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Foreign Policy on Afghanistan and Libya

A focus on Germany and France

Master's Thesis in Political Science

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Preface

This thesis is the product of my last project as a Political Science student at Radboud University Nijmegen. During the last two years, I had the chance to discover the very interesting dynamics of Political Science and especially of International Relations. I want to thank my friends and family for their advice, even when not asked for. I want to thank Ms. Van der Kamp-Alons for her professional guidance during the entire project. I especially want to thank Sandra for supporting me.

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Introduction

In the autumn of 2001, Germany decided to participate in the War on Terror in Afghanistan. As we all remember the horrible events of “9/11”, the decision might look rather straightforward. Yet in 2011, when troops under the command of Col. Gadhafi committed serious crimes against the Libyan people, Germany chose not support a restricted military solution to solve the crisis and singled itself out from its Western partners. How is this behavior to be explained? France on the contrary, led by President Sarkozy, actively contributed to a solution for the Libyan crisis. With many key economic and geostrategic factors in common, such as economic interests, geographical position and membership of international organizations, it is interesting to find out what may have caused the divergence in policy outcome towards the Libyan crisis between these two states. This thesis aims to find out which different and which similar variables were at work when Germany and France were deciding over what action to take in Libya. Additionally, we hope to find out what caused the difference in German foreign policy towards in Afghanistan 2001 and Libya in 2011. By means of the following descriptions of the two conflict situations we will introduce the two cases under study.

In September 2001, as a direct consequence of the 9/11 attacks on the New York Twin Towers, the United States put an ultimatum to the terrorist Taliban organization. The US demanded, among other things, the extradition of Osama Bin Laden. Of course the Taliban would not meet these demands, which was reason for the US to attack Afghanistan. As time passed, the situation aggravated, many (innocent) people were killed and Afghanistan effectively was facing an internal collapse if nothing had been done to help the country. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) therefore confirmed in November of the same year, by resolution 1378, that a new and transitional government had to be established in Afghanistan, which had to be “cooperating fully in international efforts to combat terrorism and illicit drug trafficking within and from Afghanistan” – hereby implicitly approving the recent US’ actions that started against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan earlier in October.¹ Next, a green light for an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission was given on December

¹ United Nations Security Council, “The situation in Afghanistan”, *UNSC*, 2000 – 2003.
http://www.un.org/ar/sc/repertoire/2000-2003/CHAPTER%208/Asia/00-03_8_Afghanistan.pdf

20th 2001 in resolution 1386, which was subsequently put up by the UK. In UNSC meetings to come, member states were called on to cooperate and act against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Up to this day, over 50 states have contributed to *Operation Enduring Freedom* – as the mission was called. The overall goal of the international community in Afghanistan is “to ensure that Afghanistan is never again a safe haven for terrorism”.²

Having described the general course of events at the eve of the war in Iraq, several similarities can be found in the period leading up to the intervention in Libya. In February 2011 the *Arab Spring* had reached Libya. The Libyan people rose up against the repressive government of Colonel Muammar al-Gadhafi and called for international help after their protests for better civil rights and a more democratic government were suppressed. Yet the subsequent protests in Benghazi were also violently put down by Gadhafi’s troops, which led to even more protests and civil casualties. International indignation rose rapidly and worldwide media held Col. Gadhafi and his troops responsible for the massacres caused among the Libyan people. Since the situation showed no signs of improvement whatsoever, most of the international community agreed that something had to be done to stop these crimes. After swift deliberations, the UNSC voiced its “grave concern” on the developing situation and unanimously adopted resolution 1970 on 26 February 2011, which included an arms embargo on Libya.³ Still the situation continued to worsen and on 17 March 2011 resolution 1973 was adopted by the UNSC, which condemned the “gross and systemic violation of human rights, including arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, torture and summary executions”.⁴ It also included a no-fly zone and authorized UN member states hitherto to use “all necessary measures” to halt the situation and protect the people of Libya. Though most states supported this resolution, Germany – which had always been a vivid partner of the transatlantic partnership – chose not to join sides with its traditional partners but instead abstained on the vote. The German representative in the UNSC argued that Germany, with the still ongoing intervention in Afghanistan in mind, saw great risks and wanted to avoid another ‘protracted military conflict’ and therefore abstained.⁵ On 31 March 2011, the intervention in Libya was taken over by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and a coalition of member states and partners intervened to stop the cruelties in Libya as soon as possible. On the 31st of October of the same year, *Operation Unified Protector* (OUP) had successfully ended. 6,000 military targets were destroyed and 8,000 men, 21 ships and 250 aircrafts had been deployed.⁶

² International Security Assistance Force, “Key Facts and Figures”, NATO, February 20, 2014.
http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2014_02/20140225_140220-ISAF-Placemat.pdf

³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO and Libya”, NATO, March 28, 2012.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_71652.htm?selectedLocale=en

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ P. Wittig, United Nations Security Council, S/PV.6498, March 17, 2011.

⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO and Libya”.

Many similarities come up in the two short expositions above: in both situations there was a clear aggressor that had also been recognized as such by the UNSC; in both crises, the international community acknowledged that the situation was precarious and that something had to be done to avoid further aggravation of the conflict; in both situations, almost all assembled states in the UNSC agreed on economic and diplomatic sanctions against the opposing party; and lastly, as to refine these statements to the interests of our research, Germany and France were on the same wavelength in the initial periods of both conflicts. Only when the Libyan authorities showed no movement to meet the exigencies of the international community and consequently additional measures had to be taken in the Libyan conflict, ways parted between Germany and France. Alain Juppé, the French minister of Foreign Affairs, recalled the French statement that “it is the responsibility of each State to protect its own population and of the international community to intervene when States failed in that duty”.⁷ Compared to the abovementioned declaration of Germany, a difference in opinions is visible concerning the desirable means to end the crisis in Libya.

1.1 Two rival theories

We now know the rough course of events in both crises. Several theories exist to explain foreign policy behavior in such situations, and all of them apply a different set of explanatory variables. In this thesis we have chosen for two International Relations (IR) theories: neoliberal institutionalism and neoclassical realism. Each applies a different set of variables, but they have a common assumption about the existing world order: the state system is anarchical and insecure. The important difference between the two theories lies in their explanation of how states deal with the state system. Neoliberal institutionalism argues that interstate behavior will be influenced by international organizations (IOs) that filter a state’s perception of other states’ behavior, whereas neoclassical realism denies this and instead ascribes such a major influence to domestic factors that make a state reprioritize its interests. This juxtaposition of two theories will enable us to find out whether the divergence in foreign policy can be mainly ascribed to specific domestic factors, or that it was the influence of international organizations that mattered most. By comparing certain domestic factors within Germany and France, as emphasized by neoclassical realist scholars, an explanation for the difference in policy outcome might be found. Yet a comparison between the behavior of these two states by accounting for the international institutions involved might also explain it. As a consequence, our research question is as follows:

⁷ United Nations Security Council, “Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council: The situation in Libya”, *UNSC*, 2010-2011, p. 3. http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/2010-2011/Part%20I/2010-2011_Libya.pdf

*To what extent can neoliberal institutionalism and neoclassical realism explain divergence in:
a) German and French foreign policy regarding the Libyan crisis of 2011; and b) German foreign
policy regarding the Libyan crisis of 2011 and participation in the war in Afghanistan?*

The comparison between the two conflict situations is valuable, because some important similarities existed between them, as we have argued above. It will therefore be interesting to find out why Germany actively cooperated in Afghanistan, but nevertheless decided not to cooperate in the intervention in Libya, whereas France did cooperate in the latter case.

1.2 The value of this research for International Relations theory

Just like any other theory, theories about international politics are “swimming in an ocean of anomalies”, as Lakatos so nicely put it. Science will not make any progress if already existing research is redone, but, as he argued in *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, scientists should always be aiming at improving existing theories – aiming at expanding a theory’s explanatory power. A new theory will be better only when its explanatory model can account for the same range of answers as provided by the old theory and, essentially, in addition can explain *more*.⁸ Therefore, cases that currently seem difficult to explain – the so called *hard cases*⁹ – could be examined in order to improve a theory’s explanatory power. In the light of such considerations, the difference in foreign policy outcome, in the cases under study poses a challenge to certain theories about international relations, for in similar circumstances a similar outcome would be expected.

Theories about interstate relations mainly try to generate insights in motivations for state interaction in general and theories of foreign policy subtly put the focus more on how and why a state’s foreign policy is executed the way it is. Neoliberal institutionalism, representing the former one, would not expect a state to leave its allies out in the cold in a common legitimate conflict – the reason of which I hope will be clear at the end of the theoretical chapter – yet Germany did so. Why then did Germany abstain from effective participation in the Libyan crisis? Was there little pressure exerted from NATO or the UN? In what sense did these organizations push states to participate? Neoclassical realism could be right as well in searching for a plausible explanation of German and French behavior. The decision of the Germans might be explicable if we consider domestic factors that might have been of influence when Germany was assessing the increasingly unstable situation in Libya and had to decide on its diplomatic response.

⁸ Imre Lakatos, “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes”, in *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, ed. Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

⁹ John Gerring, *Case study Research: Principles and Practices* (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

A neoclassical realist analysis of the cases under study should offer insights for this theory and other existing literature on the influence of domestic processes on foreign policy. Next, by applying neoliberal institutionalism we will verify whether the theory's important claims about the influence of international organizations on foreign policy will hold in conflict situations such as Afghanistan and Libya. Lastly, the comparison with France's behavior during the Libyan conflict should give some more strength to the results of this research. This comparative study can reveal whether the empirical results found will prove to account for more than one important West-European state.

1.3 Design of this thesis

The next chapter will expound the theoretical approach used in this thesis. It will go deeper into the specific variables used and explain their usefulness in our research. In chapter three, we will then explain how these variables have been operationalized and make clear what caveats and assumptions underlie our study. Chapter four concerns the empirical research, in which we will apply the two theories and assess to what extent they can explain the policy outcome in the cases under study. The findings of chapter four will be compiled and explained in the concluding chapter and should provide us with a detailed and clear answer to the research question.

Chapter 2: delineating the theoretical framework

2.1 Why compare neoliberal institutionalism and neoclassical realism?

Before we set out both theories, we will shortly expound why we use these specific two theories. Why, by looking at their different foci in explaining international relations, is it interesting to choose them?

Neoliberal institutionalism and neoclassical realism each stress a fundamentally different cause for state behavior in international politics. While neoliberal institutionalist scholars stress the influence of, among others, IOs in economic or security issues, neoclassical realists emphasize the influence of domestic factors on state behavior and effectively downplay the effect of IOs in security issues.¹⁰ Since both theories each have their distinct explanatory model, choosing neoliberal institutionalism and neoclassical realism enables us to keep the analysis of domestic factors and IOs separate from each other. The separate foci of both theories enable us to investigate their explanatory power independently in similar cases. By comparing neoliberal institutionalism with neoclassical realism, we hope to find out whether it were mainly IOs influencing the German and French policy outcome, or that it were domestic factors that caused the outcome.¹¹

¹⁰ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), chs. 7-8.

¹¹ The point should be made that neoclassical realist theory, regarding the influence of international organizations, is most of all applicable to issues concerning the security domain. They have argued that IOs probably can have some influence in, for example, economic issues. Yet disputes are being held about the latter claim, since a considerable amount of research shows that although states do often give in under pressure of IOs to approve of a rule in social or economic domains, the (lack of) practical implementation shows that the rule *in casu* is often likely to be interpreted in a vague sense (see Van der Vleuten, "Pincers and Prestige: Explaining the Implementation of EU gender Equality legislation", *Comparative European Politics*, Vol. 3, 2005). Very often definitions are deliberately kept vague by the member states in order to give them enough leeway to interpret the rule in a beneficial way, which enables them to follow their own course to a considerable extent, while simultaneously being able to avoid the shaming of IOs (see Van Kersbergen & Verbeek, "The Politics of International Norms: Subsidiarity and the Imperfect Competence Regime of the European Union", *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 13, no. 2, 2007). This way, IOs seem only to have a marginal influence. However, the very fact that states seem to invest considerable amounts of energy to IOs supports the view that IOs *are* able to alter a state's policy plans.

First, the reason why we preferred to apply neoliberal institutionalism is because its predecessor, classic liberal theory, uses factors such as multinational corporations and IOs in its explanatory model, but is *also* including domestic factors such as interest groups. Therefore, using classic liberalism would no longer enable a clear and separate analysis of the influence of IOs and domestic factors. Therefore, finding out which distinctive factor – primarily IO influence or specific domestic factors – was the major cause for state foreign policy in the cases under study would be hard with the use of the double focus of classic liberal theory.

Second, why did we choose neoclassical realism and not just classical realism or neorealism? Classical realism, just like neoclassical realism, incorporates the influence of individual perceptions in their theory. However, it stresses that hard power is the major element of state politics and argues that we should not treat decision-makers' perceptions as causes for policy choices but instead as inspirations, because in the end it is the statesman's rational assessment of the situation that will decide what to do in the national interest.¹² Neoclassical realism, instead, gives individual ideas an independent and autonomous place in directing decision-makers' perceptions. Neoclassical realism stresses their distinct influence apart from state interests and argues that ideas shape decision-maker's perceptions and will "provide the context within which states pursue their paramount objective of securing those things they identify as key material interests."¹³

As for Waltz's neorealism, the structural approach of his explanatory model in *Theory of International Politics* purposively does not include domestic factors and ideas at all. Since the inclusion of such factors gives more specific and more encompassing explanatory power to a theory about international politics, I do not think neorealism is a comprehensive approach for a thorough investigation of international politics. Neoclassical realism fills a void that existed in realist theory since it has been written down by Hans Morgenthau in 1946 – a point stressed by Zakaria in 1998.¹⁴ He argued that "a good account of a nation's foreign policy should include systemic, domestic, and other influences, specifying what aspects of the policy can be explained by what factors".¹⁵ Neoclassical realist theory does so by accounting for domestic factors, next to systemic constraints, to explain foreign policy outcome.

The aim of this chapter is to expound and elaborate on the main causal variables put forward by neoliberal institutionalism and neoclassical realism. The main arguments of both theories about the

¹² Nicholas Kitchen, "Systemic pressures and domestic ideas", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 36, January 2010, p. 127 drawing on Aron, *Peace and War*, p. 77.

¹³ Ibid., p. 128.

¹⁴ This claim is not uncontroversial, since the writings of Thomas Hobbes and Niccolò Machiavelli are often considered to be the founding works of Realist theory.

¹⁵ Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).

existing patterns of state behavior in the current international state system will be set out. They roughly point at two factors. The first one is the alleged specific influence of international organizations on foreign policy, as defended by neoliberal institutionalism. We hope to find out whether or not IOs influence state behavior in security issues in international politics, at least in the cases under study, even if push comes to the shove. It should be underlined however, that apart from their arguments building on Waltz's neorealist assumptions that international institutions do not have a decisive influence on state security policies, neoclassical realists do not have a distinct standpoint concerning IO influence. For this reason, neoclassical realist arguments regarding international institutions are mostly drawn from neorealist theory. Where applicable, additional claims from neoclassical realist scholars will be put forward. The other factor concerns the alleged influence of specified domestic factors on foreign policy outcome. As neoclassical realists argue, the systemic constraints are interpreted by states and considerably dictate state interests, yet domestic factors play an important role by acting against or strengthening the consequences of the systemic structure. They can influence cost-benefit calculations and can reprioritize state interests. As we shall see, neoliberal institutionalism does not adhere much value to these factors.

Both theories emphasize the constraints put up by the structure of the international state system. This systemic variable will dictate, to an important extent, the behavior of states. The constraints will be embodied by military power and economic preponderance. A state will not pose any threat if it has no military power that can threaten another state. Similarly, a small state can still pose a considerable threat to its neighbor if it has very advanced weaponry at its disposal. Next to that, each state has an incentive to strive for large economic strength, because that will enhance prospects for wealth and prosperity. Both theories acknowledge this, but each add a different set of secondary explanatory factors as to why the effects of the international state system are not the only force influencing a state's foreign policy outcome. They each try to explain a *non-system-logic* policy outcome, i.e. a policy outcome that runs contrary to what would be expected given the constraints of the state system, in a separate manner by arguing that the constraints of the state system are filtered, reinterpreted by either intervening IOs or domestic factors.

Having explained the choice for the theories applied in this thesis, we will expound them in the following sections.

2.2 Neoliberal institutionalism

After Hegemony, the seminal work of Robert Keohane, has been the founding book of neoliberal institutionalism. It dates back to 1984 and stands its ground unaltered in its core principles. The aim of Keohane's work was to show where the possibilities of such cooperative structures lie in international

politics, which patterns might be found, and which factors are working against and in favor of the emergence and continuation of international cooperation. As any other theory, he hoped to provide an explanation for recurring patterns in international politics, with a focus on interstate cooperation. As common interests of states are primal in that analysis, Keohane focused primarily on the Western industrialized countries whose governments are already intermingled in extensive relationships of multilateral or bilateral cooperation.¹⁶ Neoliberal institutionalism stresses the importance of international organizations' distinct and autonomous influence on interstate cooperative relationships. In IR theory, IOs are commonly understood as "persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations".¹⁷ By pointing at the possibilities for international cooperative structures, Keohane hoped to counter the pessimistic prospects for interstate cooperation as put forward in realist theories. Yet he specifically mentioned that we should avoid being *too* optimistic about international cooperation, as some theories do, because power-struggles and conflict still often occur. Therefore, he argued that neoliberal institutionalism should not replace realism, but supplement it instead.¹⁸

In defending the choice to take the state as the unit of analysis in his theory, Keohane argues that interstate behavior remains limited to states as key actors. First, as he points out by recalling his theoretical roots in Waltz's structural realism, he argues that states are the only credible actors capable of creating institutions that can influence state interests in the future.¹⁹ Within-unit actors have not shown to be able to solely establish an overarching authoritative interstate organization that is respected and treated as such. Second, he follows Waltz's argument that parsimony is important in any theory of foreign policy and that therefore a multitude of variables should be avoided. Since the behavior of states is mainly affected by the constraints of the international state system, including domestic factors often makes researchers lose the essence of international politics out of sight.²⁰ By making an analogy to firms functioning in a free market, Keohane asserts that state behavior is not determined by internal characteristics, but by the impeding characteristics of the international state system. Critics both inside and outside the neoclassical realist school have pointed at this "neglect of the differences in internal preferences and political institutions within states."²¹ One of their criticisms holds that policy outcome is also dependent on domestic actors who will push officials to include internal balancing strategies if they are to retain their domestic power. Just like in a free market, a neglect of

¹⁶ Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).

¹⁷ Robert O. Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989), p. 3.

¹⁸ Keohane, *After Hegemony*.

¹⁹ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, chs. 4-5.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Helen V. Milner, "Rationalizing Politics: The Emerging Synthesis in International, American and Comparative Politics", *International Organization*, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), p. 772.

internal preferences would neither show why some firms survive in a free market and why some do not, because a company's business strategies also follow from managerial skills and perceptions that probably will largely determine its survival prospects.

The explanatory model of neoliberal institutionalism, as argued, builds on Waltz's neorealist assumptions about international relations. They include that: 1) states are the key actors in world politics; 2) states act rationally; 3) states seek to pursue their interests instead of behaving altruistically; 4) there is no supranational authority to regulate interstate relationships.²² Keohane assumes that only egoistic and rationally acting states will set the margins of world politics, but he adds a fifth assumption that, "because states operate in an information-scarce environment, states have incentives to increase both their information about other states' actions, and their own credibility". This desire for more and better information may push states to overcome their fears of each other and might make them establish structural cooperative frameworks. Rejecting the negativistic approach of realism regarding the prospects for interstate cooperation, he emphasizes the possibility of progress in human behavior instead.²³ This incorporates a fundamentally distinct interpretation of human nature: neoliberal institutionalism assumes that states not only regard their survival as primary but also aim at increasing domestic wealth and prosperity. As any liberal theory, it assumes that a state will deem it possible to achieve this through international trade and the ensuing emergence of economic interdependence. States will seek for ways to cooperate in order to improve both their domestic and international situation.

Keohane and Axelrod (1985) emphasize that given the anarchic systemic structure we all must cope with, states might enter into cooperative structures when they are *able and willing* to "alter that context through building institutions embodying particular principles, norms, rules, or procedures for the conduct of international relations".²⁴ This holds only on the condition that states are convinced that the attainment of their own goals *cannot* be seen independently of the interests and welfare of other states – hereby assuming that no state will enter into cooperation when doing so would not improve their own situation.²⁵ Therefore, in case a threat assessment would give *both or more* states a reason to overcome their fears of each other, they might try to reach agreements on cooperation. The ensuing IOs should be able to alter both the rules of the international game and the opportunities open to states, by changing expectations about other states' actions and intentions – that is, IOs make that states filter the information of the international state system in a different manner. Keohane and

²² Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*.

²³ Keohane, *After Hegemony*.

²⁴ Robert O. Keohane and Robert Axelrod, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy", *World Politics*, Vol. 38, no. 1, 1985, p.228

²⁵ Ibid.

Martin (2003) emphasize that because of their coordinating position, IOs have unique information to their possession, which gives them the possibility of acting independently (to some extent at least), an effect also known as ‘agency slack’.²⁶ This prospect of access to more trustworthy additional information about other states creates incentives to join and respect the rules of conduct imposed by IOs. This mechanism should change states’ expectations about each other in a positive direction.




Figure 1: the neoliberal institutionalist model of policy formation.

According to neoliberal institutionalism, state interests are primarily shaped by pressures of the international state system. The important distinction with neoclassical realism, then, is that a state’s cost-benefit calculations of how best to achieve their short and long term interests will be affected by the intervention of IOs or by the benefits that they provide if the state will behave along the lines of expectancy set out by the institution. Though scholars acknowledge that IOs initially are created to further their creators’ interests, the argument is that institutions can partly outlive those interests and have an independent effect on state behavior. The consequence, it is argued, is that an institution may influence state interests and may alter calculations of how to best achieve these goals (see figure 1). Scholars stress that invested money and effort, reputation, and hard to change rules and standard operation procedures constitutionally anchored in IOs, enable it to partly live a life of its own – an effect known as ‘path-dependency’.²⁷ Consequently, via such independent effects, IOs will alter a state’s cost and benefit calculations and could lead it to revise its priorities. It is through explaining the persistent presence of international institutions, their alleged ability to alter a state’s priorities in policy outcome and to improve interstate confidence that agreements will be respected, that “neoliberal analysis makes its most distinctive contribution” to IR theory.²⁸

²⁶ Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, “Institutional Theory as a Research Program”, in *Progress in International Relations Theory*, ed. Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), ch. 3.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Robert Jervis, “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate”, in *Progress in International Relations Theory*, p. 298.

2.2.1 Main premises of neoliberal institutionalism

The mechanisms described above can be summarized into three important variables: a) state interest in the success of IOs; b) the influence of reputation; and c) the influence of IOs on state behavior. We will now investigate their influence on state behavior.

First of all, the influence of IOs can boost an important mechanism of liberal theory: the improvement of interstate relations through economic cooperative relationships. States will behave increasingly cooperative, it is argued, because of intensive trade relations that give them prospects for an increase of wealth and power in the future. Yet when such cooperative structures are being anchored in institutions, a 'complex interdependency' is established, which makes states more and more bound to adhere to the accepted agreements.²⁹ Mechanisms operating through IOs, such as issue-linkage, have positive effects on further development of cooperation. Issue-linkage enables a state to move another state in a specific direction regarding its behavior in a particular policy domain by making a policy decision on one issue connected to the other state's policy in another issue that is equally accounted for within IO agreements. As such, Haas (1958) stated that negotiations on one topic or issue-area can have a spill-over effect to other issue-areas, for example when actors feel that progress is being frustrated by issues in the former issue-area. This mechanism will increase cooperation and consequently fosters increased mutual trust.³⁰ Actors will have more faith in a good development of the relationship, because a violation of an agreement will not be seen as a single act of non-compliance, but "as one in a series of interrelated actions", whereby the IO provides for a 'shop-window' of economic and diplomatic opportunities for effective and legitimate action available to move the defecting state to reconsider its decision.³¹ Other states might try to make the dissident state change its mind by imposing sanctions in one or more policy domains; they might retaliate and, for example, they could execute protectionist measures because the 'nation has a right to protect its vital interests'.³² Would state leaders decide not to abide by the rules previously agreed on within an IO, they might put their position at risk. As a consequence, depending on the intensity and the domain of cooperation, a state is sensitive (i.e., changes of foreign economic factors influence domestic markets and will require minor policy adaptations³³) or vulnerable (i.e., a dependency on one or more other states for vital resources, such as oil³⁴) to policy changes in other states. The point is that a state's vulnerability and sensitivity are likely to increase the importance it attaches to an IO, if that organization increases their

²⁹ Keohane, *After Hegemony*, p. 117.

³⁰ Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), in Keohane, *After Hegemony*, p. 8; Axelrod and Keohane, *Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy*.

³¹ Keohane and Axelrod, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy", p. 234.

³² Ian Hurd, *International Organizations* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 21.

³³ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 139-42.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 143-6.

prospects for interest satisfaction. Therefore, the more a state is involved with an IO, the more it is likely to abide by its norms and rules – it is this alleged mechanism of interest reprioritization that gives IOs their power and influence.

The second variable concerns a state's reputation. Neoliberal institutionalist scholars emphasize that a state will often worry about it, notably in international organizations. States are generally inclined to adhere to (unofficial) rules established in IOs in order to uphold their reputation among other states. The fact that states can assess each other's behavior with norms unilaterally agreed on should make states more prone to keep their commitments, because of the possibility of reputation damage.³⁵ Such supranational standards of behavior to which a state's conduct can be assessed make states more careful in their behavior. Furthermore, acting along the lines of expectancy will reaffirm the trustworthiness of a state. Acting in discordance with those rules will likely have a negative effect as other states will probably openly remember the dissident state of its faulty behavior, which will often make other member states less eager to involve the misbehaving state in future (beneficial) co-operative agreements. The fear of economic or political retaliation will make a state attach importance to its reputation, which will increase possibilities for increased cooperation among states. Keohane therefore emphasizes the fact that we shouldn't misconceive the effect of institutions, because even though rules upheld by IOs are in fact non-enforceable, they still may serve as guidelines for conduct for member states.³⁶ In case of non-compliance with those rules, states may call on the IO as an objective 'authority' and consequently can use IOs as a tool to shame other states into policy revision. The accusing state could use shaming in order to emphasize its own 'rightful' position. Such mechanisms, linked to a state's sensitivity regarding its international reputation, show one way in which ways IOs do affect the policy options available to states. Through institutions a "bounded rationality" is thus created, a diplomatically restricted leeway left available for accepted state behavior within international organizations.³⁷

Lastly, the distinct power of international organizations concerns their often stressed moderating effect on the inherently uncertain nature of international relations. Recall how Keohane put it: "because states operate in an information-scarce environment, states have incentives to increase both their information about other states' actions and their own credibility".³⁸ The key effect of international organizations, then, is to remove parts of the uncertainty caused by this information-scarcity. States are willing to spend energy if it helps them to gain information about, and influence on other states' behavior. As a matter of fact, states do consider IOs as having something valuable to offer them,

³⁵ Keohane and Axelrod, *Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy*, p. 250.

³⁶ Keohane, *After Hegemony*, chapter 6.

³⁷ Herbert A. Simon, "A behavioral model of rational choice", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 69, no. 1 (February 1955), pp. 99-118, in Keohane, *After Hegemony*, p. 13.

³⁸ Keohane, *After Hegemony*, chapter 6.

considering the fact that they “spend a good deal of energy pursuing, deploying, and resisting [...] resources in and around institutions” to them in their policy formation processes.³⁹ The main point is that with the interference of IOs, valuable information about other states’ current and possible future behavior and intentions is more reliable and easier obtained compared to a situation when no institution would be involved in the interaction process between states. Regularly held meetings between IO-member states enable states to get some information about other states’ plans and intentions. As a consequence, any state’s policy outcome, as well as the formation process leading up to it, is subject to other states’ opinions about it. As each state shares its viewpoints and its desired policy outcome on any particular situation that falls in the policy area of the organization, other states get the chance to influence on that policy outcome. Next to that, the organization’s rules of conduct to which states have commonly agreed on by becoming a member of the organization should constrain their range of policy options. As a result, IOs affect a state’s cost-benefit calculations and can urge policy-making processes to take foreign states’ influences further into account. Member states can use the authority and the platform offered by IOs to push other states towards a certain policy direction. Through the abovementioned effects, IOs could influence state interests and the manner in which it deems it best to attain those interests. Having outlined the neoliberal institutionalist variables and causal relationships, we can now formulate the following hypothesis:

General hypothesis:

If neoliberal institutionalism is right, then international organizations will have an important influence on a state’s foreign policy outcome and a state will generally not take action that harms its interests in, and its reputation within these organizations.

2.2.2 Expectations regarding German and French foreign policy

The theory stresses that states are egoistic actors that will follow their own interests in the end, yet they will generally try to respect the agreements they have subscribed to. Since such agreements are often institutionalized in IOs, the theory expects that the institutions primarily involved in both conflict situations under study, the UN and NATO, will have had considerable influence on German and French foreign policy construction. We assume that states are inherently convinced that prosperous cooperation is in the benefit of themselves and all other states. Such argumentation leads us primarily to the expectation that Germany should not have abandoned its classical allies in the Libyan crisis for just any simple reason (although not participating was a legal option), but that they will have made a cost-benefit analysis of different policy options and their consequences. Overall, we should not find evidence of government officials plainly stressing the lack of interest for their state to participate in the

³⁹ Hurd, *International Organizations*, p. 20.

intervention coalition in Libya, since doing so would mean that they would ignore UN and NATO as soon as they were of no direct use. The possibility of political or economic damage following from such decisions should have influenced French and German decision-makers beforehand during the policy formation process. Neglecting IOs would disprove important claims of neoliberal institutionalism, so any findings that indicate in this direction are likely to weaken the theory's explanatory power.

Regarding the first liberal variable, state interest in IOs, Keohane argued that states will be seeking to improve their domestic wealth through cooperative relationships. Repetitive cooperation will foster the emergence of mutual trust instead of fear, and as this process continues a complex interdependency will arise out of which states cannot easily escape. Germany and France are both intermingled in extensive cooperative structures in the economic and security domain, both within Europe and in transatlantic organizations. Neoliberal institutionalist theory would expect that German and French arguments regarding their participation in the Afghan and Libyan conflict should have involved considerations about the fact that their decision on the matter was one that would concern both their own state as well as the organization of which they are a member. If France and Germany were convinced that the existence of the UN and NATO was really to their benefit, they would have had an interest in securing the effectiveness of the organization. Downplaying the importance of international operations would not increase the IOs' legitimacy and credibility, which in turn would not be in their own interest. If the theoretical expectations about the effect of extensive cooperation on state behavior are right, that is, if the existence of the UN and NATO were in France's and Germany's interest, we should find evidence that both states stress the importance of promoting the success of the organizations. Such evidence would mean that each state deemed its participation in the international coalition against Gadhafi (and in Afghanistan in the German case) to be important, because it would increase the likelihood of success of the operations— a success which is important for their own interests.

The second variable concerns a state's worries about its reputation. A state will assess its own and other states' behavior both on a global scale and with the official and unofficial behavioral rules set out within IOs. As we know, this aspect can be divided in two aspects: first, a state is likely to be damaged in its reputation if it acts contrary to what is agreed on or what is to be expected; and second, the very possibility that this might happen will be enough to influence state behavior, since states are eager to avoid such reputation damage. We therefore expect that Germany and France will have cared about their reputation inside and outside IOs and will have taken into consideration the consequences of possible policy options before making their final decision. With the application of this knowledge to the case under study, we should find evidence that both states wanted to avoid the negative consequences of a bad reputation and that they therefore will have considered if not taking part in the military operations in Afghanistan and Libya would damage their reputation.

Finally, the individual effect of IOs on state behavior concerns their ability to alter state interests and strategy. In other words, states should be making other cost-benefit calculations with the presence of IOs than they would make without them. The meetings in the UN and NATO enabled other member states to assess, to some extent, the plans and intentions of Germany and France in each conflict situation. As other states could likely have pushed the two states in a direction agreed on by a majority of the IO members, Germany and France are likely to have adapted their policy to be in line with the majority in the organization. Therefore, the UN and NATO should have been of influence on both states' foreign policy outcome. The theory expects both states to have taken the influence of both IOs into consideration, in a sense that they might have reprioritized their interests. They should be considerably influenced by NATO and the UN in their decision-making process and outcome on participating in the Afghan and Libyan conflict, certainly considering the capability of the UN to give the use of force a legitimate character.⁴⁰

Concluding, if research shows that other states have influenced German and French policy outcome by criticisms via UN and/or NATO platforms, and both states showed to attach importance to respecting the general will of the IOs, then those IOs have had a distinct influence. Having set out the specific expectations of neoliberal institutionalism, we can now rephrase this information to the following hypothesis:

Specific hypothesis:

If contributing to the missions in respectively Afghanistan and Libya is in line with Germany's and France's interests in the UN and NATO and does not harm their reputation in these organizations, then both states will contribute to these missions.

2.3 Neoclassical realism

The roots of neoclassical realism lie in the core assumptions of Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*. Recall that these premises are: 1) states are the key actors in world politics; 2) states act rationally; 3) states seek to pursue their interests instead of behaving altruistically; 4) there's no supranational authority to regulate interstate relationships.⁴¹ As is commonly emphasized in all realist theories, the nature of international politics is essentially anarchic and gives no guarantee for survival. The state system offers incomplete and insecure information and as a consequence works against cooperation. States cannot know the true intentions of other states today, nor can they know their future intentions.⁴² Power struggles have been and will be of all time. Since hard power is the only effective key to

⁴⁰ Alexander Thompson, "Coercion through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission", *International Organization*, Vol. 60, No. 1, 2006, pp.1-34.

⁴¹ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*.

⁴² Ibid.

survival, realist theories emphasize that “necessity and reason of state trump morality and ethics when these values conflict”.⁴³ Because the unsurpassable anarchic nature of the international state system makes that states will seek to secure their own survival above all, prospects for world peace are rather pessimistic. Waltz emphasized that states are “free to do anything they care to, but they are likely to be rewarded for behavior that is responsive to structural pressures and punished for behavior that is not”.⁴⁴ Eventually, he argued, the balance of power will be restored, but Waltz gave no time limit for this process. Though he stressed the likely repercussions to follow from *non-system-logic* behavior, possible reasons for such behavior itself are not put forward by Waltz. Neoclassical realism supplements his theory with the addition of domestic causes and processes.⁴⁵ It does not disagree with many of Waltz’s arguments, but it rejects his first principle, since within-unit variables are put forward as importantly influencing policy outcome. Scholars aim to show how foreign policy, to a considerable extent, is a “product of a country’s internal dynamics” and is not just about “relative quantities of physical forces in being”.⁴⁶

Neoclassical realism treats systemic and domestic factors both as independent variables that simultaneously shape state behavior. As Jennifer Sterling-Folker (1997) put it: “the former determine the ends to which actors strive but the latter are the means by which actors obtain those ends.”⁴⁷ The constraining and enabling aspect of the international structure necessarily shapes the ends that states will strive for, but the effect of this system nevertheless is tempered because those ends can be re-prioritized or adapted by the influence of domestic factors.

Because detailed information is needed with the addition of domestic variables to the explanatory model, applying neoclassical realism requires a quite profound analysis. Gideon Rose (1998) nicely set out what the primal distinctive characteristics of neoclassical realism comprehend. In his illuminating article, he described the theory as follows:

Neoclassical realism argues that the scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international state system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities. This is why they are realist. They argue further, however, that the impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit-level. This is why they are neoclassical.⁴⁸

⁴³ Randall L. Schweller “The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism”, in *Progress in International Relations Theory*, ch. 9.

⁴⁴ Kenneth N. Waltz, “Evaluating Theories”, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 91, no. 4, December 1997, p. 915.

⁴⁵ Schweller, “The progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism”.

⁴⁶ Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy”, *World Politics*, October 1998, p. 148.

⁴⁷ Jennifer Sterling-Folker, “Realist Environment, Liberal Process and Domestic-Level Variables”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 41, no. 1 (March 1997), pp. 3-4.

⁴⁸ Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy”, p. 146.

With the inclusion of within-unit variables, the theory is opening up the ‘black box’ in IR theory – an approach for which it is often blamed by opponents. In countering the common critique that the theory does not add knowledge for broader theory, Christensen (1996) argued in *Useful Adversaries* that this is not the case, because “it does not simply state that domestic politics matter in foreign policy, but specifies the conditions under which they matter”.⁴⁹ It is important to realize that proponents do not ascribe all action in international relations to domestic factors, but rather that circumstances are set out when they do play a role as constraining factor.

Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro (2009) provide for an extensive and much encompassing work on this upcoming theory of foreign policy in *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*. They effectively set out how the addition of the top-down approach of neoclassical realism, next to the influence of systemic constraints, is to be interpreted. They state that “international constraints filtered through the medium of state structure” affect threat assessments.⁵⁰ Schematically, the mechanism of the theory can be seen as in figure 2. Lobell *et al.* thus see the distinctive analysis of neoclassical realism as making the link between the international environment and domestic politics. As such, it can be seen as a mid-range theory between systemic theories and reductionist theories.⁵¹ They argue that the theory works as an “imperfect transmission belt” between systemic constraints on one side and selected policies on the other.⁵² It reaffirms the autonomous influence of the international state system, but simultaneously sees domestic factors as influencing a state’s final policy outcome.




Figure 2: the neoclassical realist model of foreign policy formation.

Domestic factors that try to influence the policy formation process can encourage or inhibit an objective threat analysis and as such they will decide as a ‘final arbiter’ over policy outcome.⁵³ As a result, multiple states that face a common threat may nevertheless respond in a different manner. According

⁴⁹ Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict 1947-1958* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 252.

⁵⁰ Jeffrey W. Taliaferro *et al.*, “Introduction: Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy”, in *Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 3.

⁵¹ Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy”, p. 152.

⁵² Taliaferro *et al.*, “Introduction: Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy”, p. 4.

⁵³ Sterling-Folker, “Realist Environment, Liberal Process and Domestic-Level Variables”.

to Lobell (2009), this causal mechanism also enables the theory to account for problematic cases such as warring and failed states. Because neoclassical realism accounts for domestic factors that are constraining state officials' options to react to both internal and external conflicts, *non-system-logic* outcomes may occur.⁵⁴ A good example of when the inclusion of such internal processes into the analysis can be helpful is shown in the research done by Brawley (same volume) on the divergence in reactions of France, Britain and the Soviet Union to the German expansionist behavior in the 1930's. Brawley's analysis reveals the reasons why they all responded in a different and inefficient manner. A difference in threat assessments by decision-makers caused to a large extent the divergence in foreign policy. Internal characteristics made each state respond differently to a common threat.⁵⁵

Lastly, regarding the influence of IOs, neoclassical realism stresses the common realist argument that such institutions are mainly an extension of the powerful states by whom they have been created. Following this argument, institutions like the UN have been erected only because they fortify the spread of the hegemon's values and ideas about world affairs in years to come and as such will have no proper influence in international politics on their own. The US, for example, knew that the emergence of such cooperative structures would only be in their interest as a hegemon, so to establish them would above all help reaching US goals. As a counterargument, neoliberal institutionalist scholars have pointed at the authoritative positions of current monetary, security and trade arrangements as proof of the influence of such regimes on interstate politics. Keohane argued that the hegemonic position of the US is long waning, and that therefore the persistence of existing institutionalized forms of cooperation and the emergence of recently established ones has yet to be explained by realist scholars. Additionally, the very fact that states spend a considerable amount of energy to them in their policy formation processes would prove the importance of IOs in international relations.⁵⁶ Although this claim finds its limits in the information scarcity logically cloaking security policy, via institutionalized 'rules of thumb' IOs would still constrain states in their range of policy options. Realist scholars emphasize, however, that such institutionalized patterns of behavior can always be reversed or abandoned by states. As the principle of sovereignty entails that states do not fall under any superior organizations' authority, this means that states can always question, marginalize, ignore or discard IOs if they harm national interests.⁵⁷ As a consequence, supranational governance would appear to be just a "great power concert, thinly veiled by international organizations".⁵⁸ States will always pursue a policy that is

⁵⁴ Steven E. Lobell, "Threat assessment, the state, and foreign policy: a neoclassical realist model", in Lobell *et al.*, *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*, p. 43.

⁵⁵ Mark R. Brawley, "Neoclassical realism and strategic calculations: explaining divergent British, French, and Soviet strategies toward Germany between the world wars (1919-1939)", in Lobell *et al.*, *Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy*, ch. 3.

⁵⁶ Hurd, *International Organizations*, p. 20.

⁵⁷ Ruggie, 1983.

⁵⁸ Pease, *International Organizations*, chapter 3.

in their best short and long term self-interest, so IOs will only make part of the route when states can use them to attain their goals. If IOs form an obstruction to that route, states will find and use ways to bypass them. Therefore, neoliberal institutionalism still owes the answer to the question why states sometimes deliberately choose to ignore IOs altogether.

2.3.1 Principle variables of neoclassical realism under analysis

In this paper, the focus will be put on three principal neoclassical realist variables that have been stressed by many scholars: a) the influence of domestic actors; b) government sensitivity in election time; and c) decision-makers' perceptions. The effects of the first two variables are partly interrelated with one another, which is schematized in figure 3. The first important variable is the influence of domestic actors. Recall that domestic factors in this theory make that states filter the constraints of the international state system in a different manner, compared to liberal approaches that ascribe that function to IOs. Interest groups, pressure groups, think-tanks and public opinion can potentially have an important influence on foreign policy outcome. Pressure exerted by well-organized interest groups, large societal players and public opinion can be of influence in varying degrees, depending on the government's sensitivity. Public opinion is an important aspect of societal pressure as well and should be carefully watched. Since public opinion shows a government's prospects for future elections, tactically




Figure 3: the connection between the neoclassical realist variables.

playing to the public is key for political success. As E.H. Carr argued in 1945: “power over opinion is therefore not less essential for political purposes than military and economic power, and has always been closely associated with them. The art of persuasion has always been a necessary part of the equipment of a political leader”.⁵⁹ (Indeed, as we have seen in Nazi-Germany in the 1930s, the ‘art of persuasion’ definitely is important.)

Regarding interest groups and societal actors, Ripsman (2009) argued that domestic actors will be first and foremost interested in issues regarding war, shortage of common goods, and taxes. They will effectuate their influence by putting forwarding specific demands for policy adaptation or by calling into

⁵⁹ Edward Hallett Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939* (New-York: Harper & Row, 1939), quoted in Lobell *et al.*, “Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy”, p. 203.

question a decision maker's position altogether.⁶⁰ Furthermore, societal groups that have a significant voter base in politically strategic regions should have greater influence than those situated in less important regions.⁶¹ In any sense, meeting some demands of large and influential domestic actors, such as industrial and environmental organizations, will probably provide for additional electoral support.⁶² Summarizing, it is expected that a lobby group's input can have considerable influence, if it knows how best to formulate its demands and how best to approach the right politicians.

Now let us turn to the second variable. When elections are approaching, governments of genuine democratic countries will in general be more sensitive to pressures exerted by domestic societal actors. Every government, political party and each individual at least wants to maintain its power position, or preferably increase it. Through gaining additional electoral support, which can be done by meeting demands arising from society, they want to make sure that their desired position is guaranteed as much as possible. In this situation, a political party or government will be more sensitive regarding the consolidation of their position and will therefore be more open to pressures from society, especially to important actors that will be able to provide considerable electoral support.⁶³ Even more so, when decision-makers feel that their political position is weakening, they will have extra motivations to listen to domestic actors that can strengthen their position. Government sensitivity can increase when a major issue is dominating domestic debates and makes headlines. Opinion polls may show that a particular delicate topic, political affair, or some other issue is concerning large parts of the population. As such, winning the debate can give a party just the extra push it needs to regain an electoral majority position. As large parts of society will form an opinion on such matters, taking a popular stance will very likely pay off in opinion polls. In times when such debates dominate headlines in the media, political parties in power that face a probable decline in oncoming elections will be urged to take a popular stance.⁶⁴ In other words, a government's sensitivity is higher in election time, which will enhance chances for domestic pressures affecting a state's foreign policy. It is even higher when reelection is unlikely and a major issue dominates the national debate. In such situations – when a government's sensitivity to domestic pressures is high – we expect that the influence of public opinion and strong societal actors will be strong. When sensitivity is low, their influence will naturally be weak. The last neoclassical realist variable taken into consideration concerns decision-makers' perceptions regarding the situations they encounter, the solution deemed best and the approach deemed best to

⁶⁰ Norrin M. Ripsman, "Neoclassical realism and domestic interest groups", in Lobell *et al.*, *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*, ch. 6.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ripsman, "Neoclassical realism and domestic interest groups".

achieve their goals. As Sterling-Folker argued, “ultimately it is actors within domestic realms and involved in domestic processes who must make the assessment and choices necessary for their own survival”.⁶⁵ This mechanism has three important aspects. First, personal perceptions of decision-makers reflect certain scientific, strategic and operational convictions of what a state should and can do. Such convictions give the guidance needed to effectively construct policy in situations of limited and imperfect information – which is the political world. The greater the uncertainty of the situation, the greater the impact of perceptions during the decision-making process. They ease decision-makers’ grip on real-life situations; i.e. decision-makers’ perceptions about state interests “provide norms, guidelines, and standards which affect many aspects of decision making” and therefore influence policy outcome.⁶⁶ They will influence, for example, how complex information is processed and how elements of them are prioritized.⁶⁷

Second, perceptions of decision-makers, such as the foreign policy executive, play a role in the direction of the goals that a state will strive for regarding their international position. Called ‘intentional ideas’ by Kitchen (2010), those ideas reflect decision-makers’ perceptions of the position of their state in this world and how that world is perceived.⁶⁸ A personal conviction of the importance of non-vulnerability on the field of energy supplies, for example, will lead to a different approach than an emphasis on peaceful resolution of conflict situations. Therefore, the perceptions of individuals in powerful and decision-making positions play an important role in which goals are set and the deployment of resources to attain them, since their power position enables them to influence a state’s final policy outcome. As they prioritize some interests over others, they will try to move the policy-making process in a direction that will result in an outcome they perceive to be the right one. However, such perceptions are no guarantee for policies to be successful.

Third, decision-makers have an individual perception of situations the state encounters. Their perception of the threat of any particular situation and their assessment of any danger to state interests influences the foreign policy approach of a state. In this process, they make use of the abovementioned personal experience that will give guidance in situations in which the state is involved. The greater the uncertainty of a threatening situation, the greater the impact of perceptions during the decision-making process.⁶⁹ Personal ideas about which outcome is in the best interest of the state and about which tactics are best to resolve the situation influence the policy outcome. This way, decision-makers can have an important role in prioritizing state interests, for example regarding diplomatic ties

⁶⁵ Sterling-Folker, “Realist Environment, Liberal Process and Domestic-Level Variables”.

⁶⁶ N.B. Wish, “Foreign Policy Makers and Their National Role Perceptions”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 24, no. 4, 1980, pp. 532-535 and pp. 549-50.

⁶⁷ Kitchen, *Systemic Pressures*.

⁶⁸ Kitchen, *Systemic Pressures*; Wish, *Foreign Policy Makers*.

⁶⁹ Kitchen, *Systemic Pressures*.

and foreign energy supplies, but he can also decide on the deployment of resources to attain them. However, since no human being is able to perfectly observe and gather complete information about any situation, personal perceptions can lead to wrong interpretations of a situation and occasionally will attribute to inaccurate or *non-system-logic* policies.⁷⁰

The variables discussed above lead to the following two hypotheses about state behavior:

General hypotheses:

- 1) *If neoclassical realism is right, then domestic interest groups and public opinion will influence a state's foreign policy outcome, and states will not take highly unpopular decisions in times of high government sensitivity.*
- 2) *If neoclassical realism is right, then a state's foreign policy outcome will be in line with the perceptions of the decision-makers involved.*

2.3.2 Expectations of German and French behavior

Generally, neoclassical realism expects states to behave in a risk averse manner. A state will only engage in operations when they have been properly prepared, since an ill-considered decision is likely to turn out bad. The lack of accurate and complete information about other states' capabilities and intentions will urge states to make a threat assessment first, but doing so will still give no guarantees for security. States will therefore above all pursue their self-interest in the first place. Furthermore, the theory does not expect that states will let IOs distract them from their goals. As such, it does not expect Germany and France to have deviated from their short and long term goals on security and defense policy due to NATO or UN interference during the crises in Afghanistan and Libya.

Based on the first variable, we expect the foreign policy outcome of both states regarding the conflict in Libya to have been influenced by domestic factors. As explained above, if domestic actors (i.e. large societal actors such as labor unions, environmental pressure groups and industrial organizations) have put considerable weight against, or in line with, the pressures of the international political system, this might have caused both states to have adapted their policies in that direction. As for Germany, domestic actors should have had different positions in the Afghan case, since Germany did participate in that conflict. Furthermore, public opinion could have put considerable weight on foreign policy outcome, since no government likes to take unpopular decisions. Therefore, we should find evidence that during the policy formation process in Germany and France, its direction has changed somehow if we find that domestic actors or public opinion was absolutely not on the same line as the policy makers, but also could have been fortified if the general public was similarly-minded.

Next, the government sensitivity variable holds that those who are in power will be sensitive to domestic interest groups and public opinion. As the debates about whether or not to participate in the

⁷⁰ Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy".

interventions in respectively Afghanistan and Libya were questions of war and peace, the debates will probably have concerned large parts of society, which means that there was a considerable electoral profit to gain. Therefore, taking a popular position on the topic was likely to have offered a great leverage, on the condition that important elections were approaching. We expect, then, that the policy outcome in Germany and France regarding the conflict situations under study will have been heavily influenced if elections were imminent.

Lastly, neoclassical realism expects that decision-makers' perceptions are well able to influence the final policy outcome. They have ideas about effective, tactical and morally appropriate action in response to any occurring situation. During the assessments of the situations in Afghanistan and Libya, government officials in Germany and France are thought to have had certain perceptions about the situation and how to approach it, while also keeping in mind the outcome they deem best for their state. This way, by taking both systemic and domestic pressures into consideration, decision-makers will think of the best way to protect state interests. It therefore matters which aspects of the situation he or she thinks are threatening state interests, and which of those interests are most important to protect. The behavior of both states, then, might have been affected by the decision-makers' perceptions about to which extent the situation was forming a direct threat to their state's interests. Therefore, following the neoclassical realist argument, if the perceptions of the president or chancellor and the government officials involved have been of significant influence, the effect of their perceptions of (the best way of approaching) the situation should already be discernable earlier in the policy-making process. If this was the case, the final policy outcome would have been in the same line, which might be similar to or against what might be expected considering other variables at play.

We can now formulate the specific hypotheses about the expectations of neoclassical realism regarding the behavior of Germany and France in respectively Afghanistan and Libya:

Specific hypotheses:

- 1) *Only if contributing to the missions in respectively Afghanistan and Libya was consonant with the demands of domestic interest groups and public opinion, and depending the level of government sensitivity, then Germany and France will have contributed to these missions.*
- 2) *Only if contributing to the missions in respectively Afghanistan and Libya was in line with the perceptions of the decision-makers' involved, Germany and France will have done so and he or she will have strongly influenced the final policy outcome in that direction.*

2.4 Conclusion

Inherent uncertainty is by far the most important characteristic of the anarchic structure shaping the international state system. Most diplomatic troubles would be solved if the Self was always honest and we always knew what the Other was up to. Different opinions are held regarding prospects for the

development of international politics. Having set out the general premises of neoliberal institutionalism and neoclassical realism, we can say that the former theory holds up a brighter future and that the latter subscribes to *Realpolitik* instead. Such underlying assumptions about the nature of diplomatic trafficking have their implications for the abovementioned theory-specific variables. Applying these variables to the cases under study ultimately allows us to verify to what extent the two theories are capable of explaining the German behavior during the Libyan crisis. We will analyze this case on the one hand by comparing it with the French policy-making process regarding participation in the same conflict, and on the other hand with the German decision-making process towards participation in the war in Afghanistan. Comparing both theories with the results of extensive analyses of what happened when and how in the policy-making processes in both states, should reveal the explanatory strength the two theories. The curious German behavior during the Libyan crisis will offer each theory a chance to contribute to the growth of knowledge by explaining a bit more of the 'ocean of anomalies'.⁷¹ We shall find out whether international organizations, even when used for a state's self-interest, can affect the priorities and the values deemed important by states, and if they had important effects on their interests.⁷² We may find out that such claims appear to be false in the end and conclude that international organizations are no more than playthings of states and their rules eluded whenever they are no longer of use. It could turn out that domestic factors appear to influence foreign policy instead.

⁷¹ Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programs", in *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, ed. Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

⁷² Keohane, *After Hegemony*, pp. 63-64; Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation", p. 306.

Chapter 3: methodology

In this chapter we will expound the research design, the case selection, and the implications of doing small-N research. We will operationalize the variables of our research and explain its value for existing literature and method of data collection.

3.1 Research design

The research question in the introductory chapter made clear that the central interest of the research concerns the German foreign policy outcome towards the Libyan crisis. We will strengthen the validity of our empirical findings by applying two lines of comparison in our research. They are as follows: a) German and French foreign policy outcome regarding the Libyan crisis; and b) German foreign policy outcome in the prelude to their participation in Afghan crisis in 2001 and in Libya in 2011.

	GERMANY	FRANCE
AFGHANISTAN 2001	participation	/// /// /// /// ///
LIBYA 2011	<i>no participation</i>	participation

Table 1: research design: 'Why no German military participation in Libya in 2011?'

By making these comparisons, we will be able to verify the effect of the different variables not just in one case but in similar cases and similar circumstances too. As is visible in the research design in table 1, the research puzzle starts with the German case in Libya. The comparison with German decision-making during the Afghan conflict that started a decade earlier will provide us with information to compare the two situations and check for similarities and differences. The comparison with France in the Libyan case will provide us with a comparison of two similar Western states, but with a totally different foreign policy outcome. We will not analyze the French foreign policy towards the war in

Afghanistan, because such an analysis has no additional value linked to the main purpose of this research: German foreign policy during the Libyan crisis.

In the empirical chapter (chapter four), we will first expound an objective analysis of the geo-strategic and economic circumstances of Germany and France at the onset of both crisis situations. This way, we will have objective information with which we can compare the decisions-making processes in both states and verify whether they diverge from what would be expected from an objective point of view. The next step will be the analysis of the conflicts on the basis of both theories separately.

3.2 Case selection

The France – Germany dyad has always been an interesting one: whereas most of their history has been a violent one, the last 65 years have shown a change. Yet as a result of the course of history, for a long time France felt the need to control German foreign policy. This was even noticeable after the fall of the Berlin wall, when France saw the need to tie Germany to the West in order to decrease the possibility of a new potential threat of a reunified Germany.⁷³ It shows how strong the weight of history can affect the perception of people.

In the decade after World War II, the establishment of new institutionalized structures of cooperation had to end ill-feelings between the two states. Through an economic interdependency that was intended to emerge with these institutions, France primarily sought security and influence over German capabilities, whereas West-Germany sought to regain the trust of the international community. *Bundeskanzler* Konrad Adenauer and President Charles de Gaulle of France played a pivotal role as visionary statesmen whose efforts made that it was agreed on to seek a viable solution for the enmity between the two states within the realm of a multilateral cooperative structure. Since the start of their cooperation, German and French economic policies have been increasingly interrelated to each other, a process still continuing today. However, regarding the domain of security and defense, their approaches still differed most of the time – at least halfway into the nineties. Germany sought to expand the transatlantic cooperative structure with the US, whereas France mostly deemed a European approach under French leadership the best option and later on promoted an independent European defense force instead of extensive cooperation with the US.⁷⁴ Yet since the security summit at Saint-Mâlo in 1997, France and Germany got closer again and sought, together with other European States,

⁷³ Anand Menon, "From Independence to Cooperation: France, NATO and European Security", *International Affairs*, Vol. 71, no. 1, January 1995, pp. 19-34.

⁷⁴ M. van der Heijden, "La Politique Française sur la Défense et la Sécurité Européenne" (Ba diss., Radboud University, 2013).

to establish a Common European Defense Force. This cooperation successfully culminated in the first independent European led international mission in 2009.⁷⁵

Another reason for our case selection concerns the German and French behavior during the credit crisis of 2008-2011 and the concomitant Euro-crisis of 2009-2013. The German *Bundeskanzlerin* Angela Merkel and the French president Nicolas Sarkozy actively worked together to prevent the Euro-region from falling apart. Being the strongest powers on the continent, they intensively cooperated as the 'axis of Europe' to stabilize the economic situation of the European Union and to regain the financial trust of international markets. Frequent meetings and many joint press conferences of Merkel and Sarkozy – often called 'Merkozy' in international media – underlined their convictions to fulfill their role as European problem solvers.⁷⁶

Furthermore, both states are located in roughly the same geographical position in the world and have roughly equal defense and economic interests. Both states are powerful members of the EU trade zone. In recent history (< 60 years), and definitely in the last decade, they followed a similar path and aimed to fulfill a leading role in the 'Europeanization' of the continent, which has often led to policy convergence in European affairs. Next, as we shall see, both states had similar foreign interests in Libya, yet their behavior differed considerably. Such and other examples in the history of more than six decades of intensive cooperation between France and Germany make it the more interesting to analyze differences in foreign policy.

Concluding, because France and Germany have many factors in common ('X₂'), we can consider this comparative study as a 'most-similar' research design.⁷⁷ Therefore it is the more interesting to find out what caused the variation in policy outcome on the Libyan crisis ('Y'). Though we hope to be able to *generate* new evidence for the existing literature in the field of International Relations, our research will be testing important premises of two theories and can therefore most of all be seen as hypothesis *testing*, that is, X-centered. We hope to find out what factors were the causes ('X₁') of the foreign policy outcome, the results of which could yield new insights about state behavior in similar conflict situations.

⁷⁵ This was Operation Atalanta led by the European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR).

⁷⁶ René Moerland and Joost van der Vaart, "Frans-Duitse as van Europa is terug, maar loopt stroef", *NRC Handelsblad*, June 12, 2010. <http://www.nrc.nl/handelsblad/van/2010/juni/12/frans-duitse-as-van-europa-is-te-rug-maar-loopt-stroef-11904907>; see also Yves Thréard, "L'Europe de la Merkozy !", *le Figaro*, November 4, 2011. <http://blog.lefigaro.fr/threard/2011/11/leurope-de-la-merkozy.html>

⁷⁷ John Gerring, *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices* (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 86-150, especially pp. 131-9.

3.3 Implications of small-N research

The debate about the pros and cons of small-N and large-N research and their preferred strategies has been going on for a long time. In order to explain the choice of doing a small-N research, we will shortly set out the advantages and disadvantages of doing an in-depth study. John Gerring's *Case Study Research* (2007) presents a clarifying overview on this topic. He points at important differences between using a very small or very large population when doing research, such as the internal/external validity, the scope, and the explanatory power of a research.⁷⁸

When we verify the choice for doing a small-N analysis on the basis of its implications as set out by Gerring, we see that there are some caveats for the results that will come out of this kind of research. Since we only analyze two cases, we inevitably run into most of the limits he set out. First, the scope of the findings of our study will mostly be applicable to large and middle-power democracies in Western Europe. The comparison with France prevents that results will only hold for German behavior in conflict situations. Furthermore, an in-depth analysis of the situations will provide for a detailed (perhaps pathway-like) explanation of what happened and also provides for a highly valid answer to the research question. However, such an in-depth analysis will simultaneously weaken possible broader conclusions about behavioral patterns following out of this research. In the end, one of the goals of this study is to test the explanatory power of both IR theories and hopefully to bring about propositions for their improvement on the basis of our findings.

3.4 Research value

We think that it is important for results following out of scientific research in the field of International Relations to be most of all applicable to recent conflict situations in the world, which makes it logical to choose cases that have aspects of modern conflict situations in them. These aspects are, for example, the nature of the conflict and the way in which it is fought. Such characteristics make military conflicts today different than those of past times. Genuine cases of violent territorial expansionism have ceded much terrain to cases of intrastate conflict in which a large role is reserved for non-state actors. The consequence hereof is a changing way of warfare: in such conflicts, it is not just one army against another, but instead battles are smaller in kind and spread over a larger territory. Advancements can be swift due to modern technologies but sometimes must be made from door to door and from one foxhole to another. The implications for the effectiveness of a foreign intervention in this kind of conflicts can be a reason for third parties to hesitate about intervening, since they might be dragged into a protracted conflict instead of gaining a swift victory. The cases under study might yield important findings for state behavior in this kind of conflicts.

⁷⁸ Gerring, *Case Study Research*, pp. 37-63.

Next, the often extensive availability of direct information is a reason to choose conflicts of recent times. With the help of social media, audio and video material is quickly up- and downloaded, which gives more insights on the development of a situation. The quick spread of news makes that states often feel themselves morally obliged to form an opinion, since it is not accepted any more to state that a conflict is simply not of any concern because it is happening some 20,000 miles away. The easy access to information simultaneously gives us an important advantage because valuable documents are easily retrievable and numerous in kind.

Third, recent conflicts have not yet been thoroughly investigated. For the more recently a conflict took place, the more probable that research will add an important value to the existing explanatory domain of a scientific theory about international relations. Using older conflicts, on which an extensive amount of literature has already been written, would prove to be much harder to reveal new insights for future research. As recent conflict situations have not yet been squeezed dry, they are likely to bring up interesting new findings.

The behavior of France and Germany during the Libyan crisis therefore is useful in many aspects. Social media were commonly used during the conflict and provided much information: videos of shootings, crashing planes and even the video of a murdered Col. Gadhafi were spread via such technologies. The behavior of Germany and France in both intra-state conflict situations can give us much insight in how Western democratic states could deal with such crises. Despite the fact that the Libyan crisis took place ten years later, the case of the German behavior during the war in Afghanistan is also of great value as it still suits most of the abovementioned arguments and can reveal interesting insights for the difference in a state's foreign policy outcome in similar situations. Lastly, there is much information available about the two cases. Many documents and media were produced about the situation leading up to the conflicts and this information is easily available for us today.

3.5 Delineation of the time and research limits of the study

In order not to lose the aim of this research out of sight, it is important to mark the limits of the operational field of the research. Time limits are important if we do not want to lapse into endless causal reasoning. As we are investigating the German and French behavior regarding participation in the international coalition against Gadhafi in 2011, plus the German behavior at the onset of the war in Afghanistan in 2001, we have some terms that require detailed description.

The principle actors under study are the German and French state apparatus. Any behavior – that is, foreign policy outcome – under study has followed from official declarations or communiqués made by government officials or bureaus. The time limit of the analysis of German foreign policy towards the war in Afghanistan logically starts on 11 September 2001. It ends in December 2001, when

Germany was actually involved in the operation. The time frame of the research of the Libyan case starts in February 2011, which is the moment that the situation in Libya started to turn for the worse. It ends with the official closure of the operation on 31 October 2011.

3.6 Operationalization of theoretical variables

The following section will expound the operationalization of the variables that we will be measuring in the empirical part. Concerning the neoliberal institutionalist part, we will investigate the influence of three important variables as emphasized by the theory: a) state interest in the success of IOs; b) the influence of reputation; and c) the influence of IOs on state behavior. Afterwards, the three neoclassical realist variables will be operationalized: a) the influence of domestic factors; b) government sensitivity; and c) decision-makers' perceptions.

Apart from the arguments stressed by both theories separately, both theories underline the importance of the constraints imposed by the anarchical state system. For the measurement of this variable we need information about the regional (i.e. Europe, North-Africa and Middle-East) and global balance of power, as well as information about the key economic interests of France and Germany. The former will tell us what foreign policy would be expected on the basis of an objective analysis of the power relations between the different states involved in the conflicts. Objective economic information, then, will give insights in what policy would be expected given each state's key economic interests involved in the crises. In short, we have to analyze the geostrategic and economic positions of Germany and France at the onset of the Afghan and Libyan crises. Such information will enable us to distill an objective picture of what foreign policy, objectively considered, would be expected. This information will help us in assessing if, or to what extent, each state has deviated from its self-interest. The next question, then, is to find out what caused this deviation. The interference of IOs or of domestic factors?

3.6.1 Neoliberal institutionalism

How are we to verify state interest in the success of IOs, our first variable? The existence of IOs is said to be, to a considerable extent, dependent on the protection of the interests that each state sees in it. In order to find out if this claim also holds in our research we have to find out if, and to what extent, Germany and France show to value the existence of the UN and NATO – which are the two IOs involved in our research. We want to know the extent to which each state deemed its interests harmed, or to what extent it was considered to be damaging, if the operations in respectively Afghanistan and Libya were unlikely to be a success. We therefore need information about the regional and global economic and security interests of Germany and France, which can give us an objective overview of their likely

interests in the UN and NATO. This can be found in newspaper articles, interviews, analyses of parliamentary debates and in government policy statements. These sources give information about whether or not each state had an enunciated interest in the existence of those IOs and in the success of their operations. In order not to confuse the analysis of this variable with the third variable, we will keep the focus here on evidence of an 'objective' state interest in the benefits of the organization's success.

The second variable to be operationalized concerns a state's worries in advance about the effects of any foreign policy decision its reputation. We will analyze online documents of debates of the German *Bundestag* and of the French *Assemblée Nationale* as well as articles in national newspapers to look for serious deliberations or heavy worries about the possible effects of participation in the conflicts on state reputation, both globally and within the IOs involved. These worries should have led each state beforehand to direct policy outcome (increasingly) in favor of participation, since that is what they know is expected from them internationally and by their most important allies as being a trustworthy partner. When many documents repeatedly show an enunciated worry of the German or French government about its reputation within the UN, NATO or on a global scale, then we will consider it to have played an influencing role in the foreign policy outcome. When is mentioned only few times, then we will consider it not to have played a significant role.

Third, we will analyze the distinct influence of IOs on foreign policy outcome. Considering the fact that a common European Union defense polity was (and is) not yet functional⁷⁹, plus the fact that there was an "*absence dramatique de toute structure autonome de commandement et de planification des opérations au niveau européen*" at the time of the crisis in Libya⁸⁰, the EU as an organization is not included in the analysis, so we will only focus on the UN and NATO. We will look for sources showing that other states have used these IOs to influence German or French foreign policy. This could be, for example by using them as an authority to enforce a policy shift. We will analyze online minutes and/or media reports of debates in NATO and the UN to look for evidence that other states have pointed France and Germany at the importance of living up to the expectations of fellow member states. Analysis of domestic and international debates could reveal whether they really have been influenced in their decisions to participate in each of the conflicts. We will analyze German and French Parliamentary debates to search for arguments that stress the importance of adhering to the 'rules' of IOs. Putting the different sources in a chronological order, then, will reveal whether the policy outcome has indeed been influenced due to IO interference.

⁷⁹ Anand Menon, "European Defense Policy from Lisbon to Libya", *Survival*, Vol. 53, no. 3, 2011, p.76.

⁸⁰ "*dramatic absence of any kind of autonomous structures of command and operational planning on the European level*"; J. de Rohan, *Sénat français*, Comptes rendus de la commission des affaires étrangères, de la défense et des forces armées, March 29, 2011. <http://www.senat.fr/compte-rendu-commissions/20110328/etr.html>

3.6.2 Neoclassical realism

The first variable here concerns the influence of domestic factors on foreign policy. Influence of interest groups and public opinion will be analyzed in different steps. First, we will investigate the public opinion on the participation of their state in the respective conflicts. The theory expects that a strong public opinion has an influence on policy outcome. Therefore, if there was a moderate or strong public opinion (that is, > 50 or > 75 percent) about whether or not their state should participate in the military intervention, this might have led decision makers to adapt their policy. This information is obtainable from opinion polls in national newspapers and related articles published online. We then have to verify whether or not such calls from society were taken into consideration, which could have led to an adaptation of foreign policy. It is therefore important, before we can possibly ascertain any causal relationship between public opinion and policy outcome, to have evidence that any particular policy adaptation was preceded by a convincing opinion poll preferring that specific outcome.

The other part of the first variable concerns the influence exerted by domestic interest groups. If in their interest, those groups are likely to try to influence decision-makers in order to push the government's position in a certain direction. To find out whether or not this was the case, we will analyze newspapers, public declarations of interest groups. We will investigate industrial associations, lobby organizations, energy corporations, environmental and human rights organizations, and labor unions. By inquiring with these organizations we will verify whether they have tried to push the government in a certain direction, or if they made a press release on the topic. The results hereof will reveal to what extent their opinion can be found in the argumentation for the government's final policy outcome. It will however be difficult to draw hard conclusions, because lobbying is often a blurry business. Yet we will consider domestic pressure groups to have had influence if their demands have been clearly implemented in government policy statements or decision-maker's statements. Again, it is important to verify the chronological order of evidence.

The last neoclassical realist variable concerns government sensitivity in election time. To operationalize it, we have to verify the popularity of the President, Ministers and the political parties. We also need to find out when elections were to be held. We will make use of regularly held opinion polls, published by newspapers or journals, which give an indication of popularity. We will assume that the persons or parties in power are aware of their position in the political landscape. The categorizing of government sensitivity will be done as in table 2. For example, if popularity is low and elections are im-

	ELECTIONS PENDING	NO ELECTIONS PENDING
HIGH POPULARITY	moderate	low
LOW POPULARITY	high	moderate

Table 2: when is government sensitivity low or high?

minent, then sensitivity is high, which means that we should see more demands from society back in the final policy outcome. If popularity is high in election time, then sensitivity is moderate, which would mean that domestic pressures have less chance of success. If no elections are imminent, societal pressure will have few influence. The term in which elections were to take place will also be taken into consideration, because it will make a difference if they are to be held in two weeks or in six months.

Lastly, we have to expound the decision-makers' perceptions about the developing situations in Afghanistan and Libya and the solutions they deem best. The effect of this factor is perceivable when individual perceptions expressed by a government official can very clearly be traced back in the foreign policy outcome. If their opinions, however repeatedly uttered, cannot be retraced in the policy outcome, then we will consider their individual influence not of significant importance for the foreign policy outcome. Debates in national Parliament, interviews and media reports will reveal the decision-makers' perceptions of the import of the conflict situations and the solution deemed best. Discourse analysis concerning the conflicts in Afghanistan and Libya should show which elements the decision-maker meant to prioritize; that is, which elements he or she deems most important to implement – for political, economic or security reasons – in the policy outcome. Important to note, however, is that we take their statements and remarks at face value, i.e., we assume that the decision-makers truly are convinced of the message they propagate. A weak spot, then, is that individuals may say things for strategic reasons and actually have other intentions after all. For feasibility's sake, we will assume that decision-makers mean what they say, and vice versa.

3.7 Data sources

Extensive analyses of data, facts and figures are needed if we are to obtain a clear and detailed image of both cases. We need facts and figures about the course of events in Afghanistan and Libya and about the economic and military figures of the states involved; we need original discourses that depict the lines of argumentation of decision-makers and information about other domestic actors involved. In order to obtain information about facts and figures, we make use of the SIPRI database on military expenditure and the Worldbank database on economic figures. To find information about public opinion, domestic actors and government policy, we make use of national newspapers that have trustworthy and traceable sources indicated in their articles (such as *Die Welt*, *Der Spiegel*, *Le Monde* etc.). Official statements can be found on government websites. Information about decision-makers' perceptions, is available on the Internet-sites of newspapers and governments. The same holds for information about the role of the UN and NATO in the two cases.

Chapter 4: empirical analysis

In the current chapter, we will present the results of our research. Our variable of interest (Y) is the German foreign policy outcome at the onset of the Libyan crisis, and especially their abstention on resolution 1973. We will compare the predictive power of neoliberal institutionalism and neoclassical realism to find out which theory seems to correspond the most with what happened in Afghanistan and Libya. We will start analyzing these two cases with the first theory. In the second part of the chapter, we will do the same from a neoclassical realist approach. The differences we find in policy outcome for our primary case under study – the German policy outcome in the Libyan crisis – and in the two other comparative cases, which are the German foreign policy outcome in the Afghan conflict and French foreign policy outcome in the Libyan crisis, will be expounded and explained in the concluding chapter. First and foremost, we will give a short introduction about some constraints of the international state system that influences international relations.

4.1 Systemic constraints

It is often argued that the international state system is all about power politics. The primary aim of each state to at least secure, but preferably to improve its position in the international scene is caused by the nature of the international state system: since there is no authority that can impose its will and punish states when they misbehave, no actor can guarantee the security of any state. (Arguably, the United Nations have been established to ease some of the uncertainty that follows from this situation.) This uncertainty means that when the crunch comes, a state cannot be a 100 per cent sure about the trustworthiness of even its closest allies. The seriousness of the threat arising from this uncertainty, an important matter on which different IR theories dispute, has an important role in both neoclassical realism and neoliberal institutionalism. Both theories acknowledge that each state will make its own treat assessment and will generally see a need for military means to protect their territory. The incompleteness and the uncertainty of information about other states' intentions and capabilities form the essence of the uncertainty of the international state systemic structure.

In order to verify in what sense this uncertainty could have played a role in the current research, we will have to expound the economic and geostrategic interests of Germany and France. These data can to an important extent reveal the vulnerability and sensitivity of both states. Before starting with the analysis of empirical data, we will therefore provide for an objective exposition of the (regional) geostrategic and economic interests of France and Germany. Because state interests are always, to a different extent and in different sectors, involved in conflict situations, we have to include these matters in our research. Energy interests, for example, often play an important role in many conflicts situations, but possibly imports of other vital materials might play a role in the policy-making process too. In the following section, we expound important foreign trade, energy and security interests of Germany and France in Europe and in the concerned conflict regions.

4.1.1 Systemic constraints in 2001

Let us start with an objective analysis of German trade interests. Germany had negligible trade interests involved in Afghanistan. As a matter of fact, data of the Worldbank show that Germany's trade with Afghanistan comprised less than 0.005 % of total German exports (see table 3). The most important export product of Afghanistan is opium, agricultural products come second. For its fuel imports, Germany was not dependent on Afghanistan.⁸¹ Economic figures thus suggest that no German trade interests (energy or otherwise) in Afghanistan objectively could have interfered in the decision whether or not to participate in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).

German trade partners	% of export	Weapons (m.\$)
France	11.43	-
United States	10.26	-
United Kingdom	8.33	37
Netherlands	6.46	-
China	1.57	8
Libya	0.07	-
Afghanistan	<0.00	-

Table 3: key trade partners of Germany in % of national export and total of weapons export in 2000.⁸²

⁸¹ European Commission, "Germany – Energy Mix Fact Sheet", *Editor Unknown*, January 2007. http://ec.europa.eu/energy/energy_policy/doc/factsheets/mix/mix_de_en.pdf

⁸² Worldbank World Integrated Trade Solution, "Germany Export to all country 2000", *Worldbank*. <http://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/Country/DEU/Year/2000/TradeFlow/Export> (accessed July 9, 2014); Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "Arms Transfers Database", *SIPRI*. www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers (accessed July 9, 2014)

As for the security situation in Europe, the horrific terrorist actions of 9/11 could not remain unanswered. The harshness of the attacks caused a shock in the world and gave rise to fear that the same terror could very well strike in Europe – a fear effectuated by the terrorist attacks in London and Madrid a few years later. The possibility that German territory was not well protected against terrorism thus was real, especially since the attacks had partly been prepared by terrorist cells in Hamburg, Northern Germany. Buck-passing this conflict could make the government stand on its own in possible similar future threats.

Another factor of importance is the balance of power between Germany and the other states involved. The regional balance of power in Europe would not be affected by participating in the mission, because none of Western states approved the attacks of the Taliban and, to different extents, stood on the same side. Yet a successful operation in Afghanistan would mean the establishment of a more Western-oriented government in the Middle-East, which would shift the power balance in that region towards a more pro-Western one, which benefits German trade and security interests.

Concluding, because of low trade interests in Afghanistan and the immanence of the terrorist threat, Germany had, objectively considered, good (though no acute) reasons to participate in OEF. On the basis of the analysis of economic and geostrategic interests, we would expect Germany to participate in Operation Enduring freedom. We have to find out if the intervening effect of IOs and/or domestic factors has influenced the foreign policy outcome.

4.1.2 Systemic constraints in 2011

Next, we will objectively assess the foreign interests of Germany and France during the Libyan crisis. Regarding trade interests, for both states the economic relationship with Libya does not seem to have been very encompassing at first sight. As shown in table 4, trade levels of both states with Libya do not impress. Yet, besides large date plantations, Libya is rich of natural gas and oil. Data analysis reveals that Germany imported about 10% of its total oil supplies from Libya until 2011.⁸³ Gas was mostly imported from Russia, the Netherlands and Norway. As for France, nuclear power plants supply for over 40% of the total domestic energy demand, which makes France less dependent on foreign energy supplies than Germany. Though France did not import oil from Libya in amounts more than 7% of its total oil imports up to 2009 inclusive, imports rose to around 15% in 2010. Imported natural gas mainly came from Norway and the Netherlands, as well as from Algeria via LNG.⁸⁴ It seems, by looking at both states' international interests involved in the conflict, that oil could very well have played a role in the

⁸³ International Energy Agency, "Oil & Gas Security, Emergency Response of IEA Countries: Germany", *IAE*. <http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/GermanyOSS.pdf>

⁸⁴ International Energy Agency, "Oil & Gas Security, Emergency Response of IEA Countries: France", *IAE*. http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/France_Oil_Security_Chapter_2012.pdf

	Germany		France	
Exported to:	% of tot. export	Weapon (m.\$)	% of tot. export	Weapon (m.\$)
Germany	x	x	16.22	-
France	9.45	<0.05	x	x
US	6.83	161	5.71	68
United Kingdom	6.20	2	6.71	69
Netherlands	6.59	14	4.17	23
Italy	6.10	75	8.08	-
China	5.59	3	2.84	199
Libya	0.10	-	0.25	3
Afghanistan	0.03	-	0.01	-

Table 4: Germany's and France's most important trade partners in % of overall national export and total of weapons export in 2010.⁸⁵

policy-making process towards the Libyan crisis. Germany was more dependent on Libyan oil than France until 2009, yet the picture was reversed in 2010. However, the difference in energy vulnerability seems nonetheless too small to point at energy interests as the only cause for the difference in foreign policy outcome.

Now let us take a look at the regional balance of power. Earlier in 2011, the 'Arab Spring' had led to other popular uprisings in states in North-Africa and the Middle-East, such as Tunis and Egypt, where people demanded more democracy. In those regions where Western states have less influence, such uprisings provide favorable opportunities to install a more Western oriented government and therefore to increase the power balance in the region a bit more in favor of the West and therefore in favor of German and French security and trade interests. Given its position on the European map, however, it can be argued that for France the incentive to participate in Operation Unified Protector (OUP) to solve the emerging crisis would be larger, since Libya concerns its direct Mediterranean neighborhood. For Germany, the risk of an instable Libya would not threat its direct environment, which downplays direct security considerations and makes participation in OUP not self-evident.

Both states were nevertheless equally capable of making a considerable military contribution to the conflict situation (see table 5). Their expenditures remained steady in the 90s and from 2001 onwards they increased steadily until 2010. Yet the difference is not convincing in supporting the French desire

	Germany	France
2000/2001	30	36,5
2010	35	46,5

Table 5: Military expenditure in billion euros.⁸⁶

⁸⁵ Worldbank World Integrated Trade Solution, "France/Germany Export to all country 2010", *Worldbank*. <http://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/Country/FR> (accessed 16 June 2014).

⁸⁶ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "Military Expenditure Database", *SIPRI*, accessed June 24, 2014.

to play an influencing and important role on the international scene. In the German case, the figures do seem to support their desire to hold their ground between other large states in the world.

Concluding, an objective analysis of their geostrategic and economic interests results in a separate policy expectation for each state. Concerning balance of power considerations, we can convincingly suppose that for France, more than for Germany, there were incentives to solve the crisis in Libya – that is, to participate in OUP – because the Mediterranean region is of French importance. Balance of power analyses are of smaller interest in the German case, but will definitely have to be incorporated in any cost-benefit analysis of the situation. A stable Libya would still provide for more stability in the broader region around Western-Europe, which is in economic and security interests of Germany too. Next to that, both states were militarily capable to make a significant contributing to the mission. There were objections, though, arising from many African countries (African Union members) that felt ignored when the Western world decided to intervene in Libya without their admittance. Yet no threat concerning any countermeasures to support Libya, which was seen by other African states as a respected and financially important member of the African Union, arose from them.⁸⁷

Now we are acquainted with the circumstances surrounding both conflict situations, we can incorporate them in our research and verify whether the interference of IOs and/or domestic factors has influenced the policy-making processes and their outcome. This is what comprehends the remaining sections of this chapter.

⁸⁷ Alex Dewaal, “The African Union and the Libya Conflict of 2011”, *World Peace Foundation*, December 19, 2012. <http://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2012/12/19/the-african-union-and-the-libya-conflict-of-2011/>

4.2 Neoliberal Institutionalism

We will first analyze German foreign policy on participation in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), after which we will do a similar analysis of the Libyan crisis. The inclusion of France in the latter case will provide us with valuable comparative information about the effect of the analyzed variables found in two different states. It is important to recall that neoliberal institutionalism explicitly assumes international relations to be inherently inclined to cooperation and that it therefore sees good prospects for interstate cooperation. Furthermore, it expects that the intervention of IOs will make a state reinterpret the constraints of the international state system.

4.2.1 Germany in Afghanistan

Gerhard Schröder argued in the German parliament in October 2001 that after the fall of the Berlin wall, Germany gradually became aware of its new position in the changed international order. Reunited and strong again, it had the capacities and the will to act amongst the big players of the world again.⁸⁸ Their participation in OEF (and in Kosovo two years earlier) can be viewed in this light, since it shows a gradual shift in German foreign policy and a cautious readiness to participate in military operations on foreign territory. Germany was updating its military and was able to assist with ground troops in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the whole Western world was on the same side in the conflict against the perpetrators of the attacks of 9 September 2001 – even Russia proclaimed its participation to combat Terrorism, however sending Russian troops was out of the question.⁸⁹ For Germany, the threat of terrorist attacks on home territory was the only real security reason to consider a contribution to OEF.

4.2.1.1 Interests in the UN, NATO and in the success of Operation Enduring Freedom

In this paragraph, we will analyze the importance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations (UN) and specifically of the success of OEF for Germany. In order to distinguish this variable from the opinion of decision-makers about the importance of such considerations, we will keep a general view of German interest as much as possible here and refer to paragraph 4.3.1.3 for the perceptions of government officials involved in policy-making on this topic.

Now let us start with an analysis of NATO. The German interests in this military alliance seem quite obvious. As Article 5 of the NATO charter reassures its members that “an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all”, the

⁸⁸ G. Schröder, *Deutscher Bundestag*, Plenarprotokoll 14/192, 11 October 2001, p. 18682.

⁸⁹ Reuters AFP, “Rusland en VS ‘coördineren hun acties”, *NRC*, September 20, 2001. http://vorige.nrc.nl/geslo-tendossiers/aanval_op_amerika/nieuws/article1560801.ece.

alliance provides for security of all members in case of an attack.⁹⁰ Such a powerful alliance will make foreign states refrain from attacking one of the member states. However, such interests in security provision are hard to translate into numbers and figures. In practice, we have seen that the NATO-alliance has offered and still offers valuable and precious peace and security to its members. The costs of providing for this security singlehandedly are often much too high to bear for one state. Some states would be able to do so, but spreading the costs clearly is advantageous, so the existence of NATO is certainly in German interest, especially since there does not exist an organization that provides for similar security. The defense of Germany thus will not be at the sole expense of its people, but expenses will be charged to all NATO members collectively. So in case of conflict, each state is not only militarily, but also financially assisted by other states. Given the high costs of an individual combat against an international terrorist network that turned out to have ramifications in Germany too, it was advantageous to participate in OEF, because it could get hold of important information and benefit from international cooperation.⁹¹ But more importantly, buck-passing this conflict could create ill feelings and could cause Germany to stand alone should similar threats occur in the future.

After many feared an existential crisis for NATO after the fall of the USSR, the NATO treaty is far from being a paper tiger and still is protecting its members from foreign threats. A more recent example can be found in 2012, when Secretary-general Rasmussen said that he would back-up Turkey if Syrian troops were to harm its territorial integrity.⁹² As NATO thus still provides for protection, peace and prosperity, Germany has large interests in the survival and success of the organization. Successful military operations will show NATO's authority and strength as a significant actor in international politics – the matter of which, then, is in the interest of Germany. Yet despite the fact that the organization's authority in the world would be damaged if a large nation fails to respect the NATO treaty, it remains hard to prove that OEF could not have been executed without German contribution.

Next to this, participating in the operation could offer some economic advantages. The establishment of a solid democracy in Afghanistan would create trust for investors, would boost the country's economy and could offer Germany a favorable trading position. So if the international operation in Afghanistan would be a success, economic ties with Germany could be strengthened, which would preserve their long-lasting friendly and cooperative relationship from becoming futile after all.⁹³ Another economic aspect concerns the consequences of facilitating NATO command. Research after a

⁹⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "The North Atlantic Treaty", NATO. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm (accessed July 21, 2014)

⁹¹ Caspar Janssen and Nell Westerlaken, "11_september_2001", *de Volkskrant*, September 22, 2001. <http://www.volkskrant.nl/dossier-archief/11september2001~a602247/>

⁹² Associated Press Brussels, "NATO backs Turkey in standoff with Syria", *The Guardian*, October 9, 2012. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/09/nato-turkey-syria>

⁹³ Timo Noetzel and Thomas Rid, "Germany's options in Afghanistan", *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, Vol. 51, 2009, pp. 72-4.

NATO air-force base in Germany showed that it made local and regional economies profit of it by more than 250 million EUR.⁹⁴ Considered on its own, participating in OEF thus could yield some additional employment because it would mean that German military bases would be used for operational and logistic ends. This was indeed the case, as the Rhein-Mainz and the Ramstein Air Bases had been installed as an important operating base for OEF. Besides, conferences were also held in Germany on the topic, which entailed additional employment.⁹⁵ Yet it is not to be denied that participation in war always costs large amounts of money and that direct economic benefits are difficult to measure.⁹⁶

The success of OEF is also connected to German interests in the UN. Regarding the membership of the UN, direct benefits may be less obvious for a Western state like Germany. Though we know the UN most of all as an organization that promotes human rights and gives structural medical aid, a quite commonly acknowledged argument under political science scholars for the existence of the UN is its promulgation of Western norms and values about how societies should be organized. Spreading democracy, human rights and freedom is in the interest of the West, because this is how the West (led by the US) prefers the world order to be.⁹⁷ Just like many other states, Germany's economy highly profits from the open international trade that follows out of the international order that, to an important extent, has been fostered by the UN. So in this way, the preservation of the norms and values as promoted by the UN enables Western states to an important extent to flourish as they do today. It is in the interests of these states to defend the existence of the UN and its status and effectivity. Calling upon it as an authority – which is commonly viewed as legitimate – and thereby legitimizing one's actions, thus can be seen as in the interest of Germany. As the UNSC approved the execution of an international operation against the perpetrators of the attacks on the US, if Germany would disrespect or neglect the institution in such an important conflict situation, this could seriously undermine the international esteem of the UNSC. A last argument concerns the pronounced German desire to obtain a permanent seat in the UNSC. As Germany was among the four largest contributors of the UN budget, it has clearly showed its will and responsibility to become such a member – discrediting a UNSC resolution would damage prospects for the acquisition of a permanent seat.⁹⁸

Concluding, participation in OEF would strengthen the credibility and esteem of both the UN and NATO, which was in the interest of Germany. Not participating in the operation would not threaten

⁹⁴ Miroslav Hadzic and Jelena Radoman, "Business and Security", *Centre for Civil – Military Relations*, Belgrade (2009). http://www.bezbednost.org/upload/document/0910151810_business_and_securi.pdf

⁹⁵ Donald P. Wright *et al.*, "A Different Kind of War", *Combat Studies Institute*, May 2010, p. 86, 109.

⁹⁶ Brück *et al.*, "The economic costs of the German participation in the Afghanistan war", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 48, 2011, pp. 793-805.

⁹⁷ Shashi Tharoor, "Why America Still Needs the United Nations", *Foreign Affairs*, 2003. <<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59184/shashi-tharoor/why-america-still-needs-the-united-nations>>

⁹⁸ Karl Kaiser, "A Seat For Germany on the UN Security Council", *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik*, August 1, 2004. <https://ip-journal.dgap.org/en/ip-journal/topics/seat-germany-un-security-council>

the benefits of membership of those IOs, but by participating Germany could make use of the information and technology to fight terrorism at home. Furthermore, participation could yield economic benefits, whereas not doing so would likely damage prospects for a permanent UNSC seat.

4.2.1.2 The influence of reputation

In this paragraph, we will analyze to what extent Germany considered the importance of its reputation during the policy-making on participating in OEF, both within the IOs considered in this study as on a global scale.

Within the realm of an IO, a member state will worry about its reputation because the IO functions like an authority that can assess a (member) state's behavior. If a state misbehaves, other states that find themselves disadvantaged by it might call upon the objective rules and norms multilaterally agreed on within the IO and use them to point the misbehaving state on its wrong behavior – a mechanism also known as 'shaming'. The possible influence of Germany's worries about its reputation previous to their decision (not) to participate in OEF will be analyzed in two ways. First, it wants to uphold its reputation as a trustworthy and strong ally in NATO and the UN.⁹⁹ Second, as it always been wary of foreign military operations, Germany had gained an international reputation as a righteous state and wanted to stand for the corresponding cosmopolitan values that are promoted by the IOs of which it was a member.

So how much value was attached to its reputation in the UN and NATO? For decades Germany had been an important member of the NATO alliance, both for its geostrategic position as a final post to communist East-Europe and for its anchoring in the transatlantic alliance to make sure that it would not consider a separate foreign policy endeavor once more. With the end of the Cold War, the first of those two reasons has lost much of its importance. As German forces were upheld first and foremost as a deterrent against the Russians, the reunification led it to reconsider the role of the military in the foreign policy strategy after this need had gone. A 1994 new constitutional rule in Germany allowed for forces of the *Bundeswehr* to be deployable abroad. As a result, German troops participated in a few foreign operations, such as in Serbia in 1999, which restated their reputation as a solid ally that would take its share of the burden of consolidating regional stability.¹⁰⁰ The German participation in Afghanistan seems to fit in this picture nicely, since the *Bundeswehr* was the third largest military force in Afghanistan.¹⁰¹ In order to find out to what extent the Germans have managed to put aside their

⁹⁹ Stephen M. Saideman and David P. Auerswald, "Comparing Caveats: Understanding the Sources of National Restrictions upon NATO's Mission in Afghanistan", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 56, 2012, pp. 67-84.

¹⁰⁰ Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer, "All the way? The Evolution of German Military Power", *International Affairs*, Vol. 84 (2008), p. 212.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 214.

reluctance to deploy military troops on foreign territory, we will have to analyze the arguments that the German government used to participate in OEF. Schröder, the German chancellor at the time, argued in this sense that:

Nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges, der Wiederstellung der staatlichen Einheit Deutschlands und der Wiedererlangen unserer vollen Souveränität haben wir uns in einer neuen Weise der internationalen Verantwortung zu stellen, einer Verantwortung, die unserer Rolle als wichtiger europäischer und transatlantischer Partner, aber auch als starker Demokratie und starker Volkswirtschaft im Herzen Europas entspricht.¹⁰²

The argument stressed the importance Germany saw for its reputation in the UN and NATO. Saideman and Auerswald (2012) mentioned some real-life implications of a state's reluctant attitude towards its preparedness for military deployment. Several interviews with high officials involved showed that countries that have less caveats and restrictions concerning the deployment of military means, have more influence in field operations – a practice often applied in NATO operations.¹⁰³ In a final plea shortly before the Parliament's (successful) vote on the German contribution to the War on Terror, the then German Minister of Defense Scharping argued that keeping the engagements Germany has said to agree on is also very much *"eine Frage der Zuverlässigkeit und der politischen Glaubwürdigkeit"* to its partners in the future.¹⁰⁴ Later in the same session, the Minister for International Cooperation and Development argued once more that the situation was such that *"wir [Germany] dürfen nicht wegsehen"*.¹⁰⁵

Second, as Germany meant to uphold its reputation as an advocate of human rights, it will have been urged to do so during the international debate on terrorism as well. Consequently, Germany could not simply look the other way and do nothing in a situation where human rights were obviously gravely violated. As Schröder pointed out in October 2001, Germany had a responsibility to adhere to the same values offered to the Germans by the efforts of the Western allies after World War II. Moreover, in a debate in Parliament on the German contribution to the War on Terror, he stressed that such responsibility *"schließt – und das sage ich ganz unmissverständlich – auch die Beteiligung an militärischen Operationen zur Verteidigung von Freiheit und Menschenrechten, zur Herstellung von Stabilität"*

¹⁰² "After the end of the Cold War, the reestablishment of German state unity and the recovering of our full sovereignty we have to assume our international responsibility in a new manner, a responsibility that concords with our role as important European and transatlantic partner, but also with our strong democracy and strong political economy in the heart of Europe"; G. Schröder, *Deutscher Bundestag*, Plenarprotokoll 14/192, October 11, 2001, p. 18682.

¹⁰³ Stephen M. Saideman and David P. Auerswald, "Comparing Caveats: Understanding the Sources of National Restrictions upon NATO's Mission in Afghanistan", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 56, 2012, p. 82.

¹⁰⁴ "a matter of reliability and political trustworthiness"; R. Scharping, *Deutscher Bundestag*, Plenarprotokoll 14/210, December 22, 2001, p. 20840.

¹⁰⁵ "we cannot look away"; H. Wiczorek-Zeul, *Deutscher Bundestag*, Plenarprotokoll 14/210, December 22, 2001, p. 20847.

und Sicherheit ausdrücklich ein."¹⁰⁶ Schröder thus argued that Germany had a duty to defend human rights around the world if it was to uphold its reputation as a righteous and civilized nation, and that it therefore should participate in OEF.

Therefore, the reasons behind the decision to take part in OEF definitely seem to have included arguments that concerned the German reputation and responsibility in NATO, but also to their reputation as an advocate of human rights, which refers to the UN. Their reputation in both IOs thus seems to have influenced German cost-benefit calculations whether or not to participate in the coalition, a decision that was logical yet not strictly acute given our objective analysis in paragraph 4.1.

4.2.1.3 Influence of international organizations

In recent world history, there exist many precedents of UNSC involvement in conflict resolution and each case would need its own analysis to verify whether or not it was self-interest that made a state follow the opinion of the UNSC.¹⁰⁷ In this sense, if neoliberal institutionalist theory is correct, we should find evidence that Germany reprioritized its interests because it had filtered the geostrategic situation in a different matter due to the involvement of the UN and NATO in the situation. However, if German officials advanced arguments in defense of the German decision in such a manner that the decision appeared to be primarily taken out state interests concurring with our objective analysis at the beginning of this chapter, it would not be able to support the theoretical claim for IO influence – their argumentation should deviate from that analysis to do so. In other words, the arguments put forward for the decision should be discernable from arguments that would support a Realist approach.

The day after the 9/11 attacks, Schröder declared that he reassured US President Bush the *"uneingeschränkte – ich betone: die uneingeschränkte – Solidarität Deutschlands"*.¹⁰⁸ Such a statement shows a direct message from Germany, but it is also a message in which no words about any alliance are mentioned. It should rather be seen as a bilateral message, because no one had spoken of any IO role in the situation at all. However, when we assess the deliberations of Schröder concerning the German participation in the international coalition as unified in OEF, we find statements that seem to verify the theoretical expectations. On 11 October 2001, during a debate about the statement of Ger-

¹⁰⁶ *"includes – and I say it wholly unambiguously – also the participation in military operations for the defense of freedom and human rights, and for a renewed stability and security"*; G. Schröder, *Deutscher Bundestag*, Plenarprotokoll 14/192, October 11, 2001, p. 18682.

¹⁰⁷ Zou Keyuan, "Maritime Enforcement of United Nations Security Council Resolutions: Use of Force and Coercive Measures", *The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law*, Vol. 26, 2011, pp. 235-241.

¹⁰⁸ *"unlimited – I emphasize: the unlimited solidarity of Germany"*; Editorial Office, "Dokumentation: Schröders Beileidsschreiben an Bush", *Spiegel Online*, September 11, 2001. <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/dokumentation-schroeders-beileidsschreiben-an-bush-a-156586.html>

many yet to follow on the developing situation, he emphasized the need of a significant German contribution to OEF, because “*solche Verpflichtung ergibt sich für uns aus Art. 5 des NATO-Vertrages*”.¹⁰⁹ The article states that an attack on one member shall be considered as an attack on all, and importantly that “if such an armed attack occurs, each of them [...] will assist the Party or Parties so attacked”.¹¹⁰ In the government policy statement on the situation on November 8, Schröder reiterated this obligation to adhere to the rules agreed on in the NATO treaty.¹¹¹ With the importance of the NATO-treaty so explicitly mentioned, Schröder’s statements seem to confirm its distinct influence on German foreign policy.

Yet the distinctive influence of NATO would only be definitively proved if participation would also objectively not have been in German interests at all. Yet, as Schröder’s declaration and other investigations point out, stopping the terrorist threats was an international affair but was (and still is) in domestic security interests too.¹¹² This means that we do not have a decisive lead to believe that their participation in OEF resulted mainly from UN and NATO influence or from other state’s using these IOs to push Germany to participate. To put it otherwise, we cannot prove that the German vision that participation in OEF was important for state security differed from a Realist geostrategic analysis of the situation. Rather, it can be argued that the German government saw the international mission as a useful yet necessary approach for an impending security issue. Besides, as Schröder had immediately promised German solidarity with the US, other foreign states did not have to push Germany to join the international coalition. It seems that Germany would have acted anyway, with or without NATO or UN pressure.

4.2.2 Germany and France in Libya

Having performed a neoliberal institutionalist analysis of the German behavior on the foreign policy outcome concerning the conflict in Afghanistan, we will now do the same with the German behavior during the Libyan conflict. We will also analyze the behavior of France in this conflict, which provides us with a comparative analysis of two geostrategic equivalent states. In each of the following paragraphs under section 4.1.2, we will analyze the German case first, directly followed by the analysis of the situation in France.

¹⁰⁹ “*such obligation emanates from Art. 5 of the NATO-treaty*”; G. Schröder, *Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/192*, 11 October 2001, p. 18683.

¹¹⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “The North Atlantic Treaty”, NATO. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm ([accessed June 12, 2014](#))

¹¹¹ Government Declaration of chancellor G. Schröder before the German Parliament, November 8, 2001. http://www.bits.de/public/documents/US_Terrorist_Attacks/schroeder081101.htm

¹¹² Ibid.

4.2.2.1 Interests in the UN, NATO, and in the success of Operation Unified Protector

Similar to the analysis of the Afghan conflict, we will keep the analysis of German and French IO interests on a general level as much as possible here, in order to distinguish this variable from the opinion of decision-makers on the topic, we refer to paragraph 4.3.1.3 for the perceptions of the involved government officials.

German interests in the UN and NATO have not changed much since the previous decade.¹¹³ As Merkel has stated in her 2009 party program that she would continue efforts of previous governments to gain a permanent seat in the UNSC,¹¹⁴ it certainly was in German interest to attach considerable value to UN actions. Therefore, the possibility to obtain a permanent seat in the UN could be increased if Germany would show its capabilities; apart from whether or not Operation Unified Protector (OUP) would succeed, adequately participating in the operation while Germany had a temporary seat in the UNSC in 2011 would increase chances of success.

Next to that, the success of NATO and UN operations strongly served German interests in the region. The government stated on March 16 that a success of the international community in the Arabic world served German purposes too.¹¹⁵ It was argued that the establishment of a free and stable trading nation would serve trade interests – which implies that a success of OUP was in German interests. Yet considering the additional value of a German contribution to the mission in Libya, it is difficult to argue whether this would affect their interests in both IOs. Such a claim seems hard to make, notwithstanding the fact that participating in the mission could yield privileges in the reallocation of energy contracts for Libyan oil – but that would be about it. Regarding their interests in both IOs and in the success of their military operations, we can argue that Germany held similar interests as one decade earlier. When we consider OUP, only few arguments can be found why participation would serve German interests in the UN and NATO. Only the prospects for a permanent seat in the UNSC would be maintained, which means that abstaining in Resolution 1973 would not help reaching that goal.

As for France, we have not yet discussed their interest in the UN and NATO. Similar to the German case, the existence of NATO is also protecting French interests (or territory, to put it differently), though the French military certainly is not dependent on it: as we saw in Mali in 2012, France is well able to start a military mission on its own, though assistance from allied nations is highly appreciated. In the last two decades – despite France's military independence – several budget cuts and a growing awareness of a changing European order made it slightly rethink its geopolitical strategy. As French

¹¹³ See also paragraph 4.2.1.1.

¹¹⁴ Coalition Agreement between CDU, CSU and FDP, "Wachstum. Bildung. Zusammenhalt", October 26, 2009. http://www.cdu.de/sites/default/files/media/dokumente/091026-koalitionsvertrag-cducsu-fdp_0.pdf

¹¹⁵ G. Westerwelle, *Deutscher Bundestag*, Plenarprotokoll 17/095, March 16, 2011, pp. 10815 – 10818.

leaders always have tried to maintain a strong and influential position for their nation, they came to see NATO as useful for this purpose. They realized that obtaining influential positions within NATO's organizational structure could make France play a more important role again on the international scene. But let us shift to 2011. The large financial contribution to NATO (2.4 % in 2010) is necessary to convincingly improve chances of success for the French desires: it lived up to the obligation of NATO membership, which concerns the agreement to spend at least 2% of the GDP on defense, whereas Germany did not (1.4% in 2010).¹¹⁶ The UN, then, of which France is one of the founding member states, also provides a nice platform for the promulgation of the French *grandeur* over the rest of the world. Equal to the arguments for Germany, the French economy highly profits from the existing world order and international values as promoted by the UN, and its ensuing open international trade. By beating the big drum now and then, French leaders aim at restating the importance of France as a guiding nation in the world. Respecting the status and effectivity of the UN and NATO as authoritative organizations serves French interests.

It is not hard to understand that the leading gestures of Sarkozy, who assembled some large nations around the table to tackle the crisis in Libya, helped French interests in this sense: they reaffirmed the important French role in the world and restated the legitimacy of the IOs called upon. It was argued in this sense that NATO was needed for an effective approach to international crises. If dictators like Gadhafi were to be beaten adequately, the international community needed to cooperate via such IOs. The French Prime Minister argued that *“nos messages [will be] mieux accueillis à l'intérieur de l'Alliance par nos partenaires et sans arrière-pensées”*, which means that French interests could be better served when effectuated via the organization.¹¹⁷

The aforementioned information leads us most of all to think that both IOs were of considerable interest to France's foreign policy strategy, but it remains skeptical if they really made it reinterpret the Libyan crisis in a different manner. It rather seems that the UN and NATO were only used to achieve predefined ends that France would have strived for anyway: a key role in solving the Libyan crisis. Our objective analysis at the beginning of this chapter showed that participation would have been of strategic security and economic interest, so it appears hard to defend here that French foreign policy was indeed different than what could have been expected if no IO had been involved. If, for example, France had made efforts for a collective international recognition of the NTC, neoliberal institutionalist theory could have had more footing, but in the current course of events French action seems to have run largely parallel to what would objectively be expected.

¹¹⁶ Worldbank, “World Bank Open Data”, accessed July 21, 2014.

¹¹⁷ *“our messages will be better received amongst our partners in the Alliance and without suspicion”*; Government Declaration of Minister F. Fillon before the French Parliament, October 8, 2010. <http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/103002172.html>

4.2.2.2 The influence of reputation

Today, we know the global course of German foreign policy-making during the crisis. There was an international wave of indignation about the German abstention on Resolution 1973. It is of interest, then, to find out if German officials had thought in advance of such heavy international reactions and considered possible consequences for their reputation in the UN and NATO and worldwide.

Initially, Germany was on the same wavelength as the rest of the UN member states by recognizing the cruelties and the crimes of Col. Gadhafi's troops. The government condemned the inhumanities and argued that aggravating trade-related political sanctions were the best way to fill-in these measures. The official government statement imported that Germany was very skeptical about a military intervention in Libya. The general argument for the abstention was put forward by the German representative in the UNSC:

We see great risks. The likelihood of large-scale loss of life should not be underestimated. If the steps proposed turn out to be ineffective, we see the danger of being drawn into a protracted military conflict that would affect the wider region. We should not enter into a militarily confrontation on the optimistic assumption that quick results with few casualties will be achieved.¹¹⁸

Above all, Germany thus did not want to get involved into another protracted military conflict, as happened in Afghanistan. Quite exceptionally, the whole *Bundestag* was of the same opinion when it was debated on March 16.¹¹⁹ Hardly anywhere in this debate, nor two weeks earlier, can any words be found about the possible consequences of a German separation from the rest of the UNSC. The only consideration that came closest to such ideas was the remark of a member of coalition partner FDP, who said that *"Wenn aber die UN entsprechendes beschließen, dann müssen auch wir neu nachdenken"*.¹²⁰ Apart from that statement, the government had no considerations beforehand that it would have been wise to concord with their traditional Western allies.

There seems to be hardly any proof for the claim that Germany would have adapted its foreign policy in advance in order not to fall out of line with the rest of the members of the IOs involved. Apart from remarks in the official statement that Germany considered it to be important to take its responsibility in guarding international human rights, we cannot perceive any worries about the German international reputation of this kind in government deliberations before the voting on Resolution 1973.¹²¹ (However, in the *Bundestag* on the day *after* the voting, the slandering began about whether

¹¹⁸ P. Wittig, *United Nations Security Council*, S/PV.6498, March 17, 2011, p. 5.

¹¹⁹ G. Westerwelle, *Deutscher Bundestag*, Plenarprotokoll 17/095, March 16, 2011, pp. 10815 – 10832.

¹²⁰ "Yet when the UN decide correspondingly, then we need to reconsider our position"; R. Stinner, *Deutscher Bundestag*, Plenarprotokoll 17/095, March 16, 2011, p. 10824.

¹²¹ Government Declaration by Minister G. Westerwelle before the German Parliament, March 16, 2011. http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2011/110316_BM_BT_arab_Welt.html

or not it would have been wise to have voted in concordance with the other UNSC members, precisely for the reasons discussed here. Parties blamed each other for pursuing election-politics regarding upcoming regional elections instead of pursuing foreign politics. But this is not of our concern here; we will go into this further in paragraph 4.2.2.2.)

Not quite unexpected of course, after the abstention on Resolution 1973 Germany received much criticism. As various international (Western) media pointed out, by abandoning its traditional allies Germany had effectively marginalized itself amongst them.¹²² Having quickly picked up these and other accusations, it appears that the government seemed concerned about their reputation after all: as if the Germans had suddenly awoken when the result of the voting was internationally publicized, many argued that something had to be done to ease the painful situation. By upscaling German military presence in Afghanistan, a temporary solution was found that relieved the pressure from those states participating in OUP. Though Merkel had informed the US earlier in December 2010 that Germany should not be asked for such help because it would prove pointless, Merkel now managed to pull the proposition through the Parliament in less than one week after the vote on resolution 1973 – of course with the accompanying public statement that this decree should not be seen as an exchange.¹²³

The alleged influence of a state's worries about reputation damage in IOs seems not to be proven in the period before the voting on resolution 1973. On March 17th however, as large parts of the Western world took exception to the German attitude, the government swiftly tried to repair the damage done, which then again does confirm the theory's argument.

Regarding the extent to which France attached value to its reputation during the Libyan crisis, we can make a distinction again between their reputation on a global scale and within the UN and NATO. As President Sarkozy declared in 2007 in an address on his foreign policy strategies, France would defend human rights wherever they would be threatened or neglected and would "*assume sa responsabilité*" in conflict resolution around the world.¹²⁴ This argumentation should rather be considered as an expression of the French desire to be the cock of the walk in international politics instead of a manifested concern about their reputation as a righteous nation.

¹²² Patrick Saint-Paul, "Le « lâchage » des alliés fait polémique en Allemagne", *Le Figaro*, March 20, 2011. <http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2011/03/20/01003-20110320ARTFIG00278-le-lachage-des-allies-fait-polemique-en-allemande.php>

¹²³ Editorial Office, "Germany's Libya contribution: Merkel Cabinet Approves AWACS for Afghanistan", *Spiegel Online*, March 23, 2011. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/germany-s-libya-contribution-merkel-cabinet-approves-awacs-for-afghanistan-a-752709.html>; Editorial Office, "Germany to boost NATO in Afghanistan", *Reuters Africa*, March 23, 2011. <http://af.reuters.com/article/libyaNews/idAFLDE72M0XF20110323?pageNumber=2&virtualBrandChannel=0>

¹²⁴ "*assume its responsibility*"; Royal Sarkozy, "15 points du projet politique du Président de la République Nicolas Sarkozy", *Promoteur Internet*, March 2007. http://royal.sarkozy.free.fr/projet-politique-nicolas-sarkozy.php#De_grandes_politiques_de_solidarité,_fraternelles_et_responsables

Concerning the second aspect, the French position in IOs, their attitude has always been one of desired independence. By falling back on independent and strong national forces, fortified by nuclear capabilities, France went a separate route for a long time. However, in the course of the nineties, it saw the need for participation in European security cooperation if it was to retain considerable international influence and therefore decided to (re)join international cooperative endeavors. French officials of all times have stressed the importance of independence and put into practice the widespread desire, as Sarkozy called it, to “*pèse sur le monde*”.¹²⁵ The application of such a strategy does not go very well with alliance relationships. It therefore appears that France seems most of all concerned with its own interests, and a smooth relationship with allied states is not of prime concern. Entirely in concordance with this information were the results of the analysis of parliamentary debates. Concerning the deployment of military means in Libya, the word ‘*responsabilité*’ was not used once in terms of responsibility towards membership of an international alliance by any Minister. Instead, the French responsibility to protect democratic developments and to stop human crises was repeatedly put forward. Considerations about credibility and reputation were not even mentioned at all.¹²⁶

What can be deduced from the analysis of the debates in the *Assemblée Nationale*, then, is that first of all, virtually all parliamentarians were in favor of French military action to stop the inhumanities in Libya, and second, such action was first and foremost important because it was considered to be a French duty to fulfill this task. Furthermore, just like in Germany, there existed no doubt that the acts of Gadhafi were strongly condemnable and that such statements had to be propagated by the government. The fact that France took the lead in concerting an international response to the crimes of Gadhafi’s regime is also showing its aforementioned determinacy to play an important role on the international scene – just it as was announced by the government to be a spearhead of French foreign policy. All this leads us to doubt that fear of reputation damage among its partners in IOs had a significant influence on French policy outcome in this case. Therefore, though the government did attach importance to its *general* international reputation, it seems that the theoretical expectations are only partly right here.

Regarding the emerging crisis in Libya, a similarity can be perceived in the lines of argumentation in the *Assemblée Nationale* and the *Bundestag*. Germany mainly stressed the importance of applying diplomatic means to avoid a militarization of the conflict and initially did not show any concern to keep up their reputation within IOs. The French neither showed concerns to keep up their reputation within the UN and NATO, but rather stressed the fact that what was happening in Libya clashed with all the

¹²⁵ “*put its weight on the world*”; Ibid.

¹²⁶ Various speakers, *Assemblée Nationale*, Session ordinaire de 2010-2011, March 22, 2011, séance 1.

values that the French republic was based on. Yet when push came to shove, Germany quickly adapted its policy to repair reputation damage and France also appeared to be concerned to repair their reputation after their lax response to the situation in Tunisia some weeks before the Libyan crisis.¹²⁷

4.2.2.3 Influence of international organizations

In order to find out whether or not the UN and NATO an influence on German and French foreign policy outcome on the Libyan crisis, we need to know if member states with different opinions have tried to use these IOs to influence them.

Following neoliberal institutionalist logic, Germany should find itself bound to take the responsibility of abiding by the rules of the IOs of which it is a member. As IO influence might start to play a role here, the manner in which the charter has been outlined theoretically could have consequences, because it should constrain its member states' freedom of action. However, no NATO nor any UN rule can coerce a member state to participate in any coalition. NATO regulations are set up so as to be not in contradiction with the UNSC charter. Article 43 of that charter holds that 'special agreements' about intervening measures in any operation to be taken will concern only those states that have agreed on those special agreements.¹²⁸ This means so much as that in the end, it depends on the member states themselves to decide whether or not to participate in an intervention. Until resolution 1970 most UN and NATO member states condemned the violence in Libya and commonly demanded prosecution of those responsible for the atrocities.¹²⁹ Although that resolution was adopted unanimously, each state had its own reasons to adopt the resolution. But with Resolution 1973 being a special agreement, Germany was not bound to anything concerning additional operational measures.

We now have to find out in what sense other states have tried to influence Germany to join sides with the other participants in Resolution 1973. On February 26, a large number of states had roughly agreed on Resolution 1970, which imposed financial and economic sanctions against Gadhafi's regime. Yet the next official meeting of the Security Council was on March 16, the day of the voting on resolution 1973. As the positions of most states were announced via the media in the intervening period, we have to analyze media reports to find out if other states have tried to bring Germany to other thoughts through the use of the UN or NATO.

On March 10, the *New York Times* reported a split between some important NATO member states. Though all of them agreed that any mission would be impossible without a 'legal basis' (i.e. a

¹²⁷ Perrine Mouterde, "France faces criticism over soft touch with Tunisia", *France 24*, January 14, 2011. <http://www.france24.com/en/20110113-france-faces-criticism-over-light-touch-with-tunisia-unrest-diplomacy/>

¹²⁸ Charter of the United Nations, "Chapter VII", UN. <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml> (accessed May 22, 2014)

¹²⁹ Resolution 1970 condemned Col. Gadhafi for his crimes against his population and exhorted him to end this.

UNSC resolution), France and Great Britain were in favor of a no-fly zone, whereas the US and Germany were against.¹³⁰ On March 14, the US were still indecisive about their position, but Germany and Russia kept strongly opposing a no-fly zone. Despite all officials trying to persuade one another to concede, the divide was still in existence, so the issue had to be decided by the Security Council. On the day of the vote, Germany was still indecisive and was analyzing the consequences of a possible German abstention on the vote. That same day, tough debates took away the last doubts on the part of the US by pointing at the moral impossibility of looking from the sidelines to how the Libyan population should undergo all cruelties, yet German officials appeared invincible (or were not informed that the US changed its mind).¹³¹ They saw no possibility for a no-fly zone to be enforceable without action against Libyan military targets and therefore feared a protracted conflict. At this stage, all sources show that there were intense debates over the topic, with states trying to persuade one another. This short exposition shows how the UN served as a platform fostering debate between permanent and non-permanent members of the Security Council. By facilitating meetings and having widespread authority to 'legitimize' international operations, the institution reshaped states' cost-benefit calculations. So in this way, the UN seems to have influenced Germany's foreign policy-making. Germany had to factor in the UN in its cost-benefit calculations, yet they showed not to change their intended policy.

The influence arising from the IOs involved is more clearly visible if we analyze the period after the vote on Resolution 1973. After the outcome of the vote had been made public, Germany was heavily criticized for its abstention. Though their position initially might have been understandable, when Gadhafi's cruelties added up and worsened, and a no-fly zone had the support of considerable parts of African and Arabic states, the German *Sonderweg* was hard to understand. Ten days after the passing of the resolution, NATO took over control of the operation in Libya. France, the UK and the US knew that the German government was well aware of the consequences of the abstention and would be willing to help out NATO after all – of course after the storm had died down on German homeland. Such demands came indeed when on June 10 US Secretary of Defense Gates pushed several NATO members to expand their efforts in Libya. He specifically named Germany, among others, and actually accused them (hidden in the beauty of politically correct argumentation) of not taking a fair share of the burden and 'asked' them to do so. A week later, when a concrete request came out of NATO to help OUP further, the German government proved willing to do so.¹³²

¹³⁰ Elisabeth Bumiller, "NATO Steps Back From Military Intervention in Libya", *New York Times*, March 10, 2011. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/11/world/africa/11nato.html>

¹³¹ Dan Bilefsky and Mark Landler, "As U.N. Backs Military Action in Libya, US Role Is Unclear", *New York Times*, March 17, 2011. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/18/world/africa/18nations.html?pagewanted=1>

¹³² Matthias Gebauer, "Request From NATO: Berlin Willing to Supply Weapons for Libyan War", *Spiegel Online*, June 28, 2011. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/request-from-nato-berlin-willing-to-supply-weapons-for-libyan-war-a-770949.html>

Through NATO, the US thus used ‘naming and shaming’ to push other member states to take their responsibility, and Germany immediately gave in to this pressure by providing for additional ammunition for OUP. But of course, such pressures were being effectuated ever since the German abstention from the UNSC-vote, yet this time it was done in public, and Germany seized the opportunity with both hands to show the alliance their commitment after all. Interestingly, during a NATO summit in April 2011, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs declared to have asked Secretary of State Clinton whether the US could deploy additional fighter planes in Libya, but the official response to the demand was that “NATO has not yet asked the US directly for additional assets”.¹³³ The answer implies that the US would do so only when NATO would make such demands – hereby strengthening and legitimizing the authority of NATO. Considering this allegedly important difference between demands behind closed doors and in demands public on behalf of NATO, it seems that the organization has influencing capabilities on its members’ behavior. Quite likely, the German contribution to the NATO mission in Libya would have been different if no public pressure had been exerted from NATO. As the UN (for obvious reasons) did not publicly forward any request to Germany to support the resolution, the influence of the UN itself on German decision-making has not been very large in this sense. The UN does not dispose of public tools to exert peer pressure to ‘rally around the flag’. As a consequence, the issue of reputation comes more to the fore with respect to state behavior in NATO issues.

Concluding, we can state that IOs certainly have played a role in the German policy outcome, though one more than the other. Germany did not seem to give in to pressure arising from other member states who used the summit talks fostered by the UN to influence them, yet their foreign policy certainly was influenced by NATO after the vote on Resolution 1973. Most of all, it was their high valued reputation as a trustworthy ally that pushed them to adapt their foreign policy. Apart from the ‘reputation factor’ functioning as a catalyst to adapt policy, the effect of IOs *fostering and facilitating* international debate made Germany include both the UN and NATO in foreign policy calculations.

The influence of the UN and NATO on French foreign policy towards the Libyan crisis requires a slightly different approach, since it was France that initiated collective international action.¹³⁴ It had repeated in the UN that it is the international community’s ‘responsibility to protect’ when a country is not able to provide for the protection of its own population. It had drafted Resolution 1973 in cooperation with the US, the UK and some others. On the day after the voting, French representative spoke of the necessity of not allowing this violation of international rule of law and morality. This implies that our

¹³³ William Wan and Leila Fadel, “At NATO summit, U.S. resists calls for greater engagement in Libya, *The Washington Post*, April 14, 2011. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/at-nato-summit-us-resists-calls-for-greater-engagement-in-libya/2011/04/14/AFn3IRcD_story.html

¹³⁴ Nicholas Watt, “Nicolas Sarkozy calls for airstrikes on Libya if Gadhafi attacks civilians”, *The Guardian*, March 11, 2011. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/11/nicolas-sarkozy-libya-air-strikes>

research cannot focus on other states using these organizations to push France in a particular direction, since it was France (in consultation with the UK) that lead the international coalition at the time. So how are we to analyze this variable in the French case? The effect of the UN and/or NATO on policy outcome would only be discernable in the policy outcome itself: if it is different from what is to be expected regarding our objective knowledge about their foreign (economic and geostrategic) interests as set out at the onset of this chapter, then the IOs probably caused France to reprioritize its interests and the theory could be correct here. As we recall from previous paragraphs, it wanted to measure up to other mayor powers in the world and wanted to play a leading role in the world where possible, the execution of which was partly deemed best via NATO and the UN in this case.

The performance of France in this crisis, then, seems to be in accordance with those intentions. When Sarkozy actively initiated – in consultation with UK Prime Minister Cameron – the international response, he was simultaneously boosting France’s international reputation again, which had been damaged by their half-hearted reaction to the Tunisian insurrection earlier in 2011.¹³⁵ However, the fact that French officials saw it as the best option to perform conflict resolution via the UN (Sarkozy deliberately mentioned NATO not suited for this mission, since Arab states were not supportive to a NATO-led mission given the US leadership and the precedent in Afghanistan), underlines the influence of the UN on foreign policy. If no UN had existed, an international response might have occurred anyway, but now it had a directional effect on policy outcome because France saw it as the best way to organize an international response. Action was only deemed appropriate within a UN resolution, which overall enjoys a fairly good reputation worldwide. As this approach was desirable both within and outside France, the way the UN functions thus directs state action. What is to be wondered then, is what kind of action would have been undertaken without UN existence. As France wanted to uphold its reputation of protector of human rights anywhere on the globe, it wanted to act accordingly. Consequently, since the UN can legitimize such actions, the organization’s method of working does indeed constrain the options a state deems suitable for state action. As such, it can be argued that the presence of the UN has influenced the way France reacted to the emerging crisis in Libya, but it is unlikely that the decision whether or not to interfere was entirely dependent on the UN. As we saw in January 2012, France intervened militarily in Mali before a UN mandate on the matter was given (though foreign assistance was requested by the Mali government). Such information gives reason to think that France would deploy military means anyway if it deemed it to be necessary and feasible, and seriously questions any independent effects of the UN on foreign policy outcome.

¹³⁵ Perrine Mouterde, “France faces criticism over soft touch with Tunisia”, *France 24*, January 14, 2011. <http://www.france24.com/en/20110113-france-faces-criticism-over-light-touch-with-tunisia-unrest-diplomacy/>

Slightly different arguments can be put forward for the role of NATO, because it seems to have had considerable influence on France's Libya policy. While France unilaterally launched air strikes against Gadhafi's regime shortly after the approval of UN Resolution 1973, Britain put aside French efforts for a separate command structure for the operation and demanded NATO to completely take over leadership. Yet France was against this proposal, so the tug-of-war began. Another example of NATO influence was the demand of NATO members Romania and the Czech Republic that the operation should be entirely run by NATO and that they otherwise would not support it.¹³⁶ The latter dispute was only one of many in the stressful hours leading up to the agreement.¹³⁷ As the final outcome of these negotiations shows – the mission was operationally led by NATO and politically by a diverse international coalition – French policy was definitely adapted to the combined demands of the NATO alliance.

Concluding, it seems that French foreign policy towards the Libyan crisis was to a large extent reformulated, due to NATO involvement. Furthermore, it is rather unlikely that France would have taken the risk of intervening in Libya on its own, since unilaterally deciding over other states' oil-interests in Libya certainly would have been a risky business. But the latter case is quite unlikely, because it is hard to imagine that no state at all would have urged for an international response. In the end, we can reasonably suppose that the French decision to co-deploy the international coalition in Libya *via the UN* was most of all a formal requirement. It could be viewed as a means to execute a predefined French strategy regarding the Libyan crisis, a strategy which would have been executed anyway to safeguard oil interests and to repair the French international esteem.

¹³⁶ Nicholas Watt *et al.*, "NATO to take control in Libya after US, UK and France reach agreement", *The Guardian*, March 23, 2011. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/22/libya-nato-us-france-uk>

¹³⁷ Daily Mail Reporter, "Who's in Charge?", *Mail Online*, March 23, 2011. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1368693/Libya-war-Germans-pull-forces-NATO-Libyan-coalition-falls-apart.html>

4.3 Neoclassical Realism

In the previous section we have expounded a neoliberal institutionalist analysis of German foreign policy in Afghanistan, which was followed by a similar analysis of the German and French foreign policy during the Libyan crisis. In the current section we will make similar analyses from a neoclassical realist perspective. This strategy enables us to compare German policy outcome in two different conflict situations, and simultaneously to compare it with the French policy outcome during the Libyan crisis. It is important to recall that this theory stresses the hard power aspects of international relations and considers the effect of IOs negligible (see paragraph 2.3). Next to that, it emphasizes that domestic factors function as a filter on a state's interpretation of the constraints of the international state system that influences foreign policy outcome.

4.3.1 Germany in Afghanistan

We will now start with the analysis of German policy-making at the onset of the war in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001, by analyzing the influence of domestic actors, government sensitivity and decision-makers' perceptions. The analysis concerning the Libyan crisis follows afterwards.

4.3.1.1 Influence of domestic factors

Public opinion on the deployment of military means on foreign territory has always been negative in Germany. However, the deeply rooted pacifism that characterizes Germany since 1946 was slightly influenced by the deployment of German troops in Kosovo in 1999. A small majority supported a German military contribution to stop genocide.¹³⁸ One could argue that that mission had broken the ice: in an opinion poll in October 2001 about the deployment of German troops within an international coalition against terrorist cells in Afghanistan, almost two thirds of the population supported such a decision and roughly one third was against. Yet some weeks earlier, the figures were less supportive of German participation.¹³⁹ This information suggests that public opinion on the matter was slightly turning in favor of German participation in the War on Terror.

Domestically, the most powerful political influence concerning military deployment arises from the German *Bundestag*. In order to prevent history from repeating itself, the constitution demands that the Parliament must approve any deployment of troops on foreign territory. Furthermore, any approval of a military deployment expires after twelve months, after which a renewed approval

¹³⁸ Tobias Jaecker, "Die Deutschen Medien und der Kosovo-Krieg", *Tobias Jaecker*, April 2003.

<http://www.jaecker.com/2003/04/die-deutschen-medien-und-der-kosovo-krieg/>

¹³⁹ Editorial office, "Umfrage: Schröder ist wichtigster Politiker", *Spiegel Online*, October 12, 2001.

<http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/umfrage-schroeder-ist-wichtigster-politiker-a-162026.html>

for the prolongation of the mission is necessary. As Saideman and Auerswald (2012) put forward, in order to have a reasonable chance that a mandate on military deployment will be accepted, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense and other officials consult different legislative committees during the policy formation process, which gives them an influential position.¹⁴⁰ It means that the government practically cannot singlehandedly decide over the deployment of troops. However, Ripsman (2009) argued on the influence of domestic factors in security issues, that costs of mistakes in security policies could turn out very high, and that state leaders will therefore not take chances in real-time security issues.¹⁴¹ It seems that only Schröder and some of his compatriots were of a similar opinion, when he argued that not participating in OEF would risk to cause “*einer völligen Isolierung Deutschlands für die nächste Dekade – politisch und ökonomisch*”.¹⁴² Despite the cruelties and the huge shock after 9/11, and only after some difficult debates followed by a vote of confidence, the *Bundestag* narrowly approved the proposition of the chancellor.¹⁴³

The situation describes the difficulty of finding a majority in German Parliament for military missions. What could have played a role too is that Germany has traditionally been actively involved in development aid for Afghanistan since 1915. In 2001, this aid was moving towards 80 million DM. Therefore, the argument that decades of investment should not be put at risk is likely to have played some role in the decision-making.¹⁴⁴

As we saw in the objective interest analysis in paragraph 4.1.1, Germany had hardly any economic interests in Afghanistan. Correspondingly, research for press releases of large domestic German actors (lobby organizations, associations etc.) that could have lobbied to defend their interests in Afghanistan hardly revealed any such information. Some organizations, such as the German Bond for Security and Defense Industries (BDSV), are legally forbidden to have any consultations with the government on Defense policy. The German Bond for military employees (BDwV) demanded better terms of employment, but did not state to be either in favor or against the entire operation.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁰ Stephen M. Saideman and David P. Auerswald, “Comparing Caveats: Understanding the Sources of National Restrictions upon NATO’s Mission in Afghanistan”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 56, 2012, p. 76-7.

¹⁴¹ Norrin M. Ripsman, “Neoclassical realism and domestic interest groups”, in *Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy*, ed. Steven E. Lobell *et al.*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2009), pp. 181-2.

¹⁴² “a complete isolation of Germany in the next decade – politically and economically”; Editorial Office, “Schröder: Bundeswehr-Einsatz nicht von Umfragen Abhängig machen”, *Hamburger Morgen Post*, October 11, 2001. <http://www.mopo.de/news/sonnabend-10-11-2001--10-59-schroeder--Bundeswehr---einsatz-nicht-von-umfragen-abhaengig-machen,5066732,6802410.html>

¹⁴³ Timo Noetzel and Thomas Rid, “Germany’s options in Afghanistan”, *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, Vol. 51, 2009, p. 80.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 73-4.

¹⁴⁵ Wilfried Stolze and Jürgen Meinberg, “Bundeswehr und Polizei gegen Kürzungspläne der Regierung”, *NA Presseportal*, November 8, 2001. <http://www.presseportal.de/pm/12472/298393/deutscher-Bundeswehr-verband-und-gewerkschaft-der-polizei-starten-gemeinsame-initiative-am-8?search=afghanistan>

Concluding, after the swift statement of Schröder on 12 September led to a certain direction of policy outcome, we can say that apart from many parliamentarians expressing the initial reluctance of the German public towards military deployment, there was no significant pressure from domestic actors and public opinion that pushed the government in a certain policy direction.

4.3.1.2 Sensitivity of the German government

Now let us see to what extent the government was sensitive to domestic pressure. The first term of Schröder started in the fall of 1998 and under his lead the German *Bundeswehr* participated in a large international coalition for the first time after World War II. His first four year term was to end in the fall of 2002, which means that those elections had only a limited chance to influence the decision-making process. Though with his SPD still being the most popular party, Schröder was, together with coalition party *Der Grünen*, in stable political waters. With no delicate affairs in the national debate and with the large popularity of Schröder, his Minister of Foreign affairs and the Minister of Defense, the government was not likely to face electoral problems pursuing its plans.¹⁴⁶ As such, we can suppose that there was a low government sensitivity at the time. But regarding questions about war and peace, Schröder argued that such decision should not be dependent on opinion polls at all.¹⁴⁷

The national debate on terrorism of course was important in Germany, just as it was in the rest of the world and most people were supportive of an organized international reaction against this sudden treat. The choice of the German government to support OEF therefore was a relatively safe one. Recalling from the previous paragraph that public opinion was not against a German participation in the War on Terror, together with their high popularity, the government could quite safely propagate German military participation.

4.3.1.3 Decision-makers' perceptions

The question then arises whether decision-makers' personal perceptions of the situation could have influenced policy outcome. Following the objective analysis of Germany in 2001 in paragraph 4.1.1, a positive decision regarding the deployment of the *Bundeswehr* would be expected, mostly because the international terrorist threat was affecting Germany too. In order to verify whether government officials on decision-making positions were similarly minded, we have analyzed their perceptions of

¹⁴⁶ Editorial Office, "Umfrage: Knapp 60 Prozent der Deutschen für den US-Vergeltungsschlag", *Spiegel Online*, October 10, 2001. <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/umfrage-knapp-60-prozent-der-deutschen-fuer-den-us-vergeltungsschlag-a-161652.html>

¹⁴⁷ Editorial Office, "Schröder: Bundeswehr-Einsatz nicht von Umfragen Abhängig machen", *Hamburger Morgen Post*, October 11, 2001. <http://www.mopo.de/news/sonnabend-10-11-2001--10-59-schroeder--Bundeswehr---einsatz-nicht-von-umfragen-abhaengig-machen,5066732,6802410.html>

the situation and the solution needed. We used the government policy statement as being the policy outcome and verified if any individual's perceptions monopolized the lines of argumentation.

The speeches we analyzed are those of the most important German politicians involved in the decision-making process: chancellor Schröder (SPD), Minister Fischer (*Die Grünen*) of Foreign Affairs and Minister Scharping (SPD) of Defense. Though the first sentence of the foreign policy section of the coalition agreement between SPD and *Die Grünen* started with "*Deutsche Außenpolitik ist Friedenspolitik*",¹⁴⁸ the government proposed to participate in the War on Terror. Let us start our analysis with Schröder. Analysis of his speeches lead to three important arguments. First, on the day of the attacks, Schröder immediately promised Bush unlimited German solidarity.¹⁴⁹ To reinforce this statement, he repeatedly mentioned, in various media reports since 9/11, the importance of the bond that Germany had with its Western partners. Germany would take its responsibilities and would stand by its allies. Second, Schröder argued that it was now time to act and play among the major actors of the world, and to assume the renewed German responsibility and capabilities in the world.¹⁵⁰ Third, next to these hard words, he mentioned the importance that no troops be deployed on Afghan soil, answering to the strong German hesitance concerning military deployment on foreign territory.¹⁵¹

Joschka Fischer, Minister of Foreign Affairs, stressed the need for a preventive approach of terrorism and to work towards a stable rebuilding of Afghanistan in the future.¹⁵² He emphasized that the horrible attacks unmistakably meant that Germany had to show absolute solidarity with the US. In interviews, he described the terrorist danger as "*eine Gefahr für die Weltfrieden und damit auch für uns*", a danger of a kind which could not be solved solely with humanitarian means.¹⁵³ Elsewhere, he added that if Germany would choose to let their most important alliance-partner down, then "*wird das reichende Konsequenzen für die Bundesrepublik haben*".¹⁵⁴ Regarding German participation in the War on Terror, he thus seemed rather on the same line as Schröder.

¹⁴⁸ "*German Foreign Policy is Peace Policy*"; Coalition Agreement of SPD and Bündnis90/DieGrünen, "Aufbruch und Erneuerung", October 20, 1998.

¹⁴⁹ Editorial Office, "Dokumentation: Schröders Beileidsschreiben an Bush", *Spiegel Online*, September 11, 2001. <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/dokumentation-schroeders-beileidsschreiben-an-bush-a-156586.html>

¹⁵⁰ Markus Deggerich, "Kriegsdiplomatie: Schröder spielt den Global Player", *Spiegel Online*, November 11, 2001. <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/kriegsdiplomatie-schroeder-spielt-den-global-player-a-166183.html>

¹⁵¹ Editorial Office, "Parteiengipfel im Kanzleramt: Heute Vorentscheidung über deutschen Militäreinsatz?", *Spiegel Online*, November 11, 2001. <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/parteiengipfel-im-kanzleramt-heute-vorentscheidung-ueber-deutschen-militaereinsatz-a-166301.html>

¹⁵² Editorial Office, "Joschka Fischer fordert klare Perspektiven für Afghanistan", *Deutschlandfunk*, November 12, 2001. http://www.deutschlandfunk.de/joschka-fischer-fordert-klare-perspektiven-fuer-afghanistan.694.de.html?dram:article_id=57348

¹⁵³ "*a danger for world peace and consequently also for us*"; Markus Deggerich, "Kriegsdebatte im Bundestag: Ja-Sager unter sich", *Spiegel Online*, November 8, 2001. <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/kriegsdebatte-im-bundestag-ja-sager-unter-sich-a-166722.html>

¹⁵⁴ "*it will have far-reaching consequences for the Federal Republic*"; Ibid.

Minister of Defense Rudolf Scharping, besides using similar arguments in a different wording, emphasized that the German contribution to the international war on terrorism would not be based on the idea that war was a good means to solve that kind of problems, but that the mission actually had to be considered as being a police-mission supported with military means. It was meant to stabilize a nation, instead of conquering territory.¹⁵⁵ With the latter statement, he clearly tried to respond to the anti-war sentiment among the German people. Furthermore, he argued that though the solidarity with the US was important, it was also clearly in German security-interests to participate in this mission. The German contribution should rather be seen in this light.¹⁵⁶

Now, if we compare these statements with the government policy statement on the matter, we can see that most of the remarks of the different ministers are included.¹⁵⁷ It is stated that Germany should take its responsibility in the world and pay its share for international peace, but also that it would live up to its promises as laid down in the NATO-membership. Furthermore, it is clearly stated that attention should be paid to the aftermath of battle – the rebuilding of Afghanistan. Lastly, it is mentioned that the mission would be directed against the terrorist cells in Afghanistan and not against the people. So there are many similarities between the government policy statement and the decision-makers' perceptions about the nature of the crisis, the consequences for Germany and the best alleged policy. Therefore, we can convincingly say that it seems that all their opinions have been translated into the policy outcome in one sense or another. Yet when reading between the lines of the statements of Schröder, one can sense an eager pressure to reaffirm his previous cogent statement to the US, regarding the German commitment. This fits in the picture of Schröder as the '*basta-Kanzler*', as his authoritarian style of governing often was framed.¹⁵⁸ Apart from this suspicion, we cannot perceive a specific direction in the government policy statement, but that is probably because all three were roughly on the same wavelength.

4.3.2 Germany and France during the Libyan crisis

This last section covers the analysis of both states during the Libyan crisis in 2011. It will provide us with the information needed to reveal the causes for the differences in foreign policy outcome. In each of the following paragraphs under this section, we will analyze the German case first, directly followed by the analysis of the course of events in France.

¹⁵⁵ R. Scharping, *Deutscher Bundestag*, Plenarprotokoll 14/192, p 18697.

¹⁵⁶ AP Berlin, "Scharping gegen langfristige Militärpräsenz in Afghanistan", *Handelsblatt*, October 19, 2001. <http://www.handelsblatt.com/archiv/niederlage-der-terroristen-und-starke-demokratie-sind-das-ziel-scharping-gegen-langfristige-militaerpraesenz-in-afghanistan/2109294.html>

¹⁵⁷ Government Declaration of chancellor G. Schröder before the German Parliament, November 8, 2001. http://www.bits.de/public/documents/US_Terrorist_Attacks/schroeder081101.htm

¹⁵⁸ Markus Deggerich, "Kommentar: Volk oder Gefolge?", *Spiegel Online*, November 6, 2001. <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/kommentar-volk-oder-gefolge-a-166445.html>

4.3.2.1 Influence of domestic factors

First we will verify in what sense German and French foreign policy outcome could have been influenced by domestic factors. We will investigate public opinion on the topic, after which we will analyze the positions of several domestic pressure groups.

As Gunther Hellmann argued in his article on German foreign policy surrounding the Libyan crisis, there was an “*interventionsmüden deutschen Öffentlichkeit*” at the time, mostly due to the protracted military operation in Afghanistan.¹⁵⁹ Opinion polls reaffirm this claim: on 11 March 2011, 88 per cent of the German population indicated to be not supportive of military measures to try to stabilize the situation in Libya. At the same time, 56 % was in support of a German vote for a no-fly zone over Libya and 34 % was against.¹⁶⁰ The problem with Resolution 1973 was twofold: it included a no-fly zone and an UNSC authorization for all “Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to take all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack in the country”, where the addition ‘*all necessary measures*’ was the most pinching part.¹⁶¹ According to the Germans, both of these inclusions would inevitably imply the deployment of military means. Interesting is that more than 60 % of the German public was supportive of a possible NATO mission in Libya, but simultaneously almost 70 % viewed the decision of the *Bundestag* not to participate with military means as correct.¹⁶² As politicians were also acquainted with this information, supporting the resolution would certainly not be in line with public opinion and would decrease the popularity of the government. Therefore, we can certainly say that there was a considerable pressure effectuated by the electorate not to participate militarily. Supporting the international coalition was considered good, as long as there would be no German *military* involvement. This strategy proved rewarding since only 36 % of the German people considered the German abstention as wrong.¹⁶³

Now let us take a look at other possibly influencing domestic actors. We have contacted a broad range of organizations that could have had an interest in influencing government policy on Libya. Among the several organizations that we have got in touch with were think-tanks, unions, industrial organizations and NGO's.¹⁶⁴ Most organizations responded not to have initiated anything to influence the German government. The BDSV (see paragraph 4.3.1.1) has by law been forbidden to have contact

¹⁵⁹ “*German public opinion tired of intervention*”; Gunther Hellmann, “Berlins Große Politik im Fall Libyen”, *WeltTrends*, Vol. 80, 2011, pp. 19-21. http://opus.kobv.de/ubp/volltexte/2011/5401/pdf/WeltTrends80_WeltBlick_Gunther_Hellmann.pdf

¹⁶⁰ Forsa, Stern 12/2011, March 17, 2011, p.17.

¹⁶¹ United Nations Security Council, “Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ over Libya, Authorizing ‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions”, *UNSC*, March 17, 2011. <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10200.doc.htm>

¹⁶² Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, ZDF Politbarometer, April 1, 2011.

¹⁶³ TNS Emnid, Focus 13/2011, 28 March 2011, p.19.

¹⁶⁴ The information for the ‘domestic interest groups’-variables was obtained via personal e-mail communications with the author. When no answer followed, repeated requests were made to the organizations to do so.

with the government on such matters. The German Platform for Communication, Argumentation and Interest for armed forces (FKH), which counts enterprises, Parliamentarians and other parties as its members, indicated that they had no Foreign Affairs parliamentarians amongst them at the time and stated that they generally do not intend to influence on politics.¹⁶⁵

A few organizations responded that they actually did try to influence the national debate on the Libyan crisis. Amnesty International stated her grave concern about the developing situation in Libya. It urged international society to support Libya's neighboring countries so as to enable them to receive refugees, hereby also calling upon the German government to do so. They also called for Gadhafi to stop the cruelties and demanded a peaceful solution to the conflict.¹⁶⁶ The German Bond for Military Employees (DBwV) send a press release that stressed that it would be unwise for Germany to take part in a military mission in Libya. A no-fly zone, they argued, would be ineffective and would cause a need for further military intervention – which is exactly what Germany should not want. A humanitarian mission, however, was definitely one of the options, since no one would be against it. Yet, as the Bond argued, Germany should make sure that this would not end in a military intervention after all.¹⁶⁷

The independent German scientific Institute for Security and International Politics (SWP) was actively involved in the national debate, though talking heads associated to the institute gave varying opinions on the situation. The acting head of the research-department argued in the *Financial Times Deutschland* on 28 February that Germany should not participate in a military mission, because it did not serve German and EU interests, nor would it help Libya: "*Schon ein Überflugverbot könnte den Einstieg in einen ausgedehnten Einsatz in Libyen bedeuten*".¹⁶⁸ It would probably end up in a full military intervention after all, with the risk of being dragged into another protracted conflict as happened in Afghanistan (this would eventually be one of the main argument for the German abstention, see quote on page 51). However, after the Resolution had been passed, another expert of the Institute argued in the *Südwest Presse* that Germany should have gone along with its traditional members. Though it should try to persuade fellow member states that all other options should be tested, a German '*Sonderweg*' was argued not to be positive for its international position.¹⁶⁹ Considering the statements above, the institute did not come out with a clear position.

¹⁶⁵ Roland Haag, personal communications with author, August 22, 2014; Ulrich Gonsior, personal communications with author, August 29, 2014.

¹⁶⁶ Editorial Office, "Libyen: Gaddafi muss das blutvergiessen beenden", *Amnesty.de*, February 20, 2011. <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/libyan-leader-must-end-spiralling-killings-2011-02-20>

¹⁶⁷ Babette Nürnberg, personal communications with author, August 26, 2014.

¹⁶⁸ "A no-fly zone could on itself lead to a protracted deployment in Libya"; Claudia Major and Christian Mölling, "Nur ja kein Militäreinsatz in Libyen", *Financial Times Deutschland*, February 28, 2011.

¹⁶⁹ Andreas Clasen, "Chance für ein Signal an Despoten verpasst", *Südwest Presse*, March 25, 2011. <http://www.swp.de/ulm/nachrichten/politik/Chance-fuer-ein-Signal-an-Despoten-verpasst;art4306,895485,A>

Surprisingly, considering the almost unanimity of the German Bundestag previous to the vote, the government was heavily criticized from the opposition parties afterwards. Accusations ranged from having forfeited the German position, to having ranked Germany as an ally of Gadhafi.¹⁷⁰ One week later, the government agreed to send AWAC airplanes to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. This would enable the international coalition to make additional material available for OUP. The behavior suggests, as was argued by many critics, that the government actually engaged in “*einen Kuhhandel*”.¹⁷¹

As this information suggests, there was not a single organization that openly promoted German military participation. The public neither was in favor. Together with the known German anti-military sentiment – certainly considering the difficultly progressing operation in Afghanistan – this leads us to conclude that there was a widespread and strong domestic opinion against a German military contribution to the conflict in Libya. After the passing of the UN resolution, it was international and, to a lesser extent, domestic (political) pressure that made the government adjust its policy, though public opinion judged the abstention not particularly negative.

In his study after French public opinion on the foreign policy of different French governments, Adrien Schu (2011) analyzed several international interventions in which France had been involved. He discussed why the French public can support a foreign military operation even when initially not being in favor of it. This development can be seen in public opinion on a military intervention in Libya. First, in a poll held on 4 March, the French public was not in favor (only 36 %), but as the adoption of UN Resolution 1973 rendered an intervention legitimate, public opinion suddenly was in favor (66 %).¹⁷² Schu remarked that such sudden shifts can be traced back to two other factors in particular. First, a ‘rally around the flag’ effect emerged, a factor often occurring in patriotic France: once the decision was taken to intervene, the French deemed it important that the people stood behind the decision of their leaders, more or less to defend the French credibility in the rest of the world. Second, as also often happens in France, a “*réflexe partisan*” made that many people in France supported the *Président de la République* whatever his decision was.¹⁷³ It is very likely that Sarkozy was well-informed about this mechanism.¹⁷⁴ Apparently he dared to take a chance and came out victorious. Such a remarkable relationship between state and public opinion makes it hard to grasp what the actual effect

¹⁷⁰ Various speakers, *Deutsche Bundestag*, Plenarprotokoll 17/097, pp. 11137-51.

¹⁷¹ “*horse-trading*”; Editorial Office, “Deutschland schickt 300 Soldaten”, *N-TV*, March 23, 2011. <http://www.n-tv.de/politik/Deutschland-schickt-300-Soldaten-article2923206.html>

¹⁷² Adrien Schu, “Soutien de l’opinion publique : analyse de l’intervention en Lybie”, *CICDE*, April 26, 2011. http://www.cicde.defense.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/20130326_np_cicde_red_fiche-opinion-publique.pdf

¹⁷³ “*patriotic reflex*”; *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁴ For a detailed explanation of such and other French characteristics, see Jean-Benoit Nadeau & Julie Barlow, *Sixty Million Frenchman Can’t Be Wrong*, Annova Books (2004).

of French public opinion was. Figures make us believe that it should have been of influence, but then it appears to have depended on the politicians what to do with that information.

Next, we have to find out in what sense interest groups have tried to influence foreign policy concerning the Libyan crisis. Similar to what we did in the German case, we have contacted several French organizations, such as think-tanks, lobby-groups and NGO's, to find out whether they have tried to influence French foreign policy. Unfortunately, none of the organizations we have contacted, such as the French Institute for International Relations (IFRI), think-tank *Institut Diderot* and the business confederation *MEDEF International*, turned out to have made special press releases or sent communiqués on the topic at the time. This makes it therefore hard to verify our hypotheses on the alleged influence of domestic actors in the French case, because we cannot verify what could have been discussed behind closed doors. After all, lobbying often is a vague business, and it is impossible to find out what pressure has been exerted in the process. But the research did not end here.

President Sarkozy surprised friend and foe with his sudden announcement on 10 March to recognize the National Transitional Council (NTC) as the legal representative of the Libyan people.¹⁷⁵ Though it is unlikely that domestic actors have influenced Sarkozy to make that decision, he would not make the decision without knowing the political and economic stakes in the play. He knew that economic ties with Libya were not very encompassing, except for the oil industries. French oil companies, such as Total, had large interests in Libya, so recognizing the NTC could certainly yield a favorably disposed partner for French energy industries. As far as French energy interests were involved, Sarkozy could not have taken a better decision to safeguard them. Some weeks later, as was revealed after a while, Sarkozy's action paid off indeed as an oil-deal was made between the TNC and France.¹⁷⁶ We can therefore presume that the French energy industry altogether will not have been dissatisfied with Sarkozy's efforts. Yet conclusions remain hard to reach because we cannot extract information about which positions interest groups took at the time.

Concluding, as we have not found any newspaper articles or other evidence that pointed at an explicit open advice by the French energy industry or other domestic actors, we assume that there was a low domestic pressure from domestic interest groups. Yet the French public initially was against a military mission, which should imply that the unpopular President Sarkozy might have been susceptible to that pressure. His action, however, contradicts this argument, which might incline us to think that the pressure was not high enough. As Sarkozy (and all state leaders with him) will have known, there

¹⁷⁵ S.P., "Sarkozy's Libyan surprise", *The Economist*, March 14, 2011. http://www.economist.com/blogs/news-book/2011/03/france_and_libya; Mathieu von Rohr, "The New Film Depicts Bernard-Henri Levy's Role in Libya", *Spiegel Online*, April 4, 2012. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/a-new-film-looks-back-at-Bernard-Henri-levy-s-role-in-the-war-in-libya-a-825524.html>

¹⁷⁶ Vottorio De Filippis, "Pétrole : l'accord secret entre le CNT et la France", *Libération*, September 11, 2011. http://www.liberation.fr/monde/2011/09/01/petrole-l-accord-secret-entre-le-cnt-et-la-france_758320

is always a domestic interest in securing oil supplies. The very high support in the *Assemblée* for the approach of Sarkozy and the government showed that the urge of most French citizens for a leading, important (righteous) role of France in the world was widespread – and now satisfied.¹⁷⁷

4.3.2.2 Sensitivity of the German and French government

Now we know the domestic situations in both states, we need to find out to what extent each government was sensitive to domestic influences. For a few months, a large debate about the future of nuclear energy was raging in Germany. The Merkel-government had prolonged the permission for nuclear power plants in September 2010, which led to heavy demonstrations ever since. As a direct result of the nuclear disaster in Fukushima, on the 14th of March Merkel proclaimed to reconsider this decision. With the CDU traditionally being in favor of nuclear energy, the popularity of her party received a huge blow with this sudden change of course. The emerged situation was not favorable, because regional elections were to be held in Baden-Württemberg and Rheinland-Pfalz in ten days. Baden-Württemberg traditionally was a stronghold for her party, so losing elections there would be a sensitive symbolic defeat and would mean a loss of valuable seats in the *Bundestag*.¹⁷⁸ With the situation thus quite delicate, Merkel was in need of a victory in the regional elections to boost both the CDU's (and her own) popularity again. As we saw above that public opinion in Germany was in favor of a NATO mission in Libya, but not of a German military contribution to that mission, possibly large parts of the electorate could be redrawn towards the CDU by listening to the voice of the people. The debates in Parliament seem to confirm such considerations: two days after the UN-voting on Resolution 1973, opposition parties severely accused Minister Westerwelle (CDU) of having pursued election-politics. The Foreign Affairs spokesman of the SPD argued in this sense that the Minister hoped "*die bessere Gewähr für Wahlkämpfe zu haben*" by doing what the public wanted (as he allegedly had done before) and that he should not pretend as if "*dieses Dilemma* [acting against the will of the people] *in Ihrer Fraktion nicht der Punkt wäre*".¹⁷⁹

Concluding, we can say that government sensitivity was fairly high in Germany. Because of the sudden change of course on nuclear energy and the imminent elections, the Merkel government was very likely susceptible to pressure arising from domestic actors and the electorate.

¹⁷⁷ Editorial office, "Sarkozy relaunched", *The Economist*, March 24, 2011. <http://www.economist.com/node/18440941>

¹⁷⁸ Editorial Office, "Boze burgers aan zet in Baden-Württemberg", *Duitslandweb*, March 23, 2011. <http://www.duitslandweb.nl/actueel/uitgelicht/2011/3/voorbeschouwing-verkiezingen-baden-wuerttemberg-en-rijnland-palts.html>

¹⁷⁹ "to have better prospects in the electoral battle", "this dilemma was not the issue in your Party"; Rolf Mützenich, *German Bundestag*, Plenarprotokoll #, March 18, 2011.

We found out that government sensitivity in Germany was high at the onset of the Libyan crisis, so we can verify the situation in France. It is important to underline that the French constitution allows the *Président de la République* to have a large influence in Foreign Affairs and to have the last call on matters of Defense.¹⁸⁰ Sarkozy was therefore bureaucratically enabled to ‘use’ this crisis for his own purposes, if he wanted to do so. Because the President has the exclusive right to decide over the deployment of French troops, we have not included the popularity of individual Ministers involved.

In the spring of 2011, President Sarkozy’s popularity appeared to be rather low. Opinion polls of early March show that only 21 per cent of the people indicated that they would still vote for Sarkozy if elections were to be held.¹⁸¹ This unpopularity had two reasons. First, the popularity of the government received a huge blow when France was internationally criticized for its lax response to the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt earlier that year.¹⁸² Second, much of Sarkozy’s unpopularity had to do with the fact that he had been ‘friends’ with Col. Gadhafi, whom he had received with much considerations in Paris during his Presidential campaign in 2007. As the situation in Libya evolved, and media revealed ‘evidence’ that Gadhafi had largely financed of Sarkozy’s campaign in 2007, his popularity received another blow. His active role in the international response to the crisis in Libya is seen as an effort to repair the image of France in the world, and consequently to spark his own popularity too.¹⁸³ Sarkozy also wanted to reaffirm his position during the run-up to the Presidential elections in May 2012, so he could successfully start his campaign with a nice and legitimate victory of a righteous France against a classic example of evil in Libya. The conflict thus offered a clear-cut opportunity to show France and the world that he still was the right man for the job. However, with the elections still more than one year ahead, the urgency to repair his reputation was nowhere near a ‘now or never’ situation.

The popularity of the President thus was very low at the onset of the Libyan crisis, both due to previous events during the Arab Spring and his history with Gadhafi. Together with the fact that Sarkozy was aiming at reelection in 15 months, we can scale the rulers’ sensitivity as moderate. The French government, Sarkozy most of all, definitely had to reason to regain the trust of its people, but the situation was not critical. Yet despite this situation, we found out that Sarkozy was acting against the will of the French public which initially was not in favor of an international operation against Gadhafi.

¹⁸⁰ J.H. Reestman, “*Septennats, Quinquennats*: het constitutionele bestel en de politieke systemen van de vijfde Franse republiek”, in *Op het snijvlak van recht en politiek*, ed. De Reede and Reestman, Kluwer (2003), pp. 292-242.

¹⁸¹ Kim Willsher, “Marine le Pen more popular than President Sarkozy, says French poll”, *The Guardian*, March 6, 2011. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/06/marine-le-pen-nicolas-sarkozy>

¹⁸² Perrine Mouterde, “France faces criticism over soft touch with Tunisia”, *France 24*, January 14, 2011. <http://www.france24.com/en/20110113-france-faces-criticism-over-light-touch-with-tunisia-unrest-diplomacy>

¹⁸³ François-Xavier Bourmaud, “Consensus droite-gauche sur la resolution de l’ONU”, *le Figaro*, March 23, 2011. <http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2011/03/18/01003-20110318ARTFIG00721-consensus-droite-gauche-sur-la-resolution-de-l-onu.php>

4.3.2.3 Decision-makers' perceptions

In this last paragraph, we will compare the reasoning, the arguments of the decision-makers involved in the process and analyze to what extent they have been implemented in the government policy statement. We already know that the German decision to abstain was not undisputed both from the outside as from the inside. Recalling the difficulty with which chancellor Schröder managed to make the *Bundestag* concur with German military deployment in Afghanistan in 2001, an easy decision-making about participation in the international coalition in Libya was not expected for Merkel.

In Germany pretty much all decision-makers generally take a similar stance regarding the deployment of military forces. Domestic elites and the public are also skeptical about the use of military means to solve political problems. Though this was the general sentiment until the voting on Resolution 1973, the situation was influenced by the resignation of Minister of Defense Zu Guttenberg on the third of March. He had been subjected to heavy criticism when he turned out to have committed plagiarism in his PhD. Yet former Minister of the Interior De Mazière, who took over his position, still had to get acquainted with the technical details of the Libyan case;¹⁸⁴ only on March 23 did he have his first performance in the *Bundestag*. This development effectively left the control to chancellor Merkel and Minister of Foreign Affairs Westerwelle, who was known to oppose a military intervention. Yet his limited experience with Foreign Affairs immediately raised doubts among some Parliamentarians. A report of the Swedish Defense Research Agency in 2012 argued about the emerged status quo, that the political changes, the Euro-crisis and the troubles surrounding the nuclear debate caused the German decision-making machine – and Merkel above all – to be “caught off guard and there was little time for the political and diplomatic machinery to change track”.¹⁸⁵

Merkel and Westerwelle both supported the decision to abstain on the UNSC vote. They saw it as problematic that the Western world would once again try to impose its will on an internal conflict, but simultaneously stressed that Gadhafi's rule had to end. Yet some important discrepancies existed between the two. Merkel argued at the Libya summit on 19 March that resolution 1973 was ‘also the German resolution’ and that Germany would take additional responsibility – hereby hastily trying to repair some of the damage done by Westerwelle, who had publically argued to perceive the entire operation to be all about oil interests.¹⁸⁶ One week later, Merkel argued that Germany would be very

¹⁸⁴ Madelene Lindström and Kristina Zetterlund, “Setting the Stage for the Military Intervention in Libya”, *Swedish Defence Research Agency*, October 2012.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Philipp Wittrock, “Setback for Franco-German Relations: Paris and Berlin at Odds over Libya Operation”, *Spiegel Online*, March 24, 2011. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/setback-for-franco-german-relations-paris-and-berlin-at-odds-over-libya-operation-a-752992.html>; Editorial Office, “Libya conflict: reactions around the world”, *The Guardian*, March 30, 2011. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/30/libya-conflict-reactions-world>

ready to assist in a humanitarian mission in Libya after the military operation would have ended.¹⁸⁷ Westerwelle kept stressing that Germany obviously was against Gadhafi. He eventually stated, as Merkel did eagerly, that solidarity with traditional allies was important, but he likely did not perceive much harm in the German abstention witnessing the contrary. In an interview with *Der Spiegel* he added that Germany was already taking its responsibility elsewhere in the world too, and pointed at the importance of their anti-militarist tradition. He stressed once again that he perceived “great risks” in the operationalization of OUP and stated that he did not want to “get involved in a civil war in North Africa”.¹⁸⁸ Some days later, on the 23th of March, unmistakably after swift deliberations with Merkel, he argued that the situation in Libya had changed the circumstances around the German military deployment in Afghanistan, which led to the strategy that the political solution for the diplomatic crisis Germany had put itself in, would be to deploy extra AWAC airplanes in Afghanistan to relieve pressure from those states operating in Libya.

The influence of the new Minister of Defense De Maizière probably was quite limited as he had few time to prepare for his new position. He did not make any public statements before the vote on resolution 1973 and therefore he is only of our interest after the voting took place. On March 23, he cautiously argued in the *Bundestag* that also apart from the situation in Libya, the extra German AWACs in Afghanistan would be very useful. But even if this had not been the case, it still was “*ein politisches Zeigen der Bündnissolidarität, dass wir dies gerade jetzt anbieten*”, because NATO could not be everywhere on the same time.¹⁸⁹ Some later in June that year, regarding the German decision to supply ammunition for their NATO allies in Libya, De Maizière said it was all about normal NATO politics – partners helping each other out – hereby rejecting claims of the opposition in Parliament that in fact a “*Libyen-Einsatz durch die Hintertür*” was happening.¹⁹⁰ Indeed, the decision runs counter to Westerwelle’s repeated statements that Germany would not be militarily involved in the Libya and seems to be another proof of their zigzag-policy. Yet around the same time, as Merkel visited Washington to reaffirm German support to end violence in North-Africa and Westerwelle was visiting the Libyan town of Bengasi to announce that the NTC now was considered to be the official Libyan representative for Germany, a somewhat more equivocal Libya policy seems to have developed after all.

¹⁸⁷ A. Merkel, *Deutscher Bundestag*, Plenarprotokoll 17099, March 24, 2011, pp. 11251-7.

¹⁸⁸ Editorial Office, “Interview with German Foreign Minister: ‘Gadhafi Must Go – There’s No Question’”, *Spiegel Online*, March 21, 2011. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/spiegel-interview-with-german-foreign-minister-gadhafi-must-go-there-s-no-question-a-752164.html>

¹⁸⁹ “*a political sign of bond-solidarity, which we are offering right now*”; T. de Maizière, *Deutscher Bundestag*, Plenarprotokoll 17098, March 23, 2011, pp. 11181-3.

¹⁹⁰ “*backhanded deployment in Libya*”; Editorial Office, “De Maizière verteidigt Militärhilfe für NATO”, *Focus Online*, June 28, 2011. http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/einsatz-in-libyen-de-maiziere-verteidigt-militaerhilfe-fuer-nato_aid_641081.html

Quite surprisingly, our analysis of the behavior of the German decision-makers revealed that head of government Merkel did not play the role we expected. As the Libyan crisis emerged during the stressful euro-crisis and the nuclear energy debate in Germany, Merkel had to divide her attention. She often acted more as a diplomatic firefighter to put things right instead of performing as a leader responsible for German foreign policy. This meant that there was much leeway for Minister Westerwelle to act and influence on foreign policy – a policy domain with which any head of state otherwise almost always is intensely involved. Together with the fact that there had been a switch on the Ministry of Defense, the clumsy diplomatic course of Germany thus was heavily influenced by Minister Westerwelle, who does not seem to have been the right man for the job. Because of his lack of experience in the domain of foreign policy, he likely has misperceived the possible diplomatic consequences of a German abstention. In the government policy statement shortly before the voting on resolution 1973, Westerwelle hardly uttered anything about the importance of an unequivocal collective action by the international society.¹⁹¹

After the voting, a communiqué stressed the importance of a non-military solution to the conflict, something Westerwelle emphasized many times. Yet, a ‘yes, but’-vote (as did Poland) would have been much less damaging for Germany’s reputation and would not have damaged prospects for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.¹⁹² Though Merkel did consider it important to reaffirm Germany’s bond with its allies, the government policy statement by Westerwelle did not mention such terms. Eventually, when the entire situation had calmed down, they finally seemed to have become more unequivocal over their foreign policy towards the Libyan crisis, but by that time the damage had already been done.

Having analyzed the situation in Germany, we want to find out how decision-makers’ perceptions might have influenced the policy-making process in France. As we know, the institutions of the French fifth republic “*prévoient que c’est le Président qui définit les grandes orientations de la politique internationale de la France*”, which enables him to act to a large extent without restraint in foreign affairs.¹⁹³ Next to that, because of the political immunity enjoyed during a term in office, we expect that Sarkozy had considerable leeway to act as he perceived best.

¹⁹¹ Government declaration by Minister G. Westerwelle before the German Parliament, March 16, 2011. http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2011/110316_BM_BT_arab_Welt.html

¹⁹² Ralf Beste *et al.*, “‘A Serious Mistake of Historic Dimensions’: Libyan crisis Leaves Berlin Isolated”, *Spiegel Online*, March 28, 2011. (Translated from German by Paul Cohen) <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/a-serious-mistake-of-historic-dimensions-libya-crisis-leaves-berlin-isolated-a-753498.html>

¹⁹³ “*see to it that it is the President who defines the grand orientations of French international policy*”; J.H. Reestman, “*Septennats, Quinquennats*, het constitutionele bestel en de politieke systemen van de vijfde Franse republiek”, in De Reede & Reestman (2003), *Op het snijvlak van recht en politiek*, Kluwer, pp. 292-242; A. Juppé, *Assemblée Nationale*, Session ordinaire de 2010-2011, March 3, 2011, séance 1.

Let us start with President Sarkozy. In every press release or public discourse he mentioned the impossibility of doing nothing about the crimes against humanity done by Gadhafi's troops, and often mentioned the international society's Responsibility to Protect. He perceived the situation in Libya to be different from the other recent uprisings in the Arab Spring, because Gadhafi was fighting with heavy military means against his *people*, something other rulers did not.¹⁹⁴ Sarkozy perceived the establishment of a no-fly zone as a suitable solution to improve the situation and saw a UN mandate necessary to legitimize it. Deploying ground troops was no option, he repeatedly argued. On the 10th of March, allegedly without informing even Minister Juppé of Foreign Affairs, he recognized the NTC of the Libyan rebels as official representatives of Libya and was the first statesman to do so. This action probably was a matter of swift intuitional politics, in which the well-known French political celebrity Bernard-Henry Lévi played a pivotal role.¹⁹⁵ Because this action would be seen as a 'leading step' of France, after which other nations would follow, it suited Sarkozy's style. To legitimize Resolution 1973 once more, he emphasized on the day of the voting that the Arab League had requested the no-fly zone, which was very important for the legitimacy of the entire operation.¹⁹⁶ This argument was also used by Sarkozy to try to keep NATO out of an operation, since its reputation was not that good among Arab states. On 19 March, Sarkozy once again stressed that France had to take its responsibility against the worsening situation.¹⁹⁷ He clearly perceived the situation critical enough not to be trivialized.

Premier Fillon does not seem to have played a large role in the policy outcome. He did not function as spokesperson on the topic and his task was merely to inform the French Parliament about the developments in Libya. He did not bring new information to the debate. Similarly, Minister of Defense Gérard Longuet seems not to have played a large role in the construction of the '*grandes orientations*' towards the Libyan crisis and made only few public statements. Rather, he was occupied with the practical implementation of the entire operation.¹⁹⁸

Minister Juppé succeeded Ms. Aillot-Marie on Foreign Affairs, who had to step down after a political affair related with the Tunisian uprisings earlier that year. Though Juppé had just been assigned his post, he immediately fulfilled an important role. He was experienced as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the nineties and had been a Parliamentarian for many years.¹⁹⁹ Like Sarkozy, he considered

¹⁹⁴ Editorial Office, "Conférence de presse de Nicolas Sarkozy à l'issue du Conseil européen sur la Libye", *Voltairenet.org*, March 11, 2011. <http://www.voltairenet.org/article168890.html>

¹⁹⁵ See fn. 175.

¹⁹⁶ Editorial Office, "Lettre de M. Sarkozy [...] sur l'action de la communauté internationale face à la situation politique en Libye", *Vie Publique*, March 16, 2011. <http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/117000684.html>

¹⁹⁷ Steven Erlanger, "Sarkozy Puts France at Vanguard of West's War Effort", *New York Times*, March 20, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/21/world/europe/21france.html?_r=0

¹⁹⁸ C. Guéant, *Assemblée Nationale*, Session ordinaire 2010-2011, March 9, 2011, séance 2.

¹⁹⁹ S.P., "The First European Casualty of the Arab Uprisings", *The Economist*, 28 February 2011. http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2011/02/french_politics?tid=309&ah=80dcf288b8561b012f603b9fd9577f0e

Gadhafi to have lost all legitimacy, which he reaffirmed multiple times. He perceived a no-fly zone as a suitable option to tackle the crisis, but repeated on the day after the vote on resolution 1973 that nothing could be done without a mandate of the UN.²⁰⁰ Juppé was on quite the same line as Sarkozy regarding the French policy he considered necessary to deal with the Libyan crisis. The route via the UN was perceived as vital, by which they reinforced the organization's authority and simultaneously strengthened the view of France as being a righteous nation. In line with Sarkozy and a large part of the Parliament, Juppé saw no important role for NATO in the operation, an opinion of which he tried to convince other nations by organizing a last-minute summit on the Libyan crisis in the same week. The plan turned out not to be feasible, and soon the French emphasis was put on the need to plan the reconstruction of Libya once the violence would have ended – an operation in which France had to play an important role.²⁰¹ It is remarkable how many times Juppé brought up the *grandeur* of France by mentioning that it 'took the initiative' to do this or that.²⁰² Under large applause, he spoke out before the Parliament that the voice of France was heard again in the world and the G8.²⁰³

In the official government policy statement, all the abovementioned aspects can be found. The communiqué stressed that France took its responsibility in the world by defending a people against brute force. The actions of Sarkozy, who stressed the need to protect the universal values on which the French nation has been build, and of Juppé, who convinced the UN member states of the necessity of a UNSC resolution, are mentioned as such literally, hereby underlining their importance in the entire process. It was emphasized that the operation was executed with the backing of the Arab League and was totally in concordance with Resolution 1973.²⁰⁴ As all the elements mentioned by the relevant decision-makers have been involved in the policy outcome, we cannot distinguish a clear-cut prominent influence of any individual. Though the single recognition of the TNC by Sarkozy was highly unexpected, it does not seem to have influenced the broad French policy approach objectively necessary towards the Libyan crisis, but the actions of both individuals rather seem to have influenced the execution of it.

For sake of clarity, the analyses of all variables are summarized in the scheme on the next page. Arrows point at causal relationships.

²⁰⁰ A. Juppé, *Assemblée Nationale*, Session ordinaire 2010-2011, March 1, 2011, séance 2.

²⁰¹ A. Juppé, *Assemblée Nationale*, Session ordinaire 2010-2011, March 23 & 30 and April 8, 2011.

²⁰² A. Juppé, *Assemblée Nationale*, Session ordinaire 2010-2011, March 22, 2011, séance 1.

²⁰³ A. Juppé, *Assemblée Nationale*, Session ordinaire 2010-2011, March 2, 2011, séance 1.

²⁰⁴ Editorial Office, "Déclaration du Gouvernement sur l'Intervention des forces armées en Libye", *Ambafrance-ve.org*, March 22, 2011. <http://www.ambafrance-ve.org/Declaration-du-Gouvernement-sur-l>

NEOCLASSICAL REALISM				NEOLIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM		
	Domestic Pressure	Government sensitivity	Decision-maker's perceptions	Interest in success of IO's & OEF/OUP	Reputation considerations	Influence of IO's
Germany 2001	Low: public opinion was not particularly in favor or against an intervention. Interest groups neither made statements in favor or against a German contribution to OEF.	Rather low: popularity of government was high and elections were only to be held in 11 months.	All were convinced of need to participate in OEF. Policy outcome did not show a pre-dominant influence of an individual.	NATO: military: yes economic: yes UN: economic: yes OEF: not participating would hardly damage NATO and UN interests, but some economic opportunities could be missed.	NATO: attached value to its reputation as trustworthy and responsible alliance partner. UN: attached value as an advocate of human rights.	Government was convinced of the need to participate, partly because this was considered a duty as a NATO member, so pressure of IO's was not really needed to convince it to participate in OEF.
Germany 2011	High: public opinion was in favor of intervention, but against a German military contribution. Interest groups also advised not to participate. After the vote: discord about the German abstention.	Very high: popularity of government was low due to clumsy nuclear energy policy and euro crisis. Important elections were to be held in two weeks.	The situation led Minister Westerwelle most of all at the controls. His individual perceptions were clearly visible in the policy outcome.	NATO and UN: similar to 2010 OUP: abstaining would not badly harm interests in IO's, but was likely to harm chances for permanent seat in UNSC (plus possibly oil interests in Libya).	NATO after abstention: important, but not before immediate domestic pressure. UN: not much concerning the SC. Yet afterwards it certainly did, which points at a possible miscalculation.	Influenced its cost-benefit calculations, but after the vote, there was strong pressure exerted which caused policy change. Policy outcome probably was different without IO pressure.
France 2011	Slightly moderate: public opinion was largely against intervention but followed UN policy and switched opinion. No known pressure from interest groups in favor or against intervention.	Rather high: the popularity of Sarkozy and the government was low and he had just started his campaign for the elections of May 2012.	All had similar perceptions about the situation. They were also like-minded about the policy outcome that would satisfy French interests the most. Though Sarkozy had important influence by singlehandedly recognizing the NTC.	NATO: military: some economic: some UN: moderate OUP: slightly for reasons of geographical proximity, moderately, because it could secure oil interests.	NATO: does not seem to have played an influencing role. UN: similar conclusion	NATO only caused France to alter its policy execution towards Libya. The UN was rather a means to a pre-fixed end.

Conclusion

Our research in this Master's thesis on International Relations focused on two conflict cases: Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan in 2001 and Operation Unified Protector (OUP) in Libya in 2011. The former case was the first chapter of the War in Afghanistan, which started in October 2001 and was aimed at finding the perpetrators of the attacks on the US. The main case under study was OUP, which was the international reaction to the cruelties of Gadhafi's troops in Libya, and started in March 2011. Our main interest was to find out why the German government, under the lead of chancellor Merkel, decided to abstain on the UNSC vote on Resolution 1973. The abstention led to heavy criticism from many states of notably the Western world, because Germany was the only Western state that did not vote 'yes' on the Resolution. As some sources correctly suggested, it would have been better if they had opted for a 'yes, but' vote, a decision that would have sent a supportive message to their allies participating in the international coalition. Yet it would still have largely allowed the German government to give its own interpretation to their share of the operation and would not have damaged the German reputation within the UN and NATO.

More objectively, the decision to abstain is less difficult to understand, because the Libyan crisis did not pose a direct security threat to Germany and as such was less incentive to spend large amounts of time, energy and money on it. The theoretical expectation, then, was that either the intervention of international organizations or of domestic factors would lead a state to reinterpret the constraints of the international state system. This reinterpretation should lead to a deviating foreign policy outcome either reinforcing or counteracting the systemic constraints. Our research question was focused on the difference in German foreign policy outcome concerning participation in OEF and OUP, as well as on the difference between German and French foreign policy outcome concerning the Libyan crisis. The German behavior in 2001 and the French behavior in 2011 were attributed the same weight during the data analysis, but in the end served as referential cases that put the German behavior in 2011 in perspective. So why was German foreign policy outcome in 2011 different than the outcome in 2001 and differed it from the French policy in 2011? With the application of three important variables of both neoliberal institutionalism and neoclassical realism we hoped to answer this question.

The results of the empirical analyses are confirming some theoretical expectations, while disconfirming others. Regarding the influence of IOs, we expected that a state would participate in a mission even if doing so was not in their direct interest. On the basis of our research we can say that IOs made both states include them in their cost-benefit calculations of how best to achieve their foreign policy goals. But did they cause a reprioritization of state interests? In the German case: yes. In 2001, participating in OEF was considered to be a duty following out of NATO membership and, moreover, it was also considered necessary to preserve German trustworthiness. So reputation definitely played an important role. In 2011, although initially refusing to participate in OUP, after IO pressure and fear of additional reputation damage, Germany chose to participate, albeit via back channel diplomacy and practically despite a lack of direct state interest the success of the mission. Yet in the French case it remains difficult to prove IO influence, since no evidence could be found that pointed in this direction. Rather, it seems that IOs mainly appeared in cost-benefit calculations as a means to a predefined end. This conclusion would also fit within the French tradition of independence.

Domestic interests seem to explain foreign policy outcome, to a different extent, too. In 2001, however, there is no lead to believe that they did, as there was few domestic pressure in Germany and a rather low government sensitivity. Furthermore, the outcome was also objectively in line with state interests. Yet in the German decision-making process on participating in OUP, it seems that domestic factors had a considerable influence. The government's decision to abstain in the vote on Resolution 1973 can largely be ascribed to public opinion and pressure groups being against military participation in the mission (the publication of this information preceded the decision to abstain), to the fact that the government was sensitive to this pressure because important *Länder* elections were to be held in less than two weeks, and to Minister Westerwelle failing to foresee the international consequences of his desired policy outcome. In the French case, different conclusions can be drawn. Participation in OUP was, objectively considered, to be of some state interest. Though public opinion was against, the government under the lead of the President initiated the intervention in Libya. Furthermore, though Sarkozy had just started his electoral campaign for 2012 and therefore was moderately sensitive to domestic pressures, he acted against the will of the people. His and others' individual influence do not seem to have influenced policy outcome as in the equivalent German case, because all decision-makers were largely on the same line concerning the outcome deemed best for France.

The difference between German and French foreign policy outcome towards the Libyan crisis could be seen, as argued the foreign editor of the *New York Times*, as a 'seismic European shift'.²⁰⁵ He noticed that the attitude of Germany and France meant a turn away from Adenauer's rapprochement

²⁰⁵ Roger Cohen, "France Flies, Germany Flops", *New York Times*, April 16, 2011. <http://www.ny-times.com/2011/04/17/opinion/17cohen.html>

to the West after the Second World War and from De Gaulle's 'counterweight-policy' against the influence of the US in European politics. Furthermore, it seems that the difference between German foreign policy outcome in 2001 and in 2011 can be caused by a combination of IO influence and domestic factors.

This thesis has shown that domestic factors can have an important influence on foreign policy outcome and showed that surrounding circumstances dictate when they do. We have also shown that for Germany, IOs had influence on policy outcome and that in the French case, this does not seem to have been the case. Yet we know that the evidence following from our research has its limits. As was argued in the Methodology chapter, the fact that we have considered only two states has its consequences for possible broader conclusions. Nonetheless, our findings on the impact of IO's and domestic factors are likely to account for similar states, for example Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands.

The results of our research are also pointing at another variable that possibly has an important influence on foreign policy outcome. We found evidence for some constructivist variables that seem partly to explain international state behavior. Constructivist scholars often stress the influence of role perceptions. One example from our study, then, concerns the German perception of its renewed role as a strong, influential and righteous nation in the world. Due to its historical legacy, it developed a pacifist foreign policy, which can only difficultly be overcome. This means that the domestic political culture emphasizing the German responsibility in the world can only be reinforced with military means in exceptional cases. Next to that, we can describe a French role perception from our empirical findings. Politicians in France have always stressed their 'duty' to make the world a better place and it is thought that this should be achieved through their leading role. French foreign policy seems to evolve around their perception of the *grandeur* of France, as well as around their Responsibility to Protect the people of the world against evil. Their military capabilities also evolve around this role perception, as does their foreign policy behavior, judging by the argumentation of the French government officials about the reason for participating in OUP. Therefore, it seems that a constructivist 'role perception' variable seems important for explanations of state behavior. This cultural element, which seems to influence foreign policy in an independent way, is not the same as the individual decision-makers' perceptions but should instead be considered as embedding the scope of those perceptions.

Further research should therefore focus on this specific element and find a way to combine it with domestic variables as stressed in neoclassical realist theory, but should also retain a focus on the constraining effect of IOs. This combination implies that reductionist theories are necessary if we want to be able to cover a broader range of cases in our explanations for state behavior in IR theory.

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