Resulting from Socialization, Cognitive Mobilization, or Rational Choice? - A Multilevel Analysis of European Identity across European Union Countries

Master Thesis in Political Science

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1. Introduction

Although most European governments promote further European political and social integration, the identification with the European Union or the European people cannot is not present among a majority in all countries. On the 23rd of June in 2016, 51,9% of the people in the United Kingdom voted in favor of the country leaving the European Union (Electoral Commission, 2016). This result, shocking and surprising for Europe, raises the question, in how far people´s identification with Europe differs across countries and what are the reasons for these differences. Therefore, this study aims at contributing to the knowledge on the distribution of European identity and the causes of its formation. Scholars trying to explain the formation of an individual level European identity base their studies on diverse theoretical grounds, which I divide into three streams.

The first academic stream researching European identity follow the assumptions of the social identity theory and predicts that people from different countries, if they socialize with each other, feel part of an overall group of Europeans and thus form a European identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Stoeckel, 2015). Researchers from this stream indeed find that transnational activities increase people´s level of European identity (King & Ruiz-Gelices, 2003; Sigalas, 2010; Kuhn, 2012; Golob, Kristonvic, & Makarovic, 2014; Stoeckel, 2015). Also, people from families with cross-border European ties show higher levels of European identity (Lutz, Kritzinger, & Skirbekk, 2006; Agirdag, Huyst, & van Houtte, 2012; Verhaegen & Hooghe, 2015; van Mol, de Valk, & van Wissen, 2015). Most scholars focusing on transnational activities as a source of European identity research the effects of the Erasmus program, which is a study abroad program initiated by the European Union (King & Ruiz-Gelices, 2003; Sigalas, 2010; Kuhn, 2012; van Mol, 2012; Mitchell, 2012; Oborune, 2013; Stoeckel, 2015). In line with the theory, they find that European identity formation among Erasmus students indeed is due to socialization with other Europeans abroad (King & Ruiz-Gelices, 2003; Sigalas, 2010; van Mol, 2012; Stoeckel, 2015). While scholars indicate that this effect does not influence students, who have a European identity before their Erasmus study (King & Ruiz-Gelices, 2003; Sigalas, 2010; van Mol, 2012; Kuhn, 2012; Oborune, 2013), their findings for students who do not have a European identity before their Erasmus study vary a lot (King & Ruiz-Gelices, 2003; Sigalas, 2010; Mitchell, 2012; Oborune, 2013; Stoeckel, 2015). This may be the case, because they study samples from different European countries, although the dynamics in the formation of a European identity varies a lot across them (van Mol, 2012). To clarifiy in how far the different effects found are working for different countries, a study including all European Union countries may be helpful.

The second academic stream researching European identity base their assumptions on its formation on the theory of cognitive mobilization. This theory predicts that people who understand the political system of the European Union, by being informed and educated about it, perceive the system as less abstract, and know their place and opportunities in it (Inglehart, 1970; van der Veen, 2002; Verhaegen & Hooghe, 2015). As a consequence, they accept the political system, and attain attachment to it and its community, in other words, they form a European identity (Inglehart, 1970). Also this theory is confirmed by scholars, who report that receiving education and information on the European Union foster the formation of a European identity (van der Veen, 2002), although the latter effect is rather small (Verhaegen & Hooghe, 2015). Moreover, researchers find opposing effects across countries and studies of news on the European Union on people´s level of European identity (van der Veen, 2002; Bruter, 2009). So, it may be helpful to know about the actual effect of information on the European Union on people´s level of European identity for all countries in the European Union.

The third stream of scholars researching European identity follow the assumptions of the rational choice theory, predicting that people over time get attached to a system which continuously benefits them (Weßels, 2007; Verhaegen & Hooghe, 2015). In other words, they prognosticate that people´s level of European identity are higher if they perceive that the European Union is constantly benefiting them. Scholars from this stream also find evidence supporting their theory: People who perceive a European Union membership of the country they live in as beneficial for themselves and their country indeed have higher levels of European identity (Verhaegen & Hooghe, 2015). Also, higher levels of socio-economic status (Lutz, Kritzinger, & Skirbekk, 2006; Agirdag, Huyst, & van Houtte, 2012) and higher levels of education (van der Veen, 2002; Lutz, Kritzinger, & Skirbekk, 2006; Gnutzmann & al., 2012; Kuhn, 2012) are connected to higher levels of European identity. It is not surprising that also the researchers from this academic stream report varying effects of different sources of European identity across countries.

As mentioned above, the studies of all three streams researching European identity, indicate that the causes of people´s level of European identity are complex and different across countries. It is of interest to test, which theory works better in predicting people´s level of European identity across countries. Furthermore, some of the controversial findings may be clarified once all European Union countries are included in a single analysis. Also, including all European Union countries in one study allows for testing effects of country level effects on European identity, which is rarely done before. In this study, I aim at contributing to the

research on European identity by answering two research questions, which are based on the empirical and theoretical puzzles, I identified above. Thus, the first research question is:

What are the current differences in the individual level of European identity among European Union citizens within and across European Union member states?

The first research question is of descriptive nature and answering it requires an overview over the distribution of European identity among Europeans across and within European countries. This overview will help to comprehend the structure of European identity in Europe and to prepare the answer of the second research question, which hits the core of the puzzle mentioned above:

Which theoretical streams explain the current individual level European Identity among European Union Citizens?

In order to answer the overarching research questions and add to the existing scientific literature, I analyze international multi-panel survey data in this study. In chapter 2, I provide a definition of European identity and a review of other authors´ findings on the causes of European identity. Moreover, I discuss the three main theories on which I base this study, namely, (1) the social identity theory, (2) the theory of cognitive mobilization, and (3) the rational actor model. For each of the three theories, I formulate hypotheses, in order to test them in the process of this research. In chapter 3, I lay down the methodological grounds for this study, by presenting a Eurobarometer data set and operationalizations feasible to test the hypotheses. In chapter 4, I present the descriptive data and the results of a multilevel regression analysis. Doing that, I decide whether to confirm or reject the hypotheses. Finally, in chapter 5, I summarize the results of the analysis, answer the research questions, and discuss the theoretical implications. Additionally, I reflect on the limitations of this study and make suggestions for further research.

2. Theory and Hypotheses

This chapter contains the theoretical grounds and the hypothesis for this research. In the first sub-chapter, the concept of European identity used in this study is clarified, followed by a brief review of other scholars´ findings concerning European identity. In the second sub-chapter, I discuss the social identity theory, which assumes that cross-border socialization may lead to the formation of a European identity by decreasing prejudices and boosting familiarity. In the third sub-chapter, I explain the theory of cognitive mobilization, which hypothesizes that people form a European identity, if they have knowledge on the European political system, as this leads them to understand and accept their role in it. In the fourth sub-chapter I deal with the rational actor theory, which leads to the assumption that people form a European identity, if they feel that the European political and economic system is benefiting them. In each of the three theoretical sub-chapters, I bring the theories down to some hypotheses in order to test them in the process of this research.

2.1. Definition of European Identity and Literature Review

In this section, the concept of European identity is defined, as well as its relation to the concept of national (and regional) identity. Following contemporary research, I view European identity in this study as the individual identification with the group of Europeans, which contains of two features: Firstly, the feeling of being part of the group of Europeans (Lutz, Kritzinger, & Skirbekk, 2006; Golob, Kristonvic, & Makarovic, 2014; Agirdag, Huyst, & van Houtte, 2012) and secondly being attached to that group (Agirdag, Huyst, & van Houtte, 2012; Kuhn, 2012; Stoeckel, 2015; Verhaegen & Hooghe, 2015). Obviously, the group of Europeans too large and complex to be completely understandable to an individual: Nobody can know every European! So, this group of Europeans remains a mental concept to every single European and the relation to the group as a whole largely depends on the person´s experiences and feelings towards it. Although some authors limit their definition of European identity to the first rather cognitive element - feeling part of the group of Europeans - (van der Veen, 2002; King & Ruiz-Gelices, 2003; Lutz, Kritzinger, & Skirbekk, 2006; Sigalas, 2010), the more recent studies include the second rather emotional element – feeling attached to the group of Europeans (Agirdag, Huyst, & van Houtte, 2012; Kuhn, 2012; Stoeckel, 2015; Verhaegen & Hooghe, 2015). I follow their definition, as the argument is plausible that it is equally crucial to attach something positive with a group membership in order to attain a true feeling of being included is plausible (Agirdag, Huyst, & van Houtte, 2012; Kuhn, 2012; Stoeckel, 2015; Verhaegen & Hooghe, 2015). Moreover, it seems like the

authors renouncing the emotional element do so because of data limitations. Consequently, I define European identity to be the feeling of being part of and attached to the group of Europeans.

A closely related concept to European identity is the one of national identity, which in term describes the individual identification with fellow nationals. In line with the large majority of authors, I acknowledge that people could have a European identity, a national identity (Kohli, 2000; Lutz, Kritzinger, & Skirbekk, 2006; Cram, Patrikios, & Mitchell, 2011; van Mol, 2012) and also a regional identity (identifying with the people in one´s region, e.g. Catalan) (Alonso, 2011) next to each other. This simply means that people could identify with the group of people from their region, their country, and of Europe at the same time. Of course, the extent of these identifications may vary from person to person depending on many circumstances. Many scholars research the complex sources of these differences. In the following, I discuss the three important streams of literature on European identity and their crucial findings.

Scholars from the first stream on literature on European identity base their studies on the common in-group identity model. Based on the social identity theory, it predicts that people from different groups, who socialize with each other, may feel part of an overall group. Researchers from this stream study the effect of transnational activities on European identity (King & Ruiz-Gelices, 2003; Sigalas, 2010; Kuhn, 2012), while most of them focus on the effects of an Erasmus study, which is a European Union study abroad program (King & Ruiz-Gelices, 2003; Sigalas, 2010). In general, studies show that transnational activities foster the formation of a European identity (Kuhn, 2012; Golob, Kristonvic, & Makarovic, 2014; Stoeckel, 2015). Moreover, people with a family migration background (Lutz, Kritzinger, & Skirbekk, 2006; Verhaegen & Hooghe, 2015), if their ancestors are of European origin (Agirdag, Huyst, & van Houtte, 2012), tend to have higher levels of European identity. Also, intra-EU cross-border marriages have a strengthening effect on European Identity among the marriage partners (van Mol, de Valk, & van Wissen, 2015). Overall, transnational activities are more influential in boosting a European identity among people with a low level of education, as people with a high level of education on average already have higher levels of European identity (Kuhn, 2012). Concerning Erasmus students, scholars find that European identity formation is due to socialization with other Europeans abroad (King & Ruiz-Gelices, 2003; Sigalas, 2010; van Mol, 2012; Stoeckel, 2015). However, students who decide to study abroad are more likely to have a European identity already before (King & Ruiz-Gelices, 2003; Sigalas, 2010; van Mol, 2012; Kuhn, 2012; Oborune, 2013), and in that case, their

identity is not influenced by the Erasmus study (King & Ruiz-Gelices, 2003). Concerning students who do not have a European identity before their Erasmus study, researchers´ findings on the effect of the Erasmus study vary a lot (King & Ruiz-Gelices, 2003; Sigalas, 2010; Mitchell, 2012; Oborune, 2013; Stoeckel, 2015), maybe because they study samples in different countries. Anyway, other studies show that the effect of an Erasmus study on European identity differs largely across countries, depending on complex national and regional influences (van Mol, 2012).

Scholars from the second stream of literature on European identity concentrate on the effects of information and symbols on the formation of a European identity. The theoretical base of these studies is the theory of cognitive mobilization, which assumes that being informed about the European Union leads to a European identity, by making it less abstract and less complex to European citizens (van der Veen, 2002; Verhaegen & Hooghe, 2015). Indeed, they find that receiving education and information on the European Union foster the formation of a European identity (van der Veen, 2002), especially if this information is gathered via social interactions (van der Veen, 2002). Also, the exposure of symbols of the European Union, like the Euro, does lead to higher levels of European identity (Risse, 2003; Bruter, 2009). However, it is mentioned that the effect of knowledge about the European Union on European identity is rather small (Verhaegen & Hooghe, 2015). Also in this stream of literature, researchers find different effects across countries. For example, some scholars report a negative effect of television on European identity (van der Veen, 2002), while others find a delayed positive effect for positively framed news (Bruter, 2009). In general, many factors influence the effects on European identity differently across countries (Scheuer & Schmitt, 2009; van Mol, 2012), like Euroscepticism (Verhaegen & Hooghe, 2015), functional symbols, e.g. passport or an airport sign (Cram, Patrikios, & Mitchell, 2011), or geographic location (Scheuer & Schmitt, 2009). Also scholars disagree whether the duration of a country´s European Union membership has a positive effect (Oshri, Sheafer, & Shenhav, 2015) or no effect on people´s level of European identity (Scheuer & Schmitt, 2009; Verhaegen & Hooghe, 2015).

A third stream of scholars researching European identity bases their studies on the assumption that the elites of the European society have higher levels of European identity (Lutz, Kritzinger, & Skirbekk, 2006; Agirdag, Huyst, & van Houtte, 2012), as the European Union membership benefits them and their country the most. They base their explanations on the rational choice theory, or economic utilitarianism, predicting that people identify with a system which benefits them (Verhaegen & Hooghe, 2015). This theory is supported as well:

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People who believe that the European Union membership benefits them and their country indeed have higher levels of European identity (Verhaegen & Hooghe, 2015). This effect is even considerably stronger than the one of cognitive mobilization (Verhaegen & Hooghe, 2015). Moreover, people with a higher education (van der Veen, 2002; Lutz, Kritzinger, & Skirbekk, 2006; Kuhn, 2012), people living in urban areas (Lutz, Kritzinger, & Skirbekk, 2006), people with higher professions (Lutz, Kritzinger, & Skirbekk, 2006), and people speaking non-native English (Gnutzmann & al., 2012) have higher levels of European identity. Also, pupils with higher family socio-economic status and school´s socio-economic status are more likely to have a European identity (Agirdag, Huyst, & van Houtte, 2012), while parental education does not have an effect (Verhaegen & Hooghe, 2015). Finally, males in general are more likely to have a European identity than females (Lutz, Kritzinger, & Skirbekk, 2006; Agirdag, Huyst, & van Houtte, 2012; Verhaegen & Hooghe, 2015). It is not surprising that also this stream of scholars report varying effects of different sources of European identity across countries.

In general, European identity is a complex concept, and its formation can be explained by more than one theory. It is influenced by a large large variety of factors, which produce differing effects across countries and regions. In the upcoming three sub-chapters, I will elaborate on the theoretical foundations of the three streams of research findings on European identity and derive hypotheses in order to test their assumptions. In the following analysis, I will test every factor for each European Union country, in order to establish whether some of the previous contradictory findings may be due to a limited number of countries included.

2.2. *Explaining European Identity Formation by the Social Identity Theory*

In this section, I discuss the social identity theory and its assumptions about the formation of a European identity, leading me to hypothesize effects for individual cross-border socialization, the national level of European travels, and the national level of European migration on the formation of a European identity.

According to social identity theory, individuals compare themselves with others in their surroundings, leading them to classify social groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). On the one hand, they classify themselves belonging to the group of people having similar traits, which is called the in-group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). On the other hand, they acknowledge that there is a group of people different from themselves, the out-group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The feeling that they belong to a certain set of social groups in their surroundings constitutes a large part of individuals´ social identity, as these groups, containing of people they feel alike,

is what they perceive as their social place of belonging (Stets & Burke, 2000; Kohli, 2000; van Mol, 2012). Although the society into which individuals are born is already structured into different (contrasting) groups, not all group memberships are equally conscious or important to an individual (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Some group memberships are more salient than others are, and their importance is changing, depending on the individual´s situation in life (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

Moreover, people´s social identities are organized in a hierarchical way. To mention one example unrelated to this study, Stets & Burke (2000) name three levels, "human", "American", and "Southerner". In line with that, Stoeckel (2015) calls these groups "superordinate" and "sub-" groups. The way that individuals perceive these levels can be floating and is depending on context and the institutionalization of the levels in their surroundings. Consequently, individuals can activate different identities (from different levels) in certain situations (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In line with the example from above, let us assume that two individuals from different social groups on a lower level (e.g. Southerner and Northerner), but the same social category on a higher level (e.g. American) meet. They get along very well and are socializing, which may reduce intergroup biases by two mechanisms: On the cognitive side, they are learning about the other group, which increases intergroup understanding and undermines prejudices (Stoeckel, 2015). On the affective side, socializing is reducing anxiety and enhancing familiarity and empathy with each other (Stoeckel, 2015). As a result, both get the feeling not only to be members of their social groups on a lower level (Southerners and Northerners) but to belong together to the single social group on the higher level (Americans) (Stoeckel, 2015). By this mechanism, people who considered each other as members of the out-group may afterwards consider themselves belonging to the same in-group (Stoeckel, 2015). This effect is facilitated if a superordinate identity category is available that subsumes the subgroup identities (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000 as cited by Stoeckel, 2015), like "American", subsuming "Northerners" and "Southerners" (Stets & Burke, 2000), is an actual existing and widely used category. Concluding, people can have identities from multiple levels at the same time, while the potential to develop identities on each level is given by birth into certain social categories and activated or changed by certain situations (e.g. socialization).

In the following, I apply the social identity theory to the topic of European identity and derive five hypotheses about how European identity formation works viewed by the social identity theory. From the point of view of the social identity theory, and in line with my conceptualization of European identity, an individual´s European identity is one of some

identities ordered in a hierarchical manner. For a European Citizen, these levels of potential social identities could be "European", "national", "regional", and "local" identity, ordered from higher to lower level. In case a potential European identity is not activated, but the national identity is, an individual would regard Europeans from other countries as the out-group, and fellow nationals as the in-group (Stoeckel, 2015). One way mentioned by the theory to activate the "superordinate" identity, which European identity is in that case, is the socialization with Europeans from other nations, (Stoeckel, 2015). As mentioned before, this way is even more effective, if a superordinate identity category exceeding an imagined community is available (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000 as cited by Stoeckel, 2015). By the formation of the European Union with actual political institutions and the legal character of European Citizenship, I argue that such a superordinate identity category indeed is institutionalized, subsuming all national identities in the European identity (Stoeckel, 2015). The existence of this superordinate identity category eases the activation of a European identity, as it is already existent as a mental category. This means that people, for example in case of cross-border socialization, do not have to create the category "European", but that it is already existent and they just have to decide that they fit to it. A way to activate a European identity from the social identity theory point of view, as described above, is through socialization with Europeans from other countries. These are perceived as out-group, which the socialization process changes by the reduction of inter-group biases and enhancing familiarity and empathy. By these mechanisms the feeling to belong to a single in-group is created. Consequently, on the ground of the social identity theory, the following hypothesis will be tested in this study:

H1: The more European citizens socialize with European citizens from other countries, the higher is their level of European identity.

Given that cross-border socialization indeed is a way to form a European identity, people should have a higher chance to form a European identity, if they meet more people from other European countries. In that case, they have more chances for cross-border socialization and thus are more likely to form a European identity. One obvious way to meet Europeans from other countries is to travel to another country, be it for the sake of working or of spending holidays there. From the social identity theory´s point of view, socializing with European travelers is not working in other ways or will less likely lead to the feeling to belong to a single in-group and consequently to development of a European identity. So, people´s level of

European identity should be higher in a country, if its citizens are travelling more to other European countries. Thus, I hypothesize the following:

H2a: The higher a European country´s level of European travel outflow, the higher is the level of European identity of the citizens living in that country.

Moreover, we must not ignore that cross-border socializing requires two Europeans from different countries. So, domestic citizens also should have higher levels of European identity, if their country is the destination of more travelers from other European countries. The same argument from before is valid here to: From the theoretical perspective, socialization with European travelers from other counties leads to the same feeling to belong to a single in-group. By this, it creates a European identity not only among the European travelers abroad, but also among the domestic citizens they socialize with. So, I hypothesize:

H2b: The higher a European country´s level of European travel inflow, the higher is the level of European identity of the citizens living in that country.

The social identity theory is predicting that when people socialize who perceive each other as out-group members, they develop familiarity and empathy and perceive less inter-group biases. This could lead them to feel that they belong to a single in-group on a higher level, especially if a category which is including both of them is already existent. Thus, I hypothesize in H1 that the more European citizens socialize with European citizens from other European countries the higher is their level of European identity. Then I argue that European citizens can only form a European identity through cross-border socialization, if they meet each other. So I formulate H2a and H2b saying that European citizens have higher levels of European identity, if their country has a higher level of European travels. These hypotheses are based on the assumption that European citizens meeting European citizens from other countries form a European identity, only because they socialize with each other. As a consequence they then feel that they belong to a single in-group and not to two out-groups. In other words, I hypothesize a mediation effect by cross-border socialization on the effect of European travels on European identity. Thus, I hypothesize the following:

H3: The effect a European country´s level of European travels on its citizens´ level of European identity is mediated by the citizens´ level of cross-border socialization.

As discussed above, people may form a European identity when meeting European citizens from other countries. I base this on the social identity theory, which is predicting that people

form a European identity in case they socialize with European citizens from other countries. This happens by them feeling to belong to a single in-group on a European level and not to different out-groups on a national level, which is triggered by the socializing´s effect of overcoming group-biases and developing familiarity and empathy. However, European citizens can also meet Europeans from other countries, who are not just travelling. This is the case if they meet Europeans from other countries, who are migrating. So, European citizens may easier form a European identity, if they live in a country hosting many European immigrants, as then the chance is higher to socialize with Europeans from other countries. As from the social identity theory´s point of view cross-border socialization and the subsequent European identity formation should work equally between European host citizens and European migrants as they do in other instances, I hypothesize the following:

H4: The higher a European country´s level of European migration, the higher is the level of European identity of the citizens living in that country.

The social identity theory is predicting that when people socialize who perceive each other as out-group members, they develop familiarity and empathy and perceive less inter-group biases. This could lead them to feel that they belong to a single in-group on a higher level, especially if a category which is including both of them is already existent. Thus, I hypothesize in H1 that the more European citizens socialize with European citizens from other European countries the higher is their level of European identity. Then I argue that European citizens can only form a European identity through cross-border socialization, if they meet each other. So I formulate H4 saying that European citizens have higher levels of European identity, if their country has a higher level of European migration. This hypothesis is based on the assumption that European citizens meeting European citizens from other countries feel to belong to a single in-group and form a European identity, only because they socialize with each other. In other words, I hypothesize a mediation effect by cross-border socialization on the effect of European migration on European identity. Thus, I hypothesize the following:

H5: The effect a European country´s level of European migration on its citizens´ level of European identity is mediated by the citizens´ level of cross-border socialization.

2.3. Explaining European Identity Formation by Cognitive Mobilization

In this section, the theory of cognitive mobilization and its assumptions about the formation of a European identity are discussed, leading me to hypothesize effects for individual level of education, and the individual level of information about the European Union political system.

The theory of cognitive mobilization assumes that a political system is too abstract to be fully understood by every individual (Inglehart, 1970). Not understanding a political system, in turn, may lead to an individual´s feeling of not being able to influence that system´s decision making process and not being represented by it (McLaren, 2007). However, individuals may be educated or being informed on a political system to better comprehend its nature, which is called cognitive mobilization (Inglehart, 1970). By having the feeling of understanding their place in a political system, individuals feel to belong to the group of people included by the system and thus may attain the political identity attached to that system (Inglehart, 1970). They know their place in it and understand the ways they may or may not influence political decisions, and why that is the case. Although cognitive mobilization is important in order to attain a political identity, it is not necessarily leading towards it, as individuals also need to internalize the values that are spread alongside the pure information about the political system (Inglehart, 1970). Accordingly, people who are informed about a political system, while this information let the political system appear neutral or positive, may attain a political identity in line with that system, while people who receive information about a political system framed in a negative context, will not develop such a political identity (Inglehart, 1970).

In the following, I relate the theory of cognitive mobilization to the topic of this study, European identity. There are three elements to be converted: The abstract political system, the political identity, and education and information about the political system. In this case, the rather abstract political system claiming to represent the group of people in question, which is the European people, is the European Union. Indeed, the political system of the European Union is hardly to be understood by someone, who is not informed or educated about it. The political identity, or European identity in this case, is marked by individuals´ identification with the group of people included in the political system. This is completely in line with the definition of European identity used in this study. Concluding, the theory of cognitive mobilization predicts that an individual will form a European identity, if it has the feeling to be represented by and to be included in the political system of the European Union. This is achieved if it is informed about the nature of the political system, the European Union, in a manner that it understands the system and feels represented by it. Although Inglehart (1970) in the 1970s just assumed that information on the European Union was neutral or positive,

this does not hold true nowadays anymore in all instances (Weßels, 2007). Nowadays, European Citizens may receive news or comments on the European Union framed in a negative way, especially in Eurosceptic countries (Weßels, 2007). According to the theory of cognitive mobilization, this will leave them to neither accept its ways of decision making nor their role in the system. However, Euroscepticism mostly is framed by national actors appearing in the national media, for example leaders of populist right parties (von Beyme, 2011). They are hardly interested in basing their arguments on valid information on the political institutions of the European Union, but on people´s feelings and values (von Beyme, 2011). Consequently, I assume that most of what can actually be called valid information on the European Union is still attained in a neutral (or positive) context. Concluding, based on the theory of cognitive mobilization, I assume that people who are informed about the European Union deepen their understanding about it. According to the theory, this results in them accepting their place in it and feeling part of the group of Europeans - in short, they form a European identity. Thus, I hypothesize:

H6: The better European Citizens are informed about the European Union, the higher is their level of European identity.

As described above, the theory of cognitive mobilization predicts that European citizens who are better informed about the European Union political system have higher levels of European identity. This is, because being informed on the European Union increases their understanding of the political system, resulting in them accepting their role in the decision making process. Consequently, they feel part of the group of Europeans, who are represented by the European Union: They formed a European identity. One way to receive information on the European Union is to receive education. In the national educational curricula across the European Union, among many other things, students are taught about the European Union and its mechanisms. So, people, who received a better education, are also better informed about the European Union political system. Consequently, they understand and accept the political system, feel part of the represented European people, and thus have higher levels of European identity. From that, I deduct the following hypotheses:

H7: The higher European citizens´ level of education, the higher is their level of European identity.

The theory of cognitive mobilization predicts that Europeans, who are informed about the European Union political system, will comprehend the nature of its decision making processes

and know their place in it. This leads them feeling to be represented and part of the group of European citizens, meaning that they have a European identity. Thus, I hypothesize in H6 that the better European citizens are informed about the European Union, the higher is their level of European identity. Then I argue that European citizens may form a European identity by receiving information on the European Union through their educational track and formulate H7, stating that the higher European citizens´ level of education, the higher is their level of European identity. This hypothesis is based on the assumption that European citizens who received a higher education have a higher European identity, only because they received more information on the European Union. In other words, I hypothesize a mediation-effect by the individual level of information on the European Union political system on the effect of an individual´s level of education on this individual´s level of European identity. Thus, I hypothesize the following:

H8: The effect of an individual´s level of education on this individual´s level of European identity is partly mediated by the individual´s level of knowledge on the European Union.

2.4. *Explaining European Identity Formation by the Rational Actor Model*

In this section, the rational actor model and its assumptions about the formation of a European identity are discussed, leading me to hypothesize effects for the national receiving of EU funds, a country´s relative economic wealth, people´s individual socio-economic status and education on people´s level of European identity.

The rational actor model assumes that an individual is aiming at maximizing his or her expected utility when making decisions and investing resources. The core model of an individual in this theory, often called homo oeconomicus, would always decide purely rational, striving to act according to the own interests (Lindenberg, 1985). However, this simple model was heavily criticized in sociological academic literature for being unrealistic and narrow minded, as human beings do not always act rationally and adapt to pressures from their environment. Many scholars of the rational choice literature added assumptions to this model to make it more realistic. From these theorists, I choose Lindenberg`s (1985) addition about the rational actors´ interaction with their environment, as they are most applicable to this study. According to his model, individuals are confronted with scarcity of resources and thus choose how to invest them in the most profitable way (Lindenberg, 1985). These resources can be money, time, or cognitive resources. Individuals have preferences concerning future events in mind, and attach probabilities to these events happening (Lindenberg, 1985). Moreover, they are able to reflect on their environment, learn, and invent

new ideas in case the current ways of solving a problem are not working out (Lindenberg, 1985). Accordingly, they will invest their resources in the way they expect a maximization of their utility (Lindenberg, 1985). Lindenberg explicitly mentions that this does not always lead to the outcome of an individual´s maximization of utilities, but that the individual only acts according to the expectation on how to maximize the utility (Lindenberg, 1985). By adding these assumptions, the theory takes into account that people´s actions depend on their environment and they may be restrained in their amount of resources, which may be money, time, or cognitive resources. Illustrating these assumptions, an individual may rely on a common way to solve a problem, or choose to invest into developing another way of solving that problem. For example, there is one baker in a village, who uses to bake bread for the whole village. After some time, there is competition from a supermarket, also offering bread and thus harming the baker. Finally, the baker decides to quit baking bread and specializes on making cakes. In this simple example, the baker acted according to the rational actor model. She weighed the odds whether it was more profitable to continue baking bread or to specialize on cake. She did this in order to maximize her utility. The scarce resources in this example are the baker´s time and money. Moreover, the example is illustrating that within the model individuals are very well able to adapt to their environment and create new solutions.

According to the rational actor model, individuals pursue what they perceive as beneficial for themselves. So they are expected to support a political system, if they perceive it as beneficial for the maximization of their utilities. Given that they continuously perceive these benefits, they will generalize the information they received and increasingly economize on evaluating new information on the political system (Weßels, 2007). Consequently, continuous (perceived) economic benefits may lead to generalized positive evaluations of a political system and its community (Weßels, 2007). These positive perceptions will turn to a general attachment to political objects, being equal to a political identity or a "full identification with the community" (Weßels, 2007).

In the following, I will project this on the topic of this study, European identity. In this paper, European identity is defined as feeling part of and attached to the group of Europeans. According to the rational actor model as described above, this attachment is formed by continuous positive evaluations of the community´s political system. As the European political system is the European Union, people are assumed to form a European identity by continuously perceiving the European Union, as beneficial for the maximization of their utilities. In other words, people will form a European identity, if they perceive economic benefits from the European Union. A first basic variable which may influence people´s

perceived benefits of the European Union is the amount of money their country pays or receives from the European Union. The costs or benefits for a state in the end affect the resources a state is asking from or offering to its citizens. So, citizens of countries, which are net recipients of European Union subsidies, probably perceive a membership as more beneficial than citizens of countries, which are net payers. This will lead them to consistently perceive the European Union membership as beneficial and thus they will develop a European identity. Accordingly, I hypothesize the following:

H9: The higher a country´s net receiving of the European Union, the higher is the level of European identity of the citizens living in that country.

The rational actor model assumes that European citizens will form a European identity by continuously perceiving benefits from the European Union. However, the European Union does not only generate economic benefits by distributing money directly. Also other mechanisms caused by the European Union may enhance its perceived economic benefits for European citizens. The integration of the national economies in the single market, for example, lead to increased import and export figures for the European Union member states and generated wealth on a national level. Because of these developments, I assume that European citizens associate national economic wealth with the European Union. According to the theory, citizens will perceive economic wealth as a continuous benefit from the European Union and thus they will develop a European identity. Consequently, I hypothesize the following:

H10: The higher a European country´s relative economic wealth, the higher is the level of European identity of the citizens living in that country.

Next to influencing economic indicators on the country level, The European Union´s economic benefits may also be perceived directly on an individual level. Among the most important changes brought forward by the European Union is the citizens´ freedom to work and travel across all member states. This changes a lot in the life of European citizens and their perception of benefits from the European Union. According to Kriesi´s theory of winners and losers of globalization, Europeans formed opinions on migration and globalization along class and education levels (Kriesi, et al., 2008). The analysis performed by him and his colleagues shows that people from lower classes perceive an increasing international integration, like initiated by the European Union, as a threat rather than a chance (Kriesi, et al., 2008). They feel that there is more competition on the labor market, lower wages, and a

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higher risk to lose their jobs (Kriesi, et al., 2008). People from higher classes on the other side, are not concerned by this, as their jobs are rather specialized. They indeed perceive international integration as a chance, to assign jobs for lower wages, to have more business opportunities, and to travel more (Kriesi, et al., 2008). So, I hypothesize the following:

H11a: The higher European citizens´ socio-economic status, the higher is their level of European identity.

H11a is built on Kriesi´s argument that people from a lower class perceive international integration as a threat while people from a higher class perceive it as an opportunity (Kriesi, et al., 2008). This is the case, because people from the lower class feel more competition on the labor market while people from the higher class experience more business and travel opportunities due to international integration (Kriesi, et al., 2008). However, Kriesi in his analysis focuses on states in Western Europe, who all have relatively high levels of economic wealth and thus are attractive for foreign workers. In other European states, international integration may be perceived as an opportunity also for people from lower classes, as they can work abroad and make more money than before. Moreover, companies from wealthier states may decide to outsource their production to these countries, which brings more job opportunities also for people from a lower class. Consequently, the effect hypothesized in H11a on the basis of the rational actor model, which predicts that a higher socio-economic status leads to higher levels of European identity, may be weaker in European Union countries with a relatively low economic wealth. This is because all classes may perceive the European Union similarly beneficial and thus form similar levels of European identity. Concluding, I hypothesize:

H11b: In countries with lower levels of economic wealth, the positive effect of European citizens´ socio-economic status on their level of European identity is weaker.

Before, I argued that European integration and the European Union may be perceived as beneficial by people with a higher socio-economic status, especially in countries with a high level of relative economic wealth. As a high level of education often goes hand in hand with a socio-economic status, also highly educated people perceive the benefits of the European Union´s free movement and can be labelled the winners of globalization (Kriesi et al., 2008). They can work and travel all across the European Union and have more opportunities to use their special knowledge (Kriesi et al., 2008). People with a low level of education on the other hand perceive international integration as a risk and are the losers of globalization (Kriesi et

al., 2008). They may fear increased competition and the outsourcing of their jobs in countries offering cheaper labor conditions (Kriesi et al., 2008). In line with this, Kriesi et al. find that the highly educated are strongly in favor of international integration, and the ones with a low level of education are strongly opposing international integration because of these exact reasons (Kriesi et al., 2008). Consequently, Europeans with a higher level of education may perceive the European Union as beneficial and thus form a European identity, while people with a lower level of education may feel that the European Union brings more risks to them and will not form European identity. Concluding, I rephrase H7, which was formulated on the grounds of the cognitive mobilization theory, as deducted from the rational actor model:

H7: The higher European citizens´ level of education, the higher is their level of European identity.

I summarize all hypotheses in Table 1, mentioning the theoretical ground they are derived from, the independent variables, and the type and direction of effect predicted.

Locate Table 1 here.

3. Methodology

In this chapter, I lay down the methodological grounds in order to answer the research questions formulated in chapter 1. In chapter 3.1, I discuss which data I am going to use in my analysis and what limitations it may have. In chapter 3.2 I present ways to measure of the concepts used in the hypotheses in chapter two to be able to analyze the data in order to confirm or reject the hypotheses later in the analysis.

3.1. *Type and Quality of the Data Set*

In this study I choose to analyze Eurobarometer data to answer the research questions formulated in chapter 1. I decide to choose the most recent data set including all individual level variables of interest (view chapter 3.2). This data set is the Eurobarometer 82.3 from 2014, which is conducted between the 8th and the 17th of November in 2014. As discussed in chapter 2.1, it is important to include as many European Union countries as possible in the analysis in order to account for variations in effects on European identity across countries. The Eurobarometer file includes all current European Union countries containing data from 27901 respondents (compare Table A5), so the data set offers a lot of statistical power when conducting analyses. The file also contains data from respondents from all candidate countries (Eurobarometer 82.3, 2014), which will be excluded from the analysis because of theoretical reasons: Some of the hypotheses predict that people´s level of European identity is linked e.g. to their perceived benefits their country´s European Union membership or the European Union net receiving of their country. Another strength of the data set, which just appeared after its selection, is that it is from the same year as the most recent data available for the country level variables of interest for this study (view chapter 3.2). So, all data reflects the situation by the end of 2014, the most recent point in time for which all data necessary to conduct the analysis is available.

Unfortunately, Eurobarometer does not provide any statistics on response rates per country or any other biases. There is only very few valuable information on the quality of the data set: It was conducted among Europeans with an age of at least 15 years by interviewing them in their homes (Eurobarometer, Basic Bilingual Questionnaire, 2014). The respondents were selected by a number of sampling points based on population size and density. In each of the sampling points a starting address was selected randomly and every nth address was searched from there by a random route procedure (Eurobarometer, Basic Bilingual Questionnaire, 2014). After the selection of a household the member of the household to be interviewed was selected randomly (by the "closest birthday rule"). The resulting sample was

tested by age, gender, region, and size of locality versus country data provided by national statistical institutions and/ or Eurostat (Eurobarometer, Basic Bilingual Questionnaire, 2014). An overview of the number of respondents across countries can be found in Table A5.

3.2. *Operationalization*

In this sub-chapter, I discuss how the concepts mentioned in the hypotheses will be measured in the analysis. The individual level variables, European identity, cross-border socialization, information on the European Union, education, and socio-economic status, must be operationalized using items from the Eurobarometer, as an individual value is needed for every single respondent in order to perform an analysis, which differentiates between the respondents´ individual levels on each of these variables. So I present items from the Eurobarometer, which I use as an operationalization for an individual level concept and elaborate on the reasons for it. For the national level variables, European travels, European migration, net receiving from the European Union, and relative economic wealth, I present an operationalization matching the concept as good as possible and argue why this is the case. Finally, I discuss the necessity and the operationalization of three individual level control variables, age, gender, and size of locality.

Individual Level of European Identity

As an operationalization for European identity I choose the item from the Eurobarometer which is asking for people´s attachment to Europe, offering the four categories "very attached", "fairly attached", "not very attached", and "not at all attached". I choose this item, as I define having a European identity in this study as feeling attached and part of Europe and the group of Europeans. So, using an item which asks for the attachment to Europe fits the definition of having a European identity used in this study very well, it actually resembles the definition in a rather informal way. Moreover, this question offers the advantage to be formulated in a simple and convenient way, leaving little space for interpretation and using simple or known concepts only. However, a disadvantage in using this item as an operationalization for European identity is the fact that it is hardly used by other researchers of European identity, which makes it difficult to compare the results of this study to others in scientific literature. Most scholars analyzing Eurobarometer data to research European identity operationalize it by an item asking respondents to indicate whether they feel national, European, or both (Kohli, 2000; Lutz, Kritzinger, & Skirbekk, 2006; Caporaso & Kim, 2009; Kuhn, 2012). The crucial weakness of this item is that there is no clear ordering in the amount of European identity across these categories. Concluding, I choose for the item measuring

respondents´ level of attachment to Europe to maintain the highest validity possible for my analysis.

The categories are ranging from "very attached" to "not at all attached". Although this item offers only four valid categories, I consider its measurement level to be interval, as I assume that the formulation of the category labels makes the distance between them ordered and equal. A practical reason for this is that considering the dependent variable as interval is allowing for the estimation of linear models, which will be done in this study (view chapter 4.2). Treating the item as an ordinal model would call for ordered logistic regression, which sometimes causes problems when used for multi-level models. In line with the theory, "very attached" resembles the highest level and "not at all attached" the lowest level of European identity. So, I decide to recode "very attached" to be the highest value, followed by "fairly attached", "not very attached", and "not at all attached", in order to allow for a simple interpretation of results.

Individual Level of Cross-Border Socialization

The question from the Eurobarometer I choose as an operationalization for cross-border socialization, asks respondents whether they have socialized with people from other countries of the European Union in the last twelve months. I select this question as it directly asks what we are looking for: people´s European cross-border socialization. Another advantage is the fact that the item offers three valid categories, so it differentiates between people who socialized more than others. Though a theoretical disadvantage is that it does not measure respondents´ overall European cross-border socializations, but only the ones in the past twelve months. There are many reasons, why someone on average has many more or many less cross-border socializations compared to the one year measured in the item. Furthermore, the concept of socialization is not simple and could be interpreted in more than one way. One person might have a good conversation with someone unknown and label that socialization, while another might think that this is not enough to be called socialization and uses this term to describe the building of a proper friendship. However, there is a category for people who are not sure about their answer, so this weakness is taken care of in the best possible way.

Answering the question, respondents can choose from the categories "Yes, on several occasions", "Yes, once or twice", and "No". In line with the theory, "Yes, on several occasions" resembles the highest and "No" the lowest level of cross-border socialization. As the item offers three categories only, and it is not clear whether the distance between them is equal, I treat its measurement level as ordinal in the analysis. Thus, I code it as a dummy

variable, using "No" as a reference category, to use it in the multilevel regression analysis (view chapter 4.2).

National Level of European Travels

I choose to operationalize the national level of European travels by the number of nights spent in travel accommodations per inhabitant (view Table A1). I analyze the national level of European travels, because I hypothesize that domestic citizens socialize with European travelers and the other way around. So, I do not select the number of travelers but the number of nights spent in travel accomodations as an operationalization, because more and longer trips, on average, will allow for more opportunities to socialize. Concluding, operationalizing European travels by the number of nights spent is the best choice and a better choice than to operationalize it by the number of travelers.

Numbers on how many nights were spent by domestic travelers in another European Union member state and how many nights were spent in a country by travelers from other European Union countries in the year 2014 are offered by Eurostat (Eurostat, 2015). In line with the theory, a higher number of nights spent per inhabitant in domestic travel accommodations by European travelers means a higher level of European travel inflow for a country. Conversely, a higher number of nights spent per inhabitant in European travel accommodations by domestic travelers means a higher level of European travel outflow for a country. The measurement level is ratio, as there is an order, a defined distance between the measurement points, and a zero point for the number of nights spent per inhabitant.

National Level of European Migration

As an operationalization for the national level of European migration, I choose a country´s share of inhabitants born in another European Union country (view Table A2). This is a very strong operationalization of European migration, despite one minor disadvantage. This number includes all people who have lived in a host country for many years already, so that they are not recognizable as immigrants anymore. The concept of immigrants from other European Union countries in this study is based on the idea that they are perceived as different from the native population and that socialization with them may lead to the formation of an individual level European identity (view chapter 2.2). If the immigrants already assimilated, socialization with them is the same as socialization with people born within the country and thus irrelevant from this theoretical perspective. However, most people born in another country will not assimilate completely and may still be recognizable as immigrants by host citizens. Moreover, in each European Union country there will be a

certain share of assimilated immigrants, so the relative importance of this shortcoming may be very limited.

The only practical alternative would be to operationalize European migration by the number of people who migrated from another European Union member state in the year of 2014, as these numbers are also offered by Eurostat. However, choosing for this option bears two disadvantages, one of theoretical and one of practical nature: Firstly, from a theoretical perspective, the number of people who immigrated in 2014 does not reflect the overall situation concerning European immigration in that country. Maybe 2014 was a year in which many more (or many less) people were immigrating in comparison to other member states or in comparison to other years. In that case, the chance to socialize with an immigrant from another European Union country is lower than the number would indicate. In short, this number is less stable towards temporary developments than the share of inhabitants born in another European Union member state. Secondly, from the practical side, there is no data on how many people from European Union countries immigrated to Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Austria, Romania, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom (view Table A2). Concluding, theoretical and practical reasons make the total population´s share of inhabitants born in another European Union country the best choice to operationalize European migration as defined in this study.

Also the European Union countries´ share of inhabitants born in another European Union country are offered by Eurostat (Eurostat, 2015). In line with the theory, a higher share of inhabitants born in another European Union country equals a higher level of European migration for a country. The measurement level is ratio, as there is a clear zero point, there are known and equal distances between categories, and there is a clear ordering of the size of shares of inhabitants born in another European Union country.

Individual Level of Information on the European Union

To measure people´s individual level knowledge on the European Union, I choose make an index of their comments on three statements on the European Union asked in the Eurobarometer. The first statement is that the European Union currently consists of 28 Member States; the second that the members of the European Parliament are directly elected by the citizens of each Member State and the third that Switzerland is a Member State of the European Union. All of the three could be answered by "true", "false", or "I do not know" The advantage of measuring knowledge on the European Union by these statements is that not all of them are true, so participants who guess the same answer three times can never be

correct. Moreover, a category is given for respondents who do not know the answer, so they do not have to guess. Finally, rating the statements varies somewhat in difficulty and demands diverse types of knowledge on the European Union. Some require rather practical knowledge, like statements two and three, and some more technical knowledge, like statement one, which is a good mixture. Concluding this item suits very well to test a participant´s individual level knowledge on the European Union.

To come to a number of a respondent´s knowledge on the European Union, I form an index which could be zero, one, two, or three. Answering three questions correctly results in a three on this index and the highest possible value on knowledge on the European Union. Consequently, answering zero questions correct leads to a zero and the lowest possible value. The measurement level of this index is ordinal, as there is a clear ordering of the defined values on it. So, for the multilevel regression analysis I code this variable as a dummy (view chapter 4.2).

Individual Level of Education

To operationalize people´s education I use an item from the Eurobarometer aksing respondents to indicate the age at which they stopped full-time education. I am aware of the fact that the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) is a better measure for a person´s education, but the former item is the only one offered by the Eurobarometer, so I reflect on its advantages and disadvantages. A clear advantage is that it is simple to comprehend and to fill in. A possible disadvantage is that when two respondents are scoring the same number on this item that does not automatically mean that they have the same level of education. For example, one of them could live in a country in which the age to enter school is higher or lower, or there is the possibility that one of them had to repeat one or more school years throughout their educational career. Finally, it is also possible to receive education part-time, for example next to one´s job. All of these limitations are not accounted for by this item. Although, these limitations probably will have little practical influence on the validity of this study, I will keep it in mind when interpreting the results.

Another problem, which could arise from using this item is that some people might enter full-time education at a later age. This could be the case when they start studying after retirement, or go to study for a year as a break from their jobs. I assume that people, who do not pause full-time education, finish it at latest at the age of 30 years. Consequently, to solve this problem and avoid outliers to affect the results of the analysis, I recode all respondents as having received a full-time education until the age of 30 years, if they indicate to have

finished full-time education later than at an age of 30 years. Moreover, to include all respondents in the analysis, who report that they are still following full-time education, I code their level of education equal to their age (or equal to 30 years, if they are older than that). In line with the theory, a higher number on this item resembles a higher level of education while having received no full-time education is coded as having the lowest level of education. Also this item´s measurement level is ratio, as there is a zero point, an order, and clearly defined differences between the measurement points.

National Level of Net Receiving from the European Union

As an operationalization of the national level of European Union net receiving, I choose the number of the European net receiving relative to the Gross national income (GNI)(view Table A3). I opt for relating the net receiving to the GNI, as I hypothesize an effect on European identity because of people´s perceived monetary benefits from a European political system. Consequently, the relative amount of net receiving is the number which is useful as an operationalization, as a high amount of money will have stronger perceived effects in a weaker economy than in a stronger one.

The numbers of the financial contribution and receiving of each member state to the European Union, as well their relation to the GNI, are published by the European Commission (European Commission, 2015). In line with the theory, a higher net receiving relative to the GNI in this study means a higher net receiving from the European Union. Again, the measurement level is ratio, as there is a zero point, a clear order, and defined distances between the measurement points.

National Level of Relative Economic Wealth

To operationalize the national level of relative economic wealth, I choose the countries´ gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS)(view Table A4). The GDP is a common measure of a national economy describeing the value of all goods and services produced less the value of any goods or services used in their creation. Of course, larger countries naturally have higher GDPs and moreover, we have to take into account differences in currencies and price levels. So, it makes sense to compare the national GDPs per capita in PPS, which is a theoretical currency that eliminates differences in price levels across European Union countries. This measure is an excellent indicator of a country´s economic power and wealth and thus I choose it as an operationalization for the national level of relative economic wealth.

Data on the European Union member states´ GDP per capita in PPS is offered by Eurostat, also for the year of 2014 (Eurostat, 2015). The European Union average is serving as an index, allowing cross-country comparisons and an easy calculation of percentage differences. Concluding, in line with the theory, a higher value on this index means a higher national level of economic wealth. Finally, the measurement level is ratio, as there is a zero point, a clear order, and defined distances between the measurement points.

Individual Level of Socio-Economic Status

The item in the Eurobarometer I choose as an operationalization for socio-economic status asks the respondents to indicate their social class, offering the categories "The working class of society", "The lower middle class of society", "The middle class of society", "The upper middle class of society", and "The higher class of society". I select this item as the information collected by it is based on the respondents´ normative evaluations of their own situation. The respondents´ will choose an answer depending on how they actually feel in comparison to their surroundings. This is very valuable for the measurement as I hypothesize that people have a higher European identity, because they feel that the European political system is beneficial for their own situation. Consequently, a normative evaluation of a respondent´s situation is more valuable than information on their actual education, resources, or job, for the concept that we are measuring. One disadvantage in choosing this item as an operationalization of socio-economic status is that the classes mentioned in the categories are not reflecting the current situation in the member states in a way that people could easily choose their class. For example, "the working class of society" is considered to be the lowest class, although factory workers for expensive car brands for instance might well have a relatively high status job, which could be labelled "the lower middle class of society", and if they are specialized maybe even "the middle class of society". Still they would describe themselves as workers and may choose the lowest category. Finally, this categorization does not take care of long-term unemployed people, who may only have temporary jobs. I would consider them another, lower, class than "the working class of society". This disadvantage is weakened by the fact that there are categories for respondents who cannot or do not want to classify themselves in the given categories.

Given that the category labels are ordered "The working class of society", "The lower middle class of society", "The middle class of society", "The upper middle class of society", and "The higher class of society" I assume that there is a clear ordering of the categories and thus consider the item´s measurement level to be ordinal. In line with the theory, "The

working class of society" resembles the lowest, and "the higher class of society" highest socio-economic status on this scale. As the variable is ordinal, I will use dummy coding to include it in the multi-level regression analysis (view chapter 4.2).

Control Variable I: Individual Level Gender

None of the theories on which the hypotheses which tested in this studies are based assume that there are difference in the formation of a European identity across genders. However, life in Europe is still perceived differently for women and men and authors indicate that there is a difference in the level of European identity across genders (Lutz, Kritzinger, & Skirbekk, 2006; Agirdag, Huyst, & van Houtte, 2012; Verhaegen & Hooghe, 2015). Males in general have a higher European identity, even if controlled for by predictors used in this study, like information on the European Union (Verhaegen & Hooghe, 2015), education (Lutz, Kritzinger, & Skirbekk, 2006), or socio-economic status (Agirdag, Huyst, & van Houtte, 2012). Consequently, I decide to include gender as an individual level control variable in this study. I operationalize it by an item in the Eurobarometer asking each respondent to indicate whether to be a man or a woman. This item is of nominal measurement level and thus will be coded as a dummy in the multilevel regression analysis (view chapter 4.2).

Control Variable II: Individual Level Age

As for gender, none of the theories employed in this study predict different effects on European identity by people´s age. Though, age is found to explain some variance in the amount of European identity among European citizens, as younger people have higher levels of European identity, also if controlled for by education and socio-economic status (Lutz, Kritzinger, & Skirbekk, 2006). So, I choose to include age as an individual level control variable in this study and operationalize it by an item in the Eurobarometer asking the respondents to indicate their age in years. I regard this item to be of interval measurement level, although all respondents who have a higher age than 99 years are coded to be 99 years old. This is not a crucial problem as only 13 out of 27901 respondents in the sample fall in this category and I assume that these are actually not much older than 99 years.

Control Variable III: Individual Level Size of Locality

Also size of locality should be without an influence on Euroepan identity according to the theories I am testing in this study. Still, life is very different across differently populated areas. Thus, I decide to include size of locality as a control variable to account for those differences. It is found already that people living in a city have higher levels of European

identity than those living in a rural area (Lutz, Kritzinger, & Skirbekk, 2006). Consequently, I operationalize size of locality by an item asking people to indicate their type of community, offering the categories "rural area or village", "small/ middle town", and "large town". As the measurement level is ordinal, I use dummy coding for this variable to include it in the multi level regression (view chapter 4.2).

4. Analysis

In this chapter, I am answering the research questions of this paper by reporting the results of the descriptive analysis in chapter 4.1 and the multilevel regression analysis in chapter 4.2. By discussing the descriptive statistics, I clarify what the current differences in the individual level of European identity among European Union citizens are within and across member states. To do this, I check the distribution of people´s individual level European identity, which is measured by their attachment to Europe, within and across countries. Moreover, I have a brief look on the distribution of the individual level independent variables I am going to test as predictors in chapter 4.2. In that chapter, I first reflect on the assumptions necessary to perform a multilevel regression analysis and check for the feasibility of this method in the data structure. Then, I explain how I build the models, and analyse the results of the multilevel regression analysis in order to confirm or reject the hypotheses on an empirical basis and find an answer to the second research question.

4.1. Descriptive Analysis

In order to answer the first, descriptive research question of this paper, and to prepare the multilevel regression, I start my analysis with looking at the distribution of European identity, across and within European Union member states. As discussed in the operationalization, European identity is measured by people´s attachment to Europe. Table 2 summarizes the percentages of all respondents across the answer categories. 2.1% of the respondents do not know about their attachment to Europe, while 97,9% give valid responses. The majority of the latter feels either "Fairly attached" (43.5%) or "Not very attached" (30.2%), as I visualize in Figure 1. Only a minority feels "Not at all attached" (12,3%) or "Very attached" (14%). The polynomial trend line for the percentages in Figure 1, the red line, looks similar to a normal distribution, but is somewhat skewed to the right. Overall, I conclude that the attachment to Europe variable is unbound, meaning that the full range of categories of the variable are used (Field, 2009).

Locate Table 2 somewhere here.

Locate Figure 1 here.

Looking at people´s attachment to Europe across countries, as visualized in Figure 2, we have to consider that 0 is the lowest and 3 the highest value on the score. The overall mean is 1,59 (for exact data, view Table A7), while the people in Luxembourg have, on average, the highest attachment to Europe with a mean of 2,07, and people in Cyprus the lowest level, with

a mean of 1,06. To be normally distributed, about 66% of the countries should be no more than one standard deviation, which is 0,24, apart from the overall mean. Eight countries deviate more than that, which is 28,6% and also, all countries except of Cyprus are within the interval of two standard deviations. So I argue that the distribution of the means across countries is normal. Looking at the red curve in Figure 2, which is visualizing the difference of the country means from the overall mean, we see that the curve is nearly unskewed. Also the standard deviations within countries, which are visualized by the yellow graph, do not show any clear patterns related to the distribution of country means, although they seem to be somewhat higher for countries with lower means. Accordingly, the lowest standard deviation within a country, with a value of 0,76 is reported for Luxembourg, and the highest for Greece, Malta, and Bulgaria with a value of 0,93 (for exact data view Table A7).

Locate Figure 2 here.

Now that we know more about the distribution of people´s attachment to Europe in our sample, let us have a look at the descriptive data for the predictor variables, summarized in Table 3. For each individual level variable, it shows the valid and the missing cases, the range, and the percentages for dummy variables or the mean, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis for continuous variables. The lowest number of missing cases for a variable is observed for knowledge on the European Union, gender, and age, which all have zero missing cases. Also size of locality shows a very low number of missing cases, only 16. The highest number of missing cases is to be found for socio-economic status, with 953 missing cases. Though, this number is still relatively low, as it makes only 3,4% of the total sample. Overall, there are 1932 cases in this data set, which are missing at least one of the individual level variables used in this analysis. As this is only 6,9% of the total sample, I decide to drop these cases from the multilevel analysis in order to estimate all models with the same sample size, as this is of special importance for testing the mediation hypotheses, as I explain in detail in chapter 4.2.

I discussed the dependent variable, attachment to Europe, in the section above. Although I treat it as an interval variable and thus calculated standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis, we have to bear in mind that the later two are of limited validity for a variable with only four categories. Still, the absolute values of skewness and kurtosis are sufficiently low for this variable. This also holds for age, which is ranging from 15 to 99, as discussed in chapter 3.2. For education on the other hand, skewness and kurtosis are more meaningful, as it

has 31 categories. Here, the absolute value of kurtosis is relatively high (2,29), but still below the cut-off point of 3 (Field, 2009).

Locate Table 3 somewhere here.

Having a look at the mean/percent column, one observes that about half of the respondents (47,1%) did not socialize with Europeans from other countries in last twelve months, while 21,1% did so once or twice, and about one third (31,7%) socialized with Europeans from other countries on several occasions. For socio-economic status, the distribution of cases across categories is dispersed. Most of the respondents categorize themselves as members of the working class (32,9%) or the middle class (42,7%). The category between these two, the lower middle class, is chosen by only 16,7% of the respondents. This visualizes the weakness of this item as discussed in chapter 3.2. Only a small minority of respondents categorize themselves to be members of the upper middle class (6,7%) or the upper class (0,7%). The education the sample is relatively high, as on average, respondents received full-time education until an age of 19 years, with a standard deviation of about four and a half years. However, in respect of knowledge on the European Union, only a minority of 41,3% of the respondents was able to answer all of the three test questions correctly, while about one third (33,5%) gave two, and 17,4% one correct response(s). Only 7,8% were not able to answer any of the three questions correctly. Concerning the proportion of genders in the sample, a majority of respondents are women (54,4%), almost 10 percentage points more than men (45,6%). For size of locality, the distribution is relatively unequal across categories, as only one fourth (26,4%) indicated to live in a large town, while nearly half of them (43%) live in a small or middle sized town and about one third (30,6%) live in a rural area or village. Finally, the sample is relatively old: Respondents are on average about 50 and a half years old, with a standard deviation of 18 years.

4.2. *Multilevel Regression*

In this sub chapter I report the results of the multilevel regression analysis performed in order to answer the second research question of this paper. Before I proceed with analyzing my data using multilevel regression, I discuss the eight assumptions, which must be fulfilled in order to do a regression analysis. Firstly, a (multilevel) regression requires a unbound dependent variable of at least an interval measurement level and one or more independent or predictor variables, which must be of interval measurement level or dummy coded (Field, 2009). In chapter 3.2, I discuss that the attachment to Europe which I analyze as an dependent variable

here, can be treated as an interval variable. Moreover, I show in chapter 4.1 that all categories of attachment to Europe are used across countries, so the item is sufficiently unbound to be used as a dependent variable. Finally, I coded all ordinal and nominal variables as dummies in order to use them in the regression. This means that for each category of a nominal or ordinal variable, I create a new variable with only the values 0 and 1. All cases who do not fall within the category in question are coded 0 and all cases who do belong to this category are coded 1. Then I use the lowest category, or in case of nominal variables the category which is expected to score the lowest on European identity, as a reference category and do not include it in the models. A second assumption to do a (multilevel) regression is that the predictor variables have at least some variation, so their variance should not equal zero (Field, 2009). In chapter 4.1, I show the standard deviation of all predictor variables, which is above zero for all of them, so this criterion is satisfied as well. Next to the type of variables included, a regression analysis also requires a certain type of sample. In order for the results to have enough power, the sample size should not be too small and the higher-level variable should have more than 20 groups (Field, 2009). The higher level variable in case of this paper consists of the 28 European Union member states, so we have more than 20 groups. Also the sample size is large enough, containing data from almost 26000 respondents, who have no missing values in any of the variables of interest, as discussed in chapter 4.1. From this sample, the group with the lowest number of participants still contains 500 respondents (Cyprus, view Table A5), which is satisfactory. A third assumption for a regression analysis is that all predictor variables are uncorrelated with external variables (Field, 2009). This means that no third variable is interfering with the relationship measured in this model. As I built my hypotheses on the theoretical assumption that the predicted relationships are real, I assume that the predictor variables I chose are the ones who indeed predict people´s level of European identity, and are not influenced by third variables. While the predictor variables are assumed to not be correlated with third variables, they are also assumed to not be correlated with each other (Field, 2009). This is the fourth assumption on the absence of multicollinearity. If they correlate to high, they do not explain a difference in the dependent variable by themselves. I report the test of this assumption later in this chapter, after explaining which variables are included in the final model. As a fifth assumption, a regression analysis also requires linearity of mean values of the dependent variable for each increment of the independent variables (Field, 2009). As a regression model pictures the relationships as straight lines, this assumption is necessary to be fulfilled for the model to be significant. This is also the reason that homoscedasticity is a sixth assumption for a regression analysis (Field, 2009). If the

residual terms are not constant across different levels of a predictor variable, the model is heteroscedastic and thus not able to represent the actual dynamic of the data. The seventh assumption for the regression analysis, is the one about normal distribution of errors, random coefficients and random slopes (Field, 2009). It says that in a regression model all three of them (if present) need to random, normally distributed and in terms of the error terms with a mean of 0. Although this does not mean that the predictor variables have to be normally distributed, it is more likely if they are (Field, 2009). In chapter 4.1 I show that the skewness and kurtosis for all continuous independent variables is lower than the absolute value of three, so I assume that the errors are normally distributed. The eighth and final assumption requires independence of the values and the errors on the outcome variable, which is European identity in this case, meaning that each value comes from a separate and independent entity (Field, 2009). I assume that this is given, as each respondent made her own experiences, which lead to their specific level of European identity. However, I will test whether their level of European identity and the latters´ difference from the predicted value may be dependent on the group they are in, which is the country, they are living in.

To test for the assumptions of independent values and independent errors, I compare the null-model with the empty two-level model including random intercepts across countries. The model taking into account the differences across countries, explains the data significantly better than the one which estimates the mean without controlling for country. To prove the significance of this difference I computed a deviance test (1511,294; df = 1) which produced a p-value smaller than 0,001. Consequently, the data is nested and the values and errors for respondents´ attachment to Europe is dependent on the country their live in. So I conclude that the independent values and the independent errors assumption are not fulfilled and that I apply a multilevel regression analysis to solve this problem. The intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) for this model is 0,0699, so 6,99% of the variance in respondents´ level of European identity is explained by the country they live in.

After having added the country level to the model, I include one individual level variable after another until all of them are included. For every new variable entered, the deviance test as well as the new coefficient are significant at the 0.001 level, except for gender, which does not improve the model fit. For an overview of the models testing the direct effects, view Table 5. Here we see that Model 1, including all individual level variables except of gender, fits the data significantly better than Model 2, which is adding gender to the model: Neither the unstandardized coefficient of gender, nor the deviance test comparing Model 2 to Model 1 are significant. Thus, I exclude gender from the further analysis. Also the

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country level variables, which are added one after another in Model 3 to Model 7, do not improve the model as they show insignificant results on the deviance test, comparing them to Model 1, and on their unstandardized coefficients. After checking the direct effects of the individual level and country level variables, I build the models to test for the mediation and interaction effects. For an overview over these models, Model 8 to Model 12, and a comparison to the reference model, Model 1, view Table 6. It is not surprising, that the models which I need to test the mediation hypotheses, Model 8 to Model 11, show a model fit, which is much worse than the one of Model 1, as Model 8 to 10 miss cross-border socialization and Model 11 misses information on the European Union. So, all of them are missing an individual level variable, which is a predictor of a unique significant proportion of the overall variance in respondents´ level of European identity, as shown in Model 1. Model 12 however, which includes the interaction effect of relative economic wealth and socio-economic status, shows a significantly better model fit than Model 1, although none of the interaction terms is significant. The intra-class correlation coefficient for this model is 0,0587, so 5,87% of the overall variation in respondents´ level of European identity are explained by country level differences. This is about one percentage point less than the models not including the interaction of socio-economic status and relative economic wealth. Finally, I produced the tolerance and variance inflation factor (VIF) values for all remaining independent variables, which are shown in Table 4. We see that all variance inflation factors are below 10, which is the cut-off point, where to "worry about multicollinearity" (Field, 2009). Also the tolerances are above the more liberal cut-off point of 0,1 and the rather conservative one of 0,2 (Field, 2009), so I conclude that multicollinearity is not existing to an extent that the model is significantly harmed.

Locate Table 4 somewhere here.

Locate Table 5 somewhere here.

Locate Table 6 somewhere here.

Now that I explained how I constructed the multilevel regression models to test the hypothesis formulated in chapter 2, I repeat them one after another in the following paragraph and discuss whether they have to be confirmed, borderline confirmed, or rejected, based on the results of this analysis. Finally, I am going to pay attention to interesting findings, which are not predicted by the hypotheses. Starting with H1, I predicted that cross-border socialization will lead to higher levels of European identity. This hypothesis is confirmed by the data, the

unstandardized coefficient in Model 1 (view Table 5) is 0,2862 for respondents who socialized on several occasions and 0,1897 for respondents who socialized once ore twice in the past twelve months, both with a significance level of p<0,001. So, having socialized with Europeans from other countries on several occasions in the past twelve months on average leads to an increase in respondents´ level of European identity by 0,2862 points versus respondents who have not socialized with Europeans from other countries in the past twelve months. Remember that European identity is measured by a four point item, so its value could range from zero to three.

H2a and H2b predicted a direct effect of European travels on European identity. As shown in Table 5, I tested this hypothesis in Model 3 and Model 4, which also include cross-border socialization. There we see that the unstandardized coefficients for both European Union travel inflow and European Union travel outflow are small and insignificant. So I reject H2a and H2b concluding that European travel does not have a direct effect on European identity.

In H3, I hypothesize a mediation effect of European travel via cross-border socialization on European identity. To test the mediation hypotheses, I compare one model including the mediator, with another model not including the mediator. If there is a significant increase in the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable in the model missing the mediator, I conclude that there is a mediation effect. In this case, if there is a significant increase in the effect of European travels on European identity in the model excluding cross-border socialization over the model including it, I assume that there is a mediation. So I compare the effects of European Union travel inflow and European Union travel outflow in Model 3 and Model 4 in Table 5, including cross-border socialization, with Model 8 and Model 9 in Table 6, which are not including cross-border socialization. The unstandardized coefficients for European Union travel are insignificant in both models, which indicates that there is no mediation and H3 should be rejected. However, in Model 9, which includes European Union travel outflow and excludes cross-border socialization, the unstandardized coefficient is significant at a level of p = 0,21. Given that we have a very small number of groups, in fact only 28 countries, also a significance level of α = 0,10 is worth to be noticed. Moreover, if I assume that I test one-sided, I can divide the p-value by 2, which gives a p-value of 0,105. Although this is not significant, according to conventional levels, I regard this finding as borderline significant because of the reasons named before. So I conclude that H3 is partly confirmed, because there is some mediation effect of European Union travel outflow on European identity via cross-border socialization.

In H4, I predict that a country´s level of European migration directly and positively affects its inhabitants´ level of Eurpean identity. Looking at Model 5 in Table 5, we see that the unstandardized coefficient for European Union migrants is very small and not significant. So I conclude that there is no effect of European migration on people´s level of European identity and thus reject H4 on this basis.

In H5, I prognosticate that there is a mediation effect of European migration on European identity via cross-border socialization. I test this mediation effect like the one in H3, by comparing the unstandardized coefficient of European migration in a model including cross-border socialization, to the one in a model excluding cross-border socialization. The former model is Model 1 in Table 5, where the effect of European migration on European identity is very small and not significant. The latter one is Model 10, including only European migration and not the mediator cross-border socialization, shows a higher, though still insignificant, coefficient for European Union immigrants. So I conclude that there is no effect of European migration on Europan identity mediated by cross-border socialization.

In H6 I hypothesize a direct and positive effect of information on the European Union on a person´s level of European identity. Looking at the coefficients of information on the European Union in Model 1 (Table 5), we see that all of them are significant at the 0,001 level. For people, who could answer one out of the three test questions on the European Union correctly, the coefficient is 0,1545. That means that people who could respond to one question correctly, on average, have a level of European identity being 0,1545 points higher in comparison to the ones who could not answer a single test question correctly. Accordingly, the coefficients for answering two questions correctly is 0,2483 and the one for mastering all questions is 0,3762. Consequently, I conclude that there is a direct and positive effect of information on the European Union on a person´s level of European identity and confirm H6.

H7 predicts a positive and direct effect of people´s level of education on their level of European identity. Looking at Model 1 in Table 5, we see that the unstandardized coefficient for people´s age when finishing full-time education is rather small, but highly significant at the 0,001 level. The coefficient of 0,0018 means that for every additional year a respondent received full-time education, on average his or her level of European identity is higher by 0,0018 points on the range from zero to three. Despite the coefficient being smaller than the ones of the individual level variables discussed before, we have to bear in mind that people´s age when finishing full-time education offers many categories (indeed 30, view Table 2), in comparison to cross-border socialization for example, which offers only three categories. Accordingly, the coefficient is smaller, but still highly significant. Although the effect of

education is still smaller than the ones of cross.border socialization or information on the Europan Union, I conclude that there is a direct and positive effect of people´s level of education on their level of European identity and thus confirm H7.

H8 is again about a mediation effect: I hypothesize that the effect of people´s level of education on their level of European identity is mediated by their level of information on the European Union. In the same manner I tested H3 and H5, I compare the coefficents of people´s level of education in one model including the mediator information on the European Union to the one in a model excluding information on the European Union. The model including both education and information on the European Union is Model 1 in Table 5. Here the coefficient for education is 0,0018 at a significance level of 0,001. The coefficient of education in Model 11, which is excluding information on the European Union, is 0,0179 and also significant at the 0,001 level. This effect is about ten times higher than the one in the model including information on the European Union. Moreover, a two-tailed t-test (2005.0523; df = 51936) resulted in a p-value lower than 0,001, so the difference between the two coefficients is highly significant. Consequently, the effect of people´s level of education on their level of European identity is significantly higher, if I do not account for people´s level of information on the European Union. So I conclude that the effect of people´s level of education on their level of European identity is partly mediated by their level of information on the European Union and thus confirm H8.

In H9, I predict a direct positive effect of a country´s level of European Union net receiving on its inhabitants´ level of European identity. Looking at the unstandardized coefficient of European Union net receiving of Model 6 in Table 5, we see that the effect is not significant. Consequently, based on the data, I conclude that a country´s level of European Union net receiving does not affect its inhabitants´ level of European identity and reject H9.

Also H10 is about a direct effect of a country level variable: I prognosticated that a country´s level of relative economic wealth directly and positively affects its inabitants´ level of European identity. The unstandardized coefficient of relative economic wealth for Model 7 in Table 5 is very small and insignificant, so based on the data, I conclude that there is no direct positive effect of a country´s level of relative economic wealth on its inhabitants´ level of European identity and reject H10.

Finally, in H11 I hypothesize an interaction effect of people´s level of socio-economic status and a country´s level of relative economic wealth on people´s level of European identity. In fact, I expected that the positive effect of people´s level of socio-economic status on their level of Euroepan identity is only present in countries with a higher level of relative

economic wealth. Model 7 in Table 5 includes the interaction effect of individual level socio-economic status and country level relative economic wealth. Although the Deviance test, which compares the model fit to the one of Model 1, is highly significant, none of the interaction terms is significant. However, the unstandardized coefficients for lower middle class, and middle class, and upper middle class are significantly higher than the ones in Model 1 and the coefficient for upper class is significantly lower than in Model 1. Moreover, the standard error is higher for all categories, and thus the significance of these effects becomes smaller in the categories with less cases, which becomes visible when viewing Table 3. For example, the effect of upper middle class is significant at the 0,01 level, as it conatins only 6,9% of the respondents. Despite these findings, I conclude that there is no interaction effect of a country´s level of relative economic wealth and its people´s level of socio-economic status on their level of European identity and thus reject H11.

Locate Table 7 somewhere here.

After discussing whether to confirm or reject my hypotheses, for an overview check Table 7, I shed light on interesting findings which were not predicted by the theory. Although other researchers found an effect of people´s gender on their level of European identity (Lutz, Kritzinger, & Skirbekk, 2006; Agirdag, Huyst, & van Houtte, 2012; Verhaegen & Hooghe, 2015), I do not find an effect when controlling for cross-border socialization, socio-economic status, knowledge on the European Union, education, size of locality, and age. Moreover, I confirm the effect of size of locality on people´s level of European identity: Indeed, respondents living in a rural area or village, on average, report significantly lower levels of European identity than people living in a small or middle sized town, or in a large town. The coefficient of people living in a small or middle sized town for Model 1 in Table 5 is 0,0553, and the one for people living in a large town 0,0695, while both of them are significant at the 0,001 level. This means that a person living in a large town has, on average, a level of European identity, which is 0,0695 points higher on a scale of 0 to 3 than the one of a person living in a rural area or a village. Finally, the coefficient of the control variable age in Model 1 proved to be significant at the 0,001 level as shown in Table 5. Although the coefficient is rather small, 0,0018, in comparison to the dummy coded individual level variables discussed before, we have to consider that age offers a many categories (indeed 84, compare Table 3) compared to the dummy coded variables. However, which is interesting, the coefficient of age was insignificant in Model 8, Model 9, and Model 10 (shown in Table 6), in which cross-border socialization was not included. So the data suggests that younger people have equal

levels of European identity due to them experiencing more cross-border socialization. This sheds new light on the cohort effect of age on European identity found by other researchers (Lutz, Kritzinger, & Skirbekk, 2006).

5. Discussion

In this chapter, I summarize the results of the analysis and reflect on its limitations. In chapter 5.1, I repeat the research questions formulated in chapter 1 and answer them according to my findings. Afterwards, I discuss the implications of the results linked to the theoretical foundations I derived my hypotheses from in chapter 2. Finally, in chapter 5.2, I reflect on the limitations of this study and indicate paths for further research.

5.1. Conclusions

In the following, I rephrase and afterwards answer the research questions set up in chapter 1 one by one. The first research question was of descriptive nature, and I answer it using the results of the descriptive part of the analys presented in chapter 4.1. It was asking:

What are the current differences in the individual level of European identity among European Union citizens within and across European Union member states?

The data reveals that the large majority of European Union citizens indeed has a European identity, as most of them feel fairly or very attached to Europe and only a small share does not feel attached to Europe at all. The average level of European identity varies both within and across countries: People in Luxembourg have, on average, the highest level of European identity, followed by Denmark and Sweden, while people in Cyprus show the lowest level on average, followed by Greece and the United Kingdom. Within countries, the highest standard deviation from the average is found in Greece, Malta, and Bulgaria, and the lowest in Luxembourg. The second research question, which required research of multiple relationships, was asking:

Which theoretical streams explain the current individual level European Identity among European Union Citizens?

Answering this research question, I structure my conclusions according to the theories I based my predictions on, namely (1) the social identity theory, (2) the theory of cognitive mobilization, and (3) the rational actor model. Firstly, based on the social identity theory, I expected that cross-border socialization reduces inter-group biases, enhances familiarity and empathy, and thus leads to the feeling to belong to a single in-group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Stoeckel, 2015). In other words, I prognosticated that cross-border socialization leads to the creation of a European identity. Moreover, I predicted that European travels and European migration have the same effect, partly because they provide opportunities for cross-border socialization. Indeed, I found that cross-border socialization fosters the creation of a European

identity. Also, this effect leads to tourists visiting other European states to have slightly higher levels of European identity. However, the host population of countries who experience more tourism are found to not be influenced by this effect. Also a higher level of European migration does not result in the host population to have higher levels of European identity. As far as I know, I am the first one to find an effect of country level European tourism (outflow) on European identity, so this is an important contribution of this study to the existing literature of European identity.

The second theory I tested is the theory of cognitive mobilization, which assumes that people, who know and understand the political system they are part of, better accept their role in it (Inglehart, 1970). This results in them having the feeling to be part of and attached to the political system and its community (Inglehart, 1970). In other words, the theory predicts that people who are better informed or educated on the European Union will have higher levels of European identity. Consequently, I tested whether people who have a higher level of education or information on the European Union also have higher levels of European identity. Additionally, I prognosticated that people with a higher level of education also have higher levels of information on the European Union, which in turn leads to them having higher levels of European identity. The results of my analysis indicate that the theory of cognitive mobilization is correct in this respect. Both, a higher level of education, and more information on the European Union lead to higher levels of European identity. Furthermore, a higher level of education leads to higher levels of information on the European Union, which in turn leads to more European identity.

As a third theory tested in this research, the rational actor model predicts that European Union citizens, who continuously perceive the membership in a political system as beneficial for themselves, develop an attachment to that system and its community (Weßels, 2007). In other words, the theory assumes that people who consistently perceive their country´s membership in the European Union as advantageous for themselves, will have higher levels of European identity. Consequently, I expected that a higher relative amount of European Union net receivings of a country leads to higher levels of European identity among its citizens. Moreover, I assumed thath relative economic wealth on a country level leads to higher levels of European identity among citizens. Finally, based on the theory of winners and losers of globalization (Kriesi et al., 2008), I predicted that people with a higher socio-economic status and people with a higher level of education have higher levels of European identity, as they see the European integration promoted by the European Union as creating opportunities rather than threats. Accordingly, I prognosticated that this effect of socio-

economic status on people´s level of European identity is non-existent in poorer countries, because European integration creates more opportunities for people with a lower socio-economic status in poor countries, too, because people from relatively poor countries can work in wealthier countries and earn more money due to European integration. Moreover, they may have more job opportunities since large companies may outsource production facilities from wealthier countries to their home country. In line with the theory, the results of my analysis indicate that both a higher level of socio-economic status and a higher level of education lead to higher levels of European identity. However, I did not find an effect of country level European net receiving or relative economic wealth on people´s level of European identity. Also analyzed in combination with people´s socio-economic status, country level relative economic wealth did not show any effect on people´s level of European identity.

Next to the results conducted on the basis of theoretical predictions, the model I analyzed also revealed interesting effects, which were not hypothesized by the theories. Although other researchers found that people´s gender influences their level of European identity (Lutz, Kritzinger, & Skirbekk, 2006; Agirdag, Huyst, & van Houtte, 2012; Verhaegen & Hooghe, 2015), I do not find an effect when controlling for cross-border socialization, socio-economic status, knowledge on the European Union, education, size of locality, and age. The papers mentioned above do not include (all of) these effects, so my finding is a clear contribution to the existing knowledge on European identity. Next to that, I confirm the effect of size of locality on people´s level of European identity: Indeed, respondents living in a rural area or village, on average, report significantly lower levels of European identity than people living in a small or middle sized town, or in a large town. Also, people who are older show higher levels of European identity. However, the effect of age on people´s level of European identity diminishes if cross-border socialization is not included in the model. Thus, I conclude that younger people have equal levels of European identity due to them experiencing more cross-border socialization. This finding is particularly interesting, because other researchers found the opposite effect of age, not controlling for the effect of cross-border socialization (Lutz, Kritzinger, & Skirbekk, 2006).

To finally answer the second research question, the findings of this study indicate that all theories tested explain some unique part of the variation in people´s level of European identity. So, I conclude that the three theories are complementary in explaining European identity, and that there are multiple paths for people to form a European identity. In general, it seems that country level influences are by far not as influential as individual level influences,

although this tendency may also be due to the structure of the data analyzed in this study, as I discuss in chapter 5.2. Despite only one of the five country levels tested in my analysis having an effect on people´s level of European identity, this still is a unique contribution to existing knowledge, as country level influences are rarely tested in the literature on European identity before.

5.2. Limitations

Although I made great efforts to ensure a maximum of validity in this study, some theoretical and practical limitations remain. As a theoretical shortcoming, I have to mention that the strict division of the theory on European identity into three streams is a simplification for the sake of structure and readability of this paper. Indeed, the three theories are complementary and intertwined and some scholars analyze or combine multiple theories at a time to research European identity (Verhaegen & Hooghe, 2015). Furthermore, hypothesis H7, predicting a direct positive effect of education on European identity, is not the only hypothesis, which could be derived from more than one of the theories. For example, a higher level of European tourism due to European integration is not only fostering cross-border socialization and thus may increase people´s level of European identity from a social identity theory´s point of view; It is also an advantage for the population of a country and may therefore be predicted to positively influence people´s level of European identity from the perspective of the rational actor model. Another theoretical limitation is that I, in line with most other authors (Verhaegen & Hooghe, 2015), exclusively focus on people´s perceived monetary benefits when testing the rational actor model. From a rational actor model´s point of view, people´s desire for peace, stability or freedom to travel may be causes of their European identity, too, in case they perceive the European Union to be responsible for the continuous presence of these. Consequently, the rational actor model may also explain people having a European identity, even if they believe that their country´s European Union membership does not yield any monetary benefits for themselves.

As a final theoretical shortcoming I mention that the whole stream of literature on Euroscepticism is largely ignored in this study (as well as in most studies on European identity), although research on European identity may learn a lot from its findings (McLaren, 2007). I only reflect on Euroscepticism in chapter 2.3, when reviewing the theoretical assumptions of cognitive mobilization by Ingelart (1970). Consequently, I suggest for further research that scholars mutually take notice of the findings from the other stream and incorporate them in their studies.

Next to these theoretical shortcomings, I emphasize some practical limitations of this study. Firstly, the analysis relies on data from third parties. Although the advantage in this case is high professionalism in conducting the data, I have to rely on the items as they are formulated by the responsible institute. For example, I had to operationalize cross-border socialization by people´s amount of cross-border socializations in the past twelve months. In fact, little is known about the time span needed to form a European identity after having experienced cross-border socialization. It very well possible that the effect of the cross-border socialization, which was measured in the data set, on the respondents´ level of European identity kicks in more than twelve months later than the measurement. In that case, I have to rely on the assumption that the respondents who have cross-border socialized in the past twelve months, also did this before. Another weakness lies in the fact that the data I used measures only one point in time. So, I cannot estimate, for example, the time-span for the effect of cross-border socialization on European identity. Moreover, I have to rely on the theoretical assumption that, for instance, cross-border socialization indeed causes European identity and not the other way around. Another practical limitation is the fact that the frame of this study allowed for testing only a limited number of mediation and interaction effects. There may be many more than these. To name only one example, Kuhn (2016) finds that both socio-economic status and national economic wealth foster people´s transnational activities. Consequently, both may also enhance people´s level of European identity via cross-border socialization. Concluding, I call for a similar study as this one, including more than one point in time and an increased testing of mediation and interaction effects to account for the complexity of the dynamics around European identity. A final but crucial practical limitation of this study is the fact that the power for testing the country level variables was very low, as there are only 28 cases. This is, why I am cautious to overemphasize the strong effects of individual level factors and the weak effects of country level factors in chapter 5.1. There is not much to do about this shortcoming. One may consider splitting countries up into regions to increase the number of cases on the higher level. However, this largely complicates the collection of data and may not be feasible for all country level variables of interest (e.g. national level of European Union net receiving), so I probably still chose for the best option in this regard.

6. Tables and Figures

6.1. List of Tables

Table 1: Hypotheses (dependent variable: European identity)

Theoretical Ground	Hypothesis	Independent variable	Type of effect	Direction of effect
Social Identity Theory	H1	Cross-border socialization	Direct effect	Positive
Social Identity Theory	H2a & H2b	European travels	Direct effect	Positive
Social Identity Theory	H3	European travels	Mediation via cross-border socialization	Positive
Social Identity Theory	H4	European migration	Direct effect	Positive
Social Identity Theory	H5	European migration	Mediation via cross-border socialization	Positive
Cognitive Mobilization	H6	Information on the European Union	Direct effect	Positive
Cognitive Mobilization	H7	Education	Direct effect	Positive
Cognitive Mobilization	H8	Education	Mediation via information on the European Union	Positive
Rational Actor Model	H9	EU net receiving	Direct effect	Positive
Rational Actor Model	H10	Relative economic wealth	Direct effect	Positive
Rational Actor Model	H11a	Socio-economic status	Direct effect	Positive
Rational Actor Model	H11b	Socio-economic status	Interaction with relative economic wealth	Positive
Rational Actor Model	H7	Education	Direct effect	Positive

Table 2: Attachment to Europe (percentages)

	Attachment to Europe	
	Percent	Valid percent
Not at all attached	12,1%	12,3%
Not very attached	29,6%	30,2%
Fairly attached	42,6%	43,5%
Very attached	13,7%	14%
Total valid percent	97,9%	100%
Don´t Know	2,1%	
Total %	100%	

(Eurobarometer 82.3, 2014)

Table 3: Descriptive statistics

	Valid N	Missing	Min.	Max.	Mean/ percent	Stand. deviation	Skew- ness	Kurtosis
Attachment to Europe	27325	576	0	3	1,59	,877	-,21	-,64
Cross-border socialization (dummies)	27781	120						
No (reference)			0	1	47,1%			
Once or twice			0	1	21,1%			
Several occasions			0	1	31,7%			
Socio-economic status (dummies)	26948	953						
Working class (reference)			0	1	32,9%			
Lower middle class			0	1	16,7%			
Middle class			0	1	42,7%			
Upper middle class			0	1	6,9%			
Upper class			0	1	0,7%			
Knowledge on the EU (dummies)	27901							
0 correct answers (reference)			0	1	7,8%			
1 correct answer			0	1	17,4%			
2 correct answers			0	1	33,5%			
3 correct answers			0	1	41,3%			
Education (age finishing full-time)	27455	466	0	30	19,01	4,586	-,18	2,29
Gender (dummy)	27901							
Female (reference)			0	1	54,4%			
Male			0	1	45,6%			
Size of locality (dummies)	27885	16						
Rural area or Village (reference)			0	1	30,6%			
Small or middle town			0	1	43,0%			
Large town			0	1	26,4%			
Age	27901		15	99	50,53	18,037	-,04	-,91

(Eurobarometer 82.3, 2014)

Table 3: Tolerance and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) across independent variables used in Model 1

	Tolerance	VIF
Education (age finishing full-time)	0,779	1,283
Cross-border socialization (dummies)		
Once or twice	0,824	1,214
Several occasions	0,765	1,308
Socio-economic status (dummies)		
Lower middle class	0,774	1,292
Middle class	0,666	1,502
Upper middle class	0,781	1,280
Upper class	0,969	1,031
Knowledge on the European Union (dummies)		
1 correct answer	0,349	2,864
2 correct answers	0,254	3,933
3 correct answers	0,236	4,228
Size of locality (dummies)		
Small or middle town	0,724	1,382
Large town	0,710	1,408
Age	0,923	1,084

(Eurobarometer 82.3, 2014)

Table 5: Models testing direct effects

	Model 1 b	Model 2 b	Model 3 b	Model 4 b	Model 5 b	Model 6 b	Model 7 b
Deviance test	Reference	0,8345	0,8933	0,719	0,0325	0,4939	0,9044
Attachment to Europe	1,9122*** (0,1035)	1,9077*** (0,1035)	1,9630*** (0,1162)	1,8447*** (0,1302)	1,9066*** (0,1082)	1,8920*** (0,1072)	1,8218*** (0,1403)
Cross-border socialization (dummies)							
No	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Once or twice	0,1897*** (0,0138)	0,1895*** (0,0138)	0,1898*** (0,0138)	0,1896*** (0,0138)	0,1897*** (0,0138)	0,1898*** (0,0138)	0,1896*** (0,0138)
Several occasions	0,2862*** (0,0132)	0,2857*** (0,0132)	0,2864*** (0,0132)	0,2860*** (0,0132)	0,2862*** (0,0132)	0,2865*** (0,0132)	0,2858*** (0,0132)
Socio-economic status (dummies)							
Working class	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Lower middle class	0,1148*** (0,0155)	0,1151*** (0,0155)	0,1147*** (0,0155)	0,1147*** (0,0155)	0,1148*** (0,0155)	0,1148*** (0,0155)	0,1147*** (0,0155)
Middle class	0,1908*** (0,0130)	0,1912*** (0,0130)	0,1909*** (0,0130)	0,1907*** (0,0130)	0,1908*** (0,0130)	0,1909*** (0,0130)	0,1906*** (0,0130)
Upper middle class	0,2885*** (0,0232)	0,2885*** (0,0232)	0,2885*** (0,0232)	0,2884*** (0,0232)	0,2885*** (0,0232)	0,2888*** (0,0232)	0,2881*** (0,0232)
Upper class	0,3862*** (0,0614)	0,3861*** (0,0614)	0,3862*** (0,0614)	0,3863*** (0,0614)	0,3862*** (0,0614)	0,3864*** (0,0614)	0,3860*** (0,0614)
Knowledge on the EU (dummies)							
0 correct answers	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
1 correct answer	0,1545*** (0,0228)	0,1538*** (0,0228)	0,1546*** (0,0228)	0,1545*** (0,0228)	0,1545*** (0,0228)	0,1545*** (0,0228)	0,1545*** (0,0228)
2 correct answers	0,2483*** (0,0213)	0,2470*** (0,0213)	0,2484*** (0,0213)	0,2483*** (0,0213)	0,2483*** (0,0213)	0,2483*** (0,0213)	0,2483*** (0,0213)
3 correct answers	0,3762*** (0,0214)	0,3743*** (0,0214)	0,3763*** (0,0214)	0,3762*** (0,0214)	0,3762*** (0,0214)	0,3761*** (0,0214)	0,3762*** (0,0214)
Education (age finishing full-time)	0,0018*** (0,0003)	0,0140*** (0,0013)	0,0140*** (0,0013)	0,0140*** (0,0013)	0,0140*** (0,0013)	0,0140*** (0,0013)	0,0140*** (0,0013)
Size of locality (dummies)							
Rural area or Village	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Small or middle town	0,0553*** (0,0123)	0,0553*** (0,0123)	0,0551*** (0,0123)	0,0552*** (0,0123)	0,0553*** (0,0123)	0,0553*** (0,0123)	0,0552*** (0,0123)
Large town	0,0695*** (0,0139)	0,0697*** (0,0139)	0,0694*** (0,0139)	0,0695*** (0,0139)	0,0695*** (0,0139)	0,0694*** (0,0139)	0,0696*** (0,0139)
Age	0,0018*** (0,0003)	0,0018*** (0,0003)	0,0018*** (0,0003)	0,0018*** (0,0003)	0,0018*** (0,0003)	0,0018*** (0,0003)	0,0018*** (0,0003)
Gender (dummy)							
Female		Reference					
Male		0,0094 (0,0103)					
EU travel inflow			-0,0099 (0,0103)				
EU travel outflow				0,0171 (0,0200)			
EU immigrants					0,0012 (0,0066)		
EU net receivings						0,0154 (0,0217)	
Relative economic wealth							0,0009 (0,0010)

(Eurobarometer 82.3, 2014)

b: unstandardized coefficient, parentheses: standard errors

[†] < 0,1 * < 0,05; ** < 0,01;*** < 0,001 (two-tailed for tests of coefficients)

Table 6: Models testing mediation and interaction effects

	Model 1 b	Model 8 b	Model 9 b	Model 10 b	Model 11 b	Model 12 b
Deviance test	Referemce	-491,8127	-490,5642	-491,3769	-433,6255	61,4489***
Attachment to Europe	1,9122*** (0,1035)	1,9880*** (0,1164)	1,8616*** (0,1286)	1,9333*** (0,1079)	1,7314*** (0,0953)	1,9012*** (0,2273)
Cross-border socialization (dummies)						
No	Reference				Reference	Reference
Once or twice	0,1897*** (0,0138)				0,2084*** (0,0139)	0,1886*** (0,0138)
Several occasions	0,2862*** (0,0132)				0,3075*** (0,0133)	0,2847*** (0,0132)
Socio-economic status (dummies)						
Working class	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Lower middle class	0,1148*** (0,0155)	0,1294*** (0,0156)	0,1294*** (0,0156)	0,1294*** (0,0156)	0,1278*** (0,0156)	0,1532* (0,0591)
Middle class	0,1908*** (0,0130)	0,2212*** (0,0130)	0,2210*** (0,0130)	0,2211*** (0,0130)	0,2111*** (0,0130)	0,2542*** (0,0597)
Upper middle class	0,2885*** (0,0232)	0,3516*** (0,0232)	0,3513*** (0,0232)	0,3513*** (0,0232)	0,3170*** (0,0233)	0,3289** (0,1103)
Upper class	0,3862*** (0,0614)	0,4380*** (0,0619)	0,4381*** (0,0619)	0,4379*** (0,0619)	0,4074*** (0,0619)	0,2930[†] (0,1573)
Knowledge on the EU (dummies)						
0 correct answers	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference		Reference
1 correct answer	0,1545*** (0,0228)	0,1759*** (0,0230)	0,1758*** (0,0230)	0,1758*** (0,0230)		0,1571*** (0,0228)
2 correct answers	0,2483*** (0,0213)	0,2793*** (0,0214)	0,2792*** (0,0214)	0,2792*** (0,0214)		0,2513*** (0,0213)
3 correct answers	0,3762*** (0,0214)	0,4144 (0,0214)	0,4143*** (0,0214)	0,4141*** (0,0214)		0,3778*** (0,0213)
Education (age finishing full-time)	0,0018*** (0,0003)	0,0178*** (0,0013)	0,0178*** (0,0013)	0,0178*** (0,0013)	0,0179*** (0,0013)	0,0138*** (0,0013)
Size of locality (dummies)						
Rural area or village	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference	Reference
Small or middle town	0,0553*** (0,0123)	0,0584*** (0,0124)	0,0584*** (0,0124)	0,0585*** (0,0124)	0,0569*** (0,0124)	0,0543*** (0,0123)
Large town	0,0695*** (0,0139)	0,0811*** (0,0140)	0,0812*** (0,0140)	0,0813*** (0,0140)	0,0785*** (0,0140)	0,0661*** (0,0139)
Age	0,0018*** (0,0003)	0,0005 (0,0003)	0,0005 (0,0003)	0,0005 (0,0003)	0,0024*** (0,0003)	0,0018*** (0,0003)
EU travel inflow		-0,0065 (0,0103)				
EU travel outflow			0,0252 (0,0194)			
EU immigrants				0,0059 (0,0064)		
Relative economic wealth						-0,0024 (0,0043)
Interaction of socio-economic status and relative economic wealth						
Working class						Reference
Lower middle class						0,0005 (0,0006)
Middle class						0,0007 (0,0006)
Upper middle class						0,0001 (0,0010)
Upper class						-0,0008 (0,0014)

(Eurobarometer 82.3, 2014)

b: unstandardized coefficient, parentheses: standard errors

[†] < 0,1 * < 0,05; ** < 0,01;*** < 0,001 (two-tailed for tests of coefficients)

Table 7: Hypotheses and results (dependent variable: European identity)

Theoretical Ground	Hypothesis	Independent variable	Type of effect	Direction of effect	Result
Social Identity Theory	H1	Cross-border socialization	Direct effect	Positive	Confirmed
Social Identity Theory	H2a & H2b	European travels	Direct effect	Positive	Not confirmed
Social Identity Theory	H3	European travels	Mediation via cross-border socialization	Positive	Partly confirmed
Social Identity Theory	H4	European migration	Direct effect	Positive	Not confirmed
Social Identity Theory	H5	European migration	Mediation via cross-border socialization	Positive	Not confirmed
Cognitive Mobilization	H6	Information on the European Union	Direct effect	Positive	Confirmed
Cognitive Mobilization	H7	Education	Direct effect	Positive	Confirmed
Cognitive Mobilization	H8	Education	Mediation via information on the European Union	Positive	Not confirmed
Rational Actor Model	H9	EU net receiving	Direct effect	Positive	Not confirmed
Rational Actor Model	H10	Relative economic wealth	Direct effect	Positive	Not confirmed
Rational Actor Model	H11a	Socio-economic status	Direct effect	Positive	Confirmed
Rational Actor Model	H11b	Socio-economic status	Interaction with relative economic wealth	Positive	Not confirmed
Rational Actor Model	H7	Education	Direct effect	Positive	Confirmed

6.2. List of Figures

Figure 1: Attachment to Europe

(Eurobarometer 82.3, 2014)

Figure 2: Attachment to Europe (means and standard deviations)(For Data view Table A7)

(Eurobarometer 82.3, 2014)

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8. Appendix

8.1. Appendix 1: European Travels in 2014

Table A1: European travels in the European Union in 2014 (<u>underlined</u> = estimations)

	Million nights in domestic accommodations by EU 28 travelers	Million nights in EU 28 accommodations by domestic travelers	Population in 2014 (in millions)	nights in domestic accommodations by EU 28 travelers per inhabitant	nights in EU 28 accommodations by domestic travelers per inhabitant
Malta	<u>7,45</u>	<u>1,47</u>	0,43	17,51	3,45
Croatia	58,80	<u>7,99</u>	4,25	13,85	1,88
Austria	96,79	<u>60,57</u>	8,51	11,38	7,12
Cyprus	8,18	<u>2,18</u>	0,86	9,54	2,54
Spain	359,72	<u>175,03</u>	46,51	7,73	3,76
Greece	<u>71,77</u>	<u>25,01</u>	10,90	6,58	2,29
Netherl.	93,00	<u>153,02</u>	16,83	5,53	2,09
France	362,35	<u>346,21</u>	65,84	5,50	5,26
Ireland	<u>24,97</u>	<u>32,75</u>	4,61	5,42	7,11
Italy	320,41	<u>241,55</u>	60,78	5,27	3,97
Sweden	45,99	<u>66,36</u>	9,64	4,77	6,88
Portugal	48,53	<u>26,76</u>	10,43	4,65	2,57
EU 28	<u>2355,63</u>	<u>2355,63</u>	506,86	4,65	4,65
Denmark	25,80	<u>40,08</u>	5,62	4,59	7,14
Luxemb.	2,52	<u>3,46</u>	0,55	4,59	6,30
Germany	336,66	<u>553,03</u>	80,77	4,17	6,85
United Kingd.	<u>262,63</u>	<u>308,65</u>	64,35	4,08	4,80
Slovenia	7,89	<u>12,56</u>	2,06	3,83	6,09
Estonia	4,74	<u>3,90</u>	1,32	3,60	2,97
Czech Rep.	33,83	<u>39,97</u>	10,51	3,22	3,80
Finland	16,86	<u>26,21</u>	5,45	3,09	4,81
Belgium	29,29	<u>60,38</u>	11,20	2,61	5,39
Hungary	22,29	<u>23,28</u>	9,88	2,26	2,36
Bulgaria	15,85	<u>11,16</u>	7,25	2,19	1,54
Slovakia	9,86	<u>14,63</u>	5,42	1,82	2,70
Lithuania	4,90	<u>6,16</u>	2,94	1,66	2,09
Poland	62,80	<u>83,41</u>	38,02	1,65	2,19
Latvia	2,86	<u>3,02</u>	2,00	1,43	1,51
Romania	18,87	<u>26,84</u>	19,95	0,95	1,35

(Eurostat, 2015)

Ireland, Greece, Malta, and the Netherlands did not report exact numbers but only estimations of nights spent in European Union accommodations by domestic travelers. As they are based on these numbers, the numbers for travel outflows to European Union countries are all marked as estimations.

The United Kingdom did not provide any statistics on nights spent in European Union accommodations by domestic travelers at all. I solved this problem by adding up all nights in a country´s accommodations spent by citizens from all European Union countries except of the United Kingdom to then subtract this number from the estimate given by Eurostat for the total amount of nights spent in this country´s accommodations by the European Union citizens. By doing this, I receive reasonable estimates for the nights spent across European Union countries of travelers from the United Kingdom.

8.2. *Appendix 2: European Migration in 2014*

Table A2: Migration in the European Union in 2014

	Migrants immigrated in 2014 from EU 28 countries (in thousands)	Inhabitants born in another EU 28 country (in thousands)	Population in 2014 (in thousands)	Total population´s share of 2014 immigrants from EU 28 countries (percentage)	Total population´s share of inhabitants born in another EU 28 country (percentage)
Luxemb.	17	178	550	3,01%	32,31%
Cyprus	3,7	111	858	0,43%	12,98%
Ireland	no data	471	4.606	no data	10,24%
Austria	no data	639	8.507	no data	7,52%
Belgium	65	835	11.204	0,58%	7,46%
Sweden	28	510	9.645	0,29%	5,28%
Germany	416	3.839	80.767	0,51%	4,75%
Malta	4,4	19	425	1,04%	4,45%
Spain	100	2.028	46.512	0,21%	4,36%
United Kingd.	no data	2.806	64.351	no data	4,36%
EU 28	940	17.934	506.858	0,19%	3,54%
Denmark	24	192	5.617	0,42%	3,41%
Slovenia	no data	69	2.061	no data	3,34%
France	84	2.169	65.836	0,13%	3,30%
Greece	no data	339	10.904	no data	3,11%
Hungary	11	300	9.877	0,11%	3,04%
Netherl.	58	508	16.829	0,35%	3,02%
Italy	68	1.815	60.783	0,11%	2,99%
Slovakia	2	146	5.416	0,04%	2,70%
Portugal	3,4	222	10.427	0,03%	2,12%
Finland	9,5	109	5.451	0,17%	2,00%
Croatia	2,3	70	4.247	0,05%	1,66%
Czech Rep.	15	155	10.512	0,14%	1,48%
Latvia	0,9	28	2.001	0,05%	1,39%
Estonia	no data	13	1.316	0,01%	1,00%
Lithuania	0,7	18	2.943	0,02%	0,60%
Poland	27	222	38.018	0,07%	0,58%
Bulgaria	1,4	40	7.246	0,02%	0,56%
Romania	no data	82	19.947	no data	0,41%

(Eurostat, 2015)

8.3. Appendix 3: Member States´ European Union Net Receiving in 2014

Table A3: Member state´s net receiving from the European Union in 2014

	Net Receiving (in million Euros)	Net Receiving (as percentage of the Gross National Income)
Hungary	5.682	5,64%
Bulgaria	1.824	4,45%
Lithuania	1.543	4,38%
Poland	13.748	3,47%
Latvia	800	3,35%
Romania	4.520	3,09%
Greece	5.163	2,89%
Estonia	474	2,49%
Malta	179	2,35%
Slovenia	794	2,17%
Czech Republic	3.004	2,08%
Portugal	3.211	1,88%
Slovakia	1.010	1,37%
Cyprus	115	0,69%
Croatia	173	0,42%
Luxembourg	80	0,27%
Spain	1.091	0,10%
Ireland	39	0,02%
United Kingdom	-4.930	-0,23%
Italy	-4.467	-0,28%
Denmark	-836	-0,32%
France	-7.165	-0,33%
Belgium	-1.478	-0,37%
Austria	-1.241	-0,38%
Finland	-809	-0,40%
Germany	-15.502	-0,52%
Sweden	-2.313	-0,52%
Netherlands	-4.711	-0,71%

(European Commission, 2015)

8.4. Appendix 4: European Union Countries´ Relative Economic Wealth in 2014

Table A4: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) in the European Union 2014

	GDP per Capita in PPS
Luxembourg	266
Ireland	134
Netherlands	131
Austria	129
Germany	126
Denmark	125
Sweden	123
Belgium	118
Finland	110
United Kingdom	109
France	107
EU 28 (Index = 100)	100
Italy	96
Spain	91
Malta	86
Czech Republic	84
Cyprus	82
Slovenia	82
Portugal	78
Slovakia	77
Estonia	76
Lithuania	75
Greece	73
Hungary	68
Poland	68
Latvia	64
Croatia	59
Romania	55
Bulgaria	47

(Eurostat, 2015)

8.5. Appendix 5: Respondents in Data Set across Countries

Table A5: Frequencies and percentages of respondents across countries

	Frequency	Percent
Germany	1610	5,8
United Kingdom	1317	4,7
Hungary	1061	3,8
Spain	1055	3,8
Czech Republic	1055	3,8
Slovenia	1046	3,7
Slovakia	1037	3,7
Poland	1033	3,7
Austria	1032	3,7
Croatia	1027	3,7
Sweden	1023	3,7
Romania	1018	3,6
Italy	1016	3,6
France	1012	3,6
Netherlands	1010	3,6
Greece	1009	3,6
Bulgaria	1006	3,6
Portugal	1005	3,6
Denmark	1004	3,6
Latvia	1003	3,6
Ireland	1002	3,6
Finland	1002	3,6
Estonia	1002	3,6
Lithuania	1002	3,6
Belgium	1001	3,6
Luxembourg	507	1,8
Malta	506	1,8
Cyprus	500	1,8
Total	27901	100

(Eurobarometer 82.3, 2014)

8.6. Appendix 6: European Citizens´ Attachments

Table A6: Respondents´ attachment - percentages

Attachment to...	City/town/village		Country		European Union		Europe	
	%	Valid %	%	Valid %	%	Valid %	%	Valid %
Not at all attached	2	2	1,5	1,5	16,3	16,6	12,1	12,3
Not very attached	8,6	8,6	5,6	5,7	36,5	37,3	29,6	30,2
Fairly attached	34,5	34,6	33,6	33,7	35,4	36,3	42,6	43,5
Very attached	54,7	54,8	59	59,2	9,5	9,8	13,7	14
Total Valid Percent	99,7	100	99,7	100	97,7	100	97,9	100
Don´t Know	0,3		0,3		2,3		2,1	
Total %	100		100		100		100	

(Eurobarometer 82.3, 2014)

Table A7: Respondents´ attachment across countries - means and standard deviations

Attachment to...	City/town/village		Country		European Union		Europe	
	Mean	Std. D.	Mean	Std. D.	Mean	Std. D.	Mean	Std. D.
Luxembourg	2,28	0,77	2,47	0,65	1,96	0,79	2,07	0,76
Denmark	2,45	0,71	2,85	0,40	1,43	0,88	1,97	0,81
Sweden	2,31	0,75	2,60	0,58	1,30	0,84	1,97	0,77
Hungary	2,42	0,78	2,49	0,71	1,52	0,93	1,85	0,89
Malta	2,39	0,87	2,72	0,55	1,68	0,94	1,83	0,93
Poland	2,54	0,60	2,56	0,60	1,69	0,79	1,79	0,77
Latvia	2,54	0,69	2,58	0,71	1,70	0,87	1,75	0,90
Romania	2,52	0,66	2,48	0,67	1,66	0,88	1,74	0,87
Germany	2,36	0,72	2,44	0,63	1,47	0,80	1,73	0,79
Finland	2,37	0,72	2,63	0,56	1,20	0,79	1,72	0,78
Belgium	2,25	0,79	2,25	0,76	1,59	0,85	1,66	0,84
Slovakia	2,52	0,64	2,51	0,60	1,51	0,81	1,64	0,80
Austria	2,55	0,65	2,55	0,63	1,34	0,87	1,63	0,82
France	2,23	0,84	2,53	0,65	1,49	0,88	1,61	0,87
Total	2,42	0,73	2,51	0,67	1,39	0,88	1,59	0,88
Czech Republic	2,21	0,72	2,23	0,70	1,14	0,82	1,56	0,84
Netherlands	2,04	0,86	2,29	0,74	1,17	0,82	1,55	0,81
Spain	2,50	0,68	2,28	0,87	1,45	0,91	1,51	0,91
Italy	2,46	0,70	2,41	0,70	1,35	0,87	1,49	0,85
Estonia	2,26	0,81	2,57	0,61	1,44	0,78	1,49	0,81
Croatia	2,47	0,71	2,39	0,76	1,36	0,86	1,48	0,88
Ireland	2,53	0,69	2,62	0,61	1,36	0,86	1,47	0,88
Bulgaria	2,69	0,58	2,69	0,59	1,27	0,93	1,43	0,93
Slovenia	2,46	0,73	2,51	0,66	1,31	0,84	1,42	0,86
Lithuania	2,41	0,75	2,52	0,67	1,28	0,86	1,40	0,90
Portugal	2,56	0,57	2,56	0,56	1,37	0,82	1,36	0,84
United Kingdom	2,38	0,76	2,36	0,78	1,20	0,86	1,32	0,87
Greece	2,68	0,60	2,73	0,52	1,01	0,90	1,16	0,93
Cyprus	2,43	0,76	2,62	0,63	0,95	0,85	1,06	0,90

(Eurobarometer 82.3, 2014)