help developing countries in development take-off.
1973–1990	Development and migration pessimism (dependency, brain drain)	Growing scepticism; concerns about brain drain; after experiments with return migration policies focused on integration in receiving countries; migration largely out of sight in development field.
1990–2001	Readjustment to more subtle views under influence of increasing empirical research	Persistent scepticism; tightening of immigration policies.
After 2001	Boom in publications: mixed, but generally positive views	Resurgence of migration and development optimism and a sudden turnaround of views: brain gain, remittances and diaspora involvement; further tightening of immigration policies but greater tolerance for high-skilled immigration.

FIGURE 14. DIFFERENT PHASES OF OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM IN THE MIGRATION-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS (SOURCE: DE HAAS, 2007)

### The optimistic discourse

The optimistic discourse on migration and development comes from the neo-liberal school of thought. For places to get to the same level of development, they should follow an evolutionary path of modernisation as the Western world experienced. The principle behind 'balanced growth' is that the movement of labourers will fill up the gap of labour scarcity in the places with high productivity. In the places of origin, the emigration will increase wages and the capital scarcity will lead to flows of capital from the high productivity places. This is called the Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model. The HO model sets forth conditions under which international trade will compensate the unequal distribution of resources (Leamer, 1995). These conditions are primarily the production factors and the international trade is essentially a transfer of land, labour or capital from abundant to scarce countries (Leamer, 1995). Because the factors are being transferred, a situation will occur in which factor-price differences are eliminated and trade (in particular in commodities) will cease (Leamer, 1995). This economic model has been adapted for migration. The adapted HO model will predict that there will be no more migration as soon as the wage levels in both places get to an equilibrium. The reason for this is that the initial differences in wage levels are caused by the abundance or scarcity of labour in countries. In essence, this is a plea for the abolition of movement restrictions (by wealthy countries) as migration will cease when wage levels converge. This sounds like a simplification of reality, as differences in wage levels are not solely defined by the size of the labour force, and the motives of migrants are not solely based on the differences in wage levels between their country of origin and destination.

### Pessimistic discourse

On the opposite, the pessimistic discourse on migration and development comes from the neo-Marxist school of thought. They argue that the structure of the system, not the agency of migrants, is the determining factor. Migration is in the eyes of pessimists the cause for underdevelopment because the 'brain drain' will leave poor places with a lack manpower, and skills and investments if it concerns highly-skilled migrants. Remittances will not lead to more development, but create a culture of migration, which in the end results into dependency on the rich places. Strong state policies are therefore needed to affect the structure and fight inequalities. Figure 15 shows what 'asymmetrical growth' looks like. Because migration is only for those who can afford it, the remittances they send home also are for those who are already better off in society. Furthermore, the family can use the remittances to enable the next person to migrate, leading to the culture of migration and a vicious circle of underdevelopment, dependency and inequalities. (De Haas, 2010a)




FIGURE 15. THE PESSIMISTIC VIEW ON MIGRATION AS PART OF DEVELOPMENT (SOURCE: DE HAAS, 2010A)

### A third way

Both paradigms have swapped places throughout the last decades and the assumptions they both make can be criticised. Empirical evidence from both sides has shown that neither is the single true perspective. An alternative therefore has evolved from this, which tries not to root in ideological theories but in empirical findings. The magic keyword in this third way is context. This new approach has several pillars running parallel but do not necessarily contradict each other: the New Economics of Labour Migration, the very similar Household Livelihood Strategy, and Transnationalism (De Haas, 2010a). These are all very compatible with each other as they departed from different origins but reach the same conclusions. The scheme in figure 16 shows the way these ‘pluralists’ look at the world of migration & development.

This third way has been welcomed after the newly found optimism received some criticism. One critic of migration & development is Ronald Skeldon (2008). Like it was mentioned before, migration is not a new part of development studies and vice versa. Migration rather is an intrinsic part of development, even more so in the Age of Migration (Castles *et al.*, 2013). Skeldon (2008) build on this and argues that migration & development is overemphasised in academia and policymaking. He maintains that first, migration does not solely shape the poor countries because all countries are always developing and migration will thus also leave its marks on the rich countries. Second, migration is being embodied as the ideal tool in the box for development (Skeldon, 2008). This is especially the case since most focus is on international migration. Skeldon (2008) substantiates this with an analysis of the data on migration & development, which can be encapsulated in three arguments. First,

because migrants do not origin from a country, but from a place in that country, their remittances are directed back to that place. The money does not end up with the extremely poor, as argued before. This is the second reason why migration & development is not the ultimate solution for development; migration only affects certain regions and households in a country. Lastly, Skeldon (2008) demurs the focus on migrants' agency in development. Put simply, migration, and anything following from it, is just "the responses of thousands of individuals to changing development conditions" (Skeldon, 2008, p. 14). This correlates with the focus on context mentioned above. The structure will create the conditions for development, with migration as an integral part with the migrant in possession of a potential to catalyse the development.




FIGURE 16. THE THIRD WAY VIEW ON MIGRATION AS PART OF DEVELOPMENT (SOURCE: (DE HAAS, 2010A)

Figures 15 and 16 are essentially the refinement of the arrow between international migration and development in the conceptual model (figure 3). From a constructivist point of view, this confirms the idea that concepts are very much a matter of creating and substantiating a narrative. Changing a narrative will also change outcomes, such as the way people view migration and development. Continuing this constructivist path, the next section will look at the migration-territory nexus, with a specific focus on the use of security discourses to link issues and create certain policies and narratives.

## 6.2 The migration-territory nexus

The previous section described the development discourses on migration. Roughly since the 1990s, another discourse arose within the circles of policy-making. The guest workers and labour migrants were no longer necessary in Europe due to an economic crisis and the migration policies became stricter than before. Every time these policies were criticised, the

response was a further restricting. This section will elaborate on the discourse around this continuous attempt at stopping migration.

The origins of the security discourse on migration in Europe lay in the way the EU was founded (Lindstrom, 2005). From the beginning, security was linked to defence. After all, WWII was still in everyone's minds. Decision-making remained intergovernmental, not EU institutions but governments themselves set the course of action. With the Treaty of Maastricht, the EU divided its policy-making into three pillars, of which the first was supranational (through EU institutions) and the other two intergovernmental. The third pillar, Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), contained the security-related policies. Since asylum policies were regarded as home affairs instead of foreign affairs, they were put under the flag of JHA. So besides economic reasons, there are also historical-political reasons for the security-migration linkage. The attacks of 9/11 led in Europe to an emergency summit on JHA. The conclusions were to strengthen the fight against terrorism partly by strengthening the borders. In the extension of border management came migration management linked to national security, albeit the lack of evidence for a link between irregular migration and terrorism (Collyer, 2006; Karyotis, 2007).

With the abolition of the pillar structure and the creation of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), policy-making on migration was brought into the former first pillar of supranationalism. However, it did not lose its security discourse. There are numerous DGs and agencies within the European Commission that deal with development or other migration-related fields. However, migration is still placed under the home affairs branch.

Examples of the security discourse in European policies are the readmission agreements the EU closes with third countries to seemingly circumvent the principle of non-refoulement (see §8.1). The EU also includes clauses on migration in other bilateral relations, such as the European Neighbourhood Policy. These clauses always focus on the control of irregular migration towards Europe and human trafficking.

While the development discourses were mainly built by economic and social theories, the security discourse is built on political theory. It is derived from the old ideas during the cold war about security of states. This state-centric approach remains dominant in the literature, as attempts at broadening it has gotten severe criticism. However, it is useful to explain the origin and destination of migration, something which economic theories can only partially explain.

According to political theorists, migrants could be seen as a threat to the receiving or sending state as opponents of the regime or cultural identity or act as an economic burden to the receiving country (Collyer, 2006). In short, the concept of societal security was developed to broaden the scope of the state-centric models. Security policies are a way of mediating belonging and community cohesion, it creates a common enemy. That this is harmful to migrants seems obvious, and to deconstruct it will require stopping the use of the security discourse language (Collyer, 2006). This is necessary because the security discourse can weaken the values that Europe likes so much to preach. In the end it can even undermine the prosperity of the society it tries to secure (Collyer, 2006). There seems to be a conflict of representations of Europe that the EU is creating. On the one hand there is the Europe of freedom and rights, which is always pressuring others with human rights. On the other hand there is Fortress Europe, where only those who are qualified by the EU are welcome. If the

EU wants to continue to be a moral compass in the global arena, it has to sort out its border practices.

#### Concluding remarks

The previous chapters have built three historical narratives and pointed out trends in each of them. This chapter took it interdisciplinary and identified the interplays between the three fields of migration, development and territory. These were bundled in a migration-development nexus and a migration-territory nexus. European migration policies are the central element in this research (§1.2), but in the future it might be interesting to see to which extent one is able to speak of a development-territory nexus. The next chapter will take a little sidestep and use the knowledge brought forward so far to describe a right to mobility for migrants as a bedrock for future migration policies.

## 7. Analysis: A right to mobility

The introduction (§1) and the migration-territory nexus (§6.2) already stated that migrants are being framed as criminals and the EU is putting a lot of effort in trying to stop migration flows from outside the EU (Lakoff & Ferguson, 2006; Welch, 2003). So there seems to be a disjuncture between the rights of migrants and the interests of citizens of the country of destination. This section will elaborate on the (human) rights that the migrants (should) have and the position of the EU. Bringing back the conceptual model (§2.3), this is to get to a bedrock on which future migration policies could rest and be legitimised. This will be twofold, the first part will focus on migration and human rights and the second part will focus on citizenship, to grasp the aforementioned disjuncture.

### 7.1 Migration and human rights

Currently, Europe is increasingly outsourcing its border control to neighbouring countries in an attempt to stop irregular migrants. However, by externalising the interception of refugees and undocumented migrants, the EU loses the human rights out of sight (Brouwer & Kumin, 2003). Especially refugees can enjoy protection from clearly defined international laws and covenants, when they are in states that have ratified the agreements and respect them. The EU, with its normative power, does not only uphold the rights of refugees in the global arena but was also the birthplace of them.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted in 1948 and set the stage for future international standards on human rights. The principles of the UDHR were turned into international law in 1976 by what was called the ‘International Bill of Rights’ consisting of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (United for Human Rights, 2015). Further elaborations of the individual rights were made in succeeding treaties and committees were established to monitor each signatory’s progress. Following the universal declaration, the European Community adopted the European Covenant on Human Rights in 1953 and founded the European Court of Human Rights in 1959; this was the first arrangement to legally bind states to the provisions of the UDHR.

While the first covenants were created and adopted with optimism and wide acceptance, proclamations created later on took longer to get into force (such as the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrants Workers and Members of their Families, ICRMW for short) (Chetail, 2013). Hence, for labour migrants the situation is completely different. For them, it depends on their social, cultural and financial capital to which extent they can cross borders without a lot of hassle and gain access to certain rights and services. In contrast to (highly) skilled workers, those who do not have the skills desired by European states have very little legal possibilities to enter the EU (Pécoud & de Guchteneire, 2006). Many covenants, including the UDHR, secure the right to leave or stay out of a country. However, the right to enter a country is (intentionally) left out by the contracting states. Because the international law lacks dedicated, widely ratified covenants, human rights play hardly a role in the policy debate on the openness of borders, it is solely focused on trade and security (Flynn, 2000). Moreover, the human rights in international law constrain the state’s possibilities since the rights are based on personhood instead of nationality (Pécoud & de Guchteneire, 2006). But by outsourcing the interception of migrants

to states who do not necessarily respect the international laws the EU is bypassing these constraints and putting the migrants in harm's way.

Despite the fact that the focus is on trade and security, it is possible to apply a human rights perspective to the issues of migration and this perspective can be elaborated with the UDHR as a starting point. The UDHR have generally evolved from minimum standards to fundamental rights, and specifically with no legal distinguish possible between human rights and migrants' rights (Chetail, 2013). Chetail's reversal of the international law perspective (seeing human rights law as the main basis instead of specific migrant-related law that is lacking substance) makes it easier to, first, judge the European policies and second, to advance the international migration governance since the legal basis is already present. The UNHRC is already launching a dialogue on the protection of migrants on the seas, which is difficult if there is no legal basis in the form of existing international law on human rights and the laws on open seas (Riera, personal communication, May 13, 2015). After all, migration law has to adhere international law just like any other law. A 'right to mobility' does not seem very strange from this light, as it not a new right to be added to the list of human rights but rather the implementation of existing rights (such as the right to leave a country and the right to apply for asylum) into a migrant-specific right. Like with the refugee-specific rights, it offers detailed and comprehensive freedoms and rights that migrants (should) have and the obligations and freedoms that states have. An International Bill of Rights for Migrants could be the implementation of the right to mobility and present the legal framework encompassing all rights associated with migration. An initiative for such a bill has already been taken by the IMBR Initiative (2013), consisting of an international network of scholars and students. This International Migrants Bill of Rights is indeed composed of existing international law but still managed to span a wide range of topics, such as culture, education and expulsion. At most points the IMBR is quite concise, but not everywhere. For example, in the first article the IMBR states that it "shall apply during the entire migration process" (IMBR Initiative, 2013, p. 14) but it leaves open what the migration process looks like and where it begins and ends.

## **7.2 Citizenship**

Citizenship is on the whole understood as belonging "to a bounded and exclusive political community with a shared history and prospective future" (Nash, 2009, p. 1067). Much of this is already elaborated on in §5.3. If we follow the representation constructed by politicians, the community that is defining one's citizenship is under 'attack' by foreign forces – being it globalisation or migration. While the used speech acts are questionable, globalisation is putting the political aspect of citizenship under pressure and migration is questioning the exclusivity (Nash, 2009). Globalisation is intertwining economic and political systems of states that at their heart prefer to be independent. But thanks to processes that lie beyond the scope of this research, the dependency between states has increased and keeps increasing. To a certain extent, the development of human rights in international law is the result of this globalisation. Documents such as the UDHR and CRSR restricted the global arena of politics and tied states up with a range of obligations, contributing to a Lockean or perhaps Kantian culture in the global arena (Wendt, 1999).

However, having the legal entitlements to certain rights, such as for refugees, does not immediately lead to actually having the ability to practice those rights (Nash, 2009). For this,

social structures and material resources are needed to give the rights in the documents real meaning and empower those entitled to the rights. For example the UDHR does not oblige states to enforce those rights for everyone, they rather are moral principles that should be the fundamentals of modern states (Nash, 2009). In Europe the UDHR has been further amplified to a point where there is a dedicated court that can enforce the human rights to states. Regarding the human rights of refugees, this institutionalisation is under threat by the securitisation of migration. By keeping international attention for migration at a low level and putting migration in the realm of home affairs instead of development affairs the European states are undermining any possibility for a well-established fundament for the respect of migrants' rights (more precisely, for the migrants not qualifying as refugees).

Nonetheless, human rights and citizenship can be a powerful contribution to closing the gap between migrants' rights and citizens' interests in the EU. Taking the aforesaid right to mobility into account, a right to mobility plus the respect of human rights does not equal citizenship. Nash (2009) makes a distinction into five categories of citizens, ranging from a very well protected and extended set of rights to a very limited set of rights:

1. Super-citizens, they have all the rights in a community but are, thanks to their human and financial capital, not tied to the boundedness of the community.
2. Marginal citizens, in contrast, have not the capital that super-citizens have and also have a low (or no) participation in the labour market.
3. Quasi-citizens, they gained most rights thanks to long-term residence, political organisation and their human capital. Their situation is only guaranteed by international law on human rights.
4. Sub-citizens face greater difficulties than quasi-citizens because they have neither employment nor social entitlements. Often they are in their asylum procedure, which makes them vulnerable. More than quasi-citizens, the sub-citizens rely almost solely on international law as things like the CRSR constructed the status of sub-citizen.
5. Un-citizens are at the bottom of the citizenship ladder. They have no (acknowledged) status and are often undocumented and detainment or deportation of un-citizens is for states rather easy from an international law perspective.

This categorisation makes it understandable why some migrants are keen to be qualified as refugees. This gives them, especially in the EU, well-developed rights. Luckily this categorisation is not a fixed one. Through legal procedures, employment and residence a migrant can climb up the ladder of citizenship. This thought is exactly what lies at the core of the bridge for the disjuncture between migrants' rights and citizens' interests. The migrants are granted the opportunities to gain citizenship through a clear path. This takes away their fear for (apparently) at random expulsion and at the same time maintains the fundamentals of the welfare provisions of the European societies.

## 8. Analysis: migration, development and policies

As the last chapter before getting to the conclusions, this chapter will take all the previously developed knowledge and look at how current migration policies are failing and how it could be improved through the migration-development nexus. The inclusion of migration in the soon to be adopted Sustainable Development Goals is used as an example for future European policies. Positioning this chapter in the conceptual model (§2.3), the spotlights in this chapter will be on the arrow from the ‘European policies’ box that intervenes in the relation between international migration and development in the countries of origin. Each of these has been elaborated in the previous chapters. Thus, after this chapter, the conclusions are ready to be drawn.

### 8.1 The failure of migration policies

When dealing with policies, evaluating the successes is important for future projects and to see if goals are met. With migration policies, it is maybe even more important since there are lot of resources involved and it concerns a lot of people. This section will shed some light on why migration policies seem to fail, based on an article by Castles (2004).

First of all, the process of international migration and migration flows are not easily captured in a political document (Castles, 2004). European policymakers tend to think that migrants act always according to neoclassical theory (the *homo economicus*). Therefore, simple accession regulations should influence the migrants’ calculations in such a way that they will cede the idea of migrating to Europe. However, migration is in reality a social process. The decision is often not made by the migrant-to-be alone, but involves the entire household. Networks and communities also influence the destination of the migrant, such as in the form of family unification, the presence of diasporas or assisting with the moving itself.

Second, globalisation plays an essential role (Castles, 2004). In contrast to what some may think, migration between the Global North and the Global South is not the largest ‘flow’ of migration. South-South migration is larger than South-North migration, as seen in figure 17. An even more nuanced view of the international migration flows is the diagram shown in figure 18.




FIGURE 17. THE PARTITION OF MIGRATION FLOWS (SOURCE: WORLD BANK, 2015)




FIGURE 18. MIGRATION FLOWS BETWEEN DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE WORLD (SOURCE: ABEL & SANDER, 2014)

Abel and Sander (2014) have made some remarkable observations based on their data. For example, it not just confirms that South-South migration is larger than South-North, but it also diverges the South-South flow into more precise regions (and in the article even countries) of origin and destination. It also made clear that international migration is structured on historical path-dependency, as many interregional flows connect former colonies with their former colonisers.

Furthermore, globalisation led to cheaper modes of transport, better communication possibilities and a widespread exposure of lifestyles (Serra & Stiglitz, 2008). This strengthened transnational communities and in a way is the bridge over the divide between the Global North and the Global South.

A third reason why migration policies fail is that governance and the political system are influencing migration on more levels than just the migration policies (Castles, 2004). This involves conflicts in both sending and receiving countries. These conflicts are not just the violent kind that drives people to flee to safer places. Political conflicts might arise when a

country is heavily relying on remittances, and the state is unable to protect its nationals overseas, in order to ensure the flow of remittances. In receiving countries, a conflict of interest might crop up when restriction rhetoric collides with the need for certain kinds of labour.

Regarding the European Union, the political system is quite complex. In EU decision-making, policy fields (or parts of them) are categorised on a continuum of whether the European Commission or the European Council (the heads of state) are having the competence to make the policies (Dinan, 2005). For example, the Commission has a full competence in the fields of environment and the internal economic market. For migration, decision-making to a large extent is staying with the Council. However, as the internal borders have disappeared, a shift has occurred from purely intergovernmentalism to supranationalism decision-making (Marks, Hooghe, & Blank, 1996). This enabled heads of state to point to 'Brussels' when a migration-related decision is not to their (populist) liking and to make policies without the influence of domestic powers (Lavenex, 2006). And it enabled the Commission to couple migration with its foreign policies, such as the European Neighbourhood Policy (Lindstrom, 2005).

Lastly, regarding the political system, the notion of human rights is important. The European states all have ratified the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and even created their own European versions of it (see §7.1). There is also the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (often referred to as the Geneva Convention), which includes the principle of non-refoulement. This principle restricts the states' abilities to unilaterally send migrants directly or indirectly back to a country where they will face persecution, torture or other threatening treatments (Brouwer & Kumin, 2003). This principle is not applicable to every migrant, but it gives refugees a motivation to choose certain countries over others that have for example not ratified these declarations. (Chetail, 2013)

## **8.2 Policies and the migration-development nexus**

European migration policies and development agencies have the habit to take a 'root causes' approach to migration (Castles, 2004; De Haas, 2005; Lavenex, 2006; Lindstrom, 2005; Lönnback, 2014). The root causes are equated to poverty and misery, which is obviously not only a shallow mindset but also based on myths and lead to a failure of the policies (see §1.1 and §8.1). For example, the European Commission stated, regarding the integration of migration in relations with neighbouring countries, that "The long-term priority should be to address the root causes of migration flows, by poverty eradication, institution and capacity building and conflict prevention" (European Commission, 2002). The reason this mindset is inadequate is that it is a too narrow view of migration as a problem, while instead it is a part of development and the poorest are not the ones migrating internationally. The root causes approach aims to lessen the migration 'pressure' on the EU, rather than improving peoples' living conditions. The European policies lack the coordination that really connects migration to development (Castles, 2004). And the remaining coordination is in the hands of the justice and home affairs departments (Lindstrom, 2005). The response therefore usually is to restrict the regular access to European countries (a containment policy), which adds to the failure of migration policies (Lindstrom, 2005). Similarly when irregular migrants entered the EU, even refugees are automatically detained (Riera, personal communication, May 13, 2015). While

poverty eradication and conflict prevention are noble goals to pursue, a more complete frame is needed to address the problems of developing countries; a frame that can be provided by the migration-development nexus.

Authors such as Lavenex (2006) and Lindstrom (2005) mark the Tampere Council of 1999 as the starting point of the linkage of migration and development (in the aforementioned sense of aid-for-containment policies). An agreement from 2000 is the first implementation of the Tampere dogma. The 2000 Cotonou Agreement between the EU and the ACP countries was the follow-up of the Lomé Convention (see §4.2) and the blueprint for the ENP. In essence, the Cotonou Agreement liberalises the relationship between the EU and the ACP and introduced human rights and sustainable development as well. Because of a “multipolar landscape” (Hurt, 2003, p. 164) the EU is normalising the previously exceptional relation with the countries, which is welcomed by the ACP countries (Hurt, 2003). The EU wants to cooperate with the countries to incorporate them within the global economy, and at the same time promote the EU’s favourite values of good governance and human rights (which are tied to economic assistance, comparable to the more-for-more approach in the ENP) (Hurt, 2003).

Since the signing the Cotonou Agreement has been scrutinised by many, who pointed out the dangers and weaknesses. Adepoju *et al.* (2009) affirm that the linking of migration and development has positive and negative effects; in case of the Cotonou Agreement they argue that the agreements with the ACP countries often lack transparency and have a high level of informality, which might affect the ability to implement anything. Other critics of the Cotonou Agreement pose that it is very questionable to which extent the emphasis on partnership and cooperation is genuine (Hurt, 2003). This is a legit criticism, as the ACP countries were former colonies of European empires and the relation between them has been scrutinised repeatedly since the decolonisation (see §9.1).

According to Adepoju *et al.* (2009) the attention should be on opening up channels for trade and circular migration to boost the economies of developing countries. The inclusion of migration in the Sustainable Development Goals (see §8.3) is illustrative of the migration-development nexus as a framework. In preparation for the SDGs the IOM and UNDESA wrote a ‘think piece’ on how to include human mobility in the Goals. In this think piece, they correctly stated that the root causes are a broad array of variables, such as income disparities between regions (both within and between countries), demographic pressures and socioeconomic instability (IOM & UNDESA, 2012). This shows that regarding migration governance, it could definitely be possible to address migration and development from another perspective than just poverty eradication and conflict resolution. It also gives another reason why development aid should not be tied to anti-migration measures. When it becomes common good in EU foreign policy to attach these two together, countries that do not facilitate migration to Europe (for example countries in Latin-America), might get left behind (Adepoju *et al.*, 2009). Since the EU is likely to take up the SDGs as they did with the MDGs, having migration as a goal could help steering the EU in the right direction.

The logic of the world trade system is not to be found when it comes to (labour) migration (Hanson, 2010). Issues surrounding migration governance have been kept off the agendas by the (rich) net receivers of migrants, who hold most of the bargaining power in this field. To a certain extent, irregular migration is their policy choice and logic for the global migration system (Hanson, 2010). What these states do is, according to Hanson (2010), to

allow some irregular migration to occur to supply their labour market with cheap labour. This is therefore a way to select labourers that have the strongest desire to work (putting refugees aside for a moment).

Furthermore, migration governance is considered (by the receiving states) as an interference with their sovereignty (Newland, 2010). However, after the MDGs were ratified and with the migration & development pendulum swinging to optimism (see §6.1) there has been some progress. Newland (2010) lists the action that make up this progress, such as:

- A UN special rapporteur for the human rights of migrants and a UN special representative for migrants.
- The Bern Initiative launched by the Swiss government (aimed at cooperation and dialogue between states on migration management).
- The UNHCR expands its scope beyond refugees towards migration and asylum.
- A monitoring service for the Migrant Workers Convention treaty.
- The attention of the World Bank for remittances and migration.
- The establishment of a Global Commission on International Migration, a Global Migration Group and a Global Forum on Migration.

Consensus however remained out of sight, and one of the core issues of the forums and dialogues was to find out how to shape the process of international migration governance and which agency should get the mandate for migration (see Newland (2010) for a range of models).

Europe, with its supranationalism, is perhaps at the forefront of international migration governance, although the member states are keen to keep it as national or regional as possible. Albeit it being regionally, it is laudable that receiving countries show signs that there is a potential to pursue international migration governance beyond the nation-state. As already pointed out in §5.3, migration policies in the EU are partly made through policy networks. This is also a fruitful solution for the global arena. Intensive interactions through dialogues, forums and (non-binding) conventions between governments and also by ‘hiding’ migration in constructs such as migration & development makes addressing migration issues possible on a basis of shared interests (Newland, 2010). Just like how the EU is being shaped gradually, so can international cooperation in the field of migration. It is intriguing that globally the argument of sovereignty still prevails, despite the fact that states never really had full sovereignty or control over globalising phenomena such as migration (Newland, 2010).

Common patterns in policies from across the EU are the connection of migration to security and development aid (see §6.2). This is especially harmful if it means that ‘real’ development programmes are receiving fewer funds and thus possibly worsening the situation of countries that do not function as transit countries for migration to Europe (Adepoju *et al.*, 2009). Another, better, approach is available though. According to the analyses of Adepoju *et al.* and Newland (2009), Spain is doing exceptionally well in its relations with Africa and circular migration. Due to a lack of colonial bonds and the negotiations being bilaterally there is much more indication of a partnership in tackling the issues of migration. So while the EU is much more paternalistic and restriction-oriented, some individual member states that are affected by large migration flows show that another approach is possible. The approach that Spain is taking includes a fast-track permanent residence procedure for migrant workers that

have had four seasonal contracts. This allows the employer and the migrant worker to build up a relation and a set of useful skills that are not hindered by policies. In essence, to break the post-colonial relationship between the EU and African countries, there should be a change in how agreements are made. The EU should not be the sole designer of the agreements and migration control cooperation should be separated from development aid and labour migration (Adepoju *et al.*, 2009).

One flaw of guest worker schemes is that migrants remain uncertain whether it really is circular; hence they move into illegality when their visa expires instead of returning to their country of origin. This could be tackled by promising them a new visa if they follow the laws during their stay and return to their country or origin when their visa or permit expires. This structure is similar to that of Spain and is especially effective for seasonal labour. Today, it is already implemented in Canada (Vertovec, 2007)

Circular migration is a compelling idea of win-win-win outcomes. It means that migrants only stay in a receiving country for a certain amount of time and intend to move elsewhere or back home after that period (Adepoju *et al.*, 2009). For sending countries it is a win because remittances are helping development. For receiving countries it is a win as there is less scarcity on the labour market. For migrants it is a win for it is improving the livelihood of themselves and their households. The concept of circular migration fits quite well in the ‘third way’ discourse of the migration-development nexus (see §6.1).

Transnationalism drives remittances as a major global financial flow (Vertovec, 2007). The “circular migration patterns themselves are based on, and create further, transnational networks” (Vertovec, 2007, p.3). The perceived benefits of circular migration are firstly an encouragement of flows of remittances; secondly a mitigation of the labour markets of sending and receiving countries; thirdly, the creation of a pool to recruit skilled, but not expensive, migrant workers (Vertovec, 2007).

Circular migration, in contrast to what European policymakers might think is not meaning that a migrant worker returns to the country of origin and build up the rest of his or her life there. The migrant worker can instead ‘commute’ his or her whole life between countries. Frequency is a key factor, the possibility of migrating increases if the migrant has moved more before (Vertovec, 2007).

Circular migrants send more remittances home than non-circular migrants. Supposedly this is because the chances are high that they will move back themselves too at some point, and they would like to continue a certain living standard (Vertovec, 2007). But the circular migrants also benefit from a ‘place premium’ which means that they can, thanks to their networks or dual citizenship, move easier to places that will suit best their interests (Newland, 2009).

Circular migration is attractive for policymakers and politicians because it is a compromise that benefits both the sending as well as the receiving country (Castles *et al.*, 2013). This however goes under the condition that the migrant is not forced to circulate (Newland, 2009). Migration policies are influencing the circularity of migration in a number of ways (see figure 19). True, not imposed, circular migration will help migrants to optimise their livelihood and that of their households by locating constantly to the place that best suits their interests (Newland, 2009). Another catch of circular migration is that if there is no development in the country of origin, the chances are high that the migrant will either move

elsewhere or end up in illegality (Adepoju *et al.*, 2009). Key to circular migration is the absence of fear (Newland, 2009). When migrants fear that once they leave a country they cannot come back they will be more inclined to stay. This is why forced circular migration cannot be called circular migration, as it does not take away the fear.




FIGURE 19. INFLUENCES ON THE CIRCULARITY OF MIGRATION

Newland (2009) describes the four dimensions of circular migration. There is the spatial component, mainly the place of origin and destination of the migrant and the rest of the household. There is a temporal component, describing the duration of a stay in one place. The iterative component depicts the number of cycles in the life of a migrant, typically multiple moves makes a migrant a circular one. Lastly, the developmental component represents the benefits that firstly the migrant experiences and secondly the sending and receiving countries. These components are important to incorporate in migration policies that wish to promote circular migration.

The policies of Spain and Canada mentioned before already touch upon the notion of circular migration. Data on a correlation between certain policies and the circularity of migration are scarce. Some research has been done by Graeme Hugo (2009) on Australia and the Asian-Pacific region. He found that temporary labour programmes are better able to facilitate poverty reduction and increase remittances, for example because the worker is migrating without the family (Hugo, 2009). Furthermore he argues that there is a wide range of possible temporary labour programmes, depending on the country (see for an overview: Hugo, 2009, p. 27). In Asian-Pacific countries, temporary labour programmes are encircled by very restricting policies that deny the migrants any rights to permanent residence or access to basic services, although some were able to apply for permanent residence (Hugo, 2009). The largest group of migrants are the low-skilled, poor workers that return home after their programme ends and they have paid off any debts (for rent, visas, training and officials), which is why many prefer take the route of being a undocumented migrant to avoid losing money (Hugo, 2009). Lastly, Hugo (2009) asserts that the circular migration policies in many Asian-Pacific countries suffer from poor governance; from corruption to contradicting

policies. Thus to have effective migration policies, the countries of origin and destination need to have effective administrations and cooperation, and protect the migrants' rights.

The impact policies can have on circular migration is historically exemplified by Germany in the 1960s-70s. When an economic crisis hit the country in 1967, many guest workers returned to their country of origin because it was cheaper to overcome the crisis and they could come back later on. However, when another recession hit Germany in 1973 there was much less emigration and more permanent settlement of guest workers. This was caused by a restricting of the recruitment policies and many migrant workers feared that if they returned to their country of origin, they could not come back to Germany later on and hence they applied for permanent residence. (Newland, 2009)

Thus far policies only seem to constrain circular migration. They can however also play a facilitative role if there is political will, effective administrations and development in the sending countries.

### **8.3 The integration of migration in the SDGs**

Migration is an integral part of development and as such as contributed to the achievement of the MDGs (Nyberg-Sørensen, 2014). Migration from less to more developed countries helped migrants and their households increasing their earnings, education enrolment and health care (GMG, 2013). After the establishment of the MDGs the migration-development nexus started to get in the picture and a series of events (see the list in §8.2) led to the understanding that migration should be in the successor of the MDGs as a goal but more importantly, as target and indicator across the other goals to reflect its embeddedness in development (GMG, 2013; Lönnback, 2014).

The definitive SDGs will come forward at the UN General Assembly in September 2015. The Open working Group (OWG) that was tasked with developing a preliminary version of the SDGs has done precisely what was needed. Migration has more or less its own goal formulated in SDG-10: "Reducing inequality within and among countries" (OWG, 2014, p.16). This goal focuses on lower transaction costs for remittances, eliminating discriminatory policies and facilitative policies for migration. The SDGs are developed to the point that there are seventeen goals which each a set of targets. Indicators are not yet present, but migration is present in some targets. SDG-8 mentions the protection of migrant workers' rights to promote inclusive economic growth and SDG-17 on sustainable development in general refers to the flow of resources and North-South relations (OWG, 2014).

The SDGs' focus on sustainability implies an underlying framework of suitability that has been discussed in section §5.2 and can categorise the seventeen goals into four categories: economic development (meeting basic needs), environmental durability (mitigation, adaptation), social inclusion (leaving no one behind) and good governance (to ensure efficiency and coherence) (Sachs, 2012). Each of these dimensions brings a crisis, such as the economic recession, climate change and North-South inequality. According to Sachs (2012), this is distinguishable from the MDGs, which were more about opportunities to change the world (see figure 20 for the compatibility between the MDGs and SDGs). Sachs (2012), who was the UN special rapporteur on the MDGs, also comes up with a few lessons for the SDGs, based on the strengths and weaknesses of the MDGs:

- Simplicity is key, the eight goals of the MDGs were an umbrella for a wider range of targets, but the small set of goals made it powerful to communicate.
- Morality and practicality can prevent politicisation. The MDGs did not contain legal commitments, and thus could be quickly adopted and only later formed the basis for binding agreements.
- Practical and specific targets and solutions make it easy to adopt by governments and NGOs.
- Create milestones along the way, instead of just one end goal as the MDGs had.
- Data is important to measure the progress, so investments in data collection are necessary.
- Involve the private sector, which can employ state of the art technologies and knowledge and, in the case of MNOs, have a worldwide reach.
- Fix the financing. Although the absence of binding commitments can speed up the adaptation, a lack of financing can in the end hold back results.

It seems that the proposal of the OWG did incorporate most of these lessons at this stage of the policymaking. The targets, plentiful for each goal, are practical and some targets have milestones set for before 2030 (mostly 2020). It is likely that the OWG was under a lot of pressure from lobbyists and interest groups to include ‘their’ goal, leading to nine goals more.

Taking the second lesson, preventing politicisation of the goals, is perhaps important for the inclusion of migration in the SDGs. Much of the major donor countries are also migrant receiving countries and might object to interference with what they see as their national, sovereign, interest. The morality might be helpful, as it is hard to object to the protection of people’s rights or equality. The EU can learn from the integration of migration in the SDGs how migration can be treated as purely a development-related issue, without the territorial security attached to it. EU member states might also get over their cold feet and the interactions between governments could increase the willingness for global or regional migration governance.




FIGURE 20. HOW THE MDGs MORPHED INTO THE SDGs (SOURCE: THE GUARDIAN, 2015)

## 9. Conclusion

With the new world order there has to be an acceptance that there are people willing to take risks to improve their living conditions and lifestyles (Castles *et al.*, 2013). Instead of ceding sovereignty, states could be reclaiming their sovereignty through international migration governance (Newland, 2010). With fundamentals in universal human rights and the development potential that migration has it should definitely be possible to shift the discourse in policymaking on migration away from the territorial nexus and towards a humane global mobility regime. No matter how fortified Europe will be, people will always move to the closest safe place (Riera, personal communication, May 13, 2015).

The analyses made in this thesis can be assembled into a coherent answer to the central research question (recalling from §1.2: “How can migration play an integrated role in policies aimed at official development assistance?”). Academics seem to agree that migration is a part of development, not something that leads to or follows from development. This is perhaps the most significant lesson learned from the swinging between pessimism and optimism thinking about migration and development. The very recently initiated third way thinking is hoped to end the going back and forth and instead focus the academic energy on studying the real world phenomena and induce new insights. A vital concept in this thinking is circular migration. The concept could be promising for both the sending countries (the remittances will be a helpful component of development) as well as receiving countries (more cheap labour available) and the migrants (improving the livelihood by choosing the optimal place to live). This is all under the very strict condition that the policies oriented at circular migration play a facilitative role and not act as a pivot for forcing migrants to leave a country. As soon as it gets securitised and loses the voluntary facet the policies will fail like they failed before.

On this basis it can be concluded that migration as part of development should be an aspect to be taken into account in all policies that are affecting international migration towards the EU and the issues should not be securitised. To let states reclaim their sovereignty and influence on international migration, migration governance will likely be a decisive step to take. The European Union is ahead of the rest of the world in terms of migration governance, although also in the EU it is still in its infancy. The Europeanisation of migration (and other) policies, with the CEAS as its most recent milestone, have shown that migration governance opens up possibilities. However, the externalisation of migration management is still an ongoing practice of the EU and current policies have still an inclination to fail. The policies, or the rationales behind them, see migration as a sign of failure of development and migrants as victims but these are myths. They also tend to oversimplify the view of the international structures of trade, mobility and transnationalism.

If the EU wishes to take it beyond management and expand its migration governance beyond the own borders, the aspect of human rights should not be left at home. The soon to be adopted SDGs are an example of the possibility to let states cooperate and (re)group their influence on international migration through governance. Adopting the Bill of Right for Migrants and practicing the values the EU often preaches will advance the right of mobility that migrants have. The six policy options that will be elaborated in chapter ten will build on this right of mobility and in the end it will all work towards the goal of making an impact on improving people's lives.

Returning to the conceptual model (figure 3), the hypothesis that European policies are able to affect the relation between international migration and development in the countries of origin is affirmed, but as stated above, there are certain conditions under which policies are able to have a positive (or at least a non-negative) impact on the migration-development nexus. It should also be noted that the European policies are not the only intervening variable on the relation between migration and development. Migrants are looking for the best or safest place to go, and EU migration policies appear only at the end of their journey to Europe. The next section will expand on the final element of the conceptual model, the post-colonial background.

## **9.1 Post-colonial reflection**

Following from the theoretical framework (§2) this section will reflect on the post-colonial view on European migration, territory and development policies.

Colonialism and imperialism kept a large portion of the world under European control for which they created a theoretical justification. When the European economies required new markets to satisfy, the impetus of independence gained traction and led to many new states. However, the post-colonial world order still shows signs of (modern) imperialism. Through the development paradigm the Europeans have created a new justification for their meddling with the affairs of (developing) countries. Of course not every volunteer at a NGO has the intention to be the agent for modern imperialism, but neither did officials of the old colonial administration. The fact is that humanitarianism and imperialism are becoming interwoven and together with the latent cultural imperialism there is an active working on the world order according to Western perspectives.

These Western perspectives come forward for example in the EU's ENP Action Plans. Although the Plans place a large focus on stating that it is a partnership between the EU and the neighbouring country, it is rather a Eurocentric, EU-made, paternalistic model that is very well exemplifying the development paradigm that the West created after the decolonisation (Kramsch, 2011). Looking at two Action Plans, one for Egypt and one for Tunisia, the common denominator between the Action Plans is the EU's promise of more money as long as the countries follow the EU's recipe for economic and political development (European External Action Service [EEAS], 2004, 2007). This recipe consists of securitisation of borders, anti-terrorism measures, market liberalisations and better market access for European companies (EEAS, 2004, 2007).

The paternalism of the European policies is not only an obstacle for developing countries to become truly equal partners but it is also an obstacle for the development community to accept migration as an important strategy for development that people can choose. The poor are being victimised and improvement of their situation should be made so they can keep their culture and stay where they are (Bakewell, 2008). The paternalistic approach is accompanied by another view that sees the developing world as a threat (Hoogvelt, 2006). This is also an explanation for the security measures the EU is requiring the neighbouring countries to take. This threat has two facets according to Hoogvelt (2006): exclusion and privatisation. With the former Hoogvelt is referring not only to social, economic or political exclusion of groups from society, but also to how the West is defining developing countries or migrants as a threat to a background of globalisation and a global concentration of power (oligopoly) (Hoogvelt,

2006). Privatisation means that states have less sovereignty not because of political projects like the EU but because non-state actors such as NGOs and multinationals are becoming pivotal in the world order (Hoogvelt, 2006). The development community is one that is highly privatised; the US is currently further with privatisation of the military than the EU is. When companies and NGOs take over the execution of state's agendas, the relationship between the West and the rest becomes more complex, and the latter might view the companies and NGOs as extensions of the Western states (as it is currently already the case when speaking of companies like McDonalds as Americanisation).

Next to privatisation, the West is also externalising their security regime (Ferrer-Gallardo & Van Houtum, 2014; Lavenex, 2006). Thanks to the dependency of the neighbourhood, the EU is able to use its dominance to impose certain measures to protect its own borders (in return for, for example, lower trade tariffs the EU created earlier for the neighbouring economies). This might have some positive effects, such as better training and equipment for the partner country. But for migrants it might just as well be disastrous because not every partner country is valuing their human rights very high. To illustrate this: Spain is paying Morocco a fee for patrolling the border and to return migrants who try to get to Spain. There are cases known where Moroccan border guards load the migrants in a truck and leave them behind in the middle of the desert (HRW, 2014). If the EU (or EU member states) wants to externalise their security regime, they should not forget to pass the care for human rights with it. Perhaps the partner countries do care about the migrants' rights, but are these practices the outcome of bad training, corruption and a lack of funds. Therefore the partner countries should reclaim their share of the ownership of the partnerships such as the ENP (Kramsch, 2011).

Non-European countries are already reclaiming their ownership in development cooperation. With the rise of China and other developing countries breaking the core-periphery dichotomy the dynamics in the development community are changing (Klaasse, 2014; Six, 2009). Countries like China never had the history with Africa that the European countries had, and thus is much more basing its foreign and development policies on interests rather than the ambiguous normative development paradigm (Six, 2009; Smith, 2013). The US is also more and more basing its policies on interests rather than humanitarian grounds (although the latter might be a cover for the former) to keep up with China (Smith, 2013). While it might be questionable how the Chinese operate, the diplomatic relationships are much more based on mutual recognition (the 'developing countries helping each other' discourse) rather than modern imperialism (Klaasse, 2014).

Despite the largescale ongoing privatisation, the state is still the important factor in post-colonial theory. It adopts the policies, agendas and funds (including the SDGs) that steer the development community in certain directions. The state is also the "arbiter of the repatriation of difference" (Appadurai, 1990, p. 307) and guides the globalisation of cultures through its control over the openness of the country to global flows of people, technology, capital and ideas (Appadurai, 1990). Recognising the modern imperialism in the contemporary world order, but also recognising the continuing evolving of the world order gives an auspicious mindset that is neither pure optimism nor pure pessimism. It gives a mindset that can reclaim the valuable tactics from the dreadful realm of securitisation.

## 10. Synthesis: policy options

Coming to the end of this research, this synthesis will unfold six possible policy options to improve the migration policies, with special attention for their interaction with development policies. These are all based on the study of existing policies, academic literature (such as the comprehensive overview of Smouter, 2014), and views from the European Parliamentary Committees. Although the options tend to focus on European policies, they might well be adaptable for use outside the EU (but European policies cannot be copied one-to-one to any other country). There is also no preferable order between the six options; each option has its own hurdles and advantages. However, it will become clear that combining several options will make the total ‘package’ stronger and make the resulting European migration policies have a more positive (but also complex) influence on the link between international migration and development in the countries of origin.

### 10.1 European migration centres

The first option is to open EU migration centres outside the EU. Currently one has to be on European soil in order to request asylum. The majority of the migrants that cross the Mediterranean are refugees that have a right to refuge according to international law. When they can request asylum without the deadly voyage they will remain alive and the EU can uphold its representation of its normative power. Furthermore they could function as information centres where the EU can educate people about the chances they could have in Europe. The researcher Monsutti (personal communication, May 13, 2015), who spoke with migrants about the journey across the Mediterranean Sea, heard from migrants who would rather be in a Taliban prison than in a full boat on drift. And the migrants who get detained after crossing the Mediterranean have two types of feelings: betrayal (“Is this Europe”) and denial (“It is not; wait until we get to the real Europe”) (Monsutti, personal communication, May 13, 2015).

The migration centres can also be an opportunity for labour migration. The centres can function as a regular way for would-be migrant workers to apply for a residence or work permit. Within the CEAS this could even be developed into a system in which European companies can train and recruit migrant workers. This ensures the migrant with a legal status to work and reside, the company gets its much needed labour and the EU member state will benefit from an increase in tax income. Moreover, the company can use the centres’ facilities to train the new employees before they arrive if they wish. The EU or development agencies could provide certain companies with extra incentives to train more people than they intend to employ, to help educate the local (poor) population with practicable skills.

However, if the EU wants the migrant workers programmes to work for the migrants, companies, the labour market and prevent irregular migration, it will obviously take some effort. The programmes, which will likely be a form of quotas, need to be fixed and clear for a predetermined term to remove any uncertainty or fear (Adepoju *et al.*, 2009). At the same time the EU has to strengthen its employer enforcement. The inspections of whether companies do not employ undocumented migrants are very hampered in the EU, and certainly in the US (Castles, 2004). The ‘transaction costs’ for companies to hire undocumented migrants need to be several times the costs of hiring a documented one through the EU’s programmes.

## **10.2 Revision of Dublin regulations**

A rigorous revision of the Dublin regulations is a second option. The European Commission seems to have given it a start with announcing that it wants to create a Union wide resettlement scheme for refugees (the focus is not on migrant workers at this point). Although the member states swept a compulsory scheme off the table, a voluntary version has a chance of implementation. Until now, the Dublin regulations stated that where the migrant enters the EU the asylum application will have to be filed and processed. This appears to put a relative large burden on the countries at the frontiers of the EU, such as Malta, Greece and Bulgaria and leaves the migrants in limbo (Keller, personal communication, June 3, 2015). It would be better if member states would create a system of quota of refugees they will give asylum. An agency like the EASO could then initiate the asylum procedures and determine which refugee would best fit where. This system could be refined to the point that both refugees and member states can list their preferences and let the EASO match them in the best way possible (Thieleman, personal communication, June 3, 2015). Another addition to this is those quotas are tradable. Member states that prefer a lower quota can trade (sell) them to other member states. This creates a better version of the Dublin regulations because it lowers the pressure on the outer regions of the EU and refugees do not end up in illegality because they will get their asylum processed by a country of their preference. The member states keep their (sovereign) control, something they tend to use against any international migration governance.

## **10.3 Differentiated inclusion citizenship**

A third option is to construct a special category of citizenship within the EU. This is also called ‘differentiated inclusion,’ which means that the welfare provisions of the EU member states will remain sustainable in a globalising world by giving migrants the opportunity to work on their citizenship. The welfare provisions require a community with a feeling of solidarity. While refugees enjoy an elaborated set of rights under international law, migrant workers do not. A system of differentiated inclusion (DI) will therefore give migrant workers more certainty and rights within the EU. Nowadays there already is a European citizenship, which is complementary to the national citizenship and the bearer of certain European rights such as the freedom of movement within Schengen. Along with this the EU also has a Blue Card system consisting of residence and work permits. But the Blue Card, inspired by the American Green Card, has strict requirements. To apply for a Blue Card one has to have either prove of high education or earn one and a half times the average income of the member state the applicant wants to live in.

The new category of EU citizenship could be a combination of the EU citizenship and the Blue Card system. This then could work very well with the option of migration centres mentioned before. Migrants will get a residence and work permit for either the entire EU or just one member state. This goes together with the fundamental rights (and obligations) that are derived from the UNDHR. As the migrant continues to live and work in the EU and fulfils certain tasks such as following language courses he or she will receive more rights until reaching full integration in, and contribution to, society. The DI system prevents sharp contrasts between in- and exclusion of migrants and keeps the welfare provisions sustainable.

## **10.4 Reception in the region**

The European project shows that free movement is not accompanied by mass immigration; it rather is a perfect example of circular migration (De Haas, 2015). Nonetheless, states have and will very likely continue to have the sovereign right to control what and who enters their jurisdictions. If they want to let almost no one in, they have the right to do so. Maybe not a moral right, but at least a technical right. However, as shown by the many deaths in the Mediterranean Sea, people do not stop migrating because of a strong police force (they rather see their chances of discovery increased). Therefore the states should invest in adequate reception of migrants elsewhere. This includes camps and safety for refugees (and quite possibly the deployment of troops) as well as economic growth (jobs, education) to provide the would be labour migrants with jobs. This fits neatly with the current root causes approach of the EU (see §8.2). It is again questionable how this approach can promote structural stability outside Europe (Lindstrom, 2005). The Clingendael Institute (2015) has elaborated this option further into a spectrum of options for several countries. The gist of their policy brief is that the EU has to make substantial investments in lasting stability in its neighbourhood and beyond if it wants to address the challenges that a migration blockade and reception in the region poses. However, while this might resonate with some, and shows resemblance with populist claims, it is by far the most difficult and uncertain option. Since societies are not fit for experiments, policies might have different results than expected. But thing like revising policies happen in a far more predictable manner than largescale military operations and with lower costs. Additionally, if one takes the conceptual model (figure 3) into account, then this policy option seems not to positively affect the relation between international migration and development. Conclusively, this policy option is only of help if applied moderately and in conjunction with other measures.

## **10.5 Ensure access to counselling**

In Fuenlabrada in Spain irregular migrants get, even though they are illegal according to the government, an orange card with the migrant's name and the name of his social worker (Van Spengen, 2015). This card grants the migrant access to basic healthcare and the food bank, but above all access to (legal) counselling. Originally the card is not made especially for migrants, but they form a large portion of the 10.000 people who use the card in the city (Van Spengen, 2015). The connection to the social worker informs them on the chances they have in Spain, and they either help them with a residence permit or a return home. The card helps the city too, as it lowered the crime rates and assists the integration of unemployed people and migrants (Van Spengen, 2015).

A similar programme for the entire EU would definitely be a taunting task. However, the EU could stimulate local campaigns like the one in Fuenlabrada. These campaigns have proved themselves, which some security-based measures have not. The programme will keep the police at a distance, since the migrants are no longer unknown, thanks to the connection with a social worker (who, at some point, could be a former migrant trained as social worker) (Van Spengen, 2015). The programme is also a cost-effective one, as money can be saved when the migrants are not detained and work voluntarily with the social worker on the return home when there are very few chances for the migrant (or when the migrant feels like it is better to return). Of course, this mainly applies to migrants who moved on the motive to work,

refugees have much less possibilities to return home. A separate track in the programme could secure the right procedures for refugees. In the end it the programme helps decriminalising the image of migrants while at the same time helping migrants.

## 10.6 Migration Policy Platform

Within the European Commission an institutional change is necessary. Having the competence regarding migration policies with the Home Affairs department (and the Justice departments in member states) is accelerating the securitisation of migration and development, and the criminalisation of migrants. It would consequently be beneficiary if the competence shifts towards a separate Migration department in the EC (and perhaps the member states will follow and move the policymaking outside the Justice departments). This is similar to the way the environment has its own department, despite the clear linkages with fisheries, industry and agriculture. Policies on a migration & development perspective are effective if they are not linked (such as development aid for trade liberalisation measures) but policy coherence and interactions are necessary for a migration & development perspective. Migration does not foster development, it rather reinforces the trends in a positive or negative way, with migrants having a development potential that is used when the conditions are met (so states play an important role to establish reforms). With a risk of departmentalisation, the EU is better off with a DG Migration, with a function like DG Environment. It is about who is coordinating and who is setting the objectives.

Apart from the institutional shift in policymaking, a cross-department platform is needed because narratives of development and migration communities are converging (see figure 21). Only on a planning level there are very low interactions, or at least very low integration. Forcing everyone to think about migration will increase interactions between the different policy fields and help integrating migration and the migration-development nexus in (development) policies. Having the Migration department coordinating the policymaking on migration and with increased interactions between relevant departments will from there on contribute to the policy coherence that the EU is striving for.

Table 1: Development and migration in parallel<sup>2</sup>

Contemporary development narrative	Corresponding migration realities
The dichotomy between “developed” and “developing” countries is becoming less relevant.	More states are simultaneously sending and receiving significant numbers of immigrants (for example, India and China).
The relative importance of official development assistance is decreasing.	Remittances are growing in importance for the gross domestic product of developing countries.
New forms of development partnerships are emerging: for example, South–South cooperation and public-private partnerships.	Global and regional consultative processes on migration are increasing.
The importance of policy coherence to tackle social, economic and sustainability challenges.	The topic of migration is rarely integrated into development planning, at any level.

FIGURE 21. THE DISCOURSES IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND MIGRATION COMMUNITIES (SOURCE: (LÖNNBACK, 2014)

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