Feeling global?

Daniel Polman

Understanding attitudes toward globalization across
different levels and dimensions.

Radboud Universiteit
Nijmegen

Daniel Polman - 0713562

Supervisor:
Dr. A. Akkerman

daniel@antenna.nl

19-9-2013

Index

Abstract

This thesis studies the variation of individual attitudes toward globalization, in order to find out which factors influence the attitudes of individuals toward globalization. Contrary to other studies on attitudes toward globalization, this thesis makes an analytical distinction between different dimensions and levels of globalization. This leads to more detailed results on which factors matter to attitudes toward very specific areas that are affected by globalization processes. The results show that skill level, income, trade union membership, political affiliation with both the liberal and the populist radical right, and specific restrictive or tolerant views about citizenship are all relevant in order to understand the variation in individual attitudes toward globalization. In particular, the findings show that, most of these variables only play a role in one or two specific dimensions and levels.

Key words

Attitudes toward globalization – Dimensions – Quantitative analysis

Feeling global?

Understanding attitudes toward globalization across different levels and dimensions

1. Introduction

What is globalization? The answer from a famous joke learns us that the best definition of globalization is the tragic death of Lady Diana: an English princess with an Egyptian boyfriend crashes in a French tunnel, driving a German car with a Dutch engine, driven by a Belgian who was drunk on Scottish whiskey.

What this joke really tells us is that elements from all over the world play a role in everyday events. Our daily lives are shaped by products and services that consist of parts that come from all over the world. Every day we visit websites that are hosted in other countries, or the occasional international information platforms, like Wikipedia.

Because globalization is often associated with modern technology, large multinational corporations and international organization, there is the misconception that globalization is a recent event. Be that as it may, it is thought that economic processes of globalization really started with the colonization of large parts of the world, by a small number of European states and the foundation of the Dutch East India Company (VOC), who started out as the world's first multinational enterprise (Boomkens 1999: p. 9-10). However, more recently, globalization is inextricably linked with liberalization, free markets and political democracies (ibid.).

Although I would not label myself as a big supporter of the increasing dominance of the market and ongoing liberalization, I do not have a negative association with the term globalization. On the contrary, to me globalization means that the entire world is at my doorstep, a thought that is quite exiting. However, it is not that hard to imagine that for some people, some processes related to globalization might appear, or actually are, threatening. Think for example of the people who lose their jobs as a result of "offshoring". Globalization sounds less exiting when someone loses his or her job to someone in a low wage country.

It is exactly this point that is so interesting: why is there such a big diference in these attitudes toward globalization? A question that immediately leads to additional questions, like: what determines one's attitude toward globalization? And more general: what do people perceive as globalization?

In this introductory chapter I will first give a short introduction to globalization and some of its consequences. Then I will briefly discuss the research tradition I will contribute to, followed by a more specific research question and a further outline of this thesis.

Globalization processes in the 20th century

With the development of capitalism, international trade has been reaching new heights, after a strong decline in the early 20th century (cf. Schwartz 2010). Guiding these developments, new multilateral institutions were founded to deal with issues of international economics and trade agreements, like the World Bank (founded in 1944), the IMF (1945), the GATT/WTO (1948, succeeded by the WTO in 1995), and the OEEC/OECD (1948, succeeded by the OECD in 1961). The mobility of capital became very clear when in the late 1960s and early 1970s large corporations like Nike discovered that it would give them a large comparative advantage if they would start picking up production in low wage countries (Locke 2002, p. 4). This strategy of offshore outsourcing, or simply offshoring, became widely adopted by large manufacturing companies in the 1980s (Doh, 2005; Hätönen & Erikson 2009). Indeed, it appears that the labor share in OECD countries is declining. The latest figures show a strong decline in the share of the national income that consists of labor (wages, salaries and benefits) since the 1990s (OECD 2012). Although this decline in labor share is for the largest part caused by technological advances and increasing capital per worker, privatization, increasing international competition and offshoring play vital roles in this process (Bassanini & Manfredi 2012).

In addition to the mobility of capital, labor also started to increase its mobility. Laborers from low wage countries started to migrate to more prosperous countries to perform low skilled labor for less money than the domestic workforce. This development was initiated by active immigrant policies in the period shortly after the second world war and continued with the introduction of the Schengen-treaty (signed in 1985), the Single European Act (1986) and the enlargements of the EU in 2004 and 2011, which welcomed Eastern European states with smaller economies to the European Union. This also shows the role of political organizations within these processes.

Responses to globalization

Some authors suggest that there is some sort of globalization cleavage emerging between winners and losers of globalization (cf. Kriesi et al. 2006; Kriesi et al. 2008: pp. 4-5). The challenges that result from the increasing mobility of both capital and labor have especially found resonance in the labor movement, and more specifically for one of the most prominent organizations of this movement: the trade unions (cf. Munck 2008).

But how have trade unions responded to these challenges? In the Netherlands, the largest contender, the FNV has a distinct department for "international affairs". This department is primarily focused on solidarity with trade unions and workers in developing countries and issues like *chain responsibility*.[1] While it does not teach a great deal about how globalization affects the position of workers in the Netherlands*.*

Press releases and official documents teach us that the FNV mainly regards globalization as the increasing power of the transnational and multinational corporations, which leads to a "social leakage" (FNV 2010).[2] This is why it pleads for better regulation of, especially European, labor markets (FNV 2013a). They have cooperated with other national trade unions from all over Europe to protest against social dumping: the increasing tolerance of competition on labor and the decline labor market regulation as a means to increase economic growth. According to the FNV, this trend leads to an increase in inhumane working conditions and the exploitation of workers (FNV 2013b).

On the issue of labor migration the FNV pleads that there first should be effective international or regional measures against uneven wage competition and working conditions, before there should be an increase in labor migration. Moreover, it argues that labor migration must never supplement Dutch workers, but only function as an addition to the national workforce (FNV 2011). In positioning themselves, the FNV repeats on multiple occasions that international cooperation between trade unions is necessary to overcome the problems of globalization and that their statements are in line with that of the ETUC and ITUC.

---

1   Chain responsibility refers to the concept of holding a firm responsible for all the work that is contributed within the production chain that leads up to the end product.
2   Social leakage means that the development of social policies within the EU is lagging the economic policies that undermine national social policies.

This brings us to the position of international trade union organizations, the largest of these organizations is the ITUC, which claims to represent 175 million workers in 156 countries and territories with 315 national affiliates (ITUC 2013a).

The official standpoint of the ITUC on the globalization of the economy is that there should be more intergovernmental cooperation, in order to make sure that social security for workers plays a central role in the decision making at the important global and regional institutions. This is also refered to as the *social dimension of globalization.* It works together with unions all over the world in order to *promote effective rules governing the behavior of private business* (ITUC 2013b). In its official founding program the ITUC spends a relative large part on *changing globalization* and *challenging multinational businesses* (ITUC 2006). In the vision of the ITUC, better governance of markets must change the globalization processes, in order to counter the declining position of workers. In addition, according to its congress, the ITUC should do something against the inadequate power of nation states to restrict multinational businesses in their *malfeasance and criminality* (ITUC 2006: p. 4).

The views of the FNV and the ITUC are very much overlapping. They see globalization as the decline of social rights and the increasing power of capital over (organized) labor. Both the FNV and the ITUC attempt to represent a large constituency of workers, that even includes non-members (cf. Hyman 1997: p. 118).

However, previous research appears to indicate that not all workers share these views. As stated earlier, it is expected that there are "winners" and "losers" of globalization, and that this globalization cleavage is cross-cutting (Kriesi et al. 2008: pp. 4-5). That means that the winners and losers are not divided by other cleavages, like religion or class. Moreover, globalization is not limited to the economic dimension that the trade unions focus on. Political and cultural aspects also play a role in people's attitudes toward globalization. Furthermore, people might be more nuanced in how they think about globalization. They might recognize personal benefits, while they are skeptical about the effects of globalization on the rights of workers in developing countries.

Research tradition

One thing that stands out from previous research on individual attitudes is that it focuses mostly on economic themes like free trade and labor migration. However, there is plenty of literature that suggests that globalization also has cultural and political dimensions that are closely related to one another (cf. Dreher 2005; Edwards 2006; Kriesi et al. 2006; Mudde 2004). To make the debate even

more complicated, some scholars even suggest that there are multiple levels on which the formation of attitudes toward globalization takes place (e.g. Mansfield & Mutz 2009; Feasel & Muzumder 2012).

As stated earlier, it is thought that there are winners and losers of globalizations. Previous research on attitudes toward globalization has tried to explain who these winners and losers are and whether this determines their attitude toward globalization. Two key theorems that have been used in these attitudinal studies are the Heckscher-Ohlin, and the Ricardo-Viner theorem.

According to the Heckscher-Olin (H-O) theorem, highly skilled workers in Western countries should be considered as winners and therefore have more favorable attitudes toward globalization. While their low skilled counterparts are the losers, who feel more negative about globalization (Scheve & Slaughter 2001: p. 50; Caporaso and Madeira 2012: pp. 152-155).

The Ricardo-Viner (R-V) theorem, on the other hand, claims that it is about the sector of employment. Workers in sectors with a comparative advantage are expected to have a more positive attitude toward globalization, as they are the winners here. The workers in sectors with a comparative disadvantage are more likely to be opposed to globalization, as they should be considered losers (Scheve & Slaughter 2001.: 50).[3]

However, both these mechanisms are limited to an economic view of globalization, while there are also a political and a cultural dimension to globalization. Other authors have attempted to look further than just economic variables in order to explain attitudes toward globalization (e.g. Mayda & Rodrik 2005; Mansfield & Mutz 2009). And some authors have tried to explain attitudes toward political globalization by looking at more political variables, like how people think about citizenship rights (Hooghe & Marks 2004) or political affiliations (Baker 2005; Mayda & Rodrik 2005). Moreover, the formation of attitudes toward globalization becomes less an issue of winners and losers when looking at the cultural dimension, but more an issue of other, more nuanced factors. Still certain mechanisms used to explain attitudes toward economic or political globalization can also be applied in order to explain attitudes toward the cultural dimension of globalization, like certain ideational effects, or political affiliation (cf. Hainmueller & Hiscox 2006; Hooghe & Marks 2004).

In summary, most research has only focused on the economic dimension, while ignorig the imporance of the political and cultural sides of the globalization debate. Moreover, there are authors that suggest that people judge globalization differently on different levels, which leads to specific attitudes toward

---

[3] In addition, workers employed in non-trade sectors are expected not to oppose economic globalization because they are insulated from international product-market competition

globalization on one's personal life that can differ from one's attitude toward the effects of globalization on the country they live in as a whole.

Demarcation

The goal of this thesis is to get more understanding of the variation of individual attitudes toward globalization and the explanations thereof. In order to do so, I will investigate how the attitudes and potential differences herein of Dutch workers can be explained. Accordingly, my research question for this thesis will be as follows: *which factors influence the attitude of individuals toward globalization?*

With this thesis I will provide additional data and analyses on attitudes toward globalization within Europe. In this area of research there appears to be a lack of these data for Europe that can show significant effects on attitudes toward globalization (Hay & Smith 2010: p. 904). Moreover, this thesis is scientifically relevant because it makes an analytical distinction between attitudes toward different dimensions (economic, political, cultural) combined with attitudes on different levels (individual, national, global) of globalization. This new analytical approach can give more specific insights on which factors are important for the formation of individual attitudes, and in which levels and dimensions these factors play a role.

Moreover, this thesis will give an insight in the formation of the attitudes of the Dutch. This is of societal relevance because it shows which specific groups face more difficulties with specific aspects of globalization. This information can be used for political mobilization, awareness and education by all sorts of societal actors like trade unions and political parties.

In order to answer this research question, I have formulated six additional questions:

1. What is the variation in theories that attempt to explain individual attitudes toward globalization?

2. Do attitudes toward globalization vary across different levels?

3. Do attitudes toward globalization vary across different dimensions?

4. Which variables apply to what dimensions of globalization?

5. Which variables apply to attitudes toward globalization on what levels?

6. Does this categorization in different dimensions lead to a better understanding of individual attitudes toward globalization?

Outline

In the second chapter I will look at previous research on workers attitudes toward globalization, in which I will introduce the variables I will use in my analyses. The third chapter provide the methodological considerations with an operationalization of the key concepts. In the fourth chapter I will present the results of my data analyses. The final chapter will be a conclusion with a summary and thoughts for further discussion.

2. Theories and hypotheses

The goal of this chapter is to give an overview of the works that have attempted to break down individual attitudes toward globalization, in order to provide an answer to the main research question: how can individual attitudes toward globalization be explained? In this chapter I will discuss the various theories presented in scientific literature that have been used to explain these attitudes, or parts thereof. From these theories I will derive hypotheses in order to answer my own research question.

The chapter will commence with a brief discussion of the dependent variable. In this part I will reflect on the concept of globalization and what previous researches on individual attitudes have focused on. Then I shall elaborate on the various theories that are used to explain individual attitudes toward globalization.[4]

2.1 Attitudes toward globalization

The aim of this thesis is to explain *individual attitudes toward globalization*. Attitudes toward globalization are a reflection of the effects of globalization as perceived by an individual. These perceived effects can range from very negative to very positive, and thus one's attitude toward globalization can also be very negative, very positive, or somewhere in between.

However, it is not always clear what is meant with this concept of globalization. Moreover, previous studies on attitudes toward globalization have focused on different aspects and levels when trying to explain these attitudes. In this paragraph I will present an overview of these aspects and levels, as used in the literature on globalization.

There are numerous ways of looking at globalization. In political science, globalization is often divided into three categories: economic, cultural and political globalization (cf. Mudde 2004; Kriesi et al. 2008). These three categories, or processes, are thought to be interacting in multiple ways, and their development differs across regions all over the world (Hay and Marsh 2000: p. 3). Also in scientific literature this categorization finds its reflection, economists and political economists have primarily studied economic globalization, the political globalization has been the focus of political scientists, while the cultural dimension has been the domain of sociologists (Whalley 2008: 1514). However, it appears that political scientists have also started to pick up on the economic aspects of globalization and even

---

[4]   I have decided to leave out some trivial variables like town size as used by Baker (2005), because of lack of theoretical argumentation, single non-significant results or a combination of both factors.

use cultural elements in their research. The next step will be to look into this categorization of globalization processes, in order to get a better understanding of the concept of globalization.

Economic globalization

There are many definitions of economic globalization, but they all try to catch *increased cross-border flows of money, goods and services, as well as that of investment capital* (Allen and Thompson 1997: p. 213). However, labor migration should also be considered to be a part of this process, for it plays a role in wage formation and production processes. This is why economic globalization is thought to have three dimensions: trade, international capital flows (Foreign Direct Investment) and immigration (Mayda 2006: p. 1).

Most literature on attitudes toward globalization tends to focus on economic globalization. Some authors even use the terms globalization and economic globalization interchangeably (for example Feasel & Muzumder [2012] and Mayda [2006]). Studies on attitudes toward Foreign Direct Investment are scarce (FDI), at least for countries of the "North".

Political Globalization

Political globalization is the progressive formal and administrative international political cooperation between national governments, for example in organizations related to the United Nations and in the European Union. It is seen as the political institutional reaction to economic globalization (Kriesi et al. 2008: 3). Existing political systems are restructured in order to cope with the growing deficiencies of the nation-state. According to Cerny (1997) political globalization is the increasingly relativation of the sovereignty of states:

"Globalization as a political phenomenon basically means that the shaping of the playing field of politics itself is increasingly determined not within insulated units, i.e. relatively autonomous and hierarchically organized structures called states; rather it derives from a complex congeries of multilevel games played on multilayered institutional playing fields, above and across, as well as within, state boundaries" (Cerny 1997: 253).

Fotopoulos (2001: 234) links political globalization to its economic counterpart, by stating that it is a necessary complement. The political aspects of globalization are necessary in order to have at least some form of control over the increasing flows of goods, capital and labor. Often, the choices made about further political globalization, in the form of integration in international organizations, is driven by issues of free trade and immigration (cf. Beer & Flecker 1998). This is characteristic for the

interconnectedness of political and economic globalization. Sometimes, political globalization is also referred to as institutionalized globalization, or "how the state seeks to *institutionalize* competition between sub national spaces in the context of economic globalization" (Bunnel & Coe 2005: p. 835).

Cultural globalization

Then there is the cultural dimension of globalization, a concept that is difficult to define as it is much more related to how persons experience globalization in their daily lives. It could be regarded as a collection of the side effects of economic and political globalization and how those processes affect the identities and daily activities of individuals all over the world (Fotopoulos 2001; Arnett 2000). One of the most referred to aspects of cultural globalization is the interaction with different cultures, either in a physical form through encounters with people with other ethnicities, or through other forms of media and communication like the internet and television (cf. Bohman 1998; Chiu et al. 2011). It is also thought that this leads to a cleavage between *locals* and *cosmopolitans* (cf. Roudometof 2005). The locals are attaching much greater value to their local community and economic, cultural and institutional protectionism, whereas the cosmopolitans share a more international orientation (Roudometof 2005: pp. 125-126). Some authors refer to cultural globalization as *social* globalization, which is best described as the exposure to other cultures on a daily basis (Rydgren 2011). Finally, cultural globalization is associated with "Americanization" or uniformization of society and the countermovements that focus national and regional identity (Hoffmann 2002, p. 108).

What is the role of these dimensions?

The majority of authors that have written about attitudes toward globalization has studied economic globalization, and more specifically a person's disposition toward *free trade* (e.g. Scheve & Slaughter 2001; Mansfield & Mutz 2009; Burgoon & Hiscox 2004; O'Rourke 2003; Hainmueller 2005; Feasel & Muzumder 2012; Edwards 2006), and/or immigration (e.g. Scheve & Slaughter 2001; Brader et al. 2008; Mayda 2006; Feasel & Muzumder 2012; Malhotra et al. 2013). And like most economic theories, these studies often use a rational choice perspective on a person's attitude toward globalization.

As the goal of this thesis is to get a better understanding of the factors that influence personal attitudes toward globalization, I think it is necessary to look at all dimensions of globalization, instead of just one. The reason for this decision is the belief that the effects of variables that are used to explain attitudes toward globalization often fit only one dimension of globalization. Trade union membership, for example, can have an effect on one's attitude toward economic and political globalization, while such an effect is not to be expected when it comes to the attitude of people toward cultural globalization. So to

really get a better understanding of personal attitudes toward globalization, the addition of multiple dimensions can teach us about the more specific applications of the explanatory variables I will test.

Table 1: Dimensions of globalization with their most important aspects

Globalization

Economic	Political	Cultural
- International trade	- Multilevel governance	- Interaction with different cultures/ethnicities
- International capital flows	- Int. treaties and organizations	- Cosmopolitanism
- Migration	- Relativation of nation state	- Americanization

2.2 Attitudes toward globalization: different levels and perspectives

The study mentioned in almost every research that investigate people's attitudes toward globalization is that of Kenneth Scheve and Matthew Slaughter (2001) with their book *Globalization and the perceptions of American Workers*. In their work, Scheve and Slaughter (2001: pp. 47-48) explicitly make two key assumptions that are at the foundation of their analysis. Their first assumption is that a person's attitude toward globalization is based on the effects of free trade/open market policies on their own welfare. This means that they do not take into consideration the potential effects that economic globalization has on the nation state, when these differ from the effects of economic globalization on their personal welfare.

The second assumption is that personal welfare depends on a person's *current labor income*. Thus, following both assumptions of Scheve and Slaughter, people judge globalization by the effect it has on their current labor income (Scheve & Slaughter 2001: pp. 47-48). Although, they fail to provide a clear reasoning for the grounds on which they make these assumptions, they do put their second assumption in perspective by acknowledging that both other *economic* elements, like asset ownership, and *noneconomic* elements, which they do not specify, may play a role in how a person determines his or her sense of welfare (ibid.: p. 48). However, acknowledging that other, and even noneconomic, factors can be important to one's welfare, not only undermines their second assumption, but also implies that their explanatory mechanism is far from complete.

Edward Mansfield and Diana Mutz (2009) oppose the first assumption of Scheve and Slaughter, that one's attitude toward globalization is based on the perceived effects it has on their family income. They

think that people *do* take into regard the potential effects that globalization has on the nation state, when forming an opinion about globalization. Their motivation comes from previous studies on mass opinions that have shown that individuals rarely shape their political preferences on basis of self-interest alone.

In their study, Mansfield and Mutz find that people who see international trade as beneficial to their country are more likely to support free trade policies than people who think international trade is beneficial to their family income. These outcomes indicate that people judge the effects of globalization on their family differently from the effects on the national economy. Consequently, this means that individuals can have different attitudes on different levels, like the individual and the national level. When researchers use one's attitude in general, this does not contain information about whether people judge the effects of globalization on their family income, on the national economy or maybe even on a different level. For example, international trade union organizations tend to focus on how globalization affects global (income) inequality. So in order to give a proper answer to the question of individual attitudes toward globalization, it should be clear on what level people's attitudes are measured.

Feasel and Muzumder (2012) have done exactly this. They have used separate questions about the consequences of the growing international trade and business ties between their country and others for their family and for their country (ibid.: p. 195). When using the results of these questions as dependent variables, their results show that the effects of their independent variables - age, education, and income - show variation between these two different levels. Although the directions of the relationships of these variables do not change across these levels, the strength of the effects does display changes in strength up to 33% (for specific age groups and income). This confirms the idea that the effects of explanatory variables may vary across these different levels concerning individual attitudes toward globalization.[5]

Levels of attitudes toward globalization
Individual/Family
National
Global

---

[5] There were almost no changes in significance; however, this is most likely because of the very large number of observations (n ≈ 30.000).

Based on these previous findings, I will investigate whether individual attitudes toward globalization vary between the individual/family, national and global level. This will answer the question whether attitudes toward globalization vary across different levels.

Moreover, I want to test the assumption that these levels also show variation between the different dimensions of globalization. In other words: do people who think of globalization as an economic process have attitudes toward globalization that show significant variation on all three levels with people who do not think of globalization as an economic process? The same question can be asked for people who think of globalization as either a political or a cultural process.

The combination of levels and dimensions gives another analytical layer to the concept of globalization. These levels and dimensions should also be related to each other in a theoretical way, since not all levels are equally relevant to all dimensions.

Economic globalization can be expected to have an influence on all levels. On the individual/family level it is thought to affect the financial situation within households (e.g. Scheve & Slaughter 2001). Economic globalization also has a distinct effect on the level of the nation state, where it supposedly can lead to greater economic prosperity or losses. People are assumed to make a judgment about this separately from their own financial consequences (Mansfield & Mutz 2009). Then there is the global level, where people are thought to have an opinion about the effects of globalization, especially on the economic position of developing countries, but also on the welfare of the world in general (e.g. Feasel & Muzumder 2012).

In the political dimension of globalization the effects on the individual/family level are minimal. Political globalization is mainly organizational in its nature and the discussion it brings up is mainly about national sovereignty and domestic political power versus larger international institutions. This makes political globalization especially relevant on the national level. Since cooperation within organizations like the UN, but also the IMF and OECD are linked to political globalization, political globalization is also relevant to people's attitudes on the global level.

Finally there is the cultural dimension. As stated earlier, this mainly relates to the way in which globalization relates to personal identities and daily activities. This is why the effects of cultural globalization are mostly relevant on the individual/family level. However, fear of other cultures can also

be perceived strongly on the national level. Especially with nationalist or radical right wing parties that prophet xenophobic sentiments. On the level of global equality cultural globalization might be linked with a sense of American hegemony. However, this is more an issue of political globalization, since the effects of "Americanization" are mostly perceived on the individual/family level (cf. Hoffmann 2002).

2.3 Explaining different responses to globalization

A large part of the research on attitudes toward globalization takes place under the assumption that the effects of globalization on the labor market influence the attitude people have toward globalization (Hay & Smith 2010).[6] Under this assumption there are basically two explanatory models. One is based on *endowments and human capital*, while the other is related to *aspects of employment*. Consequently, there are also two dominant theories that link the position of workers on the labor market to their attitude toward globalization. The theories that fit the former model are based on the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, while the Ricardo-Viner theorem fits the latter category. Both of which will be discussed later on.

Although the main focus of research on attitudes toward globalization has emphasized economic theories, both economic and non-economic considerations are thought to be important (Mayda & Rodrik 2005: p. 1395). In recent years, the studies on attitudes toward globalization have therefore introduced more and more of these non-economic variables. Some authors even suggest that the assumed causality in some of those economic theories should be interpreted in a different way (cf. Haimueller & Hiscox 2006).

Those non-economic variables can also fit into categories the categories of human capital and employment related issues. However, also two new categories should be introduced; one that has to do with a person's political views and another that is more based on demographic characteristics.

In the upcoming sections I will discuss the most important variables that have been used to explain individual attitudes toward (different aspects of) globalization. Most of these explanatory variables only claim to explain attitudes toward only one or two of the dimensions of globalization (economic, political, and cultural), so not all variables are theoretically relevant to all dimensions and levels on which globalization has an effect. To create an overview of the variables in relation to the dimensions and

---

[6]   Although Hay and Smith (2010) do not specify which dimension or level of globalization they focus only on economic aspects.

levels of globalization, I have put them into a table to create an overview of which attitudes toward what dimension of globalization are explained by these variables (Table 2).

Table 2: Explanatory variables for attitudes toward globalization

Dimension → Level ↓	Economic	Political	Cultural
Individual/family	• Skill level (+) • Employment in export sector (+) • Trade union membership (-) • Convertible resources (+) • Income (+)	X	• College education (+) • Affiliation with the populist radical right (-)
Nation	• Skill level (+) • College education (+) • Convertible resources (+) • Employment in export sector (+) • Affiliation with the liberal right (+) • Affiliation with the populist radical right (-) • Trade union membership (-) • Exclusive notion of citizenship (-) • Income (+)	• College education (+) • Exclusive notion of citizenship (-) • Affiliation with the liberal right (+) • Affiliation with the populist radical right (-) • Trade union membership (-)	• College education (+) • Affiliation with the populist radical right (-)
Global	• Trade union membership (-) • College Education (+) • Ethnicity (-) • Convertible resources (+)	• College education (+) • Exclusive notion of citizenship (-) • Affiliation with the liberal right (+) • Affiliation with the populist radical right (-) • Trade union membership (-)	X

(+) Indicates that a variable is expected to have a positive effect on one's attitude toward globalization, (-) indicates that this variable is expected to have a negative effect.

2.4 Human capital and endowments

The first category of variables I will discuss is related to endowments and human capital. This category covers a person's skill level, college education and convertible resources. In this part I will discuss the theoretical connections of these variables with individual attitudes toward globalization.

Skill level

The Heckscher-Ohlin theorem (H-O) is the most used theory in research in the area of attitudes toward globalization. It is originally a theory of international trade in which human capital, referred to as factor of production, is central. H-O is based on three key assumptions: factors of production are mobile across sectors, markets are perfectly competitive, and there are constant returns to scale (Mansfield & Mutz 2009; Schott 2003).[7,8] It is the first assumption, that of the factor mobility, which makes it distinct from the other theories of international trade, the Ricardo-Viner theorem, which will be discussed later on.

Taking these assumptions into consideration, H-O states that abundant factors of production are relatively cheap in comparison to scarce factors of production. This is why trade liberalization is expected to lead to an increase in the import of products that rely on scarce (and thus relatively expensive) factors of production, which in turn leads to a decline in demand for the local counterparts of these products, as they are expected to be more expensive. On the other hand, products that rely on abundant (and relatively cheaper) factors will benefit from the new markets they can reach through this liberalization. These products will likely see their prices rise due to an increase in demand and export.

Stolper and Samuelson (1941) have used H-O to look at the effects of trade on real wages. Their conclusions were that international trade is expected to raise the wages for workers who are employed in the sectors that see the relative prices of their products rise as a consequence of this liberalization. Sectors that see their prices drop will be confronted with lower wages. Following this logic, it is expected that the types of workers that a country has a surplus of, are more likely have a more positive attitude toward globalization, due to the comparative advantage they have on the market. Workers that are

---

[2]   If there are constant returns to scale, this means that an upgrade in scale of production leads to an equally great upgrade in returns (as opposed to increased or decreased returns to scale).

[3]   Factors of production are the resources put into the production process; in this case the factors of production refer to human capital in the form of labor.

scarce have a comparative disadvantage and are expected have a more negative attitude, as they will have to face more competition as a result of globalization (Scheve & Slaughter 2001: p. 50).[9]

In Western European countries, which have a relative surplus of skilled labor, globalization is most likely to have a negative effect the labor market position of the scarce factor of production: the workers with relatively low skill levels. As the supply of low skilled level is very low, the wages are expected to be relatively high, which makes these low skilled workers a relatively unattractive alternative to the workers found in low wage countries.

Because of these different effects of globalization for skilled and unskilled labor, it is thought that both groups have different attitudes regarding increasing free trade and immigration. In richer countries, in which skilled workers are generally more abundant, the skilled workers are thought to be less anti-trade and anti-immigration than the unskilled workers. Consequently their attitude toward globalization will be more positive. For poorer countries the responses are expected to be exactly the opposite. In these countries skilled workers are expected to have more negative attitudes toward globalization, compared unskilled workers, because unskilled labor is the abundant factor, while skilled labor is scarce (O'Rourke 2003).

For example, the Netherlands has an abundance of workers with high skill levels and relatively few workers with low skill levels. Let us say that in Germany this is exactly the opposite. As a consequence, the wages of low skilled workers in Germany are relatively low, while in the Netherlands, these wages are relatively high. In some cases the Dutch government even has to step in to guarantee wages, because a sector has lost its profitability. Trade liberalization makes it possible that German products become available on the Dutch market. If these products are produced through low skilled labor, they are likely to be cheaper than the Dutch versions of these products, because wages in Germany are lower, since they have an abundance of this low skilled labor. Consequentially, it becomes even less attractive for the Netherlands to continue its production of these goods that rely on low skilled labor (scarce factor of production). This results in higher labor market pressures for low skilled workers in the Netherlands, they can either lose their job, or have to sell their labor against a lower wage. This is why according to this theorem of international trade; low skilled workers in the Netherlands are more likely to oppose economic globalization than their highly skilled counterparts. These workers with high skill

---

[9] This specific part about the abundant sector is also referred to as the Stolper-Samuelson theorem (Caporaso & Madeira 2012: p. 156). However, some authors choose to refer to the whole theory as Stolper-Samuelson, or Heckscher- Ohlin.

levels gain a comparative advantage through the liberalization of change. They are likely to see the demand for their products rise as the German versions are more expensive. This is expected to lead to higher wages (per Stolper & Samuelson).

It is also important to note that since this theorem considers skills to be mobile across sectors, not just the people working in traded industries are affected by these wage pressures. Domestic labor market competition is expected to influence all workers. So if trade barriers in a specific sector were to be removed, this would not only affect workers in that specific sector, but all workers that compete in the same labor market, independent of the sector they work in (Scheve & Slaughter 2001: p.49). Moreover, this model assumes a condition of full employment (ibid.: p. 48).[10]

Workers' skill levels are regarded as a part of their human capital. In most interpretations of H-O, a person's occupational wage is thought to be the result of his or her human capital (Scheve & Slaughter 2001: p. 50). Although human capital is a collection of factors, like social networks and skill level, it is most commonly measured as a person's level of education.

In a causal scheme H-O will look as follows:

Human Capital/Skill Level $\xrightarrow{\quad + \quad}$ Attitude toward (economic) globalization

This leads to the following hypotheses based on H-O, as applicable for countries with a surplus of high skilled labor.

> *H1a: More skilled workers have a more positive attitude toward economic globalization than lower skilled workers on the individual/family level.*

> *H1b:* More skilled workers have a more positive attitude toward economic globalization than lower skilled workers on the national level.

The results of Scheve and Slaughter's survey among American workers seem to confirm their hypotheses based on H-O, as they show that less skilled workers (less educated and average/low wages) are more likely to oppose economic globalization (both free trade and immigration) than their more skilled counterparts. Beside Scheve and Slaughter, no other study appears to use occupational wage as

---

[10]   Introduced by Lord Beveridge, full employment means "that unemployment is reduced to short intervals of standing by, with the certainty that very soon one will be wanted in one's old job again, or will be wanted in a new job within one's powers (Beveridge 1945: p. 18; Gazier & Schmid 2002: p. 2).

an indicator of skill.[11] Other studies have also found similar positive effects of skill level, measured as level of education, on attitudes toward economic globalization in countries where low-skilled labor is scarce (e.g. Mansfield & Mutz 2009; Mayda & Rodrik 2005). These results have been found for both the effect of economic globalization on the individual level, as on the national. O'Rourke inventively measures skill according to the skill categories of the ILO (O'Rourke 2003: p. 10). This measurement of skill is based on the skills necessary for the job a person has. The big advantage of measuring skill in this way is that it is less likely to accidentally measure any other effects related to a person's level of education. However, O'Rourke (2003) does not control for level of education.

As a final comment I would like to add that it is interesting that in the research on attitudes toward globalization H-O is still actively used. In the field of economy, the explanatory power attributed to H-O appears to have declined. Researchers have shown on several occasions that H-O is of little relevance to the real world, in which there are more than two industries (Kwan Choi 2003).

Level of education

While a person's level of education is often used as an indicator for skill level (e.g. Scheve & Slaughter 2001; Mayda & Rodrik 2005), some authors think that level of education actually has a different effect. Following Scheve and Slaughter's (2001) influential study, Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006) also look toward the H-O theorem to explain the attitude of individuals toward economic globalization. However, they think that the positive relationship that is found between years of education and one's attitude toward globalization is caused by a different causal mechanism. They suggest that there is an *ideational*, or *information-based* mechanism (cf. Mansfield & Mutz 2009). Because, following Hainmueller and Hiscox, one's attitude toward globalization is not about the actual distribution of money, but about the exposure to economic ideas and information. This information is more likely to be obtained through college education. Colleges offer an environment that is more prone towards free trade and neoliberal market policies because mainstream economists tend to think in this direction (Hainmueller & Hiscox 2006; Caplan 2002). This makes it more likely for people with a college education to have a more positive attitude toward economic globalization.

Mansfield and Mutz (2009) suggest that higher education also brings about more civic virtues, such as tolerance of different cultures and involvement in active foreign policies (cf. Erikson & Tedin 2005;

---

[11] Instead of occupational wage, income is used very often in large-N analyses on attitudes toward economic globalization. However, at least in the studies of Mansfield and Mutz (2009) and Mayda and Rodrik (2005) this is not directly linked to a person's skill level. This is why I shall discuss this variable later on.

Mansfield & Mutz 2009). This means that people with a higher level of education are expected to have a more positive attitude toward globalization, because they are in possession of civic virtues that are more tolerant toward other cultures, and engagement in foreign politics and international organizations.

In order to test their assumptions about the effects of education, Mansfield and Mutz look at two issues that they assume are influenced by participation in college education. These issues are *isolationism* and *ethnocentrism*. Isolationism is the idea that national politics should not deal with interventions in foreign politics. Ethnocentrism is the idea that only people that have the same nationality are trustworthy. Mansfield and Mutz suggest that having followed a college education, will lead to more international oriented positions on these two issues, due to the exposure to discourses that are more favorable toward interventionism and the trustworthiness of other ethnicities.

$$\text{College education} \xrightarrow{+} \text{Isolationism and ethnocentrism} \xrightarrow{+} \text{Attitude toward globalization}$$

This effect, as suggested by Mansfield and Mutz, makes education also relevant for a person's attitudes toward political and cultural globalization. Less isolationism can be associated with a more positive attitude toward cooperation with other countries through international treaties and organizations. In the same context, De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2005) suggest that a preference towards more Europeanization/EU can be explained through cognitive mobilization, an idea based on the works of Inglehart (1970) who suggests that a higher level of education gives people the individual capacities to receive and interpret messages relating to a *remote political community*, this is the basis of what he calls *cognitive mobilization*. Only through higher education, a person can become aware of a more complex form of community that reaches across the borders of the nation state (Inglehart 1970: p. 47). Thus, people with a college education are expected to have a more positive attitude toward political globalization than people who did not follow a college education.

This leads to two hypotheses for the national and global level of economic globalization. College education is not expected to play a role in the formation of one's attitude on the individual/family level, because college education does not directly say something about how people perceive the effects of globalization on their own situation, it is more about how people evaluate the macroeconomic effects of neoliberal market and trade policies. The individual/family level is more important to the cultural dimension.

H2a: College educated people will have a more positive attitude toward economic globalization on the national level than people who did not go to college.

H2b: College educated people will have a more positive attitude toward economic globalization on the global level than people who did not go to college.

With Inglehart's view on remote political communities, two additional hypotheses should be added for political globalization:

H2c: College educated people will have a more positive attitude toward political globalization on the national level than people who did not go to college.

H2d: College educated people will have a more positive attitude toward political globalization on the global level than people who did not go to college.

A less ethnocentric vision leads to less fear of people from other cultures; both in a person's daily live as the effect of other cultures on the national culture.

H2e: College educated people will have a more positive attitude toward cultural globalization on the individual/family level than people who did not go to college.

H2f: College educated people will have a more positive attitude toward cultural globalization on the national level than people who did not go to college.

One must be careful though when comparing the effects of both college education and skill level, when skill level is measured as level of education, because it is very hard to say something about which mechanism is observed. The key difference is that all college education related hypotheses are based on a *threshold*, which leads to a dichotomous variable: either you have followed college level education and therefore have been exposed to pro-globalization thoughts, or you have not had such education and therefore lack this pro-globalization bias. The hypotheses based on skill, however, presume a more continuous scale, in which persons with a higher level of education have a better position on the labor market, and are consequently expected to have a more favorable attitude toward (in this case economic) globalization.[12] Thus if effects for other levels than college education are found in the economic dimension, this may indicate that the skill level mechanism is observed.

---

[12] This does not mean that I will measure skill level as a continuous scale, because it is an ordinal variable, I will

Convertible resources

The theoretical work of Bauman (1998) can also be seen as a sort of critique of the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem. He agrees with H-O on the point that a person's skills are central to the way globalization affects their lives. However, he does not agree that all skills are mobile. According to Bauman, this age of globalization is expected to benefit the people who and control *convertible resources*, or *exit options*, which allows them to be mobile (Kriesi et al., 2008: 5). These resources can be both intellectual and material (convertible capital). Bauman (1998) makes the difference between tourists and vagabonds. The tourists come out as winners, moving at their hearts desire, with the world as their backyard due to their access to convertible resources. When new opportunities arise somewhere else, they will be able to seize them regardless time and space. Vagabonds, on the other hand, are the losers; they too will move around, but only because they do not feel welcome anywhere. These two groups are created by one another:

> Globalization is geared to the tourists' dreams and desires. Its second effect (...) is the transformation of many others into vagabonds. The first effect breeds and inflates the second – indomitably and unstoppably. The second is the price of the first (Bauman, 1998: 47).

It is the tourists that have the possibilities to benefit from the opportunities of globalization, while the vagabonds are restraint by its challenges and are dependent on what others are willing to give. The tourists do show resemblance with the higher skilled workers from the H-O theorem, for they possess a specific set of skills that others do not. However, Bauman's research introduces a specific attribute to the variable skill: *convertibility*. Instead of general skills, globalization emphasizes the need for convertible resources: skills that can be transferred across jobs and countries. This why these convertible resources are also referred to as *exit options*, they give someone the chance to quit a job, or suffer a dismissal, without bearing the costs of long time unemployment.

In the same tradition as Bauman, Coutinho, Dam and Blustein (2008) argue that new workers in a globalized world must be flexible and able to work in rapidly changing environments. Less skilled workers will face increasing difficulties to compete within this growing global economy (Coutinho et al. 2008: p. 10). Their view on convertible resources is that the ability to keep on learning that is the key to be successful in a globalized world.

---

make several dummies for elementary, lower secondary, secondary and tertiary education.

So globalization leads to the need for convertible resources, it is these resources that determine whether a person can be successful as globalization continues. Moreover, it is these resources that determine one's attitude toward globalization.

$$\text{Possession of convertible resources} \xrightarrow{\quad + \quad} \text{Attitude toward (economic) globalization}$$

> *H3a: Workers who are in possession of convertible resources will have a more positive attitude toward economic globalization on the individual level than people who do not have access to such resources.*

> *H3b: Workers who are in possession of convertible resources will have a more positive attitude toward economic globalization on the national level than people who do not have access to such resources.*

> *H3c: Workers who are in possession of convertible resources will have a more positive attitude toward economic globalization on the global level than people who do not have access to such resources.*

These hypotheses are aimed at explaining how individuals are able to deal with globalization in relation to their position on the labor market. Therefore it fits especially the economic dimension on the individual level. However, Bauman suggests that forms of unity and dependency that were part of most historical rich/poor divisions, which led to forms of solidarity of the rich with the poor, is now missing. This is why the people with access to convertible resources will see the entire world as an attractive place full of positive challenges, while the *vagabonds* witness an *inhospitable* place (Bauman 1998: pp. 47-48). Consequently, people with access to convertible resources are thought to be more positive toward globalization on all levels. On the individual/family level, because they are thought to have a better position on the labor market, and on the national and global levels, because they see globalization as a process that creates this attractive world where the sky is the limit.

2.5 Job related variables

The second category of variables is related to a person's job. Literature suggests that one's attitude toward globalization is influenced by the sector of employment, and by a person's income. First I will discuss the influence of sector of employment.

Sector based cleavages

In the same study that found evidence for the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, Scheve and Slaughter (2001) looked at another widely used theory of international trade that could be used to explain attitudes toward globalization: the Ricardo-Viner theorem (R-V).

In contrast to H-O, R-V regards skills as sector specific, as opposed to mobile between sectors in H-O, therefore it is not a person's skill level that is relevant, but one's sector of employment.[13] According to R-V the effects of trade liberalization will not be equal for all sectors. This is the part that is quite similar to H-O, however according to R-V workers are not expected to change sector. Therefore the effects of globalization on a sector are not absorbed by the entire labor market (as is assumed by H-O), but the effects of globalization are sector specific. Accordingly, the effect of globalization on a person's sector of employment will determine his or her attitude toward economic globalization (Mansfield & Mutz 2009).

Economic globalization can do two things to a specific sector. It can either cause a comparative advantage, or a comparative disadvantage. Export oriented sectors will likely gain a comparative advantage from free trade, as they see their demand rise due to the access to a larger public. Sectors with a comparative advantage are assumed to receive more profits resulting in higher wages. People employed in these sectors are therefore expected to have a more positive attitude toward globalization. On the other hand, workers in sectors that have to face a comparative disadvantage are likely to have a more negative attitude toward globalization. For these workers, an increase in free trade means they have to face more competition from other, more competitive, countries (Scheve & Slaughter 2001: pp. 50-52). As a consequence, these sectors will see imports of cheaper products and services rise as a consequence of economic globalization, which is why the demand, and wages, in these sectors are expected to drop.

However, not all workers are employed in trade sectors. Workers employed in non-trade sectors are expected to think less negative of economic globalization then people working in protected sectors, because they are insulated from international product-market competition (ibid.: 50). Mayda (2006) finds that this lack of exposure to direct labor market pressures from international trade even leads to a more positive attitude toward globalization in non-traded sectors.[14]

---

[13]   Skills are expected to be sector specific at least *in the short run* (Mansfield & Mutz 2009: 428).

[14]   However, this difference is only present for trade issues, for the attitude toward immigration this effect was not found. Mayda (2006) suggests that this might be because immigrants can also cause labor market pressures in non-traded sectors.

Employed in sector with comparative advantage $\xrightarrow{+}$ Attitude toward (economic) globalization

Employed in sector with comparative disadvantage $\xrightarrow{-}$ Attitude toward (economic) globalization

This leads to the following hypotheses based on the R-V theorem:

> *H4a: Workers in sectors with a comparative advantage will have a more positive attitude toward economic globalization on the individual/family level, than people working in sectors threatened by foreign competition through imports.*
>
> *H4b: Workers in sectors with a comparative advantage will have a more positive attitude toward economic globalization on the national level, than people working in sectors threatened by foreign competition through imports.*
>
> *H5a: Workers in non-trade sectors will have a more positive attitude toward economic globalization at the individual/family level, than people working in sectors threatened by foreign competition.*
>
> *H5b: Workers in non-trade sectors will have a more positive attitude toward economic globalization at the national level, than people working in sectors threatened by foreign competition.*

These hypotheses are only theoretical applicable to economic globalization, just like the ones based on skill level. The reason for this is that the assumed relation is caused by the effects of free trade. Moreover, the hypotheses are only applicable to the individual/family and national level, because this theoretical approach says something about how effects of globalization on domestic labor markets affect people's attitudes toward globalization.

Although there is only limited proof for R-V, scholars that focus on attitudes toward globalization keep including it in their research, if data are available.[15] The studies by Scheve and Slaughter and Mansfield and Mutz were not able to find any significant effects for sector based factors, like exposedness to trade and industry of employment (Scheve & Slaughter 2001: p. 75; Mansfield & Mutz 2009).

---

[15]   The lack of studies that find proof for R-V is also a result of the relative small number of studies that has actually used R-V in comparison to the more popular H-O model. This is thought to be caused by a shortage in available data on sector of employment (Mansfield & Mutz 2009).

Some authors suggest that the sector based cleavage suggested by R-V can only be found in countries with low factor mobility, or in other words: in situations where people are not very likely to be able to switch sectors (cf. Hiscox 2001).

Irwin (1995), for example, has found support for the importance of a sector based cleavage when factor mobility is low. According to his study, this sector based cleavage was very potent in Great Britain in 1923 in which the debate between free trade and protectionism was a key issue in the general elections. He found that people employed in sectors with a negative trade balance (more exports than imports) were more likely to vote for the anti-free trade conservatives, indicating a more negative attitude toward economic globalization. Although this might appear a little trivial, the study does give an indication of the relevance of a sectoral cleavage in a society with low factor mobility.[16]

Income

Individuals with higher income and more education are thought to be linked to a more positive attitude toward globalization (cf. Feasel and Muzumder 2012; Scheve & Slaughter 2001). In the work of Scheve and Slaughter (2001), income is merely a proxy of a person's skill level. In this approach the theoretical mechanism for income is the same as that applies for one's skill level.

However, Feasel and Muzumder (2012) approach income in a different way. According to them, income relates to the way society is structured. They think that the people who are in control of the most capital will get the most benefits, in an approach that has a somewhat Marxist character. So income is thought to have an effect that exists separately from skill level.

Following their approach the rich are always best of, regardless of the abundant factor of production as with the H-O theorem. The results of Feasel and Muzumder, indeed show that wealthier individuals perceive greater benefits of economic globalization than the more impoverished. Only at the lowest levels of income the respondents see economic globalization as more beneficial than their more skilled and higher paid counterparts. But it must be noted that these results come from a cross-national survey that includes developing countries, and these very low income levels are not found in Western economies.

---

[16] In the Netherlands the factor mobility appears to be relatively high, only US graduates hold more different jobs than the Dutch (Borghans & Golsteyn 2012). This might lead to the expectation that the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem is better applicable to the Dutch case than Ricardo-Viner.

Drawing on these findings, it appears to be the case that economic globalization increases inequality within countries, always benefiting the rich and hindering the poor. Consequently, people with a higher income are expected to have a more positive attitude toward economic globalization.

Higher income ———————→ Attitude toward globalization
                        +

> *H6a: People with a higher income will have a more positive attitude toward economic globalization than people with a lower income, because they are expected to gain greater benefits, on the individual level.*

> *H6b: People with a higher income will have a more positive attitude toward economic globalization than people with a lower income, because they are expected to gain greater benefits, on the national level.*

Mayda and Rodrik (2005), have also found significant results for income, although they are unable to provide a theoretical explanation for this effect. The only real explanation suggested for the effect of income is that it should be regarded as a reflection of a person skill, because income, just like wage, is expected to be the effect of this (cf. Scheve & Slaughter 2001: p. 50). In the study by Mansfield and Mutz (2009), income did not come out as a significant explanatory.

2.6 Political views

The third category of variables used to explain attitudes toward globalization relate to political views persons have. Here I will discuss the influence of affiliation with certain political parties and movements, trade union membership and the views people have on citizenship.

Trade union membership

Mansfield and Mutz (2009) suggest that trade union membership might affect one's attitude toward globalization according to a similar causal mechanism as college education. They think that trade unionists will be more exposed to a specific kind of information, which is more likely to be skeptical and focuses on the challenges that globalization brings for workers around the world. The results based on the *NAES Trichotomous Index* indeed show that trade union members are more likely to be opposed to free trade. The same effect was also found by Mayda and Rodrik (2005), however, they make no statements whatsoever about the potential causality.

The attitudes of the rank-and-file members of trade unions are expected to be the most skeptical toward globalization, especially in those groups in which union membership is most rooted. However, these groups are mainly manual workers that have a limited educational history (Hyman 2003: p. 2). So maybe this effect can also be explained by education or skill level.

As stated earlier, trade unions focus a lot on the consequences of globalization – as increasing dominance of the market over other governance arrangements like the state and trade unions (cf. Streeck & Schmitter 1986) – on global inequality and the position of workers in general. This is why the effect of trade union membership is especially theoretically relevant for economic globalization on the level of individuals and global equality. However, it might also be relevant on the national level, as the views of trade unions might influence how people judge the declining power of the state versus the market. Moreover, trade union membership should also matter to the political dimensions, because trade unions tend to be negative about the lack of social policies in the Europeanization process.

> *H7a: Trade union members are more likely to think negatively about economic globalization on the individual/family level.*

> *H7b: Trade union members are more likely to think negatively about economic globalization on the national level.*

> *H7c: Trade union members are more likely to think negatively about economic globalization on the global level.*

> *H7d: Trade union members are more likely to think negatively about political globalization on the national level.*

> *H7e: Trade union members are more likely to think negatively about political globalization on the global level.*

Political affiliation

Mayda and Rodrik (2005) find that people with affiliation with the political right are likely to have a more positive attitude toward globalization. Because people who support the political right are more likely to be in favor of market oriented solutions that are shared by traditional liberal rightist parties. However, Mayda and Rodrik are unclear about what the theoretical ground for these findings is. Baker (2005: p. 929) suggests that such an effect might be caused by the ideational mechanism that was discussed earlier (cf. Hainmueller & Hiscox 2006).

Moreover, Mayda and Rodrik (2005) have a really poor operationalization of this *political affiliation with the right*, as they only use a 5 point scale from far left to far right, with no further information on what it means to be politically right. In addition to the more traditional liberal parties, there are also populist radical-right parties affiliated with the "political right". These parties are very much against immigration, and more in support of protectionism. People who identify with such parties are expected to be more opposed to globalization in all dimensions, but with primarily a national focus (cf. Hooghe & Marks 2004). Hence, they are not expected to care about effects on the global level. Only in the cultural dimension the individual level is relevant, because the ideas about other cultures presented by populist radical right parties might influence the daily experiences that people have with these cultures.

However, these ideas about the effect of political affiliation on attitudes toward globalization inherently raise a "chicken or egg" question. It might seem a more logical thought people vote for a certain party because their ideas are best reflected by that specific party, than that the party they feel affiliated with determines how they feel about globalization, which makes it an illusory correlation:

Liberal right party identification

Pro free trade ⟍   ↓ (?)

Positive attitude toward (economic and political) globalization

Populist radical-right party identification

Fear of other cultures ⟨   ↓ (?)

Negative attitude toward (all dimensions of) globalization

The question mark indicates the possible direct relationship between the specific party affiliation and one's attitude toward globalization.

In the best case this makes political identification with liberal right/populist radical right parties an indicator of neoliberal attitudes or the fear of other cultures.

Nevertheless this leads to the following hypotheses:

> *H8a: People who identify themselves with traditional liberal right wing parties are more likely to have a positive attitude toward economic globalization on the national level.*

H8b: People who identify themselves with traditional liberal right wing parties are more likely to have a positive attitude toward political globalization on the national level.

H8c: People who identify themselves with traditional liberal right wing parties are more likely to have a positive attitude toward political globalization on the global level.

H9a: People who identify themselves with populist radical right wing parties are more likely to have a negative attitude toward economic globalization on the national level.

H9b: People who identify themselves with populist radical right wing parties are more likely to have a negative attitude toward political globalization on the national level.

H9c: People who identify themselves with populist radical right wing parties are more likely to have a negative attitude toward political globalization on the global level.

H9d: People who identify themselves with populist radical right wing parties are more likely to have a negative attitude toward cultural globalization at the individual level.

H9e: People who identify themselves with populist radical right wing parties are more likely to have a negative attitude toward cultural globalization at the national level.

Inclusive and exclusive notions of citizenship

Hooghe and Marks (2004) have investigated the effect of national identity on the support for political globalization.[17] They argue that national identity can both have a positive and a negative effect, so first they make the distinction between people who support an inclusive and who support an exclusive form of national identity. Those who support the exclusive notion are expected to be against external influences in their nation, which makes them more likely to have a negative attitude toward globalization. Hooghe and Marks expect that this cleavage is especially potent in countries with political elites that are divided on the issue of European integration, because this makes it attractive for parties to mobilize along this cleavage. In the Netherlands there is a strong division between the parties in parliament who favor and those who oppose European integration (Garvert 2007; DNPP 2009). On basis of Hooghe and Marks' ideas this makes it likely to expect that attitudes toward globalization differ between people with an exclusive and an inclusive notion of national identity.

A more restrictive, or exclusive, notion of citizenship is also associated with nationalist pride (Hooghe & Marks 2004). Baker (2005) links feelings of nationalist pride with negative feelings against trade, and a

---

[17]   In this specific study it is about further integration within the EU. However, this is a form of political globalization, because in essence it is about the debate about the decline of national influence as a result of the increasing dependence on a regional organization.

more negative attitude toward economic globalization on the national level. On the other hand, Hooghe and Marks (2004) have focused primarily on attitudes toward political globalization on the national level.

Exclusive notion of citizenship $\xrightarrow{-}$ Attitude toward globalization

> *H10a: People who share an exclusive notion of national identity are more likely to have a negative attitude toward economic globalization on the national level.*
>
> *H10b: People who share an exclusive notion of national identity are more likely to have a negative attitude toward political globalization on the national level.*

2.7 Demographics

The final category consists of variables related to demographics. These are ethnicity, gender and age.

Ethnicity

Moreover, ethnic minorities are expected to have a more critical notion of globalization, because they are more aware of the effects of globalization on non-western countries (Myers 2010). In this sense belonging to a ethnic minority is expected to influence one's attitude toward global economic (in)equality.

> *H11: People who belong to an ethnic minority have a more negative attitude toward economic globalization on the global level.*

Gender and age

Mayda and Rodrik (2005) have found a strong significant effect for gender, with men being more positive toward economic globalization compared to women. They proposed that this gender difference is either caused by the significantly lower levels of labor market participation, or the different positions women occupy within the labor market, compared to men. However, they do not find these effects when controlling for active participation on the labor market or status of the sector of employment.

Burgoon and Hiscox (2004; 2008) have further investigated this gender effect, because the existing literature was of little help when trying to explain this gender effect (2004: p. 8). In their investigation Burgoon and Hiscox (2004) came across two very interesting effects: the gender gap only exists among college-educated respondents, and the gap becomes larger for these college-educated respondents in older age-cohorts. They explain these differences in the same tradition as Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006)

and Mansfield and Mutz (2009), as they regard college-educated individuals as generally more informed and less susceptible for anti-foreigner nationalist and protectionist sentiments. Moreover, people who have taken college education in economics are thought to be more pro-trade, and as it is the case: women choose fewer economic college studies. However, this difference is becoming smaller, hence the effect that older women are more negative toward economic globalization than younger women. Or, in the words of Burgoon and Hiscox:

> More exposure to economic ideas and information tends to increase support for trade; in general, women are less likely than men to have been exposed to economic ideas and information during their time in school and college, although this is less likely among younger cohorts than among older cohorts (Burgoon & Hiscox 2008: p. 14).

In a causal scheme this would look like this:

Gender ——————————▶ College education ——————▶ Attitude toward globalization

▲
|
|

Age

The real effect here is that of college education on the attitude toward globalization, however being female decreases the likelihood of a college education, although this effect of gender on education has in its turn decreased for younger age cohorts.

However, there is another possible explanation that has come forward. Based on a study by Iversen and Soskice (2001) It is thought that women are sacrificing more of their professional lives to take care for others, or that they are just more compassionate and that this makes them more susceptible to be protectionist in order to prevent the negative effects of free trade for potential losers of globalization.

Focusing on this specific gender effect exceeds the aim of this thesis, especially because this effect is likely to be caused by other variables, like college education, that will also be included in the analyses. Therefore I will not make specific hypotheses, but I will add both gender and age as control variables, just to be sure.

Summary

In this chapter I have discussed multiple theories that have been suggested in previous research as an answer to explain individual attitudes toward globalization. Globalization is a complex concept to grasp, so in order to structure the debate I have started out by making an analytical distinction between three

dimensions and three levels of globalization that have come forward from previous literature. This has led to the distinction between economic, political, and cultural dimensions, and an individual/family, national, and global level.

Susequently, I have made four categories of independent variables in order to explain people's attitudes toward globalization, one based on endowments, like skill and education; one based on job related aspects, like sector of employment and wage; one based on political views, like trade union membership, or political affiliation; and one category is based on demographics. In order to further structure the debate, I have created hypotheses that specify the dimension and level to which the variable is relevant.

For an overview of the hypotheses, I have attached a full list of in appendix A.

3. Method

The purpose of this chapter is to explain the operationalization of the variables I will use for the analyses that will be presented in chapter 4. First I will discuss the dependent variables I will use, followed by the independent variables, for the independent variables I have put the name of the indicator I will use for the data analyses in parentheses.

Description of dataset

For the empirical analysis we use a survey of over 600 Dutch citizens held in November 2011. The questionnaire of this web-based survey was send to 981 members of a panel group, using three sample criteria: region, age and gender. 631 respondents completed the survey, which is a response rate of 64.3%. After using a small weight factor for age, gender and region, the resulting sample is representative for the Dutch population. The distribution of voting preferences is similar to representative election polls conducted during the same time frame. The average time for completing the questionnaire was 25 minutes. Since the respondents were allowed to pause during the survey, this average is skewed to the right (Akkerman, Mudde & Zaslove 2013).[18]

Of these respondents, 49% is male (n=309) and 51% female (n=322). The average person in this dataset is 44,99 years of age, with a standard deviation of 13,86 years. The interviews used to gather the data have been conducted in 2011. Moreover, the database contains very specific information on how respondents feel about globalization, and what there associations with globalization are.

The dependent variable: individual attitudes toward globalization

Many authors who claim to study attitudes toward globalization have a very narrow definition, which mostly focuses solely on a specific dimension of economic globalization, like trade or immigration. This is due to a lack of proper data. These authors use existing databases, like the International Social Survey Programme, or the World Values Survey, in which specific questions about globalization do not exist. The questions that come closest to grasping globalization are related to free trade/protectionism and immigration. However, the dataset I will use contains more specific information about globalization.

The dependent variable in this analysis is *a person's attitude toward globalization*. As stated in the theory chapter, I make a distinction between three dimensions (economic, political, cultural) and three levels (individual/family, national, global). Consequentially, the dependent variables I will use for the

---

[18] This is literally copied from their forthcoming article, with the authorization of the authors. However, unlike the authors, I have not used excluded the respondents who took less than 10 minutes to complete the survey.

statistical analyses will consist of dimensions and levels. Of the nine possible dependent variables (3 x 3), I will use only seven. Political globalization on the individual level and cultural globalization on the global level are not included in the analyses, because they lack theoretical relevance (see chapter 2).

Dimensions

The division into dimensions is based upon the question what people associate with globalization. The respondents could select multiple answers to this question:

1. That people all over the world find it easier to communicate with one another.
2. The dispersion of cultures over the world.
3. That national governments lose influence within their own country.
4. That the production of goods and provision of services becomes increasingly international.
5. That different cultures in the world start to show more resemblance.
6. Other developments.
7. I have not yet thought about that.

First, the economic dimension consists of respondents who selected the fourth answer, about the increasing internationalization of the production of goods and services. Second, the political dimension is filled with respondents who selected the third answer. Third, the cultural dimension consists of respondents who selected either the first, second or fifth answer (or a combination of those answers). Respondents who only picked one of the latter two answers were not included in one of the dimensions.

Since the respondents were allowed to select as many of these seven answers as they liked, there is a good chance that one respondent will be included in multiple dimensions. If, for example, a respondent selected the answers three and four, he or she is included in both the analysis of the economic and the political dimension.

An alternative selection procedure would have been an exclusive one, in which respondents can only be included in one dimension and those who associated globalization with multiple dimensions are excluded from the data. [19] However, it should not matter that people associate globalization with multiple dimensions, because globalization has multiple dimensions and people should not limit their

---

[19] Moreover, the addition of an extra dummy variable for people that had an exclusive notion of one of the dimensions in each of the analyses has not led to any significant differences, when controlling for all the other variables.

view to one of these. What is important, is that they are included in the analyses of the dimensions that they associate with globalization.

Levels

Now, the scores on the dependent variables are determined by the level that will be analyzed. The three levels, individual/family, national, and global are respectively represented by the questions: what are the consequences of globalization for:

- Me and my family?
- The welfare in the Netherlands?
- The welfare in the world?

The respondents have answered these questions with a score on a 9 point scale, ranging from 1 to 10. The value 1 indicates that the consequences of globalization on the respective level are terrible, while a 10 determines that a person is very happy with these consequences. This score is the *person's attitude toward globalization*. Thus, the higher the score on this scale, the more positive the respondents attitude is.

Although welfare (in the survey the Dutch word *welvaart* is used) is often associated with the economic conditions within a country, it actually covers a wider range of wellbeing, happiness and social prosperity. This is why *consequences for the welfare* is the most applicable variable to measure the overall attitude of a person toward globalization, since it does not lean toward one specific dimension of globalization. Only on the individual/family level the question was more straight forward: *what are the consequences for me and my family?* However, this question is still neutral toward the different dimensions of globalization.

Bringing together the dimensions and levels will result in seven dependent variables (out of a potential nine). The first three dependent variables come from the pool of respondents that associate globalization with an increasingly international production of goods and services. From this group all levels are used, so we get an economic score for the individual/family level, the national level and the global level. The fourth and fifth dependent variables come from the group of respondents who associate globalization with the loss of influence of governments within their own country. Here we get a political score for the national and the global level. The final variables follow from the people who associate globalization with cultural aspects. From this group we get a cultural score for the individual/family and the national level.

The independent variables

In the upcoming section an operationalization of the independent variables will be provided. For these operationalizations I will make a link between the hypotheses and the survey questions that fit the theoretical idea behind these hypotheses.

Skill level

Skill level has been measured in many different ways, but most often as level or years of education (e.g. Scheve & Slaughter 2001; Feasel & Muzumder; Mayda 2006). However, this ignores experience based on post-schooling acquisition skills, achievement differences within similar education levels, and that not all skills gained through education are equally relevant on the labor market (Baker 2005: p. 927). In addition, other causal effects, like cognitive mobilization have been attributed to education (cf. Hainmueller & Hiscox 2006; Inglehart 1970). Baker (2005: pp. 27-28) therefore suggests to use a combination of *formal education level*, *income*, and *occupation*. However, he is disappointingly unclear about how he makes this complex calculation, in which he also includes the factor loadings of these variables. In addition, such a measurement can lead to extra high correlation when controlling for education and income, which might blur potential effects.

Another solution is offered by O'Rourke (2003). He suggests that skill level is best measured according to the ILO's International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO). This classification is based on both skill level and skill specialization. Here, skill level is the *function of the complexity and range of the tasks and duties involved*. And skill specialization is defined by *the field of knowledge required, the tools and machinery used, the materials worked on or with, as well as the kinds of goods and services produced* (ILO 2013a).

A good case can be made for using the method applied by O'Rourke, because it is more encompassing than other measurements, while it leaves the possibility to control for a separate effect of education level.

However, most authors that claim a specific effect of level of education only make a theoretical distinction between college education or no college education (cf. Mansfield & Mutz 2009). It is only Inglehart (1970) who presumes a general effect of education, as an indicator for cognitive mobilization.

Furthermore, it is a person's level of education that often determines what job a person will get in the first place. Therefore I reckon it safe to use the more straightforward indicator of education to measure a person's skill level for this research.

Since education is measured in 9 ordinal categories, ranging from lower secondary education (1) to post academic (9), I have decided to make 4 dummy variables. The first dummy variable will be that of *elementary education* people for the group of people who have completed only elementary education (basis onderwijs [score 1]). The second dummy will be created for *lower secondary education*, for respondents with the following categories: *lbo (lts), huishoudschool, vbo, vmbo (kader of basis), mavo, ulo, mulo, vmbo* (scores 2,3). The third dummy is for *seconda*r *education* with the categories: *havo, mms, vwo, hbs, atheneum, gymnasium, kort mbo* (scores 4,5,6). The final dummy will be created for *tertiary/college education* this dummy consists of people that have completed a *hbo, kandidaatsexamen* and higher (7,8,9).

College education

According to the theories of Mansfield and Mutz (2009), and Haimueller and Hiscox (2006), the key is whether or not a person has participated in college education. For the measurement of skill I have used four different dummies, of which one is dedicated to college education. The specific effect of college education can be revealed if all other education related dummies show significant negative effects on one's attitude toward globalization with *tertiary/college education* as a reference category.

Income

For the variable income I will use the net shared family income based on 10 categories. The first category (which has the value 1) is less than €500 a month, while the final category is a net family income over €10000. The intermediate categories are €500 - €1000, €1000 - €1500, €1500 - €2000, €2000 - €2500, €2500 - €3000, €3000 - €5000, €5000 - €7500, and €7500 - €10000. People who were not prepared to answer this question are not included in the analyses. Because the difference between the income groups varies, this is actually an ordinal variable. However, since there are 10 categories that do have a clear direction (i.e. 2 is higher than 1, and lower than 3,4,5, etc.) I will treat this, for modeling convenience, as a continuous variable in the statistical analyses.

Sector

For one's sector of employment it is theoretically relevant if a sector gains a comparative advantage from international trade, a comparative disadvantage, or whether it is a non-traded sector.

Following Mayda and Rodrik (2005) I will look at whether a sector has a comparative advantage or disadvantage coming from international trade, whilst adding a third category for non-traded sectors. This will lead to three categories that are attributed to the respondents. A respondent will score 0 if he or she works in a sector that has a comparative disadvantage. This is determined by looking at the net exports for that sector in the period 2006-2011, adjusting for trade imbalances.

In the survey, respondents were able to select one of 18 possible sectors of employment, based on the Standardized Business Index (Standaard Bedrijfsindeling, SBI) from 2008, an index created by Statistic Netherlands (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, CBS) on basis of the NACE Rev. 2 (Nomenclature statistique des activités économiques dans la Communauté Européenne) by the European Union and the ISIC Rev. 4 (International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities) by the United Nations (CBS 2013a).

I have grouped these 18 sectors into three categories: non-trade sectors, sectors with a comparative advantage and sectors with a comparative disadvantage. I will use the same approach as Mayda and Rodrik (2005), by looking at the net exports per sector over the period 2006-2011. However there is one complication: the SBI 2008 uses different categories than the index used for the trade figures, which is the SITC Rev. 3 (Standard International Trade Classification). Therefore I have used the categories from the SITC index as indicators for the categories used in the SBI. A list of which SITC indicators I have used for which SBI category can be found in Appendix C.

First I will create dummy for respondents that are employed in a sector with a comparative advantage. Respondents employed in an SBI sector with net *exports* over the period 2006-2011 will score 1, placing them in the category of people employed in a sector with a comparative advantage. All other respondents score 0.

Then I will create a dummy for respondents employed in a sector with a comparative disadvantage. These are the respondents working in SBI sectors that saw net *imports* over the period 2006-2011. They score 1 in this dummy and fall in the category people employed in a sector with a comparative disadvantage. All other respondents score 0.

Finally, there is a category for the non-trade sectors. This category entails people employed in *wholesale, retail and car repairs*; *lodging, dinner and beverage provision*; *rental and real-estate*; *education*; and *health care and welfare*. For the final dummy, for people employed in a non-trade

sector, these respondents score a 1. Respondents who listed themselves in the category *other services* have been excluded from the dataset, because they cannot be classified.

People employed in a sector with a comparative disadvantage will serve as the reference category in the statistical analyses. I have chosen this reference category on basis of theoretical grounds, because the hypotheses (H4 and H5) state something about people employed in these two sectors in comparison to people employed in sectors with a comparative disadvantage.

Two complications with this categorization are that the sector *industry* might include too many different trade sectors, especially since there is a big difference in trade figures between chemical industries and other manufactured goods. Two SITC sectors that both fall within the SBI sector of *industry*.

I admit that the combination of the SBI and the SITC is not ideal, and that the SBI in general is not a perfect fit to measure a potential trade-based cleavage. However, it is the best indicator of sector at hand, and this is why I will still use it for my analyses.

Convertible resources

The essence of possessing convertible resources is the sense a person has about the possibilities of his or her skills to be transferred to new jobs in new workplaces. Consequently, people who think that they can easily find a new job are thought to have more convertible resources. Therefore I will use the time people deem necessary to find a new job, in the hypothetical situation that they would have to find one now, as the indicator for the possession of convertible resources. The question asked in the survey was: *how long do you think that you will need to find a new job*. To which people could response on a six point scale, ranging from less than a month to two years or more (1 to 6). So the higher the score, the longer a person expects to need to find a new job, and the less convertible resources he or she possesses. Respondents who answered "I do not know" will not be used for analyses that control for convertible resources.

Trade union membership

Trade union membership is based on whether people have answered to be a member of any Dutch trade union. These data have been turned into a dummy variable in which non-members get the value 0 and members are labeled 1.

Political affiliation with the liberal, and the populist radical right

For this variable I have selected the respondent's party preference. In the Dutch party system there is only one real right wing (conservative) liberal party, which is the People's party for Freedom and Democracy (*Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie*, VVD) (Pas 2001: pp. 8-9; 11-12). Likewise, at the time of the survey, there was only one populist radical right party, which is Geert Wilders' Freedom Party (Partij Voor de Vrijheid, PVV) (ibid.: pp. 16-17). In the survey, people were asked which party they would vote for if elections were held today. According to the responses, I have created two dummy variables. One for affiliation with the liberal right, in which a party preference for the VVD will score 1, and one for affiliation with the populist radical right, in which respondents with a preference for the PVV will score 1. Logically, in both cases all other respondents will score a 0.

Exclusive notions of citizenship

In order to measure whether people have an exclusive notion of citizenship, I have decided to perform a factor analysis of a question to which respondents have indicated the importance of several aspects of citizenship according to a four point scale (1 = not important, 4 = very important).

I have chosen for this factor analysis, because the views on citizenship can be based different aspects. A person may find the place of birth very important, while not caring about whether a person is able to speak Dutch.

For the survey respondents had to indicate the importance of:

1. Being born in the Netherlands.
2. Having the Dutch nationality.
3. Living in the Netherlands for the largest part of your life.
4. Being able to speak Dutch.
5. Being a Christian.
6. Acceptation of the Dutch political system and jurisdiction.
7. Feel Dutch.
8. Having Dutch parents.
9. Having Dutch grandparents.
10. Acceptation of the separation of church and state.
11. Acceptation that there are people with different religions.
12. Acceptation that every religion may be criticized.

13. Acceptation that people have different habits and traditions.
14. Acceptation that people have different sexual orientations.

A factor analysis with a varimax rotation leads to three factors, based on eigenvalues greater than 1 (see Appendix G for the exact numbers). The first factor that came out of the analysis is based on acceptance of national culture and values (6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14). The second factor is based on an idea of *jus soli* (1, 2, 3, 4, 7). The third factor is more or less based on *jus sanguinis* or citizenship based on relatives/blood line (5, 8, 9).

The factor scores are used as indicators for different exclusive notions of citizenship. The higher the score, the more importance a person attaches to that specific factor. I have decided to include all three factor scores in the analyses, because the factors based on jus soli and jus sanguinis tell something about how much people value a restrictive notion of citizenship, since place of birth and blood lines are predetermined. The score based on acceptance of national culture and values indicates a much more tolerant view on citizenship: a vision that should be able to obtain citizenship, as long as they try to fit in. The precise outcomes of the factor analysis can be found in Appendix F.

Ethnicity

In contrast to race, ethnicity is more than just someone's appearance, it is more related to shared norms, values, cultural symbols and practices that originate in a specific cultural and political background (cf. Baker 2003: p. 250). Therefore, I will look at whether people have roots in a different (non-western) cultural and political background.

Because there are only seven people in database with non-Dutch nationality, I have based the ethnicity of the respondents on the region their parents have come from. If the respondents have stated that at least one of their parents originates from a country that is not in either North/Western Europe, or North America, I have given them a 1. Indicating that they have a different ethnicity. The other respondents score 0.

Gender

For gender I will use a dummy variable with the following categories: male (0) female (1), completely overlapping with the question from the survey. Since females score 1, the corresponding variable in the statistical analyses will be *female*.

Age

I have chosen to use the ratio scale as indicator for age. This variable consists of the age respondents told the interviewer they were at the time of the survey.

Age

4. Results

In this chapter I will discuss the results from the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions I have performed. An overview of the complete regression outputs from SPSS can be found in the Appendices E-1 to E-7.

I will start with looking at the differences between attitudes toward globalization on the different levels, and between the dimensions. Then I will shortly look at the correlation tables for the different dimension, after which I will present the seven different models that have resulted from the OLS regressions; one for each conjuncture of levels and dimensions that is of theoretical relevance (see table 2 in the theoretical chapter).

From these models I will first look at people who have an economic notion of globalization. I will test each of the variables separately on each level (individual/family, national, global). The first model is always a reflection of the endowment variables. The second model displays the effects of the job related variables. The third model consists of the variables that are related to one's political views. The fourth model consists of the demographic effects. Finally I will present a complete model with all variables. Then I will do the same for people with a political and a cultural notion of globalization.

4.1 Differences between levels and dimensions of globalization

I will start off the statistical analyses by looking at whether there are actually differences between the different levels and dimensions that came forward from the theoretical chapter.

For the sake of the OLS regressions I treat the dependent variables as if they are parametric. Therefore, I should use a Pearson Correlation (Pearson's R) to see how strong correlations are between the three different levels. For this analysis I have used all respondents, including those who stated to have not yet thought about what globalization means. The Pearson's R correlations are displayed in table 4.1.

This correlation table shows that there are moderate positive correlations between all variables (0,36 ≤ R ≤ 0,67 [Taylor 1990: p. 3]). The correlation between the national and the global level is the highest, with an R of 0,602. These figures imply that there are moderate and positive correlations between the different levels, but that there is still enough variance left to explain. This means that someone who has

a positive attitude toward globalization on the individual/family level is also likely to have a more positive attitude on the national and global levels. This also works the other way around.[20]

Table 4.1 Pearson Correlation between the different levels

Pearson Correlation		1	2	3
1. Individual/family	Correlation Coefficient	1,000		
	N	528		
2. National	Correlation Coefficient	**,452***	1,000	
	N	518	539	
3. Global	Correlation Coefficient	**,382***	**,602***	1,000
	N	512	526	532

*** Significant at p<0,01; **significant at p<0,05; *significant at p<0,10.

The findings indicate that although there are significant correlations between the three levels, these correlations are far from perfect, since the Pearson correlation coefficients are all smaller than 1. This means that there is still plenty of variation between the three levels.

The next step is to look at the differences between the three dimensions. I will do so by using an analysis of variance, better known as ANOVA. Again I will include all cases, since the hypotheses state that there is a difference between people who think of globalization as a dimension specific process and people who do not.

Table 4.2 shows that, on the national and global level, the mean scores of people who consider globalization as an economic process are significantly different from the mean scores of people who have not indicated that they regard globalization as an economic process (this includes both people who associate globalization with political and cultural processes and people who have answered either that they have not thought about this, or that they associate globalization with other developments).

---

[20] Since the dependent variables could also be regarded as categorical, non parametric variables I have also performed a Spearman's Rho correlation test. Both Pearson's Correlation as Spearman's Rho should be interpreted by the same standard, and the results show more or less the same moderate correlations (see appendix H for this correlation table).

However, on the individual/family level, the means of people who consider globalization as a economic process and those who do not, are too likely to be equal, as the p value exceeds the 0,100.

This means that the attitudes of people who think of globalization as an economic process on the individual/family level do not show significant variation with the attitudes on this level of people who do not regard globalization as an economic process.

Table 4.2 ANOVA between people with an economic notion of globalization and people without an economic notion of globalization on all levels

Level		Mean	df	F	Mean Square	p
Individual/family	Between Groups	6,587	1	4,699	1,549	0,214
	Within Groups	6,391	525	3,032		
National	Between Groups	6,874	1	56,581	17,318	**0,000*****
	Within Groups	6,201	537	3,267		
Global	Between Groups	6,734	1	19,695	6,379	**0,012****
	Within Groups	6,336	530	3,087		

*** Significant at p<0,01; **significant at p<0,05; *significant at p<0,10.

The mean score for the *Between Groups*, is the mean score for people with an economic notion of globalization, the mean score for *Within Groups* is the mean for people that did not indicate that they associate globalization with economic processes.

Table 4.3 and 4.4 show that the means of the attitudes toward globalization are significantly different on all levels. Thus, the answer to the question raised in the theoretical chapter about whether attitudes toward globaliation on specific levels vary across dimensions is yes, but with the exception of attitudes toward economic globalization on the individual/family level in the economic dimension.

Although the mean of the attitudes on the individual/family level in the economic dimension does not show significant variation, I will still use this level for the OLS regressions, because there are still specific hypotheses for attitudes toward economic globalization on the individual/family level.

Table 4.3 ANOVA between people with a political notion of globalization and people without a political notion of globalization on all levels

Level		Mean	df	F	Mean Square	p
Individual/family	Between Groups	6,074	1	24,760	8,269	**0,004***
	Within Groups	6,584	525	2,994		
National	Between Groups	6,095	1	21,088	6,326	**0,012****
	Within Groups	6,558	537	3,333		
Global	Between Groups	6,186	1	15,055	4,862	**0,028****
	Within Groups	6,579	530	3,096		

*** Significant at p<0,01; **significant at p<0,05; *significant at p<0,10.

The mean score for the *Between Groups*, is the mean score for people with a political notion of globalization, the mean score for *Within Groups* is the mean for people that did not indicate that they associate globalization with political processes.

Table 4.4 ANOVA between people with a cultural notion of globalization and people without a cultural notion of globalization on all levels

Level		Mean	df	F	Mean Square	p
Individual/family	Between Groups	6,567	1	9,529	3,152	**0,076***
	Within Groups	6,290	525	3,023		
National	Between Groups	6,595	1	18,646	5,586	**0,018****
	Within Groups	6,214	537	3,338		
Global	Between Groups	6,678	1	31,682	10,337	**0,001*****
	Within Groups	6,177	530	3,065		

*** Significant at p<0,01; **significant at p<0,05; *significant at p<0,10.

The mean score for the *Between Groups*, is the mean score for people with a cultural notion of globalization, the mean score for *Within Groups* is the mean for people that did not indicate that they associate globalization with cultural processes.

4.2 Correlations

Before starting with the OLS-regressions, I will present the correlation tables here (table 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7). I have used the Spearman's Rho for correlations between categorical variables, as no variable (except age) is a actually continuous. I have made a table for each dimension, because the OLS regressions will be performed per dimension and each dimension has a specific case selection. As follows from the tables, there are no exceptionally high correlations between the independent variables.

Table 4.5 Correlations on the dependent variables for people with an economic notion of globalization

n = 102	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
1 Elementary Education	1,000															
2 Lower Secondary Education	-0,038	1,000														
3 Secondary Education	-0,140	-0,183	1,000													
4 Convertible Resources	0,208**	0,110	-0,120	1,000												
5 Income	-0,160	-0,049	-0,171*	-0,041	1,000											
6 Comp. Advantage Sector	-0,043	-0,026	0,070	0,126	0,073	1,000										
7 Non Trade Sector	0,079	0,073	-0,055	-0,184*	-0,119	-0,810***	1,000									
8 Trade Union Member	-0,114	0,046	0,093	0,028	0,155	0,098	-0,084	1,000								
9 Affiliation with Lib. Right	-0,086	0,000	0,126	-0,068	0,147	0,067	-0,010	-0,072	1,000							
10 Affiliation with Pop. Right	-0,067	0,044	0,080	-0,198*	0,013	0,090	-0,008	-0,016	-0,196**	1,000						
11 National Acceptance	0,130	-0,075	0,007	0,191*	-0,160	-0,039	0,037	-0,075	0,016	-0,083	1,000					
12 Jus Soli	0,140	0,186*	-0,030	0,012	-0,066	-0,040	-0,027	-0,155	0,147	0,228**	-0,128	1,000				
13 Jus Sanguinis	0,240**	0,159	-0,028	0,057	0,078	0,061	-0,037	0,209	-0,053	0,234**	-0,094	0,067	1,000			
14 Female	0,232**	0,022	-0,155	0,056	-0,171*	-0,317***	0,233***	-0,099**	-0,319	-0,172*	0,097	-0,004	-0,189**	1,000		
15 Age	0,154	0,103	-0,124	0,292***	0,182*	0,102	-0,084	0,121	0,006***	-0,168*	0,066	0,045	0,137	-0,116	1,000	
16 Ethnicity	-0,059	-0,076	-0,025	-0,026	0,060	-0,002	-0,051	-0,024	-0,016	-0,134	-0,060	-0,104	-0,071	0,073	-0,140	1,000

Table 4.6 Correlations on the dependent variables for people with a political notion of globalization

n = 65	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
1 Elementary Education	1,000															
2 Lower Secondary Education	-0,062	1,000														
3 Secondary Education	-0,141	-0,275**	1,000													
4 Convertible Resources	0,070	0,038	0,010	1,000												
5 Income	0,088	-0,193	-0,004	-0,072	1,000											
6 Comp. Advantage Sector	-0,181	0,044	0,019	0,261**	-0,168	1,000										
7 Non Trade Sector	0,211*	0,009	-0,089	-0,355***	0,118	-0,856****	1,000									
8 Trade Union Member	-0,145	0,020	0,194	0,053	0,033	0,113	-0,115	1,000								
9 Affiliation with Lib. Right	-0,102	-0,199	0,062	-0,182	0,263**	-0,080	0,098	-0,102	1,000							
10 Affiliation with Pop. Right	-0,080	0,240*	0,065	-0,203	-0,177	-0,130	0,119	-0,034	-0,258**	1,000						
11 National Acceptance	-0,043	-0,193	0,106	0,317**	0,020	0,105	-0,153	-0,079	0,084	-0,166	1,000					
12 Jus Soli	0,071	0,011	-0,032	-0,180	-0,135	-0,169	0,113	-0,182	-0,078	0,247**	-0,038	1,000				
13 Jus Sanguinis	0,014	0,103	0,253***	0,111	-0,171	0,020	0,028	0,141	-0,036	0,177	-0,159	0,114	1,000			
14 Female	0,288**	-0,104	-0,207*	-0,021	-0,137	-0,353****	0,316****	-0,295**	-0,274**	0,271**	0,024	-0,027	-0,086	1,000		
15 Age	0,200	0,033	0,163	0,280**	-0,107	0,167	-0,141	0,155	-0,102	0,004	0,193	0,122	0,167	-0,131	1,000	
16 Ethnicity	-0,062	-0,121	-0,071	0,166	-0,060	0,243**	-0,293**	-0,081	-0,199	-0,024	-0,034	-0,272**	-0,045	0,229**	-0,155	1,000

Table 4.7 Correlations on the dependent variables for people with a cultural notion of globalization

n=178	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
1 Elementary Education	1,000															
2 Lower Secondary Education	-0,047	1,000														
3 Secondary Education	-0,109	-0,297***	1,000													
4 Convertible Resources	0,119	0,052	-0,053	1,000												
5 Income	0,017	-0,090	-0,099	0,042	1,000											
6 Comp. Advantage Sector	-0,109	-0,007	0,025	0,077	0,017	1,000										
7 Non Trade Sector	0,139	0,056	0,013	-0,120	-0,089	-0,788***	1,000									
8 Trade Union Member	-0,078	0,150**	-0,007	0,178**	0,084	0,045	-0,056	1,000								
9 Affiliation with Lib. Right	-0,064	-0,082	0,118	0,045	0,151**	-0,027	-0,001	0,001	1,000							
10 Affiliation with Pop. Right	-0,048	-0,020	-0,057	-0,166**	0,006	-0,022	0,038	-0,061	-0,178**	1,000						
11 National Acceptance	0,052	0,021	0,080	0,188**	-0,127*	-0,046	-0,028	0,038	-0,014	-0,062	1,000					
12 Jus Soli	0,102	0,002	0,058	0,096	0,054	-0,105	0,079	-0,044	0,227***	0,070	0,130*	1,000				
13 Jus Sanguinis	0,085	-0,002	-0,047	0,039	0,064	-0,003	-0,094	0,225***	-0,050	0,225***	-0,022	-0,034	1,000			
14 Female	0,150**	0,084	-0,036	0,059	-0,090	-0,382***	0,310***	-0,034	-0,078	0,102	-0,089	-0,030	0,028	1,000		
15 Age	0,164**	0,161**	-0,027	0,332***	-0,009	0,077	-0,039	0,117	-0,049	-0,082	0,174**	0,110	0,052	0,017	1,000	
16 Ethnicity	-0,044	-0,060	0,061	0,001	-0,087	0,099	-0,130*	0,053	-0,116	-0,065	-0,059	-0,230***	-0,061	0,083	-0,169	1,000

4.3 Attitudes toward economic globalization

Table 4.8 displays the effects of the explanatory variables of economic globalization on the individual/family level.

The negative effects on one's attitude toward economic globalization found for elementary and lower secondary education indicate that there is some sort effect of skill level. These findings indicate that people who's highest level of education is either elementary or lower secondary education have a significantly (respectively p<0,01 and p<0,05) less positive attitude toward globalization at the individual/family level than people who have a completed a form of tertiary or college education. However, no significant (p<0,10) difference is found for secondary education. Since no such effect is found for secondary education, there appears to be no proof for the ideational mechanism of college education, because this would require that all people with educations lower than tertiary or college education would have a more negative attitude toward college education. But to some extent, lower educated people have a more negative attitude toward globalization, which gives some proof for the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem and that means that hypothesis 1a cannot be refuted. However, hypothesis 2a should be refuted, as no proof is found for a specific effect for college education on one's attitude toward economic globalization on the individual/family level.

Two other, unexpected, significant effects have come forward form these models. The first is affiliation with the liberal right. This means that people who would vote for the VVD have a more positive attitude toward economic globalization than people would not vote for either VVD or PVV. So, people with an affiliation for the liberal right should be expected to have a more positive attitude toward economic globalization on the individual/family level.

The other unexpected effect is that of *Jus Sanguinis*, however, this effect completely disappears in the full model with all variables. Nevertheless, this appears to indicate that people who attach greater value to a notion of citizenship based on blood lines appear to have a more negative attitude toward economic globalization on the individual/family level. The effect of this variable disappears when adding the education dummy variables to the model. Two theoretical and statistical interpretations are possible. The disappearance of this effect could be caused by the significant correlation between *Jus Sanguinis* and *Elementary Education* (see table 4.5). But, it might also be causef by an *omitted variable bias*, which can make a relative unimportant variable significant, when an important independent variable is not included in the model (cf. Woolridge 2009: pp. 89-90).

Table 4.8 Attitudes toward economic globalization on individual/family level

n = 102	1 B	1 SE	2 B	2 SE	3 B	3 SE	4 B	4 SE	5 B	5 SE
Constant	7,049	**0,392*****	6,278	**0,782*****	6,238	**0,260*****	7,569	**0,663*****	7,251	**1,059*****
Elementary Education	-4,151	**0,963*****							-3,705	**1,116*****
Lower Secondary Education	-2,017	**0,814****							-1,741	**0,866****
Secondary Education	-0,185	0,349							-0,206	0,379
Convertible Resources	-0,063	0,114							-0,049	0,126
Income			0,142	0,099					0,061	0,106
Comp. Advantage Sector			-0,231	0,601					-0,040	0,604
Non Trade Sector			-0,972	0,610					-0,737	0,601
Trade Union Member					0,179	0,409			-0,134	0,396
Affiliation with Lib. Right					1,183	**0,472****			0,920	**0,503***
Affiliation with Pop. Right					0,296	0,580			-0,119	0,609
National Acceptance					-0,099	0,183			0,028	0,179
Jus Soli					-0,124	0,208			0,089	0,209
Jus Sanguinis					-0,365	**0,192***			-0,024	0,200
Female							-0,711	0,383	0,151	0,441
Age							-0,019	0,014	-0,011	0,015
Ethnicity							0,694	0,595	0,284	0,565
Adj. R^2	0,187		0,045		0,042		0,034		0,175	

*** Significant at p<0,01; **significant at p<0,05; *significant at p<0,10.

The dependent variable is a positive attitude toward globalization on the individual/family level for the group of people that have said to associate globalization with economic processes.

Other variables, for which effects would have been expected, did not show significant correlations. This is the case for one's sector of employment, trade union membership, convertible resources and income.[21] Likewise, the control variables gender and age show no significant effects. Another conclusion

---

[21] When using employment in a sector with a comparative advantage as a reference category instead of employment in a sector with a comparative disadvantage, the negative effect for employment in a non trade sector becomes significant for attitudes toward economic globalization on the individual/family and national levels (at p<0,10). This means that people employed in a non trade sector have more negative attitudes toward economic globalization on these levels than people employed in a sector with a comparative advantage.

This effect is most likely caused by the fact that the people who work in sectors with a comparative disadvantage are by far outnumbered by the ones employed in a sector with comparative advantage and non trade sectors. This makes it less likely that a possible effect will be significant. The effect that shows up when using employment in a sector with comparative advantage as a reference category still fits within the expectations of the R-V theorem. Although this theorem only specifies that people empoyed in a non trade sector are more positive than people working in a sector with a comparative disadvantage, following the same logic, people working in a sector with a

is that only endowments and political views play a significant role in explaining one's attitude toward economic globalization on the individual/family level. On basis of these findings this is not the case for job related aspects and demographics.

Thus, according to the findings presented in table 4.8, only hypothesis 1a should not be refuted, for the other hypotheses (3a, 4a, 5a, 6a, 7a) these findings indicate the opposite: no sufficient proof is found to not refute them.

The adjusted R Square makes it possible to compare the explanatory power of the models with one another, compensating for the number of variables included in each model.

This adjusted R Square of the complete model (5) is 0,175. This quite high in comparison to the models that will be discussed later on, which means that this model is a relative good fit to explain specific attitudes toward globalization.

When looking at the national level (table 4.9), the first model immediately shows that the effects of one's skill level are not as important, because only people with a lower secondary education at most have a more negative attitude toward economic globalization on the national level than people who have completed a college education (p<0,05). On the individual/family level this was also the case for people with an elementary education at most. This means that the hypothesized ideational effect of college education cannot be found, again. This seems to exclude the supposed effect of more exposure to mainstream neoliberal economic ideas. Or, this could mean that college education in the Netherlands is not as much influenced by neoliberal economics, as is the case in the USA, where Hainmueller and Hiscox, and Caplan do their research, or that these ideas are already implemented in the secondary education. Moreover, this finding gives some indication that one's skill level might still matter to some degree.

comparative advantage can also be thought to have a more positive attitude toward economic globalization, as they have more direct benefits than people employed in a non trade sector. See appendix G for the corresponding tables.

Table 4.9 Attitudes toward economic globalization on the national level

n = 102	1		2		3		4		5	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Constant	6,816	**0,381*****	5,790	**0,677**	6,949	**0,239*****	6,979	**0,623*****	5,533	**0,936*****
Elementary Education	-0,606	0,935							0,147	0,987
Lower Secondary Education	-2,577	**0,790*****							-1,895	**0,766****
Secondary Education	-0,317	0,339							-0,052	0,335
Convertible Resources	0,172	0,110							0,177	0,112
Income			0,309	**0,085*****					0,347	**0,094*****
Comp. Advantage Sector			-0,266	0,521					-0,197	0,534
Non Trade Sector			-0,829	0,528					-0,803	0,532
Trade Union Member					-0,263	0,375			-0,390	0,350
Affiliation with Lib. Right					0,982	**0,432****			0,977	**0,445****
Affiliation with Pop. Right					-0,166	0,532			-0,116	0,538
National Acceptance					0,205	0,168			0,229	0,158
Jus Soli					-0,135	0,191			-0,028	0,185
Jus Sanguinis					-0,080	0,176			-0,029	0,177
Female							-0,238	0,359	0,333	0,390
Age							0,004	0,013	-0,013	0,013
Ethnicity							-0,045	0,559	-0,436	0,499
Adj. R^2	0,077		0,139		0,031		-0,024		0,225	

*** Significant at p<0,01; **significant at p<0,05; *significant at p<0,10.

The dependent variable is one's attitude toward globalization on the national level for the group of people that have said to associate globalization with economic processes.

There is a significant effect (at p<0,01) found for income. Thus a higher family income is expected to lead to a more positive attitude toward economic globalization on the national level. This corresponds with the expected correlation in hypothesis 8b. However, on the individual/family level this effect was not significant (at p<0,10). This is somewhat strange, because it means that one's income does not affect one's attitude at the individual/family level, but it does influence one's attitude on the national level. It would be more logical if this was the other way around, since one's income is more related to the individual/family level. This could mean that people do not perceive a very strong effect of economic globalization on their family income.

Moreover, a comparison between the adjusted R Squares of the first two models shows that the job related variables (model 2) have more explanatory power than the endowments (model 1), with respective adjusted R Squares of 0,077 and 0,139.

Affiliation with the liberal right is the only other variable remaining in this analysis that is significant (at p<0,05). So people who would vote for the VVD have a more positive attitude toward economic globalization on the national level than people who would not vote for either a liberal, or populist right wing party. More broadly, this means that an affiliation with the liberal right, and its neoliberal ideas, is correlated with a more positive attitude toward economic globalization on the national level than people with no affiliation for the liberal or populist radical right (H8a).

This means that no significant results were found for the other hypothesized effects: trade union membership, convertible resources, sector employment, affiliation with the populist radical right, and the specific notions of citizenship.

The adjusted R-square of the complete model (5) is the highest of all OLS regressions performed for this thesis, which means that the hypotheses that say something about attitudes toward economic globalization on the national level provide the best explanatory value. This is not unexpected, as most theories and hypotheses used in the debate on attitudes toward globalization focus on explaining these specific attitudes toward economic globalization on the national level.

When looking at the global level (Table 4.10), we can see almost the same effects for level of education as the ones found on the individual/family level. This means that people who's highest level of education is either elementary or lower secondary education have a significantly (respectively p<0,01 and p<0,05) less positive attitude toward globalization at the global level than people who have a completed a form of tertiary or college education. The main difference is that in the final model (5) the negative effect of lower secondary education is not significant anymore (at p<0,10). However, this is most likely caused by the fact that the number of variables is actually too high for the limited amount of cases, since both the standard error and the B-coefficient only show a slight change and the p value is still quite close to 0,10 (p=0,139).

Trade union membership has a negative correlation with one's attitude toward economic globalization on the global level. This seems to confirm hypothesis 7c, which states that trade union members are more likely to think negatively about economic globalization on the global level. The fact that trade union membership only correlates with personal attitudes toward economic globalization at the global level could indicate that the trade union movement's emphasis on global inequality does influence the views of its members. That this effect is only visible at the global level is probably due to the fact that information on global inequality, as a result of economic globalization, and global worker solidarity

outnumbers trade union campaigns on its local effects. This is also the first proof for an ideational effect. However, just like *Lower Secondary Education*, the effect of trade union membership is not significant anymore in the complete model (5) (at p<0,10), but the explanation for this is also similar, since both the standard error and the B-coefficient only show a slight change and the p value is still quite close to 0,10 (p=0,134).

Table 4.10 Attitudes toward economic globalization on the global level

n = 102	1		2		3		4		5	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Constant	6,697	**0,396***	6,713	**0,741***	7,175	**0,254***	6,258	**0,643***	5,761	**1,050***
Elementary Education	2,001	**0,972**							2,155	**1,106***
Lower Secondary Education	-1,594	**0,822***							-1,283	0,858
Secondary Education	-0,233	0,352							0,039	0,375
Convertible Resources	0,129	0,115							0,135	0,125
Income			0,176	**0,094***					0,251	**0,105**
Comp. Advantage Sector			-0,654	0,570					-0,526	0,599
Non Trade Sector			-1,001	**0,578***					-0,997	**0,596***
Trade Union Member					-0,670	**0,399***			-0,593	0,392
Affiliation with Lib. Right					0,069	0,459			0,354	0,499
Affiliation with Pop. Right					-0,088	0,565			0,387	0,603
National Acceptance					0,087	0,178			0,055	0,177
Jus Soli					0,160	0,203			0,118	0,208
Jus Sanguinis					0,184	0,187			0,081	0,198
Female							0,282	0,371	0,432	0,437
Age							0,014	0,014	-0,001	0,015
Ethnicity							0,109	0,577	-0,029	0,560
Adj. R^2	0,074		0,042		-0,015		-0,015		0,096	

*** Significant at p<0,01; **significant at p<0,05; *significant at p<0,10.

The dependent variable is one's attitude toward globalization on the global level for the group of people that have said to associate globalization with economic processes.

A non-hypothesized, yet positive, effect is found for income. This indicates that, just as on the national level, income plays a positive role in the formation of one's attitude toward economic globalization. More specifically, a higher family income is expected to lead to a more positive attitude toward economic globalization on the global level.

Then there is a negative effect found for employment in a non-trade sector. Even though this effect was not expected, the negative direction seems strange. The results indicate that someone who is employed

in a non trade sector has a more negative attitude toward economic globalization on the global level, than someone employed in a sector with a compartave disadvantage. On basis of the Ricardo-Viner theorem, one would expect that people in a non trade sector would be more positive toward economic globalization than those working in a sector with a comparative disadvantage. Even though this R-V theorem applies best to the individual and national levels, there is no ground to expect this effect on one's attitude on the global level to be reversed. In addition to the lack of significant effects of sector employment on the other level, these results indicate that the Ricardo-Viner theorem should be refuted.

The adjusted R Square of the complete model (5) for economic globalization at the global level, however, is not as high as on the other two levels.

4.4 Political dimension

Now I will discuss the results of the analyses of attitudes toward globalization for people who have a political notion of globalization, for which the results for attitudes on the national level are displayed in table 4.11.

The first significant effect is that of affiliation with the liberal right. This means that there is a strong correlation between people who would vote VVD and one's attitude toward political globalization at the national level. This can also be seen a confirmation of the idea that a lot of institutions associated with political globalization are regarded by society as "neoliberal projects". Additionally, this finding seems to confirm hypothesis 10b. This effect is only significant (at $p<0,10$) in the complete model (5), which indicates that controlling for other, non job related variables gives a better display of the effect that affiliation with the liberal right has.

The same is true for a notion of citizenship based on the acceptance of national values and traditions. The findings here indicate that this notion of citizenship is positively correlated with one's attitude toward political globalization on the national level. A notion of citizenship that is based on acceptance of national values and tradition is much less restrictive than one based on place of birth (*Jus Soli*) or bloodlines (*Jus Sanguinis*). Hypothesis 10b states that people with a more exclusive notion of citizenship have a more negative attitude toward political globalization on the national level. Therefore people with a more inclusive notion of citizenship are expected to have a more positive attitude, which is confirmed by these findings.

Table 4.11 Attitudes toward political globalization on the national level

n = 65	1		2		3		4		5	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Constant	6,077	**0,663*****	5,876	**1,464*****	6,009	**0,446*****	6,937	**0,986*****	7,137	**2,217*****
Elementary Education	0,438	1,621							2,554	1,792
Lower Secondary Education	-0,457	0,985							0,247	1,066
Secondary Education	0,661	0,595							0,899	0,675
Convertible Resources	-0,003	0,166							-0,036	0,208
Income			0,004	0,191					-0,166	0,206
Comp. Advantage Sector			0,789	1,060					0,965	1,138
Non Trade Sector			-0,008	1,077					0,209	1,171
Trade Union Member					-0,429	0,577			-0,317	0,634
Affiliation with Lib. Right					1,100	0,661			1,485	**0,777***
Affiliation with Pop. Right					0,260	0,768			0,442	0,894
National Acceptance					0,554	0,350			0,685	**0,405***
Jus Soli					-0,442	0,279			-0,198	0,333
Jus Sanguinis					0,015	0,253			-0,075	0,290
Female							-0,561	0,631	-0,375	0,901
Age							-0,015	0,021	-0,033	0,024
Ethnicity							1,540	**0,893***	1,569	1,089
Adj. R^2	-0,033		-0,014		0,037		0,017		0,030	

*** Significant at p<0,01; **significant at p<0,05; *significant at p<0,10.

The dependent variable is one's attitude toward globalization on the national level for the group of people that have said to associate globalization with political processes.

Ethnicity shows a positive effect. This means that people with a non-Western ethnicity have a more positive attitude toward political globalization on the national level than people with a West-European ethnicity. It was hypothesized that ethnic minorities are more skeptic about economic globalization, but this did not come forward from the earlier models. This makes it even more surprising that the opposite effect shows up in the political dimension.

Furthermore, no significant results were found for the hypothesized effects of college education, affiliation with the populist radical right and trade union membership.

On the global level (table 4.12) the effect of trade union membership is significant in the political views model (4), but not in the final model (5). Again, this is very likely to be caused by the cases per variable ratio that is too small. Nevertheless, this is an indication that trade union members have a more negative attitude toward political globalization on the global level. The difference with the national level

could be that when trade unions focus their campaigns on the erosion of the position of workers toward the market, the link with exploitation of workers in other countries, where the conditions are far worse, is easily made.

Table 4.12 Attitudes toward political globalization on the global level

n = 65	1		2		3		4		5	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Constant	5,883	**0,661***	6,286	**1,472***	6,286	**1,472***	6,923	**0,993***	7,759	**2,241***
Elementary Education	0,954	1,617							1,968	1,812
Lower Secondary Education	0,274	0,983							0,987	1,078
Secondary Education	0,053	0,594							0,252	0,682
Convertible Resources	0,147	0,166							0,147	0,210
Income			0,070	0,192					-0,096	0,208
Comp. Advantage Sector			-0,345	1,067					-0,530	1,151
Non Trade Sector			-0,071	1,083					0,066	1,183
Trade Union Member					-0,987	**0,559***			-0,727	0,641
Affiliation with Lib. Right					0,626	0,640			0,897	0,785
Affiliation with Pop. Right					-0,195	0,744			-0,061	0,904
National Acceptance					0,546	0,339			0,708	**0,409***
Jus Soli					-0,579	**0,270***			-0,487	0,337
Jus Sanguinis					0,065	0,245			0,026	0,293
Female							0,130	0,636	-0,463	0,911
Age							-0,020	0,021	-0,032	0,024
Ethnicity							0,800	0,900	0,952	1,101
Adj. R^2	-0,043		-0,041		0,083		-0,011		-0,005	

*** Significant at p<0,01; **significant at p<0,05; *significant at p<0,10.

The dependent variable is one's attitude toward globalization on the global level for the group of people that have said to associate globalization with political processes.

The other two effects that are found are for *Jus Soli* and *National Acceptance*. While greater attachment to a notion of citizenship on basis of place of birth is only significant in the political views model, a view on citizenship based on acceptance of national values and traditions is only significant in the complete model. However, both effects seem to indicate the same mechanism: people with a more exlusive notion of citizenship have a more negative attitude toward political globalization on the national level, since the effect for the more tolerant notion based on acceptance is positvely correlated and the more restrictive notion based on place of birth is negatively correlated with one's attitude toward political globalization on the global level.

A look at the adjusted R Squares of both models for attitudes toward political globalization show that the same variables are better at explaining the variance in the economic dimension.[22] The negative adjusted R Square for the global level even indicates that the model is quite useless. However, the model for political views by itself appears to be not so bad as the adjusted R Square is 0,083.

4.5 Cultural dimension

The final dimension of globalization that will be discussed is the cultural dimension. The outcomes for the analyses on the individual/family level in this dimension are displayed in table 4.13.

Table 4.13 Attitudes toward cultural globalization on individual/family level

n = 174	1		2		3		4		5	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Constant	6,266	**0,306***	6,202***	**0,613**	6,203	**0,184***	6,725	**0,481***	5,646	**0,774***
Elementary Education	-4,296	**0,969***							-3,503	**1,001***
Lower Secondary Education	0,340	0,432							0,463	0,437
Secondary Education	0,115	0,278							0,159	0,278
Convertible Resources	0,082	0,087							0,154	0,095
Income			0,070	0,080					0,060	0,077
Comp. Advantage Sector			-0,006	0,450					-0,274	0,445
Non Trade Sector			-0,176	0,448					-0,206	0,429
Trade Union Member					0,526	0,306			0,194	0,311
Affiliation with Lib. Right					0,360	0,350			0,292	0,350
Affiliation with Pop. Right					0,941	**0,430****			0,974	**0,432****
National Acceptance					-0,107	0,143			-0,127	0,145
Jus Soli					-0,123	0,144			-0,039	0,145
Jus Sanguinis					-0,589	**0,144***			-0,500	**0,145***
Female							-0,170	0,275	-0,135	0,296
Age							-0,006	0,010	0,001	0,011
Ethnicity							0,871	**0,461***	0,839	**0,460***
Adj. R^2	0,093		-0,010		0,083		0,009		0,141	

*** Significant at p<0,01; **significant at p<0,05; *significant at p<0,10.

The dependent variable is one's attitude toward globalization on the individual/family level for the group of people that have said to associate globalization with cultural processes.

The only skill or education level related effect is found for *elementary education*, which indicates that people whose highest completed education is an elementary one have more negative attitudes toward

---

[22] Not too much value should be attached to this comparison between the two dimensions, as the number of degrees of freedom is different.

cultural globalization on the individual/family level. Although this does not confirm the specific effect expected of college education – since that would require that all other levels of education would have a more negative attitude – it does hint that people with a very low education might have more fear of other cultures, which results in a more negative attitude in this dimension at the individual/family level.

The variable *affiliation with the populist radical right* shows a very surprising, yet interesting result, because, contrary to the expectations (hypothesis 9d) the correlation with on one's attitude toward cultural globalization on the individual/family is positive. This means that people who are likely to vote PVV have a more positive notion of cultural globalization on the individual level. This could even imply that people who are likely to vote for the PVV do not so much think negatively about interactions with different cultures in their daily lives, but that they are heavily influenced by a larger public image created by populist radical right parties and the media, which leads to their vote for a party that has a reputation of having xenophobic sentiments. This mechanism is also referred to as a *halo effect* (cf. Rydgren & Ruth 2011).

When looking at the different notions of citizenship, only extra importance attached to citizenship on basis of bloodlines is significant (*Jus Sanguinis*). On basis of these models, the more a person's notion of citizenship puts emphasis on the importance of bloodlines, the more negative one's attitude toward cultural globalization on the individual/family. This extra emphasis on bloodlines is related to a more restrictive notion of national citizenship, which concurs with the hypothesized effects for the economic and political dimensions. Apparently, this effect also has a role in determining one's attitude toward cultural globalization at the individual/family level.

The adjusted R Square for the final model explaining attitudes toward cultural globalization at the individual/family level is also quite high with 0,141.

On the national level (table 4.14), all adjusted R Squares are disappointingly low. None of them exceed 0,003. This suggests that the models have a very poor explanatory power for the national level. This is also illustrated by the lack of results. Completely no significant effects have been found for attitudes toward cultural globalization at the national level, using these sets of variables.

Table 4.14 Attitudes toward cultural globalization on the national level

n = 174	1		2		3		4		5	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Constant	6,535	**0,311***	6,456	**0,585***	6,603	**0,185***	6,922	**0,466***	6,659	**0,808***
Elementary Education	-0,244	0,982							0,379	1,044
Lower Secondary Education	0,225	0,438							0,431	0,456
Secondary Education	-0,215	0,282							-0,221	0,290
Convertible Resources	0,079	0,088							0,083	0,099
Income			0,094	0,077					0,086	0,081
Comp. Advantage Sector			-0,163	0,430					-0,212	0,464
Non Trade Sector			-0,454	0,427					-0,468	0,448
Trade Union Member					-0,034	0,306			-0,129	0,324
Affiliation with Lib. Right					0,400	0,351			0,407	0,365
Affiliation with Pop. Right					0,009	0,431			0,104	0,451
National Acceptance					0,248	0,143			0,245	0,151
Jus Soli					-0,053	0,144			-0,047	0,152
Jus Sanguinis					-0,203	0,145			-0,222	0,152
Female							-0,291	0,266	-0,213	0,309
Age							-0,003	0,010	-0,008	0,011
Ethnicity							0,127	0,447	0,204	0,480
Adj. R^2	-0,012		0,003		0,002		-0,010		-0,015	

*** Significant at p<0,01; **significant at p<0,05; *significant at p<0,10.

The dependent variable is one's attitude toward globalization on the national level for the group of people that have said to associate globalization with cultural processes.

Summary

In this chapter I have first looked at the statistical differences between the levels and dimensions. This led to the conclusion that there is a positive correlation between all three levels, but that there is plenty of difference between them as well. Moreover, for all levels except the individual/family level in the economic dimension, there is a significant variance between the different dimensions.

Then there are the results of the OLS-regressions I have performed on basis of the theoretical framework presented in chapter 2. There are a couple of prominent findings from the results of the OLS regressions. First, there are some indications that skill level matters, but only for attitudes toward economic globalization on the individual/family level, multiple effects for these dummies have been found. Second, the supposed ideational effect of college education cannot be proved on basis of these results. Third, the suggested role of sectors is not found. Fourth, strong correlations were found for the effect of political affiliation with the liberal right. Fifth, affiliation with the populist radical right leads to a

surprising result for attitudes toward cultural globalization on the individual/family level. Sixth, a more exclusive notion of citizenship based on bloodlines is negatively correlated with attitudes toward cultural globalization on the individual level, while a positive correlation appears for a notion of citizenship that is more based upon the acceptance of norms and values in the political dimension.

5. Conclusion and discussion

The aim of this thesis was to get more understanding of the variation of individual attitudes toward globalization and the explanations thereof. In order to do so, I have used existing theories and classified them according to the dimensions and levels of globalization that these theories claim to, or should be able to explain.

In the theoretical chapter four categories of explanatory variables came forward. First there were those related to endowments, like skills, education (Hainmueller & Hiscox 2006; Mansfield & Mutz 2009), and convertible resources (Bauman 1999). Then there are job related aspects, like sector of employment (Scheve & Slaughter 2001) and income (Feasel & Muzumder 2012; Mayda & Rodrik 2005). Also political aspects matter, like trade union membership (Mansfield & Mutz 2009), political affiliation (Hainmueller & Hiscox 2006; Mayda & Rodrik 2005; Baker 2005; Hooghe & Marks 2004) and views on citizenship (Baker 2005; Hooghe & Marks 2004). Finally there are demographic attributes, like ethnicity (Myers 2010) and gender and age (Burgoon & Hiscox 2004; 2008) that were expected to play a roles. Within this literature study I have attempted to organize the existing theories according to the dimensions and levels of attitudes toward globalization they attempt to explain, as can be seen in table 2 (on page 21). This table provides the answers to the fourth and fifth additional research questions, on which variables apply to which dimensions and which levels. This organization also provided the outline for the data analysis, in which I have tested the hypotheses per conjuncture of dimensions and levels.

After establishing that the attitudes toward globalization indeed differ between levels and dimensions, I have performed several OLS regressions to see which variables help to explain one's attitude toward globalization.

There are eight specific hypotheses for which proof has been found. First, there is the apparent positive effect of skill level on the attitudes toward economic globalization on the individual level, which provides support for the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem. On other levels and dimensions some effects of a specific skill level have shown up, however, this was never for more than one skill dummy (based on level of education). Second, people with a higher income have been found to have a more positive attitude toward economic globalization, but only on the national level. Third, people with an affiliation for the liberal right are found to have a more positive attitude toward globalization than people with no such affiliation. Fourth, trade union members appear to have a more negative attitude toward economic globalization on the global level, but not on other levels. Fifth, affiliation with traditional liberal right

wing parties shows a positive effect for attitudes toward political globalization on the national level. Affiliation with the populist radical right only appears to matter to the cultural dimension. However, on the individual level a positive correlation with one's attitudes is found, contrary to the expectations. Finally, restrictive notions of citizenship based on bloodlines have been found to relate to more negative attitudes toward cultural globalization on the individual level, which is also the case for restrictive notions of citizenship based on place of birth. A notion of citizenship based on acceptance of national values, on the other hand, shows a positive effect for one's attitude toward political globalization. No proof was found for the expected effects of sector of employment and possession of convertible resources.

In addition, having a non-Western ethnicity is found to have a positive effect on one's attitude toward political globalization on the national level and cultural globalization on the individual/family level. Perhaps, people with a non-Western ethnicity are more positive toward political globalization on the national level, because they come from countries with more political struggles and they regard political globalization as something that increases political stability. The effect of ethnicity on one's attitude toward cultural globalization on the individual/family level might be caused by a multicultural attitude in Dutch society, which makes people from non-Western ethnicities feel accepted. But the theoretical and further empirical grounds for these mechanism remain open for investigation.

So the factors that matter for the formation of one's attitude toward globalization are skill level, income, trade union membership, political affiliation with both the liberal and the populist radical right, the specific notions of citizenship, and ethnicity.

So has this categorization in different dimensions led to a better understanding of individual attitudes toward globalization?

I would say that the answer to this question on basis of these results is yes, as table 5 clearly shows that there most effects are specific to only one or two combinations of dimensions and levels.

Table 5: The effects that have been found

Dimension → Level ↓	Economic	Political	Cultural
Individual/family	• **Skill level (+)** • Affiliation with the liberal right (+)	X	• Affiliation with the populist radical right (+) • **Exclusive notion of citizenship (-)** • Ethnicity (+)
Nation	• **Affiliation with the liberal right (+)** • **Income (+)**	• **Exclusive notion of citizenship** (-) • **Affiliation with the liberal right (+)** • Ethnicity (+)	
Global equality	• **Trade union membership (-)** • Income (+)	• **Exclusive notion of citizenship** (-)	X

(+) Indicates an expected positive effect on one's attitude toward globalization, (-) indicates a negative effect. The variables that have been emphasized correspond with the hypothesized effects

Discussion

An important weaknesses of this thesis is the cases per variable ratio. In other words: the amount of variables per case is too much. This can lead to less significant results and effects that are weaker than they are in reality. The models for attitudes in the political and cultural dimension sometimes lack relevant results. This is probably due to the fact that the number of hypotheses and theories for these dimensions is very limited in relation to the number of theories aimed at explaining attitudes toward economic globalization.

Nevertheless, the different analytical models have been quite useful to get a better understanding of which factors matter on which level and in which dimensions. For some variables the database was not really sufficient, like sector and ethnicity. But overall, I think this research has successfully measured the influence of the different factors at the different levels and dimensions.

It is obvious that the explanatory power of some of the models is not very strong. But this poor explanatory power of some of the models in the political and cultural dimension are logical consequence of the dominance of economic globalization in previous research. Moreover, this research is limited by the possibilities of OLS regressions. It would be very interesting to investigate the factors that have come up with correlations contrary to the expectations in more detail.

The measurement of the dependent variables could also improve by using more specific questions, like *how do you think political globalization affects the welfare of your country?* Or, *how do you think economic globalization influences the welfare in the world?* Still, I think the way the dependent variables have been structured are a good approximation.

As a final comment, I would like to recommend further research to look at the cross-dimensional and cross-level influences of attitudes toward globalization, in order to see how one's attitude in one dimension or at one level influences one's attitude on other dimensions and levels.

Literature

Akkerman, A., Mudde, C., Zaslove, A. (2013) How Populist are the People? Measuring Populist Attitudes among Voters. Forthcoming.

Allen, J., Thompson, G. (1997). Think global, then think again – economic globalization in context. *Area*, 29:3, pp. 213-227.

Allison, P. (2012). When can you safely ignore multicollinearity? *Statistical Horizons*, last seen on 09-08-2012, at: http://www.statisticalhorizons.com/multicollinearity

Arnett, J. J. (2002). The psychology of globalization. *American Psychologist, 57*(10), pp. 774–783.

Baker, A. (2005). Who Wants to Globalize? Consumer Tastes and Labor Markets in a Theory of Trade Policy Beliefs. *American Journal of Political Science*, 49(4), pp. 924-938.

Baker, C. (2003). *Cultural Studies Theory and Practice. First Edition*. London: Sage Publications.

Bassanini, A., Manfredi, T. (2012). Capital's Grabbing Hand? A Cross-Country/Cross-Industry Analysis of the Decline of Labour Share. *OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers,* No. 133, OECD Publishing: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k95zqsf4bxt-en

Bauman, Z. (1998). On glocalization: or globalization for some and localization for some others. *Thesis Eleven*, 54: 37-49.

Beer, E., Flecker, J. (1998). Joining the European Union: The Reactions of Austrian Trade Unions. In: P. Pasture & J. Verberckmoes (Eds.) *Working-Class Internationalism and the Appeal of National Identity: Historical Debates and Current Perspectives*. Oxford: Berg, pp. 215-230.

Beveridge, W.H. (1945). *Full Employment in a Free Society*, New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

Bohman, J. (1998). The globalization of the public sphere: Cosmopolitan publicity and the problem of cultural pluralism. *Philosophy Social Criticism*, 24(2/3), pp. 199-216.

Boomkens, R. (1999). Inleiding. In R. Boomkens (Ed.) *Globalisering. Samengestelde werken van Saskia Sassen.* Amsterdam: Van Gennep Amsterdam.

Borghans, L., Golsteyn, B.H.H. (2012). Job Mobility in Europe, Japan and the U.S. *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 50(3), pp. 436-456.

Brader, T., Valentino, N.A., Suhay, E. (2008). What Triggers Public Opposition to immigration? Anxiety, Group Cues, and Immigration Threat. *American Journal of Political Science*, 52(4), pp. 959-978.

Bunnel, T., Coe, N.M. (2005). Re-fragmenting the "political": Globalization, governmentality and Malaysia's Multimedia Super Corridor. *Political Geography*, 24, pp. 831-849.

Burgoon, B., Hiscox, M.J. (2004). The Mysterious Case of Female Protectionism: Gender Bias in Attitudes Toward International Trade. Available online:

http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~hiscox/BurgoonHiscoxFemaleProtectionism.pdf

Burgoon, B., Hiscox, M.J. (2008). The Gender Divide over International Trade: Why do Men and Women Have Different Views about Openness to the World Economy? Available online:

http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~hiscox/Gender.pdf

Caplan, B. (2002). Systematically Biased Beliefs About Economics: Robust Evidence of Judgmental Anomalies from the Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy. *The Economic Journal,* 112: pp. 433-458.

Caporaso, J.A. and Madeira, M.A. (2012). *Globalization, Institutions & Governance*. London: Sage Publications Ltd.

CBS (2013a) SBI 2008 – Standaard Bedrijfsindeling 2008. Last seen on: 19-06-2013 at:

http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/methoden/classificaties/overzicht/sbi/sbi-2008/default.htm

CBS (2013b). International trade, top ten gainers and losers. Last seen on: 19-06-2013 at:

http://www.cbs.nl/en-GB/menu/themas/internationale-handel/cijfers/extra/internationale-handel-top-tien.htm

Cerny, P.G. (1997). Paradoxes of the Competition State: The Dynamics of Political Globalization. *Government and Opposition*, 32(2): pp. 252-274.

Chiu, C.Y. , Gries, P., Torelli, C.J., Cheng, S.Y.Y. (2011). Towards a Social Psychology of Globalization, *Journal of Social Issues*, 67(4), pp. 663-676.

Coutinho, M.T., Dam, U.C., Blustein, D.L. (2008). The psychology of working and globalisation: a new perspective for a new era. *International Journal of Educational and Vocational Guidance*, 8(5) pp. 5-18.

De Vreese, C.H., Boomgaarden, H.G. (2005). Projecting EU Referendums: Fear of Immigration and Support for European Integration. *European Union Politics*, 6, pp. 59-82.

DNPP (2009). *Programma´s en kandidatenlijsten Europese verkiezingen 2009*.
http://dnpp.ub.rug.nl/dnpp/themas/vp/tk/per_partij

Doh, J.P. (2005). Offshore Outsourcing: Implications for International Business and Strategic Management Theory and Practice. Journal of Management Studies, 42(3): 695-704.

Edwards, M.S. (2006). Public opinion regarding economic and cultural globalization: evidence from a cross-national survey. *Review of International Political Economy*, 13(4), pp. 587-608.

Erikson, R.S., Tedin, K.L. (2005). *American Public Opinion: Its Origin, Content and Impact*. 7th Edition. New York: Pearson-Longman.

FNV (2010). *Sociaal Lek. Presentation on the Europa Conferentie 29th of January 2010*, as seen on:
http://www.europaconferentie.nl/

FNV (2011). *FNV en arbeidsmigratie uit Midden- en Oost-Europa. Voorwaarden voor vrij verkeer: meer en betere bescherming van werknemers en stevige maatregelen tegen oneerlijke concurrentie.* Amsterdam: Stichting FNV Pers.

FNV (2013a). *Internationale vakbonden pleiten voor beter toezicht op de Europese arbeidsmarkt.* As seen on:
http://www.fnvbondgenoten.nl/nieuws/acties_en_campagnes/grenzeloos_solidair_en_sociaal/nieuws/566155-europa_is_sociale_puinhoop/

FNV (2013b). *Europese demonstratie tegen social dumping*. As seen on:
http://www.fnvbondgenoten.nl/nieuws/acties_en_campagnes/grenzeloos_solidair_en_sociaal/nieuws/558999-europese_demonstratie_tegen_sociale_dumping/

Fotopoulos, T. (2001). Globalization, the Reformist Left and the Anti-Globalization 'Movement' *Democracy & Nature*, 7(2), pp. 233-280.

Garvert, K. (2007). Die Niederlande im europäischen Integrationsprozess. In F. Wielenga, M. Wilp (Eds.). *Nachbar Niederlande. Eine landeskundliche Einführung*. Münster: Aschendorff Verlag, pp. 207-238.

Gazier, B., Schmid, G. (2002). The dynamics of full employment: an introductory overview. In G. Schmid & B. Gazier (Eds.) *The dynamics of full employment. Social integration through transitional labor markets*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Hainmueller, J., Hiscox, M.J. (2006). Learning to Love Globalization: Education and Individual Attitudes toward International Trade*. International Organization,* 60(2), pp. 469-98.

Hall, P., Soskice, D. (2001). Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hätönen, J. and Eriksson, T. (2009) "30+ years of research and practice of outsourcing – Exploring the past and anticipating the future" Journal of International Mangement, 15(2): 142-155.

Hay, C., Marsh, D. (2000). *Demystifying Globalization*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hay, C., Smith, N.J-A. (2010). How policy makers (really) understand globalization: the internal architecture of Anglophone globalization discourse in Europe. *Public Administration*, 88(4), pp. 903-927.

Hiscox, M.J. (2001). Class Versus Industry Cleavages: Inter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of Trade. *International Organization*, 55(1), pp. 1-46.

Hoffmann, S. (2002). Clash of Globalizations. *Foreign Affairs*, 81(4), pp. 104-115.

Hooghe, L., Marks, G. (2004). Does identity or economic rationality drive public opinion on European integration? *American Political Science Association*, 37(3), pp. 415-420.

Hyman, R. (1997). Trade unions and interest representation in the context of globalization. *Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research*, 3, pp. 515-533.

Hyman, R. (2003). *Trade unions and the ambiguities of social Europe*. ILO Paper, as seen on 01-06-2013, on: http://www.ilo.int/public/english/iira/documents/congresses/world_13/track_5_hyman.pdf

ILO (2008). *International Standard Classification of Occupations. Volume 1: Structure, group definitions and correspondence tables*. Geneva: ILO.

ILO (2013a). ISCO conceptual framework. Last seen on: 19-06-2013 at:
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/isco88/publ2.htm

ILO (2013b). Major, sub-major, minor and unit group titles. Last seen on: 19-06-2013 at:
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/isco88/major.htm

Index Mundi (2013). Foreign Direct Investment, net outflows (% of GDP) – Country Ranking. Available online: http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/indicators/BM.KLT.DINV.GD.ZS/rankings

Inglehart, R. (1970). Cognitive Mobilization and European Identity. *Comparative Politics*, 3(1), pp. 45-70.

Irwin, D.A. (1995). Industry or class cleavages over trade policy? Evidence from the British general election of 1923. *NBER Working Paper Series*, No. 5170.

ITUC (2006). *Program of the ITUC (Adopted by the Founding Congress of the ITUC Vienna, 1-3 November 2006)*.

ITUC (2013a) Homepage. http://www.ituc-csi.org/

ITUC (2013b). Issues: Global Economy. As seen on 05-04-2013: http://www.ituc-csi.org/global-economy?lang=en

Iversen, T., Soskice, D. (2001). An Asset Theory of Social Policy Preferences. *American Political Science Review*, 95(4): pp. 875-893.

Kriesi, H.P. et al. (2006) "Globalization and the transformation of the national political space: Six European countries compared" *European Journal of Political Research*, 45: 921-956.

Kriesi, H.P., Grande, E., Lachat, R., Dolezal, M., Bornschier, S., Frey, T. (2008). *West European Politics in the Age of Globalization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kwan Choi, E. (2003). Implications of Many Industries in the Heckscher-Ohlin Trade Model. in E. Kwan Choi, J. Harrigan (Eds.), *Handbook of International Trade. Volume 1,* Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Lipset SM, Rokkan S. (1967). Cleavage structures, party systems, and voter alignments: an introduction. In S.M. Lipset, S. Rokkan (eds.). *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*, pp. 1-64. New York: Free Press.

Locke, R.M. (2002). The Promise and Perils of Globalization: The Case of Nike. MIT IPC Working Paper Series 02-007/8.

Malhotra, N., Margalit, Y., Hyunjung Mo, C. (2013). Economic Explanations for Opposition to Immigration: Distinguishing between Prevalence and Conditional Impact. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(2), pp. 391-410.

Mansfield, E.D., Mutz, D.C. (2009). Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-group Anxiety. *International Organization*, 63(3), pp. 425-457.

Mayda, A.M. (2004). "Who is against immigration? A cross-country investigation of individual attitudes toward immigrants" *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 88(3), pp. 510-530.

Mayda, A.M. (2006). Why are people more pro-trade than pro-migration? *CReAM Discussion Paper No 6/11*.

Mayda, A. M., Rodrik, D. (2005). Why Are Some People (and Countries) More Protectionist than Others? *European Economic Review*, 49(6): pp. 1393-430.

Meyers, J.P. (2010). Exploring adolescents' thinking about globalization in an international education program. *Journal of Research in International Education*, 9, pp. 153-188.

Mudde, C. (2004). Globalization: the Multi-Faced Enemy. *CERC Working Paper*. 3/2004.

Munck, R. (2008). *Globalization and the labor movement: challenges and responses*. Special conference paper for "Trade unions and social movements: what is in it for us?" Oslo, Oktober 2008: http://www.globallabour.info/en/2009/12/globalisation_and_the_labour_m.html

Nationmaster (2013).*Net migration rate -> The Netherlands*. Last seen on 29-05-2013 on:

http://www.nationmaster.com/time.php?stat=imm_net_mig_rat-immigration-net-migration-rate&country=nl-netherlands

OECD (2012). *OECD Employment Outlook 2012*. Paris: OECD.

O'Rourke, K.H. (2003). "Heckscher-Ohlin Theory and Individual Attitudes Toward Globalization" Center for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper 4018, available online at:

www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP4018.asp

Pas, N. (2011). *"The state of the right: the Netherlands"* Paris: Fondapol.

http://www.fondapol.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/State-of-the-right-Netherlands.pdf

Rehm, P. (2009). Risks and Redistribution: An Individual-level Analysis. *Comparative Political Studies*, 42(7): 855–881.

Roudemetof, V. (2005) Transationalism, Cosmopolitanism and Glocalization. *Current Sociology*, 53, 113-135.

Rueda, D., Pontussen, J. (2000). Wage inequality and varieties of capitalism. World Politics, 52, pp. 350-380.

Rydgren, J., Ruth, P. (2011). Contextual explanations of radical right-wing support in Sweden: socioeconomic marginalization, group threat and the halo-effect. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, iFirst Article, pp. 1-18.

Schott, P.K. (2003). One Size Fits All? Heckscher-Ohlin Specialization in Global Production. *The American Economic Review*, 93(3), pp. 686-708.

Schwartz, H. (2010). States versus markets. Third edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Stolper, W.F., Samuelson, P.A. (1941). Protection and Real Wages. *Review of Economic Studies,* 9: pp. 58-73.

Streeck, W., Schmitter, P.C. (1985). Community, Market, state – and Associations? The Prospective Contribution of Interest Governance to Social Order. *European Sociological Review*, 2, pp. 119-138.

Taylor, R. (1990). Interpretation of the Correlation Coefficient: A Basic Review. *JDMS*, 1, pp. 35-39.

Van der Linden, M., Rojahn, J. (1990). Introduction. In M. van der Linden and J. Rojahn (eds.) *The formation of labour movements 1870-1914: an international perspective*. *Volume 1*, Leiden: E.J. Brill.

Whalley, J. (2008). Globalisation and Values. *The World Economy*, 2008, pp. 1503-1524.

Woodward, I., Skrbis, Z., Bean, C.S. (2008). Attitudes towards globalization and cosmopolitanism: cultural diversity, personal consumption and the national economy. *British Journal of Sociology*, 59(2), pp. 207-226.

Wooldridge, J.M. (2009). *Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach*. Maso: Cengage Learning.

Appendix A: List of hypotheses

H1a: More skilled workers have a more positive attitude toward economic globalization than lower skilled workers on the individual/family level.

H1b: More skilled workers have a more positive attitude toward economic globalization than lower skilled workers on the national level.

H2a: College educated people will have a more positive attitude toward economic globalization on the national level than people who did not go to college.

H2b: College educated people will have a more positive attitude toward economic globalization on the global level than people who did not go to college.

H2c: College educated people will have a more positive attitude toward political globalization on the national level than people who did not go to college.

H2d: College educated people will have a more positive attitude toward political globalization on the global level than people who did not go to college.

H2e: College educated people will have a more positive attitude toward cultural globalization on the individual/family level than people who did not go to college.

H2f: College educated people will have a more positive attitude toward cultural globalization on the national level than people who did not go to college.

H3a: Workers who are in possession of convertible resources will have a more positive attitude toward economic globalization on the individual level than people who do not have access to such resources.

H3b: Workers who are in possession of convertible resources will have a more positive attitude toward economic globalization on the national level than people who do not have access to such resources.

H3c: Workers who are in possession of convertible resources will have a more positive attitude toward economic globalization on the global level than people who do not have access to such resources.

H4a: Workers in sectors with a comparative advantage will have a more positive attitude toward economic globalization on the individual/family level, than people working in sectors threatened by foreign competition through imports.

H4b: Workers in sectors with a comparative advantage will have a more positive attitude toward economic globalization on the national level, than people working in sectors threatened by foreign competition through imports.

H5a: Workers in non-trade sectors will have a more positive attitude toward economic globalization at the individual/family level, than people working in sectors threatened by foreign competition.

H5b: Workers in non-trade sectors will have a more positive attitude toward economic globalization at the national level, than people working in sectors threatened by foreign competition.

H6a: People with a higher income will have a more positive attitude toward economic globalization than people with a lower income, because they are expected to gain greater benefits, on the individual level.

H6b: People with a higher income will have a more positive attitude toward economic globalization than people with a lower income, because they are expected to gain greater benefits, on the national level.

H7a: Trade union members are more likely to think negatively about economic globalization on the individual/family level.

H7b: Trade union members are more likely to think negatively about economic globalization on the national level.

H7c: Trade union members are more likely to think negatively about economic globalization on the global level.

H7d: Trade union members are more likely to think negatively about political globalization on the national level.

H7e: Trade union members are more likely to think negatively about political globalization on the global level.

H8a: People who identify themselves with traditional liberal right wing parties are more likely to have a positive attitude toward economic globalization on the national level.

H8b: People who identify themselves with traditional liberal right wing parties are more likely to have a positive attitude toward political globalization on the national level.

H8c: People who identify themselves with traditional liberal right wing parties are more likely to have a positive attitude toward political globalization on the global level.

H9a: People who identify themselves with populist radical right wing parties are more likely to have a negative attitude toward economic globalization on the national level.

H9b: People who identify themselves with populist radical right wing parties are more likely to have a negative attitude toward political globalization on the national level.

H9c: People who identify themselves with populist radical right wing parties are more likely to have a negative attitude toward political globalization on the global level.

H9d: People who identify themselves with populist radical right wing parties are more likely to have a negative attitude toward cultural globalization at the individual level.

H9e: People who identify themselves with populist radical right wing parties are more likely to have a negative attitude toward cultural globalization at the national level.

H10a: People who share an exclusive notion of national identity are more likely to have a negative attitude toward economic globalization on the national level.

H10b: People who share an exclusive notion of national identity are more likely to have a negative attitude toward political globalization on the national level.

H11: People who belong to an ethnic minority have a more negative attitude toward economic globalization on the global level.

Appendix B: Descriptive statistics

	Variable	Range (min-max)	Modus	Mean	σ	n
Dependent	*Effect of globalization on me and my family*	9 (1-10)	7,00	6,46	1,74	528
	Effect of globalization on welfare in the Netherlands	9 (1-10)	7,00	6,45	1,83	539
	Effect of globalization on welfare in the world	9 (1-10)	6,00	6,48	1,77	532
Independent	*Gender*	1 (0-1)	1,00	0,51	0,50	631
	Age	48 (18-66)	63,00	44,99	13,86	631
	Education	8 (1-9)	7,00	5,00	1,99	631
	College	1 (0-1)	0,00	0,32	0,47	631
	Income	9 (1-10)	7,00	5,09	1,77	499
	Employed in a sector with a comparative advantage	1 (0-1)	0,00	0,42	0,49	459
	Employed in a non-trade sector	1 (0-1)	0,00	0,50	0,50	459
	Expected time to find a new job	5 (1-6)	2,00	2,80	1,54	442
	Trade union membership	1 (0-1)	0,00	0,26	0,44	631
	Affiliation with the liberal right	1 (0-1)	0,00	0,15	0,35	631

Affiliation with the populist right	1 (0-1)	0,00	0,15	0,36	631
Citizenship based on acceptence of national values	5,09 (-3,60-1,48)	-0,13	0,00	1,00	631
Citizenship based on Jus Soli	6,00 (-4,03-1,97)	-0,96	0,00	1,00	631
Citizenship based on Jus Sanguinis	4,77 (-2,32-2,45)	1,37	0,00	1,00	631
Ethnicity	1 (0-1)	0,00	0,08	0,27	628

Appendix C: SBI classification linked with SITC indicators (in Dutch)

Sector (SBI 2008)	Indicators (SITC Rev. 3)
Landbouw, bosbouw, visserij	Voeding en levende dieren (0)
Winning van delfstoffen	Grondstoffen niet eetbaar, behalve brandstoffen (2)
Industrie	Chemische producten (5) + fabrikaten (6) + diverse gefabriceerde goederen (8)
Productie en distributie van en handel in elektriciteit, aardgas, stoom en gekoelde lucht	Minerale brandstoffen, smeermiddelen en dergelijke producten (3)
Winning en distributie van water; afval- en waterbeheer en sanering	Afvalverwerking en milieudiensten
Bouwnijverheid	Totaal bouwdiensten
Groot- en detailhandel; reparatie van auto's	Non-trade
Vervoer en opslag	Transitohandel + Totaal vervoersdiensten
Logies- maaltijd- en drankverstrekking	Non-trade
Informatie en communicatie	Totaal communicatiediensten + informatiediensten
Financiële instellingen	Financiële diensten
Verhuur en handel in onroerend goed	Non-trade
Advisering, onderzoek en overige specialistische dienstverlening	Totaal overige zakelijke, professionele en techinsche diensten + Royalty's en licentierechten
Openbaar bestuur, overheidsdiensten en verplichte sociale verzekering	Overheidsdiensten (niet elders genoemd)
Onderwijs	Non-trade
Gezondheids- en welzijnszorg	Non-trade
Cultuur, sport en recreatie	Totaal persoonlijke, culturele en recreatieve diensten

Appendix D: export sectors   Net

x10^5

Sector	2006 Import	2006 Export	2006 Saldo	2007 Import	2007 Export	2007 Saldo	2008 Import	2008 Export	2008 Saldo	2009 Import	2009 Export	2009 Saldo	2010 Import	2010 Export	2010 Saldo	2011 Import	2011 Export	2011 Saldo	TOTAAL Saldo
Landbouw, bosbouw, visserij	20884	34568	13684	24210	38542	14332	27049	42114	15065	25722	40158	14437	28324	45215	16891	32062	48044	15982	90391
Winning van delfstoffen	11134	17602	6468	12826	18452	5626	13859	18143	4284	9831	15436	5605	13344	19078	5734	15875	20841	4966	32683
Industrie	102884	117771	14888	115988	127069	11081	124429	134011	9581	106079	116507	10427	122477	138482	16005	124635	147007	22371	84353
Productie en distributie van en handel in elektriciteit, aardgas, stoom en gekoelde lucht	47553	41430	-6123	48449	40752	-7697	61118	56803	-4315	42970	38309	-4661	60048	50963	-9085	80037	67812	-12226	-44107
Winning en distributie van water; afval- en waterbeheer en sanering	2	8	6	2	10	8	1	14	14	6	75	68	21	87	66	21	88	68	230
Bouwnijverheid	942	1812	870	988	1846	858	1195	2210	1015	1538	2107	569	1519	2102	582	1566	1949	384	4278
Groot- en detailhandel; reparatie van auto's																			0
Vervoer en opslag	19112	22883	3770	19509	23171	3661	20027	24295	4269	16892	20726	3834	18796	22505	3709	20403	24794	4390	23633
Logies- maaltijd- en drankverstrekking	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Informatie en communicatie	6534	6961	428	6765	7726	962	6639	7643	1003	6841	7544	704	7110	8481	1371	7209	8799	1591	6059
Financiële instellingen	1546	1157	-389	1707	1249	-459	1466	1126	-341	1173	1127	-47	1192	1059	-133	1260	1128	-132	-1501
Verhuur en handel in onroerend goed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Advisering, onderzoek en overige specialistische dienstverlening	24946	31936	6990	26346	34586	8240	29841	37923	8083	33821	37487	3666	33780	41217	7436	39357	48464	9108	43523
Openbaar bestuur, overheidsdiensten en verplichte sociale verzekering	1347	2091	744	1315	2280	966	1320	2417	1097	1310	2173	863	1359	2319	960	1387	2404	1015	5645
Onderwijs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gezondheids- en welzijnszorg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cultuur, sport en recreatie	581	569	-12	522	492	-30	493	514	22	571	569	-2	529	528	-1	560	569	9	-14
Overige dienstverlening	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Appendix E-1: SPSS output economic dimension, individual/family level (ECO IND)

Model 1 Summary (ECO IND)

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,468[a]	,219	,187	1,67767

ANOVA[a]

Model	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1 Regression	77,007	4	19,252	6,840	,000[b]
Residual	274,370	97	2,815		
Total	351,377	101			

Coefficients[a]

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
1 (Constant)	7,049	,392		17,998	,000
Elementary education	-4,151	,963	-,409	-4,312	,000
Lower secondary education	-2,017	,814	-,227	-2,479	,015
Secondary education	-,185	,349	-,049	-,530	,597
Expected time to find new job (NIEUWEBAAN)	-,063	,114	-,052	-,557	,579

Model 2 Summary (ECO IND)

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,270[a]	,073	,045	1,81849

ANOVA[a]

Model	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1 Regression	25,706	3	8,569	2,591	,057[b]
Residual	325,671	98	3,307		
Total	351,377	101			

Coefficients[a]

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
	B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1 (Constant)	6,278	,782		8,031	,000
H3: Income (INKOMEN)	,142	,099	,141	1,439	,153
Comparative Advantage Dummy	-,231	,601	-,062	-,385	,701
Non Trade Dummy	-,972	,610	-,259	-1,594	,114

Model 3Summary (ECO IND)

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,314[a]	,099	,042	1,82115

ANOVA[a]

Model	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1 Regression	34,703	6	5,784	1,744	,119[b]
Residual	316,674	95	3,317		
Total	351,377	101			

Coefficients[a]

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
1 (Constant)	6,238	,260		23,958	,000
Trade union dummy (VAKBOND)	,179	,409	,045	,438	,663
Dummy for liberal right parties	1,183	,472	,253	2,508	,014
Dummy for populist radical right parties	,296	,580	,053	,510	,611
REGR factor score 1 for analysis 4	-,099	,183	-,053	-,540	,591
REGR factor score 2 for analysis 4	-,124	,208	-,061	-,597	,552
REGR factor score 3 for analysis 4	-,365	,192	-,195	-1,896	,061

Model 4Summary (ECO IND)

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,250[a]	,062	,034	1,82907

ANOVA[a]

Model	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1 Regression	21,907	3	7,302	2,183	,095[b]
Residual	329,470	98	3,345		
Total	351,377	101			

Coefficients[a]

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
1 (Constant)	7,569	,663		11,413	,000
Gender	-,711	,383	-,182	-1,857	,066
Age	-,019	,014	-,138	-1,396	,166
Ethnicity	,694	,595	,115	1,166	,247

Model 5Summary (ECO IND)

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,553[a]	,305	,175	1,68979

ANOVA[a]

Model	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1 Regression	107,293	16	6,706	2,348	,006[b]
Residual	244,084	85	2,855		
Total	351,377	101			

Coefficients[a]

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
1 (Constant)	7,251	1,059		6,847	,000
Gender	,151	,441	,039	,343	,732
Age	-,011	,015	-,079	-,745	,458
Elementary education	-3,705	1,116	-,365	-3,320	,001
Lower secondary education	-1,741	,866	-,196	-2,010	,048
Secondary education	-,206	,379	-,055	-,545	,587
H3: Income (INKOMEN)	,061	,106	,060	,571	,569
Comparative Advantage Dummy	-,040	,604	-,011	-,066	,948
Non Trade Dummy	-,737	,601	-,196	-1,226	,224
Expected time to find new job (NIEUWEBAAN)	-,049	,126	-,040	-,387	,700
Trade union dummy (VAKBOND)	-,134	,396	-,034	-,340	,735
Dummy for liberal right parties	,920	,503	,197	1,829	,071
Dummy for populist radical right parties	-,119	,609	-,021	-,195	,846
REGR factor score 1 for analysis 4	,028	,179	,015	,157	,875
REGR factor score 2 for analysis 4	,089	,209	,043	,424	,673
REGR factor score 3 for analysis 4	-,024	,200	-,013	-,120	,905
Ethnicity	,284	,565	,047	,503	,616

Appendix E-2: SPSS output economic dimension national level

Model 1 Summary (ECO NAT)

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,337[a]	,113	,077	1,62995

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	33,134	4	8,283	3,118	,018[b]
	Residual	258,983	97	2,657		
	Total	292,117	101			

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	6,816	,381		17,913	,000
	Elementary education	-,606	,935	-,065	-,648	,519
	Lower secondary education	-2,577	,790	-,318	-3,260	,002
	Secondary education	-,317	,339	-,092	-,936	,352
	Expected time to find new job (NIEUWEBAAN)	,172	,110	,156	1,559	,122

Model 2 Summary (ECO NAT)

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,406[a]	,164	,139	1,57430

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	48,035	3	16,012	6,460	,000[b]
	Residual	244,081	98	2,478		
	Total	292,117	101			

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	5,790	,677		8,555	,000
	H3: Income (INKOMEN)	,309	,085	,337	3,621	,000
	Comparative Advantage Dummy	-,266	,521	-,079	-,512	,610
	Non Trade Dummy	-,829	,528	-,242	-1,570	,120

Model 3 Summary (ECO NAT)

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,298[a]	,089	,031	1,66972

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	25,916	6	4,319	1,549	,171[b]
	Residual	266,201	95	2,788		
	Total	292,117	101			

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	6,949	,239		29,108	,000
	Trade union dummy (VAKBOND)	-,263	,375	-,072	-,702	,485
	Dummy for liberal right parties	,982	,432	,230	2,271	,025
	Dummy for populist radical right parties	-,166	,532	-,032	-,312	,755
	REGR factor score 1 for analysis 4	,205	,168	,121	1,221	,225
	REGR factor score 2 for analysis 4	-,135	,191	-,072	-,706	,482
	REGR factor score 3 for analysis 4	-,080	,176	-,047	-,454	,651

Model 4 Summary (ECO NAT)

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,077[a]	,006	-,024	1,71720

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	1,717	3	,572	,194	,900[b]
	Residual	290,400	98	2,949		
	Total	292,117	101			

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	6,979	,623		11,209	,000
	Gender	-,238	,359	-,067	-,663	,509
	Age	,004	,013	,028	,279	,780
	Ethnicity	-,045	,559	-,008	-,080	,936

Model 5 Summary (ECO NAT)

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,589[a]	,347	,225	1,49384

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	101,358	16	6,335	2,839	,001[b]
	Residual	190,759	85	2,232		
	Total	292,117	101			

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	5,533	,936		5,910	,000
	Elementary education	,147	,987	,016	,149	,882
	Lower secondary education	-1,895	,766	-,234	-2,476	,015
	Secondary education	-,052	,335	-,015	-,156	,876
	Expected time to find new job (NIEUWEBAAN)	,177	,112	,161	1,588	,116
	H3: Income (INKOMEN)	,347	,094	,378	3,702	,000
	Comparative Advantage Dummy	-,197	,534	-,058	-,370	,713
	Non Trade Dummy	-,803	,532	-,235	-1,511	,135
	Trade union dummy (VAKBOND)	-,390	,350	-,107	-1,113	,269
	Dummy for liberal right parties	,977	,445	,229	2,197	,031
	Dummy for populist radical right parties	-,116	,538	-,023	-,215	,830
	REGR factor score 1 for analysis 4	,229	,158	,136	1,451	,150
	REGR factor score 2 for analysis 4	-,028	,185	-,015	-,153	,879
	REGR factor score 3 for analysis 4	-,029	,177	-,017	-,162	,872
	Gender	,333	,390	,094	,854	,396
	Age	-,013	,013	-,099	-,958	,341
	Ethnicity	-,436	,499	-,079	-,873	,385

Appendix E-3: SPSS output economic dimension global level (ECO GLO)

Model 1 Summary (ECO GLO)

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,332[a]	,111	,074	1,69462

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	34,794	4	8,699	3,029	,021[b]
	Residual	279,942	97	2,872		
	Total	314,736	101			

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	6,697	,396		16,928	,000
	Elementary education	2,001	,972	,208	2,058	,042
	Lower secondary education	-1,594	,822	-,189	-1,940	,055
	Secondary education	-,233	,352	-,065	-,662	,510
	Expected time to find new job (NIEUWEBAAN)	,129	,115	,112	1,123	,264

Model 2 Summary (ECO GLO)

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,265[a]	,070	,042	1,72361

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	22,162	3	7,387	2,487	,065[b]
	Residual	292,574	98	2,971		
	Total	314,736	101			

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	6,713	,741		9,059	,000
	H3: Income (INKOMEN)	,176	,094	,185	1,886	,062
	Comparative Advantage Dummy	-,654	,570	-,186	-1,148	,254
	Non Trade Dummy	-1,001	,578	-,282	-1,732	,086

Model 3 Summary (ECO GLO)

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,213[a]	,045	-,015	1,77398

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	14,254	6	2,376	,755	,607[b]
	Residual	300,483	95	3,147		
	Total	314,736	101			

Coefficients[a]

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
1 (Constant)	7,175	,254		28,290	,000
Trade union dummy (VAKBOND)	-,670	,399	-,177	-1,682	,096
Dummy for liberal right parties	,069	,459	,016	,150	,881
Dummy for populist radical right parties	-,088	,565	-,016	-,155	,877
REGR factor score 1 for analysis 4	,087	,178	,049	,486	,628
REGR factor score 2 for analysis 4	,160	,203	,082	,788	,433
REGR factor score 3 for analysis 4	,184	,187	,104	,984	,328

Model 4 Summary (ECO GLO)

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,124[a]	,015	-,015	1,77391

ANOVA[a]

Model	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1 Regression	4,837	3	1,612	,512	,675[b]
Residual	309,900	98	3,147		
Total	314,736	101			

Coefficients[a]

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
	B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1 (Constant)	6,258	,643		9,730	,000
Gender	,282	,371	,077	,761	,448
Age	,014	,014	,105	1,039	,301
Ethnicity	,109	,577	,019	,190	,850

Model 5 Summary (ECO GLO)

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,488[a]	,238	,096	1,67487

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	74,943	16	4,684	1,670	,068[b]
	Residual	239,794	85	2,805		
	Total	314,736	101			

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	5,761	1,050		5,488	,000
	Elementary education	2,155	1,106	,224	1,949	,055
	Lower secondary education	-1,283	,858	-,152	-1,495	,139
	Secondary education	,039	,375	,011	,103	,918
	Expected time to find new job (NIEUWEBAAN)	,135	,125	,118	1,076	,285
	H3: Income (INKOMEN)	,251	,105	,263	2,386	,019
	Comparative Advantage Dummy	-,526	,599	-,150	-,878	,382
	Non Trade Dummy	-,997	,596	-,281	-1,672	,098
	Trade union dummy (VAKBOND)	-,593	,392	-,157	-1,512	,134
	Dummy for liberal right parties	,354	,499	,080	,710	,479
	Dummy for populist radical right parties	,387	,603	,073	,641	,523
	REGR factor score 1 for analysis 4	,055	,177	,032	,313	,755
	REGR factor score 2 for analysis 4	,118	,208	,061	,567	,572
	REGR factor score 3 for analysis 4	,081	,198	,046	,409	,683
	Gender	,432	,437	,117	,987	,326
	Age	-,001	,015	-,005	-,047	,963
	Ethnicity	-,029	,560	-,005	-,052	,959

Appendix E-4: SPSS output political dimension, national level (POL NAT)

Model 1 Summary (POL NAT)

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,175[a]	,031	-,033	2,24072

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	9,625	4	2,406	,479	,751[b]
	Residual	303,176	60	5,021		
	Total	312,801	64			

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	6,077	,663		9,169	,000
	Elementary education	,438	1,621	,035	,270	,788
	Lower secondary education	-,457	,985	-,061	-,464	,644
	Secondary education	,661	,595	,149	1,111	,271
	Expected time to find new job (NIEUWEBAAN)	-,003	,166	-,002	-,019	,985

Model 2 Summary (POL NAT)

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,181[a]	,033	-,014	2,22007

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	10,256	3	3,419	,694	,559[b]
	Residual	302,545	61	4,929		
	Total	312,801	64			

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	5,876	1,464		4,015	,000
	H3: Income (INKOMEN)	,004	,191	,003	,021	,983
	Comparative Advantage Dummy	,789	1,060	,180	,744	,460
	Non Trade Dummy	-,008	1,077	-,002	-,007	,994

Model 3 Summary (POL NAT)

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,357[a]	,127	,037	2,16251

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	39,772	6	6,629	1,417	,223[b]
	Residual	273,028	58	4,676		
	Total	312,801	64			

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	6,009	,446		13,487	,000
	Trade union dummy (VAKBOND)	-,429	,577	-,097	-,744	,460
	Dummy for liberal right parties	1,100	,661	,212	1,665	,101
	Dummy for populist radical right parties	,260	,768	,044	,339	,736
	REGR factor score 1 for analysis 4	,554	,350	,196	1,586	,118
	REGR factor score 2 for analysis 4	-,442	,279	-,201	-1,586	,118
	REGR factor score 3 for analysis 4	,015	,253	,008	,058	,954

Model 4 Summary (POL NAT)

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,250[a]	,063	,017	2,18559

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	19,583	3	6,528	1,367	,261[b]
	Residual	293,218	61	4,777		
	Total	312,801	64			

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	6,937	,986		7,035	,000
	Gender	-,561	,631	-,113	-,889	,377
	Age	-,015	,021	-,091	-,720	,474
	Ethnicity	1,540	,893	,220	1,724	,090

Model 5 Summary (POL NAT)

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,521[a]	,271	,030	2,17071

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	84,816	16	5,301	1,125	,360[b]
	Residual	227,985	48	4,712		
	Total	312,801	64			

Coefficients[a]

		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
Model		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	7,137	2,217		3,220	,002
	Elementary education	2,554	1,792	,205	1,425	,161
	Lower secondary education	,247	1,066	,033	,232	,818
	Secondary education	,899	,675	,202	1,333	,189
	Expected time to find new job (NIEUWEBAAN)	-,036	,208	-,027	-,171	,865
	H3: Income (INKOMEN)	-,166	,206	-,111	-,806	,424
	Comparative Advantage Dummy	,965	1,138	,220	,848	,400
	Non Trade Dummy	,209	1,171	,047	,179	,859
	Trade union dummy (VAKBOND)	-,317	,634	-,071	-,501	,619
	Dummy for liberal right parties	1,485	,777	,286	1,912	,062
	Dummy for populist radical right parties	,442	,894	,075	,494	,623
	REGR factor score 1 for analysis 4	,685	,405	,243	1,692	,097
	REGR factor score 2 for analysis 4	-,198	,333	-,090	-,596	,554
	REGR factor score 3 for analysis 4	-,075	,290	-,038	-,259	,797
	Gender	-,375	,901	-,076	-,416	,679
	Age	-,033	,024	-,203	-1,384	,173
	Ethnicity	1,569	1,089	,224	1,440	,156

Appendix E-5: SPSS output political dimension, global level (POL GLO)

Model 1 Summary (POL GLO)

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,148[a]	,022	-,043	2,23529

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	6,800	4	1,700	,340	,850[b]
	Residual	301,709	60	4,997		
	Total	308,509	64			

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	5,883	,661		8,899	,000
	Elementary education	,954	1,617	,077	,590	,558
	Lower secondary education	,274	,983	,037	,278	,782
	Secondary education	,053	,594	,012	,089	,929
	Expected time to find new job (NIEUWEBAAN)	,147	,166	,114	,890	,377

Model 2 Summary (POL GLO)

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,087[a]	,008	-,041	2,23336

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	2,331	3	,777	,156	,926[b]
	Residual	306,177	61	4,988		
	Total	308,509	64			

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	6,286	1,472		4,269	,000
	H3: Income (INKOMEN)	,070	,192	,047	,365	,716
	Comparative Advantage Dummy	-,345	1,067	-,079	-,324	,747
	Non Trade Dummy	-,071	1,083	-,016	-,066	,948

Model 3 Summary (POL GLO)

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,410[a]	,168	,083	2,09628

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	51,947	6	8,658	1,970	,085[b]
	Residual	256,562	58	4,394		
	Total	308,509	64			

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	6,547	,432		15,158	,000
	Trade union dummy (VAKBOND)	-,987	,559	-,223	-1,764	,083
	Dummy for liberal right parties	,626	,640	,121	,977	,333
	Dummy for populist radical right parties	-,195	,744	-,033	-,262	,794
	REGR factor score 1 for analysis 4	,546	,339	,195	1,613	,112
	REGR factor score 2 for analysis 4	-,579	,270	-,265	-2,145	,036
	REGR factor score 3 for analysis 4	,065	,245	,033	,266	,791

Model 4 Summary (POL GLO)

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,189[a]	,036	-,011	2,20130

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	11,059	3	3,686	,761	,520[b]
	Residual	297,450	61	4,846		
	Total	308,509	64			

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	7,199	,993		7,249	,000
	Gender	,130	,636	,026	,204	,839
	Age	-,020	,021	-,123	-,965	,338
	Ethnicity	,800	,900	,115	,889	,378

Model 5 Summary (POL GLO)

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,495[a]	,245	-,005	2,19462

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	75,474	16	4,717	,979	,493[b]
	Residual	233,035	48	4,816		
	Total	308,509	64			

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	7,759	2,241		3,462	,001
	Elementary education	1,968	1,812	,159	1,086	,283
	Lower secondary education	,987	1,078	,134	,916	,364
	Secondary education	,252	,682	,057	,370	,713
	Expected time to find new job (NIEUWEBAAN)	,147	,210	,114	,701	,487
	H3: Income (INKOMEN)	-,096	,208	-,065	-,463	,646
	Comparative Advantage Dummy	-,530	1,151	-,122	-,461	,647
	Non Trade Dummy	,066	1,183	,015	,056	,956
	Trade union dummy (VAKBOND)	-,727	,641	-,165	-1,135	,262
	Dummy for liberal right parties	,897	,785	,174	1,143	,259
	Dummy for populist radical right parties	-,061	,904	-,010	-,067	,946
	REGR factor score 1 for analysis 4	,708	,409	,253	1,730	,090
	REGR factor score 2 for analysis 4	-,487	,337	-,222	-1,447	,154
	REGR factor score 3 for analysis 4	,026	,293	,013	,088	,931
	Gender	-,463	,911	-,094	-,508	,614
	Age	-,032	,024	-,198	-1,325	,191
	Ethnicity	,952	1,101	,137	,865	,392

Appendix E-6: SPSS output cultural dimension, individual/family level (CUL IND)

Model 1 Summary (CUL IND)

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,337[a]	,114	,093	1,70784

ANOVA[a]

Model	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1 Regression	63,143	4	15,786	5,412	,000[b]
Residual	492,812	169	2,917		
Total	555,955	173			

Coefficients[a]

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
Model	B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1 (Constant)	6,266	,306		20,459	,000
Elementary education	-4,296	,969	-,332	-4,435	,000
Lower secondary education	,340	,432	,060	,787	,432
Secondary education	,115	,278	,031	,411	,681
Expected time to find new job (NIEUWEBAAN)	,082	,087	,070	,940	,348

Model 2 Summary (CUL IND)

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,085[a]	,007	-,010	1,80213

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	3,979	3	1,326	,408	,747[b]
	Residual	551,977	170	3,248		
	Total	555,955	173			

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	6,202	,613		10,115	,000
	H3: Income (INKOMEN)	,070	,080	,067	,871	,385
	Comparative Advantage Dummy	-,006	,450	-,002	-,014	,989
	Non Trade Dummy	-,176	,448	-,049	-,392	,695

Model 3 Summary (CUL IND)

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,340[a]	,115	,083	1,71639

ANOVA[a]

Model	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1 Regression	64,087	6	10,681	3,626	,002[b]
Residual	491,868	167	2,946		
Total	555,955	173			

Coefficients[a]

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
1 (Constant)	6,203	,184		33,663	,000
Trade union dummy (VAKBOND)	,526	,306	,132	1,720	,087
Dummy for liberal right parties	,360	,350	,078	1,028	,306
Dummy for populist radical right parties	,941	,430	,167	2,188	,030
REGR factor score 1 for analysis 4	-,107	,143	-,056	-,750	,454
REGR factor score 2 for analysis 4	-,123	,144	-,065	-,855	,394
REGR factor score 3 for analysis 4	-,589	,144	-,318	-4,080	,000

Model 4 Summary (CUL IND)

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,163[a]	,027	,009	1,78439

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	14,788	3	4,929	1,548	,204[b]
	Residual	541,167	170	3,184		
	Total	555,955	173			

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	6,725	,481		13,982	,000
	Gender	-,170	,275	-,047	-,619	,536
	Age	-,006	,010	-,042	-,544	,587
	Ethnicity	,871	,461	,146	1,890	,060

Model 5 Summary (CUL IND)

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,470[a]	,220	,141	1,66165

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	122,573	16	7,661	2,775	,001[b]
	Residual	433,383	157	2,761		
	Total	555,955	173			

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	5,646	,774		7,295	,000
	Elementary education	-3,503	1,001	-,271	-3,501	,001
	Lower secondary education	,463	,437	,082	1,059	,291
	Secondary education	,159	,278	,044	,572	,568
	Expected time to find new job (NIEUWEBAAN)	,154	,095	,132	1,629	,105
	H3: Income (INKOMEN)	,060	,077	,058	,782	,435
	Comparative Advantage Dummy	-,274	,445	-,076	-,617	,538
	Non Trade Dummy	-,206	,429	-,057	-,480	,632
	Trade union dummy (VAKBOND)	,194	,311	,049	,626	,532
	Dummy for liberal right parties	,292	,350	,063	,835	,405
	Dummy for populist radical right parties	,974	,432	,172	2,257	,025
	REGR factor score 1 for analysis 4	-,127	,145	-,066	-,879	,381
	REGR factor score 2 for analysis 4	-,039	,145	-,021	-,270	,787
	REGR factor score 3 for analysis 4	-,500	,145	-,270	-3,435	,001
	Gender	-,135	,296	-,037	-,458	,648
	Age	,001	,011	,006	,079	,937
	Ethnicity	,839	,460	,140	1,825	,070

Appendix E-7: SPSS output cultural dimension, national level (CUL NAT)

Model 1 Summary (CUL NAT)

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,109[a]	,012	-,012	1,73152

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	6,062	4	1,515	,505	,732[b]
	Residual	506,572	169	2,998		
	Total	512,634	173			

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	6,535	,311		21,047	,000
	Elementary education	-,244	,982	-,020	-,248	,804
	Lower secondary education	,225	,438	,041	,513	,609
	Secondary education	-,215	,282	-,062	-,762	,447
	Expected time to find new job (NIEUWEBAAN)	,079	,088	,070	,897	,371

Model 2 Summary (CUL NAT)

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,142[a]	,020	,003	1,71915

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	10,316	3	3,439	1,163	,325[b]
	Residual	502,318	170	2,955		
	Total	512,634	173			

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	6,456	,585		11,039	,000
	H3: Income (INKOMEN)	,094	,077	,094	1,232	,220
	Comparative Advantage Dummy	-,163	,430	-,047	-,379	,705
	Non Trade Dummy	-,454	,427	-,132	-1,063	,289

Model 3 Summary (CUL NAT)

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,192[a]	,037	,002	1,71959

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	18,933	6	3,155	1,067	,384[b]
	Residual	493,701	167	2,957		
	Total	512,634	173			

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	6,603	,185		35,764	,000
	Trade union dummy (VAKBOND)	-,034	,306	-,009	-,111	,911
	Dummy for liberal right parties	,400	,351	,090	1,140	,256
	Dummy for populist radical right parties	,009	,431	,002	,022	,982
	REGR factor score 1 for analysis 4	,248	,143	,135	1,731	,085
	REGR factor score 2 for analysis 4	-,053	,144	-,029	-,368	,714
	REGR factor score 3 for analysis 4	-,203	,145	-,114	-1,405	,162

Model 4 Summary (CUL NAT)

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,089[a]	,008	-,010	1,72978

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	4,086	3	1,362	,455	,714[b]
	Residual	508,547	170	2,992		
	Total	512,634	173			

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	6,922	,466		14,846	,000
	Gender	-,291	,266	-,084	-1,093	,276
	Age	-,003	,010	-,022	-,277	,782
	Ethnicity	,127	,447	,022	,284	,777

Model 5 Summary (CUL NAT)

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,281[a]	,079	-,015	1,73446

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	40,439	16	2,527	,840	,639[b]
	Residual	472,195	157	3,008		
	Total	512,634	173			

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	6,659	,808		8,243	,000
	Elementary education	,379	1,044	,030	,363	,717
	Lower secondary education	,431	,456	,079	,944	,347
	Secondary education	-,221	,290	-,063	-,761	,448
	Expected time to find new job (NIEUWEBAAN)	,083	,099	,073	,836	,405
	H3: Income (INKOMEN)	,086	,081	,086	1,065	,288
	Comparative Advantage Dummy	-,212	,464	-,061	-,457	,649
	Non Trade Dummy	-,468	,448	-,136	-1,045	,298
	Trade union dummy (VAKBOND)	-,129	,324	-,034	-,398	,691
	Dummy for liberal right parties	,407	,365	,092	1,116	,266
	Dummy for populist radical right parties	,104	,451	,019	,231	,818
	REGR factor score 1 for analysis 4	,245	,151	,133	1,619	,107
	REGR factor score 2 for analysis 4	-,047	,152	-,026	-,313	,755
	REGR factor score 3 for analysis 4	-,222	,152	-,125	-1,460	,146
	Gender	-,213	,309	-,061	-,689	,492
	Age	-,008	,011	-,061	-,705	,482
	Ethnicity	,204	,480	,036	,426	,671

Appendix F: Factor analysis for exclusive notion of citizenship

Rotated Component Matrix[a]

	Component		
	1	2	3
15.1 In Nederland geboren zijn	-,116	**,613**	,528
15.2 De Nederlandse nationaliteit hebben	,047	**,783**	,181
15.3 Het grootste gedeelte van zijn/haar leven in Nederland wonen	-,038	**,737**	,330
15.4 Nederlands kunnen spreken	,243	**,760**	-,106
15.5 Christen zijn	,052	-,156	**,714**
15.6 Het Nederlandse politieke systeem en zijn wetgeving accepteren	**,533**	,313	-,092
15.7 Zich Nederlander voelen	,249	**,642**	,040
15.8 Nederlandse ouders hebben	-,120	,375	**,828**
15.9 Nederlandse grootouders hebben	-,081	,343	**,846**
15.10 De scheiding van kerk (geloof) en staat accepteren	**,696**	,022	,137
15.11 Accepteren dat mensen een andere godsdienst of levensbeschouwing hebben	**,855**	,020	-,130
15.12 Accepteren dat elke godsdienst of levensbeschouwing bekritiseerd mag worden	**,805**	,110	,080
15.13 Accepteren dat mensen andere gebruiken en tradities hebben	**,832**	,001	-,127
15.14 Accepteren dat mensen een andere seksuele geaardheid hebben	**,800**	,119	-,108

Appendix G: Attitudes toward economic globalization on individual and national level with comparative advantage as reference category

Individual level

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,553[a]	,305	,175	1,68979

a. Predictors: (Constant), Ethnicity, Dummy for liberal right parties, Non Trade Dummy, REGR factor score   1 for analysis 4, REGR factor score   3 for analysis 4, Secondary education, REGR factor score   2 for analysis 4, Lower secondary education, Age, Trade union dummy (VAKBOND), Comparative Disadvantage Dummy, Expected time to find new job (NIEUWEBAAN), H3: Income (INKOMEN), Elementary education, Dummy for populist radical right parties, Gender

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	107,293	16	6,706	2,348	,006[b]
	Residual	244,084	85	2,855		
	Total	351,377	101			

a. Dependent Variable: 14.1 Mij en mijn familie
b. Predictors: (Constant), Ethnicity, Dummy for liberal right parties, Non Trade Dummy, REGR factor score   1 for analysis 4, REGR factor score   3 for analysis 4, Secondary education, REGR factor score   2 for analysis 4, Lower secondary education, Age, Trade union dummy (VAKBOND), Comparative Disadvantage Dummy, Expected time to find new job (NIEUWEBAAN), H3: Income (INKOMEN), Elementary education, Dummy for populist radical right parties, Gender

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	7,211	,960		7,508	,000
	Elementary education	-3,705	1,116	-,365	-3,320	,001
	Lower secondary education	-1,741	,866	-,196	-2,010	,048
	Secondary education	-,206	,379	-,055	-,545	,587
	Expected time to find new job (NIEUWEBAAN)	-,049	,126	-,040	-,387	,700
	H3: Income (INKOMEN)	,061	,106	,060	,571	,569
	Comparative Disadvantage Dummy	,040	,604	,007	,066	,948
	Non Trade Dummy	-,698	,387	-,186	-1,803	,075
	Trade union dummy	-,134	,396	-,034	-,340	,735

(VAKBOND)					
Dummy for liberal right parties	,920	,503	,197	1,829	,071
Dummy for populist radical right parties	-,119	,609	-,021	-,195	,846
REGR factor score 1 for analysis 4	,028	,179	,015	,157	,875
REGR factor score 2 for analysis 4	,089	,209	,043	,424	,673
REGR factor score 3 for analysis 4	-,024	,200	-,013	-,120	,905
Gender	,151	,441	,039	,343	,732
Age	-,011	,015	-,079	-,745	,458
Ethnicity	,284	,565	,047	,503	,616

National level

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	,589[a]	,347	,225	1,49384

a. Predictors: (Constant), Ethnicity, Dummy for liberal right parties, Non Trade Dummy, REGR factor score 1 for analysis 4, REGR factor score 3 for analysis 4, Secondary education, REGR factor score 2 for analysis 4, Lower secondary education, Age, Trade union dummy (VAKBOND), Comparative Disadvantage Dummy, Expected time to find new job (NIEUWEBAAN), H3: Income (INKOMEN), Elementary education, Dummy for populist radical right parties, Gender

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	101,358	16	6,335	2,839	,001[b]
	Residual	190,759	85	2,232		
	Total	292,117	101			

a. Dependent Variable: 14.8 De welvaart in Nederland

b. Predictors: (Constant), Ethnicity, Dummy for liberal right parties, Non Trade Dummy, REGR factor score 1 for analysis 4, REGR factor score 3 for analysis 4, Secondary education, REGR factor score 2 for analysis 4, Lower secondary education, Age, Trade union dummy (VAKBOND), Comparative Disadvantage Dummy, Expected time to find new job (NIEUWEBAAN), H3: Income (INKOMEN), Elementary education, Dummy for populist radical right parties, Gender

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	5,336	,849		6,284	,000
	Elementary education	,147	,987	,016	,149	,882
	Lower secondary education	-1,895	,766	-,234	-2,476	,015
	Secondary education	-,052	,335	-,015	-,156	,876
	Expected time to find new job (NIEUWEBAAN)	,177	,112	,161	1,588	,116
	H3: Income (INKOMEN)	,347	,094	,378	3,702	,000
	Comparative Disadvantage Dummy	,197	,534	,037	,370	,713
	Non Trade Dummy	-,606	,342	-,177	-1,772	,080
	Trade union dummy (VAKBOND)	-,390	,350	-,107	-1,113	,269
	Dummy for liberal right parties	,977	,445	,229	2,197	,031
	Dummy for populist radical right parties	-,116	,538	-,023	-,215	,830
	REGR factor score 1 for analysis 4	,229	,158	,136	1,451	,150
	REGR factor score 2 for analysis 4	-,028	,185	-,015	-,153	,879
	REGR factor score 3 for analysis 4	-,029	,177	-,017	-,162	,872
	Gender	,333	,390	,094	,854	,396
	Age	-,013	,013	-,099	-,958	,341
	Ethnicity	-,436	,499	-,079	-,873	,385

Appendix H: Spearman's Correlation between the different levels

Spearman's Rho		1	2	3
1. Individual/family	Correlation Coefficient	1		
	N	526		
2. National	Correlation Coefficient	**,461****	1	
	N	516	538	
3. Global	Correlation Coefficient	**,408****	**,583****	1
	N	508	523	528

*** Significant at p<0,01; **significant at p<0,05; *significant at p<0,10.