

# Urban Ethnocracy

## & Structural Marginalization in Beer Sheva



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# Preface

Israel, the promised land for the children of Abraham. When Abraham arrived in Beer Sheva, where he wanted to settle, there was already a village. It was called Sodom and the people that lived there were not good. Therefore god destroyed it. Now 3000 years later. History seems to repeat itself.

Israel was promised to the Jews by Britain and the UN. But already people, the Bedouins, were living there. Nowadays many Bedouin villages are being destroyed in the Negev, because these people should not live there, according to the Israeli law. How can one people judge what is right and what is wrong? Who should go and who should stay. Who has more rights than the other?

Today a plan is on the table in the Knesset: to demolish the homes of 65.000 Bedouins in the Negev. This acts against the International Declaration of Human Rights, but still, it is approved. My research is dedicated to find out the structures that underlie these inhuman and discriminating actions.

I would like to thank all the people that opened their homes and hearts for me in Beer Sheva: Lior, Joyce, Ilad, Gilad, Liron, Abu Thabet, Harry, Avihay, Yasser, Yossef, Liad, Moron, Hanan and Zakika. I had a very special time in Israel. Thanks for letting me stay in your houses; for showing me your culture and for speaking openly about difficult topics. I would like to thank my supervisor, Olivier Kramsch. Thanks for giving me ideas, motivation and trust. Also I would like to thank my friends and parents in Holland that helped me during the writing of the thesis: by taking me away from my work once in while; push me to start again; help me with just everything! Thanks Cindy, Jelle, Douwe, Niels, Avra, JP, mum, dad. Without my friends it would be 10 times more difficult. And I would like to thank my man, Lodewijk. Thank you for being there for me and make this life an adventure!

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# Executive summary

Beer Sheva is a city in the Negev desert, which was planned to be a living and leisure area, to make the desert bloom (Wiley, 2008). The immigrating settlers from Europe, the middle East and Russia, pushed the Bedouins, who were already living in this area for ages, to the margins of society (Segal, 2008). 65.000 Bedouins live in illegal settlements across the Negev as a result of the marginalization. Ehud Prawer, former head of the planning department, wants to solve this issue by demolishing the illegal settlements and forcefully migrate the Bedouins into legal planned settlements (Yiftachel, 2008).

*The goal of this research is to contribute to the revelation of underlying structures and bottlenecks that lead to the marginalization of the Arab Bedouins in Beer Sheva', by analyzing interaction processes between the Zionist and resistance movements of the Ashkenazim and the Arabs in Beer Sheva from the '50 until now.*

The theories used for this research are the theory on Ethnocracy of Oren Yiftachel, which explains that in Beer Sheva the ethnos dominates the demos (2006). Yiftachel states that in an ethnocracy the driving axle is the Judaization and resistance of the subordinated peoples, which together lead to the ethnocratic situation. Laclou and Mouffe's see the same dynamic in their Critical Discourse Theory: The meaning on society is always changing, because of resisting meanings or according to Foucault says through time perspective.

Foucault's theory in this research is used to understand how power is diffused and devided in discourse. And how knowledge contributes to power, because knowledge decides what is true and what is not (Foucault, 1998).

The methodology used to structure the research is the Critical Discourse method of Laclou and Mouffe. The reason for this is that the analysis aims to contribute to social change of moral equal power relations in society. Laclou and Mouffe analyse discourses, which cause social actions. Laclou and Mouffes analysis takes place on three levels: on the societal, group and identity level (Jorgenson & Philips, 2002). The societal level and group level are explained in chapter 4, 5 and 6. Here the societal and group dynamics are brought down to two ethnical dynamics in Beer Sheva between the Ashkenzim and the Bedouins: the Judaization and the resistance against it. In chapter 4 and 5 the group identity of both ethnicities is described. In chapter 7 the identity and knowledge of ten inhabitants of Beer Sheva are regarded. These are the discourses that are based to the marginalization of the Bedouins. In chapter 8 the division of power among the different levels of analysis is devided.

On the societal and group level the people can be divided in two main groups:

the Jews and the Arabs. In this case: the Bedouin and the Ashkenazim in Beer Sheva. The Ashkenazim, have a fear for losing the area in the Negev, to the fast growing Bedouin population (personal communication Liron, July 2013). Therefore they use Judaic organizations to legally confiscate land, where the Bedouin live. Land of which the Bedouin claim it is their ancestral land. The Ashkenazim use planning as a tool in the ethnocratic regime, to push the Bedouin to the margins of society. The Jewish use a divide and rule strategy to control the Bedouin in recognized establishments where personal or group development is very difficult. The Bedouin never get permission of the state to build on their ancestral land. Meanwhile, the Jewish get permissions to build there. Next to discrimination in planning the Bedouins are discriminated by law. The result of the discrimination is that the Bedouin towns are the most impoverished areas of Israel (Yiftachel, 2006). The unserved Bedouins become more and more antagonistic (Yiftachel, 2010). They continue living in unrecognized villages and refuse to leave from their ancestral land. And cling on the identities, which are created by memory building (Yiftachel 2008). Their steadfastness is their way of resisting the ethnocratic regime. These dynamics protract the conflict even more (Yiftachel, 2006).

Above the large societal dynamics are divided amongst ethnical lines. These are social consequences of discourses that feed these actions. The information on the discourses in this research consist of interviews of people in Beer Sheva and their positions towards meanings that create discourses:

The Arabs and the Bedouin live segregated in the Beer Sheva area. The Bedouin live outside of the city, while the Ashkenazim and Mizrahim live in the city centre. The Bedouin are discriminated and have difficulties living up to the same standard as the people in Beer Sheva. The knowledge/presumptions the different ethnical groups have on each other, are based on how people were raised and educated, based on the media and on stories that go around in the area, They often contradict each other.

Bedouins according to Ashkenazim are criminals. Most of the times younger Bedouin steal. They are bored and have no education and not much to do. They lost their connexion to the traditions and see what the Israelis have and what they don't. Some Bedouins steal out of principle. They feel land is taken from them, so they will take things back, what they feel is theirs. The land is from their ancestors. They don't need a piece of paper to prove the land is theirs. They want to live fro their crops and herds, but they don't get enough space for this.

Bedouin are unwilling to pay taxes. But why would the Bedouin pay taxes if they have no access to facilities like electricity and water. They now live in the poorest municipalities of Israel: even the recognized villages very poor. According to one side, this is because the municipalities are corrupted, but according to the Bedouins, the government is not putting any effort in the villages like they do for the Jewish communities. There are almost no job opportunities in the Bedouin areas and also public transit is not available for the Bedouins like it is for the Jewish towns.

The government aims to develop the Bedouin community from the traditional life to modern life, by obligate them to live in recognized villages, like everybody in Israel. Many people see this as a good solution. Opposed to his others interviewees claim that the government does not aim to help the Bedouins, but they put them in recognized villages to control the population. The Israeli are afraid of the fast reproducing Bedouins, because they are associated with Arabs.

The discourse of the Ashkenazim and Mizrahim take a lead in Israel. The government uses the law to overrule the Bedouins. The Bedouins are weak, because of their difficulties to change from their traditional life to modernity. They cannot resist as a group, because the meanings towards the situation are divided. Also they don't have the tools to represent themselves. Therefore they are negatively represented by the other ethnicities.

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# Chapter 1

## Introduction

### 1.1 Project Framework

In 1947 The UN general assembly decided to separate Palestine into two states, together with the termination of the British mandate. From now on there was a Jewish and an Arab state, of which in the Jewish part, also would live Palestinians and there would be Jewish settlements in the Palestinian parts. The Arabs saw this partition plan as a settler colony. (Middle East Research, 2001) The Arabs did not agree and a poor organized army started a war against Israel, which they lost. During the Nakbah, the disaster in Arab, disaster) 700.000 Arabs fled to Egypt, Jordan and the now called West Bank and Gaza strip..In Israel their houses were destroyed, which made returning home, impossible. The new ethnocratic regime, a land regime under Jewish control, whereby only Jewish immigration and the construction of Jewish settlements is legal and stimulated, is still operating today as such (Yiftachel, 2003).

In the 50's there were several plans to develop the desert city, Beer Sheva, to a fruitful living and leisure area. The city is an example of a failed plan (Wiley, 2008). The aim was to create city, which would be a settler place for Jewish immigrants on a place where in history the Ottomans wanted to settle the Bedouin tribes of the Negev desert (Meir, 1992). Instead Beer Sheva became a place of separation and discrimination (Segal, 2008). Wherein the Arabs live in informal places and the connexion between city and citizenship is ambiguous (Yiftachel&Yacobi, 2002).

Immigration of settlers caused segregation of the different settling and already existing communities (Segal, 2008) Since the 50's a great variety of people settled in the desert city. In large there are the three main groups: The Russian Jewish immigrants, the Mizrahi (Middle Eastern Jews) and the Arab Bedouins. The different ethnicity's live together in one city, but don't share their lives, because the shape of the city does not facilitate cohesion. According to Segal, the city was planned to push out the Bedouin communities. As a result of this, the rights to enjoy the facilities of the city are not equally divided (2008).

Although every inhabitant of Beer Sheva has official citizenship in Israel, the right to the city is divided among ethnical lines. Here I introduce the term ethnocracy, defined by the geographer Oren Yiftachel. An ethnocracy is a regime that facilitates the expansion, ethnicization and control of a dominant ethnic nation over contested territory and polity. In the theoretical framework this term will be clarified in more detail.

Group	Mean income*	Education*	Housing space***	Unemployment***
Ashkenazim# (second generation)	139	206	190	54
Mizrahi# (second generation)	94	92	102	107
Arabs###	71	45	87	137
State Mean	100	100	100	100

**Table 1:**  
Socioeconomic indicators for disparities between Israeli ethno-classes  
Source: Israeli Bureau of Statistics as calculated by Adva (2002)

As a result of the ethnocratic regime the Bedouins live in informal spaces, the so called 'Grey Spaces'. Grey spaces are often ignored in urban development. The dominated ethnic group is not heard regarding the planning of the space they live on. By distant containment, the subordinate Arabs stay unserved and deprived and seen as a social hazard (Yiftachel & Yacobi, 2002). According to Yiftachel planning theories should overcome the suppression of one ethnic group over the other. But planning theories are most of the time, utopian future visions and they lack information on the consequences of a urban development plan. (1998) For example the Prawer plan claims to reconcile the different ethnicities in Israel, but again in this plan the subordinate group was not included in the development of the plan. The plan will lead to the destruction of many Bedouin houses, to be traded for a poor substitute (Adalah, 2013).

The marginalized Bedouins in a changing world have difficulties keeping up with modernization and politicization. The state uses this singularity in their benefit. They stimulate nomadic tribe culture so there is more division in the Bedouin politics. It is a divide and rule strategy of the colonial state of Israel To escape the marginalized situation, attempt to create new antagonistic institutions and political unities, are made by the Bedouins. But different agenda's and personalities make it difficult to achieve. (Yiftachel, 2008).

## 1.2 Problem Statement & Research aim

*"The blooming of the desert, made 'the other' flowers fade."*

The Bedouins in Beer Sheva are structurally marginalized because of different historical developments. The Bedouins are excluded from their right to the city.

The goal of this research is to contribute to the revelation of underlying structures and bottlenecks that lead to the marginalization of the Arab Bedouins in Beer Sheva', by analyzing interaction processes between the Zionist and resistance movements of the Ashkenazim and the Arabs in Beer Sheva from the '50 until now.

According to Yiftachel, Zionism and the resistance against it, are significant factors of an ethnocratic regime (2006). Marginalization in an ethnocratic regime has many causes and complications. In this research I choose to focus on the Zionism and the resistance movement in Beer Sheva because these movements are a visible practical expression of underlying motives.

## 1.3 Inquiry

To what extend does the interaction between the Judaization and the resistance movement contributed to the marginalization of the Arab Bedouins in Beer Sheva the last 50 years?

1. To what extend are the Arabs today marginalized in Beer Sheva?
2. Which actions of Ashkenazim can be characterized as Zionist?
2. Which actions of the Arab can be characterized as a counter action?
3. Which discourses feed the actions of both parties?
4. Can the Foucauldian theory explain the division of power in Beer Sheva?

## 1.4 Definitions

Marginalization, actions or tendencies of human societies, whereby those perceived as being without desirability or function are removed or excluded from the prevalent systems of protection and integration, so limiting their opportunities and means for survival (Anupkumar).

Zionism, or Jewish nationalism, is a modern political movement. Its core beliefs are that all Jews constitute one nation (not simply a religious or ethnic community) and that the only solution to anti-Semitism is the concentration of as many Jews as possible in Palestine/Israel and the establishment of a Jewish state there (Farlex, 2013).

The resistance movement are the Arab inhabitants of Beer Sheva resisting the Zionist idealism. Resistance in this case should be understood as any action against the Zionist movement, but also non-adjustment to the regime, conscious and unconscious.

# Chapter 2

## Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework chosen for this research is Foucault's theory on power and knowledge, Laclou and Mouffe's theory on discourses and Oren Yiftachel's theory on Ethnocracy.

The theory of Yiftachel discusses the situation in Israel around the different ethnicities and the fact that one ethnicity has the power over the other (2006). Also the theory of Foucault and Laclou and Mouffe are both applicable to the research question: To what extent does the interaction between the Judaization and the resistance movement contributed to the marginalization of the Arab Bedouins in Beer Sheva the last 50 years?

Laclou and Mouffe give a framework on how structures can be analyzed by explaining discourses and their social impact. Foucault adds the dimension of power to this theory.

### 2.1 Oren Yiftachel's Ethnocracy

Oren Yiftachel developed a theory, applicable especially on Israel, which he called ethnocracy. It is a regime that promotes and facilitates the process of ethnicization, which is the expansion and control of the one ethnicity over the other. This ethnicization is visible in disputed territories, where one ethnicity (which is the cultural identity based on a believed common past at a specific place) claims and is able to claim the state apparatus and thereby mobilizes its legal, economic, and military resources to expand its interest on all levels legally. The term ethnocracy not only is about the power of one ethnicity over the other, but also the prominence of ethnicity in all aspects of communal life. Here Ethnos rules over Demos in the political field, which legitimizes the use of ethnicity as a tool for marginalization.

The ethnos determines group membership by common origin, promoting kin relations as the main principle of deciding the group boundaries. Ethnos radicalizes and essentializes group identities. Which are often based on myths. This process of radicalization makes it difficult to cross the boundaries and create new identities.

Demos determines group membership by residence in a common territory. It promotes institutions of citizenship, law and patriotism as a tool for creating a political territorial entity. In Israel the Demos is ripped up. Citizenship is not divided equally, but is based on ethnicity. The territorial boundaries are often beyond the official boundaries. In the Israel case the diasporas are official citizens according to the law of return.

An ethnocracy is found especially in settler societies. The settlers take the control over the indigenous, which becomes a trapped minority. They cannot fully integrate in the state's dominant ethos, nor can they secede from the system. All efforts to challenge politics are marginalized and delegitimized.

Next to the law, economics and military is a planning tool to drive the minorities into the corners of the state. By identifying the public with the dominant ethnic group and use the planning policies to make the situation better for this group, the territory is expanded. The minorities are ignored in this optic. In ethnocratic cities the populations are segregated, but here economics is more important than ethnicity. The segregation in cities is less. The discriminated minority often work in the low paid jobs. The minority that wants live close to their jobs, find it hard to find a accommodation. Therefore they move into shacks and tents around the city, where access to recourses are denied. The people living in these informal structures cannot claim their rights, because they don't have an official address.

The oppressive ethos provokes resistance to the regime's goals and practices. The tension between the oppressor and the resisting force creates polarizing identities, which often deepens the segregation and inequality (Yiftachel, 2006).

## 2.2 Laclau's and Mouffes Discourse Theory

The theory of Laclau and Mouffe is suitable for analysis. The critical discourse theory is a vision of how a part of human society works. To analyse the different discourses that structure the marginalization of the Bedouins I will first give a short explanation of how Laclou and Mouffe structure society. With this theory on society, I will analyse the problem in the Negev.

### Critical Discourse Theory

The discourse theory is a link between the social of Marxism and the meaning of structuralism in one theory. Laclou and Mouffe use both and put them together in a post-structuralist idea, where meaning is created in a web of processes. The creation of meaning as a social process is about the fixation of meaning in a particular domain. Here not only language, but all social phenomena are important (Jorgenson & Philips, 2002). In the Negev, the land dispute, is also a struggle on the fixation of meaning.

We act in our daily life as if reality is a given fact. But like language, our identities and societies are flexible and evolving. The general idea of the discourse theory is that social phenomena are never finished, but always developing. In discourse theory meaning on society and identity is not fixed and therefore, there is always the possibility for a social struggle (Jorgenson & Philips, 2002).

The theory of Laclau and Mouffe make it possible to identify contradictions in society, describe them and transform them into tools of further thinking. Discourse theory does not want to pin down society as a structural reality, but the meaning of society.

Meanings are getting their position in their web of processes by comparing them to their environment. If the web would be a net, the knots would be signs, which are moments, of which the meaning is being fixed because of the relation to the other sign or moment. For example and 'ethnocracy' gets it's meaning by comparing it to for example: democracy. Also 'democracy' gets it's meaning by the comparison to for example 'the people'. The meaning of the concepts is not fixed and can change over time. In the Foucouldian discourse theory time and also power mechanisms are important factors that constitute meaning. Discourses for Foucoult are rules and practises, which create a group of statements that represent knowledge in different timeframes. (Foucoult, 1998)

The discourse with the net as a metaphor is a totality of knots (signs), which exclude other meanings the signs could have. So a discourse here is the reduction of possibilities. The excluded meanings in the theory of Laclou and Mouffe is called the field of discursivity. A discourse gets it's meaning when it is compared to the field of discursivity. Next to sign and the field there are also elements in the discourse theory. Elements are not fixed. They can have multiple meanings. The aim is to fix elements into moments, to make them knots in the net. But like said before, a discourse is never finished and can always be adjusted by the multiple meaning in the field of discursivity.

In the creation of the 'net' signs get a place in between the other signs. This process is called articulation. The relation between multiple elements creates the meaning of signs. Like for example the word body, which can be physical, but also political or societal. Depending on the connexion with other signs and the exclusion of the rest the meaning becomes clear. The words that are able to change of position are floating signifiers.

The production of meaning is a key factor to establish power stabilizations. When discourses are stabilized common sense, which is not questioned, is established. For example with nation building, a group of people feel they belong to certain geographical area, and they share conditions and interest.

In the Negev around Beer Sheva this is not the case. Different peoples in the same area have different conditions, interests and ideas about the area. The meanings of several signs are not established. The aim of discourse theory is to fix meanings in their web (Jorgenson & Philips, 2002).

## 2.3 Michel Foucaults Theory on Discourse, Power and Knowledge

### Knowledge and Discourse

This research is conducted with the premise that discourse influences knowledge and knowledge creates discourse on a topic. In this case discourse is used from a Foucauldian perspective. Foucault does not see discourse only as a linguistic concept, but views discourses as rules in practises in a certain historical and cultural perspective. So how statements are shaped by the time they were shaped in.

According to Foucault discourse means representing a group of statements, which provides a language for talking about. He sees discourse as a practical kind of knowledge about a subject: several statements that work together. Discourse is not based on the distinction between thought and action, language and practise. But it is produced by practise. It is the behaviour towards a topic, which makes discourse: the interaction between doing and saying produces knowledge on a topic.

Discourse constructs positions from which the discourses make sense. From this position it makes sense to speak or act on a topic. There for the position of the author is very important for analyzing the statement of the author. (Hall, 2001) In this research I will interview people, which are positioned in almost opposed position to each other, to show the importance of the knowledge that creates the discourses. Discourse is not a closed system: it draws on elements in other discourses binding them to its own network of meanings.

Discourse is almost the same as an ideology: a set of statements or beliefs that produce knowledge that serves the interest of a particular group or class. But according to Foucault there is a difference. Here discourse is here not called a ideology because Foucault does not make a distinction between true or false, because according to him, facts are constructed. The example of Palestinian fighters called freedom fighters or terrorists. Both statements can be made true if they were false, because people that act on a true or false statement, have real consequences, which are reality. The knowledge on the Palestine problem is produced by competing discourses and they are linked to a competition to power. It is power, which makes things true not facts. Power produces knowledge. Not important is something is true or false but the effect in practise makes it important (Hall, 2001).

### Discourse and Power

Power is produced trough accepted forms of knowledge. Discourse is the structure in which power circulates. The play of power is within discourse, which consists of the coordinates of knowledge, which create relations and strategies. If power operates to enforce truths it produces a regime of truth. Examples of this are mechanisms of truths like capitalism or the prison system. Power constitutes, rather than it is being constituted by agents. (Gaventa, 2000 ) Power is nor an agency nor a structure (Foucault, 1998). To change the consciousness, a regime of truth should be changed, which is created by the political, economic and institutional regimes of truth (Gordon, 1972-77). Hereby should be taken into account that power is diffused, not concentrated. So embodied by many not possessed by one. This is also the reason why a state centric power struggle or revolution not always leads to change.

There is a battle going on around truth: a battle around the set of rules that create the truth and the false, and the power that is connected to this. Truth is an ordered set of procedures, useful for production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements. These truths are norms in our society that it is unthinkable to doubt a truth. But Foucault shows us, that it is possible to doubt a truth. If a truth is to be destructed it is not by searching for an absolute truth but by disconnecting the power from a set of rules (Foucault, 1998). Discourse can be the mix between power and the resistance (Gaventa, 2003)

Orientalism is a phenomenon of the West with regular characteristics. The sources from this knowledge came from: classical knowledge, religious and biblical sources (three wise kings from the East), mythology and traveller tales. Here the discourse constructed the topic on Orientalism. It governs how people reason about a topic. It rules out limits and restricts other ways of talking and constructing knowledge about this. The West has the power to claim what is true and what is not. Hereby their claim on knowledge becomes true (Hall, 2006).

The theory on discourse, power and knowledge is against the Marxist theory, because the Marxists say ideas reflect the economic base of society, thus ruling ideas are from ruling class, which governs the capitalist economy, corresponding to its dominant interest (Hall, 2006) Foucault argues against this because in Marxist theory it is too much about class. There are more distinctions than class. In his text Truth and power he claims there are three things that decide the position of an intellectual: The mentioned class, conditions of life and work and the specificity of the politics of truth in the society the person lives in (Gordon, 1972-77).

2.4 Conceptual Framework




Table 2

# Chapter 3

## Methodology

In this chapter I describe how the research is put together and is executed. Which choices are made during this process. First I describe the chosen research strategy. The material data collection and analysis...

### 3.1 Research Strategy

According to Verschuren and Doorewaard (2007) there is a choice in between width and depth of a research: a difference between detail and complexity or large scale en generalizations. The topic of the research can go both ways: research is both deep and wide, but I chose to focus on the complexity and details of the discourses. In the details I can find the signs, that create the bigger net of the discourses.

To go in depth I chose to do a qualitative research. I realize with this choice I cannot cover a significant part of the problem in Beer Sheva. But to uncover a structure, details should be understood before people can understand a bigger picture.

The research will be both empirical and desk research. Both ways are necessary to add information to each other's shortcomings. Interviews will provide the different viewpoints on the Bedouins in the Negev and the Land dispute, but also they decide the field of discursivity. Desk research and the expert interviews can provide information about how these signs are connected to each other.

To analyse the data, I choose the Critical Discourse Analysis of Laclou and Mouffe, because it fits to the theoretical framework of the research. Also it suits the content of the research very well, because the theory especially speaks about struggle and how this exists in between the discursive field.

Floating signifiers belong to ongoing struggles between different discourses. To end a struggle the meaning needs to be fixed. The discourse analysis aims to remove ambiguities by enclosing moment's trough closure, though temporary closure.

### 3.2 Data collection

The data of the research will be collected from several sources. Because discourse is a part of the identity, groups and society, the sources can be found on all three levels. The data of the research will originate from several sources as possible. The research should be an in depth research, because the discourses exist in and influence human on several levels: on the societal level, on group level and the individual level. To gain the needed data for the research I will conduct nine interviews with different inhabitants of Beer Sheva.

#### 3.2.1 Levels of analysis

How come some myths are considered truth and why some are not is a central question in the Discourse Theory of Laclou and Mouffe. Myths are floating signifiers, which can change position. Different social actors struggle to make their understanding their myth the prevailing one on several levels:

##### Identity

Subjects are subject positions within a discursive structure. A person for example can have many positions for example: in a family, in society or at work. A position becomes clear when it is represented as the position. A position of a person is rationally constructed. You can be someone, because it contrasts with someone or something you are not. But the position can always change (Jorgenson & Philips, 2002).

The information on identity in discourses, which positions a person in a certain discourse at a certain moment, can be found by interviewing individuals. I will interview persons with several identity's, Like the Ashkenazim, the Mizrahim and Bedouin, to show the different signs they create and signs which creates them, to position the people in their net. During the interviews I will ask for the viewpoint of people on the phenomena of the Bedouins around and in Beer Sheva. How do they see this and from which position they see this image.



### **Group identity**

Group formation can be understood as the reduction of possibilities. The other is excluded and the internal differences are ignored. Man and woman can be part of a family. Groups do not exist only if a representative represents them like a group. This also means one person can represent a group, when all the rest of the group is physically absent. A society comes when the position of the one group is positioned in contrast to other groups (Jorgenson & Philips, 2002).

The group identity as I already shortly mentioned above are according to the theory of Oren Yiftachel of Ethnocracy, based on ethnicity. Therefore the background of the ancestors of the interviewee's will be of importance. The interviewees do not have to associate themselves with their group, but its field of discursivity represents the group already. Information on group identity will be found in literature mentioned in the bibliography. The interviewees and their vision on this literature will verify this information. The positions of the different groups in relation to each other will both be from literature and interviews.

### **Society**

Society is a temporary closure whereby several possibilities for identification make a society and excluded other possibilities temporarily. Society can be described on the basis of nationality, or class, ethnicity and many other possibilities. The changing features of a society are called floating signifiers (Jorgenson & Philips, 2002).

The understanding of society makes group divisions. When two understandings of a sign exist, which are mutually exclusive, antagonisms come into existence. These can be overcome by hegemonic interventions. Hegemony is the same as discourse, because both make signs meaningful in a certain moment.

The antagonisms and hegemony I will find partly in the group positions, but also in expert interviews and promotion material of experts. The interviews will be conducted with dr. Abu Thabet Ras from Adalah, the centre for Arab Minority Rights and Hanan Elsana of Sidreh, the Bedouin Women Weaving Centre. Their vision on antagonism and hegemony compared to literature and the interviews with other persons will draw out the ethnocratic society.

## **3.2.2 Sources**

### **The interviews**

The interviews conducted contain open questions. The interviewees should have the space to talk about what they think is important about the Bedouin around and in Beer Sheva. This way the information is directed by the interviewee and not by the interviewer. To create an image of the discourses in Beer Sheva, this open way of interviewing was found the most suitable manner. To gain an idea on the position of the interviewee in society or group a few personal questions started the interview, about work, education and background. Also these questions could give a insight on the identity of the interviewee.

### **Interviewees**

Initially the research was to be done by interviewing five Ashkenazi and five Bedouins. Arriving in Israel and staying over at people's places and talking to people uncovered the reality that only interviewing these ethnicities would restrict the amount of information. Therefore this research uses, next to the interview content, also a few quotes of situations that took place and not by official interviews.

In Beer Sheva generally three or four kinds of people are living. Jewish from Europe, the Ashkenazi, Jewish from the East, Mizrahi and the Arabs and Bedouins, which are also Arabs. The impression that the literature on Beer Sheva gave, was that the distinction between these groups was very obvious. But this was not true. Many people from Beer Sheva, have a mixed background, with Oriental and European blood. This makes it difficult to make a strict distinction between the origins of the people on the street. To create a complete image of the discourses in Beer Sheva on the marginalized status of the Bedouin, all sorts of people should be considered in the research. For this research there was chosen to interview three Mizrahi of which one expert, three Ashkenazim, and three Bedouin of which one expert on the topic.

A difficulty in approaching the Bedouin is the language. Many Bedouin do not speak English so for this a translator is necessary. To interview these people with a translator the interviews needed to be conducted in Beer Sheva. The translators were due to several reasons not able to travel to villages outside of Beer Sheva. This means that Bedouins that are more 'Ashkenazi' Bedouin than the Bedouin that live further away from Beer Sheva were approached. They also have the same marginalizing problems. The more the Bedouin live in the close surroundings of Beer Sheva, the less traditional life they live (Personal communication, Yossef). This should be taken into account, when interpreting the results of the research. Also to not widen the research field too much, the choice was made to only interview people in the city. The expert interviews were conducted to have more insight on the group level of the discourse.



## Sources of Research




Table 3

## Sources and Disclosure

Sources	Kind/quantity	Disclosure
Literature	Theoretical concepts Researches	Content analyses Content analyses
Promotional material	Adalah and Sidreh	Content analyses
Persons	Ashkezenim 3 Arabs 3 Mizrahim 3	Face-to-face interview Face-to-face interview

Table 4

## 3.3 Critical Discourse Analysis

To analyse discourse we have to deconstruct structures we take for granted and show the world as a result of political processes with social consequences. Important factors in the analysis are nodal points, which organize discourses, master signifiers, which organise identity, and myths, which create social space.

### Questions to clarify these factors are:

What different conceptions of reality exist?

And how do they relate?

Do they oppose each other (antagonism)?

What are social consequences and who pins down the meaning, (hegemony)? Thereby concepts of group formation, identity, and representation are very important.

### Other questions important to ask to analyse the discourses in a certain area were:

Which relationships do signs have?

Which meanings are excluded?

What discourse or discourses draws a specific articulation on?

What discourses does it reproduce?

Does it challenge existing discourses or is it redefining moments (Jorgenson & Philips, 2002)?

### **Faircloughs Analysis**

Laclou and Mouffe do not have a clear idea about how to analyse a discourse. But in the book of Discourse Analysis as theory and method, the better described analysis of Fairclough is used, whereby his analysis is focussed on three levels: Text, discursive practise and social praxis. Though Fairclough analysis is mainly focussed on linguistics, therefore I will only use the methodology that fits this research:

To start with the analysis, the fact should be kept in mind that discourses are constituted by the social world, but also constitute the social world. The social order and the connexion to the discourse should be analyzed (Jorgenson & Philips, 2002).

Through discursive practises social and cultural reproduction takes place, this can have ideological effects, which means the reproduction of unequal power relations.

So in the case of Beer sheva the social and cultural effects can be analyzed.

The identity of a person can be analyzed by the representation of the person as an individual or as in a group.

Like Zakika says: He is an Ashkenazim Bedouin. (personal communication, Zakika)

The aim of the critical discourse analysis is to contribute to social change of moral equal power relations in society. It most of the time takes the side of the oppressed group and want to uncover the role of discursive practices that maintain the unequal power relations (Jorgenson & Philips, 2002)..

### **Ideology and Hegemony**

Ideology is meaning in the service of power, constructions of meaning that contribute to the production, reproduction and transformation of power. According to Fairclough people can be positioned between different competing ideologies. Hegemony is not necessarily dominance but can be a result of negotiations. Discursive changes take place when they articulated in different ways.

### **Asking the next questions gives more insight on power constructions in a situation:**

How is discourse produced and how it is consumed?

To what network a discourse belongs?

It reproduces itself? Or is it transformed?

What are the consequences? Ideological, political and social?

Does the discourse strengthens the power relations or challenges it by new representations (Jorgenson & Philips, 2002)?

# Chapter 4

## Judaization in the Negev

Ben Gurion, the first prime-president of Israel and leader of the Zionist movement once stated: "The people of Israel once will be tested by the Negev. Only by developing and settling in the Negev can Israel as modern independent and freedom seeking nation, rise to the challenges that history put before us, all of us veterans and Olim, young and old, men and women, should see the Negev and their future and turn Southwards " (Gradus, 1984).

A discourse analysis according to Laclou and Mouffe happens in different levels of analysis. The search for patterns that underlie the marginalization of the Bedouins occur in different levels of analysis: the societal level, the group level and the identity level. Because in Israel the democracy is an ethnocracy according to Oren Yiftachel, The society here can be divided in groups based on ethnicity. In this chapter the actions of European Jewish will be analyzed.

In the beginning Zionism was a colonial movement. Later it became an ethnocratic expansionist and exploiting regime, which uses survival and security stories as excuse. The Zionist thought separated into two directions, the old one, and the one who wanted to become part of the world economy. The latter means the end of the occupation, which in the optics of the first former is a threat to the Zionist identity (Yiftachel, 2006)

*Which actions of Ashkenazim can be characterized as Zionist?*

### 4.1 Legal land appropriation

The Israeli governments was scared the Shiyag, a part of the desert where most of the Bedouin live, would become a bridge between Gaza and the West Bank. Also the government was concerned about costs for planning in these dispersed areas. That is the reason why the state created a legal system, which transferred refugee land to ownership of Jewish state organizations.

The Zionists registered Mawat land as state land. So 52% of the unregistered land became of the state. Most of it belonged to the Arabs in the Negev and Galilee. The Bedouins now could not make a legal claim to cultivation or residence rights. The purpose of state land is, that it is never to be sold, ensuring perpetual ownership of Jewish organization and the state. At first Arabs had about 4,2 and 5,8 million Dunam. One Dunam is 1000 m<sup>2</sup>: It all became state land. The Arabs that stayed lost 40 to 60% of their land.

The state utilizes Jewish organizations in a non-democratic way to bypass the Arabs for landownership. A land can be leased to three-headed party: the ILA, Israel Land Administration, the Jewish agency and Jewish locality as collective. In order to lease land a person must be accepted as a member of a corporative that incorporates all members of the community. The cooperative can choose members (which are all Jewish). The result of this that it is impossible for Arabs to buy or lease land of 80% of the country. Kibbutzim and Moshavim and other communalities that control land development. Critical decisions on land disputes are made by the ILA, which is a not elected body, behind closed doors, They serve Zionist project and have close connections to the army (Yiftachel, 2006).

#### 4.1.1 Mawat Land

After 1948 the Knesset adopted a law of the Ottoman Land law, which considers Mawat land, as land of the state. Mawat means here, empty, meant for grazing, not possessed by any body and no human voice can be heard from the edge of habitation. The Israeli authorities found that the tribal lands of the Bedouins in the Beer Sheva district had no owners: the people living here were nomads. The government also reactivated the Mawat land ordinance law. Which prohibits the cultivation of Mawat land. Since the Arabs in this Area never registered their land, they were unable to cultivate legally. The Mawat land, is used for Zionist projects, housing for the Jewish population. Bedouin villages with less than 1000 inhabitants are asked to relocate to legal settlements (The seven planned Bedouin towns). Jewish villages, with these amounts of people are never asked to move.

#### 4.1.2 The dark side of planning

The development of Urban Planning can have a stimulating effect on dividing practices. They try to concentrate minorities in small areas thereby minimizing their spatial control. Especially in ethnocratic regimes where the dominant group has the privilege to choose how the city is developing and the marginalized group is forced to be passive and sometimes forced to move out of the city. In this unstable situation a response of the government is to allow informalities of planning. The tactic is to avoid, distant containment, with a result of communities that stay deprived, unserved and stigmatized (Yiftachel, 2006).

In the mid 60's there was a plan to urbanize the Siyag area, where the Arab Bedouins live. The aim was to move the Bedouins in permanent settlements. They wanted to urbanize the Bedouins into mixed city's like Lod, Mala, Jaffa, and Beer Sheva. Later the plan was to gradually urbanize the Bedouins mostly in the southern Siyag (Boymel, 2000; Falah, 1983)

In the Negev seven towns were established: Rahat, Hura, Tel Sheva, Kuseifa, Aru'er and Segev Shalom. The government wanted to decrease land control of the Bedouin, by settling them permanently in urban localities. It was a lure with modern services, like housing, roads, clinics, schools and electricity, to implement Judaization top down. The Arabs moving to the towns were subsidized, if they were leaving their land behind. As a result most of the landless Arabs were moving to the towns, which destructed the relationships with their formal Bedouin protectors. With these towns, the Israeli planners, separated the Arabs municipally from Jewish areas and hereby created urban ethnocracy (Yiftachel, 2006). Although promises for services were made, the needs were not met. In the 7 planned towns there was a lack of services, schools and religious facilities (Negev, 2009).

**To force the Bedouins into the planned towns several pressure tactics were used:**

- Strict non-recognition of existing settlements located outside the planned towns.
- Denial of municipal services routinely provided to other citizens. (water, electricity, telephone, health and public services and accessible educational services.)
- Intensive legal penalties against unauthorized homes.
- Actual demolition of homes and structures.
- The frequent issuing of evictions notices and fines in order to remove Arab invaders from state land.
- Delay and land settlement proceedings, which have often lasted more than three decades and are intended to make Arabs to give up hope of winning back lands;
- Heavy environmental restrictions on grazing and the subsequent seizure and destruction of most Bedouin herds;
- The poisoning of fields planted on disputed land;
- and activation of the state tax authorities against problematic Bedouin Arabs. (Yiftachel, 2006)

Politicians and planners describe planning as an agent for social and positive change (Yiftachel, 1998). In these terms planning should be used to avoid suppression and other negative societal dynamics. This vision is idealistic, when the role of the state towards spaces is regarded in planning. Governments acknowledge that they will plea in the interest of the largest group. Planning bears the task to attract desirable residents and capital. Or in ethnocratic regimes, the state will back the dominant ethnic group. Oren Yiftachel describes planning as a tool of the ethnocracy in Israel. (2006) The practise of planning includes all public policies that affect urban and regional development, zoning and land use: in other words the public production of space. By locate housing, services, communal, religious and other facilities, planning becomes the tool for the dominant ethnic group (Yiftachel, 1998).

According to planning theorists, planning theories should avoid these dynamics. The up till now theory's are through discourses and due to a future orientated vision, hard to analyze in advance. Foucault in this sense states that only the outcome of a policy should be analyzed, instead of the conventional future orientated planning theory's (Yiftachel, 1998).

In the 90's, some alternative planning proposals from the Arab side were proposed, in contrast to the state proposals. The plans were never implemented but it raised a discussion among the Jewish: the Arab have needs too and they should be taken into account more. Organizations grew out of these initiatives. They empower the Arabs to get education, and a better position opposed to the majority.

## 4.2 Discriminatory Laws

There are many differences between the treatment of Arabs in Israel and the Ashkenazim. The Ashkenazim see themselves as the old timers, the founding fathers of the state of Israel. In their Zionist quest the Jews not only see Israel as the home for the Jews all over the world, but also see the Arabs as a threat to the Jewish state of Israel. That's why discrimination is a part of their 'job description'. The big difference between the Arabs and the Jews is that the Arabs are physically present in Israel, but don't have rights. The Jews are not physically present and do have physical rights in the state of Israel. This manifests itself in the 'discriminatory laws', of the Knesset. On the Website of Adalah there is database in which 60 laws are reported and explained why they are discriminating against the Arabs in Israel. For example the Nakbah Law authorizes the Finance Minister to reduce state funding or support to an institution if it holds an activity that rejects the existence of Israel as a "Jewish and democratic state" or commemorates "Israel's Independence Day or the day on which the state was established as a day of mourning." Palestinians traditionally mark Israel's official Independence Day as a national day of mourning and organize commemorative events (Yiftachel e.a., 2009) .

The law violates their rights, and restricts their freedom to express their opinion, and will cause substantial harm to cultural and educational institutions and further entrench discrimination. The law causes major harm to the principle of equality and the rights of Arab citizens to preserve their history and culture. The law deprives Arab citizens of their right to commemorate the Nakbah, an integral part of their history (Adalah, 2013).

Take for example the protection for Holy sites law: it empowers the Ministry of Religious Affairs to designate the names of the holy sites in Israel. To date, the Ministry of Religious Affairs has declared 135 Jewish sites as holy sites and has not declared any Muslim, Christian, or Druze holy places as recognized holy sites. The discrimination in law makes those actions of Arabs facts are sentenced, which results in prisons full of Arabs. These facts damage the representation of the Arabs (Adalah, 2013).

# Chapter 5.

## From Controllers to Desert Dwellers

In this chapter the ethnical group of Bedouins will be analyzed.

“The Bedouins had a culture and a code of laws, and centuries of desert life had given them inner freedom. Many were illiterate, but they could read the signs in the sands and the heavens, and understood natural events, and Allah was constantly in their language... A small cement house does not replace their Beir Sha's (house of hair), the freedom of the desert nor the traditions of their ancestors. ” (Jones, ...)

*To what extend are the Arabs/Bedouin today marginalized in Beer Sheva?*

### 5.1 Current situation

Around 140.000 Bedouin Arabs lived in the northern Negev. The Bedouins are semi-nomadic tribes that relied mainly on their cattle and herds before 1948. After 1948 many Bedouins fled, while 11.000 stayed. 9 tribes were forced onto the Siyag area where already six Bedouin tribes were living. In the Siyag area it is illegal to build out of stone and the area is very infertile. The Bedouins living here were forced to make shacks out of tents. The forced migration made the agricultural space and the grazing area of the herds shrink, which caused a change of lifestyle. From rulers of the Negev, they became desert dwellers, victims of the modernizing Beer Sheva region (Yiftachel, 2006)

The Arabs make 16% of the population, but only own 3,5 percent of the land. Half of the land owned by Arabs is expropriated and only 0,25% of allocated state land has been distributed to Arab localities. Thereby it is impossible for Arabs to lease or buy 80% of the land. The Arab population has six folded since 1948, yet the land is halved. In the meantime more than 700 Jewish establishments were developed in this period. No Arab localities have been built (only the Bedouin towns).

As mentioned in the last chapter the Bedouins were offered to move to the legal Bedouin cities: Rahat, Hura, Tel Sheva, Kusseifa, Aru'er and Segev Shalom. For protection reasons the Arabs were enclosed in these towns. This and the preference of a Jewish concentrated labour market, resulted in a preferential treatment of Jewish immigrants regarding employment (Yiftachel, 2006).

Next to the seven planned towns, 65.000 Bedouins still live in unrecognized villages (Adalah, 2013) The population of Arabs is growing rapidly and puts pressure on the small unserved housing in neglected areas with high residential density and poverty. This situation not only comes from the planning policies but also from the transition from semi-nomadic living standards to modernity. The communal structure changes, family relations and gender roles change, this causes high rates of criminality poor economic and educational achievement (Abu Saad, 1998; Falah, 1983; Litwick 2000)

The jurisdiction of Arab local authorities extend over 2,5 % of the state land area and only 5% of the Arabs have higher education in Israel and 25% of the Jews. This difference is due to a lack of cultural acknowledgement of the Arabs. Also the allowance of Jewish student is 3 times as high as for the Arabs (Yiftachel, 2006).

### 5.2 Legal Status

Being indigenous in the modern sense is an empowered term. The term contains the claim for power, self-determination, culture and place. The official citizenship, although under the wings of an ethnocratic regime is necessary to mobilize the Bedouins politically and stand up for their rights (Yiftachel, 2006).

Bedouins officially gained citizenship equal to the settlers after 1948. But this citizenship is only formal and doesn't change the fact that Bedouins remaining in the desert are often being discriminated because of their different living standards. In Israel not citizenship but ethnicity is the frame of reference in distributing resources and power. (Yiftachel, 2003) The Bedouins are unable to build their own house on their land, because permits are only granted in areas with approved plans. In this respect: The loss of ancestral lands, isolation and the inability to have a voice in the city of Beer Sheva or even in the Arab cities around it, keeps the bad living conditions the same until today.



According to David Harvey, the Bedouins in Israel are not able to enjoy the right to the city, which is far more than the individual liberty to access urban resources: it is the right to change ourselves by changing the city. It is, moreover, a common rather than an individual right since this transformation inevitably depends upon the exercise of a collective power to reshape the processes of urbanization (2008).

### 5.3 Ethnocracy in Planning

The most used tactics of the ethnocracy is the confiscation of land of the Bedouins. Critical legal geographers argue that dominant groups construct belief structures that justify racial and spatial inequalities through a complex professional discourse, while claiming to be impartial and objective (Yiftachel, 2006)

The settler policy made sure that about 700 new Judaic projects were implemented. The Bedouins and Arabs are fully excluded from this process. (Yiftachel, 2003). When in the settler plans Arab villages are in the way, they often are asked to relocate, because they are too small, for the plan. While in the mean time the Jewish settlements that come in this place sometimes even are smaller (Yiftachel, 2003).

For example the Prawer plan: The Blooming of the desert, 70.000 Bedouins need to relocate. According to Ehud Prawer, the plan is an opportunity to integrate the Bedouins into the Israeli society. According to human rights group Adalah, the plan is an excuse to discriminate and subordinate the Bedouins to the ethnocratic regime (2013)

The consequences of the ethnocratic regime in Israel is that the Bedouins are being discriminated in the judicial system, the electoral system, social services in planning. Israeli legislation makes sure no land, officially can be claimed by the Bedouins. Opposed to this, Jewish people can sometimes build on places without a permit, without getting punished. The houses of the Bedouins in the same situation are in risk for being torn down. Through legal actions, native land becomes state land. And many natives become trespassers on their own, former land. In the mean time destruction of their homes and expropriation, not only destroys the homes they live in, but also destroys family ties, the community structures and role of gender in the community. Through this, the settlers are stimulating identity transformations, which they not intended to. The live of the Bedouins becomes more and more antagonistic. With the help of organizations that stand up for the Bedouins also the Bedouins organize themselves (Yiftachel, 2010).

The state controllers rapports shows that the Arab-Bedouin population consists of 18% of the Negev people and live on 2,5% of the Negev land in 2010. The Israeli jurisdiction does not stay silenced on the subject. They advice the state to ignore the ownership of the Bedouins on land. (bron...) Next to the ignorance of the Bedouin land claims, the Bedouins have much less possibilities for the development of a piece of land in the desert.

### 5.4 Gray Spaces

The Bedouins are not accepted neither ignored. This especially becomes visible in the gray spaces in the urban areas, where the Bedouins are partially incorporated. In 1987 a draft was passed, which gave the illegal housings in Arab cities a permit, but only for the existing buildings. New buildings still would have been illegal, which makes it impossible for the growing Arab population to get legal housing. The consequences of this is that some of the Bedouins started to live together in the city of Beer Sheva, through squatting a public area in the city, where their old village used to be, live in impoverished areas of the old city or they would stay together in wooden or tin houses. The gray areas by the settlers are seen as criminal and dangerous for the public order. The Bedouins that live in these places are not recognized as city residents and are denied communal facilities, like religious Arab places, politics and education (Yiftachel, 2008). In 2000 Some 65.000 Bedouins lived in houses with no planning recognition and the other half lives in the planned Bedouin cities (Yiftachel, 2003).

In the gray spaces, the attitude against the state sometimes means political radicalization by disengaging themselves from the state into their own alternative 'state'. The gray spaces mobilize the people to become innovative in their survival and empowerment (Yiftachel, 2009).

Attempt to create new antagonistic institutions and political unities, are made by the Bedouins, but different agenda's and personalities make it difficult to achieve. Also the involvement of a changing world, like modernization and politicization makes it difficult or the Bedouins in their marginalized context to keep up with this fast growing organism. The state uses this singularity in their benefit. They stimulate nomadic tribe culture so there is more division in the Bedouin politics. It is a divide and rule strategy of the colonial state of Israel (Yiftachel, 2008).

Kaufman, A. (2013) Arab barred entry to swimming pool in Beer Sheva Country Club. +972. Stream Item 4 july 2013. [http://972mag.com/nstt\\_feeditem/arab-barred-entry-to-swimming-pool-in-beer-sheva-country-club/](http://972mag.com/nstt_feeditem/arab-barred-entry-to-swimming-pool-in-beer-sheva-country-club/)

# Chapter 6.

## The Steadfastness of the Bedouins

The Arab resistance against the Judaization, in general, was difficult because the Palestinians were spread all over, between West Bank, Gaza and inside of Israel. Also the resistance of the Bedouins against the Judaization has been largely ineffective. Israel continues with land control, military control and land seizure.

Which actions of the Arab Bedouins can be characterized as a counter action?

### 6.1 Non-Adjustment

The settlers, the Ashkenazim (and the lately the Mizrahim) want the Bedouins to adjust and live in permanent settlements. Even the settlements where the Bedouins already lived for centuries are certified as unrecognized. Through exclusion and discrimination in the Siyag area, many Bedouins went back to the traditional way of living by becoming self-sustainable. They continued living in unrecognized villages. The Bedouins wanted to stay in their homogenous communities to protect their culture and communal cohesion (Yiftachel, 2006).

The Bedouins, although denied in city facilities, create their own politics which brings their needs on the agenda of the settlers. The 'Sumood' is hereby the most critical point of their resistance. Sumood or Sumud is steadfastness of clinging on to their homeland: the continuation of daily life. Rituals connected to the agrarian way of living since ages. Try to keep life normal is typical for the Sumud (Yiftachel, 2006).

"Our community belongs to this place, and this place belongs to our community!" (Atoyah al-Athamin, 2008) They steadfast hold on to community land, values, political goals, while resisting the oppressive state. (Yiftachel, 2006)

The non-adjustment of the Bedouins protracts the conflict in the settler state even more (Jacobs, 1993). Thereby it already was a part of Bedouin Culture not to corporate with government authorities. This is partially because they are afraid of being recruited for the military and for tax paying but also they don't have enough knowledge on how the system works (Yiftachel, 2003).

Other Bedouins choose to live in the only seven acknowledged Bedouin towns. The towns became the poorest municipalities of Israel. Here the unemployment rate and the density per square kilometer is the highest. The towns are not suitable for agriculture or for keeping a herd, which does not reconcile with the Bedouin traditions. One third of the Bedouins started to earn a living by having employment outside of their living spaces, because in the villages there are not much facilities for this. The payment they got for this is not as high as the Jewish are getting. (Goering, 1979).

### 6.2 Identity transformations

Demolition and expropriation of the homes of the Bedouins, not only destroys the homes, but also family ties, the community structures and role of gender in the community. Trough this, the settlers are stimulating identity transformations, which they not indented to. The live of the Bedouins becomes more and more antagonistic. With the help of organizations that stand up for the Bedouins, the Bedouins organize themselves (Yiftachel, 2010).

Attempt to create new antagonistic institutions and political unities, are made by the Bedouins. But different agenda's and personalities make it difficult to achieve. Also the involvement of a changing world, like modernization and politicization makes it difficult or the Bedouins in their marginalized context to keep up with this fast growing organism. The state uses this singularity in their benefit. They stimulate nomadic tribe culture so there is more division in the Bedouin politics. It is a divide and rule strategy of the colonial state of Israel (Yiftachel, 2008). Sidreh...

The colonized turn against the overarching system and turn direction their own self-proclaimed system of rules and identities. The Bedouins of the Naqab/Negev desert turn to the different kinds of identities, through memory building in different discourses, movements and mobilizations. This process constitutes a new subjectivity. The Islamization is increasingly seen in many aspects of the Bedouin lives, for example in traditional religious dresses, family codes and even polygamy. Another memory build is the Palestinian memory. In public speeches and media the Nakbah is kept alive, by clinging on to the ancestral land with perseverance and patience: Samood.



An alternative subjectivity is the nomadic desert culture.

This cultural memory is popular among the settlers, to stimulate tourism, museums and educational centres in the desert. The identity fits best with the oriental view of the Jews and the Western people were this identification is seen as an outlet for the minorities. The settlers often call the Arab parts of for example Beer Sheva, Turkish, to not identify the history of the Bedouins with theirs (Yiftachel, 2010).

### **6.3 Organized counter actions**

The Samood as counter actions can be described as a passive protest. To organize an active protest, the help of organizations is needed. As mentioned before in this chapter, the Bedouins have difficulties organizing themselves.

One example of organized protest was the reaction on the constitution of the land owner law, discussed in chapter 4, which raised a big protest. Organizations as Adalah, Adva and the Center for Alternative Planning saw that the laws would influence the privatization process caused by the land law would severely impact the access of Arab farmers to their seized lands and took the question to court (Yiftachel, 2006).

Another tactic of the organizations is they start looking for cracks in the Israeli legal structure to oppose the discrimination two examples: Adalah and Association for Human Rights again appealed to higher court.

One development plan, which ignored the Bedouins interest, was taken into court. The plan was adjusted: now the Bedouins need to be involved in the development process. Another case was the enlargement of the Omer boundaries, including annexation of unrecognized Bedouin villages in the surrounding area. The plans were cancelled. Also the organizations got Darijat was recognized (Adalah, 2013)

Other organizations that stand up for the Bedouins are the Regional Council for Unrecognized Bedouin villages, they represents all villages and the Alliance of Bedouin Organization, which consists of legal representations of Beer Sheva informal sector, NGO programs for community empowerment (2013).

# Chapter 7

## Discourses

One level of analysing the discourses that underlie the marginalization of the Bedouin, are the perspectives of the inhabitants of Beer Sheva on the topic, connected to their identities. For this I interviewed different inhabitants with different ethnical backgrounds, which according to Oren Yiftachel is the steering axle in the politics of Israel. Signs and meaning created the knots of the net of discourse. The interviewees create the field of discursivity. What they see as important gets its meaning by comparing it to what is not important. The identities of the people will be coupled to their genealogy and their position in the city. Afterwards different signs and conceptions of these signs will be compared to each other. To show how the positions towards the sign are divided, this chapter is presented as a conversation between the people described below.

*Which discourses feed the actions of both parties?*

### 7.1 Inside stories

#### The positions of the Beer Shevans:

##### **Zakika (Bedouin)**

Zakika lives in Tel Aviv, but he visits his parents in the Bzura every week. The Bzura is the area surrounding Beer Sheva with villages, which are officially recognized. Zakika works on a Bedouin Centre in Tel Aviv. He aims to inform people of the city about the Bedouin lives in the old times. He himself lived traditionally like a Bedouin until he was ten years old. but at the time his family was not living a nomad life anymore. One of the reasons for giving up the Bedouin lifestyle, was that the food for their animals became too expensive. Only in summer time there is enough food for them. The rest of the year it had to be bought. In 1948 the families had to move from their ancestors land and later migrate into the planned towns. This, for them, felt like putting free animals in cages. Zakika went to school in Segev Shalom a Bedouin village around Beer Sheva, which is called the Bzura

##### **Yossef (Bedouin)**

Yossef was born in Beer Sheva. He lives close to Dimona in a recognized village, where the government is taking care of electricity and water. Bedouin under and above the societal ladder live in this village. Yossef went to college in Beer Sheva. He studied architecture, but he was not satisfied with the study. He now is hairdresser in Beer Sheva, in the old town, which is more the Arab area. He likes his job very much and has two own saloons. When Yossef was younger he had a car and he drove around the area a lot. He was able to move and go to the city. His tribe and family always saw him as an Ashkenazim Bedouin. Which is a western Bedouin.

#### The following two women Moran and Liad were interviewed together:

##### **Liad (Ashkenazim)**

Liad lives in Meitar, a village near Beer Sheva, right next to Hura, one of the recognized Bedouin villages. She moved to Meitar when she was 3 years old. Liad likes the village with 7000 inhabitants a lot. She went to high school and also her degree she did on the University in Beer Sheva. She studied Management of Health Systems. And her second degree was business management. Liad now works in Dexon, a medicine company that sells drugs to doctors. She is doing marketing of the company. Her friends are from Tel Aviv and Jerusalem but most of them also live in Beer Sheva

##### **Moran (Ashkenazim)**

Moran is a 32 year old woman born and raised in Beer Sheva. She owns her own house, in Ted, a neighbourhood in Beer Sheva. She went to Highschool in Tel Aviv. Afterwards she studied criminology and psychology. Now she works as a manager in cell company, which she is not very happy with. Moran has friends from all over the country. Most of them she knows from the army and university.

##### **Hanan Elsaneh (Bedouin)**

Hanan was born in Lod, but her father was from Lakiya. Her family stems from Bedouin in the Negev. They were travelling with animals at the time. Hanan studied Middle East studies and Media in Beer Sheva. Now she is deputy director of Sidreh and the Founder of the Sidreh newspaper. The organization aims to empower Arabic women in the Negev. She raises the voices of the women living in the recognized and unrecognized villages. She wants to help them with their economical and educational rights with advocacy and community organization.

### **Abu Thabet Ras (Mizrahi)**

Abu Thabet Ras is not a Bedouin but he feels like one. He has contact with the Bedouin community since 1979, when he started studying in Beer Sheva. He was human rights activist and helped the Bedouins in their struggle for land. He did his PhD in Arizona, which also has a desert landscape, which he really loves. Now he works for 38 years with the Negev and he feels very connected to the desert and the people inside.

### **Lior Singer (Ashkenazim)**

Lior was born in a military base in Tel Aviv. His father was an officer in the army. He studied in Haifa and now does his research and master in Beer Sheva. He lives here for 3 years now. Lior is biochemical engineer. In his free time he volunteers for an organization called engineers without borders, he helps building devices for electricity on bio power, for example in Bedouin villages. Most of the time, he has contact with friends from university. Lior lives together with an Arab girl, who is afraid to admit that she lives with a man she is not married with, to the Arab community. His neighbours are also Arabs. According to Lior the children are retarded because the parents are cousins of each other.

### **Harry (Mizrahi)**

Harry did not want his interview to be taped. Harry has a mixed background. One of his parents is Mizrahi and one his parents has a European background. He grew up in Haifa but now he already works for 30 years in Beer Sheva. At the moment he works in the parking lot. According to him, the Bedouins now, are different than the Bedouin 30, 40 years ago. Now the Bedouins go to University, they work in Beer Sheva but also they work in the Bzura, with sheep and olive trees. The distinction between a Palestinian and a Bedouin is very clear for this man. Although he knows that Bedouins also have Palestinian blood. Harry feels bad about the politics in Israel. 'The politicians only talk and do nothing but bad'. The destruction of the Bedouin houses is pure politics.

### **Avihay (Ashkenazim)**

Avihay is a 29-year-old man from Beer Sheva. He was born and raised here. His parents have a European background. Avihay was on the acting school in Beer Sheva and now works in the theatre, in commercials and in a few movies. He started his own bar called Brecht a few months ago, which is a great success. He is very busy so the people he spends most time with are his customers and friends who come at the bar.

### **Liron Gananyan (Mizrahi)**

Liron lives and studies in Beer Sheva since her twenty fourth. She works at a boarding school with children that are mentally disabled. She studies Behavioural Science, Psychology, Anthropology and Sociology. She is in the last year of her first degree. Originally she was born in Holon. Her parents are from Iran but also a little Russian.

### **Yaser (Bedouin)**

Yaser lives in Rahat, but before this he lived in the Bzura between the Kibbutz Nevatim and Dimona. The village was unrecognized, but his family was patriotic and wanted to support the Israeli government. So when the government asked them to move. They did it. They got twenty Dunams of land in return for this. After this they moved to Rahat a recognized village. Yasser studied architecture and went to Canada. When his grandfather got sick he started to work in the family business in Beer Sheva, in Humus Said. Yasser is not married, while he is twenty seven. He is not a typical Bedouin. He calls himself an Ashkenazim Bedouin. Yasser his ideas were mainly influenced by his family and father, although his father is older than him. His family contains about 5000 to 6000 members.

## **7.2 The Signs**

The interviewees have different ideas about signs that create the net of discourses. People around Beer Sheva have different visions on topics like the history, housing, traditions, land issue, economics and solutions depending on their background and their references.

### **History of Beer Sheva**

150.000 Arabs were living in the Israeli area before 1948. The Arab Bedouin have had their land laws in this area for already thousands of years. The Bedouins cannot distance themselves from these tribal rules. Even during the British and Ottoman period the Bedouin were able to keep their rules alive. After the Independence of Israel, only 11.000 Arabs stayed/survived. According to the government the land in the Negev was empty and when land is empty for a duration of fifteen years, it becomes state land automatically. But between 53' and 68' it was impossible to return to Israel and claim ancestral land: the Israeli government wouldn't let the Arabs go home. Still today, the state claims the territory by law, and doesn't accept the Bedouins' liability (Personal communication Hanan, July 2013).

According to Lior the Bedouins came to Israel not that long ago. Beer Sheva was established 3000 or more years ago. And not until 600 years AD, the Arabs arrived from Saudi Arabia. Prior to this there was a Christian community living in this area. The Arabs destroyed all the churches when they arrived.

The Ottomans build a mosque in Beer Sheva. After this the British kingdom ruled the area. The mosque was left to deteriorate. Nobody, not the Bedouins nor the Arabs were restoring it. The Bedouins did not seem to care for mosques because in the Bzura there are none. Now that the government restored the mosque in Beer Sheva, the Bedouins want to use it like a place for prayer again. (Personal communication, July 2013).

Like Lior does not understand why the Bedouins suddenly have interest in the Mosque of Beer Sheva after all these years of neglect, Yossef does not understand why for 65 years the government did nothing in the Negev, and now they suddenly come with extreme plans to demolish the villages. Before the government had no interest in this area, he says. The Bedouins in the villages do not have enough power to rise up against the government, they are not strong enough against the plans (Personal communication, July 2013).

### **Prawer Plan**

Abu Thabet Ras says that the Jewish moved to the desert because they needed space. In the 60's it was problematic and it still is. Nowadays it is possible for Jewish to get permissions for settling everywhere in the Negev, but the Bedouins will not get permissions for this, their villages are illegal and won't get a legal status. Their land is not acknowledged because during the Ottoman period, the Bedouins did not obtain property papers and for the Bedouins personal agreements were more important than a piece of paper (Personal communication, July 2013).

To empty the desert and make space for new planning projects, the Ehud Prawer wants to move all the Bedouin into planned legal towns. This means that 65.000 houses will be destroyed. According to Hanan this is the same as what happened in 1968. The towns turned out very poor, because the government did not invest there: "They don't give opportunities to work. They won't give education. And the Prawer plan does not make it any better." There is money but if you look to the budget of the plan, most of the money goes to demolition of the houses and the police (Personal communication, July 2013).

The Bedouin will not accept the Prawer Plan. Hanan explains that the government can plan towns in empty lots of land, but according to Bedouin these lands often belongs to tribes that fled during the Nakbah. Even after all these years, if no one living in these lands, the Bedouins keep respecting the Bedouin landownership law and will not move there. The state ignores these landownerships (Personal communication, July 2013).

Against this, Lior states that Bedouins were always nomads so they never actually had land. They did claim land, but everybody can say they have land (Personal communication, July 2013).

With or without Prawer plan, the houses of the Bedouins are being demolished. The Bedouins will not accept the Prawer plan, but they don't know how to resist it. The Bedouins are helpless: they don't have enough strength. The strength should come from outside according to Yossef. The UN cannot help, because the Bedouins are not stateless, according to Yossef. Organizations like Adalah are too small, to really help. The world will not hear them (Personal communication, July 2013).

Abu Thabet Ras does not understand why the government needs a law to solve the land dispute in the Negev. The Bedouins do not claim much: the Bedouin community consists of 50% of the population of the Negev. Meanwhile they live only in 2% of the area. In total they claim 5,5% of the total area. This will leave enough space for the Jewish (Personal communication, July 2013) Hanan says the Bedouins used to live on 95% of the Negev. The Negev is 60% of whole Israel, and only 8% of the people live in the Negev. There is enough space for 1 million Jews in the desert, but the development of the Negev goes at the expenses of the Bedouin (Personal communication, July 2013).

### **Tradition**

Tradition is a vibrant part of the Bedouin culture. Originally the Bedouins stem from nomadic tribes. Nomads did not value state borders like non nomadic tribes did. The borders are less important according to Yasser: Bedouins don't feel that borders define their territory. Some tribes are living across the state borders. These borders have less meaning for these tribes than for other people. Some tribes are spread over Egypt, Jordan and Israel. "It is because they have a travelling culture," states Yasser (Personal communication, July 2013).

Above that, Abu Thabet Ras states that the Bedouin people have their own Bedouin law for property. Before Israel was established the Bedouins lived on the land of their ancestors. Some still do, but most of it has been taken away by the government. The Bedouins know which land belongs to which family or *chamoula*. When the government decides to build a legal settlement for the Bedouins and this specific settlement originally belongs to a Bedouin family, the Bedouins will not live there. This is the case with land outside of Lakiya. The government wants to expand, but no one can live there because of the Bedouin land law. The government does not respect this tribal ownership and destroys houses on land that they call *Mawat* (Personal communication, July 2013). Hanan confirms that these people are not ready for the government's new way of living. It goes too quick for them (Personal communication, July 2013).

Yasser learned traditional uses of the tribal life from his grandfather. He mentions the traditional Bedouin way of defence: in order to clear matters, the Bedouin use swords for combat. When someone was hurting the Chamoula (tribe in Arab), they used their weapons. In Egypt and Jordan there is a Bedouin King and in dispute, they look to the other side when something happens, because they respect the Bedouin uses. Yasser states that the Jewish government disrespects the old Bedouin way of traditions. This causes problems for the Bedouin: Israel changed quickly through modernity with apparent consequences, the Bedouins did not change in the same pace (Personal Communication, July, 2013).

Inside Bedouin culture, there are differences in traditionality between generations. For example the sword, one day used to defend now is merely a symbol to the youngsters. According to Yossef, younger Bedouins do not give much value to the tribal connexion, in contrast to older people. Though younger people that do not work or have education have more feeling with the tribal live. They stay inside the community more (Personal communication, July 2013).

Another effect of the slowly changing Bedouin society from traditional life to modernity, is the changing role of the woman. In the traditional culture, women play an important role in society. They not only look after the family, but also milking and feeding the animals, and weaving and decorating. Now these tasks are disappearing and her role is less defined. Bedouin women have even more difficulties keeping up. The illiteracy among the Bedouin women is 80% (Personal communication Hanan, July 2013).

### **Housing**

Yossef says only some of the unrecognized villages are decently provided with electricity (Personal communication, July 2013). Yasser adds that the same can be said about the infrastructure. In the recognized villages there are roads and clinics, but there are too many villages for the government to provide them all with decent roads and other services. This leaves some "unrecognised" villages unserved (Personal communication, July 2013).

The unrecognized villages are not acknowledged by the government and don't get any useful facilities from them. But according to Hanan there is a law that says, that if more than 500 people live in an area for more than a few years, the land has to be given to the people that live there. But the Israeli government ignores its own laws when it suits them. They want to move as much people as possible to small pieces of land. The Bedouins, on the other hand, want the small unrecognized villages they live in to be recognised (Personal communication, 2013). Lior adds to his, that if a village gets recognition, the Bedouins cannot figure out which land will be theirs. The families living together in the newly recognized towns, still dispute about the land, because they want it for themselves (Personal communication, July 2013)

The two women, Moran and Liad, say that Bedouins are getting the possibility to live in legal villages like Tel Sheva, Rahat and Lakiya. The government even subsidizes the people that move there. The women see the towns the Bedouins live in now as not legal (Personal communication, July 2013). But the Bedouin do not want to live in an urban settlement. They want to be able to live rurally: they feel caged in urban settlements (Personal communication Zakika, July 2013) The government opposes to this that the unrecognized villages are not agricultural anymore. The indigenous people claim in contrast that this is because the government won't let the Bedouin use the land (Personal communication Hanan, July 2013)

### **Government**

The government watches over every Israeli, but the Bedouins only look at their own interest states Yasser, who is a Bedouin himself. Some Bedouin were treated well by the Israeli government after the Nakbah. These Bedouins became patriotic and believed in Israel. On the other side, there are Bedouins that do not want to move to recognized villages. They have connections with the Islamic movement and are against the Israeli state (Personal Communication, July 2013).

Although Bedouins have Palestinian roots, not all Bedouins are against the state Israel. Their point of view depends on the chamoula. Amongst the Bedouins there is a division in opinion about almost everything. It depends on where they live, where they work, if they are educated, if they have government service and if their houses are illegal according to the state. The division could be clearly seen in, for example a demonstration in the centre of Beer Sheva. It was against the demolition of the houses. Many Bedouins were protesting, but among the police on horseback, which tries to avoid escalation, there were also Bedouins.

On top of this, the Israeli army uses the knowledge of the Bedouin of the desert. There are special units with only Bedouins. These Bedouins are not from recognized settlements, but live in the Bzura. (Personal communication Yasser, July 2013).



Avihay takes the side of the government regarding the building of the legal settlements for the Bedouin. He says that the government has to build more villages like this, so that the Bedouin can live together (Personal communication, July 2013). Hanan says that the government plans these towns without consulting the Bedouin. Alternative proposals of the Bedouin are ignored. For example the suggested plan to recognize 45 Bedouin villages and make agriculture in these area possible. The government did not with this proposal (Personal communication, July 2013).

Yossef confirms this by saying that the government should take the Bedouins more into the decision making process. But because of the discrimination this is not happening, the Bedouins don't have the same rights as the other inhabitants of Israel (Personal communication, July 2013). Abu Thabet Ras says that Israel is an ethnocratic state, not a democratic one. He states that the Jewishness of Israel increases at the expenses of its democratic values. He says that the government wants the Bedouin tribes to clash, which will cause more anger among the Bedouin (Personal communication, July 2013).

### **Tax**

Avihay agrees with the state solution to create legal towns for the Bedouins. Bedouin people need to live in normal houses, pay their taxes and their children should go to school. He knows that some Bedouins don't go to school. Avihay finds the Bedouin need to adapt in this respect, as well as considering the housing problem. He goes on by saying that the Bedouins need to pay taxes, like all other people pay taxes. "The Bedouin people get everything for free, their housing in the recognized villages, they get free healthcare while the normal citizen pays (Personal communication, July 2013)."

In response, Abu Thabet Ras states that you shouldn't pay taxes if you don't have anything. First you need to get the services, then you can pay taxes. Some Bedouins got to the University. But the government does not have enough money to help every person in every Bedouin village. It wouldn't be fair for the people that don't get education to pay the same taxes as the people who do (Personal communication, July 2013).

The Bedouin don't pay taxes in the unrecognised villages and therefore they don't have permission to build on the land (Personal communication Liad and Moran, July 2013).

### **Discrimination and Prejudices**

The Bedouins feel discriminated on the job market. They feel left out, and disadvantaged to get a proper job. The reputation of the Bedouins get in their way: "Difference with Bedouin and non-Bedouin: a Bedouin does not want to work, not because he is lazy but because he needs less (Personal Communication Yasser, July 2013).

Hanan confirms that the relation between the people of Beer Sheva and the Bedouins is problematic, because the people in Beer Sheva are Jewish. She thinks that the Jewish only have negative ideas about the Bedouins. The reason for this attitude towards the Bedouin is the media coverage. Positive achievements of the Bedouins are kept silenced. And the media is in the hands of the state (Personal communication, 2013). Abu Thabet Ras soothes Hanans statement by saying that not all people have a negative attitude towards the Bedouin: when people from Beer Sheva know Bedouins personally they don't value negative statements of the media (Personal communication Abu Thabet Ras, July 2013).

Liad and Maron think for example of the Bedouin as invaders (Personal communication, July 2013). But when the British and the Ottomans came, the Bedouins were already there. In era the Bedouin were respected (Personal communication Liron, July 2013). The land was even bought from them (Personal communication Yasser, July 2013).

Liron tries to understand the discrimination by explaining the fear of the people towards he Bedouin Arabs: "the most fearfull people, wil push their will the most, because they feel they otherways get hurt. So when people consider Bedouins, they consider them as Arabs. And all Arabs are seen the same, they don't like Israel. Which in reality is not true." Also she explains, the Jewish Israeli are afraid to loose land. Because of the demographic issue: The Bedouin society grows very fast in comparison to the Jewish community. The holocaust made its impact regarding the fearfull attitude of loosing property. "You grow up with this feelings, even if you were not born in this time. It is educated in Israeli education. The fear makes it legitimate to live in Israel. You have to go to the army as a child, because people know that there is always someone that wants to hurt the Israeli (Personal communication, July 2013)."

Liron herself admits she finds the Bedouins different than the Jewish: it is something inherently, which she finds haerd to describe. Shea admits to this that people in Israel are racist: "It is a paradox because, Israelis came from a place where they now have to unite, but still they are very racist. Some come from Europe some from the Arab world. Everyone sees another culture as different, and we resist to the other culture. People see their own culture as the highest." Of all cultures in Beer Sheva, the Bedouin culture is seen as the lowest of all cultures.

Liron exemplifies the Bedouins that stand around the fences of the Boarding school where she works. The Bedouins talk to girls and offer them alcohol and cigarettes. Sometimes they take the girls with them, because they want to mix with the Jewish, to become more Western. But they don't respect the girls like they do with girls from the tribes: they drink with the girls they have sex with the girl. They won't marry her (Personal communication, July 2013).

### **Criminality**

There are a lot of prejudices about the Bedouins. Yasser compares the Bedouins to the same manner that Americans look to the Afro Americans. He thinks that it's difficult to change this reputation: "There are criminal Bedouins, but not every single Bedouin is a criminal. A small group of Bedouins creates the image of the rest of the group. A reason for the crime rate is that the Bedouins see a different life standard in their close environment. This makes them want to have the same level of wealth, for which they have to steal."

But he also states that things have changed for the future generation; Bedouins are now participating in the society, they have jobs and he sees opportunities growing (Personal Communication, July, 2013).

The bad name of Bedouins has to do with their interaction with society. Avihay and Yasser point out that Bedouins hang out on the streets, they get bored and act offensive. They play loud music, harass Israeli girls and they steal from shops. The lack of an educational framework is due to this. The media emphasises these criminal acts of the Bedouin according to Abu Thabet Ras (Personal Communication, July, 2013). He acknowledges there are problems in the Bedouin Community, but not the whole community can be blamed. In Tel Aviv is also criminality. The crime rate there is the same as in Beer Sheva, but people are not aware of this (Personal communication, July 2013).

Lior says that the Bedouins make it impossible for the government to help them in their situation. If for example the government initiates a project in the Bedouin villages. The Bedouins just steal everything in pieces (Personal Communication, July 2013) and the Police is too afraid to go into Bedouin villages. To illustrate this Lior tells about the police system of car tracking. When a car is traced in a Bedouin village, they won't get it back (Personal communication, July 2013).

Hanan takes the side of the Bedouins here and exemplifies the people from Terabin: these Bedouins say their land was taken from them. A Jewish village called Omer is now built on top of this place. This is the reason why people from Terabin steal from Omer. Because they feel it belongs to them. Omer is very rich and Terabin is very poor. The government only invests in Omer. Hanan feels the investments should be divided equally and both towns should be developed. Omer has everything. Terabin does not even have electricity (Personal communication, July 2013).

### **Economics**

The Bedouins live in the poorest areas of Israel. The planned towns are very poor, but this is because the government does not create jobs for the Bedouins, not like for the Jewish people (Personal Communication Abu Thabet Ras, July 2013).

Liron confirms this and adds that the government is afraid that the Bedouin towns will expand. The government wants to control the Bedouin by obligate them to live in legal settlements with not enough space for living their traditional rural life. She says this is not helping the Bedouins, but the Bedouin can't do anything about it because they're badly represented in the government. In essence, the Bedouins don't have anything to say about their housing problem, and that is why they're currently still staying in small towns, to their own disadvantage (Personal Communication, July, 2013). Abu Thabet Ras compares these towns to dormitories (Personal Communication, July, 2013).

Yossef says that on the one side he says that it is easy to find a job. But he also says that it is not possible for everyone. Because Beer Sheva is far away. This implicates that in the villages recognized and unrecognized there are not enough job opportunities. Also he says that there is not enough traffic going to the city. Yossef himself had a car since he was young, so for him it was easier to work in the city.

Moran exposes another issue regarding the economical impact of the Bedouin. When someone opens a shop in the Beer Sheva, they have to pay protection money to the Bedouins. It is money for not stealing from their shop. On the other hand she says. There are good customers in the phone company where works. The Bedouins always pay with cash.

Lior says the Bedouins stay poor because the municipalities of the Bedouin villages are corrupted. The Bedouins get the same amount of money from the government as all the other inhabitants of Israel. He says that if Bedouins pay taxes in the recognized villages it gets stuck somewhere at the municipality. He exemplifies a same situation in a Jewish town. Where after constatation of corruption the police came to solve the problem. The police does not enter Bedouin villages according to Lior (Personal communication, July 2013). Lior saw that in some villages aid from outside is more welcome than in the other village. According to him it has to do with the acceptance of a changing world. In Kuseifa for example, the Bedouins wouldn't let the engineers without borders help, the engineers accepted in the village and they did not see one woman. They did not want us to see how they live, Lior thinks (Personal communication, July 2013)

# Chapter 8

## The Power of Discourses in Beer Sheva

When the conflict between a settler and the indigenous keeps on going, the probability of becoming an ethnocracy is growing. In an ethnocracy the dominant group does everything to marginalize the indigenous and create better circumstances for their own ethnicity. In practice according to Kellerman settler states have three ways of dealing with indigenous groups: genocide, eviction or partial corporation. It depends of the power balance in which gradation this is happening (1993).

In the previous chapters the discourses that underlie the marginalization of the Bedouins are described. From various positions in society, different perspectives on the Bedouins and their situation in the Negev occur, with social actions as consequence. The marginalization of the Bedouins is the direct effect of these actions. But why are the Bedouins the subaltern in Israel?

*Can the Foucauldian theory explain the division of power in Beer Sheva?*

In the theoretical chapter of Foucault several important statements were made regarding the division of power in a discourse: First of all, the discourses are a mix of power and resistance. Power is diffused, not centred. Power consists of accepted forms of knowledge (Gaventa, 2003). When power is represented it gets its meaning. The meaning given to the knowledge is related to a certain time period.

### 8.1 Time perspective

Before the Nakbah there were almost three times more Arabs than Jews in Palestine. In 1948 during the Nakbah, many Arabs fled to the neighbouring countries, the Palestinian Territories, Egypt, Jordan and Syria. The Arab army was poorly organized after the partition of Palestine under British mandate. The UN general assembly decided to give the Jewish more land, 54% against 46%, because the UN also considered the immigrating Jews from Europe. The Arabs left in Israel, saw the Jewish as invaders of their land. (Middle East Research, 2001). Because of the UN decision, the Arabs lost a big part of their land and a big part of their population. The few Arabs and the Bedouins that stayed in Israel were now under the wings of the Israeli government. The Nakbah meant a big change for the Arabs and Bedouins; from now on they were second class citizens (Manna, 2013)

One of the reasons the government took the land around Beer Sheva was because they were afraid the West Bank and Gaza would have become a bridge by the Arabs Siyag area (Yiftachel, 2003). To avoid this, the ethnocratic Knesset designed laws to legally confiscate land of refugees of the Nakbah, to become land of the Jewish (Yiftachel, 2006). The Arab citizens filed 3.221 ownership claims for a total of 242,750 acres of land. The government froze these claims and never opened the cases again (Adalah, 2013). The Bedouins, who were living on their ancestral land for ages, became through legal land appropriations, invaders of their own land. They were forced into urban areas, where the crime rates are the highest of Israel (Boymel, 2000, Falah 1983, Adalah, 2013)

### 8.2 Power and Knowledge of the Bedouins

Power is diffused not centred. The knowledge of many gives power to meaning (Foucault, 1980). The interviews with the inhabitants of Beer Sheva showed that common knowledge about the Bedouins, of mostly the European Israelis, is that they steal, that they are criminal, they don't pay taxes and they take land whenever they want it. (Personal communication, L. Singer, A. Cohen, Moron, Liad July 2013) Type in 'Bedouin steal' at Google and you find many articles of Jewish newspapers, which emphasise these statements. The interview with Hanan, Yossef, Liron and with Abu Thabet Ras from Adalah, coloured this black and white picture: the Bedouins do steal and act differently towards Jewish woman, but there is a jealousy, because the Jewish have more, than they have.

When Jewish Israeli have Bedouin friends, they think these Bedouins are an exception compared to the rest of the Bedouins. Their friends for example study at university or working in Beer Sheva (Personal communication, July 2013).



The Jewish Israeli also steal, but they don't have this bad reputation that is emphasized in for example the media. The Bedouins are according to Hanan and Yossef to weak to represent themselves. They don't have the education and the possibilities. The Bedouins cannot represent themselves and therefore the Jewish represent them as bad. Adalah and Zakika are trying to represent the Bedouins in another perspective that the citizens of Beer Sheva are used to, by writing and showing the 'truth' about them (Personal communication, Z. & A. Ras, July 2013). Still this is a work in progress and according to Foucault, change occurs when counter-discursive element begins to receive wide attention through the means of communication (1980).

The wide spread 'knowledge' or opinion of the European and Oriental Jewish Israeli is that people should live in regular houses; that people need papers to prove they have bought a property; that a country has boundaries, which you should cross with a passport.

The legal towns do not cohere with the Bedouin idea of living (Personal communication Zakika, July 2013) The Bedouins are in a transition from a traditional to a more modern way of living (Ben-David, 2013). With one foot in the old and one foot in the new, the knowledge about housing and living of the Bedouins is different then the Western point of view. As a result of the wider spread knowledge on, a 'normal' way of living, the Bedouins are pushed in legal settlements. The Prawer plan and the new law on forced resettlement of the Bedouin into planned towns, is a solution to the problem according to knowledge of the Knesset (Adalah, 2013).

The position of the Jewish Israeli against the Bedouin becomes stronger, because inside the Bedouin community the meaning towards land is not coherent: according to Yasser one tribe is more patriotic then the other (Personal communication, July 2013). But represented as a group by Oren Yiftachel, the Bedouin living in the Bzura give less value to living in the recognized towns, especially when the situation after 68' only changed for the worst. The Bedouin are the desert people, not town dwellers (2006).

The position of the Bedouins toward the government is weak because they find it hard to organize them selves from their subordinate positions. To illustrate the situation: Yossef's friend's houses are on the demolition list. They don't want the houses to be destroyed, but they don't know how to raise their voices against these plans (Personal communication, July 2013). The Bedouins stay weak because of the fast developing society, which they find hard to catch up with. Attempt to create new antagonistic institutions and political unities, are made by the Bedouins, but they feel that the government is applying a divide and rule strategy in the Negev (Yiftachel, 2010) When the conflict between a settler and the indigenous keeps on going, the probability of becoming an ethnocracy is growing. In an ethnocracy the dominant group does everything to marginalize the indigenous and create better circumstances for their own ethnicity. In practice according to Kellerman (1993) settler states have three ways of dealing with indigenous groups: genocide, eviction or partial corporation. It depends of the power balance in which gradation this is happening.

# Chapter 9

## Conclusion

In the chapters 4 until 8 the four sub questions were answered to find out the main question of the research:

*To what extend does the interaction between the Judaization and the resistance movement contribute to the marginalization of the Arab Bedouins in Beer Sheva the last 50 years?*

*In the last chapters it became clear that there is no interaction between judaizing groups and the Bedouins. There are actions, which cause reactions among the Beoduins. In the middle organizations can be found that represent the Bedouins, because they are not able themselves (Personal communication Yossef, July 2013). For example BIMKOM, Adalah and Sidreh. Below I will describe the actions and reactions of the Ashkenazim and the Arab Bedouin in Beer Sheva.*

The Judaization in Beer Sheva is the conversion of ancestral Bedouin land to state land. At first the Arabs owned 4,2 to 5,8 million Dunams of land, which they lost 60% of in the last 50 years (Yiftachel, 2006). The government could take this land, because they made laws that turned out positive for Jewish inhabitants of Israel: the Israel Land Administration, the Jewish agency and Jewish locality work together to bypass the Arabs for landownership (Yiftachel, 2006).

Next to this the government saw the tribal Bedouin land as Mawat, which means empty and meant for grazing (Sitta, 2012). During the Nakbah the Bedouins living on this empty land, fled to neighbouring countries or the Palestinian Territories, between 53' and 68' they were unable to return. If land is empty for 15 years, it automatically becomes state land (Personal Communication Hanan, July 2013). The Bedouins are forced from their land by laws and into legal settlements, which became the poorest municipalities of Israel (Yiftachel, 2006). The houses are too small for the fast growing population.

Also the unrecognized villages are under pressure. The houses of 65.000 Bedouins are under the threat of being destroyed, when the Praver plan is put into action (Adalah, 2013). Because of the planning policies and the fast growing populations of the Bedouin, the space of the Bedouin became smaller and smaller (Adalah, 2013). They could not continue their agricultural lifestyle and became desert dwellers (Yiftachel, 2006). This situation not only stems from the planning policies but also from the transition from semi-nomadic living standards to modernity. The communal structure changes, family relations and gender roles change, this causes high rates of criminality poor economic and educational achievement (Abu Saad, 1998; Falah, 1983; Litwick 2000).

The ethnocratic regime provokes antagonistic behaviour among the Bedouins (Yiftachel 2010). The gray spaces where the Bedouins wind up, evolve in breeding places for radical political behaviour (Yiftachel, 2009). Criminal actions are legitimized, because they feel they earn the things that were taen away from them (Personal communication Hanan, July 2013).

The Bedouins resist the ethnocratic actions with non-adjustment. They become more self-sustainable and they try to keep living their lives as normal as possible (Yiftachel, 2006). The non-adjustment of the Bedouins protracts the conflict in the settler state even more (Jacobs, 1993). Thereby it already was a part of Bedouin culture not to corporate with government authorities. This is partially because they are afraid of being recruited for the military and for tax paying but also they don't have enough knowledge on how the system works (Yiftachel, 2003). Another effect of the discrimination of the Bedouins is memory building in different discourses (Yiftachel, 2010).

### 9.1 Recommendation

The situation is evolving in a way that nor the government, nor the Bedouin want. Therefore the government comes with the extreme plans of demolishing 65.000 Bedouin homes. The Bedouin will all be forced in legal settlements, which until now did not help to build a united nation, but caused poverty and criminality.

Untill now the government reacts with laws without consulting the Bedouins. The reactions from this behaviour are antagonistic and create idenitites and build memorries do that not align with the Israeli nation state. To find a solution that contributes to the social change of moral and equal power in Beer Sheva, the knowledge on and of the Bedouin should be diffused among all citizens of Beer Sheva. Following the three levels of Laclou and Mouffe the knowledge about all aspects of Bedouin society, Bedouin group and tribal connexion and Bedouin identity

should be spread. The negative aspects of the Bedouin society cannot be denied, but understanding for the situation, and the causes of the actions of the Bedouins should be emphasized. This knowledge should not only be spread among the citizens of Beer Sheva, but also in the Bzura and the recognized villages, because among the Bedouins, also there is not enough knowledge and cohesion. The spreading of knowledge, will equally divide the power over the people of Beer Sheva.

How can this be done? The task should be in the hands of the people in Beer Sheva. The best way to do this is personal contact. People get rid of their prejudices with personal contact. To get people to connect, the importance of the connection and the positive consequences should be emphasized by organizations that already stand in the middle between the both groups. All organizations should work together. Create a massive plan to slowly let people understand each other and respect each others differences. To make this solution a long term solution there also should be investments in education. To make the dark corners, where the fear can settle, bright with positive information or possible solutions.

# Chapter 10

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