

# The pacification of favelas in Rio de Janeiro

*An analysis of the impacts on the feeling of security and  
the role of the state as a security provider*



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**July 2015**

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Front cover: A UPP police man in the Complexo da Penha favela. Source: Brazil274, 2014  
Next page: Boys flying kites (*pipas*) on their rooftops (*lajes*). Source: Rodrigues, 2010



***The favelas have something magical, a source of life and conviviality. The atmosphere is very positive. It is a misconception that a favela would only be a big sad misery. Of course, when the police arrive and there are shootings from all sides, it is a misery. But life goes on. This enormous zest for life is contagious.***

Nanko Van Buuren

## Acknowledgements

This thesis has been written as part of the master specialization program Globalisation, Migration and Development of Human Geography at the Radboud University Nijmegen. Because of my love for soccer I got the idea to travel to Brazil during the 2014 World Cup and to study the impacts of this mega sport event. Unfortunately, it appeared to be impossible to go to Brazil in this period due to the World Cup bustles. Luckily, the IBISS Foundation offered the opportunity for a research internship in Rio de Janeiro from September 2014. I did not doubt, took the opportunity and for the first time in my life I made a long trip on my own.

In order to collect data for this study, I spent four months in Rio de Janeiro. The first month I lived in a hostel in the wealthy South zone of the city, Copacabana. In this period I went to school every day to learn the Portuguese language. This was necessary because almost nobody in Brazil speaks English, especially not in a *favela* where I lived for the remaining three months. In advance I never expected it, but the *Vila Cruzeiro* favela has come to feel like my second home. I lived in the house of a former drug boss, who was very hospitable to me, (tried to) dance samba, played soccer on a weekly basis with the local girl team, got invited to birthday parties of people I met, drank beers in the streets after an invitation of some locals, barbecued more times a week than I will ever do again and received so much love from random people on the streets by a simple smile, upraised thumb or conversation about having blue eyes. This experience would not have been possible without the support of several people. Therefore I want to thank some people in particular.

First of all, during my stay in Rio de Janeiro I met a lot of people who deserve a big word of thanks. Sasa (*hello my friend*), Dudu (*meu irmão*), Tota (*tudo tranquilo*), Gabriel (*meu grande amigo pequeno*), Michelle, Eduardo, Sheena, Josefina, Gisele, Daniela, William, Kadu, Lucia, the girls from Favela Street (*tudo dois, vamos ganhar!*), Philip and Rocky *um beijo grande* for you guys for making me feel at home.

Subsequently I want to thank my internship supervisor Nanko van Buuren for giving me the opportunity to do my research internship at the IBISS Foundation, introducing me in favelas where I otherwise could not have entered safely and giving me the freedom to set up and conducting my research

Thirdly, my thanks go to all the respondents who did not only volunteer to answer my questions, but also gave me some great memories. After an interview I got invited into the house of an old woman for a piece of watermelon. In another case I had to stay for some beers

and a lunch. Once, someone even gave his phone number so I could call him whenever I needed some help. Thanks a lot for being that open-hearted to me. To ensure the anonymity of respondents their names are changed in pseudonyms within this study.

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Fifthly, a big hug for my fellow students. Let us be honest, writing a master thesis is not always nice, sometimes it just sucks. Then it is nice to have a cup of coffee and complain together.

Subsequently, I want to thank my parents for their unconditional support. You always believed in me and gave me the love and support to accomplish this study. If I had a daughter, would I let her leave to live in a favela? Well... now I would, because I know it would be a great experience. But without having the current knowledge it would have cost a lot of long and difficult conversations. Mom and dad, thanks for letting me go my own way without having these conversations.

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So, here is the final result. I hope the reader of this thesis will feel a bit of the enthusiasm I felt when I had the chance to live in this favela in *a cidade maravilhosa*.

Anke Janssen

Nijmegen, July 2015

## Summary

In 2008 the city government of Rio de Janeiro started a large-scale security program for the pacification of favelas, which had been under the reign of drug gangs for decades. Since the implementation of this security program crime rates dropped in the whole city of Rio de Janeiro. Despite this positive development, there is a lot of criticism on the pacification program, in particular on the often violent approach of the UPP policemen. Another reason for the controversy about the UPP program is that critics argue that the drug cartels will move to other non-pacified areas because they can no longer lucratively function in the pacified areas. Based on this criticism, the aim of this research is to find out whether the actual inhabitants of both pacified and non-pacified favelas actually feel safer because of the pacification. In addition, this research aims to explain these feelings and their differences and to consider what impact this had on the legitimacy of the state. The societal relevance of this study is that it may contribute to an improvement of the security by formulating recommendations, based on an analysis of the shortcomings of the UPP program and why people feel unsafe. Subsequently, this study is scientifically relevant, because it explores and connects to the scientific debates on the fear of crime and security provision.

This research builds on case studies of three neighborhoods: two pacified and one non-pacified favela. In order to measure the feeling of security — often referred to as fear of crime in literature — what constitutes this feeling in a favela had to be examined. This was done by means of a mini survey and semi-structured in-depth interviews. On the basis of these results a conceptualization of the concept fear of crime in favela has been composed. This conceptualization was used in a more extensive survey, by which the influence of the pacification on the fear of crime has been measured. To explain the fear of crime per case, the differences between the neighborhoods and the impact of the pacification on the legitimacy of the state, semi-structured in-depth interviews with local residents were conducted.

The main conclusion that can be drawn from the mini survey is that the fear of crime in Rio de Janeiro's favelas is not comparable with that in the Western world. People living in these favelas experience different kinds of fears, such as the fear of a fire, stray bullets and homicides. In addition, due to the prevailing rules of the drug gang some other crimes — like robberies and sexual violence — almost never happen. This so-called 'law of the traffickers' ensures a certain level of order and security in the favelas. Therefore, criminal networks in Rio de Janeiro are not necessarily perceived as dangerous.

The more extensive survey made clear that the pacification had totally different impacts on the feeling of security in each of the cases. The results showed that the majority of the people in Santa Marta (pacified favela in the South zone) feel safer since the pacification of their neighborhood. The outcomes in the pacified Complexo da Penha favela (in the North zone) are more diversified. A small majority of the habitants feel less safe since their neighborhood got an UPP, but this is not unambiguous since there are also people who became to feel safer. Finally, it can be concluded that the people in Vila Nova (non- pacified) feel much less safe since the pacification of other neighborhoods. None of the respondents responded that they felt safer since the introduction of the UPP program.

By means of semi-structured in-depth interviews with the local residents of the communities for explanations have been sought for the results of the surveys. The respondents in Santa Marta attributed feeling safer to the end of frequent firefights, more experienced freedom, an improvement of the behavior of the police, and the entailed social improvements. As demonstrated earlier, some people in Complexo da Penha feel safer by the pacification in contrast to a small majority who feel less safe. The people who came to feel safer explained this by telling that there are less firefights, the visible carrying of weapons has strongly decreased and certain public facilities can function again. In contrast to this group there is a bigger group in Complexo da Penha that feels less safe since the UPP was established in their neighborhood. They said that this is because the current firefights are more unpredictable and uncontrolled, there is a bad relationship between the community and the UPP police, there are more smaller crimes – such as robberies – nowadays and the UPP police enter houses randomly. Lastly, the habitants of Vila Nova attributed their increased feelings of unsafety to the increased amount of drug traffickers, the increase of violence in their community, and the fact that they do not know the new migrated drug traffickers personally.

The same security program got implemented in Santa Marta and Complexo da Penha, but had totally different impacts in both communities. Explanations have been sought for these differences by semi-structured in-depth interviews. In this study eight possible explanations have been found: the location of the favelas, the size and structure of the favelas, the implementation of the UPP social program, the policy of the local drug gang, the (still) persistent influence of the local drug gang, the policy of the UPP police, the history of the drug gang and the confidence the population has in the pacification. Remarkable is the important the history of the neighborhood has. Especially in the Complexo da Penha favela the history of the community explains a lot of the troubling side of the pacification.

Lastly, this study connects to the debate on security provision. After decades of drug rule in these favelas, the state was brought back in by the pacification. This research aimed to better understand what this means for the legitimacy of the state. By semi-structured in-depth interview it became clear that almost all respondents believe that the state *should* be responsible for the security provision. This can be interpreted as remarkably, since even in places where the state has a very bad reputation, it is unanimously stated by the respondents that they are still the actor that should ensure security. On the other hand, almost all respondents agreed that the state does not have the capacity to do so. So, a difference was appointed between the desired ideal situation and the actual capacities of the state. Moreover, the residents of Santa Marta have more confidence in the government since the UPP was established in their neighborhood. They explained this by telling that the pacification brought lots of improvements in their lives. But on the other hand, the habitants of Complexo da Penha and Vila Nova did not have more confidence at all, due to the negative impacts in their neighborhoods. An important problem that has arisen from this study is the legitimacy of the state as a security provider.

The main conclusion that can be drawn from this study is that one cannot speak about 'the pacification' and its impacts as a whole. It depends on the individual community. It is striking that the impact of the pacification is not limited to the particular districts that have received an UPP. Non-pacified neighborhoods are also affected by the pacification; in a very negative way, even. Subsequently, the bad relationship between the community and the UPP police seemed to be a very important explaining factor. This relationship might be translated to the state-society relationship, since the UPP police is the formal executor of the state in these neighborhoods. The pacification caused a decrease in confidence in the state in some areas. Thus, this study shows that the legitimacy of the state as a security provider is problematic in Rio de Janeiro's favelas.



# Table of Contents

<b>Acknowledgements</b>	<b>iv</b>
<b>Summary</b>	<b>vi</b>
<b>1. Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 Project framework	3
1.1.1 Violence in Rio de Janeiro's favelas	3
1.1.2 Pacification Police Unit program	6
1.1.3 Controversy about the UPP program	9
1.2 Research objective	11
1.3 Research questions	11
1.4 Societal and scientific relevance	12
1.4.1 Societal relevance	12
1.4.2 Scientific relevance	13
<b>2. Theoretical framework</b>	<b>16</b>
2.1 Security: actual security vs. fear of crime	16
2.1.1 Fear of crime	18
2.1.2 Measuring the fear of crime	20
2.2 Security provision	22
2.2.1 The modern state model	23
2.2.2 Community security	25
2.2.3 The need for a state?	27
<b>3. Methodology</b>	<b>29</b>
3.1 Research strategy	30
3.1.1 Survey	31
3.1.2 Semi-structured in-depth interviews	32
3.2 The cases	33
3.2.1 Justification of the cases	33
3.2.2 Santa Marta	35
3.2.3 Complexo da Penha	35
3.2.4 Vila Nova	36
3.3 Side remarks	37
<b>4. The fear of crime in a favela</b>	<b>39</b>
4.1 Adjustment of the measurement instrument	39

4.2	Understanding the fear in a favela	42
4.3	Measuring the fear of crime	45
4.3.1	Description of the population sample	45
4.3.2	Reliability of the measuring instrument	48
4.3.3	Fear of crime in each favela	49
4.4	Influence of the pacification on the fear of crime	51
<b>5.</b>	<b>Explanation of the results</b>	<b>56</b>
5.1	Explaining the results per case	56
5.1.1	Santa Marta	57
5.1.2	Complexo da Penha	60
5.1.3	Vila Nova	67
5.2	Explaining the differences in the pacified favelas	70
<b>6.</b>	<b>Bringing the state back in</b>	<b>78</b>
6.1	The responsibility to ensure security	79
6.1.1	The government should be responsible, but...	80
6.1.2	Citizens' initiatives to improve the security	81
6.2	Legitimacy of the state	82
<b>7.</b>	<b>Conclusion</b>	<b>86</b>
7.1	Research questions	86
7.1.1	Fears in a favela	86
7.1.2	How the pacification has influenced the fear of crime	87
7.1.3	The same security intervention, but different outcomes	88
7.1.4	The state as a security provider	89
7.2	The academic debates	90
7.3	Recommendations	92
7.4	Reflection	93
7.4.1	Reflection on the methodology	93
7.4.2	Own learning experiences	94
	<b>Bibliography</b>	<b>96</b>
	<b>Appendices</b>	<b>102</b>
Appendix A	Mini survey	102
Appendix B	Survey pacified favelas	103
Appendix C	Survey non-pacified favela	108
Appendix D	Interview guide pacified favelas	113


Appendix E	Interview guide non-pacified favela	115
Appendix F	Overview interviews	117

## 1. Introduction

On 20 October 2007 Brazil was chosen to host the 2014 FIFA World Cup. To make a success of this sport mega event a comprehensive national effort began (World Cup Portal, 2013). Ensuring security during the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics was one of the key priorities of the Brazilian government since Rio de Janeiro is one of Brazil's most violent cities (Stahlberg, n.d.; Zaluar, 2001). The United States Embassy describes it as follows: "The great question mark concerning Rio's selection has been the security situation..." (Kubiske, in Freeman, 2012). The pressure to tackle this problem was intensified by international media reports on the crime situation in Rio de Janeiro (Steinbrink, 2012). Due to the extensive media attention during the World Cup, the city could not afford an explosion of violence during this event. This would have led to a deterioration of Rio de Janeiro's image (Lee, Lee & Lee, 2005; Florek, Breitbarth and Conejo, 2008). Therefore, the city government started a large-scale program for the *pacification* of Rio de Janeiro's favelas in 2008, called the Pacification Police Units (UPP: *Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora*). A new policy got implemented in several favelas that would bring police permanently into informal settlements that had previously been controlled by heavily armed drug gangs for decades (Hendee, 2013). The declared goal of this program was to improve the general security situation in the city (Steinbrink, 2012).

On March 2, 2014 the last UPP was installed in the Manguerinha favela, adding up to a total of 37 different favelas which are pacified at the moment (July 1, 2015) (Instituto de Segurança Pública, 2015). The way in which this pacification is carried out is largely the same in all favelas. First, police elite forces, better known as the BOPE (*Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais*), invade the favela community and arrest criminals, seize weapons and drugs and take over the territory from the local drug faction. After that, the UPP police come in and provide proximity policing on a permanent basis (Stahlberg, n.d.).

The outcomes of the UPP program in terms of actual security are clear. Urban violence in the whole city of Rio de Janeiro has declined in the past decade (Tierney, 2012). The number of homicides and police killings declined about 50% since start of the UPP program (Cano, Borges, and Ribeiro, 2012). This also becomes visible by the graph below, which is based on the data from *Instituto de Segurança Pública*. After 2008, the year in which the first UPP was established, a clear downward trend in military police killings and homicides is perceptible.



**Figure 1: Violence in Rio de Janeiro. Source: Tierney, 2012**

In addition, some residents and sources argue that generally the UPP has brought improvements. These include the end of armed conflict between rival gangs and between gangs and the police, the end of armed traffickers patrolling the community, renewed freedom of movement, and a safer city for all of its residents (Freeman, 2012; Muggah, 2013).

Despite these positive numbers and expressions, the workings of the UPP's are very controversial and heavily discussed. The first reason is that many residents are wary and critical about the program, as some officers have been accused of abuses against the local residents as they act in a very violent way and violate human rights (Freeman, 2012; Huffpost Live, 2014; Watts, 2013). Therefore, Freeman's (2012) research made clear that residents still mistrust the police. Many residents still avoid interacting with them because of their earlier negative experiences and because they fear to be marked as collaborators should the drug gangs return (Freeman, 2012). This information raises the question whether, despite the apparent decrease of violence, the residents of the pacified favelas actually feel safer because of the introduction of the UPP program. This question will be addressed in this research by focusing on two different pacified favelas in order to determine the feeling of security, often referred to as *fear of crime* in existing literature.

Another reason for the controversy about the UPP program are the uncertain consequences of pacification on other non-pacified neighborhoods. Critics argue that the drug cartels will move to other areas in order to operate there because they can no longer function lucratively in the pacified areas (Tierney, 2012). Muggah (2013) observes this as well: "A continuing problem,

and one recognized by the military police, is the way that violent crime is transforming, and in some cases spreading to other cities and states” (para. 6). This may lead to an increase in violence on the outskirts and other non-pacified areas of Rio de Janeiro where the traffickers probably have fled to (Tierney, 2012). The precise consequences for the security in these areas cannot be determined, because up to now there has hardly been done any research to explain these effects (Ramsey, 2014). For this reason, this study will also examine the influence of the pacification in a non-pacified favela.

## **1.1 Project framework**

In this section, the reasons for studying this subject will be described in detail. This will be done by explaining the existence of violence in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas. Subsequently, the emergence and functioning of the UPP program will be addressed. Finally, the controversy about the program will be outlined. This will eventually lead to a logical establishment of the research objective and research questions.


### **1.1.1 Violence in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas**

Violence has been a serious problem in Brazil for the last half-century, and the city of Rio de Janeiro has been no exception. Rio de Janeiro is indeed one of the most violent cities in the country (Stahlberg, n.d.; Zaluar, 2001). The city has one of the highest homicide rates in Brazil, where homicides are the number one cause of death for 15-44-year-olds (UNHCR, in Stahlberg, n.d.). Between 1978 and 2000, 49,900 people died from firearm-related injuries in Rio de Janeiro (Mier, 2013). This is more than in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: between 1948 and 1999, an estimated 13,000 people were killed in the Middle East conflict (Dowdney, in Neate & Platt, 2006). So, in a period that is almost thirty years shorter, about four times as many people were killed in Rio.

The rates on crimes, especially homicide, cannot be seen without linking it to drug trafficking. Most crimes are related to personal and commercial conflicts involving people who were connected to drug dealing gangs. Many poor young men work in drug trafficking because they are in “...a state of vulnerability as a consequence of crisis within families, estrangement between adults and youths, an inefficient school system, a lack of profession training, and insufficient employment possibilities” (Zaluar, 2001, p.369). The business of drug trafficking is highly profitable, because drug use has become one of the most important pleasure-seeking activities for many people in Rio de Janeiro, especially the younger ones. This economic activity has prospered inside a risky, hierarchical and ruthless fluid organization and should be equated

to a 'survival strategy'. For this reason it is very risky and fatal for a lot of people to join the drug gangs (Zaluar, 2001).

Most of these violent crimes occur in poor slum areas, which are called *favelas* in Portuguese. Favelas are informal communities, where most people do not pay taxes, nor own land and property titles (figure 2). They began to appear in Rio de Janeiro at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The reason for this was that the government failed to provide veterans from the Canudos campaign with the housing that had been promised to them (Neate & Platt, 2006). Brazil experienced a rapid urbanization in the last century. Therefore, poor migrants had no choice but to settle in these communities. This resulted in a massive growth of favelas, both in numbers and scale (Stahlberg, n.d.).



**Figure 2: The Vidigal favela. Source: Noveas, 2010**

It took a long time before public authorities formally acknowledged these informal settlements. The 1950 census incorporated the more than 100 favelas into the public records for the first time. They defined them by what they lacked: 1) minimum proportions of more than fifty residences; 2) rustic shack as the type of habitation; 3) 'no land titles' as the juridical condition; 4) absence of public services such as water, sanitation and plumbing, electricity and telephone connections; and 5) lack of paved streets (Pino, in Tierney, 2012). Nowadays, favelas are more commonly characterized "...as communities that have running water and electricity from the national grid, and solid houses and longstanding business" (Neate & Platt, 2006, p.11).

Since 1950, the number of favelas has grown from around 100 to at least 570 in 1991 and 763 in 2010 (Freeman, 2012; Zaluar, 2001). These favelas are spread all over the territory of Rio de Janeiro. About one third of the 6,1 million people who live in Rio de Janeiro is housed in these favelas (Neate & Platt, 2006).

The system within a favela is often described as a 'state within a state' in which the organized crime has the power, or in other words, the *lei do tráfico* (law of the traffickers). This law implies a social order established by the drug gang. They make the rules and who opposes them runs the risk of getting threatened, expelled, or even murdered. Their authority is based on violence (Favela Street, 2013; Tierney, 2012). But how Tierney (2012) describes this system, in return the traffickers offer protection:

Their territorial control permitted them to displace weak (or virtually non-existent) state institutions, divide hillsides among factions, embed themselves to protect business in return for internal security and often a range of services, such as arbitrating disputes and providing social assistance. In return for maintaining order and providing minimal social support, they demanded a base from which to run their business and a vow of silence against the police (Tierney, 2012, p.24).

So, although the overall impression of these favelas is that they are disrupted by violent gangs, at the same time these gangs ensure a certain level of order as well.

It is a system of reciprocity, uneven and coerced, where the residents could not talk to the police because of threats of force and the provided social assistance. The residents were forbidden to cooperate with the police, but – since they do not trust the police as well – it is unlikely that they would: "...they are bandits on the edge of the law. What can we expect from them? We don't like the traffickers, but we cannot trust the police" (Community leader in Prazeres, quoted in Tierney, p.24). This quote shows at the same time the often difficult relationship between the residents and the police. The fear of violence, inside and outside the favelas, is exacerbated by a violent and corrupt police force:

The legal state has been absolutely disastrous, because (it functions) like an actor in the conflict with bandits, using the same weapons and ethics as the bandits, who are considered enemies. It engages in combat with them and, as a result, it transformed into an equal of bandits (Kant de Lima, quoted in Tierney, 2012, p.18)

In many cases, the police also work closely together with the drug gangs. The main reason for this is the low salary that officers receive. Therefore a lot of policemen need to seek other work that is sometimes illegal, unfortunately (Soares, in Stahlberg, n.d.). It is common for police officers to receive bribes from drug traffickers. The reason for this is that "Besides complementing their salaries, when they receive bribes officers also outsource risks and costs to the criminals" (Stahlberg, n.d., p.5). In terms of their personal safety on the job, trying to



arrest criminals would be much riskier (Stahlberg, n.d.). Also selling machine guns by the police and military to gangs is a common phenomenon (Mier, 2012). To illustrate the corruption of the police in Rio de Janeiro; between 2003 and 2007 the police of the state of Rio de Janeiro killed 5,669 people. Almost all deaths were registered as *autos de resistência* (consequence of the victim putting the officers' or others' lives at risk), but research showed that 65% of those killings had unmistakable signs of execution (Soares, in Stahlberg, n.d.). This was the situation in almost every favela in Rio de Janeiro (Neate & Platt, 2006).

In summary, favelas are known for the presence of violent drug gangs, who are in charge of these communities. However, at the same time these drug gangs play an important role in the provision security and social order. It is even the police who is often mistrusted by the residents of these favelas.

### **1.1.2 Pacification Police Unit program**

In the last few decades, different actors have tried to tackle the problem of drug trafficking, poverty, and violence in Rio de Janeiro's favelas. Some past favela policy programs are *Posto de Policiamento Comunitário* (Community Police Posts), *Centro Integrado de Policiamento Comunitário* (Integrated Center of Community Policing), *Batalhão Comunitário* (Community Battalion), and the more recent *Grupamento de Policiamento em Áreas Especiais* (GPAE) (Police Grouping in Special Areas). These programs had mixed results and did, in general, not last long. The usual reason for this was a change in government administration or because the program was the idea of one person and was not supported by other important actors of the police and government. In addition, it was often hard for the police to gain control because they were far outnumbered by traffickers. This made it easier for them to collude with the drug trafficking (Tierney, 2012).

The city government learned their lessons from these past programs, but also from others abroad. In December 2007 Rio de Janeiro developed a new program, called the Pacification Police Units. This program was based on municipal programs which were developed in Bogotá and Medellín in Colombia. With some adaptations to the Rio's context a new favela policing program emerged (Henriques & Ramos, in Stahlberg, n.d.). The pacification police are institutionally tied to the military police, but are philosophically distinct. Their commander is a military police colonel and their officers are drawn from ranks of the military police. But on the other hand their recruits are all new and they are trained in the precepts of community policing. The pacification police also wears different uniforms than the military police, are paid in different scales, and conduct a different policy in the informal settlements. In total, there

are 4,000 pacification policemen (out of 40,000 military policemen) who are working in 37 pacification police units as of March 2014 (Instituto de Segurança Pública, 2015).

The UPP program is based on the following goals:

1) Take back state control over communities currently under strong influence of ostensibly armed criminals; 2) give back to the local population peace and public safety, which are necessary for the integral exercise and development of citizenship; 3) contribute to breaking with the logic of “war” that now exists in Rio de Janeiro (Henriques & Ramos, in Stahlberg, n.d., p.8)

The UPP program focused on tacking back territories that are controlled by drug factions (Henrigues & Ramos, in Stahlberg, n.d.). Tierney (2012) argues that the UPP’s “...official purpose is to return security to communities once controlled by armed criminals” (p.8).



**Figure 3: A UPP police man in the Vila Cruzeiro favela. source: *Último segundo*, 2012**


According to Stahlberg (n.d.), the UPP approach operates in three different stages. First, police elite forces, better known as the BOPE, enter the favela community and arrest criminals, seize weapons and drugs and take over the territory from the local drug faction (Stahlberg, n.d.). Freeman (2012) describes this as an “...invasion by BOPE to push out, kill or capture traffickers, capture arms and drugs” (p.103). After this, the pacification progress begins. In this context pacification can be seen as:

Both war and peace; war in the sense of repression, peace by means of submission. Through their occupations of spaces once governed by armed criminals, the pacification police aspire to bring peace through metaphors of war (Tierney, 2012, p.7).

More specifically, this comes down to the BOPE continuing to make seizures, arrests and identifying drug sale spots and hideouts. Finally, once the favela is ‘pacified’ the UPP police

come in and provide proximity policing on a permanent basis (Stahlberg, n.d.). The community is turned over to a new community policing unit which would indefinitely occupy the favela and prevent armed drug gangs from reclaiming the territory (Freeman, 2012).

In December 2008 the military police occupied a favela for the first time. This was the Santa Marta favela. A month later another permanent police unit was installed in a second favela, Cidade de Deus (Ferreira, in Stahlberg, n.d.; Tierney, 2012). On 13 March 2014, Military police general chief of staff Colonel Paulo Henrique de Moraes told reporters that Rio's authorities have set up 37 pacification units in different favelas. The goal was to have 40 communities occupied by the time the FIFA World Cup began in 2014 and 100 at the start of the 2016 Summer Olympics (Steinbrink, 2012). This was deemed necessary in order to crack down on violent crimes ahead of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympics (voetbal.com, 2013). But so far (July 1, 2015) there have not been any extensions of UPP's since the pacification of the 37<sup>th</sup> favela on 2 March 2014 (Instituto de Segurança Pública, 2015). The location of these UPP's in Rio de Janeiro can be found in the map below.



**Figure 4: The location of UPP's and Olympic zones in Rio de Janeiro.**

**Source: Introduction to international and global studies, 2015**

Despite official comments to the contrary, a lot of authors argue that the UPP program is established not so much to bring security for local residents, but primarily in view of the mega sport events to guarantee security during the World Cup and the Olympics (Freeman, 2012; Steinbrink, 2012). Steinbrink (2012) substantiates this statement by four arguments by which it becomes clear that the UPP program is primarily a security program for the two events. First, the timetable and the initiation date of the program connect perfectly to the planned events. Secondly, the program is not a city-wide measure. It is confined to selected favelas located in city areas which are strategically relevant to the events (see figure 4). Thirdly, the UPP

program is financially supported by international concerns such as Coca Cola, which is a major sponsor of the IOC (International Olympic Committee) and FIFA. This suggests that it is not the residents who benefit from the pacification efforts, but that it is a means in attempt to fulfill the requirements of FIFA and IOC regarding the safety of international visitors. Finally, the state involves the media in its pacification actions. For example, the pacification of the favela Rocinha developed into a large-scale media event. There were about as many police and military forces as international reporters on the scene (Steinbrink, 2012). This gives the idea that they particularly want to show the rest of the world that everything is under control. While studying the UPP, it is important to be aware of the context in which this security program is established.

### **1.1.3 Controversy about the UPP program**

There is much debate about the functioning of the UPP program. A first ongoing discussion is described in the previous section. At an earlier stage in this research this debate was the main reason for me to study the UPP's in Rio de Janeiro. The question whether the UPP's would remain and function after the World Cup 2014 seemed interesting to me. But soon it became clear to me that the timing of this study was not appropriate to answer this question, since Rio de Janeiro would be the host city for the 2016 Olympics as well. This causes that the government of Rio de Janeiro will not change anything with regard to their current policy on the UPP's in order to ensure security during the 2016 Olympics. So, this question could only be answered after the 2016 Olympics, because at that time the consequences will be clearly visible. For this reason this question is not included in this research and so, the focus lies on two other debates on this topic.

The first debate is whether the residents of the pacified favelas actually feel safer since their neighborhood was taken over by the UPP police. The outcomes of the UPP program in terms of actual security are the least controversial. Urban violence in Rio de Janeiro, especially in neighborhoods where UPP's were installed, has declined in the past decade. The military police killed 902 people in 2007, before the UPP program started, and only five years later this number declined to 301 police killings. Also in the first half of 2011, there were no homicides in the eleven of thirteen pacified communities where police was operating. This does not prove causality between the introduction of the pacification police in 2008 and the reduction of violence, but this trend nonetheless shows that something is working (Tierney, 2012). Muggah (2013) adds that Rio registered roughly 42 homicides per 100,000 people a year in 2005 and that today this number declined to 26 homicides per 100,000 people a year. This number is still intolerably high, but the improvements are irrefutable (Muggah, 2013).

Despite these positive numbers, the working of the UPP program is very controversial and heavily discussed. Many residents are wary and critical about the program (Freeman, 2012). This is mainly due to the way the police and military proceed. Their method is often very violent and there are human rights violations. The official number of deaths has declined since the establishment of the UPP's, but locals say the apparent improvement masks killings that go unreported or uninvestigated and that the used methods are excessively brutal. One example is the disappearance of Amarildo de Souza. He was classified as 'missing', but later ten officers were detained on charges of torture and concealing a corpse (Huffpost Live, 2014; Watts, 2013). A second example are the riots on 23 April 2014 in response to the death of the popular artist Douglas Rafael da Silva Pereira. It is possible he was killed by UPP officers who mistook him for a drug runner (van der Laan, 2014). Another consequence of the UPP program is a restriction of the freedom of the favela residents. The pacified favelas are patrolled and people are supervised 24 hours a day (Huffpost Live, 2014). In this light, Freeman's (2012) research made clear that these residents still mistrust the police. Many residents still avoid interacting with them, because of their earlier experiences and their fear to be marked as collaborators should the drug gang return (Freeman, 2012). In addition, the literature on security shows that the actual security and security feelings often differ widely. An improvement of the actual security does not automatically lead to a more secure feeling (Flight, 2012). For this reason, this study addresses the question whether the residents of the pacified favelas actually feel safer through the introduction of the UPP program.

Another controversy about the UPP program are the concerns about possible migration of violence and drug trafficking from areas under the UPP to those with less policing (Muggah, 2013; Peres, 2011; Ramsey, 2014; Tierney, 2012). Criticism rose from some who say that the program is pushing violent drug gangs outside the city and into surrounding municipalities instead of actually solving Rio de Janeiro's crime problem. This point of view is commonly invoked by media, with local papers reporting on the apparent migration of drug traffickers to the outskirts of the city (Ramsey, 2014). Dauden (2013) adds to this criticism – in her Youtube video – 'No, I'm not going to the World Cup' (4 million plays), by saying about the UPP program that: "We are calling this in Brazil 'putting the dirt under the rock'. This is a temporary solution for a much, much deeper problem... The gangs can never be away". Some media and officials in the metropolitan area have adopted this claim - that the pacification has spread violent crime to other areas - as the truth. But the hard proof simply is not there, because up to now there has hardly been done any research to the precise effects of the UPP program on other

areas (Ramsey, 2014). For this reason, this study will examine the influence of the pacification on the feeling of security in a non-pacified favela as well.

## **1.2 Research objective**

The objective of this study can be defined as follows:

*The objective of this research is to better understand how efforts to improve security work out in a situation where the state security system has been absent for decades, By making a review of the effectiveness of the Pacification Police Unit's in Rio de Janeiro's favelas with regard to the fear of crime<sup>1</sup> among the residents in both pacified and non-pacified favelas.*

This study will be practice-oriented, because it focuses on an existing practice. However, it will have a theoretical focus as well, because it will try to deliver a contribution to existing theories and theoretical debates. Moreover, this study will be an evaluation research. It relates to the situation that has emerged after an intervention, an ex post evaluation. As already explained in the previous paragraph, this study will examine whether the implementation of this security intervention had an impact on the fear of crime in both pacified and non-pacified favelas. By also adopting non-pacified areas in this research, it connects to the debates on this topic.

## **1.3 Research questions**

To achieve the research objective, the following main question is established:

*What impact did the Pacification Police Unit program have on the fear of crime in Rio de Janeiro's favelas?*

In order to formulate an answer to the main question and to connect to the debate about the UPP program, five sub-questions are formulated:

- 1. What constitutes the fear of crime in Rio de Janeiro's favelas?*
- 2. What impact did the Pacification Police Unit program have on the level of the fear of crime in pacified and non-pacified favelas?*
- 3. What explains the changes in the fear of crime in each of the favelas and what is the role of the Pacification Police Unit program in this?*

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<sup>1</sup> The concept fear of crime is used in literature to refer to people's feeling of security and will be used this study.

4. *What explains the differences in the impacts of the Pacification Police Unit program between the favelas?*
5. *What does the Pacification Police Unit program eventually imply for the actual and perceived role of the state as a security provider?*

## **1.4 Societal and scientific relevance**

In this section the societal and scientific relevance of this research will be discussed.

### **1.4.1 Societal relevance**

As already described in section 1.1.1, violence is a major problem in Rio de Janeiro's favelas. Every year nearly 25,000 people die from firearm-related injuries (Mier, 2013). This is more than in the whole Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Dowdney, in Neate & Platt, 2006). To improve this situation and with the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics in mind, Rio de Janeiro's city government established the Police Pacification Unit program. This study is socially relevant, because it tries to understand the effects of this security intervention on local processes of security provision.

Most obviously and importantly, this research may contribute to an improvement of the security for people living in favelas that have been subjected to or are still undergoing violent conflicts. This can be achieved by analyzing why people feel unsafe and to identify the shortcomings of the UPP program. By subsequently formulating recommendations this research may contribute to an improvement of the security situation in these favelas.

Secondly, the UPP program aims to move these situations to one of durable peace. A thorough understanding of what this intervention does in practice is therefore very important.

Thirdly, the UPP program is very expensive. Each UPP soldier costs 60,000 Brazilian Real per year (R\$), which is €19,062. This makes an annual cost of R\$480 million, which is €152,5 million (Freeman, 2012). With so much public money being invested in a security intervention, it is also important to look critically to this program if it has been effective (Willems, 2013).

Finally, the discussion about the security in Rio de Janeiro in the run to the 2014 FIFA World Cup is not a new discussion. The same type of security concerns were voiced before almost any other major international sporting event since the terrorist attacks at the Munich Olympics in 1972 (Cyphers, 2010). The most recent examples are the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi and the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa. Since the 2007 selection of Sochi as the host city of the Olympic Games, many observers raised concerns about the security. Sochi experienced

ongoing terrorist incidents, including several bombings (Nichol, Halchin, Rollins, Tiersky & Woehrel, 2014). These concerns arose from the fact that Sochi is situated on the edge of a conflict zone. To ensure security during the games, Russia launched a security operation that has cost 2.5 billion. Whether it is due to this operation is questionable, but during the 2014 Winter Olympics, there were no major violence disturbances (Hornstra & van Bruggen, 2013). Also before the 2010 World Cup in South Africa many concerns were expressed about the security during this event (Burger, 2007). The murder rate in South Africa in the last 10 years has hovered among the highest in the world. Arising crime fears have created nations with houses surrounded by electrified fencing, called gated communities. Furthermore, concerns were expressed about international terrorism (Cyphers, 2010). To ensure security during the event the country implemented special measures. One example is a temporary restriction of flight operation in airspace surrounding the stadiums (South African Civil Aviation Authority, 2009).

Despite the fact that these security concerns arose from different situations as in Rio de Janeiro, the above shows that the discussion about the security during the World Cup in Brazil is not an isolated one. Security is a recurring theme during the organization of mega sport events such as the FIFA World Cup and the Olympics. By reviewing the effectiveness of the UPP program in the context of the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics, this study can have a practical contribution to security issues in organizing other mega sport events. This also contributes to the societal relevance of this study.

#### **1.4.2 Scientific relevance**

This research is scientifically relevant because it connects to the theoretical debate on security feelings, which is referred to in the literature as *fear of crime*. Research on the fear of crime has been criticized much. This criticism is mainly focused on conceptualization and measurement (Vanderveen, 2006a). Pleysier (2010) adds to this by saying that making this concept empirically measurable is not immediately indisputable. This conceptualization and measurement is characterized as being methodologically flawed, "...and to a certain extent as non-theoretical, non-cumulative and non-comparative, especially because of the conceptual chaos in this field and the use of different labels and indicators" (Vanderveen, 2006a, p.7). Less is known about the variety in nature, meaning, relevance and experience of fear of crime in people's lives. This is due to the widespread use of collecting data on the fear of crime by survey, and because of the relatively little use of qualitative methods such as in-depth interviews or focus groups. Besides that, there is little research on the fear of crime which makes use for example of social and personality psychology. Here, one can think of state and



trait anxiety and individual differences in the experience of fear. This is a big gap in studies according to the conceptualization and the measurement of the fear of crime (Vanderveen, 2006a).

In this research a written questionnaire will be used to measure the fear of crime among the residents of the favelas in Rio de Janeiro. This questionnaire will be established on the findings of Vanderveen (2006a). However, to create a valid and reliable questionnaire in line with this research's context, the first question is: *What constitutes the fear of crime in Rio de Janeiro's favelas?* This is done before the conduction of the surveys to determine which factors play a role in the development of the fear of crime among the residents of these favelas. What makes people feel insecure? What influences these feelings? These questions will be answered by a mini survey and in-depth interviews. It is likely that the factors influencing the fear of crime are dependent on the context in which these people reside. For this reason, initially, attempt will be made to determine these factors, so it can later be adjusted in the written questionnaire. The scientific relevance of this research is to contribute to a clear conceptualization and measurement of the concept of fear of crime in the context of Rio de Janeiro's favelas. In this way this study may provide a better understanding of the phenomenon of fear of crime.

Furthermore, the scientific relevance of this research is that it contributes to a better understanding of the effects of security interventions and of processes of security provisioning with which these interventions inevitably interact. In a lot of cases research on security interventions focuses mainly on the output of the programs, or in other words on the extent to which its programmatic targets are reached. By focusing on the desired outcomes, the broader societal impacts are often poorly defined (Pugel, in Willems, 2013). One of these broader societal impacts mentioned by Willems (2013) is the complex state-society relation, or in other words, the terms of confidence that people have in the state ensuring their safety. In this way a security intervention can contribute to state formation. At the same time a broader understanding of the workings of security interventions is needed or as Muggah (2009) describes it: "...analysis of what and why it does or does not work is urgently needed" (p.4). The range of programs and their impacts that require understanding and need to be analyzed is growing. "It is therefore also an academic responsibility to gain better understanding about the working of these interventions and the impacts they have on society" (Willems, 2013, p.9).

In the case of the UPP program in Rio de Janeiro, most studies are focused on the statistical security numbers on crime rates. This study will try to fill this gap by also focusing on the societal impacts for the individual and trying to understand why this UPP program does or

does not work by examining the underlying social explanations. As Willems (2013) describes it “By also focusing explicitly on the interplay of security interventions with the dynamic processes on the ground” (p.9).

## 2. Theoretical framework

There are three important concepts to explain the impact of the pacification in Rio de Janeiro's favelas and how the government deals with violence and crime in these areas: security, fear of crime and security provision. According to Tierney (2012), the official purpose of the UPP's "...is to return security to communities once controlled by armed criminals" (p.8). So, to be able to analyze this security program it is interesting to know what is meant by the concept of *security*. Looking into the available literature, it becomes clear that there are two different concepts mapped onto the word security: the *actual security* and the *feeling of security*, often referred to as fear of crime in literature (for this reason, in this research will be referred to the concept fear of crime when talking about the feeling of security). This raises questions on what these concepts mean and how they relate to each other. A third important concept is *security provision*. With the establishment of the UPP's the government of Rio de Janeiro tries to provide security in areas dominated by local drug gangs. What is security provision and how does this concept relate to the actual security and fear of crime? To understand the influence of the UPP's on both concepts this study connects to the debate on security provision. These concepts and questions will be discussed in the following sections.

### 2.1 Security: actual security vs. fear of crime

The word security derives from the Latin word *securus*, which means 'without worry' (Wæver, 2008). Today, different meanings of the word have emerged, especially since the Cold War. The definition that will be adopted in this research is constructed by Baldwin (1997): "A low probability of damage to acquired values" (p.13). This definition requires some explanation. First of all, Baldwin (1997) uses the words 'a low probability' since he believes that the risk that particular threats cause damage may be lowered, but there can never be complete protection. Besides the fact that the definition needs some specifications: security for whom? And security based on which values? Baldwin (1997) argues that the specification of 'whom' and 'what values' depends on the specific research question. The first question can refer to an individual, a state, an international system, et cetera. The second question addresses what values are to be secured, which can be issues like physical safety, psychological well-being, economic welfare, et cetera. Although this definition seems fairly clear, security is not one-sided. It consists of both the actual security and the fear of crime, making it a complex concept to deal with properly.

"Security is both a feeling and a reality. And they are not the same" (Schneier, 2008a, para. 1). You can be secure even though you do not feel it, and you can feel secure even though you are

not (Schneier, 2008b). Vanderveen (2006b) adds to this by saying that the actual security and fear of crime are not two sides of the same coin. Both concepts are formed by different processes. It is an illusion to think that when the actual security improves, the feeling of security automatically improves as well (Vanderveen, 2006b). For example, the actual security provided by the gates in gated communities is less than the perceived sense of security by the residents. Similarly, the fear of earthquakes is more common than the fear to slip on the bathroom floor, although the latter takes more lives than the former. Furthermore, in order to refer to the UPP program, the perceived effectiveness of security measures is sometimes different from the actual security that is provided by the measures (Schneier, 2003).

So, the word security in fact refers to two different notions and sometimes it is hard to know which one is meant when the word security is used (Schneier, 2008b). The actual security is mathematical and based on the probability of different risks and the effectiveness of different countermeasures. For example, the security of someone's home can be calculated or how likely it is to be murdered, based on, for example, the crime rate in a neighborhood. It is also possible to calculate how much more secure a burglar alarm will make a home, how likely it is to be the victim of identity theft or how well a credit freeze protects from identity theft. With large enough sets of statistics on criminal acts it is possible to calculate such things; insurance companies do it all the time (Schneier, 2008a).

But security is also a feeling, named the 'fear of crime' in the literature, which is not based on probabilities and mathematical calculations, but on psychological reaction to both countermeasures and risks. Schneier (2008a) explains this as follows:

You might feel terribly afraid of terrorism, or you might feel like it's not something worth worrying about. You might feel safer when you see people taking their shoes off at airport metal detectors, or you might not. You might feel that you're at high risk of burglary, medium risk of murder, and low risk of identity theft. And your neighbor, in the exact same situation, might feel that he's at high risk of identity theft, medium risk of burglary, and low risk of murder (para. 4)

So the actual security and the fear of crime are certainly not alike, but they can be interconnected. Both forms of security can influence each other (Schneier, 2008a). The most obvious relationship is how the actual security affects the fear of crime. It is easy to imagine that someone feels less safe when more crimes or murders happen in a certain neighborhood and. Conversely, there is a relationship as well. The fear of crime can increase the actual security when it affects or deters malicious behavior. An example are visual signs of security

protection, such as video surveillance or alarm systems in a business. Such measures arise from a sense of insecurity, but influence the actual security, since some intruders will decide not to attempt to break into such areas (IES, 2012). But these causal relationships are certainly not fixed. It is possible that there is a relationship, but there is no agreement on the existence of this relationship (Vanderveen, 2006b; Schneier 2008a).

The focus in this research will be on the fear of crime, because it turned out to be very difficult to measure the actual security in the selected cases. Data on these communities were often not available or incomplete. An attempt has been made to identify and measure the fear of crime in Rio de Janeiro's favelas.

### **2.1.1 Fear of crime**

Fear of being criminally victimised is intrinsically disturbing. Many people are haunted by the thought that a stranger could pounce at any moment, either on the street or at home, and rob, assault, or in the case of female victims, rape (Box, Hale & Andrews, 1988, p.340)

The term fear of crime has been used in reference to feelings, beliefs, perceptions, opinions, and behavior regarding crime. Baumer and Rosenbaum (1981) argue that fear of crime as commonly measured, is not really *fear* of crime. Technically speaking, it should refer to an immediate, acute, response to a particular stimulus event related to crime. To date there appears to be no universally accepted definition and it is this very lack of certainty which has prompted a variety of authors to propose their own suggestions. A first one is provided by Conklin (in Vanderveen, 2006a). He defines fear of crime as the sense of personal security in the community. A subsequent definition from Ferraro and LaGrange (in Wynne, 2008) suggests that fear of crime is "...an emotional response of dread or anxiety to crime or symbols that a person associates with crime" (p.3). In addition, Covington and Taylor (in Vanderveen, 2006a), define it as the emotional response to possible violent crime and physical harm. This latter definition will be referred to when the concept fear of crime is used in this study.

Fear of crime has emerged as a popular topic of academic study during the past 50 years (Hilinski, Neeson & Andrews, 2011). Lee (in Wynne, 2008) adds to this by stating that the fear of crime has become "...an increasingly significant concern for criminologists, victimologists, policy-makers, politicians, policing organizations, the media and the general public" (p.2). There has been an extraordinary proliferation of research and literature in this field (Lee, in Wynne, 2008). Walklate (in Wynne, 2008) says about this proliferation that the "...growth in sensitivity to the fear of crime parallels the growth in sensitivity to the victim of crime more

generally” (p.2). This growth was boosted by the attention in the media of muggings in the early 1970s. Also the rising recorded crime rates in this decade contributed to this proliferation (Walklate, in Wynne, 2008).

Fear has numerous possible consequences: it damages the sense of community and neighborhood, transforms some public places into no-go areas, more prosperous citizens increasingly protect themselves and their property, or move to another neighborhood, those who already suffer from other social and economic disadvantages may suffer the most from the incidence of crime, it increases the demand for more incarceration and punishment and reduces the appeal of liberal penal policies and “...it creates a seed-bed of discontent” (Box, Hale & Andrews, 1988, p.340) which leads to an undermining of the legitimacy of the criminal justice system (Box, Hale & Andrews, 1988).

To better understand the existence of the fear of crime Box, Hale and Andrews (1988) distinguished six conditions which can cause an intensified fear: 1) vulnerability, 2) environmental clues and conditions, 3) personal knowledge of crime and victimization, 4) confidence in the police and criminal justice systems, 5) perceptions of personal risk and 6) seriousness of various offences.

The first factor is vulnerability. Many citizens feel vulnerable for a number of reasons. “Some may feel unable to protect themselves physically or economically, or be incapable of making a fast retreat, others may feel less able to cope with the physical and emotional consequence of begin victimized” (Toseland, in Box Hale and Andres, 2008, p.341). Research has identified certain groups who are more vulnerable than others, including women, the elderly, individuals of low socioeconomic status, minorities and the poor (Hale, in Hilinski, Neeson & Andrews, 2011).

The second factor are environmental clues and conditions. People can become fearful because they perceive their immediate environment to be threatening. Examples can be graffiti, drunks and homeless people on the streets, noisy neighbors and loud parties, rubbish and litter lying around and flats with broken windows (Box, Hale & Andrews, 1988). In addition, the absence of friends will probably lead to more fear of crime as well. This is because neighbors and friends can help each other, which creates a strong sense of neighborhood cohesion and community (Kennedy & Silverman, in Box, Hale & Andrews, 1988).

The third factor, fear of crime is affected by people’s knowledge about crime. In practice, this means that people who have been victimized or know other people who have been similarly

victimized, will tend to be more afraid (Balkin, 1979; Hough, 1985; Lawton and Yaffe, 1980; Linquist and Duke, 1982; Ollenberger, 1981; Skogan, 1987; Stafford and Galle, 1984, in Box, Hale & Andrews, 1988).

A fourth factor is confidence in the police and justice system. "If people believe that the police are effective and efficient at clearing-up crimes and apprehending criminals, that they respond to calls quickly and that they have physical presence on the ground, then they are less likely to fear crime" (Baker et al.; Krahn & Kennedy, in Box, Hale & Andrews, 1988, p342).

The two final factors, perceptions of personal risk and seriousness of various offences, are described by Warr and Stafford (1983) as the 'proximate causes' of fear. This refers to the seriousness of the offence and the perceived likelihood of being victimized (Warr & Stafford, 1983). "Only when citizens feel they are highly at risk of being victimized seriously is it likely that fear of crime would exist" (Box, Hale & Andrews, 1988, p.342). So, even when there is a high risk of becoming a victim, this would not necessarily generate fear. For example, crimes that immediately have an impact on individuals (such as robbery and burglary) cause greater fear than larger-scale and longer-term crimes which have a significant aggregate impact on society, but have less effect on the individual (Kershaw et al, in Wynne, 2008).

### **2.1.2 Measuring the fear of crime**

The fear of crime can only be discovered by asking the individual to report their experiences or by studying observable phenomena of the individual. Measuring the concept has been criticized widely in the past decades. Research in recent decades shows that results towards this concept are not always reliable and therefore not useful (Vanderveen, Pleysier & Rodenhuis, 2011). Criticism is mainly focused on the conceptualization and measurement. This conceptualization and measurement is characterized as being methodologically flawed (Vanderveen, 2006a). Arguably, one of the biggest problems is the concept 'fear'. Just like other emotions, like love and hate, it is difficult to define and measure: "...probably due to the insurmountable problems of trying to come up with clear, accurate, and easy to operationalize definition of what is in essence a basic human emotion" (Fattah, in Pleysier, 2010, p.64).

Another point of criticism is that little is known about the variety in nature, meaning, relevance, and experience of fear of crime in people's lives. This is due to the methods used, as almost only surveys are used to measure this concept. Qualitative methods like in-depth interviews or focus groups are sparsely used. In these kinds of methods, the respondent has no chance to indicate which kinds of factors affect his or her fear of crime. This is because these factors are already summed up in the survey and there is no possibility to add new factors. For

this reason, adding qualitative methods would be a good addition to examining the fear of crime (Vanderveen, 2006a).

A last point of criticism is the oftentimes difficult measurement of the fear of crime, and how is it not covering the whole concept. Question such as 'how secure do you feel?' and 'do you feel insecure at some times?' are standard items which are used all over the world to measure this concept. However, research over the last decades shows that these questions are not always valid, reliable, and thus useful. Fear of crime consists of different dimensions or aspects and in many studies of the fear of crime just one of these dimensions or aspects is examined (Vanderveen, Pleysier & Rodenhuis, 2011). Vanderveen (2006a) illustrates this with an ancient Indian parable in which six blind men encounter an elephant. All of them touch a different part of the elephant, thus none of them can have a complete picture. The punch line is of course that they are all partly right, but the elephant is more than the sum of those very partial descriptions (Vanderveen, 2006a). Fear of crime is similar to this example: in the past, measuring instruments dealt with only one aspect of the concept. It is clear that when a person only looks at one aspect of fear of crime – for example security feelings at night – other findings and outcomes will be found then when someone looks at several aspects (Vanderveen, Pleysier & Rodenhuis, 2011).

So when the fear of crime is measured, several aspects should be considered. Vanderveen, Pleysier & Rodenhuis (2011) and Vanderveen (2006a) distinguish five aspects that should be taken into account: fear of victimization, fear of others' victimization, seriousness of consequences of victimization, perception of risk of victimization and feeling safe at night. These five distinguished aspects are also adopted in the measurement of fear of the crime in this study. Moreover, Vanderveen (2006a) shows a possible operationalization of these aspects. In this operationalization she adopts the following factors influencing the fear of crime: threats, assault, robbery on the street, a brawl, sexual harassment and, burglary. These factors are based on the Western context, where these crimes are the most likely ones to be afraid of. It is plausible that in a totally different context – such as the favelas of Rio de Janeiro – other factors influence the fear of crime among residents. For this reason, I decided to investigate which context-specific factors determine the fear of crime. This has been done by means of a mini survey and semi-structured in-depth interviews. So, the five aspects, as formulated by Vanderveen, Pleysier & Rodenhuis (2011) and Vanderveen (2006a), are adopted in the measurement in this study, but the context-specific factors are not. These factors will be tested and, if necessary, be supplemented by other factors. In this way this research seeks to



have a share in the theoretical debate on fear of crime and may provide a better understanding of the phenomenon fear of crime in other contexts as well.

## **2.2 Security provision**

In order to understand the influence of the pacification on the fear of crime this study connects to the debate on security provision. Since security has been defined as the low probability of damage to acquired values, security provision can be defined as actions taken by actors to react to or minimize threats to these values. Following the definition of security, different actors pursue different needs, norms, values and priorities regarding security. In this case security provision is not only the implementation of security by state actors, but also “The actions taken by various non-state actors in pursuit of their own security or the security of others” (Willems, 2013, p.110). With this definition in mind it becomes clear that these actors involved in security provision may have diverging, and at times even conflicting, interpretations.

Ideas about who is responsible for security provision in literature differ. On the one hand, the dominant definition, based on European experiences, is that the state has a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. It is assumed that peace is best achieved through the establishment of a functioning state (Willems, 2013). However, in practice, in many settings access to violent means is dispersed rather than monopolized. Due to a lacking state monopoly, “There is a multitude of overlapping institutions, both state and non-state, involved in governance and security provision” (North, Wallis and Weingast, in Willems, 2013, p.111).

The same counts for Rio de Janeiro’s favelas. For decades, due to a lack of state control local drug gangs have played important roles in the security provision in several favelas. The implementation of UPP’s can be seen as an attempt by the state to reclaim an important role in the security provision. The quotes in the introduction seem to confirm this: the state sees it as its responsibility to resettle in areas where it has lost its control. The idea is that security can be achieved best by creating a system of states, in which the state is an organization that holds a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, with the primary task of providing security. The fact that the state tries to regain authority in these neighborhoods – ruled by drug gangs for decades – raises the question how effective this UPP program is in strengthening the role of the Brazilian state. How does the pacification contribute to more state control in the favelas and more responsibilities regarding security provision? This is a question about the legitimacy, reliability and credibility of the state, which leads eventually to the question what this means in terms of an improvement in the local security? So, whether the pacification has led to an

improvement of security? This research will try to find out in which way the UPP contributes to strengthening the role of the state as a security provider and what this means for the security in these favelas. This will be done by examining how people see the UPP in terms of effectiveness and reliability compared to other security providers, namely the local drug gangs. The included literature in this paragraph will help to answer these kinds of questions.

### **2.2.1 The modern state model**

The provision of security is arguably one of the most important ways the state acquires legitimacy and the right to exist, or, as Weber describes it: "Violence that is held to be legitimate" (ibid., in Willems, 2013, p.33). According to Charles Tilly (1985) the establishment of states in the west has been a long and violent process. He compares war and state building with organized crime, in which the state can be seen as a protection racket, exercised by "...coercive and self-seeking entrepreneurs" (Tilly, 1985, p.169). Out of the rise of these protection rackets the states created gained legitimacy for the protection of those who lived within its territories from threats from the outside. They were also able to extract taxes and maintain a level of order (Tilly, 1985). In line with this, Max Weber (in Willems, 2013) argues that every state is founded on force. In Weber's definition violence is not the only means used by the state but it is the means specific to the state. A state is then, "That human community which (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a certain territory, this 'territory' begin another of the defining of the state" (ibid., in Willems, 2013, p.32). A precondition for the state to remain in power is that those who are ruled must submit to the claimed authority. So state authority requires some form of approval from those who are governed. This construct is known by the term 'social contract' (Willems, 2013).

The term social contract remains strongly present in current policy vocabulary, but dates back to the 1950's. Thomas Hobbes was one of the early thinkers on the social contract theory. In 1651 he described how people gave up some of their rights to the state authority in exchange for their protection. Life without a government would lead to a war of all against all. If people have rights to everything and are entirely free, everyone would be continuously fighting for their personal rights and there would not be peace. For this reason, Hobbes (1651) pleads for an absolute authority to avoid the emergence of this state of nature. Each person needs to give up some of their rights to this authority in exchange for protection. This construction is called a social contract between citizens and the governing authority (Hobbes, 1651).

Out of this the idea the modern state evolved:

Whether acting as enforcers of the law or as defenders of the nation, the means of violence are supposed to be controlled by the government, which in turn is supposed to be representing or acting on behalf of the population. This is – in essence – the modern state model. (Stepputat, Andersen & Møller, in Willems, 2013, p.35).

More concretely, this amounts to a model in which states exercise sovereign control over their entire territory. The army, police, special forces and other governmental agencies are in control to provide law and order, and are answerable to the parliament due to the separation of powers between the legislative and executive. The first priority of national governments would be the protection of their residents from internal and external threats. In this way national governments are authorized to be the sole security provider. Security had become a public good provided by the state. “It was regarded as self-evident that preventing and responding to crime, and maintain and restoring order and security was the duty of the state” (Willems, 2013, p.35). The concrete manifestation of this is that the state has a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence to fulfill this role.

So, an important idea in the classical literature on state formation is the importance of a monopoly on violence for the authority of the state. This idea is arguably very present among the Brazilian government as well. In practice, the Brazilian state lost this monopoly in the favelas, but tries to regain it via the UPP’s. This raises several questions: How effective is the UPP program in strengthening the role of the Brazilian state? Since the state was absent for decades it is interesting how they will regain legitimacy and authority from the local citizens. It is not only important if the state acts in an effective way, but also if the state is seen as reliable and credible. So, to what extent do the people believe that the state has established the UPP program for their actual security? At the end of the day, what does this mean for the contribution to the feeling of security among the residents? Or in other words, did the UPP result in an improvement of security?

The idea of the modern state with a central role for the government in the security provision can be deduced from the realist perspective on international relations. This discourse is significantly influenced by inter-state relations in the Cold War era (Herz, 1950). On the other hand, there are opposing ideas. In environments where the state has a history of being absent, predatory, fragile, or weak, some communities have created alternative channels to provide security and resolve disputes (Leone, 2012). Non-state actors can also be involved in

governance and security provision (North, Wallis and Weingast, in Willems, 2013). This is often called 'community security' (Frerks, 2011).

### **2.2.2 Community security**

As mentioned earlier – contrary to the modern state model – there is a movement within literature arguing that, aside state actors, non-state actors are also involved in security provision due to the lack of state control. Frerks (2011) uses the concept of community security to explain this:

Community security is defined to constitute both an end state in which communities feel secure from threats exerted by violent conflict, arms proliferation, crime, and a lack of protection or direct threat by the state, and a process in which communities participate in identifying and prioritizing their security needs as well as appropriate responses to meet these needs (p.11)

Community security often arises in states that are defined as fragile. There are several definitions of state fragility. Most build on the definition proposed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which defines a state to be “Fragile when state structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their population” (2007, p.2). Nevertheless, often based on their particular mandates and interests, donors and international organizations all use their own definitions. Connecting to the debate on security provision, USAID (in Willems, 2013) refers to states that are “Unable or unwilling to adequately assure the provision of security” (p.36).

This fragility of states has developed a debate on the sovereignty of states. Sovereignty is something a state has to earn and is therefore no longer a legal given. It implies a responsibility for the protection of its people, which many states cannot fulfill in practice (Willems, 2013). Therefore, it is acknowledged that people in fragile states often rely on security and justice provided by non-state actors, including secret societies, chiefs, gangs, religious leaders or militias, paralegals, or community reconciliation and trade associations (Leone, 2012). Menkhaus (2007) summarizes this as follows:

Communities that have been cut off from an effective state authority—whether out of governmental indifference to marginal frontier territories, or because of protracted warfare, or because of vested local and external interests in perpetuating conditions of state failure consistently seek to devise arrangements to provide for themselves the

core functions that the missing state is supposed to assume, especially basic security (p.75)

So, in these places there is a multitude of overlapping institutions, both state and non-state, involved in governance and security provision. The access to violent means are dispersed in contrast the ideal state that has a monopoly on it (North, Wallis & Weingast, in Willems, 2013). Besides that, state practices are not necessarily undertaken by state actors or state institutions. There can be different institutions making authority claims. These different institutions (state and non-state) compete and negotiate for authority, which is a dynamic process. This happens between individuals at a local level, as well as between larger institutions and structures set out by economics and global politics (Willems, 2013). The establishment of UPP's can be seen as an effort of the state to reclaim authority from the drug gangs, in order to regain the task of providing security.

Beside the competition over authority, there is an ongoing competition over security provision. In line with the adopted definition of security, people have very different ideas about what security means and which security issues are prioritized. Individuals define what security constitutes to them individually, depending on the particular context. This context includes experiences, potential threats, the possible definitions prevailing discourses in society provide for them, and the influence of images presented by the elites. People choose their strategies in pursuit of their security, based on the available opportunities they have. Willems (2013) cites an example of this:

In a village the local police officer can contribute to the security by actively supporting the community by preventing and solving crimes. Yet, if this police officer is perceived to be an oppressor who acts in interest other than security as defined by the people in this village, people may find alternative way to provide in their security. (p.112)

The ongoing competition over security provision is not just about which security issues are set on the agenda, but also about who is allowed to take actions and which actions are allowed, according to whose norms. What defines security can be interpreted differently. The results is that the way security is pursued in a given community may conflict with the interests of interventions. The struggles over security are undertaken by a variety of individuals and institutions as well. Willems (2013) defines institutions as significant practices, relationships, or organizational structures, criminal gangs, and rebel groups, but also state institutions such as the local government or the police. This ongoing process of interaction between different actors dealing with security can be described as the security dynamics: "The multiplicity of

different actors working on behalf of different norms, values, needs and priorities regarding security creates a process of a constant struggling and negotiating of different security interpretations and strategies by multiple individual and institutions” (Willems, 2013, p.110).

The ideas about community security as described in this paragraph count for Rio de Janeiro’s favelas as well. Due to an absent state authority was taken over by non-state actors, namely the local drug gangs. This created a certain level of order and raises the question what happens when the state makes an attempt to take over this established control. Will they be an improvement in comparison with the former local security providers? A competition on security provision will arise. It is interesting to investigate what kind of influence this has on the legitimacy of the state.

### **2.2.3 The need for a state?**

On the one hand the fragility of states ensured that non-state actors participated in the provision of security. On the other hand, it strengthened the idea that security can be achieved in the best way by a system of states, in which the state is an organization that holds a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence with the primary task of providing security. Fragility is considered as a security threat for the people living in the region and for the state system as a whole. Engberg-Pedersen, Andersen and Stepputat (2008) state that fragility can be solved best by strengthening the state. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS, 2001) adds to this that states have the ‘Responsibility to Protect’, commonly shortened to ‘R2P’. So, the assumption arises that the primary task of the state is the provision of security, as in the modern state model. This argumentation makes interventions not only legitimate, but also necessary (Willems, 2013).

Security interventions all work to a common goal: “To (re) install a monopoly over the use of violence in the hands of state institutions – by disarming former combatants, armed groups and civilians – and improving security provision by state security forces in order to improve state-society relations” (Willems, 2013, p.39). The World Bank (2011) adds to this by stating that “Consolidating and coordinating security services is a fundamental first step in institutional reforms to prevent violence” (p.148).

Literature also shows that the absence of a state monopoly does not automatically have to lead to total chaos. In practice alternative security providers take over this role. It became clear that in the context of an ineffective state, community initiatives are nonetheless able to create a certain level of security. In fact, even actors who traditionally are associated with criminality and violence can play a role in the local security provision. This also happened in Rio

de Janeiro's favelas. Violent drug gangs took over control, which is problematic in light of the modern state model. But to a certain extent, this has, however, led to order and safety in these favelas.

This setting makes it difficult to estimate what will happen if the government tries to establish itself again as the main security provider in these favelas. It is not the case that the government is obliged to create order, because the drug gang already established a self-created order. But the motives of the police and the drug gang – regarding security provision – are totally different, or, to use the terms as used in this debate, the acquired values that have to be protected differ per security provider. This raises the question what will happen with the self-created order by the drug gang when the UPP police take over the task as security provider? The installation of UPP's might rather lead to a shift of responsibilities regarding the security provision. According to literature on security provision, a certain competition between security providers over authority will emerge. Herein the degree of legitimacy among the population plays an important role. The state has to regain legitimacy and authority in communities where it was absent for decades. The literature on security provision raises several questions that are of interest to this study. To what extent does the population in these favelas believe the government has established the UPP's for their interest instead of other interests? What influence did the pacification have on the confidence that the people have in the government? And who do the residents of these favelas think should be responsible for the security in their neighborhood? All these questions will be answered in chapter 6, which connects to this debate on security provision.

### 3. Methodology

This chapter will explain how and with what kind of information this research has been conducted. Before this will be explained in more detail, the reader needs to be aware of the four distinct phases wherein the empirical material is collected. Every phase had to be completed before it was possible to carry out the next step, because each time the collected data in the previous phase was required.

First of all, by means of a mini survey, complemented by in-depth interviews, the factors that constitute the fear of crime in Rio de Janeiro's favelas are determined. This mini survey served to determine the indicators to measure the fear of crime in a more extensive survey. After this, the fear of crime is measured with a more extensive survey. To measure the fear of crime the results of the previous mini survey are needed to operationalize the concept of fear of crime. Additionally, this more extensive survey also includes questions on whether the fear of crime is influenced by the pacification. Finally, the results of the more extensive survey will be explained by means of semi-structured in-depth interviews. More concretely, these interviews serve to understand and explain how people experience possible threats and fears in their environment. In this the results per case, possible differences between the cases and what the pacification eventually implies for the actual and perceived role of the state as a security provider will be explained.

Phase	Goal	Strategy	Addressed sub-question
1	Operationalizing the concept fear of crime in the context of Rio de Janeiro's favelas.	A mini survey supplemented by in-depth interviews among the residents of the favelas.	1
2	Measuring the fear of crime and determining the influence of the pacification.	A more extensive survey among the residents of the favelas.	2
3	Explaining the outcomes of the more extensive survey regarding the results per favela, the differences between the favelas and what the pacification eventually implies for the actual and perceived role of the state as a security provider.	Semi-structured in-depth interviews with the residents of the favelas and experts.	3, 4 and 5

Table 1: The three phases in which the empirical data is collected



While reading this chapter, the three phases in which the empirical data is collected should be kept in mind. The next paragraph will further elaborate on the chosen research strategy. This is the set of interrelated decisions on the way this research will be carried out. Subsequently, paragraph 3.2 deals with the three selected cases wherein the choice for these particular cases will be substantiated and each case will be explained separately and briefly. Finally, some remarks will be made on the doing of fieldwork in the environment of Rio de Janeiro's favelas.

### **3.1 Research strategy**

The research strategy used in this study is a case study. The first reason for this choice is the limited amount of time and resources to conduct the research. Since Rio de Janeiro has more than 763 favelas of which 37 are pacified, it would not be possible to include all in this research. Therefore, it is a logical choice to merely focus a few of these favelas. A second reason is that applying a case study offers the possibility to approach the cases more deeply and the discovering of details and stronger underpinnings. Lastly, a case study makes it possible to make a comparison between different cases. This is very useful to explore possible different outcomes within the UPP's.

This research will be a comparative case study in which three different cases will be compared. To this end, the hierarchical method will be used. This means that the research is carried out in two phases. In the first phase, the individual cases are examined separately. It is of great importance that these individual cases are studied independently as much as possible. A fixed pattern is used in all cases. This facilitates the comparison of the different cases, which will be done in the second phase. In this phase, a comparative analysis will be made on the basis of the results from the first phase. With this method an attempt is made to explain the similarities and differences between the three cases (Verschuren & Doorewaard, 2007).

A potential disadvantage of a case study is that the external validity, of the obtained results, can sometimes be under pressure. Since only a few cases are studied it is difficult to generalize the obtained results to the whole or on analogous cases (Verschuren & Doorewaard, 2007). To minimize this disadvantage, the semi-structured in-depth interviews with the experts, who have broad expertise on the pacification, are used to examine how the three cases are related to the other favelas in Rio de Janeiro. Are the cases exceptions to the rule or are they comparable to the general trend?

In order to formulate an answer to the main question and sub-questions both quantitative and qualitative data are used. These data are gathered empirically by conducting both surveys and

semi-structured in-depth interviews. By the conduction of the survey the fear of crime will be measured. This is the most effective and efficient method to generate a broad picture of how safe the residents of the three cases feel. But on the other hand, this survey cannot explain where these feelings derive from. Why do people feel afraid? What constitutes this feeling? What is the influence of the pacification on the fear of crime? What are the underlying relationships of the establishment of the fear of crime? To answer these kinds of questions in-depth interviews are needed. For this reason, the choice has been made to make use of both quantitative and qualitative data. In this way this study will first generate a broad picture of the fear of crime and secondly be more dept, in which it will become possible to trace the underlying reasons and possible differences in fear of crime. Both methods will be discussed in more detail in the following paragraphs.

### **3.1.1 Survey**

The reason that a survey has been used in this research is to get a wide picture of the fear of crime among the residents of the three different favelas. How safe do the residents feel in each favela? For this purpose, a survey is the best method, since it is a type of research in which the researcher is trying to get a broad picture of a basically spatiotemporal expanded phenomenon. The research unites in this are the habitants of the selected cases. They will be asked to fill in a written questionnaire, since this method of data generation is less time consuming.

In this study, two surveys were conducted. In the first phase, mini surveys were conducted and in the second phase a more extensive survey. The mini survey, serves to identify the indicators by which the fear of crime will be measured. With the results of the mini survey it is possible to conceptualize the concept fear of crime, which is measured by the more extensive survey in phase two. Both surveys are discussed bellow.

The mini survey (appendix A) identifies the factors that constitute the fear of crime in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro. A total of 32 mini surveys were conducted among residents of the Complexo da Penha favela. Unfortunately it was not possible to conduct these mini surveys in the other two favelas as well, due to the limited amount of time and access to these areas. Despite the fact that this can be seen as a shortcoming of this research, I believe that the answers given on this question in Complexo da Penha are representative for the two other communities as well.

The variables adopted in this survey are first based on the operationalization of the concept fear of crime by Vanderveen (2006a). But since this operationalization is based on the western

context some other variables are added: homicides, small firefights, big firefights between the police and drugs gang, stray bullets. These additional variables are based on informal conversations with people on the streets, in bars and in my house in the pacified Complexo da Penha favela.

By identifying the factors influencing the fear of crime in Rio de Janeiro's favelas the concept could be conceptualized and the more extensive survey could be composed. This survey has been conducted in three different favelas: two pacified favelas and one non-pacified favela. Since one of the cases did not have a UPP some questions had to be adjusted. This has led to two questionnaires that are almost similar, but differ on questions relating to the pacification (appendix B and C). The questions that differ are number 22, 23, and 24. In total, 77 extensive surveys were conducted among the residents of the three different favelas. In each favela 25 or 26 questionnaires were filled in by randomly selected people on the streets, in a bar, or at someone's house.

### **3.1.2 Semi-structured in-depth interviews**

After conducting the surveys the next step was to gather qualitative data. The main reason for choosing this strategy is to be able to explain the results from the survey. How can we understand the fear of crime? What evokes the fear of crime? Why do the people in some area's feel less safe than in others? Why do the people in one area feel safer since the pacification than others? These questions cannot be answered by the survey. Therefore, this is investigated after the survey by means of qualitative interviews. Semi-structured in-depth interviews are needed in order to find out the underlying stories, feelings, and reasons for people's fear of crime. As actor Robin Williams explains in Bender's and Van Sant's (1997) movie 'The Good Will Hunting', you can only truly know what moves a person by actually talking to them:

You're an orphan right? You think I know the first thing about how hard your life has been, how you feel, who you are, because I read Oliver Twist? Does that encapsulate you? Personally, I don't give a shit about all that, because you know what, I can't learn anything from you, I can't read in some fuckin' book. Unless you want to talk about you, who you are. Then I'm fascinated.

The conduction of this qualitative data has been done by means of semi-structured in-depth interviews with residents of the three favelas and some experts. By applying this way of interviewing the respondent will not deviate from the subject too much, while he/she remains free to raise or add certain issues.

For interviewing the residents of the favelas a standard interview guide was established (appendix D). The same questions were asked to each respondent in order to ease the comparison of the results. However, as in the case of the survey as well, some of the questions had to be adjusted, since one of the favelas does not have an UPP (appendix E). For this reason the interview guide that has been conducted in the non-pacified favela, Vila Nova, differs in some questions from the interview guide used in the two pacified communities. In addition, some experts were interviewed as well. For these interviews unique interview guides were established, because all of these experts had their own specialization.

In total, 26 semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted. Nine respondents were interviewed in the pacified Complexo da Penha favela, eight in the pacified Santa Marta favela, six in the non-pacified Vila Nova community and three experts. An overview of the respondents and a description of each person can be found in appendix F. The names of the respondents are changed into pseudonyms in order to ensure their anonymity.

### **3.2 The cases**

This paragraph discusses the three selected cases. First, the choice of the particular cases will be justified. Subsequently all cases will be described separately.

#### **3.2.1 Justification of the cases**

The selected cases in this study are the Santa Marta (pacified), Complexo da Penha (pacified), and Vila Nova (non-pacified) favelas. The choice for these specific cases is based on some established criteria, outlined below, and on the advice of internship supervisor N. van Buuren<sup>2</sup>. N. van Buuren worked in Rio de Janeiro's favelas for more than 27 years. Therefore, he has a lot of knowledge about the various favelas in Rio de Janeiro.

Before choosing these cases, some criteria were developed to which these cases have to comply. The first, and most important, criterion is that the cases must be consistent with the research objective and questions. The formulated objective and questions distinguish pacified from non-pacified favelas. For this reason, both pacified and non-pacified cases are adopted within this research.

Secondly, the selected cases should be accessible for doing fieldwork. As described in the introduction, violence is a major problem in Rio de Janeiro's favelas. So, personal safety must be taken into account when doing fieldwork in the favelas, especially in a non-pacified area still

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<sup>2</sup> N. van Buuren was the director of the IBISS Foundation. This organization focuses on the most disadvantaged groups within the Brazilian society. N. van Buuren works in several favelas in Rio de Janeiro for 27 years.

under the control of the local drug gang. Without knowing people from the drug gang it is not wise to enter these favelas as a foreigner. Internship supervisor, N. van Buuren, advised which favelas are suitable for doing fieldwork. He knows a lot of people in these communities and therefore knows which favelas are suitable for this type of research. In addition, he made it possible for me to enter these favelas by introducing me to prominent people in these communities who helped me to do my field work in a safe way.

Thirdly, the three cases should be similar as much as possible in order to exclude other influencing factors as much as possible. Therefore, three cases in Rio de Janeiro have been chosen. For example, should a case in a different city have been chosen, there would more likely be deviations caused by factors which play a role in that specific city, such as a different policy, city council, or composition of the population. Besides that, three favelas have been chosen, which are urban areas's with a low standard of living, and where residents live on low incomes. For example, if one of the cases would be a more wealthy area, this may affect the results. In short, by choosing the three cases an attempt was made to exclude other influencing factors as much as possible. This makes it easier to compare the cases.

Finally, N. van Buuren advised to not focus just on one pacified area, because the UPP's have a lot of different outcomes in Rio de Janeiro, both positive and negative. Only focusing on one favela would give a distorted picture of the pacification. For this reason, the choice had been made to include both Santa Marta (pacified) and Complexo da Penha (pacified) as a research object.

Two of the three cases are quite special since almost no other research has been conducted there before. These cases are Complexo da Penha and Vila Nova. These favelas almost never get visited by tourists or researchers due to the past and current violence in these places. Santa Marta, on the other hand, is a very accessible favela which is also visited by tourists. This community often served as a research object in other studies as well.

Neighborhood	Pacified?	Characteristics
<b>Santa Marta</b>	Pacified since 2008	Very accessible and peaceful favela in the touristic South zone which gets visited by tourists frequently.
<b>Complexo da Penha</b>	Pacified since 2012	Favela in the North zone where firefights between the police and drug gangs occur on a regular basis. This favela is very notorious for its violent history in which the community was ruled by a powerful drug gang. For this reason there are almost no tourists who visit this favela
<b>Vila Nova</b>	Non-pacified	Favela rules by a drug gang in the North zone. The state is not present in this community. The drug gang makes the rules and ensures that everybody complies to their rules.

**Table 2** An overview of the various cases

### 3.2.2 Santa Marta

Santa Marta is one of the two pacified favelas that serve as a research object in this research. This favela is located in the neighborhood Botafogo, which is located in the richer South zone of the city. Santa Marta has about 6,000 residents an area covering 54 thousand square meters (SoulBrasileiro, 2015). This was the first community to receive an UPP, which happened in December 2008. Santa Marta is often referred to as a model pacified favela, receiving many infrastructural and social upgrades (Roller, 2011).

The narrow alleyways of Santa Marta had been controlled by criminal groups for almost 30 years. In this period there were a lot of uncontrolled shootouts in this favela, which is situated on a mountain. The police arrived at the base of the mountain and just started to shoot upwards without aiming properly. The permanent installation of the UPP police in this community put an end to these shootouts and drug sales. At this moment there are no incursions of the police and shootouts anymore (SoulBrasileiro, 2015).

Apart from the end of the armed conflict in Santa Marta, the pacification also brought a lot of social improvements. This favela now has a variety of social projects, like the Family Health Program, micro credit, professional training courses, as well as the Padre Veloso Social Inclusion Hub, which offers activities to the elderly. Additionally, the whole hillside has free internet access for residents (Roller, 2011; SoulBrasileiro, 2015).

### 3.2.3 Complexo da Penha

Complexo da Penha serves as a research object in this study as the second pacified favelas. This community, in the North zone of Rio de Janeiro, has about 80,000 inhabitants. This favela used to be the former headquarters of the red commands, one of the biggest drug gangs in

Rio. The problems which are characteristic for Rio de Janeiro's favelas, are also applicable to this area. Drugs gangs were in charge of this area for years. Typical for this are conflicts and, the large amounts of arms and drugs, including crack, cocaine, ecstasy, and marijuana (Tavener, 2012).

Complexo da Penha was pacified by the BOPE forces for the first time in 2010. After this pacification a long process for the favela started to receive UPP stations (Parkin, 2014). Complexo da Penha has been occupied by the army for one and a half year. After this period, in June 2012, the UPP police took it over (N. van Buuren, personal communication, 30 april 2014).

Despite the pacification and the installation of these UPP's, this district still has violent episodes. For example, in March 2014, the BOPE reoccupied Complexo da Penha after the death of four UPP officers. Frederico Caldas, the commander of the UPP's, responded to this by stating that their "...response would be extremely tough" (in Parkin, 2014, para. 4). He added that the UPP officers will carry out various operations with the support of the BOPE and *Batalhão de Polícia de Choque* (Shock Police Battalion) officers. They also said to have trained around a hundred UPP officers more to create an 'intervention' unit for violent situations (Parkin, 2014).

On the other hand, there is also public criticism on the operation of the UPP in Complexo da Penha. Kimberley Farnham, an American student who has lived in this favela for over a year, states that:

People are worried that a war is going to start again...While everyone agrees that there are still *banditos* here and something needs to be done about them the police don't seem to be doing that. They are using their power to intimidate regular people who are just trying to live their life as they always do (quoted in Parkin, 2014, para. 6)

#### **3.2.4 Vila Nova**

The third case is Vila Nova (known as *Lixão*, or trash, because it was built on a landfill site). This is a non-pacified favela in the North of Rio de Janeiro. This favela arose around 1950 from two neighboring communities, namely Vila Operária and Vila Ideal. In that time about 30 families lived in these neighborhoods. Since then the number of inhabitants has increased rapidly. At the moment, about 3,000 residents live in Vila Nova (Escola Comunitária Caminhos do Saber, in Piek, 2013; Griffin, 2015)

Vila Nova is not pacified, which means that there is no police on a permanent basis. The drug gang is in charge in this favela, it makes the rules, ensures that everybody follows these rules, and guards and monitors the area for police raids and rival gangs. The presence and power of the drug gang is also visible in boys walking around with weapons in order to control the community and self made speed bumps that to slow down the police. A parallel power structure has evolved over decades of state neglect (Griffin, 2015).

### **3.3 Side remarks**

In addition to the above information, a number of comments need to be made on the field work done in Rio de Janeiro.

First of all, to really understand the context in a favela I decided to actually move there. For three months, I lived in the community Vila Cruzeiro which is located in Complexo da Penha. I believe that this can be seen as an enrichment of this research, because I really participated in the daily life structures of this favela. I played soccer on a weekly basis with the local girls team, went to birthday parties of people I met, barbequed with some locals, and spent hours on the streets having informal talks with neighbors. This experience made me understand certain things that I would not have understood if I would have spent these months in the wealthy south of Rio de Janeiro. The most important thing I learned is that my Western values are not always applicable to this totally different environment. I saw and experienced firsthand the difficult relationship between the community and the police, experienced the persistent power and influence of the drug gang despite the pacification, learned that the boys of the gang are not necessarily bad people by getting to know some of them personally, and experienced several firefights which ensures that I can imagine what kind of feelings this evokes. I also learned the unwritten rules that apply in a favela, like the prohibition of robbing and rape. Important in this is that everything begins and ends with *respeito* (respect). If you have respect for the rules and your fellows, they will have respect for you. These experiences made me understand and imagine certain things better than if I had not lived in this favela.

Secondly, I had to learn the Portuguese language because almost nobody in these favelas speaks English. I achieved to speak Portuguese pretty good by attending classes in both the Netherlands and Rio de Janeiro. Unfortunately, I did not manage to master the language perfectly. This had the result that sometimes I could not ask everything I wanted during the semi-structured in-depth interviews. But afterwards I can conclude that my Portuguese was good enough to conduct the data that was needed.



Thirdly, it took a while to get used to the daily life structures in the favelas. Here in the Netherlands it is quite easy to make an appointment for an interview on a given date and time, but this was totally different in Rio de Janeiro. When I asked people to meet on a particular date and time they responded hesitantly. After some time I found out that this was because they almost never plan something in their life. A lot of people in these favelas do not know what they are going to do tomorrow. So, I adjusted my approach to their routine and spent a lot of days in the local bar. This approach worked very well since people got curious about what I was doing there and started talking to me. At the time we were in a conversation they also wanted to fill in my survey or respond to my questions and even called their friends to help me.

Fourthly, in a previous study design I decided to compare the security statistics with the fear of crime. This plan has been modified because it appeared that it is very difficult to gather reliable statistics on each selected case. Besides that there were no statistics available of the non-pacified Vila Nova favela, which made it impossible to include this part in my study.

Finally, on 21 March 2015 a controversial article in the newspaper NRC Handelsblad got published (Boon & Logtenberg, 2015). This article accused my supervisor N. van Buuren of some criminal offenses. Whether these accusations are true or not, I want to make sure that the fact that he was my supervisor during my fieldwork does not raise any suspicions about the reliability of this research. N. van Buuren has never urged to obtain certain results in his favor. He let me conduct the research in the way I wanted to. His role within this research was mainly to provide me safe access to favelas where no foreigner enters normally. He did this by introducing me in the community or to bring me in contact with people who could guide me. Moreover, I always discussed my surveys and interview guides with him, but during these discussions he never wanted to change something besides improving the Portuguese language.

## **4. The fear of crime in a favela**

People often assume that an institutionalized authority like the police evokes a feeling of security. This is a very strong way of thinking in Europe. For example, when you are walking in Amsterdam on the Dam and you see a police car, you will think that you will not get robbed. But here they [the police] let the people [the thieves] rob. After that they arrest the thief, share the spoils and let the boy go (N. van Buuren, personal communication, 14 November 2014).

This quote shows that the fear of crime in a Western context is not comparable to the situation in Rio de Janeiro's favelas. There are other unwritten rules, threats, and risks which cause that the operationalization of the concept fear of crime, as developed in the Western context, is not applicable in the case of Rio de Janeiro's favelas. For this reason, the measurement instrument for the fear of crime should be adjusted to this exceptional context before it can be used. How this concept has been adjusted will be explained in the next paragraph. Subsequently, an explanation will be given for the differences between the fear of crime in the Western world and in Rio de Janeiro's favelas. This is done in order to understand the fear of people in a context that is so different from the western one. Additionally, the results of the measurement of this concept will be outlined. Hereby, a description of the population sample will be given, the reliability of the measuring instrument will be presented and the results of the measurement of the fear of crime will be outlined. Finally, the influence of the pacification on the fear of crime will be discussed.

### **4.1 Adjustment of the measurement instrument**

The operationalization of the concept fear of crime of by Vanderveen (2006a) and Vanderveen, Pleysier and Rodenhuis (2011) will be used as a starting point. Vanderveen, Pleysier & Rodenhuis (2011) and Vanderveen (2006a) distinguish five aspects that should be taken into account: fear of victimization, fear of others' victimization, seriousness of consequences of victimization, perception of risk on victimization and feeling safe at night. Within these variables they distinguish various indicators in order to measure the fear of crime: physical abuse, burglary, vandalism to your house, getting involved in a fight, sexual harassment, sexual assault, robbery, and violence on the street. This operationalization is summarized in table 3.

Aspect	Indicators
<b>Fear of victimization</b>	Fear to become a victim of threats, assault, robbery on the street, a brawl, sexual harassment, and burglary.
<b>Fear of others' victimization</b>	Fear that loved ones (spouse, children etc.) become a victim of threats, assault, robbery on the street, a brawl, sexual harassment, and burglary.
<b>Seriousness of consequences of victimization</b>	Estimate severity of the consequences of victimization of violence, abuse, threats, sexual offense, sexual harassment, and burglary.
<b>Perception of risk of victimization</b>	Estimate chance of being a victim of a threat, assault, robbery on street, vandalism, and burglary.
<b>Feeling safe at night</b>	Feel secure walking down the street at night, feel at ease home alone at night, feel at ease alone walking down the street at night, feel secure home alone at night, feel at ease walking down the street with someone at night.

**Table 3 Operationalization of the fear of crime according to the Western context**

Since this operationalization is based on the Western context it cannot automatically be adopted to this study. For this reason, a mini survey (appendix A) has been conducted in order to identify the indicators that constitute the fear of crime in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro. Within the mini survey the question was asked "When I feel unsafe in my own neighborhood, this is because of...". Among the answers the indicators of Vanderveen (2006a) were adopted, supplemented with the following indicators: homicides, a small fire, a big fire, a fight between the police and drug gang and a stray bullet. These added indicators are based on informal conversations with residents of the favela Complexo da Penha. The respondents could mark multiple answers. In total 32 mini surveys were filled in by randomly selected respondents in the favela Complexo da Penha. Unfortunately, it was not possible to conduct these mini surveys in the other two favelas as well, due to the limited amount of time and access to these areas. Despite the fact that this can be seen as a shortcoming to this research, I believe that the answers given on this question in Complexo da Penha are representative for the two other communities as well. The table below shows the results of this mini survey.

Indicators fear of crime Frequencies

		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
What constitutes the fear of crime <sup>a</sup>	Physical abuse	7	4.9%	21.9%
	Burglary	10	7.0%	31.3%
	Getting involved in a fight	5	3.5%	15.6%
	Vandalism to your house	4	2.8%	12.5%
	Sexual harassment	3	2.1%	9.4%
	Sexual assault	2	1.4%	6.3%
	Robbery	10	7.0%	31.3%
	Violence on the street	16	11.3%	50.0%
	Homicides	11	7.7%	34.4%
	A small firefight	29	20.4%	90.6%
	A big firefight between the police and drug gang	20	14.1%	62.5%
	A stray bullet	25	17.6%	78.1%
Total		142	100.0%	443.8%

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

The results above show that most people are afraid of a small firefight (90.6%). Also a lot of people are afraid of a stray bullet (78.1%), a big firefight between the police and drug gang (62.5%), violence on the street (50.0%), homicides (34.4%) robbery and burglary (both 31.3%). Remarkable is that all these indicators, except from violence on the street, robbery and burglary, are not adopted in the Western operationalization by Vanderveen (2006). This already demonstrates that the fear of crime in Rio de Janeiro's favelas is different than in the Western context. Additionally, the least mentioned indicators are physical abuse (21.9%), getting involved in a fight (15.6%), vandalism to your house (12.5%), sexual harassment (9.4%) and sexual assault (6.3%).

A difficulty that arose was the translation of the variables 'a small firefight' and 'a big firefight between the police and drugs gang'. In the Portuguese language *tirroteios* refers to a small firefight and *confrontos* to a big firefight between the police and drug gangs. But since *confrontos* also refers to confrontations in general and *tirroteios* is the daily-used word in favelas in order to refer to all kinds of firefights this led to confusion among the respondents. For this reason, it was decided to only include *tirroteios* in the final extensive survey because the meaning of this word was clear for everyone and a common understanding in order to refer to a firefight.

This preliminary investigation has led to the following conceptualization of the fear of crime in Rio de Janeiro's favelas. This conceptualization was adopted in the more extensive survey (appendix B and C) that was conducted in the three different favelas among 77 people.

Aspect	Indicators
<b>Fear of victimization</b>	Fear to become a victim of burglary, robbery, violence on the street, homicide, a firefight, physical abuse, and a stray bullet.
<b>Fear of others' victimization</b>	Fear that loved ones (spouse, children etc.) become a victim of burglary, robbery, violence on the street, homicide, a firefight, physical abuse, and a stray bullet.
<b>Seriousness of consequences of victimization</b>	Estimate severity of the consequences of victimization of burglary, robbery, violence on the street, a firefight, physical abuse, and a stray bullet.
<b>Perception of risk on victimization</b>	Estimate chance of being a victim of burglary, robbery, violence on the street, homicide, a firefight, physical abuse, and a stray bullet.
<b>Feeling safe at night</b>	Feel walking down the street at night, feel at ease home alone at night, feel at ease alone walking down the street at night, feel secure home alone at night, feel at ease walking down the street with someone at night.

**Table 4 Conceptualization of the fear of crime as adopted in this study**

## 4.2 Understanding the fear in a favela

According to the results of the mini survey the most important indicators which cause the fear of crime in Rio de Janeiro's favelas are violence on the street, homicide, a firefight, physical abuse, and a stray bullet. This differs a lot from the fear of crime in the Western context. But why exactly is this the case? Why are the people in Rio de Janeiro's favelas afraid of these things? And why are they less afraid of sexual harassment and vandalism for example? To understand the fear of crime in a favela, semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with some residents of the three favelas: Santa Marta, Complexo da Penha and Vila Nova.

There are two important factors that help to understand the fear of crime in a favela. The most important is the occurrence of firefights on a regular basis. This causes an enormous feeling of insecurity among residents. A second important factor is the prevailing law of the drug

traffickers, which ensures that certain unwritten rules are followed. I. Cano<sup>3</sup> (personal communication, 10 December 2014) summarizes this as follows:

In the favelas the people do not feel safe because of the shoot outs, but besides that they feel very safe. Even if the favela is in control of the drug dealers, militia or anything they feel safe... People can leave their doors open...

Firefights between the police and drug gang in the favelas cause an enormous feeling of insecurity. The reason why this scares people may not need that much explanation and is easy to understand. R. Silva<sup>4</sup> (personal communication, 4 November 2014) explain that he always feels safe in his neighborhood, except for the moments when there is a firefight. The biggest fear during a firefight is to be hit by a stray bullet. J. Cardoso<sup>5</sup> (personal communication, 28 November 2014) explains that he felt "...unsafe for stray bullets when the police was entering the favela". These unsafe feelings due to the firefights are also expressed by means of paintings in the Complexo da Penha favela. Figure 5 shows one of the many paintings in this favela which express these feelings. The text 'Paz 100 voz não é paz é medo' means 'voiceless peace is no peace, it is fear'. With the attached image of the frightened child, this can be seen as a protest against the many firefights and a visualization of children's fear.




Figure 5: Painting in the favela Complexo da Penha. Source: A. Campos, 2015

<sup>3</sup> Ignacio Cano is researcher at the State University of Rio de Janeiro. He published on issues related to public security and human rights in Brazil. His last project was the evaluation and monitoring of the first thirteen UPP's in Rio de Janeiro.

<sup>4</sup> R. Silva lives in the Complexo da Penha favela for 22 years and he works as a computer repairer in his own computer store.

<sup>5</sup> J. Cardoso lives in the Santa Marta favela for 35 years and he works as a tour guide.

A second important factor which explains the difference between the fear of crime in the Western world and a favela is the 'law of the traffickers'. This law implies a social order established by the drug gang. They make the rules and whoever opposes this run the risk of getting threatened, expelled, or even murdered. Some of the rules made by the drug gang are the prohibition of robbing and rape. Who does not follow these rules runs the risk of being punished in a very violent way. P. Veldhuis<sup>6</sup> (personal communication, 30 November 2014) explains this established order as follows: "This law included that nobody was allowed to speak, to rob, to rape... You had some basic rules... If that happened that would have changed the life of this person. This gave a very quiet and safe feeling". A habitant of the Complexo da Maré says tells in an interview with Vice News:

When I arrived, they explained their rules to me. You can't rob people. You can't hit a woman forcefully. A woman must want to have sex with you, and you can't take someone else's girl. If they find a bad guy doing stuff like that, they take him away and cut his head off... If you don't mess with them, they don't mess with you (Bernas, 2015, para. 5)

Due to this established social order, robberies and sexual violence rarely occur in a favela. J. Cardoso (personal communication, 28 November 2014) states that he feels less outside than in the favela. He argues that this is because on the streets outside the favela you can get robbed, but in the community you will never get robbed. In a favela the 'law of the traffickers' applies, but outside the favelas this law does not apply. This causes that crimes like robbing and rape almost never happen in a favela, but outside these favelas in the city of Rio de Janeiro, the crime levels on robbing and rape are critically high (OSAC, 2013). In this way, the prevailing 'law of the traffickers' can be seen as an explanation for the low fear for robberies and sexual violence in Rio de Janeiro's favelas.

This teaches us that - although the overall impression of these favelas is that they are disrupted by violent drug gangs - these gangs ensure a certain level of order at the same time. The conclusion can be drawn that in Rio de Janeiro criminal networks are not necessarily perceived as dangerous. Due to the established social order there occur almost no robberies and sexual violence. In this way criminal networks can also be able to provide order and security, very much like what is understood in literature as 'community security'.

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<sup>6</sup> P. Veldhuis guides social projects of the foundation IBISS in Rio's favelas for 6 years. He has a background as a social worker in Amsterdam.

### 4.3 Measuring the fear of crime


By means of the more extensive survey the fear of crime has been measured. 77 surveys were conducted in total; 25 in Santa Marta (pacified), 26 in Complexo da Penha (pacified) and 26 in Vila Nova (non-pacified). These respondents were selected randomly by approaching them on the streets or in a bar. Especially bars were effective places to conduct the surveys, because these were often central meeting points in the area where a lot of people passed and spent some time. For this reason, I spent a lot of time in the local bars in order to conduct my surveys. Sometimes a snowball effect arose because they also called their friends to help me to answer my surveys.

In this paragraph, first a description of the population sample will be given. Secondly, the Cronbach's Alpha will be tested in order to see if the measurement tool is reliable. Finally, the results relating the fear of crime in each favela will be discussed.

#### 4.3.1 Description of the population sample

61% of the population sample consists of men, 38% of women and 1% is missing. This somewhat skewed distribution of gender is attributable to the fact that the men in these favelas were more accessible than woman. Often, women were quite withdrawn and reserved while men were very open and accessible to talk to. In addition, 1% of the category gender is missing. The respondents answered the survey anonymously and individually. Therefore, I cannot verify whether this person was a man or a woman.


		Gender			
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Male	47	61.0	61.8	61.8
	Female	29	37.7	38.2	100.0
	Total	76	98.7	100.0	
Missing	99	1	1.3		
Total		77	100.0		






The table and graph below show the distribution of the age within the population sample. Remarkably, nobody of the respondents was between 66 and 75 years old. This is reasonably in line with the demography of Rio de Janeiro's favelas. 64.4% of the population in Rio de Janeiro's favelas is between 15 and 59 of age. Only 12.4% of the population is older than 60 years (Xavier & Magalhães, n.d.)

Age				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid 16-25	19	24.7	24.7	24.7
26-35	21	27.3	27.3	51.9
36-45	16	20.8	20.8	72.7
46-55	13	16.9	16.9	89.6
56-65	7	9.1	9.1	98.7
76 or older	1	1.3	1.3	100.0
Total	77	100.0	100.0	




The next table and graph show the distribution of the highest completed education of the population sample. College preparing schools are specialized schools that prepare students to meet particular goals, most commonly to prepare them for university. As the results show, only 11.8% of the population sample finished a study at university. 3.9% did not finish a study at all. The biggest group, 44.7%, of the population sample only finished secondary school, better known as high school.

Highest completed education		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	None	3	3.9	3.9	3.9
	Primary school	24	31.2	31.6	35.5
	Secondary school	34	44.2	44.7	80.3
	College preparing school	6	7.8	7.9	88.2
	University	9	11.7	11.8	100.0
	Total	76	98.7	100.0	
Missing	99	1	1.3		
Total		77	100.0		



The next table and graph represent the distribution of the family incomes per month. These family incomes are shown in the Brazilian Real, the currency in Brazil. One Brazilian Real is about 0.31 Eurocent. The biggest group, 44%, needs to live on R\$501 – R\$1,000, which is about €155 – €300. Only 8.0% has a family income of R\$3,001 per month or more, which is about €925.

Family income per month		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	R\$ 0 – R\$ 500	5	6.5	6.7	6.7
	R\$ 501 - R\$ 1000	33	42.9	44.0	50.7
	R\$ 1001 - R\$ 1500	17	22.1	22.7	73.3
	R\$ 1501 - R\$ 2000	5	6.5	6.7	80.0
	R\$ 2001 - R\$ 2500	5	6.5	6.7	86.7
	R\$ 2501 - R\$ 3000	4	5.2	5.3	92.0
	R\$ 3001 or more	6	7.8	8.0	100.0
	Total	75	97.4	100.0	
Missing	99	2	2.6		
Total		77	100.0		



#### 4.3.2 Reliability of the measuring instrument

By means of 32 questions in the more extensive survey the fear of crime has been measured. This has been done by using a Likert scale. Each question could be answered from 1 up to and including 7. This resulted in a mean that reflects the fear of crime between 1 and 7, in which a 1 means that a person feels totally safe and a 7 totally unsafe. To be sure that these 32 items together can form one scale, the Cronbach's Alpha has been tested.

The Cronbach's Alpha is a tool which tests the reliability of the measuring instrument. It determines whether multiple items can form one scale together. This is assessed on the basis of the cross-correlation of the various items: the internal consistency. It is important that the

distinct items all relate to one single concept (they have to be one-dimensional), so that the sum score measures one underlying construct. In addition, the coding of the items must be consistent. The same score must mean the same thing to all items. In this case, the number 7 needs to mean 'feeling totally unsafe' and the number 1 needs to mean 'feeling totally safe'. If this is not the case the particular item needs to be mirrored (SPSS Wizard, n.d.; Tilburg University, 2015)

The result of the Cronbach's alpha is always a number between the 0 and 1. High values ( $> 0.8$ ) indicate a high reliability or a high internal consistency. This means that the constituent items measure practically the same concept. Values  $< 0.5$  indicate insufficient reliability. Generally, a scale with a value of  $> 0.7$  is considered to be reliable (Tilburg University, 2015). As can be seen below, the Cronbach's Alpha of the used scale in this research is 0.953, which is considered to be very reliable.

Reliability Statistics	
Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
.953	32

#### 4.3.3 Fear of crime in each favela

By means of a survey it is measured how secure the habitants of each favela feel. This measurement of the fear of crime resulted in a mean for each favela. A Likert scale has been used in which the number 1 means 'feeling totally safe' and 7 means 'feeling totally unsafe'. The results per case can be found in the output below.

#### Report

Mean fear of crime

In which area do you live?	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Complexo da Penha (pacified)	4.4780	26	1.47577
Santa Marta (Pacified)	3.9728	25	1.27458
Vila Nova (non-pacified)	5.0548	26	1.13123
Total	4.5087	77	1.35912

This table shows that the people of Santa Marta feel safest (4.0). Subsequently the residents of Complexo da Penha (4.5), feel less safe than the people in Santa Marta. Lastly, the people in Vila Nova feel most unsafe (5.1). The question that arises is if these differences in the means are significant. This has been tested with the one-way ANOVA. The one-way ANOVA compares

the means between the groups and determines whether any of those means are significantly different from each other (SPSS Wizard, n.d.).

The test of homogeneity of variances should be looked at first. This tests whether the population variances in each group are equal. Equal population variances are a precondition in order to conduct the one-way ANOVA test. If the significance level is 0.05 or higher, it is 95% sure that this is the case (Lund Research, 2013). In this case the significance level is 0.482, so the ANOVA test can be conducted

#### Test of Homogeneity of Variances

Mean\_fear\_of\_crime2

Levene Statistic	df1	df2	Sig.
.737	2	74	.482

In the table below the significance of the ANOVA test can be found. This table tells if there is a significant difference between the groups or not. If the significance level is lower than 0.05 it is 95% sure that there is a significant difference between the groups (SPSS Wizard, n.d.). The significance is lower than 0.05, which means that there are significant differences between the neighborhoods in their fear of crime.

#### ANOVA

Mean fear of crime

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	14.958	2	7.479	4.412	.015
Within Groups	125.429	74	1.695		
Total	140.387	76			

However, this test does not say anything about which neighborhoods are significantly different from each other. To find this out a post hoc test should be done. The table below shows that Vila Nova (non-pacified) and Santa Marta (pacified) are significantly different from each other. However, the results according Complexo da Penha (pacified) and the other two favelas do not differ significantly.

#### Multiple Comparisons

Dependent Variable: Mean fear of crime

Tukey HSD

(I) In which area do you live?	(J) In which area do you live?	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Complexo da Penha (pacified)	Santa Marta	.50522	.36468	.354	-.3670	1.3775
	Vila Nova	-.57678	.36109	.253	-1.4404	.2869
Santa Marta (pacified)	Complexo da Penha	-.50522	.36468	.354	-1.3775	.3670
	Vila Nova	-1.08201*	.36468	.011	-1.9542	-.2098
Vila Nova (non-pacified)	Complexo da Penha	.57678	.36109	.253	-.2869	1.4404
	Santa Marta	1.08201*	.36468	.011	.2098	1.9542

\*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

Overall, it can be concluded that there are significant differences in the fear of crime between Vila Nova (non-pacified) and Santa Marta (pacified). So, the residents of Vila Nova feel significantly less safe than the residents of Santa Marta. Vice versa, the people living in Santa Marta feel significantly safer than the people in Vila Nova. The other pacified neighborhood (Complexo da Penha) does not differ significantly from the other two cases. So, the habitants of this favela do not feel significantly safer or less safe in comparison with the other two neighborhoods. The fact that the results on this case do not differ significantly does not mean that no statements can be made about this case. The data show that the results on Complexo da Penha (pacified) are situated between Santa Marta (pacified) and Vila Nova (non-pacified). The habitants of Complexo da Penha feel less safer than the habitants of Santa Marta, but feel safer than the habitants of Vila Nova. In the remainder of this thesis Complexo da Penha will be approached as such.

#### 4.4 Influence of the pacification on the fear of crime

Since the main question of this thesis addresses the impact of the pacification on the fear of crime, this has been tested by means of the extensive survey as well. In order to determine the influence of the pacification on the fear of crime, the following statement was given in the more extensive survey: I feel safer since the UPP installed in my neighborhood than before. For the non-pacified favela, Vila Nova, this question changed because this neighborhood does not have an UPP. In Vila Nova the question was asked if the people who live there feel safer since the UPP installed in other neighborhoods than before. This statement was presented in the form of a Likert scale, in which 1 means that somebody 'totally agrees' and 7 means that

somebody 'totally disagrees'. In other words, 1 means that somebody feels much safer since the pacification and 7 means that somebody feels much more unsafe. The means per case are showed in the table below.

#### Report

I feel more safe since the UPP installed in my neighborhood/other neighborhoods than before

In which area do you live?	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Complexo da Penha (pacified)	4.73	26	2.359
Santa Marta (pacified)	3.35	23	1.898
Vila Nova (non-pacified)	6.28	25	1.242
Total	4.82	74	2.217

The results of the above table show that the residents of Santa Marta feel safer since the pacification. On a scale from 1 up to and including 7, a mean of 3.4 is given. Secondly, the answers of the habitants of Complexo da Penha form a mean of 4.7. Finally, in Vila Nova (non-pacified) the habitants feel a lot less safe since the pacification of other neighborhoods. Their mean is 6.3 on a scale up to 7.

The question that arises is if the differences between these neighborhoods are significant. This has been tested with the one-way ANOVA. The first step of the one-way ANOVA is to test whether there is homogeneity of variances. This needs to be the case in order to continue the one-way ANOVA test. The table below shows that the significance level is 0.00, which means that there is no homogeneity of variances and that the ANOVA test cannot be used (Lund Research, 2013).

#### Test of Homogeneity of Variances

I feel more safe since the UPP/military installed in my neighborhood than before

Levene Statistic	df1	df2	Sig.
9.439	2	71	.000

The fact that there is no homogeneity of variances does not automatically mean that there cannot be a significant difference between the group means. In order to find out whether the differences between the groups are significant a Welch and Brown-Forsythe ANOVA test can be conducted (Lund Research, 2013). If the significance level is lower than 0.05 it is 95% sure that there is a significant difference between the groups (SPSS Wizard, n.d.). The significance

level by both tests is 0.00, which means that there are significant differences between the neighborhoods in their feeling of security since the UPP installed in their neighborhood/other neighborhoods.

#### Robust Tests of Equality of Means

I feel more safe since the UPP installed in my neighborhood/other neighborhoods than before

	Statistic <sup>a</sup>	df1	df2	Sig.
Welch	20.386	2	43.738	.000
Brown-Forsythe	14.529	2	59.906	.000

a. Asymptotically F distributed.

The table above proves that there are significant differences between the cases, but does not say anything about which neighborhoods are significantly different from each other. To find out which neighborhoods differ significantly, a post hoc should be done. This test can be found below. Because all significance levels are lower than 0.05 it can be concluded that all cases differ significantly from each other. Three conclusion can be made based on the results: 1) the residents of Vila Nova (non-pacified) feel significantly less safe since the pacification of other neighborhoods than the residents of Complexo da Penha (pacified) feel since the UPP installed in their neighborhood; 2) the residents of Vila Nova (non-pacified) feel significantly less safe since the pacification of other neighborhoods than the residents of Santa Marta (pacified) feel since the UPP installed in their neighborhood and 3) the residents of Complexo da Penha (pacified) feel significantly less safe since the pacification of their neighborhood than the residents of Santa Marta (pacified) feel since the UPP installed in their neighborhood.

#### Multiple Comparisons

Dependent Variable: I feel more safe since the UPP installed in my neighborhood/other neighborhoods than before


Scheffe

(I) In which area do you live?	(J) In which area do you live?	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Complexo da Penha (pacified)	Santa Marta	1.383 <sup>*</sup>	.543	.045	.03	2.74
	Vila Nova	-1.549 <sup>*</sup>	.531	.018	-2.88	-.22
Santa Marta (pacified)	Complexo da Penha	-1.383 <sup>*</sup>	.543	.045	-2.74	-.03
	Vila Nova	-2.932 <sup>*</sup>	.548	.000	-4.30	-1.56
Vila Nova (non-pacified)	Complexo da Penha	1.549 <sup>*</sup>	.531	.018	.22	2.88
	Santa Marta	2.932 <sup>*</sup>	.548	.000	1.56	4.30

\*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.



But what do all these numbers and significant differences mean, exactly? The chart below gives a clearer picture of the differences between the cases and how they can be interpreted. This chart shows the frequency of the given answers on the asked question in each favela and how they are spread.



When analyzing this graph in combination with the first table, some conclusions can be drawn. The results show that the majority of the people in Santa Marta (pacified) feel safer since the pacification of their neighborhood. This becomes evident by the mean (3,4) presented in the table above and the graph. The graph visualizes that the majority of the respondents in Santa Marta answered that they feel safer since their neighborhood got pacified. Only a few exceptions responded that they feel less safe since the pacification. So it can be concluded that in general the residents of Santa Marta feel safer since their neighborhood got pacified.

The results with regard to Complexo da Penha (pacified) are a bit more complicated. The table above shows a mean of 4.7, which means that residents in this community feel more unsafe since the pacification. But there is a large diversity among the residents since the standard deviation is quite high (2.4). This is also visible in the attached chart, which shows a big division of the given answers. 34.6% of the respondents feels safer since the pacification and is

represented by the green side of the table. On the other hand, 53.8% feels less safer since the UPP installed in their neighborhood. This leaves 11.5% of the respondents who answered 'undecided'. In conclusion, a small majority of the habitants of Complexo da Penha feel less safe since their neighborhood got pacified, but this is not unambiguous since there is a large dispersion among the respondents.

Finally, the people in Vila Nova (non-pacified) feel much less safe since the pacification of other neighborhoods. This can be concluded by looking at the mean (6.3) and by analyzing the graph. The graph shows that none of the respondents in this community agreed with the statement, which means that none feel safer since the pacification of other areas. A group of 19.2% responded with 'undecided'. For this reason, it can be concluded that nobody of the respondents in Vila Nova feels safer since the pacification of other neighborhoods and a large majority even feels more unsafe.

In the next chapters we will further explore the differences between these neighborhoods and try to account for the differences in the fear of crime. Notably, to what extent the establishment of the UPP played a role in those differences.

## 5. Explanation of the results

The situation changes a lot from community to community. There is not one thing that is called UPP that works. There are many different situations. I would say that there are some UPP's in which the situation is pretty calm as it used to be. But in some UPP's the situation is very tense (I. Cano, personal communication, 10 December 2014)

In every favela it is a different story, a different operation and a different drug fraction, so it depends (M. Montes<sup>7</sup>, personal communication, 28 November 2014)

Both quotes make clear that one cannot speak about 'the pacification' and its impacts as a whole. Each favela has a different story and history, which results in different outcomes in the pacified areas. This also became evident in the previous chapter in the results of the survey. The impacts of the pacification on the fear of crime vary in all of the three cases. This raises the question how these differences can be explained. This question will be answered in this chapter.

This chapter is subdivided into two parts. First, the fear of crime will be explained per case. Why do the residents feel safe or unsafe in their neighborhood? Subsequently, the differences between the pacified cases will be explained. Why do the residents in favela A feel less safe than in favela B? These explanations are based on the semi-structured in-depth interviews.

### 5.1 Explaining the results per case

On the basis of the quantitative data, as presented in the previous chapter, it can generally be concluded that the residents of Santa Marta (pacified) feel safer since the pacification of their neighborhood; the residents of Vila Nova (non-pacified) feel less safe since other areas got an UPP; and there is a large diversity in security feelings in Complexo da Penha (pacified), where the majority feels less safe since their community got pacified. While the previous chapter was based on quantitative data, this chapter will be based on qualitative data. By conducting semi-structured in-depth interviews an attempt was made to better understand the quantitative data. So, why do people living in Vila Nova feel less safe since the pacification of other neighborhoods? Why are the feelings of security so divided in Complexo da Penha? And why do the residents of Santa Marta feel safer since the UPP installed in their community? These questions will be addressed in this paragraph.

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<sup>7</sup> M. Montes lives in the Santa Marta favela for 21 years and works as a tour guide in his community.

### 5.1.1 Santa Marta

The first case that will be discussed is the pacified Santa Marta favela. Qualitative interviews tend to confirm the changes in feelings of security in the neighborhood identified through the survey. It can be concluded that a lot has changed in this favela. Before the pacification, Santa Marta had the same problems as all other favelas in Rio de Janeiro: a lot of drug traffickers who were visibly present with weapons on the streets, a lot of drug dealing and firefights between the drug gang and the police. M. Montes (personal communication, 28 November 2014) explains how his life looked like before the UPP police established:

Before, people did not like the place where they stayed. They wanted to move because it was very dangerous. Nobody felt safe in this area. We lived here because we did not have another place to go...In 2007 when I was still a student I was thinking every day with myself. I do not want to go back to that place full of crack dealers on the streets that could attack me any moment. They were dealing drugs in front of my door. Why the hell am I still in this place? I did not move away because I did not know where to go

A lot changed in Santa Marta because of the pacification. J. Johnson<sup>8</sup> (personal communication, 19 November 2014) explains the atmosphere in his community nowadays as "...an oasis of tranquility". The explanations for this big change are summed up below.

A first mentioned reason by the respondents is that there are no firefights and incursions of the police anymore. Before the pacification, the drug gang was in charge, which caused a lot of firefights when the police entered the favela. A. Azevedo<sup>9</sup> (personal communication, 28 November 2014) states the following about this period: "Violence, a lot of violence. This was because of the drug trafficking. Frequently, there were confrontations between the drug traffickers and the police". N. van Buuren (personal communication, 14 November 2014) explains that before the pacification of Santa Marta there were a lot of uncontrolled shootings. Santa Marta is situated on a hill (see figure 6) and when the police arrived they stopped at the base of this hill and just started shooting without aiming properly. This gave the people an enormous unsafe feeling because anybody could get hit by a bullet. These incursions happened about three times a week. Nowadays, the police are controlling this favela and there are no firefights anymore. For this reason the feeling of security has improved enormously. J. Cardoso (personal communication, 28 November 2014) argues that "There is no violence anymore...the pacification is very good because it brought security".

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<sup>8</sup> J. Johnson lives in the Santa Marta favela for 12 years and he is retired nowadays.

<sup>9</sup> A. Azevedo lives in the Santa Marta favela for 31 years and he works as a mechanic of refrigeration.



**Figure 6: The favela Santa Marta located on a hill. Source: Coral, 2013**

Secondly, the respondents in Santa Marta say that they experience more freedom since the pacification. Before the UPP was established the people were afraid to walk on the streets because of the firefights. Nowadays, everybody can enter and leave the favela without being afraid of firefights. “The pacification is a good thing here. The people have more freedom. They can go out alone, can go to college, and can walk on the streets” (E. Ribeiro<sup>10</sup>, personal communication, 28 November 2014).

A third mentioned reason is that the behavior of the police in Santa Marta improved a lot since the pacification. Nowadays, the image of the police in Santa Marta is generally very good. J. Cardoso (personal communication, 28 November 2014) states:

The police here is very good, because they do not use any violence...the police in Rio is very corrupt and uses a lot of violence, but here in the community they are very good. This here is an exception. Here is a better regime.

In line with the former, M. Montes (personal communication, 28 November 2014) states that the acting of the police changed a lot since the pacification of his neighborhood: “The police here are not the same as in 2007. They are trained to deal with people. It is like they are neighbors, not like someone who seeks for an excuse to shoot you. More social...”. He clarifies this development by naming an example of how his view on the police changed:

They even got invited in my house in a few occasions. They talked with my father because he likes airplanes and some of the police unit like that too. So they had conversations about it. It is different when you see seven police officers in the front of your door and they want to talk with your father and you do not feel like they are going to kill him and hide his body. I feel free to invite them because I do not feel a

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<sup>10</sup> E. Ribeiro lives in the Santa Marta favela for 25 years and he sells fruit on the streets.

suspicious about them. Before 2007 I would not invite them. In that time it was a different occasion (M. Montes, personal communication, 28 November 2014)

The habitants of Santa Marta like the way the UPP policemen treat them. R. Costa<sup>11</sup> (personal communication, 19 November 2014) states that “They have respect for the people who live here and help the people with all kinds of stuff”. She adds to this that she always feels safe when she sees the police in her neighborhood.

A fourth appointed reason is that the pacification did not only bring security in this favela, but also brought social improvements. Nowadays, the people in Santa Marta have running water uninterruptedly, while before the pacification, the water only came once a week. The residents also have electricity nowadays. Before the pacification the people drained the electricity. “Nowadays, everybody has light” (J. Cardoso, personal communication, 28 November 2014). Subsequently, the residents of Santa Marta and their houses are officially registered now. This is of importance, because without an official address you could not apply for a job. “If you lived on the hill you could not even flip a hamburger at Mc Donalds” (J. Johnson, personal communication, 19 November 2014). Nowadays, these people can carry out an official job. Another important appointed issue is that the UPP in Santa Marta brought social activities. “Now you have activities like colleges and courses...it got much better here” (L. Almeida<sup>12</sup>, personal communication, 19 November 2014). These social activities are part of the UPP social program, to which attention will be paid in one of the next paragraphs.

Apart from all these improvements in Santa Marta there is also mention of one negative aspect of the pacification. A. Azevedo (personal communication, 28 November 2014) states that his “Life is more expensive nowadays than previously”. This is because before the UPP installed, the people did not have to pay for water, electricity, taxes, and rent for their houses because everything got drained and nothing was registered. Nowadays, everything is registered and the people need to pay for their water and electricity, which causes that the people have a lot more monthly costs than before (I. Cano, personal communication, 10 December 2014).

On the basis of the data it can be concluded that the pacification has worked out in a very positive way in Santa Marta. Despite the increased cost of living, only positive impacts were mentioned by the respondents. According to them, the pacification has brought security, social

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<sup>11</sup> R. Costa lives in the Santa Marta favela for 25 years and works as a receptionist.

<sup>12</sup> L. Almeida lives in the Santa Marta favela for 10 years Marta and she works in a bar.

improvements, more freedom, and improved the behavior of the police. Some of the residents even call their community a 'model favela'.

### 5.1.2 Complexo da Penha

The second case that will be discussed is the pacified favela Complexo da Penha. In this favela the situation is more complex in comparison with Santa Marta. The surveys outcomes paint the same picture, as they show a big division among the residents. As R. Rocha<sup>13</sup> (personal communication, 13 November 2014) states: "There are good and bad changes". On the one hand, there are people arguing that it got safer since the pacification and that the pacification brought improvements. On the other hand, there are also a lot of people who argue that it got worse. Both groups of people have their own explanations. First the mentioned explanations why people feel safer since the UPP installed will be discussed:

The most important reason mentioned by the respondents why they feel safer since the pacification is that the number of firefights declined: "There are less firefights, the children can play on the streets more often and just a few habitants are hit by a bullet" (L. Cardoso<sup>14</sup>, personal communication, 12 November 2014). E. Rodrigues<sup>15</sup> (personal communication, 8 November 2014) adds to this by stating that "There are less firefights and less people get killed". An important reason why there are less firefights is that "There are no incursions of the police anymore...that these confrontations do not exist anymore is a big improvement" (N. van Buuren, personal communication, 14 November 2014). During incursions the police entered the favela, which always lead to a lot of firefights with the drug gang. Nowadays, the UPP police is present on a permanent basis and do not invade the community anymore. A. Santos<sup>16</sup> (personal communication, 5 November 2014) believes that the pacification made the life in this neighborhood better, because there are less firefights and it is possible nowadays for the children to play on the street. This was more dangerous before the pacification. In those days, A. Santos (personal communication, 5 November 2014) was always afraid to leave the house, because there was always a chance of a police raid meaning he could not enter the neighborhood as he came back. He adds to this that the people in Complexo da Penha got more freedom since the community got pacified.

Secondly, some respondents in Complexo da Penha said that they feel safer since the pacification because "There are no longer boys with weapons on the streets" (P. Veldhuis,

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<sup>13</sup> R. Rocha lives in the Complexo da Penha favela for 8 years and she works for a tax service company.

<sup>14</sup> L. Cardoso lives in the Complexo da Penha favela for 8 years and he works for the IBISS foundation.

<sup>15</sup> E. Rodrigues lives in the Complexo da Penha favela for 43 years and he works on his own as a truck driver.

<sup>16</sup> A. Santos lives in the Complexo da Penha favela for 24 years and he works in a pharmacy.

personal communication, 30 November 2014). Before the pacification the carrying of weapons in Complexo da Penha was ubiquitous. All over the neighborhood, boys with weapons were driving around on their motors. According to P. Veldhuis (personal communication, 30 November 2014) this creates a risk: “If there are more weapons on the streets, there is a higher risk that people will use them”. Weapons are not carried in public anymore, because a lot of them were seized and the remainder of gang activity now happens unseen.

There is a big difference when you do not have hundreds of boys with weapons walking around in your neighborhood... Before the pacification you had everywhere drug traffickers on motor bikes driving around, there were drug outlets and there were a lot of armed boys. That poses a risk (P. Veldhuis, personal communication, 30 November 2014)

For this reason, some of the residents in Complexo da Penha feel safer, because the fact that they saw these weapons made them feel afraid sometimes.

A final appointed reason is that since the pacification certain facilities can function again. For example, before the pacification some schools were closed for eight months. This was because “There were so much firefights that teachers and other staff dared not to come to school” (N. van Buuren, personal communication, 14 November 2014).

Despite these improvements, the majority of the residents in Complexo da Penha feel less safe since the pacification. G. Dias<sup>17</sup> (Personal communication, 13 November 2014) has a very clear opinion on the installation of the UPP and is one of the people who state that it got worse since the pacification:

I will not lie to you, since it is pacified here it got one big disaster. They established the UPP police to improve it, right? But the people they need to put in jail are still free. They also established the UPP in order prevent firefights, but there are still firefights. The police drive through the streets too fast and swear against the habitants. To be honest from my heart, I prefer the drug traffickers

It is also visible in Complexo da Penha that some people do not like the installation of the UPP police in their neighborhood. Figure 7 shows a wall in the neighborhood with the words ‘*Vai morre da UPP*’, which means ‘Die UPP’.

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<sup>17</sup> G. Dias lives in the Complexo da Penha favela for 17 years and she works in a cloth shop.





Figure 7: Wall with the words 'vai morre da UPP' in Complexo da Penha. Source: Anke Janssen, 2014

Several explanations are mentioned by the residents of Complexo da Penha as to why they do not feel safer since the pacification of their neighborhood.

First, all respondents agreed that there are less firefights in Complexo da Penha nowadays. But an important mentioned downside is that these firefights are more uncontrolled than before. Before the pacification, you almost always knew when there was going to be a firefight and where. The residents knew when a firefight was about to break out, because the drug gang would light firework whenever the police was about to enter. This signaled the residents to be careful. They would also know where these firefights would be, because in these days the shootouts almost always happened in only two places, the two places where the police entered the community. These were a kind of fire lines. These firefights usually stopped after one hour because one of the parties would withdraw and then it was safe again. Nowadays, it is totally different, because the police are present on a permanent basis in the whole community. The firefight can just start without a warning by fireworks, because a firefight can simply erupted in the streets as the police and the drug traffickers are passing each other. (R. Silva, personal communication, 4 November 2014). For this reason, “You never know the moment of a firefight for sure” (R. Silva, personal communication, 4 November 2014). Also the location of the firefights is not fixed anymore. “Nowadays, there are more shootings further up in the community, this did not happen before the pacification, because the police rarely got so far” (N. van Buuren, personal communication, 14 November 2014). Because the firefights are more uncontrolled nowadays, some people in Complexo da Penha feel less safe than before.

Secondly, it became clear that a lot of the residents in Complexo da Penha have a very negative image of the police. This also became clear by the surveys, in which the respondents

gave the UPP police in Complexo da Penha a mean rate of 3.8. This negative image is caused by several reasons. Complexo da Penha knows a long history of drug trafficking and used to be the former headquarter of the Red Commands, one of the three biggest drug gangs in Rio de Janeiro. During this period, the residents only knew the police as an actor who entered their community and started shootings. In these shootings, a lot of innocent people were killed. Almost everybody in this community knows somebody who was killed by the police. N. van Buuren (personal communication, 14 November 2014) recalls an example: "Like one boy, he had three sons and two got mistreated and murdered in a gruesome way by the police. If that police is always present in your neighborhood nowadays, you will not get a safe feeling". During this period a lot of habitants

...had the feeling that it was we against them. The police against us... this is stuck in the DNA of the neighborhood. You cannot only solve this by expelling the drug boys and say "we are in charge now". No, that takes a very long time (P. Veldhuis, personal communication, 30 November 2014).

This negative image of the police and feelings about the police is not easy to change, due to the history of the community. Moreover, some respondents mentioned that the UPP police in Complexo da Penha present themselves in a very unfriendly, gruff, and authoritarian manner: "I see a lot of angry armed men who stand in their uniforms and go up the mountain to find guys. I do not see a lot of the social part" (P. Veldhuis, personal communication, 30 November 2014). An example of their authoritarian appearance is the take-over of the house of a former drug boss, who is in jail now. Nowadays, his house serves as the UPP police station (the white building in figure 7). The fact that the UPP drives around the neighborhood with their guns out of the cars targeted on innocent people, does not give a very positive image as well. Another reason why residents of Complexo da Penha still have so many negative feelings about the UPP police is because they threat everybody as if they are drug traffickers. L. Cardoso (personal communication, 12 November 2014) states that the police are not very positive. He states that the police should ensure peace in his community and that they should fight against the drug traffickers. But according to him, in reality the police also use violence against innocent residents. L. Cardoso (personal communication, 12 November 2014) tells a story about the UPP police who entered a house and abused a woman for no reason. G. Dias' (personal communication, 13 November 2014) opinion about the UPP police is in line with the former: "They are bad, because a lot of times they blame the habitants of the favela, while they did not do a thing". Subsequently, respondents in Complexo da Peha mention that the UPP police are unprepared to do their job and cannot detect the drug traffickers from ordinary residents.



**Figure 7: The former house of the local drug boss serves as the UPP police station nowadays. Source: Anke Janssen, 2014**

E. Rodrigues (personal communication, 8 November 2014) says that before the pacification the police knew who the drug traffickers were and the important people in the neighborhood, but nowadays they do not know anything. They pass drug traffickers on the streets without knowing that this person was part of the drug gang. Moreover, E. Rodrigues (personal communication, 8 November 2014) mentions that today almost everybody can become a police man because they need a lot of recruits in the favelas for the pacification. The training to become a UPP police man is not that hard to complete. E. Lima<sup>18</sup> (personal communication, 11 November 2014) states about the UPP policemen in Complexo da Penha that “If there are shootings they run away in all kind of different directions. They are unprepared to do their job”. An additional reason for the bad relationship is that the residents do not have confidence in the UPP police, because they believe that there is still a lot of corruption. Several examples are mentioned during the depth interviews. One of these examples is mentioned by N. van Buuren (personal communication, 14 November 2014): Once, the police arrested five people from the drug gang. They brought two of them to the police station, but took the other three to another place. Here, they started to negotiate until they paid R\$ 1.000.000 cash money and let them free. The weapons they seized from these guys were sold back to the drug gang. Moreover, some respondents told that since the pacification a lot of leisure activities are prohibited by the UPP police. L. Cardoso (Personal communication, 12 November 2014) states

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<sup>18</sup> E. Lima lives in the Complexo da Penha favela for 30 years and works as a security.

that the UPP police do not allow big parties. The parties present before the pacification, such as *pagoda* and *baille funk*, are not allowed anymore. For this reason, there are less pleasant activities. Due to the above reasons, it is hard for the residents to have confidence in the UPP police and to believe that they are an improvement for the neighborhood.

Thirdly, several residents of Complexo da Penha pointed out that nowadays there are more small crimes that did not occur before the pacification. P. Veldhuis (Personal communication, 30 November 2014) explains this development:

Before the pacification you had a totally different security, because you had 'the law of the favela' which applied much stronger at that time. This has now been reduced a bit. This law included that nobody was allowed to speak, to rob, to rape... You had some basic rules and nowadays this is deteriorating. Nowadays, it happens that people are breaking into other people's houses. If that happened before, that would have charged the life of this person. This gave a very quiet and safe feeling in these days.

R. Ferreira<sup>19</sup> (Personal communication, 7 November 2014) adds to this by saying that before the pacification, the drug traffickers were in control and made clear what was able and what was not. During this period everybody followed the rules of the drug gangs. Nobody stole stuff from each other because if you did that you had a big problem with the drug gang. R. Rocha (personal communication, 13 November 2014) states about this period that if you did not do anything wrong in the eyes of the drug gang you were safe and could do whatever you want. By acting like this the drug gang made sure that they could stay in charge and control the community. By the pacification the 'law of the drug traffickers' became much weaker. People are not punished anymore when they rob, rape, or break one of the other previously established rules. Nowadays, there are robberies in these favelas, which was unthinkable previously. I. Cano (personal communication, 10 December 2014) explains this change by comparing the period before the pacification with the situation after the pacification:

In the favelas, the people do not feel safe because of the shoot outs, but besides that they feel very safe. Even if the favela is under control of the drug dealers, militia, or anything, they feel safe... People can leave their doors open. Now, the people in the pacified favelas are saying that they feel safe because there are no shoot outs, but they cannot leave their doors open anymore, because people can come in and steal everything.

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<sup>19</sup> R. Ferreira lives in the Complexo da Penha favela for 33 years and he works as a motor taxi driver and for the IBISS Foundation.

R. Ferreira (personal communication, 7 November 2014) admits that there are less firefights in Complexo da Penha than before. But despite this fact he feels less safe than before, because nowadays there are robberies. E. Rodrigues (personal communication, 8 November 2014) explains that now it is possible to rob somebody, because the social control that was established by the drug traffickers is gone. Also, the drug traffickers rob nowadays because they have less money than before and seek income in a different way. For example, one of the stores in Complexo da Penha was robbed a month ago. This was not even imaginable before this community got pacified. The official statistics on crime confirm this trend. I. Cano (personal communication, 10 December 2014) evaluated and monitored the first thirteen UPP's in Rio de Janeiro. This evaluation was mainly focused on the impact on crime statistics. He states that since the pacification, the number of homicides and police killings decreased with 50%. But on the other hand, the number of all other smaller crimes increased. I. Cano (personal communication, 10 December 2014) states the following about this development:

The people in the favelas feel more insecure by the increase of these minor crimes in relation to the decrease of these bigger crimes. They are afraid to leave their doors open, because people could come into their houses. They felt more secure in terms of shootouts, but they felt less safe in terms of other crimes.

This development can be linked to the debate on security provision. Security provision has been defined as follows within this research: "The actions taken by various non-state actors in pursuit of their own security or the security of others" (Willems, 2013, p.110). Because the UPP police and the drug gang have diverging, and maybe even conflicting, interpretations of this, they carry out different actions to pursuit their own security and that of others. As can be concluded from the previous part, the establishment of the UPP police in Complexo da Penha has lead to a weakening of the 'law of the traffickers'. The self-created order by the drug gang is not that strong anymore as before the pacification, because they can no longer oversee the observance of their established rules, or in other words, the so called community security that was present in this favela has deteriorated since the UPP police fulfilled the role as a security provider.

A fourth reason why the respondents do not feel safer since the pacification is that the UPP police enter the houses of residents nowadays. L. Cardoso (personal communication, 12 November 2014) says that the police sometimes even strike the people who live there. He recalls an example of the use of violence against a woman in her house when they entered. L. Cardoso' (personal communication, 12 November 2014) house was also entered. The UPP

police were on the roof of his house and he did not know why they were there, but it gave him a very unsafe feeling. E. Rodrigues (personal communication, 8 November 2014) also tells a very negative story about these house searches. Sometimes, the police sometimes just want to arrest somebody. In these cases they sometimes bring drugs during a house search and pretend if they found it at the person's house. After that, they arrest the person in question for having drugs in his house. These kinds of examples give the residents of Complexo da Penha a very unsafe feeling, since they can all potentially be the next.

Because of all the above-mentioned reasons the feelings of security in Complexo da Penha differ widely. What is notable is that all of the respondents agreed that the number of firefights declined since the pacification and that this is a big improvement. Nevertheless, the negative effects seem to weigh that heavy that the majority is feeling less safe since the pacification. In this, the negative image of the UPP police is very striking. Virtually all of the respondents indicated that the UPP police workings in their neighborhood leave much to be desired. They do not feel safer with their permanent presence. Subsequently, it is worth mentioning that by the installation of the UPP in Complexo da Penha, the 'law of the traffickers' became deteriorated. The community security you had before the pacification became less applicable because the drug traffickers can no longer oversee the observance of their established rules.

### **5.1.3 Vila Nova**

The final favela to be discussed is Vila Nova. This favela is totally different in comparison with the other two, since it does not have an UPP. The drug gang is still visibly present and in charge in this neighborhood. Vila Nova is included in this research in order to see if the pacification has influence on non-pacified favelas.

I. Cano (personal communication, 10 December 2014) states that "The interpretation that other areas are going badly because of the UPP is a misconception". He explains this statement by saying that there always has been some movement of drug traffickers and that not much changed since the pacification:

It is limited, because the people who migrate are just the top level of the local drug gang. Mid level [of the drug gang] stayed [in their own community] and sell drug without the machine gun. And the low level [of the drug gang] continued to make money. Some do that, some do something else... but more important is, these people are going to another favela with a drug gang. There are already people selling drugs. So

they cannot just arrive and start selling drugs. They can commit a few robberies, a few crimes (I. Cano, personal communication, 10 December 2014).

However, the surveys and in-depth interviews give an entirely different impression. Contrary to what the above-mentioned I. Cano (personal communication, 10 December 2014) claims, a lot of things certainly changed in some non-pacified favelas. My data collection makes clear that the people in Vila Nova feel far less safe since the pacification of other neighborhoods. This is showed in table and chart about the security feelings in the previous paragraph. In this paragraph, I explore local people's feelings of insecurity.

A first explanation, mentioned by all of the respondents, is that the amount of drug traffickers in Vila Nova increased substantially since the pacification of other areas: "It increased a lot, the amount of drug traffickers almost doubled" (R. Alves<sup>20</sup>, personal communication, 17 December 2014). G. Martins<sup>21</sup> (personal communication, 11 December 2013) adds to this that "The drug trafficking is getting stronger. More people are involved...". Before the pacification of other areas "There was already some migration of drug traffickers, but since the pacification the migration to this place increased exponentially" (J. Moraes<sup>22</sup>, personal communication, 17 December 2014). This did not happen frequently because the traffickers could do their work in their own community. The trafficking of drugs is a declining business in the pacified areas. For that reason "Bandits migrate to other places" (E. Rodrigues, personal communication, 8 November 2014). L. Texeira<sup>23</sup> (personal communication, 17 December 2014) explains that due to the pacification of other areas more drug traffickers moved to her neighborhood "Because in these pacified areas there are less drug traffickers nowadays, but in the non-pacified areas this amount increased. A lot of them moved to communities that are not pacified". N. van Buuren (personal communication, 14 November 2014) tells that it is very complicated for the people in Vila Nova because a lot of drug traffickers moved here from Vila Holanda (occupied by the army) and Complexo da Penha (pacified). Most of pacified favelas were part of the Red Commands, one of the three biggest drug gangs in Rio de Janeiro. If a drug trafficker is going to move to another favela he can only go where the Red Commands are established as well. There are also boys who stayed in the pacified favelas, but these are only the ones who are not registered by the police as drug traffickers. For this reason, the UPP police do not know that these boys are drug traffickers (N. van Buuren, personal communication, 14 November 2014).

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<sup>20</sup> R. Alves lives in the Vila Nova favela for 8 years and she works as a teacher at the local school.

<sup>21</sup> G. Martins lives in the Vila Nova favela for 30 years and she is the coordinator of the local school.

<sup>22</sup> J. Moraes works as a teacher at the local school in Vila Nova.

<sup>23</sup> L. Texeira lives in the Vila Nova favela for 25 years and she works as a teacher at the local school.

Secondly, some of the respondents in Vila Nova appointed that the increased amount of drug traffickers in this community caused more violence than before. Because the drug gang is stronger nowadays, the police enter more often in order to counteract this development. Their goal is to arrest and take the drug traffickers. J. Morais (personal communication, 17 December 2014) states: "I can see that the police are entering more often now than before the pacification of other areas". The entering of Vila Nova by the police always leads to a firefight. N. van Buuren (personal communication, 14 November 2014) tells that there are much more firefights between the police and the drug gang in Vila Nova than in the pacified areas. At the moment (November 2014) there are shootings almost every day. As much as 12 boys got killed by the police during a shootout a week before the interview was conducted. J. Morais (personal communication, 17 December 2014) states that this is a very bad development, because the habitants do not feel that safe anymore. When you are on the streets they never know if it will be safe. The police can enter any moment. "At any moment a firefight can start" (J. Morais, personal communication, 17 December 2014). R. Alves (personal communication, 17 December 2014) states:

Now it is dangerous, because there are stray bullets, violence, and firefights on the streets...there is no security. The people see weapons, the people see drugs. The children can see this as well. Before you had this as well, but now it has increased.

C. Araújo<sup>24</sup> (personal communication, 17 December 2014) adds to this opinion: "It got more dangerous, because the trafficking expanded... nowadays there are more conflicts between the drug gang and the police. More firefights. This made it more dangerous". She states that this is a bad development. She does not feel safe in her community nowadays. Before the pacification of other neighborhoods she felt safer than she does now, because "At the moment it is very dangerous here... I do not feel safe at all" (C. Araújo, personal communication, 17 December 2014).

A final mentioned reason which causes an unsafe feeling for the residents of Vila Nova is the fact that they do not know the new boys who have migrated there. These new drug traffickers carry weapons in the streets of their neighborhood. C. Araújo (personal communication, 17 December) explains that before the pacification she knew everybody in her neighborhood. She did not feel unsafe in these days, even though some of these people were carrying a gun. But nowadays there are a lot of drug traffickers with guns on the streets she does not know. This makes her feel unsafe. N. van Buuren (personal communication, 14 November 2014) explains

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<sup>24</sup> C. Araújo lives in the Vila Nova favela for 20 years and she works as a teacher at the local school.



that it makes a big difference when you see somebody with a gun you know your whole life and is your neighbor, cousin or childhood friend instead of an unknown person:

The habitants there [in Vila Nova] did not see these boys grow up. And it is totally different when you see the boy next door, you know all your life, with a Kalashnikov in his hand than somebody you totally do not know. They find that very frightening

N. Barbosa<sup>25</sup> (Personal communication, 11 December 2014) thinks the arrival of new drug traffickers is bad as well: “You also had drug traffickers, but no other drug traffickers from other areas... it is bad. Because the bandits who already lived here have respect for the habitants, but the new bandits do not”.

Vila Nova is not an isolated case. Changes are also noticeable in other neighborhoods. Two examples are Vila Aliança and the district of Delamare. N. van Buuren visits Vila Aliança almost every day since he coordinates social projects in this favela. He states that the drug trafficking in this favela expanded visibly since the pacification of other areas, because there are a lot more armed boys on the streets than before (N. van Buuren, personal communication, 7 November 2014). Delamara is a neighborhood in the northwest of Rio de Janeiro. M. Nysten<sup>26</sup> (Personal communication, 8 January 2015) visits this neighborhood every day since she works here as a doctor. She says that before the pacification of other areas she had never seen guns or drug traffickers in this area. Nowadays, there are even shootouts between the police and the drug gang that settled here.

By interpreting the quantitative data supplemented by the qualitative data it can be concluded that the impacts of the pacification are not limited to the particular districts that have received an UPP. Also non-pacified neighborhoods are affected by the pacification; in a very negative way, even. Due to the pacification a lot of drug traffickers migrated to other non-pacified neighborhoods, which has led to more violence in these communities. In fact, this can be seen as a displacement of the problem instead of a solution.

## **5.2 Explaining the differences in the pacified favelas**

As can be concluded from the previous paragraph the pacification has different outcomes in Santa Marta and Complexo da Penha. The outcomes in Santa Marta are generally positive. People feel safer, the image of the police improved and social projects were established by the

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<sup>25</sup> N. Barbosa lives in the Vila Nova favela for 23 years and she works in the Cesar Park hotel.

<sup>26</sup> M. Nysten is Dutch, but she lives already for 3 years in the favela Complexo da Penha and works as a doctor in Delamara

UPP. The impacts of the pacification in Complexo da Penha are more complicated. The majority of the people feel less safe, but there are also people who feel safer because of the declined number of firefights. Nevertheless, there are still firefights, which causes an enormous unsafe feeling, the image of the UPP police is very bad, smaller crimes happen more often and no social projects were established by the UPP. I. Cano (personal communication, 10 December 2014) states that Santa Marta and Complexo da Penha are two extremes:

Santa Marta is a small community where the introduction of the UPP really changed the life there. Now tourists go in and there are hotels and restaurants. It really changed the daily habits in the community. With good results and bad results, but it is different now. In Penha just a few things changed. The situation there has not improved. There are a lot of shootings, killings by the police, policemen who get killed.

P. Veldhuis (personal communication, 30 November 2014) says the following about the situation in Complexo da Penha: "Sometimes it seems like a mission that is unreachable. A bit like the Israel Palestine conflict. Two parties, the one has these interest and the other other interests". So, the same security policy got implemented in different neighborhoods and had totally different outcomes. In order to find out why the implementation of the UPP program had totally different outcomes in these two communities a comparison will be made between the two pacified communities Santa Marta and Complexo da Penha. In this the differences between the pacification in these cases will be explained. These explanations are summed up below.

A first explaining factor is the location of the favelas. Santa Marta is located in the touristic South zone and Complexo da Penha in the North zone. There is a visible trend that shows that the pacifications of favelas in the South zone worked out in a better way than in the North zone. The explanation for this seems to be the communities visited by tourists (generally in the south) get more attention from the city government than neighborhoods which never get visited by tourists (generally in the north). P. Veldhuis (personal communication, 30 November 2014) states that this is because "The favelas in the South zone are tourist attractions. They are directly linked to the touristic zones. It was very important to show the outside world that the whole UPP process was a success". For this reason the city government and also businesses invest more in these areas in order to improve the situation. I. Cano (personal communication, 10 December 2014) states in line with this: "I think the favelas in the South zone are very different because they do attract investments and tourists. But the favelas in the North zone,

even if they have UPP, there is not a lot of investment and there are no tourists who go there. That is one important reason”.

A second explaining factor is the size and structure of the favelas. A small community is easier to control than a big one (E. Rodrigues, personal communication, 8 November 2014; I. Cano, personal communication, 10 December 2014; L. Almeida, personal communication, 19



**Figure 8: A part of the Complexo da Penha favela. Source: Dana, 2010**

November 2014). Santa Marta is a very small community and there are only two main roads to enter the favela. J. Johnson (personal communication, 19 November 2014) compares Santa Marta with a funnel, which makes it very easy for the UPP police to control the territory. In contrast to Santa Marta, is Complexo da Penha a very big community with a lot of ways to enter and leave the favela (picture 8). “You can enter and you can go out in a lot of different ways” (J. Johnson, personal communication, 19 November 2014). The enormous size of Complexo da Penha makes it harder to control (E. Rodrigues, personal communication, 8 November 2014).

Thirdly, an important difference seems to be that in one neighborhood the UPP was accompanied by a social program, but not in the other community. The UPP social program is a document which contains plans for, among others, more public facilities, education possibilities, and social projects in the pacified areas. The UPP social program has three main goals: to collect data on the needs of pacified communities, to provide basic public services, and to promote economic development by working with local entrepreneurs. This program was presented directly alongside the policing part of the pacification initiative. It was designed as a natural counterpart to the UPP’s to improve services and foster democratic inclusion in

the long-neglected slums of Rio de Janeiro. While extended occupation by military police was the stick, UPP social would be the carrot, building a positive state presence in these crime-plagued areas (Ramsey, 2014). In Santa Marta, as a result of this program, several social projects are launched such as the Family Health Program, micro credit and professional training courses, as well as the Padre Veloso Social Inclusion Hub, which offers activities to the elderly. Additionally, that the whole hillside has free internet access for residents (SoulBrasileiro, 2015). In Complexo da Penha this policy document only exists on paper and is not implemented. The UPP Social document contains, among others, more public facilities and more education possibilities. But these facilities are not realized till this day. For example, "In 2010, a professional training school would be built within 3 months. This is actually on paper, but you can walk around the entire neighborhood and you will not find such a school" (N. van Buuren, personal communication, 14 November 2014).

Fourthly, there are important differences in the policy of the drug gangs. N. van Buuren (personal communication, 14 November 2014) explains that the drug boss in Santa Marta believes that he can sell more drugs when it is peaceful instead of when there are firefights on a regular basis. Santa Marta is based in the touristic part of Rio de Janeiro and there are tourists and other persons from outside arriving on a permanent basis. When there are firefights, these people would not enter anymore. For this reason, the boss of the drug gang does not want a conflict between the police and his gang. This is not the case in Complexo da Penha because almost no tourists and foreigners visit this favela. The drug traffickers in Complexo da Penha do not want the police here, because there is a chance that the police will find the people who are dealing. The drug traffickers in Complexo da Penha want the UPP police to leave. For this reason, they are still in conflict with the police, which is not the case in Santa Marta.

Fifthly, the still persistent influence of the drug gang differs. Despite the establishment of the UPP, the drug gang in Complexo da Penha still has a lot of power, while this is not the case in Santa Marta. In Complexo da Penha you can see and feel this persistent influence. Some examples will be appointed. Two guys from the gang got killed by the BOPE and the day after all shops and bars were closed as a sign of mourning. This was not a call from the police or the government, but from the drug gang. They told the shops and bars to close for one day. Everybody listened and not one shop or bar was opened that day. P. Veldhuis (personal communication, 30 November 2014) says about this that "You can feel that they still have a lot of power". N. van Buuren (personal communication, 14 November 2014) mentions another example. The UPP police wanted to organize a friendly football match between the UPP and

some residents of Complexo da Penha to improve their relationship. But the team from Complexo da Penha did not show up, because the drug traffickers told that everybody who would join the match would get on 'the list'. 'On the list' means that they would get killed if they would join the match. A final example is told by E. Rodrigues (personal communication, 19 November 2014). He tells that it would not be possible to implement the UPP social document in Complexo da Penha. The drug traffickers would never allow this, because in that case the UPP police would prevail. So, even if it would happen that the UPP launched social projects in Complexo da Penha, the drug gang would do everything to avoid this. Contrary to the situation in Complexo da Penha, the drug gang in Santa Marta is not that strong anymore. This drug gang was a lot smaller and did not have the same power as the traffickers in Complexo da Penha do.

Sixthly, there is a difference between the two neighborhoods in terms of the policy of the UPP police. It is visibly that the UPP police in Santa Marta use a more friendly method than the UPP police do in Complexo da Penha. A lot of examples are already mentioned in the above paragraphs. I. Cano (personal communication, 10 December 2014) adds to this by saying that it also depends on the kind of police commando in the community. "Some commandos are more open, discuss more things, the relationship is better. And in some other situations the relationship is very bad". The system of the police is very hierarchical and traditional.

So if the commando is more open and discuss things more, the relationship will be better. If the commando is more traditional, hard-line and does not talk that much with the community, than we have a continuation of the war on drugs. A little bit softer than before, but we use the term cold war on crime... it is still the view that they are fighting drugs, fighting drugs traffickers (I. Cano, personal communication, 10 December 2014).

L. Cardoso (personal communication, 12 November 2014) states that in Santa Marta the UPP police combat the drug traffickers, but in Complexo da Penha they combat the residents as well. I. Cano (personal communication, 10 December 2014) says about this that changing the mentality of the police is hard: "The major part of the policemen think that their job is to shoot criminals. That is not easy to change". N. van Buuren (personal communication, 14 November 2014) states that the policemen are used to do a lot of corrupt things. This corruption has crept in over the years and years. "It will take a very long time to get that corruption out of the police system". He adds to this that working in an honest way has been made more difficult by another police unit in Complexo da Penha. This is the 16<sup>th</sup> battalion. They have been

responsible for the whole territory for a long time. The 16<sup>th</sup> battalion sees the UPP police as inferior. If the UPP police do not work in the same way as this 16<sup>th</sup> battalion they have two anomalies; the drug traffickers and the 16<sup>th</sup> battalion. So, for this reason, a lot of UPP police work in the same corrupt way as the 16<sup>th</sup> battalion does. If you are a police man and you want to work in an honest (not corrupt) way, than this is almost impossible because of the great influence of the 16<sup>th</sup> battalion (N. van Buuren, personal communication, 14 November 2014).

A seventh difference between Complexo da Penha and Santa Marta is the history of the drug gang in the favelas. "The history of the criminal groups inside the community is important. Like the drug gangs in Alemão and Penha, these groups there were very strong with a long tradition" (I. Cano, personal communication, 10 December 2014).. P. Veldhuis (personal communication, 30 November 2014) states about Complexo da Penha that "This was the former headquarters of the Red Commands for many years. So, this is very deep-rooted. It was very difficult to penetrate here". The strong presence of the drug gang in Complexo da Penha caused that people became accustomed to growing up and living in an environment where the drug gang made the rules and was in charge. P. Veldhuis (personal communication, 30 November 2014) described the situation that existed for decades:

It is not the case that these drug traffickers are guys who always had an angry look and acted mean. No, a lot of times these guys were brothers, cousins, friends, guys you grew up with. For this reason, some people had the feeling that it was 'we against them'. The police against us [the habitants of Complexo da Penha].

This history makes the relationship between the community and the UPP police very difficult. I. Cano (personal communication, 10 December 2014) explains that the biggest difficulty of the pacification is "The culture between the community and the police. These people lived in this, so called, war for decades. Coming out of it is very difficult". He adds to this statement that "It is fighting against decades and centuries of a certain model of public security which is not easy to transform". N. van Buuren (personal communication, 14 November 2014) tells that in an ideal situation an UPP police officer walks through the community and talks with the people without carrying a weapon. But he immediately adds to this that it would be too dangerous for a UPP police man to walk around in Complexo da Penha unarmed. Moreover, the people would not react positive when a UPP police man starts talking to them. Since the drug gang in Santa Marta was not as strong as the one in Complexo da Penha, it is easier for the residents to adapt to the new created situation.

Lastly, the population's confidence in the pacification is important to understand the different impact of the UPP's in Santa Marta and Complexo da Penha. The residents of Santa Marta generally have confidence that the UPP will remain in their neighborhood, even after the 2016 Olympics. J. Cardoso (personal communication, 28 November 2014) states that "The pacification will continue in the future, because it brought a lot of security. The people have more freedom and you do not have to be afraid for a straight bullet anymore". J. Johnson (personal communication, 19 November 2014) even argues that it will definitely continue in the future: "It cannot go back [to the period when the drug gang was in power], that is one thing for sure...it [the pacification] will even get traction". On the other hand, the majority of the respondents in Complexo da Penha do not have confidence in the future of the pacification in their neighborhood. They believe that the pacification will not last long, especially not after the 2016 Olympics, so too does R. Silva (personal communication, 4 November 2014). He argues that the establishment of the UPP police in Rio de Janeiro's favelas is "Just an impulse of the government". Besides that he argues that nowadays it is bad as well. There are still a lot of firefights and conflicts between the police and drug gangs. For these reasons he believes that the pacification in Complexo da Penha will not last long. The level of confidence that habitants have in the pacification is important, because it determines how the UPP policemen are perceived, treated, and approached. P. Veldhuis (personal communication, 30 November 2014) explains how this influences the relationship between the community and the UPP police: "If they are going to be nice with the police, and the police get expelled again, then the guys from the drug gang will remember who chose which side. If that happens you will have a big problem". For this reason, almost nobody contacts the police in Complexo da Penha. Some people would like to, but this would be too risky (P. Veldhuis, personal communication, 30 November 2014). On the other hand, in Santa Marta it is perfectly normal to have a chat with a UPP police officer. M. Montes (personal communication, 28 November 2014) tells about the UPP policemen in his community that "It is like they are your neighbors... They even got invited in my house in a few occasions... I feel free to invite them because I do not feel suspicious about them". This quote makes clear that the relationship between the community and the UPP police in Santa Marta is totally different than in Complexo da Penha.

In this paragraph differences between Santa Marta and Complexo da Penha have been identified in order to understand the different outcomes of the UPP in these communities. Explanatory differences are the location of the community, the size, and structure of the favela, the implementation of the UPP social program, the policy of the drug gang, the still persistent influence of the drug gang, the policy of the UPP police, the history of the drug gang

in the favela and the confidence the population has in the pacification. Remarkable is the important role the history of the neighborhood has. Especially in the Complexo da Penha favela the history of the community explains a lot of the ongoing troubles within the pacification. This favela was seen as the headquarter of the red commands, one of the biggest drug gangs in Rio de Janeiro. So, the drug gang in this favela was very strong for decades. This history is one of the main reasons for the difficult relationship between the community and the UPP police, the executive actor of the state. This difficult relationship will be discussed in the next chapter. What kind of influence did the establishment of the UPP's have on the legitimacy, accountability and credibility of the state? Did the residents get more or less confidence in the state by the pacification? And who do they think should be responsible for the security provision?



## 6. Bringing the state back in

There is a lot of debate on security provision. It seems to be very hard for the state to ensure security in places where alternative security providers have taken over this role. Despite these difficulties the main idea – especially in the Western world – is that there is a necessity for the state to provide security. For this reason, it is useful to analyze the situation that has arisen in these favelas after the pacification from the perspectives and debates on security provision as discussed in chapter 2.

As can be read in that chapter, a movement in the literature on security provision argues that sometimes non-state actors – even un-civil and criminal ones – may come to play an important role in security provision. This is often attributed to the fragility of states. Because these states were not able to provide security in certain areas, this role was taken over by non-state actors (Willems, 2013). Therefore, it is acknowledged in literature that people in fragile states often rely on security and justice provided by non-state actors, including secret societies, chiefs, gangs, religious leaders or militias, paralegals, or community reconciliation and trade associations (Leone, 2012). Menkhaus (2007) argues that communities that have been cut off from an effective state authority seek other actors to provide their core functions, especially basic security. So, in these places there is a multitude of overlapping institutions, both state and non-state, involved in governance and security provision. The access to violent means is dispersed and not monopolized in case of an ideal state (North, Wallis & Weingast, in Willems, 2013).

The situation in Rio de Janeiro's favelas can be explained by this view on security provision, since the state has been absent in these favelas for decades, both physically and symbolically. By this absence of the state, drug gangs took over the control in these settlements: "State absence made these spaces unprotected and permitted non-state armed actors to establish social order" (Tierney, 2012, p.17). So, because of the absence of the state a self-created social order was established by the drug traffickers.

By installing UPP's in several favelas the idea of the modern state, also outlined in chapter 2, has been endeavored. The modern state model assumes that security is provided in the best way by ensuring a proper and capable state. The means of violence are to be controlled by the government, which acts in interests of the civilian population. This equates to a state which has a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence (Willems, 2013).

The pacification of favelas is in line with this idea, since the state returned to communities it had abandoned decades ago. The idea behind the UPP's is that security can be provided in the best way by bringing the state back to these favelas. The drug gangs should not longer be in charge in these areas.

Interesting here is that the favelas in Rio de Janeiro are a nice example of how non-state actors can play an important role in the provision of security. The state returned – in the form of the UPP police . With the debate on security provision in mind, this raises some related questions: What does the establishment of the UPP's mean for the legitimacy and sustainability for this kind of security provision? What kind of influence does the UPP program have on the state-society relation? Did the pacification help to strengthen the role of the Brazilian government? How do the residents of these favelas perceive the state after it had been absent for such a long time? Who do they think should be responsible for the provision of security? What kind of influence did the pacification have on the confidence that these residents have in the Brazilian government? What do the residents of non-pacified areas think about the pacification? These questions will be addressed in this chapter in order to find out in which way the UPP contributes to strengthening the role of the state as a security provider. This will be done by examining how people see the UPP in terms of effectiveness and reliability compared to other security providers, namely the local drug gangs.

### **6.1 The responsibility to ensure security**

Since the end of the Cold War much attention has been paid to the expansion of the issue areas of security studies and the deepening of the conception of referents of security, because the end of this war sensitized theorists and practitioners of security to the existence of a diversity of threats. For decades, the sovereign state has been the major security actor and it was expected that this actor ensured security (Mabee, 2003). Crawford (2006) adds to this by saying that there was a need for governments to be seen to be 'doing something' and that the state should play the anchor of collective security provision. Later, this way of thinking was supplemented by the idea that non-state actors are also involved in security provision, due to a lack of state. When a state is not able to ensure security, other actors will take over this role (Willems, 2013). This is exactly what has happened in Rio de Janeiro's favelas. Because of an absent state, the security provision was taken over by the local drug gangs.

For this reason, the respondents were asked who should be responsible for the security provision in their communities. This question should be evaluated with the background information on the debate on security provision and the history of these communities in mind.

#### **6.1.1 The government should be responsible, but...**

“The government of course” answered J. Morais (personal communication, 17 December 2014) – living in non-pacified Vila Nova – to the question of who should be responsible for security provision. Even though the state police have never provided security in these areas, during the interviews, generally all respondents claimed that the state *should* be responsible for security provision. With the history of these favelas and the reputation of the government and police in mind, this can be seen as rather remarkable. Despite the failure of the state in terms of security provision, still generally everybody believes that they are the actor that should be responsible.

Despite the fact that generally everybody states that the government *should* be responsible to ensure security, a lot of side remarks states that it is a difficult issue to actually hold the government accountable. In addition, not everybody prefers the state to be the main security provider, despite the fact that they believe that the state *should* be. A clear distinction should be made between the following questions: Who should be responsible for the provision of security? And who is most capable to be responsible for the provision of security? So, there is a difference between the ideal situation versus the pragmatic and actual capacities of the state. Those questions resulted in radically different answers.

R. Rocha (personal communication, 13 November 2014) – living in pacified Complexo da Penha – states that the government should be responsible, but she adds that it is very complicated as well, because the government does not really have the power to change something in the favelas. They promise a lot, such as a football field or other projects, but nothing happens. So, they should be responsible, but they fail to push through. Because of this lack of confidence in the government there are even people in Complexo da Penha who prefer the drug traffickers over the UPP police. E. Lima (personal communication, 11 November 2014) states that the drug traffickers are the best actors to ensure security. For him personally, this would be the best, because he believes that before the pacification they ensured security in a better way than it happens nowadays. An important reason for his opinion is that a lot of his friends are drug traffickers in Complexo da Penha, so he trusts the people from the drug gang more than he does the government. Also G. Dias (personal communication, 13 November 2014) – living in Complexo da Penha – prefers the drug traffickers above measures from the government: “To be honest from my heart, I prefer the drug traffickers”.

It is interesting to look at the opinions in a non-pacified favela, since the state is still absent in these places. Would this difference affect the way the residents think about security provision?

Nowadays the state is present in the pacified favelas in the form of UPP police. But in Vila Nova this is not the case. The police only sporadically enter to arrest drug traffickers and seize weapons and drugs. This always happens with a lot of violence and shootings between the drug gang and police. Despite these circumstances, the habitants of Vila Nova still believe that the government should be responsible, but this also has a troubled side. R. Alves (personal communication, 17 December 2014) tells that nowadays the drug traffickers are responsible for security because they make the rules and ensure, by punishing, that nobody breaks these rules. G. Martins (personal communication, 11 December 2014) adds to this that in the ideal situation the government should be responsible for the security in her neighborhood. But the problem is that the public security is not entering Vila Nova. This causes that at the moment the drug traffickers are responsible for the security. But this should not be the case, the government should be responsible for this (G. Martins, personal communication, 11 December 2014).

In conclusion, it is interesting to see that even in places where the state has a very bad reputation because of its absence and often violent behavior, it is unanimously stated by the respondents that they are still the actor that should ensure security. On the other hand, many respondents add that they do not believe that the state has the capacities to do so. These opinions are based on earlier experiences with unfulfilled promises of the government. So a difference has been found between the desired ideal situation versus the pragmatic and actual capacities of the state.

#### **6.1.2 Citizens' initiatives to improve the security**

Following the theories on security provision, due to a lack of state, non-state actors are getting involved in the provision of security. In the favelas – where the state often is absent and the control was taken over by the local drug gang – it is interesting to examine whether citizens made efforts to improve the security in their neighborhood themselves. So, the question arises whether there are citizens' initiatives that could improve the security in their communities. For this reason, the respondents were asked what kind of measures the residents of the favelas take in order to improve the security.

There are not a lot of individual initiatives from the habitants to improve the security in their neighborhood. In the pacified Santa Marta favela, the habitants do not do anything to improve the safety in their neighborhood (J. Cardoso, personal communication, 28 November 2014). Nowadays, Santa Marta is a very safe community though. There has not been one shooting in the past six years and the crime rates are very low. In the pacified Complexo da Penhad favela

residents introduced a Facebook page to inform each other about all kinds of stuff such as houses that are for sale, jobs offers, the retrieval of garbage, and the water supply. Moreover, this Facebook page's main function is to inform each other about shootings in the community. In this way, people know when there is a shooting and that they should watch out. Figure 9 shows an example of such a message, which means 'Shootings at some locations in the community. Stay alert and be careful!'.




Figure: 9 A Facebook message that warns for shootings. Source: Facebook, 2015

Vila Nova also has a warning system, but this works in a totally different way. Around the community are a lot of spots where members of the drug gang keep watch. They keep a close eye on who enters and leaves the favela. They communicate this information with each other through walkie talkies. When a police car or other threat from outside approaches the community, this is communicated immediately. Subsequently, the drug traffickers light firework to warn each other and the habitants of Vila for a possible shooting (G. Martins, personal communication, 11 December 2014).

Remarkably, here are almost no citizens' initiatives to improve the security. The majority of the respondents believe that it is not their task, but the task of the government.

## 6.2 Legitimacy of the state

The relation between the state government of Rio de Janeiro and its citizens has been laborious for decades. The government is accused for not investing enough money in good education and health care. In addition, a lot of times criticism is voiced against the government because they promised certain things and failed to implement these promises. L. Texeira (personal communication, 17 December 2014) – living in Vila Nova - expresses this as follows: "They [the government] do not do anything. They talk a lot, but they do not do anything what they said. It is like a dream that does not come true". By implementing the UPP's in several

favelas the city government made an attempt to partly overcome this criticism. After years of ignoring these neighborhoods, the city government decided to invest time, money, and recruits in these areas. This raises the question whether this has increased the legitimacy of the state. An interesting part is whether the outcomes of the pacification in each of the cases are influential, especially, the confidence the citizens have in the pacification. For this reason, the respondents were asked if the pacification changed their opinion on the state government and if they are more or less confident in the government because of the pacification. In this questionnaire, the outcomes of the pacification regarding the feeling of security, as discussed in the earlier chapters 4 and 5, are included. More explicitly, the pacification in Santa Marta had more positive results than in Complexo da Penha. So, did the residents of Santa Marta have more confidence in the government in comparison with the residents of Complexo da Penha?

The first case that will be discussed is Complexo da Penha. Previous chapters showed that the pacification had mixed results in this neighborhood. On the one hand, some people feel safer since the pacification, mainly due to the decreasing amount of firefights. But on the other hand, a small majority feels less safe since the UPP was established in their neighborhood. Moreover, the majority of the respondents in this neighborhood do not have confidence in the future of the pacification in their community. They believe that the UPP's will not last long, especially not until after the 2016 Olympics. This diversity can also be found among the respondents when it comes to the confidence they have in the government. The majority of the residents of Complexo da Penha got less confidence in the state government because of the pacification. G. Dias (personal communication, 13 November 2014) states that she got less confidence in the government, since the pacification of her neighborhood, because the UPP only brought bad things and nothing improved. Apart from that she detests the UPP police in her neighborhood, because of their corrupt procedures. R. Ferreira (personal communication, 7 November 2014) also states that he has less confidence nowadays in comparison with before the pacification, because he really does not like the police. But there are also some people in Complexo da Penha who argue that the pacification brought improvements. G. Sousa<sup>27</sup> (personal communication, 6 November 2014) got more confidence in the government by the pacification, because the safety in her neighborhood improved.

Secondly, the pacification in Santa Marta worked out in a very good way. The UPP's impact is generally positive. In addition, generally speaking, the residents of Santa Marta have

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<sup>27</sup> G. Sousa lives in the Complexo da Penha favela for 44 years and works in her own internet café.

confidence that the UPP will remain in their neighborhood, even after the 2016 Olympics. This positivity can also be in this favela concerning the legitimacy of the state. All respondents in this neighborhood state that they got more confidence in the state government since their neighborhood got pacified. The main mentioned reason is that the pacification brought a lot of improvements in this community (A. Azevedo, personal communication, 28 November 2014; E. Ribeiro, personal communication, 28 November 2014; J. Cardoso, personal communication, 28 November 2014). Apart from that, R. Costa (personal communication, 19 November 2014) mentions an important contradiction in her increased confidence. Based on what she saw on television, she states that the question – if she got more confidence in the government by the pacification – is complicated, because:

...for people who live here I got more confidence because there are a lot of benefits. But in other communities it got worse. It got worse in the places where the drug traffickers went after the pacification. So it got better for the people here in the South zone, but worse for the people in the North zone (R. Costa, personal communication, 19 November 2014).

Also in the non-pacified Vila Nova favela this contradiction has been mentioned. G. Martins (personal communication, 11 December 2014) states that it is hard to say if she got more or less confidence in the government since the pacification of other areas. The pacification worked out in a good way for the communities with UPP's. There are less drugs and armed boys. But there is also a negative side to the pacification. It caused that there is more violence in other, non-pacified, communities nowadays. Besides this, the responses on this question in Vila Nova are divided. Some people got more confidence in the state government, like J. Morais (personal communication, 17 December 2014). He look at the pacified communities: "This project of pacification changed these communities into better places. This changed the lives of the people who live in these pacified communities, because there are projects now and other things they did not have before the pacification". On the other hand, there are also people in Vila Nova who got less confidence in the state government by the pacification, such as N. Barbosa (personal communication, 11 December 2014). She substantiates their opinion by saying that the pacification is not a good thing. She bases her opinion on some pacified favelas which she visited, like Complexo da Alemão, Complexo da Penha, and Mangureira. These favelas are all located in the North zone and according to N. Barbosa (personal communication, 11 December 2014) it even got worse in these communities.

Additionally, in all of the three favelas respondents used this question – whether the respondents have more or less confidence in the state because of the pacification – to complain about the state government. R. Rocha (personal communication, 13 November 2014) – living in pacified Complexo da Penha - says that she does not have any confidence in the government. Everybody who joins the government makes mistakes. That is the reason not a thing will change in Rio de Janeiro. She thinks the government can only do a good job when they do not promise anything. J. Johnson (personal communication, 19 November 2014) – living in pacified Santa Marta - is very skeptical about the functioning of the government and does not have any confidence at all. He substantiates this by saying that they are not doing a lot. The security system is part of the government, but the government itself is not doing a lot to improve it. In addition, the same sounds were heard in Vila Nova. Both L. Texeira (personal communication, 17 December 2014) and A. Araújo (personal communication, 17 December) emphasize that they have almost no confidence in their government. A. Araújo (personal communication, 17 December 2014) explains that the government should do more to decrease the number of drug traffickers. At this moment, she believes that they do not do enough to achieve this.

In conclusion, the absence of the state has caused favelas to be under control of drug gangs, who were responsible for the security provision as well. By establishing UPP's in these areas the questions arose what significance this has? Did the effects of this security intervention contribute to the confidence of people in the state as a provider of security, or the opposite? When distinguishing between the different cases it seems that the UPP in Santa Marta has been very effective. The people in this pacified favela see that the state operates effectively and is capable to ensure security. Because of the pacification of their neighborhood they got more confidence in the state and consider them legitimate to act in their best interests. In the two other cases, Complexo da Penha (pacified) and Vila Nova (non-pacified), the impact of the pacification on confidence in the state is more diffuse. People still assume that the state is ultimately responsible for their security, but feel that this often fails in practice, because they do not have the capacity. Subsequently, they doubt the government's commitment. In other words, the UPP established in their neighborhood for their interest or to show tourists that Rio de Janeiro is a nice and safe city. Moreover, some of the respondents argue that the establishment of an UPP in their community has led to more insecurity instead of security. All of this detracts from the local confidence in the state as a central provider of security. So, an important problem that arises from this chapter is the legitimacy of the state as a security provider.



## 7. Conclusion

The favelas in Rio de Janeiro are notorious for their violent climate. This is often attributed to the presence of drug gangs who are in control of these areas. In 2008 the state government of Rio de Janeiro decided to start a large-scale program for the pacification of these favelas. This is a newly structured policy that would bring police permanently into informal settlements that had been controlled by heavily armed drug gangs for decades. The declared goal of this program is to improve the security. The outcomes of this program in terms of actual security are clear. Urban violence in the whole city of Rio de Janeiro has declined since the introduction of the UPP's. Nevertheless, there is a lot of criticism on the workings of these UPP's. This criticism is based on news reports that claim that police agents act in a violent way against residents and interviews with habitants of pacified favelas who argue that they still do not trust the police. This raises the question whether the residents of the pacified favelas actually feel safer by the installation of UPP's. A problem related to the pacification are the uncertain consequences for non-pacified areas. Critics argue that the drug cartels will move to other areas, because they can no longer function lucratively in the pacified areas. This would be a displacement of the problem instead of a solution. For this reason, this study also examined the influence of the pacification in a non-pacified favela.

### 7.1 Research questions

The research questions as formulated in the introduction will be answered in this paragraph.

#### 7.1.1 Fears in a favela

I suspected that the fear of crime in a favela would deviate from that in a Western context. Therefore, the first sub-question was: *1. What constitutes the fear of crime in Rio de Janeiro's favelas?* I tried to answer this question through a mini survey and semi-structured in-depth interviews. The results showed that the fear of crime in a favela is indeed constituted by different factors than in the Western context. There are two important points in which the fear of crime in a favela differs from the factors identified in existing literature. First, the residents of favelas declared that they were most afraid of a firefight, a stray bullet, and homicides. These issues/fears are not taken into account in the operationalization of the fear of crime in the Western context. A second difference is that the fear to become a victim of sexual violence and robbery is rather low in comparison with the fears for such crimes in the Western World.

The importance of those factors may be explained by the following: The first explaining factor is that the occurrence of firefights on a regular basis is rather rare and unusual in the Western

world, but very common in a lot of favelas. When people hear gunshots, they are afraid of being hit by a stray bullet or even die. A second explaining factor to understand the local fear of crime in a favela is the 'law of the traffickers'. Due to lack of state, the drug gangs were in charge in Rio de Janeiro's favelas for decades. They made the rules and punished the people who violated these rules. The most important rules were that you did not steal from each other, you treated women with respect, you did not enter other people's houses and you were not able to talk with the police. If you did not follow these rules you were running the risk of getting punished brutally. For this reason, everybody followed these rules. Hereby a self-created social order was established by the drug traffickers, very much like what is understood in the literature as 'community security'.

In conclusion, the fear of crime within a favela is constituted by different fears than in the Western world. This teaches us that the operationalization of the fear of crime – as developed in the Western world – is not automatically applicable everywhere. Before measuring this concept the determinant fears should be examined by the researcher. Subsequently, the conclusion can be drawn that in Rio de Janeiro criminal networks are not necessarily perceived as dangerous. By the rules of the drug gangs almost no robberies and sexual violence occurs in favelas. So this research showed that criminal networks are also able to provide order and security.

#### **7.1.2 How the pacification has influenced the fear of crime**

With the aim to regain power in the favelas and to ensure security in these areas, the city government started in 2008 a new security policy; the Pacification Police Units. The second sub-question within this study addresses the impact of these UPP's on the fear of crime: 2. *What impact did the Pacification Police Unit program have on the level of fear of crime in pacified and non-pacified favelas?* In order to explain these impacts on the fear of crime, a third sub-question has been formulated: 3. *What explains the changes in the fear of crime in each of the favela and what is the role of the Pacification Police Unit program in this?* Both questions will be answered in this section. According to the cases, the following results can be presented. First, in general the residents of Santa Marta (pacified) feel safer since their neighborhood got pacified. This can be explained as follows:

- There are no firefights anymore.
- The residents got more freedom.
- The behavior of the police improved a lot.
- The establishment of social improvements.

Secondly, there is a big division among the residents of Complexo da Penha (pacified). A small majority of the habitants (53.8%) of this favela feel less safe since their neighborhood got pacified, but this is not unambiguous, since also 34.6% responded that they feel safer. The diversity among the respondents can be ascribed to both positive and negative impacts by the pacification. Some people in Complexo da Penha feel safer by the installation of UPP's in this area:

- The number of firefights has declined.
- The visible carrying of weapons has strongly decreased.
- Certain public facilities are functioning again.

Despite these improvements, the majority of the habitants in Complexo da Penha feel less safe by the pacification of their neighborhood. The explanations given by the respondents are:

- The firefights that happen nowadays are unpredictable and uncontrolled.
- The presence of the UPP police and the bad relationship they have with the community
- Small crimes, such as robberies, happen more often.
- The UPP police enter houses randomly.

Lastly, none of the respondents in Vila Nova (non-pacified) feel safer since the pacification of other neighborhoods and a large majority even feels less safe. The respondents explain these feelings as follows:

- The amount of drug traffickers increased substantially.
- This causes more violence in the community.
- The residents do not know the new drug traffickers who migrated here.

In conclusion, the pacification made it better for some people and worse for others. No unilateral conclusion can be drawn on the functioning of the UPP's. On this basis of the observed cases in this study it can be concluded that the pacification has lead to real improvements in some communities, but at the same time it did not lead to the desired results in other favelas. Security has even deteriorated in non-pacified areas by the migration of drug traffickers. This migration of drug traffickers makes it clear that the pacification causes a displacement of the problem – the participation of people in drug gangs - instead of a solution. So, the establishment of the UPP's did not necessarily mean an improvement in the security situation in Rio de Janeiro's favelas.

### **7.1.3 The same security intervention, but different outcomes**

The same security intervention was implemented in Santa Marta and Complexo da Penha, but had totally different outcomes. The outcomes in Santa Marta are positive, while the situation

in Complexo da Penha is very complicated. Despite the fact that the number of firefights declined, much else did not improve. The next sub-question is: 4. *What explains the differences in the impacts of the Pacification Police Unit program between the favelas?* In this research, eight reasons have been found that may explain these different impacts:

- The location of the favelas.
- The size and structure of the favelas.
- The implementation of the UPP social program.
- The policy of the local drug gang.
- The (still) persistent influence of the drug gang.
- The policy of the UPP police.
- The history of the drug gang.
- The confidence the population has in the pacification.

The important role of the history of the neighborhood is remarkable and is an important explaining factor. In Complexo da Penha the drug gang was very strong for decades. As P. Veldhuis (personal communication, 30 November 2024) says: “This is stuck in the DNA of the neighborhood...”. People got used to the presence of the drug gang and the idea that the police was the enemy. It seems that this way of thinking is not easy to change and can be seen as an important contribution to the difficulties in the pacification of Complexo da Penha.

#### **7.1.4 The state as a security provider**

The favelas in Rio de Janeiro are a nice example of how non-state actors can play an important role in the provision of security. The state was brought back – in the form of the UPP police – to communities where it had been absent for decades. With the debate on security provision in mind, this raises the final sub-question: 5. *What does the Pacification Police Unit program eventually imply for the actual and perceived role of the state as a security provider?*

When analyzing the data, it is striking that even in places where the state has a very bad reputation by its absence and recurrent violent behavior, all respondents stated that the state should be responsible for the security in their community. On the other hand, many of these respondents added that they do not believe that the state has the capacity to do so. Thus, the state *should* be responsible, but according to the respondents they are not able to do so. Apart from these findings the question was raised what the effects of the pacification mean for the legitimacy of the state. A clear distinction should be made between the different cases. The UPP in Santa Marta (pacified) has been very effective and caused the residents to have more confidence in the state and consider them legitimate to act in their best interests. In the two

other cases, Complexo da Penha (pacified) and Vila Nova (non-pacified), the impacts of the pacification are more diffuse. This also becomes visible by the degree of confidence that they have – or have not – obtained by the pacification. The people living in these areas stated that they did not have more confidence in the state by the pacification, because it did not bring the desired results for their neighborhoods. So, an important problem that arises from this study is the legitimacy of the state as a security provider.

In summary, it has become clear that the pacification had mixed results in the different communities. There are both positive and negative impacts. In some areas people feel safer, in others people feel less safe. In some areas, it improved the reputation of the police, in others it deteriorated. In some communities it has led to social improvements, in others it only led to unfulfilled promises. In some favelas, the number of firefights declined, in others it increased. In some neighborhoods the number of weapons on the streets declined, in others it increased. Some pacified communities are called a 'model favela' nowadays, others are referred to as "...a nightmare" (I. Cano, personal communication, 10 December 2014). In some areas, pacification increased the legitimacy of the state, but in others it detracted it. These findings make clear that one cannot speak of 'the pacification' and its impacts as a whole. So, no unilateral conclusion can be drawn. It is a story with many different sides, with many contrasting consequences for the different communities.

## **7.2 The academic debates**

A first addressed theoretical debate in this research is that on security feelings, in the literature referred to as fear of crime. The conceptualization and measurement of this concept is criticized a lot. This is because – as critics argue – it is methodologically flawed, non-theoretical, non-cumulative, and non-comparative due to the conceptual chaos in this field and the use of different labels and indicators. Moreover, little is known about the variety in relevance, nature, meaning, and experience of fear of crime in people's lives. This is a gap in studies according to the conceptualization and measurement of the fear of crime.

In this study, the operationalization and measurement method by Vanderveen (2006a) and Vanderveen, Pleysier and Rodenhuis (2011) have been used as a starting point. But since this operationalization is based on the Western context this could not be automatically adopted in this study. So, prior to the measurement of the fear of crime, first it had to be determined which issues/fear constitute the feeling of security in a favela. This has been done by means of a mini survey and semi-structured in-depth interviews. A clear conceptualization and measurement of the concept of fear of crime in the context of Rio de Janeiro's favelas has

been established. This made clear that the fear of crime in a favela is indeed constituted differently than in the Western world. This is due to the occurrence of firefights and the historically rooted 'law of the traffickers'. In this way, this study has provided a better understanding of the phenomenon fear of crime – especially in a favela.

In addition, the developed conceptualization of the fear of crime in a favela can be used in further research. First, it could serve as a starting point to determine the fear of crime in a completely other different context. Another possibility is to use this conceptualization in more favelas in Rio de Janeiro. In this way, more generalized conclusions can be drawn about the influence of the pacification on the fear of crime.

Earlier I stated that the scientific relevance of this research is that it contributes to a better understanding of the effects of security interventions and of processes of security provisioning these interventions inevitably interacts with. In a lot of research, no attention is paid to the broader societal impacts of security interventions. The impacts on the complex state-society relation are also often underexposed. So, a broader understanding of the workings of security interventions is needed. In other words, a better understanding of what and why a security intervention does or does not work is urgently needed.

This applies as well on the UPP's in Rio de Janeiro, since most studies are focused on the statistical security numbers on crime rates. This study made an attempt to contribute to this debate by focusing on the societal impacts for the individual and by trying to understand why this UPP program does or does not work by examining the underlying social explanations. More explicitly, in this research an overview has been made of the underlying explanations of the functioning of the UPP in three different cases. An explanation has been given why this security intervention had good results in Santa Marta and more diffuse – or even bad results – in Complexo da Penha and Vila Nova. By doing so, attention has been given to the broad societal impacts as well.

Subsequently, attention has also been paid to the complex state-society relation in these favelas. As stated earlier, a security intervention can contribute to state formation and the legitimacy of the state. Through applying the debates on state formation and security provision in this research, it became clear that the impacts of a security intervention and the approach of the executor of the state – in this case the UPP police – are of great importance with regard to state formation and the legitimacy of the state as a security provider. More explicitly, the impacts of the pacification in Santa Marta (pacified) and the behavior of the UPP police in this neighborhood are considered very positive. This has lead to an increase of

confidence and legitimacy in the government in this neighborhood. In other words, the pacification has contributed to state formation in this community. But on the other hand, the impacts of the pacification and the behavior of the police in Complexo da Penha (pacified) and Vila Nova (non-pacified) are considered to be more diffuse and often even quite negative. This resulted in a decrease of legitimacy of the state in these neighborhoods. Considering these communities, the pacification did not contribute to state formation. With this explanation a better understanding of the workings of these kinds of interventions, their impact on the society, and its relation with the state has been created.

### **7.3 Recommendations**

The social issue discussed in this study is the security issue in Rio de Janeiro's favelas. These favelas are notorious for their violent climate. The city government established UPP's in order to bring security to these violent areas. The social relevance of this study is that it may contribute to an improvement of the security situations in these favelas. This may be achieved by analyzing why people feel unsafe and to identify the shortcomings of the UPP program. Based on the findings within this study, recommendations are formulated in order to improve the security in Rio de Janeiro's favelas.

One of the conclusions that can be drawn from this research is that the pacification of favelas does not really solve the core problem: the existence and participation of people in drug gangs. The installation of UPP's caused the drug traffickers move to other places, instead of drug traffickers deciding to leave the drug gangs and applying for legal jobs. In many cases people join a drug gang because there is a lack of other opportunities. It is plausible that in case of these a good income, they did not have to seek for criminal activities to sustain their living. For this reason, a first recommendation is to invest more in employment and education. It is plausible when children have a good education, they have better opportunities. This may reduce the temptation to join the drug gang. Connecting thereto, if there are more employment opportunities it may reduce the temptation to join the drug gang as well.

Another important problem that arises from this study is the legitimacy of the state as a security provider. It became clear that the relation between the state – with the UPP police as executor – and the community is often still very bad. The citizens do not trust the state and the police are there for their security. Subsequently, a lot of citizens do not have confidence in the pacification and the government. So, a second recommendation would be to improve the relationship between the police and the community. This is probably one of the hardest tasks since it required battling decades and centuries of a certain model of public security that is not

easily transformed. Even so, some options which may deliver and contribute to this achievement will be mentioned.

At the moment the UPP police and the residents of the pacified favelas barely communicate. So a first possibility is to install contact moments between the community and the UPP police. In this way it may be made more accessible to communicate with each other.

Another possibility that can improve the legitimacy of the state is to implement the UPP social policy in all pacified areas. At the moment, a lot of residents in Complexo da Penha see the state as an actor that promises a lot of things but does not fulfill its promises. This is also the case with the UPP social program. On paper, the UPP would bring social improvements in Complexo da Penha, but this was never implemented. Doing so can serve as a positive state presence by which the people may get more confidence in the government. In addition, the UPP social program contains, among others, education possibilities and social projects. Establishing these social improvements also targets the first formulated problem. The UPP social program may offer opportunities to people who experience the temptation to join the drug gang. Perhaps this temptation may be reduced by the implementation of the UPP social program.

## **7.4 Reflection**

Looking at the methodology used in research, there are some points that need to be critically reflected. This research knows some limitations and those are important to mention. In addition, it is interesting to examine what I have learned by conducting this research. This will be discussed in the second section of this paragraph.

### **7.4.1 Reflection on the methodology**

In this study, the choice has been made for a case study in which both quantitative and qualitative data are collected and used. In this process, a number of limitations have emerged. It is important to discuss these limitations in order to place the results of this research in a wider context.

A first limitation addresses the measurement of the concept fear of crime. As stated before, the conceptualization and measurement of this concept is seen as methodologically flawed, non-theoretical, non-cumulative, and non-comparative due to the conceptual chaos in this field and the use of different labels and indicators. There is no consensus in the literature how this concept can be measured in the best way. Nevertheless, in lack of other alternatives, the conceptualization and measurement as provided in literature have been used as a starting



point in this study. So, the same criticism is applicable on this study. A problem that arises is the validity of the used conceptualization and measurement of the fear of crime in this study. In other words, is the fear of crime really measured? Or were some indicators put together and simply labeled 'fear of crime'? Since the literature does not provide a unilateral answer to these questions, I cannot answer them. This is a shortcoming of this study.

A second limitation is the amount of adopted cases within this research. At the moment there are 39 pacified favelas in Rio de Janeiro and more than 700 non-pacified favelas. Because there were only three cases included in this study, it is difficult to generalize the outcomes to the entire operation of the UPP in Rio de Janeiro. This point of reflection automatically leads to a recommendation for further research: to adopt more cases in a further research on the UPP's, so that more generalizing conclusions can be drawn.

A third limitation addresses my own Portuguese language skills. Since almost nobody speaks English in Brazil – especially not in a favela – it was necessary to learn the language. Therefore I followed Portuguese classes for about half a year, both in the Netherlands and in Rio de Janeiro. Despite the fact that I managed to speak the language quite well, it was often difficult to completely understand the respondent during the interviews. Subsequently, sometimes I could not respond to the respondents' answers and ask a follow-up question, because I could not find the right words. This made the semi-structured in-depth interviews often somewhat superficial, which can be seen as a shortcoming of this study.

A final limitation is the unilateral approach. This research describes the situation from the viewpoint of the habitants of favelas. No UPP police officers or policy makers were interviewed. This has the result that their side of the story is rather neglected in this study, while it would have been very interesting addition. Some of the negative stories of the residents would perhaps be nuanced by interviewing UPP police-officers or policy makers. Perhaps they would have given a logical explanation for not implementing the UPP social policy or for the behavior and approach of UPP policemen. Because their opinions were not included in this study, a rather one-sided story was created. So, for further research I would advice to also include perspectives of UPP officers and policy makers. This would provide a broader perspective on the topic.

#### **7.4.2 Own learning experiences**

To live in the Vila Cruzeiro favela for three months has been an amazing experience that gave me some personal insights as well.

A first personal insight is that the world is not black or white. There is a very large grey area. I realized this by meeting a lot of people who join the local drug gang. Before I left for Rio de Janeiro I thought that all drug traffickers were criminals who act very violent and rude. But by meeting a lot of drug traffickers I realized that – in many cases – they want the best for their fellow men as well.

Secondly, the image I had about the favelas has changed drastically. Before, I thought that there would be a lot of poverty and violence. This made me very nervous to go there and live there. But soon I realized that favelas are actually very cheerful and warm spots with a lot of loving people. The atmosphere there is very positive. Despite the fact that a lot of habitants do not have a lot of opportunities in their lives, you can see that they try to make the best out of every day. The enormous social control is worth mentioning. Everyone knows each other, keeps an eye on each other and helps each other when this is necessary. I really enjoyed the ambience in the favelas.

Lastly, by doing fieldwork in Rio de Janeiro I realized that the Western norms and values are not always applicable in a totally different culture. In the Western world it would be disapproved if a girl of 16 years old would give birth, but in the favela 16 was seen as a nice age to have your first child. Moreover, in the Western world you are not allowed to drink alcohol before you reach the age of 16/18, but in the favelas you see children of 12 years old drinking beers with their parents. In the beginning, I found it very difficult to see and experience these cultural differences, but after some time I started to realize that I grew up with Western values. These values are often not applicable to Rio de Janeiro's favelas and you cannot do otherwise than just deal with it.

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## Appendices

### Appendix A            Mini survey

Hi, my name is Anke. I'm doing research in collaboration with the IBISS Foundation to security feelings in this neighborhood. Would you please help me with my research by filling in this file? Thank you in advance!

**When I feel unsafe in my own neighborhood, this is because of:**

- ☐ Physical abuse
- ☐ Burglary
- ☐ Vandalism to my house
- ☐ Getting involved in a fight
- ☐ Sexual harassment
- ☐ Sexual assault
- ☐ Robbery
- ☐ Violence on the street
- ☐ Homicides
- ☐ A small fire
- ☐ A big fire between the police and drugsgang
- ☐ Stray bullet
- ☐ Otherwise, namely

.....

## **Appendix B                  Survey pacified favelas**

Hi, my name is Anke. I'm doing research in collaboration with the IBISS Foundation to security feelings in this neighborhood. Would you please help me with my research by filling in this file? Thank you in advance!

**1. Gender:**

- ☐ Male
- ☐ Female

**2. Age:**

- ☐ 16 – 25
- ☐ 26 – 35
- ☐ 36 – 45
- ☐ 46 – 55
- ☐ 56 – 65
- ☐ 66 – 75
- ☐ 76 or older

**3. Highest completed education:**

- ☐ None
- ☐ Primary school
- ☐ Secondary school
- ☐ College preparing school
- ☐ University

**4. Family income a month:**

- ☐ R\$ 0 – R\$ 500
- ☐ R\$ 501 – R\$ 1000
- ☐ R\$ 1001 – R\$ 1500
- ☐ R\$ 1501 – R\$ 2000
- ☐ R\$ 2001 – R\$ 2500
- ☐ R\$ 2501 – R\$ 3000
- ☐ R\$ 3001 or more

**5. Do you have children?**

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

**6. Do your children living with you?**

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

**7. With how many people do you live together in your house?**

- ☐ Alone
- ☐ 2
- ☐ 3
- ☐ 4
- ☐ 5
- ☐ 6 or more

**8. What kind of grade would you give to the environmental conditions in your neighborhood? (for example the houses, streets, lighting, garbage etc).**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

**9. Have you ever been the victim of a crime?**

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

**10. Do you know somebody who has been the victim of a crime?**

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

**11. What kind of grade would you give to the functioning/behavior of the police?**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

**12. What kind of grade would you give to the functioning of the justice system in combating violence and crime?**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

**13. How afraid are you that your family or friends will become a victim of.....**

	Not afraid ---	--	-	+/-	+	++	Very much afraid +++
Burglary?							
Robbery?							
Violence on the street?							
Homicides?							
A firefight?							
Physical abuse?							
A stray bullet?							

**14. How afraid are you that you will become a victim of.....**

	Not afraid ---	--	-	+/-	+	++	Very much afraid +++
Burglary?							
Physical abuse?							
Robbery?							
Violence on the street?							
Homicides?							
A firefight?							
A stray bullet?							

**15. How traumatic would it be for you when you become a victim of....**

	Very small ---	--	-	+/-	+	++	Very much +++
Physical abuse?							
Burglary?							
Violence on the street?							
Robbery?							
A firefight?							
A stray bullet?							

**16. How likely do you think it is that you will become a victim of..... in the coming year**

	Very unlikely ---	--	-	+/-	+	++	Very likely +++
Physical abuse?							
Burglary?							
Robbery?							
Violence on the street?							
A firefight?							
A Stray bullet?							

**17. I feel safe when I'm walking alone in the street at night in my own neighborhood**

Entirely agree +++	++	+	+/-	-	--	Entirely disagree ---

**18. I'm at ease when I'm walking alone in the street at night in my own neighborhood**

Entirely agree +++	++	+	+/-	-	--	Entirely disagree ---

**19. I'm at ease when I'm walking together with somebody in the street at night in my own neighborhood**

Entirely agree +++	++	+	+/-	-	--	Entirely disagree ---

**20. I'm at ease when I'm alone at home at night**

Entirely agree +++	++	+	+/-	-	--	Entirely disagree ---

**21. I feel safe when I'm alone at home at night**

Entirely agree +++	++	+	+/-	-	--	Entirely disagree ---

**22. I notice the presence of the UPP in my neighborhood**

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

**23. I feel more safe since the UPP installed in my neighborhood than before**

Entirely agree ---	--	-	+/-	+	++	Entirely disagree +++

**24. The security in my neighborhood improved after the arrival of the UPP**

Entirely agree ---	--	-	+/-	+	++	Entirely disagree +++

**25. One year ago I felt more safe than I do now**

Entirely agree ---	--	-	+/-	+	++	Entirely disagree +++

**26. I notice a change in the security after the World Cup in my neighborhood**

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

**27. The UPP/military changed their procedures after the World Cup**

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

**28. I feel more safe in my neighborhood after the World Cup than 3 months before the World Cup**

Entirely agree ---	--	-	+/-	+	++	Entirely disagree +++

**29. The security in my neighborhood improved after the World Cup**

Entirely agree ---	--	-	+/-	+	++	Entirely disagree +++

**30. I'm looking for people who I can interview about this subject at a later date. Can I please interview you?**

- ☐ No
- ☐ Yes

Name:.....

Phone number:.....

## **Appendix C                  Survey non-pacified favela**

Hi, my name is Anke. I'm doing research in collaboration with the IBISS Foundation to security feelings in this neighborhood. Would you please help me with my research by filling in this file? Thank you in advance!

**1. Gender:**

- ☐ Male
- ☐ Female

**2. Age:**

- ☐ 16 – 25
- ☐ 26 – 35
- ☐ 36 – 45
- ☐ 46 – 55
- ☐ 56 – 65
- ☐ 66 – 75
- ☐ 76 or older

**3. Highest completed education:**

- ☐ None
- ☐ Primary school
- ☐ Secondary school
- ☐ College preparing school
- ☐ University

**4. Family income a month:**

- ☐ R\$ 0 – R\$ 500
- ☐ R\$ 501 – R\$ 1000
- ☐ R\$ 1001 – R\$ 1500
- ☐ R\$ 1501 – R\$ 2000
- ☐ R\$ 2001 – R\$ 2500
- ☐ R\$ 2501 – R\$ 3000
- ☐ R\$ 3001 or more

**5. Do you have children?**

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

**6. Do your children living with you?**

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

**7. With how many people do you live together in your house?**

- ☐ Alone
- ☐ 2
- ☐ 3
- ☐ 4
- ☐ 5
- ☐ 6 or more

**8. What kind of grade would you give to the environmental conditions in your neighborhood? (for example the houses, streets, lighting, garbage etc).**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

**9. Have you ever been the victim of a crime?**

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

**10. Do you know somebody who has been the victim of a crime?**

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

**11. What kind of grade would you give to the behavior/functioning of the police?**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

**12. What kind of grade would you give to the functioning of the justice system in combating violence and crime?**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

**13. How afraid are you that your family or friends become a victim of.....**

	Not afraid ---	--	-	+/-	+	++	Very much afraid +++
Burglary?							
Robbery?							
Violence on the street?							
Homicides?							
A firefight?							
Physical abuse?							
A stray bullet?							



**14. How afraid are you that you will become a victim of.....**

	Not afraid ---	--	-	+/-	+	++	Very much afraid +++
Burglary?							
Physical abuse?							
Robbery?							
Violence on the street?							
Homicides?							
A firefight?							
A stray bullet?							

**15. How traumatic would it be for you when you become a victim of....**

	Very small ---	--	-	+/-	+	++	Very much +++
Physical abuse?							
Burglary?							
Violence on the street?							
Robbery?							
A firefight?							
Homicides?							
A stray bullet?							

**16. How likely do you think it is that you will become a victim of..... in the coming year**

	Very unlikely ---	--	-	+/-	+	++	Very likely +++
Physical abuse?							
Burglary?							
Robbery?							
Violence on the street?							
A firefight?							
A Stray bullet?							

**17. I feel safe when I'm walking alone in the street at night in my own neighborhood**

Entirely agree +++	++	+	+/-	-	--	Entirely disagree ---

**18. I'm at ease when I'm walking alone in the street at night in my own neighborhood**

Entirely agree +++	++	+	+/-	-	--	Entirely disagree ---

**19. I'm at ease when I'm walking together with somebody in the street at night in my own neighborhood**

Entirely agree +++	++	+	+/-	-	--	Entirely disagree ---

**20. I'm at ease when I'm alone at home at night**

Entirely agree +++	++	+	+/-	-	--	Entirely disagree ---

**21. I feel safe when I'm alone at home at night**

Entirely agree +++	++	+	+/-	-	--	Entirely disagree ---

**22. I have noticed a change in my neighborhood since the installation of the UPP in other neighborhoods**

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

**23. I feel more safe in my neighborhood since the UPP installed in other neighborhoods than before**

Entirely agree ---	--	-	+/-	+	++	Entirely disagree +++

**24. The security in my neighborhood improved after the arrival of the UPP in other neighborhoods**

Entirely agree ---	--	-	+/-	+	++	Entirely disagree +++

**25. One year ago I felt more safe than I do now**

Entirely agree ---	--	-	+/-	+	++	Entirely disagree +++

**26. I notice a change in the security after the World Cup in my neighborhood**

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

**27. The police changed their procedures after the World Cup**

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

**28. I feel more safe in my neighborhood after the World Cup than 3 months before the World Cup**

Entirely agree ---	--	-	+/-	+	++	Entirely disagree +++

**29. The security in my neighborhood improved after the World Cup**

Entirely agree ---	--	-	+/-	+	++	Entirely disagree +++

**30. I'm looking for people who I can interview about this subject at a later date. Can I please interview you?**

- ☐ No
- ☐ Yes

Name:.....

Phone number:.....

## **Appendix D                      Interview guide pacified favelas**

Name:

Date:

Employment:

Number of years living in this neighborhood:

1. What are the biggest changes in this neighborhood after the pacification?
  - How was your life before the pacification in comparison with now?
  - For you personally?
  - An improvement or deterioration?
  
2. Are you feeling safer or less safe since the pacification?
  - Why?
  - What causes this feeling?
  
3. What causes your safe or unsafe feelings?
  - The environment?
  - The police?
  - Earlier experiences?
  - Friends?
  
4. At which moment do you feel most insecure?
  - What causes this?
  
5. What is your opinion on the police here?
  - Good or bad?
  - When you see the police you feel safe or unsafe?
  - Do you feel safer with more police here?
  - Did the procedures of the police improve since the pacification?
  - Less corrupt?
  
6. For what reason you think the pacification is good or bad?
  
  
7. When you could advice the government about how to improve the pacification what would you say?

8. How do you think that the safety in your neighborhood can be improved?
  - What kind of solutions?
  - Behavior of police?
  - Behaviors traffickers?
  - Behaviors residents
  
9. Have you noticed a change in security after the World Cup in your neighborhood?
  - A change of operation / behavior of the police
  - A change in the procedures of the pacification
  
10. How do you think the pacification will proceed in the future?
  - Improve or deteriorate?
  - Continues to exist or not?
  - Only for the World Cup and Olympics or will it proceed after these events as well?
  
11. Do you have confidence that the pacification will ensure safety in the future?
  - Why?
  
12. Who do you think needs to be responsible for the safety in your neighborhood?
  - The government?
  - The habitants?
  - The drug traffickers?
  - The association of habitants?
  
13. Did you get more confidence or less confidence in the government after the pacification?
  - Why?

## **Appendix E                      Interview guide non-pacified favela**

Name:

Date:

Employment:

Number of years living in this neighborhood:

1. Do you notice any changes in this neighborhood after other neighborhoods got pacified?
  - What kind of changes?
  - Drug traffickers from other favelas moved to this one?
  - Did it change your life?
  - Improvement or deterioration?
  
2. Are you feeling safe in your neighborhood?
  - Why?
  - What causes this feeling?
  - At which moments you feel the most unsafe?
  
3. Do you feel safer or more unsafe since the pacification of other neighborhoods?
  - Why?
  
4. What do you think of the pacification in other neighborhoods?
  - Good or bad?
  - Why?
  
5. Would you like it if this neighborhood got pacified as well?
  - Why?
  - Good or bad developments?
  - Do you think this neighborhood ever gets pacified?
  
6. What is your opinion on the police here?
  - Good or bad?
  - When you see the police you feel safe or unsafe?
  - Do you feel safer with more police here?
  - Did the procedures of the police improve since the pacification?
  - Less corrupt?

7. When you could give the government advices how to improve the pacification in other neighborhoods what would you say?
8. How do you think that the safety in your neighborhood can be improved?
  - What kind of solutions?
  - Behavior of police?
  - Behaviors traffickers?
  - Behaviors residents
9. Have you noticed a change in security after the World Cup in your neighborhood?
  - A change of operation / behavior of the police
  - A change in the procedures of the pacification
10. Who do you think needs to be responsible for the safety in your neighborhood?
  - The government?
  - The habitants?
  - The drug traffickers?
  - The association of habitants?
11. Did you get more confidence or less confidence in the government after the pacification of other neighborhoods?

## Appendix F

## Overview interviews

### Experts

Name	Date	Description
N. van Buuren	14 November 2014	N. van Buuren was the director of the IBISS Foundation. This organization focuses on the most disadvantaged groups within the Brazilian society. N. van Buuren works in several favelas in Rio de Janeiro for 27 years.
P. Veldhuis	30 November 2014	P. Veldhuis guides several social projects for the IBISS foundation in Rio's favelas for six years. He has a background as a social worker in Amsterdam
I. Cano	10 December 2014	Ignacio Cano is a researcher at the State University of Rio de Janeiro. He published on issues related to public security and human rights in Brazil. His last project was the evaluation and monitoring of the first thirteen UPP's of Rio de Janeiro.

### Respondents in the Complexo da Penha favela

Name (pseudonym)	Date	Description
R. Silva	4 November 2014	R. Silva lives in the Complexo da Penha favela for 22 years and he works as a computer repairer in his own computer store.
A. Santos	5 November 2014	A. Santos lives in the Complexo da Penha favela for 24 years and he works in a pharmacy.
G. Sousa	6 November 2014	G. Sousa lives in the Complexo da Penha favela for 44 years and works in her own internet café.
R. Ferreira	7 November 2014	R. Ferreira lives in the Complexo da Penha favela for 33 years and he works as a motor taxi driver and for the IBISS Foundation.
E. Rodrigues	8 November 2014	E. Rodrigues lives in the Complexo da Penha favela for 43 years and he works on his own as a truck driver.
E. Lima	11 November 2014	E. Lima lives in the Complexo da Penha favela for 30 years and he works as a security.
L. Cardoso	12 November 2014	L. Cardoso lives in the Complexo da Penha favela for 8 years and he works for the IBISS Foundation.
R. Rocha	13 November 2014	R. Rocha lives in the Complexo da Penha favela for 8 years and she works for a tax service company.
G. Dias	13 November 2014	G. Dias lives in the Complexo da Penha favela for 17 years and she works in a cloth shop.
M. Nysten	8 January 2015	M. Nysten is Dutch, but she lives already for 3 years in the favela Complexo da Penha and works as a doctor in Delamara



#### Respondents in the Santa Marta favela

Name (pseudonym)	Date	Description
R. Costa	19 November 2014	R. Costa lives in the Santa Marta favela for 25 years and she works as a receptionist.
L. Almeida	19 November 2014	L. Almeida lives in the Santa Marta favela for 10 years and she works in a bar.
J. Johnson	19 November 2014	J. Johnson lives in the Santa Marta favela for 12 years and he is retired nowadays.
E. Carvalho	28 November 2014	E. Carvalho lives in the Santa Marta favela for 54 years and he is the president of the association of habitants
M. Montes	28 November 2014	M. Montes lives in the Santa Marta favela for 21 years and he works as a tour guide in his community.
J. Cardoso	28 November 2014	J. Oliveira lives in the Santa Marta favela for 35 years and he works as a tour guide
E. Ribeiro	28 November 2014	E. Ribeiro lives in the Santa Marta favela for 25 years and he sells fruit on the streets.
A. Azevedo	28 November 2014	A. Azevedo lives in the Santa Marta favela for 31 years and he works as a mechanic of refrigeration.

#### Respondents in the Vila Nova favela

Name (pseudonym)	Date	Description
G. Martins	11 December 2014	G. Martins lives in the Vila Nova favela for 30 years and she is the coordinator of the local school.
N. Costa	11 December 2014	N. Costa lives in the Vila Nova favela for 23 years and works she in the Cesar Park hotel
L. Texeira	17 December 2014	L. Texeira lives in the Vila Nova favela for 25 years and she works as a teacher at the local school
C. Araújo	17 December 2014	C. Araújo lives in the Vila Nova favela for 20 years and works as a teacher at the local school
J. Morais	17 December 2014	J. Morais works as a teacher at the local school in Vila Nova.
R. Alves	17 December 2014	R. Alves lives in the Vila Nova favela for 8 years and works as a teacher at the local school.