The Responsibility to Protect in the DRC conflict

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

A process-tracing case study for the resistant attitude of the UN Security Council concerning the implementation of the R2P-principle in the MONUSCO-mandates between 2010-2015

Master thesis

by

Michelle de Vries (S4363205)
michelle.vries@student.ru.nl

M Political Science: Conflict, Power and Politics
Radboud University Nijmegen
Supervisor: Dr. Ir. M. van Leeuwen

26-06-2017

Radboud University Nijmegen

**Master Thesis**

**Master Political Science: Conflict, Power and Politics**

**Radboud University Nijmegen**

**Supervision by Dr. Ir. M. van Leeuwen
2017
Centre for International Conflict Analysis and Management
Nijmegen School of Management**

**Word Count: 34.506**

Content

[Abstract i](#_Toc486237859)

[Figures and Tables ii](#_Toc486237860)

[Abbreviations and Acronyms iii](#_Toc486237861)

[Acknowledgements iv](#_Toc486237862)

[1. Introduction 1](#_Toc486237863)

[1.1 Introduction 1](#_Toc486237864)

[1.2 DRC Conflict: Crimes against humanity and war crimes, but no R2P 1](#_Toc486237865)

[1.3 Responsibility to Protect and Compliance 4](#_Toc486237866)

[1.4 International Relations Theories on Compliance to International Norms 5](#_Toc486237867)

[1.5 Poststructuralism 7](#_Toc486237868)

[1.6 Puzzle and Research Problem 8](#_Toc486237869)

[1.7 Relevance 9](#_Toc486237870)

[1.8 Structure of the thesis 9](#_Toc486237871)

[2 Theoretical Framework 11](#_Toc486237872)

[2.1 Introduction 11](#_Toc486237873)

[2.2 Realist Perspective 12](#_Toc486237874)

[2.2.1 Introduction to the Realist Perspective 12](#_Toc486237875)

[2.2.2 Morgenthau’s principles of Political Realism 12](#_Toc486237876)

[2.2.3 Classical Realist Perspective on Norm Compliance 15](#_Toc486237877)

[2.3 Constructivist Perspective 16](#_Toc486237878)

[2.3.1 Introduction to the Constructivist Perspective 16](#_Toc486237879)

[2.3.2 Normative Context and its effects 17](#_Toc486237880)

[2.3.3 Constructivist Perspective on Norm Compliance 22](#_Toc486237881)

[2.4 Poststructuralist Perspective 23](#_Toc486237882)

[2.4.1. Introduction to Poststructuralism 23](#_Toc486237883)

[2.4.2 Poststructuralism and the discursive struggle 24](#_Toc486237884)

[2.4.3 Postructuralist Perspective on Norm Compliance 27](#_Toc486237885)

[2.5 Conclusion 28](#_Toc486237886)

[3. Methodology 29](#_Toc486237887)

[3.1 Introduction 29](#_Toc486237888)

[3.2 Method 29](#_Toc486237889)

[3.3 Case Selection 31](#_Toc486237890)

[3.4 Operationalization of causal mechanisms 32](#_Toc486237891)

[3.4.1 Classical Realist causal mechanism 32](#_Toc486237892)

[3.4.2 Constructivist causal mechanism 32](#_Toc486237893)

[3.4.3 Poststructuralist causal mechanism 33](#_Toc486237894)

[3.5 Data collection 33](#_Toc486237895)

[4. Analysis 35](#_Toc486237896)

[4.1 Introduction 35](#_Toc486237897)

[4.2 Realist analysis 35](#_Toc486237898)

[4.2.1 States’ interests in the UNSC (and the R2P-principle) 35](#_Toc486237899)

[4.2.2 States’ interests in the DRC Conflict and the MONUSCO-mandate 37](#_Toc486237900)

[4.3 Constructivist analysis 39](#_Toc486237901)

[4.3.1 The principle in the mandate 40](#_Toc486237902)

[4.3.2 The stage of the R2P-norm 41](#_Toc486237903)

[4.3.3 Conditions for the norm 50](#_Toc486237904)

[4.4 Poststructuralist analysis 51](#_Toc486237905)

[4.4.1 The prevailing discourse on Human Rights Violations in the SCR’s 52](#_Toc486237906)

[4.4.2 The MONUSCO-mandates and the prevailing discourse 59](#_Toc486237907)

[5. Conclusion 63](#_Toc486237908)

[5.1 Introduction 63](#_Toc486237909)

[5.2 Findings 63](#_Toc486237910)

[5.3 Discussion 66](#_Toc486237911)

[5.4 Suggestions for future research 68](#_Toc486237912)

[Bibliography 70](#_Toc486237913)

[Appendices 80](#_Toc486237914)

[Transcript Interview Jan Pronk, 10-05-2017. 80](#_Toc486237915)

[Transcript Interview Joost van Puijenbroek, 22-05-2017 90](#_Toc486237916)

[Transcript Interview Rose Bashwira, 24-05-2017 101](#_Toc486237917)

# Abstract

This research aims at explaining the resistant attitude of the UNSC to adopt the R2P-principle in the MONUSCO-mandates for the DRC conflict between 2010-2015. A reference to the R2P-principle within the MONUSCO-mandates between 2010-2015 would be expected given the grand scale of human rights violations taking place during the DRC conflict, and the prioritization of the protection of civilians within the mandates. Still, the tool specifically designed to respond to human rights violations and protect civilians was not referred to in any of the MONUSCO-mandates between 2010-2015. In order to explain this outcome, three distinct theoretical perspectives on norm compliance are used to identify possible causal mechanisms, namely Realism, Constructivism and Poststructuralism. Discourse analyses and in-depth interviews are used to trace whether these mechanisms are present and whether they can explain the puzzling outcome. Ultimately, it is concluded that the Constructivist and Poststructuralist perspectives offer insightful explanations for the outcome. The stage in which the R2P-principle is and the conditions under which the principle exists between 2010-2015, as well as the prevailing discourse concerning the DRC conflict within the UNSC between 2010-2015 help explain why the UNSC does not refer to the principle in the MONUSCO-mandates between 2010-2015.

Key Words: DRC - Conflict - Human Rights Violations - R2P - UNSC

# Figures and Tables

[Figure 2. 1 Norm Life Cycle 19](#_Toc485900134)

[Figure 2. 2 Norm Life Cycle Mechanism 20](#_Toc485900135)

# Abbreviations and Acronyms

DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
FARDC Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo
FRPI Front de Résistance Patriotique de I’turi
ICC International Criminal Court
ICISS International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
IR International Relations
MONUSCO Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en
 rd Congo
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
OHCHR Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
P5 Permanent five (members of the UNSC)
R2P Responsibility to Protect
SCR Security Council Report
UN United Nations
UNAMID United Nations/African Unions Mission In Darfur
(UN)GA (United Nations) General Assembly
UNSC United Nations Security Council

# Acknowledgements

With this Master Thesis I finalized my Master Political Science (Conflict, Power and Politics) at the Radboud University Nijmegen. As with my Bachelor Political Science, I greatly enjoyed this specific specialization and the process of writing the thesis. However, it was not always easy. Planning the thesis (and sticking to it), redefining the subject and question, collecting data (interviews specifically) and putting my thoughts and arguments on paper adequately, have proven rather difficult. Nevertheless, it was a very instructive part of my education and in the end, I have really enjoyed exploring the subject and the specific case.

I would also like to express my gratitude to several people. First and foremost, Dr. ir. M.. van Leeuwen, my academic supervisor. His critical remarks, informative instructions and useful discussions have been really helpful. Furthermore, I would also like to thank my interviewees, for the contribution of their insightful accounts concerning the case of Congo and the international community. Also, I would like to thank the staff and teachers in the Conflict, Power and Politics track for their insightful and inspiring lectures, that have led me to write this thesis. Lastly, I would also like to thank the second reader for the review of this thesis.

Michelle de Vries,

June 20

# 1. Introduction

## 1.1 Introduction

Special United Nations (UN) representative Margot Wallström, who has worked over 10 years in Eastern Congo, labelled the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as ‘the rape capital of the world’ (UN News Center, n.d.). Stephen Lewis, former UN Special Envoy for AIDS in Africa, declared that ‘There is no precedent for the insensate brutality of the war on women in Congo (Wakabi, 2008:15). Both these statements shed light on the brutal reality of the DRC conflict. While the conflict in the DRC is usually discussed as one in which the most grave human rights violations take place, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is usually discussed as the principle tool of the UN to respond to such human rights violations and to adequately protect civilians. Although the UN is active in the DRC, there is, remarkably, no mention of the R2P-principle in the mission’s (MONUSCO) mandate. This is remarkable because, as will be discussed subsequently, the DRC seems to be deserving such an R2P-mandate. Furthermore, in the mandate itself the objective of protecting civilians is prioritized. In IR theories, there is an ongoing debate on why states would or would not comply to international norms. The R2P-principle is an international norm and therefor also subject of this debate. Within this debate, a distinction can be made between theories that are based on an individualist ontology and a social ontology. Three different theoretical approaches will be introduced, namely Realism, Constructivism and Poststructuralism. Subsequently, these theoretical perspectives will be used to investigate the case of the DRC and the resistant attitude of the UN Security Council (UNSC) regarding the implementation of the R2P-principle in the MONUSCO-mandates as a response to the DRC conflict.

## 1.2 DRC Conflict: Crimes against humanity and war crimes, but no R2P

The DRC has been in a state of prolonged conflict since 1996. Violent conflict has been taking place in parts of the DRC, mostly the Eastern provinces, since the beginning of the conflict in 1996. In 2005 it already became the most deadly conflict of the world since world war II, with approximately 3.3 million dead between 1996-2005 (Vlassenroot and Huggings, 2005:115). Specific characteristics of the conflict are extreme (sexual) violence, widespread rape, mass population displacements and a total collapse of public health services (Steiner et al., 2009:3). It has been expressed by several experts that the conflict is becoming more violent and the violence itself is becoming more common (Wakabi, 2008:15). Specifically the sexual violence has been noted to be an inherent feature of the DRC conflict, and sometimes even used as a military strategy by different actors, including the DRC military (Bastick et al., 2007:41). Data collected by Peterman et al. (2011:1063) shows that approximately 1.7-1.8 million women between 15 and 49 years old have been raped at some point in their lives. This number rises to approximately 3 million women when ‘intimate partner sexual violence’ is reported (Ibid.). Not only are the numbers of sexual violence extreme, the brutality of the violence is too (Wakabi, 2008:15).

 In 2010 the UN published a ‘Mapping Exercise Report’ (OHCHR, 2010) on the conflict in the DRC in which the conflict and the committed atrocities were documented for the period of 1993-2003. For many organizations, this report made clear that there was a humanitarian crises going on in the DRC (Crawford, 2011). Human Rights Watch claimed that the report showed the immense scale of the crimes committed as well as the failure of governments around the world to respond adequately (Ibid.). Amnesty International and the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect also responded and condemned the human rights violations and the evidence of mass atrocity crimes in the DRC (Responsibility To Protect, n.d.). They too pointed towards the failing of the international community (Ibid.) The Global Centre argued that the international community should have applied the R2P-principle, claiming that the report showed evidence that there was the perpetration of war crimes and crimes against humanity, which are both crimes that the R2P-principle is seeking to banish (Ibid.).

 Given the reported human rights violations in the DRC conflict and the committed war crimes and crimes against humanity, one would expect the R2P-principle to be implemented by the UN in the mandate. Also, given the prioritization of the protection of civilians in the MONUSCO-mandates (UNSC, 2010; 2011c; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016), one would expect that the tool precisely designed for protecting civilians would be implemented in those mandates. The R2P-principle consists of three pillars. The first one holds that states hold the primary responsibility to protect their population from genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The second one holds that the international community holds responsibility to assist the states’ responsibility. The third one holds that the international community holds the responsibility to take timely and decisive action when states have failed to protect their population from the before mentioned crimes (Bellamy, 2010:143; GA, 2005:30). The UNHR report (2010) and responses from different human rights and research organizations have provided evidence for the ongoing human rights violations, as well as the commitment of war crimes and crimes against humanity. This illustrates that the DRC government, holding the primary responsibility for the protection of their population, is struggling to do so (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 2017). This would mean that, since the first pillar of the principle is not met, the second pillar comes into being, assuming the assistance of the international community to the state. However, some of the DRC government forces have been claimed to be complicit in the exercise of mass atrocity crimes (Ibid.; Bastick et al., 2007). One could argue then that the DRC government is not just struggling to protect the population, but is actively involved in its human rights violations and thus failing to do so. If established that the DRC government is failing in protecting their population, the international community holds the ultimate responsibility to undertake timely and decisive action, according to the third pillar of the principle.

 In the Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit, it was clarified what a mission under the R2P is allowed to entail. It is expressed that ‘…the international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter…’ and ‘…are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations…’ (GA, 2005:30). The action undertaken in accordance with chapter VI and VIII entails peaceful measures in order to protect the population from the crimes admitted under the R2P-principle, in cooperation with relevant regional organizations (UN, 1945:8-9, 11). The action undertaken in accordance with chapter VII entails further collective action, if peaceful measures are inadequate, including armed force by land, air and sea (Ibid.:9-11).

 Although there is no R2P-mandate implemented in the DRC, the UN is actively involved in the DRC with its MONUSCO-mission (UNSC, 2010; 2011c; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016). It started as the MONUC-mission in 1999 and became the largest UN Mission with approximately 22.000 peacekeepers on the ground (Neethling, 2011:25). The mission acts under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (UNSC, 2010; 2011c; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016). Although the UNSC did mention the protection of the population from war crimes as well as crimes against humanity as central in the mandate as a priority, there was no explicit or direct reference to the R2P-principle itself (Bellamy, 2015:166; UNSC, 2010; 2011c; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016). The UN(SC) thus seems to acknowledge the occurrence of these crimes and the necessity to respond to them. However, they don’t refer to the norm specifically designed to protect civilians in any of their mandates, as mentioned previously (UNSC, 2010; 2011c; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016). Still, without explicit reference in the mandates, it is clear that in the view of the international community, their responsibility is the assistance of the DRC government in the protection of the Congolese population (Ibid.). This would thus point to the second pillar of the R2P-principle, as outlined previously.

 Not only is it puzzling that there is no reference to the R2P-principle in any of the MONUSCO-mandates, the suggested, implicit second pillar structure in the mandates also seems puzzling. As mentioned, the incapacity of the DRC government to protect its population and its complicity in the exercise of some of the human rights violations, would point to the necessity of the third pillar of the R2P-principle. Under this pillar, it is the international community who bears the ultimate responsibility over the population. By maintaining that the DRC government is primarily responsible for the protection of its citizens, the UNSC effectively relinquishes the international community from the need to use stronger language to condemn the violence and take more decisive action. One central measure undertaken within this resolution is the call on the DRC government ‘… to make further meaningful progress in implementing its commitments under the PSC Framework, … and to remain fully committed to protecting the civilian population…’ (Ibid.:5). Another measure calls for ‘… continued national efforts to address the threat posed by the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons, including inter alia through ensuring the safe and effective management, storage and security of their stockpiles of weapons and ammunition, with the continued support of MONUSCO, as appropriate and within existing resources’ (Ibid.). Arguably, if the responsibility lies solely with the international community, stronger language and more extensive measures could be undertaken, as was the case with the resolution for the R2P-mission in Libya (UNSC, 2011a) and the resolution for the R2P-mission in the Ivory Coast (UNSC, 2011b). Within the first resolution there was an establishment of a no-fly zone and an asset freeze of some Libyan authorities. There was also the authorization for member states to ‘to take all necessary measures … to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack…’ (UNSC, 2011a.:3). This strong language and extensive measures can also be found in the UN-resolution for the Ivory Coast (UNSC, 2011b). Here again, the member states are authorized to ‘use all necessary means to carry out its mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence…’ (Ibid.: 3). Although the MONUSCO-mission is authorized with similar tools to other R2P-missions according to Bellamy (2015), there are differences to be found in the strength of the language used and the extent to which tools can be used with the resolutions that directly refer to R2P and place the responsibility with the international community. Considering these differences in authorized measures in the MONUSCO-mandate and the other resolutions, one could thus argue that a different interpretation of responsibility by the international community, followed with a different resolution or mandate based on the third pillar of the R2P-principle, could affect the extensiveness of the authorized measures, as in the case of Libya and the Ivory Coast.

## 1.3 Responsibility to Protect and Compliance

The principle of the Responsibility to Protect was adopted unanimously at the UN World Summit of 2005 and has been reaffirmed four times by the UNSC and UNGA since then (Bellamy, 2015:161). Furthermore, it has informed more than 25 resolutions by the UNSC since its adoption on the World Summit of 2005 (Ibid.). Although it has been embraced as an international norm by the international community and the UNSC, the principle is a much debated issue and is subject to multiple criticisms. The most debated issue for the R2P-principle, and the greatest concern expressed, is the concern that it would undermine state’s sovereignty (Bellamy, 2010:144). It is feared by some states and by several academics that the principle threatens the political autonomy of (weaker) states, as the assertive action from the international community as considered under the third pillar of the principle effectively overrules state sovereignty (Ibid.).

 This debate concerning the degree to which the R2P-principle undermines state sovereignty is particularly problematic because there seems to be a certain selectivity in the implementation of the principle. Firstly, by allocating the authorization of a R2P-mission to the UNSC, a risk for selectivity is created. This because law-making is then allocated to an elite group of power judging their own actions (Macfarlane, Thielking and Weiss, 2004:979). Subsequently, it is argued that the powerful states (in the UNSC) will determine which and whose human rights justify to implement a R2P-mission and thus when to leave the principle of non-intervention. Obviously, this allocation of authorization results in a risk for selective and arbitrary implementation of the principle, since the authorization lies with some powerful states. According to Chandler (2006:135), this is a possibility for law-making by an elite group of states, who have the power of judging their own actions. This hampers the legitimacy of the R2P-principle and creates a gap between the legality and legitimacy of the principle. Secondly, there remain to exist disagreements both on the meaning and proper use of the R2P-principle. This criticism is usually exemplified with cases that lay bare how the principle has been applied inconsistently since its adoption (Bellamy, 2010:144). The instrumental case-by-case decision-making basis of the principle gives way to the possibility of selective implementation that arises from diverging understandings on the meaning and use (Macfarlane, Thielking and Weiss, 2004:979) Thirdly, and lastly, a major criticism holds that the R2P-principle constitutes the possibility of politicization of the information gathering- and assessment of conflicts by the UN (Bellamy, 2010:148). This process of politicization lays bare the (un)willingness of states to be involved in military intervention. This could affect the effectiveness and decision-making process of R2P (Pattinson, 2008). It also points to the issue of political (un)willingness of states to engage in complex issues and intervene, which could again affect the effectiveness and decision-making process (Luck, 2010). Here, regional organizations also play a large role as gatekeepers. Their role is by some viewed as imperative since a strong partnership with the UN results in effective achievements, but disagreement with the UN can also lead to a blockade of decisive action (Bellamy and Williams, 2011).

 The case of the DRC seems to be a good example of selective implementation of the R2P-principle, considering the immense scale of violence, human rights violations and the failure of the Congolese state to adequately deal with this. This legitimizes the question of why precisely the international community chose for a very limited, and above all, implicit, implementation of the R2P-principle in the DRC. An explicit implementation of (the third pillar of) the principle could be expected to be implemented in the MONUSCO-mandates, given the DRC government’s complicity in some of the human rights violations and the government’s failure to protect their population, even in assistance with the international community. Furthermore, since R2P is precisely the tool designed to protect the population, it is puzzling why this principle is not explicitly referred to in a mandate in which the priority is to protect the population. Ultimately, this debate on the implementation of the R2P-principle by the international community is also captured in the debate between several International Relations (IR) theories. In this debate, the different IR theories try to explain why states would (not) comply to international norms such as the R2P-principle.

## 1.4 International Relations Theories on Compliance to International Norms

The issue of compliance of states to international norms is imperative, because it inspires the question whether the international norms serve more than just superficial (theoretical) cooperation or actually influences states’ behavior. This would hold that states would undertake action that they would not have undertaken if the international norm was not in place (Simmons, 2012:365). Many scholars within IR have accepted the, previously controversial, claim that *norms matter*. What is more an issue of debate currently, is how they work and what their effects are (Checkel, 1997:473). However, it has proven difficult for states to move from ‘commitment to human rights’ to actual ‘behavioral compliance’ with human rights norms (Schmitz and Sikkink, 2012:836). This possible lack of compliance is a central issue in research on human rights (norms) (Ibid.:835). The issue of compliance is also central in the earlier discussed criticisms on the R2P-principle, since they all emphasize that there are risks of selective implementation of the principle. These risks expose the difficulties in complete compliance of states to the actual ‘behavioral’ implementation of the principle. In this research domain, two theoretical approaches are dominant in investigating why states would or would not comply, namely rationalist and constructivist theories (Simmons, 2012:366; Checkel, 1997:475). The first depends mostly on material pressures and self-interest of states, whereas the latter focuses mostly on ideas and identity arguments (Ibid.).

 The rationalist perspective, also closely aligned with realism, argues that compliance of states to international law, agreements and norms is dependent on the willingness of states to enforce these, using material incentives if necessary (Simmons, 2012:366). The basis of the argument holds that states will not comply to international norms if this is in their own interest, thus when they don’t face substantial costs (Ibid.). Actors behavior is expected to be governed by a rational means-end logic (Checkel, 1997:475). According to (classical) Realists, the international arena is a system of self-help, meaning that states are looking for opportunities to take advantage of each other (Mearsheimer, 1994). Furthermore, politics are understood by realists as a struggle for unilateral advantage and power (Lebow, 2013:39). Many Realists think that self-interest surpasses moral principles. They believe that justice is a dangerous foundation for foreign policy (Ibid.:40). This holds that they don’t attach much value in the analysis of the role of norms or justice. Rather, they assume that foreign policy is ultimately about power and interests of individual states. The rationalist and Realist perspective is based on an individualist ontology in the sense that the unit of analysis is the individual state and its motives, interests and behavior (Fierke, 2013:164). From this perspective, one would expect that states will only comply to an international norm such as the R2P-principle, when it is in their own (material) interest.

 Another way of thinking on compliance within IR is provided by academics that employ a Constructivist perspective. Constructivists have questioned the individualist ontology of the rationalists and Realists, and instead focus on a social ontology (Fierke, 2013:164). This ontological basis assumes that individuals and states are social beings and can’t be separated from a normative context which shapes them and their possibilities (Ibid.). It is thus about the shared understanding and acceptance of the concept (Ibid.). It assumes that state behavior is not simply guided by individual motives and interests, but that shared ideas on legitimate actions and international reputation, relations and norms play an important role. This perspective thus takes on a different view based on shared ideas, identity and legitimacy (Simmons, 2012:369; Fierke, 2013:164). The subjects, states or individuals, are, according to Constructivists, guided by a logic of appropriateness. This logic holds that the rational action to undertake is a function of legitimacy and defined by shared ideas and norms. Thus, there is no emphasis on the individual interests of states (Fierke, 2013:164). This rational logic is instead replaced by a logic of appropriateness, which is derived from the existing social norms and guides state behavior by identifying what is ‘appropriate’ behavior (Checkel, 1997:475). In this way, structures can constrain behavior of states. The weighty status of the international legal commitments raises the reputational costs of non-compliance. International norms possess this power because they embody the social meanings and purposes of the international community (Simmons, 2007:369). From this brief introduction of Constructivist theory, one would expect that states would not comply to the international norm of R2P, when the international community, more specifically the states involved in the conflict and the mission, do not share the same norms in this domain.

## 1.5 Poststructuralism

As already mentioned, within the domain of IR, rationalist and/or Realist and Constructivist perspectives are dominant within the debate on compliance to international norms by states (Simmons, 2012:366). A different theoretical perspective that is also concerned with social life and social ontology like the constructivist perspective, is Poststructuralism (Campbell and Bleiker, 2013:206). Although this approach does not specifically outline a theory of IR, it does offer a number of general arguments that can be used to approach the study of international politics differently. This perspective is already hinted towards by a rather influential author on the DRC, Severine Autesterre (2009; 2012; 2016).

 According to her research, it are the discursive frames and the dominant narratives that inspire the response by the international community (Ibid.:2016). Furthermore, she claims that there are specific discursive frames and dominant narratives in the public discourse on the DRC conflict that frame the conflict in an alternative way (Ibid.:2009, 2012). This view is closely associated with Poststructuralism. Briefly worded, this theoretical perspective explores how the world becomes represented as it is (Zehfuss, 2012:151). Furthermore, it reveals the contingent nature of what appears to be given and fixed, in other words of reality, and how politics is involved in producing this reality (Ibid.:151-2). From this perspective, interpretation and representation are unavoidable and imperative when engaging in the domain of international politics (Campbell and Bleiker, 2013:216). Its emphasis lies on language, perception, framing and subjective experience of the world. Ultimately, it rethinks the question of power in a way that all relations are seen as effects of the operation of power through the materialization of discourse (Campbell and Bleiker, 2013:217). With regard to norm compliance, Poststructuralists are concerned with how different norms, their meaning, applicability and necessity, are interpreted differently. Given these assumptions, Poststructuralism would expect the discursive dynamics, dominant frames and different interpretations of the DRC conflict will affect the response of the international community. In this way, it could affect their stance towards the compliance to the R2P-principle. Although Poststructuralism, like Constructivism, is also based on this social ontology, it does differ from the perspective epistemologically. Where Constructivism focuses on the shared meanings of concepts and the shared views on norms and their legitimacy, Poststructuralism focuses on the discursive struggle that underlies the dominance of a (shared) perception. They thus offer different explanatory approaches to the debate in general, and for the specific case of the DRC.

## 1.6 Puzzle and Research Problem

As argued, the DRC conflict is characterized by human rights violations. The ‘Mapping Exercise Report’ by the OHCHR of 2010 laid bare the mass atrocities that were committed in the DRC in the period from 1993-2003 (OHCHR, 2010). Among the atrocities were crimes against humanities and war crimes, in some cases committed by the DRC military themselves (Bastick et al., 2007). The UN itself has emphasized the need to protect the civilians from these crimes within the MONUSCO-mandates (UNSC, 2010; 2011c; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016). The UN is actively involved in the DRC conflict with the largest UN mission so far. However, there is no explicit reference made to (the third pillar of) the R2P-principle in the mandates. This would be expected given the incapacity of the DRC government to protect the civilians on their own. Furthermore, given their complicity in some of the atrocities, one could argue that they completely fail in the protection of their population anyway, and that overstepping their sovereignty is justified. Also, it remains puzzling why there is no explicit reference to the principle that is precisely designed to protect civilians, in a mandate in which the priority is to protect civilians. Still, the UN seems to wager only implicitly on the second pillar of the R2P-principle. An explicit reference to the (third pillar of the) R2P-principle could, as shown with the resolution for Libya and the Ivory Coast, have consequences for the extensiveness of the authorization of certain measures and therefor matter for the mandates of the mission.

 This puzzling case of the DRC seems an interesting case from the perspective of the debate on selective implementation of R2P. This debate and the criticisms themselves fit within the ongoing debate in IR on the compliance to international norms by states. Different theoretical perspectives offer different explanations for why states would or would not comply to an international law, agreement or norm, such as the R2P-principle. The two most commonly used theoretical explanations are the rationalist or realist and the constructivist, as already discussed. The first perspective is based on an individualist ontology and focuses on material pressures and individual interests of states. The second is based on a social ontology and focused on shared ideas, norms and legitimacy of actions by states. A third possible perspective, Poststructuralism, is also based on a social ontology, yet differs from Constructivism, as already briefly mentioned, since it focuses on the discursive struggle underlying the dominant perspectives in international politics.

 These theoretical perspectives offer diverging explanations and expectations as to why the international community, through the UNSC, is resistant regarding the implementation of the R2P-principle (’s third pillar). The existing inconsistency between these IR, more specifically for this identified resistance, and the puzzling outcome of the case form the research problem. This identified puzzling case and the different explanations by the theoretical perspectives on compliance of states to international norms, inspire the following central question of this thesis: *What is the contribution of the Realist, Constructivist and Poststructuralist perspective for explaining the resistant attitude of the UN Security Council concerning the application of the (third pillar of the) R2P-principle in the MONUSCO-mandates for the Democratic Republic of Congo?*

## 1.7 Relevance

The case of the DRC, which is central in the research question, fits within two larger debates. The first debate is that revolving around the R2P-principle itself, which is concerned with the selectivity of its implementation. The second debate is that between different IR theories on the compliance of states to international norms. The case of the DRC, which is in itself puzzling, can thus be placed within different academic debates. Therefore, investigating this specific case with the identified theories is scientifically relevant. First, it could contribute to better or new comprehension of the outcome of the DRC case itself. Second, it could add more insights on the dynamics that are at play when a decision for the implementation of the R2P-principle in a mandate, is made. This could provide useful contributions to the ongoing debate on the selective implementation of the principle. Third, given the use of three different theoretical perspectives, it could offer useful insights both for the case itself, as well as the ongoing debate between the theories on compliance to international norms. It could lay bare which specific perspective could explain what and also, what not. Also, the interplay of different perspectives, and thus the use of multiple different lenses for the case, expands the view for explanations.

 Furthermore, engaging in this puzzle and answering the central question also has a societal relevance. Better comprehending the dynamics of a decision-making process of such magnitude in current international politics, yields insightful results that could possibly have implications for involved decision makers. It could also have consequences for local, national, regional or international practitioners involved in humanitarian (intervention) work. Ultimately, this could affect the human rights violators and victims.

## 1.8 Structure of the thesis

So far, the case of the DRC and the resistance of the UNSC with regard to the adoption of the R2P-principle in the MONUSCO-mandates, is introduced. It is argued why this attitude is puzzling and also, why the implementation the R2P-principle in the mandate would matter. Following, this puzzling case was placed within both the larger debate on the R2P-principle itself as well as the larger debate of IR theories on compliance by states to such norms. This inspired the central research question as posed above. In the following chapters, an answer to this question will be given.

 In the next chapter, the theoretical framework, the different theoretical perspectives will be further discussed. Following, in the third chapter, the data and methods that will be used to answer the question will be introduced. In the fourth chapter, the empirical data will be gathered and discussed. Lastly, the fifth chapter will present the conclusion, and answer the central research question, discuss the implications of the answer and make recommendations for future research within this research domain.

# 2 Theoretical Framework

## 2.1 Introduction

Three distinct theoretical perspectives will be used to approach the case of the DRC and the UNSC’s resistant attitude towards the implementation of the R2P-principle, more specifically its third pillar. By using three different theoretical perspectives, Realism, Constructivism and Poststructuralism, a wide range of dynamics can be explored for the specific case. Within this theoretical framework, the aim is not to give a complete overview of the entire theoretical perspective that is discussed. Rather, there will be an overview of its essential assumptions that are relevant for understanding their view on compliance to international norms. This because this issue is the focus of the research question.

 The concept of norms itself is debated. For rationalists, norms are usually viewed as regulative and simply institutional tools to bring about interaction between states. For Constructivists and Poststructuralists, norms are usually viewed as constitutive and as descriptions of appropriate behavior (Wunderlich, 2013: 22). This will become more clear in the subsequent discussion of their respective views on norm compliance. Research on compliance focuses on the implementation of the existing norms. It starts with the investigation of a certain state’s position within an international regime or organization, and then investigates which factors could affect compliance (Checkel, 1997:476). This issue of research is especially evident for the domain of human rights norms. This is so because human rights law and norms form a domain of international law in which states have no or little incentives to police the (non)compliance with the law or norms (Hathaway, 2002:1938; Henking, 1979:235). Therefore, particularly within the international domain of human rights norms, it is interesting to understand why states would still, or would not, comply to these norms.

 Usually, two contrasting perspectives for understanding the effect of norms on actors are used, namely Realism and Constructivism (Simmons, 2012:366). Both these approaches have experienced several waves of popularity. The move towards and enthusiasm for measurement emerged during the behavioral revolution (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:889). Because normative matters and norms were hard to measure, they were shoved away. This happened simultaneously with the emerging tendency of political scientists to focus on economic methods in the 1970s and 80s (Ibid.). They showed little interest in social phenomena or ideational concerns. Later, during the 1980s, the perspective that focuses mostly on norms and normative matters, Constructivism, came back (Ibid.). There was a re-emergence of interest in normative matters in political science. Ever since, these two perspectives have become dominant in the debate on norm compliance within IR. In this thesis, however, a third one, Poststructuralism, will also be used to investigate the compliance to international norms. The elaboration on how they engaged in the debate with each other, already show how the field of IR has been updated through the years and how different perspectives continue to challenge and respond to each other and their critics.

## 2.2 Realist Perspective

‘The strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must’ – Thucydides[[1]](#footnote-1)

### 2.2.1 Introduction to the Realist Perspective

Classical Realism exists over an long span of time already, with its first writings dating 2500 years back. Principle writers in this tradition are Thucydides, Machiavelli, Clausewitz and Morgenthau (Lebow, 2013:35). It was Morgenthau’s (1948) ‘Politics among Nations’, that is viewed as the major work in Classical Realism (Ibid.). As a leading approach in the domain of IR, (Classical) Realism has always attracted much criticism. These will be shown with the introduction of the other perspectives and their views on the Realist assumptions. However, even the critics have acknowledged that the Realist focus on anarchic structure, fear and power are prominent influences and explanations for conflict an war (Ibid.:12). The popularity of the Classical Realist perspective has changed multiple times during the 20th and 21st century. However, in a post-9/11 world, security issues are once again the center of attention and therefor the Realist tradition has made an impressive comeback (Ibid.).

 Realists keep in with their tragic orientation, which originates back to Thucydides’ work as a Tragedian in the Greek era. They continue to view history as something cyclical, meaning that efforts to establish and preserve order may succeed for some period, but will ultimately perish from the effects of actors who liberate themselves from law and order (Lebow, 2013:35.). They thus view order as something fragile. They have this view, since they believe that communal bonds and the order stemming from them, are easily undermined by the pursuit of unilateral advantages and interests by states (Ibid.). Also, Classical Realism assumes that the desire for power stems from the human nature, which is flawed (Elman and Jensen, 2014:3). This school of thought holds the perspective that, from a rational point of view, the world is imperfect because of forces that are inherent in human nature (Morgenthau, 1948:3). Within this imperfect world, there are opposing interests and conflicts (Ibid.). This leads states to be in a continuous struggle to increase their capabilities. They thus blame conflictual conduct in international politics on the flawed human nature (Elman and Jensen, 2014:3).

### 2.2.2 Morgenthau’s principles of Political Realism

Morgenthau (1948) aims at presenting a theory of international politics, with the corresponding purpose of ‘bringing order and meaning to a mass of phenomena that without it would remain disconnected and unintelligible’ (Ibid.:3). Ultimately, the Realist view on mankind is essential for his perspective and underlies his theory. This school of thought assumes that there are inherent forces in human nature that have as a result, from a rational standpoint, that the world is imperfect. Because this imperfect world is one with opposing interests and conflict, moral principles should be approximated through the balancing of interests and the settlement of conflicts. They can however, never be fully realized. Morgenthau thus places power-lust and selfishness at the center of human nature. This power-lust is considered to be universal and timeless. Furthermore, he claims it is the root cause of conflict (Korab-Karpowicz, 2010). Based on this perspective of human nature, he brings forward 6 fundamental principles of political realism, which will be discussed subsequently.

 The first principle laid out by Morgenthau (1948:4) is that ‘Politics are governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature’. The main point of the principle is that politics must be subjected to tests of reason and experience (Rosenthal, 1991:4). Krab-Karpowics (2010) argues that this Morgenthau’s attempt at developing Classical Realism into a theory of international politics. This principle, as well as his introduction statement, with which he claims that he aims at presenting a theory of international politics, is criticized by some. Among them is Waltz’ (1979:2), and in his perception, theories are a collection of laws examining a particular phenomenon or behavior. He claims that although Morgenthau succeeds in presenting elements of a theory, he does not actually present a theory (1990:25-6). Although he did have the capacity to single out salient concepts and construct causal analyses around them, he did not take the subsequent step beyond the developments of the concepts and the building of a complete theory (Ibid.).

 The second principle is essential and holds that the concept of ‘interest’ is defined in terms of power. Morgenthau mentions that Classical Realism assumes that statesmen think and act in these terms of power (Ibid.). In other words, power can be viewed as the leading guideline of foreign policy (Rosenthal, 1991:5). By defining the interest in terms of power, there is an intellectual discipline placed on the observer, which ordains a rational order into politics. It allows the analysis of politics and foreign policy, irrespective of the different preferences, intellectual or moral qualities or motives of individual statesmen (Krab-Karpowicz, 2010). With this second principle, Morgenthau thus did acknowledge the normative element of Classical Realism, by referring to different moral qualities, yet he immediately subjected it to the superior power considerations (Rosenthal, 1991:5). Morgenthau (1948:4) namely argues that, Classical Realism goes against two fallacies, the concern with motives and that with ideological preferences. He claims such concerns are futile and deceptive, since motives are illusive and we cannot know other’s motives, or our own. Ultimately, this principle is the foundation of the rational framework for politics of Classical Realism. Power is, in the post-war scholarship, usually understood as military capability, and interest is usually referred to as an egoistic lust for power, security and (economic) wealth (Wendt, 1999:92).

 The third principle holds that Classical Realism assumes that ‘its key concept of interest defined as power is an objective category that is universally valid, but it does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed for once and for all’ (Morgenthau, 1948:10). He thus still acknowledges that interest is essential to politics and that it is not affected by time and place, hence universally valid. However, he also acknowledges that the kind of interest that determines political action within a particular timespan depends on the specific political and/or cultural context (Ibid.:11; Rosenthal, 1991:5).

 In the fourth principle, it is stated that ‘Realism is aware of the moral significance of political action (Morgenthau, 1948:12). He claims that universal moral principles are not applicable to the actions of states, when formulated as an abstract universal principle. Instead, they should be adapted to the concrete conditions of time and place (Ibid.). Furthermore, he characterized ‘prudence’ as the essential and single moral rule of Classical Realism (Morgenthau, 1948:12; Rosenthal, 1991:5). Morgenthau (1948:12) defines it as ‘the weighing of the consequences of alternative political actions’. According to him, there can never political morality if prudence is absent, thus if the consideration of political actions is absent (Ibid.). Here, the consequentialist character of the approach is unveiled (Rosenthal, 1991:5).

 The fifth principle states that Classical Realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of certain states with universal moral laws (Morgenthau, 1948:12). Thus, it should not be the conviction of one’s own ideology that guides political action. Instead, all states should be viewed as political entities that pursue their interests defined in terms of power ((Krab-Karpowicz, 2010).). It was Morgenthau’s attempt to warn for the tendency of states to be self-righteous of their own policies, as well as arguing that Classical Realism is able to see through the mask of ideology (Rosenthal, 1991:6). The sixth, and last principle, ‘holds that the political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere’ (Morgenthau, 1948:13). Although the political realist is aware of other relevant standards of thoughts, he cannot subject those to that of politics. Here the interests are defined in terms of power (Ibid.).

 Besides these six principles of Realism, Morgenthau (1948:179) also elaborates on the ‘Balance of Power’, which is an ‘… inevitable but essential stabilizing factor in a society of sovereign nations’. He argues that the balance of power is a sort of general principle, with the purpose being to maintain the stability of the system and not destroying the multiple elements that compose the system (Ibid.). There are two underlying assumptions for this. The first being the elements which are being balanced are necessary for the society. The second holds that without this state of balance among the elements, one will gain the upper hand over the others and could ultimately destroy them (Ibid.:181). For domestic politics, there is a system of checks and balances to maintain the balances (Ibid.). For international politics however, there is clearly no such separation or allocation of powers. There are different methods of the balance of power, which are divide and rule, compensations, armaments and alliances (Ibid.:188-93). This could also be important for understanding particular states’ motivations to support a certain position of a different state or not. This particular mechanism is also completely based on the rational assumptions and the individualist ontology of the Classical Realist view.

 The underlying ontology of the theoretical perspective, as also becomes clear from the discussion of the principles, is an individualist and rational one. It is individualist in the sense that states are the basic unit of analysis, and it is rationalist in the sense that a cost-benefit analysis is central for the behavior of the individual states (Fierke, 2013:164). A logic of consequences is followed, meaning that a rational act is an act that will produce an outcome which maximizes the interests of the individual unit (Ibid.).

### 2.2.3 Classical Realist Perspective on Norm Compliance

Having explored the groundwork for Classical Realism by Morgenthau and its main assumptions, we can now discuss its expectations for norm compliance by states. Here, the rational-choice mechanism central to the theory, will be a guiding principle. According to Hathaway (2002:1944) and Elman and Jensen (2014:3), a rational-actor theory is one that assumes that states are rational actors, focused on their own interest, who make cost-benefit analyses of alternative courses of action in international politics and act accordingly. According to Morgenthau (1948) the behavior of states should be understood as having a rational foundation. In his own words, Morgenthau (1948:4) claims that:

‘We put ourselves in the position of a statesmen who must meet a certain problem of foreign policy under certain circumstances and we ask ourselves what the rational alternatives are from which a statesman may choose who must meet this problem under these circumstances … and which of these rational alternatives this particular statesman is likely to choose. It is the testing of this rational hypothesis against the actual facts and their consequences that gives theoretical meaning to the facts’.

With regard to international law and/or norms, one could thus argue that international laws and norms only exist, because it is in the interest of (powerful) states (Hathaway, 2002:1944). Secondly, they will only comply to international law and/or norms when this is also in their own interest. This means that when there is compliance to international and/or norms, it does not occur because the law or norm itself is effective, but because complying to it is concurrent to the own interests of such a state (Ibid.:1945-6).

 Particularly for human rights regimes then, Classical Realists have difficulty in explaining why states would comply to these norms. Realists cannot provide very good explanations for humanitarian intervention. This because the theory emphasizes that states follow geostrategic and/or economic interests (defined in terms of power), while norms within such a regime usually provide no direct benefits for their interests defined in power (Hathaway, 2002:1945-6). In fact, human rights regimes are not known for offering any obvious strategic or material benefits (Ibid.:1938). Given the cost-benefit analysis that a rational state actor would make according to Classical Realism, it is difficult to imagine that a state would accept costs to comply to a human rights regime if this does not positively affect their own interests. Activities such as setting up a human rights regime, surrendering power to such a regime, complying to the requirements of the regime and sanctioning others when there is no compliance to the regime, are thus not usually expected from a Classical Realist perspective (Ibid.). These will only be expected when there is also a benefit for the state’s own interest, if it acts accordingly. This, however, will then thus be explained as coincidence of a state’s interests and the existing regime (Ibid.). It is not expected that a state would change its behavior and deviate from its own interests in response to human rights norms (ibid.:1946). Several questions will thus be guiding the analyses of the case from the Poststructuralist perspective, namely:

* What role do the national preferences or interests of the member states in the UNSC play in the implementation of the R2P-principle in the MONUSCO-mandates between 2010-2015 and what does this mean for the compliance of member states of the UNSC for the R2P-principle for the case of the DRC?

## 2.3 Constructivist Perspective

‘Anarchy is what states make of it’ – Wendt, 1992:395

### 2.3.1 Introduction to the Constructivist Perspective

As illustrated with Classical Realism, during the 1960s and 1970s there were many attempts to build a theory of (international) politics which was based on economics or natural science. Although not very visible, there were still concerns for normative and ideational factors, mostly in the critiques in response to the rationalist theories (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:887). With the end of the Cold War, and the failure of the dominant IR theories to explain this, more questions about the social construction of international politics were asked (Fierke, 2013:162). The first academic attempt undertaken in this line and thereby the first to really introduce ‘Constructivism’ to IR was by Onuf (1989). He attempted to clarify the phenomena that need to be examined in order to understand how we ourselves and the world are made (Willard and Onuf, 1992:146). As a consequence, some speak of a ‘Constructivist Turn’ in IR Theory (Checkel, 1998). Broadly defined, constructivists share a critique of the individualist ontology and materialist assumptions of the traditional IR theories, such as (Neo-)Realism and (Neo-)Liberalism (Fierke, 2013:162). Their critique of these theories is not concerned with what the scholars of those theories say, rather it is with what they ignore, namely the content and sources of the interests of states and the social structure of world politics (Checkel, 1998:324). The weakness of the traditional theories, according to Wendt (1992:425), is the unwillingness to let go of the individualist assumption, which inter alia holds that identities and interests of states are exogenously given. By reaching out to previous theoretical perspectives, such as the English School, and also reaching out to other foundations, such as sociology, constructivists aim at expanding the theoretical discourse within IR (Checkel, 1998:325). While doing so, they do focus on the issue of identity of and interest formation by states, in contrast to the traditional, rational, IR theories (Wendt, 1992:393; Checkel, 1998:325). Thus, the Constructivist perspective does not argue that power and interests are completely irrelevant. Yet, it asks different questions (Finnemore, 1996:3).

 There are two major underlying assumptions that immediately distinguishes Constructivism from the traditional theories. It distinguishes them since it questions the individualist ontology of the traditional theories. The first assumption is that the context in which states (or other actors) act is both social and material. The second is that this environment can provide these actors with understanding of their interests, in other words it can constitute their interests (Checkel, 1998:325). Constructivists thus emphasize a social ontology (Fierke, 2013:164; Checkel, 1998:325; Wendt, 1992:425). From this social ontology, and within the social structure, there is more space for agency of the actors then within the individualist structure. Within the social structure, individual actors, such as states, can influence the environment and can be influenced by it (Fierke, 2013:165). This is idea is captured in Wendt’s (1992) famous article ‘Anarchy is what states make of it’. He argues that relationships between actors are not permanently characterized by enmity and self-interest. Rather, relationships can evolve through a series of interactions and gestures over time. For each actor, there is thus a possibility of choice, however this is not unlimited. Choices remain dependent on the other’s response. The choice is thus existent within a mutually constitutive framework (Wendt, 1992:404-6). Following from this understanding of choice, it is consequently argued that the units within international politics, being states, are not universally rational egoists. Rather, they have different identities shaped by the cultural, political, social and material context in which they act, and can have different relationships with other units (Wendt; 1987; Fierke, 2013:165).

### 2.3.2 Normative Context and its effects

Finnemore (1996:1) argues that the normative context is imperative, since it can shape the conceptions of interests for states and other actors. As already mentioned, interests are also essential for the traditional IR-theories, such as Classical Realism. Yet, there they are viewed as being static and the sources of the interests are not discussed. For Constructivism, the contention is that the international context is normative and shapes the interests of international actors. It does so both systematically and systemically. With the latter it is meant that the normative context operates on a systemic level and thus influences both the origin and effects of norms. This context, and the norms within it, are viewed to be intersubjective. Therefore, the norms stemming from the context are not idiosyncratic, rather they form broad patterns (Ibid.:1-2). Constructivists thus argue that norms are shared understandings of actors which constitute the identities and interests of themselves (Checkel, 1997:473). This view is also held by Finnemore (1996) and Katzenstein (1996). Wendt (1999:96) concurs with this view and states as a central thesis that ‘… the meaning of power and the content of interests are largely a function of ideas’. He goes on by arguing that power and interests presuppose ideas and constitute the material base for power and interests. This is his view of ‘ideas all the way down’ (Ibid.:135).

 Having established that ideas and the normative context matter for the Constructivist perspective, we now move on to what this normative context looks like and how it works more specifically. Also, it makes clear how, for Constructivists, the structure is not permanent, as it is for Realists. Rather, according to Constructivists, the structure can change over time. This overview of Wendt’s (1999) structure is the Social Constructivist groundwork, and the basis for the idea that the normative context matters and how it works.

 According to Wendt (1999:189) cultural structures, i.e. the normative context, are complex in their nature and effects. Therefore, he builds a typology with three distinctions, between the levels on which are organized, respectively micro and macro, between their causal and constitutive effects, and between their effects on behavior and interests (Ibid.:189-90). These will now be discussed. In short, micro-structures, according to Wendt (1999:152) are those that treat structure from the actor’s point of view and macro-structures are those that treat structure from the system’s point of view. The latter does not attempt to explain the behavior of individual actors, whereas the first does. For the micro-structure, Wendt (1999:148) refers to the interaction-level micro-structural theories. These explain outcomes by investigating the relationships between the parts of a system, here states. These states interact when they make take each other into account when they make choices (Ibid.). This interaction is structured by the formation of capabilities, beliefs and strategies of the different states. Their attributes alone cannot explain outcomes of behavior, rather how states interact with each other can (Ibid.). When speaking of outcomes, on the micro-level, behavior of particular states is explained. This is in contrast with the macro-level, which explains the broad patterns of a system as a whole (Ibid.:149). For now, the interest lies with the behavior of specific states, which together form the international community, and how their actions show a particular attitude towards the case of interest. Consequently, the second typology will be discussed. Here, Wendt (1999:165) distinguishes between causal and constitutive effects of structures. In the first there is merely a relation of interaction, whereas in the latter there is a relation that is mutually constitutive (Ibid.:170-1). The first effect holds that there is a change in one state, as a result of change in the state of another state. The second effect explains how the characteristics of another state can make one state what it is (Ibid.:165). For the causal effects, it is argued that the treatment by other actors is what learns a state certain identities and interests. For the constitutive effects, it is argued that identities of states are internally related to the identities of other states.

 Wendt (1999:184-6) emphasizes that structure and agency are equally weighted and that structure does exist, and will only evolve through the agents and their activities. Simultaneously, this process in itself is an effect of the structure (Ibid.:184-6). Because this particular process exists, and can form a culture, the structure is able to change and does not have to be deterministic, as in Realism. This is so because culture itself can be contested and this leaves a possibility for structural change (Ibid.:188). Ultimately, these process can affect behavior the identities and interests of a state, and thus also their behavior (Ibid.). The interaction between state agents produces the international system’s structure, reproduces it, and transforms it. The interaction at any point in time reflects the properties of the states and the structure in which they are in. The interaction process in itself adds the transformative element (Ibid.:366).

 Having explored the main assumptions and the groundwork of Constructivism by Wendt (1999), we can now focus on the mechanisms through which norms work within Constructivism. Since Constructivists argue that norms, culture and ideas matter for state behavior, it is also, according to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) necessary to explore the specific mechanisms through which norms do so. In their work, they introduce the ‘Norm Life Cycle’, which is a patterned way through which norms evolve. Although this focuses mostly on how norms originate, it also sheds some light how the stage of a norm could influence state behavior. Furthermore, they do too specify conditions under which norms are influential (Ibid.:888). Within Constructivism, their ‘Norm Life Cycle’ has attracted much attention and can be considered a major work on norms and compliance to norms. Therefore, a discussion of the argument can help identify more specifically what, from a Constructivist perspective, can be expected state behavior on norm compliance.

 Finnemore and Sikkink (1998:892) argue that the ‘Life Cycle’ of norms is a way of understanding the dynamics of an agreement process to these norms. They investigate the emergence of international norms, the dynamics through which these influence state behavior and under what conditions they will matter (Ibid.:894). In short, they explore how the agreement among a specific amount of actors on an emerging norm could lead to a tipping point. After this tipping point, agreement will become widespread. In order to make that argument, they first argue that they view this process as a two-level process, in which there is a link between national and international norms (Ibid.:893). However, they also emphasize that only in the early stage of the Life Cycle, the national influences are strong and this declines substantially after the institutionalization of the norm on the international level (Ibid.).

 For Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) the norm influence is a process of three distinct stages. This is also shown in Figure 1. The first stage is the ‘Norm Rmergence’, the second is ‘Norm Cascade’ and the third is ‘Internalization’. For the first two, a tipping point is identified, at which a critical amount of relevant states adopt the norm. Change within every stage is dependent on different actors, motives and mechanisms, as shown in Figure 2.



Figure 2. 1 Norm Life Cycle (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:898)



Figure 2. 2 Norm Life Cycle Mechanism (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:898)

In the first stage, norm entrepreneurs try to convince a critical amount of states to embrace the new norm. The central mechanism is thus persuasion by the entrepreneurs (Ibid.:895). Norm entrepreneurs are critical in this stage, since they either create issues or call attention to them. They do so by constructing cognitive frames and try to make these resonate with a larger public, so that it becomes the new way of understanding these issues. While doing so, there are always alternative frames, and there for the new norms must compete with other perceptions (Ibid.:897). The motives of the entrepreneurs can vary immensely per norm. However, Finnemore and Sikkink (Ibid.:898) argue that usually, a reference is made to empathy, ideational commitment and altruism. The platforms used by norm entrepreneurs are usually at the international level. Some are constructed specifically for that norm, such as many non-governmental organizations (NGOs), others are existing international organizations with larger agendas (Ibid.:899). These platforms usually have much influence, since they are known for their information and expertise on particular topics (Ibid.). The UN, although not necessarily committed to norm promotion, does have the recourses and leverage to attempt to change the normative ideas of (weak) states. This does not have to be done through reason only, but can also be attempted through moral beliefs and empathy (Ibid.:900). The tipping point in this stage, is when a critical amount of states has been persuaded and adopt the new norms. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998:901) argue that usually, before one third of the states in the system has adopted the norm, is critical amount necessary for this tipping point to occurs. Furthermore, they argue that it matters ‘which state’ adopts the norm, since some are critical and others are not. Critical states are those without which the achievement of the norm goal will probably fail (Ibid.).

 In the second stage the norm leaders, being the first states who have embraced the new norm, try to socialize the other states and make them follow their example. Here, the central mechanism is thus the imitation of the norm leaders’ behavior by the following states (Ibid.895). It is also referred to as the ‘contagion’ effect, in which the international influences of the norm become more relevant that the domestic politics of norm (change). But, ‘contagion’ suggests a passive mechanism, whereas Finnemore and Sikkink speak of a more active process, namely the socialization process (Ibid.:902). On the international level, socialization entails diplomatic criticism or praise, which can be strengthened through (material) sanctions and incentives. This can be done by states and NGOs or other international networks (Ibid.). Ultimately, states will be socialized for reasons related to their own identity as a member of the international system. At the tipping point of this stage, sufficient states, and sufficient critical states, endorse the norm and by doing so, the appropriate behavior for the identity of a state will be redefined (Ibid.:902). Different motives for this behavior are identified, namely the will to raise international legitimation, the pressure for conformity, and the will of the norm leaders to elevate their self-esteem (Ibid.:895). International legitimation is relevant, since it reflects on the government’s national basis of legitimation, which affects the consent of its citizens and the ability to remain in power (Ibid.:903). Conformity is, according to Axelrod (1986:1105) the social proof, which proves that states comply to the norms and show that they have adapted to the environment, therefore proving that they belong in the environment. Self-esteem is related to the concepts of legitimacy and conformity, since it assumes that leaders act in a certain way so that others think well about them, or they think well about themselves (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:903). This is also confirmed by Fearon (1997), who argues that norm following can be explained by the desire to gain pride or esteem, or to defend the pride or esteem.

 After this stage, in the third and last stage, there occurs norm internalization. This holds that the norms acquire the states of a ‘taken-for-granted’ issue and are no longer debated (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:895). This status makes these norms very powerful, since the behavior expected from this norm will no longer be questioned (Ibid.:904). Both professions and habits are essential contributions to the consolidation, universalization and further internalization of the new norm, after the last tipping point of the norm cascade (Ibid.:905). Professions matter, because they actively socialize citizens in certain values above other values. Habits are imperative, since it new habits can create procedural changes and consequently new political processes. This can lead to normative, ideational and political convergence (Ibid.).

 Ultimately, from this ‘Life Cycle’ framework and further Constructivist literature, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998:906) also explore under which conditions norms will be influential. They identify three specific conditions, namely legitimation, prominence and the intrinsic characteristics of the norm (Ibid.:906-8). With legitimation, they explicitly make the link to domestic and international politics. They namely argue that especially when the legitimacy of national elites is threatened, states may enhance their legitimacy by conforming to international norms (Ibid.). This idea can also be found in the work of Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990). Furthermore, when states are insecure about their position on the international level, they might also be more inclined to conform to the new norm, since it could enhance their reputation (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:906). This is idea is also supported by Gurowitz (1997) in his work on Japan and Germany. Secondly, they argue that prominence of norms is an important factor for the influence of a norm. This idea is introduced by Florini (1996), who argued that prominence of a norm is imperative for its spread to the (international) system. Thus, when a norm is supported by a state which is generally thought of as successful, are more likely to diffuse in the international system (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:906). Third, and last, it is argued that the intrinsic characteristics of the norm matter for its influence. The argument holds that several claims or qualities of a norm can influence its influence (Ibid.:906). Here, a divide is thus made between its claims, or content, and the qualities, or clarity and specificity. For the claims, or content, of the norms, various arguments are made. Boli and Thomas (1998) argue that there are five characteristics matter for world culture, namely world citizenship, individualism, universalism, rational progress and voluntarist authority. Consequently, norms that sustain these characteristics are expected to be more influential (Ibid.; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:907). In a similar way, Crawford (1993) argues that humanizing and moral progress are content-related characteristics that are more likely to underpin influential norms. More specifically, Keck and Sikkink (1998) argue that characteristics such as bodily integrity and harm and legal equality of opportunity are more influential. Regarding the qualities of the norm, it is argued that specific and clear norms, which are already around for a certain period, are more likely to be influential than those who are complex and vague (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:906).

### 2.3.3 Constructivist Perspective on Norm Compliance

Having explored the underlying ontology for Constructivism which gives prevalence to social relations instead of individualist drives, the importance and effects of the normative context for state behavior and the mechanisms of the ‘norm life cycle’ through which norms can influence world politics, we can now derive expectations for norm compliance from the Constructivist perspective.

 From the main assumptions of Constructivism, it can be derived that it has an underlying social ontology (Fierke, 2013:164; Checkel, 1998:326; Wendt, 1992:425). The main assumptions namely hold that that the context in which states act is social and material and that this environment can provide understanding of their interests, and can constitute their interests (Checkel, 1998:325). Consequently, Constructivism holds a different logic for state behavior than Realism, in which a logic of consequences is followed. For Constructivists, a logic of appropriateness is followed. A ‘rational’ choice to make is a function of legitimacy, which is defined by the shared values and norms in the social context (Fierke, 2013:164). Checkel (1997:blz) argues that, as agents learn new values and interests from the normative context, their behavior will be guided by the logic of appropriateness. According to him, this is what lies at the heart of Constructivism. Here, it is thus once more emphasized how the normative context, i.e. the social context, matters, as also became clear in the groundwork for Constructivism by Wendt (1999). In this work, the dynamics of this context are outlined, as discussed above, and it is argued that it both affects and constitutes identities and interests of states (Ibid.). This is more specifically explored through the work by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) on the ‘Norm Life Cycle’, in which the specific dynamics for the emergence and influence of norms are discussed.

 From the discussion of the Constructivist perspective and the Constructivist ‘Norm Life Cycle’, one can derive the following expectations for state behavior and the compliance to international norms. First of all, the normative context matters for both emergence and compliance to international norms. This context is what inspires the logic of appropriateness, and this logic is guiding for state behavior. Second, there are specific mechanisms that influence the emergence of a norm, namely the persuasion by norm entrepreneurs for the emergence, the imitation and socialization of states for the cascade and the institutionalization for the internalization of norms (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). Third, there are specific conditions under which these norms will be more influential, namely when they states are insecure about their domestic as well as their international position, when the norms are supported by states who are perceived as being successful, and when they are clear and specific, and related to moral progress and bodily harm (Ibid.). Ultimately, the stage in which a norm is, is fundamental for understanding whether or not states are likely to comply to it. Also, the conditions of the norm itself, are also fundamental for compliance. Thus, when a norm is in the third stage of the ‘Norm Life Cycle’, and has beneficial conditions, it can be expected that states will comply to the international norm. When a norm is not yet in this stage, the specific mechanisms of the earlier stages, and the conditions of the norm, can be helpful in explaining whether or not a state is likely to comply to that norm or not. Several questions will thus be guiding the analyses of the case from the Constructivist perspective, namely:

* In what stage (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998) can we consider the Responsibility to Protect principle to be in as an international norm and what does this mean for the compliance of states in the UNSC to this norm?
* What are the conditions of the norm itself and what does this mean for the compliance of states in the UNSC to this norm?

## 2.4 Poststructuralist Perspective

**‘**Il n’y a pas de hors-texte’ / There is no outside-text (Derrida, 1967)

### 2.4.1. Introduction to Poststructuralism

The Poststructuralist perspective is one that originates from prior, elaborate debates in social science, and is closely related to critical theory and post-colonialism (Campbell and Bleiker, 2013:199). Poststructuralism is a different philosophical domain, which is related to structuralism, modernity and postmodernity (Ibid.:205). It are specific events, such as the Vietnam war, the Algerian war, demands for civil, women and environmental rights, and economic justice, in this period that have influenced the perspective. According to Deleuze (1988:150), these events are components of an international movement which is related to the emergence of new struggles to the production of new subjectivity. With this it is meant that, these new struggles are no longer concerned with liberation of a universal human kind from the constraints imposed upon him by society, as in the early 20th century. Rather, they are concerned with a redefinition of political subjectivity, granted the globalizing forms of capitalism (Campbell and Bleiker, 2013:205). Within this new context, Poststructuralists have essential things to claim about the concept of identity in politics.

### 2.4.2 Poststructuralism and the discursive struggle

So far, the debate outlined is between the Realist and Constructivist perspective, which focus respectively on an individualist and rational ontology and an social ontology. Although they thus differ ontologically, they share an epistemologist standpoint. They namely both underline a positivist epistemological view, which, according to Wendt (1999:38) holds that they view science as being able to objectively perceive reality, and that it is possible to gain a progressive and truer understanding of how the world works objectively. The positivist view is based on the empiricist theory of knowledge, which holds that experience is the sole legitimate source of knowledge (Campbell and Bleiker, 2013:201). Here, ‘experience’ is defined as ‘direct sensory access to an external reality comprising material things’ (Wendt, 1999:38.). It thus views knowledge as being derived from a relation between a certain subject, the one who knows, and a certain object, that what is known (Ibid.). By contrast, post-positivists don’t acknowledge this privileged epistemic view on science in explaining the world ‘out there’ (Ibid.). Post-positivists instead argue that everything we see ‘out there’ is in fact conditioned by how we see this, and thereby emphasize the imperativeness of the interpretative and constitutive processes in social life (Ibid.:90). By doing so, it thus challenges the validity of the positivist epistemology (Campbell and Bleiker, 2013:202). Poststructuralists’ perspective underlines the post-positivist epistemological view. By doing so, they thus enter the debate on a different level, the meta-theoretical level, critiquing both the Realist and Constructivist positivist standpoint. Here, Realism and Constructivism are thus juxtaposed against Postrstructuralism, respectively being positivist versus post-positivist. Some however argue that Constructivists instead holds the middle-ground, between the Realists and the Poststructuralists. When Onuf (1989) first coined the term Constructivism, he did refer to a variety of post-positivist perspectives, which all offered critiques on the static assumptions of the traditional Realist assumptions. Later, there was some contestation between different Constructivists. The conventional Constructivists however, among which is also Alexander Wendt (1999), don’t reject the scientific assumptions of positivist science. In Checkel’s (1998:327) words, ‘the quarrel with rationalists is not epistemological, but ontological. This view is also supported by Katzenstein et al. (1998:675). Since these are the texts used in the earlier discussion of Constructivism, they will for now be sided with the Positivists, and thus the Realists, on an ontological standpoint. This consequently means that the Poststructuralist perspective does not fit easily with the traditional IR-theories, characterized by the different paradigms in the great debates. Also, it usually is viewed not as theory, but as a critical attitude.

 Essentially, the Postructuralist claims that there is no distinction between theory and practice, which the traditional IR-theories discussed above, do. Rather they claim that theory is practice in itself (Campbell and Bleiker, 2013:198). It is not occupied with the creation of a new paradigm through which the world can be understood. Instead, it is a critical approach that calls attention to issues of importance for global affairs, such as representation, the relation between knowledge and power and politics of identity (Ibid.).

 Among the first writers that have contributed to the Poststructuralist perspective are Deleuze, Derrida and Foucault. Foucault explored the ethos he called the ‘limit attitude’, in which he is concerned with the limits that give meaning to our thoughts and practices. This limit attitude involves the questioning of these limits, through contestation and negotiation of these limits (Campbell and Bleiker, 2013:206). Poststructuralism is inherently critical. However, Foucault argues that this positive rather than negative. In his words: ‘A critique is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are. It is a matter of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions … the practices that we accept, rest’ (Foucault, 1988:154). Furthermore, he was mostly concerned with the constitution of the subject, the human being, which he believed to be historical (Foucault, 1979). In Foucault’s terms, it is called ‘disciplinary power’, power that produces a certain political subject (Ibid.). Poststructuralists aim at understanding the different exclusions that lead to a constitution of the world as it is (Campbell and Bleiker, 2013:208). This essentially involves discourse.

 Disciplinary power, and the consequent conception of identity and subjectivity, occur within discourse (Campbell and Bleiker, 2013:208). Campbell and Bleiker (2013:208) define discourse as ‘a specific series of representations and practices through which meanings are produced, identities constituted, social relations established and political and ethical outcomes made more or less possible’. For Norval and Stavrakakis (2000:4) discourse is ‘a social and political construction that establishes a system of relations between different objects and practices, while providing positions with which social agents can identity’. In both definitions, it is pointed out that (social) relations are established through discourse, and that positions and/or options are made (more or less) possible through discourse. Here, exclusion, as already hinted towards through the texts of Foucault, becomes relevant again. The constitution of the identities of the subject and options available to them through discourse, always involves the exclusion of other options and positions (Ibid.:6).

 Poststructuralists argue that discourse is performative, which means it constitutes the subject of which they speak (Campbell and Bleiker, 2013:209). However, they do not argue that materiality has no significance. Rather, as is argued by Laclau and Mouffe (1985:108) subjects and objects *can* exist externally (to thought), but it is denied that these could also be constituted outside of any discursive conditions for their emergence. With this view of discourses as being performative, it is possible to move away from the idea of ‘social construction’ towards the ‘materialization’ of discourse. Butler (1993:9-12) argues that this materialization holds that discourse stabilizes over time and produces the effect of fixity and boundaries. This is central to discourse theory, which investigates social practices and the way it forms identities of subjects through the articulation of signifying elements discursively. Here too, it is emphasized that social identities are always contingent, however some fixations of meaning are possible (Norval and Stavrakakis, 2000:10). Now, it will be explored how this materialization of discourse takes place, and thus, in what way discourse can influence the options or positions available to the actors. Especially the work of Laclau and Mouffe (1985) is of major importance for this discussion.

 According to Laclau and Mouffe (1985:105-6) there are four categories that account for the identity of a certain discourse, namely articulation, elements, moments and nodal points. They argue that discourse comes about through the (re)articulation of elements. Articulation, according to them, is the ‘establishment of a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory process’ (Ibid.). Moments are the different positions that seem to be articulated within a certain discourse and elements are the differences that are not articulated through discourse (Ibid.). In order to establish a specific discourse (somewhat fixed), it is thus necessary to have a transition from the elements into moments. This involves nodal points, which account for this structural transition. These are ‘points de capiton’, or reference points, that bind together a specific system of signification (Ibid.; Norval and Stavrakakis, 2000:11). This is the discursive structuration of identity. Following, the constitution of this structuration will be discussed, which takes place in political dimensions, according to Laclau and Mouffe (1985). Here, the concept of social antagonism is imperative. Antagonisms show the limits in society where a social meaning is contested and consequently, not stable. It are these limits that show points where a particular identity of a certain discourse is no longer fixed, rather it is contested by forces who are at the limit of that order (Howarth, 1984:274-6; Norval, 1997). This construction of antagonisms and the establishment of the frontiers between different forces are constitutive of the discourse itself.

 So far, it is discussed what accounts for the identity of a specific discourse. Now, it will be discussed how this relates to the positions of a subject, an actor. Laclau and Mouffe (1985:114) distinguish between subject positions and political subjectivity. The subject position is the positioning of a subject within a discursive structure, and implies that any subject can have several different positions, and is thus not a subject with a fixed set of interests. Consequently, it is argued that the actions of a subject come about through the contingency of the discursive structure, in which different positions can be taken and through which the subject acquires its identity (Ibid.; Norval and Stavrakakis, 2000:19). This involves dislocation, which is the process through which the contingency of the discursive structures becomes visible (Ibid.). This process thus both threatens (existing) identities, but also forms the basis for the constitution of new ones. This because dislocation disrupts discourses on the one hand, but also create a lack of meaning which stimulates new discursive structure (Ibid.:20). When dislocation occurs then, and there is a lack of meaning in the structure, there is an emergence of political subjectivity. This because the lack of structure induces the subjects to identify with emerging social constructions. If stabilized, these political subjectivities become the subject positions which will cause individual subjects to have certain characteristics and attributes (Ibid.:21). This is where the concept of hegemony becomes relevant, since hegemonic practices are considered to be a form of political activity which concerns the articulation of several identities and subjectivities into one project. The hegemonic formation is the outcome of such a project, which aims at the creation of a new social order from several dislocated elements. This hegemonic practice requires two conditions, according to Laclau and Mouffe (1985:136), namely the existence of antagonistic forces and the instability of political lines that separates them.

 So far, it is clear that for Poststructuralism, discourse is of major relevance. Following simply from the definitions of discourse, it is clear that discourse can establish relations but can also influence which options or positions are more or less possible for several actors. Also, it viewed as being performative, so it not only affects the subject, but also constitutes it. Lastly, it becomes materialized as it stabilized over time and can produce certain boundaries, and the discursive framework by Laclau and Mouffe (1985) offers a mechanism of how this materialization of discourse takes place, and how, eventually, a hegemonic formation of one discourse is the outcome.

### 2.4.3 Postructuralist Perspective on Norm Compliance

Having explored the underlying epistemological discussion for Poststructuralism, the importance of discourse and its effects on states’ identities and positions, we can now derive expectations for norms compliance from the Poststructuralist perspective.

 First of all, it is necessary to emphasize once again that Postrstructuralism is not so much a theory of IR, but rather an approach to IR. It offers a critique on the dominant IR theories’ positivist epistemology and distinguishes itself with an post-positivist epistemology. This position argues that what we observe ‘out there’ is actually conditioned by the way we see this, and thus emphasize the essentiality of the interpretative and constitutive processes in social life. This is, as discussed already, very much in line with the aims of Poststructuralism and the importance pointed to discourse. The main aim of Poststructuralism namely is the understanding of the different exclusions that lead to the constitution of the world as it is (Campbell and Bleiker, 2013:208). This then immediately involves discourse, since they too claim that the conception of identity and subjectivity occurs within discourse and that it is performative. It is performative in the sense that it constitutes the subject of which it speaks (Ibid.). The more specific mechanism of discourse and its effect on states’ positions and identities is elaborated more broadly by Laclau and Mouffe (1985), as discussed above.

 Although I have not been able to find any articles that specifically research norm compliance from a Poststructuralist perspective, it does seem to offer a useful approach for this exercise, since it provides a different understanding of why states choose particular positions in IR and opt for certain behavior. It could thus help investigate state behavior such as to intervene in a conflict or not, or more specifically to overstep some state’s sovereignty or not. To understand the underlying discursive mechanisms at work, one can call upon the previously discussed framework by Laclau and Mouffe (1985). Ultimately, the existence of a hegemonic formation, or prevailing discourse, on a certain conflict, which emerges from the articulation of several identities and subjectivities into one project, and aims at the creation of a new social order (Ibid.:136). This will only occur under the conditions of antagonistic forces and the instability of political borders that divides them (Ibid.). Thus, by examining the discursive articulations for the conflict of interest, one can explain how certain states’ identities and positions could be shaped for that conflict. Therefore, one can also explain why a certain state would show compliant or non-compliant behavior for that specific conflict. The following question will thus be guiding the analysis of the case from the Poststructuralist perspective, namely:

* What is the prevailing discourse for the ongoing conflict in the DRC within the international community and what does this mean for the compliance of states in the UNSC to this norm?

## 2.5 Conclusion

So far, the debate between three distinct theoretical approaches is outlined, respectively Realism, Constructivism and Poststructuralism. As already mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, it was not aimed for to give a complete overview of the entire theoretical perspective. Rather, it was aimed for to show how the three perspectives engage in a debate with each other, what their main assumptions are and how these are important for their view on norm compliance.

 By discussing their different underlying ontologies, epistemologies and assumptions, as well as their specific view on norm compliance throughout the text, a range of different important dynamics has been identified and specific questions have been formulated from each perspective. These questions will be guiding the analysis of the case and will set the scope for the dynamics that will investigated and used to possibly explain the outcome, the resistant attitude of the international community towards the implementation of the third pillar of the R2P-principle in the DRC. For Realists, the interests defined in terms of power, often material, are identified as important. For Constructivists, it are the shared ideas, the normative context and specific stages and conditions under which certain norms matter. For Poststructuralists, it is the discursive structure and hegemony formation of such a discourse that is relevant for a states’ position and identity.

# 3. Methodology

## 3.1 Introduction

In this chapter the methodological tools that will be used for the investigation of the research question, more specifically the sub-questions for each theoretical perspective as laid out in the previous chapter, will be presented. It will be discussed why an in-depth case study research design is chosen, why the case of the DRC will be chosen and what method will be used for what reason. Also the advantages, biases and challenges for these methods will be discussed.

## 3.2 Method

For this research question, a qualitative research design is chosen. It entails a single case study for the DRC. By doing a qualitative, single case study it is possible to study the particular case in-depth and have attention for case-specific details as well as the causal mechanism at play. In social sciences, a known method that is very well able to get close to the causal mechanism is process-tracing (Beach and Pederson, 2013; Bennet, 2008; Checkel 2008; George and Bennet, 2005).. For this reason, this process-tracing method is chosen for answering this research question. Process-tracing ‘attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and mechanism- between an independent variable(s) and the outcome of the dependent variable (George and Bennet, 2005:206; Beach and Pederson, 2013:1). The focus is thus put on the causal mechanism, which Glennan (1996:52) defines as ‘a complex system which produces an outcome by the interaction of a number of parts’. By investigating this, one is enabled to go a step beyond studying causal relations and instead is able to locate the intermediate factors at play, by tracing the single steps of the causal mechanism between the cause and the ultimate effect (Gerring, 2007:45)

Process-tracing methods are usually tools to study causal mechanisms in single-case research (Beach and Pederson, 2013:2). They are commonly used when one wants to expand one’s understanding of a causal relationship (Ibid.:5). George and Bennet (2005:210-12) discuss how there are different forms of process-tracing used in practice. They mention that there are is a variety of ways of doing process-tracing, that ranges from a detailed case-specific study with explicit causal hypotheses to a rather general explanation for a specific case. However, they do treat process-tracing as a single method, despite the different used forms (Ibid.). Beach and Pederson (2013:10-22) have a different view and argue that there are in fact three different ways of process-tracing, each with its own research purpose. These different forms are theory-testing, theory-building and explaining-outcome (Ibid.). What differentiates the three different forms of process-tracing are (1) whether they are case- or theory-centric, (2) whether they aim at to build or test a theorized causal mechanism and (3) their understanding of a the generality of causal mechanisms, whether these are systemic of case-specific (Ibid.:13). For theory-testing process-tracing, the purpose of the analysis is to find evidence that a causal mechanism, provided by theory, exists. Here, the causal mechanism is considered to be systematic, thus generalizable within the context. In theory-building process-tracing, the purpose is to build a plausible causal mechanism. Here too, the causal mechanism is viewed as systematic. Both these variants of process-tracing are theory-centric and trace a single, generalizable mechanism. As already briefly mentioned in the previous chapter, there is no theory-centric purpose in this research, but rather a case-centric purpose. Namely, the theoretical perspectives are viewed as useful tools that can possibly provide causal mechanisms that could explain the puzzling outcome of the DRC-case. Furthermore, there is no ambition to make any generalizable claims from this research. Rather, the ambition is to explain the outcome for this particular case and assess the contributions made by the theoretical perspectives. The process-tracing variant best qualified to assess this is the explaining-outcome process-tracing. This variant is usually employed by scholars when they prioritize to explain the outcome of a certain case, and who want to make an assessment of a theoretical perspectives’ ability to account for an outcome (Ibid.:66). This is precisely the purpose and ambition of the central research question, and therefore the explaining-outcome variant of process-tracing will be employed.

This process-tracing method aims at explaining a particularly puzzling outcome by crafting a sufficient explanation for the outcome (Ibid.:11). Minimal sufficiency is defined as ‘an explanation that accounts for an outcome, with no redundant parts’ (Ibid.:63). It can be considered a single-outcome study, that seeks the causes of a particular outcome in one case (Ibid.:18, Gerring, 2006). The research purpose of this variant of process-tracing is to find out what mechanismic explanation can account for the particular outcome of that case (Beach and Pederson, 2013:12). It is thus case-centric. This case-centric approach usually assumes that the world is complex, context-specific and multi-factored and that the production of generalizable knowledge is difficult (Ibid.:12-3). Therefore, the ambition of this variant of process-tracing is limited to account for the particularly puzzling outcome of a particular case. It also assumes a different role for theory than the theory-centric process-tracing methods. Instead of aiming at proving whether a theory is correct or not, the ambition is to prove the utility of a theory in providing the best possible explanation. Theory is thus used in a more pragmatic manner, namely as an instrument with analytical utility that can possibly provide the best explanation for a particular outcome (Ibid.:13). Furthermore, it is usually necessary to involve case-specific parts in the causal mechanism, and therefore the explanation cannot be detached from the specific case and outcome (Ibid.:19). Given the complexity and duration of the conflict of chosen case, it is expected that case-specific details might also be relevant for the answering this research question. The mechanism that is being traced is thus not a single, generalizable mechanism, but instead, a case-specific, composite mechanism that explains the outcome of the case (Ibid.:21).

Within explaining-outcome process-tracing there are two different paths that can be followed, namely the inductive or deductive path. Usually, the inductive path is chosen only after the deductive path has provided no satisfying results, or when there is a little-studied outcome (Ibid.:20). In this research design, a deductive path is followed. This path is chosen, because, as clear from the research question, there are multiple different theoretical perspectives that have hypotheses concerning the outcome of the specific case. It is thus not a little-studied outcome. With this deductive path, it can be assessed what the contribution of these theoretical perspectives is and if and how they can help explain the outcome. This path holds that several steps will be undertaken. The first step is to conceptualize a theory as a mechanism. The second step is to develop empirical tests and evaluate whether these take place by holding them against the empirical record. The last and third step is to assess whether the explanation is sufficient to account for the particular outcome has been developed (Ibid.:19). There are no specific criteria to assess the ‘sufficiency’ of the explanation, rather it will be assessed whether the evidence for the causal mechanism is convincing and whether it can explain the outcome.

## 3.3 Case Selection

As already noted, explaining-outcome process-tracing is more a case-centric study instead of a theory-centric study (Beach and Pederson, 2013:156). This holds that the case selection strategies for explaining-outcome process-tracing are particularly driven by a great interest in one specific, puzzling outcome. However, this does not necessarily mean that there is no interest in accounting for outcomes across other cases as well (Ibid:160).

 In general, Beach and Pederson (2013:160-1) claim that for explaining-outcome process-tracing studies, the selection of a case is inspired by it having an interesting and puzzling outcome, which is considered to be both ‘…substantively and theoretically important’. As immediately clear from the research question, the chosen case for this study is the DRC. Already in the first chapter, it is argued that the case in question provides a puzzling outcome. This because one could expect a certain outcome to occur, namely the implementation of (the Third Pillar of the) R2P-principle by the international community, i.e. the UNSC, yet this does not occur in practice. This would be the expected outcome, given the implications of the mandate of the R2P-principle, and the ongoing human rights violations in the DRC and failure of the DRC government, even in assistance with the International Community, to protect the population. Instead, it seems that the mandate, without any specific reference to the R2P-principle itself, is based on the notion of the second pillar of the R2P-principle. This is what makes the outcome of this specific case, puzzling. This puzzling character of the case fits with the explaining-outcome variant of process-tracing, since there is focus on the puzzling outcome, and not so much with the puzzling discrepancy between distinct theories.

 Having established that this case presents a particularly puzzling outcome, one can identify this case as an influential case. The influential case is, according to Gerring (2008:657) one that casts doubts upon a theoretical explanation, because of its puzzling outcome, and therefore requires closer investigation. This closer investigation could subsequently reveal that a theory is validated, possibly slightly altered, and thus the case itself is in line with the general model of that theory. Otherwise, it could also disconfirm a theory (Ibid.). Although the aim of this research is to explain to the outcome of the puzzling case, it also aimed for to assess the contributions made by different theoretical perspectives for the explanation. This is thus still in line with the aim of testing whether this case is in in line with the general model of a theory. With the chosen deductive variant the explaining-outcome variant of process-tracing, this is exactly what will be done. As shown in the previous chapter, there are different theoretical perspectives, with distinct mechanisms and diverging expectations for a possible explanation for the specific outcome in this case. By using all three of these theoretical perspectives to attempt to explain the outcome, one can learn whether any of these can account for the outcome, either together or singularly, or whether the case disconfirms the theoretical perspectives all together.

## 3.4 Operationalization of causal mechanisms

As noted, the deductive variant of explaining-outcome process-tracing requires one to conceptualize the causal mechanism of a theory and to test empirically whether this takes place, and assess whether a minimal sufficient causal mechanism can be developed. In order to do so, the expectations for the case of the DRC provided by the different theoretical perspectives, as outlined in the previous chapter, will now be conceptualized in specific causal mechanisms per perspective. To trace whether the causal mechanism provided by each theoretical perspective contributes to the outcome, the questions per perspective, as formulated in the previous chapter, will be answered.

### 3.4.1 Classical Realist causal mechanism

From the Classical Realist perspective on norm compliance, and following its expectation for compliance to implementation of the (third pillar of the) R2P-principle for the case of the DRC, the following causal mechanism can be drawn up:

States will not comply to the implementation of (the third pillar of) the R2P-principle for the case of the DRC, if this is not in line with their own interest (military, geostrategic or economic).

The logic of consequences, and thus states’ behaviour, is guided by cost-benefit analysis

States are rational actors and follow a logic of consequences

States will comply to international norms when it is in their own interest

### 3.4.2 Constructivist causal mechanism

From the Constructivist perspective on norm compliance, and following its expectation for compliance to implementation of the (third pillar of the) R2P-principle for the case of the DRC, the following causal mechanism can be drawn up:

States will be less likely to comply to the implementation of the (third pillar of the) R2P-principle for the case of the DRC, when the norm is not situated within the third stage and when there are no beneficial conditions (as outlined in under 2.4.3)

The stage in which a norm is situated within the normative context, as well as the conditions of the norm, influences the compliance to the norm

The logic of appropriateness, and thus states’ behaviour is guided by the normative context

States follow a logic of appropriateness

### 3.4.3 Poststructuralist causal mechanism

From the Poststructuralist perspective on norm compliance, and following its expectation for compliance to implementation of the (third pillar of the) R2P-principle for the case of the DRC, the following causal mechanism can be drawn up:

States will not comply to the implementation of the (third pillar of the) R2P-principle for the case of the DRC, when this is not in line with the prevailing discourse on the DRC-conflict

A hegemonic formation on a conflict situation creates a new social order and thereby influences the positions and behaviour of states

Discourse is performative and constitutes the subject of which it speaks

States’ behaviour is influenced by discourse

## 3.5 Data collection

For the execution of this research design different data will be used. First, there will be made use of existing academic and non-academic literature (UN reports) on the specific topic to identify the role of interests (military, geostrategic and economically) of states in the UNSC. Furthermore, semi-structured interviews will be used to assess what the role of these interests are in the UNSC concerning the implementation of the R2P-principle in the MONUSCO-mandate. Second, a discourse analysis of non-academic literature (UN reports) will be executed to identify in which stage the R2P-principle can be situated (according to Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). Also, existing academic and non-academic literature (UN reports) will be used to analyze under which conditions the norm operates. Third, a discourse analysis of existing non-academic literature will be executed to assess what the prevailing discourse for the DRC-conflict is within the international community. Both of the discourse analyses will be supplemented with insights from in-depth interviews with experts on the UN or the DRC.

 However, it could be the case that some grey literature will also be used, because of a lack of availability of data. Considering that the UN published the ‘Mapping Exercise Report’ (OHCHR, 2010) in 2010, in which the human rights violations and atrocities committed in the DRC were reported, the data that will be collected will be from post-2010. This because, from 2010 it can be assumed that the international community, including the UNSC member states, were all well-aware of the ongoing human rights violations in the DRC, yet still showed a resistant attitude in implementing the third pillar of the R2P-principle.

 There are some advantages, weaknesses and possible biases that need to be discussed for the methods of in-depth interviews and discourse analysis. An advantage of the use of in-depth interviews is that these can provide, especially next to content- and discourse analysis, information on motivations or preferences for certain outcomes. There are, however, also certain weaknesses. One could question the reliability and validity of the data, since these could be subjective accounts by the interviewee or subjectively interpreted by the interviewer, and the interviewee could have an interest in shaping the results a certain way. A possible solution is to include to full transcriptions of each interview to allow the reader to assess the information deduced from the interview. Furthermore, interviews tend to encompass complex answers, which could be bad for the aim of parsimonious explanations. A possibly solution to this is to ask specific questions that direct the interviewee to respond concretely. Both of these efforts are undertaken to account for the subjectivity. Lastly, the accessibility is also a problematic issue. It might prove difficult to gain access to respondents that are willing to cooperate. The other method is, as mentioned, discourse analysis. An advantage of discourse analysis is that it is very accessible in its use. Furthermore, it possible to collect much data. A weakness, or bias, is the subjective interpretation of the researcher. A possible solution to this would be to have a second coder and account for the inter-coder reliability. Also, a possible solution to this would be to include the discourse analyses files, so that the reader can assess the information deduced from the interview. This latter effort will be undertaken to account for the possible subjectivity.

# 4. Analysis

## 4.1 Introduction

In this section the three distinct analyses, the Realist, Constructivist and Poststructuralist, will be executed and discussed in that order. It will be analyzed and traced whether, and in what way, the causal mechanisms, as discussed in the theoretical framework and the methodological section, is present in the DRC.

## 4.2 Realist analysis

For the Realist analysis, it will be traced whether and in what way interests of the international community, i.e. the UN and its member states, play a role in their resistant attitude towards the DRC conflict and the implementation of the R2P-principle for the period of 2010-2015. In summary, from the Realist perspective it is expected, as outlined in the theoretical framework and methodology section, that states will not comply to the implementation of the (third pillar of the) R2P-principle for the case of the DRC, when it is not in their own interest to do so. First, it will be discussed in what way states’ interests play a role in the UNSC, and specifically in the UNSC with regard to the R2P-principle. Next, it will be discussed in what way states’ interests play a role in (the execution of) the MONUSCO-mandate for the DRC conflict.

 Ultimately, it will be argued that from the Realist analysis it can be deduced that although there are clear indications that national preferences or interests of (member) states can play a role in the decision-making (in the UNSC) for humanitarian interventions, such as R2P, this argument cannot be convincingly applied to the case of the MONUSCO-mandate for the DRC conflict. Both the political support from all UNSC member states for each of the mandates, as well the financial and material requirements that are met by all the contributing countries, do not point to any strategic or fiscal restraints motivated by own preferences or interests.

### 4.2.1 States’ interests in the UNSC (and the R2P-principle)

There seem to be several states’ interests that do matter when decisions in the UNSC are made. More specifically, strategic and financial interests are considered to influence certain positions or attitudes of member states concerning specific issues. Prof. Dr. Jan Pronk, who was an UN special representative in Sudan from 2004 to 2006, expressed that, when answering the question of why member states hold a certain position or attitude towards a specific issue, it could depend on the specific situation in a country and their relationship with that country, or even with their relationship with other members of the UNSC, and the different views held by the members (Pronk, 2017). A specific example of the relation with a nation in conflict and a UNSC member affecting a policy decision, is reported by Bannon (2006:1160). He suggests that China, having ties to the government of Sudan and a permanent seat in the UNSC, opposed the implementation of coercive measures, such as sanctions. Consequently, it took two years after the first violence erupted before the first Council resolution was accepted in which direct action against the human rights perpetrators was passed (Ibid.) Furthermore, Pronk also discussed how currently, various countries want to tackle worldwide issues ‘on the cheap’, and then mentions the examples of climate change, refugees, peace and food supply as specific issues (Pronk, 2017). This would imply that states would want to restrain their (financial) investments in solutions and/or responses for these various issues. His account of how both strategic as well as financial interests could play a role in UNSC decisions, is also confirmed in several of the General Assembly (GA) reports (GA and UNSC, 2011; 2014; 2015) on the R2P-principle. The following quotes from these reports demonstrate this confirmation:

* ‘Politics, profits, and national interests come into play at the regional and sub-regional levels, just as they do in the deliberations of inter-governmental bodies at the United Nations.’ (GA and UNSC, 2011:8)
* ‘However, a legacy of tension or the presence of political or economic interests may, in some cases, limit the positive role of neighbouring States or contribute to greater instability.’ (GA and UNSC, 2014:7)
* ‘The [non-]implementation of the responsibility to protect coincides with a climate of fiscal restraint in many countries…’ (GA and UNSC, 2014:18)
* ‘The Security Council has too often failed to live up to its global responsibility, allowing narrower strategic interests to impede consensus and preclude a robust collective response.’ (GA and UNSC, 2015:13)
* ‘It also demands that the protection of populations be elevated above more particular political and strategic interests.’ (GA and UNSC, 2015:16)

Furthermore, several academics have eluded on this issue as well, discussing the involvement of national preferences or interests as one of the challenges in relation to the implementation of the R2P-principle or other humanitarian interventions. Some argue that it could hamper effective implementation, while others argue that it could lead to the principle being misused. Some cases are also discussed as examples of this sort of behaviour and its consequences. The following excerpts illustrate how national political preferences or interests could affects decisions in the UNSC or decisions of states to be involved in specific interventions, on the design or execution of interventions. Specifically the concern for the own interests of the involved states (or other actors) is highlighted. These self-driven interests of states can be concerned with military issues, financial issues, economic or trade issues (as in the example of China and Sudan), geopolitical and strategic issues (as the example of Somalia and Cambodia).

* ‘…the World Summit failed to agree to measures that would reduce the likelihood of strategic behavior among Security Council members to undercut action. Due in large part to U.S. pressure, the final Summit agreement removed proposed language that called on permanent Security Council members “to refrain from using the veto in cases of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”’ (Bannon, 206:1160).
* ‘The intergovernmental bodies charged with making the toughest choices about how and when to respond—whether the Security Council or the General Assembly or the Peace and Security Council of the African Union—are (and are supposed to be) intrinsically political bodies. They do not apply guidelines, standards, or templates in wholly predictable or consistent ways. Politics and national preferences play a part’ (Luck, 2010:353).
* ‘…the growing willingness of states to intervene in the domestic affairs of other states frequently has a far more self-interested basis. Governments increasingly understand that they often cannot afford to look the other way; that fundamental threats to their own security, whether from refugees, terrorists, the potential destabilization of an entire region, or a miasma of disease and crime, may well have their origins in conditions once thought to be within a state's exclusive domestic jurisdiction (Slaughter, 2005:625).
* ‘The international response to the [Somali] crisis has been slow and hesitant. The international community has responded to events as they have unfolded and has tended to prioritize the interests of external actors over those of Somali civilians’ (Bellamy, 2010:156).
* ‘The second lesson to be drawn from Darfur relates to criticisms of the R2P's reliance on the Security Council as the body of choice for authorizing humanitarian interventions. Even if operational capacity was not a barrier, any force would have difficulty gaining Security Council authorization given China's oil interests in Sudan’ (Hamilton, 2006:296).
* ‘On the question of whether or not the Cambodian case is a good example of a humanitarian crisis situation that justified Vietnam’s “humanitarian” intervention, there is a general agreement that it was a crisis situation. However, many saw the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia as a violation of non-intervention principle in international law and did not see it as a case of humanitarian intervention. Even among Vietnamese key informants, they admit that the occupation of Cambodia was primarily anchored on protecting Vietnam’s national security interest more than humanitarian consideration’ (Morada, 2006).
* ‘Accordingly, there is a need to define the concept of humanitarian intervention in order to ensure that big powers do not use the idea for their selfish interests. This could be a major hurdle that ASEAN must overcome first because, in the absence of a common definition or understanding of the concept, it would be quite difficult to develop the pertinent legal framework and mechanisms for humanitarian intervention’ (Morada, 2006.).

Ultimately, from the interviews and the analysis of academic literature concerning this topic, it can be deduced that national preferences and political or economic strategic interests do often play a role in the decision in the UNSC whether or not to implement the R2P-principle in a specific case or whether or not to implement a humanitarian mission. However, the question remains whether this mechanism is also present for the specific decision to not implement the principle in the MONUSCO-mandate for the Congo-conflict. This will be traced subsequently.

### 4.2.2 States’ interests in the DRC Conflict and the MONUSCO-mandate

Having established that there are indications that national preferences and/or interests of member states may affect decisions taken in the UNSC, and thus possibly decisions relating to humanitarian interventions and the implementation of the R2P-principle, it is now necessary to trace whether this is also occurring in the decisions made relating to the MONUSCO-mandate in the period between 2010-2015. In fact, several case-related indications actually point in the opposite direction, and demonstrate that the international community, i.e. the UNSC has been highly committed to the Congolese conflict, both politically and financially. This is deduced from the UNSC member states’ positions taken regarding the implementation of the mandates, the UN’s allocated budget and some accounts of the interviewees. All this considering, there are no clear and/or direct indications that national interests of particular member states in the UNSC have affected the current attitude of the UNSC to not implement the R2P in the MONUSCO-mandates from 2010-2015, as will be argued in the subsequent sections.

 The first MONUSCO-mandate was adopted unanimously in 2010 by the UNSC, and has been adopted unanimously ever other time as well (UN Press, 2010; 2011c; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015). In each of the mandates, priority is given to the protection of the population (UNSC, 2010:4-6, 2011c:3-4; 2012:5; 2013:5-6; 2014:6; 2015:4-6). In that sense, all of the member states can be established to be committed enough not vote against such a mandate. Although it is difficult to establish whether there were specific, own-interested motivations by any of the member states to adopt the mandates, it is possible to establish that at least no national preference or interest of any of the member states was elevated above the mission, thus above the protection of the Congolese civilians, in the sense that it did not drive any member state to vote against the mission’s mandate.

 Furthermore, neither the ‘climate of fiscal restraint’ as hinted towards in the R2P-report of 2014 (GA and UNSC, 2014:18) nor the argument of Prof. Dr. Pronk that various countries want to solve world issues ‘on the cheap’ (Pronk, 2017) seems to correspond with the MONUSCO-mandate. If it would have corresponded with the previously made arguments of fiscal restraint, there would have only been limited troops and material and financial recourses allocated to the MONUSCO-mission. On the contrary, there seems to be ample financial commitment to mission. From 2010 until 2012, the MONUSCO-mission was budgeted as the second-largest mission in that year, with the largest mission being UNAMID (GA, 2010b; 2012a; 2012b). From then on, from 2013 until 2015, MONUSCO became the mission with the largest budget and requirements (GA, 2013; 2015).

 Rose Bashwira, a PhD student from Congo, expressed her view that the international community *does* try, really try actually (Bashwira, 2017). She argues that in ‘every sector there [are] actors that try to do their best to try to tackle the issue of conflict in the DRC’ (Ibid.). She continues later on that, there are other practical issues, such as the deviant interests of the own Congolese citizens in some sectors, the complexity of the interrelation between sectors, as well as the corruption and poverty, are what challenges the efforts the international community. However, she stands firm with her view that the international community is trying its best. A similar account is also provided by Joost van Puijenbroek, an employee of PAX voor Vrede, who is implicitly expressing that it is more a practical issue than an interest-driven one. He discusses several practical challenges that greatly hamper the feasibility of the tasks of the MONUSCO-mission, such as the severe complexity of the conflict caused by the involvement of a great multitude of different (rebel) groups (van Puijenbroek, 2017). Furthermore, the vastness of the country and the unreachable parts of the country make it very difficult to achieve peace in all the different regions (Ibid.). When asked whether it would be in the interest of the UN to be more involved in the conflict he answers that currently, the international community is doing ‘all they can', and that ‘doing more is not executable’ (Ibid.). Although he thus doesn’t argue that interests are an issue for the design and acceptance of MONUSCO-mandate, he does mention some national interests to be involved in the execution of the mandate. In his view, most countries have to motive of gaining an income through this UN-mission, as well as the deployed soldiers, instead of having an actual agenda for building something up (Ibid.). Also, when commenting on the feasibility of a military strategy that could be successful, he argues that ‘that would involve accepting deaths of UN soldiers, which no country would want in such a conflict’ (Ibid.). This would imply a willingness of the various troops and member states to participate in the stabilization mission, but only a limited commitment to the execution of the tasks when this requires involvement in actual fights. This latter commitment issue could possibly hamper the execution of the mandate in which far-reaching military action is required.

 Ultimately, from the Realist analysis, it can be deduced that although there are clear indications that national preferences or interests of (member) states can play a role in the decision-making (in the UNSC) for humanitarian interventions, such as R2P, this argument cannot be convincingly applied to the case of the MONUSCO-mandate for the DRC conflict. Both the political support from all UNSC member states for each of the mandates, as well the financial and material requirements that are met by all the contributing countries, do not point to any strategic or fiscal restraints motivated by own preferences or interests. These interests are pointed out to play role in the execution of the mandate.

## 4.3 Constructivist analysis

As already discussed in the methodology section, a discourse analysis[[2]](#footnote-2) will be used to explore the question from a constructivist perspective. This way, it can be traced in what stage the R2P-norm can be considered to be, and under what conditions the norm exists, between 2010-2015. In summary, from the Constructivist perspective it is expected, as outlined in the theoretical framework and the methodology section, that states will not comply to the implementation of the (third pillar of the) R2P-principle for the case of the DRC, when the norm is not in the third stage and when it exists under unbeneficial conditions. When a norm is not in the third stage, it means that the norm is still debated and the behavior expected from the norm is still questioned. Unbeneficial conditions encompass that (1) the norm does not concern bodily integrity, (2) the norm is not supported by powerful states, and (3) certain (national) elites are threatened on a national level. First, it will be traced in what stage the norm can be considered to be in between 2010-2015, but to do so, the emergence of the norm from 2005 will also be discussed. This will be done by tracing who the main actors are involved with the norm between 2010-2015, what the dominant mechanisms are concerning the development of the principle between 2010-2015, and what their motives are between 2010-2015. An international norm is considered to be in the third stage of the Norm Life Cycle (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998) (1) when the main actors are bureaucracy, law, and or professionals, (2) when the dominant mechanism is habit and/or institutionalization of the principle, and (3) when the motive for doing so is conformity. Next, the highlighted conditions under which the norm existed between 2010-2015 will be traced, to establish whether these can be considered (un)beneficial.

 Ultimately, the constructivist analysis will demonstrate that the principle can be considered to be in the second stage between 2010-2015 and that there are rather unbeneficial conditions for the principle and, since it has not experienced full support by powerful states and the principle is also not very specific. It will show that, although conceptually there seems to be consensus concerning the principle, this is not so for the practical implementation. Many challenges for the practical implementation of the principle are identified throughout the years, and consistently, there are no specific, concrete answers provided for these challenges. Ultimately, although accepted conceptually, the principle seems to be stuck with a practical, technical problem of ‘how to be achieved’. This could account as to why there is no implementation of third pillar at all, and as to why even though the second pillar is implicitly present in the mandate, is not explicitly referred to in any of the mandates. The debated behaviour expected from the principle, as well as the disputed tools for the implementation of the principle, might restrain the UNSC from explicitly and directly referring to the principle in any of the MONUSCO-mandates between 2010-2015. The subsequent analysis will demonstrate how these findings from the Constructivist perspective were traced.

### 4.3.1 The principle in the mandate

In the MONUSCO-mandates, there is a clear priority for the objective of protection of civilians and concern for both the security challenges and the humanitarian and human rights situations (UNSC, 2010:2, 2011c:2; 2012:2; 2013:2; 2014:3; 2015:2). Following, in each of the MONUSCO-mandates it is emphasized that the DRC governments holds the primary responsibility for the protection of civilians (UNSC, 2010:1, 2011c:1; 2012:1; 2013:1; 2014:1; 2015:1), and that the assistance to the DRC government in the protection of civilians is treated as an imperative objective and task of the MONUSCO-mandate (UNSC, 2010:4-6, 2011c:3-4; 2012:5; 2013:5-6; 2014:6; 2015:4-6). One could thus consider the second pillar of the R2P-norm to somewhat anchored in the mandate, although it is never specifically referred to in any of the mandates.

### 4.3.2 The stage of the R2P-norm

The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) introduced the norm in 2001 in their report called the Responsibility to Protect (ICISS, 2001). Following their introduction of the term, framework for the design of the norm and efforts to achieve the institutionalization of the norm, the norm was discussed on the 2005 World Summit by different states. The norm was first conceptualized with the agreement on paragraphs 138 and 139 in the 2005 World Summit Outcome (GA, 2005:31). Afterwards, the UN continued to elaborate on this norm. This elaboration encompasses the yearly reports of the Secretary-General starting in 2009, and the subsequent informal and formal dialogues between the UN member states, regional and sub-regional bodies, concerning the principle’s reports and development. These efforts have been presented, emphasized and undertaken in these reports (GA, 2009; 2010a; GA and UNSC, 2011; 2012;, 2013; 2014; 2015). Although these reports followed the unanimous acceptance of the norm in 2005, which was quoted to be ‘a remarkably good outcome’, it is still an ongoing process (GA, 2009:28).

**The main actors**

In 2001, it was the ICISS who was responsible for the emergence of the principle and they first coined the term ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (ICISS, 2001). As will be demonstrated, from the analysis of the reports of the Secretary-General concerning the R2P, it can be deduced that the current main actors concerned with the principle are mostly (UN member) states, and international organizations (UN and various regional and sub-regional organizations). The involvement of these specific actors is expressed in each of the analyzed reports, as the following quotes and/or excerpts from the reports demonstrate.

* In the first report following the general acceptance of the norm in 2005, it was noted that ‘the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Summit Outcome define the authoritative framework within which *Member States, regional arrangements and the United Nations system* *and its partners* can seek to give a doctrinal, policy and institutional life to the responsibility to protect’ (GA, 2009:4).
* ‘The political dialogue on how best to implement the responsibility to protect is off to a good start, although a number of critical implementation issues will require a continuing conversation among the *Member States, the United Nations system* *and civil society organizations’* (GA, 2010a:6).
* The numerous dialogues concerning the principle were summarized and it was argued that this specific dialogue had the, among other things, the purpose of reconfirming that ‘the responsibility to protect is an evolving principle, on which the continuing input of *the member states* is both needed and valued’ (GA and UNSC, 2011:i)
* In the end, the Secretary-General expressed his looking forward to the upcoming dialogue in the *General Assembly*, which would be an opportunity to hear the different views of *the member states and the experts* (GA and UNSC, 2011:12)
* In 2012, the main topic of the report was the timely and decisive response (GA and UNSC, 2012). This issue was discussed after ‘concerns have been raised by *Member States* about responsibility, the measures that might be used when a timely and decisive response is required, and about the management and oversight of those measures’ (Ibid.:2).
* Also, it was expressed that ‘The cooperation of, and among, *Member States* is essential to successful implementation…’(GA and UNSC, 2012:16).
* In preparation for the 2013-report, a consultation process was conducted in order to ‘to seek the views of *Member States and other key partners* on the subject of the present report’, which was state responsibility and prevention’ (GA and UNSC, 2013:2).
* Ultimately, it was expressed by the Secretary-General that, ‘As with earlier dialogues, [the upcoming dialogue] will provide an opportunity for *Member States* to share their views as we continue to chart the road towards the full, balanced and sustainable implementation of the responsibility to protect concept. It is time to make the responsibility to protect a living reality for all people in the world and to make prevention a priority’ (Ibid.:17).
* ‘As the tenth anniversary of the World Summit, 2015 is an opportune moment for the *General Assembly* to build on this consensus and take stock of efforts to implement the responsibility to protect. As part of this process, *Member States* may wish to consider the inclusion of the responsibility to protect on the formal agenda of the *General Assembly’*… ‘I encourage *Member States* to seize this opportunity to craft an ambitious vision for the next decade of the responsibility to protect…’ (GA and UNSC, 2014:20).
* ‘…it is imperative that *Member States and other international actors* devote more energy and resources to effective prevention and accelerate efforts to put an end to the ongoing perpetration of such crimes.’ (GA and UNSC, 2015:6)
* *‘The United Nations, regional organizations and Member States* will not be judged on their rhetorical commitments, but rather on the actual protection provided to communities at risk. Addressing the challenges outlined in this report requires the adaptation of existing tools and mechanisms, dedicated policy initiatives, reallocation of resources and, in some cases, bold institutional change’ (GA and UNSC, 2015:16).

As demonstrated above, the main actors that are involved include various UN bodies, such as the UNGA and the UNSC, the member states of the UN and various regional and/or international organizations. These main actors are systematically called upon to continue to be involved with the development of the R2P-principle throughout the years (2010-2015) through dialogues, provision of input and practical commitment. There is no such call expressed concerning any other actors. Ultimately, these identified involved actors, thus being mostly (member) states and international organizations, are, according to the Norm Life Cycle Mechanism of Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) characteristic for the second stage of the norm, which is named the ‘Norm Cascade’. Therefore, from the analysis of these R2P-reports, concerning the involved actors with the R2P-principle, the norm can be considered to be in the second stage of the Norm Life Cycle, the ‘Norm Cascade’, between 2010-2015.

**The dominant mechanism**

As will be demonstrated subsequently, both the conceptual framework and the practical implementation of the R2P-principle have been much discussed by the UN member states, UN bodies, regional and sub-regional bodies, throughout the years since its unanimous acceptance on the 2005 World Summit. Conceptually, the principle develops throughout the years and seems to evolve into an accepted principle. Practically, the principle continues to be plagued by various implementation challenges, hurdles and in need of further dialogue. This can be deduced from the following discourse analysis and will be demonstrated subsequently.

 In the first two reports, it is emphasized how conceptually and practically, the norm is still in need of progress since its first acceptance in 2005. Conceptually, it is stated in several manners that the norm needs to be further developed, as can be deduced rom the following excerpts of the 2009- and 2010-report (GA, 2009; GA, 2010a).

* It was stated that this first report for the R2P-principle, which was noted not to be the last, could be considered a first critical step towards ‘turning the authoritative and enduring words of the 2005 World Summit Outcome intro doctrine, policy and, most importantly, deeds’ (GA, 2009:28).
* Next, it was expressed how, following the unanimously accepted R2P-principle, it was necessary to ‘look forward to ways in which the UN can best help to ensure the fulfilment of the commitment made’ (Ibid.:29).
* It was also noted that ‘the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Summit Outcome define the authoritative framework within which Member States, regional arrangements and the United Nations system and its partners can seek to give a doctrinal, policy and institutional life to the responsibility to protect’ (Ibid.:4).
* ‘…further development of the [R2P] concept is needed, as my [this] report posed as many questions as it answered’ (GA, 2010a:6).

Furthermore, it is mentioned multiple times how the practical implementation of the principle is not yet fully achieved and still only in progress. The existence of these identified practical challenges indicates that the behavior expected from the principle is still actively discussed, and the principle itself, is still evolving and in need of further development. Mostly, it pointed out how there is only a weak capacity for responding adequately in practice, as well as limited will of states to respond. It is highlighted throughout the report of 2009 how there is more knowledge needed on the role of ‘individuals, advocacy groups, women’s groups and the private sector in shaping the international response to crimes and violations relating to the [R2P]’ (GA, 2009:24). In the following report, the existing practical challenges that are emphasized are information gathering, assessment and early warning signal recognition (GA, 2010a). Specifically, quoted below, there are three gaps in the practical implementation relating to these issues highlighted, namely (1) ‘the insufficient sharing of information and analysis among the existing streams of information’, (2) the existing information gathering and analyzing mechanism for early warning does not do so through the lens of R2P, and (3) the lack of assessment tools and the capacity to ensure ‘the efficiency and system-wide coherence in policymaking and early response’ (Ibid.:4-5).

* ‘It is true that we have yet to develop the tools or display the will to respond consistently and effectively to all emergencies relating to the responsibility to protect’ (GA, 2009:24)
* ‘As repeatedly underscored above, there are substantial gaps in capacity, imagination and will across the whole spectrum of prevention and protection measures relating to the responsibility to protect’ (Ibid.:24).
* ‘Much more needs to be done, however, to internationalize such [R2P] efforts and put them in the larger context of finding better ways to protect civilians’ (Ibid.:27).
* It is reported that, despite progress in the previous decade, there remain three distinct gaps for providing timely information and assessment that is necessary for the balanced and responsible implementation of the R2P-principle (GA, 2010a:4-5).
* ‘The political dialogue on how best to implement the responsibility to protect is off to a good start, although a number of critical implementation issues will require a continuing conversation among the Member States, the United Nations system and civil society organizations’ (GA, 2010a:6).

In the next report, that of 2011, there is a discourse pointing towards further need of continued dialogue and development of the principle. Both implicitly and explicitly, it indicated that the principle was still evolving and in progress. Again, this indicates that the behavior expected from the principle is still debated, and the principle itself, is still evolving and in need of further development. This can be deduced from the following excerpts of the report (GA and UNSC, 2011).

* It was stated how this report has the purpose of reconfirming that ‘the responsibility to protect is an evolving principle, on which the continuing input of the member states is both needed and valued’ (Ibid.:i)
* The other purposes were the opportunity for exchanges on the lessons learned and providing a forum for the consideration of new ideas and enhancements concerning the global and regional cooperation for the principle, as well as the reflection on the implementation of the principle so far (Ibid.:i.).
* It was once more re-emphasized that this report and dialogue were expected to make the member states focus on and consider ways to strengthen the principle operationally, and not only conceptually (Ibid.:i.).
* Once again, the report discussed several gaps and challenges relating to the specific subject, and advised that more dialogue as well as more study was needed (Ibid.:11). There are no concrete solutions provided for these challenges in addition to the need for more dialogue and study.
* In the end of the report, the Secretary-General welcomed the effort in the process of moving forward in ‘refining the concept and charting the road to full, balanced and sustainable implementation of the principles laid out by the heads of state and the government at the 2005 world summit’ (Ibid.:12).
* It was concluded that, although there is ‘broad, deep and growing’ support for the principle, there is a difference in the declaration of a principle and the consistent implementation of it, which will continue to be a learning experience and to which not all the answers are held (Ibid.:12)

In the next report (GA and UNSC, 2012), a similar pattern can be deduced in which a discourse pointing towards the evolvement and progress of the principle is again central. However, there does seem to be a shift in focus from evolvement of the principle both conceptually and practically in the previous reports, to more focus on the practical implementation of the principle and less focus on the concept. In the following first quote, it is explicitly stated that there has been progress both conceptually and practically, but then continues to only mention the practical question as confronting the UN. Second, an explicit example shows that the debate surrounding the practical implementation of the principle is highlighted in the report. As previously mentioned, the existence of these identified practical challenges continue to indicate that the behavior expected from the principle is still discussed, as well as the principle itself, is still evolving and in need of further development.

* It was noted that since its adoption in the 2005, ‘the international community has made significant progress in the development of the concept and in its implementation’ (GA and UNSC, 2012:1). Still, the UN was confronted with the question of ‘how best to achieve the goals of RtoP in different circumstances’ (Ibid.:4).
* It was raised several times in the report that there were tensions and debate rising concerning the principle, following the implementation of the principle in Libya (Ibid.:13). It was stated that following the implementation of the third pillar of the R2P-principle and using coercive and forceful measures, ‘Some Member States … have contended that non-coercive measures were not given sufficient time to demonstrate results in Libya. Others have expressed the view that those charged with implementing Council resolution 1973 (2011) exceeded the mandate that they were given by the Council’ (Ibid.:14).

Also, the mentioned challenges in the report were all practical ones, as demonstrated in the following excerpts. Having established the challenges of selectivity, perception and understanding the relation between the pillars, there are, again, no concrete solutions mentioned. The answers to these challenges provided in the report, are similar to the previous reports, namely more dialogue and the cooperation of member states.

* This year the identified challenges of selectivity, perception of the principle and the need for understanding of the relation between the pillars, were addressed (GA and UNSC, 2012:6).
* Subsequently, it was discussed multiple times in the report that further dialogue and other steps were needed to move forward with the principle (Ibid.).
* Later on in the report, it was re-emphasized that ‘controversy still persists on aspects of implementation, in particular with respect to the use of coercive measures to protect populations’ (Ibid.:16).
* Following this acknowledgement, it was once again re-emphasized that ‘there is clearly a need for continuing dialogue on such matters in the General Assembly’ (Ibid.:16).
* Also, it was expressed that ‘The cooperation of, and among, Member States is essential to successful implementation’, and that ‘Progress towards more effective and consistent implementation of the responsibility to protect must continue’ (Ibid.:16).

In the following two reports, again, a similar discourse can be identified. There is continued focus on the practical implementation of the principle in both reports (GA and UNSC, 2013; 2014). In the 2013-report, there was an emphasis on practical implementation-challenges related to the issue of state responsibility and prevention. There were three distinct practical challenges highlighted, namely (1) the lack of political will and leadership which are required to translate the commitment into practice, (2) the different range of risk factors that can cause atrocity crimes to erupt, which makes it difficult to perceive what needs to be addressed at what moment, and (3) the relation between the national and international responsibility (GA and UNSC, 2013:15). In the 2014-report, again three practical implementation-challenges are highlighted. The challenges include (1) the daunting and multifaceted agenda of pillar II of the R2P-principle, (2) the lack of will to operationalize prevention in practice, and (3) the implementation of the R2P-principle is hampered by a climate of fiscal restraint in various countries (GA and UNSC, 2014:18). The different challenges identified in the reports are not met with concrete solutions, as in the previous reports, but instead are met with calls for further dialogues, research and continued commitment (GA and UNSC, 2013; GA and UNSC, 2014). Similar to the previously mentioned reports, the existence of the identified practical challenges in these reports again indicate that the behavior expected from the principle is still debated/questioned, and the principle itself, is still evolving and in need of further development. This can be deduced from the subsequent included excerpts.

* It was noted that, in 2013, ‘there are still challenges for Member States to fulfil the commitment made at the 2005 World Summit’ (GA and UNSC, 2013:15).
* Ultimately, it was expressed by the Secretary-General that, ‘As with earlier dialogues, [the upcoming dialogue] will provide an opportunity for Member States to share their views as we continue to chart the road towards the full, balanced and sustainable implementation of the responsibility to protect concept. It is time to make the responsibility to protect a living reality for all people in the world and to make prevention a priority’ (Ibid.:17).
* There is an expressed will to continue the consideration of the principle by the General Assembly, and that the previous reports as well as this one, all reflect a ‘deep commitment to move the principle from the realm of rhetoric into concrete action’ (GA and UNSC, 2014:3).
* It is explicitly mentioned that ‘There is no easy way to simplify the tasks or the sustained commitment involved in helping States to meet their responsibility to protect’, and that ‘there is still too little will to operationalize prevention’ (Ibid.:18).

In the latter report the progress made in ten years, since the unanimous acceptance of the principle, is evaluated (GA and UNSC, 2015). Here, it is explicitly states that there is conceptual consensus regarding the principle, as can be deduced from the following excerpts.

* It is stated that there is ‘consensus [that] spans all regions’, and that ‘There is no longer any question that the protection of populations from atrocity crimes is both a national and an international responsibility’ (GA and UNSC, 2015:4).
* In the ultimate reflection, it concluded that ‘it is vital to appreciate the normative advancement represented by the responsibility to protect’ (Ibid.:19).
* Ultimately, it is concluded that the consensus that has been developing since the first acceptance of the principle in 2005 can be considered a basis to move forward (Ibid.:20).
* It is stated that there is ‘consensus [that] spans all regions’, and that ‘There is no longer any question that the protection of populations from atrocity crimes is both a national and an international responsibility’ (GA and UNSC, 2015:4).

However, practically, there remain to exist challenges concerning the implementation of the principle. As with the previous reports, the existence of these identified practical challenges ten years after its first acceptance, the behavior expected from the R2P-principle is still debated, and the practical implementation of the R2P-principle itself, is still evolving and in need of further development. In this report, the mentioned challenges are related to a wider range of situations in which the atrocity crimes are currently being committed (GA and UNSC, 2015:14). The practical implementation-challenges that are highlighted are (1) the necessity to update the early warning mechanisms in order to respond to non-state armed groups, (2) the necessity for enhanced cooperation on the prevention of atrocity crimes given the contexts of violent extremism and terrorism, and (3) the probable decreased effectivity of the pillar III options of R2P when applied to non-state armed groups (Ibid.). Once again, in the report, there are no concrete solutions provided for the challenges, there is only the call for further dialogue, research and commitment (Ibid.).

* It is acknowledged that the implementation of the principle ‘has also raised important practical questions, particularly with respect to timely and decisive response’, i.e. the third pillar of the principle (Ibid.:5).
* One example highlighted is that the intervention in Libya ‘…generated debates about when and how force should be resorted to for the purposes of protection and raised concerns among some Member States about the misuse of the principle’ (Ibid.). Also, the Syrian case ‘has led some to question the principle’s utility in generating action in the hardest case’ (Ibid.).
* Ultimately, the conclusion of the report ends with the statement that ‘the responsibility to protect has not made unfettered progress’ (Ibid.).

Throughout the discourse analysis of the reports, there are also specific instances in which it is explicitly mentioned how coercive measures under the third pillar, in which the use of force and a timely and decisive response are encompassed, are noted to be less preferred than the first and second pillar of the principle.

* In 2009 (GA, 2009:12) it mentioned that the UN has a ‘strong preference for dialogue and peaceful persuasion’ and that therefore, ‘pillar three encompasses, in addition to more robust steps, a wide range of non-coercive and non-violent response measures under Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter’.
* In 2012 (GA and UNSC, 2012:7) it is stated that ‘Experience over the last four years has shown that the more coercive the tool, the less often it has been used to protect populations’.

As demonstrated with the analysis presented above, two separate things can be deduced. First, it can be deduced that a conceptual consensus on the R2P-principle has been established throughout the years (2009-2015). Whereas in the earlier reports, there was an effort to evolve the conceptual and practical parts of the principle, the focus gradually shifted towards the practical implementation of the principle, as demonstrated. Furthermore, in the latter report it was explicitly concluded that there is conceptual consensus and it is no longer questioned that the responsibility to protect is a national and international responsibility. Second, however, it can be deduced that there is a continued pattern of the identification of practical challenges and a structural emphasis on the need of further dialogues for further progress of the principle, as demonstrated. This indicates that, the practical behavior expected from the norm is still debated, given the identified challenges. It also indicates that further refining of the practical implementation of the principle is still in progress.

 Having established this, it can be concluded that, concerning the dominant mechanism, the principle is not in third stage, in which the principle is assumed to be ‘taken for granted’ and the behavior expected from it is not questioned. This latter issue became specifically clear in the discussion surrounding the principle’s implementation in the case of Libya, and the discussion between the member states on whether this was done adequately. Ultimately, the norm can thus be considered to be in the second stage, the so-called ‘Norm Cascade’, in which the dominant mechanism is concerned with socialization of the principle. The dialogues between (UN member) states, the UN bodies and the regional and sub-regional organization demonstrate ongoing praise and criticism on particular parts of the principle. Through this process, the principle develops itself on the international level and several actors are socialized with the norm through this process. As already mentioned, according to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998:902), this is characteristic for the second stage of a principle. From this discourse analysis, it can thus be deduced that the principle has not yet reached the third stage, but instead can still be considered to be in the second stage, concerning the dominant mechanism.

 **The motives**

The initial motives for the ICISS report can be considered altruistic and ideational, because they wanted to be better able to protect people and therefore achieve change in the way of thinking about the responsibility of states and the international community to protect civilians, as well as affect change on a policy level (ICISS, 2001). For the UN bodies, its member states and the regional and sub-regional organizations, the identified main actors between 2010-2015, a different motive is more likely to exist. One of the motives of the main actors is most likely to gain international legitimacy. In three reports, it is explicitly emphasized that there is growing and/or continued support for the principle.

* In 2011, it was concluded that, although there is ‘*broad, deep and growing’ support* for the principle, there is a difference in the declaration of a principle and the consistent implementation of it, which will continue to be a learning experience and to which not all the answers are held (GA and UNSC, 2011:12)
* In report of 2014, it is first acknowledged that there is *continued support for the principle and that it has been reaffirmed by the UN Security Council multiple times* (GA and UNSC, 2014:2).
* In the same report it is also stated that ‘This [responsibility to protect] task *could not be more urgent*, given the continued subjection of populations to atrocity crimes despite the pledge of “never again”’(GA and UNSC, 2014:20).
* It is stated that there is ‘consensus [that] spans all regions’, and that ‘There is no longer any question that the protection of populations from atrocity crimes is both a national and an international responsibility’ (GA and UNSC, 2015:4).

Such statements, which involve diplomatic praise of the urgency of the principle as well as the attached support to the principle, point to a socialization process, as also established in the analysis of the dominant mechanism. Establishing a norm with a certain perceived status and level of support, as is clearly done in the latter quote above, makes it unappealing for states to not support the norm. Instead, it makes it appealing to gain legitimacy by supporting the norm, as laid out by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998:902) in the discussion of the second stage of the Norm Life Cycle. This motive of gaining legitimacy is, inter alia, a characteristic of the second stage. Therefore, from the analysis of the motives of the main actors between 2010-2015, it can be deduced that the norm has not yet reached the third stage, but instead can still be considered to be in the second stage, concerning the level of motives.

 As discussed previously, a norm is considered to be in the third stage of the Norm Life Cycle (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998) (1) when the main actors are bureaucracy, law, and or professionals, (2) when the dominant mechanism is habit and/or instutionalization of the principle, and (3) when the motive for doing so is conformity. If this would be the case for the R2P-principle, it would be expected that there are actors, such as law enforces, justice departments and bureaucrats involved with the principle. Also, it would be expected that there are indications of successful development, implementation and institutionalization of the principle. This analysis demonstrates that these indications are not present in the reports. Instead, it is demonstrated that the main actors, being international and/or regional organizations and (member) states, the dominant mechanism of socialization and the motive of gaining legitimacy are present, and are all in line with the second stage of the Norm Life Cycle. Therefore, the norm can be considered to be in the second stage of the Norm Life Cycle. The consideration that R2P-principle has not yet reached the stage in which its expected behavior is no longer questioned, is institutionalized and considered a habit, could affect the compliance of states to the principle, and thereby could affect the attitude of the UNSC to not refer to it in the MONUSCO-mandates.

### 4.3.3 Conditions for the norm

As already discussed in the theoretical framework, there are three distinct beneficial conditions for principles that are expected, according to the Constructivist perspective, to have a positive influence on compliance any principle. These beneficial conditions entail the concern for bodily integrity intrinsic to the norm, as well as it being specific and clear, the support of powerful states, and the threatened position of national elites. It will now be traced whether these beneficial conditions exist for the R2P-principle between 2010-2015.

 The support of the norm, although it was unanimously adopted by all member stated at the 2005 World Summit, is complex. In the initial meetings for the norm and the previous dialogues before the actual world summit, there were multiple drafts that for the R2P-norm that specific countries did not support. Initially, the U.S. was unclear about whether or not supporting the norm, because in their initial statement they used supportive language, nevertheless they never used the term ‘responsibility’, and only used weak language concerning the reaction (Responsibility to protect, 2005:10). Russia initially did not support the draft for the norm, since they argued that there wasn’t sufficient understanding of the concept, and they considered the UN to be sufficiently capable to respond to crises (Ibid.:8). China didn’t comment directly on the draft of the norm, however they did propose a change in the Values and Principle Section of the World Summit Outcome draft. They proposed to emphasize ‘strict adherence to the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity’, which could be considered somewhat in contrast with an acceptance of the norm, since this propasal changes the view on sovereignty as expressed in R2P to a more conventional understanding of sovereignty. France and the UK, the other permanent members of the UN, did support the norm in the draft already. Although it was thus unanimously accepted ultimately, during the intitial sessions, three of the five P5-members of the UNSC did not completely embrace the norm. Furthermore, in the implementation of the principle in the Libyan case (Res.1973), two of the five permanent members of the UNSC, being China and Russia, abstained from voting . France, the UK and the US did vote in favor (UN Press, 2011a). In the following instance of implementation of the principle, in Côte d’Ivoire, all members of the Council voted in favor (UN Press, 2011b). The norm might thus be unanimously adopted, it is still, as shown in the analysis hotly debated, and has been from the beginning. It has not had initial unanimous support in the draft sessions and has not had support in the implementation in Libya from several powerful states, namely some of the P5-members.

 Concerning the intrinsic character of the norm, it is clearly related to bodily integrity, since it aims to protect any civilian from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. However, in the paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome, which are seen as ‘the authoritative framework for the doctrinal, policy and institutional life to the norm’ (GA, 2009:2), there are no specifics mentioned as to what this responsibility specifically entails, what tools they could use and under what circumstances, or any other specifics. These are only discussed later on, in the analyzed reports. However, the main text for the principle itself, cannot be considered specific.

 Lastly, the question of whether national elites are threatened, is worth an entire analysis on its own for which there is no room in this thesis. This would namely require an analysis of each of the involved member states, their leaders and their acceptance on the national level. It would be expected that when leaders are threatened on the national level, they would support international norms to gain legitimacy with their own population and strengthen their own position. Evidence that could support such an expectation could include satisfaction rates of political leaders of all the member states when they supported (or didn’t) the norm, and following an in-depth analysis of national political tensions in the member states when they supported (or didn’t) the norm.

 Ultimately, the traced conditions, specifically the support of powerful states and the character of the norm cannot be considered fully beneficial. It is adopted by all Member States, including the P5-members, which can be perceived as powerful states in the UN system, but three of them were initially not entirely supportive of the principle in the draft for the norm. Also, two of them abstained in the first instance of its implementation in Libya, and were thus not in favor of the norm then. Also, the norm is greatly concerned with bodily integrity, but its main text in 2005 World Summit Outcome is not very specific. These rather unbeneficial conditions for the norm could affects the compliance of states to the R2P-principle, and therefore could affect the attitude of (the member states of) the UNSC, to not refer to it in the MONUSCO-mandates.

## 4.4 Poststructuralist analysis

As already mentioned in the methodology section, a discourse analysis will be executed for the poststructuralist analysis. This way, it can be traced what the prevailing discourse within the international community is concerning the DRC-conflict, between 2010-2015. In summary, from the poststructuralist perspective it is expected, as outlined in the theoretical framework and the methodology section, that states will not comply to the implementation of the (third pillar of the) R2P-principle for the case of the DRC, when this is not in line with the prevailing discourse for the DRC-conflict.

 To analyse this, a discourse analysis of 25 UN Security Council Reports (SCR), being monthly forecasts, on the DRC between 2010 and 2015 has been executed[[3]](#footnote-3). These SCR’s are independent and impartial. They display high-quality, timely and balanced information regarding specific countries and the activities of the Council and other UN-bodies (SCR, n.d.). These reports are particularly insightful since they encompass on the one hand a summary of the key developments in the particular country for that period, and on the other hand, they highlight what they key issues are/were for the council in that period, what their respective options were regarding the developments and issues, and the dynamics within the UNSC regarding those issues and options. Therefore, these reports are specifically useful in analysing the prevailing discourse for the conflict in the DRC within the international community, being the UNSC, who ultimately also decides on the implementation of new mandates.

 The main finding from this discourse analysis is that certain shortcomings of the Congolese state, in the security-, justice- and political sector, are consistently and systematically highlighted throughout the SCR’s between 2010-2015. All of these shortcomings are being actively articulated throughout the discourse as either the causes for the human rights violations taking place, this concerns the security challenges and political events, or as being an inadequate response, this concerns the justice sector. The articulation of these identified relations between the issues and the human rights violations taking place, affects the role laid out for the MONUSCO-mission within the UNSC. Implicitly, the prevailing discourse in the SCR’s indicates that the MONUSCO-mission needs to support the government in improving their security, justice- and political sector, so that the human rights violations will be reduced and responded to adequately. This indicates that the role of the MONUSCO-mission is related to state security issues, and not human security issues, and that it is to support the DRC government. Ultimately, these findings from the SCR’s are also present in the MONUSCO-mandates, because here the objectives and tasks identified for the mission are all related to supporting the government in improving the security-, justice- and political sector. This prevailing discourse within the SCR’s between 2010 and 2015 with its focus on supporting the DRC government in enhancing the state security, is not in line with the third pillar of the R2P-principle, nor is it in line with the R2P-principle at all. This because, a prevailing discourse that would be in line with the R2P-principle would focus on the MONUSCO-mission being involved with human security and protecting the population first and foremost.

### 4.4.1 The prevailing discourse on Human Rights Violations in the SCR’s

In the first update for the DRC conflict after the MONUSCO-mission’s mandate was implemented on 1 July 2010 (UNSC, 2010:3), the issue of protecting civilians, among other issues, was addressed as being a ‘key issue’ (SCR, 2010a:3). It was expressed how certain systems and procedures of the MONUSCO-mission could be improved to enhance the protection of civilians (Ibid.). Furthermore, it was questioned in the report whether the MONUSCO-mission was sufficiently pro-active in the DRC in general, but specifically concerning the issue of sexual violence (Ibid.). This was the first report for the MONUSCO-mission. In the key developments, protection of civilians, too, was addressed (Ibid.).

 Following, in all of the 25 SCR’s for the DRC, in the period from September 2010 until June 2016, human rights violations were discussed in the key recent developments in the country (SCR, 2010a; 2010b; 2010c; 2011a; 2011b; 2011c; 2011d; 2012a; 2012b; 2012c; 2013a; 2013b; 2013c; 2013d; 2014a; 2014b; 2014d; 2015a; 2015b; 2015c; 2015d; 2016a; 2016b). In some reports, these were discussed by mentioning the violations that took place, where they took place, and sometimes these were also specified with numbers (Ibid.). As will be demonstrated subsequently, the discourse in the SCR’s is systematically organized around human rights violations taking place in the specific periods and areas. However, the discourse also articulates the connections between security, justice and political issues and the occurrence of human rights violations. As will be argued ultimately, this articulation of the connection, identifies particular relations between the issues and the human rights violations. This then affects the potential room for options for the UNSC. Following, the connections made between the issues will be demonstrated. Afterwards, the argument will be made more elaborately.

 In many reports, human rights violations that have taken place are either implicitly or explicitly linked to security challenges in that specific area and/or period. These security challenges encompass different actors, such as criminal networks, mineral exploiters and/or rebel- and armed groups, and sometimes the DRC national army, the FARDC. Following, the connections made throughout the SCR’s between human rights violations and security issues will be presented and discussed.

 In 2010, there was request to investigate the link between the illegal exploitation of natural recourses by several armed groups and the occurrence of sexual violence. Also, an explicit link was made between attacks by armed groups and the subsequent occurrences of human rights violations. In this report there were no options that included any further measures involved with the protection of civilians (SCR, 2010c). In the first excerpt, it is implicitly expressed how there could be a link between the exploitation of natural resources and the occurrence of sexual violence. Specifically in the latter excerpt the relation between the security challenges in the area and the occurrence of the human rights violations becomes clear. Implicitly it is expressed how the deteriorated security situation in the provinces goes hand in hand with different sorts of human rights violations. Thus, a certain cause-and-effect-relation can be identified, in which the security challenges in specific sectors or areas results in the occurrence of different kinds of human rights violations.

* ‘Wallström added that further analysis is needed to examine the nexus between the illicit exploitation of natural resources by armed groups and sexual violence…’ (SCR, 2011c:11).
* ‘Repeated attacks by armed groups against civilians continue…’ and ‘….that the security situation in North and South Kivu provinces continues to deteriorate, with daily reports of assassination, rape and extortion.’ (Ibid.).

In 2012, explicit links are made between the level of (in)security in a specific area of the country (Kivu) and the multiple deaths of civilians. There seems to be only a weaker, implicit link expressed between the security of and the human rights violations taking place, but subsequently, the council addresses the issue as being linked, when they explicitly express their concern for the level of security and the humanitarian situation in the area. Furthermore, it was explicitly expressed that one of the rebel groups, M23, was responsible for the displacement of many civilians and this had been focused on by the council. In the reports, there were no options that referred explicitly to the protection of civilians. There were options that explicitly referred to measures to stabilize or improve the security. In these excerpts, again there is, implicitly, a cause-and-effect-relation that can be identified between the security challenges in specific areas (Kivu for example) or from specific armed groups (M23 for example) and human rights violations taking place. Furthermore, the options provided in this reports clearly indicate that the view on the role of the MONUSCO-mission, which follows from the discourse surrounding the human rights violations, is to support the DRC government in responding to the security challenges.

* ‘Violence in parts of the DRC persisted.’ And ‘…fresh violence in the Kivu provinces had forced more than 100,000 civilians to flee their homes since November.’, ‘…about 45 civilians were killed and at least 50 were wounded during a raid in South Kivu’s Shabunda territory by members of the [FDLR] in two attacks.’ (SCR, 2012a:6).
* This issue is reiterated in the following report in which there is an explicit connection made by the Security Council, who expresses concern about the deteriorating security in the Kivus and the humanitarian situation. ‘…the Council held consultations and…’ ‘…issued a press release condemning the attacks and expressing concern over the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation in the Kivus.’ (SCR, 2012b:6).
* One of the options that was mentioned was the ‘reinforcing MONUSCO’s role in SSR and other rule of law-related reforms’ (Ibid.:7).
* Again, in the last report of 2012 the humanitarian situation and the fighting and the insecurity in the Eastern part of the country are explicitly linked, namely it was stated that ‘…Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Valerie Amos briefed the Council on the humanitarian effects of the ﬁghting in eastern DRC’ (SCR, 2012c:9).
* ‘The rebel group M23—a source of instability in the region and of massive displacement of civilians—has been at the centre of DRC related Council activities in recent months’ (Ibid.).
* One of the options that was mentioned was the ‘monitoring the security situation closely and responding to the ICGLR initiative as it plays out’ (Ibid.:10).

In 2013, again the security of specific areas (Goma) was explicitly addressed, and there was a connection expressed between the presence of rebel group M23 and the resulting deaths of many civilians. Also, M23 was seen as a risk for child recruitment. As in the previous reports, a similar relation of cause-and-effect- can be identified between the occurrences of the human rights violations, being either slaughter, child recruitment or mass displacement, and the mentioned security challenges and threats, being rebel group M23, or the fighting between FARDC and FRPI. Again, there were no options that considered any measures explicitly referring to the protection of civilians.

* Following, in the July 2013 report, the insecurity in the vicinity of Goma and the presence of the rebel group M23 is discussed in relation to the killing of several civilians. ‘Fighting between the military and the 23 March Movement (M23) rebel group renewed in the vicinity of Goma between 20-22 May as well, killing at least 20 people, including civilians.’ (SCR, 2013c:5).
* ‘MONUSCO and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Leila Zerrougui, issued a joint statement on 10 June, expressing concern over children at risk of being recruited by the M23 in North Kivu’ (Ibid.).
* In October 2013 (SCR, 2013d:4) several attacks against civilians are discussed in relation to M23. When the Security Council condemned the human rights violations, they explicitly addressed the M23 (Ibid.).
* Also in another area, violence caused by fights between the national army and a rebel group (FDLR) was linked to the displacement of many civilians. ‘…violence has also broken out near Ituri in Orientale Province where the FARDC and the Front de Résistance Patriotique de l’Ituri [FRPI] have clashed…., causing 80,000 civilians to flee their villages’ (Ibid.).

In 2014, there were again explicit links expressed between rebel group violence and the effects on civilians, such as deaths, replacement, kidnapping, exploitation and/or sexual violence. The connections expressed, again, implicitly indicate a cause-and-effect-relation, in which the security challenges and threats are responsible for the occurrences of human rights violations. There were no options mentioned in the reports that referred to protection of civilians, but there were options mentioned that explicitly referred to the responding to threats of armed groups. This again supports the argument that, following the identified discourse concerning the security challenges and the human rights violations, the view on the role of the MONUSCO-mission is that it should support the DRC government in the provision of (state) security, which would then reduce the occurrences of human rights violations.

* In March 2014 (SCR, 2014b:16) it was reported that, ‘…despite encouraging developments with respect to stabilising specific areas in North Kivu and the surrender of 8,000 rebels…. other rebel groups continue to operate and wreak havoc on civilians’.
* It is mentioned that an option for the Security Council is ‘…specifying the tasks of the intervention brigade to address threats posed by specific armed groups, such as the ADF and the FDLR’ (Ibid.).
* In the following report the kidnapping and exploitation of men and women was specifically linked to armed groups and the mining and natural minerals. It stated that ‘…women are being kidnapped by armed gangs and forced to work as sex slaves in eastern DRC. MSF also warned that men are being kidnapped and put to work as labourers in the gold and diamond mining region of Okapi’ (SCR, 2014c:12).
* Furthermore, it was noted that ‘…serious human rights violations and abuses, including rape and abductions, continue to be committed by armed groups and the DRC security forces and that armed groups continue to operate in the eastern provinces and pose a serious threat to civilians’ (Ibid.:12).

In 2015 and 2016, again, explicit links were made between rebel and armed groups and the human rights violations taking place in a similar manner as discussed above. It was also explicitly expressed that one measure to protect civilians, or reduce threats to civilians, was the neutralisation of armed groups, which was then expressed to be key priority. This clearly supports the argument made concerning the view on the role of the MONUSCO-mission, which is thus to support the DRC government in the provision of (improved) security, in order to ultimately reduce the threats to the population. This is also clear from the options that were considered by the UNSC, in which they clearly addressed security challenges and rebel groups, but again, did not refer to measures concerning the protection of civilians.

* In January 2015, it was specifically stated that ‘… the FDLR has continued to violate human rights and that there was no excuse for further delay in its disarmament’ (SCR, 2015a:7).
* Also, it was reported that Security Council members issued a press statement in which they called upon MONUSCO and the DRC to ‘… reduce threats to civilians and neutralise armed groups…’ (Ibid.).
* Options that were mentioned are ‘the council may issue a statement that expresses concern over continued violence in eastern DRC; calls on armed groups to disarm; and urges the DRC to take further action against these groups with the assistance of MONUSCO, including the FDLR after the 2 January 2015 deadline’ (Ibid.:8).
* March of the same year, the neutralisation of armed groups was noted to be a key priority, after the discussion of several rebel- and armed groups being responsible for insecurity and human rights violations (SCR, 2015b:5).
* Options that were mentioned included the ‘…call on the DRC and other countries to improve implementation of their commitments under the PSC Framework, including the neutralisation of armed groups’, and ‘indicate that MONUSCO is authorised to act against the FDLR unilaterally without the cooperation of the FARDC’ (Ibid.6).
* Later that year, October 2015, it was again discussed how several rebel groups spread violence in the eastern region of the DRC and as a consequence, endanger the lives of civilians. ‘Rebel groups continue to spread violence in the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)’, and ‘the groups continue to endanger the lives of civilians in Beni, North Kivu. Over the last ten months, more than 400 deaths have been attributed to the ADF.’ (SCR, 2015d:10).
* Furthermore, it was reported that the operations against the FRPI, a rebel group, were successful and reduced the number of human rights violations committed. It was updated that ‘…the status of the joint operations against the Force de résistance patriotique en Ituri, ….where operations have been successful in reducing human rights violations committed by the group…’ (Ibid.).
* In 2016 (SCR, 2016a:8; SCR, 2016b:26-7) similar connections were made. Deaths of civilians were linked to the insecurity and violence spread by armed groups, as well as the FARDC in the Eastern provinces (Ibid.).

Next to the connection made between security issues, there are also links made, implicitly and explicitly, between issues of justice and human rights violations. From these excerpts, it can be deduced that, implicitly, a specific relation becomes clear from the discourse. This relation is between justice and human rights violations, in which justice is portrayed as being an adequate response to the occurrence of human rights violations. Furthermore, in the options mentioned in these reports, there were references to institutional reform and justice-related actions. There were no options mentioned that referred to measures to protect the civilians. This illustrates how, following the discourse in which justice is expressed as being an adequate response to human rights violations, there is a view on the MONUSCO-mission as needing to support the DRC government in an improved provision of justice, either by stressing its importance, advising on reform and/or cooperation with the ICC, and visiting the country with a group of experts.

* In May 2011, the Security Council members urged for ‘… a swift prosecution of all perpetrators of human rights abused and called upon the Congolese authorities to inform the Secretary-General about the measures taken’, following the sexual violence that took place in North and South Kivu (SCR, 2011b:17).
* In the same report, the rapes of 185 women and girls were also discussed and following, it was discussed how ‘a team of experts on the rule of law will visit the DRC in May to reinforce investigators and prosecutors…’ (Ibid.).
* Options for the Security Council included ‘adopting a presidential statement or a press statement acknowledging recent achievements in the prosecution of sexual offenders but addressing the continuing challenges facing the DRC, in particular the election process and institutional reform and the underlying economic, social and wider governance challenges…’ (Ibid.).
* In June 2012, it was reported there was an escalation of violence in North Kivu (SCR, 2012b:6). Following, the Security Council ‘… stressed the importance of the DRC actively seeking and holding accountable those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the country… and to cooperate with the ICC’ (Ibid.).
* One of the options for the Security Council mentioned included ‘demanding that the DRC cooperate with the ICC and hold violators of human rights accountable’ (Ibid.:7).
* In February, 2013 (SCR, 2013a:11), one of the options mentioned the possibility of emphasising the importance of accountability of human rights violators, because not doing so played ‘in the hands of those interested in destabilisation’.

Furthermore, in some reports, the human rights violations were explicitly linked to political events, most notably local and national elections. Implicitly, a similar relation as with the security challenges and the human rights violations can be identified in the discourse. The elections, local and national, are being implicitly expressed to go hand in hand with the occurrence of certain human rights violations. This again affects the view on the options for the MONUSCO-mission. In the options for the UNSC, there are explicit references to monitoring the elections, but there are no explicit references to protection of civilians. Thus, as with the previous identified relations, the view on the MONUSCO-mission is that it should support the DRC government in the improved provision of political freedoms and holding of elections. This role for the MONUSCO-mission is again related to the state security sector, instead of human security and the protection of the population.

* In June 2012, it was reported that ‘… during the election, at least 33 people in Kinshasa were killed by security forces, 83 were wounded and 16 were still missing’ (SCR, 2012b:6).
* Options mentioned for the Security Council in June 2012 included ‘issuing a press statement on the election process, specifying a greater role for MONUSCO in the next election cycle; and monitoring the reaction on the ground to the election process and convening additional Council meetings as necessary’ (Ibid.:7).
* One of the options mentioned for the Security Council in October 2012 was ‘closely monitoring the events in North Kivu and the preparations for elections and convening additional Council meetings as necessary’ (SCR, 2012c:7). Similar options were also already expressed in January of the same year, namely ‘issuing a press statement on the election process, specifying a greater role for MONUSCO in the next election cycle; n monitoring the reaction on the ground to the election process and convening additional Council meetings as necessary’ (SCR, 2012a:7).
* In October 2015, it was reported that there was an ‘… increase in politically-related human rights violations against the freedom of expression of those criticising the government, including arbitrary arrests and intimidation (SCR, 2015d:10).
* The options mentioned for the Security Council in October 2015 included ‘Council members may wish to adopt a statement regarding the need to uphold the constitution and conduct free, fair and timely elections. The Council may also consider visiting the country during the electoral period to take stock of the situation and deliver a strong political message to interlocutors’ (Ibid.:11).
* In January 2016, it was reported that ‘… the [DRC] government adopted a policy of limiting the opposition’s ability to conduct political activities ahead of the electoral cycle…’, and that ‘… the report documented 143 human rights violations in relation to the pre-electoral process between 1 January and 30 September 2015’, and that ‘… tensions are high regarding the ability of opposition parties to participate in political activities leading up to the elections’ (SCR, 2016a:7).
* Furthermore, the Secretary-General and Sambo Sidikou, head of the MONUSCO-mission, warned that ‘… the political polarisation has heightened tensions and contributed to an atmosphere of increased harassment and human rights violations…’ (Ibid.).
* In 2016, the mentioned options for the Security Council included ‘Council members may wish to adopt a more robust stance regarding the need to uphold constitutionally mandated terms and the conduct of free, fair and timely elections. The Council may also consider visiting the country during the electoral period to take stock of the situation and deliver a strong political message to interlocutors’ (Ibid.:8).
* In June, 2016, an option included the possibility for the Security Council to publicly condemn the human rights abuses that were connected to the developments surrounding the elections (SCR, 2016b:27).

As demonstrated, the discourse in the SCR’s is systematically organized around human rights violations taking place in the specific periods and areas. However, the occurrences of these human rights violations are, either implicitly or explicitly, systematically and consistently articulated as being connected to other issues, namely security issues, justice issues or political issues. There are different articulated relations for these linkages. Both for the security issues and political issues, the linkage to human rights violations can be considered a sort of cause-and-effect-relation, because as demonstrated, often, the security threats, posed by rebel- or armed groups or caused by mining-related actors, are seen as the ‘causes’ or ‘responsible actors’ for the human rights violations taking place. Similarly, the political events, usually national or local elections, are seen as the ‘causes’ or ‘responsible events’ for the human rights violations taking place. ‘Security (challenges)’ and ‘elections’ are thus, in effect, actively identified within the discourse as causes, or as being accountable, for the occurrences of human rights violations. As a consequence, the options for responses and the role of the MONUSCO-mission most often include actions related to these issues, and thus address the security challenges or the electoral challenges. Furthermore, the role assigned to the MONUSCO-mission is to support the DRC government to achieve this. This identification of the relation between ‘security’ and ‘elections’ and human rights violations thus affects the room for potential responses for the UNSC, in the sense that it gears the options towards state security instead of human security, and the necessity to support the DRC government, instead of protecting the population itself. A similar argument can be made for the relation between justice and the human rights violations taking place. In the discourse, justice is actively identified as an adequate response to the occurrences of human rights violations. Because of this identification, it is considered as a potential response to the human rights violations taking place. The role assigned to the MONUSCO-mission within the discourse is to support the DRC government to achieve this. This identification of the relation between ‘justice’ and human rights violations thus affects the room for response for the UNSC in the sense that it gears the options towards state security instead of human security, and the necessity to support the DRC government, instead of the protecting the population itself.

### 4.4.2 The MONUSCO-mandates and the prevailing discourse

It has been established that a certain discourse is articulated within the SCR’s. According to both Jan Pronk (2017) and Rose Bashwira, discourse matters. Pronk (2017) discusses that ‘objectivity does not exist, there is always interpretation’. He continues his argument by stating that decisions and choices in politics are made on interpretations of facts (Ibid.). Obviously, a certain (re-)articulated discourse on a specific conflict affects this interpretation of facts, and thereby could affect the political decisions made, for example in the UNSC. According to Bashwira (2017), discourse does affect policy decisions and also affects the (local) situation in a country. Although she uses the examples of discourse concerning the mining sector and discourse concerning sexual violence, her examples do illustrate that a particular discourse can have an impact on policy decisions and the local reality. Following, it will be traced whether the identified discourse within the SCR’s has affected the MONUSCO-mandates, by tracing whether the design of the mandates is in line with, or follows logically from the identified discourse.

 The protection of civilians, and thus human security, is central in the MONUSCO-mandates. This can be deduced from the mandates in several manners.

* It is systematically and consistently addressed as an imperative objective and task within the MONUSCO-mandates (UNSC, 2010:4-6, Security Council, 2011c:3-4; 2012:5; 2013:5-6; 2014:6; 2015:4-6).
* In each of the mandates, the Security Council expresses concern for ‘the humanitarian and human rights situation’ in the country (UNSC, 2010:2, 2011c:2; 2012:2; 2013:2; 2014:3; 2015:2).
* Also, in each of the mandates, the assistance to the DRC government in the protection of civilians is treated as an imperative objective and task of the MONUSCO-mandate (UNSC, 2010:4-6, Security Council, 2011c:3-4; 2012:5; 2013:5-6; 2014:6; 2015:4-6).
* Ultimately, in each of the MONUSCO-mandates it is emphasized that the DRC governments holds the primary responsibility for the protection of civilians (UNSC, 2010:1; 2011c:1; 2012:1; 2013:1; 2014:1; 2015:1).

Although protection of the population, and human security, are thus prioritized in the mandate as central objective, the strategy to accomplish this central objective is completely geared towards improving the state security, and the role of the MONUSCO-mission to support the DRC government in doing so. The identified relations with the issues of security and political events as causes or accountable for the human rights violations taking place, or the identified relation with the issue of justice as adequate response to human rights violations taking place, are abundantly present in the tasks and objectives of the MONUSCO-mandates.

* In each of the mandates it is again emphasized that there are significant security challenges in the DRC (UNSC, 2010:1, 2011c:1; 2012:1; 2013:1; 2014:1; 2015:1).
* Also, in each of the mandates ‘security’ is mentioned as an objective and task (UNSC, 2010:4-6, 2011c:3-4; 2012:5; 2013:5-6; 2014:6; 2015:4-6).
* In 2010, the objectives of military operation in minimization of the threat of armed groups and stabilization preceded the objective of improving the capacity of the DRC government to protect the population (UNSC, 2010:4).
* A similar order of objectives was followed in each of the mandates (UNSC, 2011c:3-4; 2012:5; 2013:5-6; 2014:6; 2015:4-6).
* However, later on in the 2010-mandate, it was stated that the protection of civilians must be given priority in decisions about the use of available capacity and resources (UNSC, 2010:4). This was also re-emphasized when the order of priorities was explicitly mentioned to be protection of civilians and then the stabilization and peace consolidation (Ibid.:6). This prioritization was similarly mentioned the objectives and tasks-sections in each of the other mandates (UNSC, 2011c:3-4; 2012:5; 2013:5-6; 2014:6; 2015:4-6).
* In that sense, there was explicitly stated that the protection of civilians was the key priority, but also explicitly made clear that security and stabilization quickly followed after.

 Furthermore, in each of the objective sections, as well as the tasks sections there are reference to issues of justice, which indicates the role assigned to the MONUSCO-mission to support the DRC government in enhancing the justice-sector in the DRC.

* In the first three years of MONUSCO there was the objective of consolidating state authority, through the deployment of rule and law institutions among other things (UNSC, 2010:4; 2011c:3; 2012:4).
* From 2013 onwards, there was the objective of management of Congolese justice and security institutions (UNSC, 2013:5; 2014:6; 2015:5).
* Also, from 2013 onwards, there is a reference to justice issues in the tasks of the mission. In 2013, this encompasses the ‘provision of support to national and international judicial processes’ (UNSC, 2013:7). This is re-articulated in 2014 (UNSC, 2014:7) and in 2015 it is referred to under the task of ‘Support to the national reform process (UNSC, 2015:8).
* In 2011, the importance of the DRC government to actively seek and hold accountable those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity, was stressed by the Security Council (UNSC, 2011c:6). Also, the cooperation with the ICC was mentioned to be stressed to be important (Ibid.).
* In 2013, the Security Council requested the DRC government to ‘arrest and hold accountable those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the country (UNSC, 2013:10).
* Furthermore, in 2015, the Council called upon the DRC authorities to ensure prosecution for the ones that were responsible for human rights violations and abuses in the election of 2011 (UNSC, 2015:12).

Next to the issue of security and justice, the issue of political processes, specifically national and local elections, are also abundantly mentioned in the MONUSCO-mandates. Again, the role assigned to the MONUCSO-mission to support the DRC government in providing an enhanced environment for free and fair elections.

* In 2010 it is stated that the Security Council supports ‘…the efforts of the Government to finalize the electoral calendar for local, general and presidential elections within the constitutional framework, with a view to consolidate democracy and promote the rule of law’ (UNSC, 2010:2).
* Following, in 2011, it is stressed by the Security Council that the ‘…the successful holding of timely, inclusive, peaceful, credible and transparent elections, in accordance with the constitution and international standards, is a key condition for the consolidation of democracy, national reconciliation and restoration of a stable, peaceful and secure environment in which stabilization and socio-economic development can progress in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (UNSC, 2011c:1).
* In the same mandate, the Council urges the DRC government to ensure a conducive environment for ‘free, fair, credible, inclusive, transparent, peaceful and timely electoral processes’ (UNSC, 2011c:3). In 2012, the Council urges the DRC authorities to ensure that both the local and provincial elections are conducted transparently, timely, credible and peaceful (UNSC, 2012:6).
* In 2014, the Council once more calls on the DRC government, again to ensure a credible and electoral process (UNSC, 2014:9).

As argued in the previous section, the prevailing discourse within the SCR’s concerning the DRC conflict is actively articulating certain relations, between the human rights violations taking place and the issue of security, justice and political events. As a short recap, in this articulation, the issue of security (challenges/threats) and political events (elections) are identified as responsible or accountable for the occurrence of human rights violations. The issue of justice is identified as an adequate response after the occurrence of human rights violations. As argued, this affects the potential options for the UNSC, in the sense that most often, the options include responses to the security or political issues and to have justice-related measures to respond to the human rights violations. Furthermore, it affects the view on the role of the MONUSCO-mission, which is to support the DRC government in improving the state security in order to reduce and respond to the human rights violations taking place. In the mandates, it is, as demonstrated above, presented how these issues are abundantly present within the mandates and can be argued to be in line with, or follow logically from, the identified discourse within the SCR’s. Although ‘protection of the population’, which refers to human security, is prioritized as overall objective, the tasks and objectives to achieve this are either responding to security challenges/threats, responding to tensions surrounding the elections, or increasing or improving the capacity of the DRC justice department. Especially because the MONUSCO-mandate is established to support or assist the DRC government in its tasks, these tasks are all focused on improving or consolidating the state security and not particularly on human security. Ultimately, it can thus be argued that the active articulation of the discourse, and identification of the mentioned issues within that discourse, might have affected the potential room for options for the UNSC and might have affected the ultimate design of the MONUSCO-mandates. Ultimately, this discourse geared towards state security instead of human security, and supporting the DRC government in doing so, is thus not in line with the responsibility to protect-principle, which is a part of human security.

# 5. Conclusion

## 5.1 Introduction

This chapter will first focus on establishing whether the expectations from the theoretical perspectives have been traced for the case and whether they’ve proven useful in explaining the outcome. Furthermore, it will focus on establishing whether a minimally sufficient causal mechanism can be identified which can provide an explanation for the puzzling outcome. Next, it will be discussed in what way this research has made a contribution to both the academic and societal debate concerning this topic. Lastly, there will be a reflection on the methods used, and there will be a discussion of some suggestions for future research concerning this case or this topic.

## 5.2 Findings

In the introduction, it was argued that the non-implementation of the (third pillar of the) R2P-principle in the MONUSCO-mandates for the DRC conflict presented a puzzling outcome. It can be considered puzzling, in brief, because human rights violations have taken place on a grand scale within the conflict, and because a primary objective of the MONUSCO-mission is to protect the population, and the R2P-principle is precisely the tool designed to do so. Yet, there is no reference to the principle in any of the MONUSCO-mandates. Consequently, the aim of this research was to explain this resistant attitude of the international community, i.e. the UNSC, concerning the (third pillar of the) R2P-principle in the MONUSCO-mandates. This resulted in the following central research question:

*What is the contribution of the Realist, Constructivist and Poststructuralist perspective for explaining the resistant attitude of the UN Security Council concerning the application of the (third pillar of the) R2P-principle in the MONUSCO-mandates for the Democratic Republic of Congo?*

In order to do answer this question, three distinct theoretical perspectives on norm compliance were used as tools to identify possible explanations for the outcome. The following expectations were identified:

*Realist expectation:* States will not comply to the implementation of (the third pillar of) the R2P-principle for the case of the DRC, if this is not in line with their own interests (military, geostrategic or economic).

*Constructivist expectation*: States will be less likely to comply to the implementation of the (third pillar of the) R2P-principle for the case of the DRC, when the principle is not situated within the third stage of the Norm Life Cycle and when there are no beneficial conditions (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998) .

*Poststructuralist expectation:* States will not comply to the implementation of the (third pillar of the) R2P-principle for the case of the DRC, when this is not in line with the prevailing discourse on the DRC-conflict

 Next, the identified expectations from these theoretical perspectives were traced within the case, using discourse analyses and interviews, to establish whether the causal mechanisms identified in these theoretical perspectives were present in the case and could help explain the outcome.

 The Realist analysis traced what the role of national interests and preferences were of (UNSC) member states concerning the DRC conflict and what role this played in the design of the MONUSCO-mandates. Although there were multiple suggestions that corroborate the Realist expectation of national interests and preferences playing a role in the UNSC’s decisions (concerning R2P), there were no indications that this was also the case regarding the MONUSCO-mandates and the DRC conflict. Instead, it was established that the mission showed no indications of fiscal restraint, or political motivations of member states who did not want to be involved. In fact, it was the second largest, and later the largest, UN mission in terms of the costs and requirements, and all member states continuously unanimously agreed upon the mandates between 2010-2015. Therefore, the Realist theoretical perspective was not very insightful for explaining this particular outcome.

 The Constructivist analysis traced in what stage the principle could be considered to be and under what conditions the principle existed. From the analysis, it became clear that the main actors involved with the principle, the dominant mechanism for the principle and the motives for this mechanism could all be identified to belong to the second stage, the so called ‘norm cascade’. The principle thus has not reached the third stage, internalization. Furthermore, the conditions under which the norm existed could be considered rather unbeneficial, since it has not always had full support of powerful states and has a rather unspecific fundamental text. Ultimately, this analysis did prove insightful and helpful in explaining the outcome. The causal mechanism, in which it is expected that when a norm is not in the third stage, internalization, yet, it is less likely to be complied to, was found to be present in the case. This Constructivist explanation could help explain the resistant attitude of the UNSC regarding the implementation of the R2P-principle in the MONUSCO-mandates.

 The Poststructuralist analysis traced whether the prevailing discourse concerning the DRC conflict within the international community was in line with the R2P-principle. From the analysis, it became clear that there was a prevailing discourse in the international community concerning the DRC conflict that was organized around human rights violations taking place, but simultaneously identified specific issues as being related in specific ways to these human rights violations which were not conducive to the adoption of the R2P-principle. There are different articulated relations for these identified linkages. Both for the security issues and political issues, the linkage to human rights violations can be considered a sort of cause-and-effect-relation, because the security threats are seen as the ‘causes’ or ‘responsible actors’ for the human rights violations taking place. Similarly, the political events are seen as the ‘causes’ or ‘responsible events’ for the human rights violations taking place. ‘Security (challenges)’ and ‘elections’ are thus, in effect, actively identified within the discourse as causes for the occurrences of human rights violations. As a consequence, the options for responses and the role of the MONUSCO-mission most often include actions related to these issues, and thus address the security challenges or the electoral challenges. A similar argument can be made for the relation between justice and the human rights violations taking place. In the discourse, ‘justice’ is actively identified as an adequate response to the occurrences of human rights violations. Because of this identification, it is considered as a potential response to the human rights violations taking place. In the discourse, the role assigned to the MONUSCO-mission is to support the DRC government to achieve this. This identification of the relation between ‘security’, ‘elections’ and ‘justice’ and human rights violations thus affects the room for response for the UNSC, in the sense that it gears the options towards state security instead of human security, and the necessity for the MONUSCO-mission to support the DRC government in achieving state security, instead of protecting the population itself. In the mandates, a similar pattern was established in which human security, the protection of the population, was prioritized as overall objective of the mission, but the tasks and objectives to achieve this were all concerned with the identified related issues, and thus geared towards state security. Also, it in the MONUSCO-mandates it was explicitly made clear that the role of the MONUSCO-mission is to support the DRC government in achieving its tasks and objectives. Ultimately, this analysis proved insightful and helpful in explaining the outcome. The causal mechanism on norm compliance, in which it is expected that when the prevailing discourse concerning the DRC is not in line with the R2P-principle, the international community will not comply to the R2P-principle for the DRC, was found to be present in the case. This Poststructuralist explanation could help explain the attitude of the UNSC regarding the implementation of the R2P-principle in the MONUSCO-mandates.

 Ultimately, to answer the central research question, it can thus be argued that both the Constructivist and the Poststructuralist theoretical perspectives have provided helpful contributions, as demonstrated above, for explaining this puzzling outcome. This cannot be argued for the Realist perspective concerning this particular case. Both these perspectives have contributed in tracing mechanisms that could present a minimally sufficient explanation for the outcome. Such an explanation would encompass the following mechanism:

The R2P-principle has not yet reached the third stage, internalization, and exists under rather unbeneficial conditions between 2010-2015

UNSC member states are less likely to comply to the R2P-principle and less likely to implement it in the MONUSCO-mandates between 2010-2015

The prevailing discourse concerning the DRC conflict is geared towards supporting the DRC government in enhancing the state security and not human security between 2010-2015, and thereby affects the potential room for options for the UNSC for the MONUSCO-mandates between 2010-2015

The R2P-principle is not implemented in the MONUSCO-mandates between 2010-2015

UNSC member states will not comply to the R2P-principle and will not implement it in the MONUSCO-mandates between 2010-2015

However, it must also be noted that these identified mechanisms are possible explanations for the puzzling outcome. Although these results are backed by substantial evidence deduced from the discourse analyses, they have not been confirmed by any key individuals responsible for the mandate or from the DRC government, due to the lack of accessibility of these individuals for interviews. This will be further addressed in the following section.

## 5.3 Discussion

In the introduction it was argued that this research question fits within two separate debates, being the academic debate between the IR theories concerning norm compliance, and the societal debate concerning the decision-making and implementation of the R2P-principle. Following, the findings from this research will used to engage with both these debates.

 The academic debate consisted of the three distinct theoretical perspectives, Realism, Constructivism and Poststructuralism with their different views on and expectations for norm compliance. Each of the perspectives focused on different issues. The Realist perspective focused on the role of the interests of national states, the Constructivist perspective focused on the role of the stage of the norm and the conditions under which it existed, and the Poststructuralist perspective focused on the role of the prevailing discourse on the conflict. As already expressed in the introduction, these distinct theoretical perspectives complement each other, in the sense that they focus on different mechanisms that could simultaneously play a role for one specific issue of compliance, and therefore could complement each other in explaining that (non-)compliance. This was also corroborated in this research. Specifically for the compliance to the R2P-principle in the MONUSCO-mandates, each of the perspectives highlighted a distinct mechanism that could possibly have affected the attitude of the UNSC to adopt the principle or not. The effort to explain the outcome led to the conclusion that specifically the Constructivist and Poststructuralist provided useful explanations for this particular outcome. However, the Realist analysis also provided some helpful insights, specifically concerning the execution of the mandate and the distinct character of the conflict. Ultimately, although they each stand on their own as theoretical perspective, they seem insufficient when used as a single explanation. The complementary nature of the perspectives precisely allows for a wide lens that considers the possibility of different dynamics being at play in a single case. This leads to a nuanced conclusion that takes into account these different mechanisms that could explain an outcome, instead of simply ‘testing’ whether one theory can account for the outcome or not, or instead of providing a narrow explanation without taking into account other dynamics.

 Furthermore, it was expressed in the introduction how the Realist and Constructivist theoretical perspectives were used most commonly when engaging in research on norm compliance. Although Poststructuralism is less often referred to in these instances, this research showed the added value of also encompassing this particular perspective. It expands the lens used to discover the dynamics at play in cases of norm (non-)compliance. In this case, it also provided insightful explanations for the particular outcome. In that sense, this research has displayed the relevance of the Poststructuralist perspective in the field of research that concerns norm compliance, as well as confirmed the relevance of the Realist and Constructivist perspective and the complementary use of these perspectives.

 There was also a societal debate concerning the decision-making and implementation of the R2P-principle. A few notable, societal matters became clear from the research. First of all, the immense magnitude of the MONUSCO-mission was elucidated. As noted, it is the largest UN (stabilization) mission so far, financially, materially and in terms of deployed personnel. Thus, a lot of recourses are allocated to this particular conflict. Second, the debated and practically underdeveloped nature of the R2P-principle was expounded throughout this analysis. The principle is found to face many implementation challenges to this day and to be debated within the UNSC concerning how and when it is appropriate to implement. Third, the tremendous complexity of the DRC conflict is demonstrated. It encompasses a multitude of different armed actors, including local, national and foreign armed (rebel) groups, the national military and police forces and the international troops of MONUSCO. Also, it has a multifaceted nature, meaning that there are several distinct causes of conflict that play a role, including land issues, (illegal) exploitation natural recourses and mining, political issues such as the challenged legitimacy of the government, and other grievances. These highlighted matters inspire a few relevant questions for the societal debate concerning the (selectivity of the implementation of the) R2P-principle. First, it remains puzzling why the UN(SC) continues to linger with this narrative of (supporting) state security within the DRC, when they simultaneously emphasize the priority of protecting civilians. Following, and also given the debated nature of the R2P-principle, the question arises whether the R2P is doomed to fail. It has not yet achieved its ambition of making the international community come together and adequately respond when civilians around the world are in need of protection. This research particularly illustrates that even when the need to protect civilians is acknowledged and explicitly prioritized by the UN, it still tries to achieve this without referring to the R2P-principle. Lastly, the immense complexity of the DRC conflict makes one question the applicability of the R2P-principle in such a case. Still, since many conflicts today in which human rights violations take place have a complex, multi-actor and/or multifaceted nature, the applicability of the R2P-principle can be assumed to be at stake in more cases.

 This particular research demonstrated that there is a specific mechanism that can account for the explanation of the resistant attitude of the UNSC concerning the application of the R2P-principle in the MONUSCO-mandates, and that the implementation of the principle is thus not solely selective. However, some urgent questions, as mentioned above, did arise. Ultimately, the most notable addition to the societal debate surrounding the R2P-principle would be the question of its usefulness and its necessity. Its usefulness can be questioned considering the failure to achieve its ambition of protecting civilians effectively and the existing resistant attitude to implement it even when in a case in which it likely to do so. Its necessity can be questioned considering the ability of the UNSC to address the protection of civilians in UN missions and mandates, even without referral to the R2P-principle. Overall, the R2P-principle is thus far from being a well-established, accepted and effective addition to the realm of international norms.

 There are also some methodological issues that need to be addressed. As established in the methodological section, some biases and challenges exist concerning the used methods. For the discourse analyses, a possible identified bias was the subjectivity of the researcher, for which the using a second coder and account for the inter-coder reliability might have been a solution. However, for this master thesis there was no possibility of a second coder. Instead, other solution were used to try to minimize the subjectivity of the discourse analyses. The discourse analyses have been added in the appendices in order to provide as much clarity possible as to where the results come from. Furthermore, many quotes were presented in the discourse analysis, to explicitly make clear how the final argument for both analyses is backed by the texts and to provide the reader with the possibility to assess the quality of the argument based on this analysis. The in-depth interviews also provided some challenges. Again the subjectivity of the interviewee and interviewer could provide biased accounts. Again, to account for this bias, the complete transcripts of the interviews have been added in the appendices. This way, the reader can assess whether the arguments deduced from the interviews in the analyses is rightfully interpreted from the interview. The accessibility of interviewees was also identified to be a possible challenge. This has really proven to be the case concerning this research question. Not many individuals were willing to participate in interviews. Various individuals, mostly working for NGO’s in the country, argued that they thought of the situation as ‘too sensitive’, and that they did not want to endanger their employees or their activities in the country by participating in an interview. Their reasoning for not wanting to participate once again emphasizes the instable, fragile and complex situation in the country. Ultimately, the difficulty to identify individuals willing to be interviewed has had an effect on the research and the answer to the research question. It has affected the answer in the sense that there are indications from the discourse analyses that some mechanisms are at play for the specific case and therefore provide explanations for the puzzling outcome, yet these are only possible explanations. Also, there are no accounts from individuals involved in the MONUSCO-mission or the UNSC that these mechanisms actually affect the decision-making process. Furthermore, the missing party from the interviews as well as the discourse analysis was the DRC government and the DRC population. Such interviews could have provided more insights concerning the relation between the government, the UN and the forthcoming mandate, as well as the relation between the government and the local population. These interviews could have been conducted by doing fieldwork in the DRC.

## 5.4 Suggestions for future research

Methodologically, some suggestions for future research can be made. In this thesis the aim was to explain the puzzling outcome for the MONUSCO-mandates concerning the DRC conflict. Two theoretical perspectives proved helpful in explaining the outcome and helped establish a minimally sufficient explanation. However, as mentioned in the discussion, there is no clear cut answer that this explanation is the actual explanation for the outcome, because of the lack of in-depth interviews with decision-makers and key individuals directly involved in the decision-making process in the UNSC concerning the MONUSCO-mandates. Therefore, one suggestion for future research would be to try to access these accounts, since they could provide very insightful accounts concerning the rationale behind the mandate, and thereby provide more direct evidence. Also, the lack of any interviews with key individuals from the DRC government or the local population could be solved by exploring possibilities to engage in fieldwork. Furthermore, considering the scope of the Master thesis research, a limited scope for the discourse analysis was appropriate. The project was completed individually within five months, which limits the size of the discourse analyses feasible to incorporate in the research. Therefore, expanding the scope of the discourse analyses by including more sources and from various other organizations could be insightful in future research.

 Furthermore, a content-related suggestion can also be made. It would be very interesting to identify cases similar to the DRC and test whether similar explanations can account for the outcome. This way it could be established whether these results are unique for the DRC case, or whether other similar cases also have similar explanations. A similar suggestion can be made for any case in which there is non-compliance to an international norm. Although Realist and Constructivist explanations are already often tested, Poststructuralist explanations are less often used. This way, it could be established whether these results are unique for the R2P-principle in the MONUSCO-mandates, or whether in other cases a Poststructuralist explanation also provides insightful explanations.

# Bibliography

AU Executive Council (2005) The Ezulwini Consensus. URL: <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/Chart_R2P_11August.pdf>

Autesserre, S. (2009) Hobbes and the Congo: frames, local violence, and international intervention. International Organization, 249-280.

Autesserre, S. (2012) Dangerous tales: Dominant narratives on the Congo and their unintended consequences. African Affairs, 202-222.

Axelrod, R. (1986) An evolutionary approach to norms. American political science review 80(4): 1095-1111

Autesserre, S. (2016) The responsibility to protect in Congo: the failure of grassroots prevention. International Peacekeeping 23(1): 29-51.

Bannon, A.L. (2006) The responsibility to protect: The UN world summit and the question of unilateralism. The Yale Law Journal 115(5): 1157-1165.

Bastick, M., Grimm, K. and Kunz, R. (2007) Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict: Global Overview and Implications for the Security Sector. Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces, URL: <http://www.essex.ac.uk/armedcon/story_id/sexualviolence_conflict_full%5B1%5D.pdf>

Bashwira, R. (2017) Interview Rose Bashwira 24-05-2017

Beach, D. and Pederson, R.B. (2013) Process-tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press

Bellamy, A. J. (2010) The responsibility to protect—five years on. Ethics & International Affairs 24(2): 143-169.

Bellamy, A. J., & Williams, P. D. (2011) The new politics of protection? Côte d'Ivoire, Libya and the responsibility to protect. International Affairs 87(4): 825-850.

Bellamy, A. J. (2015) The Responsibility to Protect turns ten. Ethics & International Affairs (29)2: 161-185.

Bennet, A. (2008) Process-tracing: A Bayesian Perspective. In: J.M. Box-Steffensmeier, H.E. Brady and D. Collier (Eds) The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology, pp. 701-21. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Boli, J., & Thomas, G. M. (1998) World Polity Formation since 1875. World Culture and International Non-Governmental Organizations.

Butler, J. (1993) Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive limits of Sex. New York: Routledge.

Campbell, D. and Bleiker, R. (2013) Poststructuralism. In T. Dunne, M. Kruki, S. Smith (Eds) International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 196-218.

Chandler, D. (2006) From Kosovo to Kabul and Beyond: Human Rights and International Intervention. London:Pluto Books.

Checkel, J. T. (1997) International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the Rationalist—Constructivist Divide. European journal of international relations 3(4): 473-495.

Checkel, J.T. (1998) The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory. World Politics (50)2: 324-348.

Checkel, J.T. (2008) Tracing Causal Mechanisms. International Studies Reviews (8)2: 362-70.

Crawford, N. (1993) Decolonization as an international norm: the evolution of practices, arguments, and beliefs, Emerging Norms of Justified Intervention, 37-61.

Crawford, C. (2011) The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Global Research. URL: <http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-responsibility-to-protect-and-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo/27840>

Deleuze, G. (1988) Foucault. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Elman, C. and Jensen, M. (2014) The Realism Reader. New York: Routledge.

Fearon, J. D. (1997) Signaling foreign policy interests: Tying hands versus sinking costs. Journal of Conflict Resolution 41(1): 68-90.

Fierke, K.M. (2013) Constructivism. In T. Dunne, M. Kruki, S. Smith (Eds) International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 161-195.

Finnemore, M. (1996) National Interests and International Society. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. (1998) International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. International Organization (52): 887-918.

Florini, A. (1996) The evolution of international norms. International Studies Quarterly (40)3: 363-389.

Foucault, M. (1979) Discipline and Punish: The birth of Prison, Translated by A. Sheridan. New York: Vintage Books.

Foucault, M. (1988) Politics, Philosophy and Culture: Interviews and Other Writings 1977-1984, London: Routledge.

GA (2005) World Summit Outcome, URL: [http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/world%20summit%20outcome%20doc%202005(1).pdf](http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/world%20summit%20outcome%20doc%202005%281%29.pdf) accessed on 10-05-2017.

GA (2009) A/63/677 Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, report of the Secretary-General, URL: [file:///C:/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Documenten%20R2P/2009-r2p.pdf](file:///C%3A/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Documenten%20R2P/2009-r2p.pdf) accessed on 10-05-2017.

GA (2010a) A/64/864, Early Warning, Assessment and the responsibility to protect, URL: [file:///C:/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Documenten%20R2P/2010-r2p.pdf](file:///C%3A/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Documenten%20R2P/2010-r2p.pdf) accessed on 10-05-2017.

GA (2010b) A/C.5/64/19. Approved recourses for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011.

GA (2012a) A/C.5/66/14. Approved recourses for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012.

GA (2012b) A/C.5/66/18. Approved recourses for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013.

GA (2013) A/C.5/67/19. Approved recourses for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014.

GA (2015) A/C.5/69/17. Approved recourses for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2015.

GA and UNSC (2011) A/65/877, The role of regional and sub-regional arrangements in implementing the responsibility to protect, report of the Secretary-General. URL: [file:///C:/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Documenten%20R2P/2011-r2p.pdf](file:///C%3A/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Documenten%20R2P/2011-r2p.pdf) accessed on 10-05-2017.

GA and UNSC (2012) A/66/874-S/2012/578, Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response, report of the Secretary General. URL: [file:///C:/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Documenten%20R2P/2012-r2p.pdf](file:///C%3A/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Documenten%20R2P/2012-r2p.pdf) accessed on 10-05-2017.

GA and UNSC (2013) A/67/929 - S/2013/399, Responsibility To Protect: State Responsibility and Prevention, Report of the Secretary-General. URL: [file:///C:/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Documenten%20R2P/2013-r2p.pdf](file:///C%3A/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Documenten%20R2P/2013-r2p.pdf) accessed on 10-05-201.

GA and UNSC (2014) A/68/947, S/2014/449, Fulfilling Our collective Responsibility: International Assistance and the Responsibility to Protect, report of the Secretary-General. URL: [file:///C:/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Documenten%20R2P/2014-r2p.pdf](file:///C%3A/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Documenten%20R2P/2014-r2p.pdf) accessed on 10-05-2017.

GA and UNSC (2015) A/69/981, S/2015/500, A vital and enduring commitment: Implementing the responsibility to protect, Report of the Secretary General. URL: [file:///C:/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Documenten%20R2P/2015-r2p.pdf](file:///C%3A/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Documenten%20R2P/2015-r2p.pdf), accessed on 10-05-2017.

George, A.L. and Bennet, A. (2005) Case Studies and Theory Development in Social Sciences. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Gerring, J. (2006) Single Outcome-Studies: A Methodological Primer. International Sociology (21)5: 707-34.

Gerring, J. (2007) Case Study Research. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gerring, J. (2008) Case Selection for Case-Study Analysis: Qualitative and Quantitative Techniques. In J.F. Box-Steffensmeier, H. E. Brady, and D. Collier (Eds): The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology. Oxford: Oxford University Press (Chapter 28: 645-684).

Glennan, S.S. (1996) Mechanisms and the Nature of Causation. Erkenntnis 44(1): 49-71.

Gurowitz, A. (1997) International Society and State Inclusion of Non-Citizens: The Changing Debate in Japan and Germany. Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, 18-22

Hathaway, O. A. (2002) Do human rights treaties make a difference?. The Yale Law Journal 111(8): 1935-2042.

Hamilton, R.J. (2006) The responsibility to protect, from document to doctrine- But what of implementation?. Harvard Human Rights Journal (19): 289-297.

Henking, L. (1979) How Nations Behave. Law and Foreign Policy. New York: Columbia University Press.

Ikenberry, G. J., & Kupchan, C. A. (1990) Socialization and hegemonic power. International organization 44(3): 283-315.

Katzenstein, P. (1996) The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press.

Katzenstein, P., Keohane, R.O., and Krasner, S.D. (1998) International Organization and the Study of World Politics. International Organization 52(4): 645-685.

Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1998) Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international *politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Korab-Karpowicz, W. J. (2010) Political realism in international relations. URL: <https://stanford.library.sydney.edu.au/entries/realism-intl-relations/#HanMorReaPri>, accessed on 20-03-2017.

Laclau and Mouffe (1985) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. London: Verso.

Lebow, R.N. (2013) Classical Realism. In T. Dunne, M. Kruki, S. Smith (Eds) International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 34-51.

Luck, E. C. (2010) The responsibility to protect: growing pains or early promise?. Ethics & International Affairs 24(4): 349-365.

MacFarlane, S. N., Thielking, C. J., and Weiss, T.G. (2004) The responsibility to protect: is anyone interested in humanitarian intervention?. Third World Quarterly 25(5): 977-992.

Mearsheimer, J.J. (1994) The False Promise of International Institutions. International Security 19(3): 5-49.

Morgenthau, H. (1984) Politics Among Nations: The struggle for Power and Peace. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Morada, N.M. (2006) R2P Roadmap in Southeast Asia: Challenges and Prospects, UNISCI Discussion Papers, 59-70.

Neethling, T. (2011) From MONUC to MONUSCO and beyond: prospects for reconstruction, state-building and security governance in the DRC. South African Journal of International Affairs 18(1): 23-41.

Norval, A.J. and Stavrakakis, Y. (2000) Introducing Discourse Theory and Political Analysis. In D.R. Howarth and A.J. Norval (Eds) Discourse Theory and Political Analysis. Manchester: Manchester University press .

OHCHR (2010) UN Mapping Exercise Report. URL: <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/CD/DRC_MAPPING_REPORT_FINAL_EN.pdf>, accessed on 20-02-2017.

Onuf, N. (1989) World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory in International Relations. Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Caroline Press.

Pattison, J. (2008) Whose Responsibility to Protect? The Duties of Humanitarian Intervention. Journal of Military Ethics 7(4): 262-283.

Peterman, A., Palermo, T., and Bredenkamp, C. (2011) Estimates and Determinants of Sexual Violence Against Women in the Democratic Republic of Congo. American Journal of Public Health 101(6): 1060-1067.

Pronk, J. (2017) Interview Jan Pronk 10-05-2017.

Puijenbroek, van, J. (2017) Interview Joost van Puijenbroek 22-05-2017.

Rosenthal, J. H. (1991) Righteous realists: Political realism, responsible power, and American culture in the nuclear age. Baton Rouge: LSU Press.

Simmons, B.A. (2012) International Law. In: W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse, and B.A. Simmons (Eds) Sage Handbook of International Relations, pp. 352-378. London: Sage Publications.

Vlassenroot, K., & Huggins, C. (2005) Land, migration and conflict in eastern DRC. In: J. Clover and C. Huggins (Eds) From the ground up: land rights, conflict and peace in sub-Saharan Africa, 115-194. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

Wakabi, W. (2008) Sexual Violence Increasing in Democratic Republic of Congo. The Lancet 371(9606).

Waltz, K. (1979) Theory of International Politics. New York: Random House Waltz, K. (1990). Realist thought and neorealist theory. Journal of International Affairs, 21-37.

Wendt, A. (1987) The agent-structure problem in International Relations. International Organization 41(3): 335-370.

Wendt, A. (1992) Anarchy is What States Make Of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics. International Organization 46(2): 391-425.

Wendt, A. (1999) Social Theory of International Politics. London: Cambridge University Press.

Willard, A. R., & Onuf, N. G. (1992) World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations.

Wunderlich, C. (2013) Theoretical Approaches in Norm Dynamics. In: H. Müller and C. Wunderlich (Eds) Norm Dynamics in Multilateral Arms Control: Interests, Conflicts and Justice. London:University of Georgia Press, pp. 20-51.

Responsibility To Protect (n.d.) Crises in DRC. URL: <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-drc> , Accessed on 10-05-2017.

Responsibility To Protect (2005) State by State Position. URL: [file:///C:/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Documenten%20R2P/State%20by%20state%20position%20on%20R2P.pdf](file:///C%3A/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Documenten%20R2P/State%20by%20state%20position%20on%20R2P.pdf) , Accessed on 10-05-2017.

SCR (2010a) Security Council Report September 2010. URL: [file:///C:/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2010\_09\_Update\_DRC\_SCR.pdf](file:///C%3A/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2010_09_Update_DRC_SCR.pdf) , Accessed on 05-05-2017.

SCR (2010b) Security Council Report Forecast October 2010. URL: [file:///C:/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2010\_10\_Forecast\_DRC\_SCR.pdf](file:///C%3A/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2010_10_Forecast_DRC_SCR.pdf) , Accessed on 05-05-2017

SCR (2010c) Security Council Report Forecast November 2010. URL: [file:///C:/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2010\_11\_Forecast\_DRC\_SCR.pdf](file:///C%3A/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2010_11_Forecast_DRC_SCR.pdf), Accessed on 05-05-2017.

SCR (2011a) Security Council Report Forecast February 2011. URL: [file:///C:/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2011\_02\_Forecast\_DRC\_SCR.pdf](file:///C%3A/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2011_02_Forecast_DRC_SCR.pdf), Accessed on 05-05-2017.

SCR (2011b) Security Council Report Forecast May 2011. URL: [file:///C:/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2011\_05\_Forecast\_DRC\_SCR.pdf](file:///C%3A/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2011_05_Forecast_DRC_SCR.pdf), Accessed on 05-05-2017.

SCR (2011c) Security Council Report Forecast June 2011. URL: [file:///C:/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2011\_06\_Forecast\_DRC\_SCR.pdf](file:///C%3A/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2011_06_Forecast_DRC_SCR.pdf), Accessed on 05-05-2017.

SCR (2011d) Security Council Report Forecast November 2011. URL: [file:///C:/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2011\_11\_Forecast\_DRC\_SCR.pdf](file:///C%3A/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2011_11_Forecast_DRC_SCR.pdf), Accessed on 05-05-2017.

SCR (2012a) Security Council Report Forecast February 2012. URL: [file:///C:/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2012\_02\_Forecast\_DRC\_SCR.pdf](file:///C%3A/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2012_02_Forecast_DRC_SCR.pdf), Accessed on 05-05-2017.

SCR (2012b) Security Council Report Forecast June 2012. URL: [file:///C:/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2012\_06\_Forecast\_DRC\_SCR.pdf](file:///C%3A/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2012_06_Forecast_DRC_SCR.pdf), Accessed on 05-05-2017.

SCR (2012c) Security Council Report Forecast November 2012. URL: [file:///C:/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2012\_11\_Forecast\_DRC\_SCR.pdf](file:///C%3A/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2012_11_Forecast_DRC_SCR.pdf), Accessed on 05-05-2017.

SCR (2013a) Security Council Report Forecast February 2013. URL: [file:///C:/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2013\_02\_Forecast\_DRC\_SCR.pdf](file:///C%3A/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2013_02_Forecast_DRC_SCR.pdf) , Accessed on 05-05-2017.

SCR (2013b) Security Council Report Forecast May 2013. URL: [file:///C:/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2013\_05\_Forecast\_DRC\_SCR.pdf](file:///C%3A/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2013_05_Forecast_DRC_SCR.pdf), Accessed on 05-05-2017.

SCR (2013c) Security Council Report Forecast July 2013. URL: [file:///C:/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2013\_07\_Forecast)DRC\_SCR.pdf](file:///C%3A/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2013_07_Forecast%29DRC_SCR.pdf), Accessed on 05-05-2017.

SCR (2013d) Security Council Report Forecast October 2013. URL: [file:///C:/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2013\_10\_Forecast\_DRC\_SCR.pdf](file:///C%3A/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2013_10_Forecast_DRC_SCR.pdf), Accessed on 05-05-2017.

SCR (2014a) Security Council Report Forecast January 2014. URL: [file:///C:/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2014\_01\_Forecast\_DRC\_SCR.pdf](file:///C%3A/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2014_01_Forecast_DRC_SCR.pdf), Accessed on 05-05-2017.

SCR (2014b) Security Council Report Forecast March 2014. URL: [file:///C:/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2014\_03\_Forecast\_DRC\_SCR.pdf](file:///C%3A/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2014_03_Forecast_DRC_SCR.pdf), Accessed on 05-05-2017.

SCR (2014c) Security Council Report Forecast August 2014. URL: [file:///C:/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2014\_08\_Forecast\_DRC\_SCR.pdf](file:///C%3A/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2014_08_Forecast_DRC_SCR.pdf), Accessed on 05-05-2017.

SCR (2014d) Security Council Report Forecast October 2014. URL: [file:///C:/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2014\_10\_Forecast\_DRC\_SCR.pdf](file:///C%3A/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2014_10_Forecast_DRC_SCR.pdf), Accessed on 05-05-2017.

SCR (2015a) Security Council Report Forecast January 2015. URL: [file:///C:/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2015\_01\_Forecast\_DRC\_SCR.pdf](file:///C%3A/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2015_01_Forecast_DRC_SCR.pdf), Accessed on 05-05-2017

SCR (2015b) Security Council Report Forecast March 2015. URL: [file:///C:/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2015\_03\_Forecast\_DRC\_SCR.pdf](file:///C%3A/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2015_03_Forecast_DRC_SCR.pdf), Accessed on 05-05-2017.

SCR (2015c) Security Council Report Forecast July 2015. URL: [file:///C:/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2015\_07\_Forecast\_DRC\_SCR.pdf](file:///C%3A/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2015_07_Forecast_DRC_SCR.pdf), Accessed on 05-05-2017.

SCR (2015d) Security Council Report Forecast October 2015. URL: [file:///C:/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2015\_10\_Forecast\_DRC\_SCR.pdf](file:///C%3A/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2015_10_Forecast_DRC_SCR.pdf), Accessed on 05-05-2017.

SCR (2016a) Security Council Report Forecast January 2016. URL: [file:///C:/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2016\_01\_Forecast\_DRC\_SCR.pdf](file:///C%3A/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2016_01_Forecast_DRC_SCR.pdf), Accessed on 05-05-2017.

SCR (2016b) Security Council Report Forecast June 2016. URL: [file:///C:/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2016\_06\_Forecast\_DRC\_SCR.pdf](file:///C%3A/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Poststructuralist%20analysis/SC%20Reports%20on%20DRC/2016_06_Forecast_DRC_SCR.pdf), Accessed on 05-05-2017.

Schmitz, H.P. and Sikkink, K. (2012) International Human Rights. In: In: W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse, and B.A. Simmons (Eds) Sage Handbook of International Relations, pp. 827-851. London: Sage Publications.

Simmons, B.A. (2012) International Law. In: W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse, and B.A. Simmons (Eds) Sage Handbook of International Relations, pp. 352-378. London: Sage Publications.

Slaughter, A. (2005) Security, Solidarity, and Sovereignty: The grand themes of UN Reform. The American Journal of International Law 99(3): 619-631.

Steiner, B., Benner, M.T., Sondorp, E., Schmitz, K.P., Mesmer, U., and Rosenberger, S. (2013) Sexual Violence in the Protracted Conflict of DRC: Programming for Rape Survivors in South Kivu. Conflict and Health 3(3): 1-9.

UN (1945) Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the International Court of Justice. URL: <https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf>, accessed on 20-03-2017.

UN News Centre (n.d.) Tackling Secual Violence Must Inlcude Prevention, Ending Impunity - UN official, URL: <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=34502#.WHotHPnhDIV>, accessed on 18-12-2016.

UNSC (2010) S/Res/1925 (2010). URL: [file:///C:/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Mandaten%20Monusco/2010%20Res%201925.pdf](file:///C%3A/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Mandaten%20Monusco/2010%20Res%201925.pdf) , Accessed on 05-05-2017.

UNSC (2011a) S/RES/1973 (2011). URL: <http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1973%282011%29>, accessed on 20-03-2017.

UNSC (2011b), S/RES/1975 (2011). URL: <http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1975%282011%29>, accessed on 20-03-2017.

UNSC (2011c) S/Res/1991 (2011). URL: [file:///C:/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Mandaten%20Monusco/2011%20Res%201991.pdf](file:///C%3A/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Mandaten%20Monusco/2011%20Res%201991.pdf), Accessed on 05-05-2017.

UNSC (2012) S/Res/2053 (2012). URL: [file:///C:/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Mandaten%20Monusco/2012%20Res%202053.pdf](file:///C%3A/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Mandaten%20Monusco/2012%20Res%202053.pdf), Accessed on 05-05-2017.

UNSC (2013) S/Res/2098. URL: [file:///C:/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Mandaten%20Monusco/2013%20Res%202098.pdf](file:///C%3A/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Mandaten%20Monusco/2013%20Res%202098.pdf), Accessed on 05-05-2017.

UNSC (2014) S/Res/2147. URL: [file:///C:/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Mandaten%20Monusco/2014%20Res%202147.pdf](file:///C%3A/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Mandaten%20Monusco/2014%20Res%202147.pdf), Accessed on 05-05-2017.

UNSC (2015) S/Res/2211. URL: [file:///C:/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Mandaten%20Monusco/2015%20Res%202211.pdf](file:///C%3A/Users/Lenovo/Documents/Schooljaar%202016-2017/Thesis%20Preparation%20Seminar/Mandaten%20Monusco/2015%20Res%202211.pdf), Accessed on 05-05-2017.

UNSC (2016) S/RES/2277 (2016). URL: <http://www.un.org/fr/documents/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2277(2016)&TYPE=&referer=http://www.un.org/fr/sc/documents/resolutions/2016.shtml&Lang=E> , accessed on 17-12-2016.

UN Press (2010) Security Council Extends Mandate of United Nations Organization Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo until 30 June. URL: <http://www.un.org/press/en/2010/sc9939.doc.htm>, accessed on 22-05-2017.

UN Press (2011a) Security Council approves ‘No-Fly-Zone’ over Libya, authorizing ‘all necessary measures’ to protect civilians, by vote of 10 in favour with 5 abstentions. URL: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm>, accessed on 05-05-2017.

UN Press (2011b) Security Council demands end to violence in Cote d’Ivoire, imposing sanctions against former president and urging him to ‘step aside’, in resolution 1975. URL: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10215.doc.htm>, accessed on 05-05-2017.

UN Press (2011c) Security Council Extends Mandate of United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo until 30 June 2012. URL: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10299.doc.htm>, accessed on 22-05-2017.

UN Press (2012) Security Council Extends Mandate of UN Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo until 30 June 2013, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2053 (2012). URL: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2012/sc10687.doc.htm>, accessed on 22-05-2017.

UN Press (2013) ‘Intervention Brigade’ Authorized as Security Council Grants Mandate Renewal for United Nations Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo. URL: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc10964.doc.htm>, accessed on 22-05-2017.

UN Press (2014) Security Council Authorizes Year-long Mandate Extension for United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo. URL: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11340.doc.htm>, accessed on 22-05-2017.

UN Press (2015) Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2211 (2015) Security Council Extends Mission, Intervention Brigade in Democratic Republic of Congo. URL: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11834.doc.htm>, accessed on 22-05-2017.

Zehfuss, M. (2012) Critical Theory, Poststructuralism and Postcolonialism. In: W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse, and B.A. Simmons (Eds) Sage Handbook of International Relations, pp. 145-169. London: Sage Publications.

# Appendices

## Transcript Interview Jan Pronk, 10-05-2017.

**Michelle de Vries:** Ik wilde eigenlijk beginnen met het bespreken van uw ervaring als speciaal gezant voor de VN missie in Sudan…

**Jan Pronk:** Ja is goed, want In Congo was ik geen.. Had ik geen functie.

**Michelle de Vries:** Nee klopt. Uiteindelijk bent u door de Sudanese overheid weggestuurd.

**Jan Pronk:** Ja klopt, Persona Non Grata. En dat had te maken met verschillende opvattingen over de uitvoering van het vredesakkoord dat was gesloten met betrekking tot Darfur. Zij sloten dat akkoord, maar ze gingen door met aanvallen, de regering, en ik bekritiseerde dat. En stap voor stap werd ik … [ interruptie].

**Michelle de Vries:** Uiteindelijk heeft de overheid hiervoor nooit sancties gekregen?

**Jan Pronk:** Nee, oh nee nee nee, kijk het is een wettige lidstaat van de VN en uhm.. de VN kunnen dat eigenlijk niet sanctioneren. Een land heeft eigenlijk.. ja.. zeg maar, de soevereine mogelijkheid om een persoon weg te sturen, dat vind ik ook. Uhm, je zou kunnen zeggen, men had in de veiligheidsraad hen daar op kunnen aanspreken, niet eens zozeer op het mij wegsturen, als wel om het feit dat men het vredesverdrag (he), uh, schendt. Maar, er waren in die tijd toch redenen voor de veiligheidsraad om zich, ja, terughoudend op te stellen. Uhm, er waren, (A), Kofi Anan ging weg, dezelfde maand, de secretaris generaal, dus eh in december, was zijn laastste maand, in 2006. Dat is één. Punt twee, uhm, er was een zekere vrees om uh, Sudan toch voor het hoofd te stoten, omdat men Sudan nodig had bij de uitvoering van het vredesverdrag tussen Sudan en Zuid-Sudan, het noorden en zuiden. Uhm, en, ja, een aantal landen vond dat zo belangrijk dat men vond dat men Bashir niet al te veel voor het hoofd moest stoten. Dat was de tweede reden. En de derde reden, zou je misschien kunnen zeggen, was eigenlijk toch wel de bilaterale opstellen van de VS met Sudan. Sudan werkte met de VS samen, ook al werden er harde woorden gewisseld. En de samenwerking betrof eigenlijk de samenwerking tegen Moslimfundamentalisme. Dat was zowel in Sudan als in de VS, de vrees van Al Qaeda en het oprukken van Al Qaeda naar Afrika zelf. Dat waren drie redenen die je zou kunnen uitvoeren waarom men vanuit New York/Washington het liet lopen. En ik ben ook niet opgevolgd een jaar lang. Men heeft previes een jaar gewacht voor men een opvolger heeft benoemd.

**Michelle de Vries:** Die houding die u aangeeft, als tweede reden, vrees om het land, Sudan, niet voor het hoofd te willen stoten, omdat men het land toch [uh] nodig heeft, denk u dat dat [uh], ook geldt voor [uh] andere samenwerkingen met VN-missies en gastlanden? Dat er toch, op een bepaalde wijze, voorzichtig wordt omgegaan met de landen, [uh] omdat je deze [uh] wel nodig hebt?

**Jan Pronk:** Specifieke reden hier was natuurlijk [uh] de uitvoering van het [uh] comprehensive peace agreement tussen, [uh] Noord en Zuid, want [uh], [uhm].. Je hebt het nu over een vredesoperatie… [uh] Met betrekking tot Congo geldt het niet.

**Michelle de Vries:** Nee?

**Jan Pronk:** Nee. [Uhm], dus het was wel een, [uhm] beetje specifiek. Dus [uhm], .. Maar ik.. Je moet ook begrijpen.. Het gaat niet alleen om de VN als zodanig.. De beslissingen in de VN worden, [uhm] natuurlijk altijd genomen door de lidstaten, en dus ook wanneer het belangrijk is door de Veiligheidsraad. En [uhm] er is één land dat natuurlijk, [uhm] wegkomt met alles met wat men wil. En dat is [uhm] Israël. Hè? [Uhm]… Dus, en die.. die hebben zelden één resolutie, of nooit zelfs, een resolutie van de VN zelfs uitgevoerd. Hè? [Uhm]..Dat is dat verhaal.

**Michelle de Vries:** U gelooft wel dat wanneer het in een andere situatie had plaatsgevonden , dat er [uhm] meer mogelijkheid was, en ruimte was, om uitspraken te doen … (*tegen Sudan)*?

**Jan Pronk:** Ja, [uhm], het was erg ingewikkeld omdat er een aantal conflicten tegelijkertijd plaatsvonden in Sudan, en dat [uhm] had weer te maken met het feit dat Sudan, Sudan was. Hè? Het was een.. [uhm].. Het was een, ja, je zou kunnen zeggen, een Europese constructie.. [uhm]. En dat heb ik ook proberen uit te leggen, [uhm] tijdens college. De volken die met mekaar weinig te maken hebben, werden in één natiestaat [uhm] samengebracht en [uhm] Nou dat leidt natuurlijk tot conflict en dat kan escaleren [uhm], ja, ook in Oost-Sudan nog een uh, regering versus nogal verschillende ethnische [uhm] groeperingen strijd. [Uhm}, je had ook nog het probleem met het Noorden van Sudan. Het was een melting pot, en dat is niet eens het goede woord, van conflicten. [Uhm], ja. Je kunt.. ja.. Ik kan er over doorgaan, maar dan ga ik te ver weg van de vraag.. [Uhm], om bij je vraag te blijven.

**Michelle de Vries:** U noemde net al dat, Sudan was eigenlijk een Europese operatie..

**Jan Pronk:** Constructie.. ja

**Michelle de Vries:** Constructie ja, denk u dat [uhm] de landen die betrokken zijn bij de VN missies uiteindelijk ook doorslaggevend zijn voor de manier waarop de missie wordt [uhm] uitgevoerd en het mandaat wordt opgesteld of uitgevoerd?

**Jan Pronk:** Oké, als ik zeg Sudan was als natiestaat een Europese constructie dan ga je dus terug naar 1882, en kun je dus eigenlijk zeggen dat alle, alle staten in Afrika een koloniale constructie zijn in termen van [uhm] grenzen en samenstelling, [uhm]. Dus in dat is Sudan niet verschillend, dat is punt één. En [uhm] punt twee, op een gegeven moment ontstaat er een binnenlands of een internationaal conflict van een zodanige mate dat de veiligheidsraad dan beslist een vredesoperatie te starten [uhm]. Ik heb jullie ook [uhm] verteld dat dat niet zo vanzelfsprekend is, dat andere dingen belangrijker zijn, maar op een gegeven moment gebeurt dat. [Uhm], en dan komt de vraag, wie maken deel uit van die vredesoperatie, welke troepen. Ik geloof dat jouw vraag meer daar op doelt.. [uhm] Dan is het een kwestie van kwaliteit.. [uhm] van de troepen. De kwaliteit van de troepen, dat betekent ook [uhm] kwaliteit van het commando. [Uhm] en [uhm] het betekent ook de kwaliteit van de missie in zijn totaliteit. Als een militaire operatie [uhm] los komt te staan van de rest […*onduidelijk*] In Sudan, waren we in staat om het echt heel goed te integreren, om het [uhm] goed op elkaar af te stemmen. En daar heb ik ook heel erg hard aan getrokken. [Uhm], dus het is de kwaliteit van de operatie in zijn totaliteit, het is [uhm] de kwaliteit van de [uhm] van de militairen, component ervan, dat betekent de kwaliteit van de troepen en van de commandanten. Hè? [Uhm] en ook de kwaliteit, want dat hoort er ook bij, wat men tot zijn beschikking heeft. He, toch financiële middelen, transportmiddelen, en [uhm] wapens, en dergelijken. Men moet kunnen functioneren, [uhm] nou. En in het VN systeem is dat een beetje lastig. Omdat de VN he, niet wanneer men een operatie opzet, aan die operatie meegeeft, ja, wel geld, maar geen wapens, vliegtuigen [uhm] en dergelijken. Dat moeten al die leveranciers samen bij mekaar brengen. [Uhm[ en dat is een beetje, tja, je maakt het jezelf buitengewoon moeilijk. En je hebt bijvoorbeeld te maken met samenstel van soms tien landen. [Uhm] waarbij het ene land over veel beter materieel dan het andere land beschikt, hè. En dan, dus, [uh] in zo’n vredesoperatie samenwerken. En dat maakt het fragiel en onevenwichtig. Dus het maakt wat uit. Maar waar ligt dat aan, hè? Dat ligt aan de structuur zoals die in het kader van de operaties in New York wordt beslist. En dat ligt ook aan het feit dat de landen, of die ertoe bereidt zijn, om [uhm] hun troepenmacht te hebben. Een staande troepenmacht. Dat zou er misschien moeten zijn, [uhm] ik ben er een voorstander van dat dat gebeurt, maar [uhm] dat komt er nooit. [ *Onduidelijk..]* Maar, [uhm] he, de Russen en de Amerikanen, [uhm] zij zullen daar echt niet toe bereid zijn, dus [uhm] Dus het is roeien met de riemen die je hebt. De kwaliteit van de troepen is over het algemeen behoorlijk gestegen. ]Uhm], dat geldt zowel voor Afrikaanse als voor Aziatische staten.. Want er zijn natuurlijk niet zo gek vaak [uhm] Europese en Amerikaanse troepen die deel uit maken van zo’n missie. Maar [uhm], (A) ze worden ervoor opgeleid he, nu.. en (B) landen vinden het belangrijk want ze verdienen er zelfs geld aan, het is [uhm] zelfs een soort export [uhm].. En die landen willen dan ook natuurlijk wel dat [uhm hun eigen troepen het goed doen, dus dat is verbeterd ten opzichte van [uhm] het verleden. Men heeft ook wel materieel.

Maar [uhm] ik heb zelf wel meegemaakt ook in Sudan dat [uhm] bijvoorbeeld dat de indianen met niks kwamen en dat de Indiërs hadden alles. In Sudan had ik meer dan tien landen. Vaak wordt gezegd dat dat een probleem is op zichzelf, dat vind ik niet, [uhm], dat men uit verschillende landen komt. Het heeft zelfs voordelen, [uhm]. Anders heeft men bijvoorbeeld in één land, bijvoorbeeld opeens tienduizend Indiërs, of bijvoorbeeld, [uhm] tienduizend.. [uhm]. Het feit dat het zo gespreid is, betekent ook echt dat het VN zijn. Sociaal-psychologisch speelt dat ook een rol, hè? [Uhm], men heeft natuurlijk zijn eigen culturele en [uhm] ja, traditionele ervaringen als legereenheid die verschilt in India van Zambia. Maar, als je regelmatig meedoet bij VN operaties, dan leer je dat ook. En dan zijn die verschillen ook niet meer belangrijk. [Uhm], en dan hangt het zeer af, goed, van de kwaliteit van het commando.

**Michelle de Vries:** Goed, ja, oke. [Uhm], u benoemde net ook al dat Westerse of Europese landen , bijvoorbeeld Amerika, niet vaak meedoen, of in ieder geval niet echt troepen leveren [uhm].. Denkt u dat dat ook te maken heeft met het feit dat zij niet direct een eigen belang hebben in zo’n regio?

**Jan Pronk:** Die zouden dat hebben, maar het is beter dat ze niet meedoen, want je moet de Amerikanen eigenlijk niet hebben. [Uhm] dat, kijk, ze zijn natuurlijk uiterst deskundig en, en , [uhm] ervaren en wat dan ook, maar ze worden gezien als een vijand, in een vredesoperatie. [Uhm], overal. [Uhm], omdat men, kijk in de vredesoperatie gaat alles om conflicten. En er is dus altijd een partij, die [uhm], met name belang heeft om de VN te zien als, niet de mediator, maar de tegenstander. Congo is daar een voorbeeld van. Want als je het een chapter six operatie hebt in Congo, hè, dan is het een operatie op verzoek van de regering van Congo en die vecht tegen rebellen. Maar [uhm] die rebellen stemmen niet in. En dus komt de VN in Congo met instemming van Kinshaha, maar niet van de rebellen, [uhm] en dus zeggen de rebellen van [uhm] ‘De VN is tegen ons, de VN staat aan de kant van…’. [Uhm], dus als de VN daar bovenin fouten maakt, en dat is in Congo gebeurt, dan word het.. Dan zegt men gauw, ze zijn er alleen maar om de regering te helpen, en wij zijn tegen de regering en dus zijn we tegen de VN. Ja? Datzelfde heb je gezien, natuurlijk ook, in [uhm] Afghanistan. En als het dan ook nog de Amerikanen zijn, dan [uhm] dan geeft dat voedsel aan de gedachte, die ook wordt uitgesproken, VN is VS. Dus dat moet je dus eigenlijk niet hebben. Ja, [uhm], maar dat geldt dan eigenlijk ook voor de andere lidstaten, de permanente leden van de veiligheidsraad. Maar dat is geen algemene regel, dat is meer een [uhm] voor mij een politieke ervaring. Met uitzonderingen. De vredesoperatie die er was in Sierra Leone mislukte, omdat de VN troepen daar, dat waren Afrikaanse troepen, dat waren Kenianen, maar niet alleen maar, faalde. [Uhm] en dat kan gebeuren. En toen is er, eigenlijk orde op zaken gesteld, en dat was hard nodig want de rebellen in Sierra Leone waren roekeloos, en [uhm], wat betreft burgers en dergelijken. En toen is er een Engels detachement gekomen, en Engeland kent Sierra Leone natuurlijk ook goed van zichzelf. Overigens heeft dat nadelen vaak, je moet niet een voormalige koloniale macht hebben, maar goed, hè, in dit geval.. [uh,] werkte dat uitstekend, en dat was rond het jaar 2000, 2001. En dat was een uitzondering. En er zijn er meer. De fransen, die je eigenlijk niet moet hebben, in [uhm] voormalig Frans-Afrika, want die hebben altijd hun eigen belangen, en hoe haal je dat uit elkaar? En dat kunnen de Fransen helemaal nooit, en [uhm], dat is een politieke opmerking. [Uhm], hebben hun het wel weer goed gedaan in Ivoorkust, ja [uhm]. Soms is het even echt nodig, om orde op zaken te stellen. En dat heb ik in het college ook duidelijk gemaakt, [uhm], dan is het orde op zaken stellen om mensen te beschermen. Om burgers te beschermen, en eigenlijk is dat, ik ben steeds meer tot die conclusie gekomen.. Eigenlijk hoort dat het enige en het allerbelangrijkste te zijn wat een VN operatie doen. Maar dan moet je het ook goed doen, en de Fransen hebben dat in Rwanda, waar jij dus wat meer van weet, helemaal niet goed gedaan, omdat die, niet de mensen zijn gaan beschermen, maar ze zijn de moordenaars gaan beschermen in operation Turqoise. En deze operatie was eigenlijk ook een tijdelijke operatie met instemming van de Veiligheidsraad, en [uhm],… Maar omdat de veiligheidsraad toch al gefaald had met een goed mandaat, en een goede bemanning van [uhm] UNAMIR..

**Michelle de Vries:** Maar als ik u goed begrijp, denkt u dus wel dat wanneer het echt nodig is, om mensen te beschermen, landen wél in staat zijn om hun eigen belangen op zij te zetten, zoals bijvoorbeeld Frankrijk in Ivoorkust?

**Jan Pronk:** Ja kijk, een land moet dat kunnen, he, kijk.. Het is wel, (A) ze kunnen het niet altijd, en (B) ze worden niet gezien door strijdende partijen als aanwezig te zijn om mensen te beschermen. Ze worden vaak gezien als een tegenstander. En als je al gezien wordt als een tegenstander dan [uhm] ja, gaat het conflict ook weer verder escaleren met een andere dimensie erbij.

**Michelle de Vries:** [Uhm], ja, dan zou ik [uhm] het eigenlijk iets meer willen hebben over wat doorslaggevend is voor het implementeren van een missie, [uhm]. Omdat er natuurlijk veel verschillende conflicten zijn op de wereld waar, verschillende organisaties wel voor pleiten dat daar een missie nodig zou zijn, [uhm] en vaak wordt het dan toegeschreven aan het politieke spel binnen de veiligheidsraad waarom een missie wel of niet doorgaat. Wat is uw visie daarop?

**Jan Pronk:** Even de vraag goed toespitsen. Wat is [uhm] je echte vraag?

**Michelle de Vries:** Gelooft u ook dat missies soms niet worden geïmplementeerd vanwege politieke spellen tussen bijvoorbeeld de permanenten leden van de veiligheidsraad, of [uhm] op dat moment de andere leden van de raad.

**Jan Pronk:** Eigenlijk is dat dé doorslaggevende reden. De veiligheidsraad moet beslissen en moet dan beslissen bij consensus. En de veiligheidsraad heeft het steeds moeilijker om consensus te bereiken. Dus dat is de reden. En [uhm], goed, en dat is de volgende vraag. Waarom stellen individuele leden van de veiligheidsraad zich zo op en niet anders? Nou dat hangt af van de specifieke situatie van dat moment en hun relatie met een land hè, of met hun relatie met andere leden van de veiligheidsraad. En ja, [uhm] je kunt zeggen, ja jij gebruikt het woord politieke spel, het is gewoon politiek. Het heeft te maken met [uhm], (A) besluitvormingsstructuur die zo gekozen is, en (B) met de machtsverhoudingen en met de, het feit dat de leden van de P5, [uhm], ja een veto hebben.

Waarom zitten we niet in Syrië als VN, omdat het [uhm].. De VN zal er nooit toe beslissen om dat te doen en dat heeft er weer mee te maken dat [uhm] ja met groot gebrek aan vertrouwen tussen leden van de P5, [um], opgebloeid zijn, het wantrouwen, voordat het probleem in Syrië ging spelen. Dus [uhm] ja, noem dat niet politiek spel, ik houdt niet van het woord. Het is [uhm] politieke machtsverhouding, [uhm] visies, verschillende visies. En die structuur van het veto-recht.

**Michele de Vries:** Dus dan zou het ook te idealistisch zijn om te veronderstellen, dat wanneer er humanitaire redenen zijn om in te grijpen, dat ook altijd zo gebeurd?

**Jan Pronk:** [Uhm], ik vind R2P een grote stap vooruit, [uhm] ik heb jullie geloof ik ook verteld, maar dat weet ik niet meer precies, dat het eigenlijk vanaf het begin af aan is mislukt. En ik vind dat je dus zou moeten zeggen, van [uhm] ‘dit is dé reden om in te grijpen, niet anders, he, R2P, om mensen te beschermen’. Het zal [uhm] jaren duren voordat landen tot de conclusie komen dat dat het is. Helaas. Grijp je dan naar iets anders terug, [uhm] nee. Want dan grijp je terug naar [uhm] ja,.. Ik heb het niet over een Chapter six operatie, waarbij we zeggen partijen willen graag het volgende samen bereiken.. Ik heb het over chapter seven operaties. [Uhm], kijk als je niet werkt aan R2P dan heb je een soort van conglomeraat van belangen van participerende landen dat moet worden samengebracht, en dan,.. dus stabiliseren, of regimeverandering, of weet ik wat, en dus [uhm] maar dan is de bescherming van burgers, eigenlijk altijd het slachtoffer. Dan gebeurt dat niet en andere dingen wel. Dan hebben die een politieke [uhm] dimensie en dan eigenlijk.. Zou je kunnen zeggen R2P is de humanitaire dimensie van het geheel. Maar als je dat doet, dan heeft dat belangrijke politieke consequenties. Dan heeft het consequenties ook voor de manier waarop strijdende partijen met elkaar omgaan, dan creëert dat ook een groter draagvlak binnen die samenleving aan een later te bereiken politieke oplossing, hè? Dus, [uhm], om al die redenen zeg ik, R2P zou het moeten zijn, alleen, het is [uhm] het niet op dit moment. Er komt bijzonder weinig van vredesoperaties, op [uhm] dit moment terecht, behalve degene die er al zijn. Maar nieuwe operaties zie je niet meer, bijvoorbeeld ook niet in Yemen. En als er iets moet gebeuren is het mensenbescherming, hè, in Yemen, [uhm] tegen aanvallen. [Uhm]Dus, [uhm], ja ik zit nu hardop door te denken.. waarbij ik de vraag zelf een beetje kwijt ben..[uhm]

**Michelle de Vries**: Ik vroeg me dus af, inderdaad, of humanitaire belangen, als die, centraal zouden staan in de beslissing, of er dan niet meer missies of er dan niet meer missies zouden zijn?

**Jan Pronk:** Nee, nee, het zou zo moeten zijn, [uhm]. Er is een grotere mogelijkheid om dat te doen. Dat is waar. Je zou nu in Syrië bijvoorbeeld kunnen zeggen, [um], we gaan mensen beschermen door bijvoorbeeld een humanitaire corridor. Hè? Safe areas. Dan bescherm je mensen. En meer dan dat doen we niet. He dan hebben we niet een totaal verhaal, of een totale visie van wat er zou moeten gebeuren. Dus het is ook beperkt, het belangrijke is ook het beperkte. En misschien zou dat kunnen. [Uhm], theoretisch ja. Maar je ziet hoe ongelooflijk moeilijk het is om de Russen en Amerikanen het met mekaar eens te laten worden over het feit dat er mensen slachtoffer zijn. En, waar dat dan door komt, hè?. Dus ja, theoretisch zou het moeten, maar ook die [uhm] theoretische beperkte reden om tot een interventie te komen blijkt in de huidige concrete situatie geen argument voor de huidige leden van de veiligheidsraad om tot beraad te komen.

**Michelle de Vries:** [Uhm] Daarnaast..

**Jan Pronk:** Je zou kunnen zeggen, even, nog een keer, dan verzin ik nu iets, als het een paar keer was gelukt al, dan heb je een precedent geschapen voor een vredesoperatie met een beperkte, humanitaire, essentiële doelstelling, de franjes eraf. En dan zullen landen die doorgaans het niet met elkaar eens zijn, eerder daartoe beslissen omdat te doen. En dat was dus de makken, het slechte resultaat van Libië, daar was dit het doel en daar is dit niet gelukt doordat het is gevioleerd, en dus.. is die die grond ook niet meer gezien als, [uhm] een legitieme mogelijkheid.

**Michelle de Vries:** [Uhm], Bij R2P-, de norm, speelt natuurlijk ook altijd de vraag van soevereiniteit een grote rol, zeker wanneer je het zou hebben over de laatste stap van het principe.

**Jan pronk:** Ja, maar soevereiniteit speelt altijd een rol. [Uhm], kijk het hele r2p-begrip, zoals dat is omschreven, gaat uit van soevereiniteit. Het is uw verantwoordelijkheid/plicht om uw mensen te beschermen, en zolang u dat doet, is het niet de taak van andere landen om dat te doen. Als u dat niet kan doen, dan [uhm] moet u andere landen erbij vragen om u te helpen. Als u het niet wil doen, kunnen wij het onze verantwoordelijkheid achten om dit te doen en dan schenden wij dus dit principe van soevereiniteit. Maar dan is dat een schending van soevereiniteit met internationaal-juridisch legitieme criteria en procedures. Dus dan is de soevereiniteit geen probleem op zich zelf. Iets anders is dat er een politieke discussie kan gaan ontstaan over de vraag, ‘doet een land het wel?’ en ‘wil het land het wel doen?’. [Uhm], en daar blijkt dan makkelijk natuurlijk discussieruimte over te ontstaan waar je lang over door kunt gaan. [Uhm], en dat kan pervers worden zelfs. Je zou kunnen zeggen dat de regering van Sudan in Darfur zei dat, ‘om mensen te beschermen’, toen was het begrip r2p net aangenomen door de veiligheidsraad, ‘om mensen te beschermen, moeten wij andere mensen aanvallen waarvan wij veronderstellen dat zij de burgers zelf aanvallen’. Dat was niet het geval, dat was wel hun redenering. [Uhm], ja, daar kan men een eind mee komen. En daar kwam men ook een eind mee. En dat was ook één van de punten waarover ik verschilde van mening met de regering van Sudan. Zij zeiden in wezen dat [uhm], de belangrijkste rebellenbeweging, maar men geen akkoord mee had gesloten, [uhm] zelf doorging, maar dat was niet het geval. En zich, als guerillas verschool binnen dorpen en dergelijken, en zij gaven de andere rebellenbeweging met wie ze wel een akkoord hadden gesloten, wapens om die andere aan te vallen. En dat werd gedaan door burgers, andere dorpen aan te vallen. Dat is tamelijk pervers, maar men kwam een eind met die redenering. Want waar ligt, wat is de waarheid? Wie stelt vast, wie wie aanvalt? Dat zie je in Syrie ook. En hoe complexer een conflict is, hoe langduriger een conflict is, hoe meer partijen er zijn, waarvan je niet meer precies weet wie wie is.. Dat geeft de mogelijkheid aan een regering of een partij aan een conflict om een redenering op te zetten die niet zo makkelijk te verifëren is. Er is geen pers, geen journalisten.

**Michelle de Vries: [**Uhm], nouja zowel in Sudan, maar ook in Congo, worden soms de legers van de staat zelf ook beschuldigd van het schenden van de mensenrechten,.. [Uhm], in hoeverre zou daar dan op gereageerd kunnen worden door de VN?

**Jan Pronk:** Daar hoort op gereageerd te worden door de VN. Die horen dat te doen. En dan is moeilijk voor ze, want natuurlijk, ze zijn er op verzoek van.. Kijk, en zodra de VN-troepen andere doelen moeten nastreven dan alleen maar het beschermen van de burgers, wordt het lastig. Maar wanneer ze alleen maar de burgers moeten beschermen, wat moeilijk is, dan is het beschermen zonder onderscheid in de mensen die ze aanvallen. En dan bescherm je ze tegen zowel rebellen, als tegen regeringstroepen. [Uhm], maar dat betekent dus dat je je als VN keert tegen de troepen van de regering die heeft ingestemd of verzocht om jou aanwezigheid. Dat kan je alleen maar doen wanneer je over sterke commandanten beschikt, en wanneer je beschikt over troepen die sterk genoeg zijn en niet te klein. En als je dus troepen [*onduidelijik*] om mensen te beschermen, dan zul je dus voldoende troepen moeten sturen. [Uhm], en die, zelfs in Congo wat de grootste operatie is naar mijn weten, het is een gigantisch groot land en je kunt op bepaalde plekken bescherming bieden en op andere niet.. En dat wordt je dan toch weer kwalijk genomen. Want je hebt niet alleen niet gedaan, je hebt er ook onvoldoende aan gedaan. Hè? En dan kom je ook in het daglicht te staan als een VN, een falende operatie. En als VN, die de troepen uitstuurt, moet dan ook weten dat als men troepen uitstuurt, dan moet het robuust zijn. Dat is dan de term, echt robuust. En voor langere tijd. Je zou ook het woord zeg maar, overkill, kunnen gebruiken. Je moet zwaarbewapende troepen sturen, die moeten de wapens niet gebruiken, maar ze moeten ze hebben zodat ze ze kunnen gebruiken, want dan is het ook een afschrikking. [Uhm], als je overal bent en je hebt voldoende middelen, dus ook wapens, en voldoende troepen beschikbaar, dan werkt dat afschrikkend die iets zouden willen proberen, ook tegen burgers.

**Michelle de Vries:** Maar die troepen..

**Jan Pronk:** Die tekortkoming is er dan dus altijd weer..

**Michelle de Vries:** Die komt terug naar de structuur..

**Jan Pronk:** Het is altijd, om de zoveel tijd wordt er weer beslist over de begroting, je ziet ook wat Trump nu weer wil, het terugbrengen van de begroting van vredesoperaties met een groot percentage. Ik vind dat op zichzelf geen ramp als de Amerikanen minder willen betalen, want ik vindt ook dat zij niet teveel moeten betalen want dan hebben ze teveel macht, dat moet je spreiden, maar dan moet iemand het wel overnemen. En dat zie ik ook niet gebeuren. Ik vind ook dat vredesoperaties, dat is hun voorstel, opnieuw kunnen worden geijkt, en opnieuw kunnen worden geëvalueerd. Men weet niet hoeveel evaluatie er plaatsvindt, dat is heel veel. Maar goed als men dat nu eenmaal wil, dan moet men dat ook accepteren. Maar dan kan zo’n evaluatie best uitmonden in een conclusie dat er meer nodig is, in plaats van minder. Kijk als je gaat evalueren om dat te doen, dat is het Amerikaanse standpunt op dit moment, dan is dat geen onafhankelijke, onbeoordeelde evaluatie.

**Michelle de Vries:** Maar als dat hun standpunt blijft, dan heeft dat uiteindelijk wel een negatief effect…

**Jan Pronk:** Dan moet Europe meedoen, of China, en gelukkig doen de Chinezen een beetje mee tegenwoordig. He? Ja.. [uhm].. iedereen wil alles op een koopje. Als je iets een groot probleem acht te zijn, en dat is het, het aantal vluchtelingen is 50% gestegen.. dat heeft ook te maken met conflicten, en er zijn ook intensievere conflicten.. Je zult ook andere dingen moeten doen, je kunt niet alles op een koopje doen. En [uhm] allerlei landen willen momenteel wereldwijde vraagstukken aanpakken op een koopje. Dat geldt voor klimaat, voor vluchtelingen, dat geldt voor [uhm] vrede, ook het vraagstuk van de voedselvoorziening in de wereld. [Uhm], ja.

**Michelle de Vries:** Het r2p-principe is dus veelbesproken, niet alleen omdat het nog niet altijd is gelukt in de praktijk, maar ook in de theorie wordt het vaak bekritiseerd, zowel door staten als door NGOs, bijvoorbeeld. [Uhm], denkt u dat er een verschil zit in de manier waarop Afrikaanse staten kijken naar de soevereiniteit en de plicht van een staat om hun burgers te beschermen, dan de Westerse staten?

**Jan Pronk:** Ja, ongetwijfeld, want we hebben allemaal natuurlijk, in alle landen verschillende opvattingen over de bevoegdheden van de staat en de markt, [uhm].. en de civiele samenleving. In alle landen is er een verschillende opvatting over het specifieke karakter van het democratische proces in een samenleving. In alle landen zijn verschillende opvattingen over de rechtstaat. Dat heeft te maken met de visie van regeringen op mensen. Dus ja, dat is het geval. Maar, hoofdstuk 2: alle landen zijn lid van de VN. Als zodanig zijn ze dus ook verplicht om de gezamenlijk afgesproken, niet opgelegde, maar gezamenlijk afgesproken, criteria [uhm] en definities, om die in de praktijk te brengen. Er is nog, gelukkig, geen gezamenlijke afgesproken definitie van wat democratie inhoudt.. Maar wel van mensenrechten, en daar gaat het natuurlijk het om. En democratie is momenteel natuurlijk een wijze van uitvoering. Maar mensenrechten is een doel, een uitgangspunt op zichzelf. Dat ligt vast. Dus dat er verschillende opvattingen zijn dat zal vast, maar ze hebben zich allemaal gebonden aan iets gemeenschappelijks. En al die landen zijn dus verplicht.

**Pronk:** Toen we dat hele systeem aan het bouwen waren, jaren 40, toen waren er twee pilaren, en dat was soevereiniteit en mensenrechten. En [uh] het systeem werkt niet alleen maar op soevereiniteit van de staat, hè. [Uh], want de staat is er voor de mensen, en de mensen kunnen een beroep doen op de staat. De staat is geen doel meer op zichzelf, de soevereiniteit is ook geen doel op zichzelf. Want het gaat altijd om mensen binnen de samenleving, het gaat niet om machten binnen de samenleving. Dat is het hele verhaal van mensenre chten in de VN. Dus discussie zal er altijd blijven, maar er is iets gemeenschappelijks. Het is dus [uh] een kwestie van interpretatie van iets wat gemeenschappelijk is. En een kwestie van interpretatie van het gemeenschappelijke kan weer worden bestreden. Oké.

**Michelle de Vries:** Er zijn natuurlijk wel theorieën die zeggen dat [uhm] de manier waarop een norm, of de stage waarin een norm zich bevindt, of die al volledig geaccepteerd is of nog altijd bediscussieerd wordt, dat dat wel invloed heeft op de naleving ervan.

**Jan Pronk:** Ongetwijfeld. Ongetwijfeld, [uhm] maar [uhm], ja, kijk het verdrag van de mensenrechten is inmiddels al een jaar of zeventig oud, hè. En het is natuurlijk levend recht. Er wordt steeds iets aan toegevoegd en er wordt ook steeds iets geïnterpreteerd. En wat er wordt toegevoegd is niet het resultaat van een [uhm], hegemonistische structuur in de wereld. Hè, wat er wordt toegevoegd is het resultaat van een besluitvormingsstructuur van landen die autonoom zijn en soeverein zijn en gelijke rechten hebben. Dus alle toevoegingen hieraan zijn het resultaat van een besluitvormingsproces, zelfs bij consensus tussen al die landen. Dus het is dynamisch, levend en gebeurt op een wijze die in overeenstemming is met datgene wat ooit is afgesproken over hoe beslissingen moeten worden genomen. [Uhm] dus dat type theoretische relativering, waar jij op doelt, daar [uhm] heb ik weinig mee. Snap je? [Uhm], dat is, ja, het is hoogstens een verklaring, maar that’s it.

**Michelle de Vries:** Het zou geen oorzaak zijn?

**Jan Pronk:** Het zou geen oorzaak zijn, nee. Het is een verklaring. Landen zullen zich continu willen onttrekken aan… Dat is eigen aan landen, dat is eigen aan groepen. [Uh] Je mag niet harder dan 70, je doet het toch. Oké. En heeft dat iets te maken met de staat waarin of met de algemene acceptatie? Nee, op een gegeven moment is het beslist. En natuurlijk zijn er mensen die vinden dat je best harder mag dan 70, dat het 80 zou moeten zijn. En het is een kwestie ook weer met handhaving. Dat is nou eenmaal altijd met recht. Het is de mate van aanvaarding, maar op een gegeven moment is het beslist. En het is niet beslist opgelegd, maar in het kader van een besluitvormingsprocedure die men zelf heeft afgesproken, hebben gewild. En landen hebben die ook zo gewild. Dus het verklaart, maar het rechtvaardigt niks.

**Michelle de Vries:** [Uhm] Denk u wel dat er, wanneer sancties zouden bestaan wanneer landen zich niet compleet houden aan een norm zoals R2P, dat dat..

**Jan Pronk:** Oh ja, kijk, [uhm] je zult, je kunt niet internationale beslissingen met rechtskracht afdwingbaar maken, zonder sancties. Dat kan niet, want [uhm] iedereen zal zich daar dan altijd aan onttrekken. Als jij 80 rijdt, en je wordt niet op de bon geslingerd, dan rijdt je 80. Dus je moet handhaving hebben en je moet sancties hebben. En bij internationaal recht ontbreekt het natuurlijk aan sancties. Behalve een aantal terreinen, die zijn vergevorderd op het gebied van sancties, die zijn afgesproken. We hebben het geprobeerd op het terrein van klimaat, en dat is effe gelukt, maar nu niet meer. Binnen Europa hebben we op het terrein van monetaire politiek, daar is het er ook. En dan zijn er sancties die worden opgelegd, die zijn dan zo geformuleerd, dat als ze worden toegepast, dat ze ook helpen om het probleem weer aan te pakken. Het zijn slimme sancties, maar die heb je op weinig terreinen. Je kunt als mensenrechten worden geschonden, kan je niet veel doen. Chapter 7, hè, is een sanctie. Het feit dat de veiligheidsraad een beslissing kan nemen om te interveniëren om mensen te beschermen, is een sanctie op het niet beschermen van mensen door de machthebbers in de respectabele samenleving. [Uhm], en het feit dat dan de veiligheidsraad zichzelf ook het recht kan toe-eigenen om het regime te veranderen, of het verstandig is is een tweede, maar het is een sanctie. De dreiging van de mogelijkheid, het bestaan van de mogelijkheid, kan misschien soms ook functioneren. In een andere situatie kan je ook economische sancties toepassen, hè. Werkt vaak niet, maargoed. [Uh], het is een beetje gebeurd in het terrein van het apartheidsbeleid in Zuid-Afrika. Politieke sancties, [uh] nauwelijks mogelijk want je kunt een land niet uitstoten. [Uhm], dat kun je wel doen in [uhm] een club van landen, maar dan is dat niet gebaseerd op recht… De beslissing om Rusland uit de G8 te stoten, [uhm], dat is een politieke beslissing. Je mag hem gerechtvaardigd achten, ik vind hem niet effectief. Het is ook nergens op gebaseerd, behalve op het feit dat 7 landen het met mekaar eens zijn, maar niet op een juridische. Maar sancties, ja, en je zult, ik ben van mening dat als je internationale verdragen sluit, je ook zult moeten praten over sanctieparagraaf. Maar ja, ook sancties kunnen worden weer worden ontdoken en ontweken.

**Michelle de Vries:** Nouja, dan slotte, ook gezien de tijd, [Uhm].. U had het ook over machtsverhoudingen en ook sancties. Denkt u dat binnen het systeem van de VN mogelijk is, om puur objectief, zonder invloed van machtsverhoudingen, zult soort sancties over te laten aan de Veiligheidsraad?

**Jan Pronk:** Objectiviteit bestaat niet. Je hebt altijd intepretatie. Wanneer je beslissingen hebt in de politiek heb je altijd politieke beslissingen en keuzes op basis van interpretatie van het feit, hè. Worden mensenrechten geschonden, hè? Bijvoorbeeld, dat is een interpretatie. [Uhm], dus objectiviteit, nee. Je kunt het wel gaan objectiveren.. En dat betekent dat je dus, [uhm], heel duidelijke criteria moet vastleggen. Dat gebeurt in de VN wel. Maar zelfs als je criteria vastlegt, en procedures, hè, je moet ook overgaan in procedures, dan heb je [uhm] een onafhankelijke rechter nodig. En die bestaat niet. Die heb je in nationale staten wel, je hebt het in de VN wanneer het gaat om het internationale gerechtshof, maar dat is wat anders dan vredesoperaties. Je kunt dus procedures organiseren om te komen tot een onafhankelijke rechtspraak in het geval van het schenden van verdragen, en [uhm] het niet beschermen van mensenrechten. Alleen, dat is een uitermate langdurige procedure. En zelfs, wanneer je zo’n objectief, of geobjectiveerde beslissing van het internationale gerechtshof hebt, dan [uhm], dan moet ie nog worden aangevoerd. En ik kwam net met het voorbeeld van Israël. Er zijn ook uitspraken van het internationale gerechtshof, die niet worden uitgevoerd en ook niet worden afgedwongen door de landen die het internationale gerechtshof hebben hooggehouden. Dat zouden ze heel makkelijk kunnen doen door een beslissing te nemen in de Veiligheidsraad dat Israël moet doen wat het hof heeft gezegd. Dus [uhm], je kunt het objectiveren, maar [uhm] dat heeft over het algemeen weinig doorzettingsmacht. Dus je moet je toch een klein beetje tevreden stellen met de afweging. Kijk, en als je dus een veiligheidsraad hebt, waarvan je kunt zeggen dat die een representatieve afspiegeling is van de wereld en opvattingen en krachtverhoudingen, en niet statisch, omdat die regelmatig kan worden gewijzigd, he, Dan heb je een objectivering. Het is nooit objectief, maar dan is de subjectiviteit die er is van 25 lidstaten, maar je hebt wel een objectiveringsproces en dat leidt tot een bepaalde beslissing. Anders is er niet. Anders is er niet, hè. [Uhm], objectieve inschatting van iets zoals het is, is zelfs door een rechter in een nationale structuur, en nog hoger, je kunt in cassatie, en weer terug,.. Dus door criteria en procedures, en door een beslissing te nemen over de onafhankelijkheid van de mensen die uiteindelijk kunnen beslissen, kun je uiteindelijk bij objectivering komen.

**Michelle de Vries:** En dit ging dan met name over de beslissingsprocedure, maar ook de interpretatie van het conflict an sich, is natuurlijk ook afhankelijk van de informatie die je krijgt?

**Jan Pronk:** Ieder land heeft daar verschillende opvattingen over en verschillende belangen bij. Maar als je dus de veiligheidsraad met 25 landen, als ze praten en ze zijn betrokken en komen samen tot een beslissing, dan is dat de weerspiegeling van een soort internationaal gezamenlijk standpunt. Dus, [ja] ergens anders kunnen je die niet komen, en dat moet je ook niet willen. Want je moet niet willen dat er een 1 wereldregering is, of 1 land… ja dit is het best attainable.

**[Einde]**

## Transcript Interview Joost van Puijenbroek, 22-05-2017

**Michelle de Vries:** Voor zover ik begrepen heb, heeft u met name veel expertise wat betreft de mijnbouw in Congo..

**Joost:** Ja, daar heb ik mij de laatste jaren meer mee bezig gehouden ja, maar het is het niet, afijn, ik ben breder bekend met het conflict in Congo. Dingen zoals vrede en veiligheid ben ik wel bekend mee.

**Michelle de Vries:** Oké, [uhm], in het principe is de mijnbouw een veelbesproken issue in relatie tot het conflict wat daar plaatsvindt, [uhm] hoe denkt u dat de relatie is met de mensenrechten schendingen en de mijnbouw?

**Joost:** Nou er worden niet zo verschrikkelijk veel mensenrechten schendingen gerapporteerd als het om mijnbouw gaat.

**Michelle:** Maar denkt u wel dat een een relatie is tussen de rapportages van mensenrechten schendingen en de mijnbouw en de conflicten rondom de mijnbouw?

**Joost:** Ik ben het [uhm] nooit eens geweest met het conflict mineralen debat, zoals het heeft plaatsgevonden. En het heeft ook slecht uitgewerkt voor Congolese bevolking, want het leidde ertoe dat allerlei bedrijven van redelijke signatuur, laat ik het [uhm] zo zeggen, die [uhm] lieten Congo links liggen, omdat het te risicovol was voor hun om daar iets te ondernemen. En het leidde er ook toe dat de artisanale exploitatie van grondstoffen, [uhm], de facto onder een embargo kwam te zitten. En die mochten dus ook, die werden veroordeeld tot een illegale exploitatie en illegale export, ondanks het feit dat op lokaal niveau een groot niveau van legitimiteit had. Ik denk dat je altijd, in Congo moet je die twee zaken altijd goed uit elkaar houden, wat is legaal en wat is legitiem. En dat verschil zit hem ook in de, daaronder zit ook [uhm], de verhouding tussen de Congolese bevolking en de Congolese staat. [Uhm], als je naar de goud exploitatie kijkt dan, [uhm] zal het grootste gedeelte, hoewel de industriële ontwikkeling dus niet van de grond is gekomen, ook dat moet even na al die jaren concluderen… [Uhm] Maar god, je hebt daar in het noordoosten, waar die Kibali Gold, die zijn vrij actief, die produceren in een rap tempo een grote hoeveelheid goud. Je kunt vast zeggen dag, uit de losse pols, 70% van het goud uit die industrie komt. En je moet me niet vastpinnen op het precieze percentage, maar het grootste gedeelte kun je aannemen dat dat wel het geval is. [Uhm], maar als je kijkt naar het emplooi, de werkgelegenheid dan is het eerder andersom, 70%/80% van de werkgelegenheid in de goud exploitatie die vindt plaats in de artisanale exploitatie en niet in de industriële exploitatie. Want zijn die fabrieken eenmaal gebouwd, dan [uhm] lukt het wel. Dan hebben ze wat, 800 mensen, misschien 1000 mensen nodig, maar zeker niet meer als dat.

Dan kom je op het mensenrechten verhaal. We zien eigenlijk, mensenrechten schendingen ge”end op die twee productiewijze. En als je naar de artisanale productie kijkt die lijdt onder [uh], het nederlandse woord kan ik niet opkomen, maar het engelse woord is ‘ harrassment’ . [uhm], veel praktijken van afpersing, dat soort zaken, [uhm], dat zijn de mensenrechten schendingen, de grootste mensenrechten schendingen die plaatsvinden. Daarnaast heb je natuurlijk mensenrechten schendingen op arbeidsrechtelijke omstandigheden, die buitengewoon beroerd zijn. Volgens de wet mag je tot 30 meter onder de grond een gat graven, maar die gaten willen wel eens instorten, dat gebeurt wel eens, en dan ga je horizontaal ook nog graven, kijken of je iets bij je buurman kan pikken,… [Uhm] Het is een gevaarlijk karweitje. En je hebt mercurium, om het goud uit het stof te halen, ja dat gebeurd gewoon met de hand, dat.. dat is geen gezonde aangelegenheid, je wordt er niet. Dus arbeidsrechtelijke, maar dat zijn niet de meest primaire mensenrechten, is er natuurlijk een hele hoop mis. [Uhm], je wordt soms gedwongen om [uhm], je krijgt bijvoorbeeld een vergoeding van 100 dollar per maand, maar je wordt wel gedwongen om bij de baas je inkopen te doen, je krijgt het niet cash. Het wordt in een schriftje bijgehouden, de troque noemen ze dat. [Uhm], zo zijn er een hele hoop, maar het is vooral politie, het leger, vooral de politie, [uhm] die allerlei afpersingspraktijken uitoefenen richting de artisanale exploitatie. Wat doet de industrie…

**Michelle de Vries:** En dan bedoelt u de staatspolitie?

**Joost:** Ja de Congolese staat, en dit gecombineerd met allerlei overheidsdiensten die een rol, of niet, te spelen hebben rondom goudwinning. Dat kan zijn, je hebt een instituut die de begeleiding van artisanale mijnwerkers doet, ja die hebben dan ook een rol, maar die treden dan samen met de politie op. Tegelijkertijd, voor die artisanale werkers, het is een bron van afpersing en het is ook een bron van legitimiteit. Dat is heel tegenstrijdig. Maar als ze dan een deal hebben gemaakt met de politie, of [uhm], CESKAM?, dan voelen ze zich in een glijdende schaal van toenemende of afnemende legaliteit, hebben ze het gevoel dat ze iets meer legaliteit hebben gewonnen, want ze kunnen een briefje laten zien, of ze kunnen zeggen van ‘vorige week heb ik je dit gegeven, of dat’. Dus het is een buitengewoon ingewikkeld spel, van [uhm] afpersing en legaliteit. Dat is ook de bron van waar al die overheidsdiensten aan werken, en meestal onder het leiderschap van de politie.

**Michelle de Vries:** Oké, want dat heeft u het met name over mensenrechtenschendingen specifiek met betrekking tot de arbeidsomstandigheden, en specifiek met de mijnbouw zelf, maar in veel van de rapporten, bijvoorbeeld van de VN, wordt het veiligheidsissue rondom de mijnen ook gekoppeld aan mensenrechtenschendingen zoals ook seksueel geweld, of [uhm], vind u dat terecht of vindt u dat iets losstaand van de mijnbouw?

**Joost:** Wij zijn het niet zo verschikkelijk veel tegengekomen, maar het is natuurlijk wel, artisanale mijnbouw is een rauwe sector, met veel jonge mannen, vele van hen hebben vroeger in de oorlog, maar dat is ondertussen ook alweer 10-15 jaar geleden, in de milities gewerkt, of gewerkt.. gevochten, het is geen werk… [Uhm], ja er gaat snel geld in om, waar de gewone landebouwer, de keutelboer, de peasant, het is nauwelijks geld te verdienen, dat is een zelfvoorzienende economie, er gata hier rap geld in om. Ja, daar omheen vindt van alles plaats, op het gebied van prostitutie. Dat is vrij logisch. Uhm.. dat is niet gezegd dat het allemaal een verkrachtingsverhaal is, zoals het seksueel geweldverhaal geformuleerd is. Dat heb ik niet zo gezien, niet op die manier.

**Michelle:** Dus het is niet, volgens uw mening, het geval dat zodra de mijnbouwcorruptie zou afnemen, dat dat ook betekent dat alle mensenrechtenschendingen in het conflict zal afnemen?

**Joost:** Nee, ja, god, is prostitutie een mensenrechtschending?

**Michelle:**  Als het onvrijwillig is..

**Joost:** Ja, dan ga je weg.. En meestal hebben vrouwen een vaste plek in het productieproces. Het sjouwen van keien, mannen zijn er om in al die gaten te klimmen, en die breken er keien uit en brengen dat tot aan de ingang van de mijn, en dan zijn het vrouwen die, dan worden die keien kleiner gemaakt, en vrouwen werken dan in twee taken. Als transport van ruis en steen en dat soort zaken, en [uhm] keukenvoorziening voor al die mijnbouwjongens. Dat zijn, traditioneel, het is een buitengewoon informele maar hoog gereguleerde sector. En vrouwen hebben daar een gereguleerde rol in. Net zoals met de jongeren, wordt er duidelijk gezegd dat beneden de 16/18 is het verboden in die mijnbouw te werken. Wel bovengronds, maar niet in de gaten ondergronds. Maar bovengronds is al, dat is al ja, .. dat is al iets minder rigide gecontroleerd. Maar ondergronds, ja de mijnen, vanuit de koloniale tijd, meestal 1 of 2 ingangen en daar kun je controleren wie er in en uit gaat. Maar kinderarbeid is naar onze ervaring vrij gereguleerd. Dus er is een hele hoop [uh] mythes rondom.. En ik ken ook, ik heb ook artisanale mijnwerkers gezien die hebben hun schoolgeld al over drie jaar betaald.. Nou de gemiddelde ambtenaar kan dat niet.. Dus het is soms ook een buitengewone belangrijke livelihood.

**Michelle:** Ja, een middel om te kunnen bestaan dus ook..

**Joost:** Maar als je nu naar de industrie kijkt, dan komen we ook even bij de milities. Als je naar de industrie kijkt, dan daar begint het probleem dat die een contract sluiten met de Congolese overheid, de centrale overheid in Kinshasa. [Uhm], en die krijgen een heel gebied als concessie toegewezen, dat is hun eigendom, daar mogen zij over beschikken en er mee doen wat zij willen. In dat gebied wonen, 100.000, 200.00 mensen, die wonen daar, hebben daar altijd gewoond. Dus het is alsof je een huis koopt wat bewoond is zonder dat je het wist.. soms wist je het wel. Dat besluit van de Congolese overheid is juridisch legaal, maar het is volkomen illegitiem, want die bevolking is niet geconstateerd. En dat betekent dat het bedrijf, en dat is begrijpelijk en opzich niet fout, ja die wil die berg af gaan graven, en goud gaan verdienen. Nouja die jaagt niet die 200.000 mensen in één keer weg, want dan heb je een oorlog, dat weten zij ook. Dus ze zitten in een heel moeilijke verhouding tot het gebied waar ze werken. En dan krijg je site voor site krijg je weer, gaan ze er weer eentje evacueren.. De artisanale werkers moeten dan verdwijnen.. Bij dorpjes kun je onderhandelen, een resettlement onderhandelen en dat doen ze ook.. Soms gaat de bevolking er op vooruit. We hebben één stadje, dat heb ik ook bekeken, dat is geresettled, ja dat waren allemaal mudde hutjes, en die mensen hebben nu allemaal een stenen huis, twee/drie kamers, een sjiek dak, dat is allemaal keurig op orde, het is een beetje een steriel dorp.. Zo vinex locatie.. Het is niet dat daar die mensen afgezet worden.. Wij hebben in Nederland ook de betuwelijn aangelegd, moesten er ook mensen geresettled worden. Nouja, daar kun je van alles van vinden, maar het is uiteindelijk toch een bureaucratisch besluit.. Er wordt wel voor je gezorgd, dat gaat wel. Voor dorpjes gaat het wel.. het moeilijke is met die artisanale, met Kibali gold dan.. dan zijn er een stuk of 30 concessies binnen Kibali Gold, ja dat is de livelihood.. dan is het wat moeilijker. En die uitzettingen gaat toch vaak met geweld gepaard. En dan zien we vaak dat, die uitzettingen die doet het bedrijf natuurlijk niet zelf, dat doet de politie, soms het leger, maar in principe de politie. En de politie staat niet onder commando van een bedrijf, maar die staat uiteindelijk onder commando van de minister van politie op centraal niveau, met alle lagen daartussen. Maar omdat die multinational een contract met de president heeft gesloten, gaat die politie echt wel doen wat er uit het centrum gezegd wordt. En dan krijg je die verbinding tussen de politionele macht en het bedrijfsbelang zonder dat die officieel is. En die is er dan informeel wel degelijk. En dan zie je ook dat we,.. dan wil die bevolking een keer protesteren, wat (A) een belangrijk mensenrecht is om je te kunnen uiten, maar dan wordt er meteen de politie op afgestuurd en dan vallen er doden of gewonden. Dat is het grote probleem met de industrie. Ze hebben een concessie die bewoond wordt door heel veel mensen, waar ook heel veel mensen hun inkomsten uit halen, eveneens uit de goudwinning, dus er is een groot tegengesteld belang. De industrie is legaal maar niet legitiem, de artisanale exploitatie is illegaal maar wel legitiem. [Uhm], en dan zijn die uitzettingen van die sites, die gaan vaak gepaard met geweld.

Het wordt ook de andere kant op gespeeld. Want toen hadden wij op een gegeven moment een gebied van Kibali Gold waar wij een beetje rondliepen, en [uhm] hebben we, waren er echt forse manifestaties van jongeren die in die mijnbouw, in die artisanale exploitatie werkten, en daar waren 3/4/5 doden bij gevallen. Wat bleek later, er zat een lokale big man achter en die had jongeren uit een territoir verderop laten komen, en zegt: ‘Ik betaal jullie, maar jullie moeten protesteren’. En wat is er gebeurd, en.. Want de industrie en de Congolese overheid is gevoelig voor.. als er echt.. als er een opstandje dreigt dan worden ze heel zenuwachtig, want ze weten dat ze helemaal geen basis hebben met die bevolking, dus ze worden zenuwachtig. Toen is ook meteen de minister van mijnbouw gekomen, [onduidelijk], toen zijn er dus.. niet binnen de concessie, maar net op de rand van de concessie van Kibali Gold, zijn wat officiële zones waar artisanale exploitanten werkten, en toen heeft Kibali er voor gezorgd.. allemaal van die soldages.. om te kijken of de grond vruchtbaar is, en dat hebben ze ook gedaan en het waren vruchtbare gebieden.. [uhm] Die big men, die de jongens had laten komen om te protesteren, dit was zijn verborgen agenda, ja. Dus er is een opstandje gecreëerd, daar heeft ie wat voor betaald, het risico van het vak is dat je dan misschien ook dood gaat, en iedereen schrok zich het leplazarus, he het bedrijf, de politie waren de legitimiteit echt kwijt omdat er doden gevallen waren, en dat hadden zij natuurlijk gedaan.. Dus de minister was ook.. Nou toen werd dit dus als cadeautje geritseld om de sociale vrede, want dat is het enige waar de overheid zenuwachtig voor is, als het maar een beetje rustig blijft, nou die Big Men werd de eigenaar van die artisanale concessies, dus zo.. [Uhm], maar dat is dus als je het hebt over mensenrechtenschendingen bij de industrie is dat het grote probleem, dat ze moeten zorgen dat alles wat binnen die concessie werkt en woont, dat ze uitgezet moeten worden, anders kunnen ze hun bedrijfsvoering niet doen. En doen ze dat op een nette manier.. dat is een lastige. Dat is ook één van de redenen waarom die industriële ontwikkeling niet van de grond komt..

**Michelle:** Omdat..

**Joost:** Omdat.. hier in Nederland is ING de bank die het meeste met mijnbouw bezig is, en [uhm] die zeggen in Congo gaat wij nog geen 10 euro uitlenen aan een bedrijf, dat levert zulke problemen om daar te exploiteren, daar gaan wij niet aan meedoen..

**Michelle:** Dus, in die zin zou met name de Congolese overheid wel baat hebben bij meer stabilliteit..

**Joost:** Ja dat willen ze juist niet.. De Congolese overheid is buitengewoon tevreden met de instabiliteit.. Nou nu is het een beetje al te instabiel.. maar de afgelopen jaren bood het de Congolese overheid.. Het is niet monolitisch, het is niet zo dat de overheid het hele land onder controle heeft, dat hebben ze niet.. En binnen die overheid zitten ook allerlei regionale netwerken die … [onduidelijk] die goed geld verdienen.. Kabila heeft niet alles lijnrecht te vertellen.. doordat die instabiliteit er is, kunnen legers en gouverneurs hun gang gaan. Want we hebben bijvoorbeeld [uhm] een groot goudgewin gebied, ook diamant maar vooral goud, is een territoir want dan Bafacende heet.. niet zo ver van kisangali vandaan.. Daar zit ook een militie van Jean-luc, en die is al 10 jaar bezig om zichzelf over te geven.. en dat lukt maar niet.. En het is het leger die dat tegenhoudt. Die hebben baat.. zij zijn hun voorwendsel om daar als leger actief te zijn, want dan is het een operationele militaire zone en dan krijg je munitie toegestuurd, wapens toegestuurd, van alles.. want je bent een operationele militaire zone, dus je doet goed werk in militaire termen.. En ze kunnen daar de hele goud exploitatie volledig onder hun controle houden.. volledig. En ze werken ook samen met die militie.. Nou dat is een voorbeeld van verschillende niveaus binnen de Congolese overheid en verschillende segmenten, want het leger, die officieel niks te makken heeft daar, die mag daar helemaal niet zijn in die mijngebieden,.. die dus baat heeft bij een zeker niveau van instabiliteit. En dat is.. Congo.. als ze hadden gewild was het allang geen ontwikkelingsland meer. Economisch gezien zouden ze het beter als wij moeten hebben onderhand.. dat is overdreven, maar.. men wil dat het is zoals het is.

**Michelle:** En het economische belang zou daarbij, denkt u ook, geen rol gaan spelen? Zou er niet op een gegeven moment toch interesse zijn om bijvoorbeeld FDI rondom die mijnbouw aan te trekken?

**Joost:** Nouja, dat is wel het officiële beleid. [Uhm] wat in beperkte mate is gelukt. Het is de vraag of Kabila dat kan afdwingen? Hij moet ook zijn gouverneurs tevreden houden, hij moet een heleboel partijen tevreden houden.. dus..

**Michelle:** Dus wat dat betreft zijn er tegengestelde belangen?

**Joost:** Ja er zijn tegengesteld belangen, en er wordt ook niet al te strategisch gedacht. Soms.. het is ook vaak allemaal voor de korte termijn hoor..

**Michelle:** Want het officiële beleid van de overheid is inderdaad wel om stabiliteit te creëren.. en dat doen ze natuurlijk ook in assistentie met peacekeeping mission..

**Joost:** Kijk het officiële beleid kan niet anders zijn dan stabiliteit creëren.. anders wordt je een oorlogsstaat. Maar in de praktijk is het een plunderstaat.. de hele geschiedenis van Congo plunderen door het centrum naar de binnenland. En dat was onder Mobutu en dat is met Kabila, het is een plunderstaat. Dat is hun primaire belang.

**Michelle:** En hoe staat dat dan in relatie met [uhm] de peacekeeping mission, ..omdat zij natuurlijk wel stabiliteit zouden moeten zorgen en vaak beschuldigd worden van het falen daarin

**Joost:** Ja, die relatie is buitengewoon ingewikkeld. Kijk MONUSCO is verplicht.. het is een stabiliteitsmissie.. geen peacekeeping.. want de oorlog is officieel 10 jaar geleden beëindigd.. ook interessant, dat we al 10 jaar verder zijn met de grootste vredesmissie ooit he.. Nu geloof ik 17.000 mensen.. Maar dat we dus daar elke keer maar weer mee doorgaan.. op zich ook wel begrijpelijk maar ook interessant.. En omdat het dus geen peacekeeping maar stabiliteitsmissie is, zijn ze verplicht om het Congolese leger te ondersteunen. Niet in militaire samenwerking, niet in het samen gaan vechten, want dat zou ook veel te gevaarlijk zijn voor die VN-soldaten met zo’n onbetrouwbaar leger, echt de strijd samen aan te gaan.. Maar wel in het faciliteren van transport, voedsel, trainingen, dat soort zaken, intelligence delen ze. [Uhm], ja.. de Congolese overheid wil dat MONUSCO vertrekt, de VN wil dat niet, en dan krijg je zo’n rituele dans elke 6-12 maanden bij de veiligheidsraad wanneer het weer verlengd wordt. Dan zeggen ze weer van nou een paar 100 minder,.. of dit of dat.. of weet ik wat.. [uhm] de veiligheidsraad gaat dat niet substantieel afbouwen, daar ben ik van overtuigd. Congo is veel te fragiel en veel te instabiel.. en er kan ook opnieuw nu weer verkiezingen.. zien we ook hoe verschrikkelijk instabiel het is.. dat je in de kasai.. nu al 700 doden zijn gevallen in 7 maanden tijd.. [uhm] en een gebied van 2/3 provincies volledig onveilig heeft gemaakt. [uhm] Dat kan overal gebeuren.. want in de periode daarvoor hebben we het ADF/nalu, daar horen we nu nauwelijks meer over al een half jaar lang.. dat was ook opeens opgepopt.. nou niet opeens hoor.. niet helemaal onverwacht.. Maar het is typisch wel in zo’n conflict wat opkomt, waar het Congolese leger tot zijn nek toe achter zat, die dit heeft gepromoot ook, tegen bepaalde lokale mensen waar ze geen controle over hadden.. Musefeni zat er ook achter. Maar dat is.. dat kan.. in Equateur, de oude provincie van Mbutu, waar Kabila dus eigenlijk niks [uhm],..en Mbemba, die in Den Haag vast zit.. dat was vroeger zijn tegenstander, maar daar heeft Kabila dus eigenlijk niks te vertellen, daar kan ook [uhm] à la minute.. en zo zijn er meer gebieden. Zo zijn er echt meer gebieden waar dat zo kan gebeuren. Zo instabiel is het land nu. [uhm] Dus de Veiligheidsraad gaat echt niet [uhm] de VN missie echt substantieel afbouwen. Misschien wel een beetje minder hier of daar, maar niet substantieel, in deze fase absoluut niet. Dan zit je dus [uhm] met een missie, die qua mandaat zoiezo gehandicapt is als VN missie, met 30 nationaliteiten die er aan werken en alle sterke landen leveren geen troepen, het zijn allemaal van die derderangs landen die wat voetvolk leveren.. [uhm] De meeste landen die hebben als motivatie om hun inkomsten te krijgen via deze VN missie en die soldaten ook. Ja, dat vind ik ook [uhm] dat mag, daar is niks mis mee. Maar, ze hebben niet.. Kijk als wij naar Uruzgan gaan, dan hebben we een agenda om daar iets op te bouwen. Ik zeg niet dat wij altijd alles even super doen, maar we hebben wel een agenda om iets op te bouwen en we zitten daar niet om maandsalarissen te verdienen. Dat, [uhm], die agenda om daar resultaat te boeken die is er bij de meeste troepen-leverende landen nauwelijks aanwezig. [uhm] Dan moet ik ook zeggen, militair valt er niet zoveel… Het land is zo verschrikkelijk groot. En zo verschrikkelijk ontoegankelijk.. dat je [uhm] want dat was.. alweer vorig jaar Januari.. zou de FDLR verslagen moeten worden, aangepakt moeten worden.. Nou daar horen we niks meer van, die FDLR zit er nog steeds. Die valt militair niet aan te vallen. Zelfs, als je een super overmacht hebt, dan lopen ze gewoon een stukje verder ’t oerwoud in.. En [uhm] daar is geen militaire strategie op te verzinnen.. bijna. Of je moet zoveel manschappen inzetten en zoveel air-support hebben.. en daarbij accepteren dat daar mensen bij dood.. gedood kunnen worden, nou en dat wil ook niemand voor zo’n oorlog. Dus dat gaat niet.. militair is er nauwelijks [uhm].. Nee, een beetje pappen en nat houden.. Dan krijg je een partner, het congolese leger, dat volstrekt onbetrouwbaar is. Een tijdje geleden, vorig jaar, midden vorig jaar, was dat [uhm] en dat was ook in dat ADF/Nalu gebied, daar ergens tussen Beni end Goma in, toen was er een konvooi van [uhm] MONUSCO. Daar zijn zes blauwhelmen.. toen kwam er een ambush en toen zijn er zes blauwhelmen bij omgekomen. En later bleek dat die ambush door het congolese leger was gedaan, hun partner. Dus.. de partner waar ze mee samenwerken, die hadden een ambush gezet om [uhm] een paar blauwhelmen neer te schieten. [uhm] Dat heeft de MONUSCO zelf durven te melden in hun eigen rapport. Het is [uhm].. ze hebben milities gebruikt. En toen heeft later [uhm] de Group of Experts, die dus elke zes maanden dat onderzoek rapporteren, die hebben dat willen melden in hun eigen rapport. Maar het is natuurlijk schokkend dat je een vredesmissie hebt die samenwerkt met een overheid en dat diezelfde overheid een ambush opzet om ze neer te knallen. Dan [uhm] heb je het dus over de verwrongen relatie die plaatsvindt.. Een missie die altijd, waar dan ook, heel veel kritiek zal krijgen, maar toch door zijn aanwezigheid wel impact heeft, omdat het.. En je kunt heel veel dingen over MONUSCO zeggen, en ik ben niet negatief over MONUSCO.. Ik denk het feit dat ze er zijn, heeft een apeasement-effect, maakt het allemaal wat rustiger.. En je moet niet verwachten.. het verwachtingspatroon klopt niet met wat zij kunnen en zijn.. ze kunnen ook niet..

**Michelle:** En dat komt natuurlijk op dit moment ook omdat [uhm] zij altijd een assisterende of ondersteunende rol hebben..

**Joost:** Ja het maakt ook de beeldvorming bij de bevolking een hele vreemde.. ja..

**Michelle:** En denkt u dat [uhm].. er is ook de mogelijkheid om een chapter VII [uhm] mandaat in te voeren, waarbij je eigenlijk.. niet de toezegging of toestemming van de overheid nodig hebt om acties uit te voeren.. en dus redelijk..

**Joost:** Tegen wie moeten die operaties dan zijn?

**Michelle:** Nouja, in het algemeen zou je een mandaat kunnen opstellen waar je jezelf kunt losmaken van een partner die onbetrouwbaar is. Denk u dat dat zou helpen bij het uitvoeren van het mandaat, bijvoorbeeld wanneer je burgers probeert te beschermen?

**Joost:** [uhm] Bescherming van burgers dat mogen ze doen, of ze dat kunnen is even een andere vraag. Ze kunnen dat wel te allen tijde doen. Maar, [uhm] kijk.. we hebben dat gehad bij de M23 toen die er uit gejaagd werd. En toen kregen een vrij unieke combinatie van factoren, waar je dus die Force Intervention Brigade hadden en niet de reguliere MONUSCO-troepen, maar de Force Intervention Brigade.. Want de meeste MONUSCO-troepen zijn helemaal geen vechttroepen.. Het zijn van die.. [uhm] ja je ziet ze bij de voordeur staan.. van die bewakers-achtige troepen.. Beperkte troepen zijn echte vechttroepen. De Intervention Brigade had ook een hele andere equipment en een.. en dat was een strijd waar we.. die tegen een buitenlandse militie was. Waar overeenstemming was met het Congolese leger en waar ook overeenstemming was op regionaal en internationaal politiek niveau.. want [uhm] [uhm] Kagame, in Rwanda, heeft toen voor het eerst in zijn carriere, kreeg ie een boycot om zich heen.. Want al die hulp [onduidelijk] werd bevroren.. later is die herroepen, maar he.. Maar het was duidelijk dat Kagame en M23 voor de zoveelste keer met alle milities daarvoor.. aan het supporten was. Dus daar had je een internationaal politieke overeenstemming, een internationale militaire overeenstemming, [uhm] Kagame moest ook niet denken dat als ie door was gegaan met vechten met M23, dat hij betrokken zou zijn geweest met het neerschieten van Zuid-Afrikanen, Malawianen en Tanzanianen in Oost-Congo, want dan was zijn regionale basis helemaal verziekt.. [uhm] [uhm] Dus op alle niveaus waren die factoren tezamen om tot een goed resultaat te leiden. En Kagame wilde ook iets laten zien, van kijk eens hoe sterk, hoe goed ik ben, hè… Dus het Congolese leger vocht ook redelijk goed mee.. De commandanten van het Congolese leger waren net vervangen vlak voordat die operatie plaatsvond, tot enigszins betrouwbare commandanten. Want de commandanten die er waren, die waren rotzooi.. Al die factoren waren er.. en nou dan heb je succes.. En het was naar een buitenlandse krijgsmacht. Maar MONUSCO kan niet een oorlog gaan voeren met FARDC.. en wie is nou de buitenlandse strijdmacht op dit moment? Het zijn allemaal Congolese groepen, die allemaal gelieerd zijn aan lokale big men of de Congolese overheid op regionaal of op nationaal niveau. Goed.. [uhm] dus,

**Michelle:** Dus het is te complex om te simpelweg te zeggen dat wanneer MONUSCO in principe [uhm] als alleenstaande actor zou handelen dat ze dan wel succesvol zouden zijn..

**Joost:** Ik denk dat ze militair ook bijna het niet aan kunnen. Maar politiek ontbreekt volledig de dekking daarvoor. Behalve dus de [uhm] protection of civilians, dat wel. Als ze op moeten treden om de bevolking te beschermen, dan zijn ze verplicht om dat te doen en in zekere mate kunnen ze dat ook wel.. Maar dit zijn van die confuse conflicten.. hè..

**Michelle:** Omdat, [uhm], af en toe ook het Congolese leger zelf betrokken is bij het schenden van de mensenrechten.. En dan zitten ze natuurlijk wel in een situatie waar ze in principe niet in staat zijn om de burgers te beschermen, wanneer ze een mandaat hebben waarbij ze altijd de overheid moeten ondersteunen of assisteren..

**Joost:** Bijna altijd komen ze er achteraf achter en dan doen ze een onderzoek.. en ja, voor de bevolking spreekt dat niet.. En het is geen..ja.. wat voor type conflict hebben we het over.. ’s nachts worden er tien mensen neergeknald ergens.. ja, eer dat je het weet ben je weer een tijd verder en dan stuur je weer een groepje, een kolonne er naar toe om te kijken wat er allemaal is gebeurd.. dan ben je een halve dag verder.

**Michelle:** Dus in die zin denkt u niet dat het [uhm] een verschil zou maken in het succes van het besschermen van de burgers?

**Joost:** Kijk, ja, ik zie dat zo niet. Omdat het [uhm].. wat voor type oorlog is het? Het is geen Zuid-Sudan, waar je bij allerlei provinciale hoofdsteden centers kunt opzetten als UNMIS kunt opzetten en kunt beveiligen en waar hulporganisaties kunnen invliegen en voedsel en al.. he, doen wat ze moeten doen.. Daar is het al verschrikkelijk moeilijk om daar de bescherming te doen, maar daar is in ieder geval een strategie die tot op zekere hoogte uitvoerbaar is, ja.. En waarvan we [uhm] het regime.. en de rebellen denken dan hoeven wij het niet te doen.. het zal me een worst wezen.. Daar is in ieder geval een oorlog waarin er twee partijen zijn.. en er een stel meer komen.. het begint ook te fragmenteren, maar in ieder geval er is een oorlog.. Is er in Congo een oorlog.. Ja er is een hoge mate van instabiliteit.. Er zijn in de Kivu 70 rebellengroepen.. 70.. Er zijn er zo ongeveer 4 keer zoveel als dat er 10 jaar geleden waren.. qua aantal militia is het ongeveer hetzelfde gebleven.. dat zie je altijd.. Fragmentering blijft doorgaan. Zijn die elke dag aan het vechten die rebellengroepen? Nee, die hebben van die pockets.. In beheersing.. ze hebben precies hetzelfde gedrag als de Congolese overheid en het Congolese leger.. dus de bevolking is soms beter af bij een militia als bij het leger.. die Militie lokaal, daar kan hun toegang soms wat makkelijker zijn. Ja.. [uhm] moet, moet MONUSCO als buitenlandse, multi-nationale, slecht-equipped [uhm].. militaire macht zich.. dat op eigen houtje gaan doen? En het Congolese leger wegjagen? Dan is de tijd dat de ene ambush na de andere waar blauwhelmen neergeknald worden daar.. Dus..

**Michelle:** Dus het zou ook niet in het belang van de VN zijn, om op die manier betrokken te zijn?

**Joost:** Kunnen ze helemaal niet waarmaken.. Kunnen ze totaal niet waarmaken..Hebben ze in het verleden ook nooit waargemaakt. Als je kijkt naar de start van MONUSCO en de hele evolutie van die tijd hè, dan is het vooral.. niet peace enforcement, maar peacekeeping vaak alleen.. en in het begin van de oorlog, de eerste periode van MONUSCO waren 70 observanten.. en die zaten op zo’n 150 km van de frontlinie vandaan. Zo is het begonnen. Dat kunnen ze helemaal niet aan.. En dat moeten we denk ik ook niet willen..

Even.. ik vindt dat van MONUSCO de twee belangrijkste bijdragen die we leveren.. nou drie moet ik dan zeggen.. Is militaire aanwezigheid, daar zijn, gewoon er zijn. Als het al te gortig is, zijn ze hopelijk in staat iets te doen. Twee, OKAPI, dat is de nationale VN radio, die alle hoeken en gaten van Congo bestrijkt en waar elke dag alle soorten van nieuwsberichten op uitgestuurd worden, waardoor de bevolking toegang heeft tot informatie van wat er gebeurt. Je kunt er gif op innemen dat Kabila een pest hekel heeft aan radio OKAPI. En drie, [uhm], de UN Group of Experts, die elke zes maanden echt rapporteerd en wat toch een soort referentiepunt is in alle kennis die we hebben over de Congo, wat de VN zegt is waar.. En dat is in het verleden zeer utile geweest in de rol van Rwanda in Oost-Congo. [uhm] Daar heeft de Congolese overheid ook altijd veel baat bij gehad, dat de VN dit rapporteerde en daar hebben landen als Engeland en Blair.. die was woedend over het UN Mapping Report, over de mensenrechten.. Ja, die heeft alles gedaan om publicatie tegen te houden. En dan de andere kant ook op, ze rapporteren alles wat de Congolese overheid aan het rotzooien is. Die drie dingen, het er zijn, Okapi en de UN GoE vindt ik de belangrijkste bijdrage van de VN. En daar is de VN goed in. Je moet iemand altijd gebruiken waar die goed voor is, nee [uhm] goed *in* is. Niet goed voor is..

**Michelle:** [uhm] Ja.. omdat de dingen die u noemt wel ook afwijken van sommige reports.. de UN Security Council Reports, bijvoorbeeld dat het leger achter zo’n ambush zit, of dat er baat is bij instabiliteit rondom de mijnbouw, dat wordt natuurlijk niet in het report benoemt..

**Joost:** Dat zal de VN niet, .. nee. Er wordt wel openlijk gezegd, en dan begint natuurlijk iedereen te lachen als je het daar over hebt.. dat ja [uhm] er wordt steeds openlijker wel gezegd dat ie geen belang heeft om er iets goeds van kan bakken. Maar ik weet niet of ik dat zomaar kan zeggen.. niet in zo’n report as such.. Maar, bepaalde kwalificaties en duidingen over het gedrag wordt toch wel genoemd..

**Michelle:** Ja.. er wordt wel kritiek geleverd… Maar denkt u dat het wel verschil zou kunnen maken als het conflict op een andere manier zou worden besproken?

**Joost:** Het conflict?

**Michelle:** Het Congolese conflict? Omdat er op dit moment [uhm] veelal issues zoals mijnbouw, of veiligheidsissues of milities, vaak [uhm] de meest debated issues zijn en mensenrechten vaak gewoon een onderliggend issue is dat gekoppeld wordt aan een van de andere issues..

**Joost:** Ik denk dat de laatste tijd mensenrechten weer prominenter aanwezig is, veel meer dan die 70 milities. En dat heeft te maken met het politieke proces en situatie waar we in zitten.. Ik heb zelf op mensenrechtengebied de afgelopen gebied de afgelopen twee jaar denk ik, meer gezien dan de 20 jaar daarvoor. Ook in de tijd van Mbutu. We hebben gehad dat het hooft van de VN Mensenrechten in Congo die kreeg 24 uur om te vertrekken, heb ik nooit eerder gezien in Congo althans. We hebben gehad dat wetenschappers, zoals Jason Sterns, van New York, dat ie [uhm] [uhm] die, dat die dus het land niet meer in mocht. Dingen, hoe heet ze ook alweer van HRW, die kreeg ook geen verlenging, nu opnieuw weer wel, maar die heeft ook een hele tijd dat ze er niet meer in mocht. En meer van dat soort gevallen heb ik meegemaakt. We hebben al die demonstraties van die vreedzame protesten van Lucha, la Lucha gezien.. [uhm] Nou we hebben dus gezien wat er is gebeurd met die protest manifestaties in September, in Kinshasa, met een 50-tal doden.. zoiets. Dus mensenrechten heeft meer, de laatste tijd, veel meer in the picture gestaan dan die 70 groepen. Je zit altijd met de worsteling van wanneer is het nou vrede en wanneer is het oorlog.. Of nou ja, vrede, we hebben, we zijn niet verder gekomen dan een schemerzone.. Het is geen open oorlog in Oost-Congo, dat vindt ik niet, maar er zitten allerlei pockets van instabiliteit en hybride structuren.

**Michelle:** Een norm die vaak wel genoemd wordt in relatie met het Congolese, of [uhm] het MONUSCO-mandaat is de R2P, de responsibility to protect norm. Op dit moment is die niet officieel aanwezig in het mandaat, maar er wordt wel continu gerefereerd aan de protection of civilians. [uhm] Als u zegt dat mensenrechten steeds prominenter worden in het conflict, of in ieder geval meer aandacht krijgen, denk u dan ook dat er een kans is dat de R2P-norm misschien prominenter zou worden in het mandaat.

**Joost:** Volgens mij zit ie in het mandaat [uhm] goed verankerd, is het veel meer een vraagstuk van hoe voer je het uit. Denk ik. Ja. En dan kom je weer op die elementen van, het is zo’n vaag hybride conflict, hier popt het op, er is geen frontlinie, er is geen vijand gedefinieerd. Ja. Congolese overheid en milities zijn natuurlijk vaak twee handen op één buik. [uhm] En je zit met gebrekkige troepen en gebrekkig materieel, maar je weet ook echt dat het buitengewoon ingewikkeld zal zijn waar je heen moet.

**Michelle:** Ja, op dit moment zie je inderdaad wel in het mandaat verankerd, maar niet zozeer dat er officieel een beroep wordt gedaan op de norm. [uhm]..

**Joost:** Dat kan.. ja ik heb mij daar nooit zo in verdiept..

**Michelle:** Maar de derde pillar van de norm zou de volgende stap zijn, waarbij je eigenlijk de soevereiniteit van de overheid overslaat en zelf als MONUSCO de taak op je neemt om de burgers te beschermen. Zou dat de uitvoering volgens u, kunnen verbeteren, of denkt u dan ook, dat het gewoon te complex en te vaag is..

**Joost:** Kijk, als we het voorbeeld van M23 nemen. Dat was [uhm] een relatief eenduidige vijand, hè. We wisten wie het waren, waar ze waren, en noem maar op.. Het was eenduidig. En toen hebben die in eerste instantie dus Goma nog veroverd. [uhm] En toen heeft à la minute, toen [uhm] Goma aangevallen werd, heeft [uhm] Heeft MONUSCO alle mensenrechten verdedigers en advocaten en iedereen die bedreigd werd, die hebben ze direct in het compound opgenomen. Om die te beschermen tegen M23, en iedereen die iets kritisch had gezegd over M23 werd in de compound opgenomen. Dus in die situatie deden ze dat. Vrij, je.. kunt duizend opmerkingen maken, maar ik was er niet zo negatief over. Butembo, met die ADF/Nalu trubbel die we hebben, zijn er een redelijk groot aantal gevallen bekend waarbij Congolese FARDC commandanten, [uhm] [uhm], zelf ’s nachts de militie waren of samenwerkten met milities. Dat is in een redelijk groot aantal gevallen bekend. [uhm] Je wist nooit waar het vandaan kwam. Je kon geen één vijand herkennen. En dan wordt het ingewikkeld. Ja, dan wordt het gewoon ingewikkeld. Dan kan MONUSCO bij elk incident gaan meppen, en op bezoek gaan en investigating van ‘what happened’, maar het is buitengewoon van belang.. Als een gebied dan in grote regelmaat onveilig wordt, ja.. dan kom je op een IDP camp. Dat zou dan wel in de buurt van MONUSCO zijn en dan is MONUSCO ook niet te beroerd om dat te beschermen. Dat is..

**Michelle:** In die zijn bent u dan redelijk sceptisch over de mogelijkheden van MONUSCO om het beter te doen dan nu.. En bent u ook redelijk positief over hetgeen wat ze doen.

**Joost:** Ik ben positief, niet om dat ze het doen, omdat ze er zijn. [uhm] Kijk het gebied waar die ADF/Nalu rondloopt, is [uhm] zo goot als NL, waarvan het grootste gedeelte oerwoud. Hoe moet je dat doen?

**Michelle:** Dus uitvoerbaar is het niet?

**Joost:** Ja! Dat is het punt, het is een uitvoeringsprobleem. Ik denk als het makkelijker uit te voeren was, dan [uhm], dan [uhm] was het allemaal allang gedaan. Maar ze kunnen natuurlijk.. Ja god, in Beni stad kunnen ze meer patrouilleren, maar.. dan is het ook voor hun prettiger om dat samen met de FARDC te doen. Zodat, als je [uhm] een FARDC die zich ’s nachts als militie gedraagt ook een beetje hard gezamenlijk kunt reageren, want anders ben je het haasje natuurlijk. [uhm] En je weet dat het moeilijk is om te bepalen tegen wie je vecht.

**Michelle:** [uhm] Tot slot wilde ik het nog even hebben over de [uhm], de belangen die buitenlandse actoren wel of niet hebben in het conflict. Wat u zegt, wanneer er een buitenlandse vijand is, is er ook op internationaal niveau vrij snel politieke en militaire overeenstemming. Wanneer er binnenlandse milities zijn..

**Joost:** Weet niemand wat ze moeten doen..

**Michele:** Denkt u ook dat dat de reden is dat het lastig is om op internationaal niveau tot overeenstemming te komen, soms, samen met de Congolese overheid ook.. om..

**Joost:** Het laatste initiatief wat we daarop hebben gehad is het [uhm] de vredesakkoorden van Addis Abababa, waar toen Mary Robinson twee jaar de leiding had over… de supervisie had over de implementatie.. Ben even [uhm] de naam kwijt, van het vredesakkoord, is ook veelzeggend.. [uhm]. Maar daar horen we nu dus niks meer van. Het was twee pillaren, een interne Congolese pillaar, waarbij de regering dingen moest doen en daarover rapporteren naar de VN, en een internationale pilaar, en die ICGLR voerde dat uit, waarin de buurlanden zich natuurlijk moeesten gedragen en beloofde nooit meer in het buurland een vinger in de pap te steken. [uhm] Het vredesakkoord is bij lange lijst een dode letter verder gebleven. Daarna hebben we niks meer gehoord. Maar dat heeft de Congolese overheid ook effectief weten te saboteren. Mensen die interne hervormingen moesten doen.. Wat oorspronkelijk.. Het oorspronkelijke plan was, stond de VN aan het hoofd van de commissie die toe moest zien op de implementatie van dat vredesakkoord, zowel internationaal als nationaal. En dat heeft Kabila goed weten te wijzigen en effectieve druk uitgevoerd en gezegd dat ie … ze hebben dus niet gedurfd de soevereiniteit aan te pakken.. hè. Hij stond dus eigenlijk niet onder supervisie, maar hij moest wel rapporteren. Maar dat is iets heel anders. Hè. Dan kun je een wauwel-rapport sturen.. en daar heeft ie dat mee ontweken.

**Michelle:**  En in die zin is dus, denk u dat het lastig is..

**Joost:** Het is een proces van pappen en nat houden.. En dat zien we allang. Hoe lang?

**Michelle:** 17 jaar nu officieel dan…

**Joost:** Ja, 17 jaar.. het woordgebruik is hier en daar veranderd, met protection of civillians en dat soort zaken.. Maar in essentie zie ik niet zoveel veranderd. Maar er zit één ding bij MONUSCO natuurlijk wel.. doordat ze dus.. kwalitaten qua met FARDC moeten samenwerken en die ook moeten helpen met hun eigen operaties.. Dat ze dus een beetje partij zijn geworden in al die conflicten.. en dat.. [uhm] dat is wel een nadeel. Dan.. zo worden ze dan ook gezien.

**Michelle:** Er is ook een vijandbeeld gecreëerd richting MONUSCO? In ieder geval in Congo.. En internationaal krijgen ze veel kritiek.

**Joost:** Ja.. voor de bevolking is het iemand die nooit iets doet. Die altijd komt als de doden al gevallen zijn. Ja dan weet ik ook niet hoe ze er moeten zijn voordat de doden zijn gevallen.. Ja.. en ze met een hopeloze pakket. En ze hebben natuurlijk zelf een aantal enorme zwakheden die altijd zullen blijven.. omdat het de VN is. Maar er is niks beters. We hebben natuurlijk één keer eerder wel in willen grijpen. Dat was operatie Artemis. In 2003 in Ituri. En dat was de enige, eerste EU operatie in het buitenland. En dat was voor 98% door Frankrijk uitgevoerd. En dat was toen in Ituri en toen waren ze bang dat uh er in Ituri, er was een etnisch conflict, dat er hetzelfde ging gebeuren als dat we in Rwanda hebben gezien. Nou, dat is natuurlijk een trauma van de internationale gemeenschap. En toen hebben franse militaien erheen gestuurd. Met een echte peace enfocement en een disarmament missie. Die is vrij effectief gebleken. Hun mandaat was alleen het stadje Bunia, 3 bij 3 km zo ongeveer. Maar ze zijn ook wel de binnenlanden ingegaan, en dat hebben ze een aantal keer gedaan en dat was zoiezo een afschrikwekkend effect op alle milities in het binnenland, in dat gebied Ituri. Nouja, het is de opmaak geweest voor het vredesakkoord wat er jaren later is gekomen. Maar toen had je duidelijke vijanden en er was geen enkel Congolees leger aanwezig, alleen een ratjetoe van milities. Waarvan twee belangrijke groeperingen met elkaar aan het clashen waren. En toen kreeg je de bereidheid van een Westers land om dat te doen. Ze zijn dus.. in een keer, hup, ingevlogen, met alle equipment en alle intelligence en air support die je maar kan wensen. Verschrikkelijk duur, hebben ze drie maanden gedaan en toen zijn ze allemaal weer teruggevlogen. Dus het kan wel, maar dan moet je een heldere oorlog hebben.

**Michelle:** Dus dat blijft eigenllijk, staat nu eigenlijk centraal dat, omdat de complexiteit van het conflict zo groot is, zo vaag is..

**Joost:** Ja.. zo multi-layerd en multi-actored.. allemaal verbonden actoren.

**Michelle:** In die zin is het dan ook logisch volgens u, dat de internationale gemeenschap geen belang heeft bij het uitbreiden van het mandaat of verantwoordelijkheden, omdat het simpelweg niet uitvoerbaar is.

**Joost:** Ja, ik denk dat het primair een uitvoeringsprobleem is.. en secundair een mandaats-probleem. Want dat zie je bij die Force Intervention Brigade ook he, die heeft dan het grootste mandaat dat uberhaupt ooit een VN vredesmissie heeft gehad.. En daar is het ook afgezwakt, en ook die hadden helemaal geen zin om die FDLR oorlog te voeren. En ze vonden zelf.. Kagame gaat toch een vredesverdrag sluiten.. ik ben er mee klaar.. Wij hebben gaan onze soldaten daarvoor niet voor niets in risico brengen. En M23 wel, want dat was een regionaal probleem.

**Michelle:** Oke, duidelijk. Nou dat waren in ieder geval de vragen die ik had.. Hartelijk bedankt.

**[ Einde]** 56.40eHefeaf

## Transcript Interview Rose Bashwira, 24-05-2017

**[Watch movie clip]**

**Michelle:** [uhm] I think one of the factors that he’s also already mentioning in the video is that they’re different dynamics going on in the conflict.. [uhm]

**Rose:** Yes exactly.. What is always quoted by people when they talk about the conflict in Congo, they always say that there is not a single cause of the conflict. There are [uhm] multiple causes and there are [uhm] interrelated. [uhm] For example Freedman, [uhm] 2015, she says, talk about ethnic.. ethnical problems, she talks about the presence neighbour army, she talks about land and local disputes.. She talks also about heritage from the colonial.. [uhm] the colonization. She says that it is a very important point to take into account when talk about the conflict in Congo. So apart from the conflict around minerals, there are a lot of other conflict, but all of them are interrelated, because when you see.. when you have the conflict mineral you have also some land dispute and also ethnic problems, you have also the presence of the neighbour army around the mines, so yeah..

**Michelle:** [uhm] And the [uhm] human rights violations are also usually a factor that is discussed when they talk about the Congo conflict, [uhm] and usually they also get connected to all these kind of security issues. [uhm] But, do you think that it’s fair to only connect them to specific issues, or do you think that they should talk about the human rights violations as such, because are also just [uhm] a charachteristic of the conflict itself.

**Rose:** [uhm] Yeah, in many parts of the world, when there is violence there is also human rights violations. But when you take the case of the Congo for example, there is one author, I don’t remember her name, but who said that the situation of for example sexual violence in Congo it’s also related to the social norms of masculinity. So it’s kind of interconnected with how people think about gender roles and gender dimensions. It’s how people think about the role of women how… by affecting the women they also affect the community.. SO it’s.. sounds like the women are more affected, but there is that way of looking at the symbol that they have in the community.. but also the fact that most of the time men think that ‘okay the women will just be raped, but I’ll be killed’. So they tend to push the women in front and just step back.

**Michelle:** So they’ll just use women as a shield, because they do survive, but then they’re also traumatized.. Because the sexual violence has far reaching for the women.. not just health problems but also..

**Rose:** Yes, psychological problems and also cultural problems, because they’ll be stigmatized in the local community. But also they can give birth to children after the rape, and then the children are also stigmatized, so yeah, there are all these things around the rape that [uhm] doesn’t really [uhm]… it’s the social situation, and I think it’s really like the .. social situation, because.. For example there’s a woman that I met in my fieldwork in the mining site, and she told me that she’s there because she couldn’t continue to stay in her village. She was abducted for several months, and then she went back. At the first time everybody was really relieved, and she was seeing that people really love her because they cheered her up, but after two days she felt like her husband didn’t want to be beside her. And also her family and friends were stand-off, stayed back. So she was thinking like she’s not really welcome, but the first day it was like you’re welcome, it’s good that you’re back. But after days.. [uhm] she doesn’t feel like she fit in that community. So she started to move and she said that in the mining nobody cares about where you come from, [uhm] what is your story, and she feels more at home in that community than in her own.

**Michelle:** And then, [uhm] when they go to the mining site for example, [uhm] are there the same kind of situations that occur, are there also human rights violations happening, sexual violence for example, around those sites?..

**Rose:** I know that mainly [uhm] mainly around artisanal.. [uhm] Until now there’s no evidence of that. There’s one of my colleagues writing a paper on this relation between sexual violence and presence of artisanal mining. But she has some issue with collecting data. But what is true is that armed groups who are occupying those places, I think a social attitude around the mining is really related to sex, maybe there was some kind of evidence of women being raped, because when the armed groups were occupying the mining, they took control, fully control of the mining sites, so they imposed men to work for them.. so they can the [uhm] can take the mineral, they impose people to give them food and other stuff. So yeah, maybe there can be some evidence about rape also, but I didn’t find such evidence. I know that there is transactional sex, which can be exploited too.. if you don’t have anything but you have to feed somehow and then some women told me that cannot just go back home.. So they have to.. and when you feel like you have to, it’s kind of exploitative. But people related that not to sexual people, because they say it’s something that happens between two adult people who consent to do that, but yeah.. I think also the concept of sexual violence is different because of the whole discourse at the international level. So some people related sexual violence to armed groups, if it’s local people who rape you, then it’s not related to sexual violence.. But when you talk with them you can say mainly forms of sexual violence happening the community.

**Michelle:** And would it then also not account as a human rights violation, because obviously when you’re exploited then.. it’s also a violation.

**Rose:** Yeah, and also for the work of children in the mining, it’s also really happening. There is also some other example human rights abuse.. [uhm] violation.. the mining is really a good example mainly examples of that, because there’s [uhm] forced labour.. sometimes, you know, mining it’s also an example of power relations, where there’s client-patron relationships. Some people don’t have money to buy an ID card that allows them to go to the mining, so they go working on behalf of another person. That person has [uhm] big power over them. And they have to work.. for sometimes for free.. or sometimes they just call the women and say ‘come to my house, you can help me to clean the house or wash the clothes’..

**Michelle:** And [uhm] do you think that ultimately it matters if the discourse, on the international level, is kind of set on certain conceptions of sexual violence or child labour or exploitation. That it might affect decisions, make decisions that are not always the best decisions?

**Rose:** [uhm] That is one of my conclusions in my PhD. In the mining sector for example we have these [uhm] big attention on sexual violence that the consequence of that big attention was that.. to make all the women inside the mining.. they say it’s better for the women to find alternative activity.. because they say that in the mining they are marginalized, raped and really vulnerable. So it’s good for them to go out. But more and more the discourse changed, because the reform also changed. And then.. the people started to think that ‘we cannot just pick positions for these women, they’re adult, they know what they’re doing’. Because when you are in the field and ask them ‘Do you want to find another activity?’, the response is different from one women to another. Some of them find opportunity in the mining, where others are there just to survive, most of them are displaced.. They were finding that mining is secure place.. People all think that mining is a secure place. Because one point, with all that armed groups around, local elite in the mining find a way to, to gain the security and security of their investment by secure relationship with one of the armed groups.. so that the mining community, and mining site were a bit more secure than the place around. So people were going from their village to the mining for their security.. I don’t remember what question I was talking about..

**Michelle:** If it matters that when there is a certain discourse for the people..

**Rose:** Yeah, definitely, when I was looking at all the discourse of sexual violence and how it has impacted on the access of women for the mining. Because then there was no access to the mining they have people going out.. At local level, people think that [uhm] [uhm] there was a law that the Congolese government raised up that pregnant women and children shouldn’t be in the mining.. according to the OECD guidelines. But when it arrived at the local level, they thought that it was all the women. So they decided that no women were allowed in to the mine sites. And then it became like negotiations for the women, they cannot access the mine but they can negotiate with the local authority so that they can access. And by [uhm].. so by negotiating it is creating a vulnerability because they don’t have a right to go there and its dependent on the local authority if they accept or not if they can go there. But when the discourse evolved.. [uhm] more thinking about inclusion and gender mainstreaming.. the other discourse of sexual violence still exists.. but the other discourse is also there which kind of contradicts.. and at the local level we still have the culture of women must be protected, must not work in the mining, she has to have the presence of a man.. So this international discourse come to.. it’s like that together with the local discourse and now I noticed that the civil servant can take one or the other depending on … what he thinks. Sometimes he say okay she can go in the mining, the law is not preventing women to go to the mining.. and also at international level they’re talking about gender mainstreaming, so yeah you can go. But another day he can just say, no you can’t go in the mining because the culture prevents women to go to the women, and also there is all that sexual violence in the mining, so for you protection, you can’t go in the mining. So there is all that discourse and I think it has a great impact on the local level. If you take only the discourse on sexual violence and how it has.. it has an impact on local level.. I mean when you read for example.. [uhm] Thea’s [Hilhorst] papers on sexual violence, all that in organization who are now involved in sexual violence.. it was like boom. Every organization has to have a line on sexual violence to be funded because a lot of money.. and everyone was concerned about sexual violence.. even people who haven’t have any idea about what it is.. That means also to have.. if you didn’t have the issue in the program and you have to integrate it.. The way that you’re talking to people is also different to people who created the organization to tackle the issue of sexual violence. [uhm] The way that people perceive sexual violence is also related to that. So the.. international discourse really matters when you go to the local level.

**Michelle:** Okay, and in that sense.. would it also matter for the [uhm] the[uhm] the policies that different companies.. or organizations.. like the UN for example.. implement..in the country?

**Rose:** Yeah… Yeah.. Exactly, for example when you talk about the mining.. after the dodd-frank act, the call it the Obama’s law, but yeah.. it was been refusing the company in new ways who take there mineral.. their raw mineral to Congo to buy it without being [unclear].. It also affected the international level, the international market, because now they have to be sure to come from a conflict free site.. But also at the local level, it also affected the livelihood of people. So yeah, and every company have to follow that instruction if they want their mineral to be buy.. bought at the international level. But also, [uhm], company like apple or samsung, they have to be sure that their minerals are conflict free.. so that people like you or me here, I can buy a phone which is conflict free. So I think all that discourse have.. matter to all levels..

**Michelle:** So like the question of ‘Do you think it matters where the attention goes..’ Yes it matters.. really, because it impacts also the local level.

**Rose:** Yes..

**Michelle:**  And [uhm] the question ‘Does the international community always understand the local situation well enough?’ that also.. a bit answered already…

**Rose:** No not always, they have good initiatives.. and if it’s well implemented I think it can make a difference. Because the way.. for example.. the traceability program is structured.. if it is well implemented.. I think it will it would have been really great for the mining sector in the DRC. But then it arrived in a local situation which is.. kind of chaotic and disturbed.. the poverty is there and corruption is there.. so somehow they find a way to go behind all those things.. and they just disturb.. destroy everything. For example.. I take just a small example.. it is said that the mineral is traced from the pit to the moment of export.. But some other times.. there is so many pits in one place and they don’t want to go to all those pits.. so they just take one site and they that that is the pit.. You don’t know how many who are working in that site.. And people who are working in that site are really into informal activity.. because they feel like, they are not concerned of the traceability.. It starts at the selling point, and we are not going to the selling point, we are just selling our minerals around here. And it doesn’t matter to whom and for what.. you know, all that situation.. when you are, for example, here you feel like it’s really good and when you get reports from people, it sounds good. Even when in big cities in Congo, you feel like, yeah it’s working. But when you go to the pits sometimes, it’s difficult, because you come with all that training on how you have to work.. and with whom you have to exchange. But when have in the field, it is not the same thing, not the same actors and you have to adapt so that you can work..

**Michelle:** So the complexity of the situation, the local situation, is just too difficult..

**Rose:** Yeah.. sometimes it’s really difficult and the way people can adapt the situation for their own good is really amazing, but yeah, it just makes the whole these initiatives go wrong..

**Michelle:** Yeah, and for the response of the international community adequate, because they don’t always understand well enough the local dynamics..

**Rose:** Yes.. exactly.

**Michelle:** And do you also think that the complexity and vagenuess,..that surrounds the conflict.. that outside countries might be less interested to address the conflict, because they might feel like it would be difficult to have success in preventing, for example, harm to the population.. Because.. it is such a difficult conflict to address. And so different to understand for outside actors.. for example the UN.. that they might be less interested to [uhm] to get involved in the situation, because they’re afraid that it might fail.. and that it would harm their own reputation for example…

**Rose:** No.. I think everybody’s trying, although it’s difficult.. but everyone’s trying. And [uhm] if you take your question.. for example.. of the interest of the international community.. I think in all the sectors there are actors.. and people who are trying to do their best to fill the gap. But sometimes the problem is that they’re focusing on just one sector, without taking into account the complexity of relation with that sector with other sectors, and that make sometimes.. [uhm] end up with failure of the program. But yeah, I think in every sector there is actors that try to do their best to try to tackle the issue of conflict in the DRC. Because for example they’ve been saying that there has to be reform on jurisdiction sector and the police and the military sector, and it happened.. and people were trained and also some of them on sexual violence and gender.. But after the training you don’t really understand.. why it doesn’t change the perception on gender.. the way of working. [uhm] But.. that is my point of view. I think people who are put in such program, they’re just looking for the money they can have from it.. Especially at the local level, you know.. [uhm] That was being said even for the sexual violence program. You open a clinic for survivors of sexual violence, in a community where there is no need.. all the women will claim that they sexually violated, so they can get free healthcare. [uhm] Yeah, I think the problem is really deep. And its come with alle the factors of Congo, the corruption and poverty, you know. So people can come to the training, but they have their own agenda. And after the training, they still think like before the training.

**Michelle:** So then, the problem would be the implementation and the practical motives that people have.. But it wouldn’t.. but it’s not the case that the international community is paying insufficient attention, you believe that they’re trying.

**Rose:** Yeah I think they’re trying, they really try. And regarding your question about [uhm] [uhm] about the relationship with the all the programs and the local people.. If I take only the issue on mining, again, I’m sory it’s a sector I’m good with. Local civil servant was being [uhm] really dissapointed, not because it’s a bad program. No, it’s a good program, but it didn’t feel like they gain anything. They say that before the program, they were doing the same job, and getting something from it. But now, with the program, they cannot get as much as they used to.. [uhm] So, most of the time the governments have to work with the organizations, so that they can implement the program. And I think, now.. it’s a requirement that the government makes when you come with a program to implement.. so that the civil servants.. and if you don’t work with them, the program will not work, you will not go further. So I don’t think that there will be a time when the government will just let international community work itself in Congo, because they will feel like their power is just..

**Michelle:** In that sense, also the question regarding the R2P.. right now they’re trying to protect the population in assistance with the Congolese army.. but because, in many reports, also by the UN, the Congolese army is named as one of the perpetrators sometimes..

**Rose:** Even the UN troops sometimes..

**Michelle:** [uhm] Yeah.. also.. so in that sense..you think that it would be a success if the R2P would go as far as being solely done by the international community and not the government..

**Rose:** No that would.. like I told you right now.. the Congolese soldiers was being accused of raping citizens.. the UN also has the same problem. So they cannot just be the only person to say that they will secure people.. the population. When they have the same problem that the local army has... We know that the local army is corrupt.. But also the time that they merge.. all the armed groups with the Congolese army, it created friction and also stress.. on the army because it was being merged.. People with high level of education with people who never go to school. The reaction of these two people is different. And sometimes, the person who never goes to school has a greater [uhm] grade.. than the person who studies.. and he’s the one who gets command and he can give all the commands that he wants, and the people under him must execute it. So there’s that problem, I think, [uhm] you have to consider that when you look at the army of Congo it’s a mix of many people and many interests, also.. some of the time they take direct orders from, for example.. at higher level.. For example the war in 1996.. some of them were being said to have get orders to stay back.. to not fight.. and they can’t flee because they can’t fight. And it’s happened many times when into a conflict.. they get orders to not fight.. and they cannot also just accept it to be killed. And then they just fleeing.. And in the news you just heard that the Congolese army just flees.. but it’s because they don’t want to be killed and they cannot fight. So [uhm], I think the problem of the Congolese army is not just that they’re corrupt, or that they’re weak.. but [uhm] that there is a problem caused by the fact that they mixed.. the army and the local groups, the rebels groups who were attacking.. in [uhm] before 1996, they are mixed.. In 2003.. after the San City meeting.. they come with all kind of backgrounds.. and they.. some of them don’t have the background of military structure and don’t really think about it.. they’re just there and know to take the gun and shoot. But also.. there is corruption.. the higher level of soldiers are corrupt, and sometimes they just take orders against their own conviction.

**Michelle:** So it’s not just that it wouldn’t work, but also that it wouldn’t help the situations.. because the UN already has the same problems..

**Rose:** Yes.. the UN has the same problem.. also I think that if it tried to work without the Congolese government.. but they say that sometimes it not just working.. And to say that you’re just taking over the responsibility of the state.. it is what happened, from my point of view, is not helping the society. Because, for example, all these years of international aid, there were giving support for healthcare and education. And what was the response from the government? They just leave that..they didn’t care about it anymore. And even if the budget can come with money for healthcare or education.. they know that the church and international organization are taking care of that. So all that money just goes into the pockets of people.. The population.. will never see.. So I don’t think that it’s good to take over the responsibility of the government, but also I know that it is difficult to work with the government, with all the corruption.. Because I think they tried the threeway of working with the government.. the takeover 1 structure and work in that structure.. But the government just doesn’t care anymore about that structure. I thought they work side by side.. the government and sometimes it works.. but sometimes there are still cases of corruption. And either they just train the government and give capacity building.. and let them work with themselves.. But they always see that after some time.. they go again in the same way.. So yeah, I think it’s still difficult.

**Michelle:** And [uhm].. so in your opinion then the protection of civilians, maybe not sufficient right now, but it couldn’t go any other way because a different option would also not work.. Because the option where the international community is more involved would also not..

**Rose:** I think it’s good when the international community is involved, because local people would kind of be afraid of what people would say.. or they are kind of afraid that the cooperation with the international community can just end.. and if we stop they will not get paid anymore.. because the sector is not paid by the government. So somehow.. they manage to work in the conception of the international community.. And [uhm] the little that they can do thanks to the presence of the international community makes the difference, really for the local population. So I would not say that the international community just quit the Congo, because it will be a disaster more than it is right now, continue to work with people and try to train them. I think it’s good that they [uhm] today.. I think the sector that employs the most people is the NGOs, and the fact that people get trained on the way of thinking and the way of working.. [uhm] through the NGOs, I think is really matter.. Because then they get skills, and so they get the idea of how to work in a position that you don’t be corrupt in. But yeah, there are still some issues at the local level.

**Michelle:** But that’s.. mostly [uhm] the different work sector that you discuss now in relation to the international community.. but in terms of security? You also think that the international community and especially the MONUSCO-mission right now, is.. the right way for them to work.. to just assist the government and the army.

**Rose:** [uhm] When you go to the field, for example when I was going far away into the mining, the first thing to do is to go to an MONUSCO office and ask for the security situation of the [uhm] the [uhm] the place that you’re been working to.. Because that information, you will not get it from anyone else. But also, when you talk to people at local level, they will tell you that MONUSCO is the organization which hires the most people in the DRC. That is true that the part in Kinshasa closed and now they’re focusing on the Eastern part, but still a lot of people are working in MONUSCO and if MONUSCO has to close all those people will just be unemployed.. and that’s just be a big crisis in the country. So at local level, people are not really in to thinking that MONUSCO can close.. just close. [uhm] But sometimes, they have that think too about the presence of MONUSCO, as just looking at people.. without intervening. [uhm] Most of the time, [uhm] they are trained.. in patrols.. people are talking and say that they’re just losing a lot fuel, without working.. [uhm] Because sometimes, two or three convoys going back and forth and you don’t know what they’re doing. Yeah.. sometimes people are kind of pessimistic about their presence.. but sometimes the presence give that feeling of security somehow.

**Michelle:** Because.. the Government is currently pushing for the MONUSCO-mission to at least, not go away, but have smaller amounts of troops and littler presence.. Do you think the local conception differs from that view.. because they might benefit from the presence..

**Rose:** Not benefit from the presence.. because when you look at the troops of MONUSCO, most of the time they’re foreign countries, Pakistan, Egyptian, Indians.. and also I think in Katanga there are people from Benin.. and so, it’s always people from outside.. So [uhm] local people are not in the military troops of MONUSCO, they are mostly in the offices. Yeah.. so some of the people I talked to think that it will be better if they will reduce part of the forces that are working of Congo.. But also the fact that when there are, for example, Pakistanis.. They don’t hire local people in the camp. They come with their own cook, everyone comes from Pakistan.. and [uhm] sometimes people don’t feel like this is right. But also I heard that they don’t really spend money in the local community, that make that they didn’t really change, their presence in the local community doesn’t really change the, the way of people are living.

**Michelle:** And also not in terms of security then? They don’t feel like they’re protected by the MONUSCO troops..

**Rose:** [uhm] I don’t know really.. I didn’t come with that..

**Michelle:** I think I covered most of the questions so far.. do you have anything you want discuss further or emphasize more?

**Rose:** No, I think we covered all.

**Michelle:** Well, thank you very much then..

**[ Einde ]** 44.5

1. From the translation of ‘The Peloponnesian War’ by Richard Crawly, 2009 [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. The discourse analysis can be found in the added separate document [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. The discourse analysis can be found in the added separate document [↑](#footnote-ref-3)