


Multi-sectoral Partnerships: A panacea for post-conflict development?

MSPs as a solution to post-conflict economic development issues in Afghanistan



Freya van Os

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Preface

The process of writing this thesis was a long one, sometimes frustrating but fortunately rewarding in the end. Hopefully, when we look back in a few years we can say the same for the post-conflict economic development process in Afghanistan. So far it has only been a long, and frustrating process, with ups and downs, and the reward of a safe and stable Afghanistan has yet to come. Many different actors are responsible for making the post-conflict economic development process in Afghanistan a success in the end. The same applies to this thesis, many people have contributed to the final result and I am grateful for all support and assistance I received.

First of all, I would like to thank my supervisor Willemijn Verkoren for her guidance, and her help with finding an internship. Next, I would like to thank the EVD, in particular the department for Private Sector Investment, for providing me with an internship and Paul Schoenmakers for being my internship supervisor. The research for this thesis was conducted under the umbrella of a more comprehensive research into public-private cooperation in fragile states by the Peace, Security and Development Network. Therefore, I would like to thank all members of the Public Private Cooperation Workgroup Afghanistan, who have welcomed me into the workgroup and were always available for questions. Furthermore, I am grateful for the opportunity that Clingendael has given me to remain involved in the project and the network after my internship had ended. In addition, a special thanks goes out to all respondents who have cooperated and provided me with valuable insights in post-conflict economic development and the work of NGOs in Afghanistan. Finally, I would like to offer my gratitude to my parents for their mental and financial support, my sister for her assistance and ability to find articles that I could not find, and my boyfriend, Michel Willems, for supporting me during this process, and distracting me when necessary.

Abstract

The goal of this thesis was to determine whether multi-sectoral partnerships can be a conflict sensitive solution to the problems with the post-conflict economic development in Afghanistan. In order to do this, twelve multi-sectoral partnerships in Afghanistan and in other post-conflict countries, have been discussed. A checklist for conflict sensitivity has been filled out for each project. In addition, the problems that occur in the post-conflict economic development of Afghanistan have been examined. Based on the results of this research it can be concluded that multi-sectoral partnerships are neither conflict sensitive nor conflict insensitive by nature. Furthermore, it can be concluded that multi-sectoral partnerships are no solution to all problems in the post-conflict economic development in Afghanistan, but can be a valuable addition to the post-conflict development process.

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1. Introduction

Unfortunately there are many countries in the world affected by violent conflict. More often than not, these countries are poor and underdeveloped. When the conflict has ended, the task ahead is daunting. In addition to the normal challenges of developing countries, post-conflict countries also face the challenge of peace consolidation and the rebuilding of the damage occurred during the conflict. This is a task too large for the country on its own, many other actors are involved in the post-conflict development process. Examples are the United Nations, Non-Governmental Organizations, the World Bank and other developmental organizations, and other governments. The communication and coordination between these different parties involved is often difficult, complicating the post-conflict development process.

Afghanistan is one of these poor and underdeveloped countries that has been affected by violent conflict. Since the Taliban was overthrown in 2001, many different parties are involved and even more post-conflict development projects have taken place in Afghanistan. Today however, the country remains unstable, unsafe and underdeveloped. In this thesis, several problems in the post-conflict economic development process in Afghanistan are discussed, and it is attempted to determine whether cooperation between the different parties involved could be a solution for these problems.

This chapter provides an introduction to the subject of this thesis, the research question and sub questions are proposed, and the scientific relevance of the subject is discussed. In addition, the most important concepts of this thesis are defined and a layout of this thesis is provided.

1.1 Introduction to the subject

The future of Afghanistan is an uncertain future. At this point in time, the future looks bleak as violence spreads around the country, economic development is hampered, and the government is unable to control the entire territory. According to the Fragile State Index (2010) the situation is getting worse. Prospects are not favourable for Afghanistan. This is not uncommon in the world of post-conflict reconstruction. In general, the United Nations (UN) reckons that countries in post-conflict transition have a fifty percent chance of reverting to war and chaos (Del Castillo, 2009, p. 2). It can be debated whether or not Afghanistan is a post-conflict country. After all, the insurgency continues to effect large parts of the country. However, since the invasion in 2001 and the subsequent withdrawal of the Taliban a new government was installed. In addition, the reconstruction process started. The full-scale war in Afghanistan was declared over by the United States in 2003 (Karon, 2003). Therefore will Afghanistan be considered as a post-conflict country in this thesis. And, like all

post-conflict countries, Afghanistan has come to a point in which there are two possibilities. Either the conflict is reignited, or the road to peace and recovery will be taken. At the moment there are many problems in the transition process in Afghanistan. In this thesis, the emphasis will be on the economic developmental processes in Afghanistan. Countries that fail to address post-conflict economic reconstruction effectively face a fifty/fifty chance of reverting to war (Del Castillo, 2009, p.4), making economic reconstruction vital for the transition process.

1.2 Peace building strategies and economic reconstruction

Most operations in post-conflict countries have been deployed by the United Nations. Since the creation of the United Nations there have been several strategies for dealing with post-conflict countries, from traditional peacekeeping to peace supporting operations. In 1948 the first UN mission was mandated. The first missions, including Israel in 1948 and Kashmir in 1949, were traditional peacekeeping missions¹. Traditional peacekeeping is intended to assist in the creation and maintenance of conditions conducive to long-term conflict resolution by the parties themselves (Bellamy et al., 2004). This type of operation had several shortcomings, the states in conflict had to cooperate fully to achieve success, the mandate was very limited and the operation contributes very little to resolving the conflict. In addition, no after care is provided and there is limited incentive for the conflicting parties to resolve the conflict².

Due to this limitations, and the occurrence of situations in which traditional peacekeeping would not suffice, a new type of operations were mandated in the nineties, managing transition operations³. This type of operation is fundamentally different from the traditional peacekeeping missions because it takes place at a different stage of the conflict. In addition, a significant civilian component is present in the managing transition operations (Bellamy et al., 2004). Managing transition operations take place after a ceasefire and a political settlement have been reached by the parties involved (Bellamy et al., 2004). There are several problems related to this type of operation, the military component is fairly weak and the success of the operations depends entirely on the cooperation of the involved parties. The complexity of the operation makes it very expensive, and failure in one aspect (for instance demobilisation) will influence other aspects. Furthermore, the emphasis is placed too much on elections as a viable solution and end to the conflict⁴. Due to its specific characteristics, this type of operation is not suited to environments where conflict is ongoing (Bellamy et al., 2004). New strategies had to be developed for such situations, wider peacekeeping for instance.

Wider peacekeeping is different from other peacekeeping missions before, because it takes place in a hostile environment with ongoing violence, often in non-inter-state wars (Bellamy et al., 2004). Wider

¹ Lecture by A. Pauwels, February 2008, Nijmegen.

² Idem.

³ Lecture by A. Pauwels, March 2008, Nijmegen.

⁴ Idem.

peacekeeping only took place in Bosnia, where it failed miserably due to a lack of financial means and equipment⁵.

During the same time as the wider peacekeeping and managing transition missions were deployed a new type of mission emerged, peace enforcement. This type of mission takes place in an intra-state conflict, without permission of the involved government. Violence (all necessary means) may be used to carry out the mandate (Bellamy et al., 2004). The major shortcoming of this type of operation is that it does not contribute to durable peace. In addition, an enormous capacity is necessary to enforce peace⁶.

Peace supporting operations are the blueprint of current UN missions⁷. This type of operation has attempted to learn from the problems of past strategies. There is a strong military component and a stronger mandate; violence may be used when necessary. In addition, there is a better harmonisation between the mandate and the financial and military means needed to achieve the mandate. Furthermore, the emphasis lays on reconstruction, in order to create a sustainable peace. Examples of peace supporting operations are Kosovo and East-Timor. Although there is a better harmonisation between the mandate and financial and military means needed, there remains an unwillingness to contribute, financially and with troops, amongst the member states of the UN⁸.

The missions of the UN have evolved to accommodate changing needs in post-conflict development. The scope of the missions has grown wider, and it has been attempted to solve shortcomings of past strategies. Lessons learned from past missions were used to adapt post-conflict strategies. The course of the mission in Afghanistan is different from the 'usual' post-conflict missions of the UN. First of all, the initial invasion of Afghanistan by the US, supporting the Northern Alliance, was not mandated by the United Nations Security Council. A mandate was given in 2002 to form the International Security Assistance Force (currently led by NATO). In addition, the United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan (UNAMA) was deployed in Afghanistan in 2002 as well. UNAMA is a political mission, mandated to assist the government and the population in laying the foundations for sustainable peace and development. The ISAF mission has a peace-enforcing mandate, and is allowed to use violence when necessary.

Second, Afghanistan in 2001 can be considered a failed state. Although failed states are not homogeneous, there are several characteristics. For instance, there is a failure of the government to maintain the essential wellbeing of their populations and/or governments that have begun to prey on their own citizens; a sustained degradation of the infrastructure necessary or citizens to maintain a normal life, resulting in substantial humanitarian crises and/or migration; widespread lawlessness to the point that criminal groups act with impunity or rival the authority or government actors; and a transference of some or many citizens' loyalties to non-state actors in many parts of the country

⁵ Idem.

⁶ Idem.

⁷ Idem.

⁸ Idem.

(Rotberg, 2002). In addition, states plagued by chronic state failure are statistically more likely to host terrorist groups that commit transnational attacks (Piazza, 2008). Failed states have particular characteristics that make post-conflict operations more difficult. Since for instance the state is very weak and lacks legitimacy, a state building approach is necessary, in addition to the 'normal' post-conflict operations. This aspect makes the post-conflict development process in Afghanistan even more complicated.

The economic aspect of the post-conflict operations has varied during time. An important factor herein is the World Bank. Since the establishment of the World Bank after the Second World War the institution has a specific mandate to assist post-war reconstruction (Bojici-Dzelilovi, 2002). During the early years, the institution functioned as a key agency for channelling aid for the reconstruction of Western Europe. In the decades that followed, the World Bank became a pillar of the system of international aid to less developed countries (Bojici-Dzelilovi, 2002). However, the World Bank is not a relief agency. The exact role of the organization varies from country to country. In cases where the World Bank assumed the role of overall coordination its influence in defining the reconstruction agenda was large. Overall, the central issue in the working method of the World Bank is how to strengthen the private sector. In order to achieve this goal, macroeconomic stabilization, the rebuilding of the infrastructure and institutional and regulatory frameworks are the means to this goal. The development of an open, market-based economic system is one of the principal goals of assistance (Bojici-Dzelilovi, 2002). The rigid measures taken to accomplish macroeconomic stabilization, and an open market-based economic system can undermine efforts in other areas of reconstruction. A lack of funds for development, and a weak government can be results of this strategy (Bojici-Dzelilovi, 2002). Fortunately, the World Bank is beginning to realize that adhering to these strict measures may not be the way to go, and a more flexible approach is considered.

The results of the UN missions of the past are variable. In 1997, Paris concluded that the missions so far had been quite unsuccessful. In his article, he discussed eight countries, Namibia, Cambodia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Mozambique, Angola, Rwanda and Bosnia. According to Paris (1997), only Namibia was on a path towards stable peace. All of the other states had either slipped back into civil war or had experienced problems that threaten to reignite conflict. In addition, almost all countries are still very underdeveloped and poor, even after the extensive economic reconstruction, which is part of the peace building process. In 2010, Paris concluded once more that the UN missions of the (recent) past are not totally successful. For instance, the UN mission in East-Timor was ended in 2002 and was considered a success. However, violence erupted once more in 2006 (Paris, 2010, p. 342).

If the purpose of peace building is to create the conditions for self-sustaining peace, most missions cannot be seen as total successes (Paris, 2010), and many problems remain (for more information on the problems of post-conflict peace building, see chapters two and five). Many of the countries in

which such missions were deployed are still very underdeveloped, poor and dependent on foreign aid (Paris, 2010). It can be concluded that the economic aspect of post-conflict development was not very successful. However, the economic reconstruction is a vital part in the creation of sustainable peace. This thesis will therefore focus on the post-conflict economic development section within the operation in Afghanistan. In chapter five, an analysis is provided of the issues related to the post-conflict economic development in Afghanistan.

1.3 Multi-sectoral Partnerships

The private sector, both local and international, can play a part in the economic development process. According to Killick et al. (2005) the local private sector can contribute actively to peace, and it remains one of the most underestimated and underused peace-building actors. The private sector however is not the only important sector in economic development in post-conflict countries. Government, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and multinational organisations (MNOs) such as the World Bank are also important. These sectors are more established as actors in the post-conflict economic development process than the private sector. Van Tulder and van der Zwart (2006) point out that government and civil society have failed in creating sustainable development in general, in spite of millions of dollars in development aid. Their evidence are the many poor and underdeveloped states in the world, especially in Africa. In addition, experiences with post-conflict development of the past have also not been entirely positive (Paris, 2010). According to Paris (2010), the post-conflict economic development processes are ridden with problems, resulting in unstable, poor and underdeveloped countries.

There are several authors that claim that cooperation between the different sectors involved would be more beneficial to the development process in general (e.g. Van Tulder and van der Zwart, 2006; Reinicke et al., 2000; Kolk et al., 2008) and of post-conflict economic development in particular (Killick et al. 2005). There are several arguments why multi-sectoral partnerships are beneficial to development. Partnerships are particularly suitable for undertaking large-scale projects, which supersede the capacity of one of the partners. In addition, through partnerships, results can be achieved that otherwise would not have been achieved. Partnerships can create synergy between partners' objectives, resulting in otherwise unachievable results (Workgroup PPC Afghanistan, 2010). In addition, cooperation between the different sectors could contribute to mutual understanding, more trust and respect between the sectors which in turn is beneficial for cooperation in the future (Van Tulder and Fortanier, 2009). However, most of these arguments are not empirically tested in the case of development in post-conflict situations. In chapter two, a more extensive analysis of the scientific literature on the subject of multi-sectoral partnerships in development will be provided.

This thesis will attempt to shed light on the question whether or not multi-sectoral partnerships could contribute in a positive way to the post-conflict economic development process in Afghanistan.

1.4 Research Question

The research question of this thesis is

In what degree are Multi-sectoral partnerships a conflict sensitive solution for the problems with the post-conflict economic development process in Afghanistan?

The concept of conflict sensitivity is very important in post-conflict situations. Care must be taken not to aggravate the conflict, and if possible, contribute actively to peace. It is important that economic development strategies in post-conflict countries are conflict sensitive. The concept of conflict sensitivity is therefore a central concept in this thesis.

To answer this research question the following sub-questions are proposed:

1. *In what degree can multi-sectoral partnerships be conflict sensitive?*
2. *What are the problems with the post-conflict economic development process in Afghanistan?*
3. *Have multi-sectoral partnerships been used as an economic development strategy in post-conflict countries, and if so, what were the results?*
4. *Have multi-sectoral partnerships been used as an economic development strategy in Afghanistan, and if so, what were the results?*

It is important to determine whether or not multi-sectoral partnerships can be conflict sensitive. As mentioned before, conflict sensitivity is very important in post-conflict situations, if multi-sectoral partnerships cannot be conflict sensitive, they should not be used in post-conflict situations. So far, there has been little or no attention in the existing scientific literature on the subject of conflict sensitivity in partnerships, it is therefore unknown if multi-sectoral partnerships can be conflict sensitive. To determine if multi-sectoral partnerships can be a solution to the issues with the current post-conflict economic development processes in Afghanistan, one must know the issues. Sub question two was therefore proposed. Sub question three was proposed in order to determine whether multi-sectoral partnerships have been used in other post-conflict countries than Afghanistan. Experiences with such partnerships in other countries can be valuable in determining whether or not such partnerships can be used in Afghanistan. Even though there have not been many multi-sectoral partnerships in Afghanistan, there are some examples. In order to answer the main research question, it is important to analyse the results of existing multi-sectoral partnerships in Afghanistan. Sub question four was therefore proposed.

1.5 *Post-conflict economic development defined*

In this thesis the term ‘post-conflict economic development’ is used in a broad sense. It includes post-conflict economic *reconstruction*. Since Afghanistan has never really had working (economic) institutions, the term reconstruction would be too limited when describing the processes in Afghanistan to revive the economy. The term ‘post-conflict economic development’ includes not only the rehabilitation but also the creation of basic services and (re)building of physical and human infrastructure, the stabilization and structural reform policies, the microeconomic foundations required to create a market economy and reactivate investment and broad-based economic growth (Del Castillo, 2008).

1.6 *Conflict sensitivity*

An important concept in this thesis is ‘conflict sensitive’. This paragraph will provide a definition of this concept. Firstly, definitions from different organisations will be provided. Eventually, a working definition for this thesis will be proposed.

1.6.1 *Definitions*

According to the United Nations (2005), a conflict sensitive approach is an approach that in no way contributes to violence, corruption, criminality or human rights violations to ensure that the conflict is not revived. In addition, conflict sensitive also refers to efforts to contribute *actively* to peace building, human security and sustainable development. A more comprehensive definition was proposed by the partners who were involved in the development of the Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peace building – A Resource Pack (Roth, 2004, p.1), they define conflict sensitivity as follows. Conflict sensitivity is the capacity of an organisation to (a) understand the (conflict) context in which it operates, (b) understand the interaction between its operations and the (conflict) context, and (c) act upon the understanding of this interaction in order to avoid negative impacts and maximise positive impacts on the (conflict) context and the intervention.

The term ‘context’ is used, rather than ‘conflict’, the term ‘conflict’ would be too restrictive for two reasons. First of all, just understanding the conflict is not enough, understanding the context in which the conflict could develop, with all socio-economic and political tensions, root causes and structural factors, is important in order to act conflict sensitive. Second, the term ‘conflict’ can be misunderstood as being a macro-political violence between two warring parties (Roth, 2004, p.1), which is too restrictive in this matter.

In this thesis, a combination of both definitions will be used. Conflict sensitivity is defined as follows. Conflict sensitivity is the capacity of an organisation to (a) understand the (conflict) context in which it operates, (b) understand the interaction between its operations and the (conflict) context, and (c) act

upon the understanding of this interaction in order to avoid negative impacts, such as contributing to violence, corruption, criminality or human rights violations and to maximise positive impacts on the (conflict) context, to contribute actively to peace building, human security and/or sustainable development.

1.7 Multi-sectoral Partnerships defined

In this thesis, multi-sectoral partnerships are defined as ‘a form of cooperation between two or more organizations from two or more of the following sectors: Non-governmental organizations, private sector, government, multi-national organizations’.

1.8 Scientific Relevance

There is a large body of knowledge on post-conflict economic development. Many different theories on the economic reconstruction and development have been developed (e.g. Collier and Hoeffler, 2002a; Del Castillo, 2008; Galtung and Tisné, 2008; van Gennip, 2005). In addition, there is scientific literature on international cooperation between different sectors, such as the public and private sector (e.g. Kolk et al., 2008; Selsky and Parker, 2005; Van Tulder and Kostwinder, 2008). Within this subject, some attention has been given to multi-sectoral partnerships in development (e.g. Van Tulder and van der Zwart, 2006; Van Tulder and Fortanier, 2009; Bäckstrand, 2006). The focus of this literature is on ‘development as usual’, in underdeveloped countries unaffected by conflict. So far there has been very little literature on multi-sectoral partnerships in post-conflict economic development, the literature that is present often describes a specific case (e.g. Prescott and Pellini, 2001; Maresca, 2003). The majority of the literature that is present is non-scientific literature (for instance the AIV-advice no. 50 about private sector development and poverty eradication, 2006). The research in this thesis combines both fields of study, in particular for the case of Afghanistan.

1.9 Layout of this thesis

In chapter two, the existing literature on this subject will be discussed, and a theoretical framework is developed. The third chapter is dedicated to the methodology of this research and the working method of this thesis is explained. In the fourth chapter background information on Afghanistan will be presented, in order to come to a better understanding of the situation in Afghanistan. In chapter five, the specific issues related to the post-conflict economic reconstruction process in Afghanistan will be discussed, providing an answer to sub question two. The sixth and seventh chapter in this thesis will deal with the experiences with multi-sectoral partnerships in other post-conflict countries (chapter six), and Afghanistan (chapter seven). In addition, these chapters will provide an analysis of the conflict sensitivity of the discussed cases, thereby answering sub question one. The last chapter will be a

concluding chapter in which the research question will be answered. Furthermore, the theoretical and practical contribution of this thesis, limitations of this research and recommendations for further research can be found in this chapter.

2. Theoretical framework

In this chapter, a theoretical framework will be presented which is based on two sets of theories: one on post-conflict development processes, and one on multi-sectoral partnerships in development. This chapter starts with a paragraph about the war economy, because civil war changes the characteristics of the national economy. It is therefore important for post-conflict economic development to understand the concept of a war economy. The second paragraph continues with the concept of conflict sensitivity that was defined in chapter one, and presents the do no harm framework. This framework is a valuable tool in understanding the (conflict) context of a particular country. Paragraph three and four present the two sets of theories, on post-conflict development processes and on multi-sectoral partnerships in development. The following paragraph introduces multi-national organizations. Paragraph six explains the different roles that the partners can have in a partnership, and the reasons for their involvement in such partnerships. The final paragraph is a concluding paragraph.

2.1 War economy

Protracted civil war changes the economic structures of the national economy profoundly. The formal economy is often destroyed, the shadow or informal economy becomes more important, and a war economy is created (Kamphuis, 2005). In a typical post-conflict situation, four different economies can be distinguished that coexist and are intertwined into a war economy: the international aid economy, the criminal economy, the informal economy and the remaining formal economy which only covers a fraction of the total economic activity (Ehrke, 2003). This type of economy perpetuates the very structures that have given rise to the conflict and can easily lead to new violence. The people that have profited from the war economy will have strong incentives to a continuation of the conflict situation (Kamphuis, 2005, p. 185).

War economies have the following characteristics: there is a huge agrarian sector that basically serves subsistence needs. The low level of production hardly allows for a surplus that can be sold (informal economy). Industry is almost non-existent, and the production and service sector are characterized by little or no value adding (formal economy). The government is often dependent on development aid and grants (aid economy) (d'Epinay et al. 2007, p. 12). In the case of Afghanistan, the drug trade is flourishing, making up a large part of the Afghan export and financing the insurgents and warlords (criminal economy). In order to create sustainable development, it is important that the war economy is transformed, the informal economy should be reintegrated with the formal economy and the

criminal economy, and eventually the aid economy as well, should be minimized. In order to create sustainable development, it is important that the government receives revenues, such as taxes, to be able to pay for its expenditures. One of the important sources for taxes are businesses, which is one of the reasons why the informal economy should be formalized. In addition, the government cannot impose rules and regulations on activities that take place in the criminal or informal economy. Last, the aid economy should be minimized in order to prevent negative effects such as aid dependency.

2.2 *Do no harm framework*

In order to understand the (conflict) context and the interaction between the projects and the context, it is necessary to conduct a conflict analysis. A valuable tool in this is the “do no harm framework” of Mary Anderson (2000). This framework was developed to help aid workers get a handle on the complexity of the conflict environments, and to help them see how decisions they make affect inter-group relationships (Anderson, 2000, p. 9). The “do no harm framework” has six steps. The first step is to understand the context of conflict, which of the conflicts in society are potentially dangerous in terms of violence. Only those are relevant for the analysis. Analyzing the dividers and tensions between the groups involved in the conflicts of step one is the second step, analyzing the connectors and local capacities for peace is step three. To assess the impact of the project, it is important to know the dividers, tensions, connectors and local capacities for peace. Dividers and tensions influence the conflict context negatively, connectors and local capacities for peace can have a positive effect. Step four and five deal with the aid programme, in step four the aid programme itself is analysed. Step five analyses the impact of the aid programme on dividers and connectors. The final step deals with programming options. When the analysis shows that the programme exacerbates dividers, or overlooks connectors, other programming options should be chosen to avoid this consequence (p.11-13).

The effects of aid on conflict, on the dividers and connectors, occur in two ways. The first is through resource transfers, these resource transfers can affect conflict in five ways. Theft of diversion for use by warriors, distribution effects (the manner in which aid is distributed among groups in society), market effects (aid influences wages, prices and profits), substitution effects (when local resources are no longer needed to survive, because of the aid, the resources can be used for conflict), and legitimization effects (how aid is given legitimizes some people, and de-legitimizes others) (Anderson, 2000, p.13-14).

The second way in which aid affects conflict is through implicit ethical messages that the aid organizations propagate with their actions. For instance, when international agencies have different policies covering the safety and care of their international and national staff, the implicit ethical message is that different lives have different value (p.14-15).

In the following chapter on the methodology of this thesis, a measuring instrument based on the do no harm framework will be introduced.

2.3 Post-conflict economic development theory

After the Cold War, a new type of international peace operation emerged, post-conflict peace building. It was a more comprehensive type of operation than the traditional missions of the United Nations, which involved monitoring ceasefires or neutral buffer zones between former combatants. Humanitarian, economic and political elements were added to the missions (Paris and Sisk, 2007). The goal of peace building was “to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to prevent a relapse into conflict” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). The important part that economic development can play in post-conflict operations was recognized for the first time. The dominant economic doctrine was that of neo-liberalism. (Bojici-Dzelilovi, 2002, p. 90) In this post-conflict development process, a market-based capitalist economic system is established, in combination with a political regime that is willing to promote and defend free-market capitalism (Guttal, 2005, p. 73). The reconstruction process is financed largely through multilateral and bilateral loans and grants, which come tied to policy conditionalities (Guttal, 2005, p. 74). However, according to research by Bojici-Dzelilovi (2002), this dominant model has failed to penetrate to the root causes of conflict. Many of the countries affected by violent conflicts have remained caught up in the spiral of insecurity, underdevelopment and deprivation of large segments of their population (Bojici-Dzelilovi, 2002, p.96). The model of liberal peace (a term introduced by critics of this approach) has suffered more critique. In 1997, Paris concluded that the post-conflict peace building efforts of the UN were not very successful. Of the eight countries discussed in his paper, only one, Namibia, was on a path towards stable peace. Thirteen years later, Paris once again concluded that the results of the dominant model of liberal peace are rather disappointing (2010, p.337). Efforts to promote liberal democratic governing systems and market-oriented economic growth have been more difficult and unpredictable than initially expected, in some cases producing destabilising side effects (Paris, 2010, p.337).

Learning from past experiences, the UN and other international agencies involved in post-conflict peace building began to focus on longer-term state building efforts to create a more sustainable peace (Paris and Sisk, 2007). In addition, the emphasis of post-conflict operations on humanitarian relief shifted to reconstruction and development (van Gennip, 2005). Creating sustainable development after a war is very difficult, vital economic infrastructure is ruined, state institutions have often collapsed, schooling is disrupted and finding skilled workers is difficult. In addition, especially after a long lasting war, there are those who profited from the war and who resist peace (van Gennip, 2005). Even though it is very difficult, the economic reconstruction of the post-conflict country is highly important. Consolidation of peace following violent conflict has very little success unless jobs are created and the

economy is quickly stabilized (Del Castillo, 2009, p.29). Creating opportunities for employment in the short run is critical, as ex-combatants require an alternative source of livelihood to prevent their return to battle (Zyck, 2009). Furthermore, the entire population, including those who have profited from the conflict, must quickly reap the benefits of peace. When economic development lags behind the chances of a return to conflict are increased.

2.3.1 *Development as usual*⁹?

In the past, post-conflict economic development was approached as ‘development as usual’, as if economic development were not constrained by the consequences of war. The countries affected by war were often already developing countries, such as Cambodia, Sierra Leone and El Salvador. When it came to the economic development, the countries were treated as if there had been no conflict. This development as usual approach was unfortunate, since countries undergoing post-conflict economic development differ from ordinary developing countries and the post-conflict economic reconstruction is a fundamentally different process (Del Castillo, 2008, p.26). Post-conflict countries face the challenge of peace consolidation, which can be counterproductive to economic development. According to Del Castillo (2008), this political objective of sustaining peace should prevail over the developmental (economic) objective when they are of conflicting nature. Peace is a precondition for sustainable development and should therefore receive priority. This thus means that political priorities will often constrain economic policymaking, and optimal and best-practice economic policies are not attainable (p.41). In addition, the political implications of (economic) projects should be taken into account. Economic development is inherently neither good nor bad (Killick et al, 2005, p. 2), but economic projects are not neutral, some will profit from the projects, others will not. This can aggravate conflict. On the other hand economic development may help to reduce conflict because it creates economic incentives for peace. Important in post-conflict conditions is that projects are undertaken in a conflict sensitive manner (United Nations, 2005).

There are however some similarities between ordinary developing countries and countries undergoing post-conflict economic development. Post-conflict countries and developing countries have generally devastated or distorted economies. Policies of the past may have led to major macroeconomic imbalances that require tough stabilization policies and structural reform (Del Castillo, 2008, p.31). The countries are often characterized by a lack of transparency, poor governance, corrupt legal, judicial, and police systems, inadequate protection of property rights and are highly dependent on official aid flows (Del Castillo, 2008, p.31). This latter characteristic influences the relationship the government has with the population. When the government is not dependent on the population for its income (for instance through taxes) but receives its income through aid flows, it will be more

⁹ This paragraph is based on Del Castillo, G. (2008). *Rebuilding war-torn states: The challenge of post-conflict economic reconstruction*. New York: Oxford University Press.

receptive to the demands of the donors than those of the population. Donors influence the receiving government in a number of ways, in some cases only slightly. In other cases conditional demands are made, tied to withdrawal of funding in case of non-compliance (Therkildsen, 2002). In addition, it is unlikely that a social contract is formed between state and citizens (Goodhand, 2004). In such a social contract revenues, in the form of taxes for instance, are collected from the population in exchange for services and protection (Barakat, 2008). A state that is not dependent on its population for survival, and where there is no social contract between state and citizens, is called a rentier state. In rentier states, social and economic integration is generally low (Rubin, 1992, p.79), meaning that there are large differences in social and economic status in the population. In addition, the accountability of the government regarding its population is low. This can be problematic to the legitimacy of the government (Herb, 2005).

2.3.2 Local private sector in post-conflict economic development

The traditional actors involved in post-conflict economic development in the past were government, NGOs and organizations such as the World Bank and the United Nations. In the last few years, realization has set in that the (local) private sector can play an important role as current post-conflict nation building approaches have placed great emphasis on private sector economic activity as a basis for sustainable development (Barbara, 2006; Bray, 2007; Killick et al., 2005). For instance, the local private sector is an important source for income and can provide employment for, amongst others, ex-combatants (Zyck, 2009). Even though the reintegration of former combatants is usually financed through foreign aid, a lasting reintegration is not sustainable without broad-based economic recovery (Bray, 2009, p.4). When all goes well, the local private sector can provide employment, sustain livelihoods and serves to reinforce economic foundations of peace (Bray, 2007, p. 16). A population that reaps the benefits of peace will be less likely to return to war (Zyck, 2009).

However, the local private sector can also have a negative impact on conflict (Killick et al., 2005). Involving the local private sector may be problematic when it is perceived to have had a stake in the conflict. It is not uncommon for businesses to be mirroring the conflict dynamics in their own operations by, for example, employing only one ethnic or religious group to the exclusion of another, or to act as suppliers for the army (Killick et al. 2005, p.4). In addition, there are businesses that were able to profit from the conflict through for instance patronage. Those who have gained power and influence will wish to preserve their positions (Bray, 2007). Furthermore, a too large emphasis on private sector involvement can have negative effects on the post-conflict development process. The interests of the private sector are not always compatible with those of broader society, prioritizing the private sector in those cases may lead to an increase in tensions (Barbara, 2006, p.588). For instance, in cases such as Iraq and East Timor, a great emphasis was placed on the importance of constructing

accommodating post-conflict states capable of catalysing private sector investment, which did not always correspond with the needs of society in general (Barbara, 2006).

2.3.3 Problems in post-conflict economic development

Creating sustainable economic development in post-conflict countries has proved to be a difficult and enormous task which has not had the results that were hoped for. Several problems related to the current post-conflict economic development process can be identified. Some issues have already been mentioned in this chapter, for instance, the fact that there are people who have strong economic incentives to a continuation of the conflict situation (Kamphuis, 2005) and involving the private sector may be troublesome due to conflicting interests with society in general. In addition, the lack of financial means and equipment during many post-conflict missions in post-conflict countries poses a problem as well¹⁰. Other problems in post-conflict economic development are discussed below. In chapter five, the particular issues related to the post-conflict economic development of Afghanistan are discussed more in depth.

First of all, at the start of the process, donor countries often pledge to donate large amounts of money. However, this commitment often remains unfulfilled as only portions of the promised amount are donated. In addition, the interest of the outside world, and therefore their donations, for a post-conflict zone is highest when the conflict has just ended. In post-conflict societies there is a brief phase of very rapid growth related to the sudden influx of aid funds and the restoration of infrastructure. The need for foreign assistance, and the capacity to use this assistance properly, significantly increases after three years, however, by that time, the inflow of assistance has already declined due to a dwindling interest in the country (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002b).

Another important issue is the aid dependency that often occurs in post-conflict countries. As Paris (2010) concluded, many of the post-conflict countries where UN missions have been deployed remain depended on foreign aid. According to Del Castillo (2008, p.84), a large amount of aid normally leads to aid dependency, rather than sustained growth, in post-conflict countries. Furthermore, corrupt and ineffective use of aid will not be welfare improving for the country, and may even lead to further conflict by increasing discontent and exacerbating the income gap. Large flows of outside assistance in combination with the “hands on” approach of the international actors can create new political and economic patterns in the host society that come to rely on a continuation of large-scale external aid and guidance. This process is counterproductive to the goal of post-conflict development, to ensure that the country can sustain itself in the international community (Paris and Sisk, 2007). Furthermore, the dependency on aid of the government influences the relationship between the government and its population. In paragraph 2.3.1, the concept of a rentier state was introduced, a state that is not dependent on its citizens for its income, but acquires that through for instance oil revenues or aid. In

¹⁰ Lecture by A. Pauwels, March 2008, Nijmegen.

these countries, there is no social contract between state and population, which lowers the accountability, and thereby the legitimacy of the government (Herb, 2005).

The impact of the international presence is large. There is some positive spin-off, particularly to those owning property or operating particular shops (Marsden, 2003, p.99). Hotels, supermarkets and other stores emerge to serve the needs of the international staff, and locals with specific skills profit from the higher wages NGOs and other developmental organizations pay (Killick et al., 2005). However, the negative aspects of the international presence can have an even larger impact. In addition, the brain drain that occurs when highly qualified individuals including judges, teachers and civil servants willingly abandon their posts to take positions as drivers or work for international NGOs and other development organisations (van Gennip, 2005, p.61) causes a lack of capable locals who can contribute to the rebuilding of the government structures (Kamphuis, 2005, p.188). Furthermore, the economic growth related to the international presence is not sustainable (Killick et al., 2005). When the international presence is withdrawn, the people dependent on the foreign presence lose their jobs and income, which can be a devastating blow to the newly formed economy.

Post-conflict countries often do not have strong governments and institutions. This means that they are unable to provide the population with their basic needs and social services. Donors and creditors are content to hand over development activities to private actors on the grounds that weak, dysfunctional, and/or authoritarian host governments are not capable of meeting their national development obligations. Services provision, humanitarian relief, and even security and conflict management are routinely farmed out to private contractors, consultancy firms, and national and international NGOs (Guttal, 2005, p. 74-74). Parallel structures are developed, bypassing the weak government. Though the reasons for this are understandable, it does not contribute to capacity development of the government, causing the NGOs to step in even more. This vicious cycle can be difficult to break through, however, this is necessary when engaging in conflict sensitive development. After all, a weak government is a factor that increases the chances of a conflict breaking out (Collier, 2008). In addition, when the NGOs provide the services instead of the government, the legitimacy of the government is undermined.

In addition, there is a lack of cooperation and communication between the different organizations and governments involved in post-conflict economic reconstruction. It is not uncommon that different organizations are basically working on the same issue, independent from each other. This is very inefficient and wastes resources that could have been used elsewhere¹¹.

Finally, according to Cramer (2006), there is a notion that a country emerging from war is a 'blank slate', where there is no development, there are no institutions what so ever and one can impose a new system without much trouble. However, this notion could not be more wrong. The conflict has led to

¹¹ Interview with an employee of a Dutch NGO, Den Haag, July 14, 2009.

coping mechanisms, and although institutions may be defective or failing, they are present and cannot simply be replaced with a different system.

Many of the problems discussed in this paragraph are related to each other. Factors such as aid dependency, a weak government unable to provide services to its population, a lack of skilled staff in government institutions, and the lack of a social contract between state and population all influence the legitimacy of the government and are interconnected. This makes it more difficult to tackle these problems. The issues that were discussed in this paragraph are based on theory and document research, chapter five will provide an insight in the actual problems that exist in the post-conflict economic development process in Afghanistan. The next paragraph discusses what is by some authors seen as a possible solution for the problems mentioned in this paragraph, multi-sectoral partnerships.

2.4 Multi-sectoral partnerships in development

According to van Tulder and van der Zwart, scientists often depict society in the form of a triangle with three distinct, but related, spheres (2006, p. 8). The three primary institutions in the triangle are the state, market and civil society. All occupy a different role and position in society (Van Tulder and van der Zwart, 2006). The state provides a legal framework that structures society. The market sector primarily creates value and welfare for society by converting inputs into outputs, within the bounds of the legal framework. Civil society represents that sum of social relations among citizens that structures society outside politics and business. Being an organized network of citizens, civil society fulfils the need for relationships and socialization through the development and sharing of norms (Van Tulder and van der Zwart, 2006, p.9). Each of these spheres has a primary weakness. In the case of the government, the weakness is rigidity (or bureaucratization), monopoly forming in the case of businesses, and fragmentalization and a lack of professionalism in the case of civil society.

When it comes to activities in developing countries, all three primary institutions are prone to some failure, which limits the effectivity of their operations (Van Tulder and van der Zwart, 2006; Haas, 2004). These failures are related to their weaknesses. According to research from Haas (2004), the three deficits of global environmental politics are the governance deficit, implementation deficit and participation deficit (Haas, 2004). Van Tulder and van der Zwart (2006) are more specific in their explanation of the failures. According to them, the governmental sphere failed in achieving many of the official goals of development aid. The civil society failed in reaching the poorest parts of populations in a more or less efficient manner by development NGOs, and market failure points to the negative effects on local economies and that markets are not a panacea for development (Van Tulder and van der Zwart, 2006). According to Bäckstrand (2006), traditional developmental strategies cannot deal with the pressing problems and complex dimensions of sustainable development. Van

Tulder and van der Zwart (2006) and Kolk et al. (2008) agree with the point of view that creating sustainable development is a problem that exceeds the capabilities of a single societal sphere.

According to Bäckstrand (2006) partnerships have emerged as a response to the limits of traditional developmental strategies and are a response to functional demands for better governance. Furthermore, proponents argue that partnerships are instruments that can overcome the forms of failure that are attached to unilateral action by each of the three societal spheres (Kolk et al., 2008), and as an important instrument to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of development assistance (Van Tulder and Kostwinder, 2008). The international community stimulates partnerships between different societal spheres, for instance since the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg (Bäckstrand, 2006). In addition, the Dutch government places a large emphasis on partnerships as a crucial component of its policy to reach the Millennium Development Goals (Van Tulder, 2008). According to research by Bäckstrand into partnerships announced at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, partnerships are innovative forms of governance that can pool together diverse expertise and resources from civil society, government and business sectors. With their decentralized, flexible and informal features, partnerships can potentially link local practice with global environmental and developmental norms across different sectors (2006, p. 303). In addition, partnerships can generate additional knowledge and resources with which results can be achieved that benefit all parties and which they could not have achieved on an individual basis (Reinicke et al., 2000).

This thesis focuses on multi-sectoral partnerships in post-conflict countries. However the societal spheres of Van Tulder and van der Zwart (2006) (with the exception of the sphere state, which is considered to be equal to the term 'government') civil society and market are hereby too broad to use. Therefore, in this thesis the three relevant actors in a multi-sectoral partnership will be the government as the representative of the state, NGOs as representative of civil society and the private sector as representative of the market. According to van Tulder and van der Zwart (2006), the market-sphere primarily creates value and welfare for society by converting inputs into outputs within the bounds of the legal framework. This concept is too broad to use, and could also include governmental agencies. Therefore, a narrower concept of private sector is used in this thesis. Civil society is a very broad concept, as it represents the sum of social relations among citizens that structures society outside politics and business, and includes family, voluntary organizations, societal groups, churches and trade unions (van Tulder and van der Zwart, 2006). Not all groups described in this definition are involved in post-conflict economic reconstruction and therefore not relevant to this research. NGOs are chosen as a representative of this group because they are actively involved in post-conflict economic reconstruction. In addition, NGOs are active in all levels of society, which makes cooperation with this type of organization easier than other groups in civil society. For instance, it is more difficult to cooperate with family groups on a national level.

In recent years, there has been a change in thinking about development. Before, the responsibility for development lay mostly with governments. Today there is an increasing recognition that sustainable economic development is only attainable through the combined efforts of stakeholders from the different societal spheres – state, civil society and businesses (Van Tulder and Kostwinder, 2008). There is increased attention for the active role that firms can play in developmental processes, either through Corporate Social Responsibility, or through cooperation with non-governmental organisations (NGO's) and/or governments (Van Tulder and Fortanier, 2009). This latter form of cooperation, public-private partnership (PPP), has been around for quite some time and since the beginning of the 1990s, the number of PPPs has increased. PPPs are thought to facilitate flexibility in the interaction between the societal spheres and to address underinvestment in social services. The roots of this type of partnership can be found in the US, and the scientific discipline of New Public Management favoured PPPs as a more managerial approach to state operations (Van Tulder and van der Zwart, 2006). The public-private partnership is not the only type of partnership that is possible when it comes to multi-sectoral partnerships. Partnerships come in a variety of forms. In the table below the different forms are presented.

Bipartite partnership	Public – private partnership (government – private sector)
	Profit – non-profit partnership (private sector – NGO)
	Public – non-profit partnership (government – NGO)
Tripartite partnership	Government, private sector and NGOs

Table 2.1: forms of partnerships

2.5 *Multi-national organizations*

According to Van Tulder and van der Zwart (2006), multi-sectoral partnerships are formed by three actors, government, NGOs and private sector. However, there are actors involved in post-conflict economic development that cannot be categorized in any of these three sectors.

Multi-national organizations (MNO) such as the World Bank are neither government, nor NGO or private sector, but often play an important role in the post-conflict economic development process. Therefore, a fourth partner, multi-national organizations, will be added to this research. The table of possible partnerships including the multi-national organizations is added below.

Bipartite partnership	Government – Private sector
	Government – NGO
	Government – MNO
	Private sector – NGO
	Private sector – MNO
	NGO – MNO
Tripartite partnership	Government – private sector – MNO
	Government – NGO – MNO
	Private sector – NGO – MNO
	Government – company – NGO
Four partner partnership	Government – private sector – NGO – MNO

Table 2.2: all forms of partnerships

2.6 Partnerships: Roles of the actors

The four actors in a multi-sectoral partnership, government, private sector, NGOs and multi-national organizations, occupy different roles in such partnerships. In this paragraph, the different roles of the actors will be discussed.

2.6.1 Government

The traditional role of the government in multi-sectoral partnerships is that of financier. For instance, the Dutch government has funds available for reconstruction and development, and for subsidies to reduce the risks of investment. For instance, there is the Private Sector Investment subsidy (PSI+). This programme provides subsidies to private companies that invest in Afghanistan or other fragile countries. Several projects in Afghanistan and other fragile countries have been granted a subsidy. In addition to the role of financier, there are other possibilities for the government in multi-sectoral partnerships. The government has the possibility of (economic) diplomacy and high-level relations exist between the Dutch state and foreign governments. Governments can even provide soldiers (for security) or other personnel for development projects and the provision of expertise, often through employee volunteering (Kolk et al. 2008). Next to that, the Dutch government has knowledge about governance with which they may be able to assist (in this specific case) the Afghan government.

Another possible role for the Dutch government is a broker function, in which the government, given its extensive network in developing countries, could help to facilitate access to such markets. The

government can also bring various companies together (Kolk et al. 2008). The Dutch government has created a Match Making Facility¹² for this purpose.

The government of the recipient country has a very different role than a foreign government has in multi-sectoral partnerships. As the government of a post-conflict country mostly depends on foreign assistance for their budgets, they cannot act as a financier of projects or partnerships. There are however other contributions local governments can make in a partnership. For instance, in some of the cases discussed in chapter seven, the Afghan government was the supplier of land, or other production factors such as buildings. In addition, the local government can commission projects and provide security, for example through its police or military force (Workgroup PPC Afghanistan, 2010).

2.6.2 *Private sector*

In paragraph 2.3.2, the impact of the local private sector on post-conflict economic development was explained. Some positive, such as it being a source of income and employment, and some negative contributions of the local private sector have been discussed. However, not all possible roles the local private sector can have in post-conflict economic development have become clear. For instance, local businesses have specific knowledge about local needs and the business environment, a skilled workforce and have connections at all levels of society, from grass roots to (local and or national) government (Killick et al., 2005). Because of their specific knowledge about local needs, they can propose projects that are relevant to their environment. In addition, their experience in doing business in, for this case Afghanistan, can be very valuable to the partnership¹³. It is often the case that the private sector has suffered during the time of conflict. Financial resources will be limited and this will in turn limit the financial resources the local private sector can contribute to a partnership¹⁴.

It is not just the local private sector that can have a positive role in post-conflict economic development; the international private sector can contribute as well. The international private sector often has large financial resources that can be invested in projects. In addition, they have a skilled workforce, specific information about their core business, management, marketing and technical expertise. Their most important role will thus be that of financier and the provider of knowledge about production processes (Workgroup PPC Afghanistan, 2010). In addition, the international private sector is often directly involved in the reconstruction of a post-conflict country. For instance, American companies are responsible for many projects in the reconstruction of Iraq (Barbara, 2006).

The private sector in general is driven by the opportunity for profit, and will therefore take some risks. However, investing in post-conflict countries is for many companies a bridge too far. MNOs such as

¹² Match Making Facility: <http://www.evd.nl/zoeken/showbouwsteen.asp?bstnum=158519&location>, visited on the 15th of December 2009.

¹³ Interview with an employee of a government agency. Den Haag, June 16th, 2009.

¹⁴ Interview with an employee of a government agency. Den Haag, June 16th, 2009.

the World Bank through their MIGA-project¹⁵ can lower the risks for the businesses and thereby increase their willingness to enter a partnership or invest in a post-conflict country.

By engaging in a multi-sectoral partnership, businesses can create goodwill for their firms. In addition, companies can get access to NGOs' and governments' specialised know-how and networks in their area, learn about stakeholder engagement and interactions, improve their credibility, legitimacy and brand reputation, thus increasing awareness of and attractiveness to new and existing customers as well as employees (Van Tulder and Fortanier, 2009).

2.6.3 *Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs)*¹⁶

The NGOs often possess very specific knowledge about local needs and circumstances, especially the local NGOs, or those INGOs that have been involved in Afghanistan for a period of time. They often have a local network on the ground, perhaps even local employees. They can try to create a support base for the projects, mobilise and organise locals. In addition, NGOs often provide funds for development, give training to locals and engage in other forms of capacity building. In addition, NGOs can propose projects by signalling a need of the population and act accordingly. NGOs are usually the sector that implements the projects, and is therefore very experienced in doing so.

For NGOs, benefits are not only the direct support for the cause, but also more indirectly access to technical, management and/or marketing expertise, widening of networks, greater leverage and visibility, and career development and learning opportunities for current and future staff members and volunteers (Van Tulder and Fortanier, 2009).

2.6.4 *Multi-National organizations (MNOs)*

Multi-national organizations involved in post-conflict economic development and construction such as the United Nations and the World Bank were often founded for this purpose. For instance, the World Bank¹⁷ and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)¹⁸ were founded after World War two, to assist in the (economic) reconstruction of Europe. These organizations are often providers of funds, through loans, credits and grants. Furthermore, these organizations have precious experience in the field of post-conflict economic development and reconstruction. The United Nations has a different, more

¹⁵ MIGA is the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, a part of the World Bank. Their mission is to promote foreign direct investment (FDI) into developing countries. Companies can insure their investments in these countries for several things, such as war and civil disturbance (Workgroup PPC Afghanistan, 2010).

¹⁶ This paragraph was based on the results of a set of interviews with employees of several Dutch NGOs. Den Haag, July 14, 2009, Den Haag, August 18, 2009, Amsterdam, August 26, 2009 and Utrecht, August 28, 2009.

¹⁷ World Bank. Accessed on February 10th, 2010, from <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:20653660~menuPK:72312~pagePK:51123644~piPK:329829~theSitePK:29708,00.html>

¹⁸ IMF. Accessed on February 10, 2010, from www.imf.org.

comprehensive role¹⁹. The organization is involved in amongst others, peacekeeping, peace building, conflict prevention and humanitarian assistance. The manner in which the UN provides support for post-conflict development ranges from donations to military involvement to civilians who assist the recipient country.

2.7 *Negative aspects of partnerships*

There are also important arguments that highlight the negative impact of partnerships in general. The main issue with multi-sectoral partnerships is that these partnerships are often supply driven, instead of demand driven, which makes it difficult to create sustainable partnerships and projects (Workgroup PPC Afghanistan, 2010). In addition, when actors from different sectors focus on the same issue, they are likely to think about it differently, to be motivated by different goals, and to use different approaches (Selsky and Parker, 2005, p. 851). Furthermore, all actors are driven by their own values, while at the same time being part of a broader effort of reconstruction (Bojici-Dzelilovi, 2002). For instance, the private sector will be driven by the possibility of profit, while NGOs have their own philosophy, for instance a focus on women, these different objectives and goals can cause friction in a partnership. In addition, other working methods and time frames may be used in the different sectors, which further complicates collaborative efforts (Van Tulder and Kostwinder, 2008). Firms tend to deal quickly with issues and NGOs and government engage in long discussions before making a decision (Workgroup PPC Afghanistan, 2010). Furthermore, partnerships often suffer from 'calculative' or free rider behaviour of the participants that try to reap benefits to their maximum, but spill-of the costs to the partner (Van Tulder and Kostwinder, 2008).

In addition, it may be detrimental to the reputation of NGOs to work with the international private sector or governments. NGOs want to be perceived as impartial, but when they cooperate with governments this ideal is threatened. Furthermore, cooperation with firms of a questionable reputation may affect the NGOs' reputation negatively²⁰.

2.8 *Multi-sectoral partnerships as a solution?*

The multitude of issues that need to be tackled in a post-conflict situation, such as the economic development, capacity building of the government and the introduction of a law and regulation system, are interconnected and the creation of sustainable development has proven to be a difficult task. In the past, many of the countries faced with this challenge did not come out on top, as many of them are still poor and underdeveloped (Paris, 2010). Post-conflict countries not only deal with the challenge of development, but also have a range of problems related to their post-conflict status, as discussed in

¹⁹ United Nations Homepage. www.un.org. Accessed on February 10, 2010.

²⁰ Interviews with employees of several Dutch NGOs. Den Haag, July 14, 2009, Den Haag, August 18, 2009, Amsterdam, August 26, 2009 and Utrecht, August 28, 2009.

paragraph 2.3.3. According to several authors (Bäckstrand, 2006; Kolk et al., 2008; Van Tulder and van der Zwart, 2006; Reinicke et al., 2000; Van Tulder and Kostwinder, 2008), partnerships are an important instrument to increase the impact of development assistance. The question this thesis attempts to solve is whether multi-sectoral partnerships can be a solution to the problems in post-conflict economic development. The different roles of the sectors involved in the partnerships, as discussed in paragraph 2.6, can be a starting point in the attempt to answer this question.

The main problems as discussed in paragraph 2.3.3 are the lack of financial means, a wrong timeline in post-conflict development and the occurrence of aid dependency, governmental capacity problems and a lack of social contract between state and population, leading to a legitimacy issue concerning the government. Some of the problems leading to the legitimacy issue could possibly be addressed by a partnership. NGOs often take over, and form parallel structures where the capacity of the government fails. If they would work together in a partnership, the results achieved by this partnership would reflect onto the government, not only increasing its capacity, but also creating a new social contract between state and population. This in turn positively affects the legitimacy of the government. Furthermore, the lack of financial means could be partially solved by engaging in a partnership with a partner that has funds available. In addition, there is the issue of a lack of cooperation and communication, which influences the efficiency, and effectivity of post-conflict economic development projects. It appears that partnerships would increase the communication and cooperation between the different sectors involved; after all, a partnership is a cooperation between different partners. Therefore, this issue could be tackled by a multi-sectoral partnership. Other issues, such as the wrong timeline in post-conflict development, the existence in society of tensions and dividers and the lack of financial means and equipment during post-conflict missions, are unlikely to be solved by multi-sectoral partnerships. The problems and possible solutions discussed in this paragraph are all theoretical however. In chapter five, the problems related to the post-conflict economic development of Afghanistan are discussed, and the question whether multi-sectoral partnerships can have a positive influence on this specific process will be answered in chapter eight.

3. Methodology

In this chapter the methodology of this research is presented. In the first paragraph, the general research approach will be presented. The data collection methods will be discussed in paragraph 3.2. The measuring instrument used to analyse the multi-sectoral partnerships will be introduced in paragraph 3.3. In addition, the validity and reliability of these methods is discussed in the last paragraph of this chapter.

3.1 *General research approach*

The general research approach for this thesis was theory testing. This research approach is particularly suitable in situations in which existing theories are tested, adjusted and /or refined (Verschuren and Doorewaard, 2007, p.44). Although there is not much scientific literature on multi-sectoral partnerships in post-conflict economic development, and theory development would be suitable as a research approach as well, there has been chosen for a theory testing research approach. After all, several authors have suggested that partnerships could be very important in post-conflict economic development (Killick et al., 2005; Bray, 2007), or in development in general (Selsky and Parker, 2005; Reinicke et al., 2000; Bäckstrand, 2006). There is a basis of a theory, that multi-sectoral partnerships will contribute positively to post-conflict economic development. This thesis will test whether this is actually the case, the focus hereby will lie on Afghanistan. In order to do so, two sets of theories will be combined into a theoretical framework, theory on multi-sectoral partnerships in development and on post-conflict economic development. This framework will be applied to the case of Afghanistan, as several cases of partnerships in Afghanistan will be discussed (chapter seven). In this research, there may be some aspects that correspond to theory development, for instance the combining of two sets of theories. However, this is not the overall research approach.

The goal of this thesis is to contribute to and test the theory about economic development in post-conflict countries, especially in the case of Afghanistan. This case will help to provide an understanding in the complex post-conflict economic development process and the role that multi-sectoral partnerships actually have in such processes.

3.2 *Data collection methods*

The data collection methods that were used during this research were qualitative methods. The choice for qualitative methods was based on the features of qualitative research. This type of research is

particularly suitable for situations after which little research has been conducted (Boeije, 2006, p.35). It became clear in the previous chapters that the subject of multi-sectoral partnerships in post-conflict development has received little attention so far. In addition, the manner in which actors behave in any field, in this case post-conflict development, depends on how they perceive this field, it is therefore important to understand how the actors perceive the situation. Qualitative research is very suitable for situations in which the experience and feelings of the research subjects are important (Boeije, 2006). During the research a number of qualitative data collection methods were used.

3.2.1 Literature study

The first part of this research was a large-scale literature study on both sets of theories, multi-sectoral partnerships in development and post-conflict economic development. The aim of the literature study was to determine what there has been written about the theories in existing scientific literature, in order to provide an overview of the concepts, ideas and theory of the several authors. This overview can be found in chapter two, the theoretical framework of this thesis.

In addition, non-scientific literature was used to gain insight in the manner in which political and non-governmental organisations behave in post-conflict economic development.

3.2.2 Case study

To gain a proper understanding of the case of Afghanistan, it was necessary to do an in-depth case study on the country. A case study is mostly used in situations in which a deeper understanding of an object or process is necessary. There are several types of case studies, depending on the number of cases researched during the study (Verschuren en Doorewaard, 2007). In this case, a single case study was the proper method. Several different data collection methods were used to create a complete picture of the situation in Afghanistan. Documents were analysed, several people were interviewed and the news media provided an up to date overview. The use of several methods for data collection, as in this case document analysis and interviews, is called triangulation and provide several different angles from which to investigate the case (Boeije, 2006).

In addition, the multi-sectoral partnerships discussed in chapters six and seven were case studies as well. In this case, a multiple case study was the proper method. Again, several different data collection methods were used to create a picture of the partnerships in post-conflict countries other than Afghanistan, and in Afghanistan. The methods used were document analysis and interviews.

3.2.3 Interview

The type of interview that was used during this research (for instance during the case studies) was a semi-structured interview. This format has been chosen because the researcher is rather inexperienced

in doing interviews, but quite knowledgeable about the subject. A semi-structured interview will provide some guidance, without being too restrictive. This type of interview offers the researcher the organisation and comfort of pre-planned questions (Morse and Richards, 2002, p.94), without the loss of flexibility. A totally structured interview would be too rigid to use in this research, since there is no room for spontaneous questions in this type of interview. The use of a semi-structured interview is appropriate when the researcher knows enough about the study topic to frame the needed discussion in advance (Morse and Richards, 2002, p. 94) as was the case in this research.

A topic list was prepared and used during the interviews on which the subjects to be discussed were mentioned. The topic list used was as a guidance for the conversation, rather than as a strict format. The interviews took the form of a conversation, rather than a formal interview.

There are several methods to ensure that an interview progresses as smoothly as possible and that the results are not distorted. Vennix (2006, p.274) has proposed a model for communication in which the process of communication is explained.




Figure 3.1: Simplified model of a communication process between two individuals

In this simplified model of the communication process between two individuals it becomes clear where the possible disruptions can appear. The stages of interpretation and reception are the two stages in which disruptions are most likely to appear. To prevent such disruptions from taking place, two measures were taken. During the interview, the answers of the subjects were paraphrased, to ensure that the message was understood correctly. In addition, the interviews were transcribed and sent to the subjects to check for any inaccuracies. The comments were subsequently incorporated in the transcriptions. This process increases the reliability of the interpretations of the researcher.

In addition, according to Emans (2002), the researcher should ensure that the interview takes place in a favourable social situation. This entails that the researcher should put the subject at ease by easing into the topic. It is important that the researcher takes the time to introduce the topic at hand and explains the methods used in the interview. In addition, the goal of the interview should be explained once more. Even though the subjects were aware of the overall goal of the research, they were reminded of this at the start of the interview. There was the possibility to ask questions regarding the goals and topics of the interview. Most subjects took advantage of this moment to ask about the research.

As a follow-up to the interviews that were conducted, a list with open-ended questions was sent to the subjects that were interviewed. This list of questions was prepared to receive answers to some additional questions that appeared after the interview. The choice for a written questionnaire instead of a second interview was made because of the time pressure and the schedules of the subjects. A second interview could not be conducted within a reasonable timeframe. Unfortunately, not all subjects returned the questionnaire.

When preparing the questions for a topic list or questionnaire it is important to keep in mind that the questions are clear and simple (Emans, 2002), in addition, the questions should be short, neutrally formulated, not suggestive and not formulated in a negative way (Vennix, 2006). These recommendations were followed with the preparation of the topic list and the subsequent follow up.

3.2.4 Research subjects

Most of the research subjects that were interviewed for this research were employed at a Dutch NGO. Their specialism is Afghanistan. These research subjects were chosen because almost all of the subjects have been to Afghanistan at least once and are aware of the situation there. In addition, to provide the research with insights from the government, a small number of employees of Dutch government agencies were interviewed. These subjects had also been to Afghanistan at least once and had a good understanding of the Afghan situation. The working method and ideology of Dutch NGOs and other organizations involved in post-conflict development is not necessarily the same as such organizations from other countries. The result of the choice for Dutch research subjects is that the Dutch view of post-conflict economic development is central to this thesis.

3.3 Measuring instrument

The multi-sectoral partnerships that will be discussed in chapters six and seven will be analyzed using the “do no harm framework” from Anderson (2000). Since this thesis deals with multi-sectoral partnerships, instead of aid programmes, the framework will be adjusted accordingly. Anderson

(2000) has provided a tool for assessing and ranking project proposals for aid programmes according to conflict sensitivity. In this thesis, this tool will be used to assess the multi-sectoral partnerships in conflict areas. However, some adjustments will be made. First of all, the tool will be altered to include not just aid programmes, but multi-sectoral partnerships. Second, the tool provided by Anderson (2000) is used for analysing project proposals while this thesis analyses (mostly) finished projects. This has some implications for the formulation of the questions and the amount of questions asked.

Projects can be divided into four different groups, A – D, from conflict sensitive to conflict insensitive. The projects are assigned a group based on their scores on a number of different subjects, (a) impacts on other communities, (b) effects of resources on perceptions and relationships, (c) ethical aspects, (d) risk of violence, (e) beneficiaries of the project, (f) partners of the project, and (g) project staff. In addition, a miscellaneous category has been added for other important issues that cannot be categorized in the other subjects. Each subject will have a number of yes or no questions that must be answered to reach a conclusion about the conflict sensitivity of the project. In this thesis, these questions were answered in the form of a checklist (see below) by the researcher using the information available about the projects.

The checklist was formed using the tool for assessing and ranking project proposals (Anderson, 2000, p. 114), and the “do no harm” checklist (Anderson, 2007, p.24), and was further adapted to the specific needs for this thesis. For instance, the formulation of several questions was changed. This was necessary because the projects analysed in this thesis have been finished, and the tool itself was designed for analysing project proposals. In addition, the researcher added some questions in order to properly analyse the effect of the partnership on the post-conflict economic development process. The following questions were added:

Did the project have a negative effect on the post-conflict reconstruction process? Did
the project have a positive effect on the post-conflict reconstruction process?

The checklist is presented below.

	Yes	No
Impact on other (local) communities		
1. Has the project considered preferences/priorities of neighboring communities?	[]	[]
2. Has the project considered negative impacts on neighboring communities?	[]	[]
3. Did the project avoid making tensions worse, and/or support connections between communities?	[]	[]
4. Did the project increase tensions between different communities?	[]	[]
Effects of resources on perceptions and relationships		
5. Did the project result in harmful competition/suspicion/biases within and between communities?	[]	[]
6. Whether the resources at risk of diversion (including theft, arbitrary taxation, corruption, or employment of microproject resources for military purposes)?	[]	[]
Ethical aspects		
7. Did the project avoid provocations, harmful behavior/relationships/messages?	[]	[]
8. Did the project cause provocations, harmful behavior/relationships/messages?	[]	[]
9. Did the project anticipate ethical problems and opportunities?	[]	[]
Risk of violence		
10. Has the project assessed the risks of violence in surrounding areas?	[]	[]
11. Did the project reduce the vulnerability of people and communities to violence?	[]	[]
12. Did the project place people and communities at (more) risk to violence?	[]	[]
Beneficiaries		
13. Do the beneficiaries all share their identity?	[]	[]
14. Do the beneficiaries share identity with staff?	[]	[]
15. Are all beneficiaries from one area?	[]	[]
16. They were chosen based on what criteria:		
Political	[]	[]
Social	[]	[]
Economic	[]	[]
Geographic	[]	[]
Partners		
17. Are there local partners involved?	[]	[]
18. Are there international partners involved?	[]	[]
19. Do any of the partners have a military or political interest?	[]	[]
20. If there are more local partners, do they belong to one group?	[]	[]
Staff		
21. Was there local staff involved in the project?	[]	[]
22. Did the project employ international employees?	[]	[]
23. Do the local staff share their identity?	[]	[]
24. Do the local partners originate from the same area?	[]	[]
Other		
25. Did the project have a negative effect on the post-conflict reconstruction process?	[]	[]
26. Did the project have a positive effect on the post-conflict reconstruction process?	[]	[]

Figure 3.2: Conflict sensitivity checklist

The analysed projects will be divided into four groups, based on their scores on the checklist. When there is limited information, and some questions cannot be answered, the result will be based on the questions that could be answered.

3.4 *Validity and reliability of the research*

The validity of this research can be divided into two types of validity; internal and external validity. Internal validity deals with the question whether the researcher actually measures what is intended. External validity focuses on the concept of generalisability. When the conclusions of a research can be generalised to other similar situations, the external validity can be considered to be high. The internal validity of this research can be considered to be reasonably high. The choice for an interview, and a follow up document, with open-ended questions increases the probability that the researcher actually measures what is intended. Open-ended questions are considered to be more valid than closed questions, because there is a limited number of possible answers in the latter form. In such cases, there is the possibility that none of the provided answers is considered to be accurate. In open-ended questions, the subject can formulate his answer exactly as he wants (Vennix, 2006, 230). The validity will therefore be higher. The checklist that has been used to determine the conflict sensitivity of the cases studied in chapter six and seven was based on a tool for assessing and ranking project proposals for aid programmes (Anderson, 2000). It has been used to assess multiple project proposals and can be considered to be measuring what it intends to measure. Although the checklist was altered slightly to assess (mostly) finished projects instead of project proposals, it is believed that the validity of this measuring instrument remained intact. The external validity of this research is rather low. Since this research focuses mainly on one case, Afghanistan, the conclusions of this research cannot be generalised to other post-conflict countries. However, the results of this research can lead to new hypotheses that can be tested in other situations.

A research is reliable when the same results are observed after repeated measurements (Vennix, 2006). This is more difficult in a qualitative research because the interpretations of the results depend on the individual researcher. In addition, the values that are measured in a qualitative research are subjective, memories can be distorted and opinions can change over time. It is therefore not self-evident that a repeated measurement will result in the same value. These factors make a qualitative research generally less reliable (Vennix, 2006). Open-ended questions tend to be less reliable than closed questions (Vennix, 2006, 230). The possibility that an identical answer is provided a second time is higher in closed questions than in open-ended questions. To increase this reliability, the transcripts of the interviews were sent to the subjects. Any interpretation mistakes of the researcher could be altered, increasing the reliability of the research.

4. Afghanistan²¹

²¹ For a more detailed analysis of Afghanistan, the article by S. Barakat (2008) "Synthesis Report: Understanding Afghanistan; the consolidated findings of a research project commissioned by her Majesty's government" is recommended.

The situation in Afghanistan is very complex. This chapter will provide an analysis of the context in which the current conflict arose. Many different subjects will be discussed shortly to create an understanding of the Afghan background, which is necessary to understand how the country ended up where it is today. Even though millions of dollars have been invested in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, major problems still remain. According to the Human Development Index (HDI) of 2007, Afghanistan is the fifth least developed country in the world. It has even dropped a place since 2004, a sign that things are not progressing as they should (IRIN, 2007).

4.1 Population

According to Vogelsang (2007), there are over 55 different ethnic groups in Afghanistan. The main ethnic groups are Pashtun (44%), Tajik (25%), Hazara (10%), Uzbek (8%), and Turkmen (3%) (Barakat, 2008). These ethnic groups live in rather homogeneous provinces in Afghanistan. Tribal relations are extremely important within different ethnic groups, especially within the Pashtun community. The map below provides an overview of the different ethnic groups.




Figure 4.1: Ethnic groups in Afghanistan²²

The population of Afghanistan shows a so called youth bulge, meaning that the population is growing rapidly and there is a large number of children and a lower proportion of older individuals. The presence of a growing, young population may contribute to insecurity, when this is not accompanied by economic opportunities for these individuals. When there are many young men in a community, and there are no economic opportunities for them, it is more likely that these men will join insurgency groups such as the Taliban, especially if they would get paid to do so (Barakat, 2008).

²² Mazar Development Fund, <http://www.mazardevelopmentfund.org.au/images/ethnicgroupsmap.gif>, visited on December 27, 2009.

4.2 *History*²³

The history of Afghanistan is one of conflict, instability and interference from neighboring countries. Several great empires, such as the Greek and Persian empires, have attempted to incorporate Afghanistan. In more recent times, even though Afghanistan has never been formally colonized, the country has been severely impacted by other countries, such as England, Russia, and Pakistan. A clear example is the founding of the Afghan state: the country was created by England and Russia to be a buffer between India (part of the British sphere of influence), and Russia (Crews and Tarzi, 2006). In addition, Afghanistan traditionally has been dependent on foreign patrons. Because of its strategic location, the British and the Soviet governments supported many regimes in the past, mostly financial. This created governments, which were not dependent on its citizens for their survival. Internal interests were often second to the external interests of the patrons. This process has blocked the development of a social contract. This process continues today in a different form, as foreign aid makes up a large part of the government budget. According to Goodhand (2004), the estimated ratio of domestic to foreign income is one to eight. The Afghan state is not dependent on its population for income, for instance through taxation, but on foreign donors. This reliance on foreign aid, and on foreign advisors, is a risky strategy, as it risks creating a rentier state (Goodhand, 2004).

The last four decades have been an especially turbulent time in Afghan history. In the 1970s the Afghan communists, supported by the Soviets, came into power. This regime took strong action against Islamic-fundamentalists. This led to widespread rebellion against the regime. Also, within the communist party conflicts were common and several coups occurred. In 1979 a large-scale rebellion against the government resulted in an invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets. This invasion led to a full-scale war between the Mujahideen and the USSR between 1980-1989. Mujahideen are Islamic guerrilla fighters; there were several Mujahideen groups in Afghanistan, who initially formed the resistance against the pro-Soviet government of Afghanistan, and later against the USSR in Afghanistan. The Mujahideen were supported by the USA and Pakistan. The resistance was no homogeneous and harmonious group; several different ethnic groups had their own militias and resistance groups.

After the fall of the USSR and the end of Russia's influence in Afghanistan the situation did not improve much. Struggles for power erupted between the different resistance groups. As long as there had been a common enemy in the communists they had cooperated, but now they refused to give up power in the areas they controlled. When the Taliban emerged in 1994 they encountered little resistance, at least from the Pashtun population who were fed up with the unrest and quarrelling commanders²⁴. The Taliban managed to conquer Kabul in 1996, overthrowing the government of

²³ For a more detailed overview of the Afghan history the book by W. Vogelsang, "Afghanistan: een geschiedenis" is recommended. This book was used as a main source for this paragraph.

²⁴ For more information about the Taliban, see paragraph 4.8

Rabbani, the president of Afghanistan at that time. Even though the Taliban controlled a large part of Afghanistan, the northeast remained out of their control. This was the area in which the Northern Alliance formed, who opposed and later overthrew the Taliban, with the assistance of the USA (Vogelsang, 2007).

4.3 *International campaign against terrorism*

The terrorist attacks on September 11th of 2001 were the starting point of the US-led campaign against terrorism. The 9/11 attacks were attributed to Al-Qaida, whose leadership found refuge in Afghanistan. The Taliban refused to hand over the Al-Qaida leadership to the USA. On October 7th 2001 the military campaign, mainly composed of forces from the Northern Alliance and supported by the USA and several other countries, invaded Afghanistan in order to overthrow the Taliban regime. In addition to the military campaign it was attempted to create distance between the Taliban and the Pashtun, the ethnic group that was most affiliated with the Taliban. This was successful, as many local Pashtun leaders turned away from the Taliban. The invasion took place fairly quickly, it started with the bombing of Taliban-strongholds in early October, and the Northern Alliance managed to conquer Mazar-i Sjarif, the rest of Northern Afghanistan and Herat in early November. On November 13th, the Taliban forces retreated from Kabul. About a month later, the last major Afghan city that remained under Taliban control, Kandahar, was surrendered. Unfortunately most Taliban leaders and warriors managed to escape (Vogelsang, 2007). The initial invasion in Afghanistan was not mandated by the United Nations, after the Taliban had been overthrown an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was authorised by the UN. Their mandate was to assist the newly established Afghan Transitional Authority²⁵. In addition, there is a United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), created in 2002²⁶. This intervention in Afghanistan was contrary to the disengagement with Afghanistan of the previous years, when Europe and the USA did not pay particular interest in the situation in Afghanistan (Barakat, 2002).

4.4 *Present conflict*

According to Barakat (2008), the conflict in Afghanistan in reality is a multi-conflict system, with several inter-related conflicts. The conflict between the insurgency and the government (and its international supporters) is perceived to be the most significant. One cannot speak of ‘the insurgency’ however, since it is comprised of a number of armed opposition groups with differing motives. The Taliban, itself not a homogenous group, only makes up a small part of what is perceived as the

²⁵ NATO. Accessed on August 12, 2010, from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8189.htm

²⁶ United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. Accessed on August 12, 2010, from <http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1743>

insurgency. A larger part is made up by a federation of smaller entities, including Hizb-e Islami, the Haqqani network and numerous Pakistani groups.

The narco-conflict is perhaps the least violent. However, the enormous amounts of narcotics that is produced in Afghanistan fuel the conflict economy and provide the insurgency and warlords with funding.

The conflict in Afghanistan is part of a regional conflict system. The paranoid Turkmen, Uzbek and Tajik regimes to the North of Afghanistan, Iran and its turbulent relations to the West and Pakistan to the East are all potentially destabilizing to Afghanistan. Especially the border with Pakistan, and the support from Pakistan to insurgent groups in Afghanistan pose fundamental security dilemmas for Afghanistan.

In Afghanistan tension exists between the Northern and Southern regions, non-Pashtun and Pashtun areas, which could in the future ignite a civil war.

On the local level there are many small conflicts, often wrongly attributed to the insurgency. These are actually local disputes, grievances of certain communities or social groups over perceptions of exclusion. In addition, local power holders, such as warlords, are often unwilling to share or transfer that power to the central government, creating small strongholds in the countryside.

4.5 Political situation

The foundation for the current government has been laid in the Bonn agreement (in 2001). However, the Taliban were not included in this agreement, and not all-important political groups were included in the negotiations (Barakat, 2008). In addition, different cultural groups in Afghanistan and the geography of the country make it difficult to have a strong central government, which controls the entire country (Vogelsang, 2007). These factors led to an administration which has limited territorial control and is incapable of forging a secure environment (Barakat, 2008). In the past, resistance and rebellion have been common in Afghanistan, and today there remains a lot of resistance against the government, especially from local commanders who refuse to surrender power they gained during the conflicts (Vogelsang, 2007) and from the Taliban insurgency who oppose the political and societal reforms and the Western presence in Afghanistan (Barakat, 2008).

The Afghan Transitional Government, led by Hamid Karzai, lasted from 2002 – 2004, when elections were held. Karzai was again elected president. He formed a new government, with mostly Pashtun ministers in key positions. A year later, in 2005, elections were held for the parliament. The campaign was somewhat troublesome as several candidates were disqualified from the elections for alleged ties to illegal militias. The results of the elections were favourable to Karzai, as he achieved a majority in the parliament (Katzman, 2006). In 2009, presidential and provincial elections were held, the first post-Taliban elections run by the Afghan government itself in the form of the Afghanistan Independent Electoral Commission (Katzman, 2010). In the run-up to the election there were reports

of registration fraud; fraudulent registration cards were found, and there was evidence that cards had been offered for sale. The presidential election itself was also not without trouble, as widespread fraud allegations were made against Karzai. Around one millions votes for Karzai were considered fraudulent, in addition, around 200.000 votes for his primary competitor, Dr. Abdullah, were considered fraudulent as well. A second round in the elections was necessary, since neither candidate achieved more than 50% of all votes. This second round was never held, because Abdullah pulled out, on the grounds that the problems that plagued the first round were likely to recur, since Karzai had not taken proper measures. Karzai was declared the winner of the elections, and formed a new cabinet. Several important ministers from his previous cabinet were reappointed, such as the ministers for Defence, Interior, Agriculture and Education. Karzai attempted to re-nominate Ismail Kahn as minister of Energy and Water; he was voted down by the parliament on the grounds of the fact that Kahn is a faction leader, with no technical expertise. The elections for parliament, which were scheduled for May 2010 have been postponed, it was argued that Afghanistan's flawed institutions would not be able to hold free and fair elections under this timetable (Katzman, 2010).

The occurrence of corruption and fraud is a growing problem in the Afghan government and seriously impedes the trust of the population in the government. In addition, the nepotism that is common to Afghan society impedes the efficiency of the Afghan government. Friends, allies and family of leaders are often placed in the government, instead of capable people, who are needed to develop the capacity in the government. The many problems in the Afghan government pose serious risks to the rebuilding of the state (Workgroup PPC Afghanistan, 2010).

4.6 Economy

The decades of conflict have impeded the Afghan economy severely. It is now one of the poorest countries in the world and remains highly dependent on foreign aid, and this is likely to remain so for quite some time.

In the past, Afghanistan was an important transit country as many trading routes crossed Afghan territory. However, since the 1970s, development is impeded by the years of conflict and unrest. Since 2001, initiatives have been deployed to increase the (economic) development in Afghanistan. These initiatives are somewhat successful, however, much remains to be done. In the table below the annual indicators since 2004 of the economic structure of Afghanistan are shown.

Annual indicators

	2004 ^a	2005 ^a	2006 ^a	2007 ^a	2008 ^a
GDP (US\$ m; excl opium production)	5,402	6,489	7,723	9,596	12,850
Real GDP growth (%)	8.0	16.1	8.2	11.5	7.5
Consumer price inflation (Kabul, av; %)	13.2	12.3	5.1	13.0	24.0
Population (m)	24.5	24.8	26.7	n/a	n/a
Exports of goods fob (US\$ m; incl re-exports) ^b	1,643.0	1,794.8	1,810.6	1,834.5	2,138.4
Imports of goods fob (US\$ m)	5,086.3	6,130.1	6,743.6	7,836.4	8,535.9
Current-account balance (US\$ m; excl grants)	-3,894.0	-4,880.3	-5,405.7	-6,424.4	-6,827.9
Foreign-exchange reserves (US\$ m)	1,283	1,662	2,064	2,763	3,228
Total external debt (% of GDP)	12.8	184.0 ^c	155.0 ^c	21.0	17.8
Debt-service ratio (%)	3.5	5.7	1.6	1.1	1.2
Exchange rate (av) Af:US\$	47.7	49.7	49.5	49.8	n/a

^a IMF estimates; fiscal years beginning around March 20th (varies slightly from year to year). ^b Excludes opium and flows associated with US Army and most International Security Assistance Force activities. ^c Includes restructured Russian claims, which have been recognised by Afghanistan.

Table 4.1: Annual Indicators Afghanistan²⁷.

Although the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Afghanistan has grown every year by a considerable percentage, it remains very low when compared to other countries in the region such as Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Pakistan²⁸. Exports remain rather low, while the imports of goods increase every year, resulting in a negative current-account balance, increasing the debts of the country. Afghanistan is yet unable to support itself and relies heavily on aid and loans.

4.6.1 War economy²⁹

The economy of Afghanistan changed during the years of conflict. Outward migration, urbanization and the subsequent abandonment of fields and villages made agriculture and livestock less important in some areas. Internal trade suffered greatly, as it became virtually impossible to cross frontlines between fractions. The industrial sector in Afghanistan disappeared mostly, especially after the collapse of the communist regime. However, external illegal trade expanded due to the collapse of state control over the borders, which made smuggling easier. Most conventional businessmen moved their operations abroad.

Poppy cultivation, smuggling and customs and 'road tax' became the main sources of income for the militias and their associates. The drug trade has reached enormous proportions in Afghanistan. The country is the world's biggest producer of opium, as 93% of the world supply is produced in Afghanistan. Since the 'war on terror' started, the opium production has flourished, with support of the Taliban insurgents (Walsh, 2007). Estimates are that over 300.000 farmers are involved in the production. In addition, local commanders, traders and warlords are involved in the drugs economy.

²⁷ Economist Intelligence Unit (April 2009). Country Report Afghanistan. London, UK.

²⁸ IMF, accessed on August 3, 2010, from

http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?sy=2005&ey=2011&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=subject&ds=%2C&br=1&pr1.x=68&pr1.y=7&c=512%2C912%2C564%2C927&s=NGDP_RPCH%2CNGDPD%2CNGDP_D%2CPCPIPCH%2CLP%2CBCA%2CBCA_NGDPD&grp=0&a=

²⁹ This paragraph was based on Giustozzi, A. (2006) Local business, local peace: the peace building potential of the domestic private sector. International Alert.

The informal economy, including the drug trade, accounts for 80-90 percent of the Afghan economy. Other important sectors in the informal economy are merchandise trade, transport, and construction.

4.6.2 Soviet heritage in the economy

An additional complicating factor for the rebuilding and reconstruction of the Afghan economy is the communist heritage. Although Afghanistan never was a part of the Soviet Union, the country was under their military control (Vogelsang, 2007). In addition, there was also a Soviet influence on the economy. Even when Afghanistan did not have a true plan economy, the country did become part of the Soviet regional economy, producing several products for the entire region, among which were Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and relying on these countries for other products. There was a mutual dependency between the countries (Vogelsang, 2007).

This has its implications for the reconstruction of the Afghan economy. For instance, factories that have been successful in the past due to the purchase policy of the Soviet Union cannot be revived easily because there is no real outlet for their products³⁰. Rebuilding these factories will be almost useless, since they cannot sustain themselves.

4.7 Business environment

The overall business environment of Afghanistan is characterized by the years of conflict the country has suffered. Insecurity, corruption, bureaucratic delays and anti-competitive practices are obstacles toward doing business that are related to the conflict economy (Paterson, 2006). This paragraph provides the general characteristics of the business environment of Afghanistan. This subject is especially important for this thesis, because the multi-sectoral partnerships discussed in later chapters are influenced by the characteristics of the business environment in Afghanistan.

Labour costs are low, at least for low skilled workers. The highly educated employees who are fluent in English are more expensive, their wages are between ten and fifty times higher. The latter category is in high demand from NGOs and international organisations that can afford to pay higher wages. The educated locals are thereby more likely to work for the INGOs than for the local government, which has a negative influence on the capacity of the local government (Giustozzi, 2006).

Technical know-how and engineering knowledge are relatively scarce (Giustozzi, 2004). In the countryside, underemployment is a major problem. There is widespread seasonal employment, often related to the production of poppy. This underemployment has facilitated the survival of the militias, which can offer a modest pay (Giustozzi, 2006).

³⁰ Personal communication of an employee of a Dutch government agency, Den Haag, July 2009.

The infrastructure and basic services are very limited in Afghanistan. The infrastructure in Afghanistan was almost totally destroyed by decades of conflict and lack of maintenance. Over the past years, many investments were made in the infrastructure. However, many problems remain. For instance, there is a limited access to electricity, especially in the countryside. Even in Kabul electricity has only been available for 24 hours a day since 2009, and the electricity still fails often. In addition, there are not many roads in a good condition, and some parts of the country are very difficult to reach (Workgroup PPC Afghanistan, 2010). Furthermore, it is important that the infrastructure is maintained and that knowledge and funds for this maintenance are available. Most companies involved in Afghan reconstruction of infrastructure are foreign companies, who sometimes sub-contract the tasks to Afghan companies, on greatly reduced margins (Giustozzi, 2006).

With the fall of the Taliban and the subsequent new regime, a whole new law and regulation system needed to be developed. A new constitution was written and a reform of the law and regulation system took place. However, these new laws cannot be implemented. According to the Fragile State Index, the government of Afghanistan is unable to establish a solid national legal system, the civil service is weak and corrupt and the police lack resources (2010). Most disturbing is corruption, which is highly present in Afghanistan in all governmental systems. The widespread occurrence of corruption is caused by several factors; first of all, there is a history of malfunctioning governments, in which corruption was considered as normal (Barakat, 2008). In addition, wages are low when compared to other occupations, for instance with INGOs (Giustozzi, 2006). Furthermore, the illegal drug trade is also one of the major causes for corruption (Workgroup PPC Afghanistan, 2010).

In addition, there are issues regarding to property rights. It is often not formally documented who owns what piece of land, making it very difficult to settle land disputes or buy or rent land. This problematic access to land is one of the most important obstacles towards international investments (Paterson, 2006).

4.8 Taliban

The Taliban have been a major influence in Afghanistan for the past decades. This paragraph provides some background information on this group.

The Taliban has its roots in the Afghan Mujahideen, which were heavily supported by the Americans in the 1980s, and began as a student movement in the madrassas (Koran schools). These madrassas were situated in Kandahar and in refugee camps across the Pakistan border. After the Soviet invasion, these madrassas were often the only available education for Afghan refugees. Many young boys were educated in these Koran schools and found discipline and meaning there (Sullivan, 2007). In addition, they were educated in the Islam, according to Rashid 'they learnt about the ideal Islamic society

created by the prophet Mohammed 1,400 years ago and this is what they wanted to emulate' (in: Sullivan, 2007).

The rise of the Taliban was supported by a number of factors. First of all, the Taliban has the support of the secret service of Pakistan, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) (Atwan, 2007). The Taliban is mostly composed of members of Pashtun tribes (Sullivan, 2007), which explains some of the Pakistani interest in the group, since many Pashtun also live in Pakistan. Furthermore, Pakistan sought to influence Afghan politics. The support of the ISI resulted in the capture of several weapons by the Taliban, increasing their opportunities. Later on, when the Taliban had captured large parts of Afghanistan, Pakistan provided engineers and airport technicians, a phone and wireless network. Another factor contributing to the rise of the Taliban was the situation in Afghanistan. After the Soviet invasion had ended, much was expected of the Mujahedin in terms of leadership. These expectations could not be met, as their leadership was unable to keep the country together, and the Mujahedin were seen as corrupt and power hungry (Sullivan, 2007). This disillusion made it easier for the Taliban, led by Mullah Omar, to gain influence in Afghanistan.

In 1994, the Taliban began to gain influence in Afghanistan as they stood up against warlords when they abused their power. In return, the communities in which they intervened were to accept the Sharia law. From then on, the Taliban conquered large parts of Afghanistan fairly quickly. In October 1994 they were in control of Kandahar, and in March of the following year one-third of Afghanistan was controlled by the Taliban. This was accomplished through a combination of force and bribery of local commanders. On September 27th, 1996 the Taliban captured Kabul and in May 1997 over 90% of Afghanistan was under Taliban control. (Sullivan, 2007). During their regime, a fundamentalist, puritanical form of the Islam, based on the sharia law, was implemented all over their territory, and women's rights were severely restricted (Atwan, 2007).

Today, the Taliban remains a group that has a large influence on Afghanistan, as the insurgency continues. Incidents, such as the attack on an Afghan air base on the third of August 2010, occur on a regular basis³¹. Taliban influence appears to be growing in most Afghan provinces, especially around the Durand Line. It seems inevitable that concessions have to be made in order to achieve peace with the Taliban. In June 2010, the president of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, established a peace council tasked with exploring negotiations with the Taliban (Baker, 2010).

4.9 *Foreign influences in Afghanistan*

As mentioned before in this chapter, other countries have had a major influence on Afghanistan. Today this is no different; this paragraph provides an overview of the most important foreign influences in Afghanistan.

³¹ Al Jazeera (2010). *Taliban attack Afghan air base*. Accessed on August 4, 2010, from <http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2010/08/20108381759693940.html>.

4.9.1 Foreign troops

The United Nations is present in Afghanistan since 2002. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)'s key role is to promote peace and stability in Afghanistan by leading the efforts of the international community. UNAMA's priorities include strengthening institutions and building the capacity of the Government at all levels, including the development of institutions of good governance, of law and order, and of security.

The UN mandated NATO to send troops to assist the Afghan government in the establishment of a secure and stable environment. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been deployed in Afghanistan since 2002. Over 30 countries participate in the ISAF mission. The Netherlands plays an important role, especially in Uruzgan where the majority of the Dutch forces are deployed. Other important participants are Germany, Italy, France, Canada and the United States.

In addition to the foreign military troops in Afghanistan, there are many other organizations present. After the American invasion of Afghanistan development and aid agencies poured into the country. Many are still here today, assisting the government in fields such as education, health care, or working on grassroots level with the local communities.

4.9.2 Pakistan

The longest border of Afghanistan is the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Durand Line. This border poses several problems. The Durand Line was agreed upon by the British and Afghanistan in 1893. Pakistan has never officially ratified the agreement when it became independent of India. Many in Afghanistan and Pakistan do not agree with the current border since the Durand Line divides the Pashtun populations of Afghanistan and Pakistan (Crews and Tarzi, 2006). Furthermore, the border region is very unsafe, due to Pakistan's inability to control the border. Many insurgency groups reside in this unstable area, on either side of the border.

During the years of conflict, many Afghans fled to Pakistan and were housed in refugee camps. Madrassas in these refugee camps in Pakistan were the breeding ground of many Taliban (Crews and Tarzi, 2006).

Pakistan has meddled in the internal affairs of Afghanistan over the past decades. As mentioned in paragraph 4.8, the Taliban received support from the Pakistani intelligence agents and the government of Pakistan contributed to their rise. In addition, on other occasions in the past when Pakistan did not agree with the government of Afghanistan they supported the opposition or insurgency groups.

4.9.3 Al-Qaida

The organisation was founded in 1988 by a millionaire from Saudi Arabia, Osama bin Laden. The purpose of the organisation was to help finance, recruit, transport and train fighters for the Afghan resistance against the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union was defeated, the objective of Al-Qaida changed to the following: “establish a pan-Islamic Caliphate throughout the world by working with allied Islamic extremist groups to overthrow regimes it deems "non-Islamic" and expelling Westerners and non-Muslims from Muslim countries”³². The multi-national, decentralised structure makes it almost impossible to determine how many fighters are involved in the struggle.

Before Al-Qaida found refuge in Afghanistan during the reign of the Taliban, they were based in Sudan. The presence of Al-Qaida was the main reason for the USA to invade Afghanistan. It is unknown where the headquarters of the organisation are today; possible locations are Iran, the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, or in Pakistani cities.

4.10 Conclusion

Afghanistan is a complex country, with a troubled history and a tumultuous present, which have a major impact on the post-conflict economic development process. For instance, the lack of law and regulation hampers the development of the private sector. Also, outside investors will be less likely to invest in Afghanistan when the business environment is in such poor shape. For the local private sector, the lack of law and regulation proposes problems as well. Creating sustainable development is difficult in such a hostile environment. In addition, the security situation proposes another serious barrier to outside investment. International companies are unlikely to invest when the security situation is so poor. The risks are then too high compared to the possible advantages. To ensure that the post-conflict economic development process will result in sustainable development it is necessary to involve the private sector as well. The situation in Afghanistan makes this very difficult, which is one of the problems in the post-conflict economic development process in Afghanistan. In chapter five, other problems related to the post-conflict economic reconstruction of Afghanistan are discussed. In later chapters it will be examined whether or not multi-sectoral partnerships can provide a solution for these problems.

5. Problems with the current economic developmental process in Afghanistan

The reconstruction and development process in Afghanistan has been underway for several years now, and so far, results are not as expected. This chapter aims to analyze the problems that occur within the

³² Global security, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/al-qaida.htm>, accessed on February 20, 2010.

economic developmental process in Afghanistan and answers sub-question four: What are the problems with the post-conflict economic development process in Afghanistan?

5.1 Legitimacy of the Afghan government

The legitimacy of the government of Afghanistan is limited, due to several problems. This lack of legitimacy of the government is detrimental to the economic development process. Factors that reduce the legitimacy of the Afghan government are the widespread corruption, nepotism and the influence of militia leaders and criminals in the government (Giustozzi, 2004). The widespread corruption in Afghanistan also affects everyday life. In 2006, 93 percent of respondents in a national survey stated that over half of the public services in Afghanistan demanded bribes, and over half of the respondents felt that corruption in the police and army reduced their personal safety (Galtung and Tisné, 2008, p.10). Furthermore, due to the lack of funds and capacity³³, the government is unable to provide the population with the basic social services such as education and health care without the assistance of foreign donors and NGOs³⁴. Donors have largely delivered assistance through their own implementation agencies and national NGOs (such as USAID), instead of channelling their assistance through the Afghan government (Rubin, 2006, p.179). Around 75 percent of the aid was channelled outside of the Afghan government (Galtung and Tisné, 2008, p.15). Since the Afghan government is so dependent on foreign aid, and cannot provide the population with the basic social services, it can be classified as a rentier state. There is no social contract between government and population, affecting the legitimacy of the Afghan government (Herb, 2005).

The security situation in Afghanistan also influences the post-conflict economic development process. The Afghan government does not have a monopoly of violence over the country, and cannot control the entire territory. Several Dutch NGOs have indicated that the security situation is one of the major problems of their work in Afghanistan. For instance, employees (local and international) are being threatened, sometimes even kidnapped or murdered, and several projects were attacked and plundered by criminals or insurgents³⁵.

5.2 Donor governments

The divisions, rivalries and fragmentation of the “international community” have been obstacles to the reconstruction process in Afghanistan (Rubin, 2006). Furthermore, the case of Afghanistan is more complex due to the dual task at hand, the country needs to be rebuilt after the intervention, while at the

³³ Interviews with employees of several Dutch NGOs. Den Haag, August 18, 2009, Lelystad, August 25, 2009 and Amsterdam, August 26, 2009.

³⁴ Interview with an employee of a Dutch NGO, Den Haag, July 14, 2009.

³⁵ Interviews with employees of several Dutch NGOs, Lelystad, August 25, 2009 and Amsterdam, August 26, 2009.

same time the US military mission continues to hunt down Al Qaida and the Taliban in the war against terrorism (Rubin, 2006, p.179). This pursuit of multiple objectives causes tension and tradeoffs within and between donor governments. For instance, the goal of the Foreign Office of Britain is to eliminate drugs and terrorism, while the goal of the UK Department for International Development is to provide humanitarian and development aid. The policy of the UK in Afghanistan is a trade-off between both goals (Atmar and Goodhand, 2001, p.8). In addition, foreign policy, and the distribution of aid, is dictated by short-term exigencies of electoral cycles, instead by the needs of the receiving country (Atmar and Goodhand, 2001, p.8). The political party which has the upper hand in cabinet will determine the foreign policy, and different parties have different opinions about this subject. For instance, the more conservative political parties tend to spend less on development aid. The needs of the receiving country will be less important than the political objectives at home. The recent collapse of the Dutch cabinet over the possible extension of the mission in Afghanistan is another example of the electoral cycles that dictate foreign policy. It will depend on the next government whether or not the small mission that is in Afghanistan at the moment will stay, or leave, which was agreed upon in 2007³⁶. The needs of Afghanistan in this matter are far less important than the political objectives of the Dutch political parties.

5.3 *Communication and coordination*

Another serious issue regarding the reconstruction process in Afghanistan is the lack of coordination and communication among the involved organisations and governments. The international community does not always have a coherent strategy. For instance, in 1999 the US and the UK had taken a harder line against the Taliban than Scandinavian countries. Even though there was a level of convergence on the key policy goals, different positions have emerged in terms of how they should be implemented (Atmar and Goodhand, 2001, p.8). The international NGOs do not have a coordinated approach to the reconstruction; especially USAID acts fairly independently from other large NGOs³⁷. The coordination and communication between the different sectors is even worse. An example of this is the raid of a NGO project by the military. A health clinic was entered with violence by military troops because it was thought that there were members of the Taliban present. This occurred without warning the staff. Other incidents have occurred in which clinics were used by military troops as observation posts at night, without consent or prior knowledge of the staff³⁸. This lack of communication and coordination

³⁶ Parlement & Politiek (2010). Kabinetscrisis 2010: de Uruzgan-crisis. Accessed on August 25, 2010, from <http://www.parlement.com/9353000/1f/j9vvhy5i95k8zx/vh8lnhrpmxvf?gclid=CLjVk9fd1KMCFYK3god5CxNOW>

³⁷ Interviews with employees of several Dutch NGOs. Den Haag, August 18, 2009, Lelystad, August 25, 2009 and Amsterdam, August 26, 2009.

³⁸ Interview with an employee of a Dutch NGO. Amsterdam, August 26, 2009.

is detrimental to the formation of trust between the several sectors³⁹. Furthermore, according to Kai Kaiser of the World Bank (cited in Galtung and Tisné, 2008, p.7), information is a key ingredient of success in reconstruction. Poor information is a cause for inadequate coordination and inadequate oversight. In addition, at village or project level, it is difficult for stakeholders to monitor the development processes without access to information about these projects. Information is not readily available for all, and is often only accessible in English. According to Galtung and Tisné (2008), improved transparency is a necessary condition to prevent aid recipients to receive funds for the same project more than once, coordinating activities, and reducing waste and duplication (p.8).

A growing percentage of aid is subcontracted through major contractors and NGOs (Galtung and Tisné, 2008, p.7). This development makes it more difficult to get access to project information and makes the accountability of private contractors much worse.

5.4 Timeline of aid

The amount of aid that was offered to Afghanistan in the early years after the intervention was very large. Especially high-priority government departments and NGOs working in sectors such as health and education were offered large amounts of aid, often too much to absorb. This over funding led to fraud by the recipients of aid (Galtung and Tisné, 2008, p.14). In the first couple years after a conflict, or in the case of Afghanistan the intervention, aid levels are very high. The absorption capability of the government is very low at that point. As discussed in paragraph 2.3.3, it takes time for post-conflict countries to improve to a level at which aid can be of much use (Collier, 2008, p.106). After three years, the capacity to use aid usually has increased significantly, and the needs of the government for more funding increased as well (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002b). However, over the years the amount of aid offered to post-conflict countries often decreases significantly, so in the end, the amount of aid is too much, too soon, but too little in total. Instead of an enormous influx of aid that decreases after a few years should aid be available in large amounts for at least the first decade after a conflict (Collier, 2008, p.106).

5.5 Division of aid

The division of aid is also problematic, as the spread of reconstruction benefits between the rural and urban populations is extremely uneven. The urban minority is more visible and accessible than the rural majority. As a consequence, there is a lack of reconstruction activities at the village and community level (Barakat, 2002, p.814). This emphasis on Kabul and other major cities can also be seen in the work of NGOs, as most have their main office, sometimes even their only office, in

³⁹ Interviews with employees of several Dutch NGOs. Den Haag, August 18, 2009, Lelystad, August 25, 2009 and Amsterdam, August 26, 2009.

Kabul⁴⁰. Some organizations do not even venture beyond the immediate surroundings of Kabul. Furthermore, it is being acknowledged that the rural communities are often too difficult to reach⁴¹.

5.6 *Working methods of developmental organizations*

The involvement of the United Nations in Afghanistan comes with several recurrent features, the deficit of resources, support and credibility (Fielden and Goodhand, 2001, p.26). Furthermore, several factors hamper the development of a strong knowledge base about Afghanistan in the UN. These factors include a high turnover of staff, a lack of time spent in Afghanistan by the staff and a tendency not to consult with a wide array of Afghan state and non-state actors. In addition, major decisions about Afghanistan are not made in Kabul, but in Western capitals by Western governments who keep their own interests at heart (Fielden and Goodhand, 2001, p. 27). This development is also present within NGOs; international personnel often dominates policy- and decision-making processes (Marsden, 2003, p.96).

In addition, the sectoral approach of the UN has some contradicting results, shown by the example of food aid. The sectors Food security and Food assistance are still regarded as separate sectors, even though misdirected food aid can seriously damage post conflict agricultural recovery. For instance, the distribution of rice by the sector Food Assistance influences the price of rice. Farmers will produce less rice because they cannot sell their product for a reasonable price. The production of rice decreases, which damages the agricultural recovery. The actions of the sector Food assistance damages the sector Food security. Cooperation between these sectors is vital to avoid this type of situation (Barakat, 2002, p.809).

5.7 *Remaining issues*

Other problems with the post-conflict reconstruction process that are mentioned by employees of Dutch NGOs are the fact that NGOs are often seen as political actors⁴², not neutral as they want to be perceived. This is caused by several factors, for instance the development activities of soldiers (such as the Provincial Reconstruction Teams), which blur the line between NGOs and military forces⁴³. Furthermore, the lack of capacity of the central government leads to an overdependency on local power holders and communities⁴⁴, which influences the work of some NGOs. In some cases, the local power holders oppose the work of NGOs, or only allow projects that are profitable to them⁴⁵.

⁴⁰ Interviews with employees of several Dutch NGOs. Den Haag, August 18, 2009, Amsterdam, August 26, 2009 and Utrecht, August 28, 2009.

⁴¹ Personal communication by an employee of a Dutch NGO, Den Haag, July 2009.

⁴² Interviews with employees of two Dutch NGOs. Den Haag, August 18, 2009, and Utrecht, August 28, 2009.

⁴³ Interviews with employees of several Dutch NGOs. Den Haag, August 18, 2009, Amsterdam, August 26, 2009 and Utrecht, August 28, 2009.

⁴⁴ Interviews with employees of two Dutch NGOs, Amsterdam, August 26, 2009 and Utrecht, August 28, 2009.

⁴⁵ Interview with an employee of a Dutch NGO, Den Haag, August 18, 2009.

A final important issue is the lack of awareness of the history of Afghanistan, and of post-conflict reconstruction in general. The history of Afghanistan influences the reconstruction process, and this is sometimes ignored. For instance, there remains a Soviet inheritance in the governmental structure of Afghanistan (Marsden, 2003, p.94). In addition, many donors are not knowledgeable about local conditions, laws, traditions and culture. According to Galtung and Tisné, many reconstruction errors in Afghanistan and Palestine could have been avoided if donors were more conversant with and knowledgeable about local conditions, and used this knowledge to draw on local skills and competencies (p.16). On the other hand, beneficiaries would also benefit from better knowledge of the international donor world (Galtung and Tisné, 2008, p.16).

5.8 *Conclusion*

The question that this chapter is meant to answer was ‘What are the problems with the post-conflict economic development process in Afghanistan?’ Well, there are a multitude of problems related to the post-conflict economic development process in Afghanistan. Several of these problems coincide with the theoretical issues discussed in paragraph 2.3.3. For instance, the legitimacy of the Afghan government is limited, due to widespread corruption, nepotism and the influence of militia leaders and criminals in the government, and the lack of funds and capacity. Other examples are the lack of communication and coordination between different sectors involved in the post-conflict reconstruction and the wrong timeline of aid distribution. As discussed in paragraph 2.8, multi-sectoral partnerships could theoretically solve some of these issues.

Some of the problems discussed in this chapter are interconnected, for instance, the unavailability of information about projects can be considered a side effect of the lack of coordination and communication of the different sectors involved in the development process. Furthermore, beneficiaries and donors alike would benefit from better knowledge about each other. This too is connected to the lack of coordination and communication between the involved sectors. In theory multi-sectoral partnerships could provide a solution for the problems related to the lack of coordination and communication between the sectors. After all, cooperation between the sectors in a partnership would increase communication, and could increase trust, understanding and respect between the partners (Van Tulder and Fortanier, 2009). Furthermore, it is theorized that partnerships could tackle problems that supersede the capacity of one of the partners, and that partnerships can create synergy between partners’ objectives, resulting in otherwise unachievable results (Workgroup PPC Afghanistan, 2010). In addition, NGOs have formed parallel structures in Afghanistan. The capacity of the government to provide the population with basic services such as health care is too low. If the NGOs would work together with the government, instead of forming parallel structure, the

results achieved by this cooperation would reflect onto the government, not only increasing its capacity, but also creating a new social contract between state and population. This in turn positively affects the legitimacy of the government.

Other issues in the post-conflict economic reconstruction of Afghanistan are unlikely to be solved by multi-sectoral partnerships. For instance the influence of militia leaders and criminals in the government is not an issue that can be solved with a partnership, and neither is the security situation, the wrong timeline of aid and the fact that foreign policy, and the distribution of aid, is dictated by short-term exigencies of electoral cycles.

The next two chapters will analyse partnerships in practice in post-conflict economic development, chapter six in other post-conflict countries, chapter seven in Afghanistan. Attention will be paid to the conflict sensitivity of the projects, the overall results and problems that were encountered during the projects.

6. Multi-sectoral partnerships in post-conflict countries

Overall, there is little scientific literature on multi-sectoral partnerships in post-conflict countries. This does not mean however that there are no examples of such partnerships. This chapter will provide an analysis of multi-sectoral partnerships in economic development in post-conflict countries other than Afghanistan. The examples in this chapter are not representative for all multi-sectoral partnerships in economic development in post-conflict countries. Information about the partnerships discussed in this chapter resulted from the interviews with several Dutch NGOs, a government agency, and a literature research on multi-sectoral partnerships in post-conflict countries. The available information on the partnerships will be used to fill out the checklist on conflict sensitivity, resulting in a categorization of the projects. Unfortunately, the description of the cases is mostly based on one source, usually an organization involved in the partnership. The checklists for all projects discussed in this chapter can be found in Appendix A.

Since there are several different types of partnerships, as explained in chapter two, this chapter will be structured accordingly. Attention will be paid to partnerships with two partners (NGO-Government, NGO-Private sector and Government-Private sector) and partnerships with all three partners involved. A fifth paragraph describes partnerships in which multi-national organizations such as the World Bank are involved. The conflict sensitivity of the projects will be discussed and displayed in a table.

The final paragraph of this chapter will provide an answer to the sub-question '*What are the experiences with multi-sectoral partnerships in economic development in other post-conflict countries?*' by providing a short summary of the experiences with multi-sectoral partnerships in post-conflict economic development.

6.1 Partnership between NGO and Government

During the interviews conducted for this research it was found that partnerships between NGOs and governments are probably the most common in post-conflict reconstruction. Often this kind of partnership takes the form of a donor-recipient relationship. For instance, many Dutch NGOs are funded by the Dutch government. There are however other types of partnership possible. During the conflict, NGOs have often taken over some of the tasks of the local government, such as the provision of healthcare. After the conflict, NGOs can continue to provide these services, preferably in cooperation with the local government⁴⁶.

⁴⁶ Interviews with two employees of Dutch NGOs, Den Haag, August 18, 2009 and Utrecht, August 28, 2009.

In August 2006, the Lord's Resistance Army and the Ugandan government signed a ceasefire and a year later, the government launched a three-year Peace, Recovery and Development Plan⁴⁷. This plan however, has a strong focus on large-scale infrastructure and economic development, and may have neglected peace building and reconciliation. There is still no peace between the LRA and the Ugandan government. In the area affected by the conflict, Northern Uganda, there are continued high levels of vulnerability, food insecurity, increasing conflict over land and renewed instability.

The humanitarian actors, mainly international NGOs, in Uganda were using a cluster approach in their actions before the ceasefire, and this was later applied in the post-conflict reconstruction process as well.

A cluster approach is meant to strengthen overall levels of accountability for humanitarian response and to ensure that gaps in response do not remain unaddressed because there are no clearly assigned responsibilities. A cluster approach is an approach in which the humanitarian needs are divided in several sectors, for instance, protection, water and sanitation, shelter, food aid, nutrition and livelihoods support. Each sector is divided in different levels (headquarters, regional, country and operational). There are usually multiple organizations involved in a sector, working independently from each other. This leads to a lack of strategic leadership. To strengthen the leadership, one organization is appointed as a lead agency and is responsible for the humanitarian assistance in that sector, the other organizations involved in that sector are grouped into a cluster, and work together on the specific humanitarian needs. New and stronger lines of accountability are introduced between the lead agencies and the Humanitarian Coordination of the country in which the cluster approach takes place. Simply said, the basis of the cluster approach is the idea of a strengthened sector group under an accountable lead agency. Participants in the cluster approach determine together where the need for aid is highest (Stoddard et al., 2007).

When the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan failed to address the need of the population for basic services, the cluster approach was used. Priorities included basic health and water needs, education, livelihoods support and road construction, as well as capacity-building support towards district structures in civil administration and rule of law. The majority of clusters are co-chaired by a humanitarian agency representative, from one of the INGOs involved, and a district office representative. In this case in Northern Uganda, clusters were merged with existing government sectoral coordination structures at the district level. In addition, local organisations have also participated in these clusters.

The cluster approach has had some positive effects in Northern Uganda, for instance, the protection cluster found organisations duplicating programmes in the same region, and after consultation agreed

⁴⁷ This case was based on an article on the website of the Humanitarian Practice Network: Martin, E. (2010). Capacity-building and partnership in Northern Uganda. Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, March 2010. <http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?ID=3109>

that one of the organisations would move its programme to an area where coverage was lacking (Stoddard et al., 2007, p.7).

There are some problems with this cluster approach, as not all donors appreciate this form of relief, seeing it as going beyond the humanitarian mandate since it does not only prioritizes basic health and water needs and education, but also capacity building in civil administration and the rule of law. Another issue is that international NGOs are often unwilling to provide information on their development and recovery activities to the authorities. Since District authorities are charged with integrating all work plans and budgets into their District Development Plans, this is problematic. In addition, not all agencies see value in coordinating with a government which they perceive to be weak. Furthermore, previous experiences of recovery programmes, in Uganda, but also in other post-conflict countries, implemented by the national (and regional) government faced massive corruption. It is therefore important that the funds for reconstruction are closely monitored. However, this problem is not just an issue with the cluster approach, but in all recovery programmes implemented through local government structures.

This project will be categorized in Category A, conflict sensitive. This characterization is based on the results of the checklist, which can be found in Appendix A. According to the cooperating organizations (the humanitarian organizations and local / national governments), the effect of this project on the post conflict economic reconstruction process is positive. It is seen by cooperating organizations as ‘an effective coordination platform for information-sharing, reducing duplication and filling gaps in response, and a vehicle for strengthening accountability through the monitoring of funding flows’ (Martin, E., 2010). The beneficiaries were chosen on the basis of geographical area, not the site-specific approach in which parts of the population were not reached (Martin, E., 2010). Within the cluster approach, the sector group assesses the effect of their work on other communities, minimizing tensions (Stoddard et al., 2007, p.7). These factors cause the categorization in Category A, conflict sensitive.

6.2 Partnership between NGO and Private sector

The Dutch NGO ICCO has experience with working with the private sector in conflict areas, mostly through local NGOs. This partnership can take many forms, such as microfinance projects, but also more comprehensive cooperation such as the formation and guidance of cooperation by farmers. An example of this is a project in Rwanda. The goal of the partnership is to strengthen the position of a number of Rwandese cooperations involved in the production of bananas and peppers. Cooperation is being sought with local entrepreneurs and with the savings- and credit corporation which was set up in the period prior to this project (by ICCO). A local NGO, partner of ICCO, supplies the cooperation with education and several services, such as transport. The aim of this project is eventually to form a

viable company, in which the cooperations are involved. For now, ICCO provides funding for the project⁴⁸. Other examples of partnerships between NGOs and the private sector are the foundation of value chains in post-conflict and developing countries⁴⁹.

The project will be categorized in Category B, mostly conflict sensitive. This categorization is based on the results of the checklist. This categorization is caused by the positive effect of the project on the post-conflict economic development process⁵⁰, and the manner of selection of the beneficiaries. According to ICCO, the beneficiaries are selected on social and economic criteria, targeting the most vulnerable in society. In addition, there are no known negative effects, harmful messages of harmful competition associated with this project⁵¹. Furthermore, the sector in which this project takes place, the agricultural sector, is particularly suited for targeting the poorest of society. Therefore, this project will be categorized in Category B, mostly conflict sensitive.

6.3 *Partnership between Government and Private sector (PPC)*

The Dutch Government has initiated a project in which a governmental organization, the EVD, provides grants to international companies who invest in a less developed country, with a local partner. There is a special programme for post-conflict countries, such as Burundi, DRC, Palestine and Sierra Leone (Private Sector Investment +, PSI +). This is a recent development, however, quite a number of grant applications have already been presented to the EVD. During the grant application procedure, the conflict sensitivity of a project is researched, the emphasis lies with economic conflict sensitivity. For instance, the project is required to be innovative, to ensure that there is no unfair competition and the project needs to stimulate the local economy. If necessary, experts on for instance agriculture, are consulted to determine the reliability of the information provided by the partners. Furthermore, the local (and international) partners are researched. A background check of the partners is standard procedure and the information provided by the partners is checked. For instance, all partners must provide financial information and information about the ownership structure. In addition, a project proposal and budget calculation must be provided for the project⁵². The project officer will judge the project proposal and advise the grant-committee, which ultimately determines which projects get a grant. The project officer will be responsible for one or more countries. He visits these countries, and some of the projects there, about once a year. He will therefore have an understanding of the local situation. When a project is thought to be detrimental to the country it will

⁴⁸ ICCO. Visited on March 3, 2010, from <http://www.icco.nl/delivery/main/en/project.phtml?p=en-project&project=7>.

⁴⁹ Interview with an employee of a Dutch NGO. Utrecht, August 28, 2009

⁵⁰ Interview with an employee of a Dutch NGO. Utrecht, August 28, 2009

⁵¹ Interview with an employee of a Dutch NGO. Utrecht, August 28, 2009

⁵² More information about the grant procedure of the PSI + programme can be found on the site of the EVD: www.evd.nl.

be denied a grant⁵³. A possible addition to the proposal in the MIGA insurance (see paragraph 2.6.2). A part of the grant can be used to insure their investments against for instance war and civil disturbance.

This initiative will be categorized in category B, mostly conflict sensitive, since the projects can have a positive influence on post-conflict economic reconstruction and care is taken to ensure that the projects do not have a negative influence on the country, and that unfair competition is avoided. The working method of this project is rather conflict sensitive, because the applicants have to provide the EVD with a plan that was carefully thought over, including issues such as negative impact on the country, and tensions between communities. Furthermore, a realistic assessment on the risks of violence is advised. However, the main issue of the proposal is the economic impact of the proposed project.

6.4 Partnership between Government, NGO and Private sector

The project discussed here should have been a cooperation between the US government (through USAID), the Iraqi government, several NGOs and the private sector in Iraq⁵⁴. It turned out to be a cooperation between USAID and the American private sector in the reconstruction of the healthcare system in Iraq. There are several NGOs involved in the reconstruction of the healthcare system. Projects in this sector should be authorised by the Ministry of Health. In addition, the NGO Coordination Committee in Iraq (NCCI) attempts to coordinate all NGO activities. The US government is very involved in the reconstruction of Iraq through USAID, which is the government agency to extend assistance to countries recovering from disaster, trying to escape poverty, and engaging in democratic reforms⁵⁵.

USAID contracts private companies to reconstruct the healthcare system. Unfortunately, the main beneficiaries of this partnership are not the Iraqis, but the American private sector. American private contractors have secured lucrative contracts from the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), and seem unwilling to cooperate with the Iraqi private sector, other NGOs involved in the healthcare sector or the local authorities. Some of the companies have uncooperative attitudes towards the Iraq Medical Assistance Committee (IMAC), the joint CPA/Ministry of Health responsible for authorising medical assistance programmes, and towards the NGO Coordination Committee in Iraq (NCCI). In addition, since the remits of some contractors are unclear, this created confusion among the CPA and UN agencies, such as the WHO, over who was doing what, leading to delays in evaluating the health situation and in response planning. This lack of cooperation and communication leads to duplication of effort and unnecessary competition over responsibility for rehabilitating health facilities.

⁵³ Personal communication of an employee of a Dutch government agency, Den Haag, July 2009.

⁵⁴ This case was based on research by Prescott, G. and Pellini, L. (2004) Public-private partnerships in the health sector: the case of Iraq. Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, March 2004.

<http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=2614>

⁵⁵ USAID website. Accessed on August 27, 2010, from http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/.

Fortunately, not all private companies involved in the reconstruction of the health sector in Iraq are so uncooperative. There are some who have a transparent, cooperative working method, coordinating with the local authorities and NGOs, resulting in a better relationship with the Iraqis, NGOs and authorities. However, the overall experiences with the partnership in this case are not positive.

This project will be categorized in category C, mostly conflict insensitive. This categorization is caused by the fact that this partnership is largely excluding the Iraqis. It appears that the contractors are building health care systems based on US-models, instead on the local needs. Furthermore, the main beneficiary is the American private sector. Tensions between different communities, mainly the American private sector involved in Iraq, and the local authorities and NGOs have increased due to this working method. The way in which the contracts were given, in a closed bid process with no transparency, is harmful behaviour. Therefore, this project will be categorized in category C, mostly conflict insensitive.

6.5 Partnerships with multi-national organizations

The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) is an initiative to stem the flow of conflict diamonds. There are over 40 participants, including the international diamond industry, civil society organizations and a large number of governments. Over 99% of the global diamond production is accounted for in this project. This project is not necessarily related to post-conflict reconstruction, however, it is included in this chapter because of its comprehensive nature and conflict sensitivity. The certification of diamonds prevents the use of diamonds to finance wars against legitimate governments (UN, 2005, p.57). The KPCS was established in 2002. The KPCS imposes extensive requirements on its members to enable them to certify shipments of rough diamonds as 'conflict-free' and prevent conflict diamonds from entering the legitimate trade. Under the terms of the KPCS, participating states must meet 'minimum requirements' and must put in place national legislation and institutions; export, import and internal controls; and also commit to transparency and the exchange of statistical data. Participants can only legally trade with other participants who have also met the minimum requirements of the scheme, and international shipments of rough diamonds must be accompanied by a certificate guaranteeing that they are conflict-free. Diamond experts estimate that conflict diamonds now represent a fraction of one percent of the international trade in diamonds, compared to estimates of up to 15% in the 1990s⁵⁶.

When this project is analysed with the checklist, answering the relevant questions only, using the available information one can conclude that this project is very conflict sensitive. The KPCS was initiated because conflict diamonds were funding violence in several countries. The impact of the project on other communities can therefore be seen as positive, as it decreased tensions attributed to

⁵⁶ Kimberley Process Certification Scheme homepage. Visited on March 2, 2010, from http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/home/index_en.html.

conflict fuelled by diamonds. Furthermore, this particular resource is highly at risk of diversion through theft, this project reduces the incentive of stealing diamonds and using the profit to fuel conflict. Not all questions were answered, those from the categories 'beneficiaries' and 'staff', since these were not applicable to this particular case. Almost all other questions could be answered with the information gathered from UN Global Compact (2005) and the official site of KPCS⁵⁷. This project will be categorized in category A, conflict sensitive.

In December 1999, a Joint Working Group on Health Services was formed during a workshop on the health system of East Timor⁵⁸. The goal of this workgroup was to establish a new health system. In addition to national and international NGOs, the UN was involved, and so was the National Council of Timorese Resistance. In March 2000, when the emergency phase in East Timor had ended, an Interim Health Authority was established. Members were local and international UNTEAT staff. In addition, NGOs were assigned districts in which they were the lead agency for management and provision of health services. In dialogue with the IHA, plans were drawn up by the NGOs to reconstruct the health system. For instance, one health centre with inpatient facilities was rehabilitated in each district capital. In addition, one centre with an outpatient department would be placed in each sub district, to provide basic services in more remote areas, health posts were established and (mobile) clinics were created.

Important donors in this project were UNTEAT, the peacekeeping force in East Timor, Humanitarian Consolidated Appeal, the Consolidated Fund for East Timor, the European Commission Humanitarian Office, who funded this type of humanitarian aid through NGOs, and the World Bank. Several emergency NGOs were involved, at first as the main health service provider, later, when the IHA was in place, as temporary health service providers while the system's capacity was being strengthened. From the start of the project, a strategy was formed to cope with the withdrawal of NGOs from the health care system. The government of East Timor decided that a quick withdrawal, in December 2001, would be possible, and acted accordingly. It would remain possible however, for NGOs to be involved in health care, but not as main service providers. Areas in which their assistance was still required were indicated and a new procedure to assess NGO proposals was established. Proposals were requested to be in accordance with principles such as equity, gender and cultural sensitivity.

Positive results could be reported in the early years of this project. The performance of the immunization programme improved, and service utilization continued to grow in the first years, even after the withdrawal of the NGOs. Furthermore, it is believed that efficiency has increased, geographic equality has been stimulated through standardization, and workforce motivation is believed to have

⁵⁷ Kimberley Process Certification Scheme homepage. http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/home/index_en.html. Visited on the 2nd of March 2010.

⁵⁸ This case was based on the research of Alonso, A. and Brugha, R. (2006). *Rehabilitating the health system after conflict in East Timor: a shift from NGO to government leadership*. Oxford University Press in association with The London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.

increased due to the fact that the health care system is now under control of the East Timorese themselves. There are also some problems related to this project, as with many post-conflict projects, the system was initially benefiting from resources that were not sustainable in the long run, such as foreign aid. In addition, there were interruptions in the drug supply; sometimes essential drugs could not be supplied for two or more weeks due to logistical weakness and gaps in the management system at the central medical stores and facility level. Furthermore, there were persistent problems of low staff attendance in some facilities, especially in outlying areas. Most of these problems could be dealt with relatively effectively in a short time, by fully implementing the health care information system.

This project will be categorized in category A, conflict sensitive. This categorization is based on the results of the checklist. The success of the project in rehabilitating the health care system of East Timor indicates the positive effect the project had on the post-conflict development. In addition, geographic inequality in health care quality was reduced. The project did not place people in more risk of violence, there were no harmful messages, relationships, provocations or ethical problems reported. There was a close relationship between the donors, the government and the NGOs in this case, which resulted in discussion and cooperation. It must be noted however, that there were some preconditions in East Timor which probably have had a positive effect on the outcome of the post-conflict reconstruction process, and also this particular project. There was a widespread recognition of the legitimacy of the transitional administration, social cohesion within the state, and coordination facilitated by a high level of consensus among all actors. It is rare that these factors are present in a post-conflict country. The favourable outcome of this project causes the categorization in category A, conflict sensitive.

6.6 *Conflict sensitive multi-sectoral partnerships*

In chapter one the sub-question “*To what degree can multi-sectoral partnerships be conflict sensitive?*” was proposed, this paragraph will attempt to provide a first and partial answer to this question, using the discussed partnerships from this chapter.

Below a table is presented which summarizes the findings of this chapter.

Project:	Type of partnership	Categorization conflict sensitive			
		A	B	C	D
Northern Uganda	NGO – Government	X			
Rwanda	NGO – Private sector		X		
PSI +	Government – Private sector		X		
Iraq health care	Government – NGO – Private sector			X	
Kimberley Process	Government – NGO – Private	X			

Certification Scheme	sector – MNO				
East Timor Health care	Government – NGO – MNO	X			

Table 6.1 conflict sensitive overview

As a reminder, category A is conflict sensitive, B is mostly conflict sensitive, category C is mostly conflict insensitive and the final category D stands for conflict insensitive. Most projects discussed in this chapter are categorized in category A. Two projects are categorized in category B, and one project in category C. None is deemed conflict insensitive.

Some of the partnerships discussed here have an obvious conflict sensitive nature, such as the example from Uganda, and the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme which aims to stop the trade of blood diamonds which are used to finance conflict. Unfortunately, some other partnerships were somewhat conflict insensitive, even when intentions were good. For instance, the working method of the American government in the reconstruction of its health sector appears to be harmful, since the Iraqis are not very involved in this project.

6.7 Conclusion

The experiences with multi-sectoral partnerships in other post-conflict countries have been mixed. Although good results have been achieved, many things have gone wrong. Most projects examined in this chapter have provided some positive effect on the post-conflict economic development in their particular country. Cooperation between the various partners was not always successful. Even when different sectors form a multi-sectoral partnership communication and cooperation do not come naturally. Communication often remains problematic. For instance, information is not shared between all partners, because of a lack of trust or because organizations do not realise the necessity of sharing information. Furthermore, not all NGOs see value in coordinating with a government which they perceive to be weak and/or corrupt. The circumstances in the post-conflict country in which the partnership takes place are also very important for the success of the project. In the case of East Timor Health Care, the positive result was possible due to the favourable circumstances which are uncommon in post-conflict countries. For instance, the government of East Timor had great legitimacy amongst the population and social cohesion was high.

Even though the projects that were discussed in this chapter are often success stories, this does not mean that all experiences with multi-sectoral partnerships in other post-conflict countries have been positive. One may not be so keen on publishing their experiences with such partnerships if they were a (complete) failure.

The experiences with multi-sectoral partnerships, good and bad, in post-conflict countries other than Afghanistan can provide valuable lessons for future projects. The next chapter discusses experiences with multi-sectoral partnerships in Afghanistan.

7. Multi-sectoral partnerships in Afghanistan

There are some examples of multi-sectoral partnerships in Afghanistan. This chapter will analyse several of such partnerships. The information about the partnerships discussed in this chapter resulted from the interviews with several Dutch NGOs, a government agency, and a literature research on multi-sectoral partnerships in Afghanistan. In addition, the results of a research that was conducted for the Public Private Cooperation in fragile states- report on Afghanistan were used. The primary objective of this research was to identify key areas, local sectors, local needs and (im)possibilities where public-private cooperation can best or most effectively contribute to pro-poor, just and sustainable growth. In addition, the project aimed to show what public-private cooperation looks like ‘on the ground’. Furthermore, some attention was paid to conflict-sensitivity. An extensive desk study, several fact-finding missions to Afghanistan, interviews in the Netherlands and four case studies were part of the research (Workgroup PPC Afghanistan, 2010).

The available information on the partnerships will be used to fill out the checklist on conflict sensitivity, resulting in a categorization of the projects. The checklists for all projects discussed in this chapter can be found in Appendix B.

Since there are several different types of partnerships this chapter will be structured accordingly, in the same manner as the previous chapter. Attention will be paid to partnerships with two partners (NGO-Government, NGO-Private sector and Government-Private sector) and partnerships with all three partners involved. A fifth paragraph describes partnerships in which multi-national organizations such as the World Bank are involved. The conflict sensitivity of the projects will be discussed and displayed in a table.

The final paragraph of this chapter will provide a short summary of the experiences with multi-sectoral partnerships in post-conflict economic development in Afghanistan.

7.1 Partnership between NGO and Government

The German government has several government capacity-building projects in Afghanistan, because functioning government institutions are crucial to the post-conflict reconstruction⁵⁹. The execution of these projects is put in the hands of NGOs, who are funded by the German government. For instance, the Tribal Liaison Office (TLO) is an Afghan NGO that works in the border region of Loya Paktia

⁵⁹ This case is based on information provided by the German Federal Foreign Office. Accessed on July 30, 2010, from <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Infoservice/Presse/Meldungen/2009/090707-projekteAFGH.html>

between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The goal of this NGO is to improve local governance, stability and security in Afghanistan through systematic and institutionalized engagement with traditional tribal structures and civil society groups. This NGO was founded with the help and support of the German and Finnish government and the Heinrich Böll Foundation (HBF), as they funded the head office in Kabul and several field offices in Afghanistan⁶⁰. The German government supplied this NGO in 2009 once again with 400.000 euro for a project to strengthen tribal institutions and integrate them into the country's new government and administrative structure. TLO will organize Jirga's (tribal councils) to ensure that community representatives and government officials will consult with each other before decisions are made regarding the communities. The project is intended to prevent a power vacuum from developing, which the Taliban and other militant groups could exploit, by strengthening the local tribal structures. In other projects, the TLO has brought PRTs (coordinated by the US) onboard and into dialogue with local structures, as traditional structures wanted to understand the nature of the PRTs engagement (Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2006). All projects done by the TLO have been on the request of tribal elders, therefore, their working method is very needs based (HBF, 2006). An aspect that made it easier for TLO to succeed is that one of the main TLO staff came himself from a very influential traditional family, which was held in high esteem among the south-eastern elders, helped TLO to gain entrance into the otherwise inaccessible structure of traditional elders (HBF, 2006). However, this ethnic advantage can also be a disadvantage, when the organization is seen as prejudiced.

This TLO-initiative will be categorized in category A, mostly conflict sensitive. The working method of the TLO, strengthening the ties between communities and government institutions and thereby strengthening the capacity of the government is conflict sensitive⁶¹. So far, there are no harmful side effects reported to this project, such as harmful competition, tensions between communities or provocations. The engagement with local actors helped to identify the needs and desires of the population (HBF, 2006). This NGO was not imposed onto tribal communities in the southeast, but initiated upon the request of several tribal elders from the area. The NGO provided important linkages between the community and the local government (HBF, 2006), resulting in a positive effect on the post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan. Therefore, this project will be categorized in category A, mostly conflict sensitive.

⁶⁰ Homepage of the TLO. Accessed on July 30, 2010, from <http://www.tlo-afghanistan.org/>.

⁶¹ Homepage of the TLO. <http://www.tlo-afghanistan.org/>. Accessed on July 30th, 2010.

7.2 *Partnership between NGO and Private sector*

About three years ago, a group of Dutch NGOs suggested the idea of creating a value chain for dried fruits in Afghanistan⁶². The Shamali area was chosen as a location for this project. The Dutch Ministry of Defence and the VNO-NCW have initiated the project further. The idea of a value chain for dried fruits was developed further and Dutch and Afghan partners were approached. A partnership was formed with Kruidenier Foodservices, the Dutch Nut Group and Shamali Farms (a commercial farm on the Shamali Plains, which grows grapes and raisins). In addition to these private companies, Duine Management en Ondersteuning (DMO), a non-profit organization in the management industry owned by an employee of VNO-NCW, remained involved. The plan of the partnership is to start a dried fruits processing facility on the land of Shamali farms. It would use modern technology and improved processing of dried fruits (and possibly, in the future, fresh fruits) to meet with European standards. The products are to be sold in Europe. The factory would be able to use the produce from the Shamali farm and purchase from the local farmers and farmers from Uruzgan. The factory would furthermore rent out the facility to other companies for processing. The transport and distribution of the products in Europe will be done by the Dutch Nut Group and Kruidenier Foodservices. In addition, the partnership will be extended with a government agency, the EVD, which will provide an investment, if the project passes the PSI+ subsidy procedure.

At the moment of the research, the partnership was formed, but the PSI+ procedure has not yet been started. In addition, the Dutch partners have not yet been in Afghanistan and have not met with the Afghan partner. The exception is DMO, the owner has been to Afghanistan. There are several problems relating to this partnership. There has been very little or no progress in the last year, and both Dutch private partners (DNG and KFS) are reluctant to invest time and money to write the grant-applications, the reasons for this are unknown at this point (Workgroup PPC Afghanistan, 2010). Furthermore, DNG and KFS should come to Afghanistan in order to move this project along. But every time a visit was planned, the Dutch Embassy advised the Dutch investors not to come over for security reasons. In addition, the expectations, for instance about quality of the products, of the two involved Dutch businesses are too high for the Afghan situation (Workgroup PPC Afghanistan, 2010). The long distances in Afghanistan make transportation difficult and expensive. There is a lack of proper storing facilities, and the standards in processing practices such as sorting and cleaning of the products are low. And most importantly, there is a lack of standards and certifying bodies, in particular related to food safety and sanitation, which is especially important when it comes to international markets, which are becoming more concerned with certification and traceability. At the time of this research, assessments were carried out to determine whether or not this project had a chance for success.

⁶² This case is based on research done for the Peace, Security and Development Network, Workgroup PPC Afghanistan. Public Private Cooperation in Fragile States: *case study Afghanistan*, January 2010. Peace, Security and Development Network.

Even though the project was yet to start at the time of the research, it is possible to categorize the project, based on the actions so far. The case of the value chain for dried fruits will be categorized in category B, mostly conflict sensitive. This categorization is caused by the unwillingness of the Dutch companies to move further with the project, which can have a negative effect on the post-conflict development process, because there is no progress in the development of the agricultural sector in this particular area. The categorization is still conflict sensitive, because of the nature of the agricultural sector. The beneficiaries will be mostly farmers, in addition to the partners, which are one of the most vulnerable groups in Afghan society. In addition, the choice for a value chain in dried fruits is based on the agricultural history of the country. Before the Russian invasion, Afghanistan was one of the main exporters of raisins in the world, producing high quality products. The climate and conditions in Afghanistan are highly suitable for the production of dried fruits, such as raisins and apricots, and fresh fruits, such as pomegranates. Today however, standards are very low, and products that are being produced are of very low quality. There is still great potential for the Afghan agricultural sector and the government of Afghanistan wants to stimulate the agricultural sector. This is part of a conflict sensitive approach. In chapter one, the working definition of conflict sensitivity for this thesis was given. This definition did not only include understanding the conflict context, act upon this understanding and not contribute to violence, but also to contribute actively to peace building, human security and/or sustainable development. By stimulating the Afghan agricultural sector, this partnership will create sustainable development for a vulnerable group in society.

So far, there have been no unethical consequences of this project, no increased tensions or harmful competition between communities as a result of this project. Since the project has not moved beyond the start-up phase, this is not surprising. These factors cause the categorization of this project in category B, mostly conflict sensitive.

7.3 Partnership between Government and Private sector (PPC)

The case of the Tradepoint Afghanistan Distribution Centre is an example of a multi-sectoral partnership with a government agency and several private companies⁶³. In 2004, a cooperation between Tradepoint and Mr. Badakhshi (the Afghan husband of one of the employees), resulted in Tradepoint Afghanistan, an Afghan subsidiary of Tradepoint Europe. Tradepoint was originally a logistics company, expanding its business in for instance the trade of edible oils and commodity trading and marketing⁶⁴. In addition, Mr. Badakhshi had connections with a major-general in the Afghan National Army (his brother), who directed all military hospitals in Afghanistan. Furthermore,

⁶³ This case is based on research done for the Peace, Security and Development Network, Workgroup PPC Afghanistan: Public Private Cooperation in Fragile States: *case study Afghanistan*, January 2010. Peace, Security and Development Network.

⁶⁴ Tradepoint Europe BV homepage. Accessed on August 28, 2010, from www.tpeu.nl/index2.html.

the Tajik ethnicity of Mr. Badakhshi, and his ties to the Northern Alliance, opened doors for Tradepoint, but may have closed others (Workgroup PPC Afghanistan , 2010, p.2). Tradepoint Afghanistan became the exclusive distributor of Philips medical products in Afghanistan, which became profitable. Other plans soon followed, such as importing Philips consumer goods, and to set up a chicken farm. To accommodate these new plans, a distribution centre was planned. The choice for the transport sector in a post-conflict country could be wise, as it is a sector that recovers from conflict quickly (Workgroup PPC Afghanistan , 2010, p.3). However, in the case of Afghanistan there were signs that the transport sector had become intertwined with the criminal economy during the decades of conflict. At that time, the Pakistani and Afghan mafia dominated this sector (Rashid, 2000).

A local partner in transport was selected, Tac Taz International, and a broader plan was formed. In addition to a distribution centre, technical workshops, a training centre, and a car washing facility were added. Tradepoint Afghanistan furthermore claims to have done research into the transport sector, and concluded that the demand for storage and distribution was high in Afghanistan⁶⁵. In this stage, Tradepoint applied for the PSOM program⁶⁶, the company could have financed the investments itself, however, applying for this subsidy spread the financial risks of the project. The application was eventually granted by the government agency EVD. Therefore, the partnership was extended into a PPC.

After the approval by the EVD, Tradepoint and Tac Taz continued with acquiring trucks and to apply for credit, both very difficult to insure. In addition, acquiring land needed for the distribution centre turned out to be impossible. Before the application was granted by the EVD, a lease agreement was signed by Tradepoint and the president of Neftegaz, the state-owned company that managed the site. The agreement stipulated that the land would be made available to Tradepoint without cost, but all investments in the land and building would fall under the ownership of the Afghan state. This agreement however, turned out to be invalid, as the president of Neftegaz was unauthorized to decide over the plot of land. A meeting was set up with the Afghan Ministry of Finance, which was the authorized organization in this matter. During this meeting, the partnership offered to pay a monthly rent, in addition to the earlier agreement. When a decision by the ministry failed to occur, representatives of the Afghanistan Investment Support Agency (AISA) and the president of the AICC tried to mediate, both without result. The partnership failed to acquire the land needed for the distribution centre, and the project would never continue.

Due to the unfinished nature of this project, several questions in the checklist could not be answered. This applies in particular for questions relating to the effects and results of the project. It is possible however, to categorize the project according to the other questions. This project will be categorized in category C, mostly conflict insensitive. This categorization is caused by the fact that there was no

⁶⁵ During the research of the Workgroup PPC Afghanistan it became apparent that during the time that the partners produced a business plan, at least three distribution centres were constructed. Of these centres, at least one operated far under its capacity. This implies that there was no need for a new distribution centre.

⁶⁶ The PSOM programme is now today as the PSI (+) programme.

proper research into the history of the transport sector. Even though Tradepoint Afghanistan claimed to have done research into the transport sector, they did not take into account that during the decades of conflict the transport sector had become linked to the criminal economy and that the Pakistani and Afghan mafia dominated the sector. It is unclear whether this was still the case during the time of this case, 2005, but new entrants should have thoroughly investigated this matter and operate with extreme care. There appears to have been no such investigation, not by Tradepoint nor by the EVD⁶⁷. This lack of knowledge about the history of the transport sector had an adverse effect on the ethical aspects of the project. Getting involved in a sector possibly dominated by the mafia in a post-conflict environment can be considered as harmful behaviour to the society. Since the case has never really materialized, there had not been actual consequences, however, the behaviour can still be considered as harmful. In addition, the impact of the project on other (local) communities had not been researched. Therefore, the project is categorized in category C.

Prior to the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, there was a small sugar industry present in Afghanistan; one sugar company was placed in Baghlan⁶⁸. A German seed company was involved at the time to provide seeds and technical assistance. It was difficult to acquire enough sugar beets for the sugar production, but the company did fairly well. Unfortunately, due to the Russian invasion and following civil war, most of the equipment was damaged or lost. The plant site and machinery however, were maintained during the years. In 2003, the German seed company originally involved in the company took the initiative in rebuilding the factory. A public-private partnership was formed. Involved were the Afghan Ministry of Mines and Industries, the German seed company and a group of Afghan private investors. Later on, the German government got involved as a financier.

In 2005, the New Baghlan Sugar Company (NBSC) started operations and in 2006 the factory produced its first sugar.

From the start, the factory has had difficulties collection enough sugar beets for production. The local farmers are not willing to provide land for sugar beet cultivation for a variety of reasons. The financial compensation from the NBSC is considered to be too low and sugar beets are not a traditional crop in Baghlan. Furthermore, the sugar beet plant is highly susceptible to diseases and parasites. In addition, the weather conditions of Afghanistan are not favourable to the sugar beet plant, a drought in 2006 caused the loss of 16% of the crops. Disease and parasites affected the remaining 84%. No sugar could be produced in 2007. Furthermore, a suicide attack took place at the official inauguration ceremony for the factory. At the moment of the attack, several members of parliament and other dignitaries were

⁶⁷ According to a former employee of a Dutch government agency, the EVD is not aware of all exact details of the local context, and relies on advice from the RNE in such matters (Workgroup PPC Afghanistan, 2010, p.7).

⁶⁸ This case is based on research done for the Peace, Security and Development Network, Workgroup PPC Afghanistan: Public Private Cooperation in Fragile States: *case study Afghanistan*, January 2010. Peace, Security and Development Network.

present at the factory, this was probably the reason for the attack. Around 70 people died and more than a 100 people were injured, including school children and members of the Afghan parliament.

In 2009 the private investors indicated that they had lost confidence in the profitability of the enterprise and they proposed to dissolve the partnership. The private investors were unable to win enough votes to dissolve the factory, probably to due political reasons as the government of Germany pressurized the German partner and the Afghan government to vote against liquidation. At the end of the case study, it was yet unknown what the future will bring for this partnership.

The case of the New Baghlan Sugar Company has been considered as a successful example of a multi-sectoral partnership. However, the case study proves that it was in fact not a success. At the time of this research, the factory has ceased all production and the Afghan private investors have decided to sell their shares.

The New Baghlan Sugar Company project will be categorized in category C mostly conflict insensitive. This case is an example of failed reconstruction project in a post-conflict country with a complex history. The fact that a plant was successful in the past, during different regimes, does not mean that it will be successful today, if the plant is rehabilitated. The research done by the partners was incorrect, and resulted in overoptimistic predictions about the future. When this forecast turned out to be untrue, tensions between the Afghan private investors and the German government arose. In addition, the project did not reduce the vulnerability of people and communities to violence, as became apparent during the opening ceremony of the factory, during which a suicide attack took place. Furthermore, there has been no positive effect on the post-conflict economic reconstruction of Afghanistan. Therefore, this project will be categorized in category C, mostly conflict insensitive.

7.4 Partnership between Government, NGO and Private sector

In 1971 a cheese factory was built in Baghlan, it was a state-owned plant built with donor support⁶⁹. Unfortunately, the factory was destroyed only seven years later. In 2004, the Afghan government, through the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL) asked a Dutch NGO, DCA, to rehabilitate the factory. DCA had been working in Afghanistan since 1978, when it was created to support the Afghans during the Russian era. After the Russians left, DCA continued in a changed form. DCA-VET, with a new objective: to offer aid and assistance to the population of Afghanistan by improving the health and productive output of the local livestock. The third partner of the project was a group of Baghlan farmers, which would provide the factory with milk. The project was financed by CIMIC, the civilian part of the Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Team, and the Royal Netherlands

⁶⁹ This case is based on research done for the Peace, Security and Development Network, Workgroup PPC Afghanistan: Public Private Cooperation in Fragile States: *case study Afghanistan*, January 2010. Peace, Security and Development Network.

Embassy (RNE). In addition, an Afghan NGO, Revitalisation and Building (PRB) was contracted by DCA to implement some of the components of the project.

Several assessments were made, about the potential milk supply, cheese markets and the cost of the plant, and at the end of 2005 the contracts were signed.

In addition to reconstruction the plant, the goals were the following: distributing dairy cattle, sheep and poultry combined with training in animal husbandry and health issues, and strengthening the prevention of livestock diseases by building Veterinary Field Units (VFUs). The government of Afghanistan stressed the distribution of animals to poor families, CIMIC insisted on the distribution of poultry to secondary schools as a quick impact activity and the VFUs were introduced by DCA, a veterinary organisation. Early on in the project, the poultry project was cancelled due to several reasons. A threatened avian flu epidemic provided the excuse to terminate the project, but security problems, unclear responsibilities and the low priority the schools had for the project were the main reasons for termination.

In 2006, a new cheese factory was built with Dutch equipment, and a Dutch project manager was in charge. Cheese production started in December. In addition, training for the staff, setting up an administrative system and establishing milk collection centres were other important activities during 2006. Furthermore, 500 sheep and 177 cows were distributed to vulnerable families in nearby villages and seven VFU buildings were constructed which became operational in early 2007.

The cheese factory faced several problems in 2007, as making and storing good quality Gouda cheese proved difficult, in addition, selling the cheese was even more difficult causing stocks to grow quickly. Furthermore, milk and cheese went missing due to weak administration and stealing. A new international manager was appointed, with experience in dairy development in developing countries. Several changes were made. For instance, a monitoring system for the milk products was installed, production was diversified and the Afghan manager of the factory was dismissed. However, the most important problem remained, the limited supply of milk. In the assessments, many farmers registered who could supply large amounts of milk every day. In reality however, very few farmers, even those who had been given a cow, delivered milk to the factory. In addition, a severe drought in 2008 caused milk supplies to be even lower. The farmers sold their surplus milk to traders in Baghlan and Pul-I-Khumri who offer a better price than the cheese factory. This was avoided in the 1970s, because the road was blocked and farmers could not sell their surplus milk to traders, so all the milk went to the cheese factory. In addition, during the seventies, the Baghlan Sugar Factory provided dairy farmers with leftovers from the factory to feed their cattle, and provided them with improved dairy breeds. This was no longer the case in 2008. Another reason for the low milk intake of the cheese factory could be that another NGO handed out hand-operated butter churns to dairy farmers near the plant. At this point of time, it is too early to determine this project a success or a failure.

The Baghlan Cheese Factory project will be categorized in category B, mostly conflict sensitive. This categorization is based on the checklist, most questions could be answered and the results are mostly positive. For instance, the beneficiaries are vulnerable, poor families. In addition, although there was some harmful behaviour, such as stealing, this has been adequately dealt with, with the appointment of a new manager. Furthermore, the sector in which this project takes place, the agricultural sector, is part of a conflict sensitive approach. In the case of the value chain in dried fruits (paragraph 7.2) it was explained that stimulating the Afghan agricultural sector could create sustainable development for a vulnerable group in society. In addition to the checklist, the operational results were taken into account. Even though the Cheese factory itself cannot be considered a success yet, other aspects of the project can be seen as successful. Cows and sheep have been provided to families, reducing their vulnerability, and several VFUs have been introduced. The project cannot be considered as totally conflict sensitive, due to the lack of proper communication with the locals, and the fact that resources went missing due to theft. Therefore, the project is categorized in category B.

7.5 Partnerships with multi-national organizations

The Business Humanitarian Forum (BHF) is an international non-profit organization focused on restarting the economies of post-conflict countries through public-private cooperation. The organization works closely with the United Nations Development Programme, the partners insist on responsible corporate practices. In Afghanistan, the forum has brought representatives from different business sectors (both local and international) together for off-the-record brainstorming about the problems in Afghanistan reconstruction. Several public-private project concepts were developed and a pilot project for a generic medicine production facility, which is likely to reach the production stage, is underway. The medicines that will be produced in this factory will be distributed in Afghanistan by the government. Before this project, there was an enormous shortage of medicines in government programmes (Maresca, 2005). Partners involved in this project are the European Generic Medicines Association, Afghan Health Ministry, the World Bank and an Afghan physician, dr. Baz, as a principal investor. In addition, the BHF and UNDP are involved. The latest publications on this project are positive. In 2007, the project was completed, the factory is constructed and the equipment has been delivered. At the moment, the main activity is the distribution of foreign-produced medicines. According to dr. Baz, the security and economic conditions in Afghanistan do not yet permit the local production of generic medicines (BHF, 2007). In 2009, the factory was included in a report on the pharmaceutical situation in Afghanistan (Bashaar, 2009, p.6). Even though no further information about the situation today can be retrieved, this report indicates that the factory still exists.

Several problems occurred during the early stages of the partnership, such as the locating and purchasing of land for the factory. The mayor of Kabul, who received a briefing on this project in 2004, provided his support and a suitable piece of land was acquired with his help (Maresca, 2005).

Another problem was related to the delivery of the equipment to the factory when it is finished. DHL and the Deutsche Post have agreed to take responsibility for this and are funding the operation (Maresca, 2005). The equipment was delivered in July 2005. In addition, the lack of constant access to electricity was a problem. This was eventually solved by the purchase of two generators (BHF, 2007).

This project will be categorized in category A, conflict sensitive. This categorization is based on the results of the checklist. The project is clearly needs based, considering the lack of medicines in Afghanistan. Since there was no other medicine factory in Afghanistan at the start of this project, no harmful behaviour, such as unfair competition, was present. This project will not only bring a medicine factory to Afghanistan, the employees of the factory are trained, so a knowledge base is established. Based on the information at hand, there are no unethical messages or behaviour reported in this project. The conflict context of Afghanistan is considered as well, since there is no medicine production at this time because of the security situation in Afghanistan. The foreign-produced medicines are being distributed throughout Afghanistan, the beneficiaries are therefore, in theory, all Afghans. Therefore, the overall result of the checklist causes the categorisation in category A, conflict sensitive.

7.6 *Conflict sensitivity multi-sectoral partnerships*

In chapter one the sub-question “*To what degree can multi-sectoral partnerships be conflict sensitive?*” was proposed, the first part of this paragraph will attempt to provide a partial answer to this question, using the discussed partnerships from this chapter. Later on in this paragraph, the findings of the previous chapter on the conflict sensitivity of multi-sectoral partnerships in other countries than Afghanistan will be combined with the findings of this chapter to answer the sub-question in total.

Below a table is presented which summarizes the findings of this chapter.

Project:	Type of partnership	Categorization conflict sensitive			
		A	B	C	D
Tribal Liaison Office	NGO – Government	X			
Value chain dried fruits	NGO – Private sector		X		
Tradepoint	Government – Private sector			X	
Baghlan Sugar Factory	Government – Private sector			X	
Baghlan Cheese Factory	Government – NGO – Private sector		X		
Medicine Factory	MNO – Government – NGO – Private sector	X			

Table 7.1 conflict sensitive overview

As a reminder, category A is conflict sensitive, B is mostly conflict sensitive, category C is mostly conflict insensitive and the final category D stands for conflict insensitive. A majority of four projects is deemed (mostly) conflict sensitive, two projects are considered to be mostly conflict insensitive.

Unfortunately, the reasons for the categorization in category C, mostly conflict insensitive, is caused by a lack of cooperation and trust between the partners in the case of the project in the water sector, a lack of proper research in the cases of Tradepoint and the New Baghlan Sugar Factory. Furthermore, it is often the case that the partners have unrealistic expectations. The positive experiences with multi-sectoral partnerships are usually characterized by cooperation and communication between the partners. In addition, some sectors, such as the health sector and the agricultural sector are more conflict sensitive than others, such as the transport sector in the case of Afghanistan. Many of the projects discussed in this chapter have come across problems, causing the delay or even cancellation of the project. Some of these problems are common in post-conflict countries, such as issues relating to the ownership of land.

In this thesis, twelve cases have been researched, this is only a limited number compared to the total number of multi-sectoral partnerships in post-conflict areas. These twelve cases are chosen to represent all types of multi-sectoral partnerships possible, from two-partner partnerships with different sectors involved, to partnerships with three or even four sectors. Some conclusions can be drawn for this research, although the validity of this research is limited due to the small number of cases researched. In this thesis, it has been made clear that conflict sensitivity is very important in post-conflict areas, and there is no doubt that this also applies to multi-sectoral partnerships. The answer to the question whether or not multi-sectoral partnerships can be conflict sensitive is not straightforward. These partnerships are not inherently conflict sensitive, nor are they inherently conflict insensitive. The characteristics, goals and partners involved in the partnership determine the conflict sensitivity of a partnership. Based on the combined results of tables 6.1 and 7.1, it appears that partnerships in which NGOs are involved are more conflict sensitive than partnerships without an NGO involved. This can be explained by the nature of the average NGO, compared to other possible partners in such a partnership. The goal of the private sector is to make a profit, the international or local (or donor) government has certain interests and requirements. NGOs are often more experienced in working in conflict areas and conflict sensitivity is often part of their working method.

To conclude, multi-sectoral partnerships can be very conflict sensitive, however, they can also be very conflict insensitive. Care must be taken when developing a partnership, a trust between the partners is important, and a proper research into the conditions of the post-conflict country should be standard. Furthermore, cooperation and communication between the different partners is key.

7.7 Conclusion

This paragraph aims to answer the sub-question Have multi-sectoral partnerships been used as an economic development strategy in Afghanistan, and if so, what were the results?. There have been examples of multi-sectoral partnerships in Afghanistan. The results of these partnerships are varied. Some cases, such as the value chain in dried fruits and the Tradepoint distribution centre never materialized, while others, for instance TLO and the medicine factory, appear to have a positive outcome. Many problems occurred in the analysed partnerships, even in the successful projects. Some are characteristic for post-conflict countries, such as problems relating to ownership of land, a lack of facilities such as electricity and transport opportunities, and an unstable security situation. Others are related to the specific history of Afghanistan. For instance in the cases of the Baghlan Cheese Factory and Baghlan Sugar Factory. The Soviet heritage in Afghanistan was an important factor in these cases. These factories used to be dependent on each other, for instance, the sugar factory provided nearby farmers with high quality food for their cows, which was a useless by-product of sugar beets. This high quality food increased the milk output of the cows, which went to the cheese factory (Workgroup PPC Afghanistan, 2010). In addition, during the Soviet years, the farmers could not sell their surplus milk to traders, the only option was the cheese factory. The partners in these two projects did not take the Soviet heritage into account and rebuilt the factories without proper research. The lack of proper research into the market is also occurring often in the discussed projects. For instance, according to research done by Tradepoint there was a need for more distribution centres, while there were several centres already, and some were operating under capacity. Furthermore, farmers near the cheese and sugar factories indicated that they could supply the factories with raw materials, which turned out to be not the case. In addition, stores in the surroundings of the cheese factory indicated that they would sell the Gouda cheese produced by the factory. The cheese turned out to be basically unsaleable.

Another important problem that occurred in the discussed projects is the unrealistic expectations of foreign companies about the possibilities and facilities in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, because Afghanistan is an underdeveloped post-conflict country, the facilities there are not up to European standards. In addition, the expectations that Afghan investors and / or partners have of the partnership are often not realistic either. For instance, in the case of the cheese factory, the Afghan private investors had too large expectations of the partnership. They assumed that the partnership would be successful, because of the foreign interest in the case. Unfortunately, the foreign partners assumed the case would be successful because the Afghan partners were interested⁷⁰. Furthermore, the communication between the different partners is often problematic, as not all information is shared. In addition, where a partnership should revolve around a shared goal, this is not always the case. For instance in the case of the cheese factory. The different partners had different goals, DCA wanted

⁷⁰ Personal communication by an employee of a Dutch government agency, Utrecht, July 2009.

VFUs, the government of Afghanistan wanted to distribute livestock and CIMIC insisted on the distribution of poultry, all aside the common goal of the cheese factory.

Even though there were many problems, this does not mean that there were no successes amongst the discussed projects. Therefore, it cannot be claimed that multi-sectoral partnerships are useless when it comes to post-conflict economic development in Afghanistan, but they are not soul saving either.

The next, and final chapter will provide an answer to the research question proposed in chapter one.

8. Conclusions and Discussion

In chapter one, the research question of this thesis was proposed. As a reminder, this question is placed below.

To what degree are multi-sectoral partnerships a conflict sensitive solution for the problems with the post-conflict economic development process in Afghanistan?

In this chapter, the research question will be answered. In addition, the results will be discussed in paragraph 8.1. The second paragraph will deal with the limitations of this thesis research. Furthermore, in paragraphs 8.3 and 8.4 the theoretical and practical contributions of this thesis will be discussed. In the last paragraph some recommendations for further research on this subject will be proposed.

8.1 Conclusion and Discussion

In this thesis, the degree to which multi-sectoral partnerships can be a conflict sensitive solution for the problems with the post-conflict economic development process in Afghanistan has been researched. To do so, it first had to be made clear what conflict sensitivity is, and how this would be measured in this thesis. A checklist was created, and several multi-sectoral partnerships, in Afghanistan and other post-conflict countries, were categorized according to their score on this checklist. Sub question one, In what degree can multi-sectoral partnerships be conflict sensitive?, could be answered. Multi-sectoral partnerships are neither conflict sensitive, nor conflict insensitive by nature. Some projects discussed in this thesis, such as the medicine factory in Afghanistan, were relatively conflict sensitive, while others, such as the Baghlan Sugar Factory, were relatively conflict insensitive. The attitude of the partners involved in the partnership determine the conflict sensitivity of the partnership.

Furthermore, it was important that an understanding was created about the specific situation in Afghanistan. In chapter four some information was provided about the most important factors of the situation in Afghanistan, such as history, the current conflict, the economic and societal situation and the influence of external actors in Afghanistan. In addition, sub question two 'the problems with the post-conflict economic development process in Afghanistan' was discussed in chapter five. The most

important problems in Afghanistan are the limited legitimacy of the Afghan government, the lack of communication and cooperation between different sectors involved, a lack of access to information about development projects, the influence of militia leaders and criminals in the government, the wrong timeline of aid, and the security situation.

In chapters six and seven, the remaining two sub questions were answered. Chapter six discussed results of multi-sectoral partnerships in other post-conflict countries. The results were mixed. Not all discussed projects were successes, although many were. Several problems were encountered during the projects. For instance, not all organizations want to cooperate with a government they perceive as weak, or share knowledge and information about their projects (Northern Uganda and Iraq Health Care). Other issues that were encountered were corruption, logistical weaknesses, staff problems and an overall lack of communication and cooperation. Chapter seven discussed results of multi-sectoral partnerships in Afghanistan. The results were once again mixed. The Tradepoint and Baghlan Sugar Factory are two examples of failed projects, while the value chain for dried fruits and the Baghlan Cheese Factory can still become successful. Several problems were encountered during the projects. For instance, insufficient research into the market (Tradepoint, Baghlan Sugar Factory and Baghlan Cheese Factory), a lack of sharing of information and knowledge between partners (Value chain, Tradepoint), a lack of information about other developmental projects (Baghlan Cheese Factory), bad communication within the partnership (for instance on expectations, which was the case with the case of the Value chain). Furthermore, in the case of Tradepoint, the conflict context of the transport sector was not taken into account. In addition, there was a lack of communication and cooperation in general between different sectors in the cases of the Value Chain, Baghlan Sugar Factory and Tradepoint. Furthermore, in the case of the Baghlan Cheese Factory, the goals of the different partners were different. And last, there was a lack of knowledge on the history of the Baghlan Cheese Factory and the Baghlan Sugar Factory, their Soviet heritage was crucial to these cases.

Based on the analysis of the multi-sectoral partnerships in Afghanistan and in other post-conflict countries the conclusion can be reached that multi-sectoral partnerships are not the ultimate conflict sensitive solution to the problems in post-conflict economic development in general, and specifically to the problems in the post-conflict economic development process in Afghanistan. However, such partnerships can be a valuable addition to the tools used in post-conflict economic development. As it has been showed in the past, no government or organization can rebuild a country on its own, so cooperation between different sectors is necessary. All possible partners can contribute something to such partnerships, and all partners can learn from each other. Mutual trust is key, and all partners should be treated equal. Multi-sectoral partnerships are neither conflict sensitive nor conflict insensitive by nature. The partners determine the working method and thus the conflict sensitivity of the project. Although it appears that NGOs represent conflict sensitivity the best, this does not mean that the other partners are not concerned about this objective.

There are some issues related to the reconstruction of Afghanistan that could theoretically be solved by a better cooperation between the different sectors involved. Examples of such issues, as discussed in chapter five, are the divisions, rivalries and fragmentation of the “international community”, which have been obstacles to the reconstruction process in Afghanistan (Rubin, 2006), the lack of communication and coordination between the involved governments and organization, and the lack of awareness of the history of Afghanistan and of post-conflict reconstruction in general. However, it became apparent in chapter six and seven, that when different sectors cooperate in a partnership, this does not mean that information is shared among all partners, and that communication comes naturally (see for instance the cases of Tradepoint and the Value chain of dried fruits). Simply forming a multi-sectoral partnership does not make communication issues disappear, however, it does provide better opportunities for the different partners involved to communicate, share information and build a relationship based on trust. Other issues cannot be solved by a better cooperation between the different sectors involved. For instance, the issue that NGOs are often seen as political actors instead as neutral actors will remain, and may even increase as NGOs cooperate with other sectors which are not neutral, such as the government. In addition, the resolvment of issues such as the unequal division of aid, a wrong timeline of aid and the multiple objectives of donor governments, cannot be achieved with multi-sectoral partnerships. Multi-sectoral partnerships are therefore no solution for all issues related to post-conflict economic development. The assumption of Van Tulder and Kostwinder (2008) that partnerships are an important instrument to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of development assistance, and that of several other authors that partnerships are a solution to development problems (e.g. Bäckstrand, 2006; Van Tulder and van der Zwart, 2006; Reinicke et al., 2000; Kolk et al., 2008; Killick et al. 2005) can therefore not be verified with the results from this thesis.

Multi-sectoral partnerships can only be a positive, and conflict sensitive, addition to post-conflict economic development in Afghanistan if all involved sectors cooperate willingly and recognize the potential of such partnerships. In addition, they have to be willing to share knowledge and information and be open for other working methods. Because even though such partnerships are no panacea for development, they can certainly be valuable.

8.2 *Limitations*

There are several limitations to this research. First of all, the nature of this research, qualitative research, makes it more difficult to reproduce the results, because the interpretation of the results depends on the researcher. Furthermore, memories of the respondents can be distorted and opinions can change over time, which makes reproduction of the results even more difficult.

Second, only a small number of people has been interviewed, all of whom are Dutch. The working method of Dutch NGOs and other organizations involved in post-conflict reconstruction is not necessarily the same as such organizations from other countries, so results may differ if respondents from other countries are added to this research. In addition, only respondents from NGOs, government and the private sector have been interviewed⁷¹, none from a MNO. Furthermore, a relatively small number of cases has been discussed, only twelve, which is a limited number compared to all multi-sectoral partnerships in post-conflict economic development. Even though these cases were carefully selected in order to make sure that all possible partnerships were examined, from two-partner partnerships with different sectors involved, to three- and even four-partner partnerships, it cannot be concluded that these cases are a good reflection of such partnerships in general.

In addition, it was not always possible to answer all questions on the checklist. In some cases, more and better information could have changed the categorization. The working method, a literature research on many of the discussed cases, can be problematic. Only the published information can be researched and analysed, this in contrast with an interview, in which the researcher can get access to more information. Unfortunately, the description of most cases, particularly of the cases discussed in chapter six, was based on one source, usually one of the organizations involved in the partnership. The information provided by these involved organizations cannot be seen as neutral as the organizations are not impartial and it is possible that important negative aspects have remained unpublished.

8.3 *Theoretical contribution*

The research in this thesis combines two large fields of research, theories on post-conflict economic reconstruction on one side, and multi-sectoral partnerships in development on the other side. This last field of research deals mostly with 'development as usual', in underdeveloped countries unaffected by conflict. In the last few years, there has been a change in thinking about development. There is an increasing recognition that sustainable economic development is only attainable through the combined efforts of stakeholders from the different societal spheres (Van Tulder and Kostwinder, 2008). Partnerships are seen as having great potential in normal development, as no one sector can be successful alone.

However, development in post-conflict countries differs greatly from development in underdeveloped countries unaffected by conflict. In addition to the 'normal' development issues, post-conflict countries also face the challenge of peace consolidation, which can be counterproductive to economic development (Del Castillo, 2008). In addition, there is a multitude of other problems that should be dealt with in post-conflict countries, such as capacity building of the government and the introduction

⁷¹ Not all interviews were conducted in the scope of this research, some interviews were conducted during the case studies for the research for the Workgroup PPC Afghanistan .

of a law and regulation system. Therefore, research that has been done on multi-sectoral partnerships in normal development is not necessarily applicable to post-conflict countries.

Furthermore, the issue of conflict sensitivity is not relevant in normal developing countries, whereas it is critical in post-conflict countries. The issue of conflict sensitivity is rather underexposed in the existing body of knowledge on cooperation in the development of post-conflict countries. In addition, there has not been a study that researches the conflict sensitivity of multi-sectoral partnerships. This thesis points out that conflict sensitivity is important in the post-conflict economic reconstruction, even in small scale local projects. In addition, this thesis shows that partnerships are neither inherently conflict sensitive, nor conflict insensitive.

The issue of cooperation and partnerships in (post-conflict) development is growing in importance, for instance, the Dutch minister of Development Cooperation advocates partnerships in development and many organizations realize that the failures in post-conflict development are too large to overcome alone. All this is not yet based on any scientific evidence, or scientific literature on multi-sectoral partnerships in post-conflict economic development, since there is very little scientific literature on this subject. This thesis increases the body of knowledge on this subject. The research done for this thesis acknowledges the possible positive role that multi-sectoral partnerships can play in post-conflict economic development, while in addition recognizing that such partnerships are no ultimate solution for the many problems at hand.

8.4 Practical contribution

The aim of this thesis is to attempt to help organizations involved in post-conflict economic reconstruction realize that cooperation between the different sectors involved is extremely important for the reconstruction process. Furthermore, this thesis shows that multi-sectoral partnerships can be successful, and it became apparent that all partners could provide a relevant contribution to such a partnership. Hopefully these results will stimulate the willingness of the different sectors to participate in such partnerships.

8.5 Recommendations for further research

The limitations of this thesis provide a starting point for further research. This research has only included Dutch respondents from different sectors involved in post-conflict economic reconstruction. Since the working method of Dutch organizations involved in post-conflict reconstruction is not necessarily the same as such organizations from other countries it would be interesting to extend this research into other nationalities and research what their attitude is towards multi-sectoral partnerships in post-conflict economic development. This would be highly relevant, since it is very rare that there is only one country involved in the post-conflict economic reconstruction of a post-conflict state.

Cooperation between different countries is necessary; therefore it is relevant to understand the working method and attitudes of each other.

Furthermore, a more extensive analysis of partnerships in post-conflict countries may provide more relevant information about the success and important characteristics of such partnerships, which would provide important lessons learned to future partnerships. Hereby, the sample size should be much larger than with the research of this thesis.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Checklists chapter six

Northern Uganda

	Yes	No
Impact on other (local) communities		
1. Has the project considered preferences/priorities of neighboring communities?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Has the project considered negative impacts on neighboring communities?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Did the project avoid making tensions worse, and/or support connections between communities?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Did the project increase tensions between different communities?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Effects of resources on perceptions and relationships		
5. Did the project result in harmful competition/ suspicion / biases within and between communities?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6. Where the resources at risk of diversion (including theft, arbitrary taxation, corruption, or employment of microproject resources for military purposes)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ethical aspects		
These questions could not be answered for this case.		
Risk of violence		
10. Has the project assessed the risks of violence in surrounding areas?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11. Did the project reduce the vulnerability of people and communities to violence?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12. Did the project place people and communities at (more) risk to violence?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Beneficiaries		
13. Do the beneficiaries all share their identity?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
14. Do the beneficiaries share identity with staff?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
15. Are all beneficiaries from one area?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
16. They were chosen based on what criteria:		
Political	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Social	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Economic	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Geographic	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Partners		
17. Are there local partners involved?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
18. Are there international partners involved?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
19. Do any of the partners have a military or political interest?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
20. If there are more local partners, do they belong to one group?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Staff		
21. Was there local staff involved in the project	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
22. Did the project employ international employees?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
23. Do the local staff share their identity?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
24. Do the local partners originate from the same area?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other		
25. Did the project have a negative effect on the post-conflict reconstruction process?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
26. Did the project have a positive effect on the post-conflict reconstruction process?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Rwanda

	Yes	No
Impact on other (local) communities		
1. Has the project considered preferences/priorities of neighboring communities?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Has the project considered negative impacts on neighboring communities?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Did the project avoid making tensions worse, and/or support connections between communities?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Did the project increase tensions between different communities?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Effects of resources on perceptions and relationships		
5. Did the project result in harmful competition/ suspicion / biases within and between communities?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
6. Where the resources at risk of diversion (including theft, arbitrary taxation, corruption, or employment of microproject resources for military purposes)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ethical aspects		
7. Did the project avoid provocations, harmful behavior / relationships / messages?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8. Did the project cause provocations, harmful behavior / relationships / messages?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
9. Did the project anticipate ethical problems and opportunities?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Risk of violence		
10. Has the project assessed the risks of violence in surrounding areas?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11. Did the project reduce the vulnerability of people and communities to violence?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12. Did the project place people and communities at (more) risk to violence?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Beneficiaries		
13. Do the beneficiaries all share their identity?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
14. Do the beneficiaries share identity with staff?		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
15. Are all beneficiaries from one area?		<input type="checkbox"/>
16. They were chosen based on what criteria:		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Political	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Social	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Economic	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Geographic	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Partners		
17. Are there local partners involved?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
18. Are there international partners involved?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
19. Do any of the partners have a military or political interest?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
20. If there are more local partners, do they belong to one group?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Staff		
21. Was there local staff involved in the project	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
22. Did the project employ international employees?		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
23. Do the local staff share their identity?		<input type="checkbox"/>
24. Do the local partners originate from the same area?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other		
25. Did the project have a negative effect on the post-conflict reconstruction process?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
26. Did the project have a positive effect on the post-conflict reconstruction process?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

PSI Plus

	Yes	No
Impact on other (local) communities		
1. Has the project considered preferences/priorities of neighboring communities?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Has the project considered negative impacts on neighboring communities?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Did the project avoid making tensions worse, and/or support connections between communities?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Did the project increase tensions between different communities?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Effects of resources on perceptions and relationships		
5. Did the project result in harmful competition/ suspicion / biases within and between communities?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
6. Where the resources at risk of diversion (including theft, arbitrary taxation, corruption, or employment of microproject resources for military purposes)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ethical aspects		
7. Did the project avoid provocations, harmful behavior / relationships / messages?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8. Did the project cause provocations, harmful behavior / relationships / messages?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
9. Did the project anticipate ethical problems and opportunities?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Risk of violence		
10. Has the project assessed the risks of violence in surrounding areas?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11. Did the project reduce the vulnerability of people and communities to violence?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12. Did the project place people and communities at (more) risk to violence?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Beneficiaries		
These questions are not relevant to this particular case since this case deals with project proposals from companies and not from NGOs. The main beneficiaries will therefore be the involved companies.		
Partners		
17. Are there local partners involved?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
18. Are there international partners involved?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
19. Do any of the partners have a military or political interest?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
20. If there are more local partners, do they belong to one group?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Staff		
21. Was there local staff involved in the project	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
22. Did the project employ international employees?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
23. Do the local staff share their identity?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
24. Do the local partners originate from the same area?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other		
25. Did the project have a negative effect on the post-conflict reconstruction process?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
26. Did the project have a positive effect on the post-conflict reconstruction process?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Iraq Healthcare

		Yes	No
Impact on other (local) communities			
1. Has the project considered preferences/priorities of neighboring communities?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
2. Has the project considered negative impacts on neighboring communities?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
3. Did the project avoid making tensions worse, and/or support connections between communities?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
4. Did the project increase tensions between different communities?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Effects of resources on perceptions and relationships			
5. Did the project result in harmful competition/ suspicion / biases within and between communities?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
6. Where the resources at risk of diversion (including theft, arbitrary taxation, corruption, or employment of microproject resources for military purposes)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
Ethical aspects			
7. Did the project avoid provocations, harmful behavior / relationships / messages?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
8. Did the project cause provocations, harmful behavior / relationships / messages?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
9. Did the project anticipate ethical problems and opportunities?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Risk of violence			
10. Has the project assessed the risks of violence in surrounding areas?		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11. Did the project reduce the vulnerability of people and communities to violence?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
12. Did the project place people and communities at (more) risk to violence?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
Beneficiaries			
13. Do the beneficiaries all share their identity?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
14. Do the beneficiaries share identity with staff?		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
15. Are all beneficiaries from one area?		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
16. They were chosen based on what criteria:			
Political		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Social		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Economic		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Geographic		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Partners			
17. Are there local partners involved?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
18. Are there international partners involved?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
19. Do any of the partners have a military or political interest?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
20. If there are more local partners, do they belong to one group?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Staff			
21. Was there local staff involved in the project	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
22. Did the project employ international employees?		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
23. Do the local staff share their identity?		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
24. Do the local partners originate from the same area?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Other			
25. Did the project have a negative effect on the post-conflict reconstruction process?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
26. Did the project have a positive effect on the post-conflict reconstruction process?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	

Kimberly Process Certification Scheme

	Yes	No
Impact on other (local) communities		
1. Has the project considered preferences/priorities of neighboring communities?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Has the project considered negative impacts on neighboring communities?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Did the project avoid making tensions worse, and/or support connections between communities?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Did the project increase tensions between different communities?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Effects of resources on perceptions and relationships		
5. Did the project result in harmful competition/ suspicion / biases within and between communities?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
6. Where the resources at risk of diversion (including theft, arbitrary taxation, corruption, or employment of microproject resources for military purposes)?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ethical aspects		
7. Did the project avoid provocations, harmful behavior / relationships / messages?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8. Did the project cause provocations, harmful behavior / relationships / messages?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
9. Did the project anticipate ethical problems and opportunities?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Risk of violence		
10. Has the project assessed the risks of violence in surrounding areas?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11. Did the project reduce the vulnerability of people and communities to violence?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12. Did the project place people and communities at (more) risk to violence?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Beneficiaries		
These questions are not relevant in this particular case because the project does not take place in the post-conflict country itself. There are no direct beneficiaries through this project.		
Partners		
17. Are there local partners involved?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
18. Are there international partners involved?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
19. Do any of the partners have a military or political interest?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
20. If there are more local partners, do they belong to one group?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Staff		
These questions are not relevant in this particular case because the project does not take place in the post-conflict country itself.		
Other		
25. Did the project have a negative effect on the post-conflict reconstruction process?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
26. Did the project have a positive effect on the post-conflict reconstruction process?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

East Timor Health Care

	Yes	No
Impact on other (local) communities		
1. Has the project considered preferences/priorities of neighboring communities?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Has the project considered negative impacts on neighboring communities?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Did the project avoid making tensions worse, and/or support connections between communities?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Did the project increase tensions between different communities?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Effects of resources on perceptions and relationships		
5. Did the project result in harmful competition/ suspicion / biases within and between communities?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
6. Where the resources at risk of diversion (including theft, arbitrary taxation, corruption, or employment of microproject resources for military purposes)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Ethical aspects		
7. Did the project avoid provocations, harmful behavior / relationships / messages?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8. Did the project cause provocations, harmful behavior / relationships / messages?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
9. Did the project anticipate ethical problems and opportunities?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Risk of violence		
10. Has the project assessed the risks of violence in surrounding areas?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11. Did the project reduce the vulnerability of people and communities to violence?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
12. Did the project place people and communities at (more) risk to violence?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Beneficiaries		
13. Do the beneficiaries all share their identity?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
14. Do the beneficiaries share identity with staff?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
15. Are all beneficiaries from one area?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
16. They were chosen based on what criteria:		
Political	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Social	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Economic	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Geographic	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Partners		
17. Are there local partners involved?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
18. Are there international partners involved?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
19. Do any of the partners have a military or political interest?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
20. If there are more local partners, do they belong to one group?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Staff		
21. Was there local staff involved in the project	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
22. Did the project employ international employees?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
23. Do the local staff share their identity?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
24. Do the local partners originate from the same area?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Other		
25. Did the project have a negative effect on the post-conflict reconstruction process?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
26. Did the project have a positive effect on the post-conflict reconstruction process?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Appendix B: Checklists chapter seven

Tribal Liason Office

		Yes	No
Impact on other (local) communities			
1. Has the project considered preferences/priorities of neighboring communities?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
2. Has the project considered negative impacts on neighboring communities?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
3. Did the project avoid making tensions worse, and/or support connections between communities?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
4. Did the project increase tensions between different communities?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
Effects of resources on perceptions and relationships			
These questions cannot be answered for this particular case due to a lack of information about this subject.			
Ethical aspects			
7. Did the project avoid provocations, harmful behavior / relationships / messages?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
8. Did the project cause provocations, harmful behavior / relationships / messages?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
9. Did the project anticipate ethical problems and opportunities?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Risk of violence			
10. Has the project assessed the risks of violence in surrounding areas?		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11. Did the project reduce the vulnerability of people and communities to violence?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
12. Did the project place people and communities at (more) risk to violence?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
Beneficiaries			
13. Do the beneficiaries all share their identity?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
14. Do the beneficiaries share identity with staff?		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
15. Are all beneficiaries from one area?		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
16. They were chosen based on what criteria:			
Political		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Social		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Economic		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Geographic		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Partners			
17. Are there local partners involved?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
18. Are there international partners involved?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
19. Do any of the partners have a military or political interest?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
20. If there are more local partners, do they belong to one group?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Staff			
21. Was there local staff involved in the project	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
22. Did the project employ international employees?		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
23. Do the local staff share their identity?		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
24. Do the local partners originate from the same area?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Other			
25. Did the project have a negative effect on the post-conflict reconstruction process?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
26. Did the project have a positive effect on the post-conflict reconstruction process?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	

Value chain dried fruits

		Yes	No
Impact on other (local) communities			
1. Has the project considered preferences/priorities of neighboring communities?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
2. Has the project considered negative impacts on neighboring communities?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
3. Did the project avoid making tensions worse, and/or support connections between communities?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
4. Did the project increase tensions between different communities?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
Effects of resources on perceptions and relationships			
5. Did the project result in harmful competition/ suspicion / biases within and between communities?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
6. Where the resources at risk of diversion (including theft, arbitrary taxation, corruption, or employment of microproject resources for military purposes)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
Ethical aspects			
7. Did the project avoid provocations, harmful behavior / relationships / messages?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
8. Did the project cause provocations, harmful behavior / relationships / messages?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
9. Did the project anticipate ethical problems and opportunities?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Risk of violence			
10. Has the project assessed the risks of violence in surrounding areas?		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11. Did the project reduce the vulnerability of people and communities to violence?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
12. Did the project place people and communities at (more) risk to violence?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Beneficiaries			
13. Do the beneficiaries all share their identity?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
14. Do the beneficiaries share identity with staff?		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
15. Are all beneficiaries from one area?		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
16. They were chosen based on what criteria:			
Political		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Social		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Economic		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Geographic		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Partners			
17. Are there local partners involved?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
18. Are there international partners involved?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
19. Do any of the partners have a military or political interest?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
20. If there are more local partners, do they belong to one group?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Staff			
21. Was there local staff involved in the project	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
22. Did the project employ international employees?		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
23. Do the local staff share their identity?		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
24. Do the local partners originate from the same area?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Other			
These questions cannot be answered for this particular project since the project had yet to materialize.			

Trade point

		Yes	No
Impact on other (local) communities			
1. Has the project considered preferences/priorities of neighboring communities?	[]	[x]	
2. Has the project considered negative impacts on neighboring communities?	[]	[x]	
3. Did the project avoid making tensions worse, and/or support connections between communities?	[]	[x]	
4. Did the project increase tensions between different communities?	[]	[x]	
Effects of resources on perceptions and relationships			
5. Did the project result in harmful competition/ suspicion / biases within and between communities?	[-]	[-]	
6. Where the resources at risk of diversion (including theft, arbitrary taxation, corruption, or employment of microproject resources for military purposes)?	[x]	[]	
Ethical aspects			
7. Did the project avoid provocations, harmful behavior / relationships / messages?	[]	[x]	
8. Did the project cause provocations, harmful behavior / relationships / messages?	[x]	[]	
9. Did the project anticipate ethical problems and opportunities?	[]	[x]	
Risk of violence			
10. Has the project assessed the risks of violence in surrounding areas?		[-]	[-]
11. Did the project reduce the vulnerability of people and communities to violence?	[-]	[-]	
12. Did the project place people and communities at (more) risk to violence?	[-]	[-]	
Beneficiaries (<i>main beneficiaries are the partners in this case</i>)			
13. Do the beneficiaries all share their identity?	[]	[x]	
14. Do the beneficiaries share identity with staff?		[]	[]
15. Are all beneficiaries from one area?		[]	[x]
16. They were chosen based on what criteria:			
Political		[]	[]
Social		[]	[]
Economic		[x]	[]
Geographic		[x]	[]
Partners			
17. Are there local partners involved?	[x]	[]	
18. Are there international partners involved?	[x]	[]	
19. Do any of the partners have a military or political interest?	[x]	[]	
20. If there are more local partners, do they belong to one group?	[]	[]	
Staff			
21. Was there local staff involved in the project	[x]	[]	
22. Did the project employ international employees?		[x]	[]
23. Do the local staff share their identity?		[]	[]
24. Do the local partners originate from the same area?	[]	[]	
Other			
25. Did the project have a negative effect on the post-conflict reconstruction process?	[-]	[-]	
26. Did the project have a positive effect on the post-conflict reconstruction process?	[-]	[-]	

Baghlan Sugar Factory

	Yes	No
Impact on other (local) communities		
1. Has the project considered preferences/priorities of neighboring communities?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Has the project considered negative impacts on neighboring communities?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Did the project avoid making tensions worse, and/or support connections between communities?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
4. Did the project increase tensions between different communities?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Effects of resources on perceptions and relationships		
5. Did the project result in harmful competition/ suspicion / biases within and between communities?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
6. Where the resources at risk of diversion (including theft, arbitrary taxation, corruption, or employment of microproject resources for military purposes)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Ethical aspects		
7. Did the project avoid provocations, harmful behavior / relationships / messages?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
8. Did the project cause provocations, harmful behavior / relationships / messages?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9. Did the project anticipate ethical problems and opportunities?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Risk of violence		
10. Has the project assessed the risks of violence in surrounding areas?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11. Did the project reduce the vulnerability of people and communities to violence?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
12. Did the project place people and communities at (more) risk to violence?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Beneficiaries		
13. Do the beneficiaries all share their identity?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
14. Do the beneficiaries share identity with staff?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
15. Are all beneficiaries from one area?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
16. They were chosen based on what criteria:		
Political	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Social	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Economic	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Geographic	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Partners		
17. Are there local partners involved?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
18. Are there international partners involved?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
19. Do any of the partners have a military or political interest?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
20. If there are more local partners, do they belong to one group?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Staff		
21. Was there local staff involved in the project	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
22. Did the project employ international employees?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
23. Do the local staff share their identity?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
24. Do the local partners originate from the same area?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other		
25. Did the project have a negative effect on the post-conflict reconstruction process?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
26. Did the project have a positive effect on the post-conflict reconstruction process?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

Baghlan Cheese Factory

	Yes	No
Impact on other (local) communities		
1. Has the project considered preferences/priorities of neighboring communities?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Has the project considered negative impacts on neighboring communities?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Did the project avoid making tensions worse, and/or support connections between communities?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Did the project increase tensions between different communities?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Effects of resources on perceptions and relationships		
5. Did the project result in harmful competition/ suspicion / biases within and between communities?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
6. Where the resources at risk of diversion (including theft, arbitrary taxation, corruption, or employment of microproject resources for military purposes)?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ethical aspects		
7. Did the project avoid provocations, harmful behavior / relationships / messages?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
8. Did the project cause provocations, harmful behavior / relationships / messages?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
9. Did the project anticipate ethical problems and opportunities?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Risk of violence		
10. Has the project assessed the risks of violence in surrounding areas?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11. Did the project reduce the vulnerability of people and communities to violence?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
12. Did the project place people and communities at (more) risk to violence?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Beneficiaries		
13. Do the beneficiaries all share their identity?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
14. Do the beneficiaries share identity with staff?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
15. Are all beneficiaries from one area?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
16. They were chosen based on what criteria:		
Political	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Social	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Economic	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Geographic	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Partners		
17. Are there local partners involved?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
18. Are there international partners involved?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
19. Do any of the partners have a military or political interest?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
20. If there are more local partners, do they belong to one group?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Staff		
21. Was there local staff involved in the project	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
22. Did the project employ international employees?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
23. Do the local staff share their identity?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
24. Do the local partners originate from the same area?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other		
25. Did the project have a negative effect on the post-conflict reconstruction process?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
26. Did the project have a positive effect on the post-conflict reconstruction process?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

Medicine Factory

	Yes	No
Impact on other (local) communities		
1. Has the project considered preferences/priorities of neighboring communities?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Has the project considered negative impacts on neighboring communities?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Did the project avoid making tensions worse, and/or support connections between communities?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Did the project increase tensions between different communities?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Effects of resources on perceptions and relationships		
5. Did the project result in harmful competition/ suspicion / biases within and between communities?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
6. Where the resources at risk of diversion (including theft, arbitrary taxation, corruption, or employment of microproject resources for military purposes)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Ethical aspects		
7. Did the project avoid provocations, harmful behavior / relationships / messages?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8. Did the project cause provocations, harmful behavior / relationships / messages?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
9. Did the project anticipate ethical problems and opportunities?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Risk of violence		
10. Has the project assessed the risks of violence in surrounding areas?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
11. Did the project reduce the vulnerability of people and communities to violence?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12. Did the project place people and communities at (more) risk to violence?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Beneficiaries		
13. Do the beneficiaries all share their identity?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
14. Do the beneficiaries share identity with staff?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
15. Are all beneficiaries from one area?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
16. They were chosen based on what criteria:		
Political	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Social	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Economic	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Geographic	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Partners		
17. Are there local partners involved?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
18. Are there international partners involved?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
19. Do any of the partners have a military or political interest?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
20. If there are more local partners, do they belong to one group?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Staff		
21. Was there local staff involved in the project	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
22. Did the project employ international employees?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
23. Do the local staff share their identity?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
24. Do the local partners originate from the same area?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Other		
25. Did the project have a negative effect on the post-conflict reconstruction process?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
26. Did the project have a positive effect on the post-conflict reconstruction process?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>