

How to get democratic neighbors?

The influence of EU accession on the support for democracy in
Central and Eastern Europe



Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen

Master Thesis Political Science: Comparative Politics

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10-8-2017

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Word count: 19.989

“Planetary democracy does not yet exist, but our global civilization is already preparing a place for it: it is the very Earth we inhabit, linked with Heaven above us.”

Václav Havel (1995), first President of the Czech Republic

Abstract

In 2004, eight post-communist countries accessed to the European Union. According to the democratic criteria they were accepted to join the club of European member states. Now, more than a decade later, these countries show different signs of democratic success. What was the role of EU accession in making these states and its citizens more democratic? With the help of various theories and data the conclusion can be made that the EU is able to make their neighbors more supportive for democracy by giving them accession to the EU. However, this accession also has a dividing function between the globalization fans and critics, and the fear of losing the own culture plays a big role. This might cause the backsliding on the democratic scale of some of these countries.

Keywords: EU accession, EU enlargement, democratic backsliding, post-communist states, Central and Eastern Europe, support for democracy, democratization, globalization

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
Abbreviations

Abbreviation	Explanation
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
CPI	Corruption Perceptions Index
ESS	European Social Survey
EU	European Union
EP	European Parliament
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ISCED	International Standard Classification of Education
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
VIF	Variance Inflation Factor
WVS	World Values Survey

Chapter 1: Introduction

After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Fukuyama called for the end of history (1989). Liberalism and democracy had won. A group of new democracies arose in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). They changed their economy from a communist to a capitalist one, implemented democratic institutions and sought for political engagement with the European Union (EU). This Union tried to get these countries in their democratic sphere of influence. In 2004, eight of these post-communist states became member of the EU. They met the Copenhagen Criteria, assuming them to have “stable institutions guaranteeing democracy” (European Commission, 2017). However, real democracy can only result from democratic-minded citizens (Welzel & Inglehart, 2007). Since their accession to the EU, now thirteen years ago, these countries show different degrees of average support for democracy, resulting in different degrees of democratic states and freedom rates (figure 1.1). For example Hungary’s freedom rates are in decline because the government is limiting the ability of political opposition (Freedom House, 2017). Whilst for example the Czech Republic, on the contrary, has the highest possible scores on civil liberties and political rights (Freedom House, 2017). In all these countries elections took place, which makes the degree of democracy in these states a result of support for democracy. In this thesis will be examined how the support for democracy evolved in CEE-states after their accession to the EU in 2004, what accounts for the differences in support for democracy in states and between states, and what the role of accession to the EU can be for support for democracy in these post-communist countries.

Figure 1.1: Freedom rates 2001-2017



1 = best, 7 = worse

Source: Freedom House

Various theories to explain support for democracy will be used in this thesis. A theory that is important to explain support for democracy is Modernization Theory. This theory, for the first time in political science thoroughly tested by Lipset (1959), states that the economic development of a country explains its degree of democracy. This mechanism works via four sub-mechanisms: Urbanization, industrialization, education and wealth. After Lipset, this Modernization Theory is tested multiple times. For example by Geddes, who agrees on the claim that economic development leads to democratization. Przeworski & Limongi (1997) state that economic development has an effect on the persisting, but not on the appearance of democracies. These theorists focus on the macro level of the state. Other theorists focus on individuals and agree on the influence of education (Benavot, 1996) and wealth (Mishler & Rose, 1996) on the support for democracy of individuals. This Modernization Theory will be the framework, to which the following theories will be attached in order to have an overarching and clear theoretical set-up.

The first theory in this framework is the Government Performance Theory. This theory claims that the extent to which a democratic government functions influences the support of the democratic system by its individuals (Evans & Whitefield, 1995). This theory has an objective and subjective elaboration. Boräng et al. (2017) argue that the objective government performance, expressed in government effectiveness and the degree of corruption, influences the individual support for democracy. For example, if a government is less corrupt, then citizens will be more in support of the democratic system because this leads in their perception to less corruption. Mishler & Rose (1997) argue that the subjective individual experience with government explains whether citizens have more or less support for democracy. Accession to the EU might have an effect on the increased government effectiveness, less corruption and better economic performance of the government (Mattli & Plümper, 2002).

The second theory that is essential to understand support for democracy in the 21st century is Globalization Theory. According to this theory there is a distinction between ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of globalization (Kriesi, 2012). The winners get new opportunities because of globalization and EU accession, while the losers fear their jobs because of a broader labor market and the increase of immigration. These attitudes will also influence their attitudes towards democracy, because democratic values have a tendency towards an open society. And in addition, as a consequence of democratic referendums, their countries became member of the EU which is causing them economic and cultural disappointments. Consequently, people that are more Eurosceptic will be less supportive for democracy. On the other hand, people that have more confidence in the EU will be more supportive for democracy, because for them this open system is beneficial.

The third theory that will be used in this thesis is Socialization Theory. This theory explains that an individual gets socialized with his/her environment. If the environment of an individual is more democratic, then this individual will become more supportive for

democracy as well. This can be elaborated in two ways. First, Marquart-Pyatt & Paxton (2007) claim that the longer the country an individual lives in is democratic, the more democratic this individual will be. Here is the democratic history of a state essential. Second, Finkel et al. (2001) claim that the longer an individual lives in a democracy, the more democratic this individual will be. One of the main instruments to socialize an individual is education, which is also a mechanism from the Modernization Theory. Higher education on average increases the support for democracy of an individual.

Besides these three theories and Modernization Theory as overarching theory, literature about the effect of EU accession will be used in order to link theories to the role of EU accession. Mattli & Plümper (2002) show that some of the main reasons for a state to access the EU is economic growth and prosperity and assistance with building strong administrative apparatuses. Schimmelpfenning & Scholtz (2008) tested that EU accession is an effective way to make governments more effective. All this would mean that accession to the EU has a positive effect on the support for democracy in an accessing state.

Because democratization is one of the major topics in political science, there is enough literature on how and why countries democratize. However, most theories are about how a state becomes democratic instead of why individuals support democracy. Pevehouse (2002, 2005) wrote about the role of organizations in the implementing and consolidation of democracy, but does not particularly zoom in on the aftermath of EU accession. In addition, he focuses on democracy on the level of state institutions, not on support for democracy on the individual level. If zooming in on support for democracy, mechanisms can be distilled from Modernization Theory (Lipset, 1959), and the attached theories that will be used in this thesis: Government Performance, Globalization and Socialization Theory. However, these theories are not yet extensively connected to the influence of a regional organization like the EU. And although there is literature on the backslide of democratization in several case

studies on CEE countries that accessed to the union in 2004 (Kornai, 2015; Sedelmeier, 2014), this backslide is not yet connected with the process of accession to the EU and particularly not with what this means for the support for democracy in these states in the short and longer term. This is what the scientific relevance for this thesis is.

The theories stated above give possible explanations for the degree of the support for democracy. These theories are able to explain whether and to what extent the accession to the EU of the states that became member in 2004 is related to the level of support in the short and longer term. The first research questions of this thesis is:

How did support for democracy evolve between 2005 and 2013 in countries that accessed to the European Union in 2004?

If examined how support for democracy evolved, then the above mentioned theories will be used to explain what accounts for the support for democracy in these countries and this will answer the following question:

To what extent can accession to the European Union influence the support for democracy in states that accessed to the EU in 2004?

With regard to the societal relevance, this thesis contributes to the debate on EU-enlargement. In several Western EU member states this enlargement is a controversial issue. The popularity of the EU is under pressure and Euroscepticism is increasing. One of the concerns of this skepticism is the enlargement with non-democratic countries. This thesis

contributes to the question whether the EU is able to make accessing states more democratic, if a state is really democratic before accession and what other disadvantageous consequences could be of accession for a country with regard to democratization. In this thesis, the actual influence of EU accession on a core element of democratization, the support for democracy will be examined. In addition, this thesis will contribute to the societal debate whether democracy from above works at all. In this sense, the EU neighborhood policy, with one of the aims to make the neighbor more democratic, will be tested on its effectiveness.

After this introduction, the theoretical framework will give an overview of the theories mentioned above and the existing literature that tested these theories. From these theories, expectations will be formulated. Fourth, the data and methods will be discussed before the results will be presented. After the results, a conclusion can be stated. After this conclusion, there will be a discussion in which the conclusion will be put in perspective, the limitations of this research will be discussed and the opportunities for future research will be explored.

Chapter 2: Theoretical framework

In this chapter I will review the existing theories that explain support for democracy. First, I will give my nominal conceptualization of democratization. Second, I will discuss the existing literature explaining democratization. Third, the literature on EU accession in combination with democratization will be reviewed. Fourth, the theoretical mechanisms of the Modernization, Government Performance, Globalization and Socialization Theory will be explained and accordingly hypotheses will be formulated.

2.1 Conceptualizing democratization

In this thesis, the dependent variable ‘democratization’ will be measured through the support for democracy in a state. Support for democracy means in this thesis that an individual thinks that democracy is the best system to live in. All Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries in this thesis have elected parliaments and governments, chosen by the electorate of these countries. If a political party or leader with authoritarian characteristics is chosen, it can be concluded that a population is less supportive for democracy. As Welzel & Inglehart (2007) emphasize, there is a broad consensus in the democratization field that people’s commitment to democracy determines the fate of a democratic state. And that a democratic population is essential for the sound functioning of a democracy. A democratic country is not democratic if only its institutions and/or elites form a democratic system. This is why the focus in this theoretic chapter will be on explanations for support for democracy.

2.2 Literature review

In this literature review, the four theories that I will be using to explain support for democracy will be discussed. Modernization Theory, as an overarching framework. As first theory in this overarching framework, the Government Performance Theory. Second, Globalization Theory. And third, Socialization Theory.

The most influential democratization theory in the field of political science is the Modernization Theory. This theory explains the positive relation between economic development and the democratization of a society. The causal mechanisms behind this relation follow four pathways according to Lipset (1959): Education, industrialization, urbanization and wealth. He made his claim on basis of two groups of countries. First, 28 European and English-speaking Nations, dividing them in “Stable Democracies” and “Unstable Democracies and Dictatorships” Second, 20 Latin American Nations, dividing them in “Democracies and Unstable Dictatorships” and “Stable Dictatorships”. Subsequently, with different indices for wealth, industrialization, education and urbanization he concludes that a more modernized society is a more democratic one.

Geddes (2007) supports the claim that economic development influences democracy in a country, referring to various authors like Boix & Stokes (2003), who state that equality as a result of modernization increases the likelihood of democracy, but adds that the modernization effect weakened after the Second World War. Przeworski & Limongi (1997) conclude that economic development does not affect the probability of a state becoming democratic. But when a state is democratic, economic development does affect enduring democratic existence. They claim this after analyzing data of 135 countries that existed between 1950 and 1990. According to these authors, other reasons than economic ones are more significant.

Two of the four Lipset pathways, described above, have a direct influence on support for democracy: Education (Benavot, 1996) and economic wealth (Geddes, 1999; Inglehart, 1999). Barro (1996) emphasizes that education and income are the only significant pathways of the modernization theory that lead to democratization. Lipset (1959) states that there is a correlation between education and democracy. People that can read and go to school are better able to participate and socialize with democratic values. He measured education in a state with the percentage of literacy, the enrolment in primary education, post-primary education and higher education. In all categories, democracies score higher than dictatorships, both in Europe and Latin America.

Benavot (1996) zooms further in on the role of education in the democratization of a society. He distinguishes between mass and higher education. Mass education teaches individuals their passive political rights, but higher education teaches individuals better how to participate and this has a bigger effect on the overall support for democracy in a state. Benavot made this claim with a panel data analysis of over a hundred countries, controlling for economic development, the date of independence, ethnic homogeneity and the colonial heritage of a state. But also the region a state is situated in was controlled for: Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, Asia, OECD Countries and Eastern Europe.

Lipset (1959) states that societies with more wealth will be more likely to be democratic. They are more independent because they have more income, better access to health, and are better able to communicate. Because they are better able to communicate and are less independent, they will be better able to participate in society and have an opinion about for example how the government functions. This leads to more support for democracy. Lipset (1959) measures this with per capita income, thousands of persons per doctor, persons per motor vehicle, telephones, radios and newspapers per thousand persons. He concludes that both in Europe and Latin America in democracies there is more wealth than in dictatorships.

Mishler & Rose (1996) conclude that economic hopes are the most important cause for an individual to support a democratic regime in Eastern Europe. They do this by analysing the support for Communist and post-Communist regimes in five Eastern-European countries. Their conclusion is that there is a rise in support for the new democratic regime in comparison with the old one. However, the support for the new, capitalist system is lower than for the old, planned economy.

The second theory explaining support for democracy is the Government Performance Theory. It describes that there is a relation between how a government functions and the support for democracy. The mechanism behind it is that individuals will be more supportive for a democratic system if this individual experiences that this system works. A distinction can be made between the perceived performance of a government and the objective performance of a democratic government.

Evans & Whitefield (1995) consider both objective and subjective indicators about economy and politics as indicators for support for democracy. They do this with eight Eastern European countries that were part of the Soviet Union. They conclude that how individuals evaluate the functioning of democracy in practice is the most significant predictor of support for democracy. There is a small effect of personal economic experiences on support for democracy, but when marketization is controlled for, this effect almost disappears.

Magalhães (2014) claims that government effectiveness is the strongest macro-variable that predicts support for democracy in a society. He makes this claim on the basis of 100 surveys in close to 80 countries. Government effectiveness is defined as the quality of policy-making formulation and implementation. The result is that higher government effectiveness leads to higher levels of support for democracy. Contrary, in non-democracies, higher government effectiveness leads to less support for democracy. In conclusion: The effectiveness of a government creates support for the system this government is working in.

Boräng et al. (2017) describe that a higher objective Quality of Government (QoG), with for example a better bureaucratic system and less corruption, leads to more support for democracy. After a multilevel analysis with over 20 countries and a considerable time-span the authors conclude that this effect is significant in younger democracies, because the memory of an older corrupt system is still fresh in mind. The occurrence of a sound government causes more support for democracy.

Mishler & Rose (1997) conclude from their extensive research with 7.961 respondents in Eastern Europe that current personal economic and political experiences with government have a bigger influence on support for democracy than the socialization of these individuals in communist societies. In specific, the personal experiences with institutions that provide individual freedom have a big effect on support for the current system.

The third theory that will be used is the Globalization Theory. This theory explains that individuals that profited from globalization will be less Eurosceptic and more supportive for democracy. On the contrary, people who benefit less from globalization, will be less supportive for the EU and democracy because globalization causes more immigration and consequently more competition for these people on the labour market instead of higher educated people who merely profit of globalization.

Kriesi (2012) is the architect of the integration/demarcation cleavage and tested it in six Western-European countries: Austria, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK. Kriesi examined whether 'losers of globalization' will be more likely to vote for parties that have EU-sceptical and anti-immigrant programme points. He confirmed that this is both in the 1990's and 2000's the case, and thus people that perceive to be negative affected by globalization, will be more likely to have anti-EU attitudes.

Hampshire (2013) states that the subject of immigration clearly shows that the modern liberal state, as we know it nowadays, has contradictory facets. The liberal state is democratic, which means that citizens decide what happens and there is a big role for the media. This has a tendency towards closeness, because people fear their jobs as a consequence of immigration for example. Second, the liberal state is constitutional. Democratic governments are bound to constitutions and for example have to respect human rights, which favours openness. Third, the liberal state is a nation-state. Citizens in it have nationalist attitudes and cultural preferences. This is a reason for closure instead of openness. Fourth, the liberal state is capitalist, and thus dependent of other states and workers from other states. This has a tendency towards openness.

Scheve & Slaughter (2001) find that low-skilled workers are more in favor of restricting immigrant inflows. They state this conclusion on basis of their study on labor market competition and individual preferences about immigration policy. The attitudes are observed on three moments in time, in 1992, 1994 and 1996. Rydgren & Ruth (2011) confirm the ethnic competition thesis with their case study on the support for the Sweden Democrats over two elections. This ethnic competition thesis means that people will be more likely to support far-right parties with EU-skeptical stances if they want to reduce competition with immigrants over scarce sources like for example jobs.

A fourth theory explaining the support for democracy is the Socialization Theory. This theory explains that the environment of an individual determines whether this individual is supportive for democracy. Marquart-Pyatt & Paxton (2007) state that the longer a state is democratic, the more political tolerance its citizens will have. According to these authors, political tolerance is one of the most important characteristics of democratic citizens. They tested this claim with analysing a group of eight Eastern European young democracies that democratized after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and six Western European older democracies.

They find prove for their claim, but state that the difference in tolerance can have other causes per country, other than the younger or older the democracy is.

Finkel et al. (2001) focus on the individual and claims that the longer an individual lives in a democracy increases his/her support for it. Because of more experience with democracy, the former authoritarian regime will be less valued. They conclude this after a three-wave panel study with citizens of Leipzig, a former East-German city. These citizens both experienced a communist and a democratic regime. After living longer in the latter, the support for this system will increase because of positive experiences.

Rohrschneider (1999) states that besides the length of an individual in a democracy, first of all the formative years of an individual in a certain system determines his/her support for democracy. The economic and political values an individual is exposed to during his/her crucial years in their development are essential. The author concludes this, almost ten years after the reunification of Germany in an extensive study on individual political values in this young new Germany.

2.3 EU accession

In this section I will zoom in on the literature about the effect of EU accession on support for democracy. Various authors explain that participation of a country in a regional organization, or the process prior to accession, can lead to the democratization of a state. According to Schimmelfenning & Scholtz (2008), accession is the only significant instrument of EU neighbourhood policy in order to democratize a country. This is the case because the elites in this country will have an incentive to implement democratic reforms. Accession to a regional organization seems to be the most powerful instrument to achieve this. Other theorists emphasize that political elites join regional organizations intentionally to consolidate democracy (Pevehouse, 2002; Mansfield & Pevehouse, 2006). Accession to a

regional organization is a way for these elites to secure the democratic reforms they carried out.

Mattli & Plümper (2002) argue that there are various motivations for a state to desire membership of the EU. They distinguish between four motives. First, constructivist motives. States want to access because they have the same norms and values as the members of the Union. Second, because accession can lead to economic growth and prosperity and there will be assistance to build stronger administrative apparatuses. Third, a country that accesses will be able to build a better bureaucratic network. And fourth, accession will lead to a capital inflow.

The connection to citizens that become more supportive for democracy can be linked in several ways. For example, in the long term accession can be beneficial for support for democracy via Socialization Theory: The longer an individual lives in a democracy, the more likely it is this individual will be supportive of democracy. Second, because of democratic reforms as a result of accession, education can be improved in a country. And according to Modernization Theory, this will be beneficial for support for democracy. Third, the government performance can be improved as a consequence of accession. And there might also be economic progress as a result of accession for individuals. However, individuals might also have an increased attitude of closeness as a consequence of EU accession, because there is a higher authority than the own nation-state who decides for them to accept open borders and the inflow of immigrants. This might lead to less support for democracy.

2.4 Theory and hypotheses

In this section I will formulate hypotheses on basis of the existing theory. In order to formulate hypotheses, I choose to take Modernization Theory as an overarching framework to which Government Performance, Globalization and Socialization Theory can be connected. These theories, which focus on specific mechanisms in the Modernization Theory, will provide testable hypotheses about the effect of EU accession on support for democracy. In this section, first I will elaborate on the mechanisms in Modernization Theory. Then, per other theory, I will explain the basic assumptions, connect this theory to Modernization Theory, apply it to the specific research context of this thesis, which is accession to the EU, and finally formulate hypotheses.

2.4.1 Modernization Theory

According to Modernization Theory, economic development causes democratization. Lipset (1959), one of the Modernization scholars, argues that there are four conditions that make democratization possible. First, wealth, the degree of comfort in which an individual can live strengthens its demand for a democratic society. If an individual earns more money, then he/she will be able to communicate better, read a paper and watch television. This has an emancipating and equalizing effect. If an individual experiences more equality, then it will be likely that this individual wants a system in which this equality is institutionalized and in which an individual can decide on its own fate. Equality and self-determination are valued in democracy, and the support for this system should be more if an individual is wealthier. An additional consequence of wealth is the appearance of a middle class. People start enterprising as a consequence of economic development. If people have their own enterprises, then it will be more likely that they want a say in matters that affect their business. Democracy is a

system in which every stakeholder can have a say. And thus, it will be likely that with the rise of the middle class, the support for democracy will increase.

The second condition is industrialization. The degree to which an economy has shifted from an agrarian society to an industrialized one. In an agrarian society, workers are less dependent on national legislation, because they produce on a small scale and in a hierarchical structure. However, in an industrialized society, people are part of the middle class, as explained above, or are workers. I argue that it is important for these workers that they can mobilize and voice their concerns. There is no better way for workers to mobilize than in a democracy in which the interests have a proportional say.

The third condition is education. The degree to which individuals is educated explains his/her support for democracy. The more an individual is educated, the more this individual will be able to think critically and independently. And if an individual is better able to think independently, this individual will be less supportive for a system in which others decide for this individual what to do or think, like in an authoritarian system. I argue that in a higher educated individual will be more supportive for a system in which critical thoughts are allowed and proportionally represented in institutions that govern. And in addition, there is a socializing effect. In a democratic society, the more and better education an individual gets, the more this individual gets socialized with democratic values like freedom, participation and pluralism. If an individual gets socialized with these democratic values, then individuals will be more supportive for this system in which they are grown up.

The fourth condition for democratization is urbanization. The degree to which people in a society live concentrated in cities instead of on the countryside. I argue that in situations with small societies in small villages, it will be more likely that there is an informal hierarchy in which matters are discussed and where the need for a democratic system will be less present. However, in cities this informal hierarchical system will be less successful, and the

need of the channelling of opinions and interests will be required. In order to have an effective way to do this a democratic system is needed, and the support for democracy will be higher.

2.4.2 Government Performance Theory

According to the Government Performance Theory, the way in which a government functions and performs determines whether its citizens are supportive for the form of government in that country. This means that a well-functioning government in an authoritarian system will lead to more support for an authoritarian form of government, contrary to a democracy. And that a well-functioning government in a democracy will lead to more support for democracy, contrary to another, more authoritarian form of government. In this thesis, I focus on the latter, democracies, because the countries of research all have a democratic form of government. I argue that generally spoken, an individual wants a democratic government to treat persons equally and to respect the rule of law. In addition, individuals want the government to work effectively, for example with a good balance between centralized and decentralized government. If individuals experience that state institutions work fair and effective, they will be more supportive for the system because they experience that this system is working. Individuals will benefit from a system that works fair and effectively, because a citizen can rely on its government institutions because they are predictable. Besides a government working fair and effectively, citizens want a government that performs well. For example when it comes to economic growth and consequently employment. A government has a role in these fields and if an individual experiences that there is progress because of the functioning of the democratic elected government, then this citizen will be more supportive for a democratic system, contrary to an authoritarian or dictatorship in which this individual would expect a less functioning and performing government.

One of the features of Modernization Theory is that economic progress leads to more support for democracy. Government Performance Theory underlines, that the economic performance of a government links directly to the support for democracy. A government is able to improve the economic progress in a country with policy interventions. Secondly, the demand to a fair democratic system is also something that is present in Modernization Theory, for example when it comes to the urbanization and industrialization of a society which leads to a more effective way of governing a polity. This effective way is a well-functioning democratic system. In this way, both the economic and effective government role a government can take according to Government Performance Theory is an elaboration of Modernization Theory.

EU accession should have a positive influence on government functioning and performance, because a candidate member of the EU has to meet certain criteria on subjects like government effectiveness, democracy and rule of law. In addition, after accession, the bureaucratic network of a state will expand and professionalization of state institutions will occur. In this sight, there will be more government effectiveness, better maintenance of the rule of law and consequently less corruption. According to the above described mechanisms in the Government Performance Theory, this will lead to more support for democracy. In addition, besides the improved functioning of government, after EU accession a country will be able to perform better in terms of economic growth as a consequence of entering the EU internal market and receiving subsidies of the EU which benefits certain groups of citizens. This will lead to a higher support for democracy, because citizens that benefit link this to the democratic system which made EU accession possible.

The first hypothesis tests the expectation that lesser perceived corruption has a positive effect on the support for democracy. The expectation is that in a country where the mean

corruption perceptions are lower, there will be more support for democracy, because the system will work better in the opinion of an individual, if this system is not corrupt.

H1: The lesser perceived corruption in a country, the more supportive for democracy its citizens will be

When focusing now more on the performance of a government, the GDP of a country can be seen as an imperative of how a government performs. This is why the next hypothesis tests the expectation that a country with a positively changed GDP will have citizens with more support for democracy. If individuals experience economic prosperity, then these individuals will be more positive about the system of democracy because this system might be associated with economic success and progress.

H2: The more positive the change in GDP in a country, the more supportive its citizens will be for democracy

The fourth hypothesis focuses on the functioning of the government, and in particular to what extent an individual is satisfied with the national government. As explained above, the expectation is that when an individual has confidence in the national government, and implicitly the way in which this government functions, then this individual will be more supportive for democracy, because this is the system this government functions in.

H3: The higher the satisfaction with the national government of an individual, the more supportive for democracy this individual is

2.4.3 Globalization Theory

Globalization Theory explains that people who benefit from globalization will be more supportive for the open system of democracy than people who feel threatened by the consequences of globalization in their wealth and culture. This cleavage divides the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of globalization (Kriesi, 2012). In general, the lower social classes experience less benefits from globalization than higher social classes. When focusing on the losers of globalization, they have an increasing competition on the labor market because of the blurring of national borders. Often these are low-skilled workers who have per definition more competition on the labor market and consequently a more uncertain job perspective. If an individual is unemployed and searching for a job, then this individual will be less satisfied with the system he/she is living in, because this system caused his/her unemployment. This can be perceived as a result of the open and capitalist character of democracy, contrary to a planned economy. An individual that experienced more wealth in a less democratic system, or expects to have more in another system, will be less supportive for the system of democracy. In addition, these individuals will be more likely to have fierce attitudes against immigration and the open character of a democratic state because this increases the competition on the labor market. Besides the economic component of globalization and immigration, also the cultural component is of importance. Because of globalization and immigration, the national identity is more uncertain, and as a consequence citizens who fear losing their national identity will be less supportive for the open character of democracy which caused the incoming of individuals with another cultural background in the first place.

Globalization can be seen as the spreading of modernization across borders in my view. I argue that new forms of communication, production and society are an extension to the modernization model of Lipset (1959). However, where Modernization Theory focusses on democratization of society as a whole, Globalization Theory on the contrary shows the

eruption of a new distinction in this society. Instead of a whole society benefitting from wealth and education, Globalization Theory emphasizes that the higher-educated and higher-skilled benefit more from this extension of modernization than the other group in society. Globalization Theory takes over the assumptions of Modernization Theory, that higher education and more wealth have a positive influence on the support for democracy, but that this should be analyzed at the individual level, and that some individuals will be more supportive as a consequence of modernization and globalization than others.

EU accession gives space to globalizing tendencies and can in this regard be seen as the institutionalization of globalization. As a consequence of accession, it was increasingly possible to trade, enterprise, work and move across national borders. In extension of the causal mechanisms described above, this leads to a bigger division along the globalization-cleavage between the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of globalization. As a consequence of accession, the labor market will be extended which causes even more competition for ‘globalization losers’, which consequently will lead to less support for democracy. In addition, accession to the EU will lead to more international obligations, which results for example in the responsibility to receive immigrants. People who see immigrants as a threat to the own culture will be less supportive for the open character of democracy which has a tendency towards openness and lead to accession, which led to these international obligations.

One of the consequences of globalization and accession to the EU is the opening of the labor market, which causes more job uncertainty, for example for people who are unemployed. If an individual is unemployed, the expectation is that this individual will be less supportive for democracy. This individual might see the open character of democracy and consequently EU accession as a cause of his/her unemployment, because it opens the borders for workers from other countries and regions than when these borders would stay closed.

H4: Unemployment of an individual leads to less support for democracy of this individual

Besides the individual level, unemployment on the national level might cause a negative attitude towards democracy. In addition to the negative effect of unemployment for unemployed themselves, other citizens experience that there is a higher number of unemployment, there will be higher costs for social security for example. Because unemployment causes financial and social problems, individuals in this country will be less supportive for democracy.

H5: Higher unemployment in a country has a negative effect on support for democracy by the individuals living in this country

This described unemployment in a country is expected to have a negative effect on the relation between unemployment on the individual level and the support for democracy of this unemployed citizen. Because, if an individual is unemployed, a higher number of national unemployment will reduce the chances for this individual on the labor market. And consequently minimize the support for the system of democracy of this individual.

H6: Unemployment in a country strengthens the negative relation between unemployment of an individual and support for democracy

Another consequence of globalization is immigration. Citizens that experience immigration as negative, will be less supportive for democracy because the open character of democracy made it possible that immigration occurred. The negative attitude towards immigration might have economic, cultural, security or other kinds of motivations. First, I focus on economic, and secondly on cultural motivations. The competition on the labor market is a consequence of immigration, made possible by globalization and EU accession. Citizens might regard immigration as bad for the own country's economy, because immigration takes away jobs from citizens of the own country, or if immigrants don't work, as an additional cost item for social security. The perceived economic disadvantages of

immigration will lead to less support for democracy, because citizens think that the open character of democracy causes a worse economic situation.

H7: Citizens who think immigration is bad for the economy are less supportive for democracy

Besides the economic attitude towards immigration, there are also actual numbers of immigrants entering a certain country. The expectation is that in countries where more immigrants are received, there is less support for democracy. If a country receives more immigrants, this will be perceived as a consequence of the open character of democracy and as a consequence citizens will be less supportive for the system that is responsible for it. Because of additional negative perceived effects of actual immigration, citizens will be less supportive for democracy.

H8: More immigration leads to less support for democracy by individuals living in this country

The expectation is that this actual number of immigrants will strengthen the negative relation between an anti-immigrant attitude and support for democracy. When an individual is already skeptical about democracy, because it caused immigration and its negative consequences, then this individual will be even more skeptical if the actual number of immigrants is higher. If the actual number of immigrants is higher, the expectation is that the negative relation between anti-immigrant attitudes with an economic motivation and support for democracy will be stronger. If more immigrants enter the country, the economic experiences with immigration will strengthen their attitude against democracy.

H9: More immigration strengthens the negative relation between a negative attitude towards immigration with an economic motivation and support for democracy by individuals

The second motivation for anti-immigrant attitudes is a cultural one. Citizens, afraid that they will lose their national culture as a consequence of immigration will be less supportive for democracy because the open character of democracy and EU accession caused the entrance of immigrants who bring other cultures and are perceived as a threat to the national culture.

H10: Citizens who think immigration undermines the national culture are less supportive for democracy

If the actual number of immigrants is higher, the expectation is that the negative relation between anti-immigrant attitudes with an economic motivation and support for democracy will be stronger. If more immigrants enter the country, the cultural experiences with immigration will strengthen their attitude against democracy.

H11: More immigration strengthens the negative relation between a negative attitude towards immigration with a cultural motivation and support for democracy by individuals

If we finally focus on the other side, the ‘winners of globalization’, then could be argued that people who have more trust in the EU, will be more supportive for democracy. Democracy, after all lead to accession to the EU, because all eight countries held referendums on accession. These people who have trust in the EU, will be supportive for the system which made accession possible and made possible that they actually benefit more from globalization.

H12: The higher the trust in the EU of an individual, the more supportive for democracy this individual will be

2.4.4 Socialization Theory

Socialization theory assumes that the environment of an individual determines his/her support for democracy. Because the country in which an individual lives has more experience and a longer tradition with democracy, it will be more likely that the democratic values are common and individuals in this country are more likely to be affected by these values. If an individual lives in an environment where democracy is a matter of course, then an individual will be more likely to support this matter of course. Countries in which democracy is present and institutionalized for hundreds of years, will have less debate on the system than countries that met democratic standards only a few decades ago. The socialization with democracy can follow various pathways. It for example goes via breeding by parents, the group of friends someone is involved in or the education someone gets in school. The higher an individual is educated, the more supportive this individual will be for democracy. Primary education already teaches individuals the basic values of democracy, and in higher education citizens learn to think critically, participate and the importance of pluralism. This has an emancipating effect, and the expectation is that citizens who are better able to think for themselves instead of following the opinion of another, will be more supportive for a system in which this is institutionalized: Democracy.

Socialization Theory links to Modernization Theory, because the socialization of an individual in a society goes via some of the imperatives of the Modernization Theory. With education, citizens get familiar with the basic democratic values like freedom and equality, and with higher education, citizens learn how to express themselves, to think critically and debate. As a result of wealth, citizens are better able to get informed via media, which socializes them with democracy because the media act in a certain democratic discourse. As a result of urbanization, people live together in bigger cities and in this bigger cities the discourse of democracy will be stronger because there is more need for a system like

democracy because informal arrangements, like in agrarian towns, are no longer an option. An individual living in this city will socialize into democracy in these cities.

As a consequence of EU accession, the expectation is that education standards in have increased due to bureaucratic cooperation of governments, also in the expert field of education. Also as a consequence of accession, it became easier for students to study abroad and socialize with the European and liberal values of democracy. In addition, because of the receiving of students from other EU countries, the influence of democratic values increased. According to Modernization and Socialization Theory, the extent to which an individual is educated explains his/her support for democracy.

H13: The higher an individual is educated, the more supportive this individual will be for democracy

As a condition for accession, the eight countries that accessed to the EU in 2004, had to meet the Copenhagen Criteria, guaranteeing stable institutions that safeguard democracy, rule of law, human rights and respect to minorities. If I assume that all countries that accessed to the EU became democratic on the same moment, right after the fall of the Berlin Wall, then the assumption should be that all individuals in CEE countries are to the same extent socialized with democracy. However, I argue that not all countries that accessed to the EU in 2004, were to the same extent democratic. Some countries were more democratic than others and this means that individuals in different countries didn't have the chance to socialize to democracy to the same extent. In light of the Socialization Theory, individuals that live in a country that is longer democratic, will be more supportive for democracy, because this country has a longer democratic tradition and are socialized in this richer democratic tradition.

H14: The more democratic a country was before accession, the more supportive its citizens will be for democracy

2.5 Summary of hypotheses

Table 2.5: Summary of hypotheses

Theory	Level independent variable		Hypothesis
Government Performance Theory	Macro	1	<i>The lesser perceived corruption in a country, the more supportive for democracy its citizens will be</i>
	Macro	2	<i>The more positive the change in GDP in a country, the more supportive its citizens will be for democracy</i>
	Micro	3	<i>The higher the satisfaction with the national government of an individual, the more supportive for democracy this individual is</i>
Globalization Theory	Micro	4	<i>Unemployment of an individual leads to less support for democracy of this individual</i>
	Macro	5	<i>Higher unemployment in a country has a negative effect on support for democracy of the individuals living in this country</i>
	Macro (interaction)	6	<i>Unemployment in a country strengthens the negative relation between unemployment of an individual and support for democracy</i>
	Micro	7	<i>Citizens who think immigration is bad for the economy are less supportive for democracy</i>
	Macro	8	<i>More immigration leads to less support for democracy by individuals living in this country</i>
	Macro (interaction)	9	<i>More immigration strengthens the negative relation between a negative attitude towards immigration with an economic motivation and support for democracy by individuals</i>
	Micro	10	<i>Citizens who think immigration undermines the national culture are less supportive for democracy</i>
	Macro (interaction)	11	<i>More immigration strengthens the negative relation between a negative attitude towards immigration with a cultural motivation and support for democracy by individuals</i>
	Micro	12	<i>The higher the trust in the EU of an individual, the more supportive for democracy this individual will be</i>
	Socialization Theory	Macro	13
Macro		14	<i>The more democratic a country was before accession, the more supportive its citizens will be for democracy</i>

Chapter 3: Data and Methods

In the third chapter of this thesis, the data and methodology will be discussed. First, the research approach of this thesis will be justified. Second, the case selection is elaborated on. Third, the data that will be used to test the hypotheses will be described. Fourth, the operationalization of the included variables will take place. Fifth and finally, the research methods will be justified.

3.1 Research approach

Because the aim of this research is to test the possible influence of accession to the EU on the individual attitudes of individuals, a quantitative research approach is chosen. This approach enables me to dive in the personal characteristics, which are essential to explain the degree of support for democracy. At the same time, the influence of country-specific characteristics, which are also essential, can be tested with this approach. And third, the interaction between country-specific and personal characteristics can be estimated, in order to test the interaction-hypotheses of this thesis. Besides the testability of variables on different levels, a quantitative approach enables me to test with big groups of people, approximately about thousand individuals per moment in time per country. This results in better results to make generalizable conclusions that underline or reject the formulated hypotheses and theories where these hypotheses are rooted in. That is why in this thesis a quantitative approach is chosen.

3.2 Case selection

This thesis is about seven of the eight CEE countries that accessed to the EU on 1 May 2004. These are Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. However, unfortunately there is no available data on individuals in Latvia, which is why the

scope is narrowed to the seven other countries. The 2004-enlargement is the biggest in the history of the EU, because besides these mentioned CEE countries, also Cyprus and Malta accessed (Europa Nu). My focus is on the CEE countries, because they have a more comparable history than the South European islands Cyprus and Malta. All eight became communist countries after the Second World War when they became in the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union. And all eight made their transition towards democracy after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Also the fact that these countries accessed at the same time to the EU makes their comparativeness even more ideal. This moment is 15 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and 9 years before the last measurement on support for democracy in the available date, in 2013. This period of time, 25 years, is a broad period in which a democratic development could take place. More or less in the middle, an event occurred that can have an effect on the support for democracy on the individual level: The accession to the EU.

3.3 Data

In order to have a sufficient amount of data, in this thesis two data sources will be used. First, the sixth round of the European Social Survey (ESS), held in 2012. And second, in order to complement this round, the fifth and sixth wave, respectively measured from 2005 until 2009 and 2010 until 2014, of the World Values Survey (WVS). For the macro variables of this thesis, besides ESS, data from Transparency International, the World Bank and Eurostat will be used. The scores per year and country on these variables can be found in Appendix 2. More information about this data can be found in the operationalization.

3.3.1 European Social Survey

The ESS is surveyed every two years since 2002. It includes measurements of many personal characteristics and social and political attitudes. In this thesis, the sixth round of this ESS is included, which is surveyed in 2012 and a smaller part in 2013. This is the only round

that includes a variable that measures support for democracy. The survey aims to have 1.500 respondents per country that participate per round. Second, the aim is to have a response rate of at least 70% and a maximum non-response of 3% (ESS, 2017). The response rates of the relevant countries of this thesis vary between 57.78% for Poland and 74.70% for Lithuania. All other response rates are adopted in table 3.3.

Table 3.3: Response rates ESS round 6 (2012)

	2012-2013
Czech Republic	68.24%
Estonia	67.84%
Hungary	65.12%
Lithuania	74.70%
Poland	74.57%
Slovenia	57.78%
Slovakia	73.94%

Source: ESS round 6 (2012-2013)

The data includes two weighting variables. First, design weights, because of the complex sampling design, individuals in some regions and countries have higher probabilities to be in the sample than others. And second, post-stratification weights. Because design weights can't compensate also for sampling errors and non-response bias, this second weighting variable is included. This takes care of the over- or underrepresentation of groups with regard to age, gender, education and region. However, in this thesis, these weighting variables will not be used because the data samples for the relevant countries are representative enough.

There are several drawbacks regarding the ESS data. First of all, not all CEE countries that became member of the EU in 2004 are present: Latvia is missing. Another drawback is that there are no variables on Euroscepticism, which is a shortcoming in the light of this research. And the third drawback is that the dependent variable of this thesis, 'support for democracy', is only measured in one ESS-round, in 2012. This causes that other data sources

have to be consulted, because otherwise the statistical strength of the results might be doubtful. In this case, there would only be seven measurements per macro-variable which is too little.

3.3.2 World Values Survey

To complement the data of the ESS, the fifth (2005-2009) and sixth (2010-2014) wave of the WVS is used. This WVS is executed in waves of five years and includes, alike the ESS, a broad range of personal characteristics and social and political attitudes. The minimum of respondents per participating country is 1.200 (WVS, 2017). The sample is representative for the population of the country for all persons above 18 years. Although the respondent rates are not available for all included countries, because of less uniform documentation in WVS than in ESS, I found a non-response rate for Hungary in 2009, which is 36%. And a response rates for Poland in 2005, 56%. A response rate for Slovenia in 2012, which is 60%. And a response rate for Poland in 2012, which is 40.3%. It can be concluded that the response rates are far below the response rates in ESS and this might cause representation problems in the actual group of respondents.

There are several drawbacks for the WVS as well. First of all, the variables are not fully compatible with the variables of the ESS, which means that some variables of the WVS have to be recoded before they can be pooled with the ESS data. And in addition, some required independent variables are not at all present in the WVS which will unfortunately cause missing respondents in the results. And second, not all CEE countries that accessed to the EU in 2004 are present in the fifth and sixth WVS wave. Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia are missing in Wave 5 (2005-2009). And Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia are missing in Wave 6 (2010-2014).

3.4 Operationalization

In this section, first the dependent variable, support for democracy, will be operationalized. Second, the independent micro variables, and third the independent macro variables will be operationalized as well. Finally, the control variables will be discussed.

3.4.1 Dependent variable

The dependent variable in this thesis is *support for democracy*. This is measured in ESS with the variable ‘implvdm’ which is attached to the question: ‘How important is it to live in a democratically governed country?’ The respondent was able to answer on an 11 points scale, where 0 is ‘not at all important’ and 10 is ‘extremely important’. In the WVS, the variable is measured on a 10 points scale, with the same question. The names of the variables in Wave 5 and 6 are respectively ‘V162’ and ‘V140’. In order to have a compatible variable, with both ten possible values I recoded the ESS variable, which originally had 11 values. I merged the values 1 and 2, which both became value 2. The lowest possible value in ESS, 0, became 1. In this way both the ESS and WVS variables became compatible. *Support for democracy* is an ordinal variable, because there is a hierarchy between the values, but the steps are not equal. A higher value on this variable means that a respondent has more support for democracy. Alternatives to measure this variable would have been ‘satisfaction with how democracy works’, but this does not cover the support for democracy as an ideological set of values. However, if I would have chosen this variable, this would have been measured in all ESS rounds. Nonetheless, in my opinion it is more important to have a proper operationalization and choose to include other data sources in order to come to more statistical leverage.

3.4.2 Independent micro variables

The first independent micro variable is *satisfaction with the national government*. In ESS this is measured with the variable ‘stfgov’. For this variable respondents were asked: ‘How satisfied are you with the national government?’ Respondents had the opportunity to answer on an 11 points scale where 0 is ‘extremely dissatisfied’ and 10 is ‘extremely satisfied’. In the WVS however, there is a variable that measures the confidence in government. Because ‘satisfaction’ and ‘confidence’ are not the same I was not able to pool this data. If I would have been able to show that these variables correlate extremely, I would have been able to pool the data anyway, but this wasn’t the case. Because of these reasons, I did it with only the ESS-variable: satisfaction with the government. This is an ordinal variable, because there are eleven possible values, there is a hierarchy, but the distance between these values is not set. A higher value on this variable means more satisfaction with the national government.

The second independent micro variable is *unemployment*. In ESS this is measured with the variable ‘uempla’ which measures whether respondents were the last seven days unemployed and actively looking for a job. If this applies to the respondent, then the value is 1. If this does not apply for the respondent, the value is 0. An alternative for this variable in ESS would have been ‘uempli’, which measures unemployment the last seven days, but not actively looking for a job. However, because the theoretical expectation is that individuals who are looking for a job will have more problems with a tight labor market, I chose the first option. In WVS individual unemployment is measured with variable ‘V241’ in wave 5 and ‘V229’ in wave 6. In these questions, respondents are asked what their employment status is. For this variable, value 7 is relevant. This value represents the answer ‘unemployed’. Another option would be ‘housewife’, ‘retired/pension’ or ‘student’, but this is far from covering what is meant by unemployment. From these variables, a dummy variable is made, where value 7 is

recoded to value 1, and the other values to 0. In this way it can be pooled with ESS and a dichotomous nominal variable represents the unemployment of an individual with value 1 with respect to 0 as all the other options.

The third independent micro variable is *economic attitude towards immigration*. In ESS this variable is measured with variable 'imbgeco', measuring the statement 'immigration is bad or good for the country's economy'. Respondents were able to score this statement on an 11 points scale where 0 represents 'bad for the economy' and 10 represents 'good for the economy'. This is an interval-like ordinal variable because there are ten possible values, but the distance between these values is not specifically set. Unfortunately, also for this variable there was no matching option in the WVS. The most close by was a variable that measure the attitude of people whether they have the opinion that people from the own country have priority over immigrants when it comes to the labor market. However, the labor market is just a part, and does not cover the whole economy, as the variable in ESS does. A higher value on this variable means that an individual thinks that immigration is earlier better than worse for the economy.

The fourth independent micro variable is *cultural attitude towards immigration*. In ESS this variable is measured with the variable 'imueclt'. This variable measures the statement 'country's cultural life is undermined or enriched by immigrants'. Respondents were able to score this statement on an 11 points scale where 0 represents 'undermines' and 10 represents 'enriches'. This is an ordinal variable because there are eleven possible values, but the distance between these values is not specifically set. Also for the cultural component of attitudes towards immigration, no matching variable could be found in the fifth and sixth wave of the WVS datasets. A higher value on this variable means that the individual thinks that immigrants enriches the culture of a country more than it undermines it.

The fifth independent micro variable is *trust in the European Union*. This is measured in the ESS with the variable 'trstep', which represents the question how much trust an individual has in the European Parliament (EP). It measure it on an eleven points scale with 0 as 'no trust at all' and 10 representing 'complete trust'. This is an interval-like ordinal variable because there are eleven possible values, but the distance between these values is not specifically set. Although the EP does not cover the whole EU, in my opinion the attitude of an individual about the EU, and the trust an individual has in the EU can be measured with this variable. In addition, another variable to test trust in EU and its institutions is not available in ESS. In the WVS, there is a variable that measures the confidence in the EU. However, 'trust' and 'confidence' are not the same, which is why I choose, the same as variable 'satisfaction with government', not to pool ESS and WVS data on this variable. I only use the ESS data on this variable. This is an ordinal variable, because there are four possible values, there is a hierarchy, but the distance between these values is not set. A higher value on this variable represents more trust in the EU.

The sixth and final independent micro variable is *highest level of education*. In ESS, this is measured with the variable 'eisced'. The highest completed level of education is measured with an international standard called the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED), which is maintained by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The respondents are scored on an 8 points scale where 0 is not possible to harmonize with ISCED. 1 is less than lower secondary education. 2 is lower secondary. 3 is lower tier upper secondary education. 4 is upper tier upper secondary education. 5 is advanced vocational education. 6 is lower tertiary education, BA level. And finally 7 is higher tertiary education. This is an ordinal variable because there is a certain hierarchy, but the distances in this hierarchy is not quantifiable in equal steps.

In WVS, the highest attained level of education is measured with variables ‘V238’ in wave 5 and ‘V248’ in wave 6. Here it is measured on a 9 points scale. 1 is no formal education. 2 is incomplete primary school. 3 is complete primary school. 4 is incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type. 5 is complete secondary school: technical/vocational type. 6 is incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type. 7 is complete secondary: university-preparatory type. 8 is some university-level education, without degree. And 9 is university-level education with degree.

I recoded both the ESS and WVS variable in a compatible way, creating 4 dummies and a reference category. The first dummy is called ‘Primary education and no formal’, which takes together values 0 and 1 of ESS, and 1, 2 and 3 of WVS. The second dummy is called ‘Lower secondary education’ which takes together value 2 of ESS and value 4 and 5 of WVS. The third category is the reference category ‘Higher secondary education’, which takes together values 3 and 4 of ESS and values 6 and 7 of WVS. The third dummy is ‘Lower tertiary education’ which takes together values 5 and 6 of ESS and value 8 of WVS. The final dummy is called ‘Higher tertiary education’ which takes together value 7 of ESS and value 9 of WVS. The dummies are dichotomous variables, because a respondent can have a 0 or 1 at these dummy variables. In table 3.4, the old and new variables are brought together in an overview.

Table 3.4: Recoding of education dummies

New category/dummy	ESS	WVS
Primary and no formal	Not harmonizable with ISCED Less than lower secondary	No formal Incomplete primary education Complete primary education
Lower secondary education	Lower secondary education	Incomplete secondary t/v type Complete secondary t/v type
Higher secondary education (ref)	Lower tier upper secondary education Upper tier upper secondary education	Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type Complete secondary: university-preparatory type
Lower tertiary education	Advanced vocational	Some university-level

	education	education, without degree
	Lower tertiary education	
Higher tertiary education	Higher tertiary education	University-level education with degree

3.4.3 Independent macro variables

The first independent macro variable is *perceived corruption*. In this thesis, this is measured with the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from Transparency International (Transparency International). Since 1995, this institute shows the scores on perceived corruption in a worldwide range of countries. They do this on the basis of different numbers of surveys per country. This variable measures to what extent people perceive corruption to exist among public officials and politicians. Until 2012, the scores ranged from 0-10. However, since 2012 Transparency International uses a 100 points scale. In order to make a compatible dataset I will multiply these scores with 10. In the final dataset, the value 0 represents a highly perceived corrupt country, and the value 100 represents a very clean perceived country when it comes to corruption. This is an interval variable, because there is a hierarchical range, and to a certain extent there are equal steps. The higher the score, the lesser perceived corruption in this country.

The second independent macro variable is *difference in GDP*. The relevant data for this did I find on the website of the World Bank (World Bank). On this website the GDP per capita growth is shown per country in percentages. I choose to use the GDP per capita in order to make a fair comparison. A country with more citizens will of course be more likely to have a bigger GDP, which is why the actual GDP is divided by the number of the population. This is a ratio measurement level, because it is about a percentage of money with an absolute 0-point and equal steps. A positive value means growth of the GDP per capita. A negative value means a decrease of the GDP per capita.

The third independent macro variable is *unemployment*. The data is also coming from the World Bank (World Bank). This variable measures the percentage of unemployment of the total work force by all ages in the years and countries that are relevant for this thesis. The

World Bank measured this from 1990 until 2016, which is why it is a good resource. I choose to focus on the percentage of the total workforce, because this is the population that is able to work, and the percentage of this group represents what part of the population that has to work, is unemployed. It is a ratio variable, because it has an absolute null point and percentages have the same equal steps between the values. The higher the number, the more unemployment there is in this country.

The fifth independent macro variable is *immigration*. For this variable I use the crude net migration rate including statistical adjustments of Eurostat (Eurostat). This variable exists of the immigration numbers, subtracted with the emigration numbers with respect to the population of a country per 1000 citizens. The statistical adjustments mean that the natural population growth is taken into account and controlled for. It is a ratio variable, because it is a percentage and has an absolute null point. A value above null means that there was more immigration than emigration. And a number below null means that there was more emigration than immigration.

The sixth independent macro variable is *degree of democracy before accession*. To measure the degree of democracy before accession, the state of democracy in 1997 will be measured. This is eight years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, when there became an end to communism, and seven years before accession, the moment on which these states were democratic enough to access according to the EU. In order to measure democracy in 1997, I choose to combine six of the included variables of the Democracy Barometer in the ESS. These are variables in the field of individual liberties, the rule of law, the public sphere, transparency, participation and representation. In my opinion, these are the most important indicators to measure liberal democracy in a state. All these values are summed up and divided by six in order to get a new variable that I call *degree of democracy in 1997*. This variable has values ranging from 0 to 100 in which 100 is the most democratic state possible.

This is an interval variable, because there is hierarchy and to a certain extent equal steps. A higher value means a higher degree of democracy in 1997.

3.4.4 Control variables

In this thesis I include control variables in order to have a more accurate analysis of the influence of my variables of focus that are adopted in the hypotheses. Control variables have both an expected influence on the dependent variable, but also on the independent variables. The first control variable in this thesis is *gender*, which is measured in the ESS database with the variable 'gndr'. The possible values of this dichotomous nominal variable are 1 for male and 2 for female. The second control variable in this thesis is *age*, which is in ESS measured with the variable 'agea'. This is an interval variable, because it is hierarchical measured, with values that have to a certain extent the same distance to each other.

3.5 Research methods

In order to test the hypotheses an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis can be executed. With this analysis it is possible to show whether significant relations between independent and dependent variables are present and if so, what the direction and strength of these relations is. The goal of OLS is to gain parameters by estimating the least sum of squares in the distance between the empirical observations and a certain linear function. There are assumptions attached to OLS regressions that have to be met in order to have unbiased and reliable results. First, there should be linearity: The slope of the dependent variable (Y) should result from the independent variables (X) with a function per X and a random error. Second, the errors should be normally distributed. Third, the average of the errors should be 0 and independent from the X's. Fourth, the errors should not correlate with each other: The error of one case should not influence the error of another case.

Because the data in this thesis is about individuals living in countries, the data is nested. There is a micro-level, level 1, which is the level of the individual in this case. And there is a macro-level, level 2, which is the level of the countries in certain years. A consequence of estimating parameters with a one-level model would be intra-class correlation: The values on Y may correlate in countries because people live in the same countries in the same years. This may influence the outcomes on Y. In this way, the OLS assumption of uncorrelated errors would be violated. If I would not use a multilevel model, then the between-group and within-group variance would be mixed up. In a multilevel model it is possible to split these both variances. This is why in this thesis, a multilevel model will be executed in order to control for the multi-level structure of this data.

Chapter 4: Analysis

In this chapter, the hypotheses that resulted from the theoretical framework in chapter 2 will be tested with a multilevel regression analysis. First, I will give the descriptive information about the variables that will be used to test these hypotheses. Second, I will analyze the mean support for democracy per country over years with the available information. Third, I will present the results of the null models that justify a multilevel approach. Then, with multiple statistical models, the relationship between support for democracy and independent variables will be analyzed. First, the results on bivariate analyses will be presented. Fifth, the models with macro variables. Sixth, added with macro variables and seventh with cross-level interactions. At the end of this chapter I will discuss the results with an overview.

4.1 Descriptives

In table 4.1, I give a summary of the dependent and independent variables, including their statistical information. For all of the cases, I show the valid N, the minimum and maximum value, the mean and standard deviation. In case of dummy variables, instead of the mean I show the percentage and omit the standard deviation. As shown in table 4.1, in the dataset there are more women than man included. However, with 55.09% this difference is not problematic. The average age is 47.87, and the average support for democracy, the dependent variable in this thesis, is 8.15 on a 10 points scale. When it comes to the valid N, it strikes that there is a significant small number on the three variables that measure attitudes about immigration with numbers around 12500 valid respondents. Whilst all other variables have around 20000 respondents. This can be explained with the fact that there were no compatible immigration variables in the WVS which could be combined with the variables in the ESS.

Table 4.1: Descriptives of all independent and dependent variables

Variable	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean/ Percentage	Standard Deviation
Gender (dummy)	20119	0	1		
Men (ref)				44.91%	
Women				55.09%	
Age of respondent	20088	15	102	47.87	18.18
Support for democracy	19536	1	10	8.15	2.14
Satisfaction with government	12176	0	10	3.41	2.42
Micro unemployment (dummy)	20126	0	1		
Not unemployed (ref)				93.74%	
Unemployed				6.26%	
Attitude towards immigration: economy	12612	0	10	4.63	2.45
Attitude towards immigration: culture	12665	0	10	5.34	2.49
Trust in the European Union	11170	0	10	3.96	2.51
Highest level of education (dummy)	20126	0	1		
Primary and less				7.79%	
Lower secondary				25.95%	
Higher secondary (ref)				38.27%	
Lower tertiary				15.35%	
Higher tertiary				12.64%	
Corruption Perceptions Index	20126	34.00	68.00	56.66	8.36
Growth GDP per capita	20126	-6.42	7.92	1.74	3.34
Macro unemployment	20126	6.51	17.75	10.57	2.61
Crude rate of net migration	20126	-5.70	3.20	-0.66	2.35
Degree of democracy in 1997	20126	45.91	62.55	54.55	4.95

Source: ESS round 6 (2012-2013), WVS Wave 5 (2005-2009) and WVS wave 6 (2010-2014), Transparency International, World Bank and Eurostat.

4.2 Support for democracy

When focussing now on the dependent variable, support for democracy, unfortunately not all respondents in the dataset answered the question to what extent they are supportive for a democratic system. Only 19536 respondents of the in total 20126 have a valid value on this variable. Secondly, as shown in table 4.2 there is no data for every country on every year, which makes it difficult to conclude something about a trend over time per country. Nevertheless, something can be said over the overall average, which is 8.15. This is relatively high on a 10-points scale. This means that the support for democracy in the seven included countries from 2009-2013 is on average 8.15. One could conclude that this support is very high.

Table 4.2: Mean support for democracy per year per country


Country	2005	2009	2011	2012	2013
Czech Republic	X	X	X	X	7.94
Estonia	X	X	8.29	7.99	8.31
Hungary	X	8.69	X	8.51	8.52
Lithuania	X	X	X	X	7.51
Poland	8.70	X	X	8.35	9.15
Slovenia	7.91	X	8.11	8.16	X
Slovakia	X	X	X	8.01	7.94
Total per year	8.31	8.69	8.20	8.20	8.23

Source: ESS round 6 (2012-2013), WVS Wave 5 (2005-2009) and WVS wave 6 (2010-2014),

It is also possible to conclude something about the mean support for democracy per country from 2009 until 2013 because most countries are present in more than one year. Unfortunately this is not the case for Czech Republic and Lithuania, which only provide data in 2013. Interesting to mention however, is that these countries score the lowest in mean support for democracy, as also shown in figure 4.1. Czech Republic has a value of 7.94 on a

10 points scale. And Lithuania the lowest with 7.51. Poland and Hungary score the highest means over the years 2009-2013, respectively with 8.44 and 8.57.

Figure 4.2: Mean support for democracy per country in Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovenia and Slovakia from 2009-2013



Source: ESS round 6 (2012-2013), WVS Wave 5 (2005-2009) and WVS wave 6 (2010-2014),

4.3 Null models

My expectation is that the data is nested, because individuals answered the survey in the same years, in the same countries. This might cause intra-class correlation. If this is the case, a multilevel model will be required to test the hypotheses. For the one level null model the below showed formula is of relevance. There is an intercept, represented by the sign β_0j , which stands for the value on the intercept (β_0) in a certain year (j). And secondly, there is an error represented by the sign e_{ij} , which represents the error (e) of a certain individual (i) in a certain year (j). The whole one level formula looks like this:

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_0j + e_{ij}$$

This formula is about the level of individuals, which I will call level 1. However, when arguing that the data is nested, a level should be added. This is the level of the country-year combination, which I call level 2. Because of the multilevel structure, I assume that the

intercept, above represented by sign β_{0j} varies along different country-years. This is the reason that β_{0j} has to be further specified. This will result in the following specification:

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + u_{0j}$$

In this equation, γ_{00} represents the means of country-year means, also referred to as the “grand mean”. Now, this is the only fixed factor in the multilevel equation. u_{0j} represents the deviation of the country-year specific means from the “grand mean”. If these above showed equations are put together, then the following formula will represent the multilevel model which is going to be tested:

$$Y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + u_{0j} + e_{ij}$$

In order to find out whether it is necessary to use this multilevel model, a likelihood ratio test will be executed. This test shows whether a one-level model, like the first formula, in which the nested data structure will not be taken into account, or a multilevel model, the last showed formula, in which a multilevel structure is taken into account, will have a better fit. This multilevel model takes into account that respondents correlate in the same years, in the same countries. In order to do the likelihood ratio test, which tests which null model fits the data best, the -2 Log Likelihood (-2LL) values of both the one level model and the multilevel model will be taken into account. If the difference between these values is significant, then the model with the smallest value will have a better fit than the other model. This significance test will be executed with a chi-squared test.

The -2LL value of the single level model is 85109.107, and the -2LL value of the multilevel null model is 84714.291. The difference between these values is 394.82, and according to the chi squared test, this is statistical significant ($p < 0.01$). This means that one of the two models has a better fit than the other. And because the multilevel model has the smallest value, it is justified to use a multilevel model for this dataset. With this model there is

an intra-class correlation of individuals nested in country-years of 0.022, or 2.2%. Because of this intra-class correlation, a multilevel model will be used in this thesis.

4.4 Bivariate analysis

Before putting the independent variables together in different models, the relation between the relevant independent variables and the dependent variable will be analyzed. This will be done with a multilevel bivariate regression analysis. The results are adopted in table 4.4. All independent micro variables have the expected outcomes, and all these outcomes are significant with $p < 0.001$. This means that the chance that the estimated parameters are correct for this population is higher than 99.9%. In addition to the significance, all relations go in the expected direction. However, all expected macro variables show no significant effects in the bivariate analysis. This means that there is no correlation measured between the independent macro variables and the dependent variable: support for democracy. Because there is no significant result measured, the direction of these parameters is not relevant. Besides the macro variables, also the micro control variables, gender and age, show no significance. This means that in this sample there is no relation between these variables and the dependent variable. This is unexpected, because the control variables were chosen with the expectation that these variables would have both an effect on the dependent and independent variables. However, they will still be taken into account in the rest of the models because they still can control for the effects of the other micro and macro variables in the various models.

Table 4.4: Multilevel bivariate regression analysis of the independent micro, macro and control variables

Independent variable	B
Satisfaction with government	0.115*** (0.008)
Micro unemployment (dummy)	
Not unemployed	Reference
Unemployed	-0.437*** (0.063)
Attitude towards immigration: economy	0.084*** (0.008)
Attitude towards immigration: culture	0.103*** (0.008)
Trust in the European Union	0.170*** (0.008)
Highest level of education (dummy)	
Primary and less	-0.582*** (0.062)
Lower secondary	-0.341*** (0.036)
Higher secondary	Reference
Lower tertiary	0.350*** (0.043)
Higher tertiary	0.674*** (0.045)
Corruption Perceptions Index	-0.012 (0.009)
Growth GDP per capita	-0.034 (0.023)
Macro unemployment	0.027 (0.028)
Crude rate of net migration	0.061 (0.035)
Degree of democracy in 1997	0.019 (0.015)
Gender (dummy)	
Men	Reference
Women	0.020 (0.030)
Age of respondent	-0.000 (0.001)

*=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***= p<.001. Standard errors in parentheses.

Source: ESS round 6 (2012-2013), WVS Wave 5 (2005-2009) and WVS wave 6 (2010-2014), Transparency International, World Bank and Eurostat.

4.5 Micro-level hypotheses

In order to avoid multicollinearity, an extremely strong correlation between independent variables in models, I checked for the VIF-scores of all the variables that were going to be used. Multicollinearity might cause biased estimates and VIF-scores are able to detect multicollinearity. From a VIF-score of 10, there is severe multicollinearity. It appeared that the micro-variables didn't have any problematic VIF-scores. In a model with only the micro and control variables, the VIF-scores varied between 1.010 and 1.680. With all the macro variables added to the model, it appeared that four of the five macro variables had VIF-scores higher than 10, which is problematic. In order to solve this problem, no more than three macro variables at once were added to a model and for every model the VIF-scores were checked. In this way, the VIF-scores didn't come beyond 4, which is not problematic. In the highest case, Growth GDP per capita and the Crude rate of net migration had scores of respectively 3.739 and 3.357.

In building up the models, first the micro and control variables will be included. In this section, the micro-level models will be presented, which can be found in table 4.5. In the first model I only included the variables that were both present in the ESS and WVS model in order to not immediately lose thousands of respondents. This is why in the first model, only the micro unemployment dummy variable, the education dummies and the control variables are included. In the following models, the "ESS-variables" are added to the first simple model. These are the satisfaction with the national government, trust in the EU and both the immigration attitude variables. In order to see the effects apart from each other the immigration attitudes variables are added separately and in the fourth model they are both included. In the following paragraphs I will one by one discuss the results of the micro-level hypotheses.

According to models 2, 3 and 4 can be concluded that H3 is supported. H3 suggested that an individual that is more satisfied with the national government, will be more supportive for democracy. In all three models there is a positive relation between the satisfaction with the government and the support for democracy of respondents. The estimates vary from 0.038 until 0.040, which means that in the last case every higher unit on satisfaction with the government, an individual will be 0.040 more supportive for democracy on a 10-points scale. All results are significant at $p < 0.001$, which means that there is a 0.01% probability that the findings are based on chance.

From models 1 until 4 can also be concluded that the expected negative relation between unemployment and support for democracy is founded. This expectation, articulated in H4, is significant. However its significance decreases if more variables are added in the model. In model 1, the negative relation is significant at $p < 0.001$, but in models 2, 3 and 4 its significance decreases to $p < 0.05$. This means that the relation between unemployment and support for democracy is less sure if more possible causes are added to a model. However, the relation is still significant and the strength of the negative relation varies between -0.347 and -0.260. In the strongest, first case this means that a person that is unemployed is -0.347 supportive for democracy than a person that has a job or is in another way not unemployed.

Table 4.5: Multilevel regression analysis of support for democracy: independent micro and control variables with fixed effects

Model	1	2	3	4
	estimate	estimate	estimate	estimate
Fixed effects				
Intercept	8.127*** (0.108)	7.072*** (0.142)	6.909*** (0.140)	6.904*** (0.140)
Satisfaction with government		0.040*** (0.010)	0.037*** (0.010)	0.038*** (0.010)
Micro unemployment (dummy)				
Not unemployed	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Unemployed	-0.347*** (0.062)	-0.260** (0.097)	-0.286** (0.097)	-0.288** (0.099)
Attitude towards immigration: economy		0.039*** (0.010)		-0.001 (0.012)
Attitude towards immigration: culture			0.069*** (0.009)	0.071*** (0.012)
Trust in the European Union		0.141*** (0.010)	0.136*** (0.010)	0.134*** (0.010)
Highest level of education (dummy)				
Primary and no formal	-0.536*** (0.066)	-0.860*** (0.154)	-0.807*** (0.153)	-0.849*** (0.157)
Lower secondary	-0.209*** (0.041)	-0.307*** (0.062)	-0.309*** (0.061)	-0.307*** (0.063)
Higher secondary	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Lower tertiary	0.352*** (0.046)	0.287*** (0.061)	0.276*** (0.061)	0.275*** (0.062)
Higher tertiary	0.612*** (0.049)	0.621*** (0.074)	0.620*** (0.073)	0.617*** (0.074)
Gender (dummy)				
Men	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Women	-0.006 (0.030)	0.023 (0.044)	0.018 (0.044)	0.018 (0.045)
Age of respondent	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Random effects				
Country-year variance (2 nd level)	0.137	0.111	0.099	0.096
ICC (individuals in country-years)	0.030	0.023	0.021	0.021
Model summary				
-2LL	84087.148	41602.878	41721.927	40587.123
N country-year level	16	11	11	11
N individual level	19496	9541	9567	9307

*=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***= p<.001. Standard errors in parentheses.

Source: ESS round 6 (2012-2013), WVS Wave 5 (2005-2009) and WVS wave 6 (2010-2014).

H7 is the first hypothesis on the relation between attitudes towards immigration and support for democracy. This hypothesis suggests that there is a relation between how individuals judge the effect of immigration on the economy and their support for democracy. If an individual thinks that immigration is good for the economy, this individual will be more supportive for democracy, is the claim. In the second model, H7 is supported with the highest possible significance ($p < 0.001$). However, if the other attitude-towards-immigration is added, the significance disappears. This happens, even though these variables are not multicollinear, which would mean that there is an overlap between these two variables. When checking the VIF-scores for these variables in this model the variables respectively have a score of 1.673 for the economic variable and 1,639 for the cultural variable. This score is somewhat higher than the other variables, but not problematic. When analyzing the significant score in model 2 can be concluded that with every unit on a 10-points scale that an individual thinks immigration is better for the economy, the support for democracy of this individual increases with 0.039. However, because if the cultural component is added, this effect disappears I reject H7. In addition, model 4 in which is no significant relation found, has a better -2LL fit than model 2, which means that it explains more variance than model 4.

The other hypothesis about an attitude towards immigration is H10. This hypothesis suggests that an individual that thinks immigrants enrich the national culture will be more supportive for democracy. And vice-versa an individual that thinks that immigration undermines the national culture is less supportive for democracy. Both without and with the economic immigration variable included in the model, there is a significant result that supports this expectation. It is in both model 3 and 4 significant at $p < 0.001$. The strength of the positive relation varies between 0.069 and 0.071. This means that an individual that is one unit more positive about immigration as an enrichment for the culture of the country are 0.069 to 0.071 more supportive for democracy.

Hypothesis 12 is about the positive relation between trust in the EU and support for democracy. This expectation can be supported with estimates in level 2, 3 and 4. The positive relation is in all three models significant at $p < 0.001$. The strength of the relation is respectively 0.141, 0.136 and 0.134, which means in the latter case that an individual that has one unit more trust in the EU, will on average be 0.134 more supportive for democracy on a 10-points scale.

The last micro-hypothesis is H12, which suggests a positive relation between the highest level of education of an individual and his/her support for democracy. In all micro-models, 1 until 4, the education dummies are significant at $p < 0.001$ and point in the expected direction with respect to the reference-category: higher secondary education. For example in model 4, the final micro-model, individuals which only had primary education or no formal education are on average -0.849 less supportive for democracy than individuals that had higher secondary education. And, on the contrary, individuals that had higher tertiary education are on average 0.617 more supportive for democracy than an individual whose highest level of education was higher secondary.

4.6 Cross-level hypotheses

After concluding on the micro hypotheses, now the macro variables will be added to the model. First, I added the variables one by one and separately to all micro and control variables in models 5 until 9. These results can be found in table 4.6. After the separated models, I added the variables in groups of two or three in order to find whether in other combinations significant results could be found. The results of these models 10 until 14 can be found in table 4.7. In these models I first added the variables who had a significant result in the separated models 5-9 and after tried other combinations.

Table 4.6: Multilevel regression analysis of support for democracy: independent micro, macro and control variables with fixed effects

Model	5	6	7	8	9
	estimate	estimate	estimate	estimate	estimate
Fixed effects					
Intercept	7.610*** (0.723)	7.008*** (0.122)	7.156*** (0.519)	6.963*** (0.100)	5.394*** (0.956)
Satisfaction with government	0.038*** (0.010)	0.039*** (0.010)	0.038*** (0.010)	0.036*** (0.010)	0.039*** (0.010)
Micro unemployment (dummy)					
Not unemployed	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Unemployed	-0.288** (0.099)	-0.288** (0.099)	-0.288** (0.099)	-0.287** (0.099)	-0.289** (0.099)
Attitude towards immigration: economy	-0.001 (0.012)	-0.001 (0.012)	-0.001 (0.012)	0.000 (0.012)	-0.001 (0.012)
Attitude towards immigration: culture	0.071*** (0.012)	0.071*** (0.012)	0.071*** (0.012)	0.073*** (0.012)	0.070*** (0.012)
Trust in the European Union	0.135*** (0.010)	0.134*** (0.010)	0.134*** (0.010)	0.136*** (0.010)	0.134*** (0.010)
Highest level of education (dummy)					
Primary and no formal	-0.846*** (0.157)	-0.845*** (0.157)	-0.849*** (0.157)	-0.814*** (0.157)	-0.854*** (0.157)
Lower secondary	-0.305*** (0.063)	-0.303*** (0.063)	-0.308*** (0.063)	-0.286*** (0.062)	-0.310*** (0.063)
Higher secondary	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Lower tertiary	0.277*** (0.062)	0.275*** (0.062)	0.274*** (0.062)	0.297*** (0.062)	0.272*** (0.062)
Higher tertiary	0.617*** (0.074)	0.623*** (0.074)	0.616*** (0.074)	0.620*** (0.074)	0.618*** (0.074)
Gender (dummy)					
Men	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Women	0.018 (0.045)	0.019 (0.045)	0.019 (0.045)	0.015 (0.045)	0.020 (0.045)
Age of respondent	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Corruption Perceptions Index	-0.012 (0.012)				
Growth GDP per capita		-0.102** (0.029)			
Macro unemployment			-0.024 (0.047)		
Crude rate of net migration				0.143*** (0.015)	
Degree of democracy in 1997					0.028 (0.018)
Random effects					
Country-year variance (2 nd level)	0.083	0.037	0.094	0.004	0.076
ICC (individuals within country-years)	0.017	0.008	0.020	0.001	0.017
Model summary					
-2LL	40586.217	40579.701	40586.870	40567.219	40584.826
N country-year level	11	11	11	11	11
N individual level	9307	9307	9307	9307	9307

*=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***= p<.001. Standard errors in parentheses.

Source: ESS round 6 (2012-2013), WVS Wave 5 (2005-2009) and WVS wave 6 (2010-2014), Transparency International, World Bank and Eurostat.

H1 suggests a relation between the perceived corruption in a country, articulated in the Corruptions Perceptions Index (CPI), and the support for democracy. The expectation is that the higher the score is on CPI, which would mean less perceptions of corruption, the more support for democracy in a country. In the separate model, model 5, there is no significant relation found. And in the other models where CPI was included, model 11, 12 and 14 there were two significant estimates found at $p < 0.01$, respectively in model 11 and 14. However, these results showed a negative relation of the CPI with support for democracy. Respectively -0.037 in model 11 and -0.036 in model 14. This would mean that in a country with one unit less corrupt perceptions, on average an individual is -0.036 or -0.037 less supportive for democracy. This is the contrary of the expected direction and this is why H1 has to be rejected.

The second cross-level hypothesis is H2, which suggests that there is a positive relation between the growth of GDP per capita and the support for democracy of an individual living in this country. There is a significant relation found in the separate model 6 in which this variable is added to the micro and control variables. This relation is significant at $p < 0.01$, however the relation is in the contrary direction than the expected effect. In model 6, a result is found of -0.102. This means that, according to this result, a unit more growth of the GDP per capita, causes on average -0.102 less support for democracy of an individual on a 10-points scale. However, in one of the other models with combinations of macro-variables, a positive significant relation is found in model 12, where growth of GDP per capita is added together with CPI. This result is significant at $p < 0.05$ and gives a parameter of 0.098. This would mean that one unit more growth of GDP per capita would mean on average 0.098 more individual support for democracy in this country. Because there is one result that supports the hypotheses, and one that supports the contrary, this H2 is rejected.

H5 suggests that more unemployment in a country leads to less support for democracy of the individuals living in this country. Both in the separated, as well as the combined models with more than one macro variables, no significant relation between macro unemployment and individual support for democracy can be found. This is why H5 has to be rejected.

The fourth cross-level hypothesis is H8, which suggests that more immigration in a country leads to less support for democracy by the individuals living in this country. In all macro-models where this variable was included, a significant relation was found. However, all these significant results point in the other direction than was expected. This means that a positive relation is found between immigration and support for democracy. In other words, the more immigrants a country receives, the more support for democracy there is in this country. The results vary from 0.143 in the restricted model to 0.131 in one of the combined models, which means that every unit more migration leads in the strongest case to 0.143 more support for democracy. Because the significant relation is in the other way than was expected, H8 has to be rejected.

The final macro hypothesis, H14, suggests that the more democratic a country was in 1997, the more supportive for democracy its citizens will be when they respond between 2005 and 2013. In the separated model where the degree of democracy in 1997 was adopted, model 9, there is no significant relation. However, in the combined models where this variable is included with other macro variables, in model 11 and 14, there actually is a significant relation at $p < 0.01$. This means that this relation is for 99% certainty not based on chance. In addition, the significant relation points in the expected direction. This relation varies between 0.057 in model 11 and 0.055 in model 14. This means in the strongest case, that every higher degree of democracy in 1997 in a country, on average the citizens in this country are 0.057 more supportive for democracy on a 10-points scale. However this relation is not very strong, it can be concluded that there is a significant relation with controlling for other macro

variables. In addition, these latter models, 11 and 14, with more included macro variables have a better -2LL fit than model 9 where no significant result is. This is why H14 can be adopted.

4.7 Cross-level interactions

After the analysis of the relation between macro variables and support for democracy, the final step is to analyze the expected interactions to the models, articulated in H6, H9 and H11. In order to do this, I first did three simple multilevel regressions with only the two relevant variables and the interactions. The summary of these results can be found in table 4.7 and the full model can be found in Appendix 4. After these simple models, the interactions were tested in models with all the other micro and control variables. The summary of these results can be found in table 4.8 and the full model is included in Appendix 5.

Table 4.7: Summary of results of simple cross-level interaction model (full model can be found in Appendix 4)

Hypothesis	Variable	B
H6	Intercept	7.980***
	Micro unemployment	-0.879**
	Macro unemployment	0.023
	Interaction	0.041
H9	Intercept	7.714***
	Attitude towards immigration: economy	0.096**
	Crude rate of net migration	0.101
	Interaction	0.002
H11	Intercept	7.575***
	Attitude towards immigration: culture	0.108**
	Crude rate of net migration	0.060
	Interaction	0.007

*=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***= p<.001.

Source: ESS round 6 (2012-2013), WVS Wave 5 (2005-2009) and WVS wave 6 (2010-2014), Transparency International, World Bank and Eurostat.

Table 4.8: Summary of results of cross-level interaction model with other micro-variables (full model can be found in Appendix 5)

Hypothesis	Variable	B
H6	Intercept	7.178*
	Micro unemployment	-0.242
	Macro unemployment	-0.025
	Interaction	-0.004
H9	Intercept	7.062***
	Attitude towards immigration: economy	0.056
	Crude rate of net migration	0.141
	Interaction	0.001
H11	Intercept	6.915***
	Attitude towards immigration: culture	0.082**
	Crude rate of net migration	0.102
	Interaction	0.008

*=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***= p<.001.

Source: ESS round 6 (2012-2013), WVS Wave 5 (2005-2009) and WVS wave 6 (2010-2014), Transparency International, World Bank and Eurostat.

H6 expected that the macro unemployment of a country strengthens the negative relation between the unemployment of a person and his/her support for democracy. Although, I already concluded that there is a significant negative relation between unemployment of an individual and his/her support for democracy, a significant relation between macro unemployment and support for democracy was not found. The latter conclusion is also supported by both the simple and more complex interaction model. In addition, there is also no significant interaction effect found that supports the claim that macro unemployment in a country strengthens the relation between micro unemployment and support for democracy and this is why this first interaction hypothesis, H6, has to be rejected.

The second interaction hypothesis, H9, suggests that a higher crude rate of net migration strengthens the effect of an individual's attitude towards immigration regarding the economy and his/her support for democracy. I already rejected the micro-hypothesis that suggested that this attitude towards immigration regarding economy is significant, because this effect disappears when the attitude towards immigration regarding culture is included in the model. In addition, I found out that the effect of crude rate net migration on support for democracy had a significant in the other direction than was expected. And also in the interaction models, both the simple and the model with the other micro variables, there is no significant result found for the strengthening of the relation between the independent micro and dependent variable by a higher crude rate of net migration. This is why H9 has to be rejected.

H10 suggested that the crude rate of net migration strengthens the relation between the attitude regarding to the national culture when it comes to migration and his/her support for democracy. For this micro-hypothesis a significant relation was found in the expected direction. However, also for this final interaction hypothesis, no significant relation was found and also H10 has to be rejected accordingly.

4.8 Summary and discussion of the results

Table 4.9: Overview of the result on all hypotheses

Theory	#	Independent variable	Level ind. variable	Expected effect	Result
Gov. Perf.	1	Perception of corruption	Macro	Positive	Rejected
Gov. Perf.	2	Change in GDP	Macro	Positive	Rejected
Gov. Perf.	3	Satisfaction with government	Micro	Positive	Adopted
Globalization	4	Unemployment individual	Micro	Negative	Adopted
Globalization	5	Unemployment in country	Macro	Negative	Rejected
Globalization	6	Macro unemployment via micro	Macro (interaction)	Strengthening positive	Rejected
Globalization	7	Attitude towards immigration: economy	Micro	Positive	Rejected
Globalization	8	Immigration	Macro	Negative	Rejected
Globalization	9	Immigration via attitude towards immigration: economy	Macro (interaction)	Strengthening positive	Rejected
Globalization	10	Attitude towards immigration: culture	Micro	Positive	Adopted
Globalization	11	Immigration via attitude towards immigration: culture	Macro (interaction)	Strengthening positive	Rejected
Globalization	12	Trust in the European Union	Micro	Positive	Adopted
Socialization	13	Education of individual	Micro	Positive	Adopted
Socialization	14	Democracy in 1997	Macro	Positive	Adopted

In table 4.9, an overview is given of the results on the 14 hypotheses that resulted from the theoretical framework. Almost all expected micro-hypotheses are adopted, except for H7, which suggested that there is a positive relation between the attitude towards immigration regarding economy and support for democracy. On the other side, almost all macro-hypotheses are rejected, except for the hypothesis that suggested that the degree of democracy in 1997 influences the support for democracy of an individual after accession to the EU. Finally, all three interaction-hypotheses were rejected, because there were no significant results that supported their expectations.

With regard to the theoretical roots of the hypothesis can be stated that two of the three hypotheses of the Government Performance Theory are rejected. However, these two of the three hypotheses were macro variable and since most of the macro-hypotheses of this thesis are rejected, it is questionable whether this theory would have been of more value when more micro-hypotheses were added, for example micro-variables that were able to test whether individuals see their country or government as corrupt and to what extent this micro variable had a significant relation with support for democracy. The same goes for change in GDP. Maybe there could have been found a significant result is the household income of an individual was added. However, it can be concluded that more satisfaction with the government, which is in all of the seven countries a democratic government, leads to more support for democracy as a system. The expectation that a perceived well-functioning government has a positive influence on the support for the system this government is working in can be supported.

The results for the Globalization Theory give a mixed impression. Six of the nine hypotheses are rejected, however this included the three interaction variables and two macro variables which are almost not significant at all in this thesis. However, also one micro hypothesis, the attitude towards immigration regarding economy is rejected. On the other hand, the variables that are actually supported: Unemployment of an individual, attitude towards immigration regarding culture and trust in the EU, are adopted and show strong and stable relations. This would mean that the Globalization Theory gave fruitful insights to explain support for democracy on the micro-level. That a person that is unemployed is less supportive for democracy, a person that sees immigration as a threat to the country's culture is less supportive for the system of democracy and that a person with more trust in the EU is more supportive for the system of democracy. For cross-level relations however Globalization Theory is whether not a good predictor, or more macro observations are required in order to

find significant conclusions. One macro-hypothesis brought a significant conclusion in an unexpected direction: Individuals in a country with higher immigration numbers are more supportive for democracy. The expectation in Globalization Theory was that individuals will be less supportive for democracy if more immigrants are coming to a certain country. A possible explanation of the reversed effect is that a country with individuals that are more supportive for democracy, will also have more liberal ideas and will be more open to immigrants.

Socialization Theory was the third theory that brought up hypotheses that could explain the support for democracy of individuals. The first hypothesis was that the degree of education of an individual explains whether this individual is supportive for democracy. The multilevel regression analyses resulted in an adoption of this expectation. An individual that is lower educated is less supportive for democracy and an individual that is higher educated is more supportive. Socialization Theory also gave a macro-hypothesis that expected that the longer and more a country is democratic, the more supportive for democracy the people are that are living in that country. Also this hypothesis was adopted: An individual that lives in a country that had a higher degree democracy in 1997, will be more supportive for democracy at the moment of the survey between 2005 and 2013. In short, can be concluded that Socialization Theory brought op fruitful expectations to explain support for democracy.

In the conclusion, the above mentioned and discussed results will be linked to accession to the EU in order to answer the explaining question of this thesis: To what extent the accession to the European Union does explain support for democracy in countries that accessed the EU in 2004.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

In this conclusion, I will answer the research questions I formulated in the introduction in chapter 1. One of these questions had a descriptive character, the other question had an explaining character. The first research question of this thesis is:

How did support for democracy evolve between 2005 and 2013 in countries that accessed to the European Union in 2004?

In the analysis of the support for democracy data on the seven countries that were included in this thesis it appeared that the mean support for democracy is relatively high with taken into account the questionable “democratic” developments in some of these states in the past years. All countries have a mean value, separately and together, on support for democracy that can be seen as “very important”, which is surprisingly in the light of the popularity of political parties with undemocratic ideas in the field of freedom of expression, freedom of press, the separation of powers and the rule of law. However, it has to be argued that most of these undemocratic events, for example in Hungary and Poland, took place after 2013, in which the last measurements of this thesis took place. And in addition, it can be questioned to what extent individuals that value democracy, have the same perception of liberal democracy which is more than only free and fair elections, but also rule of law, separation of powers, freedom of press and expression, and so on. The question is whether they see the antidemocratic actions of the Polish and Hungarian government as antidemocratic. Nevertheless, it is surprising that Poland and Hungary have the highest scores on support for democracy in this thesis.

Unfortunately, it is not possible to make hard statements about the trends in the support for democracy in the seven relevant countries, because the observation per year vary between one of the seven countries in 2009, to six of the seven in 2013, which would lead to

unequal comparisons over time. However, the most observations were done in 2012 and 2013, which makes it possible to analyze those two and see a light increase in support for democracy. However, in some of the countries in 2013 were just a few respondents, which means that this result might be biased as well.

The second research question in this thesis is:

To what extent can accession to the European Union influence the support for democracy in states that accessed to the EU in 2004?

The aim of this thesis is to find on what aspects the EU could have its influence on support for democracy in states that access. In answering the question what the EU could do to achieve this, I will follow the theoretical perspectives, attached to the overarching theoretical perspective on democratization: Modernization Theory. The attached theories are the Government Performance Theory, the Globalization Theory and the Socialization Theory.

According to Government Performance Theory, the performance of a national government influences the support for democracy of an individual living in the country this government is acting in. The theory explains that if a government performs well in a democratic system, individuals will be supportive for this system. According to the results, presented in chapter 4, the satisfaction with the national government has a positive influence on support for democracy. The role of the EU in this satisfaction might be that the EU enables governments to expand their bureaucratic networks in order to work more effectively (Mattli & Plümper, 2002). But also the capital inflow attached to EU accession can be something that makes the satisfaction with government higher, because as a consequence of the policy of a government the GDP grows. However, for this last expectation no results are found in chapter 4. Another role the EU could play is to ban corruption in young member states and in this way

gain the support for democracy of citizens because they can trust their government and civil servants. However, also for this corruption statement, no significant result is found.

Globalization Theory, designed by Kriesi (2012), assumes that individuals that benefit from globalization, the 'globalization winners' will be more supportive to an open democratic society, whilst individuals that experience disadvantages of globalization, the 'globalization losers' will be less supportive. The role of the EU is that accession to the Union so to say is institutionalizing of globalization. It opens borders to trade, labour and enterprising. This might even widening the gap between the winners and losers of globalization. For example, unemployed people, as shown in chapter 4, are less supportive for democracy and this might be the consequence of their perception that the open system of democracy does not work for them. In addition, people that are supportive for the EU, are on average also more supportive for democracy. Also with regards to immigration, the expectation is embodied by the results: Individuals that see immigration as undermining of the national culture, are less supportive for democracy. However, people that think that immigration is bad for the economy aren't necessarily less positive about democracy. The cultural component obviously plays a bigger role. This means that besides economic disadvantages for globalization losers, foremost cultural fears of losing the own identity as a consequence of globalization is of importance.

Country-specific characters, like unemployment on the national scale, didn't show to be of influence in the support for democracy in this thesis. Immigration on the national scale, however, happened to have a positive relation with support for democracy. This was against the expectation of the theory. This means that a country with more immigrants in a year has on average more supportive individuals for democracy in that year. This might be a consequence of a more liberal state, with more liberal individuals living in it, with a democratically developed policy that is more open to immigrants. In addition, it might be a consequence of the type of economy of a country, that needs more immigrants in order to

fulfil jobs (Hampshire, 2013), and individuals in it knowing that these immigrants are needed for more wealth. In short, I argue that accession to the EU might widens the gap between globalization winners and losers in their support for democracy. The losers might lose even more support for democracy, while the winners will be even more enthusiastic about a democratic system.

The Socialization Theory underlines that the environment an individual lives in, determines his/her values on for example democracy. The theory states in addition that the longer a country is democratic, the more democratic the tradition of a country is, and accordingly, the more supportive an individual will be for democracy. In this thesis it appeared that the more democratic a country was in 1997, seven years before accession, the more democratic individuals were on average between 2005 and 2013. This is a determinant which the EU doesn't have that much influence on, because this was far before the accession to the EU. However, I argue that the procedure for becoming member of the EU was already started, whether formally or informally. This could influence the degree of democracy of these states in 1997, because these states have to meet democratic criteria in order to access. In this way, it can be argued that accession to the EU could also have a "carrot-and-stick" function in the degree of democracy of countries. Degree of democracy in a country in 1997 can in this way be on the record of the European Union, and the socialization of citizens in this countries into democracy as well.

An important instrument to socialize individuals into democratic values is education. The better the education and the higher the mean education level of individuals, the more supportive these individuals will be for democracy. Because, the higher the level of education, the more attention there is for active democratic values, like participation and being able to form an own critical opinion, instead of only passive democratic values, like voting. In this thesis, the result is that indeed higher educated individuals are on average more supportive for

democracy than lower educated individuals. This might besides being a matter of values also have other reasons. For example, a lower educated individual might be more often unemployed, or live in communities where democracy is less valued. This is also where the Socialization and Globalization meet when it comes to globalization ‘losers’, who are often less educated than the ‘winners’. Anyhow, the EU can play a role in the improvement of education, but also to raise the mean level of education of individuals, by bureaucratic exchange, like also elaborated in this conclusion at the GPT paragraph. But the EU also plays a role in student exchanges in which students get socialized with other European students with liberal and democratic values.

The overall conclusion is that the EU can influence mechanisms that make individuals more or less supportive for democracy. It is able to improve government performance and work as a “carrot-and-stick” in order to get states in the democratic direction, and accordingly socialize its citizens into democracy. There is a certain path dependence, if a country is and its citizens are democratic there is only the way up, which is sustainable. However, according to globalization theory, EU-accession can also widen the gap between democracy fans and critics. And this can be a reason for some of these countries to backslide on the democratic scale, because of Euroscepticism, populism and nationalism. The latter because in my results is found, that foremost the cultural fear, more than the economic dimension, plays a role in determining people’s attitude towards democracy. This is a threat to support for democracy and the question is what this division between two groups will do for sustainable democracy. In the next chapter these conclusions will be put into perspective.

Chapter 6: Discussion

In this discussion I will put my conclusions, from the previous chapter, into perspective. At the same time I will elaborate on the limitations of my research and I will give some opportunities for future research.

In the conclusion I stated that the widening effect of EU-accession might cause the backsliding on the democratic scale of for example Hungary and Poland. This is quite a bold statement and should be funded with future research. My expectation is that, the widening gap between globalization winners and losers might lead to more Euroscepticism, more populism and more nationalism because individuals that feel threatened from outside have the tendency to move towards a closed attitude. In this research is found that there is an important role for cultural motivations: Being afraid of losing the own culture as an effect of immigration and accordingly having less support for the open character of democracy which causes more immigration. This leads to votes for political parties that articulate this attitudes and power for this parties might lead to backsliding on the democratic scale.

The conclusions stated in chapter 5 are evidently based on the available data that I used in this thesis. However, the data that could be used had two major limitations. First, because only seven states were used, the macro observations of these countries varied between 7 and 16 which is a small number in order to get significant results. However, in two of the five macro hypotheses, a significant result was found. Second, because in the ESS data, the dependent variable was only measured in one round, I had to pool the data with WVS data. However, because most other WVS variables than the dependent variable were not compatible, a lot of respondents fell away after measuring the first model, when variables were added to the model that were only measured in ESS, which makes all other estimates far less strong.

A recommendation from my side would be to uniformise the variables in datasets that measure more or less the same. In this way, datasets could be more easily pooled, and consequently better estimations could be made. An example is that ESS measures 'satisfaction' with government and 'trust' in the EU, where WVS measures confidence in the government and the EU. This is why the data on these two variables could not be pooled in this thesis, which is also a reason why after the first model a lot of respondents were lost.

Another limitation of this thesis was that I can only conclude on what aspects EU-accession could have an influence, but what effect is actually to dedicate to the role of the EU is questionable. This is why, in future research, a case study to one or more of the included cases may be of value in order to see whether for example certain reforms in countries are an actual consequence of EU-accession. For example, the possible reforms in the education sector, measures against corruption or the inflow of more immigrants and the role the EU played in these events can better be judged with a case study.

A next suggestion for future research in a quantitative way is to include more countries. I made the choice to focus on countries that accessed on the same moment to the EU, because in my opinion this would lead to the most equal comparison. However, this caused data availability issues, as I explained in a previous paragraph in this chapter. This is why I would advise a next researcher to include other countries that accessed to the EU on other, later or earlier moments in order to have better estimates. For example Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995, Bulgaria and Romania in 2007.

The final opportunity for future research that I would like to mention is to dig deeper in the history of the countries of relevance. According to the Socialization Theory, the longer and the richer the democratic tradition, the more support for democracy the citizens of this country will be. I only took into account the degree of democracy in 1997, seven years before accession. But to take into account the longer democratic history of states, my suggestion

would be to analyse the degree of democracy of the Soviet regime of a country, which varies per country. Or even dig deeper, in the degree of democracy in a country before World War 2. Because stable support for democracy is not something trendy, but may have its roots over hundred years of history.

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Appendix 1: Number of respondents per year, per country

Year	Czech Republic	Estonia	Hungary	Lithuania	Poland	Slovenia	Slovakia
2005 (WVS, W5)					1.000	1.037	
2009 (WVS, W5)			1.007				
2011 (WVS, W6)		1.533				1.069	
2012 (ESS, R6) (WVS, W6)		2.279	1.895		2.851	1.257	1.415
2013 (ESS, R6) (WVS, W6)	2.009	101	119	2.109	13		432

Source: ESS round 6 (2012-2013), WVS Wave 5 (2005-2009) and WVS wave 6 (2010-2014).

Appendix 2: Country-year scores on independent macro variables

Corruptions Perception Index

	2005	2009	2011	2012	2013
Czech Republic					48
Estonia			64	64	68
Hungary		51		55	64
Lithuania					67
Poland	34			58	60
Slovenia	61		59	61	
Slovakia				46	47

Source: Transparency International

Growth GDP per capita

	2005	2009	2011	2012	2013
Czech Republic					0.517
Estonia			7.924	4.681	1.777
Hungary		-6.419		-1.093	2.399
Lithuania					4.560
Poland	3.539			1.607	1.452
Slovenia	3.823		0.441	-2.894	
Slovakia				1.484	1.382

Source: World Bank

Macro unemployment

	2005	2009	2011	2012	2013
Czech Republic					6.95
Estonia			12.33	10.02	8.63
Hungary		10.03		11.00	10.18
Lithuania					11.77
Poland	17.75			10.09	10.33
Slovenia	6.51		8.17	8.84	
Slovakia				13.96	14.22

Source: World Bank

Crude rate of net migration

	2005	2009	2011	2012	2013
Czech Republic					-0.1
Estonia			-2.9	-2.8	-2.0
Hungary		1.7		1.6	0.6
Lithuania					-5.7
Poland	-0.3			-0.1	-0.7
Slovenia	3.2		1.0	0.3	
Slovakia				0.6	0.4

Source: Eurostat

Degree of democracy in 1997

	1997
Czech Republic	49.89
Estonia	51.75
Hungary	58.66
Lithuania	52.09
Poland	55.12
Slovenia	62.55
Slovakia	45.91

Source: European Social Survey, round 6 (2012)

Appendix 3: Multilevel regression with different combinations of macro variables

Multilevel regression analysis of support for democracy: independent micro, macro and control variables with fixed effects

Model	10 estimate	11 estimate	12 estimate	13 estimate	14 estimate
Fixed effects					
Intercept	6.967*** (0.780)	5.786*** (0.337)	7.154*** (0.402)	7.083*** (0.781)	6.015*** (0.537)
Satisfaction with government	0.037*** (0.010)	0.039*** (0.010)	0.039*** (0.010)	0.037*** (0.010)	0.039*** (0.010)
Micro unemployment (dummy)					
Not unemployed	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Unemployed	-0.287** (0.099)	-0.289** (0.099)	-0.288** (0.099)	-0.286** (0.099)	-0.288** (0.099)
Attitude towards immigration: economy	0.000 (0.012)	-0.002 (0.012)	-0.001 (0.012)	0.000 (0.012)	-0.001 (0.012)
Attitude towards immigration: culture	0.073*** (0.012)	0.072*** (0.012)	0.072*** (0.012)	0.073*** (0.011)	0.072*** (0.012)
Highest level of education (dummy)	0.136*** (0.010)	0.135*** (0.010)	0.135*** (0.010)	0.136*** (0.010)	0.135*** (0.010)
Highest level of education (dummy)					
Primary and no formal	-0.814*** (0.157)	-0.850*** (0.157)	-0.843*** (0.157)	-0.814*** (0.157)	-0.849*** (0.157)
Lower secondary	-0.285*** (0.062)	-0.303*** (0.063)	-0.303*** (0.063)	-0.288*** (0.062)	-0.304*** (0.063)
Higher secondary	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Lower tertiary	0.295*** (0.062)	0.277*** (0.062)	0.276*** (0.062)	0.293*** (0.062)	0.277*** (0.062)
Higher tertiary	0.623*** (0.074)	0.628*** (0.074)	0.623*** (0.074)	0.622*** (0.074)	0.627*** (0.074)
Gender (dummy)					
Men	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Women	0.016 (0.045)	0.019 (0.045)	0.018 (0.045)	0.017 (0.045)	0.019 (0.045)
Age of respondent	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Corruption Perceptions Index		-0.037** (0.007)	-0.003 (0.010)		-0.036** (0.008)
Growth GDP per capita	-0.014 (0.021)		0.098* (-0.031)	-0.006 (0.001)	
Macro unemployment		0.011 (0.025)		-0.011 (0.018)	
Crude rate of net migration	0.131*** (0.023)			0.137** (0.025)	
Degree of democracy in 1997		0.057** (0.012)			0.055** (0.011)
Random effects					
Country-year variance (2 nd level)	0.004	0.016	0.036	0.005	0.017
ICC (individuals within country-years)	0.001	0.004	0.007	0.001	0.004
Model summary					
-2LL	40566.787	40575.664	40579.627	40566.381	40575.852
N country-year level	11	11	11	11	11
N individual level	9307	9307	9307	9307	9307

*=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***= p<.001. Standard errors in parentheses.

Source: ESS round 6 (2012-2013), WVS Wave 5 (2005-2009) and WVS wave 6 (2010-2014), Transparency International, World Bank and Eurostat.

Appendix 4: Multilevel regression with simple cross-level interaction

Multilevel regression analysis of support for democracy: simple cross-level interactions without micro and control variables

Model	15 estimate	16 estimate	17 estimate
Fixed effects			
Intercept	7.980*** (0.347)	7.714*** (0.139)	7.575*** (0.141)
Micro unemployment (dummy)			
Not unemployed	Reference		
Unemployed	-0.879** (0.296)		
Attitude towards immigration: economy		0.096** (0.026)	
Attitude towards immigration: culture			0.108** (0.020)
Macro unemployment	0.023 (0.031)		
Crude rate of net migration		0.101 (0.061)	0.060 (0.061)
Micro unemployment*Macro unemployment	0.041 (0.027)		
Attitude towards immigration: economy*Crude rate of net migration		0.002 (0.011)	
Attitude towards immigration: culture*Crude rate of net migration			0.007 (0.008)
Random effects			
Country-year variance (2 nd level)	0.115	0.137	0.133
ICC (individuals within country-years)	0.025	0.028	0.028
Slope variance unemployment effect	0.027		
Slope variance immigration: economy effect		0.005	
Slope variance immigration: culture effect			0.002
Model summary			
-2LL	84656.252	53911.681	54063.139
N country-year level	16	11	11
N individual level	19536	12333	9307

*=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***= p<.001. Standard errors in parentheses.

Source: ESS round 6 (2012-2013), WVS Wave 5 (2005-2009) and WVS wave 6 (2010-2014), Transparency International, World Bank and Eurostat.

Appendix 5: Multilevel regression with cross-level interaction in full models

Multilevel regression analysis of support for democracy: cross-level interactions with micro and control variable

Model	18 estimate	19 estimate	20 estimate
Fixed effects			
Intercept	7.178* (0.627)	7.062*** (0.153)	6.915*** (0.151)
Satisfaction with government	0.038*** (0.010)	0.040*** (0.010)	0.035** (0.010)
Micro unemployment (dummy)			
Not unemployed	Reference	Reference	Reference
Unemployed	-0.242 (0.561)	-0.264** (0.097)	-0.286** (0.097)
Attitude towards immigration: economy	-0.001 (0.012)	0.056 (0.026)	
Attitude towards immigration: culture	0.070*** (0.012)		0.082** (0.021)
Trust in the European Union	0.134*** (0.010)	0.142*** (0.010)	0.138*** (0.010)
Highest level of education (dummy)			
Primary and no formal	-0.849*** (0.158)	-0.840*** (0.153)	-0.776*** (0.153)
Lower secondary	-0.310*** (0.062)	-0.289*** (0.061)	-0.284*** (0.061)
Higher secondary	Reference	Reference	Reference
Lower tertiary	0.276*** (0.062)	0.298*** (0.061)	0.299*** (0.060)
Higher tertiary	0.616*** (0.074)	0.625*** (0.073)	0.620*** (0.072)
Gender (dummy)			
Men	Reference	Reference	Reference
Women	0.020 (0.045)	0.019 (0.045)	0.016 (0.044)
Age of respondent	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Macro unemployment	-0.025 (0.057)		
Crude rate of net migration		0.141 (0.058)	0.102 (0.055)
Micro unemployment*Macro unemployment	-0.004 (0.052)		
Attitude towards immigration: economy*Crude rate of net migration		0.001 (0.011)	
Attitude towards immigration: culture*Crude rate of net migration			0.008 (0.009)
Random effects			
Country-year variance (2 nd level)	0.143	0.114	0.100
ICC (individuals within country-years)	0.030	0.024	0.052
Slope variance unemployment effect	0.022		
Slope variance immigration: economy effect		0.004	
Slope variance immigration: culture effect			0.002
Model summary			
-2LL	40586.001	41563.090	41687.410
N country-year level	11	11	11
N individual level	9307	9541	9567

*=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***= p<.001. Standard errors in parentheses.

Source: ESS round 6 (2012-2013), WVS W5 (2005-2009) and W6 (2010-2014), World Bank and Eurostat.

Appendix 6: Description of the used models

Model	Description	Table (T)/ Appendix (A)
1	Micro variables dummy unemployment, dummies education and control variables	T4.5
2	Micro variables model 1 + satisfaction with government, attitude towards immigration: economy and trust in the European Union	T4.5
3	Micro variables model 1 + satisfaction with government, attitude towards immigration: culture and trust in the European Union	T4.5
4	All micro variables	T4.5
5	All micro variables and Corruption Perceptions Index	T4.6
6	All micro variables and Growth GDP per capita	T4.6
7	All micro variables and Macro unemployment	T4.6
8	All micro variables and Crude rate of net migration	T4.6
9	All micro variables and Degree of democracy in 1997	T4.6
10	All micro variables, Growth GDP per capita and Crude rate of net migration	A2
11	All micro variables, Corruption Perceptions Index, Macro unemployment and Degree of democracy in 1997	A2
12	All micro variables, Corruption Perceptions Index and Growth GDP per capita	A2
13	All micro variables, Growth GDP per capita, Macro unemployment and Crude rate of net migration	A2
14	All micro variables, Corruption Perceptions Index and Degree of democracy in 1997	A2
15	Simple interaction with micro, macro and micro*macro unemployment	A3
16	Simple interaction with Attitude towards immigration: economy, Crude rate of net migration and the interaction between these two	A3
17	Simple interaction with Attitude towards immigration: culture, Crude rate of net migration and the interaction between these two	A3
18	Model 15 with all other micro variables	A4
19	Model 16 with all other micro variables except Attitude towards immigration: culture	A4
20	Model 16 with all other micro variables except Attitude towards immigration: economy	A4

