



United States of America in Tríplice Fronteira

A research to the influence of the geopolitical vision of
terrorism of the United States of America on the everyday
life of inhabitants of Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil

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Executive summary

Tríplice Fronteira is located at the border of Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina. On each side of the border is a city: Ciudad del Este in Paraguay, Foz do Iguaçu in Brazil and Puerto Iguazú in Argentina. The three cities are separated by two rivers: the Rio Paraná and the Rio Iguazú. The Ponte Internacional da Amizade connects Foz do Iguaçu to Ciudad del Este. The Ponte Internacional da Fraternidade connects Puerto Iguazú to Foz do Iguaçu. Law enforcement in Tríplice Fronteira has been low over the last decades, the states have little legitimacy in the region, which causes huge amounts of criminal activities, like money laundering, trafficking of people, drugs and automobiles, and software piracy. Attention was drawn to the presence of terrorism in South America after the bombing of the Israeli embassy in 1992 and a Jewish Community Centre in 1994 in Buenos Aires. This put the spotlight on Tríplice Fronteira for the first time. According to investigations the bombings were prepared in and financed from Tríplice Fronteira, allegedly by Lebanese residents of Ciudad del Este. Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 the concerns about narco-terrorism and the funding of terrorism increased. The large Muslim community residing in Tríplice Fronteira remits money to Lebanon and Palestine; to family and Hezbollah. Hezbollah is considered to be a terrorist organisation by the United States of America (further: USA). In 2002 a Joint Security Command on security in Tríplice Fronteira was created and joined by Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina and the USA. According to the USA Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay should take action against the remittances, on the basis of United Nations resolution 1373. This demands that all states shall prevent and suppress the funding of terrorist acts.

In the literature there is a division between those who believe that the remitted money by the Muslim community from Tríplice Fronteira is indeed financing terrorism and those who state that the link between Tríplice Fronteira and terrorism has never been proven. However, little research focuses on the effect of the representation and practices about Tríplice Fronteira of the USA on the people who actually live in this area, while those are the people who are at the centre of this debate.

To what extent does the representation and practices of the United States of America in Tríplice Fronteira between Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina influence the everyday life of inhabitants of Foz do Iguaçu (Brazil)?

The representation of the USA of Tríplice Fronteira continues to be that it is an important regional nexus of arms, narcotics and human trafficking, counterfeiting, pirated goods, and money laundering. According to the USA these actions are potential sources for funding terrorist organisations. Subsequently, the USA states that Brazil's law enforcement units are adequate, but limited in the fight against terrorism. The USA practices upon its representation through participation in the 3+1 group and cooperation with the different countries. Furthermore, urged by the USA, Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina passed anti-terrorism legislation and established new law enforcement agencies after 9/11.

When talking to the inhabitants of Foz do Iguaçu, no counterterrorism measures came up, without me asking for it. The inhabitants of Foz do Iguaçu narrate their city in local and economic terms. An important aspect of the everyday life in Foz do Iguaçu is the ability to buy better or cheaper products across the border; moreover the border provides jobs for a lot of inhabitants of Foz do Iguaçu. In general, Ciudad del Este and Puerto Iguazú are considered to be another part of town and are – for all respondents – an essential part of everyday life. All of the inhabitants of Foz do Iguaçu address the

high levels of corruption and the improved control at the Ponte Internacional da Amizade due to the fiscalização. The respondents emphasise that the fiscalização of the border is at the expense of extensive control on contraband that crosses from Paraguay to Brazil. Generally, the inhabitants of Foz do Iguaçu feel that there is little discrimination between the Brazilian and the Arabic communities. Moreover, they feel that the narrative of the USA is out of touch with reality; furthermore many wonder why a terrorist cell would be in Tríplice Fronteira, while this is far away from the global turmoil. Some respondents feel that the fresh water of the Aquífero Guaraní is the real reason why the USA tries to exert power over Tríplice Fronteira.

In contrary to the view from above, the view from below stresses locality, for example: the Ponte Internacional da Amizade is dangerous, but Foz do Iguaçu is safe; while the narrative from above states that the Tríplice Fronteira as a whole is unsafe. Moreover, the view from above *borders, orders and others* through differentiating the Arabic community from others. The view from below does not make differentiations between people or communities, but between money and products in terms of complementation. The respondents narrate Tríplice Fronteira as a region with a lot of possibilities, the border allows entrepreneurs to employ cross-border activities, the higher wages in Ciudad del Este allow a lot of Brazilian employees to make a living and the differences in prices and quality of products allow inhabitants to buy the best product. Rather than erecting borders between the products, cities or communities, the view from below creates a frontier; a place where the in- and out-group meet and which integrates several countries, communities and economies.

In general the inhabitants of Foz do Iguaçu live their life, benefiting from the differences in price and quality of products and making use of the advantages the other border cities offer them. The residents live their everyday life without paying much attention to the representation of the USA. Yet, the practices of the USA, like stimulating border patrol and training border guards, influence the everyday life of the respondents. They state that they visit Puerto Iguazú and Ciudad del Este less than they would do when the checks would be littler. So, the practices resulting from the representation of the USA limit the inhabitants of Foz do Iguaçu slightly in their everyday life, but they are not aware of this affect. Moreover, the increased border patrols are generally perceived as positive by the residents of Foz do Iguaçu, because it counters crimes like drug trafficking, which is more important to them than countering terrorism.

As a result of this research, the most important recommendation I would like to do is that other scholars, involved in the debate on terrorism and funding terrorism, take the grassroots more into account, the people who live in these contested areas are not just subjects to debates on terrorism, but they are a vital part of it. Moreover, this research has been conducted in Foz do Iguaçu, an additional study conducted in Puerto Iguazú or Ciudad del Este would be helpful. In addition, this research showed that the inhabitants of Foz do Iguaçu create a frontier, rather than a border. I would like to recommend exploring the possibility of including the notion of the frontier (Kristof, 1959) in the framework of bordering, ordering and othering. Finally, I would like to encourage policy makers of the USA, Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and the municipalities of Tríplice Fronteira to see as a city (Magnussen, 2010).

Preface

In front of you is my master thesis on the representation and practices of the United States of America in Tríplice Fronteira. In September 2013 I started my journey as a master student in conflict and border studies at the joined master programme of Human Geography and CICAM. From a young age I have been intrigued by conflict and during my bachelors at the Radboud University I found my other passion; border studies. After an intense first semester of a lot of papers, assignments, books and articles I found myself to be a richer person. My dream to do fieldwork in South America was still alive and since I wanted to leave right after the first semester I started orientating quickly. Dr. Olivier Kramsch recommended me to read about the borderlands of South America and Tríplice Fronteira in particular. I was surprised academic articles about terrorism came up and I knew right away that this would be my thesis topic. After reading more articles questions started to arise; I tried to answer one of these questions in this thesis. I hope I am able to show you that the people who live in areas that are considered to be terrorist are not just subject to academic debates, but they are a vital part of these debates and should be considered as such.

First of all, I like to thank my thesis supervisor dr. Olivier Kramsch. My research had a rocky start due to your health and a rocky end due to my health; nevertheless you provided me during the entire process with useful feedback and you helped me mature as a scholar. Your enthusiasm for the topic, the research and the region was a continuing encouragement. In addition, I would like to thank the Stichting Nijmeegs Universiteits Fonds for providing me a scholarship for my fieldwork abroad, this has been very helpful. Furthermore, a special thanks to all the people who were kind enough to talk to me, both experts who helped me and the many inhabitants of Foz do Iguaçu who shared their stories with me.

Thanks to all my dear friends in Foz do Iguaçu; I want to thank you for welcoming me in Foz. Diogo & Rubia, thank you for taking me in your home and teaching me Portuguese; Juliana, Luciana & Sid Jr., thanks for interpreting interviews; George & Georgia, thanks for helping me settle so soon after my arrival. In addition, my thanks go out to all the people working and visiting Bambu. A special thanks to Luciana for all the trips you took with me to Puerto Iguazú and Ciudad del Este and thanks for all the chats, tears and laughter we shared.

Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends in The Netherlands for all the support while I was working on my thesis. Papa en mama, heel erg bedankt voor de steun en het vertrouwen dat jullie me tijdens mijn studie gegeven hebben en in het bijzonder toen ik in mijn eentje naar Zuid Amerika vertrok. Dorinke & Pier en Lisette & Sjoerd, bedankt voor het meeleven tijdens mijn studie en in het bijzonder toen ik weg was. Ivan Hagenbeek, ik weet dat het niet makkelijk voor je was toen ik zomaar drie maanden vertrok, maar bedankt dat je me hebt laten gaan en bedankt voor al het vertrouwen dat je altijd in me hebt. At last, my dear friends Floor, Suzanne, Sanne, Fenki, Jeroen, Tom, Anton and Sander, thanks for all the hours we spend together in class and the university library.

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1. Introduction

The first chapter gives an overview of the location and the situation of Tríplice Fronteira (§1.1), thereafter the scientific and social contribution of the research will be explained (§1.2), subsequently the research goal (§1.3), the research model (§1.4) and the research question and sub questions (§1.5) will be discussed.

1.1 Research objective

Tríplice Fronteira¹ is located at the border of Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina. On each side of the border is a city: Ciudad del Este in Paraguay, Foz do Iguaçu in Brazil and Puerto Iguazú in Argentina. The three cities are separated by two rivers: the Rio Paraná and the Rio Iguazú. The Ponte Internacional da Amizade (Friendship Bridge) connects the Brazilian city of Foz do Iguaçu to Ciudad del Este, the Paraguayan border city. The Ponte Internacional da Fraternidade (Bridge of Brotherhood) connects the Argentine city of Puerto Iguazú to Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil.



Map 1.1: Tríplice Fronteira of Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina (source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R%C3%ADo_de_la_Plata#mediaviewer/File:Riodelaplatabasinmap.png)

Attention was drawn to the presence of terrorism² in South America after the bombing of the Israeli embassy in 1992 and a community Jewish Centre in 1994 in Buenos Aires (Costa & Schulmeister, 2007: 27). This put the spotlight on Tríplice Fronteira for the first time, where a large community of Lebanese and Palestine Muslims reside (Sverdlick, 2005: 85). According to investigations the bombings were prepared in and financed from Tríplice Fronteira, allegedly by Lebanese residents of

¹ This research refers to the region by its Portuguese name, because the fieldwork has been conducted in the Brazilian border city. In English referred to as *Tri-Border Area (TBA)* or *the Triple Frontier* and in Spanish as *La Triple Frontera*.

² 'Terrorism consists of those deeds and statements, those material practices and discourses, those enacted policies and pronouncements, which are meant to terrify. [...] It is government by intimidation' (Pred, 2007: 363)

Ciudad del Este (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2012: 150). In 1999 the anti-terrorism coordinator of the Department of State, Mr. Sheenan, notified the Argentine government about the concerns of the United States of America (further: USA) about the region, this concerned the increasing presence of terrorist and narcotic trafficking cells in the region. Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 the concerns about narco-terrorism and the funding of terrorism kept increasing (Manero, 2007: 44). Mike Braun served seven years in the Drugs Enforcement Administration's Operation Snowcap (1987 – 1994) where he led teams of special agents who were trained and equipped by USA military special forces on counter-narcotics operations. He states the following:

'it was becoming abundantly clear in those days that certain elements of terrorist organizations [...] were becoming involved in some aspects of the drug trade. [...] In 2007 the UN identified the four most lucrative illicit markets that terrorist and insurgent groups exploit in their efforts to generate contraband revenue. They reported that the drug trade generates approximately \$322 billion dollars annually; human trafficking about \$32 billion; the arms trade about \$10 billion; and the blood diamond trade at about \$1 billion. Based on those numbers, is it any wonder they are drawn to the drug trade?' (Braun, personal communication (p.c.), 07-04-2014).

Law enforcement in Tríplice Fronteira has been low over the last decades, the states have little legitimacy in the region, which causes huge amounts of criminal activities (Costa & Schulmeister, 2007: 32; Sverdlick, 2005: 90). Estimates are that every year US\$500 billion is laundered into the international financial system in Tríplice Fronteira (Sverdlick, 2005: 85). Money laundering is not the only criminal activity in Tríplice Fronteira; other big businesses are smuggling (people, drugs and automobiles) and software piracy (Sverdlick, 2005: 87-90; Costa & Shulmeister, 2007: 30-32). Thanyã Davilla Savio, a lawyer who represents juveniles in cases on drug trafficking, confirms that it is a well-known fact that Tríplice Fronteira is a door for drug trafficking. The teenagers she represents usually come from a very poor background, with little or no family support and therefore they truly believe that smuggling is justified. The teenagers realise it is wrong, but considering their lives, they believe it is the only way to make a living; making drug smuggling the number one crime committed by juveniles (Davilla Savio, p.c.: 24-04-2014).

The large Muslim community residing in Tríplice Fronteira remits money to Lebanon and Palestine, not just to family, but also to Hezbollah (Costanza, 2012: 196; Levitt, 2005: 4; Abbott, 2004: 51; Costa & Schulmeister, 2007: 38). Reportedly \$50 million was remitted between 1995 and 2002 (Costanza, 2012: 194; Sverdlick, 2005: 88), and it is estimated that approximately \$10 million is remitted from Tríplice Fronteira to the Middle East every year (Levitt, 2005: 5). Many people of the Muslim community in Tríplice Fronteira see Hezbollah as a charity organisation who, for example, funds a martyr's widow and children (Sverdlick, 2005: 88), but the USA thinks of Hezbollah as a terrorist organisation. However, Hezbollah *'is not only terrorist, it is also a political party, social welfare movement [...], but it is also a transnational criminal organisation and it is certainly involved in terrorist attacks worldwide'* (Levitt, 2013).

Since the creation of Hezbollah in the beginning of the eighties in Lebanon, it has always been a militant proxy for Iran (Levitt, 2013; Costanza, p.c.: 20-03-2014). The nature of this relationship has shifted over time, but it is still in place. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon helped Iran to form an umbrella group (Hezbollah) out of smaller militant groups. Because of this invasion *'the group is dead*

set against the existence of Israel' (Levitt, 2013). Nowadays the relationship between Hezbollah and Iran is referred to as a strategic partnership. Hezbollah is by no means an unambiguous organisation, it has multiple and competing interests. For example, if Syria needs weapons delivered in Yemen, Syria uses Hezbollah as delivery service. Subsequently if Iran wants Hezbollah to target Israeli tourists over the world the organisation will do it as well, because Hezbollah still serves as a proxy for Iran. When analysing Hezbollah's actions, one have to take their competing interests into account (Levitt, 2013).

In 2002 a Joint Security Command was created, the 3+1 group, a policy group on security in Tríplice Fronteira for which Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay invited the USA as member. The USA addressed the issue of remittances send to Hezbollah in this Joint Security Command frequently (Manero, 2007: 44; Costa & Schulmeister, 2007: 32). According to the USA Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay should take action against the remittances, on the basis of United Nations (further: UN) resolution 1373 (Costa & Schulmeister, 2007: 32). This demands that all states shall prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts (UN, 2001). Although Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay recognize that the area is highly criminalised, they deny that there are terrorist supporters or -groups in the area. Academically the link between criminality in Tríplice Fronteira and terrorism has never been proven as well (Manero, 2007: 44; Costa & Schulmeister, 2007: 32).

Former President of Brazil Lula acknowledged both Hamas and Hezbollah as legitimate political parties, which means that both organisations are not associated with terrorism in Brazil (M. Barakat, p.c.: 24-04-2014). Costanza states that it is important to make a distinction between the official political stance regarding Hamas and Hezbollah and the stance of the security services, charged with identifying potential threats. Local security services are aware of the potential threat of Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations, they try to monitor cash flows and track persons allegedly related to Hezbollah. They have limited capabilities though, due to political leaders that are not willing to acknowledge that there may be individuals associated with terrorism living inside their country (W. Costanza, p.c.: 20-03-2014). *'In Brazil, Itamaraty (Brazilian Foreign Ministry) opposed any legislation that recognized terrorism within Brazilian borders. Consequently, there are weak laws on terrorism which limits the ability of local authorities to actively and aggressively seek them out. There has to be political will and the financial resources to support a counterterrorism program'* (W. Costanza, p.c.: 20-03-2014).

'Bottom line is that it's not politically wise to recognize a terrorist threat'
(W. Costanza, p.c.: 20-03-2014).

In the literature there is a division between those who believe that the remitted money by the Muslim community in Tríplice Fronteira is indeed financing terrorism (for example: Abbott, 2004) and those who state that the link between Tríplice Fronteira and terrorism has never been proven (for example: Manero, 2007; Costa & Schulmeister, 2007). However, little research focuses on the effect of the representation and practices of the USA about Tríplice Fronteira on the people who actually live in this area, while those are the people who are at the centre of this debate.

1.2 Contribution

A scientific research should not only contribute to the academic field wherein the research is conducted, but it must also contribute to society.

This research contributes to the academic field of human geography, because it tries to advance the emerging literature on Tríplice Fronteira by adding another perspective to the debate. As noted above, the academic debate seems divided by those who believe that Hezbollah, and thereby terrorism, is funded from Tríplice Fronteira and those who believe that this cannot be proved. However, a grassroots perspective on the issue of Tríplice Fronteira seems to be missing from the discussion. An important insight which emerged from human geography the last decades is the construction of space through practices of everyday life (De Certeau, 1984), which contrasts with the top-down perspectives, who are predominantly present in the debate regarding Tríplice Fronteira. Another perspective might add new possibilities and insights to the current academic debate.


This research contributes to the society of Tríplice Fronteira, because a grassroots perspective could offer different policy recommendations regarding criminality and the funding of terrorism. By offering a grassroots perspective, policymakers could gain insight in what happens in their community and make policies on how to act in a region which is dealing with border problems and foreign biases in a bottom-up manner, rather than top-down.

1.3 Research goal

A lot of research have been conducted on criminality and terrorism in Tríplice Fronteira, however, while reading the literature, the question emerges how people living in these border cities perceive the representations of the area, as criminal and funding terrorism. The aim of this research is to contribute to the emerging literature on Tríplice Fronteira and when possible, do policy recommendations on how to act in a region which is dealing with limited governance and foreign biases.

The aim of this research is to contribute to the emerging literature on Tríplice Fronteira between Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina, through a study on the representation and practices of the United States of America in Tríplice Fronteira and the influence of this representation and practices on the inhabitants of Foz do Iguaçu (Brazil).

1.4 Research model



(a) A study on the theoretical frameworks of bordering, ordering & othering, the construction of space and fragile states plus preliminary research concludes in an assessment framework that concludes in the research perspective, (b) this is the foundation of the empirical assessment of the research object. (c) The results of the confrontation between the assessment framework and the research object will be analysed (d) and these results are expected to contribute to the deepening of the current academic debate.

1.5 Research question

According to the literature Tríplice Fronteira is highly criminalised, however as Costa & Schulmeister state: '*are intelligence services and other analysts unable to gather evidence about linkages [between criminality and terrorism] because they are incapable of doing so, or because no such linkages exist?*' (Costa & Schulmeister, 2007: 38). Even though the link between criminality and terrorism has not been proven, according to the USA Tríplice Fronteira is a terrorist sanctuary (Manero, 2007: 45), which means that it is an ungoverned area (Korteweg, 2008: 61). This leaves us wondering, what does it mean for the people that live in the three cities at each side of the border. Does the representation of terrorist sanctuary by the USA influence their everyday life?

Therefore the research question of this research will be:

To what extent does the representation and practices of the United States of America in Tríplice Fronteira between Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina influence the everyday life of inhabitants of Foz do Iguaçu (Brazil)?

To guide the research question, several sub questions are formulated.

- *What are the representation & practices of the USA in Tríplice Fronteira?*
First of all it is important to identify the representation of the USA more clearly and to identify if the USA takes action upon this representation in Tríplice Fronteira.
- *Does the representation & practices of the USA of Tríplice Fronteira influence policy of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay?*
Subsequently it is important to figure out whether this representation has influenced the policy makers of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay to file anti-terrorism laws in the region and in Foz do Iguaçu in particular.
- *How do residents of Foz do Iguaçu perceive living in Tríplice Fronteira?*
The research goal and question both emphasise the everyday life in Tríplice Fronteira, a vital part of everyday life is how people perceive their environment. To understand the influence of the representation of the USA, one has to understand the region first.
- *How do the residents of Foz do Iguaçu perceive the representation & practices of the USA?*
The representation *an sich* will be hard to measure; however, people do actively judge the practice of policy. So, if the policy is influenced by the USA representations, this could be a start of operationalising the representation. Nevertheless it is important to ask people whether or not they are aware of this representation and if they have an opinion about it.

1.6 Outline

This thesis is structured as followed, the second chapter gives a brief overview of global and local developments that have been important for the evolution of South America and Tríplice Fronteira in particular. Chapter three contains the theoretical framework; first of all the theory selection is discussed. Subsequently the theoretical debates on state fragility, the construction of space, and bordering, ordering & othering will be explained. The last paragraph contains the assessment framework, explaining the indicators and the operational definitions used in this research. Chapter four presents the methodological framework. The first paragraph of this chapter puts forward the selection of research methods; subsequently the research methods on desk research, case study and narrative research will be explained. This is followed by a paragraph on data collection and lastly a paragraph on case selection and description.

Chapter five is the first empirical chapter, it presents the narrative of the USA; the view from above. It pays attention to the first act of terrorism in South America: the AMIA bombing. The following paragraphs pay attention to criminality and terrorism and the border crossings in Tríplice Fronteira. Finally an overview of counterterrorism in Tríplice Fronteira is given. Chapter six is the second empirical chapter, this chapter presents the narrative of the grassroots; the view from below. This narrative is based on fieldwork conducted in Foz do Iguaçu in April and May of 2014. Because of the diversity of people living in Foz do Iguaçu, I distinguished four different respondent groups: 1) Residents of Foz do Iguaçu 2) Residents of Foz do Iguaçu; who work in Ciudad del Este, Paraguay 3) Entrepreneurs 4) Members of the Arabic community of Foz do Iguaçu. This chapter tells the story of how people make use of the border, how they perceive and experience the border crossings and how they feel about the allegation of terrorism in the region. The first paragraph presents a short overview of the interviewees.

Chapter seven presents the analysis of the data. The analysis is based on the selected theories of state fragility, the construction of space and bordering, ordering and othering. The analysis is ordered as followed: first the view from above is analysed on the basis of the relevant theory, subsequently the view from below is analysed and thereafter the analysis of both views are confronted with one another. Chapter eight answers shortly the sub-questions and thereafter the research question, subsequently the recommendations for scholars and policy makers and the shortcomings of the research are discussed.

2. Setting the context

The evolution of territory in Latin America has largely been affected by global and regional developments, like colonisation (§2.1), modernisation (§2.2) and regional cooperation and global unrest (§2.3). This chapter gives an overview of global and local developments that has been important for the evolution of South America and Tríplice Fronteira in particular.

2.1 Colonisation

The colonisation process in this area started slowly, initially there was no priority to occupy or colonise the area of Tríplice Fronteira. Instead, the Spaniards were using the region as passage to find the 'Sierra de la Plata'; a region where large quantities of precious metals supposed to be. The quest for gold failed and the Spaniards started to build settlements in the region they initially past (Kleinpenning, 2000: 211). The Spanish crown saw the current country of Paraguay as an unimportant province of the colony Argentina. But still the Spanish signed treaties in Europe with the Portuguese settlers about the Paraguayan territory; however, the borders were repeatedly violated by the Portuguese. In 1811 Paraguay became independent, the isolation strategy of Dictator Franca establish an independent and stable Paraguay. In 1864 Paraguay was attacked once more and lost in the war with the Triple Alliance (Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay), which lasted until 1870. Paraguay lost considerably amounts of land to Brazil and Argentina (Kleinpenning, 2000: 221-225).

Today the ties between the three countries are friendly and cooperative (Kleinpenning, 2000: 225), however it took a long time before the borders weren't contested anymore. Manero argues that there had to be a change in geopolitical logics that had been historically accepted by the Latin American armed forces (2007: 19). *Neighbourhood geography* – contesting the state sovereignties – has been of major influence on decision making in Latin America, the many territorial conflicts are an example of the neighbourhood geography. The three geo-strategically logics of conflict – fluvial, maritime and territorial – that represented territorial proximity have been dislocated (Manero, 2007: 22); moreover globalisation changed territoriality and the function of borders. Although globalisation hasn't eliminated the function of borders (Kahler, 2006: 1), the change in the defence of borders required a change in geopolitical logics. It shifted from neighbourhood geography towards *transnational strategic representations*.

2.2 Modernisation

The prevailing strategic representation after World War II was *modernisation* and the underlying threat of communism. The First World – Western Europe and North America – saw it as their duty to spread modern divisions of labour, healthy diet, good education and 'the benefits and virtues of political democracy and societal security' to countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, who were seen as underdeveloped (Slater, 2000: 22). The Point Four Program, initiated by President Truman in 1949, shows the desire to spread modern values. The program saw it as its duty to fight poverty and bring democracy, as a force capable of stirring people into action against oppressors, hunger, misery and despair (Slater, 2000: 23). In other words, President Truman saw a link between poverty and communism and the imposing of democratisation as a way to oppose communism (Slater, 2000: 23). Although one can question many parts of the modernisation theory and the need to spread democracy in 'the Third World', the threat of communism was the prevailing transnational strategic representation at the time. No surprise that the shift in neighbourhood logics towards strategic representation took off in this time:

'This change corresponds, on one hand, with a new international situation characterised by the entry of Latin America into the Cold War with the Cuban question (1959) and with the redefinition of the threats established by the United States. On the other hand it corresponds with national situations characterised by the autonomy of the army compared to the civil capacity and the emergence of new politico-social actors like the populists' (Manero, 2007: 26)

Although the authoritarian regimes were willing to fight international communism and communist representations, the shift away from the neighbourhood logic was difficult. The traditional rivalries remained and domination and mistrust were at the centre of foreign policy up to the 1970s (Manero, 2007: 26).

2.3 Regional cooperation and global unrest

With the end of the Cold War, everything familiar to Latin American armed forces was lost, no tensions between states and no major ideological cleavages to fight against. Instead, a new strategic representation arises, that of the danger of drug trafficking, organized-crime activities, terrorism and political and social instability (Manero, 2007: 27). Latin America is entering a time which is characterised by increased cooperation between the countries and global unrest, due to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 at the World Trade Centre in New York.

2.3.1 MERCOSUL

In 1991 Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay decided during a meeting to establish a common market between their countries. On March 26, 1991 the countries signed the Agreement of Asunción in Asunción, Paraguay. Through this treaty the Southern Common Market was created. In Spanish the Southern Common Market is referred to as El Mercado Común del Sur (abbr. MERCOSUR) and in Portuguese as o Mercado Comum do Sul (abbr. MERCOSUL) (Mercosur, 2014). The objectives of the MERCOSUL are:



Map 2.1: MERCOSUR in numbers (source: MERCOSUR. (2014). *En pocas palabras*. http://www.mercosur.int/t_generico.jsp?contentid=3862&site=1&channel=secretaria&seccion=2)

1. The free movement of goods, services and production between the countries through, among others, the elimination of customs and non-tariff movement of goods and the elimination of any other restriction.
2. The establishment of a common external tariff and the establishment of a common trade policy in relation to other states or groups of states and the coordination of positions in regional and internal economic and/or trade forums.
3. Coordination of macroeconomic policies between the different parties within the states: from agricultural, industrial, fiscal, monetary, foreign currencies and capital, services, customs, transport and foreign trade and other communication which ensure suitable conditions of competition between the different parties.
4. The commitment of state parties to harmonize their legislation in relevant areas in order to strengthen the integration process.

Nowadays o Mercado Comum do Sul consists of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela and Bolivia. The associated states of MERCOSUL are: Chile, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Guyana and Suriname (MERCOSUR, 2014).

2.3.2 The War on Terror

Only hours after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 the authorities of the USA claimed to know that the perpetrators were linked to Osama Bin Laden and a little later former president George Bush Jr. announced the “War against Terrorism”. Quickly after the attacks the Congress of the USA authorised former president Bush Jr. to take any measures necessary and allocated \$40 billion to the war against terrorism (Moore, 2001: 1). The National Security Strategy of the United States of America of September 2002 emphasises that the USA is fighting a war against terrorist of global reach. The USA acknowledges that in many regions legitimate grievances prevent the emergence of lasting peace and that these grievances must be addressed, however the USA feels that no cause, nor grievance justifies terror and that the USA will make no concessions to terrorist demands (The White House, 2002: 5). In September 2006 The White House released the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, which states the following:

‘America is at war with a transnational terrorist movement fueled by a radical ideology of hatred, oppression, and murder. Our National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, first published in February 2003, recognizes that we are at war and that protecting and defending the Homeland, the American people, and their livelihoods remains our first and most solemn obligation. Our strategy also recognizes that the War on Terror is a different kind of war. From the beginning, it has been both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas. Not only do we fight our terrorist enemies on the battlefield, we promote freedom and human dignity as alternatives to the terrorists’ perverse vision of oppression and totalitarian rule. The paradigm for combating terrorism now involves the application of all elements of our national power and influence. Not only do we employ military power, we use diplomatic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement activities to protect the Homeland and extend our defenses, disrupt terrorist operations, and deprive our enemies of what they need to operate and survive. We have broken old orthodoxies that once confined our counterterrorism efforts primarily to the criminal justice domain.’ (The White House, 2006b: 1).

In the National Security Strategy of 2010 the USA states that they will always seek to delegitimize the use of terrorism and to isolate those who carry it out. In order to reach that goal, the USA states that they enlist all of the intelligence, law enforcement and homeland security capabilities (The White House, 2010: 20). Furthermore does the Department of Defense state in 2014 that the department will rebalance the counterterrorism efforts towards a greater emphasis on building partnership capacity, especially in fragile states. However, the department will *'still retain robust capabilities for direct action, including intelligence, persistent surveillance, precision strike, and Special Operations Forces (SOF)'* (Department of Defense, 2014: 21). The USA continues to counter the proliferation and use of Weapons of Mass Destruction and cooperate with regional partners to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qai'ida and other extremist groups, like Hezbollah and Hamas. Since the groups and threats continue to diversify and adapt themselves to new environments, the Department of Defense stated in 2014 that they will increase the use of special operations to maintain security in the USA (Department of Defense, 2014: 21).

3. Theoretical framework

In this chapter the theoretical framework will be presented in order to be able to analyse the data and to draw conclusions about the influence of the representation of the USA on everyday life in Tríplice Fronteira. The theoretical framework contains first of all a paragraph on theory selection (§3.1). Subsequently the theoretical debates on state fragility (§3.2) the construction of space (§3.3) and bordering, ordering & othering (§3.4) will be explained. The last paragraph contains the assessment framework, explaining the indicators and the operational definitions used in this research (§3.5).

3.1 Theory selection

Tríplice Fronteira is a region with specific geographical aspects, the most important whereof are the fact that the area includes three different nation-states, the space wherein it is located and its location on the border. Physical surroundings are crucial to the daily lives of the people, which is the subject of this research.

The first important aspect of Tríplice Fronteira is the fact that it includes three nation-states. The nation-state has undergone an important transformation the last decades, since the rise of the modernisation theory and the liberal peace paradigm: *'These policies are seen [...] as representing a coherent, Western, neo-liberal political agenda, referred to as liberal peace'* (van Leeuwen et al., 2012: 295), they include not only the use of liberal democratic systems, but a set of neoliberal values, inter alia market reform, development through economic growth and a limited role for the state (van Leeuwen et al., 2012: 295). Through this paradigm the international community has a strong focus on the nation-state (Magnussen, 2010: 41-42). An influential debate on the nation-state is the concept index of fragile states. States that are considered to be fragile are the new focus of development aid, in order to prevent the development of terrorism (Pronk, lecture, 17-02-2014). Although the failed states discourse has been widely accepted, it is not uncontested. It is important to take notice of what is considered to be a weakness of the theory. Nonetheless, the theoretical debate on weak states is closely related to the debate on terrorism, therefore it seems important to consider whether or not Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay are fragile states and if this influences the representation of the USA.

The second important aspect of Tríplice Fronteira is the space wherein it is located. Important in thinking about space is whether space exist *an sich* or whether it is constructed by the people who live in it. An influential thinker on the construction of space is Henri Lefebvre, who stands in the Marxist tradition. The theory of Lefebvre is crucial in thinking about space and therefore his theory will be shortly explained. The theory of Lefebvre focuses on the construction of both abstract space and everyday life, with an important link to capitalism. This research does not put emphasis on capitalism; therefore I choose to use the theory of Michel De Certeau. De Certeau wrote an elaborate work on the practice of everyday life and the construction of space and place. Although the theory of De Certeau is of high value in the explanation of the construction of space through everyday life, it does not include tools to explain policy which influences everyday life. Therefore the ideas of Warren Magnussen on *Seeing like a city* will be included; he argues that a policymaker should be at the political level of the city instead of the nation-state. This theory allows me to not only include everyday life, but also policymaking at the grassroots.

The final important geographical aspect of *Tríplice Fronteira* is that it is located in a border region, therefore it is important to include the theory on bordering, ordering and othering. Borders and frontiers are places of exclusion, purification of space (van Houtum & van Naerssen, 2001: 126), but also places where people meet and interact (Kristof, 1959: 270). Since the border possibly is an integral part of structures of everyday life, it is important to take that into account as a factor in this research.

It has to be noted that all selected theories are part of the post-modern tradition. Clarke defines post-modern as “*incredulity towards metanarratives*” (Clarke, 2006: 109). In which meta-narratives are seen as an overarching principle, which legitimated a certain kind of modern discourse. Those modern discourses claimed to reveal the truth, thereby guaranteeing the importance, value and utility of knowledge-based action into the society (Clark, 2006: 110). Modernity claimed that the outcome of scientific research was the truth, but the inaccuracy of the description and the evidence of perversion because of this believe in the truth, undermined the grand narratives of modernity (Clark, 2006: 110-111). Post-modernism on the other hand is a way of operating (Eco) or a state of mind (Bauman), rather than a claim to truth. ‘*The modern was hooked on the Truth [...] The postmodern, in contrast, is about remaining open to the other, not closing off possibilities, not airbrushing the unrepresentable out of the picture or off the map*’ (Clarke, 2006: 114). In this way post-modernism is a sensitivity to the unrepresentable. Because of the openness and the countering of meta-narratives the post-modern tradition suits the goal of this research.

3.2 State fragility

There are several ways to define a state, for example Max Weber defined the state as: ‘*a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory*’ (Di John, 2008: 3). A broader definition of the state is the idea of the social contract, developed by Thomas Hobbes; this definition focuses on the relationship between the state and its citizens. He argued that every individual without a state and the rule of law lives in a state of war of all against all. To protect these individuals who voluntarily give up some of their freedom in exchange for peace and security, the social contract was created between the state and the citizens (Di John, 2008: 3-4).

Helman & Ratner were among the first scholars who brought up the concept of ‘failed states’, they noticed that some states were increasingly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community. There are many definitions of what a failed state is, for example a state fails when it is no longer capable of holding up the monopoly of violence or that a failing state is unable to perform the basic functions of a state. Thus means that the social contract has broken down and the state fails to enforce the structure, authority, law and political order (Di John, 2008: 4; Jones, 2008: 180-181). In this thesis I will make use of the definition of failed states developed by Zartman, which is in line with the Hobbesian social contract theory: ‘*state failure occurs when ‘the basic functions of the state are no longer performed [...]. It refers to a situation where the structure authority (legitimate power), law, and political order have fallen apart*’ (Di John, 2008: 4). During the Workshop on Crisis States of the Crisis States Research Centre at the London School of Economics in 2006 scholars made an attempt to categorise nation-states according to different levels of vulnerability and effectiveness:

'A fragile state is a state significantly susceptible to crisis in one or more of its sub-systems [...]. In a fragile state, institutional arrangements embody and perhaps preserve the conditions of crisis: in economic terms, this could be institutions (importantly, property rights) that reinforce stagnation or low growth rates, or embody extreme inequality (in wealth, in access to land, in access to the means to make a living); in social terms institutions may embody extreme inequality or lack of access altogether to health or education; in political terms, institutions may entrench exclusionary coalitions in power (in ethnic, religious, or perhaps regional terms), or extreme factionalism or significantly fragmented security organisations' (CSRC, 2006).

'A crisis state is a state under acute stress, where reigning institutions face serious contestation and are potentially unable to manage conflict and shocks. (There is a danger of state collapse). This is not an absolute condition, but a condition at a given point of time, so a state can reach a "crisis condition" and recover from it, or can remain in crisis over relatively long periods of time, or a crisis state can unravel and collapse' (CSRC, 2006).

'We define a failed state as a condition of "state collapse" – eg, a state that can no longer perform its basic security, and development functions and that has no effective control over its territory and borders. A failed state is one that can no longer reproduce the conditions for its own existence' (CSRC, 2006).

These definitions contain indicators for fragile, crisis or failed states. However, Di John introduces three indicators, which are in my view valuable for the discussion. These are: 1) the growth of criminal violence, 2) the inability to control borders and 3) the inability to deliver political goods, which are: security, institutions to regulate and settle conflicts, political participation and social service delivery, like infrastructure (Di John, 2008: 4-5). These indicators are useful because they refer to whether or not the state is able to fulfil its part of the social contract, which means that it provides security. Thus no criminal violence, well protected and controlled borders and the ability to provide political goods.

The failed states discourse has been widely accepted in newspapers and academic literature (Jones, 2008: 181). Moreover, the Fund for Peace publishes every year the Fragile States Index, with categories ranging from 'very high alert' to 'very sustainable'. The Fund for Peace uses different indicators for the composition of the list, like demographic pressure, refugees and internal displaced people, group grievances, economic decline, uneven economic development etcetera (Fund for Peace, 2014). Yet, Jones notes that it is remarkable that the concept of failed states is absorbed in academics so easily. There have been little concerns or critical reflection of the state failure discourse. In particular the ideological character of state failure, which is intimately related to imperialism. According to Jones the discourse is continuously characterising social conditions and identifying causes wrongly, furthermore it serves as a legitimisation and reproduction of the imperial qualities that are at the heart of the state failure.

'A recurring feature of imperialism in the global development of capitalism has been intervention in non-European societies, with the objective of securing or establishing social orders, conditions and institutional arrangements beneficial for imperial commerce and economic expansion [...] all forms of imperial intervention have to be legitimized. A persistent element in the ideological legitimization of imperial intervention is the identification of some

lack or inferiority on the basis of which different societies and states can be distinguished, both from the imperial powers and among each other' (Jones, 2008: 197).

For example, in the nineteenth century colonial occupation was legitimised by differentiating between 'civilized' and 'uncivilized', subsequently the differentiation was made according to varying capacities of self-rule, under the League of Nations and, later, the United Nations. During the Cold War communism was the way to categorise friends and enemies. Currently, the War on Terrorism uses the discourse of 'state failure' with the categories of weak, fragile, failed and collapsed states to differentiate and to legitimate intervention (Jones, 2008: 197). Furthermore, imperial interventions have been reinforcing authoritarian rule and social forces and undermine democratic and progressive tendencies. Through the transformation of power relations under colonial rule ethnicity changed from a fluid, cultural identity to a fixed political identity. Western support kept corrupt dictators in power as a way to secure the imperial order. Paranoia regarding 'Islamic terrorism' has replaced the paranoia regarding Soviet expansionism. Continuously, regressive forces take advantage of this strategic logic of imperial intervention. Thereby Western powers prolong and worsen conditions of violence and breakdown, undermining democratic or moderate forces and reinforcing regressive forces and thus contributing to state failure (Jones, 2008: 198).

3.3 The construction of space

Lefebvre describes the increasing distancing from *nature* through the production of a *second nature*, which reaches its fullest expression in the urban. Lefebvre states that the production of space started in the political city, an important aspect of these cities were that they had developed writing. Through writing the city gained power, because writing enlarged the administrative capacity, but also its political and military power. Writing has the ability to impose the (written) law of the city on the surrounding villages and the countryside (Gregory, 1994: 370-372). But the political city is threatened and finally replaced by the merchant city, which is market driven. Through its battle between feudalism and capitalism the merchant city is quickly replaced by industrial capital, which finally resulted in the industrial city (Gregory, 1994: 373-375). The industrial city represented a second nature, partly through the incorporation of manmade nature in the city (for example parks and gardens) and partly because of the incorporation of nature in the industrial process (via water-wheels and steam-engines). The industrial city will be followed by the urban society, a critical zone formed by implosion and explosion; localisation and globalisation; and differentiation and integration (Gregory, 1994: 375). The four types of space is not space *an sich*, but they include experiences, perceptions, times, spaces, images, concepts, languages, rationalities, theories and practices (Gregory, 1994: 375).

Subsequently, Lefebvre links the modes of production and the different cities and thereby forms the representation of abstract space. Thus, when the mode of production was primitive, the representation of space was analogical, which means that villages represent and reproduce itself as an exaggerated form of the human body. During the political city, there was the ancient mode of reproduction, which represents space in a cosmological way. This means that the architecture of the city represents the cosmos (Gregory, 1994: 383-385). The ancient mode of production evolved into the feudal mode of production, during this evolvment also the urban form evolved. At the beginning of the feudal systems cities were still political; however, after a while they turned into merchant cities. During the feudal mode of production the representation of space was symbolic. The symbolic representation was highly influenced by the church, which placed importance on the image of the

crucified body of Jesus Christ (Gregory, 1994: 385-388). Subsequently, the mode of production evolved into capitalist. This finally transformed the merchant city into the industrial city and the industrial city into the urban society. All make use of the capitalist mode of production, which represents, after weighing perspectives and abstractions, as logical. Logical space contains the linear perspective, which has been discovered during the European Renaissance (Gregory, 1994: 389).

The work of Lefebvre gives an elaborate overview of the production of space in the last millennia, especially in combination with the capitalist mode of production. Michel De Certeau offers another framework on the construction of space and everyday life in his book *Practices of Everyday Life*. He argues that space is not abstract, but that it is actively constructed by those who make use of it (1984: 117). According to him every story is a travel story and thus a spatial practice. De Certeau makes a distinction between *space* and *place*; *space* exists when one takes into consideration the vectors of direction, velocities and time variables. *Place* on the other hand is the order in accord with which elements are distributed in relationship of coexistence. They can exist besides one another, but both on a distinct location, which means that place is a configuration of positions. In short, space is a practiced place (De Certeau, 1984: 117).

'On this view, in relation to place, space is like the word when it is spoken, that is, when it is caught in the ambiguity of an actualization, transformed into a term dependent upon many different conventions, situated as the act of a present and modified by the transformations caused by successive contexts' (De Certeau, 1984, 117).

In daily practices the differentiation between place and space is mostly made in terms of things that are reducible to just being-there and operations, which means the specification of spaces by the actions of historical subjects and movements (De Certeau, 1984: 118-119). Stories are crucial in the transformation of space into place and the other way around, an example of linguistic construction of space and place is the example of tours and maps. Maps contain a plain description of a room ('the desk is right of the door'); while tours contain a movement articulated via operations ('you come in through a low door'). Thereby the tour becomes an act of speech which alters seeing and going in an attempt to describe place or space. A tour is thus '*a speech act that furnishes a minimal series of paths by which to go into each room; and that the path is a series of units that have the form of vectors*' (de Certeau, 1984: 119). The vectors of the movement are either static ('to the right, in front of you') or mobile ('if you turn to the left, you will...'). So the description is either the presentation of a tableau ('there are...') or an organisation of movement ('you enter, you go across, you turn'), altering *seeing* and *going*. Seeing being the knowledge of an order of places and going being spatializing actions. Everyday stories tell what people can do and make out of it, they define space (De Certeau, 1984: 119-122).

Like stated above, space is like the spoken word, caught in an ambiguity of actualisation. That is why it is not surprising that when people are narrating their stories they use both tour and map elements. The chain of spatializing operations are marked out by references to what it produces or what it implies; the production of a representation of places or the implication of a local order (de Certeau, 1984: 120). While narrating their chain of spatial actions the respondents indicate an *effect* obtained by the tour ('you see...') or a *given* that shows its limits ('there is a wall'), its possibility ('there's a door'), or an obligation ('there's a one way street') (de Certeau, 1984: 120). By describing an effect of a tour one refers to what it implies, the local order of places (seeing), while the description of the

given is a way of organising spatial actions (going) by the stating limits, possibilities and obligations. Moreover a speech act marks out boundaries; stories play the everyday role of a tribunal that decides on the limitations of practices (de Certeau, 1984: 122).

There is no spatiality which is not organized by the determination of the frontier; every story on the organisation of space is thereby not only a description, but also a culturally creative act. This gives it a performative force, which is able to create space. On the contrary, when stories are disappearing there is a loss of space. The stories create a theatre of actions, the story's first function is to authorise. *'A narrative activity [...] thus continues to develop where frontiers and relations with space abroad are concerned. Fragmented and disseminated, it is continually concerned with marking out boundaries. [...] stories "go in a procession" ahead of social practices in order to open a field for them'* (De Certeau, 1984: 125). The second function of the story that it is both the frontier and the bridge. The frontier is created by contacts, yet the thing that differentiate them, is also their common point. Thus conjunction and disjunction are inseparable (De Certeau, 1984: 126). These contacts create spaces of interaction, which can be referred to as *regions*. This means that in the same place there are as many regions as interactions or intersections. In this way the dynamic contradiction between delimitations and mobility is introduced. While the region marks out the possibility of interaction, it also marks out frontiers. Frontiers between the acting subjects (things, animals, human beings), which are not only dividing among themselves places, but also among emotions, characteristics and movements. Limits or possibilities are encountered when amorous and hostile struggles are imprinted in the contact between two or more subjects (de Certeau, 1984: 126-127).

Although the stories and practices of everyday life are important, they do not incorporate a policy view. Magnussen tries to offer a way to view policy from the grassroots of a city. He argues that the notion of the nation-state as subject to policy research is widely accepted. The acceptance that politics is solely focused on the nation-state, because it assumes to be the supreme authority. Although the nation-state is at the centre of policymaking, one can ask oneself, should it be? Because a city is not a state, although policy for the city is made by the state (Magnussen, 2010: 42-43). *'To see like a city is to envision the world in terms of what results from distinctively urban practices: ones that enable cities to be as they are'* (Magnussen, 2010, 43). Cities are increasingly changing; they grow to be more self-organising, even in relation to complex processes such as commercial exchanges and cultural productions. To what extent these complex processes conflict with more cooperative activities determine what form or order cities take (Magnussen, 2010: 45-46). Furthermore, there are different political authorities that characterise everyday urban life; these political authorities tend to proliferate. While they claim to be apolitical, they actually are and thereby they produce, sustain and disrupt the city (Magnussen, 2010: 46). This does not mean that the city is ungoverned; there is a high level of practices of self-governance, which are ubiquitous to the city.

'These practices are so much a part of everyday urban life that we often take them for granted: To a remarkable extent people line up, take turns, let one another pass on the street, respect on another's privacy, dispose of their wastes appropriately, and generally go about their business without interfering with other people. [...] Social life anywhere would be impossible without it' (Magnussen, 2010: 47).

The order of a city is always temporary and localised, cities are constantly changing. Thus, seeing like a city is inherent to accepting the fact that the world is not as static as the nation-state occurs to be. So what appears in a place at any moment is likely to disappear. The scale and direction of the changes differs, it can be from local to global and from Silicon Valley to Afghanistan. Thus transformations are nonlinear and inherently unpredictable (Magnussen, 2010: 48).

3.4 Bordering, ordering & othering

Political and economic activities are increasingly crossing borders, but what does the decreasing influence of borders mean to territorial identities and territorial conflicts? The role of boundaries is closely connected to concepts such as territory, territoriality and sovereignty (Newman & Paasi, 1998). Kahler argues that '*Territoriality and conflict in an era of globalization*' that globalisation has changed territoriality and the function of borders, but has not eliminated them (2006: 1).

When talking about borders, we need an understanding of what the border actually is; Kristof provides a useful definition of the border. '*The boundary indicates certain well established limits (the bounds) of the given political unit, and all that which is within the boundary is bound together, that is, it is fastened by an international bond.*' (Kristof, 1959: 270). However, to give a better understanding of the content of the border she continues:

"Boundary" is a term appropriate to the present-day concept of the state, that is, the state as a sovereign (or autonomous) spatial unit, one among many. Since the transition from tribal law to territorial law the essentials of statehood, both from the functional and the legal point of view, are: territory, people, and a government in effective control internally, independent externally, and willing and able to assume obligations under international law. Sovereignty is territorial; hence it must have a certain know extent: a territory under exclusive jurisdiction limited by state boundaries.' (Kristof, 1959: 270).

An important point Kristof makes is that the border is a fixed line which is constructed by law. But this is deceiving, even though borders seem fixed lines on maps; they always reflect the mental images of politicians, lawyers and intellectuals (Baud, 2000: 42). To mark the border the state places symbolic markers of its sovereignty along the border, this has two main reasons: the external and internal objective. The external objective is to show to foreigners the exact location of the national border and to show that the state controls the entire country, from the borders until the centre. The internal objective of symbolic marks along national borders is that it is part of the general process of nation building, which has as goal the subjecting of, for example, semi-autonomous regions and indigenous populations. The external and the internal subjective are closely intertwined (Baud, 2000: 53).

Both the internal and the external subjective are closely linked to the concept of othering. As noted above, borders are constructed by law, but they don't represent fixed lines in space or time; rather they symbolise a social practice of differentiation (van Houtum & van Naerssen, 2001: 126; Diez, 2006: 236). The creation of borders is an ongoing process of making differentiations in space and time between people, money or products (van Houtum & van Naerssen, 2001: 126). Ordering and othering is the process wherein humans make distinctions between an in-group and an out-group; 'us' and 'them'. By making a distinction between oneself and another group a border is erected. In spatial terms this means that it is an act of purification of space, where people form a spatial unit which is coherent (van Houtum & van Naerssen, 2001: 126). Thus, bordering is the creation of the

border, or a pure space, subsequently ordering is the creation of the 'we', while othering is the creation of the 'them' (van Houtum, lecture, 7-1-2014). Elias and Scotson show in their book *'The established and the outsiders'* the age of the in-group often influence the degree of group cohesion, like the collective identification with the group and the commonality of norms within the group. The feeling of belonging and the possible perceived superiority towards the out-group actively shapes borders between different groups (1994: xviii). Thus: *'(B)ordering rejects as well as erects othering. This paradoxical character of bordering processes whereby borders are erected to erase territorial ambiguity and ambivalent identities in order to shape a unique and cohesive order, but thereby create new or reproduce latently existing differences in space and identity – is of much importance in understanding our daily contemporary practices'* (van Houtum & van Naerssen, 2001: 126).

The theory on bordering, ordering and othering focuses on the limiting character of the border: the separation of people and territory. However, Tríplice Fronteira is a place of interaction between people, goods and labour. During the fieldwork I found out that residents of Foz do Iguaçu generally consider the other border cities to be other neighbourhoods, rather than other countries. So, remarkably borderlands are fuzzier than the theory of van Houtum and van Naerssen state, they are places of interaction. As mentioned above, Ladis K.D. Kristof stated that the term boundary is appropriate to the present-day concept of the state, where the state is understood as an autonomous spatial unit among others. Kristof continued by making a distinction between the border/boundary and the frontier. The border indicates a certain established limits of a given political unit that is fastened by an international community, moreover the border is inner orientated and it is a separating factor between the in- and out-group. While the *'...frontier was not an abstract term or line; on the contrary, it designated an area which was part of a whole, specifically that part which was ahead of the hinterland. Hence it was often called the foreland, or borderland, or march.'* (Kristof, 1959: 269). There are important differences between the border and the frontier. The frontier is a fuzzy area, where the in- and out-group meet. The frontier is outer orientated, it has an integrating factor and it wouldn't exist without the people who live there and create the frontier (Kristof, 1959: 271-273).

3.5 Assessment framework

In researching the influence of the representation and practices of the USA it is crucial to have a thorough understanding of how the core concepts of *state fragility*, *the construction of space* and *bordering, ordering & othering* can be measured in reality. Verschuren & Doorewaard state that it is important that core concepts in a research are being defined and formulated into an assessment framework, in order to perceive them sensory (2007: 17). Besides formulating indicators, it is also important to formulate an operational definition; this definition consists of the selected indicators (Verschuren & Doorewaard, 2007: 146). Therefore this paragraph states the selected indicators and the following operational definition.

3.5.1 State Fragility

As mentioned above Zartman states that *'state failure occurs when 'the basic functions of the state are no longer performed [...]. It refers to a situation where the structure authority (legitimate power), law, and political order have fallen apart'* (Di John, 2008: 4). The Crisis States Research Centre made several distinctions within the field of state failure, defining failing states, crisis states and failed states. However, for this research it is more important to know whether the states are able to perform the basic functions and if authority is still in place, rather than knowing what kind of fragile

state it is. Therefore I will make use of the indicators Di John (2008: 4-5) formulated in his literature review on state fragility. These indicators are focussed on the level of performance of the basic functions of the states in Tríplice Fronteira:

- 1) Inability to control borders
- 2) Inability to deliver political goods, which are:
 - a. Security
 - b. Institutions to settle conflicts
 - c. Political participation
 - d. Social service delivery, like infrastructure
- 3) Growth criminal violence

This means that the following operational definition of state fragility is used in this research: *a state is fragile when it is unable to control its borders, deliver political goods and criminal violence is growing.*

3.5.2 The construction of space

De Certeau states in his book *The practice of everyday life* that “*space is practiced place*” (1984: 117). This is expressed in a speech act which includes vectors of direction, velocities and time variables, that develops frontiers and relationships with the place that surrounds it (de Certeau, 1984: 117-127). What place is to space, are maps to tours. Tours become through articulation of the organisation of spatial actions, because the organisation of the movement is articulated by a speech act. In turn, the speech act is, through narrating the organisation of movement in place, creating space. Thus one can measure the creation of space, through the narratives (speech act) of the organisation of movements of people’s everyday life. Like mentioned above, this speech act alters between *seeing* (the knowledge of an order of places, presenting a tableau) and *going* (spatial actions, which organises movement) (de Certeau, 1984: 119).

People use both map and tour elements in their speech act, referring to their travel story in effects and givens. An effect is a practice obtained by the tour (‘you see’), while a given postulates limits, possibilities and obligations of the tour (‘there is a wall, a door or a one way street’). By describing an effect of a tour one refers to what it implies, the local order of places, while a given describes the representation of places (de Certeau, 1984, 120). So the description of the effect of the tour implies knowledge the local order of places (seeing) and the description of the given is a way of organising spatial actions (going) by stating limits, possibilities and obligations. So, seeing and going are the indicators for the construction of space, these concepts are further made operational in effects and givens; limits, possibilities and obligations.

- 1) Seeing
 - a. Effects
- 2) Going
 - a. Givens
Limits, possibilities and obligations

This means that the following operational definition of the construction of space is used in this research: *a person constructs space when he or she expresses knowledge of an order of places*

through effects and organizes his or her actions through limits, possibilities and obligations in a speech act.

3.5.3 Bordering, ordering & othering

'The boundary indicates certain well established limits (the bounds) of the given political unit, and all that which is within the boundary is bound together, that is, it is fastened by an international bond.' (Kristof, 1959: 270). Borders are constructed by law, but they do not represent fixed lines in space or time; rather they symbolize a social practice of differentiation (van Houtum & van Naerssen, 2001: 126; Diez, 2006: 236). The creation of borders is an ongoing process of making differentiations in space and time between people, money or products (van Houtum & van Naerssen, 2001: 126). Subsequently ordering and othering is the process wherein humans make distinctions between an in-group and an out-group, in an attempt to achieve a spatial unit which is coherent and pure (van Houtum & van Naerssen, 2001: 126). Furthermore, to mark this border the state or person places symbolic markers along the border, serving the internal and external objective, being: facilitating the general process of nation building (internal) and showing foreigners the exact location of the national border to show that one controls the entire territory (external). The external and the internal subjective are closely intertwined (Baud, 2000: 53).

To measure the practices of bordering, ordering & othering, one has to measure the social practice of differentiation between people, money and goods. Subsequently, bordering can be enhanced by placing symbolic markers, serving the internal and external objective.

- 1) Symbolic markers along the border
- 2) Social practice of differentiation
 - a. People
 - b. Money
 - c. Products

This means that the following operational definition of bordering, ordering & othering is used in this research: *a person borders, orders or others, when placing symbolic markers along borders and when he or she makes use of the social practice of differentiation between people, money and products. Whereby social practice of differentiation is understood as the ongoing process of making differentiations in space and time.*

4. Methodology

In this chapter the methodological framework will be presented. The first paragraph of this chapter puts forward the selection of research methods (§4.1), subsequently the research methods on desk research, case study and narrative research will be explained (§4.2). This is followed by a paragraph on data collection (§4.3) and lastly a paragraph on case selection and case description (§4.4).

4.1 Methodology selection

Verschuren & Doorewaard state in their book *'Het ontwerpen van een onderzoek'* that the choice for a research strategy is the result of a couple of core decisions a researcher has to make while designing the research (2007: 160). They pose these core questions as three dilemmas: generalizability vs. depth, quantitative vs. qualitative research and doing vs. thinking (Verschuren & Doorewaard, 2007: 160-161). It is important to take both the personal preferences of the researcher and the research subject into account.

The subject of this research is the influence of the representations of the USA on the everyday life of people living in Tríplice Fronteira. It is a complex matter, in which personal stories of people are key. This means that it is important to try to understand what motivates the people living there. A focus on generalizability would constrain the possibility of studying the region intensively. Although a large scale in-depth research would be preferable, since it would be both generalizable and in-depth, it is impossible because of time, money and safety constraints. Therefore I choose to do a small scale in-depth research, to get a grasp of how people experience living in Tríplice Fronteira.

The second dilemma posed is about quantitative or qualitative research. As noted in the theoretical framework, this thesis has been written in the post-modern tradition. Post-modern research is focussed on discourses and narratives and makes use of qualitative research methods. Because these methods enable the researcher to give a voice to marginalised people and counter meta-narratives like this (Creswell, 2007: 27). Thomas states that a qualitative study could *'confront the centrality of media-created realities and the influence of information technologies'* (1993: 25). Since this thesis focuses on the geopolitical representation of the USA, which could be identified as a meta-narrative, it makes sense to use a qualitative study to empower the citizens living in Tríplice Fronteira. Moreover qualitative research enables me to get to know the people who are living in the region and understand their experiences thoroughly.

The final dilemma is on doing vs. thinking. To explain this further, Verschuren & Doorewaard state it is important to identify yourself as a researcher. Whether you prefer to go into the field and collect your data by talking to people (doing) or do you prefer to stay inside the university to collect data via literature and secondary sources and reflect on this (thinking) (2007: 161). My personal preference is to do fieldwork; I believe that going into the field provides the researcher with more information. It is easier to talk to the people and by experiencing the region it is easier to understand and relate to their stories. Nonetheless, it is impossible to do a research without any literature and secondary sources which are reflected upon. Therefore both doing and thinking will combined, but the emphasis is on doing fieldwork.

Verschuren & Doorewaard state five possible methods: survey, experiment, case study, grounded theory and desk research (2007: 161). By choosing depth, qualitative research and doing fieldwork in the dilemmas, I pre-selected possible research methods. Both survey and experiment are

quantitative research methods and thus not appropriate for my research. Grounded theory and desk research are focused on thinking, while doing fieldwork is key in this research. The only method left is case study research, which fits all the selected criteria. It is possible to do a multisite study or a within-site study (Creswell, 2007: 97). Because of safety and time constraints, it was impossible to do a multisite study; therefore I conducted a within-site study. In a case study it is important to use multiple sources of information; because of this it is necessary to make use of desk research as well.

Case study research is appropriate for this research, it is a method focused on getting an in-depth understanding of a specific case, usually by doing fieldwork. However it focuses on the explanation of a case, rather than explaining personal stories of people. Therefore it is unable to analyse these stories, using the method of case study. Because of this there will be made use of a third research method in this thesis: narrative research. Czarniawska defines it as a specific type of qualitative design in which *'narrative is understood as a spoken or written text given an account of an event/action or series of events/actions'* (2007: 17). As stated above, qualitative research in the post-modern tradition focuses on empowering people by countering meta-narratives with narratives of the marginalised. Even though it is common to analyse narrative data chronologically, it is also possible to analyse the data thematically. This is an effective way of analysis when the researcher has a clear focus from the beginning onward, which is the case. In the research goal it is stated that the aim of this research is to contribute to the emerging literature on Tríplice Fronteira between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, through a study on the representation of the USA and the influence of this representation on the inhabitants of this region. This research has thus a clear (thematic) goal, which was incorporated in the in-depth interviews. Therefore narrative research is a good addition to the methodological framework, it enables me to confront thematically the meta-narrative of the USA with the grassroots narrative of the residents of Tríplice Fronteira.

4.2 Research methods

In this paragraph the above selected research methods will be explained. First desk research (§4.2.1), second case study research (§4.2.2) and last narrative research (§4.2.3).

4.2.1 Desk research

Desk research is a research method that makes use of existing material in combination with reflection. Important is that the existing sources are used in a different way than intended and that there is no direct contact between the subject and the researcher. It is possible to use multiple kind of sources in desk research: literature, secondary data and statistical data (Verschuren & Doorewaard, 2007: 201-202). In this research academic literature, policy documents, WikiLeaks documents and audio material has been studied and reflected upon to prepare the fieldwork. An advantage of desk research is that it is less time consuming than other research strategies, since data does not have to be collected by the researcher. A disadvantage is that there is an opportunity that the researcher displays a one sided vision of the data, because the researcher selects parts of the sources. Another disadvantage is that the researcher misses non-verbal communication, since there is no direct contact between the researcher and the subject of research (Verschuren & Doorewaard, 2007: 206). Because of this, this research makes use of two other research methods: case study research and narrative research.

4.2.2 Case study research

Case study research is a qualitative research method in which a researcher tries to get an in-depth and holistic understanding of the research subject (Verschuren & Doorewaard, 2007: 183). Creswell states that case study research as a methodology can be defined as following:

'a type of design in qualitative research that may be an object of study, as well as a product of inquiry. Case study research is a qualitative approach in which the investigator explores a real-life, contemporary bounded system (a case) or multiple bounded systems (cases) over time, through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information (e.g., observations, interviews, audiovisual material, and documents and reports), and reports a case description and case themes' (Creswell, 2007: 97).

The characteristics of case study research are that it concerns a limited amount of research objects, it is labour intensive, it focuses on getting an in-depth understanding of the research subject, it uses strategic sampling and data is usually collected through fieldwork (Verschuren & Doorewaard, 2007: 184). It is possible to do a multisite study and a within-site study. In case of a multisite study the unit of analysis in the case study are multiple cases, which can be compared: a comparative case study. The unit of analysis in a within-site study is a single case (Creswell, 2007: 97). A general way to collect data while doing case study research is via face-to-face interviews, with open questions. Furthermore it is possible to collect data via focus groups, observations and audio visual material (Verschuren & Doorewaard: 184). Case study research enables the researcher to explain contemporary and complex processes, by using in-depth methods of analysis and it has an open and explanatory nature (Dankert, personal communication, 13-11-2012; Creswell, 2007: 97-98; Verschuren & Doorewaard, 2007: 183-185).

Creswell identifies three types of case studies: the intrinsic case study, the instrumental case study and the collective case study. When conducting an intrinsic case study the researcher selects a subject of its own interest and the focus is solely on the case itself. In an instrumental case study the researcher wants to address a concern or a problem and selects a case which illustrates this. Like an instrumental case study, a collective case study (or multiple case study) tries to address a concern or issue, but multiple cases are selected, instead of one (2007: 99). The kind of case study a researcher selects is connected to the case selection, an important aspect in doing case study research. Creswell stresses that it is key to find a case that can be described within certain parameters, like place and time (2007: 98). Challenges in identifying a case are for example: one or multiple cases? If so, how many cases? Is the researcher able to collect enough data to give an thorough understanding of the case? Moreover, it is important to think about generalizability. In a case study it is important to choose a case strategic, this means that the case overlaps with other cases and thereby becomes generalizable. Through strategic sampling the validity and reliability of the research increases (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 229).

4.2.3 Narrative research

Narrative research is a qualitative research method which starts with people expressing their experiences in written or told stories (Creswell, 2007: 72). Bold states: *'It is important to recognize the strength of the narrative, the way that human existence relies on synthesis and analysis of narratives'* (Bold, 2012: 17). There are many different scientific definitions of the narrative, ranging from Labov & Waletzky's narrative as units that construct a temporal sequence of events to

Reissman, who stresses the importance of paying attention to the multilayered meanings within the narrative and the context in which the narrative is set (Bold, 2012: 18).

However, researchers working in the field of social science tend to focus on social contexts and the meaning of the narratives. It is possible to identify five indicators which influence narratives: temporality, people, action, context and certainty. Temporality contains that narratives exist in a sequence of events in time. Because it are events in time causation might arise, which means that one event causes another, this is deducted by the reader(s) or hearer(s). Furthermore human interest is vital to narratives, without interest narratives do not exist. Thus, it is important that narrative researchers accept the fact that the events they study are changing processes (Bold, 2012: 19). The indicator people expresses that human beings are constantly at a point of personal change, again this means that it is important to narrate in terms of a process. The indicator action strengthen the emphasis on processes, particular actions have to be understood in relationship with references to past actions and potential future actions (Bold, 2012: 19-21).

'The outcomes are not always the same for everyone despite them having the same experiences. Narrative [research] captures the contextual influences in a way that other research methods may not' (Bold, 2012: 21).

The indicator context expresses that it is only possible to make sense of a narrative if it is understood in the context in which the person tells it. To conclude the indicator of certainty, a researcher using narrative research must accept there is no certainty. Instead of trying to establish certainty, a narrative researcher explores the different possibilities which could have influenced the event. Crucial in this is the fact that the event is open to different interpretations (Bold, 2012: 20-21).

Like desk research and case study research, narrative research faces challenges as well. The most important of whom is misinterpretation. Narratives take place in a specific setting, the context is thus highly important when the researcher (re)tells the story. Restorying is the process of reorganising the data into a more general framework, this framework consists of collecting the narratives, analysing them and rewriting the narratives to report them (Creswell, 2007: 72-74). Bold states:

'...one must also recognise the dangers associated with the levels of interpretation at the level of creation and re-creation in both the creator's and the recipient's minds. The creator interprets events as the narrative develops, and each individual recipient re-creates the narrative based on his/her previous knowledge and understanding [...] Narrative is not an objective reconstruction of life – it is a rendition of how life is perceived' (Bold, 2012: 17).

The most common way to analyse narrative data is to place it in chronological sequence and subsequently provide causal links between the different parts of the narrative. Restorying a narrative chronologically can be both past-present-future, as beginning-middle-end (Creswell, 2007: 74). Bold poses another way to analyse narrative data: thematic analysis. Thematic analysis consists of the researcher looking for themes and shared experiences within the narratives that involve relationships between people and the context the event took place in. This type of analysis is most effective when the researcher has a clear focus from the beginning onward and the in-depth interviews are focused on providing the information where the researcher is looking for. When reporting narrative data thematically, the separate narratives function as examples in a bigger theme

(2012: 129-131). In the written report the researcher creates a meta-narrative by bringing all components of the narratives together (Bold, 2012: 29).

4.3 Data collection

In this paragraph the manner of data collection will be put forward. There will be made use of multiple sources of data, in order to increase the validity of the research. The multiple sources of compiled data are written and audiovisual (§4.3.1) and fieldwork (§4.3.2).

4.3.1 Written and audiovisual data

The written data includes academic literature, governmental reports, UN resolutions, a treaty, newspaper articles and WikiLeaks documents. The academic literature is collected at the Radboud University Nijmegen and includes papers from journals and books. The governmental reports are all accessible online, via the websites of governmental websites. The same goes for the UN resolutions and the WikiLeaks documents, which include reports of newspaper articles, confidential e-mails and confidential reports. The treaty and the newspaper articles are derived from the municipality of Puerto Iguazú. The audiovisual data consists of a podcast, clips from YouTube and pictures. The podcast and clips are accessible online. The pictures include photos derived from literature, online sources and personal sources, taken during my visit to Tríplice Fronteira.

4.3.2 Fieldwork

For this research I conducted fieldwork from the 6th of March 2014 until the 4th of June 2014, of which I spend three weeks in Buenos Aires and ten weeks in Tríplice Fronteira. Two weeks of which I lived in Puerto Iguazú, Argentina and eight weeks in Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil. During my fieldwork I conducted eight expert interviews, one in-depth interview with a resident from Ciudad del Este, Paraguay and seventeen interviews with residents from Foz do Iguaçu. Occasionally it was not possible to meet or to conduct the interview via Skype, in that case the interviews were conducted via e-mail or facebook chat.

I conducted expert interviews to get a more thorough understanding of the region. The expert interviews include in-depth interviews with scholars, municipalities and *Migraciones* (Migration) at the Argentine border.

Table 4.1: Overview expert interviews

Name	Date of Interview	Organisation	Expertise
Priscilla Palacio	19-03-2014	Universidad de Buenos Aires	Professor in Economics and recently did research in Tríplice Fronteira
William Costanza	20-03-2014	Marymount University	Hezbollah in Latin America
Mike Braun	07-04-2014	SIG Global	Drug trafficking in Tríplice Fronteira
Thanyã Davilla Savio	24-04-2014	Lawyer – OAB Foz do Iguaçu	Juvenile cases regarding drug trafficking
Mohammed Barakat	24-04-2014	Municipalidad Foz do Iguaçu – Director of the International Secretary of Tourism in Foz do Iguaçu	Policy on criminality and terrorism Tríplice Fronteira
Antonia Soto	06-05-2014	Municipalidad Puerto Iguazú	Policy on security and cooperation in Tríplice Fronteira
Juan Gonzalez	23-05-2014	Municipalidad Ciudad del Este	Policy on criminality and terrorism Tríplice Fronteira
Gladys Cristina Garcia	16-05-2014	Migraciones Argentina	Border patrol

To get to know the everyday life in Tríplice Fronteira, I conducted seventeen in-depth interviews with inhabitants of Foz do Iguaçu (see §3.4 case selection). *‘When you talk about exploring the everyday lives of communities living in the border area it’s important to define what is meant by communities’* (W. Costanza, p.c.: 20-03-2014). Since Foz do Iguaçu is a very diverse city and random sampling doesn’t do justice to this diversity, I used strategic sampling. I distinguished four respondent groups, which in my point of view are important for the dynamics in the city:

1. Residents of Foz do Iguaçu
2. Residents of Foz do Iguaçu; who work in Ciudad del Este, Paraguay
3. Entrepreneurs
4. Members of the Arabic community of Foz do Iguaçu

I was looking for five respondents per group, unfortunately the Arabic community in Foz do Iguaçu is very closed and was – for different reasons – hesitant to talk to me. Luckily I managed to talk to two Arabic men. See table 3.2 for an overview of the respondents. I solely use their first names, to guarantee their privacy. One of the respondents stated that he would like to remain anonymous, therefore I will refer to him as: Rafael*. The in-depth interviews were semi-structured, which means that the interview guides served as a guideline. The interview guide differed per respondent group and are based on the theoretical framework (see Appendix I: Interview guides).

Table 4.2: Overview of respondents

Residents Foz do Iguaçu		Residents Foz do Iguaçu, who work in Ciudad del Este		Entrepreneurs		Members of the Arabic community	
<i>Name</i>	<i>Date of interview</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Date of interview</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Date of interview</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Date of interview</i>
Juliana	29-04-2014	Rafael*	07-05-2014	Diogo	30-04-2014	William	20-05-2014
Luciana	30-04-2014	Steffi	04-05-2014	Agostinho	07-05-2014	Tarik	22-05-2014
Bruna	05-05-2014	Carolina	06-05-2014	Sidney	24-05-2014		
André	05-05-2014	Luis Carlos	06-05-2014	Samy	10-05-2014		
Jussimar	08-05-2014	Marina	15-05-2014	Val	20-05-2014		

The in-depth interviews are recorded and transcribed. Subsequently these transcriptions and the written and audiovisual data are assembled in Atlas.ti, software to analyse qualitative data. Subsequently the data was coded twice according to two coding schedules (see Appendix II: Coding schedules), first thematically to order the data and second theoretically, which will enable me to draw conclusions. The data of the respondents of Foz do Iguaçu will be analysed thematically into the following themes: 1. Making use of the border 2. Crossing the border 3. Terrorism at the border. Every respondent group will be analysed separately, to unravel possible differences. The themes are connected to the theoretical framework. Subsequently the data will be analysed theoretically according to the selected indicators, stated in paragraph 3.5 *Assesment Framework*.

4.4 Case selection


Tríplice Fronteira includes three border cities, which all could serve as case. Because the three cities are very different from each other, it is impossible to select a case which overlaps and thereby becomes generalizable. Meanwhile Flyvbjerg notes that selecting an extreme case can sometimes be more illustrative, than selecting a common case (2006 :229). By being in the region for two months I

experienced the central role of the Brazilian border city of Foz do Iguaçu. There is a lot of commercial interaction between Foz do Iguaçu and Ciudad del Este (Paraguay) and a lot of tourism between Foz do Iguaçu and Puerto Iguazú (Argentina), furthermore when someone wants to travel by land from Puerto Iguazú to Ciudad del Este, they have to pass through Foz do Iguaçu.

Moreover Puerto Iguazú is as a small town which predominantly lives of tourism and is much more detached from Foz do Iguaçu and Ciudad del Este, which are closely connected. Because of these reasons Puerto Iguazú is not fit as case for this research. Ciudad del Este on the other hand is a big and fascinating city, however safety is a big problem. The city centre is chaotic during the day and when the shops close at three o'clock in the afternoon it becomes a ghost town. Taking my own experiences, advice from local people and academic literature into account I judged that it was too dangerous for me to do fieldwork there by myself. Thereby also Ciudad del Este became unfit for my research as well.

4.4.1 Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil

Foz do Iguaçu is a Brazilian municipality in the state of Paraná. *Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística* states that the municipality of Foz do Iguaçu covers 617.700 km² and estimated that there lived 263.508 people in Foz do Iguaçu in 2013 (IBGE, 2014). Foz do Iguaçu is located on the South West border of Brazil. The Rio Paraná and the Rio Iguaçu form the natural borders with the neighbouring countries of Argentina and Paraguay. The Ponte Internacional da Amizade (Friendship Bridge) connects Foz do Iguaçu to Ciudad del Este, the Paraguayan border city. The Ponte Internacional da Fraternidade (Bridge of Brotherhood) connects Foz do Iguaçu to Puerto Iguazú, which is the Argentine border city. Map 2 displays a tourist map of the area, including the three cities and touristic highlights of Tríplice Fronteira: Cataratas do Iguaçu and Itaipu Binacional.



Map 4.1: Tourist map of Tríplice Fronteira, with at the right Puerto Iguazú (Argentina), Foz do Iguaçu (Brazil) in the middle and Ciudad del Este (Paraguay) on the bottom left (Source: <http://mapasblog.blogspot.nl/2011/02/mapas-de-foz-do-iguacu-pr.html>)

Cataratas do Iguaçu are the biggest waterfalls of the world and is one of the touristic highlights of South America. They are located at the border of Argentina and Brazil and on both sides of the border is a national park (figure 1). Parque Nacional do Iguaçu attracts many Brazilian and foreign tourist every year and is an important source of income for the city Foz do Iguaçu. Another big source of income is Itaipu Binacional, one of the biggest hydro-electric power plants in the world. It is a joint project of Paraguay and Brazil and is located in the Rio Paraná (figure 2). It provides almost all electricity consumed in Paraguay and a large part of the electricity consumed in Brazil. Because of its size the dam also generates lot of tourism. The same goes for the Parque des Aves (the bird park), located next of Parque Nacional do Iguaçu.




Photo 4.1: Parque Nacional do Iguaçu (15-04-2014)



Photo 4.2: Itaipu Binacional (06-04-2014)

In 1984, after the military government in Argentina, the three municipalities signed the treaty *Carta de Santa Maria de Iguaçu*³. This treaty is at the heart of the integration of the region of Tríplice Fronteira. It emphasises mutual cooperation and exchange between the three municipalities on trade, tourism, health, education and athletics (Carta de Santa Maria de Iguaçu, 1984). At this point in time the treaty is not used often anymore, because the cities cooperate well. But when a diplomatic problem arises the cities refer to it as a reminder that they are required to work together. Nowadays the three municipalities work together on, for example, avoiding epidemics like dengue, cholera or influenza. Furthermore there is a lot of cultural interaction (A. Soto, p.c.: 06-05-2014).

‘usually when we have holidays, patriotic holidays, Brazil and Paraguay come to Puerto Iguazú, Argentina to celebrate. They have parades and participate in the parade. And the same happens when there is a patriotic holiday in Brazil as well. They invite Argentina to come over there, because it is a kind of a big community. So all countries are linked, most part of the country is connected’ (A. Soto, p.c.: 06-05-2014).

Even though the touristic highlights and the regional cooperation, the border city of Foz do Iguaçu has a down side. Thanyã Davilla Savio, a lawyer in Foz do Iguaçu, states that it is a well-known fact that Foz do Iguaçu work as a door for drug trafficking. There is control at the border, but it is not sufficient to prevent crime (p.c.: 24-04-2014). She states:

³ In Spanish referred to as *Acta de Santa Maria del Iguazu*

'The lack of border control is intimately connected to the smuggling of drugs, because the smuggling is done by car, by boat (to cross the river between Brazil and Paraguay), and even on foot. After passing the border, per se, the drug usually continues travelling, usually disguised inside the panels of cars or carried by mules travelling by bus. [...] Because the police doesn't have enough people to patrol the border as it should, it usually relies on anonymous denunciations [...] some of these calls are made by smugglers themselves, who denounce a shipment of drug so that when the police is checking the tip, they can pass with bigger shipments undetected' (T. Davilla Savio, p.c.: 24-04-2014).

A lot of youth of Foz do Iguaçu and Ciudad del Este want to make money fast these days, to buy gadgets and gain popularity. An option to make money fast is to smuggle drugs, but on the other hand they are possibly destroying their lives (J. Gonzalez, p.c.: 23-05-2014; T. Davilla Savio, p.c.: 24-04-2014).

The lack of border patrol at the Brazilian – Paraguayan border is not only linked to the little amount of police staff, but also to the huge amount of people crossing every day. A lot of people who live in Foz do Iguaçu make a living in Ciudad del Este, for them it is not necessary to make immigrations every day, as long as they have their work documents in place. People who cross for other reasons can expect checks a couple of kilometres away from the border (J. Gonzalez, p.c.: 23-05-2014). This means that the border and Ciudad del Este are basically a free area. However, Brazil intensified the patrol at the Paraguayan border last years and was because of that able to successfully combat drug trafficking, due to joint efforts of *Receita Federal*⁴, the Brazilian Army and other security forces (M. Barakat, p.c.: 24-04-2014).

Furthermore, the homicide rate in the city of Foz do Iguaçu is one of the highest in Brazil. The department of Justice published an overview of the homicide rates in the country. The 400 municipalities with the highest absolute number of homicides are ranked according to the number of inhabitants: municipalities over 100.000 inhabitants, municipalities with 50.000 – 99.999 inhabitants and municipalities with 30.000 – 49.999 inhabitants. Subsequently the number of inhabitants was connected to the absolute number of homicides into an index, with the following categories: level I – homicide rate between 10 and 19,9, level II – homicide rate between 20 and 29,9, level III – homicide rate between 30 and 49,9, level IV – homicide rate between 50 and 69,9, level V – homicide rate over 70. In 2012 Foz do Iguaçu had a population of 255.718 inhabitants and an absolute homicide number of 172, which concludes in a homicide rate of 67,3. Ranking them as the fourth municipality in level IV and 29th municipality in total in the category of municipalities over 100.000 inhabitants. To compare, the homicide rate of Rio de Janeiro in 2012 was 21,5 and of São Paulo 15,4 (Ministério da Justiça, 2012: 1-7).

⁴ The Brazilian customs police

5. The view from above

The first empirical chapter presents the narrative of the USA; the view from above. This narrative is based on documents of the Department of State of the USA, the White House, the annual Country Reports on Terrorism and WikiLeaks documents. The Country Report on Terrorism was published by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism until 2010; nowadays it is published by the Bureau of Counterterrorism. The first paragraph pays attention to the first act of terrorism in South America: the AMIA bombing (§5.1). The following paragraphs pay attention to criminality and terrorism (§5.2) and the border crossings (§5.3) in Tríplice Fronteira. The final paragraph gives an overview of counterterrorist actions that are taken in Tríplice Fronteira (§5.4).

5.1 The AMIA bombing

The attention of the USA was drawn to Tríplice Fronteira after two bombings in Buenos Aires. The Argentine prosecutor argued in May of 2003 that the perpetrators of the attacks were allegedly Lebanese citizens from Ciudad del Este. This was the immediate cause of the USA to start monitor Tríplice Fronteira.

On the 18th of July, 1994 a bombing on the Argentine-Jewish Mutual Association (AMIA) community centre killed 85 people and injured more than 150 people. The Argentine government is continuously trying to bring the suspects of this attack to justice (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2012: 150). In May of 2003, Argentine prosecutors linked Ciudad del Este and Foz do Iguaçu to the AMIA bombing and issued arrest warrants for two Lebanese citizens of Ciudad del Este. Reportedly Imad Mugniyah was the prime suspect in the case of the AMIA bombing, who is furthermore considered to be the mastermind of the suicide bombing of the USA embassy in Beirut in 1983 (Abbott, 2004: 51-52). This

'Argentine Jews (and many non-Jews) reportedly feel former Argentine President Carlos Saul Menem, of Syrian ancestry, accepted a bribe to conceal Iran's role in the bombings' (Abbott, 2004: 52).

implies according to the USA that he has direct ties to Hezbollah. As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, since the creation of Hezbollah, the organisation is a proxy for Iran, thus there are not only ties to Hezbollah, but also to Iran. In 1999 the anti-terrorism coordinator of the Department of State, Mr. Sheenan, notified the Argentine government about the concerns of the USA about the region, in particular the increased presence of terrorist funding groups and drugs-

trafficking groups in the region. Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 the concerns about narco-terrorism and the funding of terrorism kept increasing (Manero, 2007: 44).

The search for the perpetrators of the bombing continued and on the 9th of November of 2006 an Argentine judge issued arrest warrants for eight former Iranian government officials and a member of Hezbollah (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2008: 149). The INTERPOL Executive Committee decided unanimously to issue international arrest warrants for five Iranians and a Lebanese national for the AMIA bombing on the 13th of March, 2007. Iran protested the decision and requested for a voting in the General Assembly. On the 7th of November the INTERPOL General Assembly voted (78 for, 14 against, 26 abstentions), confirming the Executive Committee's decision and the wanted notices were issued (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2008: 149). The bombing also caused tensions between Brazil and Argentina, since the government of Brazil has refused twice to endorse Argentina's claim that the perpetrators of the bombing may have received

support from individuals in Tríplice Fronteira by abstaining from voting in the case of issuing INTERPOL's warrants (WikiLeaks, 2014a).

In 2013 the foreign ministers of Argentina and Iran met three times for a dialogue designed to clarify Iran's alleged role in the bombing. The two governments agreed upon a truth commission during the UN General Assembly of September 2013, furthermore requested Fernandez de Kirchner the USA to raise the AMIA bombings in the negotiations with Iran (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2014: 207). Since the link between the two bombings in Buenos Aires and residents of Tríplice Fronteira was made, the USA monitors the region closely, narrating it as a crucial place in South America in the war against terror.

5.2 Criminality and financing terrorism

The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism reports that Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina have long been concerned about the big number of transnational crime in Tríplice Fronteira. In the early 1990s the three countries started to establish a mechanism to address and cope with weapon and drug trafficking, smuggling, document and currency fraud, money laundering and the manufacture and movement of pirated goods (2008: 148). Nonetheless, according to the USA Tríplice Fronteira continues *'to be an important regional nexus of arms, narcotics, and human smuggling, counterfeiting, pirated goods, and money laundering – all potential funding sources for terrorist organizations'* (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2014: 206). They state that Tríplice Fronteira remains a weak spot when it comes to transnational crime and to a lesser extent transnational terrorism, due to corruption, weak government institutions, insufficient cooperation, weak legislation and a lack of resources for law enforcement. The Bureau of Counterterrorism notes that, in spite of this, the countries are making efforts to investigate and counter possible terrorist connections and organisations, as well as trying to tighten border security (2014: 206).

'The United States remains concerned that Hizballah and HAMAS raise funds among the sizable Muslim communities in the region, and that the high incidence of illicit activity could tempt terrorist groups to seek to establish safe havens in this largely uncontrolled area. Persons suspected of ties to terrorist groups have been spotted in the TBA⁵, but no operational activities of terrorism have been detected' (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2005: 91).

In April of 2014 the USA stressed that there were no known terrorist cells of either Al-Qai'ida or Hezbollah in South America; however, ideological sympathizers continue to provide financial and ideological support to terrorist groups in the Middle East (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2013: 206). Even though money flows to the Middle East, Brazil is increasingly capable of monitoring cash flows within their territory. Furthermore they make more use of the Financial Activities Oversight Council⁶ to monitor and identify possible funding sources of terrorism (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2005: 92). The Bureau of Counterterrorism states that at this moment Brazil's law enforcement units are adequate, but limited in the fight against terrorism. Important to note is that much of the law enforcement is focused on countering narcotics, rather than countering terrorism. Furthermore inter-service rivalries hinder the coordination between civilian security agencies, law enforcement agencies and the Brazilian military (2014: 208).

⁵ Tríplice Fronteira

⁶ In Portuguese referred to as *Conselho de Controle de Atividades Financeiras*

WikiLeaks published from February 27th of 2012 onward emails from Stratfor, which fronts as an intelligence publisher, but actually provides confidential intelligence services to large companies (WikiLeaks, 2014b). This email exchange between analysts at Stratfor illustrates the view from above:

From: os@stratfor.com [mailto:os@stratfor.com]
Sent: Wednesday, May 09, 2007 9:06 AM
To: analysts@stratfor.com
Cc: os@stratfor.com
Subject: [OS] TRI-BORDER- Hezbollah builds a Western base

Hezbollah builds a Western base

From inside South America*s Tri-border area, Iran-linked militia targets U.S

Dave Spillar
Strategic Forecasting, Inc

From: Reva Bhalla [mailto:reva.bhalla@stratfor.com]
Sent: Wednesday, May 09, 2007 9:15 AM
To: analysts@stratfor.com; ct@stratfor.com
Subject: RE: [OS] TRI-BORDER- Hezbollah builds a Western base

this sounds a bit alarmist. As G says, the Lebanese Shia in south America are more worried about selling cars and drugs than blowing up buildings. How large of a militant presence does Hez actually have in the tri-border area? I recall reading about how the Hezbollah movement in Venezuela was made up mainly of peasant farmers who really didn't identify with the group's religious ideology.

From: Peter Zeihan [mailto:zeihan@stratfor.com]
Sent: Wednesday, May 09, 2007 9:20 AM
To: analysts@stratfor.com; ct@stratfor.com
Subject: RE: [OS] TRI-BORDER- Hezbollah builds a Western base

Only 25k people within spitting distance of Bolivia where anti-american rhetoric is more common than drinking water

Yeah * a bit of a stretch

From: Andrew Teekell [mailto:teekell@stratfor.com]
Sent: Wednesday, May 09, 2007 5:04 PM
To: analysts@stratfor.com; ct@stratfor.com
Subject: RE: [OS] TRI-BORDER- Hezbollah builds a Western base

Tri-border is a huge dope transshipment point. Coke coming out of Bolivia thru Paraguay into Rio and SP. Some to Europe. The Lebanese are all wrapped up in the drug trade. Hez is there too. It's a money-making operation. However, wherever there's a Hez operation, they can use it to support attacks. This would be an attractive alternative to using one of the Iranian Embassies in the region - that can be too easily traced back to Tehran. That can be awkward.

Andrew S. Teekell
Strategic Forecasting, Inc.

(Source: WikiLeaks, 2014c).

The Office of the Coordinator of Counterterrorism reports that Paraguay has actively prosecuted suspected terrorist fundraisers; in 2004 Paraguay successfully prosecuted and convicted Assad Ahmad Barakat on charges of tax evasion, he was sentenced to 6,5 years of jail time. In August of 2004 also his brother and fellow suspect terrorist fundraiser, Hatem Barakat, was prosecuted, being charged with document fraud. In March that same year another case on tax evasion was opened against a money exchange house and 46 individuals suspected of involvement in money laundering were charged (2005: 92). Furthermore, the Government of Paraguay created stricter counterterrorism laws and continued to pursue individuals who violate these laws in 2010 and 2011 (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2014: 221). In June of 2010 alleged Hezbollah fundraiser Moussa Ali Hamdan was arrested in Ciudad del Este, which shows according to the USA that Tríplice Fronteira is indeed a free area for financing terrorism (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2011: 144). On the 23th of June 2010, President Lugo signed a new antiterrorism law that criminalizes terrorist activities and funding, with sentencing guidelines ranging from 5 to 30 years (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2011: 144). Even though the many prosecutions and the improved counterterrorism laws, the USA states that Paraguay still faces huge challenges, like ineffective immigration, customs and law enforcement controls at its borders in general and Tríplice Fronteira in particular (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2014: 221).

The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism reports that in June of 2007 the Argentine Congress passed new legislation on penalising funding of terrorism. The law criminalizes acts of terrorism, financing of terrorism and money laundering with the purpose of financing terrorism. This law opens up the possibility for the Financial Intelligence Unit (further: FIU), Central Bank and other law enforcement institutions to investigate and prosecute these crimes (2008: 149). Furthermore, the Attorney General's Office and the Central Bank established special units to investigate cases regarding money laundering and financing terrorism (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2006: 128). In 2011 the antiterrorism law was revised, broadening the definition of terrorism and raising fines and prison sentences for crimes linked to funding terrorism. *'It closed several loopholes in previous legislation, empowered the Argentine FIU to freeze assets, and criminalized the financing of terrorist organizations, individuals, and acts'* (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2014: 208).

5.3 The border crossings

The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism notes that Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina remain concerned about the many illegal activities at the borders of Tríplice Fronteira, arms and drugs smuggling, document fraud, money laundering and the manufacture and movement of contraband are common in the region (2009: 156). Therefore the three countries decided to increase the coordination, information sharing and joint activities against criminality and terrorism in the border region (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2006: 156). As a result of these joint activities, the Ponte Internacional da Amizade⁷ became safer; however smuggling operations now take place on the Río Parana and the reservoir of the Itaipu Dam (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2011: 132).

According to the USA Brazil achieved visible results from investments in border and law enforcement infrastructure, these changes were established to increase the control on the flow of legal and illegal goods in Tríplice Fronteira. Receita Federal takes effective action to counter the trafficking of drugs,

⁷ In English referred to as *Friendship Bridge*

weapons and contraband across the border with Paraguay. In 2008 the Receita Federal reported that they confiscated over \$76 million in smuggled goods, including drugs and weapons. Because of the many water in the region, *Polícia Federal*⁸ has special maritime police units that patrol the rivers (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2009: 160). Brazil continues to invest in border and law enforcement to improve the control on legal and illegal goods. Brazil's intelligence and law enforcement forces increasingly work together with regional and international partners, like the USA, in combating document fraud (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2014: 209).

The USA feels that Paraguay is facing huge challenges, like ineffective immigration, customs and law enforcement, when it comes to border patrol (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2014: 221). *'Limited resources, sporadic interagency cooperation, and corruption within customs, the police, the public ministry, and the judicial sector impeded Paraguay's law enforcement initiatives throughout the country'* (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2013: 188). The USA provides training to improve law enforcement and counterterrorism capabilities; officers of the Department of Homeland Security were seconded to Paraguay to enhance the border controls (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2013: 188).

'The delegation of the United States presented an account of the training courses on combating money laundering and terrorist financing that the United States has provided to officials of the Argentine, Brazilian and Paraguayan Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs), as well as to officials working in the legal, financial regulatory, law enforcement and prosecutorial sectors'

(Department of State, 2004)

The Bureau of Counterterrorism notes that, like Brazil, Argentina continues to focus on policing the border in Tríplice Fronteira. The most important targets are illicit trade, trafficking of drugs, humans and contraband and other forms of transnational crime. Furthermore, the government of Argentina continues to implement a new security system along their borders, based on fingerprints. The system has been implemented on all international airports and requires travellers to take a photo and their fingerprints when arriving in and departing from Argentina (2013: 176). Furthermore, on the 17th of October 2011 Argentina passed Decree 1642/11, which created the National Program for Monitoring the Implementation of Policies for the Prevention of Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism. The Ministry of Justice and Human Rights is responsible for the implementation of the program, which includes coordinating national activities, projects, evaluations and the setting of strategies (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2012: 151).

5.4 Counterterrorism

In the National Security Strategy of 2010 the USA states that they will always seek to delegitimize the use of terrorism and to isolate those who carry it out. In order to reach that goal, the USA states that they enlist all of the intelligence, law enforcement and homeland security capabilities (The White House, 2010: 20). Measures to counter terrorism, terrorist threat and terrorist funding increased after 9/11, but were not new. In the security strategy of 1997 *'National security strategy for a new century'* the USA stressed that there are states that might threaten their interests (The White House, 1997: 8).

⁸ Federal Police of Brazil

The USA stressed that there are a number of states that have the capabilities and the desire to threaten their interests. They make a distinction between stable and unstable states. Stable states might threaten the interest of the USA through the use of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. The unstable states might destabilise regions where the USA has interests through internal conflict or state failure (The White House, 1997: 8). In the National Security Strategy of 2006 former President Bush stated that the USA:

‘must [...] solidify strategic relationships with regional leaders in Central and South America and the Caribbean who are deepening their commitment to democratic values. And [the USA] must continue to work with regional partners to make multilateral institutions like the OAS⁹ and the Inter-American Development Bank more effective and better able to foster concerted action to address threats that may arise to the region’s stability, security, prosperity, or democratic progress. Together, these partnerships can advance our four strategic priorities for the region: bolstering security, strengthening democratic institutions, promoting prosperity, and investing in people’ (The White House, 2006a: 37).

In 2010 president Obama stated in the National Security Strategy that failing states cause conflict and endanger regional and global security. Moreover, he stressed that global criminal networks foster insecurity both abroad and within the USA. The criminal networks bring people and goods across the borders of the USA and threaten thereby the US citizens. President Obama stresses that the USA will only be successful if the American power will be used effective and integrative (The White House, 2010: 8-11). *‘Our diplomacy and development capabilities must help prevent conflict, spur economic growth, strengthen weak and failing states, lift people out of poverty, combat climate change and epidemic disease, and strengthen institutions of democratic governance’* (The White House, 2010: 11).

Table 5.1: Ranking of the USA, Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina in the Failed States Index of 2014 (Fund for Peace, 2014)

Failed States Index 2014				
Country	USA	Brazil	Paraguay	Argentina
Ranking	159	125	102	144
Category	Very Stable	Warning	High Warning	Stable

Despite the efforts Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina made, the USA remains concerned about the region. Even though Argentina is considered to be a stable state by the Failed States Index, Brazil and Paraguay are in the categories of warning and high warning (see table 5.1) (Fund for Peace, 2014). The USA states that it is likely there are still groups like Al-Qai’ida and Hezbollah that use the region to raise funds from local supporters (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2012: 184); furthermore Iran’s influence in the Western Hemisphere continues to be a concern as well. According to the Bureau of Counterterrorism Iran was unable to expand both economic and political ties in Latin America, due to

⁹ OAS is the abbreviation of the Organization of American States. The organization is aiming to promote democracy, defending human rights, ensuring security, fostering development and supporting Inter-American legal cooperation. It is a partnership between Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, The Bahamas, Trinidad and Tobago, United States of America, Uruguay and Venezuela. (OAS, 2014).

strong sanctions imposed by the USA and the European Union (2014: 206). When Brazil hosted the meeting of the 3+1 group in December 2005 all delegates reaffirmed their commitment to fulfil the obligations outlined in Resolution 1373 of the UN Security Council. Furthermore they agreed to exchange information among governments and to strengthen law enforcement in Tríplice Fronteira (Office of the Coordinator of Counterterrorism, 2006: 158).

The USA is pleased that Brazil generally has responded to efforts of the USA to identify and block terrorist-related funds (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2013: 153); moreover Brazil works intensively together with the USA in combating document fraud. Operationally, Brazilian security forces worked with USA officials to pursue terrorist suspects, as a result of investigative leads provided not only by the USA, but also by other intelligence, law enforcement and financial services. To deal with this Brazil has a sophisticated and competent FIU¹⁰ (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2014: 208-209).

The Bureau of Counterterrorism reports that corruption within the security, border control and judicial institutions are holding Paraguay back from providing more effective law enforcement and border security. Nevertheless, the government of Paraguay continues to cooperate with the USA on countering terrorism. The Department of State's Antiterrorism Assistance program contributed to building Paraguay's counterterrorism law enforcement capacity through training (2014: 222). Which includes: *'the Police Leader's Role in Combating Terrorism, Fraudulent Document Recognition, Investigating Terrorist Incidents, Interviewing Terrorist Suspects, and Cellular Telephone Forensics'* (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2014: 222).

Argentina and the USA used to cooperate in analysing information on possible terrorist threat. The USA stresses that an important focus for Argentina is policing the remote northern and north eastern borders, including Tríplice Fronteira, against human and drug trafficking, contraband smuggling and other crimes (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2012: 149). *'Law enforcement and security cooperation with Argentina was significantly curtailed in February 2011 after Argentine authorities seized sensitive U.S. equipment intended to support an approved bilateral training exercise with the Argentine Federal Police's counterterrorism unit'* (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2013: 176). Nowadays the cooperation on law enforcement and security is more modest and mainly focussed on information sharing (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2014: 207).

¹⁰ Conselho de Controle de Atividades Financeiras

6. The view from below

The second empirical chapter will explain the narrative of the inhabitants of Foz do Iguaçu; the view from below. This narrative is based on fieldwork conducted in Foz do Iguaçu in April and May of 2014. William Costanza stated: *'When you talk about exploring the everyday lives of communities living in the border area it's important to define what is meant by communities'* (W. Costanza, p.c.: 20-03-2014). Because of the diversity of people living in Foz do Iguaçu, I distinguished four different respondent groups: 1) Residents of Foz do Iguaçu 2) Residents of Foz do Iguaçu; who work in Ciudad del Este, Paraguay 3) Entrepreneurs 4) Members of the Arabic community of Foz do Iguaçu. This chapter tells the story of how people make use of the border (§6.2), how they experience the border crossings (§6.3) and how they feel about the allegation of terrorism in the region (§6.4). §6.1 presents a short overview of the interviewees.

6.1 Introduction

Residents of Foz do Iguaçu

Juliana is 34 years old and was born in Rio de Janeiro, her family moved to Foz do Iguaçu when she was eight. Juliana is a teacher in technical drawing and lived in New Zealand for five years; she came back last June. Luciana is 35 years old; she is born and raised in Foz do Iguaçu, like many generations of her family. She works at the sales and marketing department of a travel agency. Bruna moved to Foz do Iguaçu three years ago, she used to live in a little town nearby the city. She is 25 years old and graduated in biology. At this moment she works in a hostel in Foz do Iguaçu. André is 32 years old and works in a hostel as well; as a receptionist. He lives in Foz do Iguaçu for ten years now, but he was born in Curitiba. Jussimar is 40 years old and born in Foz do Iguaçu; he works in tourism as well. He does paperwork for customs.

Residents of Foz do Iguaçu; who work in Ciudad del Este, Paraguay

Rafael* is 25 years old, he is an executive in a music store of a French brand in Ciudad del Este. Steffi is 24 years old, she is an agricultural engineer and works just across the border in Paraguay. She works in Paraguay, because it is difficult to get a job as agricultural engineer in Brazil. Carolina was born in Paraguay, but she lives in Brazil and has Brazilian documents. She used to work in a spa in Ciudad del Este, but nowadays she is studying medicine in Presidente Franco, a city next to Ciudad del Este. Luis Carlos is 43 years old, he moved to Foz do Iguaçu from Minas Gerais when he was 15. He is divorced and has two children. He worked in Ciudad del Este in ICT for 25 years, until three months ago. Nowadays he makes special fitted furniture. Marina works as a sales assistant in an electronics store and is 30 years of age.

Entrepreneurs

Diogo is 32 years old and works in tourism in Foz do Iguaçu. He owns two companies, a company which consists of a couple of hostels in the city and a company which organises trips in and around Foz do Iguaçu. Agostinho is 39 years old and is a photographer. He owns a small company including two trainees, a regular staff member and himself. Furthermore he frequently hires freelancers. Sidney is 47 and distributes fruits and cereals to supermarkets in Brazil. Samy is 47 as well and came to Foz do Iguaçu when he was 19. He used to own three fitness centres, but at this moment he owns only one in Foz do Iguaçu, which he opened in '89. Val is Australian, but has been running a company in tourism in Foz do Iguaçu for three years now. He organises tours for backpackers all over South

America. He decided to start a company in Foz do Iguaçu, because his business partner was here and because it is at the border of Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay.

Members of the Arabic community in Foz do Iguaçu

William and Tarik are both born in Foz do Iguaçu and they are members of the Arabic community. William is 25 years old and works in an electronics store in Ciudad del Este, Paraguay. Tarik is 23 years old and at the moment of interviewing he had only three months left of his study. He will be graduating in medicine.

6.2 Making use of the border

'Today you have all kind of currencies, especially here in the city, because it is a tourist city. So you can pay with anything, if you get food, they accept any kind of exchange money. Probability it is just this area, [I am] not sure, but in other areas they probably just accept pesos, but not here. They accept all kinds of currencies. And in Paraguay as well' (A. Soto, p.c.: 06-05-2014).

Residents of Foz do Iguaçu

The people who live in Foz do Iguaçu travel a lot between the three border cities. They visit Puerto Iguazú for the good night life and the restaurants. Furthermore they visit the Argentine border city to buy foods which are expensive in Brazil or of lesser quality. For example: cheese, salami, wine and dulce de leche¹¹. All of the interviewees in this respondent group say that they visit Puerto Iguazú between once a month and once a week.

Yes, I would say once a month I go there to buy some stuff or just to relax, to go to some clubs or a bar to have some beer and have fun. They are really nice there and it is cheap for us to buy stuff [...] Usually food, cheese, olives, salami and dulce de leche and other stuff. The meat is really good there, it is amazing, and some see food you know. Shrimps and other stuff, it is really cheap there (Bruna, p.c.; 05-05-2014).

Yes, many times [...] if I am not going there with some friends to show the city, we are going there to some dinner and enjoy the nightlife in Iguazú, because it is really good. More than in Iguaçu. It depends where you are looking for, they have a really busy nightlife [with different] kind of music styles and the kind of bars over there (Luciana, p.c.; 30-04-2014).

[I visit Puerto Iguazú usually] twice a month. Well, when you live 5 kilometres from the border it is not that often. Normally [I go] to get some gas in the car or to buy some cheap things, some salami and cheese. Onions, peach. [Is gas cheaper in Argentina?] Much cheaper yes. Here it is 3 reais¹² and in Argentina it is 1,90 reais. Here we have 25% alcohol ethanol is the gas and there it is pure gasoline. So it is much cheaper (André, p.c.; 05-05-2014).

On the other side of the border of Foz do Iguaçu is the Paraguayan city of Ciudad del Este. Ciudad del Este is especially known for its cheap electronics. Paraguay has little in- and export taxes, while taxes in Brazil increased, especially on electronics. Because of this, a lot of Brazilians come to Foz do Iguaçu

¹¹ Dulce de leche is a typical South American product, which can be used, for example, in deserts. It consists of caramel and milk.

¹² On 05-05-2014 one Real (plural: reais) was worth 0,328 euro

to shop for cheap goods in Ciudad del Este. Residents of Foz do Iguaçu make a lot of use of the shopping centre across the border, all interviewees stated that they mainly visit Ciudad del Este to shop for cheap goods. Some of them stress that they rather not visit Ciudad del Este by themselves, because they consider the city too dangerous.

[I go to Ciudad del Este] to shop sometimes, I don't go much further than that centre. I just stay in the shopping centre. Because there is nothing out there to do, that I know. It is nothing that I actually know or anyone goes with me, I don't go there by myself. [...] First of all, I think it is too dangerous, so I don't feel comfortable to go by myself and second of all, it is boring to go somewhere by yourself. I usually go with my parents or my dad, my dad really enjoys to go. He really wants to know the price of the things and to look at the stuff (Juliana, p.c.; 29-04-2014).

[Do you ever visit Ciudad del Este?] Yes. Always when I need to buy something. Like electronics, some specific electronics, and drinks, by drinks meaning drinks with alcohol in it. All kinds of stuff (Jussimar, p.c.; 08-05-2014).

Residents visit the other border cities to buy cheaper products and to enjoy themselves. Bruna, André and Jussimar stress that there is many interaction between the cities and identify Tríplice Fronteira as a metropolis, while Juliana and Luciana identify it as a region wherein cities work together. However, all of them recognise that the border is vital for the economy in the region.

There are many people who live here in Foz and work in Paraguay. I know four or five people who do this. Who live here and work there. There are also some people who work here. [Would you say that there is more interaction between Ciudad del Este and Foz do Iguaçu, than Puerto Iguazú?] No, I think all of the three, but here is the main thing. The heart of the three borders. But Puerto Iguazú is the smaller one. [...] Just who knows go there or go there tourism, to know the falls and the ice bar. And that's it [...] I think it is just one city in three different countries. They are all close to each other; they interact with each other (André, p.c.; 05-05-2014).

Yes, I think they are almost the same city. Some people live here and work in Paraguay, a lot of people. Brazilians that work with farms and stuff, usually live in Brazil and go to Paraguay every day. Not just Ciudad del Este, but other cities inside Paraguay, they live here and go there to work. And some people live here and study in Paraguay and some people study in Puerto Iguazú and do the same. It is almost the same city, it is nice (Bruna, p.c.; 05-05-2014).

[Tríplice Fronteira is] one area. At this moment they are working together and have a partnership. At the moment anyone not of the countries close the frontiers, close the borders. It happened many times before. Yes, they are working together. But this depends, if the three countries not have any kind of political problems, sometimes this happens (Luciana, p.c.; 30-04-2014).

Remarkable is that the interviewees are not stating anything about the allegations of terrorism of the USA, nor about the Arabic community living in Foz do Iguaçu. Instead, the residents emphasise the benefits of living in a border region, especially the economic advantages, like buying products and leisure activities.

Residents of Foz do Iguaçu: who work in Ciudad del Este, Paraguay

The respondents of this group – people who live in Foz do Iguaçu and work in Ciudad del Este – stated that one of the most important reasons to work across the border are the wages. Education in Paraguay is not good according to the interviewees, which causes a lack of high skilled labour in Paraguay; therefore it is easy for Brazilians to get (well paid) jobs in Ciudad del Este.

Because of the money, the money you make is way better, than the money you would make in Brazil (Rafael, p.c.; 07-05-2014).*

In Foz do Iguaçu pays little. A tourist town with two boundaries do not have employment for everyone. And even if it would not pay for what I get when working here. Sad but so true [...] Earn easy money just come to Ciudad del Este. [...] It is the only way to survive with a good income (Marina, p.c.; 15-05-2014).

25 years ago [working in Ciudad del Este] was a really good option for many people, good wages/salary; it was an opportunity, not just for me, but for a lot of people, to do that. Ciudad del Este, 20 years ago, was considered the most expensive square meter in the world. Because of the economic activities. There were many muamba; this means the things you bring in by illegal transportation (Luis Carlos, p.c.; 06-05-2014).

Carolina used to work in a spa in Ciudad del Este, but now she studies medicine in Presidente Franco. She explains that it is not just the wages which make Paraguay attractive, but also the cheaper education.

Look, if I am Paraguayan and I want to study in Brazil and if I pass the test I have to take 10.000 Guarani's and if I want to study in Paraguay I can take 1.250 Guarani's, can you see the difference. And for us, Brazilians, it is the same. We pay 5000 reais and in Paraguay we pay 630 reais per month. So it is so expensive. It is impossible. Just rich people can study in Brazil (Carolina, p.c.; 06-05-2014).

Like the interviewees who live in Foz do Iguaçu, the interviewees who live in Foz do Iguaçu and work in Ciudad del Este visit Puerto Iguazú often, to go out to dinner and enjoy the nightlife.

[Puerto Iguazú] is my favourite place at the triple frontier, at the borders. It is amazing. Marco Las Tres Fronteras. This is the best place here in the area. [...] I go once a week, to eat; I go to spend some pesos in the Feirinha¹³, because I like to buy wine. And I go to Cuba Libre¹⁴ (Carolina, p.c.; 06-05-2014).

Yes, I like to party there. [And how often do you go to Puerto Iguazú?] Once a week (Rafael, p.c.; 07-05-2014).*

I just go to Puerto Iguazú if I want to have dinner, because there it is very nice. Barbecue restaurants are not expensive, compared to Brazil. And we go to, it is a famous place, the Feirinha to eat or drink beer, it is cheaper or we go to the nightclub (Steffi, p.c.; 04-05-2014).

¹³ Feirinha is the marketplace of Puerto Iguazú, where they sell olives, wine and cheese.

¹⁴ Cuba Libre is a nightclub in Puerto Iguazú.

The main reason why the interviewees in this respondent group visit Ciudad del Este is obviously to work. But they state that they also visit Ciudad del Este to shop and to visit family.

[Do you visit Ciudad del Este just for work or also for other things?] *For everything and even in my spare time I come back here. Because things first arrive here in Brazil than in much of the time* (Marina, p.c.; 15-05-2014).

I visit Paraguay to buy some stuff, because it is really nice to buy some stuff in Ciudad del Este, because it is cheaper than Brazil. Mainly electronics and I have some people of my family living in Paraguay, cousins, uncles. Because my family, my whole family, are from Paraguay (Carolina, p.c.; 06-05-2014).

The people who work in Ciudad del Este tend to emphasise the differences between the three countries and the three border cities. None of them would identify Tríplice Fronteira as a metropolis, unlike the interviewees in the respondent group *Residents of Foz do Iguaçu*. They stress that it are separate cities and countries, but they do recognise that there is a lot of interaction and cooperation between Foz do Iguaçu and Ciudad del Este.

Ciudad del Este has many influences on Brazil and have many Paraguayans and Brazilians married and everything, you don't feel the difference between the countries as much. But if you go further, than you actually see all the differences. Culturally, technology and everything. Paraguay, in my opinion, is about 80 years behind Brazil. Not culturally, not because Paraguay wants to be, but there was a war in Paraguay. Brazil helped in the war, around 1800s, we devastated Paraguay¹⁵ [...] but if it is one region or are there many differences, than I say yes. I feel the whole region is separated in three different countries, especially because of the culture (Luis Carlos, p.c.; 06-05-2014).

[Would you consider Tríplice Fronteira a metropolis?] *Yes, it kind of is. If you count the population, Foz do Iguaçu is like 300.00 and with Ciudad del Este and Puerto Iguazú it is almost a million, so yes. In Ciudad del Este live almost half a million [...] It is like this, it are three cities cooperating together, I think it is like that. It is not one big city; I think it is something in the middle. It's vague* (Rafael*, p.c.; 07-05-2014).

Like the Residents of Foz do Iguaçu, the Residents of Foz do Iguaçu; who work in Ciudad del Este do not mention anything about the allegations of the USA, nor the Arabic community. The interviewees emphasise the benefits of working across the border and the differences between the countries. The respondents refer to the border cities and the involved countries (Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay), but not to possible external actors, like the USA.

Entrepreneurs

Entrepreneurs in Foz do Iguaçu stress the importance of the location of Foz do Iguaçu, being next to the border. Diogo states:

Foz do Iguaçu is a potential city for business because of [the three borders]. Because a lot of people come over here because of the big potential, just like Paraguay. Paraguay is a place to make money, because it is easy to import things and there are no taxes. It is easy to export; it

¹⁵ Triple Alliance war: 1864-1870, see §1.1

is easy to receive money from other countries. Because the taxes, if you get money from other countries are low. So the position of Foz do Iguaçu, and Puerto Iguazú also, and Paraguay; they all come together (Diogo, p.c.; 30-04-2014).

All of the interviewed entrepreneurs state that they employ cross-border activities and that they make use of comparative advantages. For example, they buy electronics for the company in Ciudad del Este and they make use of the difference in exchange rates.

[It] maybe depends on the time of the year. On the political economics. Some countries are more cheaper than Brazil right now [...] Because of the exchange rates of the money (Samy, p.c.; 10-05-2014).

We get all our electronics and some personal belongings from Paraguay, it is way cheaper. We exchange money to Argentinean pesos; because we get a better rate from Foz do Iguaçu. So we use Argentina to get better, more value for our exchange. That is about it (Val, p.c.; 20-05-2014).

The countries who are involved in tourism employ a lot of cross-border activities and make use of the border in doing business:

One trip we organize is the three border experience, which will leave from Brazil; we have lunch in Paraguay and visits in Paraguay. Visit the waterfalls, visit Indian villages, and then we go to Argentina. We cross from Paraguay to Argentina, where we visit the city of Puerto Iguazú and we come back to Brazil in the evening. So we have breakfast in Brazil, lunch in Paraguay and dinner in Argentina in the same day (Diogo, p.c.; 30-04-2014).

We do bus travel packages, so you choose a route around South America and we book all your buses and activities in each place. We don't have much tourist packages for the Iguaçu area, but our customers come through this area and we book transfers [...] A lot of people are looking how to get from Puerto Iguazú to Foz do Iguaçu, so a lot of people find us through their search for that information and because here we run those transfers and tours across the borders, it is easier. We use the borders (Val, p.c.; 20-05-2014).

Furthermore they all have employees and/or customers from Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina.

I have Argentineans and Brazilians, Paraguayans not much. It is hard to have Paraguayan employees, because the education in Paraguay is not as good as Brazil or Argentina. It is a bit hard to find people who speak English and are able to develop or work with more high technology (Diogo, p.c.; 30-04-2014).

Clients come to CEASE¹⁶ and they buy here. They just know that they have the best fruit. So they know that and they come here, to buy stuff in all the CEASE to sell at little markets in Argentina and Paraguay. So we have people buy from other countries (Sidney, p.c.; 24-05-2014).

¹⁶ CEASE is the name of the wholesale wherein Sidney has his company

I do photo's in other countries as well, Argentina and Paraguay [...] I do have jobs in all the country in Brazil and in all the country in Paraguay, in Argentina not much (Agostinho, p.c.; 07-05-2014).

The interviewed entrepreneurs all stress that Tríplice Fronteira is one region; some identify it as a metropolis and some just as an economic region with a lot of interaction.

Actually three cities means only one cities, we treat each other like neighbours, we don't treat like different cities. Or different countries even, it is a huge block in three cities. For the heart, I think it is only one (Agostinho, p.c.; 07-05-2014).

...a big frontier, big interaction. Cultural, social, commercial [...] Now we have five different currencies and you can pay in all of them. Everybody know about the exchange rates and everything. Two languages, three languages, most of them Portuguese, Spanish and many of them speak English [...] It's here! It is another neighbourhood! (Samy, p.c.; 10-05-2014).

Like one, they have to work together, Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina. They have to work together in the same market. That is why. You can't separate them [...] They have three cities, they are together. It is a big market, rather than a metropolis. Because they have the same synergy, they have to work together (Sidney, p.c.; 24-05-2014).

Moreover, entrepreneurs try to market Tríplice Fronteira as one, Diogo states:

That is what we try to do; we market the three countries as one. Because people always go and come back. If you offer a service which is more high technology or needs, Brazil is the place between the three borders we are talking about. If you need a doctor or dentist, Argentinean people will come to Brazil; Paraguayan people will come to Brazil. So if you need wine, Paraguayan people go to Argentina, Brazilian people go to Argentina. If you need electronics, Brazilian people go to Paraguay, Argentinean people go to Paraguay. So depending on which service you do in your business, you can check which is the best country to be in (Diogo, p.c.; 30-04-2014).

The entrepreneurs take another stance than the previously mentioned respondent groups, they emphasise the unity of Tríplice Fronteira and the economic benefits of doing business in the region. The entrepreneurs tend to highlight the possibilities of the region, rather than the flaws. Moreover, they do not draw attention to any discussion regarding terrorism.

Members of the Arabic community in Foz do Iguaçu

Both William and Tarik state the following on why their parents came to Brazil:

My father come with my grandfather when he was 6 years old, and my mom with 17 [...] probably to try a better live (Tarik, p.c.; 22-05-2014).

My father was born [in Brazil] But all his family is Arab. My mom was borne there. But when she was 4,5 years she came here [...] They came to Brazil to get a better life (William, p.c.; 20-05-2014).

Like the other respondents, also the members of the Arabic community of Foz do Iguaçu, visit Puerto Iguazú and Ciudad del Este often. For example to buy cheap goods in Ciudad del Este, to work or to party and to buy goods at in the Duty Free Shop at the Argentine border or food in Feirinha.

[I visit Ciudad del Este] just for work. Maybe for party but once in year. They have good discos. People are funny there. [And Puerto Iguazú] I was there Sunday, to buy cheese, olives these stuffs (William, p.c.; 20-05-2014).

[I visit Ciudad del Este] to by some things that also are cheaper than here. Perfume, cell phone, notebook. Things like that. [I visit Puerto Iguazú] less, 7, 8 times for year, must mostly to buy something from the duty free and, sometimes. I go to some bar, or to the casino and enjoy some things that they have there and here we don't (Tarik, p.c.; 22-05-2014).

Also the members of the Arabic community feel that Tríplice Fronteira is highly interconnected, however, Tarik states:

Maybe we can say that Foz do Iguaçu and Ciudad del Este [is one urban area], but Puerto Iguazú doesn't. Because it have Brazilian working in Ciudad del Este and some Paraguayans working here and that doesn't happen between Brazil and Argentina (Tarik, p.c.; 22-05-2014).

William states on the other hand:

In commercial way, yes [there is a lot of interaction]. Every city has his attraction, because cultural is all the same. There's no huge difference. They have their differences but nothing u can say oh my god. [Would you say that Tríplice Fronteira is a metropolis or one big urban area?] I don't know. Neither, I think that the three cities complement each other. Paraguay and Brazil have a big agricultural production, Argentina have the cheapest gasoline, Paraguay have no taxes for importation and Brazil have money to buy stuffs (William, p.c.; 20-05-2014).

Tarik and William are not stating anything about the allegations of terrorism, nor about the statements of the USA about their community. Like the other respondent groups they speak about the benefits of the other cities, like jobs and leisure.

Making use of the border: the view from below

All of the interviewees state that they visit the neighbouring border cities to buy cheaper goods. Cheese, salami and wine for example are cheaper and of better quality Puerto Iguazú. Furthermore they visit Puerto Iguazú for leisure, for instance to have a good time at a club or to go out to dinner. Ciudad del Este is also visited to buy cheap goods, like perfume and electronics, but also to visit family and to work. A lot of the interviewees feel that Tríplice Fronteira is one region, yet, the people who work in Ciudad del Este tend to emphasise the differences between the three cities and countries. Remarkably, none of the interviewees brought up terrorism of the view from above, furthermore no one made a remark about the Arabic community.

6.3 Crossing the border

'Estar aqui por algumas semanas me fez acreditar que os controles aduaneiros não são muito rigorosos. Existe uma política especial para os controles na fronteira?

- Não. Devido ao grande fluxo de pessoas cruzando as fronteiras, o controle é feito por amostragem' (M. Barakat, p.c.: 24-04-2014).¹⁷

Residents of Foz do Iguaçu

The city of Foz do Iguaçu is confronted with not just one, but two borders; the border crossing with Argentina and with Paraguay. The natural borders between the countries are rivers; therefore the border crossings are bridges. Like stated above in the quote of Mister M. Barakat, this complicates and limits the border controls. That is why the borders are prone to smuggling and trafficking.

The residents of Foz do Iguaçu interviewed for this thesis all expressed their concerns about the Brazilian border control. They say that the border control is poor and they feel that this is due to high levels of corruption.

Yes, they are waiting for it. Brazil is waiting for the other countries to do something. Like Argentina, they are really restricted, so they do nothing. And Paraguay, don't care and Brazil does nothing. It is like an open place [...] I don't know if they are lazy, I don't know if they don't have the amount of money to invest in the people working there [...] to get people qualified or to pay the qualified people. I am not sure why (Bruna, p.c.; 05-05-2014).

I took a friend over there, one day. It was about one o'clock at night and I just gave her a lift over there and come back. And nobody stopped me, it was night time. It could just be a stolen car. No problem at all [...] The immigration of Brazil is hopeless there as well. [...] I think, because most of them actually make money with the lack of patrolling (Juliana, p.c.; 29-04-2014).

Because it is corruption, we know that money is going to be stuffed in some pocket, but not in the Brazilian one. [...] I think they are there to control sometimes and usually they stop people who even not represent any kind of nothing. For example: when you are crossing there, you saw something illegal, you saw on his face he is a really bad person, but they are going to stop you. Just because you are crossing with a laptop over 300 dollars and why you not declared over there. That is really weird (Luciana, p.c.; 30-04-2014).

With the last comment Luciana refers to the Brazilian policy of *fiscalização*. *Fiscalização*¹⁸ is the policy of placing extra checks at the border to monitor if people declare the goods they bring into the country, to ensure tax revenues. In Brazil it is allowed to take goods under 300 dollar into the country without paying import taxes, everything above 300 dollar must be declared and paid taxes.

At the moment a lot of stuff cross to Brazil without paying fees, they do not receive the fees from that import stuff. That is what they are looking for. The main function of the borders in Brazil is to control that, the taxes (Luciana, p.c.; 30-04-2014).

They just check for taxes. [They check] just what you bought. You need to pay something, just money, just this (Bruna, p.c.; 05-05-2014).

¹⁷ Translation: 'Being here for a couple of weeks made me believe that border controls are not very strict, is there a special policy on the border controls?' 'No. Because of the large flow of people who cross the borders, the control is done by sampling'.

¹⁸ Some respondents refer to *fiscalização* as *fiscalization*

It is an honest job, people go there to shop with their own money and come back to their country. It is not a big thing, like the country will lose millions or billions. It is still living, but living on the shades [...] I think if they made a law: you can go and bring it here, but just say what you are bringing, we don't mind that you bring. We don't charge taxes, but just declare. Because then we can have a control on what is entering, that is one of the problems we are in (André, p.c.; 05-05-2014).

The interviewed residents of Foz do Iguaçu describe the border passing between Brazil and Paraguay as non existing; they all agree that the border is poorly controlled and that it is a mess. Furthermore they emphasise that there is a lot of criminality at the bridge between Brazil and Paraguay, especially robbing and trafficking. Every day drugs and guns are crossing illegally.

It is the most devious border of Brazil, that is what I think of the crossing. [...] I think the border patrol on the Brazil side is a little bit better than on the Paraguayan side. In Paraguay they don't have patrol at all (Jussimar, p.c.; 08-05-2014).

The border patrols are hopeless and useless. I think they could be way more strict. Actually ask for you ID and everything. [...] It is crazy to me as well. Because when I entered New Zealand, at New Zealand airport they didn't let me cross until they pretty much checked my whole luggage. They are way more strict over there, why can't we be over here? (Juliana, p.c.; 29-04-2014).

I think when things are legalized, or at least, regulated, the problem with gun shootings and people get killed, I think, is going to stop a lot. Because most time of the things are because: o, you did not delivered the shit. It happens because it is not regulated. Because if it would be regulated, people didn't need to go to and stay in the shade (André, p.c.; 05-05-2014).

The Brazilian – Argentine border on the other hand is characterised as being stricter than the Brazilian – Paraguayan border. The interviewees note that the Argentine border police actually control the border. However, Jussimar notes that he does not like the bureaucracy on the border crossing; because it prevents him from passing easily.

Even if you go by car, you have to wait on the border, show all the IDs and wait and wait. So sometimes we don't go there because of this. Because they are pretty restricted with the border, but it is really nice, because Paraguay is a mess. Everything can get in and out, in Argentina no. You know it is really difficult to pass with bad stuff, because you know they'll check (Bruna, p.c.; 05-05-2014).

...they look after the whole place way better, more strict, they actually ask for your identity. My ID doesn't have a photo anymore and my driver's license is expired, so I can't even go over there and I don't even try it, because I know I can't cross the border (Juliana, p.c.; 29-04-2014).

I don't like the bureaucracy when you cross. Especially because we have the MERCOSUL agreement, that supposed to be free crossing and not have all the bureaucracy. Or fifteen kilometre supposes to be a free crossing and you should not suppose to show your ID (Jussimar, p.c.; 08-05-2014).

Most of the respondents feel that the criminality in Foz do Iguaçu is border related, they think that the fact that there is an opportunity to cross to another country with contraband contributes to the existence of criminality and/or an underworld in the city.

I just think if you mess with the wrong people, you're fucked. If you work honestly and you have your own job and take care of your life. Nobody would bother you. [...] Because if you mess with the people here, you have a problem. [...] In general I think it is a very small city. It works like a metropolis with the other cities, but it is a small city where everyone knows everyone. Or, every people who mess with the wrong things, know the other people who mess with the wrong things as well. So yes, I think that is the relation of the three borders (André, p.c.; 05-05-2014).

Usually there are guys who steal cars here and they just cross to Paraguay. So it makes Foz a little bit dangerous too, drugs, guns, stolen cars and selling stuff. It crosses the border very easily. It is nice that you can buy stuff and come back, but I think it is not worth it [...] I think it is related. Not just this, you hear about it every day at the news. These problems with the border (Bruna, p.c.; 05-05-2014).

Although one of the main arguments of the view from above is the lack of border patrol and the trafficking of narcotics and weapons, the Residents of Foz do Iguaçu do not mention the international attention for Tríplice Fronteira. When sharing their experience of the border crossings, they highlight not just the lack of border patrol, but also corruption and fiscalização. While the view from above emphasises the consequences of trafficking for the international community, the interviewees stress the local consequences, like the criminality in Foz do Iguaçu.

Residents of Foz do Iguaçu: who work in Ciudad del Este, Paraguay

Also the residents of Foz do Iguaçu, who work in Ciudad del Este state that the Brazilian control at the border is poor. Again the high levels of corruption within the border patrol are emphasised by the interviewees.

Actually Brazilian-Paraguay border is corruption for everything. They live for this, they live like this. I am working today, if an English guy ask to stamp his passport I say that he needs to pay, ah you pay, go ahead. If it is ok to safe. You can understand they are like this, they work for this, to get easy money. If they pay, it's ok, if not it is the same for them. They just try. You are in profit, that or not. You work there, you get salary, but you can get more money, you are in the profit (Steffi, p.c.; 04-05-2014).

Never. Any of them [checked me]. [...] The Paraguayan border is bullshit, stupid shit, with money you can do whatever you want. In Paraguay and in Brazil too. I don't think that any kind of police can do anything about [the criminal organizations], because they're involved. I am not sure, I haven't seen cops doing anything, but I just don't get it, how can you fight a lot of criminal shit on the border, with that kind of shit, with that kind of guns and that kind of cops? And have no results? (Rafael, p.c.; 07-05-2014).*

Luis Carlos worked in Foz do Iguaçu for 25 years, he says: 'Yes, many times they stopped me. Many, many times I was stopped by the Brazilian border.' But he continues and states that there was also another side to the Brazilian border patrol:

They did an entire clean-up, imprisoned people, get new people and those were a little bit more honest. The first clean-up they did, it was called Anaconda, they imprisoned 43 people, federal agents, that were working at the border. [...] The federal agents were people, they suppose to control the whole place, they are the border patrol and they were going to the shop in the Paraguay with a car and fill up the car with illegal stuff and come back (Luis Carlos, p.c.; 06-05-2014).

Besides the high levels of corruption, the respondents also emphasise that the border control is mainly focused on collecting tax revenues. The *fiscalização* at the border is described as hard. Luis Carlos explains why the Brazilian government implemented this policy:

About twenty years ago, we had tourist buses that was coming here, going to Paraguay to buy the illegal things and going back. The whole country, whole Brazil was doing that. [...] the road police and the Receita Federal, they came together and started to stop the buses. They stopped the busses and were taking all the whole bag they bought, which they didn't declared, they confiscated the whole thing and they also took the bus out of the road [...] But this increased fiscalization is good, because from bringing all the stuff from there, without the tax, looses the country, everybody knows that. Even if all this movement would bring business Foz do Iguaçu to grow, we know it is not good in the end (Luis Carlos, p.c.; 06-05-2014).

The border crossing of Brazil and Paraguay is bad according to the residents of Foz do Iguaçu; who work in Ciudad del Este. One of the problems is corruption, however, they put forward another problem: the Ponte Internacional da Amizade. The bridge and the huge amount of traffic which is crossing every day is causes a lot of difficulties:

It takes too much space and too much people and it would take a lot more money. If we are going to do right now, the same way that Argentina does, not even half of the people can cross. Because there will be lines from miles and miles and miles, you can wait for ten hours to get in (Luis Carlos, p.c.; 06-05-2014).

The bridge is a unique way to cross, that is a problem. Because you need more options to cross to Paraguay. There is a lot of [traffic] and because of that we need more options to cross to Paraguay. Today I was going to university after lunch and there was a big, big, big line. But I want to go to university, I didn't want to buy in the city centre, but the line was because of the city centre. You see? (Carolina, p.c.; 06-05-2014).

According to the interviewees, the lack of space and the high levels of corruption at the border crossing causes a lack of control and thus a possibility to cross illegal goods easily.

It is easy to take drugs, everything that not is ok. It is easy, of course. We have control, but it is not the best control. [...] In Paraguay you have a lot of people going back, so it is easy to cross with illegal things and the police in Paraguay is corrupt, so it is very easy to cross the border with illegal stuff (Steffi, p.c.; 04-05-2014).

Actually some things happened in stores, not the one where I work – that is actually the one that doesn't do any harm to any kind of law – but in Paraguay if you ask for some store and say 'I live in Foz do Iguaçu or Rio do Janeiro and I have to pass some products', you bought a TV, fucking huge, enormous and you need a car or something, you pay someone to do it. They

do it by car, by boat. They smuggle electronics from Ciudad del Este to Foz do Iguaçu (Rafael, p.c.; 07-05-2014).*

The border crossing with Argentina is according to the respondents pretty good, it is safe and restricted, they stop everybody and you have to show your documents, furthermore there is barely criminality at the border crossing.

It is different there. Because you can't cross drugs easy there. The border is so hard to do everything, you crossed that border, so you saw. They stop everyone, every car, you need to show your documents, you need to register in the system. When you go and not come back, you have problems with the Argentineans. Of course, it is different from Paraguay, not a lot of people go back the same day [...] In Argentinean border it is easier, because there are not many people going back the same day. It is like this (Steffi, p.c.; 04-05-2014).

But in Argentina it is different, you have to show your passport before you leave Brazil, before you get in Argentina you have to show your passport and tell them you get in there and tell Brazil you are leaving. Argentina side is way harder, to smuggle (Rafael, p.c.; 07-05-2014).*

The interviewees feel that the criminality in Foz do Iguaçu is related to its location at the border.

[Would you say that the criminality in all of Foz is border related?] 90% (Marina, p.c.; 15-05-2014).

It is easy to cross drugs, weapons and there are many people that come here to live to have illegal work in Paraguay for cross this. Electronics, cigarettes, drugs. Everything is the same, if you work with this, you also live this kind of life. Yes, the criminality is because we have the border with Paraguay (Steffi, p.c.; 04-05-2014).

Brazil is really big and all the criminal guys know that we have here a gap in the country. But if they don't want to pass, they stay here in Iguaçu. So they live here, to be here and sometimes they go to Paraguay and sometimes they stay in Foz do Iguaçu to wait for something and sometimes they start to do the criminality here in Foz do Iguaçu (Carolina, p.c.; 06-05-2014).

Like the Residents of Foz do Iguaçu, the Residents of Foz do Iguaçu; who work in Ciudad del Este emphasise the lack of border patrol, the corruption and the fiscalização. In contrary to the Residents of Foz do Iguaçu these interviewees highlight the Ponte Internacional da Amizade as a complicating factor. They state that there is simply not enough space to execute proper checks at the bridge. Although the interviewees add another level of understanding to the limited border patrol, they do not mention terrorism in Tríplice Fronteira, nor the interference of the USA. Like the Residents of Foz do Iguaçu, they are mainly concerned with local consequences.

Entrepreneurs

The interviewed entrepreneurs endorse the other respondents regarding the Brazilian border control. They emphasise not just the lack of control on what is taken into the country, but also the lack of immigrations. It is easy to, on purpose or accidentally, enter Brazil without a stamp:

But at the Brazilian border it doesn't happen the same, it is not the same, the Brazilian border is not controlled. So when you get out of Argentina, you can come into Brazil without stamping. Easily (Agostinho, p.c.; 07-05-2014).

Brazil, nobody is coming to you. Even when you are travelling and you have your passport and you need to make entrance to the country. You need to go and knock on the door of the cops and say: Look, I am from England and I need a stamp. O ok, here is the stamp. And they give you a stamp. If you don't do that you are going to pass without a stamp and this happens a lot over here. A lot of people arrive at the hostel and say, o didn't get the Brazilian stamp and they need to go back to the border to get the stamp (Diogo, p.c.; 30-04-2014).

Like the other interviewees, also the entrepreneurs address the corruption:

[There is] a lot of corruption. [...] even if you pay everything and you go and they ask you for more money to give to them (Samy, p.c.; 10-05-2014).

MERCOSUL is like the European Union, good at paper, but not in real life. But for us it is good, in the frontier. We have a rule that works right, here is Foz do Iguaçu. But in other places... On the paper it is very good, but in real life it is hard to make it work due to corruption (Sidney, p.c.; 24-05-2014).

The Brazilian – Paraguayan border is described by the entrepreneurs as a mess; an open border and non existing. They state that the control is simply not there. Diogo notes that the criminality in Foz do Iguaçu is because of the lack of control at this border and the big quantities of drugs that pass by Tríplice Fronteira.

The border between Brazil and Paraguay is a mess, people try to control the border. But there is not any control, people just go and come back whenever they want, they carry what they want and there is a lot of corruption as well [...] [The criminality in Foz do Iguaçu] is because the location, for sure. It is easy to cross the border and it is close. You have Paraguay and then you have Bolivia, the way for the traffic of drugs, cocaine, marihuana, all this comes from that area. You can compare San Diego and Tijuana, the border of the United States and Mexico. It is pretty much like that. One side has all the troubles, all the drugs, the guns and things, and the other side have people who want that. They make a way to come, because it is big market for them and there is no big control on it (Diogo, p.c.; 30-04-2014).

Well, it is an open border. The passing between the two cities and countries is easy. It is almost a European Union kind of set up, if you move outside the border towns you can be stopped and checked and be in a lot of trouble. But the borders, apart from the traffic jams in the morning it is pretty easy (Val, p.c.; 20-05-2014).

I get in my car and I drive and I see the river on the left side and the right side and I see the city in front of me and I am in Paraguay. It is easy. There is no control and for most parts of the time you go, see more people, see less people (Samy, p.c.; 10-05-2014).

The Brazilian – Argentine border is characterised as the only border which actually works. They execute controls and they check documents.

It is very different. In Argentina they stamp the passport when you get in and when you get out. They really control the cars what you're taking. When you are going in actually, they control more than when you are coming out. They control much more than at the Paraguayan border (Agostinho, p.c.; 07-05-2014).

I'd say it is not as easy, but it is still not hard. Because the Brazilians treat it as an open border, but the Argentineans do security checks and you have custom controls there. So it is a bit off a speed bump between those two countries, compared to Paraguay (Val, p.c.; 20-05-2014).

Besides the high levels of corruption, the entrepreneurs address the lack of immigrations. They state that the lack of border control does not just affect the goods that are taken into the country, but also people. The entrepreneurs stress that it is easy to enter Brazil without a stamp. Even though the view from above tries to act upon the lack of control on people and goods at the border crossings of Tríplice Fronteira, none of the entrepreneurs mention this.

Members of the Arabic community in Foz do Iguaçu

Both Tarik and William feel that the Brazilian – Paraguayan border is open and poorly controlled. Tarik points out, just like many of the residents who live in Foz do Iguaçu; who work in Ciudad del Este, that there is no alternative to the checks as they are executed now, due to traffic jams.

It almost doesn't have inspection. Because of the big traffic of cars and people. They can't do it another way. The border is too small, to so much people. And every day, almost 70 thousand people cross the border. And, any Brazilian work and live there, and they cross the border every day. We don't have enough people to supervision all this people every day [...] There are almost 70 thousand people crossing the ever day in 12h, are almost 100 people every minute. We can't control them all (Tarik, p.c.; 22-05-2014).

William on the other hand, puts emphasis on the high level of violence on the bridge and that he barley crosses the bridge by foot, because he feels unsafe.

What can I say. Sometimes they respect the law. Sometimes no. It's a big joke actually. [You pass the border two times a day for work, do you ever get checked?] In 8 years maybe 2 or 3 times, when has military operation. I saw sometimes people trying to cross with drugs and guns... Once time I saw a thief being shot by cops. In front my eyes, it was terrible. With a shotgun, on his back. There's one way, I can't change my route, in 8 years maybe I walked 5 times. 85% car, 14% mototaxi and 1% crawling when I have been to a club (William, p.c.; 20-05-2014).

Tarik feels that the criminality in Foz do Iguaçu is not just a local problem, according to him, the criminality is big, but this is a problem that affects the whole country. However, he does endorse to the other respondents, in the sense that the criminality in Foz do Iguaçu interplays with the corruption of the local police force and the local of Foz do Iguaçu at the border with Ciudad del Este:

We would have to speak about the corruption of officer to explain that. If you stay in Jardim Jupira¹⁹ at night, you will see officers entering the favela, and they do nothing. Probably they just enter to receive some money. The officers prefer the receive money from the smuggler, than to put them on jail [You mention smuggling, besides the fact that criminality interplay with corruption, do you think it is border related as well? So the fact that Ciudad, Foz and Puerto are border cities makes them vulnerable to criminality?] Yes, more because of Ciudad del Este. The corruption there, is another level. You can everything, as long you have money to pay and because of that, is easy to bring drugs, guns, and stuffs like that. You can do everything you want there, as long you have money to pay (Tarik, p.c.; 22-05-2014).

Like the residents in the other group, also Tarik feels that the Argentine border is more restricted than the Brazilian – Paraguayan border:

It's open to people... And with restrictions, about the things you bring or how much you bring. Like, it have federal agents in the border all the time and if you try to bring something that isn't allowed, you go to jail (Tarik, p.c.; 22-05-2014).

Tarik addresses the problem of the lack of space at The Ponte Internacional da Amizade, subsequently William stresses the level of violence at the bridge between Brazil and Paraguay. Nor William, nor Tarik mention the view of the USA about terrorism in the region and their community.

Crossing the border: the view from below

Most of the interviewees state that the Brazilian border patrol could be better, at this moment it suffers from corruption, a lack of staff and space to do proper controls. Furthermore, the respondents feel that the fiscalização of the border is at the expense of extensive control on contraband crossing the border. The interviewees states that the border between Paraguay and Brazil is open border, with a lack of control on both sides. Moreover, they stress that a lot of illegal goods are crossing the Ponte Internacional da Amizade; marihuana, cocaine, weapons, electronics and so forth. The border crossing with Argentina is characterised as more strict and less criminal, mainly due to the efforts of Argentine immigration (you have to show your legal documents every time). The interviewees are divided on the topic whether or not the criminality in Foz do Iguaçu is border related. Many of them link, for instance the high homicide rate, to the drug trafficking at the border, while others feel that criminality is a problem in all of Brazil. It is remarkable that in spite of the attention for the border crossings by the view from above, none of the interviewees mentioned the USA or terrorism. The stories the interviewees shared are locally orientated, rather than internationally. The respondents do not state that Tríplice Fronteira is a possible threat for the USA. Moreover, none of the respondents mentioned something about the Arabic community.

6.4 Terrorism at the border

'Yes, they [the Paraguayan army] work together with INTERPOL for special operations. And there have been people in Nicaragua to get special training in working with explosives and they are trained by the US' (J. Gonzalez, p.c.: 23-05-2014).

¹⁹ Jardim Jupira is a neighbourhood of Foz do Iguaçu close to the Río Paraná, the natural border with Paraguay. It is poor and generally considered as a dangerous area to visit

As mentioned above, the view from below narrates Tríplice Fronteira differently than the view from above. The view from above narrates the region as terrorist and emphasise the danger of the lack of border control for the USA. The view from below stresses the benefits of living at the border, in particular the economic benefits. As stated above, none of the residents expressed perceptions on representations and practices of the USA by themselves. However, when addressed in interviews, all respondents were aware of the view from above.

Residents of Foz do Iguaçu

As mentioned in the first chapter of this thesis, a large Arabic community resides in Foz do Iguaçu. Four of the interviewees stated that they feel there is little interaction between the Arabic community and other communities in Foz do Iguaçu. They identified the community as being closed. However, because there is little interaction, they feel like there is also little discrimination between the communities. However, Luciana feels that there is much interaction and acceptance between the community and Jussimar notes that when time goes by the lack of interaction slowly disappears.

They are really close, one to the other. They don't really interact with other people, they interact, but to the inside circle; to the people who go to the other people's houses, they just interact with that. With the Arabic people. They don't bother anyone (André, p.c.; 05-05-2014).

[My] friends said that when they were arriving they were Koreans, Japanese, Lebanese and now they are Brazilians. They eat more Brazilian food, they just understand them. They are just decedents now. [...] they are way more Brazilian now, than they were before, as the generations are passing by. [Is there discrimination?] A little bit yes. I think that if you meet some culture that is really different, first you push away. But with time it brings you close again. The discrimination before was more than now [...] they are accepting all the cultures a little bit better now (Jussimar, p.c.; 08-05-2014)

Other families keep the tradition and some were already born here and they live a Brazilian life. They know their families have traditions from Lebanon or Arabia or anything, but they consider themselves Brazilian [Do you think there is discrimination?] I never see it, no. It never happened. In Iguaçu I don't see people like that; we don't worry about who you are or where you come from. No, I never see it. It not depends where you come from or your religion (Luciana, p.c.; 30-04-2014).

An important element in the narrative of the USA is the cash flow between the Arabic community in Foz do Iguaçu and the Middle East. Because of this the USA states that Tríplice Fronteira is an area with terrorist funding and possibly a terrorist cell. The residents of Foz do Iguaçu all say that they have never seen any evidence for terrorism in Tríplice Fronteira, nor that it is lawless. Bruna does state that there are dangerous neighbourhoods in Foz do Iguaçu, which could be considered as lawless.

There are some neighbourhoods in Foz do Iguaçu where the law doesn't exist, all the neighbourhoods near the river are not really nice. Usually some dangerous place, people who buy and sell drugs live there. Really dangerous neighbourhoods, like favellas and stuff. Nobody goes there. Tourist sometimes wants to go to walk by the river, but we say: don't go, it is not a nice neighbourhood, you can't go by yourself. Marco Três Fronteiras, no, don't go.

Go to Argentina, that is more safe. And go with a group, don't go buy yourself it is not nice (Bruna, p.c.; 05-05-2014).

I don't think lawless or ungoverned (Jussimar, p.c.; 08-05-2014).

No, it looks like it is lawless. But it looks like, because of all the things when you have to cross the border. But actually it is not. Here you have laws and everything. But because it is so easy to cross the border and for you to be criminal, you have way more of these activities over there. It is too easy for you to make something wrong in front of the border, because that look likes it is lawless. But it is not (Juliana, p.c.; 29-04-2014).

Luciana acknowledges that there is a big cash flow from Tríplice Fronteira to the Middle East, but she notes that this money is for families, rather than terrorism.

Yes, maybe. But it is not that all those people who live here give money to the terrorist. O my god, not at all. Because we now the people live here for age and someone already got back to Lebanon and some people are already died and lost a lot of family (Luciana, p.c.; 30-04-2014).

The residents of Foz do Iguaçu all feel that the statements made by the USA are out of touch with reality. Most of them wonder why a terrorist cell would be in Tríplice Fronteira, while this is far away from both the USA and other possible locations for terrorist attacks.

I don't think it is their fault that they fight with the Americans or the Americans hunting them. I think it is Americas fault. They enter in the business of other people, they mess with the people, for what? (André, p.c.; 05-05-2014).

Yes, but from here? How they are going to do their terrorist activities from here to USA? It is a little bit far away, isn't it? [...] But in my opinion, USA is trying to put images of everybody around down and they are the best and fuck the rest. That is what they do. [...] I think they are speculating too much, because how could terrorist here, a terrorist organization in Brazil, attack them? Or attack Europe? It is a little bit far away (Juliana, p.c.; 29-04-2014).

That is bullshit, I am so sorry. We live with this kind of community for too longer and nobody take an airplane and try to put against any kind of building in Brazil. Yes, it could be not limited in Tríplice Fronteira, but USA has a lot of controlling and see what happened. What kind of things are they going to say? What kind of things they could say about that? Here we don't have limits right, we suppose to be, how the USA considers us, terrorism here in the border? Because we don't have control? USA has a lot of control and see what happened, what kind of excuses are they going to say? That it was all because of us? While we are far away? That terrorist live here and then fly to the USA? (Luciana, p.c.; 30-04-2014).

Like stated in the fifth chapter of this thesis, the USA works together with Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina. In the Country Report on Terrorism 2008 the USA stated that Brazil achieved visible result from investments in border and law enforcement infrastructure. In the Country Report on Terrorism 2013 the USA emphasised to continue to cooperate with the countries involved on combating fraud and other forms of international crimes. Furthermore the USA provides the Paraguayan army with training in order to improve the border control and decrease the flow of illegal goods. The

interviewed residents of Foz do Iguaçu mentioned that they have noticed that the border control has increased over the last ten to fifteen years:

Yes, I think it is way better now (Jussimar, p.c.; 08-05-2014).

Yes, the last years. The bridge was remodelled, it was really bad a couple of years ago. It is much better when you talk about social work, they remodelled the bridge, they give more equipments for the federal police to work and more knowledge to see criminal things. At the Brazilian side yes, but at Paraguay it is still the same. The border office was remodelled using Brazilian money (Luciana, p.c.; 30-04-2014).

At Argentina, yes, we can see a lot of difference. And Brazil and Paraguay we see a difference in just the federal police²⁰, but just because of the taxes (Bruna, p.c.; 05-05-2014).

The Residents of Foz do Iguaçu differ on the level of interaction between the Arabic and the Brazilian community, however, they all state that there is little discrimination between the communities. Moreover, they feel that the allegations of the USA are out of touch with reality. The cash flow from Tríplice Fronteira to the Middle East is meant for family, rather than terrorism. The interviewees state that the border control has increased.

Residents of Foz do Iguaçu: who work in Ciudad del Este, Paraguay

Like the residents of Foz do Iguaçu, also the residents of Foz do Iguaçu; who work in Ciudad del Este emphasise that the Arabic community in Foz do Iguaçu is closed and that there is little interaction between them and the Brazilian community. Carolina and Marina indicate that they do feel that there is a lot of interaction. Furthermore they feel that there isn't much discrimination between the communities. Steffi, on the other hand, feels sometimes discriminated by people from the Arabic community. Rafael* personally feels troubled by the presence of the Arabic community in Foz do Iguaçu.

For sure, I might get killed for saying this, but I think all of them are criminals. Because I see no reason for them being here, they could be somewhere else. Why here? [...] I can't get it, I am sorry (Rafael, p.c.; 07-05-2014).*

Here we accept everyone and accept everyone have so much respect for each people coming to visit and to live. It is so cute, I remember when I lived in that neighbourhood I heard an Arab side of another Chinese side, I thought as much. We live in peace (Marina, p.c.; 15-05-2014).

I have a few friends that come from the Arabic community, but it is not common. They prefer to stay with them, they get married between them, they live in the same building, they live in the same area [...] They have discrimination with us, they think humans, Brazilians doesn't have values or anything. It is not common to have dates, a boyfriend or girlfriend, they won't get married with Brazilians, because we are unvalued people, in Portuguese it is vagabunda. It means like slut. In general I don't like the Arabic, but I respect them (Steffi, p.c.; 04-05-2014).

²⁰ Receita Federal

Generally the residents of Foz do Iguaçu; who work in Ciudad del Este say that the law enforcement is good. Rafael* puts forward that there is criminality in the city, but states like André that when you are not involved in criminality you are safe:

...there is a lot of murdering, not honest people. Honest people are not dying, just bad guys are dying. So awesome, keep killing yourself (Rafael, p.c.; 07-05-2014).*

Most of the interviewees of this respondent group feel that the statement of the USA – that the Arabic community in Tríplice Fronteira is involved in terrorist activities – is a joke and they need someone to take the blame.

Most of the Arabians, Arabians descendants are families. That doesn't have one element or the other related to terrorism. They are actual families, like mommy, daddy, kids, grandma. They don't get involved (Luis Carlos, p.c.; 06-05-2014).

There are many Arabs here, many mosques, many fanatics, it is normal everywhere has. I believe that if something were to happen it would have happened. They know not what they speak, someone in the world has to take the blame, perhaps here take the blame for having a large number of Arabs (Marina, p.c.; 15-05-2014).

Rafael* takes another position:

Yes, for sure. Why not? It is like this: if you would be a terrorist, where would you go? To a place you would be found or to a place where they don't control anything? [...] it is obvious. I might have seen a lot of things, but I might be wrong too. I clashed my car with some Arabic stupid asshole and he couldn't speak Portuguese. What the fuck was he doing in Foz do Iguaçu driving a car? I mean, he didn't have any passport, people without passports; they got something wrong with them. Right? That is a fact. How did he got to Foz do Iguaçu without having a passport? Crossing the border. There is something connected to this low border patrol, of course, just put it in perspective. If I was a terrorist of course I would settle in Foz, that is how it works (Rafael, p.c.; 07-05-2014).*

The interviewees acknowledge that there are problems, but they also feel that the American involvement is out of place, moreover some of them feel that the USA uses the terrorism argument as an excuse to get influence in the area, because they are after the Aquífero Guaraní²¹:

Look, I think it's a joke. United States wanting to rule the country that is not theirs, I think Brazil is who should take better care of their nation. Of course everyone should face the same problem, but go get in the yard the other is too. They cannot have here why not sustentão²² the population they cause repression and cause fear with power they demonstrate (Marina, p.c.; 15-05-2014).

It is a natural place, an amazing place a lot of water, nice water. Because we are a privileged place, because we have a lot of nice water, so they are looking for the future (Carolina, p.c.; 06-05-2014).

²¹ In English referred to as: Guaraní Aquifer. It is located beneath the surface of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay and is one of the world's largest aquifer systems and an important source of fresh water.

²² Translation: support

USA, in my opinion, they look with big eyes to Paraguay and Brazil, because we have water. The big aquifer, the name is Aquífero Guaraní, in Brazil we have many parts and in Paraguay all the country. We feel like the USA says this, because they want to 'he, look, this country is not safe, go in, to make the correct thing', but they just think about the water. It is the same as in the Middle East with the petroleum; it is the same thing (Steffi, p.c.; 04-05-2014).

Luis Carlos experienced firsthand how the control changed after 9/11:

...a few times I was stopped at the Paraguayan border, because I had some facial features of Arabians. And they were really hard on Arabians, so they stopped me to check it out. [Do you have Arab roots?] No. Not that I know of. It was about ten years ago. It never stopped me to cross the border; it didn't affect me at all. But on this one time, a special time, the same guy stopped me for 10 days straight, he stopped me every time, the same guy every day. Until one day I said 'my friend, you stop me every day, I cross every day, you see I am Brazilian, come on'. And then it stopped (Luis Carlos, p.c.; 06-05-2014).

Generally the interviewees agree that the border control has increased over the last years:

But yes, look, getting back was way improved (Rafael, p.c.; 07-05-2014).*

It increased a lot. Physically, the building has increased a lot. Paraguay, maybe 5, 6 years ago, but Brazil, I can't remember how long. Probably ten years, the Brazilian one. That is a guess, but it is easy to find out when they build that. When they rebuild, they do like a clean-up on staff. Many of the agents that worked there were really corrupt and they actually imprisoned that people (Luis Carlos, p.c.; 06-05-2014).

The Residents of Foz do Iguaçu; who work in Ciudad del Este differ on the level of interaction between the Arabic and the Brazilian community. Unlike the Residents of Foz do Iguaçu, some of the interviewees feel troubled or discriminated by the Arabic community. Except Rafael* all of the interviewees feel that the statement of the USA is a joke. Some of the interviewees feel that the USA uses the terrorism argument to exert power over the region, because of the Aquífero Guaraní. The interviewees do feel that the border control has increased over the last years.

Entrepreneurs

It is remarkable that the entrepreneurs – in contrast to the previous respondent groups – indicate that there is a lot of interaction between the Arabic community and the Brazilian residents of Foz do Iguaçu. Furthermore they feel that there is little discrimination, although there are some prejudices. Only Sidney feels different when it comes to this topic, he feels that there is much discrimination and little interaction, because the Arabic community is closed.

...we live here with different religions, different customs and languages and we have peace here. [There is no discrimination?] No there is no discrimination. It is very common, you go and you see different expressions of religion and language people talking and you have new people born here. You have Chinese with Lebanese, who get married and have a new human being, and different cultures blending in (Samy, p.c.; 10-05-2014).

The women are wearing a burqa, but I can't tell who is an Arab or who is a mix. I find that there is a pretty good interaction between the Arabs and the rest of the ethnicities in this area

and when they wouldn't wear different clothes, you wouldn't tell. You hear Arabic spoken now and again and you get surprised because you expect to speak in Brazilian, not in Arab and then you take a look. But it could be either way (Val, p.c.; 20-05-2014).

The Arab community is a close community; they are talking with each other. So it is really hard to get to know them. So there is not much interaction. [Is there discrimination towards them or the other way around?] Much. They are in Brazil, but they want to live in the way they lived in their country. They just try to apply their rules in the country, our society. In religion, in costumes and clothing [...] I have nothing against the Arabs, but I see that the society has, I don't have friendships with them, but no problem. But I know the society has discrimination towards each other (Sidney, p.c.; 24-05-2014).

The interviewed entrepreneurs stress that there is no evidence for terrorism in Tríplice Fronteira, nor that there is no law enforcement in Foz do Iguaçu. Sidney states that there is a certain degree of lawlessness in the Tríplice Fronteira and thus Foz do Iguaçu, however, he explains that this is the case in a lot of border regions.

Here in Brazil we have an expression: lands of nobody. Anybody can do anything you want. And this is one of these areas. It is like other frontiers. All the frontiers across the world have problems, they are crazy. US – Mexico, Germany – Austria, India – Pakistan. It is not our fault, because it has to be. Because if people want to do illegal stuff all the time, they can. Where you have a frontier, you have crazy people (Sidney, p.c.; 24-05-2014).

People are talking about there are terrorist here of Al-Qaida and things like that, never was proved anything. Never they find like this died from Al-Qaida; never, but it was kind of speculation, they were all talking about this. But Foz do Iguaçu and the border is pretty much a safe area, you don't find big problems with security over here. Not like you find in other cities or places, some murders and trafficking of drugs and things like that, but you don't have terror over here (Diogo, p.c.; 30-04-2014).

I mean, it wouldn't be hard for them to get here, if they had a reason to be here. So if they do exist for some or another reason, I wouldn't be surprised. But it seems a little far from any critical turmoil in the rest of the world. Why would they be here? It doesn't make sense why'd that be here. But there might be a reason (Val, p.c.; 20-05-2014).

Like other respondents, also Diogo and Samy explain that there is a cash flow to the Middle East, but that this money is meant for the relatives of those who send money; who are still dealing with war every day.

No, the money coming from here to the Middle East is easy, because the largest in Brazil. We have more Lebanese than Lebanon. [...] They put the war running there, so they fly out to a different country. Most of them are here and they send money to there. And also, if your country is been attacked, what you are going to do? You are going to send money and those guys that are trying to defend the country, they are not terrorist, and they are patriots. It is a different perspective of view. What is terrorism? They send money, yes, and? It is tough! (Samy, p.c.; 10-05-2014).

That is true, if you have the biggest community over here and all of the family of that people are from the Middle East, so of course they are going to send money to their families. That is one thing they say, but it doesn't make sense. They say: o, people send a lot of money to the Middle East. Of course! You have 7000 Arabic's over here, which still have their family over there. And they ran from a really miserable life over there and they come here and make money over here and you have your mom in Jordania and your mom is without money and your cousin is without money. It is war over there; it is a hard situation over there. Of course, if I make 100 dollars here, I will send 50 dollar to my family over there. It doesn't say that they send money to Al-Qaida (Diogo, p.c.; 30-04-2014).

Sidney doubts this, but acknowledges the lack of proof:

Have a lot of money flowing here in the frontier and a lot of money goes there, you can't believe that this money is just to buy new clothes for the kids. We know some part of this money is for illegal stuff, because a lot of money goes there. But the people who say this has to proof it. We think, but we don't have the proof (Sidney, p.c.; 24-05-2014).

Most of the interviewees feel that the claims about the presence of a terrorist cell in the region is absurd. They feel they are subject to manipulation and speculation of the USA. Multiple security services tried to gather evidence in the area, but it is hard to control and perhaps they are looking for something that is not there.

[I don't think people from the CIA and FBI are here] and even if they are here, it is really hard to make the control (Sidney, p.c.; 24-05-2014).

It is manipulation, they put something on TV. Oh, beautiful production. That's it. People don't used to have the experience, they used to believe. That is wrong just to believe, just to accept. We must feel, what is life? We shouldn't accept nothing (Samy, p.c.; 10-05-2014).

It is one tag place for any security department, all of them were with their eyes here. FBI was passing here, CIA was passing here, all others, federal department, top investigations, England, France, Spain, everyone passed by here. [...] [It was] a target in the media. A lot of people were talking about it, you go to supermarkets, people talking about this. You go to bars, people talking about this, pretty much they did like a big market and they tagged Foz do Iguaçu. Now [the USA] started to worry about other things. They killed Osama bin Laden, they started another war. So they are Iraq, they start to worry about other things. They change the point. 'Let's talk about other things', and they move on, like they do. They are very good at this (Diogo, p.c.; 30-04-2014).

The entrepreneurs feel, unlike the other respondent groups, that there is a lot of interaction between the Brazilian and Arabic community, furthermore they feel that there is little discrimination between the communities. Rather than stating that the statements of the USA is out of touch with reality, the entrepreneurs stress the lack of evidence of the view from above. Nevertheless the interviewees feel that the claims about the presence of a terrorist cell in the region are absurd. They feel that Tríplice Fronteira is subject to manipulation and speculation of the USA.

Members of the Arabic community in Foz do Iguaçu

Both Tarik and William state that there is a lot of interaction between the different communities in Foz do Iguaçu. Personally they do not feel discriminated, William states:

I don't feel the discrimination. Because we are a lot in here (William, p.c.; 20-05-2014).

However, Tarik explains that he has friends that do feel discriminated sometimes:

I don't [feel discriminated], but I have many friends who already felt discriminated. Sometimes because the religion and the accent, but mostly because their unknowledge. Have people who think that Allah is a different god, and isn't. Allah is god in the Arabic language (Tarik, p.c.; 22-05-2014).

William and Tarik both feel that Foz do Iguaçu is not lawlessness, nor do they feel that there is terrorism in Tríplice Fronteira. Tarik stresses that the city or the region is not a terrorist sanctuary, but that it is easy for criminal organizations to settle there.

Yes, I think so, not about the part of a terrorist sanctuary, but really is easy for criminal organizations to settle here. [You think Tríplice Fronteira is lawless?] No. But Paraguay is, because of the corruption there and poverty, it's harder to make them follow the rules (Tarik, p.c.; 22-05-2014).

[Would you say that Tríplice Fronteira is ungoverned or lawless?] Neither. Everyplace has their corruption (William, p.c.; 20-05-2014).

They argue that a big cash flow from Tríplice Fronteira to the Middle East is no evidence for funding of terrorism.

Most of the people that came to Brazil, have family in the Middle East, and there they don't have many opportunities work, and mostly of the little cities there, the people live from the agriculture. So almost everybody send money to their family who still live there (Tarik, p.c.; 22-05-2014).

They always say that [there is a big cash flow]. They don't have a point anymore. Before they had a point, because 9/11. Now they don't have point at all. They just throw terrorist, without any excuse (William, p.c.; 20-05-2014).

William stresses that the statements of the USA are not affecting him, but Tarik feels differently:

I am a little angry, because their opinion, make the people from all the world relate Muslim to terrorists (Tarik, p.c.; 22-05-2014).

Like other respondents, also William and Tarik noticed that the border patrol has increased over the last years. Although they differ to what extent the border patrol has increased.

[Do you feel the border patrol has increased of the last 10 years?] Yes, significant. They extend the border, and put more federal agents. It's too much people and many illegal things was entering our country and they want to retain that. Have federal agents in the river too with helicopters. In my view, reduces 70% (Tarik, p.c.; 22-05-2014).

Look for the people leaving or arriving I think not at all. But for the trucks, products and these stuffs I think a little bit (William, p.c.; 20-05-2014).

William and Tarik feel that there is a lot of interaction between the Brazilian and the Arabic community and that there is little discrimination. Like the entrepreneurs they stress the lack of evidence for the statements of the USA. They argue that a big cash flow from Tríplice Fronteira to the Middle East is no evidence for funding terrorism. William stresses that the statements of the USA are not affecting him, Tarik states that he feels troubled by the statements of the USA, but that he does not act upon it. Both of them feel that the border control has increased over the last ten to fifteen years.

Terrorism at the border: the view from below

Generally the interviewees feel there is little discrimination from and towards the Arabic community in Foz do Iguaçu, however, they do differ on the level of interaction. The entrepreneurs for example, feel there is much interaction, while the other respondents tend to emphasise the lack of interaction. Many of the respondents feel that the narrative of the USA is out of touch with reality; moreover many wonder why a terrorist cell would be in Tríplice Fronteira, while this is far away from both the USA and other possible locations for terrorist attacks. Some respondents feel that the USA has a hidden agenda and is actually interested in Tríplice Fronteira because of its fresh water resource; the Aquífero Guarani. About the cash flow to the Middle East many of them say that the money is meant for relatives who live in war. In general the residents of Foz do Iguaçu mentioned that they noticed that the border control has increased over the last ten to fifteen years.

7. Analysis

This chapter presents the analysis of the data. The analysis is based on the selected theories of *state fragility* (§7.1), *the construction of space* (§7.2) and *bordering, ordering and othering* (§7.3). The analysis is ordered as followed: first the view from above is analysed according to the relevant theory, subsequently the view from below is analysed and thereafter the analysis of both views are confronted with one another.

7.1 State fragility

A state is fragile when it is unable to control its borders, criminal violence is growing and a state is unable to deliver political goods, like security, institutions to settle conflicts, political participation and social service delivery.

7.1.1 The view from above

The USA remains concerned about Tríplice Fronteira, because they feel it continues *‘to be an important regional nexus of arms, narcotics, and human smuggling, counterfeiting, pirated goods, and money laundering – all potential funding sources for terrorist organizations’* (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2014: 206). Even though the high level of criminality in the region and the lack of border control, the USA emphasises that Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay are taking action to counter this. Both Brazil and Argentina improved their border control in the last ten years.

Argentina passed legislation on penalizing funding of terrorism in 2007 and revised the legislation in 2011, by broadening the definition of terrorism and raising fines and prison sentences for crimes linked to funding terrorism, Argentina improved the institutions to settle conflicts. Furthermore, Argentina implemented a new security system along its borders, based on fingerprints. The system requires travellers to take a photo and their fingerprints when arriving in and departing from Argentina, increasing their ability to control its borders. Moreover, Argentina passed Decree 1642/11, which created the National Program for Monitoring the Implementation of Policies for the Prevention of Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism, increasing both the delivery of security and the institutions to settle conflicts (see table 7.1). Since Argentina is able to deliver the critical functions of the state to the residents of Puerto Iguazú and is still improving them, Argentina is not considered to be a fragile state.

Table 7.1: State fragility according to the view from above

State fragility			
	<i>Brazil</i>	<i>Argentina</i>	<i>Paraguay</i>
Control borders	>	>>	X
Delivery of political goods, like:			
Security	>	–	X
Institutions to settle conflicts	>	>>	>
Political participation	–	–	X
Social service delivery	>	–	X
Control growth criminal violence	–	–	X

– = Country is able to deliver this >> = The delivery has increased a lot > = The delivery has improved, but is still poor
X = Country is unable to deliver this

The USA states that Brazil achieved visible results from investments in border and law enforcement infrastructure, in 2008 the Receita Federal reported that they confiscated over \$76 million in

smuggled goods, improving not just the ability to control its borders, but also the ability to deliver the political good of security. As a result of these investments and cooperation with Paraguay and Argentina, the Ponte Internacional da Amizade became safer. Smuggling operations still take place on the Río Parana and the reservoir of the Itaipu Dam, which is why the Receita Federal has special maritime police units. These units contribute to the ability to deliver the political good of security. The USA states that institutions to settle conflicts are adequate, but limited in the fight against terrorism; much of the law enforcement is focused on countering narcotics, rather than terrorism. Furthermore inter-service rivalries hinder the coordination between civilian security agencies, law enforcement agencies and the Brazilian military. Brazil is increasingly able to deliver the main functions of the state to the citizens of Foz do Iguaçu, but the challenges are big and thus, notwithstanding the improvements, the border control and delivery of political goods remain insufficient. However, the delivery of the main functions of the state is improving and Brazil does not seem to be susceptible to crisis in one or more sub-systems²³ and is thus not considered to be a fragile state.

Paraguay seems to be vulnerable to a crisis in one or more sub-systems, for instance in political terms, through its fragmented security organisations; which all suffer from corruption. The USA states the following about the security organisations: *'Limited resources, sporadic interagency cooperation, and corruption within customs, the police, the public ministry, and the judicial sector impeded Paraguay's law enforcement initiatives throughout the country'* (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2013: 188). Because of this, Paraguay is unable to perform the critical functions of a state, like the delivery of the political good of security and the control of its borders and criminal violence in the country. The fact that Paraguay continues to cooperate with the USA on counterterrorism activities, prosecute terrorism fund raisers and passed antiterrorism legislation in 2010 are all contributing to a better delivery of political goods and the institutions to settle conflicts in particular. The USA feels that corruption within the security, border and judicial institutions are holding Paraguay back from providing more effective law enforcement and border security. This means that Paraguay is unable to control its borders and to deliver most of its political goods. Therefore Paraguay is considered to be a fragile state.

The view from above considers Argentina and Brazil to be stable states. Brazil has to be careful, since the control of its borders and the delivery of political goods in Foz do Iguaçu still lacks quality. Paraguay is considered to be a fragile state, since the country is unable to deliver political goods and to control its borders and crime at its territory in general and in Ciudad del Este in particular.

7.1.2 The view from below

Important to note is that many of the respondents make a distinction between the border crossings and the city of Foz do Iguaçu. They emphasise for instance that the border crossing between Brazil and Paraguay is dangerous and thus that Brazil and Paraguay are unable to control their borders and deliver the political good of security, but most of them feel that the city of Foz do Iguaçu is safe.

Most of the interviewees stated that the Brazilian border control could be better, at this moment it suffers from corruption, a lack of staff and space to do proper controls. Tarik stated that officers are entering Jardim Jupira at night, probably to receive money, because they prefer this over confining criminals. Luis Carlos explained that operation Anaconda imprisoned 43 federal agents, who were

²³ See definitions of fragile, crisis and failed state of the Crisis States Research Centre at page 13 of this thesis

part of criminal organisations or who were corrupt. This means that the delivery of the political good of security and institutions to settle conflict and the control of borders are vulnerable to arbitrariness, but that it is improving (see table 7.2). Furthermore respondents noted that the lack of space on the Ponte Internacional da Amizade is a problem, regarding the ability to control the borders. The remodelling of the bridge did improve the control, but according to the respondents the improvement is because of the fiscalização, rather than checks for illegal goods. This means that Brazil has a limited capacity to control its borders and that the social service delivery of infrastructure at the border is insufficient. A lot of respondents feel that the criminality in the city is due to the border, but that the city itself is not lawless. Thus, Brazil is able to deliver the political goods of security and institutions to settle conflict in the city, but not at the border. The same goes for the Brazilian control at the Argentine border; both Agostinho and Diogo noted that it is easy to enter Brazil without a stamp, due to the lack of control. Thus, Brazil's ability to control its border is also limited at the Argentine border. According to the view from below Brazil, and the city of Foz do Iguaçu in particular, is stable. The border crossings on the other hand are considered to be fragile, due to inability to control the borders, control criminal violence and deliver political goods.

Table 7.2: State fragility according to the view from below

State fragility			
	<i>Brazil</i>	<i>Argentina</i>	<i>Paraguay</i>
Control borders	>	–	X
Delivery of political goods, like:			
Security	–	–	X
Institutions to settle conflicts	>	–	X
Political participation	–	–	X
Social service delivery	>>	–	X
Control growth criminal violence	–	–	X

– = Country is able to deliver this >> = The delivery has increased a lot > = The delivery has improved, but is still poor
X = Country is unable to deliver this

All respondents emphasise the level of corruption in Paraguay. Steffi notes that at the border crossing between Brazil and Paraguay everything is corruption and Rafael* states that you can do anything you want in Paraguay, as long as you have money. The corruption in Paraguay prevents the country from delivering political goods like security, institutions to settle conflicts, political participation and social service delivery. For instance, William stated that he witnessed a shooting through the Paraguayan police in the city centre of Ciudad del Este. Furthermore the city deals with a lot of criminality, Rafael* stressed that there are many shops in Ciudad del Este who smuggle things into Brazil for clients. Furthermore all the respondents note that in Paraguay anything is for sale (weapons, drugs, electronics) and that it can enter Brazil easily. Paraguay does not seem to be able to control its borders, nor control violence, nor deliver political goods. Therefore Paraguay is considered to be a fragile state according to the view from below.

Argentina is considered to be a stable state according to the respondents. The border controls are strict, there is barely violence in Puerto Iguazú and the delivery of political goods is proper. The border crossing is described as strict, Juliana stated for instance that here driver's license is expired and her ID does not have a photo anymore, so she cannot go to Argentina. She does not try, because she knows she will not be able to cross. Moreover Bruna and Steffi stress that it is impossible to cross illegal goods to Argentina, due to the control at the border.

7.1.3 Confrontation

When using the mainstream discourse of state failure as operational definition the view from above allows us to categorise easily whether or not a state delivers its main functions and whether or not it is fragile. Important to note is that the view from above puts emphasis on the nation state and the region as a whole, rather than the different cities. The view from below makes clear distinctions between the state of Brazil, the city of Foz do Iguaçu and the border crossings. Therefore it is difficult to categorise whether or not, for instance the political good of security, is delivered. Because it is delivered in the city of Foz do Iguaçu and Puerto Iguazú, but not in city of Ciudad del Este and the Ponte Internacional da Amizade. Subsequently, the view from above emphasises that the Brazilian border control is improved, but that it does not focus on terrorism yet, just drug trafficking. The view from below contradicts this; it puts emphasis on the policy of *fiscalização* and the importance to collect tax revenues, rather than to check for illegal goods. The view from above narrates the intensified border patrol as an improvement of the delivery of security, while the view from below narrates it not just as the improvement of security, but mainly as a policy to collect tax revenues. Concluding, when using the mainstream discourse of state fragility the view from below does not allow an easy categorisation. It takes the complexity of the region and the policy measures into account, whereas the view from above tends to narrate the region as criminal/terrorist. This is in line with the imperial way of differentiating between civilised and uncivilised and friends and enemies as stated by Jones (2008: 197). Moreover, the narration of criminal and terrorist by the view from above endorses that the War on Terrorism is being used as a way to legitimise intervention in Tríplice Fronteira. The view from below does take the historical context into account and emphasise the levels of corruption, endorsing that Western support keeps corruption in place.

7.2 The construction of space

A person constructs space when he or she expresses knowledge of an order of places through effects and organizes his or her actions through limits, possibilities and obligations in a speech act.

7.2.1 The view from above

The view from above focuses on presenting knowledge about Tríplice Fronteira, rather than organising actions by means of going and givens. This means that seeing is more present in the view from above; the USA presents a tableau about Tríplice Fronteira. This tableau, consisting of effects, is formulated in terms of criminality, terrorism, lawlessness and improvement. The view from above presents a tableau for the whole region, with references to the different countries. The USA states that Tríplice Fronteira remains a weak spot when it comes to transnational crime and to a lesser extent transnational terrorism. They continue that persons that are suspected of ties to terrorist groups have been spotted in Tríplice Fronteira, but that no operational activities of terrorism are detected. Besides stressing criminality, terrorism and lawlessness, the view also stresses improvement. For instance that Brazil is increasingly capable of monitoring cash flows within their territory and that Argentina created the National Program for Monitoring the Implementation of Policies for the Prevention of Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism (see table 7.3).

The effects are obtained by practices; which are organisations of spatial actions (going) and thus narrated through givens. The view from above tends to narrate practices in terms of limits and obligations. It states that the effects of criminality, terrorism and lawlessness, are obtained by the practices of corruption, weak institutions, insufficient cooperation, limited legislative capacity and poor law enforcement abilities. It argues that the law enforcement in Brazil is adequate, but limited

in the fight against terrorism. Subsequently, the practice of corruption within security, border control and the judicial institutions – especially Paraguay – is limiting the countries from fighting terrorism. Moreover, the view from above emphasises the obligation of Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay to Resolution 1373 of the UN Security Council. The view from above states that the effects of improvement are obtained by practices of intervention, narrated through possibilities. For instance, the government of Paraguay uses the possibility of the Department of State's Antiterrorism Assistance program, which contributes to building Paraguay's counterterrorism law enforcement capacity through training. Moreover, Argentina implemented terrorism laws, which opens up the possibility to investigate and prosecute acts of terrorism, financing of terrorism and money laundering with the purpose of financing terrorism.

Table 7.3: The construction of space according to the view from above

Construction of Space						
Seeing	Effects	Going	Givens	<i>Limits</i>	<i>Possibilities</i>	<i>Obligations</i>
X	X			X		X

Subsequently, the view from above expresses both limits and possibilities for terrorist funding in its speech act: ideological sympathisers are continuously able to provide financial and ideological support to terrorist groups in the Middle East, but Iran was unable to expand its economic and political ties in Latin America, due to sanctions imposed by the USA and the European Union.

The view from above constructs space through the presentation of a tableau of Tríplice Fronteira (seeing), narrated in terms of criminality, terrorism, lawlessness and improvement (effects). Generally it organises its actions in limits and obligations (givens), the policy interventions are narrated as possibilities (given).

7.2.2 The view from below

The way the view from below narrates their everyday life stories differs per theme. When respondents narrate how they make use of the border, they tend to focus on the organisation of their practices (going), rather than expressing the knowledge of an order of places (seeing). When the view from below narrates how the respondents cross the borders, it expresses predominantly limits and obligations (givens) in its speech act. When talking about terrorism at the border, the view from below narrates solely in terms of seeing and effects, rather than going and givens. This is because the inhabitants of Foz do Iguaçu are aware of the representation of the USA and they have an opinion about it, but they do not act upon the representation in their everyday life.

When analysing the theme 'Making use of the border', the view from below focuses on the organisation of practices, rather than the presentation of an order of places. The respondents express their knowledge of the cities and the region through their actions (going) and givens (see table 7.4). The view from below predominantly narrates Tríplice Fronteira in possibilities (given). It emphasises the possibility to buy products in the other border cities and the opportunity to make a living in Ciudad del Este. The respondents state that the three cities of Tríplice Fronteira are complementing each other and that they use the other border cities because they offer them the possibility to buy products, which are cheaper and of better quality.

Table 7.4: The construction of space *Making use of the border* according to the view from below

Construction of Space				<i>Making use of the border</i>		
Seeing	Effects	Going	Givens	Limits	Possibilities	Obligations
		X	X		X	

The view from below emphasises the benefits of living next to two borders. The respondents all state that they use Puerto Iguazú for the night life and the restaurants. Furthermore they visit the Argentine border city to buy foods which are expensive in Brazil or of lesser quality. Ciudad del Este is also visited to buy cheap goods, like perfume and electronics, but also to visit family and to work. Another important possibility is the ability to work in Ciudad del Este; Marina states that there are not enough well paid jobs in Foz do Iguaçu. Working in Ciudad del Este is a good opportunity to earn more, Luis Carlos stresses that this has been the case for over 25 years. Carolina adds that it is not just the wages which make Paraguay attractive, but also the cheaper education. Moreover, entrepreneurs stress the endless possibilities of doing business at the three borders. Diogo explains that his company uses the three borders for excursions and Val that he uses the three borders to make it easy for tourists to travel from Foz do Iguaçu to other places in South America. Furthermore, Samy and Val stress that they use the exchange rates of different currencies and Sidney states that his clients come from all over Tríplice Fronteira to buy fruits at his company. In addition, all of the entrepreneurs say that they have employees and clients from Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina.

As mentioned before, the border crossing with Argentina is more restricted, while the border crossing to Paraguay is described as an open place through the view from below. The border crossings in itself are narrated as possibilities to buy cheaper and better products, to go out or to work. However, border control is narrated as limiting through the view from below, because it limits the access of the respondents to the other border cities. When analysing the theme *Crossing the border*, it stands out that the interviewees focus less on the organisation of actions (going) through possibilities and more on organisation of actions through limits and obligations (see table 7.5).

Table 7.5: The construction of space *Crossing the border* according to the view from below

Construction of Space				<i>Crossing the border</i>		
Seeing	Effects	Going	Givens	Limits	Possibilities	Obligations
		X		X		X

The Brazilian border control is narrated as none existing, except for the fiscalização. The view from below stresses that people are obligated to declare all goods over 300 dollars and that this is especially controlled at the Paraguayan-Brazilian border. Luciana explained that the fiscalização of the border is at the expense of extensive control on contraband and narcotics that are crossing the border every day. Furthermore, André stated that it is an honest job: ‘...people go there to shop with their own money and come back to their country. It is not a big thing, like the country will lose millions or billions. It is still living, but living on the shades’. So, the fiscalização is not just limiting the control on contraband, but also on what people can import into Brazil. Moreover, the residents of Foz do Iguaçu; who work in Ciudad del Este emphasise that the lack of space at the Ponte Internacional da Amizade in combination with the increased controls resulted in big traffic jams, limiting their options to cross. In addition many respondents, for instance Luis Carlos and William,

admit that they don't feel safe to cross the Ponte Internacional da Amizade by foot and that they use other modes of transport. This limits their options to cross as well. Subsequently, the intensified Argentine control is limiting people to visit Puerto Iguazú. The view from below emphasises that the border crossing with Argentina is restricted, through the obligation to show your documents when you cross. Bruna and Jussimar indicate, for example, that this is a reason for them to visit Puerto Iguazú not as often as they would like. The view from below also addresses the practice of corruption at the border; it is narrated as a limit and a possibility. Many respondents state that corruption interplays with criminality, making the city dangerous and limiting them in their practices of everyday life. Other respondents emphasise that if one has money, one can do anything.

Most of the respondents state that there is little discrimination towards the Arabic community. As mentioned before, the view from below differs on the level of interaction. Generally the interviewees feel that there is little interaction between the Arabic community and the Brazilian community, except for the entrepreneurs. It is remarkable, that when analysing the theme *Terrorism at the border*, the view from below is primarily focused on presenting a tableau of the order of places (seeing), rather than organising actions (going) (see table 7.6). It expresses the tableau through effects, narrated in terms of out of touch with reality; hidden agenda and lack of prove. People have an opioni, but they do not act upon the representation in their daily life.

The view from below narrates the view from above as out of touch with reality; it wonders why a terrorist cell would be in Tríplice Fronteira, while this is far away from both the USA and other possible locations for terrorist attacks. This statement presents an order of places, in the sense that the view from below presents the knowledge of places about the establishment of a terrorist cell and that this should be close to the global turmoil, which Tríplice Fronteira is not. Regarding the cash flow from Tríplice Fronteira to the Middle East many of them say that the money is meant for relatives who live in war; furthermore they point to the lack of evidence of the view from above. There is no prove according to the interviewees. Subsequently some respondents feel that the USA has a hidden agenda and is actually interested in Tríplice Fronteira for the fresh water of the Aquífero Guaraní. By expressing these arguments the view from below shows that it has knowledge about the order of places. They barely narrate practices (going), while talking about terrorism in Tríplice Fronteira. The only thing the view from below narrates in givens is the increased border control over the last ten to fifteen years. It is in general considered as a possibility, because it increases the possibility of a safer border crossing and perhaps city. But as noted in the analyses of *Crossing the border*, the view from below stresses as well that increased border controls limits the practices of everyday life of residents.

Table 7.6: The construction of space *Terrorism at the border* according to the view from below

Construction of Space			<i>Terrorism at the border</i>			
Seeing	Effects	Going	Givens	Limits	Possibilities	Obligations
X	X					

The view from below constructs space through the organisation of its practices in Tríplice Fronteira (going), narrated in givens, consisting of limits, possibilities and obligations. Foremost, it presents knowledge of the order of places (seeing) through the effects obtained by the practices. In constrast, the view from below presents a tableau regarding terrorism at the border, narrated in terms of out of touch with reality, hidden agenda and lack of prove.

7.2.3 Confrontation

The view from above constructs space through the presentation of a tableau of Tríplice Fronteira (seeing), narrated in terms of criminality, terrorism, lawlessness and improvement (effects). Generally it organises its actions in limits and obligations (givens), the policy interventions are narrated as possibilities (given). While the view from below constructs space predominantly through the organisation of its practices in Tríplice Fronteira (going), narrated through givens, consisting of limits, possibilities and obligations. Foremost, it presents knowledge of the order of places (seeing) through the effects obtained by the practices, but the view from below narrates other topics in different ways, while the view from above tend to presents knowledge throughout its speech act. The view from below focuses on the organisation of practices (going), through givens in the themes *making use of the border* and *crossing the border*, while it focuses on seeing through effects in the theme of *terrorism at the border* (see table 7.7). For instance, when the view from below narrates how the respondents cross the borders, it expresses predominantly givens of limits and obligations in its speech act: like the obligation to declare goods and the limit to travel to Puerto Iguazú because of the bureaucracy. In contrast, when talking about terrorism the respondents barely narrate practices (going), they rather express knowledge about, for instant, the lack of proof of the view from above.

Table 7.7: The construction of space: confrontation view from above and view from below

Construction of Space							
	Seeing	Effects	Going	Givens	Limits	Possibilities	Obligations
View from above	X	X			X		X
View from below							
<i>Making use of the border</i>			X	X		X	
<i>Crossing the border</i>			X		X		X
<i>Terrorism at the border</i>	X	X					

The view from above narrates increased border control as a practice of intervention, creating the possibility to control decriminalise the region. The view from below states that it is good border controls are increased, yet it limits the respondents in their everyday life, for instance the increased controls at the Ponte Internacional da Amizade limits cars to cross the bridge. Moreover, corruption is narrated as a limit by the view from above, because it limits Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina in their fight against crime and terrorism. The view from below considers corruption both a possibility and a limit, it limits the security services from fighting crime, but it enables the respondents to get what they want, in exchange for money. This is endorsing the view of Magnussen, who states that cities are increasingly changing; they grow to be more self-organising, even in relation to complex processes such as commercial exchanges and cultural productions (2010: 45-46). As mentioned above, the view from above constructs space through narrating Tríplice Fronteira in terms of criminality, terrorism, lawlessness and improvement. Magnussen stresses that a city is not ungoverned, because there is a high level of practices of self-governance, which are ubiquitous to the city. These practices of self-governance are expressed in the speech act of the view from below; that emphasises that a city is temporary and localised and constantly changing. Concluding, the view from below and the view from above function both as a frontier and a bridge. They create contacts (the frontiers), yet the thing that differentiate them, is also their common point (the bridges). These contacts create spaces of interaction between the view from above and below: the regions. The regions mark out the possibility of interaction and the frontiers. Frontiers between the acting

subjects: for example the three cities if Tríplice Fronteira, economic benefits, crime and terrorism. The acting subjects are dividing among themselves places, emotions, characteristics and movements.

7.3 Bordering, ordering & othering

A person borders, orders or others, when placing symbolic markers along borders and when he or she makes use of the social practice of differentiation between people, money and products. Whereby the social practice of differentiation is understood as the ongoing process of making differentiations in space and time.

7.3.1 The view from above

The view from above borders, orders and others by making a distinction between residents of Tríplice Fronteira (see table 7.8). It expresses differentiations between the Arabic community who lives in Tríplice Fronteira and the other communities. It states for example that the USA remains concerned that Hezbollah and Hamas raise funds among the sizable Muslim communities in the region.

Table 7.8: Bordering, ordering & othering according to the view from above

Bordering, ordering & othering			
<i>Symbolic markers along the border</i>	<i>Social practice of differentiation</i>		
	People	Money	Products
	X		

Although there were no known terrorist cells of either Al-Qai'ida or Hezbollah in South America in April of 2014; the USA fears that ideological sympathisers continue to provide financial and ideological support to terrorist groups in the Middle East. Moreover, the view from above stresses that despite efforts of Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina to counter terrorist funding activities, it is likely there are still groups like Al-Qai'ida and Hezbollah that use the region to raise funds from local supporters. Subsequently Iran's influence in the Western Hemisphere continues to be a concern as well, even though Iran was unable to expand both economic and political ties in Latin America, due to strong sanctions imposed by the USA and the European Union. Thus, the view from above erects a border between the different communities of Tríplice Fronteira, the region and the rest of Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina and between Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina and the USA. In addition, the view from above makes use of the social practice of differentiation between people, by continuously differentiating the Muslim community and others in space and time.

7.3.2 The view from below

The view from below continuously differentiates money and products in space and time. The respondents visit the other border cities to buy goods that are cheaper or better; which is differentiation in products and money. Moreover, entrepreneurs indicate they use exchange rates of different currencies in their favour, differentiating in money as well (see table 7.9). It is important to note that the view from below does not put emphasis on the differentiation of money and products as such, but rather state that it complements each other. For example William states that there is a lot of interaction in commercial ways: Paraguay and Brazil both are big agricultural producers, Argentina has the cheapest gasoline, Paraguay has no import taxes and Brazilians have money to buy the goods from Paraguay and Argentina.

Table 7.9: Bordering, ordering & othering according to the view from below

Bordering, ordering & othering			
<i>Symbolic markers along the border</i>		<i>Social practice of differentiation</i>	
	People	Money	Products
		X	X

The view from below does not put emphasis on the placement of symbolic markers along the borders, the inhabitants state that there are buildings at the border with customs, but most of them do not feel that they are entering another country. In general the interviewees stated that they feel that Tríplice Fronteira is one region, some felt it is an economic region, others define it as a metropolis. Just the residents of Foz do Iguaçu; who work in Ciudad del Este emphasise differentiations in the Brazilian, Paraguayan and Argentine culture. Even though the view from above states generally that the Arabic community in Foz do Iguaçu is closed and that there is not a lot of interaction, it does not differentiate between the different communities. For instance, Marina and Samy state that the inhabitants of Foz do Iguaçu live in peace with each other. Luciana adds that it does not matter where you are from or what your religion is, in Foz do Iguaçu people respect each other. So, the view from below does not make use of the social practice of differentiation between people, although it continuously differentiates between money and products in terms of complementation.

7.3.3 Confrontation

The view from above makes use of the social practice of differentiation between people, by continuously differentiating the Muslim community and others space and time. The view from below does not make use of the social practice of differentiation between people, but it continuously differentiates between money and products in terms of complementation, rather than erecting borders between the products, cities or communities. The view from below differentiates solely between the people who live in Tríplice Fronteira and the USA. The theory of bordering, ordering and othering seems to be applicable to the rigid view from above; however the view from below is resilient. The notion of the frontier of Kristof seems more applicable to the region; the view from below describes Tríplice Fronteira as an area where the in- and out-group meet, an area which is integrating several countries, communities and economies. It stresses that Tríplice Fronteira is an area which is created by the people who live there.

8. Conclusion

This chapter includes the answer to the research question, the recommendations and the reflection. After briefly summarising the empirical findings, the main research question is being answered (§8.1), subsequently the recommendations for scholars and policy makers (§8.2) and the shortcomings of the research are discussed (§8.3).

8.1 Answering the research question

The aim of this research was to contribute to the emerging literature on Tríplice Fronteira between Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina, through a study on the representation and practices of the United States of America in Tríplice Fronteira and the influence of this representation and practices on the residents of Foz do Iguaçu (Brazil). As a result of the research goal, the following research question is formulated:

To what extent does the representation and practices of the United States of America in Tríplice Fronteira between Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina influence the everyday life of inhabitants of Foz do Iguaçu (Brazil)?

The representation of the USA of Tríplice Fronteira continues to be that it is an important regional nexus of arms, narcotics and human trafficking, counterfeiting, pirated goods, and money laundering. According to the USA these actions are potential sources for funding terrorist organisations. Subsequently, the USA states that Brazil's law enforcement units are adequate, but limited in the fight against terrorism. The USA practices upon its representation through participation in the 3+1 group and cooperation with the different countries. For example, USA officials worked with Brazilian security forces to pursue terrorist suspects, as a result of investigative leads provided by the USA and intelligence, law enforcement and financial services. Moreover, The Department of State's Antiterrorism Assistance program contributed to building Paraguay's counterterrorism law enforcement capacity through training, furthermore the USA shares information on law enforcement and security with the Argentine government. Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina passed new legislation and established new law enforcement agencies after 9/11. Argentina and Paraguay implemented anti-terrorism laws, which include penalising the funding of terrorism. Brazil increased its capability to monitor cash flows in Tríplice Fronteira.

When talking to the inhabitants of Foz do Iguaçu, none of the above mentioned counterterrorism measures came up, without me asking for it. The inhabitants of Foz do Iguaçu narrate their city and the other border cities mainly in local and economic terms. An important aspect of the everyday life in Foz do Iguaçu is the ability to buy better or cheaper products across the border; moreover the border provides jobs for a lot of inhabitants of Foz do Iguaçu. In general, Ciudad del Este (Paraguay) and Puerto Iguazú (Argentina) are considered to be another part of town and are – for all respondents – an essential part of everyday life for shopping, working, having dinner etcetera. All of the inhabitants of Foz do Iguaçu address the high levels of corruption and the improved control at the Ponte Internacional da Amizade due to the fiscalização. The respondents emphasise that the fiscalização of the border is at the expense of extensive control on contraband that crosses from Paraguay to Brazil. The border crossing with Argentina is generally considered to be safe, free of criminality and restricted, whereas the border crossing between Brazil and Paraguay is considered to be open and messy. Although the inhabitants of Foz do Iguaçu differ on the level of interaction

between the Brazilian and Arabic community, they generally feel that there is little discrimination between the two communities.

The inhabitants of Foz do Iguaçu generally feel that the narrative of the USA is out of touch with reality; moreover many wonder why a terrorist cell would be in Tríplice Fronteira, while this is far away from the global turmoil. Some respondents feel that the fresh water of the Aquífero Guarani is the real reason why the USA tries to exert power over Tríplice Fronteira. The entrepreneurs and the members of the Arabic community emphasise the lack of evidence for the statements of the USA. Subsequently, respondents noted that the cash flow from Tríplice Fronteira to the Middle East is meant for relatives who live in war.

The view from above and below both state that Argentina is the most stable and Paraguay the least, according to the mainstream discourse of state fragility. In contrary to the view from above, the view from below stresses locality, for example: the Ponte Internacional da Amizade is dangerous, but Foz do Iguaçu is safe; while the narrative from above states that the Tríplice Fronteira as a whole is unsafe. Moreover, the view from above *borders, orders and others* through differentiating the Arabic community from others. The view from below does not make differentiations between people or communities, but they constantly differentiate money and products (buying wine in Puerto Iguazú, buying electronics in Ciudad del Este or using the difference in currencies, when exchanging their money) in terms of complementation. The respondents narrate Tríplice Fronteira as a region with a lot of possibilities, the border allows entrepreneurs to employ cross-border activities, the higher wages in Ciudad del Este allow a lot of Brazilian employees to make a living and the differences in prices and quality of products allow inhabitants to buy the best product. Rather than erecting borders between the products, cities or communities, the view from below creates a frontier. Tríplice Fronteira is a place where the in- and out-group meet and which integrates several countries, communities and economies. It stresses that Tríplice Fronteira is an area which is created by the people who live there. Even though the view from below barely differentiates between the inhabitants of Tríplice Fronteira, they do erect a border between Tríplice Fronteira and the USA, by stating that the representation of the USA is out of touch with reality and that there is a lack of proof for the funding of terrorism in Tríplice Fronteira.

Notwithstanding the view from below, the USA stimulated Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina to increase border control and to address for instance corruption and trafficking. The topic of corruption was brought up in both narratives. The view from above states that corruption is a limit in the war on terrorism, yet the view from below stresses that corruption can also be a possibility: money can buy anything. Stricter control on corrupt border guards is usually perceived as good by the inhabitants of Foz do Iguaçu, even though corruption is currently an integral part of everyday life. The respondents generally state that the border control has improved over the last ten years. Most of them consider this a good thing, yet they narrate the increased border patrol in general as limiting their everyday life. For instance the fiscalização is limiting them from taking more than 300 dollar into Brazil; the increased checks at the Argentine border is for some a reason to visit Puerto Iguazú less, because customs take too much time or inhabitants are not able to visit at all, due to an expired or damaged documents; the checks at Brazilian customs at the border with Paraguay lead to traffic jams, which is for some inhabitants a reason to visit Ciudad del Este less. Although the inhabitants of Foz do Iguaçu feel that the representation of the USA does not affect their everyday life, yet the increased border patrol stimulated by the USA does influence them.

In general the inhabitants of Foz do Iguaçu live their life, benefiting from the differences in price and quality of products and making use of the advantages the other border cities offer them. The residents live their everyday life without paying much attention to the representation of the USA. Yet, the practices of the USA, like stimulating border patrol and training border guards, influence the everyday life of the respondents. They state that they visit Puerto Iguazú and Ciudad del Este less than they would do when the checks would be poorer. So, the practices resulting from the representation of the USA limit the inhabitants of Foz do Iguaçu slightly in their everyday life, but they are not aware of this affect. Moreover, the increased border patrols are generally perceived as positive by the residents of Foz do Iguaçu, because it counters crime like drug trafficking, which is more important to them than countering terrorism.

8.2 Recommendations

The aim of this research was to contribute to the emerging literature on Tríplice Fronteira²⁴ and when possible do policy recommendations on how to act in a region which is dealing with limited governance and foreign biases. The academic debate was focussed on whether or not the money from Tríplice Fronteira was spend on terrorism by Hezbollah and whether or not this meant that terrorism was financed from Tríplice Fronteira. This research showed that the inhabitants of Foz do Iguaçu feel in general that allegations of terrorism are out of touch with reality, but is showed as well that the representation and practices of the USA influenced their life.

First of all, I would recommend other scholars involved in the debate on terrorism and the funding of terrorism to take the grassroots more into account, the people who live in these contested areas are not just subjects to debates on terrorism, but they are a vital part it. I feel it is easy to forget the people who are affected by border controls, air strikes and gunfire when talking about areas were alleged terrorist live. Yet, I feel it is our task as scholars to look beyond the threat of terrorism and consider the impact of policy measures on the communities that are living in these areas. I would like to stress that this goes as much for Tríplice Fronteira, as for other places around the world where people are limited in their everyday life by anti-terrorism laws.

Second, this research dealt with time, money and safety constraints. Therefore the number of respondents is limited, in particular the number of respondents of the Arabic community. I would like to recommend that more research is being done to the grassroots of Tríplice Fronteira and in particular to the influence of the representation on the Arabic community of Foz do Iguaçu and Ciudad del Este. As stated in the methodology chapter the community was – for different reasons - hesitant to talk to me. During another research time should be invested in building trust between the scholar and the community. Moreover, this research has been conducted in Foz do Iguaçu, an additional study that would be conducted in Puerto Iguazú or Ciudad del Este would be helpful.

Third, this research showed that the inhabitants of Foz do Iguaçu create a frontier, rather than a border. The borderland of Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina. The region is resilient and the inhabitants barely differentiate between communities. I would like to recommend more research is being done on the relevance of the theory of Bordering, ordering & othering in borderlands. I would like to recommend exploring the possibility of including the notion of the frontier (Kristof, 1959) in the framework.

²⁴ In English academic literature usually referred to as *Triple Frontier* or *Tri-Border Area*; In Spanish as *La Triple Frontera*

Finally, I would like to encourage policy makers of the USA, Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and the municipalities of Tríplice Fronteira to see as a city (Magnussen, 2010). Seeing like a city is inherent to accepting the fact that the world is not as static as nation-state occur it to be. So what appears in a place at any moment is likely to disappear. Thus transformations are nonlinear and inherently unpredictable (Magnussen, 2010: 48). Accepting this does not mean that the city is ungoverned; there is a high level of practices of self-governance, which are ubiquitous the city.

8.3 Reflection

Every research has limitations, also this one. As noted before, due to financial and time constraints I was not able to conduct only three months of fieldwork, of which I spend ten weeks in Tríplice Fronteira. Even though I got a sense of what life is like in the region, I cannot rule out the fact that I might have missed elements in explaining and understanding Tríplice Fronteira. In addition, this research builds on data collected in Foz do Iguaçu. As a researcher I was forced to make a selection of a lot of data. I am aware of the fact that in the process of making this selection, parts that might be considered important by another scholar, has been left out.

Due to time and safety constraints, this research has been conducted in one of the three border cities. Therefore this study is unable to formulate statements about the influence of the representation and practices of the USA on the everyday life of inhabitants of Puerto Iguazú (Argentina) and Ciudad del Este (Paraguay). Additionally the number of people I was able to speak to during my time in Tríplice Fronteira was limited to 17 respondents. I am aware of the fact that five respondents do not represent an entire community of entrepreneurs or all residents of Foz do Iguaçu, moreover I realise that a respondent is both entrepreneur and resident or that a respondent is part of the Arabic community and working in Ciudad del Este. Even though the respondent groups seem static, the groups are fluid. Unlike the other respondent groups, I only talked to two men of the Arabic community. I realise that two respondents do not represent the opinion of the entire community, but as mentioned before the community was – for different reasons - hesitant to talk to me.

Subsequently, most of the interviews have been conducted in English, because my (Brazilian) Portuguese was not good enough to have extensive conversations. I am aware of the fact that, due to the language, respondents were less able to express their feelings, perceptions and emotions. The interview with the municipality of Foz do Iguaçu was online and the answers were short, it would have benefited the research if the municipality of Foz do Iguaçu would have been able to talk to me, like the municipality of Puerto Iguazú and Ciudad del Este were able to.

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Appendices

- Appendix I: Interview guides
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Appendix I: Interview guides

Interview guide - Residents Foz do Iguaçu

1. Could you please introduce yourself?
(name, age, job)
2. Can you describe an ordinary weekday?
3. Do you ever visit Puerto Iguazú?
 - Regularly?
 - What for?
4. Do you ever visit Ciudad del Este?
 - Regularly?
 - What for?
5. Would you say there is a lot of interaction between the three cities?
 - Do you think it is a metropolis, rather than three cities?
6. How would you describe the different border crossings?
 - Brazil – Paraguay?
 - Brazil – Argentina?
 - Do you think this is good/bad?
 - Did the border patrols increased since 2000?
7. Would you describe Tríplice Fronteira as ungoverned or lawless?
8. The criminality rates are high in this area, do you think this connects to the geographical location of Foz, as being a border city?
 - Do you have any experience with 'border related' criminality (smuggling, etc.) ?
 - If so, does this influence your life?
 - USA says that Tríplice Fronteira as a terrorist sanctuary, because of limited border patrol & laws: what do you think?
9. There is a big Arab community in Foz & Ciudad, is there many interaction between the different communities?
 - Is there discrimination between the Arabic and Brazilian community?

Interview guide - Residents of Foz do Iguaçu; who work in Ciudad del Este

1. Could you please introduce yourself?
(name, age, job)
2. Why do/did you work in Paraguay?
3. Can you describe an ordinary weekday?
4. Do you visit Ciudad del Este just for work, or also for other reasons?
 - Regularly?
 - What for?
5. Do you ever visit Puerto Iguazú?
 - Regularly?
 - What for?
6. Would you say that the three cities are a metropolis, rather than three separate cities in three separate countries?
 - Is there many interaction between the three cities?
7. How do you describe the border passing with Paraguay?
 - Is it difficult to get a work license in/for Paraguay?
 - When travelling back & forth to work, do you get checked?
 - While passing, did you ever see criminal activities?
 - i. Do you have any experience with criminality in Foz do Iguaçu or Ciudad del Este?
 - ii. How do you cope with that? Do you change your routine?
8. Do you think the criminality in Foz do Iguaçu border related?
9. The USA describes Tríplice Fronteira as a terrorist sanctuary, because of limited border patrols and law, what do you think?
10. There is a big Arab community in Foz & Ciudad, is there many interaction between the different communities?
 - Do you meet a lot of them, while working in Paraguay?
 - Is there discrimination between the Arabic and Brazilian community?

Interview guide - Entrepreneurs

1. Could you please introduce yourself?
(name, age)
2. Could you give me a description of your company?
 - Do you employ cross-border activities?
 - In general: is there a lot of interaction between the three cities?
3. Do you, as an entrepreneur, use the location of Foz, near two other countries?
 - Comparative advantages?
4. Do you have employees only from Brazil or also Argentina & Paraguay?
5. Is there a lot of policy guide lines in you field of business?
 - Is there a lot of bureaucracy?
 - Is there a special focus on security?
6. Do you ever visit Puerto Iguazú?
 - Regularly?
 - What for?
7. Do you ever visit Ciudad del Este?
 - Regularly?
 - What for?
8. Would you say there is a lot of interaction between the three cities?
 - Do you think it is a metropolis, rather than three cities?
9. The USA says that Tríplice Fronteira is a lawless area, would you agree?
 - Why/why not?
 - There is high rate of registered criminal activities in the area, does your company had an experience with crime?
 - Do you think this is border related?
10. There is a big Arab community in Foz & Ciudad, is there many interaction between the different communities?
 - Is there discrimination between the Arabic and Brazilian community?

Interview guide - Arabic community

1. Could you please introduce yourself?
(name, age, job)
2. Do you ever visit Puerto Iguazú?
 - Often?
 - What for?
3. Do you ever visit Ciudad del Este?
 - Often?
 - What for?
4. Would you say there is a lot of interaction between the three cities?
 - Do you think it is a metropolis, rather than three cities?
5. How would you describe the different border crossings?
 - Brazil – Paraguay?
 - Brazil – Argentina?
 - Do you think this is good/bad?
 - Did the border patrols increased since 2000?
6. Would you say that Tríplice Fronteira is ungoverned or lawless?
7. The criminality rates are high in this area, do you think this connects to the geographical location of Foz, as being a border city?
 - Do you have any experience with ‘border related’ criminality (smuggling, etc.) ?
 - If so, does this influence your life?
8. Could you tell me something about the Arab community in Foz?
 - When did your family came here?
 - Why did they came here?
9. Is there discrimination between the different ethnicities in Foz do Iguaçu?
10. The USA calls Tríplice Fronteira a terrorist sanctuary, because of the limited border patrol and law enforcement, what do you think?
 - They say/think this because of the cash flow to the Middle East and thus because of the Arab community here.
 - Do you notice this?
 - Does this ever bother you?
 - If so, does this changes your life and routine?

Appendix II: Coding schedules

Coding schedule thematic analysis

1. Living in Tríplice Fronteira
 - 1.1 Visiting Puerto Iguazú
 - 1.1.1 Shopping
 - 1.1.2 Leisure
 - 1.1.3 Other
 - 1.2 Visiting Ciudad del Este
 - 1.2.1 Shopping
 - 1.2.2 Work
 - 1.2.3 Other
 - 1.3 Quantity of visits to Puerto Iguazú
 - 1.4 Quantity of visits to Ciudad del Este
 - 1.5 Relation three cities
 - 1.5.1 Metropolis
 - 1.5.2 Cities working together
 - 1.5.3 Separate cities & countries
 - 1.6 Use of borders by entrepreneurs
 - 1.6.1 Cross-border activities
 - 1.6.2 Comparative advantages
 - 1.6.3 Employees
 - 1.6.3.1 Brazil
 - 1.6.3.2 Argentina
 - 1.6.3.3 Paraguay
 - 1.6.4 Policy
 - 1.6.4.1 Bureaucracy
 - 1.7 Arab community Foz do Iguaçu
 - 1.7.1 Interaction Arab – Brazilian community
 - 1.7.2 Discrimination Arab – Brazilian community
 - 1.8 Working in Ciudad del Este
 - 1.8.1 Costumers
 - 1.8.2 Reason to work in Ciudad del Este
2. Crossing the border
 - 2.1 Border crossing Brazil – Paraguay
 - 2.2 Border crossing Brazil – Argentina
 - 2.3 Control border passing
 - 2.3.1 Control border passing Paraguay
 - 2.3.1.1 Opinion on control
 - 2.3.2 Control border passing Argentina
 - 2.3.2.1 Opinion on control
 - 2.3.3 Control Brazil
 - 2.4 Criminality at the border
 - 2.4.1 Brazil – Paraguay
 - 2.4.1.1 Personal experiences
 - 2.4.2 Brazil – Argentina

2.4.2.1 Personal experiences

2.5 MERCOSUR

3. USA in Tríplice Fronteira

3.1 Quantity border patrol since 2000

- 3.1.1 Law enforcement
- 3.1.2 Policy on security
- 3.1.3 Ideas for policy on security
- 3.1.4 *Fiscalisation*

3.2 Criminality Foz

- 3.2.1 Personal experience criminality
- 3.2.2 Corruption
- 3.2.3 Border related
- 3.2.4 Politicians

3.3 Opinion on representation USA

- 3.3.1 Lawlessness
- 3.3.2 Terrorism
- 3.3.3 Cash flow
- 3.3.4 Aquífero Guarani

Coding schedule theoretic analysis

1. State failure
 - A. Growth criminal violence
 - B. Inability to control borders
 - C. Inability to deliver political goods
 - I. Security
 - II. Institutions to settle conflicts
 - III. Political participation
 - IV. Social service delivery
2. Construction of space
 - A. Seeing
 - B. Going
 - I. An effect
 - II. A given
 - i. A limit
 - ii. A possibility
 - iii. An obligation
3. Bordering, ordering, othering
 - A. Symbolic markers along the border
 - B. Social practice of differentiation
 - I. People
 - i. Paraguayans
 - ii. Argentineans
 - iii. Arabic
 - iv. USA
 - v. Border guards
 - II. Money
 - III. Products