The background of the slide is a photograph of a prison wall. At the top, there is a section of the wall with horizontal bars and a window. Below this, the wall is covered in multiple layers of coiled barbed wire. In the center of the wall, the words "UN MONUC" are painted in large, bold letters. The "UN" is in a dark grey color, and the "MONUC" is in a bright blue color. The overall scene is brightly lit, suggesting daylight.

***MONUC decides to remain actively seized on the matter?***

**MONUC and SSR in the Kivu provinces**

**Chantal Daniels  
Nijmegen, July 2009**

*MONUC decides to remain actively seized on the matter?\**  
**MONUC and SSR in the Kivu provinces;**

*A study on the extent to which SSR policies and activities of MONUC contribute to durable peace in the Kivu area, when considering the views of actors involved and affected by these interventions*

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\* The title refers to the last clause of every UN Security Council resolution, in which the Security Council states that it '*decides to remain actively seized on the matter*'. It relates to one of the main themes of this research: *is remaining actively seized on the matter sufficient for SSR in the DRC to contribute to durable peace?*

*Security is like oxygen; easy to take for granted until you begin to miss it, and then you can think about nothing else.*

Joseph Neye, 2007

## Preface

I can still picture myself sitting in the car on my way from Bujumbura to Bukavu; a nice and bumpy mountain road, and a driver who drove like crazy. I was thinking about my first real African experiences I had been through only a couple of hours ago (crossing the border, the vaccination check etc.) when it started to turn dark. All at once I remembered a warning from my three day security training. Something popped up from my mind saying ‘never drive during the evening, especially not outside the cities’, when I started to note that there was barely someone on the road, except for us and some angry looking people with machetes and weapons. Whether these were actually rebels, I will never know, but my first thought was...“*please, let me arrive to Bukavu safely, and then everything will be alright!*”.

My research in the DRC was a time in which I experienced an awful lot. I laughed, I cried, I was shocked, I was disappointed, I was amazed and I was proud. The DRC is a country of extremes; extremely beautiful, extremely friendly people, but also extremely torn by conflict, despair and poverty. Arriving with a mixed feeling of fear and hope, I left the country with relief but also sadness. Sadness to leave all those persons I met in the midst of conflict and with no direct exit strategy.

I was the lucky one, having the opportunity to leave when things got worse. It felt like Anouk sings in one of her songs “*so I close my eyes and turn my head away, and I hope it'll be alright. Fall into a restless sleep, while so many innocent die*”<sup>1</sup>. Though, I also left the DRC with hope; a hope that there will be a time of change.

There are several people without whom this research might not have been possible, of without their help it would have been a far more difficult and less pleasurable experience.

I am greatly thankful for the opportunity Rosan Smits and Carl Jansen from ICCO gave me to conduct fieldwork in the DRC. Furthermore, I would like to thank all ICCO colleagues at the field office in Bukavu for their advice and support. I would also like to thank all the amazing people I've met and the friends I have made during my stay in the DRC. Morag, Ayman, Alessandro, Mike, Alexis, Laurance and all others: you have been a great help and made my experience unforgettable!

I would also like to thank Jaïr van der Lijn, my supervisor, for his support, suggestions and critical notes during the research and writing process. Despite the fact that we not always agreed, you instructed me to get the best out of myself.

Thanks to my parents who have always supported me in whatever endeavour I chose to undertake, even if they were against it. I would especially like to thank Bas for his continuous support and help, and especially your patience. Your faith and belief in me have always encouraged me to follow my passion.

I would like to end by thanking all my friends, who made the process much more comfortable. Who supported and distracted me where necessary and supported me when even I did not know if this actually was the best choice to make.

All errors and shortcomings are mine.

---

<sup>1</sup> Anouk Teeuwe, *Hail*, Graduated Fool released in 2002

## Summary

*United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations have developed into one of the world's most important institutions engaged in establishing peace and security. Over time, several generations of peacekeeping operations have succeeded one another. It has taken until the most recent generation of peacekeeping operations that the UN started to look upon security sector reform as a cornerstone for establishing durable peace. Now the UN commonly implements security sector reform (SSR) in many of its peacekeeping operations.*

*This study focuses on whether such SSR policies and activities contribute to durable peace according to actors involved or affected by these interventions. The study takes as an empirical case the Kivu provinces in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). More specifically, the study looks into how the SSR policies and activities of the UN peacekeeping operation in the DRC (MONUC) contribute to durable peace. This will be assessed on the basis of the perceptions, views and evaluations of those involved or affected by MONUC's SSR interventions.*

*To answer this question, the study draws upon a literature review and on empirical field work on durable peace and SSR. The fieldwork has mainly taken place in the DRC's Kivu provinces. Interviews have been held with a wide range of actors in the region, and much information has been gathered through workshops and work groups that have been organized. In so doing, the study explores the perceptions on MONUC's SSR interventions held by (1) MONUC officials, (2) representatives of the International Community, (3) representatives of Intergovernmental Organizations, (4) DRC Government officials, (5) representatives of national NGO's and (6) local citizens. In the analysis, the perceptions of what SSR entails and means for the actors involved and affected by SSR will be used to assess to the extent to what MONUC's SSR efforts have contributed to durable peace in the Kivu provinces. In so doing, the analysis of the different perceptions has been related to the literature on different dimensions of durable peace; structural violence, causes of conflict and conflict potentials. The overall analysis assesses the contribution of MONUC's SSR interventions to durable peace on the basis of these perceptions.*

*The analysis of perceptions shows that the different actors hold many different views on MONUC's SSR activities. In general, MONUC's efforts on SSR have contributed to changes in the Congolese security sector. However, this study also indicates that these are minor changes and that there are still many challenges. Before outlining these challenges, it should be remarked that many of the effects of MONUC's SSR interventions will only be visible on the long term. Another thing that should be taken into account is that although MONUC's activities create a basis for further reform, other actors also need to take responsibilities to sustain these efforts. The biggest challenge for SSR in the DRC actually comes forth out of the insufficient ability and willingness of the DRC government to work towards the reform of the security sector. There is limited national support for SSR, and there is no coherent national SSR strategy. Another important issue is the lack of communication and cooperation between those involved in SSR.*

*This study outlines several recommendations for MONUC to increase its effectiveness and its contribution to durable peace. These points have been based upon the analysis of the views of the different actors in the field and earlier studies. The study also indicates that other actors, such as neighbouring countries and the Congolese population itself, should also increase their efforts and take their responsibility.*

*As long as governmental and local support for MONUC's SSR policies and activities is absent, progress will most probably remain limited and short termed.*

*What can be concluded is that there is still much to be done to achieve durable peace in the Kivus with SSR. Structural violence in the Kivu provinces unfortunately still remains a fact, despite MONUC's efforts. Furthermore, although MONUC's SSR interventions have created a basis to address the causes of conflict and conflict potentials in the Kivus, they have not yet eliminated it. Deciding to remain actively seized on the matter has proved to be a basis for MONUC, however, so far this has not been sufficient to contribute to durable peace. Much is to be expected from MONUC's SSR interventions in the future. Their activities are on the right track, but responsibilities need to be taken by all actors involved. These responsibilities include the development of a national SSR strategy, full cooperation and coordination between those involved in SSR, improving the provision of information on SSR and support for SSR of all involved. Only then can further progress on SSR in the DRC and a contribution to durable peace be ensured.*

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## List of Acronyms

AFDL	Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre
CNDP	Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple
CSRP	Police Reform Monitoring Committee
DDR	Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration
DDRRR	Disarmament Demobilisation Repatriation Rehabilitation and Reintegration
DIC	Inter Congolese Dialogue
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative to the Secretary General
EU	European Union
EUPOL	European Union Police
EUSEC	European Union Security Sector Reform Mission République Démocratique de Congo
FARDC	Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo
FDLR	Forces Democratique de Liberation du Rwanda
FSH	Fondation Solidarité des Hommes
GCPP	Global Conflict Prevention Pool
GFN-SSR	Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform
GMRRR	Groupe Mixte de Réflexion sur la Réforme et la Réorganisation de la Police Nationale Congolaise
HQ	Headquarters
ICJP	Initiative Congolaise pour la Justice et la Paix
IDP's	Internally Displaced Persons
IFO's	International Financial Organisations
IO's	International Organisations
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IPU	Integrated Police Unit
MLC	Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo
MONUC	United Nations Organisation Mission to the DRC Congo
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO's	Nongovernmental Organisations
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECD-DAC	Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
ONUC	United Nations Organisation in the Congo
PA	Participatory Appraisal
PNC	Police National Congolais
RAF	Rapid Reaction Force
REJUSCO	Restauration de la Justice à l'Est de la RDC
RCD	Rally for Congolese Democracy
RO's	Regional Organisations
RPF	Front Patriotique Rwandais
SC	Security Council
SMSG	Special representative to the Secretary General
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund

UNPOL	United Nations Police
WFP	World Food Programme
WWII	World War II

## Chapter 1: Introduction

*“The only true basis of enduring peace is the willing cooperation of free peoples in a world in which, relieved of the menace of aggression, all may enjoy economic and social security”. “It is our intention to work together, and with other free peoples, both in war and peace, to this end”* (Declaration of St. James Palace, 1941).<sup>1</sup>

Since its foundation in 1945, the UN has assumed an increasingly prominent role in promoting peace and international security.<sup>2</sup> It has partaken in many peacekeeping operations and has taken diplomatic, economic and military efforts to secure peace and stability across the world.<sup>3</sup> Many authors now consider the UN to be the leading international actor for international peacekeeping.<sup>4</sup> This thesis concerns itself with the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations. More specifically, it focuses upon the contributions of UN peacekeeping operations to durable peace and security. It aims to combine theoretical insights on durable peace and security sector reform with more practical insights obtained from a field study about the UN mission in the Democratic republic of Congo. Before disclosing the main objective and research questions of this study, first, however, the problem context of the research object will be discussed.

### **1.1 The United Nations, peace and security**

Since the emergence of the United Nations in 1945, many things have changed. The end of the Cold War, in particular, marked a change in international relations, conflicts, and, related to this, in peace building operations. During the Cold War era most conflicts were defined by struggles between the west and the east (and their respective allies) and were mainly of an interstate character. After the collapse of the Berlin wall, however, the politics of containment was abandoned and many of the more peripheral and less affluent regions were left on their own.<sup>5</sup> This post-cold war era now had conflicts of a completely different character. Conflicts became more complex and often involved intra-state warfare. Now, many military conflicts are played out by a confusing patchwork of multiple national and international actors, are not confined to a single state or area and involve many different interests and interest groups.<sup>6</sup>

This has had a great impact on the peacekeeping policies and activities of the United Nations. In fact, the end of the Cold War is often referred to as the start of a new era of UN peacekeeping operations. Whereas the earlier, first generation peacekeeping operations involved an impartial role of the UN, a minimum use of force and consensus politics, newer generation peacekeeping operations have been endowed with more power. They have been given stronger mandates, often involve a military force and encompass a wider array of activities that ranges from providing a basic level of security to rebuilding the state apparatus.<sup>7</sup>

More recently, however, UN peacekeeping operations started to focus on a particular aspect of peace- and state building. As part of a wider and growing interest in the relationship between security, peace and development, the UN is now increasingly concerned with rebuilding the security sector (ie. police force, juridical system, military, and other) of (post-) conflict states. Shared under the label of security sector reform (SSR), these policies include activities such as: the reorganization of different security institutions and organizations, the development of a system of checks and balances and the setting up of stronger civilian and governmental control of the sector. The main thought behind these reforms is that a well-working security sector will provide stability in post-conflict areas and will lead to more prosperity and well-being.

As opposed to earlier concerns with only the keeping or enforcing of peace in a region, these policies are believed to be better able to establish a more durable peace situation.<sup>8</sup>

One of the cases in which a SSR program has been included in a UN's peacekeeping mission is the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo. The conflict in this central African country can be clearly referred to as a complex conflict, in which a wide range of national and international actors are active. Although the UN has been active in the DRC since 1999, conflict has still not come to an end in the eastern part of the country.<sup>9</sup>

As many have argued, the specific conflict in the DRC, with particular respect to its history, geographic position and politics, can be seen as one of the most challenging contexts in which the UN operates. Since 2004, the UN has explicitly incorporated SSR into its peacekeeping mission' mandate, by UN resolution 1565. Despite the many challenges faced, and notwithstanding the ongoing fighting's, these SSR activities have already laid down a foundation for further reform.<sup>10</sup>

However, there is still much to be done on this field. Besides this, many of the policies and activities developed by UN headquarters in New York and the regional offices in the DRC do not seem to be working out on the field.<sup>11</sup> Policies sometimes do not seem to fit to the local situation, which often proves to be more complex than what was anticipated. These problems and challenges have also been recognized in the wider context of UN peacekeeping operations. Different authors have pointed out that there is no one size fits all policy and that the UN should be more sensitive to the particular context in which it operates.<sup>12</sup>

For this reason it is deemed important to evaluate how policies and activities are played out in local contexts. Researches on the effectiveness and impact of UN peacekeeping have mainly focused on how policies are doing in their own terms.<sup>13</sup> On the other hand, however, there is little insight in how local populations, organizations and authorities experience the effects and impact of UN peacekeeping. Therefore it is even more important that effects are not only tested with regard to internal objectives of policies or objectives of formal authorities. Another issue is that relatively little is known about the effects of SSR activities on the peace building process. Does it actually contribute to durable peace?

## **1.2 Research aims and research questions**

This research wishes to respond to these flaws and to contribute to a wider understanding of how SSR actually contributes to durable peace. This will be done by not only looking into the UN's internal objectives, but it will consider a wide array of actors. The objective of this study is to look at how local and international actors involved experience, evaluate and perceive the impact of SSR interventions of the UN organization mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), in order to make claims about the contribution of MONUC SSR's policies and activities to durable peace in the Kivu provinces. In doing so, this study also aims to contribute to the debate and literature on effects of SSR and UN peacekeeping in practice.

From this research goal, the following research question can be derived: *“To what extent do the SSR policies and activities of MONUC contribute to durable peace in the Kivu area, considering the views and evaluations of actors involved and affected by these interventions?”*. The following sub questions will therefore be answered.

- *What are the key elements of durable peace?*
- *What is the context and content of SSR policies of the UN in general and MONUC in particular?*

- *Who are the main actors involved and effected by SSR interventions in the DRC?*
  - *What are their views on MONUC's SSR interventions in relation to security, stability and peace?*
  - *What are commonalities and differences between these perceptions?*
- *What does this say about the relationship between MONUC's SSR policies and activities, and durable peace?*
  - *How do the views on MONUC's SSR interventions relate to contribution of MONUC's SSR interventions to durable peace?*

These questions will be explored in the context of MONUC's SSR efforts in the Kivu provinces in the DRC. An evaluation will be made on the basis of an analysis of the perceptions of both international and national actors. This qualitative method will be further explained in the methodology section in this chapter. The study describes the views of different actors in the field and aims to provide more detailed information than merely figures on the effects of MONUC's SSR activities in the Kivu area. Such an interpretive, qualitative study is expected to deliver other more actor and context specific information than other studies. So this is not a formal policy evaluation, but far more a study on how SSR works out locally and how it is evaluated and perceived by actors active in the field. This study will not only include formal institutional actors such as MONUC and individual donor countries, but also local NGO's and local citizens in the Kivus. These actors will be further specified in the methodology section in.

### **1.3 Relevance**

#### *Scientific relevance*

As argued earlier, in the last years SSR has become an important field of discussion for scholars and policymakers in the field of conflict resolution and building peace. The assumption that SSR contributes to development, good governance and a more durable peace has led to the implementation of SSR policies and activities in many UN peacekeeping operations. However, the larger part of literature, studies and policies on SSR have mainly focussed on a discussion of which actors the security sector should entail, what aims for SSR should be laid out and what developments are visible in specific SSR activities. Despite the interesting contributions this literature has offered, there has been limited attention for the specific context(s) in which SSR takes place. Most discussions either focus on the policies outlined by macro-actors such as the UN or concentrate upon the abstract concept itself, there are only a few studies that focus upon SSR in a specific implementation context. And even when the context is taken into account, there is often little interest in the views and perceptions of the local population or other (micro) actors involved or affected by SSR. Besides this, there has been little research on evaluating important SSR missions by means of academic study. More specifically, no real evaluation mechanism exists yet to evaluate success and failure of SSR.

This study wishes to respond to these flaws, by providing insight in the actual implementation of SSR interventions in a specific context and by looking into how these activities are perceived by a wide range of (inter)national actors. Moreover, this information can be used as a basis for establishing criteria for an evaluating mechanism for SSR.

#### *Social/Societal relevance*

So far, reports and studies on SSR in the DRC have been rather limited and often focussed only on one specific element of SSR. Moreover, studies on MONUC's SSR activities or SSR in the Kivu provinces are only present in small numbers.

This study will draw upon the existing reports and studies, but also aims to combine the approaches they take by describing not only the process of SSR in the DRC and the Kivus, but also its progress, its challenges and, most importantly, its contribution to durable peace. In so doing, it aims to give a more complete overview of the SSR process and the actors involved in the DRC and the Kivu region than earlier reports.

By using the evaluations, views and ideas of a wide range of both local and international actors, this study aims to provide a more detailed insight in how MONUC's SSR interventions are perceived. Moreover, it gives a voice to those, who have often not been heard; the local population. Hence, overlap, differences and frictions between different actors and their perceptions can be identified. In so doing, this study aims to contribute to the current shortage of knowledge on MONUC's SSR efforts by providing a detailed insight in why MONUC's SSR interventions are effective in some cases, less in other cases, and what challenges and opportunities there are concerning the ground-floor level of the SSR process. By providing concluding recommendations, this study also aims to increase the effectiveness and contribution to durable peace of MONUC on SSR and the SSR process in general.

#### **1.4 Case study**

The United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo is an important and interesting example of UN peacekeeping operations. For many, the conflict in the DRC is relatively unknown. In a sense, this is strange, since the country hosts one of the largest and most expensive UN peacekeeping operations active today.<sup>14</sup>

Despite the fact that war officially ended in 2002, for many citizens in the eastern part of the country conflict did not cease. The specific context of the DRC, with particular respect to its history, geographical position and politics have made conflict in the DRC one of the most challenging contexts for the UN to operate in. The geopolitical complexity, in which the conflict is embedded, poses many challenges to the UN peacekeeping operation in the country. Geopolitical complexity refers to the fact that the problems of a sovereign state should not be looked upon only in individual terms, but should also consider the diverse range of other states, international organizations and other parties that are involved. These intricate relationships between actors of different nationalities and state affiliations result in a high complex situation in which responsibilities and influences cannot be easily ascribed to one single (governmental) actor. This geopolitical complexity is highly visible in the DRC.

The country is characterized by weak and geographically limited governance and involvement of the UN, the European Union, individual countries, neighbouring states and multiple foreign and domestic rebel groups. These characteristics will be further explained in chapter 3.

The importance of reforming the country's security sector, in combination with the country's geopolitical complexity makes the country an excellent exemplary case of complex peacekeeping. Another thing is that the UN in the DRC explicitly focuses upon SSR, as an integral part of their peacekeeping/ peace building mandate, which makes the DRC an even more interesting case.

This study will focus upon the UN peacekeeping operation in the DRC, particularly in the Kivu provinces, with an explicit interest in SSR. The Kivu provinces are one of the core areas in which MONUC's SSR policies and activities are implemented. This area can be seen as one of the most complex and challenging cases of SSR of the UN today.

### **1.4.1 Context**

During colonization and since its independence, the DRC went through a long history of exploitation, misrule, dictatorship, struggle and conflict. Despite international efforts to establish peace, the series of peace agreements and the efforts of the newly appointed government as a result of the country's first democratic elections in 2006, conflict in the eastern part of the country has not ended. Even though the DRC is often referred to as a post-conflict state, fighting is still part of every day reality for those living in the Kivu provinces.<sup>15</sup>

In 1999, the UN established a new peacekeeping operation in the country, the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). MONUC has primarily been established to monitor compliance with the in 1999 signed Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Their mandate has been revised, extended and adapted several times, making it more applicable for the deteriorating situation in the DRC. As a part of these changes, the UN SC authorized MONUC with more and new responsibilities from 1999 till present. Also the geographical area of deployment of MONUC shifted from the whole country to the main area of conflict; the Kivu provinces.<sup>16</sup>

The Kivu provinces are one of the main regions in conflict in the DRC. They are the playground of three interrelated conflicts with an international, national and local dimension.<sup>2</sup> In general, it can be said that the resource rich region is packed with warring armed groups, that the government in Kinshasa barely has an influence, and that the region is subjected to influence of neighbouring countries. These characteristics of the Kivus form the main context in which MONUC operates. One of MONUC's most important tasks at the moment is the reform of the Congolese security sector. Although policies on this subject are designed by the UN Headquarters in New York and by the central MONUC Headquarters in Kinshasa, implementation takes place all over the country. In the Kivu provinces, MONUC regional Headquarters is actively carrying out SSR activities designed elsewhere.<sup>17</sup>

### **1.5 Methodology**

To answer the central question of this study, *“To what extent do the SSR policies and activities of MONUC contribute to durable peace in the Kivu area, considering the views and evaluations of actors involved and affected by these interventions?”* a specific research strategy will be outlined. For this reason this section will deal with the methodological approach and research design used throughout this study. The study will be of an explorative character and will describe perceptions, evaluations and views of actors involved and affected by MONUC's SSR activities in the Kivu provinces in the DRC. Building upon an analysis of these perceptions, evaluations and views, and the outline of a general definition of durable peace, it will be assessed to what extent MONUC SSR policies and activities contribute to durable peace in the Kivu area.

This section will firstly discuss two broad research strategies that might be applicable to the object of study. It will argue that there is an important choice to be made between a more scientific, positivist approach on the one hand and a more post-positivist interpretative approach on the other hand. It will argue that for the study at hand an interpretative approach will be suited best. The second part of this section will therefore deal with the theoretical basis for using interpretive approaches as a research method. Subsequently the why's and how's of using perceptions as a research object will be described. Next, the selection of research methods and instruments will be explained. The fourth part of this section will describe the methods of analysis used to analyse the research findings will be described.

---

<sup>2</sup> These conflicts and characteristics will be further explained in chapter 3

### ***1.5.1 The importance of meaning: towards an interpretive approach***

There are many different research approaches possible to assess the contribution of SSR activities of UN peacekeeping operations to durable peace. The most important distinction to be made between these approaches is between positivistic, categorical approaches to analysis on the one hand, and more interpretative, constructivist studies on the other hand. Although the distinction between positivist studies and interpretative studies is often blurred<sup>3</sup>, here the distinction will be made on the basis of whether or not an approach is sensitive to the different meanings, identities and perceptions that different actors attach to the same issue. Positivist studies tend to treat social phenomena as the one and only, actually existing 'truth', whereas interpretive studies focus on the different meanings that phenomena have for a broad range of different actors.<sup>18</sup> For the latter there are no a-priori, essential, universal meanings attached to certain phenomena. More specifically, there is a whole range of different meanings attached to them by different actors. This will be further explained in the second part of this section. It is important to remark however, that an interpretative approach is not equivalent to an 'anything goes approach', there is still some authority vested in the analyst whose role it is to get a better understanding of the social reality around her.<sup>19</sup>

Most research that has focused upon the success or contribution of UN peacekeeping to durable peace has approached it from a more or less positivist perspective. As argued above, positivism entails a research approach that aims to find out 'true' facts about certain social phenomena. For them it is possible to get to a singular and universal reality. Of course, a research may bring forward new insights and new or different truths, but there is one true reality that can be investigated. The main goal of most positivist research in this field is therefore often to measure or assess the results of UN peacekeeping by looking into the factual achievement of durable peace. Such research is often conducted by a-priori established criteria and indicators (that indicate the 'true' essence of a certain phenomenon) to assess the effectiveness of intervention policies. These researches draw upon large numerical databases, surveys, (comparative) qualitative case studies or sets of pre-structured interviews.<sup>20</sup> The criteria used are largely based on the internal goals of the intervention policies that are set out or based upon general theories on durable peace and peace building.

By scoring each of the different criteria, researchers get a 'true' picture<sup>4</sup> of how the intervention or intervention policies have performed on these criteria. Such studies often provide a surveyable way of evaluating and monitoring peacekeeping processes.<sup>21</sup> They are therefore quite attractive to be used for assessing factors of success and failure of UN peacekeeping operations, and the durability in the aftermath of these interventions.<sup>22</sup> These approaches, however, also have several shortcomings. To start with, numerical pictures provide significant information on effects, but give less information on why the specific approaches are effective and why others are not.<sup>23</sup> This is however less the case with qualitative studies.

More importantly however, more positivistically oriented researchers often do not pay much attention to the fact that there can be different opinions, perceptions and evaluations to the same issues. Or, if they do, they wish to find out which of these opinions is 'really' speaking the truth about matters or they as researcher want to give the one and only true answer to the issue at hand. This means that some meanings are sometimes neglected. However, what for some actors might be not so important, might be of significant importance to others.

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3 Denzin and Lincoln (2003) for instance share positivist approaches under the four major interpretive paradigms that structure qualitative research

<sup>4</sup> or intend to at least approach the truth



Quantitative research, in particular, often looks for one single truth regardless of different views and believes. To conclude, some positivist approaches have also been criticised for their selectiveness in including only certain opinions of certain actors, while other opinions are –yet not always intentionally- excluded.<sup>24</sup>

Fetherston and Johansen (1997) argue that a more interpretive approach towards success or failure of UN peacekeeping operations is necessary. In doing so, they emphasize that factors of success and failure should take into account the consequences of UN peacekeeping for those living in conflict zones. Fetherston (1997) expresses that more attention “*needs to be directed at the importance of building conceptual understandings, out of which practice (and policy) might be generated, that are grounded in the experiences and work of the people most immediately affected by continuing violence (both structurally and directly). Of course, this does not mean re-establishing the power of particular elites but thinking about the lives of those most disconnected from this kind of ‘power’*” (p. 160).<sup>25</sup>

The issues described here indicate that there is a pressing lacuna in research on success and failure of UN peacekeeping operations. It has been outlined that a more interpretive approach can fill this gap and is essential to enhance a full understanding of effects of UN peacekeeping operations. For this reason, this study will use an interpretative approach to look into the effects of SSR policies and activities of the United Nations Operation Mission in the DRC. By analysing the perceived effects of MONUC’s SSR interventions in the DRC and the Kivus, an assessment will be made to look into the contribution of these interventions to durable peace.

### ***1.5.2 Interpretive approach***

Interpretive approaches find their origins in phenomenology, a philosophy of knowledge which emphasizes direct observation of issues to sense reality. The most important feature of phenomenology is that it aims at describing meaning and perceptions. In doing so, the researcher tries to sense reality through the eyes of others.<sup>26</sup> Interpretive approaches are based upon the idea that relevant meanings, beliefs and preferences of the people involved need to be understood to understand actions, practices and institutions.<sup>27</sup>

The issues outlined in the previous section mark that a more interpretive approach towards success and failure of SSR interventions of UN peacekeeping operations can offer specific insights on the actions, practices and institutions of peacekeeping that often remain unexposed. In use, qualitative interpretative approaches need to take into account that all views are equally important, as unambiguous answers often do not exist.<sup>28</sup> There is no single truth to be assessed, rather there are a wide range of different meanings that should be all taken into consideration.<sup>29</sup> Yet, this immediately gives entry for outlining some of the difficulties of using an interpretive approach. Because there is no single truth to be assessed, no clear answers can be given. There are always exceptions and contradictory perceptions. This also brings forward problems with the reliability of perceptions. Furthermore, by using interpretive approaches, the interpretive role of the researcher is of main importance. This, in some cases, can be seen as a disadvantage due to biases of the researcher.<sup>30</sup> Yet, it is stressed that in order to gain a balanced view and to increase the usefulness of studies about UN peacekeeping, the views and perceptions of all actors involved and affected should be represented, analysed and evaluated in the study.

For these reasons an interpretive approach is chosen in this study. It will be used to achieve a better understanding of the contribution of MONUC’s SSR policies and activities in the Kivus to durable peace in the Kivu provinces.

As touched upon earlier, there often is no single truth. Peoples' perceptions on the same subject might differ, but still represent a/their truth. By using the different perceptions of all actors involved and affected by MONUC's SSR policies and activities more knowledge will be gained on peoples' realities, on the overlap between these realities and potential collisions between them. This information will be used to obtain a balanced view on the MONUC's SSR policies and activities in the Kivus, and highlights possible future problems. These perceptions will in a later stadium be analysed. The outcomes of this analysis will be linked to a definition of durable peace in order to qualitatively assess the contribution of MONUC's SSR policies and activities to durable peace in the Kivu area.

### ***1.5.3 Methods of data collection***

To answer the central question of this study, different methods have been used. In particular, different sub-questions need different methods. The majority of data has been collected during field research in the Democratic Republic of Congo from August until November 2008. This fieldwork was conducted in the Kivu provinces of the DRC, and most information has been gathered in the main cities Goma, Bukavu and Uvira.

Because of the fact that the main policies on SSR are developed on a national level and are merely being executed in the Kivus, other information was gathered during a ten day stay in the capital city Kinshasa. Other relevant data was collected before and after the stay in the field. This data has been collected through interviews and conferences conducted/visited in The Hague, Brussels, Antwerp and Paris. The methods used for data collection include literature review, secondary data collection, interviews, participatory appraisal techniques and participatory observation. This will be further explained below.

#### ***1.5.3.1 Literature review***

The problem definition of this study follows from a literature review on UN peacekeeping, durable peace and security sector reform.<sup>5</sup> The central question of this study has been formulated on the basis of this review. The aim of the literature review used in this study is to gain insights in specific concepts and processes, and the academic and social debates on peacekeeping, durable peace and SSR.<sup>31</sup> In doing so, literature review serves as a basis for the theoretical embedding of the concepts used throughout this study and sheds light on the specific context of research.

Relevant literature has been reviewed in order to gain insight in the history and conflict in the DRC and the Kivu provinces, the evolution of UN peacekeeping operations, the UN mission in the DRC, the process of security sector and the concept of durable peace. In doing so, debates on effectiveness of UN peacekeeping, durable peace and security sector reform have become the basis of this study.

#### ***1.5.3.2 Interviews***

Interviews have been conducted in different ways. But the study mainly draws upon semi-structured interviews and informal interviews.<sup>32</sup> The data collected with these interviews will be used as input for answering the sub-questions.

Before the start of the field work in the DRC several semi-structured interviews have been held with experts on the DRC and security sector reform in the Netherlands, Belgium and France.

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<sup>5</sup> See chapter 2 and 4

These interviews have been held with diplomats, academics and NGO representatives in the field, in order to gain further insights in the research context and the process of SSR in the DRC.

During the field research in the DRC, 67 formal semi-structured interviews were conducted with actors within MONUC, representatives of international donor countries in SSR, representatives of intergovernmental organisations involved in SSR, representatives of the DRC government in the Kivus, national NGO's in the Kivus, and civil society representatives and local population in the Kivus. These interviews have been conducted to gain insight in conflict and its root-causes in the Kivus and the DRC, the UN mission in the DRC, SSR in the DRC and perceptions of these representatives on SSR in the DRC. These individuals were asked whether they knew other likely interviewees for this research. In doing so, snowball sampling has partly been used to select informants.<sup>33</sup>

In the aftermath of the field research several semi-structured interviews have been held by telephone and email, in order to gather missing information and receiving up to date information on MONUC's SSR policies and activities in the Kivus (as it is a quite dynamic context), and the deteriorating situation in the Kivu area. In addition to formal interviews, much information was gathered through informal interviews and talks with people met during field research, and attended meetings and conferences. The information gathered through these more informal ways has been written down in research notes, which served as a basis for the analysis.<sup>6</sup>

The search for key-informants has been the start of the data-collection in this study. Key informants have been selected on the criteria of their availability, their overall knowledge on the subject and their position in organisations or society with regard to the subject. These interviews enabled the obtaining of general information on the subject, provided insights on sensitive issues and have led to much communication and cooperation between actors.<sup>34</sup>

Semi-structured interviews have been conducted on the basis of a flexible list of topics, depending on the interviewee. A choice has been made to conduct semi-structured interviews, as there is more interaction between the researcher and the respondent than during an interview with structured questions.<sup>35</sup> This can lead to obtaining more information, as the researcher is better able to respond to the answers of the respondent. The information that is particularly important in the view of the specific interviewee is knowable to arise from the interview.<sup>36</sup> All formal interviews have been semi-structured interviews.

Informal interviews often lead to information which comes closer to the actual processes in the field. These interviews can not only lead to more information on specific subjects, but may also lead to less social desirable answers (which are equally important). Besides this, it will give the researcher the opportunity to obtain information on subjects that are not included on their topic-list, but which will show to be important as well on the overall theme<sup>37</sup>. For this reason, informal interviews have been used as a method of data collection in this study. Informal interviews have been of particular use in obtaining information from those informants who found it difficult to speak openly, such as specific national actors, certain MONUC officials and civilian population.

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<sup>6</sup> Although a list is provided of all interviewees, their names are not mentioned in the text. In order to protect the privacy of interviewees and the sensitive information they provided, their names and positions cannot be traced back to specific perceptions and quotes. References to interviews refer to specific interview numbers (that have been coded by the author).

The assumption was made that since the informants were aware of the topic of the research, these conversations could be used to inform aspects of that research. Should they have felt that certain information was too sensitive, they indicated so.

#### *1.5.3.3 Participatory Appraisal- techniques*

In order to obtain information in other ways, participatory appraisal (PA) techniques, such as mapping and ranking have been used. The information obtained has been used to verify the information received from interviews and secondary data or to expand this information.

The first PA- technique used in field research is mapping. The design of a map on a specific issue by individuals or groups is useful in helping to identify problems or opportunities in specific areas and for opening up discussion between different actors. During the design of a map within a group, discussion and manipulation takes place. People are discussing and correcting one another. The advantage of this type of analysis can be found in the fact that people discuss the situation with each other; it is not a report from one point of view. The other PA-technique used is ranking, placing something in a specific order. The choice for ranking is based on the idea that it is useful to obtain sensitive information. It can also be a fast way of identifying main problems or opportunities.<sup>38</sup>

Although PA-methods have many advantages, there is also a backside of these techniques. Information can be gathered in a fast, organized way, by the respondents themselves and it is not influenced by a-priori selected topics by the researcher. On the other hand, these techniques can only be used as a basis for further research or as a control mechanism for information obtained with other methods. Besides, this way of analysing can bring along dynamics which can influence the final result.

During several attended meetings and interviews in the field, PA-techniques have been applied. These methods have been used in order to gain information from groups and individual actors on their perception on causes of conflict in the DRC and the Kivus, and their perception of MONUC's SSR policies and activities.

#### *1.5.3.4 Participatory Observation*

Participatory observation is a way of data collection that is intertwined with all other kinds of data collection. It is a method in which the researcher is physically present, participates in the research setting and follows the events.<sup>39</sup> Taking part in different meetings both in the Netherlands and in the field has been a central issue to gain insight in the DRC and the Kivus in general, and SSR in general in the DRC and in the Kivus provinces. Furthermore, participatory observation has been used to identify actors involved and affected by in SSR in the DRC and their perceptions on the process, to indicate causes of conflict in the DRC and the Kivus, to observe processes of communication and cooperation and to look further into decisions taken and the actors involved in decision making processes.

#### *1.5.3.5 Secondary Data*

Analysing secondary data has been used throughout this study. Mikkelsen (2005) indicates that secondary data includes '*research and other official and unofficial studies, reports on socio-cultural, political, ecological conditions, national and area-specific statistics, topical and area-specific articles from journals and newspapers, archives and files, aerial and satellite photos and maps*' (p.88).<sup>40</sup> The reviewed secondary data includes working papers on conflict resolution in the DRC, on SSR in the DRC, on combating impunity in the DRC and on cooperation in SSR.

Other secondary data which has been used are unofficial evaluations on MONUC and SSR cooperation in the DRC, unofficial reports on developing SSR strategies in the DRC, PowerPoint presentations on SSR activities, and the stability plan for eastern DRC.<sup>7</sup> Lastly, internal documents on achievements of SSR activities of MONUC have been used. The collected secondary data has been used to support and supplement other obtained research material. When analysing this data, the author and the specific organisation, and their vision and goal of the specific document have been kept in mind. This is important with regard to biases that may apply to the document.

#### ***1.5.4 Methods of data analysis***

Analysing data has mainly been achieved through coding or labelling. Coding is the breaking down of raw data into conceptual categories. Labelling this data with themes is then used to analyse this data.<sup>41</sup> This analysis has been structured by the central research question and sub-questions. Other information, obtained by secondary data and PA-techniques has been used to complete information received from interviews, but also served as a way of increasing validity of the information gathered. In doing so, data from multiple sources has been merged to corroborate findings, a process which is also called triangulation.

By analysing information collected by different methods and by different persons and/or organisations, single study biases can be reduced. Furthermore, triangulation is also about “*finding multiple perspectives for knowing the social world*”, argue Marshall and Rossman (2006) (p.204).<sup>42</sup> The results of this labelling are visible in the classification of topics used throughout chapter 6 and in annex X, that broadly outlines the different points brought forward, and a division of responsibilities for these points, by the interviewees.<sup>8</sup>

#### **1.6 Structure of the study**

This study is divided into eight chapters. The next chapter, chapter 2, describes the setting of UN peacekeeping and durable peace, both in historical and theoretical terms. This chapter will describe the key concepts and issues addressed in this study and their theoretical underpinnings. Firstly, it will outline the history of UN peacekeeping operations, their structure, their evolution and their aims. In doing so, it places UN peacekeeping in a historical context and sheds light on the structure of peacekeeping operations. Moreover, in this chapter the evolution and development of peacekeeping and their changing aims will be described. The second part of chapter two will provide theoretical insight in the concept of durable peace and will elaborate on how this notion relates to UN peacekeeping operations. In doing so, it will first explain the concept of peace and the evolution of notions of peace towards the notions of durable peace. Then the chapter will explore how durable peace is understood and used by the UN and its peacekeeping operations.

The third chapter is based on the characteristics of conflict in the DRC, the Kivus and the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC. This chapter will start out with a brief history of conflict in the DRC and the causes of conflict, in order to give context to the second and third part of this chapter. The second part of the chapter will elaborate on the conflict in the Kivu provinces and will examine the specific causes of conflict in this geographical region. The main features of the conflict, the actors involved and other important aspects of the conflict will be taken into account. The sections on causes of conflict in the DRC and the Kivu provinces are based upon a combination of literature analysis and data collection.

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<sup>7</sup> See bibliography

<sup>8</sup> For more information see chapter 6 and Annex X

The last part of this chapter will provide insight in the particularities of the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC. More specifically, it will elaborate upon its structure, mandate, activities and deployment.

Chapter 4 will deal with general theories on SSR and how this has led to UN policy prescriptions. The first part of the chapter will focus on what a security sector is, what the effects of war on security sector are, and how reforming the security sector of states has become an important issue. With this, this section aims at defining a states' security sector and the actors it comprises. It will also consider how the tasks of these actors change in times of war and how reforming security sectors have become important. The second part of this chapter describes the concept of SSR in more detail, by looking into the main aims and aspects of SSR, and the key actors' active in SSR. Moreover, this section discusses various competing definitions of SSR and will provide insight in the aims and different aspects the process entails, and describes the key actors involved in SSR. In the final part of this chapter the focus will be on UN SSR policies in particular. It will explore the relationship between UN SSR policies and earlier discussed theories and assumptions on SSR. In so doing, this section will describe the contents of UN policies on SSR and the integration of SSR tasks in UN peacekeeping operations' mandates.

Chapter 5 describes the different levels of SSR policies and activities in the DRC. With this, it briefly explains the SSR process in the DRC, and elucidates on MONUC's SSR mandate and activities. It aims to take a closer look at other actors involved in SSR in the DRC and their activities. The first section of this chapter will describe the current status of the security sector in the DRC and earlier reform efforts in the country. The section aims to provide insight in developments within the Congolese security sector and its problems. The second part of the chapter will describe MONUC's SSR mandate and activities in the DRC. It describes MONUC's SSR tasks, their SSR activities on a national level and their activities in the Kivu provinces. In so doing, the section provides insight in MONUC's mandate and SSR related tasks, activities undertaken at a national and local level and will go into the problems encountered. The last part of the chapter describes other actors that are also involved in SSR in the DRC and the Kivus. This section highlights that MONUC is not the only actor involved in SSR in the DRC and reflects upon the complexity of SSR in the DRC as all these actors are involved in the process. This chapter will largely be based upon data collected in the field, complemented with literature analysis.

The sixth chapter will focus on the perceptions on MONUC's SSR policies and activities of international and national actors involved or affected by SSR. The first section of this chapter will describe the views on SSR of MONUC in general and in the Kivus in particular of international actors. In doing so, this section aims to lay bare how international actors perceive these policies and activities of MONUC and the problems they indicate. The second part of this chapter deals with the opinions of national actors in the Kivus on MONUC's SSR policies and activities in the region. In this way, the section sheds light on how local actors experience and perceive MONUC's SSR efforts and its effects.

Chapter 7 is the analysis chapter, in which the contribution of MONUC's SSR policies and activities to durable peace will be assessed. This chapter will build upon the perceptions on SSR and MONUC's SSR interventions, outlined in chapter 6, but will also draw upon relevant documents and literature. The main aim of this part of the chapter is to explore how MONUC's SSR interventions have contributed to or will contribute to durable peace in the region.

The concluding chapter, chapter 8, explores the research question and integrates the insights of the preceding chapters into one coherent answer to the research question of this study. On the basis of this synthesis, several, threats and challenges for SSR, but also recommendations for SSR in the DRC will be put forward. In the next section a reflection on this research and its scientific and social/societal contribution will be described. This chapter will end with a short description of important changes in SSR in the DRC that have taken place beyond the timeframe of this study.

## Chapter 2: An introduction to the key concepts in this study

Over the last 60 years, United Nations Peacekeeping has evolved into a complex undertaking that involves a wide range of activities. Most often current United Nations Peacekeeping operations aim to realize durable peace in conflicting areas. This involves many different activities of which security sector reform is one of the most important parts.<sup>43</sup>

This chapter will explore the key concepts related to United Nations interventions and its contribution to durable peace. The concepts that will be outlined here have been used by many organisations and governments, but they are not widely agreed upon. Also an overall general accepted definition of durable peace is still lacking. In this chapter therefore these concepts and their different meanings will be explored. An outline will be given of how they will be used throughout this study. The chapter begins by elaborating the concept of United Nations peacekeeping. Then the concept of durable peace will be explored.

### **2.1: A short history of United Nations and Peacekeeping Operations**

The United Nations Charter, which was signed in 1945, is the basic fundament for all the work of the organisation. In the aftermath of World War II, the United Nations was established to prevent a Third World War and to “*save succeeding generations from the scourge of war*” (p.10).<sup>44</sup> The main aim of the organisation is to maintain international peace and security, through cooperation, negotiation and diplomacy. Although peacekeeping has not been included in the United Nations Charter, it currently has evolved into one of the main tools of the organisation to achieve their objectives.<sup>45</sup>

#### **2.1.1 An organisation called the United Nations**

After World War II (WWII), it was a joint believe that there should ‘never be a new world war’ again amongst many different nations. To achieve this, many nations believed that creating an international organisation with all the necessary actions and powers was needed to prevent a third World War.<sup>46</sup>

This organisation came into existence on the 26<sup>th</sup> of June 1945 and was from there on called the United Nations. It can be looked upon as the successor of the League of Nations, which was founded as an after effect of the treaty of Versailles in 1919-1920. The latter organization tried to prevent war trough providing collective security.<sup>9</sup> After a number of notable successes and significant failures, the League ultimately proved incapable of preventing aggression. The outbreak of the Second World War suggested that the organisation failed its primary purpose, namely to prevent a future world war.<sup>47</sup> But the main concepts and ideas of the League of Nations has provided a basis for the new organisation. However, the new organisations should be more strongly focus upon including more member-states, having a broader approach towards peace and security, and should be endowed with more power and higher effectiveness.<sup>48</sup>

Similar to the League of Nations, the main objectives of the UN, as laid out in the Charter, are maintaining peace and preventing any military conflicts in the world, in order to avoid a World War III. Next to that, they focus on developing friendly relations among nations; on cooperation to solve international economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems, on promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; and on becoming a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in attaining these ends.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Collective security can be looked upon as a security agreement on which all states cooperate collectively to provide security for all (Nye, 2006).



Since this time, the members of the UN, led by the Security Council, have attempted to fulfil this mission. Although the United Nations exists out of six main organs, the Security Council (SC) and the Secretary General are the most important bodies to fulfil the UN's objectives towards maintaining peace and security.<sup>50</sup>

In general, the organisation tries to create a platform for discussion, negotiation, diplomacy and problem solving, between and inside nations. Since the organisation came into existence in 1945 almost every country has become a member state and has ratified the UN Charter. The UN Charter has been drawn up by fifty governments and was adapted unanimously on the 25<sup>th</sup> of June 1945. This Charter, which is formulated as an international treaty, forms and establishes the organisation and is an agreement between its member states. The Charter is a constituent treaty and all the UN member states are bound to its articles. Next to this, obligations to the UN, by this Charter, prevail over all other treaty obligations.<sup>51</sup>

### ***2.1.2 The role of the United Nations Security Council in conflicts***

Although the UN Security Council exists out of 15 member states, of which 5 are permanent members and 10 are rotating members, the SC is allowed to act on behalf of all UN member states. The five permanent members of the SC have veto powers to block any decision. The non-permanent, rotating, members do not have such a vote. Whether the decisions of the SC are binding depends upon the chapter of the UN Charter under which the decision has been taken. The most important chapters with regard to UN peacekeeping are chapter VI and VII.<sup>52</sup>

Chapter VI of the UN Charter outlines the main means available for a pacific settlement of disputes. Article 33 of the Charter provides a list of international traditional instruments that can be deployed to resolve conflict; either diplomatically or legally. The chapter calls upon member states to resolve conflicts in the aforementioned manner, mandates assessment of the conflict situation or allow for the appointment of a mediator. In so doing, chapter VI resolutions only recommend certain specific actions that can only take place in cooperation with the involved parties.<sup>53</sup>

Chapter VII allows for actions with regard to threats to peace and security, and acts of aggression. This chapter is only applicable in cases in which there is a threat for or breach of peace. Article 39 of the Charter outlines that the SC shall “*determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security*”.<sup>54</sup> Article 41 sums up non-violent measures which can be taken. “*The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations*”.<sup>55</sup> If Article 41 measures will be inadequate or prove to be insufficient, the SC “*may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations*”.<sup>56</sup>

Important to note is that initially the United Nations tried to establish an UN-army, which would carry out the Article 42 actions that were decided upon in the SC. Although this idea failed and the UN-army was never established, Article 42 measures have been regularly carried out in the past by UN-member states.

This happens when individual states are willing to execute these measures, or when they form a UN peacekeeping operation. The only cases in which states are allowed to use violence internationally are when they are authorized by the SC or when they are under attack and there is a case for self-defence.<sup>57</sup> Before discussing such a case, the study will first briefly go into the history of UN peacekeeping operations.

### **2.1.3 A short history of UN Peacekeeping operations**

The origin of peacekeeping operations is somewhat unclear and different scholars trace back its origins to different stages in history. In general it can be said that peacekeeping is based upon the idea that great powers have great responsibilities. This idea is still present today, but can be traced back to the Roman Empire and the world history since then.<sup>58</sup> Despite this long history, this section will only focus on the more recent history of UN peacekeeping. UN peacekeeping has never been a part of the UN Charter. However, deploying soldiers in the light of a peacekeeping operation has been looked upon as a necessary step towards maintaining peace and security by the UN.<sup>59</sup> Much of the contemporary peacekeeping operations have therefore been formed by the United Nations.<sup>60</sup> According to the UN, the official history of UN peacekeeping operations therefore starts a couple of years after the founding of the international organisation. And in this time it became clear that not incorporating peacekeeping operations was a weakness of the UN Charter. More specifically, it was the necessity for field presence in the Middle East in 1948 and a couple of months later in India and Pakistan that revealed the relative powerlessness of the UN Charter to provide a legal framework to such actions.<sup>61</sup>

In the 1950s, the second Secretary General of the UN, Dag Hammarskjöld, ascribed a new collective security role to the UN. In this new role peacekeeping became a key issue.<sup>62</sup> He placed peacekeeping between traditional means for pacific settlement of disputes, Chapter VI methods, and more forceful actions as authorized under Chapter VII of the UN. In doing so, he referred to the concept of UN peacekeeping as authorized under “Chapter six and a half”.<sup>63</sup>

Since then, several UN peacekeeping operations were deployed, but in the subsequent period of the Cold War the establishment of peacekeeping operations was virtually absent.<sup>64</sup> Due to a lack of consent between the different permanent members of the SC there were hardly any resolutions concerning the deployment of peacekeeping operations. Although the General Assembly holds the right in the case, in which the SC is somewhat paralysed, to deploy or extent peacekeeping operations, this rarely occurred.<sup>65</sup>

After the Cold War several changes in peacekeeping became visible. Since then, as Bellamy (2004) puts it, “*peacekeeping began a triple transformation*” (p.92).<sup>66</sup> These transformations especially concerned changes in the numbers of peacekeeping operations, the level of difficulty within new operations and the aims and approaches of operations.<sup>67</sup> In this regard, a particular evolution of peacekeeping operations took place, involving a significant change in the concept, the aims and the activities of peacekeeping.<sup>68</sup>

The first generation peacekeeping operations, also known as traditional peacekeeping, emerged in the 1940's.<sup>69</sup> These missions can be characterised by their relative impartiality, the aim for consent and a minimal use of force. As such, these first generations of peacekeeping missions draw upon the following set of assumptions: (1) the actors in conflict are states which have clear armies, and (2) these actors are in search for a political solution for and wish to end their dispute. Another premise is that peacekeeping missions should be under command of the UN, authorized by the SC and controlled by the Secretary General of the UN.<sup>70</sup>

These traditional peacekeeping missions aim to contribute to long-term conflict resolutions through political means and furthermore prevent escalation of a conflict and are placed under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Within this process conflicting states are key players, who are supported by the International Community. Second generation missions are more ambitious and challenging, as they include not only a military component, but also a humanitarian and peace building component, and therefore a broader range of tasks and activities.<sup>71</sup> The idea behind this new generation of peacekeeping was to contribute to peace building and durable peace by above means in both intra and inter state conflicts.<sup>72</sup>

In the mid 1990's UN peacekeeping experienced some dramatic failures and the UN had to cope with a lot of critique.<sup>73</sup> Experiences in among others Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda, in which the UN was unable to prevent an escalation of conflict and the protection of civilians, showed the serious shortcomings and a need for change of UN peacekeeping.<sup>74</sup>

The in 1995 published "An Agenda for Peace", with recommendations for improving peacekeeping, by then Secretary General of the UN Boutros Boutros-Ghali proved to be insufficient.<sup>75</sup> In response to the above and failures experienced in the past, in 2000 the Brahimi Report was published. This report, conducted by a panel of experts and led by Lakhdar Brahimi, looked at the future of UN peacekeeping. It identified current shortcomings and made a large number of recommendations for the improvement of peacekeeping.<sup>76</sup> The report resulted in yet another generation of peacekeeping better adapted to a changing political context and the emergence of more intra than inter state conflicts after the end of the Cold War.<sup>77</sup>

In this regard, a shift took place from traditional first generation peacekeeping authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter towards a more forceful third generation peacekeeping, authorized under Chapter VII. These so called Multidimensional Peacekeeping Missions, Integrated Missions or Peace Support Operations are often referred to as including a peace enforcement element, as they are allowed to impose their presence without consent of the parties and to "use all necessary means" regarding force, under specific conditions.<sup>78</sup>

Above missions show an overlap with preceding generations of missions. There is also an emphasis on peace building, but also they distinguish themselves on other aspects. Not only do these missions have stronger mandates and the ability to use force, but there is also a better balance in terms of the relation between their mandate and the resources available. In these missions the emphasis lies on peace building, reconstruction and durable peace. They do so by an integrated approach, which aims to align all UN efforts in the field.<sup>79</sup> The purpose of this coordinated approach of all UN forces and agencies is to ensure that all will be working on a common goal.<sup>80</sup> The mandates of third generation of peacekeeping operations enables them to work on aspects such as institution building, capacity building, monitoring human rights, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform (SSR), and other aspects that are clearly linked to realizing durable peace. As all these aspects are included and these missions aim to take into account the context in which they operate, these missions have often been referred to as complex operations.<sup>81</sup>

This latest generation of peacekeeping operations, as a coherent and integrated approach to building durable peace, are now seen as the best instrument available for these difficult situations. Despite several criticisms, particularly levelled at the blurring of political, military and developmental goals, it is still seen as the best tool at hand. And since its birth, the third generation of peacekeeping operations have been revised many times to better fit the context on the ground in which they are employed.<sup>82</sup>

Nowadays the UN remains the main peacekeeping organisation in the world. It has recovered from the confidence loss in the 1990's and although it still has to face different scandals and failures, the immense role the UN plays in maintaining global peace and security is still being acknowledged worldwide.

#### **2.1.4 A definition of the concept UN peacekeeping**

As outlined above, the concept of peacekeeping has changed and expanded over time. As it started off as an effort aiming mainly at monitoring a cease-fire, it has evolved into an integrated and coordinated approach towards conflict resolution and transformation.<sup>83</sup>

As the UN puts it: “*UN peacekeeping continues to evolve, both conceptually and operationally, to meet new challenges and political realities*”.<sup>84</sup> This is one of the main reasons, according to the United Nations, that a strict definition of the concept was never developed. In this light peacekeeping refers to a United Nations presence in the field (normally involving civilian and military personnel) that, with most often the consent of the conflicting parties and usually authorization of the Security Council, implements or monitors arrangements relating to the control of conflicts and their resolution, or ensures the safe delivery of humanitarian relief.<sup>85</sup> As the UN argues: “*These operations may consist of several components, including a military component, which may or may not be armed, and various civilian components encompassing a broad range of disciplines*”.<sup>86</sup>

This standard definition of peacekeeping describes all activities conducted in the light of peace and security of peacekeeping activities. It does however, leave in the middle the question of when peacekeeping missions should be sent. As this thesis will focus on the UN Integrated Mission in the DRC, a more targeted outline of an Integrated Mission is required.

Although there is no precise and universal definition of the concept Integrated Mission, it can still be broadly defined as an effort to maximize and coordinate the available UN resources and expertise, to strive towards conflict resolution and to support long term stability and development. In line with this, the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) defines an integrated mission as “*an instrument with which the UN seeks to help countries in the transition from war to lasting peace, or address a similarly complex situation that requires a system-wide UN response, through subsuming various actors and approaches within an overall political-strategic crisis management framework*” (p.12).<sup>87</sup>

This definition implies that there should be a shared vision among all UN actors to the strategic objectives of the mission. It should also be based on a common understanding that peace and security issues are inextricable linked with human rights and development. By outlining this as core issues the UN stresses that a system-wide approach will be the most sustainable approach to solving conflicts.<sup>88</sup> Through to the coordination and integration of efforts of all UN actors and the outlining of common objectives, the UN aims for more effectiveness, efficiency and achievements on all aspects of its work, an in so doing aim to overcome inefficiency and overlap.<sup>89</sup>

As this study focus on the UN mission in the DRC (*Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo*, MONUC) the definition outlined above will serve as a basis for understanding Integrated Missions. Noting that current missions are adapted to the realities on the ground, a more specific explanation of the Integrated Mission in the DRC and its mandate will therefore be given in chapter 3.

## **2.2 Durable Peace**

*“Like war, peace is a moving target. People in the Middle Ages probably understood peace very differently than did their descendants in the seventeenth century. Our understanding of peace too seems to be changing: if war may soon become the mutual infliction of disease, would peace mean a state of ‘mutual inoculation?’” (p.165).<sup>90</sup>*

War and peace are two concepts that are inextricably linked. Since the existence of human kind we have known these concepts and ancient notions of for instance the Roman Empire and the Spartans still influence our ideas of these concepts heavily.<sup>91</sup> Although most early writings focused on conditions of war and peace between nations, nowadays the bulk of information addresses how to get rid of civil wars, wars between states, conflict causes and how to establish durable peace. But describing a concept as durable peace and making it assessable requires some more explanation of other related concepts as well. In this section durable peace and related concepts will be further explored.

### **2.2.1 Conceptualizing Peace**

As described by Adler (1998), peace is a dynamic concept that gets its own significance in every context and civilisation. It is a concept that changes through time and of which no firm definition exists. The concept of peace has had different usages throughout history. It has been used in the context of justice and injustice, democracy, development and in the context of peace of mind.<sup>92</sup>

The concept of peace may also refer to a situation in which no physical violence occurs. Johan Galtung (1969), who is recognised as one of the most important authors on the concept of peace, introduced two important concepts, negative peace and positive peace. The concept of negative peace refers to the absence of violence in a specific situation. In this regard, peace can be looked upon as merely the absence of war. The concept of positive peace is used to refer to the absence of structural violence or social injustice, by the presence of harmony.<sup>93</sup> The concept of positive peace therefore is broader than negative peace, as it also refers to the improvement of politics and human nature, social justice, morality, international organization and law, and human progress.<sup>94</sup> In doing so, positive peace should create a more stable and secure context on the long term and, hence, is more durable.

### **2.2.2 From Peace to Durable Peace**

The concept of durable peace has become a buzz-word in contemporary conflict related studies, and is often used to outline a new end goal to peace. Although it is generally acknowledged that peace should entail more than only addressing violence, the term durable peace is often used without suggesting exactly what it is. Next to this, various terms such as durable peace, sustainable peace and stable peace are often used to refer to a similar process.

According to Boulding (1978) stable peace *“is a situation in which the probability of war is so small that it plays no significant role in people’s plans”* (p.143).<sup>95</sup> This definition is not only rather vague, but it also remains silent on which factors or indicators influence stable peace.

Lederach (1997) uses a broader definition of the concept. He points out that *“sustainable peace requires that long-time antagonists not merely lay down their arms but that they achieve profound reconciliation that will endure because it is sustained by a society-wide network of relationships and mechanisms that promote justice and address the root causes of enmity before they can regenerate destabilizing tensions”* (p.ix).<sup>96</sup>

Besides the fact that this definition goes beyond the mere absence of fighting, it also emphasizes the importance of processes of reconciliation, justice and addressing root causes of enmity. Despite of this, however, Lederach's definition fails to identify those issues related to the conflict that in the future can lead to conflict or fuel conflict.

Other scholars and organisations such as Hartzell, Roddie and Rothchild (2001), Ali and Matthews (2004), Doyle and Sambanis (2000), the European Union and the United Nations regularly refer to the term durable peace.<sup>97</sup> This is seen as an improvement in the debate on peace and peacekeeping. In spite of this, these authors and organisations fall short in providing a definition of the used concept, although they do identify specific variables and activities which should contribute to or influence durable peace. When looking at the earlier discussions in this chapter, it should be clear that durable peace is not a static concept. This thesis will therefore, further focus on variables and activities which are supposed to contribute or influence durable peace.

To elaborate upon this, the durability of peace is frequently defined as “*the time between a cease-fire (whether achieved through an agreement or not, whenever the fighting stopped) and the resumption of fighting between the same parties*” (p.276).<sup>98</sup> There are cases where it is hard to tell exactly when the fighting stopped, and/or when it started again, but using a continuous measure of time avoids arbitrarily calling some amount of time durable peace and anything less than that not durable peace.<sup>99</sup>

But, as Bigombe, Collier and Sambanis (2000) state: ‘*The task of reaching peace may seem enormous, the harder task is probably not to reach peace but to sustain it*’ (p.323).<sup>100</sup> The question which then needs to be answered is: which factors influence the durability of peace and what are the preconditions of durable peace? Research on durable peace therefore often focuses on the duration of peace after civil and interstate wars, root-causes of conflict and key variables within stabilizing peace, such as Fortna (2004), Doyle and Sambanis (2000), and Collier et al. (2000). The next section will draw upon earlier work in the field of durable peace research in order to explore key features of the concept.

### **2.2.3 Factors affecting durable peace**

There are different factors which are supposed to affect the durability of peace, such as identity or ethnicity. It is argued that identity wars are more likely to resume when compared to other wars.<sup>101</sup> In the same study, Doyle and Sambanis (2000) point out that also the cost and the duration of a war, the number of factions involved in conflict, the level of economic development, democracy levels in the country, and the availability of resources can influence the durability of peace after civil war.<sup>102</sup> These findings are supported by different other authors, such as Collier et al. (2003) and Herzell, Hoddie and Rothchild (2001).<sup>103</sup> These aspects can be looked upon as ‘conflict potentials’, defined by Schmid (2000) as “*structural elements of a latent conflict situation that determine the risk of escalation into violence*” (p.26).<sup>104</sup> These elements can change through time and place and are subjected to and reflect the dynamics of a conflict.

A large group of scholars refer to durable peace as more than Galtung's (1969) “absence of structural violence” in post-conflict situations.<sup>105</sup> This literature often focusses on addressing underlying causes of conflict and its characteristics as a pre-condition of durable peace. The basic assumption of these articles is that specific underlying causes or characteristics of the former war are determinant for the reoccurrence of war and conflict.<sup>106</sup>

Although most causes of conflict are context specific, some causes can be said to be more frequently occurring. Matters such as the role of identity and/or religion, resources, inequality and the state have an influence on and can be a reason of conflict.<sup>107</sup> Furthermore, external relations, which are often state related, are also seen as important variables.<sup>108</sup> Understanding, assessing and addressing these issues in a specific context is often looked upon as a condition for maximizing the opportunities for achieving durable peace.<sup>109</sup>

As argued above, there is a wide range of views on durable peace. Many different factors and variables which might influence durability of peace are identified. Besides this, increasing attention is paid to the different root-causes and potentials of a conflict. It is self-evident that these variables are context and conflict specific, but overall some general conclusions on durable peace can be drawn. These aspects looked upon as a basis for durable peace, will be outlined below.

The approaches towards durable peace outlined above are looked upon as being relatively isolated. This thesis aims to overcome this by developing a more encompassing definition of durable peace, which will be used throughout this study. This will be done by building upon the approaches discussed above. The definition consists of three components, namely the absence of Galtung's (1969) structural violence, the importance of addressing root-causes of conflict as recognised by amongst others Hartzell, Roddie and Rothchild (2001) and eliminating conflict potentials and characteristics within conflicts, an often missing component described by Schmid (2000).<sup>110</sup> Building upon this, the definition used throughout this study is as follows:

*Durable peace is not only the absence of structural violence between groups, but also involves addressing and eliminating context and conflict specific root-causes and conflict-potentials.*

This definition has been created, because durable peace is believed to be a process which encompasses addressing the three issues outlined in the definition above. As such, these three elements cannot be seen isolated, but need to be seen as interlinked. Establishing durable peace therefore involves all three processes. Addressing one of them will immediately affect the other elements of durable peace. For this reason this the definition outlined above can be seen as a more complete and integrated definition than other definitions.

#### **2.2.4 UN Peacekeeping and durable peace**

The UN, as one of the main organisations involved in peacekeeping, aims to contribute to a durable peace in war-torn societies, through its peacekeeping operations.<sup>111</sup> They acknowledge that peacekeeping and peace-building is a complex process which involves many actors, but on the long-term will help "to build durable peace in societies shattered by war".<sup>112</sup>

Most peacekeeping operations draw upon a concept of peace which is very close to the definition of negative peace (the absence of war). This is often used as a short-term mission-goal.<sup>113</sup> This implies that many of the peacekeeping projects are short term policies. However, over the last years, with the changes in UN peacekeeping operations, increasing attention has been paid to the reconstruction of institutions, development, democratization and justice, to maintain peace. The current multidimensional/ integrated UN peacekeeping operations thereby also serve the long-term mission goal of creating sustainable peace.<sup>114</sup> Therewith the aim and activities of these rather new UN peacekeeping operations are compatible with the conceptualisation of positive peace, as they do focus on wider range of activities and aim to increase the durability of peace.

Despite these positive sounds, there is still much debate on the effects of peacekeeping operations. Opponents of peacekeeping often point to failures of peacekeeping operations. Others, however tend to be more positive. Many of those who assess the effectiveness of peacekeeping also describe positive aspects of these operations. Amongst these works on the effects of peacekeeping, it is established that third party intervention has a positive influence on the durability of peace after civil war.<sup>115</sup> Comments are also made on specific types of UN peacekeeping operations that include extensive civil service tasks. These are believed to really improve the chances of success of UN peacekeeping in general.<sup>116</sup> Others, however, claim that there is no significant effect visible on the findings brought forward.<sup>117</sup> Hence, there is much dispute on what peacekeeping operations actually bring about.

As argued earlier, the UN is working to optimise their peacekeeping operations in order to contribute to durable peace in more effective ways. Current UN integrated missions, which came into existence after the Brahimi report, are an example of this development.<sup>118</sup> Besides this, many UN reports have been published on its contribution to durable peace. These emphasize the importance of addressing root-causes of conflict and having a long term commitment.<sup>119</sup> Nowadays, the UN acknowledges that peacekeeping should involve more than only creating peace, but also should involve sustaining peace. This involves many different activities and policies, including the creation of security, political agreements and the taking of socio-economic measures.<sup>120</sup>

To summarize, the role of UN peacekeeping operations in contributing to durable peace has often been acknowledged as important, but has also been challenged. Different components of peacekeeping operations have been identified to positively influence durable peace, while other components do not. Initiatives to increase the contribution of UN peacekeeping to durable peace have been taken by the UN, and take into account the outcomes of research on the subject. Yet how is this research contributing to the UN. How exactly is durable peace assessed and which factors are seen as important in this process?

### ***2.2.5 Assessing durable peace***

Assessing durable peace is a difficult task, which requires a full understanding of the concept, its components and the local situation. There are various ways of assessing durable peace. Many of them have mainly focussed on the specific contributions of UN peacekeeping operations to durable peace. These attempts can be categorised as follows.

On the one hand we can distinguish a group of scholars, who aim to assess the durability of peace in the direct aftermath of war. These researches are mainly of a quantitative character, focussing upon the time between a peace-agreement and renewed fighting. They also explore other factors which might influence this process.<sup>121</sup> On the other hand there is a group of scholars who analyse the different variables of influence on durable peace, focussing on risk-factors and root-causes of, and responses to conflict.<sup>122</sup> Their approaches are of quantitative or qualitative characters. A combination of both quantitative and qualitative assessments on the effects and contribution of peacekeeping to durable peace is rare, but has also taken place. By indicating several policy-tools which are supposed to contribute to durable peace, an assessment is made whether they do or do not contribute, and specific factors of influence on the process are outlined.<sup>123</sup>

As stated above most accounts of assessing durable peace of current research mainly assesses durable peace on the basis of pre-set terms which are believed to affect durable peace. These attempts, however, neglect the different views on these terms.



In doing so, the different perceptions on initiatives to contribute to durable peace, which might vary per actor, are not sufficiently taken into account. Because of this, a more interpretative approach towards assessing durable peace is of key importance, as these perceptions might not only influence the process and effects of durable peace, but also give a broader insight to the dynamics of such processes.<sup>124</sup>

In this study, durable peace will therefore be assessed as follows. Durable peace is defined as *not only the absence of structural violence between groups, but also involves addressing and eliminating context and conflict specific root-causes and conflict-potentials*. As argued earlier, SSR is generally expected to contribute to durable peace. With this, MONUC's SSR efforts in the DRC and the Kivus are also expected to contribute to durable peace in the Kivus. However, as argued above, the perceptions on initiatives to contribute to durable peace might vary per actor. Therefore this study will first analyse the perceptions on MONUC's SSR interventions held by a wide range of actors involved or affected by SSR in the country. On the basis of this analysis, an assessment is made to what extent MONUC's SSR policies and activities meet the different elements of the created definition of durable peace. What these different elements of durable peace exactly entail in the DRC and the Kivu provinces will be specified in chapter 3 and chapter 7. The methodology used has been described in the methodology section in chapter one.

## Chapter 3: The case of the Democratic Republic of Congo

Since its independence, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has gone through a long history of conflict, struggle, exploitation and oppression. As the Congolese conflict still continues on today, many Congolese citizens are still struggling for survival and peace on a daily basis. Although these struggles have perhaps gone widely unnoticed for the larger public in the West, there has been much involvement of the (western) international political community, notably the UN and others.

From the period of decolonisation on, there have been many interventions by the international political community in the DRC: ranging from the UN peacekeeping operation in the 1960's, the involvement of many individual states in peacekeeping or negotiation, to the new, and complex UN mission of 1999. However, the results of these interventions have been fairly ambiguous. Moreover, it can even be argued that the interferences by this multiplicity of states and international organisations have contributed to an even more complex situation. There is minimal cooperation between these actors and political interests and their activities differ significantly.<sup>125</sup>

So, despite of all their efforts to assist Congo on its way towards peace and democracy, the International Community still has a long way to go. Before embarking upon a discussion of the more recent efforts of the International Community in Congo, this chapter will first provide more insight in the (history of the) conflict and the different actors involved. Firstly, it will outline a brief history of the DRC and its conflicts. Then the main area of conflict, the Kivu-provinces, will be shortly discussed. This exploration will include a detailed portrayal of the actors involved in the conflict. Next, the main causes of the conflict in the DRC and the Kivus will be explored. In the remaining part of the chapter, the United Nations Mission in the DRC (MONUC) (which is one of the main actors involved in conflict resolution in the DRC), will be shortly introduced.

### 3.1 A history of conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Due to the many actors involved, conflict in the DRC can be characterized as a complex one. Despite of this complexity, the colonial history and Mobutu's 32 years of dictatorship are commonly seen as the most important instigating factors of the conflict.<sup>126</sup>

Already before the 15<sup>th</sup> Century Congo was a highly diversified Empire. It consisted out of many smaller empires, which were united in the Congo Empire. In the late 15<sup>th</sup> century, this Empire had been able to develop into a large regional power, with a prosperous economy and a relative political stability. In the 15<sup>th</sup> Century, Europeans set foot in Congo for the first time. A decade later, a flow of trade had been established between Europe, America and Africa.<sup>127</sup> This relatively secure situation changed in the 19<sup>th</sup> century when European states started to colonise Africa. The Congolese Empire came under direct rule of the Belgian King Leopold II, first as a personal state directly belonging to the king and later as an official Belgian colony. Under the rule of King Leopold the II a brutal history of rape, pillage, human rights abuses and exploitation followed.<sup>128</sup>

January 1959 proved to be a turning point in Congo's history. After the forced close-down of a meeting of the Congolese political party *Abako* - that had requested immediate independence from Belgium for Congo- an enormous bloodshed took place. The party, led by Joseph Kasavubu, aimed for independence and a replacement of the political elite by Congolese évolués. The *Mouvement National Congolais*, led by Patrice Lumumba was the political opponent of *Abako*.

This party saw the independence of Congo as an opportunity for a new political order and more chances for all Congolese citizens, and opposed many of Abako's ideas. Since that day, there was an increasing pressure on Belgium to release Congo from its rule.<sup>129</sup> On the 30<sup>th</sup> of June 1960, Congo became independent. Kasavubu became the first Congolese president and Lumumba was his first minister.<sup>130</sup>

During their rule, the Congolese governmental institutions were still very weak. The nation was ill-prepared for its newly gained freedom and lacked the knowledge and skills to rule the country. There were many conflicts and opposing interests, especially at the governmental level. Where Lumumba and his party aimed for a strong central government, an independent foreign policy, and structural social changes, the gross of the other parties aimed for federalism and a less radical split with history. The latter parties enjoyed the support of Belgium as well as the United States.<sup>131</sup>

July 1960 staged the first real political crisis in Congo since its independence. Violence against Belgian citizens forced many Belgians to leave the country. There was mutiny in the army, a power struggle within the government, and two provinces called out their independence. In order to restore peace and national integrity the UN sent a military force (ONUC<sup>10</sup>).<sup>132</sup> Two months later Kasavubu decided to fire Lumumba from his job as first minister and to send home the parliament. This moment was seized by the then young army staff chef, Mobutu Sese Seko, who attempted to take control over the country.<sup>133</sup>

In 1965, Mobutu officially got into power. His dictatorial regime would last for 32 years (until 1997). He urged for the 'Africanization' of the country, a process which included the renaming of the country into Zaire and emphasizing the use of African languages instead of French. 'Africanization' also included a form of identity politics through which Mobutu tried to create a sense of (national) unity amongst different ethnic groups. Mobutu systematically used the country's abundant resources to consolidate his power, enriching himself and his allies.<sup>134</sup> Next to this, he suppressed all kinds of rebellion and resistance, imprisoned political opponents, and eliminated many of his rivals. After 1990, Mobutu's power started to fade away, because (inter)national support<sup>11</sup> started to diminish. In that period, the country was forced into a phase of transition towards democracy by the International Community. These transitions, however, were postponed over a long time due to many cases of corruption and manipulation.<sup>135</sup>

In 1996, the Rwandan civil war and genocide had spilled over to the eastern DRC. In the previous two years Rwandan (Hutu) forces had systematically murdered around 800.000 Tutsi's and moderate Hutu's in Rwanda. The *Front Patriotique Rwandais* (RPF), formed by Rwandan Tutsi's (who had fled the country in the preceding forty years and settled in Uganda), came to power in Rwanda in 1994. Many of those responsible for the genocide in Rwanda fled into the Kivu provinces in the DRC.

There they set up bases for incursion against Rwanda and attacked ethnic Tutsi's in the DRC on a regular basis. The RPF started to attack these bases at the end of 1996 and provided ethnic Hutu's in the DRC with arms.<sup>136</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> ONUC is the United Nations Mission in the Congo, established in 1960. For more information see <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/onuc.htm>

<sup>11</sup> During the Cold War, Western countries such as the United States, France and partly Belgium, and International Organisations provided economic support to Mobutu's regime, due to Mobutu's pro-Western and anti-communist stance, and the country's strategic location and mineral wealth. The end of the Cold War marked a shift in this support; with the Soviet and communist threat gone, there was no longer a reason to support Mobutu.

The security situation in the region deteriorated rapidly, which was a major concern for many neighbouring countries. Together with Congolese Tutsi's, Rwanda, Uganda and Angola planned to topple the regime of Mobutu. In 1997, the forces, led by Laurent Kabila, triumphed and Kabila came to power. The country was renamed into The Democratic Republic of Congo. Kabila faced several obstacles in governing the country. Various groups attempted to seize power, the country's economy was badly damaged and Kabila's former foreign supporters were unwilling to leave the country.<sup>137</sup>

In return for their support in overthrowing Mobutu and seizing power in the DRC, Kabila provided his Rwandese allies with positions in the government. A new war broke out in August 1998, when Kabila tried to remove all Rwandese from government positions, as he had become suspicious of the Rwandese involvement. In reaction to this, Rwanda and Uganda invaded the DRC to overthrow Kabila, who called upon Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia and others for help. At a certain point in 1999, formerly cooperating states Rwanda and Uganda gave up their alliance with each other, because they had different interests in the DRC. Most of these issues concerned resources and ethnicity.<sup>12</sup> At that time, besides these foreign actors, many national armed groups were also involved in the conflict. The many ethnic conflicts and struggles within the country (mainly in the Kivus) had led to many internal tensions within the country. Furthermore, national armed groups started to ally with foreign armed groups, which made the conflict even more complex.<sup>138</sup>

The war officially lasted until 2003 and resulted in the deaths of an estimated four million people. The Lusaka cease-fire agreement, signed in July 1999, aimed for a cessation of hostilities in the DRC and the orderly withdrawal of all foreign forces. The agreement was signed by representatives of all countries involved in the conflict (Angola, DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe). However, only two of the undersigners were national rebel groups (the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo and the Congolese Rally for Democracy).<sup>139</sup> All other rebel groups active in the country were excluded from the negotiations. This is seen as one of the most important reasons why the Lusaka cease-fire agreement was only short lived. Another important reason was that both Rwanda and Uganda did not live up to the agreement by not withdrawing their troops from the DRC. To make sure that all parties would keep themselves to the peace agreement, a United Nations Mission to the DRC was established in 1999.<sup>140</sup>

In 2001, Kabila was assassinated by one of his bodyguards and replaced by his son, Joseph Kabila.<sup>141</sup> Ongoing peace negotiations resulted in a partial withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan troops from Congolese territory, by first the Pretoria and later the Luanda Agreement.<sup>142</sup> These agreements aimed at dismantling the *Forces Democratique de Liberation du Rwanda* (FDLR) and normalising the relations between the DRC and Rwanda, and Uganda. This did however not make an end to hostilities in the country. Both Rwanda and Uganda relied heavily on the DRC's natural resources and were reluctant to give up their interest.

As a result of the peace agreement, the Congolese government started to focus mainly on internal parties and rebel groups and neglected the role still played by foreign groups in the country.<sup>143</sup> Two years after the signing of the Lusaka cease-fire agreement, the Inter Congolese Dialogue (DIC) was held in Addis Ababa in 2001.<sup>144</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Clashes between Rwanda and Uganda destroyed their cooperation in the DRC. These clashes stemmed from series of accusations of training rival rebel groups, conflicting reasons for intervening the DRC, trade issues of Congolese resources, disagreement between local commanders and unilateral decisions taken. For more information see: [http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/report\\_archive/A400037\\_04052000.pdf](http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/report_archive/A400037_04052000.pdf)

This dialogue between the government of the DRC, the political opposition in the DRC and several armed groups<sup>13</sup> focussed upon working towards a political solution to the conflict. It aimed for a possible reunification and laid down a framework for providing Congo with a unified, multi-party government. It also set out a timeline for democratic elections.

The first draft of the Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition, which is the name of the package outlined above, was signed in Pretoria in 2002.<sup>145</sup> The April 2003 Sun City agreement was the final outcome of the negotiations, and targeted the restoration of peace and national sovereignty after a transitional period.<sup>146</sup> Unfortunately, it did not deliver the expected results. The agreement was only signed by national groups involved in the conflict. Foreign armed groups were excluded from the negotiations and no further regional dialogue on their presence in the DRC took place.<sup>147</sup> The agreement, therefore, failed to address problems that arose from the presence of foreign armed groups. It did, however, lay down a basis for the in June 2003 established transitional DRC government.<sup>148</sup>

During this transitional period, the DRC government was made up out of representatives from all national actors previously involved in conflict. It risked breaking down several times because of the many differences in viewpoints. During this period a large part of the DRC (in particular the eastern part) remained under control of rebel groups. In combination with the inability to resolve political differences in the government, this posed new threats to stability in the country. It ultimately led to a further crisis in eastern DRC, again centred on Hutu's and Tutsi's who felt their interests were not served in the transitional government. The crisis was manipulated by both the Kinshasa government and Rwanda in pursuing their own interest by influencing the nation through identity politics.<sup>149</sup>

The elections, originally scheduled for 2005, were postponed for twelve months. This postponement was a result of difficulties in providing the necessary legal documents for organising the elections. For the first time in forty years, the country would hold multiparty elections. Starting off with thirty-three presidential candidates, no candidate won more than fifty percent of the votes. Incumbent president Joseph Kabila and vice-president Jean-Pierre Bemba went forward to a second election round which was held in October 2006.<sup>150</sup>

Then, there were many outbreaks of violence between troops loyal to Kabila and those loyal to Bemba. This showed the fragility of the electoral process<sup>151</sup>. After Kabila was officially announced as the winner of the elections, Bemba did not rest in his fate, alleging fraud in the electoral process.<sup>152</sup> Bemba's accusation of fraud was rejected by the Supreme Court later on. After this verdict, Bemba decided to take place in the Senate. Then fighting renewed in March 2007, and Bemba accused the DRC government of planning to assassinate him. The government on their turn accused Bemba of an attempted coup.<sup>153</sup> In May 2008, Bemba was arrested and brought to the International Criminal Court.

He was suspected of war crimes and crimes against humanity during the civil war between 2002 and 2003 in the Central African Republic.<sup>154</sup> Besides these tensions between Bemba and Kabila, internationally, however, the elections are looked upon as being quite successful.

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<sup>13</sup> Representatives of the components and the entities of the Inter Congolese Dialogue, in each Delegates of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Congolese Rally for Democracy, the Movement for the Liberation of Congo, the main organisations and parties of the political opposition as well as representatives of the Forces Vives of the Country, the Congolese Rally for Democracy-Liberation Movement, the Congolese Rally for Democracy-National and the Mai-Mai

There were still many factors that posed significant threats to the stability of the eastern part of the DRC. Many armed groups (both foreign and Congolese) remained. They continuously fight over power, land and resources. The lack of the government's ability to control and securitize this part of its territory poses a significant threat to peace in the East. Although the efforts of the United Nations to stabilise the eastern DRC region have been partly successful, they failed at their attempts to remove the armed groups in the Kivus. As shown by the outbreaks of violence in October 2008 in the Goma area, their presence still poses the most important threat for peace in the DRC.<sup>155</sup>

Another, more recent peace agreement was directly aimed at establishing peace and stability in the East (the 2008 Goma Agreement). Subsequently, the Amani peace program was set up by the Congolese government to further coordinate peace efforts in eastern Congo. Several results have been achieved, such as new round table negotiations. But the highly diversified aims and interest of twenty-two armed groups and renewed fighting between the different armed groups<sup>14</sup> has put an enormous pressure on the agreement.<sup>156</sup>

What becomes clear from the above is that, conflict in the DRC is highly opaque and complex. It involves many different national and international actors who often walk on and off the stage. Because many African actors are involved, the conflict has often been referred to as the African Wars. Even though it started out as an intra-state conflict during decolonisation, the conflict quickly turned into an inter and intra state conflict with many features and parties involved. After a relatively stable period of dictatorship, the country was quickly entangled in a new war at the end of Mobutu's dictatorial rule. Due to spill over effects of the Rwandan genocide in 1994 and Kabila's dismissal of Rwandese from his government, this new war involved many external actors.<sup>157</sup> Peace-agreements and international efforts to work towards peace in the country partially had the expected results. But the conflict -which now mainly revolves in the Eastern part of the DRC- remains a huge challenge for both the Congolese government as for the International Community.

### **3.2 Causes of conflict in the DRC**

As all countries have *“different histories and geographical conditions, different stages of economic development, different sets of public policies and different patterns of internal and international interaction”*<sup>158</sup>, the causes of conflict in countries are also context specific, and reflect a wide ranging diversity and complexity. As the United Nations argues: *“some sources are purely internal, some reflect the dynamics of a particular sub-region, and some have important international dimensions”*.<sup>159</sup>

Building upon the fact that causes of conflict are country specific, it is clear that the current situation in the DRC also stems from a rather specific background. This part of the chapter will outline the main causes of conflict in the specific case of the DRC. Note that they are treated individually here for analytical purposes only, whereas ‘in real life’ they can not be seen as separated, and are inextricably linked with one another.

#### **3.2.1 Historical inheritance of colonialism**

As explained earlier, the colonial period had a devastating effect on Congo and its citizens. The direct rule of King Leopold II in the country was characterised by exploitation, enslavement, mutilations and grave human rights abuses. Leopold's regime in the so called ‘Congo Free State’ was one of the most horrifying examples of private colonialism. After its independence, the country was left with only weak political institutions and infrastructure, without the necessary agents to maintain it.

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<sup>14</sup> For an overview of DRC peace-agreements, see annex I

Due to the lack of higher education, Congolese were not prepared for their newly gained freedom and lacked the knowledge and skills to govern.<sup>160</sup> The country faced the challenge of achieving national unity, but was unable to do so and tumbled immediately into conflict. This conflict was followed up by 32 years of dictatorship of Mobutu, which was characterised by corruption, power misuse, misrule and nepotism.

The characteristics of both the colonial and Mobutu era gave shape to the present country. The DRC is nowadays a country in which cohesion between its citizens is largely absent, spheres of influence are limited, corruption has been institutionalised and misuse of power for self-enrichment is still prior to effective governance. This has led to a lack of confidence in the government, inequality and unequal treatment, and created ground for foreign influences.<sup>161</sup>

### **3.2.2 Identity and ethnicity**

During the Congress of Berlin of 1884-1885, the colonial powers divided up Africa into territorial units. The outcome of the conference, also known as the formalization of the earlier 'scramble for Africa', created new state borders for the continent. Decisions were taken upon the spheres of influence of the different European colonial powers in countries.<sup>162</sup> The conference marked the beginning of modern Europe's colonial activities in Africa, eliminating most forms of African autonomy and merging different areas and communities which had been unrelated before.<sup>163</sup>

The drawing of new state borders caused many problems to the Congo in particular. Many previously cooperating countries and communities were ruptured by this artificial border drawing. The new borders now divided groups, that once where a whole, into a part living inside Congo and a part living in one of the neighbouring countries. The same process took place in the neighbouring states themselves. This rupture of communities by artificial border drawing has resulted in many identity conflicts in the region. Now, people often felt more closely related to groups in their neighbouring countries, rather than feeling related to the citizens of countries in which they lived.<sup>164</sup>

This created a feeling of "us versus them", which is illustrated by many forms of identity politics, ranging from local to (inter)national levels. People and communities are excluded or included from essential resources (both political and physical) on the basis of their identity or ethnicity. This exclusion brought about many indispositions which formed the basis for many (often armed) struggles in the region. Furthermore, neighbouring countries, such as Rwanda, interfered with the identity politics going on in the DRC. They stood up for those who were originally '*rwandophone*'. In doing so, they openly opposed Congolese governmental decisions and made judgements about the lack of governmental initiatives to protect ethnic Tutsi's in the country. These ethnic Tutsi's, the so called '*Banyamulenge*', have been the target of attacks, exclusion and the denial of rights.<sup>165</sup>

### **3.2.3 Politics and governance**

On the fields of politics and governance, the cravings for power and self-enrichment by elite groups have always been central themes in the DRC. To put it bluntly, yet realistically, it can be argued that many of those in power (in particular at the national level) have practically never been inhibited by moral or idealistic considerations. As many of their policies have not addressed the real problems and challenges that the majority of the population faces, but instead focused on self enrichment and power consolidation, the countries citizens have on a whole never really benefited from policies made by the governmental elites.

There now is a lot of distrust towards the government and little faith in democratic governance at all by the Congolese population.<sup>166</sup>

The country is internationally recognised as ‘a state’ as it meets the formalistic judicial criteria of statehood, which are: having a permanent population, having a defined territory, government and having the capacity to enter into relations with the other states. Nevertheless, the country does not fulfil the responsibilities which come along with statehood.<sup>167</sup> The state is unable to control its territory and ties with a large part of the population are almost absent. Governance in the DRC can be mainly characterized by corruption, self enrichment and power consolidation, instead of by an effective and representative form of governance that serves the population rather than oneself.<sup>168</sup> Therefore, the DRC can be qualified as a weak state.

This has created a situation which leaves most of the inhabitants struggling for their own survival. The government leaves a large vacuum which is currently being filled by armed groups and neighbouring countries. Even crucial sectors of national sovereignty such as the tax system and the security sector are now in the hands of private organisations and rebel groups. As corruption and the preferential treatment of people of own band and ethnicity are commonplace, this is one of the main causes of conflict and distrust in the region. People do not merely depend upon the government for their security and survival, but have to deal with many other, unreliable parties. This results in an enormous dissatisfaction and insecurity by those who are unable or unwilling to commit to these people.<sup>169</sup>

#### ***3.2.4 Export of conflicts from neighbouring countries and alliances***

Various crises in neighbouring countries (Rwanda and Burundi in particular), brought about an influx of refugees to the DRC. These refugee flows have affected the “*demographics, economics, politics and security in the Great Lakes region, and the Kivus in particular*”.<sup>170</sup> Originally, these civil wars were isolated conflicts in countries, but as many groups entered into alliances the wars achieved a regional dimension.<sup>171</sup>

After the Rwandan genocide, Mobutu used the Hutu forces in his country to destabilise Rwanda and Uganda. Besides this, he also seized the moment to oppress the Congolese Tutsi population. Kabila on his turn seized power in 1997 with the help of Rwandan, Uganda, Angola and Congolese Tutsi forces. These alliances were based on the principle “the enemy of the enemy is my friend”, and by this, proved to be very unstable. In 1998 a new conflict arose when Kabila’s allies turned his back on him.<sup>172</sup>

The presence of foreign (armed) groups does not only influence power and politics in the DRC, but also creates an excessive resistance of national armed groups against foreign presence. There has not been an effective response to the presence of foreign armed groups in the region neither by the Congolese government nor by the International Community or individual foreign states. Neighbouring countries and armed groups in particular have learned that they can earn more when the country is in conflict than by having peace and stability, especially with regard to the illegal exploitation of resources.<sup>173</sup> It is for this reason that the Kivu provinces are the main battleground of national and foreign armed groups, each striving for their own, opposite, goals.<sup>174</sup>



### 3.2.5 A weak economy and pressure for democracy

The DRC is potentially one of Africa's richest states due to its vast amount of natural resources. However, mismanagement, corruption, instability and war have left the country's economy largely underdeveloped and only benefiting a small minority of (political) elites since its independence in the 1960's. During the Cold War, the country's gross domestic product (GDP) increased significantly due to enormous amounts of foreign aid.<sup>175</sup> The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union marked a decline in aid flows into the country. As Ihonvbere and Mbaku (2003) state: *"the strategic and economic importance of the DRC and the rest of the continent diminished sharply in Western policy-making circles... in the absence of the communist threat, the United States and its European allies lost the incentive to prop the Mobutu regime and other client regimes in Africa"* (p.217).<sup>176</sup>

Foreign aid from Western countries became conditional; political reforms towards democratization were a condition for receiving aid. Initially, Mobutu was not willing to give up his one-man-rule, but international pressure forced him to appoint a transitional government.<sup>177</sup> However, he retained control over the country's most important institutions. As a result, in the 1990's, the country's formal economy started to disintegrate and its GDP declined. As the United States government describes it: *"hyperinflation of nearly 40 percent a month, government deficits in which expenditures exceeded revenues by more than four times, and plunging mineral production combined to make the country one of the world's poorest"*<sup>178</sup> and led to bankruptcy of the country in 1994. Through subsequent conflicts in the country and failing governance, its economy remained underdeveloped.<sup>179</sup>

This has made poverty in the country customary, it triggered further inequality and internal pressure for democratisation, and stimulated dissatisfaction amongst citizens.<sup>180</sup> In so doing, the lack of economic development and pressure for democracy launched further instability in the DRC. Whereas the faltering Congolese economy and pressure for democracy in itself are not an immediate cause of conflict, along with failing governance and the existing conflicts, these issues have triggered further instability. A weak economy and both internal and external pressure for democracy can therefore be looked upon as causes of conflict in the DRC.

## 3.3 The Kivu-provinces in flames

According to the International Crisis Group (2003) *"[The Kivu] area was the powder keg where ethnic massacres first exploded in the 1990s and regional war in 1996 and 1998. Indeed, it was the centre of three intricately linked conflicts inherited from Belgian colonialism, 32 years of misrule under Mobutu and institutionalisation of ethnic discrimination against Kinyarwanda-speaking citizens, and the extension of the Burundian, Rwandan and Ugandan civil wars. The Kivu situation is now complicated by direct military involvement of external actors, multiplication of local warlords and active exploitation of natural resources by both"* (p.i).<sup>181</sup> This description of the Kivus is not only concise and insightful, but also very striking.

### 3.3.1 A short history on conflict in the Kivu provinces

The effects of the Rwandan genocide in the DRC have been mainly visible in the Kivus.<sup>15</sup> The flow of Rwandan citizens into the Kivus, as described earlier, resulted in a Rwandan fight taking place on Congolese territory. This has resulted in Congolese resistance. A large part of Congolese armed groups stem from this time, fighting against foreign presence. Furthermore, the inability of the Congolese government to control its territory made the resource rich Kivu provinces the playground of both foreign and national armed groups.<sup>182</sup>

<sup>15</sup> For a map of the country and the Kivu provinces see Annex II and Annex III

In 1996, the DRC government announced that, the already suppressed and excluded, Banyamulenge were forced to leave the country. This started an uprising of the Banyamulenge against the Mobutu government. This conflict on identity and ethnicity quickly turned into a fierce resistance against Mobutu himself. Also Rwanda, Uganda and Kabila's *Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo-Zaïre* (AFDL) got involved in this resistance. In doing so, the Kivus became the main area where the overthrow of Mobutu's regime had started.<sup>183</sup>

By the time Kabila became president of the DRC, much of the ongoing problems in the Kivus were stabilised but not yet solved. Less than one year later, a new conflict arose in Congo, when Kabila turned his back on those countries that previously helped him into power. The main battleground, again, were the Kivu provinces. Rwandan and Ugandan forces invaded the DRC and Kabila called upon Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia and others for help. This resulted in the presence of many different foreign troops in the Kivus.<sup>184</sup>

This combined with tensions between the Banyamulenge and Congolese armed groups, and the withdrawal of cooperation between Rwanda and Uganda, the Kivu area became a chaos. The Kivu provinces became a melting pot of national and foreign armed groups and military troops. All were fighting for different reasons. Alliances were forged and broken off, by which actual cooperation became rather unclear and complex.<sup>185</sup>

As stated earlier, the war in the DRC officially ended by the signing of the Sun City Accords in 2003. The main problem with these peace agreements is that they failed to include all actors involved in conflict. Therefore, armed groups still pose an enormous threat to stability in the Kivus.<sup>186</sup>

The current political situation shows that there is a general lack of progress in state reconstruction, institution building and good governance. The already unstable Kivu provinces did hardly benefit from the peace process. They remained in the same flammable situation and still lack strong government influence.<sup>187</sup> Serious fighting by both foreign and national armed groups in eastern Congo continues to this day.<sup>188</sup>

### ***3.3.2 Main actors and armed groups involved in conflict in the Kivu provinces***

As outlined above, the Kivu provinces, North and South Kivu, have been a playground of war and violence for already 15 years. The area can be looked upon as a battleground of an intertwined local, national and international character. Local level conflicting parties are the Banyamulenge, Mai Mai, *Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda* (FDLR) and the *Congrès national pour la défense du peuple* (CNDP).<sup>16</sup> These parties do not only fight each other, but fight against the national government as well. National actors involved in conflict are the Congolese government and the *Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo* (FARDC). These actors mainly fight against national and foreign armed groups, as outlined above. At the international level, Rwanda also plays a particular important role.

#### ***3.3.2.1 Force Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR)***

The presence of foreign armed groups in the Kivus has been one of the main reasons of the (re)current conflict in the region. As argued earlier, these groups mainly came into existence as a result of the Rwandan genocide in 1994. As the main perpetrators in the Rwandan genocide, many of the Hutu militia's fled into eastern DRC after the seizure of power by Tutsi's in Rwanda. With the help of Mobutu they were able to rearm in the Congolese refugee camps, regrouped and settled in the Kivus.<sup>189</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> For an overview of main armed groups and actors involved in conflict in the Kivu provinces see annex IV

They fight against Tutsi rule and influence in the region and continue with their campaigns against Tutsi presence in the region. They fight against the CNDP, which protects the Tutsi's in the DRC. Next to this, they pose not only a threat for Congolese Tutsi's, but for all Congolese citizens, as they steal, rape and murder in the area, under the name FDLR.<sup>190</sup>

### 3.3.2.2 *Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP)*

As a reaction, Rwandan Tutsi's crossed the border into the DRC, seeking those responsible for the genocide. After attacking many Hutu refugee camps, they noticed that the country was full of resistance against Mobutu. Together with the Banyamulenge, Kabila's forces and backed by Rwanda, Uganda and Angola, they overthrew Mobutu, placing Kabila into power. Kabila rewarded these forces with seats in his government, but expelled them soon hereafter.<sup>191</sup>

These groups started a new rebellion against Kabila and the Hutu militias in the eastern part of the DRC, regrouped and operate under the name CNDP. The CNDP consists mainly out of Banyamulenge, soldiers from the former *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie* (RCD)<sup>17</sup> and dissidents from the FARDC. This group was mainly led by, the in January 2009 arrested, Laurent Nkunda and is now under the lead of Bosco Ntaganda. Their current role in the conflict is their military interventions that are said to be efforts to protect the Tutsi population in the DRC, against the FDLR, Congolese army forces, and others. It is assumed that they are supported by Tutsi led Rwanda.<sup>192</sup>

### 3.3.2.3 *Banyamulenge*

The Banyamulenge are Rwandan speaking migrants who arrived in the DRC from the 1880's on. The larger part of them is Tutsi and has been classified as 'ethnic citizens'. Since the DRC's independence the nationality and identity of the so called Banyamulenge became uncertain. Although they have nowadays been recognised as Congolese, land rights and leadership positions have been denied to them by the Congolese government. Furthermore, the larger part of the Congolese classifies them as Rwandan instead of Congolese. These issues have resulted in ongoing fights between the Banyamulenge and the DRC government on identity issues. Fights between the Banyamulenge and the Mai Mai have taken place as well. The Mai Mai fight against foreign presence and do not recognise Banyamulenge as Congolese, but as originally Rwandese. Lastly, the Banyamulenge are threatened by the FDLR because of their Tutsi ethnicity.<sup>193</sup>

### 3.3.2.4 *Mai Mai*

The presence of foreign armed groups has contributed to the resurrection of national armed groups, such as the Mai Mai. They are local community-based militias, originally established to fight against foreign interference. These interferences were seen as a threat to their local territory. The Mai Mai consists out of warlords, traditional tribal elders, village heads and politically motivated resistance fighters. One of the main problems of the Mai Mai nowadays is that it does not form a coherent group. During the years, their original goal of resistance against foreign interference has changed and they have allied themselves with different national and foreign armed groups, fuelling and prolonging the Kivu conflict. These alliances might change on a daily basis, which makes a full comprehension of their actual role difficult.<sup>194</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> The RCD was a rebel group mainly active in the Kivu provinces. Their fight, with the support of Rwanda and Uganda started off as an opposition against Kabila in 1998. Fractures in the RCD led to a dissolution of the rebel group around 2003. Nkunda, who was a senior officer with the RCD faction in Goma until 2003 later established the CNDP.

### *3.3.2.5 The Congolese government*

The Congolese government faces many difficulties with regard to the presence of armed groups in the Kivus. The 2008 Goma Agreement between the Congolese government and 22 armed groups has been one of the latest initiatives of the DRC government to work towards stability in the Kivus. This agreement has committed all parties to an immediate ceasefire, obliges them to disengage their forces from frontline positions, and forces them to abide international human rights law. Following the signing of the treaty, the Congolese government set up the Amani peace program, to further coordinate peace efforts in eastern Congo.<sup>195</sup> These agreements lay down a basis for peace and stability, but have not offered sufficient means to remove all armed groups. The Congolese government therefore had to call for Rwandan assistance in eradicating foreign armed groups. This newly created alliance between Rwanda and the DRC led to the arrest of the CNDP's leader Nkunda. New initiatives have been taken towards working together against the FDLR.<sup>196</sup>

### *3.3.2.6 FARDC*

Although the FARDC is formally under government control, reality is that the larger part of the FARDC can be looked upon as an actor in conflict itself. The FARDC is the Congolese national military force, which is responsible for defending DRC territory and national security. They are currently undergoing a reform by which also former members of armed group can be integrated in the FARDC. Their main task now is to fight against the presence of armed groups. The Congolese military suffers from corruption, looting, stealing and is regularly accused of the abuse of citizens. Therefore, they have often been referred to as a greater threat for the Congolese population than the armed rebel groups. Although they officially fight against foreign armed groups, alliances with FDLR and others can not be ruled out.<sup>197</sup>

### *3.3.2.7 Rwanda*

Both Mobutu and Kabila failed to address security issues in the eastern DRC, especially with regard to Tutsi minorities. This has been a reason for Rwanda, Uganda and other countries to intervene in the DRC regularly. The role of Uganda in the DRC decreased, as explained earlier, after frictions with Rwanda in 1999. In spite of the formation of several alliances with Kabila, the emergence of a new conflict could not be prevented in 1998. As a result, more foreign actors got involved in conflict in the Kivus.<sup>198</sup> After the Lusaka ceasefire agreement most of the foreign armies withdrew. But the ongoing conflict in the Kivus and the presence of many natural resources is a reason for many to keep interfering in a direct or indirect manner.<sup>199</sup> This interference of Rwanda has created much distrust and suspicion between Rwanda and Congo. One can witness a deterioration of their relationship over the last 15 years. Rwanda's support for Tutsi's in the DRC through intervention has not been appreciated by the Congolese government.<sup>200</sup> Rwanda's current role in the Kivu conflict is still vague. On the one hand Rwanda has been accused of maintaining ties with the CNDP, providing them with military material in exchange for resources. On the other hand, the recent alliance between the DRC and Rwanda led to the arrest of Nkunda and a fight against the FDLR.<sup>201</sup>

### *3.3.2.8 Actors in conflict and complexity*

To summarize, conflict in the Kivus has become increasingly complex. Due to the changing alliances between the various actors involved, the multiple national and international interferences and the lack of governmental control, the region has become a playing field for a myriad of rebel groups, armies and armed communities. This complex web of actors, alliances and conflicts makes it increasingly difficult to point down who is responsible for what and which causes of conflict and groups should be addressed.

The aims of the different armed groups simply cannot be united, neither be achieved, as they are often contradictory. The current security situation remains a fragile one. The presence and ongoing fights between armed groups continues to be a threat to the population and undermines peace efforts. In a next section, these causes of conflict and the complex entanglements of different interests of different groups will be explored in more detail.

### **3.3.3 Security situation**

It is important to look at how these complex relations and conflicts work out in the field today. In this section, therefore, the security situation in the Kivu area that results from the actions of these actors will be discussed. One of the main reasons of the presence of these complex webs of alliances is the vacuum left by insufficient governmental security.<sup>202</sup> Furthermore, a lack of government influence in combination with a weak national army constitutes new dangers and challenges to the United Nations Mission, MONUC, in the DRC.<sup>203</sup>

Due to the lack of government policies and actions, recruiting new soldiers has often been an easy task for many of the armed groups. This recruitment takes place voluntary, but also by the use of force. The other side of the medal is that continuous fighting resulted in thousands of deaths, hundreds of thousands of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP's), destroyed infrastructure and local population left empty-handed, often abused and traumatised.<sup>204</sup>

The 2008 Goma Agreement and the follow up Amani peace process have had mixed results. The Goma Agreement created a ceasefire between the different actors involved, but has been violated as early as four weeks later.<sup>205</sup> Renewed fighting has undermined the process and Amani efforts significantly.<sup>206</sup> After a period of relative stability, the latest clashes (between Nkunda's CNDP and the Congolese national army at the end of 2008) launched a new downward spiral of violence in the Kivus. In December 2008 new and encouraging peace negotiations have been held in Nairobi setting up a dialogue between the DRC government and the CNDP. The recent arrest of Nkunda on the 22<sup>nd</sup> of January 2009, gives many citizens new hopes for the future. Optimism is understandable, but taking away a leader of a rebel group does not automatically eradicate the rest of his army.<sup>207</sup> Furthermore, the FDLR and others have to be addressed as well. Much more efforts and reforms are needed to work towards durable peace in eastern DRC, which also requires addressing the causes of conflict.<sup>208</sup>

## **3.4 Causes of conflict in the Kivus**

This section addresses the main causes of conflict in the Kivu area. Besides general national issues, certain regionally/geographically specific features of the Kivu area are of much importance. These features have played an important role in the conflict in the Kivus. They can be divided into: (1) causes related to Kivus external borders (mainly Rwanda), (2) causes related to the specific institutional context of the region and (3) causes related to the social context of the area. Each will be briefly discussed below.

### **3.4.1 External borders**

The porous borders of eastern DRC with Rwanda and Burundi have played an important role in the current Kivu conflict. The openness of the borders has provided a basis for the relatively easy entry of Rwandan armed groups. On the other hand this also provided an exit opportunity for refugees. However, the relative openness of the borders has strengthened the national armed groups and by this explains most of the recent fighting.<sup>209</sup> Porous external borders can therefore be looked upon as one of the causes of conflict in the Kivus.

### **3.4.2 Institutional context**

The status and quality of the institutional context of a conflict area has an important impact on the stability and security in this area. The institutional context is defined here as the set of (legal) rules, regulations and control mechanisms provided by the national and local authorities in order to govern and control a certain territory. When looking into the institutional context of the DRC and the Kivus in particular it can be argued that this has an important impact on the continuation of the conflict.

The DRC is often described as a fragile state, which implies that it is seen as being “*unable to provide physical security, legitimate political institutions, sound economic management and social services for the benefit of its population*”.<sup>210</sup> Indeed, these characteristics can be associated with the DRC. As argued earlier, corruption, mismanagement and self-enrichment still commonly occur within the governmental context of the DRC.<sup>211</sup> Moreover, it can even be argued that (national) governmental control in the Kivus on a variety of fields is largely absent.

This lack of governmental control has created a situation in which armed groups are still able to continue their fighting. Another important issue is that the national army (FARDC) is barely under state control. Kinshasa has severe difficulties in steering it. Furthermore the external borders of the Kivus are still easily permeable and goods and persons can easily cross the borders. As a result many of the counties abundant resources are illegally exploited and transported to other countries without permission. On top of this, the policing and judicial systems in the region are still very weak and citizens mainly have to take care for their own security.<sup>212</sup> The general inability and unwillingness of the Congolese government to address the issues outlined above effectively can be seen as an important cause of the continuation of the conflict in the Kivus.

### **3.4.3 Social context**

Another element which is important to consider when looking into the development of security and stability in a region is the social context. The social context refers to the types and contents of social relations in a certain region. It includes both community structures, social relationships and tensions and conflicts between them but also refers to broader social categories such as culture and ethnicity. In the context of the Kivu region, the structure of the communities and their ethnic context are the most important categories to look at.

The Banyamulenge community, mainly found in South Kivu, have played an important role in many of the conflicts in the Kivu area. These migrants, mainly originating from Rwanda, arrived in the DRC from the 1880's onward. Until the independence of the DRC, relations between the Banyamulenge and surrounding communities were generally peaceful. Since Congolese independence, however, this has changed significantly as their nationality became uncertain. Although feeling more or less Congolese, the Banyamulenge were often classified as Rwandan. As a result of the Congolese identity politics, the access to land and government positions has been denied to them over a long period.

Many wars and attacks against the Banyamulenge followed during the years. This has resulted into a marginalisation of Banyamulenge identity in the Congolese context, and evaporated much of their hope on justice for their community. Due to this desperate situation, many of the Banyamulenge saw no other option than to fight against this injustice. Their fights and struggles are still going on today. There have however been some improvements for them in the last few years. Today identity rights and claims have been guaranteed by the DRC government. Other claims, however, have still been denied.<sup>213</sup>

Furthermore, the DRC government does not provide security to the Banyamulenge, while they are daily under attack of the FDLR, the Mai Mai and sometimes even the CNDP.<sup>214</sup> This has created and still continues to be an important source for conflict, as the Banyamulenge still aim to fight for a more secure and just situation in the Kivus

#### **3.4.4 Resources**

As argued earlier, the presence of abundant natural resources in the eastern DRC has not only been a reason of, but also fuels and prolongs the Kivu conflict. The presence of resources has been one of the main reasons for the foreign interest in the country. It has fuelled networks of corruption, caused many illegal trade flows and provided a reason for many armed conflicts. Due to the exploitation of these resources and the financial gains associated with it, armed groups have been able to continue their fights. The occupation of resource rich areas has enabled illegal trade of resources, weapons and money. In doing so, these groups have ensured their existence to a large extent.<sup>215</sup>

The (illegal) exploitation of resources is strengthened by the DRC governments' inability to control its resources and territory. Corruption also plays a role here. It can be argued that, for many, having a conflict in the region is more advantageous than peace and stability. Conflict in the region implies instability and a lack of governmental control, which allows for the illegal trade of resources. The possibility to illegally exploit resources has resulted into a situation in which actors rather fight and earn money, than settle and lay down their arms. It is the greed for resources and the struggle for power that lay at the basis of current conflict in the Kivus.<sup>216</sup>

### **3.5 The United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC)**

The United Nations Security Council established MONUC in November 1999, as an immediate effect of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement signed in July 1999. MONUC was established to facilitate the implementation of the Agreement. In August 1999, the UN SC first authorized the deployment of 90 military liaison personnel to the capital cities of all the states that had signed the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. The tasks of this military personnel varied from establishing contacts with all parties in the agreement, to assisting the parties and assuring their guarantees of cooperation and security, to providing information for the Secretary General regarding the local situation and on a possible further role of the UN in the implementation of the Agreement.<sup>217</sup> This formed a basis for further involvement of the UN in the DRC and activities of MONUC.

#### **3.5.1 Mandate**

In November 1999, the members of the UN SC decided that *“the personnel authorized under its resolutions 1258 (1999) and 1273 (1999), including a multidisciplinary staff of personnel in the fields of human rights, humanitarian affairs, public information, medical support, child protection, political affairs and administrative support, which will assist the Special Representative, shall constitute the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) until March 2000”*.<sup>218</sup> The MONUC mandate has been revised, extended and adapted several times in order to make it more applicable to the deteriorating situation. Moreover, since 1999 the UN SC authorized MONUC with many more and new tasks and responsibilities.<sup>219</sup>

In general, MONUC's mandate can be divided into five phases. These phases represent the different changes and extensions of MONUC's power and activities in the DRC. Phase one (SC resolution 1258, 1999) involved the establishment of a liaison force to determine the feasibility of the mission.<sup>220</sup> It provided the legal framework for the mission.

In the second phase (SC resolution 1291, 2000) MONUC was established and endowed with a Chapter VII mandate. 5,537 troops and 500 military observers were deployed for the mission. Their main task was to monitor the Lusaka ceasefire agreement and report on any disengagement.<sup>221</sup>

In phase three (SC resolution 1355, 2001; and 1445, 2002), MONUC started to focus on disarming and demilitarizing the foreign combatants and DDR in the DRC, and established a civilian police unit to train the Congolese police. Because of the deteriorating situation in the eastern part of the DRC, the mission's military strength was expanded with up to 10,800 forces.<sup>222</sup> Phase four (SC resolution 1565, 2004), aimed to provide for the necessary security means for the upcoming elections. Within the context of this resolution, reforming the security sector together with DDR and the stabilization of the Kivu provinces and Ituri became MONUC's most important tasks. During the elections, MONUC's force was increased with up to 17,030 military.<sup>223</sup> Phase five (SC resolution 1756, 2007) and onwards, expanded MONUC's mandate to further apply SSR and to contribute to 'effective governance' activities. Besides this, the resolution authorized MONUC to assist the DRC government in organizing local elections. Ongoing conflict in the Kivus made the SC decide to further increase MONUC's force.<sup>224</sup>

The timeline of MONUC's mandate and the development of its strengths and responsibilities clearly shows that its focus has changed quite a lot. Starting off as a peacekeeping and peace building operation for the whole country, it has gradually changed into a mission that responds mainly to the conflict in the eastern DRC. Now MONUC emphasizes on the building of a stable and secure environment, consolidate democracy and promote effective governance and building peace in the Eastern part of the DRC. The mission is currently working with all the different resolutions from previous years up to resolution 1856 (2008).<sup>18</sup> The reform of the security sector has become one of MONUC's most important tasks. Completing this process is not only looked upon as a condition for stability, but also serves as an exit strategy for MONUC.

SSR has been included in MONUC's mandate from 2004. The process of SSR has been delayed several times and faces many challenges.<sup>225</sup> SSR in Congo includes the effective restructuring and integration of the police, military and justice systems.<sup>226</sup> As argued earlier, Because of the importance of SSR for MONUC, but also for stability, this thesis will focus on SSR activities of MONUC and their effects. A further elaboration on MONUC's SSR mandate and activities will be given in Chapter 5.

### ***3.5.2 Organisational Structure***

The way in which missions are organisationally set up also affects their impact on overall peacekeeping and the building of peace. In this section the specific build up of the MONUC peacekeeping mission will be explored. The section will both deal with the organisational layout and the content of the mission. The UN mission in the DRC approaches peace building, reconstruction and achieving durable peace in an integrated way. In doing so, they aim to streamline a system-wide United Nations approach to peacekeeping and building in the country. This includes a close cooperation with other UN agencies, such as UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF and the WFP.<sup>227</sup> Because of these efforts MONUC can be classified as an Integrated Mission.

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<sup>18</sup> For a timeline of MONUC phase deployments and mandate history see Annex V, for the full document on resolution 1856 see annex VI



MONUC consists out of three main pillars: political affairs, humanitarian policies and military. This overall structure is divided into several sections and different divisions, and falls under the direct command of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). The Office of Public Information, the Office of the Police Commissioner, the Political Affairs Division, the DDRRR/DDR Office, the Rule of Law Office and the Human Rights Office are all part of the political affairs pillar, that falls under the office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG).

The humanitarian pillar includes the Integrated Office, United Nations specialized agencies, funds and programmes, the Security and Safety Section, the HIV/Aids Unit, the Electoral Assistance Division, the Civil Affairs Office, the Child Protection Section, the Gender Issues Section and the Mine Action Liaison Unit. These divisions and sections are under the command of the DSRSG (Humanitarian Coordinator). The military pillar can be divided into the Eastern Division Headquarters, Mission and Sector Headquarters, Military Contingents and Military Observers. MONUC has Headquarters, Sector Headquarters, Brigade Headquarters and Logistical Bases throughout the country. Their main Headquarters are located in Kinshasa and the eastern part of the country.<sup>19</sup>

Currently, the main areas in which peacekeepers and other UN personnel are deployed are Kinshasa and the Kivus. The current strength of the mission is 19,815 troops, 760 military observers, 391 police; 1,050 international civilian personnel, 2,183 local civilian staff and 591 United Nations Volunteers. The total number of staff strength can be further expanded, as set out in UN SC resolution 1856.<sup>228</sup> MONUC is one of the largest and most expensive missions in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.<sup>229</sup> For this reason there are high expectations of the mission.

### ***3.5.3 From mandate to policies and activities***

MONUC's mandate authorizes it to work towards institution and capacity building in the DRC. Policies and activities are largely developed at the MONUC HQ in Kinshasa and partly within the UN HQ in New York. Implementation of these activities takes place throughout the country by the different MONUC HQ's. In doing so, MONUC aims to adapt policies and activities to local realities on the ground. However, they often face difficulties in adapting policies and activities to specificities in a certain region, mainly because of strict policy guidelines. The only difference between different implementations of policies in different regions is whether a specific activity or policy is implemented or not.<sup>230</sup> Currently the main focus lies on the implementation of activities on human rights monitoring, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform (SSR) and other aspects related to building in the DRC.<sup>231</sup> The focus and vision of MONUC on SSR will be further explained in chapter 5.

### **3.6 Conflict in the DRC and the Kivus: causes, actors and interventions**

There are many factors that play a role in the current conflict in the DRC's Kivu area. This section has pointed out several of the most important causes of conflict, key actors involved and the role of the UN mission MONUC in it. The main causes of conflict in the Kivus and the Kivus that can be outlined are of a historical, political and geopolitical, cultural and material character. In fact it is the intricate connection between these factors that has created such a complex in the DRC and the Kivus. This complexity is added to by the even more complex relations between the wide variety of actors involved in the conflict.

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<sup>19</sup> For a map of deployment see Annex VII, for an organigramme of MONUC see Annex VIII

As these actors include both national as international, both rebels and legitimate security actors, it is quite difficult to pin down a single actor as the key responsible. This provides a key challenge for MONUC, especially with regard to providing security.

## Chapter 4: Security Sector Reform; from general theory to UN policy prescriptions

Since the end of the Cold War, good governance and state-building became a hot issue on the UN's peacekeeping agenda. The reform of the security sector is seen as one of the most important elements of such policies. It is nowadays commonly accepted that the reform of security sectors contributes to establishing those structures which contribute to preventing instability and conflict.<sup>232</sup> Next to this, reform of the security sector is expected to increase regional and international cooperation and to bring about sustainable peace.<sup>233</sup> This section will examine where these assumptions come from and are based upon.

For that reason this chapter will focus upon the conversion of SSR theories into general approaches towards SSR and notably into UN policy prescriptions. The chapter will start out with a brief explanation what the security sector is and how the sector is affected by war. Next, the chapter will elaborate upon SSR premises and theories. Then a closer look will be taken at how these theories have been translated into general approaches towards SSR of those concerned with this process. Next, key-actors in SSR and their goals and objectives will be described. In the remaining part of this chapter a closer look will be taken at the policy prescriptions of the UN concerning SSR.

### 4.1 Understanding the Security Sector

The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2007) expresses that *"security is fundamental to people's livelihoods, reducing poverty and achieving the Millennium Development Goals. It relates to personal and state safety, access to social services and political processes. It is a core government responsibility, necessary for economic and social development and vital for the protection of human rights"* (p.13).<sup>234</sup> Many organisations, such as the United Nations, agree with this notion and emphasise the importance of security, while recognising the difficulties in pursuing it.

Providing security to inhabitants is one of the most elementary tasks of national governments. In times of war, however, this core government responsibility can not always be fulfilled. This does not only create an enormous sense of insecurity amongst the country's citizens, but also poses many new threats to them.<sup>235</sup> When threats of violence, rape and murder become part of the every day life of civilians, this has enormous consequences for their wellbeing, and will also leave giant scars when war has ended.<sup>236</sup>

Although providing security to its citizens is the primary task of state governments, their capacity to provide security is often severely weakened in times of war. War has severe impacts on the security sector, frequently hampers it or even eradicates it.<sup>237</sup> Another important threat to the security of citizens is posed by the privatisation or criminalisation of the security sector in instable or war torn societies. In such a situation, the governments' responsibility to provide security for its citizens is often taken over by private or criminal parties. This leaves many people without security; as they are not able to pay the price those private organisations ask offering security.<sup>238</sup>

As security is one of the most important features that adds to human well being<sup>239</sup>, such challenges should be dealt with in peacekeeping missions. This insight has generated a deep interest in reforming, rebuilding or developing the security sector in (post) conflict countries by international political actors and institutions such as the UN.

It is believed that, reforming the security sector will not only increase people's security on the short term, but also enables them to develop economically and creates conditions for durable peace on the long term.<sup>240</sup>

#### **4.1.1 What is the security sector?**

Defining what a security sector is, is a precondition for understanding security sector dynamics on a whole. This section will therefore go into the current debate on what a security sector entails. It particularly focuses on which key actors should be included in a conceptualization of the security sector. Different authors identify different actors ranging from defence and law enforcement agencies to government ministries and civil society groups.<sup>241</sup> Important to note is that there is no exact understanding of what a security sector is, because it is a dynamic concept that evolves in response to changing needs and conditions.<sup>242</sup>

Edmunds (2002) makes the following distinction between definitions of the security sector. He describes that there are two different approaches that characterise the scope of the definitional debate. The first range of actors is more of a traditional type and includes mainly traditional security actors. These definitions focus upon armed forces and police who are authorised by the state to utilise force to protect the state itself and its citizens. The second approach entails a wider view on the security sector, which has become more common the last years.<sup>243</sup> But again, according to different authors, the security sector may entail many different institutions, bodies and actors.

In his article *The Post-conflict Security Sector*, Law (2006) defines the sector as “*all jurisdictions with a capacity to use force, both statutory and non-statutory, the authorities involved in their management, the parliamentary and judicial bodies that oversee them, and the civil society organisations that monitor, research, publicise and propagate ideas about the security sector*” (p.1).<sup>244</sup> His definition focuses on the main actors in the security sector and their functions. It is a somewhat abstract definition in the sense that it describes the security sector in broad conceptual terms.

The definition of the security sector by the Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR) has common characteristics with that of Law (2006). They refer to the concept as including “*traditional security actors such as the armed forces and police; oversight bodies such as the executive and legislature; civil society organisations; justice and law enforcement institutions such as the judiciary and prisons; as well as non-state security providers*”(p.3).<sup>245</sup> Besides the fact that it shows a large overlap with the definition given by Law (2006), it is more specific in naming the actors involved in the security sector and more inclusive as it also refers to non-state security providers, such as private security firms. It is important to include these actors, as they have become a major security provider during the time the state was unable or unwilling to do so.

The United Nations uses a broad definition of the concept describing the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of security in a country. According to the organisation it is generally accepted that the security sector includes “*defence, law enforcement, corrections, intelligence services and institutions responsible for border management, customs and civil emergencies. Elements of the judicial sector responsible for the adjudication of cases of alleged criminal conduct and misuse of force are, in many instances, also included. Furthermore, the security sector includes actors that play a role in managing and overseeing the design and implementation of security, such as ministries, legislative bodies and civil society groups.*”

*Other non-state actors that could be considered part of the security sector include customary or informal authorities and private security services*”.<sup>246</sup> Although they point out that no universal model of a security sector exists, they outline several common features, which effective and accountable security systems ought to have.

The OECD DAC views “security systems” as comprising issues such as internal control, executive control, parliamentary oversight, judicial review, civil society oversight. Besides describing these different layers, they also outline the different major actors involved in these layers and their main oversight mechanisms.<sup>247</sup>

As the discussion above has shown, there is a wide range of views on the security sector. Different authors ascribe different actors and organisations from different layers of society to the concept. They also outline different layers of security. There are almost as many definitions as there are scholars and institutional actors that write on the subject.<sup>248</sup> Nonetheless, despite of this heterogeneity of definitions, there seems to be a certain convergence on specific aspects of the security sector. Many authors stress the central role of those with the legitimate capacity to use force within the security sector. The UN, however, is the most explicit with outlining these actors and moves beyond more traditional actors such as army and police.<sup>249</sup> In line with the views of the UN, in this thesis the interplay between the traditional security actors and other official agencies such as intelligence, customs and border control will be taken into account. A second key dimension of the security sector outlined by most authors is the oversight and monitoring structure. Whereas some authors put this under the general label of parliamentary, judicial and civil society oversight, others speak more specifically about responsibility structures.<sup>250</sup> The importance of oversight structures will also be stressed in this thesis. In line with the definitions above, specific attention will be paid to civil society oversight mechanisms.

More specific differences between the different authors mainly concern the inclusion of non-state security sector actors in their definition of the security sector. Following the GFN-SSR and the UN this thesis will look into the specific roles played by non-state security actors as well.<sup>251</sup> An explicit feature which is only referred to by the UN is that they stress the importance of the context in which the security sector is embedded. They argue that there is no universal model applicable and that it is always related to the context.<sup>252</sup> This is an important insight, which does not commonly feature in studies about security sectors. The context specificity of the security sector will be one of the primary focus points in this study. Before going into the specific features of the security sector in the DRC, first the effects of war on the security sector will be discussed.

#### ***4.1.2 The effects of war on security and the security sector***

In wartime, state institutions, such as the police and judicial system, often aim to protect the interests of the state, a certain regime or a political elite rather than civilians. Regardless of their efforts, the capacity to protect civilians in wartime of such institutions is limited and mainly focuses on counterinsurgency. When operating in areas under enemy control, their functionality is severely restricted or not present at all. Moreover, in many cases these institutions actually engage in activities opposite to the role they are expected to play. They themselves often engage in (and are actively covering up) human rights violations. For them, keeping silent becomes part of every day policing and justice.<sup>253</sup>

According to Call and Stanley (2002) this often results in “*shattered social and community ties and weakened institutional and cultural constraints on crime and violent conduct*” (p.305).<sup>254</sup> Civilians in war torn societies themselves often also engage in violence, expecting and accepting it as a means of resolving conflicts.<sup>255</sup>

When war has ended, such issues and their impact on security do not dissolve automatically. Moreover, post-war societies then face many other threats and challenges in terms of security. Ending a war implies going through a range of changes and processes, such as disarmament and demobilisation and often asks for reforming or rebuilding the security sector. Former combatants and other actors in the security sector face the difficult task of reintegrating in society. Because in many cases there are only a few jobs in which they can use their former skills, they are often left unemployed. They frequently still possess their weapons and there is a strong incentive to resort to criminal activities.<sup>256</sup>

The same phenomenon occurs when wars are ended by the signing of a peace agreement. The capacities of states to deter criminal activities and unrest have often deteriorated after war and have affected the number of security personnel due to a lack of resources. These issues are often dealt with by peace agreements to prevent renewed conflict. As Call and Stanley argue: “*any combination of these weaknesses can create a permissive environment for criminal activity to escalate*” (p.306).<sup>257</sup> Even when a police system remains in tact, problems arise due to the fact that these systems have to shift their activities from political control to citizen protection and from serving privileged groups to serving an entire population.<sup>258</sup>

Contrary to this, public security privatisation is a much occurring problem in post-conflict societies. Public insecurity presents an opportunity for groups that possess weaponry, to present themselves as private sector protectors.<sup>259</sup> As the state fails to deliver security to their citizens, private security organisations aim to fill this gap, either for political or economical reasons.<sup>260</sup> This often results in post-conflict societies and security systems in which state control and influence on the security sector is limited or even lacking. Or, on the other hand, when the state succeeds in setting up a new security sector, it often lacks experience and sufficient power to fulfil its new tasks. Either way, ending war, hence, often poses enormous security threats to the population due to criminal activities of former police and military personnel, inexperience in providing security or security provided only to a part of the population.<sup>261</sup>

#### ***4.1.3 Development of the importance of reforming security sectors***

After having sketched out the different views on what a security sector is and which actors play a role in it, the next step in this thesis is to look at the process of security sector reform. As stated earlier, reforming the security sector has been widely recognised as an important step towards renewed state building and the creation of a secure environment in which state reconstruction and development is possible.<sup>262</sup> Understanding the concept of security sector reform also asks for a wider understanding of the context in which the concept has emerged. The importance of reforming security sectors emerged in a particular context. This context explains on a more detailed level why a certain view on reforming security sectors has been developed. In order to do so, this section starts out with a more or less chronological account on the importance of the reform of security sectors.

#### *4.1.3 Post Cold War contexts of security sectors*

During the cold war, security sector reform concerns were only of secondary concern for most states. Even development practitioners tried to avoid the issue. At that time, most security policies only focused on defending states from military threats. This approach changed with the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s.<sup>263</sup> No longer were state security policies then aimed at merely defending the state, but also other aspects of security started to attract attention. Issues such as the well being of populations and human rights were put on the security agenda. In this regard SSR became part of a wider human security framework.<sup>264</sup>

It was within this context that the issue of security became increasingly linked with issues of economic and social development. From both sides of the security and development spectrum the coordination and the integration of activities on security and development became seen as beneficiary. Security is one of the main concerns of those suffering from conflict, poverty and exclusion. It was believed that efforts in both fields would become more sustainable when addressing the problem of security as well. In this line security came to be defined in much broader terms. It was no longer seen as only security of the state, but now also included personal safety issues.<sup>265</sup>

Another context in which reforming security sectors developed is in United Nations peacekeeping. In the 1990's UN peacekeeping became the pivot of many initiatives on disarming and reintegrating foreign combatants. These efforts mainly aimed at the controlled reduction of troops. These disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs became widely seen as a key factor in peace building. As DDR was looked upon as one of the necessary elements to achieve durable peace, UN peacekeeping operations became increasingly involved in such programs. While programs on DDR are inextricably linked with the countries security sector and its efficiency, this also meant an increased on the importance of reforming security sectors.<sup>266</sup>

The last context in which reforming the security sector emerged is the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). At the end of the Cold War the EU and NATO undertook large efforts to acknowledge the importance of and to re-conceptualize the relationship between security and development. Besides their involvement in many peace processes, these organizations were confronted with the formerly communist states now willing to become part of the EU and/or NATO. Questions about their enlargement also evoked questions on the importance of reforming security sectors in these countries. The security sectors of these states were corrupt, hierarchical, and serving the interest of the state and should be reformed according to western European standards of the security sector.<sup>267</sup> Reform became one of the conditions of a potential membership, in which sharing the same values on security issues was key.<sup>268</sup>

In these contexts, security sector restructuring emerged as a key process. It has been widely accepted by development practitioners and security experts ever since the late 1990s.<sup>269</sup> Today, reform policies focus on creating a secure environment that is beneficial to development, poverty reduction, human rights, the development of democratic institutions, and law enforcement. In pursuing these objectives, reform relies on the state's capacities to take away main hindrances, and deal with difficult and complex problems. Importantly, states should primarily aim to address security threats that affect the well being of its citizens. In practice this means that a broad range of state institutions have to be involved in providing security.

Reform should not only aim at institutions such as the military and police, but should also include oversight bodies, justice and law enforcement institutions as well as civil society organisations and non-state security actors.<sup>270</sup> Whether reforming security sectors should take into account and build upon existing security structures or start off with a 'blank page' is still an issue of debate.<sup>271</sup>

## **4.2 From theory to approaches to Security Sector Reform**

What can be inferred from the discussion above is that reforming or restructuring state's security sectors is now one of the main focus points of the International Community.<sup>272</sup> As a badly developed security sectors can severely affect the progress of their work, the reform of the security sector has become one of the starting points of their policies.<sup>273</sup>

So now, reform of the security sector shapes many of the projects on security cooperation, international programmes for development and programmes to promote democracy.<sup>274</sup> Despite its wide occurrence in these international programmes, a generally accepted definition of the process is still missing. Very similar to the work on peacekeeping, there are different interpretations of what of security sector reform entails.<sup>275</sup> Next to this, many different concepts are used to refer to similar ideas. It depends on the preference of the organisation it is used by, whether the term development, reform or reconstruction of the security sector is used. This makes the field rather ambiguous and complex. The next section therefore will aim to clarify this complexity by the various views on security sector reform, its aims and the actors involved in the process.

### **4.2.1 What is Security Sector Reform?**

In the previous sections the different approaches towards the security sector, the context in which reform of the security sector takes place and how the concept has become part of the international security and development agenda have been outlined. This section will now take a look at the process of SSR itself and the key activities it includes. Despite of the fact that, as touched upon above, it is a relatively new concept and highly dependent on the context in which it is applied, some general aspects of the SSR process and its characteristics can be distinguished.<sup>276</sup>

Hänggi (2004) argues that: "*SSR is a relatively ambiguous concept, which refers to a plethora of issues and activities related to the reform of the elements of the public sector charged with the provision of external and internal security (p.1)*".<sup>277</sup> SSR is driven by the idea that an effective and efficient security system is a prerequisite for ensuring peace and security, democracy and sustainable development. According to Hänggi, this has to take place within a framework of accountability in order to give citizens opportunities to assess and influence the activities conducted by government institutions. This is often seen as a key element of democratisation.<sup>278</sup>

In his account on SSR, Edmunds (2002) pleads to include a more normative dimension to SSR. He refers to the SSR as "*the provision of security within the state in an effective and efficient manner, and in the framework of democratic civilian control*" (p.2). Normative about this is that Edmunds agrees that "*reform prioritises the provision of security within the state in a preferred way*" (p.2). According to Edmunds, the specific elements of SSR that need to be addressed largely depend upon the particular problems with the security sector in a country.<sup>279</sup>



The UK Government's Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) defines SSR as: "*a broad concept that covers a wide spectrum of disciplines, actors and activities. In its simplest form, SSR addresses security related policy, legislation, structural and oversight issues, all set within recognised democratic norms and principles*" (p.4).<sup>280</sup> This definition is more specific than the definition of Edmunds. It describes the elements of the security sector more specifically and relates it to democratic control. This is important because, as argued earlier, oversight mechanisms are of utmost importance to give accountability to the sector. Likewise, numerous of other organisations and scholars, such as Brzoska, & Heinemann-Gruder (2004) and Chanaa (2002), have developed a similar definition and approach towards SSR.

A definition of SSR that is widely accepted by international organisations, governments and development practitioners is the definition of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). SSR is defined by the committee as "*transforming the security system, which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions – working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance and thus contributing to a well-functioning security framework. SSR includes, but extends well beyond, the narrower focus of more traditional security assistance on defence, intelligence and policing*" (p.20).<sup>281</sup> Although the definition describes the process, outlines the most important actors involved and focuses upon its end goal, it remains rather vague what instruments are needed to achieve the objectives. Next to this, there is no visible reference to the different contexts in which such SSR takes place.

The United Nations Security Council is less explicit than other organisations when referring to SSR. While taking seriously that different UN organisations and entities use different definitions of the security sector and the concept of SSR, this paper takes the definition used by the Security Council as a starting point.<sup>282</sup> The UN Security Council is of the opinion that SSR is "*critical to the consolidation of peace and stability, promoting poverty reduction, rule of law and good governance, extending legitimate state authority, and preventing countries from relapsing into conflict*".<sup>283</sup> Therefore the council "*emphasizes that security sector reform must be context-driven and that the needs will vary from situation to situation*" and "*encourages States to formulate their security sector reform programmes in a holistic way that encompasses strategic planning, institutional structures, resource management, operational capacity, civilian oversight and good governance*".<sup>284</sup>

There is much overlap between the different definitions of SSR. Many authors stress the centrality of change and reform.<sup>285</sup> Most specific is the OECD definition as it focuses upon the importance of moving beyond more traditional security sector reform policies. Instead of singularly focussing upon the traditional institutions of military, policing and justice sectors, they aim to include many more actors in the definition.<sup>286</sup> A second issue of importance, stressed by most authors, is the issue of democratic control and accountability. Whereas some authors put this under the general label of good governance or "democratic control"<sup>287</sup>, others speak more specifically about responsibility structures.<sup>288</sup> The UN is more inclusive in its definition and specifies what good governance and democratic control entails by talking about the extension of legitimate state authority and about establishing clear structures of civilian oversight.<sup>289</sup>

More specific differences between the different authors are differences in the conceptualisation of the security sector and differences between descriptions of conditions of security sector reform. Edmunds (2002) makes an important remark on the conditions of SSR.

He underlines that SSR policies should also include the evaluation criteria of effectiveness and efficiency. By this, he stresses the feasibility of SSR.<sup>290</sup> More importantly, both Edmunds' and the UN's definition of SSR address the importance of more closely looking into the context and situational specificity of SSR.<sup>291</sup> Whereas other authors tend to be more specific about which actors to include and which strategies to follow<sup>292</sup>, both the UN and Edmunds argue that these elements are always context specific. The UN even takes one step further by stressing the crucial importance of national ownership of SSR.<sup>293</sup>

It is important to remark that SSR often takes place in very different contexts, such as the context of developmental, post-authoritarian and post-conflict states and regions.<sup>294</sup> All face specific problems and possibilities, involving different activities and actors, and require a different approach of dealing with SSR. These differences are outlined in annex IX.<sup>20</sup> For the purpose of this study on SSR in the DRC, here the focus will be on post-conflict contexts. A closer look will be taken at elements, aims and actors of SSR that are of particular importance to post-conflict contexts. The empirical part of this study will look into these various elements and dimensions of SSR in the field. In particular, it will explore the relationship between these more theoretical notions of SSR and the actual needs, ideas and perceptions of people and organisations living and working in the field. Building upon the above it will in particular look at to which extent SSR policies and activities of MONUC meet the needs and ideas of those living and working in the country. This will help to identify specific successes and flaws in SSR of MONUC and the United Nations in general. Before going in to this, however, the study will first outline general notion on the key aims and aspects of SSR

#### **4.2.2 Key aspects of SSR**

Besides the differences in SSR definitions, there are some commonalities as well. Most SSR approaches, according to Hänggi (2004), aim at “*developing affordable security bodies capable of providing security (operational effectiveness and efficiency aspect) and developing effective oversight mechanisms consistent with democratic norms (democratic governance aspect)*” (p.5).<sup>295</sup> Besides this, issues of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants, transitional justice and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons are also common features in approaches to SSR in post-conflict countries.<sup>296</sup>

Edmunds (2002) identifies five areas in which SSR plays an important role. Firstly, SSR plays an important role in the democratisation of countries. In most cases, security sector actors have a monopoly on using violence in a country. When the security sector becomes politicised, there is a risk of disturbing democratic processes taking place in the country. A certain degree of democratic control can assure that the security sector serves the demands of the majority. Therefore, effective and democratic control of civilians on the security sector is essential for democratisation. Secondly, SSR is seen as a key component of good governance. Engagement of security sector actors in activities such as corruption and crime can weaken good governance. It is now commonly agreed upon that a well functioning security sector serves as a corner stone for good governance. Furthermore, security sector actors play a positive role in economic development. It can secure the environment for legitimate economic activities and can remove instability and unpredictability. Next to this, security sector actors can contribute to the professionalisation of the state. This can be done by fulfilling the security demands of civilians in an effective manner and building confidence. SSR is also a tool for conflict prevention as it can facilitate the effective management of security problems, which in the future might lead to conflict or instability.<sup>297</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> For an overview of contexts in which SSR can take place, see Annex IX

According to Wulf (2004), in general, security sector reform initiatives address four broad dimensions: political, economical, social and institutional. The political dimension includes democratic and civilian oversight over the security forces. The aim of SSR in this area is to work towards a system of good governance, to strengthen the capacity of civil society to influence debates on the security sector, and to assure that there is civilian oversight of the sector. The economic dimension focuses on the allocation of necessary resources. Furthermore, an emphasis lies on guaranteeing efficient and effective use of resources. The social dimension of SSR outlines one of the key tasks of SSR policies, namely providing security to citizens. Reform efforts on this field aim at strengthening the capacity of security forces to protect citizens. The institutional dimension concerns the structure and governance of the security sector. It is argued that institutional and governing tasks need to be clearly defined to prevent overlap. Secondly, the structure of the security sector and its aims need to be clearly defined. SSR addresses both these issues with regard to the institutional dimension.<sup>298</sup>

#### **4.2.2 Key aims of SSR**

The broader aim of SSR, hence, lies firstly in establishing effective governance, oversight and accountability of the security sector. Secondly, SSR aims at improving justice and security services. Thirdly, developing local leadership and ownership of the reform process is a key element of SSR. Lastly, and most importantly, SSR aims at sustaining justice and security service delivery.<sup>299</sup> The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2005) states that: *“SSR involves the building of an accountable, effective and efficient security system, operating under civilian control within a democratic context, acting according to international standards, and respecting human rights, can be a force for peace and stability. It provides the necessary framework within which political, economic and social development can occur”*(p.20).<sup>300</sup> Bearing in mind that each situation requires a context specific approach, specific SSR activities should also be country and context related.

Nevertheless, the OECD (2007) sets out four general principles for effective SSR programs. The OECD argues that SSR programs should be aimed at improving the development of professional justice and security services for communities. Besides this, governance oversight of justice and security institutions needs to be strengthened to ensure accountability, and to ensure respect for human rights and the rule of law of security actors. Furthermore, local ownership of the SSR process and programs has to be guaranteed through increased government leadership and participation of civil society in the process. Finally, the sustainability of security services needs to be increased through the development of human resources and through the strengthening of budgetary processes and financial management.<sup>301</sup>

The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD indicates that: *“given its scope and complexity, the SSR concept spans a wide array of activities from political dialogue, policy and legal advice, training programmes, to technical and financial assistance”* (p.5).<sup>302</sup> They distinguish three main categories of reform activities. The first category includes activities that aim to restructure the security apparatus and to expand the capabilities related to fulfilling the core operational tasks of the security sector. SSR activities in this field include reform of the army and intelligence services, the police, the judicial system and other security sector actors. Reform activities in the second category aim at strengthening civilian oversight of the security sector. Such activities include capacity building of civil society groups, reform activities of civil management bodies as relevant ministries and advisory bodies, and more. The last category addresses the inheritance of conflict.

Activities that address these issues commonly include DDR related activities, transitional justice programmes, the protection of vulnerable groups and more. Activities in this category are often looked upon not as core SSR activities, but as SSR related activities.<sup>303</sup>

To summarize, SSR plays an important role in several areas. SSR efforts address a political, economic, social and institutional dimension. In doing so, initiatives on SSR can contribute to democratisation, good governance, economic development and professionalisation of the state. The aim of reform activities, although context specific, include the development of professional security deliverance and strengthening the accountability of the sector. In order to do so, national participation and ownership are crucial.

Notwithstanding the importance of SSR in post-conflict countries in ensuring stability, and state reconstruction and building, some scholars argue that SSR is too ambitious. Whereas the concept increasingly shapes international programs on development assistance, security cooperation and promoting democracy its effectiveness is still not clear. The few studies published on SSR indicate that there is a large optimistic attitude to SSR, but that this is based upon future perspectives rather than on its real performance.<sup>304</sup> Another point is the effectiveness of SSR. The OECD handbook on Security System Reform (2007) outlines several aspects of SSR with regard to designing and implementing SSR programmes. However, a mechanism for assessing the effectiveness of SSR has not yet been developed. This is also not addressed by much of the literature on SSR.

#### ***4.2.3 Key actors of SSR***

In post-conflict countries there is a lack of local resources and know-how, and institutional frameworks are often rather weak.<sup>305</sup> SSR, therefore, is most often executed by external (international) actors in cooperation with national actors. There are different means through which external, international actors, become involved in SSR in a country. Three main means of involvement can be identified: (1) lobby and advice, (2) training (3) technical and/or financial support.<sup>306</sup> Most often a combination of all these forms of support is present in a country, as different forms of support are given by different organisations. For international actors the promotion of development and democracy, building peace, and/ or extending political influence plays an important role for their involvement in SSR in a specific context.<sup>307</sup>

In reforming the security sector, a distinction can be made between the role of national actors, international actors and those who are part of the reform process itself. This last group consists out of all actors who are part of a security sector in a country. International and national NGO's also play a role in SSR, but often their role is only small and based on partnerships with national and international governmental actors. National and international actors who are involved differ per context, but a general classification can be made.<sup>308</sup>

The primary actor of SSR design and implementation should be the national government of a country, argues Chanaa (2002). It has to come to an agreement (in most cases together with the International Community) on how the security sector should be reformed, what the aims are of the security sector and how tasks will be distributed.<sup>309</sup> On an international level, there is an increasing number of actors engaged with SSR. In this regard, a distinction should be made between the involvement of International Organizations (IO's), Regional Organizations (RO's), International Financial Organizations (IFO's) and individual donor countries.<sup>310</sup>

Most often the engagement of individual donor countries is based on bilateral agreements. For international, regional and international financial organizations SSR has become a part of the array of activities they conduct in the light of peacekeeping, reconstruction and/ or development.<sup>311</sup> The larger part of these organizations already worked on SSR related issues, such as training the military, police and reforming the judicial system. The main difference lies now in the fact that currently such activities take place under the umbrella concept of security sector reform, whereas previously such activities took place separately. As the UN SC (2007) indicates: “*the contemporary prominence of SSR in the UN follows decades of Council and UN agencies involvement in SSR in practice if not in name*”.<sup>312</sup> The same applies to many other organisation and countries.

Civil society should be also involved in SSR policy making. Ball (2006) describes that there are four roles for civil society to play in order to influence accountability and policy formulation of the security sector. As she states, civil society can “*act as a watchdog, foster change, help develop norms of democratic behaviour and provide technical input to policymaking and implementation*” (p.4).<sup>313</sup> There is still much debate on the inclusion of non-state actors in SSR. Although some include non-state actors in their definition, these are often not included in SSR programs or activities.<sup>314</sup>

Security sector reform in one sector can affect reform in other sectors, and in so doing might influence other aspects of governance. Therefore SSR necessitates a coherent, integrated and holistic approach. This approach requires cooperation between key security, political and development organizations and actors in both design and implementation.<sup>315</sup>

### **4.3 The United Nations policy framework on SSR**

The previous section shows that SSR stems from the search for solutions to problems associated with peace consolidation. Nowadays, organisations such as the United Nations, the European Union and developmental agencies are drawn to the idea that SSR can contribute to good governance, democratisation and the prevention of instability and conflict. In the last ten years, SSR has, therefore, become an integrated part of their policies on reconstruction and transformation of post-conflict countries.<sup>316</sup>

The United Nations is one of the core organizations involved in SSR. SSR is nowadays often part of their Integrated Missions. In this study, the focus will be upon on the SSR policies and activities of the main actors that shape peacekeeping missions, which are the UN Secretariat and the UN SC.<sup>21</sup> This section highlights how the theories outlined earlier have influenced the United Nations policy agenda on peace and development. Furthermore, current UN policies towards SSR will be described.

#### **4.3.1 From theory to policy; SSR and the United Nations**

The UN is one of the key practitioners of SSR. It has integrated SSR policies in many of its peacekeeping missions. According to the UN Security Council (2007) “*supporting the reform of national security institutions, and civilian control, oversight and governance of the security sector have all been recognized in the past as part of the overall equation in helping to restore peace and security in a post-conflict situation*”.<sup>317</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> As stated earlier, the United Nations system is a large one, which consists out of many different organs, departments and sub-organizations. For the purpose of this study, a choice has been made to focus on the UN secretariat and the UN Security Council. When the UN or UN approaches are mentioned, they refer to both of the UN organs.

However, it is only since the last years that the UN refers to specific activities as part of a broader SSR framework. It nowadays includes matters relating to SSR more often in mandates of its peacekeeping operations.<sup>318</sup> Furthermore, the United Nations started to acknowledge the importance of creating links between security and development and takes seriously the integrated dimension of SSR.<sup>319</sup>

The link between security and development in UN policies is not new, neither are SSR related UN activities. As the UN SC (2006) puts it, “*for many years now, the United Nations system has also been engaged in a wide range of SSR activities, although not necessarily under the label of SSR*”.<sup>320</sup> It can be argued that, the current UN vision on security and security sector reform finds its basis in the Millennium Declaration. The link made between development and security, which is of much importance here, is that the UN emphasises to address the root causes of conflict of which economic security is one. In order to do so, the UN has broadened its definition of the concept of security. This re-conceptualisation entails an approach that goes beyond political and military aspects of security only is necessary, the UN formulated numerous basic principles towards engagement in SSR. Below the basic principles of the UN concerning SSR are outlined (see Figure 1).<sup>321</sup>

- (a) *The goal of the United Nations in security sector reform is to support States and societies in developing effective, inclusive and accountable security institutions so as to contribute to international peace and security, sustainable development and the enjoyment of human rights by all;*
- (b) *Security sector reform should be undertaken on the basis of a national decision, a Security Council mandate and/or a General Assembly resolution, the Charter of the United Nations and human rights laws and standards;*
- (c) *In order to be successful and sustainable, support in the area of security sector reform must be anchored on national ownership and the commitment of involved States and societies;*
- (d) *A United Nations approach to security sector reform must be flexible and tailored to the country, region and/or specific environment in which reform is taking place, as well as to the different needs of all stakeholders;*
- (e) *A United Nations approach to security sector reform must be gender sensitive throughout its planning, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation phases. It must also include the reform of recruitment processes and improvement in the delivery of security services to address and prevent sexual and gender-based violence;*
- (f) *A security sector reform framework is essential in the planning and implementation of post-conflict activities. Ideally, security sector reform should begin at the outset of a peace process and should be incorporated into early recovery and development strategies;*
- (g) *A clearly defined strategy, including the identification of priorities, indicative timelines and partnerships, is required for the implementation of a security sector reform process;*
- (h) *The effectiveness of international support for security sector reform will be shaped by the integrity of motive, the level of accountability and the amount of resources provided;*
- (i) *Coordination of national and international partners' efforts is essential. Lead national entities and a designated international counterpart should be identified wherever possible;*
- (j) *Monitoring and regular evaluation against established principles and specific benchmarks are essential to track and maintain progress in security sector reform.*

Figure 1: Basic principles United Nations engagement in Security Sector Reform (Source: A/62/659-S/2008/39)

The most important elements of SSR, distinguished by the UN, are (1) national ownership and the full commitment of states and societies involved, (2) context related and flexible approaches, (3) gender sensitivity and (4) coordination between all involved in reform.

In line with the earlier discussion of definitions of SSR, the United Nations currently looks upon SSR as a process that aims to improve the security of a state and its people. It includes aspects such as the development of the justice system, and the (internal) governance of security sector institutions.<sup>322</sup> Moreover, they embrace the vision that “*a commitment to effective SSR is a part of comprehensive and sustainable peacekeeping and peacebuilding strategies*”.<sup>323</sup>

Despite the fact that the UN recognises the importance of SSR, a common UN approach towards SSR is still absent.<sup>324</sup> The organisation itself recognises that this is a weakness. Currently they are working on a working-definition of the concept and the principles on which this should be based. Indeed, they are looking for a more suitable role for the UN in SSR.<sup>325</sup> Nonetheless, even without an unambiguous definition the organisation continues to work on SSR in peacekeeping operations.

#### **4.3.1 SSR and UN peacekeeping operations**

In 2007 the UN Security Council noted that a professional, accountable and effective security sector is of key importance for the consolidation of peace and security. Therewith the UN recognises the significance of SSR in preventing countries from relapsing into conflict and laying the foundations for durable peace.<sup>326</sup> In assisting countries to make the transition from conflict to sustainable peace and development, the United Nations has set up various programs on SSR.<sup>327</sup> Most often these programmes are part of the organisations' multidimensional peacekeeping operations or integrated missions. Such peacekeeping missions usually *"have mandates which routinely include broad tasks such as police and defence reform, restructuring, training and operational support; assistance in the restoration and reform of judicial and prison systems; support for the restoration of state authority and administrative capacities at central and local levels; good governance; support for civil society; and assistance to constitutional processes"* (p.1).<sup>328</sup> All of these tasks are looked upon by the UN as necessary elements of an effective SSR assistance strategy.<sup>329</sup>

Although the UN is one of the most important actors in the field of SSR, it emphasizes that states are and should be the primary providers of security. *"This is their sovereign right and responsibility"* (p.25).<sup>330</sup> The UN, therefore, describes its own task in security sector reform as one of supporting national actors in maintaining and enhancing their capacity to meet their responsibilities. This of course refers to a broader framework of human rights and the rule of law.<sup>331</sup> Point of departure is that security, development and human rights are independent and mutually reinforcing conditions for durable peace.<sup>332</sup>

For the UN, an approach towards security sector reform in post conflict situations is based on three clusters of objectives: (1) the construction of a new institutional framework, (2) dealing with armed groups and (3) the set up of accountable and durable security structures. As the UN update on SSR (2007) outlines *"(i) the build-up of new security sector institutions, where none exist or are acceptable for reform by the International Community, or the retrenchment of overwhelmingly controlling, present, repressive and threatening state security institutions from intervention into politics, economy, and society, where such institutions continue to exist; (ii) the disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration, transformation, and prosecution of illegitimate armed non-state actors in order to re-establish a state monopoly of legitimate violence; (iii) the long-term goals of building-up accountable, efficient and effective security forces"*.<sup>333</sup> The UN aims to achieve these objectives by using many different instruments *"ranging from (a) strengthening civilian and democratic participation and control through (b) reallocating military (material, economic and human) resources for civilian ends ('conversion', 'demilitarisation' and control of military spending) to (c) reforming military and police institutions to perform specific tasks ('professionalisation', 'capacity building'), (d) developing an independent judiciary and a humane penal system ('rule of law') and (e) undertaking security analysis and creating policy models"*.<sup>334</sup> The UN stresses that these instruments should be adapted to the context in which they find themselves.<sup>335</sup>

These objectives and instruments form the basis of UN SSR activities. Other aims and policy implementations are often context specific and take into account local realities.<sup>336</sup> Hence, this specific approach towards SSR that the UN takes on depends on the country in which a UN peacekeeping operation operates. The UN objectives outlined above describe the general UN approach towards SSR. As the UN acknowledges the importance of making SSR policies context specific, their general notion of SSR policies and activities are taken as a starting point for SSR in the DRC but are not determinant or definite. The more context specific description of MONUC's mandate and activities on SSR will be given in chapter 5.



## Chapter 5: different levels of SSR policies and activities in the DRC; who is who in the zoo?

A typical expression in Swahili is “*avumaye baharini papa kumbe wengi wapo*”<sup>337</sup>, which says that a shark might be the most famous predator in the sea, but that there are also many others. This saying describes very well the security sector reform situation in the DRC. In the DRC, the United Nations mission in Congo might perhaps be the most important actor in the field, however there are also many others working on the issue. It is therefore important to consider the roles of both MONUC and those of other actors in the field. This chapter starts off with a brief explanation of the DRC’s contemporary security sector. Then the different SSR initiatives in the DRC will be described. Next, MONUC’s SSR mandate and activities will be outlined. Lastly, a closer look will be taken at some of the other key actors involved in SSR in the DRC.

### 5.1 SSR in the DRC

From colonisation onwards, the DRC’s security sector has most of the time been under the direct rule of (political) elites. Because the security sector was mainly steered by the interest of these elites, it was never able to fulfil the task of protecting citizens. For this reason, SSR in the DRC has become one of the main challenges for national and international actors. The 2002 Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition highlighted the first steps to be taken by the DRC government on SSR. From that moment, many new initiatives on the process have taken place. This section will elaborate on the status quo of the security sector in the DRC and the preceding SSR initiatives taken.

#### 5.1.1 *The status of the security sector in the DRC*

For decades, both the army and the police have served to secure the individual political and economic interests of politicians and officers rather than providing security to citizens. The security sector in the DRC could be characterised as rather chaotic as there was much confusion on the role of the army, the police force was weak, civilian oversight was largely absent, there was much unequal treatment of civilians, there were many human rights violations and much corruption. These structures have been established under colonial rule, have been maintained by Mobutu and have not undergone any significant change ever since. The Congolese security sector of today can be looked upon as the path dependent result of this earlier structure. The issues that weakened the Congolese security sector in the past still influence the sector today.<sup>338</sup>

The Congolese army has never been in the position to provide the DRC with a secure environment. During both the colonial period and the Mobutu regime the army has been systematically used as a tool of the ruling, rapacious elites. As such, the army has always served the interests of those ruling the country, instead of serving general interests. The remainder of the army today is one which is unable to protect the country’s territory, which is poorly trained and badly paid. They have to comply with three different, often competing due to personal interests, chains of command; the president of the DRC, the Minister of Defence and the chief of the FARDC.<sup>339</sup> In addition to this, the poor and irregularly payments made them resort to plundering and abusing the local population and have sometimes caused them to link up with armed groups.<sup>340</sup>

The Congolese police have never managed to provide basic law and order in the DRC. From the colonial times on, they were highly fragmented, corrupted, and poorly trained and equipped. The Congolese army and police are severely underpaid.

This has resulted in a situation in which the Congolese police is searching for a way out through corruption, extorting and abusing the population, and obtaining additional incomes through armed groups.<sup>341</sup> The Congolese police nowadays consist out of the former *force publique*, the civil guards, the urban police, the gendarmerie and the policing components of former rebel groups. Hence, the PNC is not only comprised of police officers, but also former servicemen and former militia. The in 2005 established *Groupe Mixte de Réflexion sur la Réforme et la Réorganisation de la Police Nationale Congolaise* (GMRRR)<sup>22</sup> has indicated that the PNC is not in any way capable to ensure the safety of Congolese citizens.<sup>342</sup> In 2008 the *Comité de Suivi de la Réforme de la Police* (CSRP) was created to monitor the process of police reform. This committee encounters serious challenges in defining its role, as the structure, nature and role of the police have not yet been officially formulated.<sup>343</sup>

The judicial sector in the DRC is more of a conceptual construct, than a real and working institution. This sector in the DRC has more often served political elites rather than the general population. Justice has always been an extension of politicians, and army and police officials, ensuring that their position could not be endangered by anyone. Moreover, the majority of cases have never been brought to court, due to pre-emptive interventions by the police or army. Those who do serve the population are largely ill trained. To put it bluntly, the judicial system is largely undeveloped and judgements are often influenced by the police, the army and politicians.<sup>344</sup>

Dahrendorf (2008) identifies three aspects of an effective security structure, namely: the ability to protect national territory against aggression and internal threats, adherence to the rule of law, and the ability of security services to protect and respect citizen's rights.<sup>345</sup> When applying the above to the DRC, it becomes clear that Congolese security forces and institutions are deficient on all these fields. The inability of the security sector to fulfil its tasks has created a situation in which the security sector is more of a threat to the population rather than a contribution to their security.<sup>346</sup> Human right abuses, sexual violence and looting by the police and army are often not brought to court. This has created a society in which impunity is more the rule than the exception.<sup>347</sup> Besides this, there is a huge gap between the actual size of police and army and the numbers mentioned in official documents, which can be attributed to corruption<sup>348</sup>. This makes the questions on whom and what needs to be reformed unclear. Furthermore, there are many private security companies that have filled in the gap created by an inefficient security sector. This has made security a privilege for those who are able to pay for it, or for those in power.<sup>349</sup>

### **5.1.2 SSR efforts in the DRC**

Security sector reform in the DRC is looked upon as a cornerstone of effective governance and future stability in the country. The current form of the security sector has proven to be a threat to the population, as it is largely inefficient, corrupt, and linked up with armed groups and power struggles. To address this, SSR in Congo has become part of a broader framework of programs that aim to develop and reform state institutions.<sup>350</sup>

The 2002 Global and All-Inclusive Agreement created a basis for power sharing in the DRC. Despite the fact that it laid down basic plans for the new governance of the DRC and aimed to reunite the country, and create elections and DDR, it was rather superficial concerning SSR.

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<sup>22</sup> The groups consists out of 25 Congolese and international experts. It was Established to review the current status of National Police of Congo. Their main purpose is to draw up recommendations defining the police in accordance with the new Constitution and to draft organic legislation on the organisation and operation of the police.

As the International Crisis Group (2006) puts it: “*no comprehensive security sector review was undertaken and thus no systematic effort was made to base the new security services on a careful assessment of risks, needs and capabilities*” (p.3).<sup>351</sup> The main emphasis was on providing security for the elections in 2006, and some other small activities and reforms were identified. International partners were asked to assist in implementing the ‘*tronc commune*’ of SSR; supporting and coordinating DDR of Congolese combatants and the integration and reform of the armed forces and the national police.<sup>352</sup>

Prioritising the development of security conditions for the election, SSR efforts were mainly aiming at a process of *brassage*, in combination with training the new national army forces, and training on crowd control and protection of the national police.<sup>353</sup> *Brassage* can be looked upon as an endpoint of preceding DDR efforts, the reintegration phase. At the end of the DDR process, combatants can choose between a civilian life or being part of the new army. The term *brassage* is used for describing a process of the integration of different Congolese armed groups (with exception of the CNDP)<sup>23</sup>, into the national army, which goes hand in hand with the relocation of the operation area.<sup>354</sup> The approach towards army integration and reform shows that the process of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration is inextricably linked with reforms within the security sector. As DDR is the foundation of army integration, a successful completion of DDR is a necessary condition for SSR.<sup>355</sup>

In 2004, MONUC was mandated to establish three joint Commissions on SSR, on the development of legislation and the elections.<sup>356</sup> These commissions were aimed at outlining reform priorities, evaluating progress, building a basis for information sharing and to coordinate technical and financial assistance. The Congolese government, MONUC and other international partners were involved in these commissions. Parallel to the establishment of the joint commission, the World Bank and Congolese authorities started to coordinate the national DDR programme. Despite of the fact that much progress has been made, the commissions identified many coordination difficulties between international SSR actors and the highly diversified transitional government. As a result, individual donor countries established many bilateral agreements with the DRC government on *brassage* and SSR instead of developing shared ones. This substantially complicated the coordination of SSR activities.<sup>357</sup>

Despite the initial focus of the transitional government, at the end of the transition process many SSR problems remained unresolved. The Congolese army (FARDC) was unified on an artificial basis, still remained poorly trained and badly equipped, and was highly politicized. In so doing, posed more of a threat to the population, rather than protecting them.<sup>358</sup> Police reform was limited and judicial reform had more or less remained absent. Furthermore, civilian oversight on security institutions had not yet been effectively established. As argued by Onana and Taylor (2008): “*While the transition concluded in the formal sense with elections and a government and other new institutions installed, it had not concluded in the sense of state-building and reform*” (p. 512).<sup>359</sup>

Since the establishment of the country’s new democratic system of governance in July 2006, many activities have taken place. SSR in the DRC, however, advanced only slowly. The national DDR programme, CONADER, stopped, due to failure and mismanagement.

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<sup>23</sup> Nkunda refused to let his troops take part in a DDR programme ending in *brassage*. He compromised with the DRC government that his troops would be mixed with FARDC troops, under certain conditions: his forces would not take part in retraining and would not be relocated within the country.

This resulted in a shortage of funding for DDR and overshadowed many of the already achieved results.<sup>360</sup> The repeating clashes between the different armed groups often made them prioritize fighting over voluntary participation in DDR, which made the case even worse.<sup>361</sup> This delayed the reform of the Congolese army and SSR in general. Furthermore, as there is still no agreement on an overall SSR strategy, there is still no general coherent body of policies present in the field.<sup>362</sup>

In February 2007, the DRC government adopted the Governance Compact. The agreement set out a clear, but ambitious reform plan for the country and included a section on SSR. This agreement mainly focussed on the army. In this plan, the following priorities were listed for army reform: (1) drafting a white paper on defence and army reform, (2) establishing a chain of payment for the army, (3) supporting the creation of integrated brigades, and some other details. As a follow up, the first round table talks on army reform took place in July 2007.<sup>363</sup>

After these priorities were set, there was only limited progress in the development of a SSR-strategy, until September 2007. At that time a reform plan of the army was presented by the DRC government. As a result five groups were established to investigate the following issues: (1) identifying the threat to invest forces, (2) which forces are needed in the army, (3) the administration of the army, (4) training and infrastructure. These groups brought forth a plan for the next twelve years which among other things included the completion of DDR and army integration, the establishment of a legal framework for army reform and the development of a rapid reaction force. Ownership of the plan was Congolese, but international donors were willing to send personnel and resources. After being rejected by the Ministry of Defence, the agreement was put off the table.<sup>364</sup> Despite the fact that the Ministry of Defence is an integral part of the DRC government, the plan was only rejected by this ministry as the plan would encompass less power for the Minister and Ministry of Defence.<sup>365</sup>

The February 2008 new Roundtable talks on SSR have been the most recent initiatives of national and international donors to work towards a common strategy on SSR. The conference focussed on the reform of the FARDC, the *Police National Congolais* (PNC) and the justice department. They differ from earlier Roundtable talks which only focussed upon the reform of the army.<sup>366</sup> The DRC government presented its approach towards SSR to the International Community. It was left to the International Community to decide whether and how they would assist the government. Follow up thematic meetings have been held since, in order to coordinate support and funding, and to work towards short, medium and long term objectives on specific issues within police, justice and army reform.<sup>367</sup> These committees work amongst others on the specific SSR needs in eastern DRC.<sup>368</sup>

A feasible, agreed upon, overall SSR strategy (*plan global pour RSS*) has not yet been achieved.<sup>369</sup> But the recognition that cooperation between national and international actors is key to improvement and that an overall discussion on SSR is now taking place gives many hope for effective SSR in the future.<sup>370</sup>

It should be noted that bilateral agreements between individual donor states and the DRC government might undermine collective efforts of national and international SSR actors. Next to this, the diversity of actors working on SSR in the DRC is a challenge for cooperation between them.<sup>371</sup> New funding by the Worldbank for the renewed national DDR programme has provided opportunities for progress on DDR, despite the fact that the process still faces many challenges.<sup>372</sup> Current initiatives and activities already taking place highlight this.

The main task now is to work a national and international agreement about a SSR strategy in which political willingness of national and international actors is necessary, and realism should not be overshadowed by personal interests.<sup>373</sup>

## **5.2 From policy to practise; MONUC and SSR**

By building upon the theories and developments in the field, the UN has formulated some general policies on SSR. As the United Nations recognizes, SSR and policies on durable peace “*must be context-driven and that the needs will vary from situation to situation*”.<sup>374</sup> Therefore the UN has developed a context specific approach towards SSR in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The earlier discussion of general developments on SSR in the DRC has highlighted that MONUC, together with the DRC government, is one of the main actors on SSR. This section, therefore, will elaborate on MONUC’s role in the process. Firstly, MONUC’s mandate on SSR will be described. Next, the section will describe national and Kivu specific MONUC efforts on SSR.

### **5.2.1 SSR Mandate MONUC in the DRC**

Security sector reform is a core element in the mandate of MONUC, but initially it never was included in their mandate.<sup>375</sup> Initially MONUC addressed SSR by creating a DDR/ DDRRR Division responsible for disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration/ reinsertion, rehabilitation, and reconciliation of respectively national and foreign armed groups. Until 2006, MONUC’s involvement in SSR was only generally referred to as the objective to “*provide advice and assistance to the transitional government and authorities [...] in order to contribute to their efforts, with a view to take forward [...] security sector reform, including the integration of national defence and internal security forces together and, in particular, the training and monitoring of the police, while ensuring that they are democratic and fully respect human rights and fundamental freedoms*”.<sup>376</sup> From mid 2006 on, MONUC was authorized to take on specific SSR tasks, by Security Council resolution 1756 (2006). Hence, a separate SSR Division was created. The main problem however, is that there was still no general UN secretariat approach towards SSR. It was not until the beginning of 2007 that the UN started working on a general approach towards SSR that also focussed on the role of MONUC on SSR in the DRC<sup>377</sup>.

Although the UN recognizes that SSR is a broad concept, the mandate of MONUC on SSR has been limited to reforms of the police, justice and army system. Strictly taken, the mandate of MONUC on SSR can be divided into (1) supporting and assisting the new government in the development of a global approach towards SSR for Congo and the coordination of SSR activities in the country, (2) developing reform plans for the army, police and justice, (3) supporting the management and operational needs of security sector actors by providing basic training to the FARDC, police and of actors in the judicial sector. The main emphasis of MONUC currently lies within the development of a Congolese SSR strategy, developing sector specific reform plans and army reform.<sup>378</sup>

Underlining the above, the UN Security Council mandated MONUC at the end of 2008 with a more specific mandate on SSR. MONUC has been mandated to “*provide military training, including in the area of human rights, international humanitarian law, child protection and the prevention of gender-based violence, to various members and units of the FARDC integrated brigades deployed in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as part of international broader efforts to support the security sector reform*”

and “in coordination with international partners, including the European Union operations EUSEC and EUPOL, to contribute to the efforts of the International Community to assist the Congolese Government in the initial planning process of the security sector reform, to build credible, cohesive, and disciplined Congolese armed forces and to develop the capacities of the Congolese national police and related law enforcement agencies”.<sup>379</sup>

### 5.2.2 National SSR activities MONUC

Most actors involved agreed that the development of a *plan global* on SSR should be the cornerstone of SSR in the DRC. The *plan global* should not only outline the current situation, or the reform needed and the end stage aims of reform, but should also identify the specific assistances and means needed for reform. The UN and other actors support and advise the DRC government on drafting this plan. But stress that national ownership is highly important. Although two plans have been presented to MONUC and other actors, no agreement has been achieved on these plans until now. At this stage, many discussions between the DRC government and international actors are still taking place, and 12 thematic groups focus upon sub-sectoral reform plans have been formed.<sup>380</sup>

Because of the urgency to develop an overall strategy, the Security Council has specifically requested the DRC government to develop and implement a comprehensive national SSR strategy. Such a plan should be based upon the outcomes of the preceding February 2008 Roundtable talks on a SSR strategy soon. Such a plan should be based upon the outcomes of the earlier Roundtable talks on a SSR strategy in February 2008. The UN stated in resolution 1856 (2008) that “*professional security organizations in the areas of defence, police and the administration of justice that protect civilians, that are well managed*” can only be established when a *plan global* is developed.<sup>381</sup> The plan has to act in correspondence with the country’s constitution, and needs to respect the rule of law, human rights and international (humanitarian) law. Moreover, the plan needs to be established with support of the International Community. The SC called upon the Congolese authorities to establish a vetting mechanism “*to take into account when they select candidates for official positions, including key posts in the armed forces, national police and other security services*”, in order to sustain previous efforts of national and international partners.<sup>382</sup>

Furthermore, since mid 2008 the SSR Division of MONUC has been working to identify and coordinate SSR activities taking place throughout the country. This coordination has previously been absent, and caused overlap and lacks in reform. The newly developed weekly SSR meetings in Kinshasa have created a way to secure regular coordination and negotiations between the different UN Divisions, the European Union and others.<sup>383</sup> By setting up these mechanisms, MONUC attempts to recede on issues identified through experience in the DRC.

Army reform has also been identified as a priority by MONUC. This process, however, faces many difficulties. The national DDR programme was brought to a halt in 2006 for two years caused a decrease of new soldiers for army reform.<sup>24</sup> While CONADER stopped, the army integration programme also stopped for 2 years, which delayed any army reform activities.<sup>384</sup> After this difficult period, the army reform programme restarted in 2008, with the partial acceptance of a plan on reform. This plan, designed by the Ministry of Defence, roughly outlines the general structure of the army.

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<sup>24</sup> The outcome of the DDR process, in which former belligerents choose between a civilian life or becoming as soldier, is the direct input for army reform activities.

The army will consist out of a Rapid Reaction Force (RAF), a *force de couverture*<sup>25</sup>, and a principal defence force. By 2020 the whole army should be provided with the necessary skills and equipment, and the RAF and Intervention Forces should be established. Currently MONUC, the DRC government and others have been working to further develop the plan, with a particular focus on the organisational structure and funding.<sup>385</sup>

Furthermore, MONUC force has developed a training programme in close cooperation with the ministry of Defence and the FARDC. Soldiers that have been through the process of *brassage* will participate in this project. A first program is the *projet de formation principal* established in December 2006, in which basic training is provided to FARDC integrated brigades. These brigades are called the 'integrated brigades', as soldiers which have been through *brassage* have been mixed with old FARDC troops. At the moment there are 18 integrated brigades, but not all of them have been trained yet. Currently about 9500 soldiers, (12 battalions) have been part of the MONUC training programme in Ituri and the Kivus. In comparison, MONUC expected to train around 25000 soldiers, (28 battalions) before the end of 2008. One of the main reasons for this delay is the delay in DDR. No new troops are delivered yet to take part in the training programme. Planned additional training and train-the-trainer programmes have not yet taken place.<sup>386</sup>

The United Nations Police (UNPOL) in Kinshasa has been working on coordinating and developing police reform related activities. They are largely involved in assisting the DRC government in designing a law and order framework. They also participated in setting up a structure and hierarchy for the police, outlining recruitment and human resources policies, evaluating budget and finance processes, and looking into logistics and infrastructure. UNPOL and others are still working on this proposal, which will be presented to the PNC and relevant ministries. Furthermore, specific police-training activities have been developed, in cooperation with the PNC, which are currently taught in the rest of the country by the regional divisions of UNPOL.<sup>387</sup>

The MONUC Rule of Law department (RoL) and the DRC government are also engaged in discussions on justice reform, communication and coordination between. Similar to police reforms, how the structure of the judicial sector will look like is still not entirely clear.<sup>388</sup> There are, however, already certain activities that focus in particular on education and training, and providing logistical support in the judicial sector. Current training programmes have been focussing upon the training of magistrates, ethics and responsibilities in the judicial sector, education on less known laws. These training-programmes have been developed in close cooperation with the Congolese government and both international and local NGO's.<sup>389</sup>

Training provided to the FARDC, PNC and to the judicial sector address a wide variety of subjects and competences. Other training modules have been taught by different sections of MONUC, such as the child protection, human rights, and rule of law division.<sup>390</sup> Since December 2008, proposals for including a gender approach and the combating of sexual violence have been accepted and will be included in training programmes soon.<sup>391</sup>

### **5.2.3 SSR activities MONUC in the Kivus**

Security Sector Reform in the Kivu provinces is part of a broader approach named the 'Stability and Stabilisation Support Strategy' of MONUC.<sup>392</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> This force will focus on the self-provision of the army and their families by agriculture, and will be executed by those who are too old to participate in fighting, but have no army pension.

The Stability Plan for the East aims to “*stabilize eastern DRC and protect civilians by improving the security environment and extending basic state authority through a combination of integrated political, military, development and humanitarian initiatives*”.<sup>393</sup> In the Stability Plan, SSR is emphasised as the plan focuses on stabilising the east of the DRC by improving the security environment.<sup>394</sup>

SSR activities in de Kivus have mainly concentrated on the training of army personnel and police officers. Army training has priority in this context, as it poses one of the largest threats to security at this moment. Beside this, a well trained army decreases the threats from the outside. When speaking about training for the army, a distinction needs to be made between MONUC training the newly created integrated brigades and training the FARDC. Currently MONUC is one of the actors in the Kivus trains to the newly created integrated brigades. This training takes place in cooperation with the FARDC. The training of new army personnel is the basis for their reintegration in the national army. Training programmes mainly consist out of basic training elements. This is necessary since many soldiers never had any training before. The trainings therefore focus on leadership, discipline, navigation, respecting the law and more. A similar re-training of the FARDC is taking place as well, and these trainings mainly focus upon improving technical and operational capabilities.<sup>395</sup>

Training and re-training takes respectively three months or five weeks time. Besides focussing on basic army competences, it also concentrates on child protection, human rights, gender and rule of law. The trainings are given by Indians military in Nyaleke in North Kivu and by Pakistanis in Luberizi in South Kivu, in close cooperation with the FARDC.<sup>396</sup> Until now, six battalions of the integrated army (more or less 5000 soldiers) have been trained in South Kivu. In North Kivu three battalions (more or less 2250 soldiers) have been trained. Furthermore, the first training module for the FARDC has taken place last year. Around 900 FARDC soldiers have been re-trained in South Kivu, but no troops have been trained yet in North Kivu. The training programme is currently under revision. In the new training programme there will be more emphasis on army ranks. Besides these achievements, army training still faces several challenges with regard to logistics, the supply of forces to be trained from the DDR programme and the sustainability of training in the current political context in which no SSR strategy exists.<sup>397</sup>

Police training for the PNC has largely taken place in Kinshasa, less training directly takes place in the Kivus. Civilian police (CIVPOL) in MONUC’s Kivu divisions takes care of the police training programmes in both the Kivu provinces. CIVPOL provides this training together with PNC members which have been trained in Kinshasa. Furthermore, CIVPOL provides technical assistance for the programme, which is based upon an evaluation of the current situation and the needs for training. Besides increasing the regular police competences, the training programmes also aim at increasing respect for human rights, children’s rights and women’s rights, based on respecting and committing to the law. Although all training programmes are the same nationwide, there are different training programmes for specialised civil, military and higher rank police officers. The programme is completed after three months of training. Observers have argued that persons who have finished their training demonstrate a more professional attitude. On the other hand, however, the lack of logistical supplies and the presence of corruption in the police still remain a challenge that should be addressed in the police training programmes.<sup>398</sup>

The Rule of Law division, in cooperation with the department of Human Rights and several other non-UN partners, have executed judicial trainings in the Kivus. The programme is set up on a national level and is regionally implemented wherever possible.



Due to the absence of an overall structure, judicial training largely takes place on an ad hoc basis and is highly dependent on logistics. Although no exact numbers can be provided about training programmes in the judicial sector, and many of its effects are less visible than what is the case with police or military training, many people have argued that progress is being made.<sup>399</sup>

### **5.3 Other SSR activities in the DRC**

As stated earlier, the United Nations is not the only (international) actor involved in SSR in the DRC. Different other international actors have also been engaged in the process. Their policies and activities are sometimes closely tied to MONUC's policies, others are only partly linked with MONUC's SSR programme. Due to the enormous number of actors involved, coordinating SSR activities has become rather difficult. But despite these coordination difficulties, these actors still have an important impact upon MONUC's SSR activities and SSR in the DRC in general. Their activities should therefore not be seen separate from MONUC's SSR efforts. For this reason, this section will elaborate upon the engagement of the European Union, other relevant donor countries and (inter)national NGO's in army, police and judicial reform. Note that most activities focus upon reform of the army, and less attention is given to police and justice reform.

#### ***5.3.1 Army reform activities by the EU, donor countries and NGO's in the DRC***

##### ***5.3.1.1 EUSEC***

The EU has become increasingly involved in the DRC since 2001. Building upon the efforts and activities of its member states, over the last twenty years the EU has become a more prominent actor in international affairs and has widened the scope of its interventions.<sup>400</sup> After supporting MONUC with European Union forces during the transition and election period from 2003 until 2005, the EU decided that it would intensify its efforts in the DRC.<sup>401</sup>

In May 2005 the European Union established an advisory and assistance mission for security reform (EUSEC). This small scale mission has been mainly deployed to support the Congolese national army, the FARDC. The main reason for this deployment was because there was only slow progress in the field of SSR. EUSEC aims to assist the Congolese authorities in matters related to military structure and army reform.<sup>402</sup>

EUSEC works closely together with MONUC, and other actors, in assisting the national government to develop an overall SSR strategy for the DRC.<sup>403</sup> In the field, EUSEC has its basis in amongst others, North and South Kivu. It focuses on setting up a payment system for the FARDC. This programme is takes place in cooperation with its Congolese counterparts and addresses one of the main weaknesses of the Congolese Army, corruption. A large part of corruption in the FARDC is caused by a lack of payment. This has brought about the pinching of soldiers' salaries, ghost soldiers<sup>26</sup> and looting.

Currently EUSEC has completed the registration of army personnel in the Kivus.<sup>404</sup> This registration is part of an official identification programme for soldiers, to generate knowledge on the actual number of soldiers and to make sure that people are not registered in more than one brigade. Hence, to avoid corruption. Furthermore, registration is linked to a training/ re-training programme by MONUC. Besides this, it also provides insight in the consistence of brigades, and allows for regroupment.

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<sup>26</sup> Non-existing soldiers, subscribed in the army for the purpose of gaining extra salaries

Monitoring the payments of salaries in the FARDC is the second activity of EUSEC in the field. They supervise the distribution of salaries to the different brigades and take samples to check whether individuals in the brigades receive the payments they should receive. Next to this, they are working towards improving distribution facilities.<sup>405</sup>

#### *5.3.1.2 Individual donor countries*

At the moment there are many individual countries involved in army reform in the DRC, such as Belgium, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, the United States, South Africa and Angola.<sup>406</sup> These SSR efforts are based upon bilateral agreements with the DRC government. In the field of army reform these countries have been involved in the setting up and training of specialised army units, such as the Rapid Reaction Force. Furthermore, several countries have made places for internships for Congolese military available. Besides this, these countries have set up regular training programmes and train-the-trainer programmes. The building and rehabilitation of military hospitals, prisons, military camps, infrastructure in military camps and training camps have also been part of their SSR activities. Lastly, projects on improving the living conditions of soldiers' families have been deployed by several countries.<sup>407</sup>

#### *5.3.1.3 National NGO's*

In the Kivus, several national NGO's have been involved in army reform activities, such as Fondation Solidarité de Hommes (FSH), the Programme de Restauration de la Justice à l'Est de la République Démocratique du Congo (REJUSCO) and Héritiers de la Justice. These NGO's have been involved in providing training to the FARDC. They have trained the army on issues such as creating awareness on child-protection, human rights and sexual violence. Most NGO's conduct these trainings in cooperation with related divisions of MONUC and in close cooperation with the related government ministries and civil society organisations. For the larger part, these NGO's receive external funding from international NGO's and governments.<sup>408</sup>

### ***5.3.2 Police reform activities by the EU, donor countries, IGO's and NGO's in the DRC***

#### *5.3.1.1 EUPOL*

The European Union mission in Kinshasa for the integrated police unit (EUPOL) was established in April 2005 within the framework of the European Defence and Security Policy (ESDP). From 2005 until 2007 their main objective was to assist the PNC in keeping order during the DRC's transition and election period. They supported the PNC in establishing a specialised police unit, namely the integrated police unit (IPU). The EU deployed personnel at all levels within the IPU in order to advice, mentor and monitor it. Furthermore, EUPOL carried out a training programme for the integrated police and provided advice on the reform of the *Police Nationale Congolaise*.<sup>409</sup>

EUPOL Kinshasa was followed up by EUPOL RD Congo in July 2007, which became further engaged in SSR in the DRC. Their task is to assist the Congolese authorities in security sector reform, in particular on the fields of police reform and its interaction with the justice system. Similar to the UN they are involved by giving advice and support to the Congolese government in their attempts to build a SSR strategy. They take part in several thematic groups and focus on developing a strategy for police reform.<sup>410</sup> In addition, they help training the PNC, in order to provide them with basics policing skills, but also focus on issues such as human rights, child protection and gender in their training modules.<sup>411</sup> Furthermore, they emphasize the importance to generate awareness on the necessity of good practises by the police and stress the role of civil society in SSR.

These activities are mostly taking place in Kinshasa, but since October 2008 EUPOL has also been active in the Kivus.<sup>412</sup>

#### 5.3.2.2 *Individual donor countries*

The larger part of the police reform efforts by individual donor countries has taken place in the period to the 2006 elections. After the elections, a far less number of activities on police reform have been taking place on behalf of individual donor countries. Most of these countries prioritise army reform. Several training programmes for the police are executed and some logistical support to the police has been provided.<sup>413</sup> There are also plans of several countries to improve the payments system for the police.<sup>414</sup>

#### 5.3.2.3 *Intergovernmental Organisation's*

One of the most important intergovernmental organisations working in police reform in the DRC is the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The IOM works on forming and reforming the border police in North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri. They have been invited by the Congolese government fulfil this task in close cooperation with the *Police Nationale Congolaise*.<sup>415</sup>

Their programme does not only aim at advising and training the border police, but also aims to include their families and communities. Former police offices are converted into training camps for the border police. The building of these camps is often done by those living in the community. Furthermore, a programme for women in the community has been set up. Women that participate in this programme receive a piece of land and some materials to cultivate it. By including the whole community and by establishing a mean to generating income, the IOM works to sustain their programme. Besides this, by including the whole community, the IOM aims to create awareness about the importance of the development/reform of the border police by the local population.<sup>416</sup>

The IOM programme consists out of four phases. The first phase is described above. A second phase includes the selection of border police candidates, those who will take part in the training programme. The basic selection criteria are age, registered policing experience and a certain percentage of women needs to be included. Further selection takes place during the workshops, assessments and trainings. The third phase consists out of the actual training of those who are selected. The training programme encompasses 39 training modules that focus upon navigation, human rights, sexual violence, corruption, administration, rule of law and so on.

These trainings are provided by various organisations, such as the PNC, MONUC, IOM and others. The fourth phase of the project is to work on border policing at strategic points in the Kivus. This includes the establishment of offices at strategic points, but also includes guiding and advising the new border police in their daily tasks.<sup>417</sup>

Developing/ reforming the border police is a relatively new project in South Kivu, but in North Kivu it is already in its third phase. In total 772 people will be trained to work in the border police. The intention is that ultimately the migration police and border police will be merged, as they fulfil similar tasks. Furthermore, cooperation with neighbouring countries will be extended.<sup>418</sup>

### ***5.3.3 Judicial reform activities by donor countries and NGO's in the DRC***

#### ***5.3.3.1 Individual donor countries***

For most of the individual donor countries the emphasis lies on army reform. Therefore efforts on judicial reform of such countries are minimal or even absent. The United States supports the strengthening of the judicial sector through USAID. Together with the MONUC rule of law division they work towards expanding access to justice, strengthening judicial independence and capacity building of judiciary personnel. On a political level USAID supports activities to establish a judicial framework and defining the role of justice and legislation in such a framework.<sup>419</sup>

#### ***5.3.3.2 National NGO's***

In the Kivus, several national NGO's have been involved in judicial reform activities, such as Initiative Congolaise pour la Justice et la Paix (ICJP), Programme de Restauration de la Justice à l'Est de la République Démocratique du Congo (REJUSCO) and Héritiers de la Justice. The larger part of these NGO's works closely together with MONUC and other (inter)national NGO's. They aim to strengthen the judicial sector in the DRC and to promote human rights. Their efforts focus on ensuring the well functioning of justice and criminal court proceedings, monitoring human rights and raising awareness on justice and rights. They deliver technical and material support to courts, the judicial system, the military police, and victims.<sup>420</sup>

### **5.4 SSR in the DRC: the necessity of reform, and activities of MONUC and other actors**

As argued earlier, the Congolese security sector of today can be looked upon as the result of the earlier structure shaped during colonisation and dictatorship. In doing so, the security sector is highly corrupt and protects the interests of political elites rather than the population. SSR in the DRC is therefore often seen as a cornerstone of peace and stability in the country. Much activities have taken place since 2002, however, an overall reform strategy is still absent. MONUC is one of the main actors involved in SSR in the country. Besides MONUC there are many other international and national actors that execute SSR activities in the DRC and the Kivus. This chapter has pointed out the structure of the Congolese security sector and earlier reform efforts. Furthermore, it described SSR activities carried out by MONUC, and other international and national actors, on reform of the army, the police and the judicial sector.

## Chapter 6: There are more answers to every question

Differently positioned actors hold different views about the context in which they find themselves. Moreover, actors may very well hold quite opposite views on certain issues. In addition to this, they may ascribe different levels of importance to different subjects. This chapter will therefore focus upon the perception of different actors involved in, and influenced by security sector reform in the DRC. These actors are outlined below. A distinction can be made between those involved in the process in a direct or indirect manner. Besides this, a distinction can also be made between actors operating on a national or an international level. The information provided in this chapter sheds light up on how SSR efforts in the Kivus of MONUC are perceived. It highlights the different points of view with respect to MONUC's SSR activities; the progress made, its effects, and the problems encountered. The themes dealt with per actor might differ, as these are point brought forward by the actors themselves. Yet they remain in the subjected area of SSR and MONUC's SSR interventions in the DRC and the Kivus.

This chapter will start out with the perceptions held by the International Community. Firstly the perceptions of MONUC officials on SSR efforts in the DRC and MONUC's role in it will be given. Secondly, the perceptions of international donor countries and other intergovernmental organisations will be described. Then, the perceptions of the Congolese society will be described. These are divided into the perceptions of the Congolese government, Congolese NGO's in the Kivus and civil society/ local citizens in the Kivu's. On the basis of these perceptions an analysis will be made of MONUC's SSR activities in the DRC and the Kivus, by cross-referring the different perceptions held by different actors. This will be done in order to gain a more balanced view on the process, its achievements and the problems it encounters.

### **6.1 Perceptions of the International Community and Intergovernmental Organisations**

The International Community, more specifically MONUC, the European Union and individual donor countries, have become the most important international actors involved. During this period they have booked several successes, but also encountered certain problems. The views that they hold on factors of success and failure of SSR in the DRC are important, since these are the most experienced SSR actors in the field. This section will focus upon the issues that they see as being important. Despite the fact that the focus of this study is on SSR in the Kivus, it is important here to broaden the scope a bit, due to the characteristics of the reform process. As decisions are taken at the national level and implemented in the whole country including the Kivus, SSR policies should be looked upon from a national perspective as well. Perceptions of the International Community in this analysis will therefore reflect upon different spatial levels of those working on national level and those working in the Kivus provinces.

#### ***6.1.1 The United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo***

As described earlier, MONUC has become one of the main actors on SSR in the DRC since 2006. For the purpose of this study it is important to first address their own perceptions of the policies and activities that they undertake. Despite the fact that MONUC is often looked upon as one coherent actor, different actors within MONUC have different perceptions on SSR. This is also related to the context in which they operate. For this reason, a distinction needs to be made between the different operational levels of MONUC; those working in the field in the Kivus, and those working on the political and policy level in Kinshasa.

During the interviews, the following points on SSR have been put forward by the MONUC representatives: (1) support for MONUC's activities, (2) communication, coordination and cooperation, (3) a *plan global* for SSR, (4) army reform, (5) police reform and (6) judicial reform. The perceptions of MONUC staff on these points will be described below. All points are equally important and will be discussed in a chronological order of points mentioned in interviews.

#### *6.1.1.1 Support for MONUC's activities*

One of the main issues outlined by the interviewees is that local support by both citizens and authorities is a necessary element of effective SSR. Most MONUC officials, however, agree upon the fact that there is still very little support present for their activities. This severely hampers MONUC's efforts in generating a stable situation in the Kivu area. Despite the recognition of MONUC that gaining support for their mission is a process that takes time, this goes slower than expected.<sup>421</sup> As a MONUC official in Bukavu argues, "*Progress made can be eradicated by the deterioration of the situation the next day. Therewith the process of SSR goes up and down*".<sup>422</sup>

For many MONUC officials, insufficient government support for MONUC's SSR activities is one of their main concerns. The DRC government is seen as being internally divided and as often pursuing its self-interest. Several of the interviewees argue that the reform of the security sector poses threats to the positions of government officials, and abates the likelihood of government officials pursuing own interests.<sup>423</sup> MONUC actors commonly acknowledge that there is no full government support for MONUC. Moreover, many government officials are reluctant to act and take responsibility for sustaining progress made by the UN mission.<sup>424</sup>

Several MONUC representatives in the Kivus also indicate that MONUC has significant problems in gaining support by the Congolese population for their SSR activities. On this topic, a MONUC employee says that "*MONUC is very thin on the ground*".<sup>425</sup> It is argued that the Congolese government barely controls the military and policing system. The unreliability and unpredictability of the police, the army and the judicial system has lead to an enormous feeling of insecurity. Several MONUC representatives argue that the Congolese do not count on the security sector for their own security and protection and rely on the private security sector. Besides this, many MONUC officials argue that corruption has become common practice in the country. As one MONUC employee states, "*The average citizen has become accustomed to corruption and misuse of power in the last 50 years*".<sup>426</sup> In doing so, initiatives to change this system therefore can largely be found within the International Community and less with the Congolese themselves.

Another issue that has been put forward by some MONUC officials is that the population is poorly informed about the aims and tasks of MONUC. As a consequence, they are said to have become disillusioned on what MONUC can do for their country. According to a MONUC official, both the DRC government and the UN mission in the DRC have failed in their attempts to inform the public correctly about MONUC's mission.<sup>427</sup>

In addition, MONUC experiences a little willingness from neighbouring countries (mainly Rwanda, partly Angola and Uganda) to strive for peace and SSR in the DRC. For the larger part, these countries are afraid that the conflict in the DRC might spill-over to their own countries. On the other hand, a MONUC employee in Bukavu notes "*they also use this instability to increase their influence in the DRC and often aim to exploit resources in the DRC*".<sup>428</sup>

#### 6.1.1.2 Communication

A second point identified by interviewees is the difficulty that MONUC faces with regard to communication. They argue that these problems stem from too little communication between the local, national and international levels within the mission. MONUC in Kinshasa, but especially MONUC in the Kivus, experiences problems with policies made in New York. These policies have to be executed by Kinshasa and in the Kivus. Many MONUC officials believe that such policies often have no relationship with the local reality. This leads to many misunderstandings and complications. Both issues result in MONUC being in a very difficult position in the eastern part of the DRC now, especially with regard to DDR and SSR. For instance, MONUC's capacity and resources are experienced to be insufficient to fulfil their SSR and DDR mandate. Moreover, it is noted that there is a lack of qualified personnel at many levels of the mission, due to financial restraints. For many MONUC officials, these problems are the result of a lack of communication between the UN headquarters in New York and the MONUC headquarters in Kinshasa and the Kivus.<sup>429</sup>

Besides this, MONUC representatives argue that they find that many actors on a national level are misinformed. Problems with communication have been put forward as the main reason for this misinformation. Communication between the DRC government and MONUC, the DRC government and its citizens, and MONUC and Congolese citizens is largely absent. Interviewees state that MONUC's task in the DRC is to support the DRC government in rebuilding the country. They believe that it is first a government responsibility to initiate SSR. Many local actors overlook this government responsibility, expecting that MONUC will take over the government and all governmental responsibilities.<sup>430</sup> But, as a MONUC official states "*MONUC is no Santa Clause*".<sup>431</sup> MONUC officials believe that the DRC government does not take any initiative in changing these expectations. Due to a lack of communication and confusing support with change, the contribution of the national government to reform is minimal. In addition to the lack of communication, actors miss the knowledge on needs and activities of others involved in the process. Taking into account the current context of communication, an integral approach for SSR is therefore looked upon as very unlikely.<sup>432</sup>

#### 6.1.1.3 Coordination and cooperation

A third point put forward by the interviewees is the issue of coordination and cooperation within MONUC and between MONUC and other SSR actors in the DRC. A MONUC official in Kinshasa notes that "*Until May 2008 SSR in MONUC was based upon words, instead of action*".<sup>433</sup> Since that moment, MONUC efficiently started working on SSR and developed a more comprehensive and coherent approach towards the process.<sup>434</sup> In the same month the MONUC SSR team in Kinshasa started to work on coordinating activities and programmes taking place on security sector reform in the DRC. Such coordination had previously been absent. For instance, a common approach to army and police training has been absent. In this regard every donor gave their own form of training to different brigades. Many MONUC employees believe that this has made training incoherent; with overlap and/or gaps.<sup>435</sup>

The new initiative on weekly SSR meetings in Kinshasa has been created by MONUC to oversee all activities taking place on SSR and to improve coordination and cooperation between actors involved. It also attempts to make an end to the international deployment of ad hoc SSR activities as the result of a list of endless requests by the DRC government. Besides this, according to an SSR advisor, the coordination initiative has improved awareness on the current status of the security sector and its necessities, according to the SSR advisor to the head of MONUC.<sup>436</sup>

Despite the fact that a common approach is still absent, the coordination initiative is looked upon as a starting point for developing a general SSR doctrine. Cooperation between the DRC government and all donors are believed to be the key to effective SSR. Without such cooperation and a *plan global*, reforming the security sector is an impossible task. A MONUC official in Uvira states that “SSR is a difficult process, which requires full engagement of all actors involved”.<sup>437</sup> It has been pointed out that, by improving coordination between the DRC government and other actors involved in SSR, the path towards the reform of the Congolese security sector should be easier to draw now.<sup>438</sup>

#### 6.1.1.4 Plan Global on SSR

According to MONUC staff, the *plan global* on SSR is an important point to be mentioned with regard to SSR. The absence of an overall framework for SSR in combination with the preference of bilateral agreements with donors of the DRC government has complicated SSR in the DRC significantly, MONUC officials claim. The DRC government, internally divided on which course to take, has been reluctant in setting up a process of SSR and has hindered international cooperation in the process.<sup>439</sup> Despite international requests for, and initiatives to develop such a plan, no realistic plan has been presented yet. MONUC employees argue that this has impeded progress on SSR and limited MONUC’s SSR activities to training, logistical support and financial support.<sup>440</sup>

Besides this, it is believed that donors and donor countries have had a share in this as well. During the transition period they tried to impose a SSR-plan on the DRC. Thereby “they forgot that local ownership of such a plan is crucial with regard to sustainability of the process”, claims a MONUC official in Kinshasa.<sup>441</sup> Since that moment, the DRC government became rather reluctant in working towards a general strategy for SSR. By bilateral agreements with donors the governments’ involvement in decision making increased. Furthermore, such bilateral agreements have been lucrative for the DRC government, due to the fact that donors are not aware of other agreements between the DRC government and donors. With this, the DRC government has been able to generate more financial and technical means compared to a situation in which donors cooperate and consult about their involvement in SSR with each other, several MONUC employees believe. Despite the fact that donor countries agreed that no further SSR initiatives would take place on a bilateral basis as long as a *plan global* is absent, many have started again with such activities, placing their countries interest above a common goal.<sup>442</sup>

According to MONUC officials, truly reforming the Congolese security sector now depends upon the DRC government. “They have to stand as one, agreeing, government with specific ideas for SSR”, argues a MONUC official in Goma.<sup>443</sup> Only then a *plan global* for SSR in the DRC can be developed and implemented. The moment such a plan exists and is agreed upon the DRC government and other actors on SSR can work together in implementing this plan, and agree upon the budget, accountability and evaluation. Without such plan SSR initiatives will remain ad hoc and results will have a limited sustainability.<sup>444</sup>

#### 6.1.1.5 Army reform

Many MONUC actors pointed out that army reform is another point of discussion. They identify that these army reforms face not only difficulties, but also points of progress are stipulated. The delay in and problems with the DDR process in the DRC are looked upon as a factor of influence on the current problems in the field of SSR. Several UN officials point out the following problems with regard to DDR and SSR.



Firstly, insecurity and the presence of armed groups in the country, especially in the Kivus, have resulted in a reluctance of armed-groups to take part in the DDR process. They pointed out to be unwilling to disarm as long as others are not taking part in a DDR or DDRRR programme<sup>445</sup>. Secondly, the characteristics of DDR in the DRC brought about the absence of selection criteria for being part of the army. Congolese armed groups can choose, after taking part in DDR, between a civilian life or taking part in the national army. Also the current DDR process has resulted in a lack of unity in the army. The national army now consists out of groups previously fighting each other who now have to work together. In combination with the fragility of peace and ongoing fighting, national unity in the army is simply absent and severely complicates army reform initiatives.<sup>446</sup>

*“Due to the security situation, mainly in the Kivus, SSR efforts have largely been focussing on army reform”*, notes a MONUC official in Goma. Army training has been prioritized, as currently the army is one of the largest threats to security. Next to this, having a well trained army can decrease threats from outside.<sup>447</sup> MONUC officials believe that army training has improved the last years and brought about some lasting effects. Soldiers who have received training in general improved their operational performances and discipline increased. Furthermore a rise in national morals became visible. On the other hand, it has been noted that the process of army training faces several challenges. Currently there is a lack of availability of troops to be trained. Due to a decrease of people taking part in the DDR programme, no new army trainings of integrated brigades have taken place since August 2008, an UN official in Kinshasa states. Furthermore, it is found that the process faces challenges on the logistical side. There is a lack of communication equipment, food supplies, training sites are poorly maintained and permanent accommodation for troops is absent. MONUC officials argue that, both the DRC government and MONUC do not fully live up to their responsibilities. MONUC employees indicate that MONUC, responsible for paying the food of soldiers during training, has had enormous delays in these payments. The DRC government, responsible for paying the salaries of the army, also does not pay the soldiers on a regularly basis. Furthermore, it is noted that the government has not responded actively to the extreme abuses and extortion of the local population, committed by the FARDC.<sup>448</sup>

Despite specific flaws in training, the provision of army training is experienced as beneficial. Especially on the lower levels training is of utmost importance, as most of the soldiers never received any training. In general, *“MONUC training should continue, largely in its current form”*, states a MONUC trainer for the FARDC in Luberizi.<sup>449</sup> But the logistical supply system of both MONUC and the DRC government has to be improved to sustain the training provided to the army. Therewith not only the capabilities and morals of the army will increase, but also the circumstances they work in will be improved. It is noted that for strengthening this process, follow up training and train the trainer programmes are crucial. Currently, such programmes have been developed but not yet taken place. It is up to the FARDC to deliver such troops, as *“MONUC can not force them to take part in a training programme”*, a MONUC army trainer notes, still waiting in Kinshasa for his mission.<sup>450</sup> In addition to this, it is stated that a plan on army reform and training should be set up by the DRC government and donors. Such a plan should also set out a clear chain of command for the army. As long as such a plan is absent, training will be the only reform taking place; constantly taking place on an ad-hoc basis claim several MONUC officials.<sup>451</sup>

#### *6.1.1.6 Police reform*

MONUC has assisted police reform by providing training and working towards developing reform policies, a MONUC police officer in Kinshasa notes. These activities are another point put forward by the interviewees as important to discuss.

MONUC staff sees a change in professionalism for those who finished the training. Police are more motivated, which has a positive effect on security. But they also point out specific points for improvement. The delays in or the absence of payments for police are a remaining threat for security. Furthermore, the police are partly resisting in taking part in reform. For many their job can be at stake due to a lack of education or their age. There is no distinction in trainings for the different provinces. With this, trainings are non-flexible with regard to province or region specific problems.<sup>452</sup>

With regard to reform policies MONUC is closely cooperating with the PNC and the related ministries.<sup>453</sup> One of the main difficulties identified by MONUC officials is that currently different police units are a part of different ministries. It is necessary to reorganise the police to one national organism. To be able to do this, a specific law on the issue has to be passed or changed. This has proven not to be easily done, as this can only be done by the different ministries. These ministries are all fighting to keep a part of the police under their auspice.<sup>454</sup>

Progress has been made on working towards issues such as payment of the police and training note MONUC police officers. It is argued that, the main issue lacking at the moment is a concrete plan on police reform. Developing such a plan requires the full engagement of all actors involved. This willingness is largely absent on a political level. Furthermore, coordinating different initiatives on police reform, of MONUC, the IOM and international donor countries, is a condition for further progress. Carrying out above tasks, in combination with adapting police training to local realities, is looked upon as the basis for effective and sustainable police reform.<sup>455</sup>

#### *6.1.1.7 Judicial reform*

Reforming the judicial sector in the DRC has only been taking place under the umbrella of SSR since February 2008, an interviewee in Kinshasa notes. Reforming the judicial system is a difficult task which has not only experienced problems, but is a process that has also brought about significant changes in the judicial sector. By this, judicial reform is another important discussion point indicated by interviewees.

Many MONUC staff states that the judicial sector in the country is severely understaffed. This has resulted in a lack of justice. “*Within this context impunity has become the ‘normal way of life’*”, a Rule of Law staff-member of MONUC states.<sup>456</sup> The impact of all of this on the security situation is enormous. It creates a system in which violations of human rights, criminal activities and impunity are part of every day life. Even if there is a possibility to go to court, it becomes visible that this system is corrupt and protects perpetrators. As a result, the insecurity increases and citizens have more faith in armed groups than in government institutions.<sup>457</sup>

The Rule of Law section of MONUC believes that it has made significant progress in laying a basis for judicial reform by training, working on specific laws, general awareness on justice and attracting staff. On the other hand, it is indicated that the process faces the following challenges. There is a lack of willingness of national partners to reform; preferring to follow their own interest. This blocks the work of MONUC and other actors in the field and undermines the whole judicial system. Furthermore, both MONUC and national actors are understaffed to do all the work needed in the country. The dependence on the financial means and willingness of donors is another point which makes judicial reform difficult.<sup>458</sup>

Actors within the human rights departments of MONUC in the Kivus argue that capacity building and awareness on laws and rights have been improved. They have tried to better inform citizens on their rights and duties. In doing so, the citizens' ability to use this information for their own purposes has increased significantly.

Another feature of the Human Rights and Rule of Law developments of MONUC has been the reforms in the penitentiary system. Despite that little of this has become visible for the general public, MONUC actors argue that the detention conditions have improved considerably. Nonetheless, MONUC officials note that real changes on human right violations and judicial reform are barely visible for outsiders. However, there are still many difficulties in the field, largely due to a shortage of funding.<sup>459</sup> As a result, often only a small part of the judicial sector is addressed. This frequently results in a situation in which "*improvement in one field often results in deterioration in another field*", a MONUC representative stated.<sup>460</sup>

#### *6.1.1.8 Summarizing MONUC's perceptions*

To summarize, many MONUC representatives argue that MONUC's SSR mandate is too ambitious and contains too many objectives. They have to achieve a lot with the scarce resources they have. Besides, the shortage of government and citizen support for their SSR activities, and activities in general, has severely complicated reform efforts. In order for security sector reform to succeed, MONUC staff notes that support of these actors is a necessary condition. MONUC officials put forward that the lack of communication within the mission and between the mission and other international and national actors impedes reform efforts. Communication needs to be improved, according to MONUC staff, to ensure that international and national actors are informed about MONUC's aims and activities. Besides, coordinating activities of the different SSR actors within the DRC, and ensuring cooperation can only take place while there is communication between these actors. Also, guaranteeing that UN policies made in New York are more applicable to local realities requires efforts to improve communication between the different MONUC and UN headquarters, note several UN officials. The limitation of MONUC's SSR activities to merely training for police, army and the judicial system is another problem put forward by many MONUC officials. Such trainings are believed to be non-sustainable without a *plan global*, regularly payments of security actors and institutions to train and re-train security sector actors. MONUC staff states that the DRC government needs to take its responsibility, together with other SSR actors, in developing a *plan global*, ensuring payment of security actors and building institutions which are able to train and re-train security sector actors on the long term. Lastly MONUC staff notes that the success or failure of SSR in the DRC depends upon the efforts of all actors involved in the process. The moment one of these actors is failing to cooperate, the whole process will be undermined. Currently, this is demonstrated with regard to the DRC government. Without a realistic SSR strategy, no other actor is able to establish something sustainable, states a MONUC official in Kinshasa.

In general, it is pointed out that progress has been made on specific issues. MONUC staff notes that this progress is little visible due to a rapidly changing stability situation in the Kivus. They argue that the absence of stability in the Kivus does not only undermine developments in the security sector, but also distracts attention from SSR. Nevertheless, there is more awareness of all actors on the security sector and the necessity of reform. The interviewees further note that cooperation and coordination on SSR between MONUC actors, but also between MONUC and others improved.

On the other hand it is pointed out that this process is a typical Congolese *pole-pole*<sup>27</sup> process and should not be expected to accomplish on the short term.

### **6.1.2 Individual Donor Countries**

As mentioned earlier in this study, individual donor countries have different reasons for being involved in SSR in the DRC, such as aid, personal interest and more. Their reason for involvement and their approach towards SSR therefore can change significantly from MONUC's approach. As such, their perception on current SSR efforts of MONUC might differ from other perceptions. In addition to this, their cooperation with MONUC and their perception on MONUC's efforts will shed light on a broader range of achievements and problems. Therefore the following section will focus upon the views of international donor countries on MONUC's SSR policies and activities. The perceptions of the following countries are included; the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Belgium. Whereas their focus on SSR differs per security sector branch<sup>28</sup>, their perceptions on the overall SSR process in the DRC are largely consentient.

#### *6.1.2.1 The Congolese context of SSR and international donor countries*

Understanding the current problems with military, police and justice requires and understanding of the current and historical system of security in the DRC, note several representatives. An official states that: *"From independence on, the DRC went through a history of great military leaders as heads of states"*.<sup>461</sup> As a result, every part of society was militarised and the military was not only taking the role of defending the borders against foreign threats, but controlled the countries citizens. The military took on policing tasks and the whole judicial system was build upon military justice. It has been put forward that this trend is still largely visible in the DRC, beside to the fact that military are protecting individual citizens and groups against others. It is argued that the immense step which has to be taken on the subject of army reform and judicial reform is that the country has to change from a military order to a civil order.<sup>462</sup>

Pure SSR is defined by one of the representatives as: army reform, police reform, reform of the judicial system and reform of general security services. At this moment there are some difficulties with these reforms, as there is no national reform plan upon which all involved actors agree, says this official. This has resulted in different activities undertaken by the different actors involved in SSR, but without a coherent strategy. According to this representative, stability in the Kivus, on the one hand is a condition for effective SSR in the rest of the DRC. On the other hand it is noted that a security sector reform approach can be developed without including the Kivus. Continuing with this view, it is stated that: *"it is impossible to involve all the different regions with their individual problems"*.<sup>463</sup> Such an approach is therefore looked upon as rather feasible because whilst taking into account the enormous size of the country.<sup>464</sup>

Another issue put forward is that the SSR focus most often lies on reform of the army. This focus stems from the notion that the army constitutes one of the largest threats to the population and to peace in the DRC. Besides, many donors are of the opinion that *"in the DRC it is better to do one thing well, instead of five things only half"*.<sup>465</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> Swahili expression to explain that something takes time and should not be rushed.

<sup>28</sup> The UK mainly focuses on the military and police, training, logistical supply and living conditions. The focus of the Netherlands is largely on army reform and improving those aspects which are always beneficial, such as housing, medical aid and more. Belgium also focuses on army reform, quite similar to the approach of the Netherlands. All three approaches can be looked upon as integrated, as they do not only provide training and logistical supply, but also aim at improving the contextual aspects.

Most attention therefore focuses on the army and less attention is paid to judicial and police reform. It is argued that this approach constitutes many problems. All parts of the security sector are immediately linked with each other and should therefore be equally addressed.<sup>466</sup>

#### 6.1.2.2 *Plan Global on SSR*

Representatives argue that, until now there have only been some initiatives on specific areas of SSR. These initiatives were poorly coordinated and often did not deliver the expected results. Previous developed plans were poorly communicated with the different ministries in the government and mainly drafted by the ministry of defence. A separate plan was created by different army officials, but vanished without even being discussed. Even though some plans exist, they do not consist out of a concrete SSR strategy for the country. As a consequence, the drafting of a realistic and agreed upon plan is largely stalled. Therefore it is believed that the DRC government needs to develop an agreed upon national SSR plan.<sup>467</sup> This thought is emphasized by an official who states that, “*international donors cannot and will not invest and take responsibilities while a concrete plan is absent*”.<sup>468</sup>

The initiative of EUSEC to work towards an acceptable solution for all actors involved is perceived as a slow process with little results. Besides it is noted that “*it is again the International Community taking the lead, instead of the DRC government creating ownership over the process*”.<sup>469</sup> The initiative of EUSEC is believed to make a more coherent performance of the different actors involved in SSR easier and more effective. On the other hand it is argued by representatives that the DRC government is showing little cooperation on the initiative.<sup>470</sup>

The difficulties outlined above are perceived to have in all SSR actors searching for their own path. Despite an agreement between donor countries of postponing support until a *plan global* is developed, the larger part of them continued with their SSR initiatives. Officials put forward that individual countries still support their own plans and become less critical, as they want to do something. SSR actors face the dilemma of waiting on the *plan global* or undertaking something uncoordinated. Many of the donor countries chose the last option.<sup>471</sup> As a result “*international donors are so divided on which course to take, that it gives the DRC government an opportunity to play them off against each other for another couple of years*”, notes a representative. It is further stated that “*The political and economic interest of donor countries makes them resort to such agreements*”.<sup>472</sup>

#### 6.1.2.3 *Training in the army, policing and judicial sector*

Representatives believe that current training and other SSR activities taking place in the light of SSR are always useful; people cannot be trained enough. The main question put forward with regard to training is its sustainability. Training can improve the quality of services delivered by police, army and justice, but when a lack of payment, unbearable living conditions and corruption are still every day reality, training will have little impact on durable reform of the security sector, claim several officials. That is why some international donors focus on those issues which are ‘always useful’. This can include for instance building military hospitals, military prisons, improving living conditions of the army and police and more.<sup>473</sup>

#### 6.1.2.4 *MONUC and SSR*

It is believed that the pressure on MONUC and individual donor countries on reforming the Congolese security sector has increased during the last year. “*SSR needs to succeed as this is the new flagship of the United Nations and the main exit strategy for MONUC*”, notes a representative.<sup>474</sup>

Despite this pressure, SSR goes very slowly and only small progress has been made. It is believed that the MONUC and the UN had to choose between two evils: leaving the DRC without completing the SSR process or doing whatever is possible. “*The UN and MONUC chose the least evil of the two; an under populated mission with a lack of personnel, finance and other resources, and an immense SSR mandate*”, states an official.<sup>475</sup>

The previous involvement of MONUC in SSR is looked upon as rather limited, mainly focussing on DDR. Their role in SSR has increased and SSR is now an integral part of their mandate. Despite their SSR mandate, MONUC’s efforts are perceived to be limited to providing training to army, police and justice, whilst they work towards a *plan global*. Even though it is recognised that training is necessary, it is put forward that training is not changing the overall structure of the security sector. Besides this, MONUC’s training activities, but also those of other SSR actors, are largely ad-hoc. Therefore, the sustainability of such trainings can be further questioned.<sup>476</sup>

Representatives note that there is only limited information on the exact aims and goals of MONUC’s SSR activities in the Kivu provinces. They indicate that MONUC deploys many SSR related activities in the Kivus, but also note that there is a lack of sustainable results until now. It is believed that the small progress made stems from the fact that MONUC is forced to work with little resources; on the aspect of budget, personnel and resources. On the other hand they note that the absence of durable results can also be traced back to the absence of *plan global* on SSR in the DRC; mainly a government responsibility.<sup>477</sup>

#### 6.1.2.5 Summarizing Individual Donor Countries perceptions

To summarize, some of the representatives of individual donor countries engaged in reforming the Congolese security sector indicate that it is of utmost importance to take into account the Congolese context for SSR. Understanding this context helps to identify the main problems within the security sector and should be the basis of any reform efforts. Others, however, do not indicate this issue. Another point that has been noted by those who focus not only on army reform, is that SSR in the DRC should not merely focus on army reform. Due to the inter-linkages of all parts of the security sector, all should be equally addressed to achieve durable results. Another point put forward by all representatives is the absence of a *plan global* on SSR. The DRC government is mainly referred to as rather reluctant in taking upon this task. The development of a general SSR strategy will be the basis of improved cooperation between the different SSR actors. Furthermore, it enables a more coherent strategy for training of SSR actors and makes an end to donors and the DRC government following mainly their own interests. Regarding SSR of MONUC all interviewees point out that MONUC’s SSR mandate is too broad with regard to its means. This has created a situation in which MONUC attempts to do whatever possible, but without the expected sustainable results. The development of a *plan global* and increasing the resources available is seen as a manner of increasing the durability of MONUC’s SSR activities.

In general it representatives believe that activities deployed are effective, but should be made durable. MONUC, and other SSR actors, are working in a difficult context, which should be taken into account. Every actor, and especially the DRC government, needs to take its responsibility, cooperate and work towards a national SSR strategy. Only then will SSR be more durable.

### 6.1.3 Intergovernmental Organisations

Besides MONUC and individual donor countries, certain intergovernmental organisations are active in the field of SSR in the DRC. Whilst their SSR activities are set up separate from MONUC, the larger part of them cooperate with MONUC on certain issues. For this reason these organisations are aware of achievements made and problems encountered by MONUC on SSR. Taking into account their perceptions will thereby shed further light on MONUC's SSR activities. These perceptions will also highlight the opinions on MONUC of organisations with a similar structure, working in the same context. For these reason this section will focus upon perceptions on MONUC's SSR activities in the DRC and the Kivus. Perceptions of the following organisations will be outlined below: EUSEC and EUPOL, the International Organisation for Migration and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

#### 6.1.3.1 EUSEC and EUPOL

The following course of events has been outlined by a representative of the European Union. It is argued that reforming the security sector was largely neglected during the DRC's transitional period. It is argued that since the appointment of the new government in 2006 new, but small, progress has been made. Despite the fact that the *Table Ronde* on SSR in February 2008 did not deliver a national SSR strategy, it is believed that discussions taking place in February became the basis for further deliberation on a *plan global* and SSR in general.<sup>478</sup>

Reforming the Congolese security sector is believed to be essential when aiming for durable peace in the country. “*Without SSR the created peace will only be of short term*”, an official states.<sup>479</sup> Notwithstanding this recognition, the instability in the Kivus is seen as a barrier for effective SSR. This instability has resulted in delays in DDR and DDRRR, and has caused delays in and disturbance of the most crucial part of the security sector; the military.<sup>480</sup>

Interviewees note that a wide range of activities has been deployed by organisations such as the MONUC, the European Union and by individual donor countries. They argue that unfortunately, results are largely invisible. It is put forward that EUSEC and EUPOL have created a basis for further reform with their activities and negotiations, both in Kinshasa and in the Kivus. Training provided by MONUC and donor countries to security sector actors are looked upon as partly effective. The sustainability of these efforts is questioned with regard to the stability situation in the Kivus. The outbreaks of violence in the Kivus at the end of 2008 have undone much of the work on training. Many soldiers became demoralised whilst fighting against Nkunda.<sup>481</sup>

It is believed that despite these difficulties and the absence of a *plan global*, activities on SSR should proceed. Follow up activities, on the other hand, need to take into account problems which can be encountered and require more flexibility. For this reason several officials argue that, SSR will be a process which takes time. It is “*a process which needs to be done step by step*”<sup>482</sup> and “*will consist out of a path of trial and error*”<sup>483</sup>, the interviewees state.

Many officials are of the opinion that every actor in the DRC engaged in SSR faces problems with specific issues. They note that especially MONUC has to cope with many problems, as completing the SSR process is not only part of their mandate, but also their unofficial exit strategy.

The interviewees believe that there are several factors which complicate MONUC's SSR activities, namely: MONUC's composition, mandate and activities on SSR, the lack of cooperation of the Congolese government, willingness and responsibility of national actors, and the influence of neighbouring states.<sup>484</sup> Representatives note the following points with regard to the composition of MONUC, its mandate on SSR and their reform activities.

It is believed that one of the main problems of MONUC, and the UN in general, is that the quality of their personnel differs significantly. The largest troop delivering countries are often countries in which a United Nations peacekeeping mission is deployed as well. For this reason their criteria for reforming a security sector are very different than those of personnel not sent from a country in conflict. Another point put forward by officials is the size of the country and the means available for the mission. The available resources need to be adapted to the size of a country. They note for instance that the UN mission Sierra Leone had almost the same number of personnel as the MONUC, despite the fact that the DRC is much larger. Interviewees further say that even though general progress has been made by MONUC in stabilising the country, their mandate on SSR is too broad.<sup>485</sup> An official states that *"having such a wide and difficult mandate, the present political unwillingness of the DRC government to change and a lack of qualified personnel is not the solution for stabilizing the country and completing SSR"*.<sup>486</sup> Lastly, many representatives note that progress has been made and activities are deployed. On the other hand they note that this is mainly happening on the basic level. MONUC's SSR approaches should be more context bound, as every region in the DRC faces different challenges. It is put forward that such approaches also need to take into account the current absence of peace and security and the dynamics of these features.<sup>487</sup>

Many interviewees note that the DRC government wants to change specific things in the country, but they do not know how and do not want to ask for help. On the other hand, the government is looked upon as reluctant in taking advice from international donors on SSR. It is even argued that *"the government shows a lack of interest in the whole reform programme, as the current situation serves their personal interest better"*. *"The government does not want any coordination of activities between international donors"*.<sup>488</sup> Many officials believe that the reason for this reluctance is that coordination might decrease the financial means the government receives. Currently, international donors are not informed on bilateral agreements between the DRC government and other donors. Therefore the government receives means for most of their requests from different international donors. In general they note that on all levels, especially the political level, people can be found those who try to spoil and undermine the reform process.<sup>489</sup> It is claimed that *"this is causing state weakness, as personal interests serve as the basis for many things"*.<sup>490</sup>

Several representatives argue that willingness and responsibility for reform of national actors is largely missing. It is stated that *"Congolese actors should not forget that they have to build up their own country, with the support of MONUC and others"*. *"The DRC government has to take its responsibilities and needs to be willing to reform the security sector"*.<sup>491</sup> They believe that as long as this willingness is absent, any reform will be non-sustainable. Sustaining reform efforts further requires on the responsibility of the DRC government of paying salaries to security sector actors. Currently the DRC government is reluctant in paying the salaries of police and army. They note that this constitutes further insecurity towards the local population and subverts progress made by MONUC and others.<sup>492</sup>

The last point mentioned by EUSEC and EUPOL representatives is the influence of neighbouring countries. It is experienced that the besides the instability in the Kivu region, the involvement of Rwanda complicates the context in which SSR is taking place.



The interest of armed groups and neighbouring countries in resources has forced MONUC and others to locate police and soldiers in such resource rich areas. In doing so, there is a large chance that they resort to corruption or get involved in the conflict.<sup>493</sup>

To summarize, EUSEC and EUPOL representatives identify several difficulties with regard to the context for SSR of MONUC and the mission itself. It has been put forward that the instability in the Kivus is a threat for SSR. Stability in this area is a condition for sustaining results of reform booked by MONUC. Another point noted by officials is that MONUC's structure, its mandate and its activities are not adapted enough to local realities. Carrying out SSR activities requires flexible activities which can be adapted to problems encountered. It is also believed that the structure of MONUC and its SSR mandate needs to be adjusted to the means available. Regarding the cooperation and willingness of national actors on SSR with MONUC, the interviewees point out that the DRC government is the largest stumbling stone. Government cooperation and willingness for support is a necessary element for success, they believe. The last point identified by the interviewees is the involvement of neighbouring countries in the DRC. These actors need to withdraw to ensure that SSR in the Kivus is not undermined due to the temptation of corrupt security sector actors.

Generally, SSR in the DRC and the Kivus is seen as a necessary process for sustaining peace in the country. MONUC is believed to have booked several results on reform, but faces the main challenge of sustaining these results. For MONUC to succeed with SSR in the country an overall support of national actors is required. On the other hand, taking into account the means of MONUC, it could be considered to change their SSR mandate or expand their resources.

#### *6.1.3.2 International Organisation for Migration*

Representatives of the International Organisation for Migration argue that reforming the security sector in the DRC is a difficult task. It is believed that reform requires the full cooperation of all actors involved, but also the support of local citizens. The IOM has put much effort in convincing the local population of the necessity of their programme. Transparency towards them has increased the population's support for the IOM programme on border police reform. This transparency, in order to gain support of local population, is looked upon as largely absent within MONUC's programmes on SSR. IOM staff states that despite governmental support for their programmes in the Kivus, local authorities and police have not cooperated as expected. Their cooperation is increasing, but the larger part is somewhat reluctant to participate in reform. It is believed that this stems from a fear of losing power due to reform. They note that MONUC is facing the same problems.<sup>494</sup>

In interviews it has been put forward that sustaining SSR programmes largely depends upon the DRC government. Currently, the efforts of the government in this area are inadequate. IOM staff for instance notes that the IOM, in cooperation with the *Police Nationale Congolaise* and MONUC, is responsible for the implementation of the programme. However, the DRC government is responsible for paying the border police salaries. "*The DRC government has been quite reluctant in paying these salaries, of not only to the border police, but also to police and military in general*", a representative states. Partly due to this, security actors resort to corruption and looting. The local population is therefore under severe threat, because of insufficient efforts of the Congolese government in sustaining reform activities.<sup>495</sup>

IOM representatives in the Kivus see MONUC's SSR activities as one of the most difficult tasks the UN is facing in the DRC. "*Several conditions need to be met*", is stated, "*to work towards effective SSR in Congo*".<sup>496</sup>

The following conditions are identified by these representatives: full cooperation and accountability of all involved in SSR, communication and transparency between actors in SSR, support of the local population for the process, and the use of qualified personnel for reform activities.<sup>497</sup> The first indicated condition is the full engagement of all actors involved in reforming the security sector. It is believed that this engagement is simply absent in the DRC. IOM staff argues that there is a reluctance of the DRC government to work towards a feasible *plan global* on SSR. Security sector actors and international actors involved in reform have also been rather reserved in cooperation.<sup>498</sup>

Communication and transparency between actors involved in SSR has been put forward as another point for development. Due to the large number of actors involved in SSR in the DRC, communication and transparency is experienced as difficult. Especially since many actors first focus on their countries or organisations interests. For this reason it has been stated that: *“furthering communication and transparency improves SSR efforts in the DRC. It ensures that every actor involved is working towards a shared goal”*.<sup>499</sup> Communications between the UN headquarter in New York and MONUC’s headquarter and field offices in, Kinshasa, Bukavu and Goma, is seen as a major challenge. IOM staff believes that this communication needs to be improved to ensure that New York policies are adjusted to daily reality in Kinshasa and the Kivus.<sup>500</sup>

The next point noted by IOM officials is support of the local population for SSR programmes of MONUC. *“The larger part of the local population does not know what SSR is”*. *“Therefore they support some SSR activities, but oppose other activities”*, a staff member states.<sup>501</sup> They have not yet seen real changes in the security sector. The shortage of information on SSR combined with the lack of government influence in the eastern part of the DRC is believed to result in a situation where locals have the feeling that no actor guarantees them security. IOM staff remarks that local population has no trust in their government and trust in MONUC fluctuates.<sup>502</sup>

IOM staff claims that, at this moment, the whole security sector in the DRC is failing on all aspects. Police departments are ill functioning, the military is not functioning as it should and mixes up with policing affairs, and the justice is largely absent. *“Although there is a law, it is used in one’s own interest”*. *“Police and military take citizens into custody, whenever they want to and therewith take over the rule of law”*, an official notes.<sup>503</sup> MONUC’s inability to effectively address these issues stems from a lack of cooperation and support of international and international actors. On the other hand, IOM staff believes that MONUC’s structure is also a cause of reform failures in the security sector. According to representatives, there is a lack of qualified personnel in MONUC’s SSR departments; but also in MONUC and the UN in general. Without ensuring quality of employees, it is difficult to execute the policy and programmes in an adequate and durable manner.<sup>504</sup> On this, it is claimed that the United Nations *“focuses on gathering quantity, no matter what the quality is”*, with regard to mission personnel.<sup>505</sup>

In summary, IOM staff in the Kivus argue that MONUC needs to improve several points to work ensure effective SSR in the Kivus. The first point refers to raising support of local population and security sector actors on SSR by increasing transparency of their actions and activities. Providing more and better information on MONUC’s SSR goals and activities can take away fears and raise more awareness. In doing so, support for MONUC’s SSR programmes will most probably increase. IOM representatives further put forward that cooperation of SSR actors and taking their respective responsibilities is another difficulty faced by MONUC.

These actors need to cooperate and take upon responsibilities to assure adequate SSR and sustain MONUC's reform efforts. A last point indicated by IOM officials is the quality of MONUC's SSR personnel. Quality of personnel has to increase to work towards sustainable SSR in the country. Ensuring this requires a focus of the UN on quality of personnel instead of quantity.

#### *6.1.3.3 United Nations Development Programme*

UNDP staff members explain that the UNDP is currently only involved in the DDR process in the DRC. Whilst they are not yet involved in SSR, MONUC representatives in Kinshasa and UNDP representatives in Kinshasa and Bukavu put forward that the UNDP will take upon SSR tasks on the longer term. There are plans that the UNDP will take over MONUC's role in sustaining SSR when the UN peacekeeping operation leaves the DRC.<sup>506</sup> UNDP staff states that *"because of these plans for the future and the inter-linkage of DDR and SSR in the DRC"*, they closely follow the reform process.<sup>507</sup> It is noted that the UNDP participates in negotiations on the national level, of developing a national SSR strategy, on an informal basis.<sup>508</sup>

UNDP representatives recognise that, while focussing on reforming the Congolese security sector it is important to focus on the sustainability of these reforms. They believe that improving human security needs to be a solid aspect of reform policies. Attention for human security within SSR programmes would address the context in which security sector actors are working. It is deemed that improving this context will address issues related to the malfunctioning of the security sector. Sustaining SSR therefore requires the inclusion of programmes on economic, food, health, and personal and community security in reform policies. It is argued that although there is attention for these issues, the concept of human security should be an integrated part of SSR efforts and receive more attention.<sup>509</sup>

Staff members of the UNDP further put forward that effective SSR efforts requires the support of the Congolese citizens. For this reason they argue that attention should be paid to reconciling the Congolese population and the Congolese security sector.<sup>510</sup> It has been stated that *"Whereas reform is the basis of change, ensuring the trust of the population in the security sector is a basis condition for sustaining security sector reform. Therewith the current problem of impunity shall be dealt with as well"*.<sup>511</sup> The UNDP is one of the organisations focussing on the above issue in the field of DDR. Cooperation with MONUC on these issues is taking place, but only in the military sections of the mission. The UNDP therefore emphasizes that such an integrated approach is also necessary in the policing and rule of law sector. This should be taken upon by MONUC and other organisations working on SSR.<sup>512</sup>

To summarize, UNDP staff underlines several points of improvement for MONUC's policies and activities on SSR. They believe that MONUC should have a larger focus on human security. It is argued that including the aspect of human security in reform policies and programmes is crucial with regard to sustaining SSR efforts. Another point put forward is reconciliation between local population and security sector actors. Although MONUC is cooperating with the UNDP on this issue in the military sector, such programmes are also necessary in the policing and judicial sections. UNDP representatives argue that reconciliation is the basis for trust of the Congolese population in their security sector. For this reason they emphasize that reconciliation between these actors is a condition for sustaining SSR efforts.

## 6.2 Perceptions of the Congolese Society

Besides taking into account the perception of International actors on MONUC's SSR activities and achievements, it is of utmost importance to highlight the perceptions of the Congolese society. The different perceptions of the Congolese government in the Kivus, national NGO's and local population will be described. Their perception is often neglected, whilst these are the people who are actually living in the country. Besides, their perception might differ significantly from the perceptions of international actors. For these reasons this section will describe the perceptions of different parts of the Congolese society on MONUC's SSR programmes and progress. This section therewith aims to provide insight in how programmes and achievements of MONUC on SSR are perceived by the Congolese society in the Kivus.

### 6.2.1 The DRC Government in the Kivus

Government representatives in the Kivus argue that reforming the Congolese security sector is one of the aspects of high importance for establishing peace and stability in the country. They are of the opinion that SSR programmes are minimal in the Kivus, as the main focus lies on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of armed groups. These groups are experienced as one of the main problems for the country, especially for the Kivus. Whilst, Nkunda's troops and other armed groups are a problem in the Kivus, the FDLR is indicated as the largest problem for the area. Representatives believe that the moment the FDLR will be removed, many other armed groups will resolve quickly hereafter.<sup>513</sup> *"Only then is it possible to work towards stability in the Kivus and start with reforming the security sector reform on a more durable basis"*, a government representative in the Kivus emphasizes.<sup>514</sup>

Officials put forward that MONUC is not dealing with armed groups in the right manner. It is stated that *"their actions are not strong enough"*. *"Therefore armed groups can continue their activities of corruption, plundering and rape"*.<sup>515</sup> Representatives note that the Congolese society previously looked upon MONUC as an organisation that would bring peace in the country, but MONUC proved that they are unable to meet these expectations. Government officials indicate that for this reason the support of the Congolese for MONUC decreased rapidly. The effects of their programmes on DDR and SSR have been very limited and representatives believe that citizens still face many of the same security challenges they faced before.<sup>516</sup>

*"MONUC and other international organisations claimed to have an idea of how to establish peace in the country"*, states a government official.<sup>517</sup> With this, representatives argue, they forgot to include the Congolese and the context specific problems. Government officials argue that any SSR approach should be based on cooperation between both the Congolese government and international actors. They claim that until a year ago, an SSR approach was mainly based upon the ideas of the International Community and mainly MONUC. The moment it appeared that this approach did not work, the International Community started to include the DRC government.<sup>518</sup> *"But still, whilst the government came with good ideas on how to reform the security sector, the International Community was unwilling to support this plan"*. *"Therewith they hindered and delayed SSR progress instead of facilitating progress"*, an official furiously states.<sup>519</sup>

To summarize, government representatives in the Kivus largely look upon MONUC as an organisation unable to address the main problems the region faces and unwilling to cooperate with the DRC government.

They emphasize the importance of SSR with regard to peace and stability in the region, but indicate several problems with MONUC's approach to SSR and DDR. They put forward that MONUC's approach on eradicating armed groups in the Kivus has been too soft. Their actions need to be strengthened to ensure security for the local population. Another point put forward is the development of a national strategy for SSR. It is believed that the International Community largely neglects the opinions and ideas of national actors on SSR. Government officials emphasize that ensuring the design of an effective SSR strategy requires the involvement of national actors and willingness of international actors in SSR to cooperate.

### **6.2.2 National NGO's in the Kivus**

Many national NGO representatives note that reforming the Congolese security sector is a challenging, but necessary process in the DRC. The security sector is malfunctioning and constitutes an enormous threat to the local population. It is argued that numerous of organisations work on reforming the security sector, but results have not yet been directly visible.<sup>520</sup> A representative states that *"the SSR process has evolved differently than expected"*.<sup>521</sup> They point out that the unwillingness of armed groups to take part in DDR has delayed the larger part of army reform activities. Furthermore, they believe that those activities taking place have been mainly limited to training the armed forces instead of reforming their structure.<sup>522</sup>

NGO staff members further indicate that the recognition that the security sector is more than the national army should be executed in practise by MONUC. Currently the majority of MONUC's programmes aim at reforming the army. A more balanced attention for army, police and justice reform is recommended to MONUC.<sup>523</sup> Within this *"fighting impunity and strengthening the judicial system is a necessary condition for SSR to succeed"*, states a representative.<sup>524</sup>

Representatives express that the DRC government has to take a leading role in developing a programme for SSR in the DRC. They feel that the DRC government shifted this responsibility to MONUC without actually supporting MONUC's programmes and activities. For this reason many representatives argue that the primary responsibility for SSR has to be carried over to the Congolese government.<sup>525</sup> A NGO staff member states that *"the government has to outline the structure of army, police and rule of law sections"*.<sup>526</sup> It is believed that a government outline will create a basis for more direct programmes of MONUC, but also of other national and international actors involved in SSR. NGO staff further emphasizes that the government has the responsibility to work towards sustaining SSR efforts, by ensuring the payment of security actors and by including the ideas of local actors in a *plan global* for SSR. Representatives feel that a division between SSR tasks should be made clear. They are of the opinion that ownership of processes on SSR and peace in the DRC should be Congolese. Assistance for such processes should come from the International Community and MONUC.<sup>527</sup>

NGO staff believes that the lack of government responsibility on SSR brought about an enormous responsibility for MONUC to ensure that their programmes are effective. Representatives point out that MONUC has not yet been able to meet such expectations and its programmes remain rather invisible for the Congolese population.<sup>528</sup> *"UN soldiers and the white UN cars are widely visible amongst the country, but the actual role of MONUC in the DRC is not clear to the population"*, a NGO representative argues.<sup>529</sup>

For SSR to be effective, a change of mind of Congolese citizens is a necessary condition as well, claim many NGO representatives. For many citizens the link between reforming the security sector and achieving peace is not clear. Whereas the average Congolese want the situation to change, they only see a limited role for themselves to enable this change. Consciousness has to grow on the fact that there also lies a responsibility with the Congolese citizens. NGO staff believes that without support of citizens peace cannot and will not be achieved.<sup>530</sup>

NGO staff members argue that the role of national NGO's in international programmes on SSR has been minimal. Besides several partnerships with MONUC, the role of national NGO's in SSR and the drafting of a national reform strategy can be neglected. It is believed that the role of national NGO's in SSR is undermined. Besides the national government and some privileged actors, other national actors need to be included in SSR. NGO's have community based ideas on the reform process; views that are currently lacking.<sup>531</sup> It is stated that *"if international and national organisation would combine their expertise on SSR and peace, efforts could be more complementary"*.<sup>532</sup>

To summarize, the views of NGO representatives in the Kivus are largely consentient. They all recognise that SSR is a difficult and challenging process in the Kivus. Until now, results not have been directly visible, whilst many organisations work on reform. NGO representatives have put forward several points which should be taken into account with regard to SSR. It should be noted that this is a summary of these points, but they have been put forward by different representatives. The first point put forward is that MONUC's efforts on reform in the Kivus need to be more balanced. Equal attention should be paid to military, judicial and police reform for SSR to succeed. Another point is that the DRC government needs to take responsibility and ownership over SSR in the DRC. Representatives argue that Congolese ownership over SSR, and international support and assistance for the process, is the basis of effective reform. Only then will responsibilities be clear and tasks can be divided. Many representatives note that local support for MONUC's SSR activities is small, due to a lack of information on MONUC's aims and programmes. Increasing the flow of information towards citizens will increase their support for the missions' programmes, as people will have a better view on the benefits programmes have. On the other hand, representatives believe that Congolese citizens need to take responsibility for changing the country as well. A last point put forward some of the NGO staff is that NGO's are scarcely involved in SSR in the Kivus. They emphasize that national NGO's and their views should be included in SSR programmes and policies, to guarantee a complementary and community-based approach.

### **6.2.3 Local citizens in the Kivus**

Currently, civil society/ local citizens are the only actors who are not directly involved in SSR in the DRC, even though they are the main actors who face the results of MONUC's efforts on SSR. For this reason their perceptions will be described below. This section will be a summary of points put forward by many civil/society actors and local citizens in interviews and conversations.

#### **6.2.3.1 Context for SSR and MONUC**

As the director of one of the leading civil society organisations in Bukavu states: *"Looking at the DRC nowadays, you will see a country in which so many things go wrong and so many things are happening without consequences. Imagine yourself seeing this in your own country; you would think it would be absurd. But in our society, although some recognise the absurdness of the situation, a lot of things have become normal"*.<sup>533</sup>

Citizens put forward that the average Congolese citizen has delivered a fight for survival for many years. After periods of relative stability, new crises arose time after time. The majority of the Congolese has been forced to flee several times in their lives due to war or threats of armed groups. Besides this, the general lack of government capabilities and will to ensure security for its population is believed to result in an overall mistrust of towards the DRC government.<sup>534</sup> *“Many Congolese see themselves as victims of issues they can not influence, namely the presence of armed groups in their country, the lack of government responsibility to protect and stand up for its citizens, and the ill-functional security sector”,* a citizen notes.<sup>535</sup>

*“MONUC was ‘warmly’ welcomed by the larger part of the Congolese, hoping that finally their country would be subjected to change”,* explains a local citizen.<sup>536</sup> Despite MONUC’s efforts to work towards peace in the country and several peace-agreements citizens indicate that they have become disappointed. Whereas the western part of the DRC has become relatively stable, the eastern part of the country still faces many challenges. They feel that MONUC has proven to be unable to change this. Despite their recognition that progress has been made and the living circumstances for some have improved, many citizens lost their trust in MONUC.<sup>537</sup>

Frequent demonstrations against MONUC in Goma and Bukavu are an expression of the population of this loss of trust, notes a citizen. Citizens put forward that many Congolese in the Kivus have not seen much of a difference between the mission’s arrival, the transition period and their current security situation. The expectations of MONUC did not live up to its actual workings.<sup>538</sup> Besides, *“many Congolese do not exactly know the tasks of MONUC and are only confronted with the direct outcomes of insecurity”,* notes a citizen in Bukavu.<sup>539</sup>

#### 6.2.3.2 MONUC and SSR

Working on SSR requires an understanding of the conflict in the DRC, believe many citizens believe. Such an understanding is currently absent amongst many international actors working on the subject. They note for instance that DDR and DDRRR, and therefore SSR in the DRC are failing. Armed groups are not willing to take part in these processes without specific guarantees. Such guarantees, as for instance amnesty, have not been provided by the Congolese government, neither by the International Community, several civil society representatives note.<sup>540</sup> As a result, *“the Kivus are harbouring remnants and criminals, despite the presence of MONUC, because MONUC does not understand the dynamic of the conflict”,* a Congolese citizen states.<sup>541</sup>

Furthermore, the reasons of a failing security sector in the DRC need to be addressed. The population is mainly confronted with the inability of the DRC government and the security sector to deliver effective security. According to them, MONUC has also failed to do so and even contributed to greater insecurity. For this reason, the role of MONUC in the DRC is perceived as rather ambiguous. Many suspect them of supporting armed groups and not willing to work towards peace, noting that they do not know what MONUC is doing in their country. Therewith the support of the population for MONUC and their SSR activities has decreased significantly since 2006.<sup>542</sup> Some state that *“MONUC is seeing everything, but not acting at all. They are not willing to put their own lives at stake for a Congolese life”*.<sup>543</sup> On the other hand, some citizens note that those who have received help from MONUC appreciate this. They claim that only if MONUC leaves, will the contribution of MONUC to stability and an effective security sector will be noticeable.<sup>544</sup>

Bureaucracy within the UN is looked upon as a reason for inefficiency of MONUC. In specific cases it takes too much time to get approval of both Kinshasa and New York, several informed citizens note. This brings about threatening situations and prevents to ensure flexibility of MONUC's programmes. Furthermore, responsibility for SSR should lie with all actors in the DRC; the Congolese government, the International Community, the security sector itself and civil society. Bringing these actors together is believed to deliver the most sustaining approach to reform, as all opinions will be taken into account.<sup>545</sup>

In summary, local citizens are somewhat divided about the MONUC's efforts on SSR. On the one hand it is noted that MONUC has booked some results on SSR and protecting the population. On the other hand, many points have been put forward on failures of MONUC. In general they put forward that the local population expected a lot from MONUC, but MONUC has not been able to meet these expectations. Many believe that MONUC has to put more efforts in bringing about stability in the Kivus and guaranteeing security for the population in this area. They also note that MONUC has to provide more information on its programmes and goals in the region. Another point indicated by citizens is that MONUC has little understanding of the conflict in the Kivus and its dynamics. To ensure effects of their programmes, they have to improve their knowledge on the conflict, to have better understanding on how to address certain problems. Besides, it is claimed that MONUC does nothing to address the reasons of a failing security sector. Their role in the Kivus is therefore perceived as ambiguous. MONUC needs to prove to the population that they are striving for stability and are willing to ensure security for locals. The last point indicated refers to the lack of flexibility of MONUC's activities and inclusiveness. On flexibility it is noted that MONUC's programmes and activities should be easier to change, without including bureaucracy of the UN in New York. On inclusiveness it is noted that MONUC needs to ensure the inclusion of representatives of all actors in the DRC in a SSR process. Bringing together these representatives will deliver the most sustainable approach towards SSR.



## Chapter 7: SSR and durable peace: an analysis

The analysis in chapter 6 has shown that there is a myriad of different views on the effects and contents of MONUC's SSR activities. In each section in the chapter the specific points of view of the different actors (ranging from the international level to the local) were outlined. It is important to acknowledge these diverse standpoints as they each highlight how MONUC's policies are experienced at the distinct fields these actors are active in. Rather than outlining the effects of MONUC's SSR efforts in broad, general terms, the analysis of the different viewpoints have indicated that the same aspects of a policy or activity may be evaluated differently by different actors.

This chapter will build upon these perceptions, but will also draw upon other relevant documents and literature. The different perceptions put forward in chapter 6 and this literature will provide the basis for the assessment of MONUC's activities in this chapter. More specifically, this chapter will explore how MONUC's activities relate to the different aspects of durable peace as outlined in chapter 2 and 3. The main aim of this part of the chapter is to explore how MONUC's SSR interventions have contributed to, or will contribute to, durable peace in the region. The results of this analysis will be presented in the last part of this chapter.

### **7.1 MONUC's SSR interventions in the DRC: a contribution to durable peace?**

This section will assess the contribution of MONUC's SSR policies and activities to the different dimensions of durable peace. To do so, first the different aspects of durable peace will be related to the case of the DRC and the Kivu provinces. It will specify what specific issues are crucial to develop durable peace in the Kivu area. To discuss what these aspects entail, this study will mainly draw upon the literature explored in chapter 2 and 3. Next, the question of *to what extent MONUC's SSR activities and policies contribute to durable peace* will be answered.

#### **7.1.1 Durable peace; a definition adapted to the DRC and the Kivu provinces**

As described in chapter two, the definition of durable peace used in this study has been based upon a wide range of theoretical points of view on durable peace. What the discussion of this literature showed was that many of the existing definitions on durable peace stand rather isolated from one another. Therefore, a more encompassing definition of durable peace was developed, which aimed to link many of the formerly isolated debates and definitions in one more coherent definition. The following definition has been developed on the basis of these discussions "*durable peace is not only the absence of structural violence between groups, but also involves addressing and eliminating context and conflict specific root-causes and conflict-potentials*". This definition consists out of three main components: (1) the absence of structural violence, which was retrieved from Galtung (1969), (2) the importance of addressing specific root-causes of conflict, as recognised by amongst others Hartzell, Roddie and Rothchild (2001), and (3) eliminating conflict potentials in instable regions, which is a component described by Schmid (2000).<sup>546</sup>

In chapter three, the two particular elements of the definition of durable peace were discussed. These are root-causes of conflict and conflict potentials. It outlined several general causes of conflict: (a) the historical inheritance of colonialism, (b) issues concerning identity and ethnicity, (c) institutional issues concerning politics and governance, (d) export of conflicts from neighbouring countries and alliances, and (e) a weak economy and pressure for democracy. It also stressed the importance of the context specific issues in the Kivu area.

The following causes of conflict that are specific for the Kivu region have been outlined: (a) the regions porous external borders, (b) the institutional context, (c) the social context, and (d) resources in the region. General causes of conflict and Kivu specific causes of conflict, as outlined above, will be combined in cases in which general causes also affect specific causes of conflict in the Kivu region. Furthermore, the specific causes of conflict in the Kivu region are strongly related to the Kivu specific conflict potentials in the region, and no clear distinction between the two is possible. For this reason, both the causes of conflict and conflict potentials will be treated together.

The next section will look into the contribution of MONUC's SSR policies and activities in the DRC and the Kivus to the different dimensions of durable peace. This will be done on the basis of the perceptions, ideas and evaluations of those interviewed combined with an analysis of relevant literature and policy documents.

### ***7.1.2 MONUC's SSR policies and activities; a contribution to durable peace?***

It is not realistic to expect that MONUC's SSR policies and activities fulfil all requirements for durable peace in the region. However, what can be expected is that MONUC's interventions will contribute to several important requirements for durable peace. Firstly, the section will look into the contribution of MONUC's SSR interventions to combating structural violence. Then a closer look will be taken into the extent to which MONUC's SSR policies and activities address and eliminate the root-causes and conflict potentials in the DRC/Kivu conflict.

#### ***7.2.2.1 MONUC's SSR interventions and structural violence***

In this section the following question will be answered: *do MONUC's SSR policies and activities contribute to abating structural violence in the Kivu provinces?*

The short answer to this question is, perhaps somewhat bluntly put, just a plain no. If one assesses the current situation in the Kivu provinces this is perhaps the most logical answer to give. The latest heavy outbreaks of violence in the Kivus in October 2008 illustrate this most clearly.<sup>547</sup> The pressure of the CNDP rebel groups on Goma and the national army have again created a violent and insecure situation in the region. Besides these recent outbreaks, the analysis of perceptions of local actors in Chapter 6 has shown that, many local citizens also still have to cope with violence on a structural almost daily basis. Every day, many citizens living in the Kivus are forced to leave their homes and search for shelter elsewhere due to violence in the region. In the Kivus one in three women has been raped. Women, men and children face the immediate threat of becoming a victim of brutal aggression in a war which has perhaps officially ended in the DRC, but never really came to an end in the Kivus.<sup>548</sup> Thus, for so far structural violence has still not been abated in the region. In fact, people are still severely affected by it.

When assessing the contribution of MONUC's SSR activities to the abatement of structural violence, it becomes slightly more difficult to answer the question with just a plain no. In fact, MONUC's SSR activities, to a certain extent, can be said to positively influence other already existing activities that are aimed at combating structural violence. This needs some elaboration. As much structural violence in the region is caused by warring armed groups, MONUC's efforts to reform the national army could be seen as a first step to tackle the issue of structural violence.

Much of these activities are aimed at strengthening the national army, helping them to deal effectively with armed groups. However, it is difficult to see the direct effects of these activities yet. This is problematic since tackling structural violence is believed to be one of the central preconditions for building a stable and effective security sector.<sup>549</sup> This argument has also been one of the central issues that were highlighted by the various actors in chapter 6. It should, nonetheless, also be noted that there is a reciprocal relationship between SSR and structural violence.<sup>550</sup> So, in this sense having a stable security sector can also be seen as one of the pre-conditions for abating structural violence. It is a chicken and egg discussion. Both the actors in chapter 6 and literature stress the urgency of tackling this issue. In this study, this argument is underlined as well. The success of SSR is highly dependent on the absence of structural violence. Although MONUC's SSR mandate does not include tackling structural violence, this should not be seen as an excuse to leave this issue to others. In fact, it should be seen as one of the most important issues for their SSR policies to succeed. Many of the difficulties that MONUC currently experiences in pursuing their SSR strategy can be largely related to the presence of structural violence and instability in the region. To a certain extent, the current lack of progress on SSR can be considered both a result and a cause of this devastating security situation.

The SSR activities of MONUC are also hampered by the lack of support of the national government. There have, in particular, been severe problems concerning the support of the Congolese authorities for army-restructuring, which is an integral part of SSR. Without a clear strategy for army reform structural violence can never be combated adequately. Chapter 6 and literature show that the DRC government is deemed to be rather reluctant in sustaining MONUC's efforts for army reform.<sup>551</sup> They do not provide the necessary resources to pay for the salaries of military staff and do almost nothing to improve their living conditions. This study aims to foreground the problems that result from this. Despite the fact that government officials have claimed that they need further support from MONUC to resolve these<sup>552</sup>, here it is stressed that the wait-and-see attitude of the government is not only striking but also highly problematic. Cooperation and coordination between the national government and MONUC is therefore very much wanted. It is important to note that this is also an issue of the distribution of responsibilities. Not every element of the task of building a secure environment should be delegated to MONUC. In fact, providing a secure environment without the presence of structural violence could be seen as one of the core tasks of a national government.

The reciprocity of SSR and structural violence, and the difficult relationships between the national government and MONUC have made combating structural violence a complex issue. As the absence of structural violence is an important pre-condition for durable peace, it can be argued that its presence in the Kivu area hampers the establishment of durable peace there. To a certain extent this can be imputed to MONUC's SSR strategy. Although the SSR activities of MONUC provide some basis to combat structural violence, these efforts alone do not suffice. Other measures that more explicitly address structural violence should also be taken. For a starter, to develop a more effective strategy, MONUC will need the full cooperation of the DRC government. At this moment, however, *'ce sont les Congolaise qui souffrent'*. So, when assessing the presence of durable peace in the Kivu region, it can be argued that the condition of the absence of structural violence has still not been fulfilled. Much more needs to be done and current SSR efforts of MONUC have not been sufficient to abate structural violence in the region. This is particularly relevant on the short term. On the long term, however, it is to be expected that the reform activities of MONUC will help to strengthen the national army and will make it more efficient. This is a quite positive prospect for the future, although the general idea is that still much more can be done on this field.

In Table 6 at the end of this section, the long term and short term effects of MONUC's SSR policies on the field of structural violence are outlined.

#### *7.2.2.2 SSR, root-causes of conflict and conflict potentials in the DRC and the Kivus*

The two indicators, root-causes of conflict and conflict potentials, refer to the underlying, often not directly visible, threats to peace and stability in the region. The absence of both is a good indicator of the presence of durable peace in a region. This section will therefore deal with the following question: *do MONUC's SSR policies and activities contribute to taking away causes of conflict and conflict potentials in the Kivu provinces?* In order to answer this question several specific points need to be addressed. These are: (1) the historical inheritance of colonialism in the DRC, (2) identity and ethnicity and the social context in the Kivus, (3) politics, governance and the institutional context in the Kivus, (4) import of conflicts from neighbouring countries and external borders in the Kivus, (5) resources in the Kivus and (6) a weak economy and pressure for democracy. This section will, hence, deal with the different causes of conflict and conflict potentials. Note that DRC specific causes of conflict and Kivu specific causes of conflict will be combined in cases in where national causes directly affect the specific causes of conflict and conflict potentials in the Kivu region.

#### *The historical inheritance of colonialism in the DRC*

One of the main underlying causes of conflict that has been identified in the DRC, are the problems inherited by colonialism. After the colonial period, the Congolese state was left with fragile institutions, weak governance structures, a malfunctioning economy and a deeply traumatised population (for a more detailed overview, see chapter 3). As argued earlier, these characteristics have had an important impact on conflict in the DRC and the Kivu region and need to be addressed in order to provide for durable peace. In this section the effects of MONUC's SSR interventions on taking away this key-cause of conflict will be assessed.

Although history, of course, cannot be changed, SSR is believed to take away some of the problems inherited by colonialism. These problems, such as a lack of control over security sector actors and security as a privilege for a minority of the population, have fuelled and can further fuel conflict in the region.<sup>553</sup> One of the most important issues for MONUC on this terrain is establishing parliamentary oversight over the security sector, in order to guarantee security for all. Another important element of MONUC's SSR interventions is creating Congolese ownership over the reform process. This issues stresses the importance of the Congolese government to take responsibility for SSR. They should be strongly engaged in SSR themselves, rather than (post-) colonial actors imposing their reform policies upon the DRC.

When assessing the contribution of MONUC's SSR policies and activities to abating problems following from the colonial period, the preliminary answer would be that there is no significant contribution. The Congolese security sector remains an ill functioning sector that largely lacks governmental control and only protects those who are able to pay for security.<sup>554</sup> However, on the aspect of Congolese ownership and responsibilities over reform processes, there now is, as also argued by many actors in chapter 6 and affirmed by the literature, some sense of national ownership of the process.<sup>555</sup> With this, the question whether MONUC has contributed to taking away the historical cause of conflict deserves more than an easy no.

The ownership of SSR by the Congolese authorities, however, still is minimal. In fact, the DRC government is rather reluctant to take their responsibility on this field, even though they have become more actively involved in SSR negotiations.<sup>556</sup>

One of the main problems outlined in chapter 6 is that the DRC government feels that SSR is largely based on the ideas of the International Community. They do not feel that they have sufficient influence on it. International actors and national NGO's however complain about the lack of governmental initiative on SSR. In so doing, the struggle in order to develop a national reform plan still continues (between the DRC government and other actors involved in SSR). As a result, no national SSR plan, nor a strategy, has been developed and SSR continuous to take place on an ad-hoc basis.<sup>557</sup> Thus, the increased pressure of MONUC and other actors on the DRC government is understandable and also seen as necessary.

So, without the essential cooperation of the DRC government, the effects of MONUC's SSR activities on this field remain quite limited, see Table 6. However, on the long term the DRC government, under UN and other international pressure, will have to cooperate with the International Community on SSR. It will be forced to take its responsibility in developing a reform strategy and it will have to establish a democratic structure for the security sector. On the longer term, therefore, it is foreseeable that MONUC's SSR policies and activities will contribute to overcome some of the problems inherited by colonialism, as pointed out in Table 6.

#### *Identity and ethnicity and the social context in the Kivus*

The various tensions between different ethnicities or identities in the DRC can be seen as another important cause of conflict and conflict potential. After the Berlin Conference of 1884, groups of the same ethnicity and identity were separated by the then newly drawn borders. Because of this, the Congolese now lack a feeling of national unity. They feel that they belong to a certain tribe, ethnical group, or community rather than to the DRC nation.<sup>558</sup> More specifically, in the Kivus, the social situation of some ethnic groups, in particular that of the Banyamulenge, has been a reason for many clashes.<sup>559</sup> The rights of this ethnical group have largely been denied by the DRC government (for a more detailed overview see chapter 3). As argued earlier, these characteristics have largely influenced conflict in the DRC and the Kivu region and need to be addressed in order to achieve durable peace. In this section the effects of MONUC's SSR interventions on taking away these interrelated causes of conflict will be assessed.

MONUC deals with the issue of a lack of national coherence, by establishing SSR activities at the national level. MONUC has strengthened its efforts to create a *national* police, a *national* army and a *national* justice system to aim for a stronger sense of nationality in the region.<sup>560</sup> Another element of their policy that adds to this cause of conflict is that MONUC aims to involve all different layers and ethnicities in the security sector.<sup>561</sup> By establishing a security sector that protects all Congolese citizens, instead of only certain groups, their activities will add to creating national unity.

When assessing the contribution of MONUC's SSR interventions to taking away causes of conflict related to the social context, identity and ethnicity, almost no effect can be distinguished. The ongoing fighting on the basis of identity and ethnicity in the Kivus, the continuing malfunctioning of the security sector, and the ongoing problematic relationship between security sector institutions and the Congolese citizens show that so far identity building efforts have had limited results or have been voided by these issues.<sup>562</sup> Moreover, MONUC's approach has caused several problems, such as generating distrust amongst different ethnical groups, and causing identity clashes between local communities and the national identity.<sup>563</sup>

Nevertheless, many national NGOs and some representatives of the International Community believe that this approach, although less effective on the short term, will be more effective on the long term. For now, differences between groups and tribes are still emphasized by citizens and security sector actors. On the longer term, however, it is believed that this approach will lead to the recognition that there are many similarities between the different ethnicities and identities in the region. The DRC government and many Congolese citizens, on the other hand, feel that it will only have effect for a brief period of time. They believe that these problems cannot be overcome.<sup>564</sup> In line with the views of national NGO's and international actors, this study stresses that these problems can and need to be overcome on the longer term. Recognising the fact that this will take time, it will lead to more stability and a growing confidence of citizens in the security sector. This is also argued by International Community actors and national NGO's.<sup>565</sup>

So, MONUC's SSR activities have addressed some of the social context related causes of conflict as well as conflict potentials in the field of identity and ethnicity. Results so far, however, have been not (or barely) visible, and have been only very short termed. For this reason the short term contribution of MONUC's SSR interventions to abate causes of conflict and conflict potentials stemming from identity, ethnicity and the social context in the Kivus can be evaluated as largely absent, as shown in Table 6. Nevertheless, the expectations on the longer term are that MONUC's SSR policies and activities will bring about an increased feeling of national unity. In so doing, MONUC will deliver a partial contribution to the identity, ethnicity and social context related problems in the Kivus, as indicated in Table 6.

#### *Politics, governance and the institutional context in the Kivus*

Another root-cause of conflict that has been outlined in chapter three can be found in the field of politics and governance. It has been argued that there are two main problems in this field. The first is that the national government has insufficient control over certain areas in the DRC, in particular in the Kivu region.<sup>566</sup> Due to communication problems, but also to problems related to hierarchical control (especially that of the military), the government has severe difficulties in managing the region.<sup>567</sup> The second issue is that certain elites in the state apparatus are pursuing their own interests rather than that of the entire population.<sup>568</sup> These problems have had an important impact on conflict in the DRC and the Kivu region and need to be addressed to develop durable peace. In this section the effects of MONUC's SSR interventions on taking away these causes of conflict will be assessed.

MONUC's SSR mandate does not directly aim to solve the problems related to the restructuring of the state apparatus in order to ensure that the state can take upon its governmental and security responsibilities. However, MONUC does to a certain extent force the DRC government to take its responsibility. Examples of this are the development of initiatives to remove foreign and national armed groups –so that government troops can take over-, the development of a *plan global* on SSR, and more.<sup>569</sup>

When assessing the contribution of MONUC's SSR interventions, this contribution is somewhat difficult to define. Many non-governmental national actors believe that the government will change its current attitude. This is also stressed by some of the literature.<sup>570</sup> This is, then, still an important threat to durable peace in the region. The International Community, however, is a bit more positive on this field. They argue that some of the efforts of MONUC on the field of SSR have, to a certain extent, already changed the structure of politics and governance in a positive way.<sup>571</sup> Indeed, government involvement in the Kivus has slowly increased and small initiatives on SSR have been taken.

But, in line with the argument of most of the national actors, it remains the question whether the DRC government actually will change its attitude, especially with regard to the long term.<sup>572</sup> Furthermore, the changes indicated by the International Community have not been directly visible, nor have they led to significant changes in the structure of politics and governance, nor in the institutional context in the Kivus.

So, until now, MONUC's SSR interventions have had no real contribution to politics and governance, and the institutional context in the Kivus. (see also Table 6). However, due to the current fragile and hostile situation in the Kivu region the pressure of MONUC and others on the DRC government to change this will most probably increase. In so doing, the DRC government will be forced to act upon the problems in the region and will have to put the general interest first. Therefore it can be expected that the long term contribution of MONUC's SSR interventions to this cause of conflict will be slightly more positive.

#### *Import of conflicts from neighbouring countries and external borders in the Kivus*

Another root-cause of conflict in the DRC that has been highlighted in chapter three is the negative influence that conflicts in neighbouring countries have on the region. As has been described in chapter three, the borders in the eastern DRC, especially in the Kivu provinces, are the main entry points for rebel groups, weapon transports, refugees and foreign influences, and are as well a leeway for the illegal exploitation of resources. Conflicts in neighbouring countries do not only have an impact on the DRC in terms of economics or in terms of refugee inflows, but also easily fuel conflict in the Kivu region.<sup>573</sup> The inability of the Congolese army and border police to respond to the threats posed by foreign military and rebel groups, has also facilitated the import of neighbouring conflicts to the DRC. The linkages between Congolese groups with tribe members, family and friends living in these countries is yet another reason why these conflicts are easily exported into the DRC.<sup>574</sup> These characteristics have heavily influenced conflict in the DRC and the Kivu region and need to be dealt with in order to provide for durable peace. In this section the effects of MONUC's SSR interventions on taking away this border and neighbouring conflict related cause of conflict will be assessed.

When assessing MONUC's contribution to the abatement of this cause of conflict, it follows that there is no easy answer possible. Cross-border alliances are still an important problem for the DRC and especially the Kivu region, despite MONUC's efforts to strengthen the security sector institutions that should combat them.<sup>575</sup> MONUC's SSR interventions have aimed to establish an efficient and effective security sector which is able to fulfil tasks such as border protection and control. In so doing, MONUC address the problems associated with having porous external borders and the import of conflicts from neighbouring countries. However, MONUC representatives recognise that they have not yet been able to meet their own expectations with regards to long term improvements of this security sector branch. In fact, almost every actor agrees on this with MONUC.<sup>576</sup> Nevertheless, this should not overshadow the short term results already achieved. Army and police training have to certain extent dealt with these issues, however, an overall improvement of the security sector on this field is still missing. The DRC government should play an important role in this. Unfortunately, this role has not been taken up yet.<sup>577</sup> Not paying salaries to the army and border-police has made many of these actors resort to corruption and in doing so dissolved many of MONUC's results.

So, porous borders and the presence of conflict in neighbouring countries continue to pose significant threats to the security situation in the DRC and especially the Kivus.

This is a substantial conflict potential that has been addressed by MONUC's SSR interventions, yet with limited results, as indicated in Table 6. The long term contribution of MONUC's SSR activities to the abatement of this cause of conflict and conflict potential is more negative. This is also pointed out in Table 6. Whereas MONUC's SSR interventions strengthen those security institutions necessary for external protection of the country, the DRC government needs to pay salaries to these security sector actors. This, so far, has caused many problems. Most probably this is not expected to change on the longer term, especially if the governmental system does not undergo substantial changes.<sup>578</sup>

#### *Resources in the Kivus*

Another cause of conflict that has been outlined in chapter three, are the problems associated with the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the Kivu region. Resources have been the stake of many conflicts in the region.<sup>579</sup> It has led to an increased foreign interest in the region. The protection of these resources needs to be dealt with in order to develop durable peace. In this section the effects of MONUC's SSR interventions on taking away this key-cause of conflict will be assessed.

This point is similar to the previous point about the import of conflicts from neighbouring countries and encounters comparable problems. As such, when assessing the contribution of MONUC's SSR activities to the abatement of problems concerning resources, the answer is similar. MONUC's SSR interventions have strengthened the national army and police, but only with limited results with regard to the protection of resources. So far, these security sector actors have not been able to sufficiently protect resources and prevent illegal exploitation.<sup>580</sup> Whereas there is a bit more control on resources today, as indicated in Table 6, much more needs to be done. One of the main aspects is that security sector actors need to be paid by the Congolese government otherwise they will quickly resort to corruption. However, as action by the Congolese government is not expected to be taken soon, the long term effects will be rather limited. Moreover, as illegally exploiting resources is beneficial for many actors, they will not easily give up their source of income. Therefore, as indicated in Table 6, the long term expectations of the contribution of MONUC's SSR interventions to this cause of conflict are less positive.

#### *A weak economy and pressure for democracy*

The last cause of conflict highlighted in chapter three is the countries weak economy in combination with the international and national pressure for democracy. Between both these issues there is an ongoing interaction. The countries faltering economy has made poverty in the country normal, triggers further inequality between and dissatisfaction amongst citizens. It also increased internal pressure for democratisation. In so doing, the lack of economic development and pressure for democracy launched further instability in the DRC. These problems have had a significant influence on conflict in the DRC and the Kivu region. In order to progress durable peace in the country these problems need to be addressed. This section will elaborate on the effects of MONUC's SSR interventions on taking away these causes of conflict.

MONUC's SSR mandate does not aim to strengthen the countries economy. However, by providing security and stability through SSR it may be expected that on the long term this will also have effects on the economy. Furthermore, MONUC works towards establishing democratic security institutions and civilian oversight mechanisms.



So far, MONUC's SSR efforts have not been sufficient for the Congolese security institutions to create stability in the Kivu region. Moreover, besides negotiations between MONUC and the DRC government on establishing democratic security institutions and civilian oversight mechanisms, no direct activities have taken place on this aspect.<sup>581</sup>

### 7.2.3 Summarizing the relationship between SSR and durable peace

Now the key variables of durable peace have been discussed in relation to the SSR policies and activities of MONUC, this section will summarize the findings of the previous section in broad outlines. It can not and should not be expected that MONUC's SSR interventions address all elements of durable peace, and eliminate all conflict related issues. Therefore it is important to make a distinction between the short term and long term effects of SSR policies on the different aspects of durable peace. Especially because although some activities have success on a short term basis, it is of utmost importance to prolong them so that peace can be durable. On the other hand, it is also important, especially to the actors affected by SSR efforts, to understand that, while policies on the short term have little effects, they may on the long term very well have more significant results. For this reason in the previous section both short term results and long term expectations are outlined. Note that the long term effects are only expectations that depend highly on the engagement and willingness of specific actors. The results of this evaluation will be illustrated in Table 6 and will be briefly explained below.

**Table 6: The contribution of MONUC's SSR policies and activities to the different elements of durable peace**

	Contributions of MONUC's SSR efforts	
	Effect on the short term	(expected) effects on the long term
<b>Absence of structural violence</b>	-	+/-
<b>Addressing causes of conflict and conflict potentials</b>		
• Historical inheritances colonialism	-	+
• Import of conflicts and external borders	+/-	-
• Politics, governance & institutional context	-	+/-
• Identity, ethnicity & social context	--	(+)/-
• Resources	+/-	-
• A weak economy & pressure for democracy	--	+/-

No contribution: --  
 No significant contribution: -  
 Limited contribution: +/-

Positive contribution: +  
 Strong positive contribution: ++

In general, the analysis shows that MONUC's SSR interventions have not contributed significantly to the combating structural violence. More specifically, no significant contribution can be identified. Perhaps it is not fair to expect that MONUC's SSR activities will contribute on this field, as the combating of structural violence is not part of their SSR mandate.

Certainly, there are no expectations about a contribution of SSR activities on this field on the short term. Yet MONUC's efforts on SSR could be expected to deliver a limited contribution to the taking away of structural violence on the longer term. MONUC's SSR interventions aim to strengthen the institutions of the security sector, such as police, army, justice. In so doing, MONUC's SSR activities will help the main agencies that have as one of their main tasks to combat structural violence in the region. So, as MONUC's SSR activities will strengthen these actors, on the longer term they will have (indirectly) helped them in combating structural violence. This is an important insight that should not be overlooked.

Generally, the analysis has put forward that the larger part of MONUC's SSR policies and activities have not contributed significantly to address the causes of conflict and conflict potentials in the region. First of all, the historical inheritances of colonialism have not been effectively addressed on the short term. There are however some prospects. SSR interventions can be expected to address this inheritance on the longer term, by ensuring Congolese ownership over the process and granting the Congolese government more responsibilities.

Secondly, the countries' external borders, especially in the Kivus, have remained a serious problem, despite MONUC's efforts to strengthen and professionalize the security sector on this field. Although some results have been booked on the short term, the prospects on the long term are less positive. Most important is that the salaries of those controlling the borders are paid out on a regular basis. If not, such officers are quite easily tempted into corruption or other illegal activities to provide an income. Currently there are no expectations that this will be improved on the longer term. MONUC's SSR interventions can therefore still be looked upon as not adequately addressing the import of conflicts and the upholding of external borders on the longer term.

A third important issue is that MONUC's SSR efforts have not directly impacted the institutional context and politics and governance yet. There are very few short term results to be expected. However, on the longer term these efforts can be expected to contribute to strengthening the institutional context. Because MONUC is putting more pressure on the Congolese government to take its responsibilities to protect its population and territory, a limited contribution to addressing these issues can be expected on the longer term.

Although the social context, in which struggles related to identity and ethnicity are the main challenges, has been addressed by MONUC's SSR interventions, there have only been meagre results on this field. Especially on the short term, results will hardly be visible and current results can not be really be seen as improvements. Despite the fact that MONUC emphasizes national unity in the security sector and protection of all by this sector, overcoming identity and ethnicity issues takes time. Whereas improvements in this field can be expected on the longer term, it is questionable whether these improvements are substantial enough to even contribute to this topic in a marginal way.

Another point to be mentioned here is the issue of illegal resource exploitation. In line with the results and problems described earlier on the point of borders and the import of conflicts, MONUC's SSR interventions have had a limited contribution to address this issue. An important issue is that salary payments of the security sector actors active in the field need to be ensured and sustained on the long term. Since many actors benefit enormously from illegally exploiting these resources, there are only limited prospects on this issue on the long term expectations.

A last point is the contribution of MONUC's SSR interventions to addressing the countries weak economy and the pressure for democracy. As described earlier, this contribution is largely indirect and maybe even far-fetched, but also not noticeable yet. There is not yet a contribution of MONUC's SSR interventions to improving the countries weak economy and the pressure for democracy. Nevertheless, on the long term it can be expected that MONUC will increase its activities in the field of establishing democratic security institutions and will further strengthen the countries security sector. This will most probably bring about more stability, a greater sense of democracy and will also indirectly contribute to economic advancements on the long term.

To conclude, the question whether MONUC's SSR policies and activities contribute to durable peace in the Kivu provinces can be, strictly taken, answered with a no. As described above, the extent to which MONUC's SSR interventions contribute to the larger part of the elements of durable peace is minor, not visible or merely absent. However, it should also be noted that on the longer term a firmer contribution can be expected. Current SSR efforts of MONUC should be seen as a basis for the establishment of an efficient and effective security sector in the DRC, which is willing and able to address the regions problems.

## Chapter 8: Conclusion and recommendations

This study has focused on the contribution of MONUC's SSR policies and activities to durable peace in the Kivu provinces. Chapters 2 and 3 have dealt with UN peacekeeping and durable peace, the history of conflict and the main causes of conflict. It has also been described and explained the role of the United Nations Mission in the DRC. It has described what UN peacekeeping and durable peace is, and how the concept of durable peace is used in an UN peacekeeping context. Furthermore, the study explored the specificities of the conflict in the DRC and the Kivus. The fourth chapter has focused on theories on SSR, how these have been translated into UN policy prescriptions, and how SSR has become an integral part of many new UN peacekeeping operations. This chapter highlighted the contextual development of SSR and how SSR has been implemented in the UN and its peacekeeping policies and activities. The fifth chapter looked into the SSR policies of UN peacekeeping in the specific context of the DRC and the Kivu area. It elaborates upon earlier SSR developments in the DRC, and other SSR activities taking place in the country and on their engagement with MONUC's SSR activities. The sixth chapter described the different perceptions of actors involved and affected by MONUC's SSR policies and activities. Moreover, it indicated how these actors perceive and evaluate the SSR activities of MONUC and highlights specific problems that they encounter. In so doing, the preceding chapters have dealt with the different sub-elements of the central research question *"To what extent do the SSR policies and activities of MONUC contribute to durable peace in the Kivu area, considering the views and evaluations of actors involved and affected by these interventions?"*.

In Chapter 7 several of these elements were integrated in a single coherent analysis of the contribution of MONUC's SSR policies and activities. It has specifically focussed to assess MONUC's SSR activities and policies to the three main elements of durable peace. This has been done on the basis of the different views and perceptions held by different actors involved or affected by the SSR policies, outlined in chapter 6, and other relevant literature. This chapter will build extensively upon the analysis of chapter 6 and 7. The aim of this chapter is to explore the research question in full detail and to integrate the insights of the preceding chapters into one coherent answer to the main research question of this study. On the basis of this synthesis, several recommendations for SSR in the DRC will be put forward.

The analysis in the preceding chapters has shown that MONUC's SSR activities have contributed to the development of durable peace in the DRC and Kivu region to some extent. However, this contribution is minimal and limited only to certain sub-elements of durable peace. In the next section, the outcomes of this analysis will be briefly outlined. Then the current threats and challenges for SSR in the DRC and the Kivu provinces will be discussed. As the main aim of this research is to explore the contribution of MONUC's SSR activities to durable peace in terms of the *views and perceptions* held by the different actors active and affected by these interventions, this discussion is largely based upon the analysis of the perceptions of the various actors involved. However, the analysis will be substantiated and supported by academic literature and several policy documents (see chapter 7). After this discussion, a reflection by the researcher on this research and its academic and social/societal contribution will be given. The chapter will end with some recommendations and an outline of the changes in SSR in the DRC since 2009.

## **8.1 Comparing perceptions with MONUC's contribution to durable peace**

This section will build upon the analysis outlined in chapter 6 and 7 to give a concise answer to the main research question of this study. The section, however, will not only summarize the arguments put forwards in the two preceding chapters, but will also try to interrelate the different perspectives held by the different types of actors that have been involved or affected by MONUC's SSR activities. In so doing, some tensions between different points of view will be put forward. It is exactly these differences that provide interesting insights for answering the main research questions. Differences might refer to important tensions between MONUC's SSR objectives, policies, activities and the implications for different types of other actors involved. Besides this, this section might also bring forward what issues are particularly important and what views are most relevant in terms of their relationship to others. On the basis of this comparison and assessment, some general claims will be made about how MONUC's SSR activities have contributed to durable peace. The discussion in this section will also point out several important issues upon which action should be taken in order to achieve durable peace in the region. This will be the basis for the recommendations that will be given in a next section.

### ***8.1.1 Comparing the different perceptions on MONUC's SSR interventions***

Despite the fact that there is some overlap, the perceptions, views and evaluations on MONUC's SSR policies and activities, as outlined in chapter 6, also differ significantly. Different actors stress different points of importance. The most important differences occur when comparing the perceptions of the International Community with the perceptions of local actors in the Kivus. The latter have also put forward several recommendations for improvement. These recommendations largely concern the distribution of responsibilities amongst the different actors involved and affected by SSR in the DRC. These issues will also be highlighted in this section. An overview of this exploration is also given in Annex X, where the different perceptions of the actors interviewed, their recommendations and the distribution of the different responsibilities concerning SSR will be given schematically.<sup>29</sup> Both this section and the Annex, aim to put into perspective the different perceptions of actors in relation to those of others.

#### ***8.1.1.1 Perceptions held by different actors of the International Community***

The International Community largely acknowledges that MONUC's SSR interventions are not perfect, but perform reasonably well considering the circumstances. In general the views of the different actors in the International Community show a large overlap. Nonetheless, several differences in evaluations are visible. It has been indicated by MONUC, individual donor countries and the IOM that cooperation and communication between all SSR actors needs to be increased in order to achieve the most durable results. The IOM takes a step further by stressing that SSR needs to be considered as a core responsibility of all actors involved or affected by SSR. In order to increase cooperation and sustainability of SSR efforts, all actors should take their responsibilities, but should also be included in decision-making processes. This currently not the case, as becomes visible in annex XI. This figure shows the policy cooperation networks on SSR in the DRC. From this figure it becomes visible that no first-line policy-cooperation takes place between the local population and national NGOs, and the national government and international actors involved in SSR. Moreover, this figure also indicates that between certain international actors, no first-line policy-cooperation takes place.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> For a full overview of the different perceptions on SSR in the DRC, see Annex X

<sup>30</sup> For a full overview of communication networks on SSR in the DRC, see Annex XI

Most of the other members of the International Community outline the following points of improvement for MONUC. A main difficulty for the moment is its broad mandate in combination with a shortage of resources and funding. Besides this, many actors indicate that MONUC should strengthen its communication strategies. This now leads to a shortage of information towards the population or misunderstandings. Better communication would lead to more local support and will increase the applicability and effectiveness of their programmes. Both MONUC itself and the individual donor countries indicate that MONUC's training programmes are insufficient to generate sustainable SSR results. To achieve this, the overall structure of the security sector should also be reformed. The UNDP adds that MONUC's SSR efforts should also focus on human security and on the reconciliation of local citizens and the security sector to increase effectiveness and sustainability. Only then will people experience overall security and trust security sector actors. An issue that is outlined by both the EU mission and IOM representatives is the quality of UN personnel. They are of the opinion that within the mission a focus is on quantity of personnel instead of on their quality. The only actors that underline the need for a more flexible and context specific approach on SSR are EUSec and EUPol. This is rather strange, as most other actors emphasize a context specific approach in their own policies.

With regard to the policies of the International Community as a whole, several individual donor countries argue that SSR should be seen as something which is more than only army reform. They also note that effective SSR requires a better understanding of the context of the DRC. Most international actors argue that the support of the DRC government for SSR in general, and for MONUC's SSR activities in particular, is largely absent. They stress that support by the national government is a pre-condition for the effectiveness of the SSR programmes. Next to this, many International Community actors believe that the government should take more responsibility to increase the sustainability of SSR efforts undertaken in the country, by for instance developing a *plan global* and by providing funds to pay the salaries of security sector actors.

MONUC and the IOM see that support by the local population is necessary to further progress on SSR. This support is now largely absent because of the lack of information and many misunderstandings. Therefore communication and transparency towards the local population are seen as of utmost importance to increase this local support. EUPol and EUSec further add that Congolese citizens should be taking responsibility for SSR as well, by supporting activities, informing MONUC on their security issues and more. The point of the EU, although valid, is somewhat remarkable. Whereas the EU does not indicate that citizen support is necessary for sustainable SSR efforts, they do emphasize the responsibilities of the population, regardless their support for MONUC's SSR activities in the region.

Representatives of MONUC, individual donor countries, and EUPol and EUSec note that the instable situation in the Kivus is a big hurdle for effective SSR. Not only does the need to re-establish stability in the Kivus shift the attention away from SSR activities, but instability in the region often also undoes many of the achievements. Representatives of the EU mission in the DRC furthermore argue that the involvement of neighbouring countries very much undermines the SSR efforts undertaken.

#### *8.1.1.2 The perceptions of different actors in the Congolese society*

The evaluations, views and perceptions of local actors in the Kivus are more differentiated. In general, Congolese government representatives in the Kivus and local citizens do not experience MONUC's efforts as positive. They do see some positive features of MONUC's policies, but in general their evaluation is predominantly negative.

National NGO's in the Kivus place themselves somewhat between the views of the International Community and the local actors in the Kivus. They refer to some specific flaws within MONUC's SSR policies and activities, but also acknowledge that there are several positive points about these interventions.

Local actors, strangely enough, do not see any points of improvement for all actors involved or affected by SSR efforts. Their points focus more specifically on recommendations to specific actors and their responsibilities. Many national NGOs and local citizens point out that MONUC should improve its communication to local actors and indicate that MONUC should be better able to adapt itself to the local context. What is remarkable here is that it is only the local citizens that emphasize the importance of adaptability and flexibility. Representatives of the local population further note that MONUC should also put greater efforts in addressing the root causes of the problems of the failing Congolese security sector. They also point out that there is a great need to meet the expectations of the population. This last point has become problematic since the Congolese population is only poorly informed about MONUC's objectives and activities. Local representatives believe that improving MONUC's communication strategy will contribute to this point. A point made by the DRC government is that they find MONUC largely unwilling to cooperate with the DRC government. It should be noted, however, that this problem is only pointed out by governmental officials and by none of the other actors.

With regard to the issues put forward by the International Community, the different local Congolese actors have different opinions. The Congolese government notes that SSR policies and activities should more strongly take into account the ideas and views of local Congolese actors. National NGO's argue that their views should also be an integral part of developing SSR strategies, since they are the actors with the most 'field' experience. Representatives of the Congolese citizens express that all actors involved should be included in the policy making and implementation efforts on SSR. This point is rather important to concentrate upon. Not only as it is the most inclusive view on SSR policy making and implementation, but also because including a wide range of different actors, tends to get the most sustainable results.

As argued earlier, excluding some significant parties from the decision making process often leads to tensions and conflicts. National NGO's further emphasize that the current activities on SSR only focus at army reform. Whereas judicial and police reform is taking place, this point is in place. Current efforts mainly focus on army reform and far less on police and judicial reform. SSR efforts should equally address all sectors of the security sector in order to increase sustainability and prevent downfall in specific sectors.

National NGO's are the only Congolese actors in the Kivus that stress that the DRC government should also take its responsibilities. Because governmental support is seen as a pre-condition for effectiveness and sustainability of SSR they argue that the Congolese state should do more on this field. It is remarkable that this point has not been put forward by other representatives of the Congolese society.

The national NGO's are also the only actor that claims that the Congolese population itself should also take responsibility concerning SSR, by supporting reform, providing information and increasing communication with SSR actors. Citizen's support is seen as crucial for effectiveness and durability of SSR efforts. This support is largely absent at the moment. The NGOs note that this is mainly due to flaws in the information and communication strategies on SSR.

On the other hand, they indicate that the Congolese also need to change their attitude towards SSR. They need to realize that they themselves are also responsible for changing their country. They should not just lay back and rely on foreign aid and support only.

Another point put forward by the Congolese government is that the presence of armed groups still forms a large hurdle to take for effective SSR. As the Kivu area still is largely instable, they are quite right in pointing out this issue. As the presence of armed groups is not the only problem the Kivu provinces are facing, they should however also look into the broader causes for this instability. There are, hence, not only external interferences, but also a lot of internal causes. The DRC government strangely enough only sees this as a responsibility for MONUC, rather than looking into their own role in creating this instability. The Congolese government sometimes to easily shifts its own responsibility to MONUC.

#### *8.1.1.3 Comparing the perceptions of the International Community and the Congolese society*

In the preceding sections, the perceptions of the International Community have been cross linked internally, which was also done with the perceptions of the Congolese society. In this section, however, the perceptions of both groups of actors will be related and compared.

It is highly remarkable that, when comparing the perceptions of the International Community with those held by Congolese society actors that in a lot of cases they oppose one another directly. The only exception of this is the views held by the national NGO's. There is quite some overlap between the views held by the latter and the views held by the International Community. They both share the idea that all actors should take an equal share in the responsibility of creating a good working security sector. Both the national government and the population should become more responsible. This is contrary to the evaluations of the DRC government and those of the Congolese citizens who only refer to MONUC and the International Community as the main actors responsible.

When looking at all the different points outlined above, the following issues can be seen as the key challenges for SSR activities of MONUC and other actors involved. (1) MONUC's SSR mandate is too broad for the resources it has on SSR, (2) SSR is more than only reforming the army, (3) SSR encompasses more than training only to be sustainable, (4) communication and cooperation between MONUC and those involved and affected by SSR needs to be increased, (5) a better understanding of the context in which activities take place, and more flexibility and applicability of activities in specific regions is necessary for SSR to be more effective, (7) for reform to be sustainable it is also important to focus on reconciliation between security sector actors and the Congolese population, (8) inclusiveness of all actors, also NGO's and the population is important for SSR to succeed; SSR is a responsibility of all involved and affected, (9) support of, and the taking of responsibilities for reform by the DRC government is necessary for SSR to be sustainable, and (10) the support of local citizens for reform processes is of utmost importance.

#### *8.1.2 Relating perceptions and MONUC's contribution to durable peace*

As the section above has illustrated, there are many similarities between the different perceptions on MONUC's SSR interventions. However, the section above also showed that there, too, are many differences (that are equally important). This has put forward several important issues and challenges for SSR in the Kivu area. When looking into the relationship between MONUC's SSR activities and the achievement of durable peace, it is important to keep these issues in mind. In this section therefore the different aspects of durable peace will be explored both on the basis of these issues and on the basis of the results of the analysis in chapter 7.



Here, the three main elements of durable peace will be discussed in relation to the different perceptions of those involved and affected by SSR, the challenges outlined above and academic literature and policy reports. The section will largely draw upon the analysis executed in chapter 7, but will aim to put into perspective the different views held by different actors in order to assess the achievement of durable peace in the region. In so doing, this section will answer the following question: *how do the views on MONUC's SSR interventions relate to contribution of MONUC's SSR interventions to durable peace?*

#### *8.1.2.1 Structural violence*

The analysis has shown that MONUC's SSR interventions have not contributed sufficiently to combat structural violence. All actors and literature appear to agree on this. However, the International Community and a part of the academic literature are slightly more positive. Despite their recognition of the fact that current efforts are not sufficiently effective, they believe that there is a basis for further reform to combat structural violence. This is mostly based on the notion that the army is improving, mainly because of training efforts. However they also acknowledge that there are many problems with the army still. On the other hand, however, they argue (in line with most other actors) that some of the measures taken until now should be strengthened in order to achieve results on this field. Merely training security sector staff is not enough to secure reform. The positive effects of training staff should be sustained by allocating more resources to SSR and, most importantly, should be accompanied by a stronger support of the national government and the local population. The local population itself, on the other hand, argues that MONUC has been largely unable to meet their expectations about eradicating structural violence. They do not see clear effects yet. This is an important insight. Since these are the people who are directly confronted with structural violence in their every day lives, MONUC's efforts should have a direct impact on their situation. While other actors, who are less directly affected, see some slight and gradual changes, the local population has not yet noticed any 'real' improvement of their situation. This is in itself not remarkable, since for their situation to really improve there need to be some significant structural changes, which MONUC has not been able to achieve on this relatively short term basis. That the International Community, on the other hand, does see some improvements does not mean that they are wrong. These actors are more experienced in the field and know that many of the changes made take time to show effects. Besides this, since they themselves are not directly affected by structural violence, they are more keen to even see incremental changes as improvement. The opinions brought forward in literature are often based on the views of international actors and in so doing often reflect their opinion.<sup>582</sup>

In sum, then, MONUC's SSR activities are not believed to have had a significant contribution to the eradication of structural violence. The International Community and much of the academic literature are slightly more positive on this field, since they acknowledge that most effects will be on the long term and that progress will only be made in incremental steps. It is understandable that the local population has some higher expectations, since for them there is much urgency to improve their situation. In order to achieve this, it is also important to note that current efforts need to be sustained and support of the DRC government and population is necessary. So, what can be argued here is that MONUC's SSR efforts have not yet produced significant results on the field of combating structural violence. It is not expected that this will be improved on the short term. Since there are some gradual, incremental changes, some results are however to be expected on the long term. If these will be sufficient is still rather unclear.

#### *8.1.2.2 Causes of conflict and conflict potentials*

In this section the analysis of the following causes of conflict and conflict potentials will be discussed: (1) the historical inheritance of colonialism, (2) import of conflicts from neighbouring countries and external borders, (3) politics, governance and the institutional context in the Kivus, (4) identity, ethnicity and the social context in the Kivus, (5) resources and (6) a weak economy and the pressure for democracy.

##### *Historical inheritance by colonialism*

The analysis has put forward that the larger part of MONUC's SSR policies and activities have not contributed significantly to address the historical inheritances of colonialism. Notwithstanding the fact that there is much agreement on this issue, the explanations of different actors on the topic differ a lot. The Congolese government is of the opinion that colonial history repeats itself; like a colonial power MONUC is unwilling to cooperate with them and does not include their ideas in reform plans. They argue that in so doing the DRC is highly dependent to the whims of the International Community and MONUC, and has limited space to manoeuvre in. The larger part of International actors, national NGO's and also academic literature, however, argue the exact opposite. They argue that there is an important lack of governmental support and initiatives for SSR. Indeed, the national government does little to sustain MONUC's SSR efforts. It appears that the Congolese government is afraid for change. This is both an issue of incapacity, they simply do not have the knowledge and competence to organise change, and an issue of unwillingness. The latter seems to be connected to the fact that many government officials are still engaged in self-enrichment and corruption.

Indeed, it seems that the efforts of the International Community and national NGOs are severely hampered by the national government. Of course it is important to avoid a practices that resonates with a certain type of post-colonialism, yet, it should also be acknowledged that there still is much corruption and pursuit of self interest in the national government. So, these allegations of the national government towards MONUC and the International Community might be to a certain extent unfair. There is nothing wrong if MONUC and the International Community put some pressure on the government to perform and take their responsibility. This is not post-colonialism. It is merely stressing the importance of pursuing a responsible form of self-government. On the other hand, national ownership is necessary, so MONUC should also be sensitive to the critique of the national government. This will be further elaborated in the recommendations section.

As argued earlier in chapter 3, the most important impact of colonialism on the DRC was that it left behind a very weak governance structure and a very weak state. MONUC has attempted to improve parts of the governance sector (ie security sector) and focuses on ownership by the national government and that the national government should take its responsibilities. The analysis has shown that, besides the national government itself, most actors put forward that this has not been achieved due to disinterest, corruption and self-enrichment within the state. MONUC still continues its efforts on this field, yet experiences many difficulties.

It can therefore be argued that MONUC's SSR interventions have not significantly contributed to address the historical inheritances of colonialism. As their policies and activities take time to hook on, on the longer term, however, a firmer contribution can be expected. For this it is important to ensure that the DRC government takes more responsibilities with regard to SSR and that there is Congolese ownership over the process.

### *Import of conflicts and external borders*

The next point put forward in the analysis is that the DRC's external borders, especially in the Kivu provinces, have remained an enormous problem. This, despite the progress made by MONUC in addressing this issue. The International Community argues that this is largely due to instability in the Kivu region and due to the continuing presence of armed groups. They also stress that the army and border police seem to be unable or unwilling to protect the borders. The main problem according to both the literature, the perceptions of many international actors and national NGO's is that there is hardly any support by the DRC government for reform. Moreover, the DRC government does not take much initiative to sustain MONUC's reform efforts by developing a *plan global*. Besides this, the analysis puts forward that the fact that the government undertakes little action to improve the living conditions of security sector actors and structurally avoids paying their salaries, severely hampers effectiveness on this terrain. The government, however, believes that it is mainly MONUC's responsibility to deal with internal and external threats. This is not only naive but also very irresponsible. Most international actors, MONUC itself but also the national NGOs agree with this. They view MONUC as a tool to support the Congolese government in reforming the security sector, not as the only actor-responsible. The view of the Congolese government is somewhat strange, especially with regard to earlier claims that they are not allowed sufficient space to manoeuvre and govern themselves (see also the discussion on colonialism above). It now easily shifts its own responsibility to MONUC.

In sum, however, it can be argued that the problems concerning external borders have not been tackled by MONUC's SSR interventions, despite the fact that some progress is made. It should however be remarked that this is not only due to MONUC itself, but also because of the (lack of) support from the government. On the longer term progress can only be made if the Congolese government takes its responsibilities and if security actors controlling the border are paid and sustained on a regular basis. There are however no signs yet that the government will change its role.

### *Institutional context*

Another issue put forward in the analysis is that MONUC's SSR efforts have not directly contributed to address the institutional context (i.e politics and governance). Representatives of the International Community are of the opinion that some minor changes in the structure of politics and governance have been made. National NGO's and local citizens, however, argue that there is no real improvement made yet. The views expressed in literature take a somewhat middle position. They point out that there are no real changes yet, but that efforts to force the DRC government to cooperate with reform have been increased. This might produce some results on the long term. The DRC government, strangely enough, has not mentioned this issue. This, in a sense, characterizes their attitude towards reforms and, most importantly, illustrates how they think about changing their own role in it. For International Community actors, every small step is a step towards improvement. They tend to be more positive about effects on this field than other actors. Congolese NGO's and local citizens tend not to agree with this. They argue that little of these reforms is visible, nor has it led to significant changes in the structure of governance or the institutional context in the Kivus.

To conclude, notwithstanding the fact that limited results are visible, MONUC's SSR interventions have not been able to sufficiently address the institutional context and politics and governance. On the longer term a firmer contribution can be expected. For this, however, the pressure of MONUC and other actors on the DRC government to protect its population and territory needs to be further increased.

### *Identity, ethnicity and social context*

The analysis has put forward that problems concerning the social context, in which many struggles over identity and ethnicity are played out, have indeed been addressed by MONUC's SSR interventions. However, except for some direct, very short term results, little result of these efforts has been visible yet. The views of some representatives of the International Community and national NGO's underline this assessment. They note that results are limited, but will increase over time. Other actors, such as the DRC government and local citizens argue that MONUC's efforts will only contribute to national unity on the very short term. The view of the International Community and national NGO's, come forth out of their efforts to establish a national police, a national army and a national judicial sector, which serves the whole population. By acknowledging the developments in these fields they argue that this will add to the development of a feeling of national unity (and coherence) and that this may partly contribute to overcome struggles over identity and ethnicity on the long term. The views of the Congolese government and local population can be explained by looking back into history. This shows that that identity and ethnicity related problems are deeply rooted in society and are difficult to overcome. So, MONUC's SSR interventions have addressed the social context in which identity and ethnicity are the main problems, but results are very limited on the short term. On the long term these problems can partly be overcome by MONUC's SSR interventions (especially by creating a sense of national unity in the security sector), but this process of course takes time.

### *Resources*

A next point is the issue of illegal resource exploitation. In line with the results and problems described earlier on the point of borders and the import of conflicts, MONUC's SSR interventions have had a limited contribution to address this issue. However, it has also been put forward that these results are easily reversed. Some International Community actors agree that there is some improvement, but also recognise that much more progress needs to be made. This issue of resources has attracted more attention in the literature that has been discussed. It has been pointed out that the Congolese security sector is still unable to protect the resources in the Kivus. The views of International Community representatives are more positive than those of others on this terrain. While the International Community expects that the protection of resources will increase over time, on the condition that salaries are paid to security sector actors, a large part of literature points to another problem. They argue that there are too many actors who benefit from illegal exploitation of resources. This is an important point to acknowledge and this will be further elaborated in the section on threats and challenges

In sum MONUC's SSR interventions have had a minor contribution to address issues related to resources. However, on the long term, even if the DRC government is able to financially support security sector actors in this field, there are only limited prospects on improving this. Resources in the Kivus are too important for many national and international criminal actors to give up their illegal exploitation.

### *Weak economy and pressure for democracy*

A last point is the contribution of MONUC's SSR interventions to address the weak economy and the pressure for democracy. This contribution is not only indirect, but also not noticeable yet. Most actors share this thought. In the analysis it has been pointed out that on the long term more stability, a greater sense of democracy and maybe even a contribution to economic development can be expected. Stability, which security sector reform seeks to achieve, will have an important impact on the economy and on the level of democracy.

The issue has not been emphasised by the different actors in the field. In fact, it is only the academic literature that has highlighted this issue. What can be argued, however, on the basis of this analysis is that there have been significant results yet on improving the weak economy and addressing the pressure for democracy. However, on the longer term improvements on these fields are to be expected.

## **8.2 Conclusion, threats and challenges**

The extent to which MONUC's SSR interventions contribute to the elements of durable peace is rather limited, in some cases not visible or simply merely absent. Although the analysis shows that actors sometimes differ in their perceptions about these issues, this still is the general conclusion that can be drawn. However, it should also be noted that on the longer term a firmer contribution can be expected. In fact, the analysis shows that SSR is a slow, complex and gradual process which takes enormous efforts and a large amount of time to produce effects. That this is rather frustrating for certain actors involved and affected by SSR is evident. This is especially the case with the local population who experience the problems that SSR addresses on a regular daily basis.

If one looks into the more specific elements of durable peace and the contribution of MONUC's SSR activities to these, the picture becomes a bit more complicated. The main argument, however, remains. On the short term the effects are limited, while on the longer terms more structural results are to be expected.

Structural violence is still existent in the region and only if SSR will be substantially improved, in combination with structural changes within the organization of the army, then results might be booked on the long term. A fair question, however, would be if SSR is expected to deliver results on this field. Up until now, combating structural violence have not been included in MONUC's SSR mission mandate. Yet, as army reform is, indeed, part of their tasks there should be some spin off towards combating structural violence. But perhaps, this is one of the elements that might only start to produce effects on the long term.

For the root causes of conflict and the conflict potentials (ie. 1. the inheritance of colonialism, 2. import of conflicts and border issues, 3. institutional issues (governance), 4. identity and ethnicity, 5. resources and 6. economy and democracy), the picture is also somewhat negative. Much of MONUC's efforts are not expected to deliver results on the short term, as many of its policies and activities need much time and effort to succeed. One important issue that has been highlighted in the analysis of all 6 issues is the relationship with the national government. If MONUC's efforts are not supported and sustained by the Congolese state, then results will certainly remain limited. This will be elaborated in the next sections. A point similar to that of structural violence is that one should be careful to see MONUC's SSR program as responsible to produce results on all the different aspects outlined here. One should carefully consider the relationship between SSR and the different elements outlined above. Again some of these issues will be taken up in the next sections. Not all elements discussed here are assessed negatively. There have been some results on the field of borders and resources. MONUC's efforts to train the army and border patrol have somewhat strengthened their control over borders and resources in the region. The question is however if this can be sustained. Again the role of the national government is crucial here. If they do not provide the (financial) resources to support these efforts, then this might easily collapse. On the longer term, expectations are slightly more positive but depend both on support and ownership by the Congolese government and on developments within MONUC's SSR program. What such developments should entail, and what issues should certainly be addressed will be outlined in the sections below.

So, in general MONUC's current SSR efforts can be seen as a basis for the establishment of an efficient and effective security sector in the DRC. However, for so far, these efforts have proven to be insufficient to address the main aspects of durable peace (ie. structural violence, causes of conflict and conflict potentials). Hence, that MONUC decides to remain actively seized on the matter is important, yet not sufficient to bring about real change. To achieve this, some of the issues outlined below will need to be considered.

### ***8.2.1 Threats and challenges to SSR in the DRC***

The initiatives on SSR in the DRC outlined in chapter 5, the perceptions in SSR described in chapter 6 and the analysis in chapter 7, point out that SSR in the DRC still faces many threats and challenges. Although these chapters show that different actors and institutions hold different views on the subject, some general conclusions can still be drawn. In this section, the main challenges and threats for SSR will be outlined on the basis of this earlier analysis.

As argued in chapter 7, MONUC's SSR mandate does not directly define activities to combat structural violence. It does, however, mandate MONUC to develop a more stable and peaceful situation in the DRC by strengthening the countries' security sector. As argued earlier, there is a link between structural violence and MONUC's work on reforming the Congolese security sector. This is especially visible in the Kivu provinces, one of the most violent areas of the DRC. The absence of an effective and reliable security sector in this region has prolonged the presence of structural violence. Vice versa, the presence of structural violence in the region has severely hindered the development of a well-functioning security sector in the region. Many actors have argued that, despite the fact that MONUC is working to improve the security sector, there have only been a few visible effects of their efforts. This does not mean, however, that there have been no results, but, as many actors have argued, these results have proven to be difficult to sustain. One of the main reasons for this is that fighting in the region continues. This has not only hampered SSR activities, but also undermined other related programs on DDR and state reconstruction, and more. So, the presence of structural violence in the region can be seen as a main threat and challenge for MONUC to deal with.

Another important issue that has been highlighted in the analysis is the reluctance and incapability of the DRC state and government to address the problems in the Kivu provinces. Although many actors stress that MONUC is the main actor responsible for establishing durable peace and stability in the region, the role of the DRC state and government should certainly not be overlooked. Because of corruption and because of the fact that many of the political elite still pursue their own interest rather than the public interest, the state apparatus is often more of a nuisance rather than a helping hand in the SSR process. This is an important challenge to be taken up. If nothing will be done about the role and support of the DRC government, MONUC's SSR activities will not be likely to succeed.

It can be said that, with regard to the root-causes of conflict and conflict potentials in the Kivus, MONUC's SSR interventions have provided a basis for further developments. Although the objectives of MONUC's SSR policies are not directly aimed at combating these causes, they can have a positive influence on these aspects. A good example is provided by MONUC's training programs. These have laid down a broad basis for more professionalism and efficiency in different military, judicial and police agencies of the Congolese security sector. However, many of these effects have unfortunately been short termed. Interviewees and scholars have outlined several reasons for this. The first reason is that MONUC, in many cases, does not act strong enough against the DRC government, to force them to take certain responsibilities.

On top of this, there are several problems with MONUC's communication and cooperation with different local actors. More communication would lead to a better understanding of the different parties involved and affected by their SSR policies. MONUC should also consider its inclusiveness and should look into which actors are important to cooperate with (for instance local civilians). An important challenge for MONUC therefore is to develop strategies that will sustain their efforts on the long term. As will be discussed later on in this chapter, a key element to deal with this is to develop better communication and cooperation strategies. Resources also remain an important issues, as many actors depend on their illegal exploitation. Since there are many interests involved, many people benefit more from instability than stability on this terrain. This is also an enormous problem for MONUC, when addressing the problems concerning resources.

Another problem is the absence of an overarching framework on SSR in the DRC. This is mainly due to the reluctance of the DRC government to develop such a plan. Now there are many problems concerning the coordination of SSR activities in the DRC, especially with regard to the distribution of responsibilities (who is responsible for what) and the expectations that the various actors involved have of one another.

To conclude, SSR in the DRC can contribute to establishing durable peace on the longer term. However, the full commitment of all actors involved and affected is required. In general, the process of SSR in the DRC connects with William Faulkner's famous quote: *"The man who removes a mountain begins by carrying away small stones"*.<sup>583</sup> But these small stones need to be carried away by all actors. Without such engagement, the efforts of those actors actually committed to the process will be undone by those who prefer the pursuing of self-interest or achieving short term goals. This, is, then, perhaps the most important challenge that MONUC (and all the other actors involved) face, enhancing the cooperation and engagement of the myriad of actors in the field.

### **8.3 Contribution and reflection**

In this part of the chapter the scientific and social/societal contribution of this research will be discussed in retrospect and a reflection on the research process will be provided. In the contribution section, the contribution of this research to scientific and social debates will be described. The reflection section will briefly discuss difficulties and problems encountered, and recommendations for further research will be given.

#### ***8.3.1 Contribution of this research***

##### *Scientific contribution of the study*

As argued earlier, so far, literature, studies and policies on SSR have mainly focussed on a discussion of which actors the security sector should entail, what aims for SSR should be laid out and what developments are visible in specific SSR activities. However, despite the interesting contributions this literature has offered, there has been only limited attention for the specific context(s) in which SSR takes place. Most discussions either focus on the policies outlined by macro-actors such as the UN or concentrate upon the abstract concept itself, there are only a few studies that focus upon SSR in a specific implementation context. And even when the context is taken into account, there is often little interest in the views and perceptions of the local population or other (micro) actors involved or affected by SSR. Besides this, there has been little research done to evaluate important SSR missions by means of academic study. No real evaluation mechanism exists yet to evaluate success and failure of specific interventions.

In policies and theories on SSR the context dependency and the need for SSR policies to be flexible, dynamic and adaptable to the specific context in which they are used is often neglected. This study has outlined that effectiveness of SSR depends on a myriad of issues, many of them not directly associated with the security sector. This insight is an important one and has not been given much attention in the literature on the subject. SSR is complex, as is the context it is used in. By taking this insight as a starting point, this study has stressed the importance to remain as open as possible to this complexity and aimed to take in as many views and perceptions as possible to do justice to this complexity. In so doing, it aimed to focus more on the actual context, the specificity of environment in which SSR has operated.

This also relates to the issue of the importance of different views and perceptions. The perceptions of the local population and national NGO's on security and security needs are often neglected in SSR theories and policies. This is rather remarkable, since the people who live in a country are often those who are most confronted with insecurity on a daily basis. Since they experience insecurity and SSR on the ground floor, micro-level, their perceptions often differ from governmental and international views. This study has added to the academic debate on SSR that theories and policies on SSR to a certain extent need to take into account general perceptions of actors involved *and* affected by SSR. These are the actors that actually experience the problems and difficulties and hence offer (the most) important insights on what is actually needed.

Another point is that, no evaluation mechanism exists yet. It is of utmost importance to develop instruments to assess SSR to increase its effectiveness. And such an assessment should be performed on the basis of some neutrality and some distance from the actors that decide upon policies. It is important to evaluate policies not only in terms of their own objectives, but also in terms of its actual performance, the real effects that are experienced on the ground floor. This study stresses the importance to take into consideration how the policies are received, perceived and evaluated by those experiencing them at the 'shop-floor' level. Such an approach avoids reverting to a-priori categories and policy-internal objectives, and provides more space to come up with unexpected results that highlight the unintended effects and problems that are experienced in the actual, complex practices of SSR. This, then, is the main academic contribution to the field, the idea that it is important to include the different perceptions and views of actors involved and affected by SSR to do justice to the complexity and context dependency of SSR.

#### *Social/societal contribution of the study*

As argued earlier, so far, reports and studies on SSR in the DRC have been rather limited and often focussed only on one specific element of SSR. Moreover, studies on MONUC's SSR activities or SSR in the Kivu provinces are only present in small numbers. This study has drawn upon the few existing reports and studies, but aimed to combine the approaches they took by describing not only the process of SSR in the DRC and the Kivus, but also its progress, its challenges and, most importantly, its contribution to durable peace. In so doing, it gives a more complete overview of the SSR process and the actors involved in the DRC and the Kivu region than earlier reports. This study not only provided a more coherent account on SSR activities but also did so in the specific empirical context of a SSR project in progress. This is what makes it particularly interesting for actors involved in SSR practices in the field.



Other reports on SSR in the DRC largely outline the process in general terms and deals only with some of the problems that the process encounters. These studies are often based upon other studies, reports, and interviews (with a limited number) of often mainly international actors. Although this study also draws upon these sources, it distinguishes itself from other studies by using the perceptions of a far wider range of both local and international actors. In so doing, it highlights the importance of including the views, ideas and perceptions of many different actors in gaining a more detailed insight in processes, problems and responsibilities. Moreover, overlap, differences and frictions between different actors and their perceptions have been identified. In so doing, this study provides detailed insight in why MONUC's SSR interventions are effective in some cases, less in other cases, and what challenges and opportunities there are concerning the ground-floor level of the SSR project.

Another point is that the approach of using perceptions as a starting point for further assessments gives a voice to those who have often not been heard; the local population. So far, their views and ideas are often neglected or not inventoried. However, these are the main actors affected by instability, interventions and SSR in the region. With this, they experience the direct outcomes of MONUC's SSR policies and activities in the Kivu provinces and have relevant, often differing from other, evaluations. Knowing what they need and experience might help the actors involved in designing and implementing SSR policies to achieve better results that are more relevant for the needs of the local population

This study has contributed to social/societal issues about SSR by providing detailed information on MONUC's SSR efforts in the DRC and the Kivu provinces and its contribution to durable peace. By using the perceptions of actors involved and affected by MONUC's SSR interventions, this study has outlined (new and) important points for this process. Furthermore, it provides information on the complexity, the difficulties and the challenges encountered by MONUC. This study also outlines the often forgotten necessity of all actors to cooperate and coordinate in order for SSR to succeed. The recommendation it has offered in the previous section might allow for SSR in the DRC to improve substantially, although pursuing them will not be an easy job.

### ***8.3.2 Reflection on the research***

SSR appears to be a new buzz-word in the world of academics and international relations. However, there has been a relative lack of detailed scrutiny about what the process exactly entails. This has complicated the research process significantly, as many actors use different definitions of the concept, there is not much research that this study could draw upon, and that there is much politics behind the concept, which makes it a rather sensitive issue.

Doing research about SSR and durable peace in the Kivu provinces proved to be extremely complex. There is a myriad of actors involved, they have complex and intricate relationships and there is much political sensitivity about the issues. The dynamics of conflict in the Kivus proved to be even more dynamical and complex than expected. In so doing, as is often the case when translating theoretical/academic concepts into practice, the distinction between the different elements of durable peace outlined in chapter 2, was not as clear and separately recognizable when looking at the situation in the Kivus. In the analysis of durable peace, therefore, conflict causes and conflict potentials have not been dealt with separately, but together.

Another point was that, although several actors and organizations were set out as research objects in advance, during the fieldwork it was established that a multiplicity of other actors were also involved.

An example of this is that when conducting the research on MONUC's SSR policies and activities in the Kivu provinces, it became clear that it was both distinct from national SSR policies as well as very intricately related with MONUC's SSR interventions on a national level. Besides this, when looking into the ground-level SSR activities, it became clear that a larger number of international actors were involved in the process as well. Hence, it became also important to describe their role in the process in order to understand MONUC's role in SSR in the Kivus. Lastly, after conducting several interviews with local actors, their perception proved to be significantly different from the views of international actors. In fact, this became a key issue for the study at hand. Hence, the decision has been made to further assess these local views as well. In so doing, this research came to entail much more than initially expected. Nevertheless, it now provides a more complete overview of the process and its perceived problems and progress. This is a valuable contribution to the debate on SSR. The most important thing is to acknowledge that different actors perceive the effects of policies in different ways. These perceptions also provide a very valuable evaluation next to the regular evaluation of the effectiveness of SSR policies. The combination of the two will offer a more coherent perspective on SSR might contribute to durable peace.

Conducting research in the DRC has not been as difficult as expected. There have however been several difficulties. One of the things that made it difficult was to do interviews in another language. Although French (the official language in Congo) was not a problem, interviews in Swahili with help of translators have been more difficult to undertake. Another issue is examining the different geographical sites that were important for SSR. Especially the issue of getting there proved to be very difficult, both because of security reasons and because of the low quality of infrastructure. In particular, transportation outside the cities was rather difficult with regard to insecurity, weather conditions and the absence of infrastructure. Interviews have been conducted with many different actors, however, the national army and police have been rather reluctant in providing clear and relevant information. This mainly because of the political sensitivity of the issue.

One of the most problematic issue in conducting research in the eastern DRC has been the abrupt changes in the region's stability and security. These factors have complicated and hampered field-trips and traveling significantly. In so doing, the larger part of this research builds upon the fieldwork conducted in Kinshasa, Bukavu and Goma, and a limited number of field-trips. The help of the larger part of actors interviewed, however, has contributed to overcoming many of the issues outlined above. Further research could explore the issue of SSR in more remote areas to complement this study, but will need to draw upon more significant resources to actually get there. Yet, it is important to do so.

#### **8.4 Recommendations**

In the final part of this thesis the focus will be upon these future efforts on SSR in the DRC. On the basis of the analysis of the perceptions and evaluations of the different actors involved and affected by SSR policies, it will now outline several recommendations to further advance SSR in the DRC. As the study has concentrated upon the SSR efforts of the United Nations Organisation Mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo in particular, it will direct most of its recommendations to the efforts of this organisation. Some important other actors will, however, be addressed as well. The section will start out with the latter; the role of important other actors (non-UN) on SSR and will conclude with some recommendations for MONUC.

Firstly, one should acknowledge that communication and cooperation between those involved in SSR in the DRC is a key problem. Moreover, communication between those involved and those affected by SSR in the country is largely absent.

Furthermore, little attention has been paid to the views and perceptions of local, civilian, actors on SSR. In so doing, SSR programmes are often non-responsive to local reality and there is a shortage of local ownership over the process. Besides this, the national government of the DRC has been rather reluctant to take their responsibility to develop a national SSR strategy, and to pay the salaries of security sector actors. This severely complicates the undertaking SSR activities in the DRC. Therefore, this study outlines the following recommendations for actors involved in SSR in the DRC.

1) Recommendations for actors involved in SSR in the DRC:

- Cooperation and communication between all actors involved in SSR, also including those affected by SSR interventions, is of great importance. This prevents overlap and gaps between programmes and will ensure that programmes can be adapted to local needs. Another issue that improved communication will tackle is that it can create a more transparent situation in which all actors involved know who is responsible for what. Besides this, this will also help to link up the expectations of actors affected by SSR with the real mandates and responsibility of those active in SSR activities. Hence, a clear communication and cooperation strategy, that involves all actors involved and affected by SSR, should be created.
- A second point is to improve the flexibility, inclusiveness and national ownership of SSR interventions. By increasing the flexibility of programmes, they can become more responsive to local contexts. This can for instance be done by adapting SSR policies to the specific problems in the region in which they are implemented and including those actors who are of importance in a certain region. Including the views and opinions of the wide range of actors involved or affected by SSR, might help to develop a more coherent and effective approach towards SSR. By including the views of local citizens, civil society organisations, tribal leaders, and for instance spiritual leaders, the adaptability of SSR policies and programmes to local reality and the effectiveness of these programs will be improved. Lastly, ensuring national ownership over SSR interventions will not only increase the national support for SSR, but also help giving local actors a voice in the process. In doing so, a joint strategy can be developed by incorporating the views and beliefs of national and local actors.
- Currently, the DRC government is quite reluctant to take up on SSR. Increasing the pressure on the government to take its responsibilities will sustain the progress already made. Without their support and efforts, the progress made on SSR will be rather short termed, whereas it is the Congolese citizens who suffer from this. Yet, the current structure of the government (including the mismanagement, corruption and power misuses), will prove to be an important hindrance in achieving this.

The second set of recommendations are more directly focused on MONUC. It is clear that MONUC's SSR efforts in the DRC have become a basis for further reform. However, implementing SSR programmes in the country remains challenging. Communication and cooperation between the large number of actors involved is one of the key problems of MONUC. Moreover, the views and perceptions of local, civilian, actors are often not taken into account, nor are they correctly informed about MONUC's activities. Current programmes encounter severe problems as they have not been adapted to local reality. Furthermore, the current focus on army reform has caused problems in other fields of reform, such as the police and judicial sector. Lastly, MONUC's approach to the security sector is (too) restricted to the army, police and justice sector.

However, there are many other security sector actors and institutions which are also of importance for establishing an effective and efficient security sector in the DRC.

## 2) Recommendations for MONUC:

- For MONUC's SSR efforts to be more effective, the analysis points out that improving communication and cooperation structures will be one of the most important issues. Currently, MONUC mainly cooperates with institutional actors: the International Community and the DRC government. In order to increase further effectiveness of activities it is recommended to expand this cooperation and communication, by including a wider range of actors involved and affected by SSR (notably local citizens and NGOs). In doing so, national NGO's and Congolese citizens can express their perceptions on security, security sector reform and the actual needs in the country and the Kivu provinces. Including the opinions and views of these different actors will ensure a more coherent and effective approach towards SSR in the country.
- In order to increase awareness and gain support on MONUC's SSR efforts, improving communication with and information towards the population is also of great importance. Informing the population in the Kivus on the mandate of MONUC, its programmes on SSR and its aims on the long term will prevent misunderstanding and will bring about more support by locals for their activities in the Kivus. Whereas current information meetings have not delivered the expected results, MONUC could consider using Congolese means of providing information, such as through churches, wall paintings, radio commercials and more.
- Including the opinions of the local population on what should be done and on what the effects are of current programmes can help improving these programs. Including these actors in establishing and improving programmes can even be more useful, as these actors know exactly what the problems are in the area they are living. This will help the programs to be more in line with the needs of the people living in (post) conflict situations.
- More effectiveness of MONUC's SSR programmes can also be generated by increasing the flexibility and context dependence of these programmes.
- MONUC's SSR tasks relate to reforming the army, police and judicial system in the DRC. Currently, the focus mainly lies on army reform, which has negative effects on other security sector branches. The policing, military and the judicial sector need to be equally addressed due to the connection between them. The moment efforts in one field are larger than in another field, there is a risk that progress in the one field causes a deterioration of the situation in the other field.
- Whereas MONUC's efforts only aim at reforming the policing, army and judicial sector, there are other security sector branches in the country as well which need to be addressed. These actors include non-state security actors, such as private security corporations, intelligence services, but also civilian oversight over the security sector and more. In doing so, MONUC's efforts need to be expanded by including other relevant security sector actors.

## 8.5 Changes in SSR since 2009

New developments have taken place on SSR in the DRC. Despite the fact that these developments have taken place beyond the timeframe of this study they are important to describe, to show that progress has been made.

In April this year the Congolese Ministry of Defence presented a plan on defence reform. This *plan révisé* outlines a proposal of reforming the defence sector and plans of the structure of a future defence organization. Representatives of International Organizations and individual donor countries partly see the plan as old wine in new bottles. The last year presented plan on reforming the defence sector which required more explanation which did not follow, is still largely recognizable in this new plan. On other hand, new elements have been added as well.<sup>584</sup>

The plan is mainly based upon a four pillar approach. To start with, much attention is paid to the military and their constituency, and all related issues such as the paying the salaries of, and creating a social policy for the military. Only when the military enjoys support and trust of the Ministry of Defence they can effectively and efficiently fulfil their tasks. In doing so, trust of the population in the military will increase. A second pillar is territorial deployment. Currently, the military is deployed all over the country, also in areas in which no direct military deployment is requested. Attention and deployment needs to be increased in those areas where military deployment is required, such as eastern DRC, resource rich areas and at important roads and shipping routes. The third pillar deals with the structure of the defence sector, as the number of staff, the formation of new units, the organization structure and chain of command, social configuration of personnel, and recruitment and training. The main division within the military will remain the *force de couverture*, the *défense principale* and the rapid reaction force. The fourth and last pillar outlines the restructuring or establishment of military infrastructure.<sup>585</sup>

Much national and international SSR actors embrace the idea of having a plan on defence reform. On the other hand, there are several plan-related issues under discussion, largely focussing on making the plan affordable, integrated and sustaining. The fact that there is a plan, with Congolese ownership, which can and will be adapted to input of the International Community, is the current starting point. This plan also requires a committee which will coordinate reform. This committee, the *Committee suivi pour la réforme de l'armée*, is crucial for the International Community. It provides them the opportunity not only to monitor progress and implementation, but also to improve coordination between the different actors involved in SSR. In doing so, actors involved in SSR can coordinate their activities in certain sectors and cooperate. Despite the importance of this committee, it has not yet been established.<sup>586</sup>

## ANNEX I


**Table 1: Timeline DRC peace-agreements**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Agreement</b>	<b>Actors</b>	<b>Aim</b>
10/07/1999-31/08/1999	Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement	Representatives of Angola, DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo and the Congolese Rally for Democracy	Cessation of hostilities
30/07/2002	Pretoria Agreement	Joseph Kabila representing the DRC and Paul Kagame representing Rwanda	Withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the dismantling of the Ex-FAR and Interahamwe forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
06/09/2002	Luanda Agreement	Jospeh Kabila representing the DRC and Joweri K. Museveni representing Uganda	Withdrawal of Ugandan troops from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, cooperation and normalisation of relations between the two countries
16/12/2002	Pretoria Agreement/ Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition	Representatives of the components and the entities of the Inter Congolese Dialogue (DIC), in each delegates of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Congolese Rally for Democracy, the Movement for the Liberation of Congo, the main organisations and parties of the political opposition as well as representatives of the Forces Vives of the Country, the Congolese Rally for Democracy-Liberation Movement, the Congolese Rally for Democracy-National and the Mai-Mai	Political solution for the conflict, with a view to an eventual reunification of the country and laid down a framework for providing the Congo with a unified, multi-party government and a timeline for democratic elections
02/04/2003	Sun City Accords	Representatives of the components and the entities of the Inter Congolese Dialogue, in each Delegates of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Congolese Rally for Democracy, the Movement for the Liberation of Congo, the main organisations and parties of the political opposition as well as representatives of the Forces Vives of the Country, the Congolese Rally for Democracy-Liberation Movement, the Congolese Rally for Democracy-National and the Mai-Mai	the participants in the DIC signed the final act of the political negotiations, by which they formally approved the whole of the agreements which constitutes a total programme for the restoration of peace and national sovereignty in the DRC, for a transitional period of two years
23/01/2008	Goma Agreement	Congolese government and 22 armed groups	Committing all parties to an immediate ceasefire, disengagement of forces from frontline positions, and to abide by international human rights law. Following the signing, the Congolese government set up the

			Amani peace program, to further coordinate peace efforts in eastern Congo.
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## Annex II

**Map 1: The Democratic Republic of Congo**




(Source: [www.congocampaign.org](http://www.congocampaign.org) Retrieved at 6<sup>th</sup> of May 2009)



### Annex III

**Map 2: The Kivu provinces in the Democratic Republic of Congo**



(Source: [www.wikipedia.org/wiki/maimai](http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/maimai) Retrieved at the 6th of May 2009)

## ANNEX IV

**Table 2: Main actors and armed groups involved in conflict in the Kivu provinces**

<b>Group</b>	<b>Background</b>	<b>Composition</b>	<b>Aim</b>	<b>Role in conflict</b>
Forces Democratiques de Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR)	Based in eastern DRC after involvement in Rwandan genocide, partly refuse to go back to Rwanda fearing reprisal of the Rwandan Tutsi's.	Hutu extremists involved in Rwandan genocide (Interhamwe)/ Hutu members of former Rwandan army/ displaced Rwandan Hutu's	Abandon Tutsi rule and influence in the region, continue with their campaign to exterminate Tutsi's	Used by Kabila as a counter force against other foreign armies in the DRC in 2000. Now mainly fighting CNDP and attacking Congolese citizens. Cooperation with other armed groups has often been supposed. Repatriation efforts have had limited effects
Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP)	In 2003 Nkunda joined the new integrated national army of the DRC. Soon he rejected the authority of the government and turned against government.	Mainly Banyamulenge, soldiers from the former Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) and dissidents from the FARDC	Protection of Tutsi population in the DRC	Main fight against FDLR, but also the FARDC and others who might threaten the position of Congolese Tutsi's. Assumed to be supported by Tutsi-led Rwanda
Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC)	Congolese military forces which are responsible for defending DRC territory. Currently undergoing a reform through which also former warring factions can be integrated in the FARDC	Consisting out of former soldiers and newly created brigades integrating former warring factions	Defending DRC territory and fighting armed groups on DRC territory	Often characterised as a threat for the Congolese population; corrupt, looting, stealing and abusing. Officially mainly fighting against foreign armed groups, but alliances with FDLR and others can not be ruled out
Mai Mai	Local community-based militia group active from 1998, formed to defend their local territory against other (foreign) armed groups. Not a particular group, but many different groups with different aims	Including armed forces led by warlords, traditional tribal elders, village heads, and politically motivated resistance fighters	Fight for their land and protect it from foreign presence and involvement. Aims further differ per Mai Mai group	Originating as resistance against foreign presence, different Mai Mai groups allied themselves with a variety of domestic and foreign government and guerilla groups at different times.
Other relevant actors: United Nations Mission in the DRC (MONUC)	Established as a result of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement	Different units and departments work towards institution building and capacity building through different activities	Assisting the DRC government in maintaining peace and rebuilding Congolese institutions	Have a neutral role in conflict, but supports and trains the Congolese National Army (FARDC).
Banyamulenge/ Banyarwanda	Since the DRC's independence the nationality of the so called Banyamulenge became uncertain. Classified as 'ethnic citizens', their fight resulted in grievance about the denial of land rights and leadership positions.	Rwandan speaking migrants, mainly Tutsi, who arrived in eastern DRC from the 1880's on. They feel more Congolese than Rwandese.	Land, identity and recognition, which enables them a peaceful living in the DRC	Fight against FDLR because of ethnicity. Fight against DRC government because of identity and recognition. Fight against Mai Mai because of origins. There is supposed fighting of the CNDP against the Banyamulenge as well.

## ANNEX V

**Table 3: Timeline of MONUC Phase Deployments and Mandate History**

<b>S/RES</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Mandate primary characteristics and strength</b>
1258	August 1999	<b>Phase I:</b> a liaison force to determine feasibility of mission
1291	February 2000	<b>Phase II:</b> MONUC established; Chapter VII mandate; 5,537 troops & 500 obs.; monitor ceasefire and disengagement
1355	June 2001	<b>Phase III:</b> MONUC police force created to advise and train a Congolese police force
1445	December 2002	New DDR ops; troop expansion to 10,800.
1565	October 2004	<b>Phase IV:</b> Focus on election security and security in eastern DRC Military force restructured, expanded by 5,900 troops; mandate reconceptualised and clarified under Chapter VII to use preventative force
1756	May 2007	<b>Phase V:</b> continues tasks from S/RES/1565 (Chapter VII); expands mandate to include post-transition challenges in security sector reform and effective governance; requests benchmarks for drawdown and mentions “exit strategy”; maintains 17,030 military personnel, 760 military obs., 391 police trainers, six FPU’s of 125 officers a unit/total 750 officers
1797	January 2008	MONUC is authorized to assist the Congolese authorities in organizing, preparing and conducting local elections.
1856	December 2008	By which the Council extended MONUC until 31 December 2009, while reinforcing its strength and refocusing its mandate more sharply on the protection of civilians in the still-embattled eastern provinces. The Council authorized deployment of up to 19,815 military personnel, 760 military observers, 391 police and 1,050 personnel of formed police units through the end of 2009.

(Source: The Henry L. Stimson Centre and UN Security Council Resolutions)

## ANNEX VI

### **Resolution 1856 (2008)**

#### **Adopted by the Security Council at its 6055th meeting, on 22 December 2008**

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* its resolutions and the statements of its President concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in particular resolution 1843 (2008) and resolution 1794 (2007) and the statements of its President dated 29 October 2008 (S/PRST/2008/40) and 21 October 2008 (S/PRST/2008/38),

*Reaffirming* its commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

*Stressing* the primary responsibility of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for ensuring security in its territory and protecting its civilians with respect for the rule of law, human rights and international humanitarian law,

*Condemning* the Congrès national pour la Défense du peuple (CNDP) repeated offensive military actions in the past months, which have caused massive displacement of populations in North Kivu as well as cross-border movements of refugees and which have also involved the PARECO and other illegal armed groups, and *condemning* also the attacks by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in the Orientale Province, as well as the resumption of hostilities by illegal armed groups in Ituri,

*Underlining* that a major obstacle to lasting peace in the Kivus is the presence and activities of illegal armed groups on Congolese territory, including the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) as acknowledged by its resolution 1804 (2008), which represent one of the primary causes for the conflict in the region,

*Taking note* of the final declaration of the Nairobi summit organized on 7 November 2008 by President Mwai Kibaki, acting Chairman of the International Conference on the Great Lakes region, and President Jakaya Kikwete, President-in office of the African Union, and the communiqué of the extraordinary summit of the SADC Heads of State and Government held in Sandton on 9 November 2008, *welcoming* the appointment of facilitators including the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes region, former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, and the former President of the United Republic of Tanzania, Benjamin Mkapa, *inviting* these facilitators to keep the Council informed of their activities, and *encouraging* the countries of the region to maintain this high level of commitment on the crisis in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and act to assist efforts to resolve the conflict,

*Recalling* the joint communiqué of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda signed in Nairobi on 9 November 2007 and the Acte d'engagement which emerged from the Conference for Peace, Security and Development in North and South Kivu, held in Goma from 6 to 23 January 2008, and *reaffirming* that the Goma and Nairobi processes are the appropriate framework for stabilising the situation in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

*Emphasizing the responsibility of* the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Governments of the region to prevent the use of their respective territories in support of violations of the arms embargo imposed by resolution 1807 (2008) or in support of activities of armed groups present in the region in accordance with the Pact on Security, Stability and Development for the Great Lakes Region and *urging* them to take effective measures to prevent crossborder support to any illegal armed group in the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and *welcoming* the progress made in high-level bilateral talks between the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda,

*Recalling also* the importance of urgently carrying out comprehensive and lasting security sector reform and of permanently disarming, demobilizing, resettling or repatriating, as appropriate, and reintegrating Congolese and foreign armed groups for the long-term stabilization of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the contribution made by international partners in this field,

*Recognizing* the link between the illegal exploitation of natural resources, the illicit trade in such resources and the proliferation and trafficking of arms as one of the major factors fuelling and exacerbating conflicts in the Great Lakes region of Africa, and in particular in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

*Expressing* its extreme concern at the deteriorating humanitarian and human rights situation, *condemning* in particular the targeted attacks against the civilian population, sexual violence, recruitment of child soldiers and summary executions, and *stressing* the urgent need for the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in cooperation with the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and other relevant actors, to end those violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, in particular those carried out by the militias and armed groups and by elements of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC), the Congolese National Police (PNC) and other security and intelligence services, and to bring the perpetrators, as well as the senior commanders under whom they serve, to justice, and *calling on* Member States to assist in this regard and to continue to provide medical, humanitarian and other assistance to victims,

*Recalling* its resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008) on women, peace and security, its resolution 1502 (2003) on the protection of United Nations personnel, associated personnel and humanitarian personnel in conflict zones, its resolution 1674 (2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflicts, and its resolution 1612 (2005) on children in armed conflict, and *recalling* the conclusions of the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict pertaining to parties in the armed conflict of the Democratic Republic of Congo (S/2008/693),

*Condemning* the continuing illicit flow of weapons within and into the Democratic Republic of the Congo and *declaring* its determination to continue to monitor closely the implementation of the arms embargo and other measures set out by its resolution 1807 (2008),

*Underscoring* the long-term, sustainable efforts needed from the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its international partners to consolidate democracy and promote the rule of law, good governance, recovery and development,

*Expressing* its full support for MONUC, *condemning* all attacks against United Nations peacekeepers and humanitarian personnel, regardless of their perpetrators, and *emphasizing* that those responsible for such attacks must be brought to justice,

*Recalling* that the temporary increase of MONUC's capacities authorized by its resolution 1843 (2008) aims at enabling MONUC to reorganize, and in particular reconfigure its structure and forces and optimize their deployment, allowing the constitution of a quick-reaction capability to provide greater flexibility to deploy as needed to strengthen efforts to protect civilians and provide additional security in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

*Recognizing* that effective coordination between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and MONUC on security matters in the areas of conflict as well as the accelerated building of credible, cohesive and disciplined Congolese armed forces is essential for the implementation of MONUC's mandate,

*Taking note* of the fourth special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, dated 21 November 2008 (S/2008/728), and of its recommendations,

*Determining* that the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to pose a threat to international peace and security in the region,

*Acting under* Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* to extend the deployment of MONUC until 31 December 2009 and *authorizes* the continuation until that date of up to 19,815 military personnel, 760 military observers, 391 police personnel and 1,050 personnel of formed police units;

2. *Requests* MONUC to attach the highest priority to addressing the crisis in the Kivus, in particular the protection of civilians, and to concentrate progressively during the coming year its action in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

3. *Decides* that MONUC shall, from the adoption of this resolution, have the mandate, in this order of priority, working in close cooperation with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in order to:

*Protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel and United Nations personnel and facilities*

- (a) Ensure the protection of civilians, including humanitarian personnel, under imminent threat of physical violence, in particular violence emanating from any of the parties engaged in the conflict;
- (b) Contribute to the improvement of the security conditions in which humanitarian assistance is provided, and assist in the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons;
- (c) Ensure the protection of United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment;
- (d) Ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel;
- (e) Carry out joint patrols with the national police and security forces to improve security in the event of civil disturbance;

*Disarmament, demobilization, monitoring of resources of foreign and Congolese armed groups*

- (f) Deter any attempt at the use of force to threaten the Goma and Nairobi processes from any armed group, foreign or Congolese, particularly in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including by using cordon and search tactics and undertaking all necessary operations to prevent attacks on civilians and disrupt the military capability of illegal armed groups that continue to use violence in that area;
- (g) Coordinate operations with the FARDC integrated brigades deployed in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and support operations led by and jointly planned with these brigades in accordance with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law with a view to:
  - Disarming the recalcitrant local armed groups in order to ensure their participation in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process and the release of children associated with those armed groups;
  - Disarming the foreign armed groups in order to ensure their participation in the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration process (DDRRR) and the release of children associated with those armed groups;
  - Preventing the provision of support to illegal armed groups, including support derived from illicit economic activities;
- (h) Facilitate the voluntary demobilization and repatriation of disarmed foreign combatants and their dependants;
- (i) Contribute to the implementation of the national programme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of Congolese combatants and their dependants, with particular attention to children, by monitoring the disarmament process and providing, as appropriate, security in some sensitive locations, as well as supporting reintegration efforts pursued by the Congolese authorities in cooperation with the United Nations Country Team and bilateral and multilateral partners;
- (j) Use its monitoring and inspection capacities to curtail the provision of support to illegal armed groups derived from illicit trade in natural resources;

*Training and mentoring of FARDC in support for security sector reform*

- (k) Provide military training, including in the area of human rights, international humanitarian law, child protection and the prevention of gender-based violence, to various members and units of the FARDC integrated brigades deployed in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as part of international broader efforts to support the security sector reform;
- (l) In coordination with international partners, including the European Union operations EUSEC and EUPOL, to contribute to the efforts of the international community to assist the Congolese Government in the initial planning process of the security sector reform, to build credible, cohesive, and disciplined Congolese armed forces and to develop the capacities of the Congolese national police and related law enforcement agencies;

*Territorial security of the Democratic Republic of the Congo*

- (m) Observe and report in a timely manner on the position of armed movements and groups and the presence of foreign military forces in the key areas of volatility, especially by monitoring the use of landing strips and the borders, including on the lakes;
- (n) Monitor the implementation of the measures imposed by paragraph 1 of resolution 1807 (2008), in cooperation, as appropriate, with the Governments concerned and with the Group of Experts established by resolution 1533 (2004), including by inspecting, as it deems necessary and without notice, the cargo of aircraft and of any transport vehicle using the ports, airports, airfields, military bases and border crossings in North and South Kivu and in Ituri;
- (o) Seize or collect, as appropriate, the arms and any related materiel whose presence in the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo violates the measures imposed by paragraph 1 of resolution 1807 (2008) and to dispose of such arms and related materiel as appropriate;
- (p) Provide assistance to the competent customs authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in implementing the provisions of paragraph 8 of resolution 1807 (2008);
- (q) Assist the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in enhancing its demining capacity;

4. *Decides* that MONUC will also have the mandate, in close cooperation with the Congolese authorities, the United Nations Country Team and donors, to support the strengthening of democratic institutions and the rule of law and, to that end, to:

- (a) Provide advice to strengthen democratic institutions and processes at the national, provincial, regional and local levels;
- (b) Promote national reconciliation and internal political dialogue, including through the provision of good offices, and support the strengthening of civil society and multi-party democracy, and give the necessary support to the Goma and Nairobi processes;
- (c) Assist in the promotion and protection of human rights, with particular attention to women, children and vulnerable persons, investigate human rights violations and publish its findings, as appropriate, with a view to putting an end to impunity, assist in the development and implementation of a transitional justice strategy, and cooperate in national and international efforts to bring to justice perpetrators of grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law;
- (d) In close coordination with international partners and the United Nations Country Team, provide assistance to the Congolese authorities, including the National Independent Electoral Commission, in the organization, preparation and conduct of local elections;
- (e) Assist in the establishment of a secure and peaceful environment for the holding of free and transparent local elections that are expected to be held by the end of June 2009;
- (f) Contribute to the promotion of good governance and respect for the principle of accountability;
- (g) In coordination with international partners, advise the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in strengthening the capacity of the judicial and correctional systems, including the military justice system;

5. *Authorizes* MONUC to use all necessary means, within the limits of its capacity and in the areas where its units are deployed, to carry out the tasks listed in paragraph 3, subparagraphs (a) to (g), (i), (j), (n), (o), and in paragraph 4, subparagraph (e);

6. *Emphasizes* that the protection of civilians, as described in paragraph 3, subparagraphs (a) to (e), must be given priority in decisions about the use of available capacity and resources, over any of the other tasks described in paragraphs 3 and 4;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to present recommendations in his next three-monthly report on the progressive handover of those tasks listed in paragraph 4, from MONUC to the United Nations country team and bilateral and multilateral partners, as far as the western part of the country is concerned, with a view to reinforcing the action of United Nations peacebuilding mechanisms in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in order to permit MONUC to concentrate its efforts on the eastern part of the country;

8. *Underscores* the importance of MONUC implementing the mandate described in this resolution in full, including through robust rules of engagement and *requests* the Secretary-General to ensure that MONUC's concept of operation and rules of engagement are updated by 31 January 2009 to bring them fully in line with the provisions of this resolution and to report on it to the Security Council and troop-contributing countries;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to report regularly, and at least every three months, on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and on MONUC's activities, and to provide the Security Council, with the same regularity, a specific update on the military situation;

10. *Requests* in particular the Secretary-General, in his next report under paragraph 9 above, to inform the Security Council on the development of a strategic work plan with appropriate benchmarks to measure and track progress on the implementation the mandate described in paragraphs 3 and 4;

11. *Requests* the Secretary-General to include in his next report a comprehensive assessment of MONUC's DDR and DDRRR programmes and, in close coordination with his Special Envoy for the Great Lakes region, to make recommendations on possible adjustments needed to increase their effectiveness, resourcing and coordination with MONUC's military component;

12. *Demands* that all parties cooperate fully with the operations of MONUC and that they ensure the security of as well as unhindered and immediate access for United Nations and associated personnel in carrying out their mandate, throughout the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, *demands* in particular that all parties provide full access to MONUC military observers, including in all ports, airports, airfields, military bases and border crossings, and, in addition, that MONUC human rights observers are granted access to detention centres and brassage centres, and *requests* the Secretary-General to report without delay any failure to comply with these demands;

13. *Requests* MONUC, in view of the scale and severity of sexual violence committed especially by armed elements in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to strengthen its efforts to prevent and respond to sexual violence, including through training for the Congolese security forces in accordance with its mandate, and to regularly report, including in a separate annex if necessary, on actions taken in this regard, including data on instances of sexual violence and trend analyses of the problem;

14. *Emphasizes* that operations led by the FARDC against illegal foreign and Congolese armed groups should, consistent with the mandate set forth in paragraph 3 subparagraph (g) above, be planned jointly with MONUC and in accordance with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law and should include appropriate measures to protect civilians;

15. *Takes note* of the measures taken by MONUC to address instances of sexual exploitation and abuse and of the zero-tolerance policy, *requests* the Secretary-General to continue to fully investigate the allegations of sexual exploitation and violence by civilian and military personnel of MONUC, to take the appropriate measures set out in the Secretary-General's bulletin on special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse (ST/SGB/2003/13);

16. *Encourages* MONUC to enhance its interaction with the civilian population, in particular internally displaced persons, to raise awareness and understanding about its mandate and activities;

17. *Demands that* all the parties to the Goma and Nairobi processes respect the ceasefire and implement their commitments effectively and in good faith, *calls on* all armed groups to immediately lay down their arms and present themselves without any further delay or preconditions to Congolese authorities and MONUC for their disarmament, repatriation, resettlement and/or reintegration, as appropriate;

18. *Requests* the Secretary-General and his Special Envoy for the Great Lakes region to intensify their good offices, in close consultation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in facilitating a political solution to address the underlying causes of the crisis in the Kivus and calls on the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Government of Rwanda and other Governments of the region, international partners and all regional and Congolese parties to cooperate with the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes region and with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

19. *Urges* the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda to take concrete steps to defuse tensions, including through reactivating the Joint Verification Mechanism, and to step up their cooperation in order to implement fully the commitments taken in their joint communiqué signed in Nairobi on 9 November 2007 (S/2007/679), in particular to address as a priority the disarmament and repatriation of the FDLR working in close cooperation with the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes region and MONUC;

20. *Urges* all Governments in the region, in particular those of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Uganda, to resolve in a constructive manner their shared security and border problems, to prevent the use of their respective territories in support of violations of the arms embargo reaffirmed by resolution 1807 (2008) or in support of activities of armed groups present in the region, and abide by their commitments made at the Tripartite Plus meeting of September 2007 to establish bilateral diplomatic relationships;

21. *Urges* all States, especially those in the region, to take appropriate steps to end the illicit trade in natural resources, including if necessary through judicial means, and, where necessary, to report to the Security Council, *encourages* in particular the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to work with specialist organizations, international financial institutions and MONUC, as well as the countries of the region, to establish a plan for an effective and transparent control over the exploitation of natural resources including through conducting a mapping exercise of the main sites of illegal exploitation;

22. *Requests* the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with the support of the international community and of MONUC, to develop and implement as a matter of urgency a comprehensive national security sector reform strategy, including based on the outcome of the Roundtable on Security Sector held in February 2008, in order to establish professional security organizations in the areas of defence, police and the administration of justice that protect civilians, are well managed, and act in accordance with the Constitution and with respect for the rule of law, human rights and international humanitarian law and urges the Congolese Government to ensure the sustainability of the support given by its partners in this area in particular by giving priority to the reform of the administration and command structures of FARDC and all its other security forces and reiterates its call upon the Congolese authorities to establish a vetting mechanism to take into account when



they select candidates for official positions, including key posts in the armed forces, national police and other security services, the candidates' past actions in terms of respect for international humanitarian law and human rights;

23. *Demands that* all parties ensure timely, safe and unhindered access of all humanitarian actors and comply fully with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law, human rights law and refugee law;

24. *Demands*, recalling its resolution 1698 (2006), that all armed groups, in particular the forces of Laurent Nkunda, the FDLR and the LRA immediately stop recruiting and using children and release all children associated with them; 25. *Recalls* the utmost importance of the fight against impunity, notably in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, by bringing to justice those who have committed crimes and atrocities;

26. *Requests* the Secretary-General, through his Special Representative for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to continue to coordinate all the activities of the United Nations system in the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

27. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

(source: UN Security Council resolution 1856, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org> Retrieved at the 1<sup>st</sup> of February 2009)

## Annex VII


**Map 3: Map of MONUC Deployment April 2009**



(Source: [www.monuc.org](http://www.monuc.org), retrieved at the 5<sup>th</sup> of May 2009)

## Annex VIII

**Figure 2: Organigramme of MONUC**



(Source: Dahrendorf, N. (2008), *MONUC and the Relevance of Coherent Mandates: The Case of the DRC*, in: Hänggi, H. and Scherrer, V., Lit Verlag: Zürich)

## Annex IX

**Table 4: Contexts of Security Sector Reform**

	<b>Developmental context</b>	<b>Post-authoritarian context</b>	<b>Post-conflict context</b>
<b>Key criteria</b>	Level of economic Development	Nature of political system	Specific security Situation
<b>Key problem</b>	Development deficit	Democratic deficit	Security and democratic deficits
<b>Key reform objective</b>	Development	Democratisation	Peace-building / nation-building
<b>General reform process</b>	Transition from underdeveloped to developed economy	Transition from authoritarian to democratic system	Transition from violent conflict to peace
<b>Nature of external involvement</b>	Development assistance coupled with political conditionality	Accession to multilateral institutions as incentive for reform	Military intervention / occupation; mostly UN-led peace support operations
<b>Key external actors</b>	Development/financial actors: multilateral donors (e.g. OECD, UNDP, World Bank); bilateral donors; non-state actors	Security actors: international (e.g. EU, NATO, OSCE); governments; non-state actors (e.g. INGOs, PMCs)	Security actors: intervention forces; peacekeeping forces under international auspices; non-state actors (e.g. PMCs)
<b>Specific security sector problems</b>	Excessive military spending; poorly managed / governed security sector leads to ineffective provision of security, thereby diverting scarce resources from development	Oversized, over resourced military industrial complex; strong state, but weak civil society institutions; deficiencies in implementing SSR policies	Government and civil society institutions collapsed; displaced populations; privatisation of security; possibly pockets of armed resistance; abundance of small arms and anti-personnel mines
<b>Possibilities for SSR</b>	Mixed (depending on political commitment to reform, strength of state institutions, role and state of security forces, regional security environment, donor approach to SSR, etc.)	Rather good (strong state institutions, professional security forces, broader democratisation process), even better if external incentives available (e.g. accession to EU or NATO)	Rather poor (weak and contested state institutions, privatisation of security, dependence on peace support / intervention forces)

Source: Hänggi (2004)

## Annex X

**Table 5: Perceptions of actors involved and affected by SSR in the DRC**


	Perception MONUC	Perception Individual Donor Countries	Perception EUSec EUPol	Perception UNDP	Perception IOM	Perception DRC government	Perception National NGO	Perception Civil population
Progress is made by MONUC	X	X	X	X	X		?	
Progress dominates overall perception on MONUC's SSR interventions	X	X	X	X	X		?	
Mandate is too broad for resources	X	X	X					
Support of population is needed	X				X		X	
Support of DRC government is needed	X		X					
Communication needs to be improved	X				X		X	X
Sustainability SSR is not enough through training	X	X						
DRC government responsibility to increase sustainability (plan global, paying salaries etc)	X	X	X				X	
Cooperation needs to be increased	X	X			X			
Stability in Kivus is a condition for SSR	X	X	X					
SSR is now merely army reform		X					X	
Understanding Congolese SSR context is necessary		X						X
Increase applicability to local context and flexibility			X					X
Neighbouring involvement is a problem			X					
Quality MONUC's SSR personnel is a			X		X			

<b>problem</b>								
<b>SSR is a responsibility of all involved</b>					X			
<b>Focus on reconciliation population and Security Sector</b>				X				
<b>Unwillingness of cooperation of MONUC with DRC government</b>						X		
<b>Armed groups are a problem</b>						X		
<b>Congolese ideas need to be the basis for SSR</b>						X		
<b>SSR is also a responsibility of the population</b>			X				X	
<b>Including NGO views on SSR</b>							X	
<b>Inability of MONUC to meet populations expectations</b>								X
<b>Addressing causes of failing Security Sector</b>								X
<b>Inclusiveness of all actors</b>								X
<b>Including Human security in SSR</b>				X				

- Responsibility of all involved directly or indirectly
- Positivism dominates
- Responsibility of population
- Responsibility of International Community
- Responsibility of MONUC
- Responsibility of DRC government
- External factors influencing SSR

## Annex XI

**Figure 3: Policy cooperation networks on security sector reform in the DRC**



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## **Interviews and meetings**

Interview Abdourahmane Seido, Senior SSR Assistant, MONUC Bukavu

Interview Alain Salesse, Electoral Logistics Officer, MONUC Bukavu

Interview Alex McKenzie, DDR/DDRRR Officer, MONUC Bukavu

Interview Alexis Bouvy, Life and Peace Institute

Interview Alessandro Mobono, OIC Regional UNMACC, MONUC Bukavu

Interview Amadou Amani and Harriet Solloway, Rule of Law Officer and Director, MONUC Kinshasa

Interview Andrea Gentile, International Organisation for Migration (2x)

Interview Anna-Maria Olsson, EUPOL/ EUSEC Kinshasa

Interview Anonymous, Police National Congolais

Interview Anton Depla, LogOps Field Manager, MONUC Bukavu

Interview Ayman Ibrahim, Military Observer, MONUC Bukavu

Interview Azhar Munir, SSR Military Training, MONUC Bukavu

Interview Bernard Leloup, Head of Political Affairs, MONUC Uvira

Interview Bokani Hart, OIC Civil Affairs, MONUC Bukavu

Interview Chief of Town, Walungu

Interview Christan Shamam, Police National Congolais

Interview Colonel Bayela, Police Commissioner CIVPOL, MONUC Kinshasa

Interview Colonel Pelaprat, DCOS SSR MIL, MONUC Kinshasa

Interview David White, SSR Military Training, MONUC Kinshasa

Interview Diallo Abdoulaye, Police Officer CIVPOL, MONUC Bukavu

Interview Dino Silipingi, International Organisation for Migration

Interview Director, CAMPS Bukavu

Interview Eddy van Laethem, Log Ops Field Manager, MONUC Uvira (2x)

Interview Emmanuel Klimis, Researcher, Grapax Brussel

Interview Eric, SSR Officer, EUSEC Goma

Interview Eric Blaise, SSR Officer, MONUC Kinshasa

Interview Eric Kagemba, OGP Bukavu

Interview EUSEC Bukavu and Goma

Interview Fanuel Bizuru, Chief Banyamulenge Community Uvira

Interview Fidele Djoda and colleague, UNDP Kinshasa and Bukavu

Interview Filip Reyntjens, University of Antwerp

Interview Former Child Soldiers Mayi Mayi

Interview Francois, Bertrand, Eric, Didier and Thomas, SSR Officers, EUSEC Bukavu and Goma

Interview Francois-Xavier Delestre, EUPOL Kinshasa

Interview Frits Stam, EUSEC Kinshasa

Interview Giles Enticknap, UK Embassy Kinshasa

Interview Haiboune Alhassane, Police Commissioner CIVPOL, MONUC Uvira

Interview Henri Bosshoff, ISS Africa

Interview Heral Hinkel, DDR/DDRRR Officer, World Bank

Interview Honorine Munyonyo, Police National Congolais

Interview Hugo de Vries, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Interview Jaques Theberghe, SSR Officer, MONUC Goma

Interview Joseph Assanda, Amani Programme Goma

Interview Ltd. Colonel Kouamé Konan, Police Commissioner UNPOL, MONUC Kinshasa

Interview Ltd General Caron, SSR Advisor to the SRSG, MONUC Kinshasa

Interview Madame Chef de Division and colleagues, DRC government

Interview Melanie Goguen, SSR Officer, MONUC Goma

Interview MONUC representative, MONUC Bukavu

Interview Morag Hill, FSH

Interview Moussa Sanogo and Anselme Yabouri, Police Commissioner CIVPOL/ Coordinator Stability Plan and Political Affairs Officer, MONUC Goma

Interview Muarhabazi Namegabe, BVES

Interview Nizar Allani and Grace, Regional Air Ops Officer and Political Affairs Officer, MONUC Kinshasa

Interview Peter Aerts, Defence Attaché, Dutch Embassy Kinshasa

Interview Philip Lancaster, DDR/DDRRR Teamleader, MONUC Goma

Interview Philip Winter, Regional Coordination Officer Stability Plan, MONUC Goma

Interview Raim, Bukavu

Interview Raf Custers, IPIS

Interview Raphael Wakenga, ICJP

Interview Renner Onana, DDR/DDRRR Team Leader, MONUC Kinshasa

Interview Roeland van de Geer, SRSG to the Great Lakes Region, European Union

Interview Thomas, SSR Officer, EUSEC Bukavu

Interview Tim Woodman, Defence Attaché, UK Embassy Kinshasa

Interview Seraphin, Bukavu

Interview Serena Tiberia, Human Rights Officer, MONUC Bukavu/ Uvira

Interview Sonia Luque, Human Rights Officer, MONUC Bukavu

Interview Walter Heyns, Military Training, Belgium Army

Interview Wasfy, Military Observer, MONUC Bukavu/ Walungu

Interview Womens Group, Walungu

Interview Yaron Oppenheimer, Dutch Embassy Kinshasa

Personal Communication Azhar Munir, SSR Military Training, MONUC Bukavu

Personal Communication Colonel Pelaprat, DCOS SSR MIL, MONUC Kinshasa

Personal Communication Eric Blaise, SSR Officer, MONUC Kinshasa

Personal Communication Marc Caron, previous SSR advisor to the SRSG of MONUC Kinshasa

Personal Communication Peter Aerts, Defense Attaché, Dutch Embassy Kinshasa

Personal Communication Armande Gayet, SSR Coordinator, MONUC Kinshasa

Regional meeting, ICCO, Bujumbura, 28th of September- 1st of October 2008

Seminar 'De kracht van Congo', Amsterdam, 2<sup>nd</sup> of February 2009

Seminar on Africa, The Hague, 19<sup>th</sup> of April 2008

Seminar EurAc, Paris, 26<sup>th</sup> of May 2008

SSR meeting, Kinshasa, 14<sup>th</sup> of October 2008

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<sup>415</sup> Interview 9

<sup>416</sup> Interview 9; and interview 20

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<sup>421</sup> Interview 10; and interview 24

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<sup>425</sup> Interview 13

<sup>426</sup> Interview 10

<sup>427</sup> Interview 13

<sup>428</sup> Interview 21

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<sup>431</sup> Interview 8

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<sup>441</sup> Interview 48

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<sup>443</sup> Interview 34

<sup>444</sup> Interview 48; and interview 34

<sup>445</sup> Interview 36; and interview 56

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