

The principal and the executive: improving the relationship between municipalities, and theatres and concert halls

A mixed methods approach

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Preface

Before you lies my Master's thesis on the relationship between municipalities, and theatres and concert halls [TCHs]. Several people have contributed to this thesis and I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to them.

First of all, Sandra van Thiel who has been my thesis supervisor. She is straight to the point, gives sharp feedback and is always positive and friendly. For me this combination of characteristics made it very pleasant to work with her. In addition to this, she was also the first teacher (in all my years) to offer me tea during meetings, which is definitely a bonus in my book. Next, the VSCD who gave me an interesting research purpose to work with and always made me feel welcome when I was at their office. Also, I will never forget one of my first days at the office, when I ended up at an office farewell party learning how to make cocktails. That skill may never be listed on my resumé, but it is a life skill that I highly appreciate. Moreover, the interviewed municipalities and TCHs, and the survey respondents: I am very grateful that all of these people have taken the time to participate in the research. The interviews were very pleasant and informative and the survey results were very insightful. Jochem, Sanne, Gabriel, CP and Ru, all of you have taken the time to read either a few or several pages of my final concept. It means a lot to me that you were willing to do this for me. Furthermore, Lydia Jongmans from VNG, for helping me to reach out to municipalities. Also, my former statistics teacher Alex Lehr with whom I had two lengthy conversations about statistics. There are two reasons I visited Alex to talk about statistics: one, his office is on the ground floor of TvA 5 and therefore has very low key access and two, he is one of the most approachable teachers I have ever met, something I highly appreciate and deserves a compliment. I also want to express my gratitude to all of the other people who have helped me during this study. Finally, in the preface of my Bachelor's thesis I thanked my parents; they deserve another thank you now. Mom and Dad, I know that I always have a home to come back to and that is something that really matters.

By finishing this thesis, I will receive my Comparative Politics Administration and Society Master's degree from the Radboud University. Looking back on my years as a student, I feel as if I have absolutely made the most out of it. Of all the experiences I have had, I most fondly look back on the semesters when I studied abroad in South Africa and in China, as it has taught me a great deal that books could not. If there is any message that I can give to you based on those experiences, it is that you do not need to be the same to find a common ground and some mutual understanding; all you need to do is show interest and be open to changing your opinion.

Summary

The purpose of this thesis is to identify possible barriers within the relationship between municipalities, and theatre and concert halls [TCHs], resulting in recommendations to improve this relationship. The thesis describes the general characteristics and development of the relationship between municipalities and TCHs. To assess the relationship between municipalities and TCHs two theoretical models are used: the principal-agent and principal-steward theory. For the relationship to be well-functioning it is important that both parties choose the same type of relationship, either a principal-agent relationship or a principal-steward relationship. However, if the two parties choose a different type of relationship this leads to negative consequences. The choice each party makes for the relationship is based on three mechanisms, consisting of one or multiple sub-mechanisms. These mechanisms need to be aligned with the type of chosen relationship; otherwise a shift in the chosen relationship may occur. The relationship and presence of (sub) barriers are examined with a mixed methods design, consisting of a survey and semi-structured interviews. To analyse the survey results several methods are used, such as factor analysis, ordinal logistic regression, and the Kruskal-Wallis test. The results demonstrate that municipalities and TCHs are generally content with the relationship. Most relationships are an intermediate between a combined relationship (consisting of both principal-agent and principal-steward characteristics) and the principal-steward relationship; the principal-agent relationship rarely exists. Nevertheless, based on the results of both the survey and the interviews there is scope for improvement in the relationship. To improve the relationship, municipalities and TCHs in general need to discuss their expectations of the relationship, and the uniformity of the municipality needs to be improved. Moreover, the implementation of more principal-steward monitoring instruments should be considered. Furthermore, municipalities should discuss with TCHs how they perceive all sub mechanisms as they differ significantly in their perception. As far as the type of relationship is concerned, principal-agent relationships should improve their communication, the uniformity in the municipality and formalise their communication. Combined relationships should discuss their perception of the relationship and the belonging characteristics and consider implementing more principal-steward monitoring instruments. Principal-steward relationships should implement more principal-steward monitoring instruments. In general municipalities and TCHs should improve their knowledge and understanding of the other party and show appreciation and trust towards each other, to create a better relationship.

List of abbreviations

AS	Agent-steward (combined) relationship
BV	Besloten vennootschap (Private limited company)
HPHM	High programmability and high measurability
HPLM	High programmability and low measurability
KvK	Kamer van Koophandel (Chamber of Commerce)
LPHM	Low programmability and high measurability
LPLM	Low programmability and low measurability
OCW	Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschap
MUNs	Municipalities
NCE	Neo Classical Economics
NIE	New Institutional Economics
NPM	New Public Management
NV	Naamloos vennootschap (public limited company)
PA	Principal-agent relationship
PS	Principal-steward relationship
TCHs	Theatres and Concert Halls
VSCD	Vereniging van Schouwburg- en Concertgebouwdirecties
VNG	Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten
QUANGO	Quasi autonomous non-governmental organisation

Table of Contents

Preface	3
Summary	4
List of abbreviations	5
1. Introduction.....	8
1.1. General context	8
1.2. Problem definition	9
1.3. Societal relevance	9
1.4. Scientific relevance	10
1.5. Outline of the research	10
2. The development and characteristics of the relationship between municipalities and TCHs	11
2.1. Discourses on culture	11
2.2. Actors influencing TCHs	12
2.3. New Public Management	12
2.4. The effects of reform on cultural management in Europe	13
2.5. TCHs' development from municipal to autonomous organisations.....	14
2.6. The legal forms of autonomised TCHs	15
2.7. The financial and cultural relationship between municipalities and TCHs	16
3. Theoretical framework.....	18
3.1. Principal-agent theory	18
3.2. Principal-steward theory	20
3.3. Two extremes on a broad spectrum	23
3.4. Choosing a type of relationship	25
3.5. Expectations of the other party, and the barriers and solutions	30
3.6. Situational characteristics, and the barriers and solutions	33
3.7. Psychological characteristics, and the barriers and solutions	37
3.8. Summary	40
3.9. Hypotheses	42
4. Methodology	44
4.1. Operationalisation	44
4.2. Research design	50
4.3. Data collection	51
4.4. Data analysis	53
4.5. Validity and reliability	60
5. Analysis	63

5.1. Type of relationship	63
5.2. Types of barriers	70
5.3 Summary	87
5.4 Hypotheses.....	88
6. Conclusion	89
6.2. Answer to the research question	94
6.3. Recommendations.....	96
6.4. Reflection on research, outcomes and theory	99
6.5. Further research	102
References.....	103
Appendices.....	107
APPENDIX I: List of interview respondents.....	108
APPENDIX II : Geographical distribution of survey respondents	109
APPENDIX III: Overview of municipalities’ and TCHs’ average scores on sub barriers	111
APPENDIX IV: Overview of types of relationships’ average scores on sub-barriers.....	113
APPENDIX V: Model goodness-of-fit scores ordinal logistic regression.....	116
APPENDIX VI: Survey municipalities.....	118
APPENDIX VII: Survey TCHs	127
APPENDIX VIII: Interview manual for municipalities.....	136
APPENDIX IX: Interview manual for TCHs	138

1. Introduction

This chapter is the introduction to the thesis. Section 1.1. discusses the general context and the cause for this research. Section 1.2. contains the problem definition. Section 1.3. explains the relevance of the research for both science and society. Finally, an outline of the thesis is given.

1.1. General context

According to the Dutch government policy on culture of 2002 (Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschap [OCW], 2012, p.9) more than seventy-five percent of Dutch citizens considers art and culture important for Dutch society and eighty-five percent considers art and culture important for the development of children. According to these numbers the Dutch highly value culture, which gives an incentive for research aimed at improving cultural policy.

The Vereniging van Schouwburg- en Concertgebouwdirecties [VSCD] has observed that the relationship between municipalities and theatres and concert halls [TCHs] has been changing for some time now (VSCD, personal communication, 2015). This development is foremost the consequence of the majority of TCHs becoming a quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisation [QUANGO]. The two main causes for this trend of TCHs being autonomised are cuts in the budget of municipalities and a general change in the political and societal perception of culture (VSCD, personal communication, 2015). The relationship with the municipality is vital for many members of the VSCD, the organisation that represents the interests of TCHs. Many municipalities are not only responsible for financial support, but also a partner for TCHs in the development of policy on performing arts. Since the relation between municipalities and TCHs is highly important and because this relationship is often under great pressure, the VSCD is looking for characteristics that influence the relationship between these two parties and a framework in which a healthy relation can be established. Both municipalities and TCHs benefit from a positive relationship since this leads to a thriving arts environment (VSCD, personal communication, 2015).

Generally, little is known about how cultural organisations are affected by policies and governance. This area of research has been generally neglected (Lindqvist, 2012, p.9). Arts and cultural organisations are influenced by legislation, regulation, politics and professional ideas. In a sector that is to a large extent dependent on the government and their political decisions, it is important to understand how governance affects the management conditions of cultural organisations. If inappropriate governance restrains the management of these organisations, the boards of cultural organisations will not be able to execute their task effectively (Lindqvist, 2012, p.10).

In this research the principal-agent and principal-steward theory are used. These theories focus on the nature of the relationship between a principal and an executive. In the case of municipalities and TCHs, the municipality can be regarded as a principal while the TCH can be regarded as an executive. If both parties choose the same type of relationship, this leads to a well-functioning relationship. However, if both parties choose a different type of relationship, this leads to one of the parties feeling betrayed and frustrated (see chapter 3 for more elaboration). This research focuses on how the relationship between municipalities and TCHs can be depicted, what barriers are in existence and how these barriers can be overcome.

1.2. Problem definition

The research purpose of this thesis is as follows:

The purpose of this thesis is to identify possible barriers within the relationship between municipalities and TCHs, resulting in recommendations to improve this relationship.

Research question:

How can the barriers be overcome and the relationship between municipalities and TCHs be improved?

Sub-questions:

1. How have TCHs developed into autonomous organisations?
2. How can the relation between municipalities and TCHs be arranged?
3. Which barriers to a good governance relationship exist between municipalities and TCHs?
4. How do municipalities and TCHs assess their relationship?

1.3. Societal relevance

This study contributes to a better relationship and understanding between municipalities and TCHs. TCHs provide a public service by offering performance arts to a substantial number of inhabitants of the Netherlands; in 2014 Dutch TCHs had 10.4 million visitors and offered 29.801 performances in total (numbers of VSCD members only) (VSCD, 2015). The outcomes of this research provide recommendations to improve the relationship between municipalities and TCHs; this is beneficial for both parties. Furthermore, for municipalities this research can provide relevant insights for potential improvements of their relationship with other autonomous organisations, both inside and outside the cultural sector.

1.4. Scientific relevance

This research uses two models, the principal-agent and principal-steward theory, to examine the relationship between municipalities and TCHs. Both of these theories have been applied on a regular basis in the private sector, but less often in the public sector (Van Slyke, 2006). With the help of a nationally distributed survey, the results provide new insights into how these two theories manifest themselves in a public sector. As the public sector is different from the private sector in many ways, these insights are valuable and may be able to contribute to the use of principal-agent and principal-steward theories in the public sector at large. Moreover, the research provides a public administration point of view on the cultural sector, which is scarce. Up until now, there has been little research on how municipalities and TCHs have shaped their relations (VSCD, personal communication, 2015).

1.5. Outline of the research

Chapter 2 provides information on the development and characteristics of the relationship between municipalities and TCHs, as this is valuable to better understand the unique context of the relationship. Chapter 3 is the theoretical framework that explains the two theoretical models used in this study: the principal-agent and the principal-steward theory. Moreover, the barriers to a well-functioning relationship and their solutions are explained. Chapter 4 explains the methodological choices that were made, how the research was conducted and the limitations to this study. Chapter 5 discusses the results of the survey and the interviews on the barriers and solutions. Finally, chapter 6 provides a conclusion in. In this conclusion the research question is answered, reflection on the research, theory and outcomes is given, and recommendations for further research are presented.

2. The development and characteristics of the relationship between municipalities and TCHs

This chapter provides insight into how municipalities and TCHs have established a relationship, the reasons for establishing this relationship and how this relationship has developed through time. This information is valuable for better understanding the relationship between municipalities and TCHs nowadays. Section 2.1. explains the general discourse on the perception and valuation of. Section 2.2. covers the different actors influencing TCHs.

Section 2.3. explains New Public Management and its influence on the public sector. Section 2.4. discusses the effect of reforms (as influenced by New Public Management) on cultural management. Section 2.5. describes the development of TCHs from municipal organisations to autonomous organisations. Section 2.6. covers the four legal forms for autonomous TCHs in the Netherlands. Finally, the financial and cultural relationship between municipalities and TCHs is depicted.

2.1. Discourses on culture

There are three discourses on how people perceive and value culture. These discourses influence the decisions made in relation to TCHs. The first discourse on culture is the economic discourse. Economics is commonly used to establish framework for the analysis of the cultural sector and is additionally used as justification for the public funding of culture (Pratt, 2005, p.36). The second discourse is the social one, which is concerned with the location of culture and its benefits for society (Pratt, 2005, p.38). The third discourse is the ideological or political one and can be divided into three perspectives (Pratt, 2005, p.37). Firstly, the humanist perspective perceives culture as uplifting and civilising for people. Secondly, the aesthetic notion that believes the creation and appreciation of art brings people closer to sublime values. Finally, there is the discourse of nationalism that believes art contributes to nation-state building by establishing and deepening the national identity (Pratt, 2005, p.38).

2.2. Actors influencing TCHs

Although this research focuses on the relationship between municipalities and TCHs, it should be taken into account that there are five other potential actors. These actors can be regarded as stakeholders who influence the policies and performance of TCHs all to a different extent (Langeveld, 2009, p.15):

1. The owner(s) of the TCH;
2. Visitors and potential visitors;
3. Performers;
4. Financers; and
5. Staff of the TCH.

2.3. New Public Management

This section describes New Public Management [NPM], as it has largely influenced management styles and instruments in the public sector and therefore management styles and instruments in the cultural sector. NPM is a management trend that started to grow around 1975 and can be linked to four other administrative trends, namely:

1. The downsizing of government;
2. A shift toward privatisation and semi-privatisation;
3. The development of automation, especially in information technology; and
4. The progression of a more international agenda (Hood, 1991, p.3).

Hood (1991, p.4) states that the concept of NPM is a broad one, that has been used by several authors who have stressed different aspects of NPM. Pollitt (2007, p.110) regards NPM as a two level phenomenon. At the higher level the main assumption is that the public sector would become more efficient and effective by introducing concepts, techniques and values from the private sector. At the lower level NPM consist of several key concepts and practices. Based on Hood (1991), Pollitt (2007) and Klijn (2014), NPM has four general characteristics:

1. Strong emphasis on performance. Desired output and outcomes and performance indicators are explicitly defined so performance can be measured.
2. Introduction of market mechanisms, which results in more temporary contracts and overall greater competition in the public sector.
3. Transforming larger organisations and units into smaller and more specialised organisations and units. Moreover, the privatisation and contracting out of governmental organisations.
4. Viewing service users as 'customers'.

However, NPM creates several tensions. There is the tension between “gaining political control over bureaucracies and free managers; between savings and improving performance; between motivating staff and weakening tenure and between improving quality and cutting costs” (Klijn, 2014, p.205). In other words, NPM tries to improve certain features in an organisation, while at the same time cutting budgets and thereby minimising means to improve these features.

Since the introduction of NPM in the Netherlands, government organisations have started to hive off units and tasks (Stellinga, 2012). The last few years many TCHs have become autonomised as well (Langeveld, 2009, p.39).

2.4. The effects of reform on cultural management in Europe

Lindqvist (2012) has studied the effects of public sector reforms on the management of cultural organisations in Europe, many of these can be directly linked to NPM. These effects give an insight into current management styles in the cultural sector and thereby provide a general idea on the current environment TCHs operate in.

Lindqvist (2012) divides the effects into the category sector-level effects and organisational-level effects. The sector-level effects consist of four trends (Lindqvist, 2012). First of all, there are generally more sources of funding available in Europe, but the majority of these funds are granted on a project basis. This has resulted in an increase in short-term employment contracts (Lindqvist, 2012, p.19). Secondly, there has been a growth in public-private partnerships, new trusts and agencies and bodies with different degrees of autonomy, creating new organisational forms. This has led to more heterogeneous relationships between executive organisations, agencies and governments (Lindqvist, 2012, p.19). Thirdly, decentralisation has led to fragmentation of the control that higher state institutions have over lower state institutions. This decentralisation of decision-making is often referred to as ‘hollowing out of the state’ (Lindqvist, 2012, p. 21). Fourthly, the focus on evidence-based governance has led to an increase in external audits. The evidence-based approach has been introduced in many European countries since the 90s. Cultural organisations are expected to generate social, cultural and economic benefits for society (cf. discourses on culture in section 2.1) (Lindqvist, 2012, p.22).

The organisational-level effects have resulted in four trends as well. Firstly, ‘policy attachment’ has risen. This is a strategy whereby cultural organisations link the societal value of their own activities to more influential policy areas, such as the economy for example (Lindqvist, 2012, p.22). An example is a TCH that programmes performances on Sunday evening and says that as a result of this more people visit the city centre on a Sunday evening. The TCH can argue that this results in an increase of customers for local restaurants, bars and pubs and consequently in an increase of revenues (attachment

to local economy). Secondly, managerialisation refers to the increase of management techniques, which focus on organisational demands and outcomes, such as auditing. This is also called ‘instrumentalisation’ (Lindqvist, 2012, p.22). Thirdly, there is a focus on managing through audits and symbolic management, which leads to management focusing on performing well on audits, instead of realising the actual goals (Lindqvist, 2012, p.22). With the increase of implementing management techniques there is less attention for attaining the actual goals, instead of the measured goals (cf. section 3.6.2). Finally, there is a rise in management problems. Due to frozen or reduced public funding the salary levels in the sector have decreased, this has a two-fold effect. As a result of lower salary levels, there is a decrease in the number of people interested in having a career in the cultural sector. In addition to this, financial pressure combined with increasing monitoring leads to professional tensions for cultural managers. Managers have less autonomy and less funds available, this can result in decreased job satisfaction and increased frustration and tension for the manager (Lindqvist, 2012, p.23).

2.5. TCHs’ development from municipal to autonomous organisations

Thus far, the motivations for autonomisation (NPM) and the effects of reform on cultural management in Europe have been explained. This section focuses on the TCH sector and describes how the majority of TCHs has developed from municipal organisations into autonomous organisations.

Until the Second World War TCHs in the Netherlands were usually owned by a group of citizens, although in some larger cities TCHs were occasionally exploited by entrepreneurs or municipalities (Langeveld, 2009, p.39). After the Second World War it became nearly impossible for TCHs to operate without governmental financial support. As a result, citizens and other operators started to sign over their TCHs to municipalities (Langeveld, 2009, p.39). In addition to this, municipalities started to establish and operate new TCHs due to their newly developed active cultural policies (Langeveld, 2009, p.39). As local authorities became more involved in developing cultural policies, the role of the government in the cultural field started to change. Large numbers of municipalities created special units in their organisation that became responsible for local TCHs (Langeveld, 2009, p.39).

More recently, municipalities have started to autonomise cultural activities. This includes TCHs, of which many have been autonomised over the last few years (Langeveld, 2009, p.39). One of the main reasons for this autonomisation, besides the general national tendency of municipalities to hive off departments and units, was a policy document of the Underminister of Culture Rick van der Ploeg (1998-2002). His policy document ‘Een Ondernemende Cultuur’ from 1999 (An entrepreneurial culture) led to increased attention for cultural entrepreneurship within TCHs (VSCD, personal communication, 2015). The idea of cultural entrepreneurship was meant to give cultural policy a new impulse in the modern economy. Culture should provide art-cultural value, but also business and societal profit (Van der Leden, 2013, p.102). This meant a shift from the dominant ideological/political

discourse to more emphasis on the economic and social discourse of culture (cf. section 2.1). Culture had to become more business-like and autonomisation was generally regarded as an effective way to establish this change.

2.6. The legal forms of autonomised TCHs

The former section described the development of TCHs from primarily municipal organisations into autonomous organisations. This section briefly explains the four options for legal forms of autonomous TCHs in the Netherlands. These four forms are the foundation (stichting), association (vereniging), private limited company (besloten vennootschap) [BV] and public limited company (naamloze vennootschap) [NV]. Most TCHs are either a foundation or a public limited company (Langeveld, 2009, p.41).

Foundation

A foundation is a legal form that is most commonly used for an organisation with a societal goal that has access to capital. A foundation has a board, but no members. A foundation is obliged to invest its profit in furthering its goals. The board of the foundation is not employed by the foundation but can receive a compensation for their work. A foundation can also hire employees. The foundation is a legal entity, which means the management is not accountable for debts in the case of liabilities (Kamer van Koophandel [KvK], 2014, p.26).

Association

The association is suitable for an organisation that wishes to realise its goals by means of cooperation. An association has to have at least two members and the highest power is vested in the general assembly, where usually all members have one vote. The general assembly appoints the board of the association (KvK, 2014, p.21).

There are two kinds of associations. Firstly, the association with full legal capacity that has to be registered by a notary with statutes. Statutes contain the name, location, purpose, membership obligations and rules for the appointment and removal of directors of the association. The board is not financially responsible for liabilities. Secondly, there is the association with limited legal capacity in which the board is financially accountable when liabilities occur. Moreover, this type of association is unable to inherit or own registered goods such as buildings (KvK, 2014, p.21).

Private limited company (BV)

A BV can have one or multiple owners, who are employed by the company and act on behalf of the company. The BV is a legal entity in itself, which means owners are not financially accountable. The capital of the BV is divided into shares that are owned by shareholder(s). These shareholder(s) have the highest power vested within the BV (KvK, 2014, p.7).

Public limited company (NV)

The NV is similar to the BV. Within the NV the capital is also divided into shares, with the difference that the shares of the NV are freely tradable. This means the shares can be traded without intervention of a notary (KvK, 2014, p.11).

2.7. The financial and cultural relationship between municipalities and TCHs

This section focuses on the financial and cultural dimension in the relationship between municipalities and TCHs. This section explains these two dimensions in the relationship, and the belonging negative and positive governmental views on subsidising TCHs.

The financial and cultural dimension

The relation between municipalities and TCHs can be divided into two general dimensions according to Graafland (2002). Firstly, the financial relationship that concerns the municipal subsidies provided to TCHs. Subsidies can potentially lead to strong dependence on the side of the TCH which eventually can lead to (partial) obstruction of the development of the organisation (Graafland, 2002, p.23).

Secondly, the cultural intrinsic relationship concerning how municipalities envision cultural policy and the role TCHs have in implementing these policies (Graafland, 2002, p.24). These two dimensions simultaneously play a role in the positive or negative views municipalities (politics) have towards subsidising TCHs.

Negative views on subsidising TCHs

There are two prominent negative views on TCHs according to Graafland (2002, p.24). Firstly, the ‘swimming pool syndrome’ that occurs when municipalities regard TCHs as an elitist facility such as swimming pools. TCHs are perceived as luxuries that are not essential, but do take up a large share of the municipal budget. Secondly, the ‘beggars’ syndrome’ occurs when municipalities perceive TCHs as ‘beggars’ when they ask for extra subsidy, even if their request for extra funding is justified (Graafland, 2014, p.24). Furthermore, path dependency within political parties plays a part in the (financial) policy on TCHs as well. Once political parties have chosen to take a certain stand it is difficult for new aldermen and council members to divert from this position. Political parties or members who divert of

their former position frequently receive critique from opposing parties and the public. This makes it difficult for political parties to change the policies on TCHs, even if current policies are hindering the TCHs from operating adequately (Graafland, 2002, p.24).

Positive views on subsidising TCHs

There are several reasons why municipalities subsidise TCHs, all of these are part of the discourses on culture (cf. section 2.1). As part of the economic discourse, there are two reasons for subsidising.

Firstly, the presence of performing arts in a region can be used to attract companies and investments to the area. When a company is looking for a place to settle, cultural variety is usually considered an asset to the area (Langeveld, 2009, p.181). Secondly, shows and concerts often attract tourists who stimulate the local economy by using other services in the region as well (Langeveld, 2009, p.183).

Following the social discourse there are two reasons for subsidising. Firstly, performing arts have a social-cultural function as they provide a meeting place for citizens (Langeveld, 2009, p.185).

Secondly, giving out subsidies can serve a redistributive motive. By using the subsidy to lower entrance prices (sometimes for particular groups such as students or the elderly), art performances become more accessible for people with lower levels of income (Langeveld, 2009, p.185).

As part of the ideological/political discourse on culture there are four reasons for subsidising TCHs.

Firstly, in some countries the government tries to stimulate the use of certain goods by citizens. In those countries performing arts are considered as one of these merit goods and therefore consumption should be stimulated (Langeveld, 2009, p.179). Secondly, certain art performances have a historical value, which can be considered important to protect for future generations (Langeveld, 2009, p.183). Thirdly, the buildings in which TCHs are located are often public or collective goods. Therefore, citizens should be able to access these buildings (Langeveld, 2009, p.182). Finally, (local) governments can be interested in the positive external effect of TCHs. External effects are side effects that are not entailed in price and market mechanisms. In case of TCHs, these are increased local and national pride and an improvement in the general state of wellbeing (Langeveld, 2009, p.180).

3. Theoretical framework

This chapter encompasses the principal-agent and principal-steward theories. These theories provide a lens through which the relationship between municipalities and TCHs can be looked at. In the relationship between municipalities and TCHs, municipalities are principals as they commission orders, and TCHs are executives as they provide services in exchange for funding. The principal-agent and principal-steward are both theories able to explain the nature of the relationship between principals and executives and what barriers could exist, by providing a set of characteristics which influence the type of relationship that exists.

Section 3.1. elucidates the principal-agent theory. Section 3.2. elucidates the principal-steward theory. Section 3.3. connects the two theories to each other. Section 3.4. explains the consequences of choosing a type of relationship and which mechanisms are responsible for the chosen relationship. Section 3.5. explains the expectations mechanism, and the barriers and solutions. Section 3.6. explains the situational characteristics mechanism, and the barriers and solutions. Section 3.7. explains the psychological characteristics mechanism, and the barrier and solutions. Section 3.8. summarises the theory. Section 3.9. contains the hypotheses based on the theory.

3.1. Principal-agent theory

This section explains the principal-agent theory and its main characteristics. The principal-agent theory originates in the New Institutional Economics [NIE] theory (Mol et al., 1997; Moe, 1984). NIE was preceded by the Neo Classical Economics theory [NCE].

NCE assumes actors are able to make completely rational and optimal choices; there is little attention for the complexity and limitations of the context in which actors operate. Whereas NCE views individuals as able to make completely rational and optimal choices, NIE takes complex circumstances into account that limit the possibility to make completely rational and optimal choices. NIE has eye for the institutional context and limitations imposed by politics, law and society. Moreover, NIE take into account that individuals in an organisation may have divergent goals and pays attention to constraints on the availability of information. NIE consists out of three main schools of which the principal-agent theory is one.

3.1.1. Characteristics of the principal-agent theory

Principal-agent theory can be used to explain relationship between a principal and an agent. The theory assumes that social life is a series of contracts between the buyer of goods and services (the principal) and the provider of goods and services (the agent) (Waterman & Meier, 1998; Bozeman, 2000). Many relationships in organisations or between organisations encompass characteristics of the principal-agent theory according to Ross (1973, p.134). The majority of articles on the principal-agent relationship mention six main characteristics (see table 1 for an overview).

First of all, there is goal conflict between the principal and the agent since their personal goals diverge. This is termed the agency problem and occurs when cooperating parties have diverging goals and a division of labour (Eisenhardt, 1989, p.58). Secondly, in addition to the divergence of goals, both parties try to maximise their own payoff. This is based on the idea that people are foremost motivated by self-interest (Shapiro, 2005). Thirdly, the principal is able to observe the outcomes of the work of the agent, but unable to observe the actions undertaken by the agent (Miller, 2005, p.205). This causes information asymmetry between the two parties. Due to this information asymmetry, it is challenging for the principal to assess whether the agent takes advantage of this particular condition and displays opportunistic behaviour (Shapiro, 2005, p.264). Although there are authors who depict a principal-agent relationship with information symmetry (a relationship in which the principal is perfectly informed) (Caerse et al., 2006; Levinthal, 1988), the majority of scholars assume that information asymmetry is inherent to the principal-agent relationship. Fourthly, expenditures caused by a principal who is unable to align his or her goals with those of the agent is known as ‘agency costs’ or ‘the principal’s problem’ (Miller, 2005, p.204). Fifthly, when information asymmetry occurs the principal is unaware of the productivity of the executive and the honest prices for his or her services and goods, ‘Moral Hazard’ can occur (Moe, 1984; Shapiro, 2005). An agent can display Moral Hazard in two ways; by overcharging their services and goods or by exposing low levels of effort, also referred to as shirking (Dees, 1992; Van Thiel, 2015). Due to the self-serving nature of the agent the probability of the agent displaying Moral Hazard increases when an agent is assured of income and therefore Moral Hazard is nearly risk free (Miller, 2008, p.351). Finally, when the principal is incapable of assessing the ability and competence of an agent adverse selection arises. The agent might overstate their abilities resulting in the principal suffering from the deceit of their agents (Eisenhardt, 1989; Mitnick, 2008; Shapiro, 2005).

The theory is based on economic rationality; people are motivated by extrinsic factors, which are tangible and economic. People behaving as agents generally do not identify with the organisation they work for, rely on power tied to their position within the organisation and are usually part of an organisation in which the management philosophy can be described as control-oriented (Davis et al., 1997a, p.34). Moreover, agents have an individualistic life perspective which manifests itself in putting

less value on harmony within the workplace, usually being short-term oriented when it comes to relationships and having low trust in others (Davis et al., 1997a, p.34). Finally, their work environment or local culture usually values hierarchy (Davis et al., 1997a, p.35).

3.1.2. Critique on the principal-agent theory

The principal-agent theory has received a fair amount of criticism by several authors through the years. First of all, some authors claim the principal-agent theory oversimplifies human beings (Davis et al., 1997a). As humans are said to be motivated by more than self-interest alone, the principal-agent theory is incapable of explaining certain behaviour encountered in organisations. Moreover, the agency theory ignores notions such as worker loyalty, pride and identification with the organisation (Davis et al., 1997a). Davis et al. (1997a) perceive goal convergence between principal and executive as possible. Secondly, principal-agent theory is said to be inadequate as a framework when an information gap exists and therefore the services and goods provided by the executive cannot be competently measured or observed (Van Slyke, 2006, p.163). However, Eisenhardt (1989) says this manifestation of the information gap is the core of the principal-agent theory since the situations in which this problem arises are the situations in which contracting is problematic. Finally, an organisation designed with the principal-agent theory in mind can result in a self-fulfilling prophecy (Davis et al, 1997a, p.27). In other words, an organisation that lives by the principles of the principal-agent theory will lead to the people in the organisation behaving as agents. In consonance with Davis et al., Podrug et al. (2010) argue that consistently analysing behaviour in an organisation from a principal-agent point of view can result in negative consequences. They argue that there should be a focus on the principal's behaviour and the consequences of this behaviour on the agent's wellbeing simultaneously.

The most prominent criticism of the principal-agent theory states that the principal-agent theory is incapable of explaining all behaviour demonstrated in organisations. Nevertheless, the theory is capable of explaining a certain amount of behaviour, which manifests within organisations. Therefore, the principal-agent theory, as explained in this theoretical framework, will be used to assess the relationship between municipalities and TCHs in this research.

3.2. Principal-steward theory

The principal-steward theory was developed as an alternative to the principal-agent theory (Van Slyke, 2007, p.164). Some authors (Davis et al., 1997; Van Thiel, 2015) view the principal-steward theory as an economic theory while others say the theoretical basis lies in psychology and sociology (Van Puyvelde et al., 2012; Caers et al., 2006).

3.2.1. Characteristics of the principal-steward theory

Whereas in the principal-agent theory the executive is considered an agent, in the principal-steward theory the executive is considered a steward. According to Van Puyvelde et al. (2012, p.436) two branches exist within the principal-steward theory. The first branch is based on the absence of goal conflict between the agent and the principal. The steward prioritises the goals of the principal above its own, to, in the end, realise higher-end personal goals such as personal achievement, affiliation and self-actualisation. The appreciation and rewards of cooperation in the long term are greater than self-interest in the short term (Davis et al., 1997a, p.24). The second branch assumes the goals of the steward and principal are aligned (Van Puyvelde et al., 2012, p.436). The steward's interests, motivations and personal goals are directly affiliated to the objectives of the organisation (Davis et al., 1997a, p.25). Goal convergence is regarded as an ideal type of the principal-steward relationship in this research since extremes (such as complete goal convergence) are uncommon and can therefore be considered ideal types. Ideal types refer to an abstract model of optimal characteristics of the theory, which usually are not optimally present in reality (see table 1 below for the optimal characteristics of both models).

In general, the principal-steward theory assumes long-term contractual relations are based on "trust, reputation, collective goals and involvement where alignment is an outcome that is created by relational reciprocity" (Van Slyke, 2007, p.164). As a result of a relationship in which both parties highly value and invest in cooperation the convergence of goals occurs gradually over time. Moreover, the theory is based on altruistic principles: people have a desire for self-actualisation (Maslow) and are motivated by intrinsic rewards (Davis et al., 1997a). Stewards are interested in realising higher end goals and are motivated by other means than salaries and other tangible incentives. The intrinsic rewards motivating stewards are trust, reputational enhancement, discretion and autonomy level of responsibility, job satisfaction, stability and tenure and mission alignment according to Van Slyke (2007, p.165).

People behaving as stewards generally identify themselves with the organisation they work for, rely on power tied to their personality instead of to their position and are usually part of an organisation in which the management philosophy can be described as involvement-management, focused on giving them challenges and responsibility (Davis et al., 1997a, p.32). Moreover, stewards have a collective life perspective. This manifests itself in putting high value on harmony within the workplace, a preference for long-term relationships, having high trust in others and defining success not as individual success but as success of the group (Davis et al., 1997a, p.34). Finally, their work environment or local cultural usually does not value hierarchy and tends to marginalise inequalities (Davis et al., 1997a, p.35).

Table 1 Ideal types of principal-agent and principal-steward theory

Principal-agent	Principal-steward
Conflicting goals (focus on conflict)	Similar goals (focus on cooperation)
Information asymmetry perceived as a liability	Information asymmetry not perceived as a liability
Opportunistic behaviour	Mutual trust
Executives motivated by extrinsic rewards	Executives motivated by intrinsic rewards
Control oriented management	Involvement oriented management
Executive low identification with organisation	Executive high identification with organisation

3.2.2. Critique on the principal-steward theory

The principal-steward theory has received critique as well. The core of the critique is that the principal-steward theory is part of the principal-agent theory, instead of a theory in its own right. Albanese et al. (1997, p.609) criticise Davis et al. (1997a) for having confused the agency (principal-agent) theory with the agency problem. The agency problem assumes a divergence of interests between agents and principals. Principal-agent theory assumes principals and agents behave as rational actors and therefore are focused on actualising their own interests (Albanese et al., 1997, p.609).

Rational actors are actors who identify their needs, prioritise these and actively try to accomplish these wants (Albanese et al., 1997, p.610). However, occasionally agents are unable to realise their wants because their behaviour is irrational or contains errors. Furthermore, the needs of rational actors can vary from self-centred to altruistic (Albanese et al., 1997, p.610). In other words, rational actors can be considered behaving as stewards instead of as agents if their behaviour is irrational, their behaviour contains errors or if their wants are altruistic by nature. Consequently, in some cases the needs and behaviour of agents can be identical to the interests of the principals (Albanese et al., 1997, p.609). Therefore, Albanese et al. (1997, p.609) consider it incorrect to assume the principal-agent theory suggests the agent will always behave in an undesired manner due to self-interest. Moreover, focus on long-term relationships, trust and value commitment are mentioned as characteristics of the principal-steward relationship, although these characteristics are part of the principal-agent theory as well according to Albanese et al. (1997, p.609). Additionally, over time both principal-agent and principal-steward relationships can manifest within the same organisation and interest convergence or divergence may occur (Albanese et al., 1997, p.610). Finally, they suggest adding these ‘new’ perspectives of the principal-steward theory to the existing principal-agent framework to constitute a more comprehensive principal-agent theory. They claim several of the conditions used to explain stewardship behaviour are actually part of the principal-agent theory as well (Albanese et al., 1997, p.609).

Davis et al. (1997) have replied to the critique of Albanese et al. (1997) and argue that the principal-agent theory they have used in their article is based on the originators and major scholars in this area. According to Davis et al. (1997b, p.611) these scholars claim the chief constituent of the principal-agent theory is the substantial divergence of interests between principals and agents, which causes the agency problem to manifest. The realisation of the agency problem explains the need for frequent and strict control mechanisms. In other words, the agency problem (the divergence of interests) is at the heart of the principal-agent theory (Davis et al., 1997b, p.611). Davis et al. (1997b, p.612) oppose the argument that irrationally behaving actors can lead to stewardship behaviour by saying they have examined stewardship behaviour in the framework of rational actors. This examination has demonstrated that stewardship behaviour can be considered rational behaviour. On the other hand, Davis et al. (1997b, p.612) acknowledge the argument of Albanese et al. that over time relationships within an organisation and the interests of actors can alter. Moreover, they acknowledge it is possible for agent and steward relationships to exist simultaneously within organisations.

According to Schillemans (2013) the principal-steward theory is still in the stage of development. Therefore, the critique on the principal-steward theory is an ongoing debate and there are still adaptations and additions made to the theory. Nonetheless, this section has tried to give an overview of the most substantial and recent critique on the principal-steward theory.

3.3. Two extremes on a broad spectrum

Some authors portray the principal-agent and principal-steward theory as two separate theories (Van Slyke, 2006; Davis et al., 1997a). However, the critique (as mentioned in sections 3.2 and 3.3) on both models demonstrates there is an ongoing debate on the prominence of certain characteristics in each theory and on whether both theories should be regarded as one theory or as two separate theories. Albanese et al. (1997) and Caers et al. (2006) assert that the two theories should not be regarded as separate, but that the principal-steward theory should be integrated into the principal-agent theory. On the other hand, Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003, p.398) state: “Agency and stewardship theories are contrasting, yet potentially complementary approaches to governance”. Moreover, several authors assert that the type of relationship can alter over time and agent and stewardship relationships can exist simultaneously within the same organisation (Davis et al., 1997b; Albanese et al., 1997). Based on this critique it may be more suitable to consider the principal-agent and principal-steward theory as extremes on a broad spectrum instead of considering them as two separate entities (see figure 1). Every principal-executive relationship consist of several of the aforementioned characteristics (see table 1), either belonging to the principal-agent or principal-steward theory.



Figure 1: Principal-agent and principal-steward continuum (based on Koolen, 2015).

Based on the aforementioned critique, this study regards the degree to which several characteristics are present as the determinant for the placement of each relationship in the relationship spectrum (see figure 2 below). In this spectrum, 1 represents the ideal type of the principal-agent theory, meaning all principal-agent characteristics are highly present and principal-steward characteristics are present to a minimum. The value 2 represents a relationship in which principal-agent characteristics are strongly present and principal-steward characteristics are marginally present. The value 3 is the combined (neutral) relationship in which both principal-agent and principal-steward characteristics are evidently present to (nearly) the same degree. The value 4 represents a relationship in which principal-steward characteristics are strongly present and principal-agent characteristics are marginally present. The value 5 represents the ideal type of the principal-steward theory, in which all principal-steward characteristics are highly present and principal-agent characteristics are present to a minimum. Value 1 and value 5 are considered ideal types and therefore not expected to (frequently) occur in reality, while relationships with values between 2 and 4 are expected to occur frequently in reality. Over time a relationship may shift from one side of the spectrum towards the other side of the spectrum.




Figure 2: Principal-agent/steward relationship spectrum

3.4. Choosing a type of relationship

When TCHs were hived off, this led to the establishment of a new relationship between municipalities and TCHs; as TCHs become independent, municipalities no longer have direct control over the TCH. Therefore, the relationship had to be redetermined by both parties. In the relationship between the principal and executive there are several mechanisms that determine the kind of relationship that is established. This section explains the consequences of the chosen relationship and which mechanisms are responsible for the chosen relationship.

3.4.1. The consequences of the chosen relationship

The chosen relationship has consequences (see table 2 below). When both parties choose a principal-steward relationship this can potentially lead to an optimal performance of the organisation, according to Davis et al. (1997a, p.38). There is respect and trust between both parties (Van Thiel, 2014a). If both parties choose a principal-agent relationship this leads to potential risk costs being minimalised (Davis et al., 1997a, p.38). In this relationship, there is mutual distrust and many monitoring and controlling mechanisms are in place (Van Thiel, 2014a). However, if both parties choose a different type of relationship this can create barriers to a well-functioning and satisfactory relationship. If the principal chooses a principal-agent relationship and the executive chooses a principal-steward relationship this leads to the executive feeling betrayed (Davis et al., 1997a, p.38). The executive feels distrusted and controlled too excessively, which causes frustration (Empty Nest Syndrome) (Van Thiel, 2014a). If the principal chooses a principal-steward relationship and the executive chooses a principal-agent relationship, this can lead to the principal feeling betrayed and the executive showing opportunistic behaviour (Moral Hazard) (Davis et al, 1997a, p.38). The type of relationship that manifests is usually the results of the risks that principals are willing to take (Davis et al., 1997a, p.26). When both parties have chosen the same type of relationship there is no immediate cause for friction. However, when they both choose a different type of relationship, this leads to one party feeling betrayed and frustrated, which eventually results in a strain on the entire relationship.

The next sections explain the Empty Nest Syndrome and Moral Hazard, as both of these are symptoms of a dysfunctional relationship between the principal and the executive.

Table 2 Consequences of chosen relationship

		Principal	
		Choosing the principal-agent relationship	Choosing the principal-steward relationship
Executive	Choosing the principal-agent relationship	Minimisation of potential risk costs	The executive shows opportunistic behaviour while the principal feeling betrayed (Moral hazard)
	Choosing the principal-steward relationship	Executive feeling betrayed and excessively controlled (Empty nest syndrome)	Trust and respect between both parties

Based on Davis et al., 1997a & Van Thiel, 2014a.

3.4.1.1. Empty Nest Syndrome

When the principal chooses to have a principal-agent relationship with the executive and the executive chooses to have a principal-steward relationship with the principal this results in the Empty Nest Syndrome (see table 2). The outcome of the Empty Nest Syndrome is the executive feeling betrayed and excessively controlled.

The Empty Nest Syndrome is a metaphor for the negative psychological symptoms parents can experience when children leave their home and become independent. Van Thiel uses this metaphor to describe the repercussions of the government choosing a principal-agent relationship while QUANGOs choose a principal-steward relationship. In this research the municipalities represent the parents (the government), while the TCHs represent the children (the QUANGOs).

According to Van Thiel (2015, p. 27), there are three similarities between the situation of children becoming independent and leaving their parent's home and the development of QUANGOs. Firstly, usually both children and organisations become independent, which means they become responsible for making their own choices and parents lose a certain amount of influence. However, both children and quangos still partly depend on their parents, financially for example (Van Thiel, 2015, p.27). Secondly, the decisions and identity of children and QUAGOs usually are influenced more by other people and actors than by their parents (Van Thiel, 2015, p.27). Finally, children and QUANGOs will frequently engage in risk full experimenting (Van Thiel, 2015, p.28).

Parents and government organisations can suffer from several negative symptoms as children leave their home. Symptoms of the Empty Nest Syndrome vary from a sense of loss, grief and depression to anxiety and stress because of concern about the children. Parents can be fearful their children's upbringing was inadequate in preparing them to become independent. Moreover, parents may experience a sense of rejection as a result of their children becoming independent. These negative symptoms are usually the result of parents who have identified themselves with the role of being a parent. This role gave them a sense of self-esteem, identity and purpose in their lives. The negative symptoms of the Empty Nest Syndrome can often be (partly) averted by parents being involved in other activities aside from parenting (Van Thiel, 2015, p.28).

According to Van Thiel (2015, p.35), government organisations often experience a loss of control and have a difficult time adapting to the new situation. This frequently results in a dearth of respect for the autonomy of QUANGOs (Van Thiel, 2015, p.35). She gives the example of the process of agencification that occurred in the public sector due to NPM. This agencification process received criticism, for example by audit offices, that the control of agencies was inadequate and that there was a dearth of democratic accountability (Van Thiel, 2015, p. 26). As a response to this critique, governments started tightening their grip on QUANGOs (Van Thiel, 2015, p. 26).

There are two options to cure the negative outcomes of the Empty Nest Syndrome in the relationship between municipalities and TCHs: the principal has to communicate towards the executive about their expectations of a principal-agent relationship, or the principal has to start transforming their own expectations and behaviour into a principal-steward relationship. To realise the latter, the principal has to implement mechanisms suitable for the principal-steward relationship.

3.4.1.2. Moral Hazard

One of the other negative symptoms of the principal and executive choosing a different relationship is the occurrence of Moral Hazard. When the principal chooses a principal-steward relationship and the executive chooses a principal-agent relationship, this provides opportunity for the executive to take advantage of the vulnerability of the principal (Dees, 1992, p.36). The agent can take advantage of the information asymmetry to realise their personal goals instead of the principal's goals, resulting in an agent that is shirking or overcharging goods and services (Dees, 1992, p.36).

To solve this problem, the principal should either replace the agent with a steward, transform the executive into a steward (hypothetically) or implement various mechanisms suitable for a principal-agent relationship. These mechanisms, and the mechanisms for the principal-steward relationship, are explained in the next sections.

3.4.2. Types of mechanisms responsible for the chosen relationship

There are three mechanisms responsible for the type of relationship that develops between two parties according to Davis et al. (1997a). First of all, each party has expectations about the intentions and behaviour of the other party (Davis et al., 1997a, p.38). Secondly, the situational characteristics are important, these consist of the management philosophy and cultural differences (Davis et al., 1997a, p.38). Finally, the psychological characteristics of each party influence their preference for the type of relationship. These psychological characteristics consist out of social comparison, identification with the organisation, the kind of power and the type of motivation of employees. The principal-agent and principal-steward theory offer different perspectives on these mechanisms (see table 3 below for an overview).

These three mechanisms altogether influence which type of relationship each party chooses. If the dominant perspective (principal-agent or principal-steward) in one or more of these mechanisms changes or is not aligned with the chosen relationship, this can lead to one of the parties changing their choice of relationship. If the other party is unaware of this altered choice, this may lead to a manifestation of the Empty Nest Syndrome or Moral Hazard, which are leads to an unsatisfactory, non-functional relationship.

Table 3: Mechanisms for determining choice of relationship

Mechanism	Aspects of the mechanism	Principal-agent theory	Principal-steward theory
Expectation of the other party	Expectation of intentions and behaviour of the other party	Distrust	Trust
Situational characteristics	Management philosophy and cultural differences	Control oriented management philosophy, individualistic sense of being, preference for short-term relationships, low trust in others, high power distance culture.	Involvement oriented management philosophy, collective sense of being, preference for long-term relationships, high trust in others, low power distance culture.
Psychological characteristics	Motivation of employees, social comparison, identification with the organisation and kind of power	Extrinsically motivated, low identification with organisation, use of institutional power, low value commitment	Intrinsically motivated employees, highly identified with organisation, use of personal power, high value commitment

Based on Davis et al., 1997a, p.37.

3.5. Expectations of the other party, and the barriers and solutions

The expectations mechanism encompasses communication on expectations and uniformity in the relationship. The belonging barrier is different expectations and consists of two potential sub-barriers: inadequate communication and the Multiple Principals Problem. The section starts with discussing communication on expectations followed by discussing the Multiple Principals Problem.

3.5.1. Different expectations (inadequate communication)

The expectations each party has of the other party influences the type of relationship they choose (Davis et al., 1997a, p.38). The principal may expect the executive to act self-less and therefore choose a principal-steward relationship, whereas they can also expect the executive to try to shirk when possible and therefore choose the principal-agent relationship. Simultaneously, the executive can make assumptions on how the principal will act towards them, either giving them autonomy and trust, or strictly monitor them and choose a relationship based on these expectations. The longer the relationship lasts, the more information both parties have to guide these expectations (Davis et al., 1997a, p.38). In order to guide these expectations, communication in general and on expectations is considered important.

3.5.2. Multiple Principals Problem

Thus far, the expectations of the parties have involved only two parties, municipalities and TCHs. However, sometimes there is more than one principal involved. This can potentially lead to contradicting expectations, as principals can have different expectations. Hitherto the literature available on the Multiple Principals Problem only encompasses multiple principals in a principal-agent relationship; an overview of this literature is given in the next section. However, based on conversations I had with people employed in the TCH sector, the Multiple Principals Problem can also occur in a principal-steward relationship. Therefore, the Multiple Principals Problem is considered a general problem for both principal-agent and principal-steward relationships.

Moe (1987, p.482) claims the principal-agent relationship as described by most authors focuses on one agent and one principal out of convenience, but in reality power relationships usually consists of multiple principals. Agents are often forced to compromise or favour particular principals over others. Occasionally agents can employ strategies, which cause principals to compete with one another.

There are three situations in which TCHs may have to deal with multiple principals. Firstly, the municipality may not act as a unitary actor towards the TCH. Scientists have rejected the consideration of bureaucracy as a unitary actor a long time ago. Bureaucracies encompass various individuals with

different professions of whom the majority have different personal and policy goals (Waterman & Meier, 1998, p.181). Consequently, TCHs may have a different relationship with, and receive different demands from, various bureaucrats. Secondly, there can be a principal-agent relationship between politicians (principals) and bureaucrats (agents) as well. Despite being part of the same government organisation principals and bureaucrats can have divergent goals (Waterman & Meier, 1998). Consequently, TCHs may receive different demands from bureaucrats or politicians. Finally, TCHs may have to deal with different demands from various stakeholders such as performers (see section 2.2 for more examples). In some cases TCHs may have to deal with many principals simultaneously, which creates a complex situation.

The existence of multiple principals has two potential negative consequences. Firstly, having multiple principals frequently leads to conflicting goals, as the existence of multiple principals strongly indicates (some) principals will (partly) disagree on goals. When principals disagree on goals and are unable or unwilling to come to an agreement, this creates a complex situation in which executives have to decide which principal's goals should be realised (Waterman & Meier, 1998). This decision is complicated by the fact that the principal-agent theory does not provide guidance on which principal an executive should respond to (Waterman & Meier, 1998, p.180). As a result, executives are uncertain whose goals to adopt and the goals of some principals are relinquished. Secondly, sheer information asymmetry seldom exists. The majority of executives prefer one principal with whom they have the most goals in common and provide this principal with information. This results in an alteration of information symmetry between principals. The principal receiving information will have a privileged position compared to other principals (Waterman & Meier, 1998, p.180). This can cause some principals to experience problems, as the information asymmetry between them and other principals or executives grows.

Table 4 Solutions to Multiple Principals Problem

Solutions to the Multiple Principals Problem
Try to achieve information symmetry between the parties
Have the parties meet up regularly
Integrate contracts, contact persons or units

Based on Herweijers, 2008; Van Thiel, 2004.

To counter problematic consequences of multiple principals it is important to transform the relationship into a one principal-one executive relationship or have all the principals agree on goals and policy. In the case of municipalities and TCHs, it is necessary that there is agreement in the municipalities on goals concerning the TCH. There are three solutions to realise agreement on goals (see table 4 above). Firstly, different groups should communicate their views, thereby making different (groups of)

principals aware of the various existing views. Having information symmetry increases the chances of reaching an agreement between parties, since parties make decisions based on the same information. Secondly, reaching an agreement is more feasible if both parties meet on a regular basis (Herweijer, 2008, p.108). Finally, integration of roles on the part of the municipality helps to alter the municipality into acting as one actor towards the TCH. The three roles that can be integrated are contracts, persons or units.

Multiple (smaller) contracts and statutes can be integrated into one contract (Van Thiel et al., 2004, p.20). When municipal employees have easy access to all agreements on the TCH this lowers chances that employees overlook prior agreements. This reduces chances contradicting agreements are made. Moreover, contact persons can be appointed in a policy or financial unit (Van Thiel et al., 2004, p.20). This reduces chances that contact persons fragment responsibility across different units/directions (e.g. economy, culture or real estate) or give contradicting answers and assignments. Moreover, TCHs only need to contact one unit if they are uncertain which person is capable of and responsible for answering their question or solving their problem. Furthermore, units can be set up as one interface unit or board, responsible for relationship management (Van Thiel et al., 2004, p.20). Having one specialised unit or board ensures that the executive knows who to contact and reduces the chances that responsibility is fragmented or TCHs receive contradicting answers and assignments.

The table below (table 5) provides an overview of the different expectations mechanism, the sub-barriers and the solutions.

Table 5 Mechanism of expectations, and sub-barriers and solutions

Mechanism	Aspects of the mechanism	Sub- barriers	Solution
Expectation of the other party	Expectation of the intentions and behaviour of the other party	Actors choosing a different type of relationship	-Improve communication on expectations (municipalities and TCHs)
		Having multiple principals	-Improve uniformity in municipality

3.6. Situational characteristics, and the barriers and solutions

The second mechanism is situational characteristics. Situational characteristics concern the management philosophy of the organisation, the culture within the organisation, either a more hierarchical or a more same level approach, the amount of individualism, and preference for short- or long-term relationships. The barrier in this regard is incompatible situational characteristics. The sub-barriers are unsuitable monitoring, an unsuitable type of contract, and an unsuitable type of communication.

3.6.1. Monitoring in a principal-steward relationship

The situational characteristics have an influence on the type of relationship that is chosen (Davis et al., 1997a, p.38). Even if a principal says he or she aspires a principal-steward relationship, as long as the implemented monitoring instruments are based on a principal-agent relationship this can create frustrations and result in the Empty Nest Syndrome (see section 3.4.1.1.). This section explains which monitoring instruments are suitable for a principal-stewardship relationship, as these instruments differ significantly from the more ‘traditional’ principal-agent monitoring instruments.

Monitoring mechanisms in a principal-steward relationship do not stem from distrust, but are an important measure to guide the steward. The steward will not intentionally abuse the information asymmetry caused by the absence of monitoring, but the absence of monitoring may result in lower performance caused by a lack of guidance. Van Thiel (2015) mentions instruments suitable for monitoring in a principal-steward relationship (see table 6).

The appointment of independent supervisory or non-executive board; independent regulators to oversee agencies; the use of judicial review or an ombudsman instead of government inspections; negotiations on management contracts or covenants, steering and/or information protocols in which mutual obligations to exchange information are laid down as well; encourage agencies to engage in peer reviews or benchmarks; allow downward accountability (to clients and stakeholders), next to hierarchical accountability to the ministry; employ feasibility tests in which agencies pre-test a policy proposal; and so on. (p.38)

Table 6 Suitable monitoring instruments for a principal-steward relationship

Suitable monitoring instruments in a principal-steward relationship
Appointment of independent supervisory or non-executive board
Independent regulators
Use of judicial review or ombudsman
Steering and/or information protocols
Allow downward accountability
Negotiations on management contracts or covenants
Encouragement of the executive to participate in peer review or benchmarks

Based on Van Thiel, 2015, p.37.

3.6.2. Monitoring in a principal-agent relationship

Whereas in the principal-steward relationship monitoring is important to guide the executive, in the principal-agent relationship regular and thorough monitoring is important to reduce information asymmetry. However, frequently a performance paradox occurs during monitoring; this takes place when performance indicators do not represent the reality of the performance (Smith, 1995) and can lead to Moral Hazard occurring (see section 3.4.1.2.).

Avoiding a performance paradox is important in both a principal-agent and a principal-steward relationship. However, this barrier focuses specifically on avoiding a performance paradox in a principal-agent relationship, as municipalities in this type of relationship normally attach more weight to performance-indicators. In addition to this, the risk on opportunism of the agent arises when monitoring is not suitable for a principal-agent relationship. This section discusses causes of performance paradoxes and explains how to avoid performance paradoxes from occurring in a principal-agent relationship.

There are several potential causes for a performance paradox. Firstly, if managers take intentionally advantage of loopholes in rules and systems to make their (organisation's) performance appear better this is called gaming (Fisher & Downs, 2010). Secondly, focusing on certain aspects of the performance indicator schemes can cause tunnel vision. Other aspects of performance that are not measured, but are important for performance, are overlooked (Smith, 1995, p.284). Thirdly, when the focus lies on the performance indicators instead of on the underlying objectives this is called measure fixation. Managers primarily focus on accomplishing good results on performance indicators they have to report on instead of focusing on realising the actual objectives of the organisation (Smith, 1995, p.290). Finally, when bureaucratic performance measurement leads to a dearth of innovation this is called ossification. Managers focus on the existing performance measures and ignore new threats and opportunities, which

eventually leads to organisational paralysis (Smith, 1995, p.299). A performance paradox can occur both intentionally (gaming e.g.) and unintentionally (tunnel vision e.g.).

To avoid a performance paradox in the public sector Van Thiel & Leeuw (2002, p.271) have given recommendations on performance monitoring. Three of these are explained below. Firstly, the focus should be on actual performance instead of on performance indicators. Therefore, monitoring should focus on the quality and the content as a whole (Van Thiel & Leeuw, 2002, p.272). Secondly, to ensure objectivity the monitored organisations should not be allowed to develop their own indicators (favourably) (Van Thiel & Leeuw, 2002). Thirdly, there should be a check-up procedure on accountability requirements. If the requirements are not reported or attained, the principal should ask the executive why the requirements were not attained (Van Thiel & Leeuw, 2002). Based on Smith (1995) and Van Thiel and Leeuw (2002), the table below (table 7) gives solutions to ensure suitable monitoring in a principal-agent relationship.

Table 7 Suitable monitoring in a principal-agent relationship

Suitable monitoring in a principal-agent relationship
Performance indicators represent reality
Performance indicators are developed independently of the executive
Monitoring is not hindering the TCH's functioning
Monitoring primarily focuses on societal results instead of on performance indicators
There is a follow up procedure for monitoring: accountability requirements are checked on completeness and questions are asked following reported accountability requirements

Based on Van Thiel & Leeuw, 2002; Smith, 1995.

3.6.3. Type of contract

It is important that principal and executive use a suitable type of contract. Eisenhardt (1989, p.58) mentions two types of contracts, the behaviour-oriented contract and the outcome-oriented contract. The outcome-oriented contract focuses on the outcomes that the agent realises, instead of focusing on how the agent realises these outcomes. The behaviour-oriented contract on the other hand, focuses less on outcomes and more on certain behaviour (Eisenhardt, 1989, p.61). An example of municipalities focusing on certain behaviour is a municipality that wants more people with a low income to visit cultural performances. To realise this, the TCH can actively promote performances to people in the low-income category. This could be done by designing and handing out discount coupons for example. These promotion activities may not lead to a (significant) increase of low-income visitors (which is an

outcome), but does demonstrate the TCH actively tries to (behaviour) attract this group of visitors to cultural performances.

Eisenhardt mentions three factors that influence which type of contract is the most suitable for the relationship. Firstly, programmability plays an important role. Programmability is the degree to which the desired behaviour of the agent can be specified in advance. The more programmability that is possible, the more attractive it is to have a behaviour-based contract. However, it can be challenging to monitor behaviour as information asymmetry is often present. In these cases, an outcome-based contract can be more attractive. Secondly, the measurability of outcomes is important. Measurability is the degree to which the desired outcomes can be specified in advance. The more measurability outcomes have, the more attractive it is to have an outcome-based contract. Nevertheless, some tasks take a long time to complete, produce soft outcomes or involve joint- or team effort, which usually lowers measurability. In these cases, behaviour-based contracts are usually more attractive. Finally, when principals and agents are in a long-term relationship the principal will get to know the agent better, this usually leads to a decline in the information asymmetry and often makes the behaviour-based contract more manageable than in the beginning of the relationship (Eisenhardt, 1989, p.62). Which type of contract (behaviour or outcome-based) is the most suitable depends in a principal-agent relationship on what is the easiest to monitor: behaviour or outcomes.

Eisenhardt's article focuses on the principal-agent theory. If both parties choose the principal-agent relationship, the executive will not have a problem with a detailed contract and the belonging extensive amount of monitoring, as this is expected. However, if both parties choose the principal-steward relationship it is irrational, because of trust, for the principal to use highly specified contracts and the belonging extensive monitoring. A more global behaviour- or outcome-based contract would be more suitable in this case (see table 8 below).

Table 8 Suitable type of contracts per type of relationship

Principal-agent	Type of contract
Principal-agent relationship: high programmability and low measurability of outcomes	Specified behaviour-based contract.
Principal-agent relationship: low programmability and high measurability of outcomes	Specified outcome-based contract (operational goals specified).
Principal-steward relationship: high programmability and low measurability of outcomes	Global behaviour-based contract.
Principal-steward relationship: low programmability and high measurability of outcomes	Global outcome-based contract

3.6.4. Type of communication

The last sub-barrier of situational characteristics is the type of communication. The principal’s manner of communication should suit the type of relationship. As mentioned before, if one of the mechanisms is unaligned with the chosen relationships this can cause the Empty Nest Syndrome or Moral Hazard. Regarding the type of communication; in the principal-agent relationship the principal is expected to use a more hierarchal and formal way of communication, which fits the high power distance culture and distrust between both parties (Davis et al., 1997a). In a principal-steward relationship, the principal is expected to use a more same level approach and informal way of communication, which suits the low power distance and trust between both parties (Davis et al., 1997a).

The table below (table 9) provides an overview of the situational characteristics mechanisms, the barriers and the solutions to the barriers.

Table 9 Mechanism of situational characteristics, and sub-barriers and solutions

Mechanism	Aspects of the mechanism	Sub-barriers	Solutions
Situational characteristics	Management philosophy and cultural differences	Unsuitable monitoring for the type of relationship	Implementing monitoring strategies suitable to the type of relationship
		Unsuitable type of contract	Use suitable type of contract for the type of relationship
		Using an unsuitable type of communication	Align type communication with the type of relationship

3.7. Psychological characteristics, and the barriers and solutions

The last mechanism is the psychological characteristics. This mechanism includes the motivation of employees, social comparison, identification with the organisation and the kind of power principals use. The barrier in this regard is incompatible psychological characteristics and consists of unsuitable incentives.

3.7.1. Type of incentives

Motivation can be divided into two types: intrinsic motivation and extrinsic motivation. Intrinsic motivation is the kind of motivation that comes from inside an individual while extrinsic motivation comes from using rewards such as money, status or grades. Because of this, some people will accept a lower wage as long as the job is ‘emotionally’ fulfilling, whereas for some people a high wage is the most important argument for accepting a job (Van Puyvelde, 2007). An agent will choose a high wage job, while the steward will choose a lower wage job that is beneficial to society (also known as ‘labour donation’ (Van Puyvelde, 2007, p.443)). Thus, what motivates agents and executives is inherently different (Corbey, 2010; Grundei, 2007, Van Puyvelde, 2007).

Extrinsic rewards have a negative effect on stewards; research has demonstrated that using extrinsic incentives undermines intrinsic motivation (Corbey, 2010; Grundei, 2007). This could lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy: using extrinsic incentives (based on the principal-agent theory) leads to executives behaving as agents (Davis et al., 1997a). On the other hand, the effect of intrinsic rewards on agents is debatable. In general, it can be assumed that agents will demonstrate opportunistic behaviour when intrinsic rewards are used. However, it is also said that using intrinsic incentives can lead to the growth of intrinsic motivation (Corbey, 2010, p.489). In this research, it is assumed that agents will show opportunistic behaviour when intrinsic rewards are used.¹

To motivate the agent to act in the interest of the principal there are four options (see table 10 below) (Van Slyke, 2007, p.167). Firstly, the principal can assign the risk to the agent by using performance related pay, meaning the agent only receives payment if the set goal(s) are accomplished. Secondly, the principal can monitor the agent’s behaviour and/or accomplishments, as monitoring can be used to lower information asymmetry (see section 3.6.2.). If an agent is aware of monitoring, this may motivate him or her to behave as expected in fear of risking their payment or job. Monitoring can be done by several control mechanisms, such as audits and performance evaluations. Thirdly, the principal can reward the agent when he or she performs above average. Finally, the principal can demote or enhance the reputation of the agent (Van Slyke, 2007, p.167).

¹ It is often assumed that intrinsically motivated people are better at their job than extrinsically motivated people, meaning that it would always be most beneficial to attract a steward. Nonetheless, this assumption is part of ongoing research and debate. In this research the decision has been made to make no value distinction between intrinsically or extrinsically motivated employees. Therefore, intrinsically (stewards) or extrinsically (agents) motivated executives are equally attractive depending on the type of relationship.

Table 10 Incentives for principal-agents and principal-steward

Principal-agent	Principal-steward
Assigning risk to the agent (pay for performance)	Giving the steward autonomy (less specified contracts)
Monitoring (e.g. audits, self-reports and performance evaluations)	Improving internal accountability (e.g. professional licensing, codes of ethics and peer reviews)
Reward systems (e.g. bonuses).	Information disclosure
Reputation enhancement or demoting	Focus on societal outcomes

Based on Van Slyke, 2007; Dicke, 2002.

According to Schillemans (2013), principal-steward theory is still in the stage of development, therefore it has not yet been translated into more concrete advice on control mechanisms. On the one hand, Davis et al. (1997a, p.26) say it is unnecessary to use structures that monitor and control; a steward should be given a high amount of autonomy. On the other hand, Dicke (2002, p.457) says control mechanisms are important to develop the internal accountability of the steward. These control mechanisms aim at strengthening the steward's sense of personal responsibility and the values of the organisation the steward works for. There are four possible incentives to motivate the steward (see table 10 above). Firstly, giving the steward autonomy can create a sense of responsibility. Secondly, codes of ethics can be used as a guideline for the expected behaviour. Thirdly, peer reviews can be used as a less hierarchical way of monitoring. In addition to this, it can be stimulating and inspiring for executives to give advice to and learn from colleagues. Finally, professional licensing (as seen in the medical world) requires the steward to be approved for his or her function by a board of professionals. All these mechanisms are aimed at making the steward more aware of the organisations' values and to give them a strong sense of personal responsibility (Dicke, 2002, p.457).


The table below (table 11) provides an overview of the psychological characteristics, and its barriers and solutions.

Table 11 Mechanisms of psychological characteristics, and sub-barrier and solution

Mechanism	Aspects of the mechanism	Sub-barrier	Solution
Psychological characteristics	Motivation of employees, social comparison, identification with the organisation and kind of power	Using unsuitable incentives	Using suitable incentives for the type of employees


3.8. Summary

Conceptual model 1: Research purpose




As mentioned in chapter 1, the goal of this study is to identify potential barriers in the relationship between municipalities and TCHs, and give recommendations to improve this relationship. The research purpose is represented in the first conceptual model (see model 1 above). As can be seen in the model, when a municipality and TCH are in a relationship they may encounter barriers. If the parties do not find solutions to overcome these barriers this leads to an unsatisfactory relationship. If the two parties encounter barriers, but find and implement solutions, this leads to a satisfactory relationship. If the two parties do not encounter any barriers, this also leads to a satisfactory relationship.

Conceptual model 2: (Sub-) mechanisms responsible for the chosen type of relationship



The second conceptual model (see model 2 above) visualises how a type of relationship is chosen. There are three mechanisms responsible for this choice: the expectations of the other party, the situational characteristics and the psychological characteristics. Each mechanism consists of one or multiple sub-mechanisms. Related to these mechanisms and sub-mechanisms are the potential barriers, as explained below.

Conceptual model 3: Potential barriers responsible for Moral Hazard or Empty Nest Syndrome



*General barriers

The third conceptual model (see model 3 above) visualises the barriers that municipalities and TCHs may encounter in their relationship. There are three (main) barriers consisting of one or multiple sub-barriers. If one or more sub-barriers are present, this leads to the presence of the (main) barrier. The more barriers are present and the higher the degree to which they are present, the more likely Moral Hazard or the Empty Nest Syndrome occurs.

Based on the theory, there are several solutions to overcome the (sub-) barriers. Concerning the first barrier, it is important to improve communication on expectations and create more uniformity within the municipality. Concerning the second and the third barrier, it is important the sub-barriers are aligned with the relationship both parties have chosen. The barriers and solutions as mentioned are the foundation for the rest of this research.

3.9. Hypotheses

Based on the theoretical framework several hypotheses are formulated to assess the relationships between municipalities and TCHs. These are given below, for both municipalities and TCHs in general and for the principal-agent [PA] and the principal-steward [PS] relationship; for the combined relationship [AS] there are no assumptions.

First, the hypothesis for municipalities and TCHs in general:

1. Municipalities and TCHs score the same on all barriers, as they have the same perception of the relationship

Secondly, the hypotheses for the types of relationships:

2. PA and PS relationships score equally on the general barriers: inadequate communication and Multiple Principals Problem

3. PA relationships score average or higher on suitable PA monitoring

4. PA relationships score below average on suitable PS monitoring

5. PA relationships score average or higher on suitable PA incentives

6. PA relationships score below average on suitable PS incentives

7. PS relationships score average or higher on suitable PS monitoring²

8. PS relationships score average or higher on suitable PS incentives

9. PS relationships score lower than average on suitable PA incentives

² There is no hypothesis for the PS relationship on PA monitoring, see section 3.6.2.

10. The majority of PA relationships use a detailed contract
11. The majority of PS relationships use a global contract
12. The majority of PA relationships use hierarchical and formal communication
13. The majority of PS relationships use same level and informal communication

4. Methodology

This chapter describes the research methods used to assess the relationship between municipalities and TCHs. Section 4.1. operationalises the concepts derived from the theoretical framework. Section 4.2. elucidates the mixed methods research design. Section 4.3. describes the process of data collection. Section 4.4. depicts the process of data analysis. Finally, the validity and reliability of the research methods are discussed.

4.1. Operationalisation

The theoretical framework has provided information on the possible barriers within the relationship between municipalities and TCHs, and the solutions. To measure whether these barriers are present and solutions are possible, the concepts have to be operationalised, which can be seen in table 12 below. For each concept the different variables are given. For all variables indicators were created which enables measuring their presence in real life situations. For each indicator the chosen method for data collection has been marked. To illustrate this, the operationalisation of the variable ‘multiple principals’ is explained. This variable represents a situation in which there are multiple principals present within the municipality. This can create ambiguous, sometimes even adverse communication on goals and expectations towards the TCH. The following indicators are used to identify the presence of this sub-barrier.

The first indicator is whether the communication of the municipality is uniform. If both parties or the TCH do not perceive the communication as uniform, this suggests this sub-barrier is present. The second indicator is that everyone in the municipality is aligned (politician - public servant, public servant - public servant) in terms of TCH policy. If both parties or the TCH do not perceive the public servants and politicians as aligned, this suggest this sub-barrier is present. The scores on these two indicators (1-5) are combined to assess whether the Multiple Principal Problem is present. If the score is above a 3, this means the uniformity of the municipality is sufficient. If the score is below a 3, this means the Multiple Principal Problem is present.

In addition to the two aforementioned indicators, there are also separate indicators for both groups to give more insight into the perception and presence of the Multiple Principal Problem. As for municipalities, they have two individual indicators. The first indicator is the awareness of different visions on TCH policy within the municipality. If municipalities do not perceive themselves aware of other attitudes and ideas on TCH policy, this could indicate a cause for the Multiple Principal Problem. The second indicator is having regular meetings to the discuss TCH policy within all relevant parties in the municipality. If municipalities disagree that they have regular meetings, this could indicate a cause

for the Multiple Principal Problem. The third indicator is whether roles, such as commissioner and supervisor, are integrated into one contact person, one contract or one department within the municipality. If municipalities disagree that they have integrated these roles, this could indicate a cause for the Multiple Principal Problem. As for TCHs, they have two indicators. The first indicator is whether they experience multiple people giving their organisation orders. If TCHs agree, this is an indication there are multiple principals present. The second indicators is whether their organisation encounters problems because of having multiple principals present. If TCHs agree, this is an indication that having multiple principals causes problems.

Table 12 Operationalisation of variables

Variable	Definition	Indicators	Methods and techniques	
			Survey	Interviews
Barrier 1: Different expectations				
Type of relationship	Principal-agent relationship, a relationship based on distrust in which the principal holds a strong hand over the executive	Conflict in the relationship Different goals MUN primarily using performance indicators to evaluate TCH MUN often doing check ups	X	X
	Principal-steward relationship, a relationship characterised by mutual trust and autonomy of the executive in which both parties work together to realise the same goals	Mutual trust TCH is involved with the MUN Mutual goals MUN trusts expertise TCH MUN rewards the TCH with autonomy and responsibility MUN involves TCH in making policy	X	X
Different expectations (communication)	MUN and TCH are unaware of each other's goals and expectations causing frustration	Unsatisfied with communication between parties Different attitude towards the relationship Not communication on goals and expectations towards TCH	X	X
Multiple principals	There are multiple principals with	MUN is not communicating uniform towards the	X	X

different goals and expectations causing confusion for the TCH

TCH
MUN employees are unaligned in terms of TCH policy
MUN employees not aware of other ideas and attitudes within the MUN itself towards TCH
No regular meetings to discuss TCH within MUN
No integrated roles within the MUN
TCH perceives multiple principals
TCH encounters problems because of multiple principals

Barrier 2: Situational characteristics

Monitoring strategies	Principal-agent relationship	Measure fixation caused by using performance indicators is avoided	X	X
	Monitoring strategies are suitable for the type of relationship	Ossification caused by monitoring is avoided Opportunities for gaming are reduced Tunnel vision caused by performance indicators is avoided There is a follow up procedure for monitoring		
	Principal-steward relationship	There is discussion about contracts	X	X
	Monitoring strategies are suitable for the type of relationship	Independent sources are used for assessment Information protocols are used TCHs are encouraged to take part in peer reviews and benchmarks		

		TCHs are encouraged to be accountable towards clients		
Type of contract	Principal-agent relationship	Specified behaviour based contract	X	X
	Whether the type of contract is suitable for the relationship	Specified outcome based contract		
	Principal-steward relationship	Less specified outcome based contract	X	X
	Whether the type of contract is suitable for the relationship	Less specified behaviour based contract		
Type of communication	Principal-agent relationship	Hierarchical and formal	X	X
	Whether the dominant style of communication is suitable for the relationship			
	Principal-steward relationship	Same level communication and partly informal	X	X
	Whether the dominant style of communication is suitable for the relationship			
Barrier 3: Psychological characteristics				
Type of incentives	Principal-agent	Material and financial rewards	X	X
	Methods used to stimulate the TCH to perform better	Reputation enhancement Monitoring on performance indicators Carrying risks for their behaviour		
	Principal-steward	Giving TCH autonomy	X	X
	Methods used to stimulate the TCH to	Improving internal accountability		

perform better

Information disclosure on TCH policy

Feedback on societal outcomes

Solutions to the barriers

Solutions to barrier 1

Plans for clear communication

X

Ensuring same expectations and goals

Ensuring a one-principal- one executive situation

Solutions to barrier 2:

situational characteristics

Using suitable monitoring

X

Using a suitable type of contract

Using suitable type of communication

Solutions to barrier 3:

Type of incentives suited to the relationship

X

4.2. Research design

This section reports on which research methods are chosen and the reasoning behind this choice.

4.2.1. Mixed methods design

I have chosen to use a mixed methods design; a design in which data is collected and analysed in multiple ways (Creswell, 1994, p.174). A mixed methods design is not a common research design and there is an ongoing debate on whether it is appropriate to combine different methods within one research. Mahoney (2010) points out that case study research and statistical research are designed for different purposes, so therefore it is not always possible to combine them. According to him, it still needs to be resolved whether and how quantitative and qualitative research methods can be combined. This is both a practical and philosophical problem. He acknowledges certain benefits of combining methods, but advises a certain degree of reservation towards this. Keeping this in mind, I nonetheless have chosen to use a mixed methods design because of its main strength: the fact that using methods can compensate for each other's weaknesses (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2010). Choosing different methods can provide answers to different questions. In this study, a quantitative analysis of municipalities and TCHs' relationship can provide general answers on the state of the relationship and the existing barriers and solutions within this relationship. However, within this method, there is little room for providing answers that do not fit the barriers and solutions, as proposed in the theoretical framework. Therefore, certain barriers and solutions experienced in empirical situations may be overlooked, which would paint an incomplete picture. In addition to this, the advice on how to improve the relationship between TCHs and municipalities would be highly general and unable to provide municipalities with concrete examples of how and which solutions can be implemented. To compensate for these limitations, this study also includes a qualitative approach. The qualitative method used provides more detailed information and a better overall understanding of the problem, which may help municipalities and TCHs in their understanding of the problems and their solutions. By the same token, qualitative methods are often criticised for their lack of generalisability because they often work with a much smaller N. The qualitative method can compensate for this lack of generalisability by providing information on the general situation.

The qualitative and quantitative data collection and analyses took place at the same time. When it comes to weighing of results, in a majority of the research the quantitative results take precedence over the qualitative data, since the qualitative data is used as an enhancement to provide more background information and detail. However, when it comes to solutions for the problem qualitative data is the main focus and takes precedence over quantitative results.

4.2.2. Choice of quantitative method

The quantitative chosen method is the survey. A typical characteristic of the survey is that it has a large-scale approach, which enables using a large number of variables and many units of study (Van Thiel, 2014b, p.74). As a result of data collection on a large scale, standardised measurement forms have to be used to make the information easy to process (Van Thiel, 2014b, p.74). Surveys can be used to collect factual information, but also to gather information on the opinions and attitudes of people towards a subject (Van Thiel, 2014b, p.74). According to Van Thiel (2014b, p.74), surveys are especially advantageous for deductive (theory-driven) research, as a consequence of the need for standardisation and designing of a scale or set of answer categories in advance. In the case of this study, the possible set of answer categories in the survey has been completely based on the theoretical framework. Another benefit of using surveys is that they are not only an efficient way of collecting data, but they also allow for easy generalisation, which results in higher levels of external validity. A major disadvantage is superficiality of data as a result of standardisation.

4.2.3. Choice of qualitative method

To compensate for the mentioned major disadvantage of the survey, semi-structured interviews have been chosen as the most suitable qualitative method. In a semi-structured interview respondents are able to give more diverse answers, provide examples and explain their own experiences. An interview manual was used as a guideline (see appendices VIII & IX).

4.3. Data collection

This section explains how the data was through the survey and the interviews, and which considerations and choices were made during this process.

4.3.1. Survey

Based on the theoretical framework and the research question, a survey questionnaire was set up. The survey was designed to assess the relationship between one municipality and one TCH. In the case that there were several TCHs located in one municipality they could either fill in multiple surveys, or choose to fill in one survey based on averages. To my knowledge, one municipality filled in the survey based on averages and one municipality filled in two surveys. The majority of the survey questions used the Likert scale consisting of five answer categories. In social science, the Likert scale is one of the most common scales for surveys (Van Thiel, 2014b, p.79). If a Likert scale was not applicable for the question, there were yes or no answer categories or open questions. Municipalities and TCHs received different questionnaires, the main difference being the phrasing of the ‘other’ in the relationship. In the

case of municipalities questions were asked about their relationship with TCHs, while TCHs received the same questions asked about their relationship with municipalities. A few questions on multiple principals were different for each group. These results are discussed separately in chapter 5.

The survey was designed in Qualtrics, a programme created to design surveys. The choice for using Qualtrics was a deliberate one. The Radboud University holds a license for the programme and has a design with the University logo, which can be incorporated into the lay-out of the programme. Since the survey would be sent to both groups (municipalities and TCHs) using the lay-out of the Radboud University might come across more professional and objective, consequently limiting social-desirable answers.

Before the survey was distributed, it was tested in a pilot. The two different versions of the questionnaire were filled in by a wide array of people with different backgrounds and different degrees of knowledge about the public sector. Before the pilot these people were only informed about the topic of the study, so they had to rely on the instructions and context provided in the survey to answer the questions. This pilot was used to determine the average time it takes to complete the survey and to improve the clarity of instructions, information and questions. Afterwards the improvements were incorporated into the pilot and the pilot was retested. Eventually the survey was distributed to the target group.

The target group consisted of all the TCHs that were members of VSCD at the time of this research and all municipalities linked to these TCHs. It was a conscious choice to reach out to the entire population to improve generalisability to the furthest extent possible and give each municipality and TCH a chance take part in the survey.

The survey was distributed by email to the target groups. First an invitation was sent out, that was later followed by a reminder. The email invitation included the most important and basic information such as the research purpose, the relevance of the research for the sector and an estimation of the time it would take to complete the survey. The survey instructions provided more detailed information on the survey and the study in general. In the case of TCHs, the emails were sent directly to the (general) managers' email-addresses as provided by the VSCD. In the case of municipalities, the emails were sent to the responsible alderman or the general municipality email address, depending on the accessibility of information. When general email addresses were used, municipalities that did not respond to the invitation were called to check whether the email had been received by the target group.

4.3.2. Interviews

For the interviews five municipalities and the five TCHs linked to these municipalities were interviewed. All five pairs have different backgrounds: one TCH has been autonomous for years, one has been autonomous for over a year, one was in the process of becoming autonomous, one is still part of the municipality and one has been recently reinstated after years of absence. Moreover, the size and geographical and socio-economic characteristics of the municipalities differ greatly. In relation to this, also the size of the department responsible for the TCHs differ enormously, ranging from one to multiple employees. Furthermore, the degree in satisfaction and challenges in the relationship differ in all five cases. The five pairs were chosen because of their different backgrounds, since this can provide a wide array of new information. The interviews were held with the (general) managers of TCHs and with alderman or civil servants in the case of municipalities. Initially, aldermen were asked to participate in the interviews, but in some cases civil servants were interviewed instead because they had more detailed knowledge on the topics.

To set up the interview manual the majority of the interview questions were based on operationalised variables as derived from the theoretical framework, since the research is primarily deductive. These questions must leave room for critical reviews of the theory and new solutions or more practical advice on implementing solutions. To see the interview guide see appendix VIII (municipalities) and IX (TCHs).

4.4. Data analysis

This section explains how the data collected through the survey and the interviews was analysed and which considerations and choices were made during this process.

4.4.1. Survey

4.4.1.1. Response rate and impression of the data

The data gathered in Qualtrics was transferred to SPSS version 23. Firstly, the data and response rate were checked. The survey had been sent to 105 municipalities in total of which 48 have filled in the survey. This is a response of 45.71 percent in total. This percentage is significantly higher than the average response rate of online surveys (Van Thiel, personal communication, 2016).

To see whether the geographical distribution of the respondents was balanced, the Netherlands was divided into four regions: North, South, East and West. The difference in terms of percentage between the total of addressed municipalities in the region and the responding municipalities in the region was

calculated. The geographical distribution of responding municipalities was almost equal to the geographical distribution of addressed municipalities (see appendix II). Only the region East had a slightly higher response rate with 3.45 percent. 136 TCHs were addressed (some municipalities have multiple TCHs) and 62 responded. This is a response rate of 45.58 percent in total, which is close to the 45.71 percent response rate the municipality survey had. When looking at the geographical distribution of the TCHs and their response rate, these are slightly less well comparable than in the case of the municipalities. As for the region East, their share in the total of responding TCHs is 5.36 percent higher than their share in the total of addressed TCHs. As for the region South, their share in the total of responding TCHs is 7.46 percent lower than their share in the total of addressed TCHs. As a consequence, in the results of the survey the TCHs in the East of the Netherlands are slightly overrepresented, while the TCHs in the South are slightly underrepresented.

For both municipalities and TCHs there was some mortality. One respondent is excluded from all results (including the response rate). This particular respondent gave an extremely high assessment to the relationship (10 out of 10) and filled in neutral on all ten following Likert items, whether they were more principal-agent or principal-steward like, before quitting. Moreover, during the survey multiple municipalities and TCHs have quit, with a total of five municipalities and three TCHs discontinuing at some point during the survey. The answers of these respondents until the point of quitting are included in the results.

The reasons given for not participating in the survey were also analysed; these varied greatly. One TCH was moving to a new location, other potential respondents experienced time limitations, were recently installed, were only recently autonomised or were in the middle of a transition. There was not one dominant reason; the majority of the non-responders did not give a reason for not responding. It is difficult to make an estimated guess about the main reasons for not responding. Time is definitely an important reason, but privacy during a conflict could be an important reason as well. Even though anonymity was granted, both municipalities and TCHs could feel uncomfortable giving a bad review of the relationship and thereby potentially hurting the relationship even more. Especially in the case of municipalities, who are often publicly scrutinised this could be an important reason. Nonetheless, this cannot be certified, so therefore it is something to keep in mind, but not attach much weight to.

After looking at the response rate certain variables were recoded so all variables measured indicators in the same direction. Moreover, the dichotomous items were recoded so they could be integrated with the ordinal items into the two monitoring barriers. I have chosen to test normality of the results in three ways: using the q-q plot, using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk test for normality and by looking at the skewness. These normality tests showed that the variables were not normally distributed, as was to be expected in the case of Likert items. The boxplots also showed some outliers, however I have chosen not to delete these (with the exception of the one case mentioned before) since they do not

seem to be measurement mistakes, but extreme cases instead. Deleting these would manipulate the data in my opinion in an untruthful way, which generally would make it easier to work with the data, but also less valid. Despite the fact that the population in the sample is not normally distributed, if the sample is large enough (minimum of 30 cases) a sample is still considered normally distributed (De Vocht, 2011, p.122). However, when variables have been measured on a nominal or ordinal scale non-parametric tests should be used (De Vocht, 2011, p.122). Despite the fact that Likert items require non-parametric tests, factor analyses have been conducted in this study. The reasoning for this is that despite the flaws, factor analysis gives interesting insights in relationship characteristics, which gives indications for further research and theory development.

Following the results on the barriers, it was tested whether the type of autonomisation (including non-autonomised) has any influence on the survey results of TCH respondents. According to both the Kruskal-Wallis and the MANOVA test³, the type of autonomisation does not significantly (>.5) influence any scores of TCHs on sub-barriers.

4.4.1.2. Factor analysis

Factor analysis has the goal to identify the underlying variables that explain correlations within a set of observed variables. In this study it is used to see whether the factors produced by the factor analysis fit with the two models of research.

When conducting a factor analysis, the suitability of the data should be checked first. According to Field (2013), the Kaiser-Meyer Olking measure of sampling (KMO value) has to be higher than .5, for data to be suitable for factor analysis. The higher the KMO value, the compacter the patterns of correlations are. Secondly, the Bartlett's test has to be significant (value below .05) to ensure the correlation matrix is different from an identity matrix (Field, 2013, p.695). Municipalities have a KMO value of .754, while TCHs have a KMO value of .753. Both parties have a p value of .000 for Bartlett's test. This means the data is suitable for factor analysis.

When doing factor analysis, each decision heavily influences the results. Therefore, these decisions and the reasoning behind them are explained. First of all, the principal-component method was used for the factor analysis. One of the limitations of this method is that the results are restricted to the collected sample, as this methods assumes the used sample is the population (Field, 2013, p. 674). However, for this particular data sample, other methods that can be used to generalise a sample were not suitable. According to Field (2013, p.674), of the several factor analysis methods that assume the used sample is the population, this is one of the two preferred methods.

³ More information on these two tests follows in section 4.4.1.4.

Secondly, all factors with eigenvalues greater than one were retained as recommended by Kaiser. There has been discussion about this norm and Joliffe (as in Field, 2013, p.677) says the norm is too strict and advises an eigenvalue of more than .7, although Kaiser's norm of 1 is the most common and therefore the norm of 1 is used in this study (Field, 2013, p.677). The higher the norm, the better the factors explain the original data (Field, 2013, p.678).

Thirdly, the type of rotation is important as oblique rotation allows correlation between factors, while orthogonal rotation does not (Field, 2013, p.680). It is frequently the case that in social science orthogonal rotation is used when theoretical models are seen as opposites and therefore non-overlapping, although it is also said that any data involving humans always has related underlying factors (Field, 2013, p. 680, p.681). Since my data involves humans and the broad spectrum of relationships which contain overlapping characteristics (see section 3.5), oblique rotation seems the most appropriate type of rotation for this study. Furthermore, I have chosen to look at the structure instead of the pattern matrix. This is because even though most researchers look at the pattern matrix because it is easier to interpret, it also ignores shared variance (Field, 2013, p.702). Therefore, the structure matrix is used in this study, as overlap of variables is expected.

Finally, there are several viewpoints on how high value loadings should be before they are regarded as significant. Stevens (as mentioned in Field, 2013, p.666) recommends factor loadings with an absolute value of more than .4, although some researchers recommend .3. In this study .4 has been chosen since it keeps the amount of variance in a factor as explained by variables higher and therefore stronger.

4.4.1.3. Cronbach's alpha

Cronbach's alpha is the most commonly used indicator for scale reliability (Field, 2013, p.708). Commonly a Cronbach value below .7 or .8 is considered too low and regarded as an indication of an unreliable scale (Field, 2013, p.708). However, this norm has been challenged by several scientists. Kline (as in Field, 2013, p.709) says that when dealing with psychological constructs, values below .7 can be expected because of the diversity of the constructs measured. Nunally (as in Field, 2013, p.709) suggests that in the first stages of research values of .5 or higher are sufficient. Not only the acceptable value is debatable, how higher values are achieved is also debatable. Cronbach's alpha increases with the numbers of items on the scale (Field, 2013, p.709). Moreover, Cronbach's alpha does not measure the extent to which the scale measures one underlying factor or construct. Cronbach himself suggested that if the scale contained several subscales Cronbach's alpha should be calculated for each scale separately (Field, 2013, p.709). Although Cronbach's alpha is a valuable method for testing scale reliability, it is important to bear in mind these possible pitfalls of attaching too much weight to the results.

Table 13 Cronbach's alpha scores of variables

Variable	Number of items	Cronbach's alpha
Type of relation	10	.561
Principal-steward	6	.834
Principal-agent	4	.024
Communication	3	.808
Multiple principals	2	.836
Monitoring	11	.660
Monitoring PA	6	.380
Monitoring PS	5	.651
Incentives	8	.586
Incentives PS	4	.511
Incentives PA	4	.381

As can be seen in table 13 above, PS scales score much higher than PA scales do. When these subscales are not applied, all variables score above .500. When subscales are applied, PA subscales score insufficient (as in, below .5). Moreover, the two general barriers both score above .8, meaning these scales are highly reliable according to Cronbach's alpha. Despite the value of some scales being too low according to Field (2013) I decided to use these scales derived from the theoretical framework. These scales were derived from theory and the PS, as the opposite of PA, often scored high, indicating this part of the theory produced a useful scale. Nonetheless, these low scores should be kept in mind when interpreting the outcomes of this study.

4.4.1.4. Testing the difference between groups

MANOVA is used to calculate whether groups score significantly different on multiple variables. It is based on several assumptions, of which normality is one (De Vocht, 2011, p.170). Since the data does violate the assumption of normality and the sample is relatively small this makes the MANOVA results debatable. Moreover, since the PA group consists out of only seven respondents, the degrees of freedom provided a problem. Therefore, for the type of relationships two MANOVAs were run. One MANOVA was conducted with the PA and PS Monitoring and Incentives and one with the two common barriers Communication and Multiple Principals Problem. Even though the MANOVA is generally considered a robust test, the violation of normality and the low amount of respondents made the results debatable (Statistics Laerd, 2016). Therefore, the Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney U test were also conducted to calculate whether groups score differently on multiple variables. Both tests are non-parametric and

make fewer assumptions than other tests (Field, 2013, p.214). The results of Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney U test are mentioned in chapter 5; the results of the MANOVA can be seen in appendix III and appendix IV.

The survey also contains a few categorical variables. One common way to calculate whether there is a significant difference in the score between two or more groups on a categorical variable is the Chi-square test. Nonetheless, the results of the Chi-square test calculated with data from this survey contained many cells with a frequency below five, which makes the approximation low (Field, 2013, p.723). Therefore, Fisher's exact test was used, which is an alternative for Chi-square test when sample sizes are small (Field, 2013, p. 724).

4.4.1.5. Kendall's tau

Kendall's tau-b correlation coefficient is a nonparametric measure to calculate correlation between variables. Since the data violates the assumption of normality, a nonparametric correlation test is in order. Often Spearman's correlation coefficient is the more popular nonparametric test (Field, 2013, p. 278). However, there are two reasons for choosing Kendall's tau-b instead. First, Kendall's tau is advised when you have a small data set with a large number of tied ranks, meaning many scores have the same rank (Field, 2013, p.278). Since the dataset is relatively small, especially when tests are conducted for municipalities and TCHs separately, this condition is met. Moreover, since the independent variables are ordinal and only have five different values, the condition of a large number of tied ranks is met as well. Secondly, there are strong indications that Kendall's tau allows for more accurate generalisations, since there is much to suggest that Kendall's tau is better at estimating the correlation in the population (Field, 2013, p.278).

4.4.1.6. Ordinal logistic regression

Regression analysis is used to predict the value of a dependent variable based on the value of one or more independent variables. In this study, regression analysis is used to see per barrier how certain characteristics or measures used in the relationship influence the relationship satisfaction for both municipalities and TCHs. A multiple linear regression analysis was considered, but some of the main assumptions were not met. The three issues with main assumptions are the lack of homoscedasticity in a large part of the data, the variables not being normally distributed and the low N which made the data very sensitive to outliers, high leverage points or highly influential points (Statistics Laerd, 2016). There are methods to transform the data to possibly solve these issues, but this would require transforming the data to a large extent, which is still debatable and very time consuming.

Instead of a linear regression model, the choice was made to use a logistic regression analysis. Since the dependent variable 'Relationship satisfaction' consisted of seven different values (no one gave a mark

below three), the amount of respondents in relation to the ordinal/continuous independent variables created a problem. Therefore, I made the choice to divide the satisfaction variable into an ordinal one with three values. The first value contains the numbers 3 up to and including 5, which represent insufficient satisfaction and consists out of 11 respondents. The second value contains the numbers 6 and 7, which represent sufficient satisfaction and consists out of 40 respondents. Third value contains all numbers from 8 up to and including 10, which represent high satisfaction with the relationship and consists out of 63 respondents. These categories are based on the general category representation of numbers (insufficient, sufficient and good), and to make all categories of a more reasonable size. This decision is debatable, because it merges different values and the ranges are not equally divided. However, it lowers the amount of cells with zero frequencies (covariates) columns and thereby boosts explanatory power of the model.

To test how the model fits the observed data, three methods were used. The Deviance test, the Pearson test and the likely-hood ratio test. When the model contains many cells with zero frequencies (covariates), Deviance and Pearson goodness-of-fit tests scores are less suitable to assess whether the model fits the observed data (Statistics Laerd, 2016). Therefore, the choice was made to use the results of the likely-hood ratio test to examine whether the model fits the observed data. The results of the likely-hood ratio test are discussed in the analysis, for an overview of the Deviance and Pearson goodness-of-fit test results see appendix V.

Due to the low N, the high amount of ordinal variables and the merging of categories of the dependent values, the model provides a, limited degree of certainty on the effects of independent variables on the dependent variable. Nevertheless, the variables that are most significant and strong in predicting relationship satisfaction will provide interesting and valuable insights into which variables have the biggest influence on satisfaction.

4.4.2. Interviews

All interviews were voice recorded and were manually transcribed in Dutch (the language in which the interviews were conducted). Subsequently, the interviews were translated from Dutch to English. The transcript of the interviews has been manually coded. This was primarily carried out by deductive coding and secondarily by inductive coding. The reason for this decision is that in this study interviews are used to provide an empirical review of the current theory, on which the survey questions are based, but at the same time the interviews should provide leeway for new information not directly related to the theory. The deductive codes are based on operationalisations (see section 4.3), while new information unrelated to the theory was coded inductively.

4.5. Validity and reliability

The next section discusses the validity and reliability of using a survey and interviews. Moreover, the steps taken during the research to improve both validity and reliability are elucidated.

4.5.1. Survey

In general, the survey has a high reliability since it consists of standardised explanations and answers. However, there are three main factors which can affect the validity and reliability of a survey. Firstly, it is important that the concepts in the study are well operationalised (Van Thiel, 2014b, p.82); they must be understandable and explain the true meaning to ensure internal validity. To ensure adequate operationalisation of the survey, a pilot has been used. In this pilot a wide variety of people (from (non-)public and (non-)academic backgrounds) have completed the survey. Beforehand, people were not aware of the exact research purpose and therefore had to rely on the information given in the survey instructions. After they had given their responses, adaptations were made and the survey was retested by both old and new pilot respondents to heighten validity.

Secondly, non-response and mortality (quitting) are important threats to external validity. When the non-response and/or mortality is high this leads to a sample that is too small to generalise or unable to represent the differences among respondents. A high non-response is often the result of difficulties with gaining access to closed communities and people being insensitive to requests due to the fact they receive so many (Van Thiel, 2014b, p.83). To improve the response rate and lower mortality several measures were taken. First of all, this study was supported by two umbrella organisations: the VSCD for the TCHs and the Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten [VNG] for the municipalities. Both the VSCD and VNG have send out an email to inform their members about my study and to underline the relevance of the study. Secondly, the VSCD provided me with their member list which contained the email addresses and phone numbers of TCH managers. Thirdly, the invitation contained a request to send a notification in case they did not want to participate in the survey and if they would want to list a reason for this, with an explanation why this was important for the study. Fourthly, they were sent a reminder and in the case of municipalities they were called. Municipalities were called because they receive more requests and the organisations are often larger with makes the chances of the request 'getting lost' in the organisation a greater risk. Finally, to reduce mortality, the questions were designed to be easily understandable, the questionnaire had a simple and clear lay-out and the amount of time it took to complete the survey was minimalised.

The final factor that can affect the validity and reliability of a survey is the tendency of participants to give socially desirable answers (Van Thiel, 2014b, p.83). To prevent this, anonymity was granted to the respondents. Moreover, the survey was tested to ensure that instructions were clear, questions were easy

to read and the mentioned concepts were unambiguous. In addition to this, the invitations for the survey mentioned either the commissioner for the study (the VSCD) or my background as a student in Public Administration, depending on the target group. This minimises the perception some respondents may have that I am part of the other group, which can lead to social desirable answers. However, as municipalities have public legitimacy, they are more prone to giving social desirable answers to limit public critique, while often TCHs are more distanced from public critique. This problem cannot be completely eliminated and therefore this should be kept in mind.

4.5.2. Interviews

There are two main factors influencing the validity and reliability of interviews. First of all, the researcher him or herself, as the researcher is the most important instrument (Van Thiel, 2014b, p.100). As a researcher it is important to be aware of researcher bias, which is more strongly present in qualitative research. Researcher bias can influence multiple stages of research, such as the selection of respondents, subconscious influencing of the respondents during data collection and the interpretation of answers. To limit researcher bias during data collection a full-structured interview is recommended. This leads to a higher validity and higher reliability (Van Thiel, 2014b, p.100). In this study a deliberate choice has been made for semi-structured interviews, even though this lessens the reliability compared to a full structured interview. The reasoning behind this is that a full-structured interview would be similar to the survey, while the goal of incorporating a qualitative research method was to compensate for the weakness of a survey. To heighten validity, the interviews were recorded and transcribed to ensure the correct quoting of respondents. These transcriptions were manually coded and later these codes were reread and checked to heighten objectivity and correctness. In addition to this, short summaries and interpretations of the answers were given during the interview to check whether the respondents agreed with these interpretations. When answers were unclear, more questions on this topic were asked. Finally, awareness of my own researcher biases has encouraged me to be as objective as possible before, during and after the interviews. Additionally, this is also the reason this chapter contains use of the word I and all its variations. As a researcher my choices in methodology have influenced the course of the research and therefore also the results, this is unavoidable. By using the word I and its variations, I try to emphasise and raise awareness to the fact that as a researcher my choices have influenced the outcomes, despite my best efforts maintain objectivity.

The second factor that influences the validity and reliability of interviews is the research population. The larger and more varied the research population is, the higher reliability and validity are (Van Thiel, 2014b, p.100). The research population in this study consisted of 10 respondents, which is limited when one looks to the entire population and lowers external validity (generalisability). However, the research population was varied and represented differences between the degree and stages of autonomisation of

TCHs. Additionally, there was much variety between municipalities in terms of size and geographical and socio-economic differences. More importantly is the reasoning that the main goal of the interviews is to provide more in depth-knowledge, critical comments and suggestions and to acquire new insights that are not included in the theory yet. Therefore, internal validity is valued more highly than external validity.

5. Analysis

This chapter contains the results of both the survey and the interviews on the occurrence of (sub-) barriers and solutions to overcome these barriers. Section 5.1. discusses the results of the survey on the occurrence of the different types of relationships: principal-agent, combined (AS) or principal-steward. Section 5.2. discusses the scores of municipalities and TCHs, and the types of relationships (PA-AS-PS) on all (sub-) barriers. Moreover, the interview results on the (sub-) barriers and solutions are discussed. Furthermore, a new (sub-) barrier is introduced. Section 5.4. summarises the results of the analysis. The last section contains the outcomes of the tested hypotheses.

5.1. Type of relationship

The results from the survey reveal that both municipalities (N =50) and TCHs (N=63) lean more towards being a principal-steward relationship than being in a principal-agent relationship. The average score of municipalities [MUNs] on the type of relationship continuum (as shown in figure 3) is 3.58, whereas TCHs score a 3.32 on average. The Mann-Whitney U test ⁴shows there is a significant difference between the perception of municipalities and TCHs when it comes to the type of relationship they are in ($U= 1238.500, z = - 2.186, p = .029$). These findings suggest that municipalities generally perceive their relationship as closer to an ideal principal-steward relationship than TCHs do.




Figure 3 Type of relationship continuum

As can be seen in table 14, only a very small amount of respondents (N=113) (6.2%) perceive their relationship as a principal-agent relationship. The majority of the respondents (49.6%) perceive their relationship as a principal-steward relationship, while a slightly smaller percentage (44.2%) perceives their relationship as a combined relationship.

⁴ A MANOVA test was conducted as well. The results of this test can be seen in APPENDIX III and IV

Table 14: Occurrence of types of relationships

Type of relationship	TCHs	MUNs	Total
1 Ideal type principal-agent	-	-	-
2 Principal-agent	9.5%	2%	6.2%
3 Neutral (agent/steward)	49.2%	38%	44.2%
4 Principal-steward	41.3%	60%	49.6%
5 Ideal type principal-steward	-	-	-

Both groups were asked to assess their relationship with a mark. Figure 4 shows municipalities assess their relationship with a higher mark than TCHs do. On average, municipalities assess the relationship with a 7.6 while TCHs assess it with a 7.1. According to the Mann-Whitney U test ($U = 1242.000$, $z = -2.041$, $p = .041$), there is a significant difference between the two results. On a scale from one to ten, both results are more than sufficient, with a combined average of 7.3. This means both groups are satisfied with the relationship, although municipalities are substantially more satisfied.




Figure 4 Assessment of the relationship

When the different types of relationships are compared on the marks they have given the relationship, there are unequivocal differences. On average principal-agent relationships score a 5.4, combined relationships a 7 and principal-steward relationships a 7.8. According to the Kruskal-Wallis test there is a significant difference between the different relationships and their assessment of the relationship, χ^2

(2, N=113) = 18.115, $p = .000$. Moreover, there is a significant positive correlation between relationship satisfaction and being in a relationship with more steward characteristics ($r = .366$, $p = .000$).

A factor analysis on principal-agent and principal-steward characteristics was conducted for both groups. The results of these two factor analyses are dissimilar and give insight into how municipalities and TCHs interpret the same set of questions on the type of relationship differently. The results and interpretation of the components are shown below.

Table 15 Factor analysis of principal-agent and principal-steward relationship characteristics according to municipalities

Municipality	PA	AS	PS
The TCH is involved in the municipality	.025	.147	.905
In the relationship with the TCH there is conflict on a regular basis	.464	-.691	-.330
The TCH is involved in developing policy	.031	.300	.491
There is mutual trust in our relationship	-.110	.772	.616
Our appreciation is primarily shown through financial and material means	.772	.276	.032
Our appreciation is primarily shown through giving autonomy and responsibility	.288	.573	.141
We check-up on the TCHs' performance on a regular basis	.769	.031	.065
We judge the TCH mostly based on performance indicators	.262	.756	-.075
The TCH and us have a common goal	-.115	.859	.489
We trust on the expertise of the TCH	.158	.716	.536
Eigenvalues	1.606	3.737	1.114
% of Variance	16.062	37.367	11.143
Alpha	.485	.817	.794

This section discusses the factor analysis results on relationship characteristics of municipalities (see table 15 above). The PA component consists of three of the four PA characteristics. The PA characteristics 'conflict on a regular basis', 'checking up regularly' and 'showing appreciation primarily through financial and material means' are all part of this component. This component represents the

ideal type of the PA relationship with the exception of ‘assessment mostly based on performance indicators’. Moreover, this relationship has the lowest (insufficient) alpha of all components by far.

The AS component consists of four of the six PS characteristics and one of the four PA characteristics. The opposite of this component is experiencing ‘conflict on a regular basis’. The two PS items on involvement are missing: ‘The TCH is involved in the municipality’ and ‘the TCH is involved in developing policy’. The combined relationship can therefore be described as a mix of several PS characteristics, without the element of involvement and with an element of control (the one characteristic of the PA relationship). Surprisingly, this component has the highest alpha of all components, which implicates that for municipalities this is the most consistent and coherent set of characteristics. A possible explanation for this is the democratic legitimacy of municipalities that requires an element of control and the more distant behaviour/attitude towards autonomised TCHs, which results in lower involvement.

The PS component consists of five of the six PS characteristics; only the PS characteristic ‘showing of appreciation through giving autonomy and responsibility’ is missing. An explanation that this one PS characteristic is missing could be that the appreciation for the TCH is shown by involving the TCH very closely in the municipality, instead of giving them a heap of autonomy and responsibility. An alternative explanation is that municipalities do not regard giving autonomy and responsibility as a way of showing appreciation towards the TCH. This type of relationship places high value on involvement, trust and a same level basis, without placing much value on checks and control.

Table 16 Factor analysis of principal-agent and principal-steward characteristics according to TCHs

TCH	PA	AS	PS
We feel connected to the municipality	.124	-.239	.664
In our relationship with the municipality there is conflict on a regular basis	.436	-.601	-.503
We are involved in developing, for us relevant, policy	.124	.277	.679
There is mutual trust in our relationship	-.282	.208	.810
Appreciation for our organisation is primarily shown through financial and material means	-.687	.243	-.152
Appreciation for our organisation is primarily shown through giving autonomy and responsibility	-.113	-.073	.863
We are checked on performance on a regular basis	.728	.489	-.118
We are judged mostly based on performance indicators	-.034	.873	.092
The municipality and us have a common goal	.173	.203	.633
The municipality trusts our expertise	-.062	.035	.762
Eigenvalues	1.317	1.548	3.364
% of Variance	1.317	15.478	36.404
Alpha	.100	.466	.837

This section discusses the factor analysis results on relationship characteristics of TCHs (see table 16 above). The PA component consists of two of the four PA characteristics: ‘regular conflict and ‘regular check-ups’. Surprisingly, the strongest opposite characteristic is the PA characteristic ‘showing appreciation through financial and material means’. This could be an indication that rewarding the organisation financially fits a PS relationship better than a PA relationship. This was also confirmed during the interviews. Two municipalities who strived for a PS like relationship chose to reward the TCHs; if the TCH had any surpluses they were allowed to keep these. According to TCHs, the PA relationship places little value on showing appreciation, but highly values controlling and the conflict in the relationship.

The AS component consists of two of the four PA characteristics: ‘regular check-ups’ and ‘assessment mostly based on performance indicators’. The opposite characteristic is ‘conflict on a regular basis’. In the combined relationship there is a strong emphasis on monitoring, but there is no conflict. It is close to the theoretical ideal type of the PA relationship, but it lacks the PA elements of conflict and showing primarily tangible appreciation.

The PS component consists of all six PS characteristics and the PA conflict characteristic is a strong opposite characteristic of this relationship. These outcomes perfectly align with the ideal type of a PS relationship. Moreover, this relationship is the only one with a high alpha, meaning this is a highly valid set of characteristics.

The factor analyses demonstrate different results, implicating that the characteristics of the type of relationships are different for municipalities and TCHs. Comparing the two variants of the PA relationship, it is interesting that they are quite similar to each other, except for that municipalities place a high value on showing appreciation through financial and material means, while for TCHs this characteristic is the complete opposite of a PA relationship characteristic. A possible explanation for this is that TCHs in a PA relationship do not feel appreciated. They may regard cuts in their budget or not receiving extra funding as a lack of appreciation. However, municipalities may regard providing subsidy on a regular basis as a way of showing appreciation towards the TCH.

Comparing the two variants of the AS relationship, for municipalities this relationship has the highest alpha and is a combination of PS characteristics, such as trust and having a common goal, with an element of control. For TCHs the PS elements are absent: only control element exists. This indicates that both parties perceive the AS relationship very differently. For the TCHs this relationship is more business-like, whereas for municipalities this relationship is characterised by involvement and closeness.

Comparing the two variants of the PS relationship, the results are almost similar. Only in the case of municipalities, the characteristic of 'showing of appreciation through giving autonomy and responsibility' is missing. It is remarkable that municipalities do not consider this as a characteristic of the PS relationship, while TCHs do so. A possible explanation for this is that municipalities feel negative towards giving autonomy and responsibility, because it can be perceived as a way of showing detachment towards the TCH, whereas they want to actively involve the TCH in their municipality.

Based on the comparison between these two factor analyses and other outcomes in this section, there is a strong indication that the theory, especially the PA relationship theory, does not represent the reality of relationships between principals and executives in the TCH sector. In the conclusion (see chapter 6) this will be discussed in more detail.

Table 17 Ordinal logistic regression analysis for relationship satisfaction as predicted by principal-agent and principal-steward relationship characteristics

	PA		AS		PS	
	Estimate	S.E.	Estimate	S.E.	Estimate	S.E.
Regular conflict	-1.126***	.261	-	-	-.550	.316
Financial rewards	.179	.234	-	-	.132	.273
Control regular	.273	.248	-	-	.379	.292
Assessment based on performance indicator	.359	.258	-	-	.345	.287
Involved in policy	-	-	.528	.311	.489	.322
Involved in municipality	-	-	-.187	.348	.887	.387
Mutual trust	-	-	1.438**	.428	1.186*	.478
Appreciation freedom and responsibility	-	-	-.377	.373	-.364	.401
Mutual goal	-	-	1.118**	.382	1.204**	.420
Trust in expertise	-	-	.867	.482	.774	.501
N	113		113		113	
Chi Square	38.887***		72.136***		81.676***	
d.f.	4		6		10	

- * = Significant at the .05 level
- ** = Significant at the .01 level
- *** = Significant at the .001 level

An ordinal logistic regression was conducted to calculate the relationship characteristics most significantly influencing the relationship satisfaction (see table 17). First, the model only containing PA characteristics was run; only ‘regular conflict’ significantly predicted the relationship satisfaction. Subsequently, the PS characteristics model was run; having a ‘common goal’ and having ‘mutual trust’ significantly predict relationship satisfaction. Finally, the model with all relationship characteristics was run; both having a ‘common goal’ and having ‘mutual trust’ are significant predictors of relationship satisfaction.

Overall, the type of relationships and assessments of the relationship provide some interesting insights. First of all, results of the assessment indicate that both municipalities and TCHs are satisfied with their relationship in general, although municipalities assess the relationship more positively. Secondly, only a very small amount (7 out of 113) of the respondents is in a principal-agent relationship. Thirdly, being

in a principal-steward relationship generally equals more relationship satisfaction. Fourthly, factor analysis shows different components than theoretically expected: characteristics of PA and PS are often mixed. Moreover, the principal-steward relationship demonstrates high scale reliability in both cases, whereas the principal-agent relationship scores insufficient on scale reliability. Finally, experiencing regular conflict and especially having a common goal, and having mutual trust are the most significant characteristics when it comes to relationship satisfaction.

5.2. Types of barriers

In this section, the results for both municipalities and TCHs, and the different type of relationships are discussed. Each barrier contains the differences between municipalities and TCHs, and the differences between the three types of relationships. Furthermore, significant results of the ordinal logistic regression are discussed. Finally, the results of the interviews about the barriers and their solutions are discussed.

5.2.1. Barrier 1: Different expectations

5.2.1.1 Different expectations (communication)

The results from the survey reveal that both municipalities (N=46) and TCHs (N=63) are generally satisfied when it comes to communication in their relationship. However, municipalities differ from TCHs as they are considerably more positive about the quality of communication. On a scale from 1 to 5 (5 meaning the quality of communication is excellent) municipalities score a 3.8. In comparison, TCHs score a 3.35. A Mann-Whitney U test affirmed there is a significant statistical difference between both groups ($U = 895.500$, $z = -3.524$, $p = .000$).

In terms of percentages on the three individual indicators, the difference between the groups is more distinct. 83 percent of municipalities agree or completely agree that the general quality of communication is good, whereas only 49 percent of TCHs feels the same way. Moreover, 72 percent of the municipalities agree or completely agree that they have the same expectation of the relationship as the other party, while less than 52 percent of TCHs agree. Furthermore, 80 percent of municipalities agree or completely agree that their communication on expectations is univocal, whereas a considerably smaller amount (63.5%) of TCHs agree or completely agree.

PA relationships score the lowest on the communication mechanism with a score of 2.29, while combined relationships scored a 3.38 and PS relationships a 3.84 on average. The differences are statistically significant, $\chi^2(2, N=109) = 24.688$, $p = .000$. Based on these averages, it can be inferred that PA relationships experience the communication barrier, while for combined relationships and PS relationships communication does not provide a barrier.

Communication is a general barrier, meaning that despite the type of relationship respondents are in, the average result on the communication mechanism should be high in all cases. Having more principal-steward relationships characteristics present positively correlates with communication satisfaction ($r = .397, p = .000$). This means the more steward characteristics a relationship has, the more satisfied respondents are about communication.

An ordinal logistic regression was conducted with all three variables (see table 18). The final model statistically significantly predicted the dependent variable over and above the intercept-only model, $\chi^2(3) = 56.138, p = .000, N = 109$. According to the ordinal logistic regression, two out of the three variables are a significant predictor of relationship satisfaction for both parties. Unsatisfactory communication has an estimate of $-.943, SE .401, p = .019$, while having different expectations and a different attitude towards the relationship has an estimate of $-.929, SE .375, p = .013$. These outcomes are anticipated, as all relationships require good communication for a satisfying relationship.

Table 18 Ordinal logistic regression analysis for relationship satisfaction as predicted by communication

	Beta	Std. Error
Unsatisfactory Communication	-.943*	.401
Not communicating expectations to TCH	-.470	.324
Having different expectations and attitude towards the relationship	-.929*	.375
N	109	
Chi Square	56.138***	
d.f.	3	

The interviews made it apparent that some municipalities and TCHs do not clearly express their expectations to each other. This led to discrepancies in their answers to the same questions, despite assuming the other party has the same expectations. Another inadequacy is the perceived lack of cultural policy implementation; some TCHs experience a discrepancy between the actions and goals as reported in the cultural policy document and the actions and goals in reality. Moreover, all TCHs are very positive towards, and sometimes expect, a municipality to hold brainstorming session on new initiatives with them and help to facilitate these new initiatives. However, aldermen who are responsible for several dossiers at the same time often fall short of expertise, time or keenness to actively brainstorm with TCHs, as one alderman explained. For a TCH, this absence of willingness to brainstorm can be disappointing.

Most municipalities have stipulated that they should meet up several times a year, but in reality the frequency is less. The reasons for meeting up less frequently is, among others, the perception that meeting is unnecessary when there are no direct grounds to do so. This frequently results in meetings with TCHs that are only focused on financial outcomes. As one of the alderman said: “I think formally we should have three formal appointments a year, but through time this has gradually decreased. No one is waiting for an unnecessary conversation. I will see the TCH manager at another moment”.

One of the TCHs said it is very important to meet up regularly and inform each other to avoid surprises: “If you do not meet regularly and you have to make a special appointment to meet up an alderman knows: ‘Oh no, here comes trouble’, otherwise he would not try to make an appointment. This is something you want to avoid”. Therefore, it is advised to meet up regularly, also when there is no immediate cause. Moreover, giving feedback is important as some TCH managers experience not receiving any feedback on reports or ideas as frustrating. Sometimes a short email saying: “Thank you for sending it, I will read it” can be enough to prevent frustrating the TCH manager, as one TCH respondent says. Furthermore, it is important to give the TCH an opportunity to respond to a municipal decision or judgement regarding their organisation, as mentioned by another TCH manager. Finally, one TCH manager advises to always communicate in a positive manner: “First mention the positive points and then name points of improvement”.

5.2.1.2. Multiple Principals Problem

The survey shows a significant difference between municipalities (N=50) and TCHs (N=63) when it comes to perceiving the multiple principals barrier. On a scale from 1 to 5 (5 meaning the municipality is uniform) municipalities score a 3.89. In contrast, TCHs score a 2.87 on average. A Mann-Whitney U test revealed a significant difference between the two groups ($U=629.000$, $z = -.5362$, $p=.000$). These results indicate municipalities are substantially more positive about unanimity in their organisation on goals and expectations than TCHs are, who even rate the unanimity as insufficient.

There were two general statements used to indicate the presence of the Multiple Principals Problem. The first statement was that the communication of the municipality is uniform. Almost 48 percent of TCHs disagree or completely disagree, while less than 5 percent of municipalities disagree or completely disagree. The second statement was that everyone within the municipality is aligned (politician - public servant, public servant – public servant) in terms of TCH policy. Almost 51 percent of TCHs disagree or completely disagree, whereas less than 9 percent of municipalities disagree or completely disagree.

Both groups were asked to respond to statements based on which group they belong to. The answers to these statements have not been taken into account to calculate the scores on the mechanism to keep the differences comparable. However, the results of these individual statements give a good insight into the presence of the Multiple Principals Problem (TCHs) or the potential causes for the Multiple Principals Problem (municipalities).

Regarding municipalities, 54 percent of all TCHs experience multiple principals within the municipality while more than 33 percent of all TCHs say having multiple principals creates problems and/or uncertainties for their organisation. These outcomes are unexpected, as it suggests that, despite more than half of the TCHs experiencing multiple principals, this does not create problems or uncertainties for TCHs. A possible explanation for this is that TCHs decide to only communicate and take orders from one principal. An alternative explanation is that some TCHs use the existence of multiple principals to their own benefit; each time favouring a different principal with whom they have the most goals in common. TCHs that favour a principal based on functionality can thereby avoid problems for their organisation.

As for municipalities, over 67 percent says they have integrated the roles of commissioner and supervisor into one contact person, one contract, or one department in the municipality. Over 67 percent of municipalities also says they have regular meetings to discuss TCH policy with all relevant parties in the municipality. Moreover, over 80 percent of municipalities say they are aware of colleagues' visions on TCH policy. This last outcome suggests that municipalities are not in need of regular meetings to increase awareness of municipal colleagues' visions on TCH policy. However, the fact that almost 51 percent of TCHs compared to less than 9 percent of the municipalities feels that within the municipality people are unaligned in terms of TCH policy, suggests regular meetings may be valuable. Moreover, the fact that 33 percent of TCHs says that having multiple principals hinders their organisation, suggests that both integrating roles and having more meetings should be implemented more often to lower the presence of multiple principals.

When it concerns the type of relationships, PA relationships score a 2.42 on average on assessing the uniformity of the municipality, combined relationships score a 3.09 and PS relationships score a 3.6. A Kruskal-Wallis test confirms there is a significant statistical difference ($\chi^2(2, N=109) = 12, 143, p = .002$). This finding is confirmed by the positive correlation between having more principal-steward characteristics present in the relationship and experiencing uniformity in the municipality ($r = .268, p = .000$).

With respect to the ordinal logistic regression for this mechanism, the model with the two general variables statistically significantly predicted the dependent variable over and above the intercept-only model, $\chi^2(2) = 16.956, p = .000, N=109$. The only significant variable is 'alignment within the

municipality' with an estimate of .569, SE .256, $p = .026$. In other words, alignment within the municipality on TCH policy is important for relationship satisfaction.

All interviewed TCHs experience the Multiple Principals Problem to some degree. In some cases, they are unsure who to contact for certain matters and spend a lot of time searching for the proper person to contact. In other cases, TCH managers receive phone calls or visits from municipal employees they have never met before. One of the TCH managers feels that the responsibility for the organisation is fragmented throughout the entire municipality. Another TCH manager described another downside of having multiple principals: "Sometimes you have good conversations with a public servant in which you are plotting a new course together. Later on you talk to a public servant responsible for finance, who did not hear about your conversation with the other servant, and you have to start all over again". During the interviews, it became apparent that the corresponding municipalities are not aware of this problem to the same degree.

Advice on how to overcome this barrier is given for both municipalities and TCHs during the interviews. In regard to TCHs, one of the TCH managers advises to take matters into your own hands:

You have to take charge. It is similar to a relationship; if you want the relationship to change it is best to start by changing yourself. The other person has to change with you then. The moment you change your attitude by formulating what you want and what you stand for, the other person can still resist, but in the end it is a matter of persuasion.

A practical example of taking charge is given by another TCH manager. When this TCH manager is called by an unfamiliar municipal employee the managers answers by saying: "I appreciate the fact that you call, but I would be happy if you call your colleague inside the municipality because he is my contact person."

As for municipalities, one municipality advises municipalities to install an account manager who is in direct communication with the TCH. The alderman and account manager should discuss matters concerning the TCH together beforehand and subsequently discuss these matters with the TCH.

5.2.2. Barrier 2: Situational characteristics

5.2.2.1. Monitoring strategies

According to the survey, municipalities (N=46) score a 3.91 on suitable PA monitoring and a 3.07 on suitable PS monitoring. In contrast, TCHs (N=63) score a 3.38 on suitable PA monitoring and a 2.33 on suitable PS monitoring. According to the Mann-Whitney U test, municipalities and TCHs scores are significantly different on both the implementation of suitable PA monitoring ($U = 837.500$, $z = -4.476$, $p = .000$) and PS monitoring ($U = 729.500$, $z = -4.880$, $p = .000$).

In general, municipalities perceive their monitoring as suitable for both a PA and PS relationship. TCHs perceive the monitoring as suitable for a PA relationship as well, but they do experience insufficient implementation of suitable PS monitoring instruments.

When it comes to using suitable PA monitoring, PA relationships score a 3.43 on average, AS relationships a 3.55, and PS relationships a 3.67. With reference to using instruments suitable for a PS relationship, PA relationships score a 2.29, AS relationships a 2.57 and PS relationships a 2.75. The Kruskal-Wallis test demonstrates that the different types of relationships do not score significantly different on the PA monitoring barrier, ($\chi^2 (2, N=109) = 1.504, p = .472$) and PS monitoring barrier ($\chi^2 (2, N=109) = 2.538, p = .281$).

Table 19 Implementation of PA and PS relationship monitoring techniques according to municipalities and TCHs

	PA monitoring		PS monitoring	
	MUNs	TCHs	MUNs	TCHs
Very weak	-	-	-	12.7%
Weak	-	11.1%	13%	44.4%
Average	10.9%	39.7%	71.7%	39.7%
Strong	87%	49.2%	10.9%	3.2%
Very strong	2.2%	-	4.3%	-

As for percentages, the majority of municipalities (87%) perceives their monitoring as suitable for a PA relationship, as does the lion’s share of TCHs (49.2%) (see table 19). As for suitable PS monitoring, the majority of municipalities (71.7%) perceives the suitable PS monitoring as average, whereas the lion’s share of TCHs (44.4%) perceive suitable PS monitoring as weak.

Table 20 Implementation of PA and PS monitoring techniques according to the type of relationship

	PA monitoring			PS monitoring		
	PA	AS	PS	PA	AS	PS
Very weak	-	-	-	14.6%	10.6%	3.6%
Weak	14.3%	6.4%	5.5%	57.1%	27.7%	30.9%
Average	28.6%	31.9%	23.6%	14.3%	55.3%	56.4%
Strong	57.1%	61.7%	69.1%	14.3%	6.4%	5.5%
Very strong	-	-	1.8%	-	-	3.6%

The majority of all three relationships (PA – 57.1%, AS – 61.7%, PS – 69.1%) regard the monitoring as suitable for a PA relationship (see table 20). In respect of implementing monitoring instruments suitable to a PS relationship, the majority of PA respondents (57.1%) regards this as little. Both the majority of AS (55.3%) and PS (56.4%) respondents regard the use of PS monitoring instruments as average.

The model with all monitoring aspects (PA and PS) is significant, as the final model statistically predicted the dependent variable over and above the intercept-only model, $\chi^2(11) = 28.016, p = .003, N=109$. Of all twelve variables, only one is significant: ‘monitoring does not hinder the functioning of the TCH’ with an estimate of 1.081, SE = .337, $p = .001$. This result indicates there should be extra focus on whether monitoring is hindering the TCH in operating.

Stemming from the interviews, monitoring turns out to be one of the most complex elements in the relationship between municipalities and TCHs. One of the main points of critique, as mentioned by TCHs, is when monitoring focuses primarily on numbers. One TCH manager said: “When you focus on measuring certain results, it is what is being measured that becomes important, not what it is supposed to represent”.

In regard of monitoring, one of the municipal respondents said: “TCHs have to be entrepreneurs with public funds”. In other words, TCHs are taking risks with funds subsidised by taxes. This makes the relationship with a TCH complex for municipalities. Another municipality referred to the financial monitoring as well, describing the financial situation as ‘frustrating’. The TCH in this municipality receives funding, but needs a higher amount each year. This creates frustration for both the TCH and council. “You can tell the TCH you will not give them more money, but this creates frustration on their part. This is the tension you have to work with”, according to the municipal respondent.

Another municipality said one of the reasons for strict monitoring is because, generally speaking, the citizens in this municipality have a low income. This creates resistance to high expenses that are not directly linked to improving the financial situation of citizens. As the municipality explained: “Our

biggest concern is to stay within the limits. This is a pity, but money is the dominant way of looking at the theatre at the moment”.

Some municipalities choose to focus on (strict) financial monitoring because of two reasons: their responsibility to the tax payer and political pressure. As one municipality respondent mentioned, a financially failing TCH often leads to a storm of critique for the municipality, especially when people feel the municipality could and should have monitored more frequently and thorough.

Besides financial monitoring, some municipalities also monitor the quantity of performances, the type of performances, and whether target audiences visit performances for example. In respect of performance-indicators, a few times looking at room occupancy is mentioned. However, several respondents said it is a meaningless way of monitoring, as room occupancy says nothing about the audiences’ diversity, their satisfaction or the revenues of the performance. Moreover, this percentage is said to be easily manipulated as performances can be relocated to a smaller room to improve room occupancy. One alderman expressed the uselessness of certain monitoring techniques: “Art and culture are an experience for people, sometimes it is hard to benchmark these experiences”.

There is no one-size-fits-all advice when it comes to monitoring, as this varies from one situation to another. However, based on the interviews, it is important municipalities are aware of how frustrating it is for TCHs when monitoring hinders their creativity and operational management, as confirmed by the ordinal logistic regression. On the other hand, based on the interviews, it is important TCHs are aware of the public and political pressure to quantify outcomes. A healthy financial situation is a necessity to secure persistent support for the TCH, as several municipalities affirm.

Three solutions originate from the interviews. Firstly, TCHs can explain to the local council how their organisation operates to enable the council to make more informed decisions on monitoring instruments (section 5.2.4. explains this solution in more detail). Secondly, municipalities should explain the reasoning behind monitoring strategies. During some interviews, it became evident that TCHs are sometimes unaware of the direct reasoning behind particular monitoring strategies, which causes frustration. When the reasoning behind certain monitoring strategies is explained, presumably even stricter forms of monitoring cause less frustration. Finally, according to one TCH manager, it is better to say what you notice, instead of setting strict requirements:

When few children visit the theatre it would be sensible to say something along the lines of: ‘at the moment I have the impression not many children are visiting the theatre’ instead of saying ‘produce six shows for children each year’. Things works differently in the creative sector; if you set strict requirements this creates resistance, if you set a challenge this fosters creativity.

5.2.2.2. Type of contract

The survey shows that most TCHs (N=62) (37.1%) consider the type of contract used in their relationship as a global behaviour-based contract, while most municipalities (N=45) (48.9%) consider the contract as a specified outcome-based contract (see table 21). According to Fisher's exact test, there is no significant difference between the two groups ($p = .227$).

Table 21 Type of contract used according to municipalities and TCHs in percentages

	MUNs	TCHs	Total
Type of contract			
Specified behaviour-based contract	-	1.6%	0.9%
Specified outcome-based contract	48.9%	32.3%	39.9%
Global behaviour-based contract	17.8%	29%	24.3%
Global outcome-based contract	33.3%	37.1%	35.5%
Type of behaviour			
High programmability, low measurability	2.2%	6.5%	4.7%
High programmability, high measurability	53.3%	27.4%	38.3%
Low programmability, low measurability	13.3%	16.1%	15%
Low programmability, high measurability	31.1%	50%	42.1%

Interestingly, when one looks at the programmability and measurability of behaviour and outcomes, the majority of municipalities (53.3%) perceive the work of the TCH as having highly programmable behaviour and having highly measurable outcomes. In contrast, the majority of TCHs (50%) regards the programmability of behaviour low and the measurability of outcomes high. According to Fisher's exact test, there is a significant difference between both groups ($p = .048$). This indicates that although the majority of both groups (80.4% in total) perceive monitoring on outcomes as meaningful, TCHs perceive programming their behaviour as useless.

With reference to the perception of programmability and measurability in relation to the used type of contract, municipalities and TCHs differ. As for municipalities, there is a significant correlation between using an outcomes based or behaviour based contract and the perception of programmability and measurability. Rating programmability low and measurability high correlates with using an outcome based contract ($r = .312$, $p = .038$). Rating measurability high and having an outcome based contract fits the assumptions of the theoretical framework. As for TCHs, there are no significant correlations ($p > .05$) between how they rate programmability and measurability and the type of contract.

This indicates that municipalities and TCHs differ in their perception of programmability and measurability in the relation to the used type of contract, as municipalities do perceive a relation between these two concepts and TCHs do not.

With reference to the type of contracts, the majority of PA respondents (57.2%) has a detailed contract, whereas the majority of AS (55.3%) and PS (66%) respondents have a global contract (see table 22). Fisher's exact test indicates that there is no significant difference between the three types of relationships ($p = .201$).

Table 22 Type of contract used according to type of relationship

	PA	AS	PS
Type of contract			
Specified behaviour-based contract	14.3%	-	-
Specified outcome-based contract	42.9%	44.7%	34%
Global behaviour-based contract	14.3%	31.9%	41.5%
Global outcome-based contract	28.6%	23.4%	24.5%
Type of behaviour			
High programmability, low measurability	-	6.4%	3.8%
High programmability, high measurability	42.9%	38.3%	37.7%
Low programmability, low measurability	-	17%	15.1%
Low programmability, high measurability	57.1%	38.3%	43.4%

Regarding the programmability and measurability, the majority of PA relationships (57.1%) regard the TCHs' work as having high programmability of behaviour and high measurability of outcomes, whereas the majority of PS relationships (43.4%) consider the TCHs' work as having low programmability and high measurability. As for AS relationships, 38.3% regards the TCHs' work as having high programmability and high measurability while an equal 38.3% regards it as having low programmability and high measurability. According to Fisher's exact test, there is no significant difference between the three groups ($p = .941$).

Table 23 Ordinal logistic regression analysis for relationship satisfaction as predicted by programmability and measurability with HPHM as reference category

Programmability and measurability	Estimate	Std. Error
High programmability, low measurability	-1.221	.928
Low programmability, low measurability	-1.682**	.600
Low programmability, high measurability	-1.136*	.460
N	107	
Chi Square	10.188	
d.f.	3	

Based on the model, perceiving the TCHs' work as having highly programmable behaviour and highly measurable outcomes [HPHM] has a significant positive influence on relationship satisfaction (see table 23). Based on background information, conducted interviews and theory, these results could be attributed to TCHs, who perceive their work as having HPHM, regard monitoring and assessment by the municipalities as meaningful. However, if TCHs perceive their work as not having HPHM, the monitoring and assessment may be perceived as an unnecessary, meaningless and hindering. As for municipalities, the feeling of having insight into the TCHs work, and thereby having a sense of control, is a possible explanation for HPHM having such a positive influence on relationship satisfaction.

5.2.2.3. Type of communication

The lion's share of TCHs (N= 62) (46.8%) and the majority of municipalities (N=45) (51.1%) consider the (primarily) used type of communication as same level and informal (see table 24). Moreover, the results indicate that 28.9 percent of municipalities view the communication as (primarily) hierarchical in comparison to 43.5 percent of TCHs.

Although the lion's share of both parties consider the communication as same level and informal, a considerable number of TCHs (43.5%) perceive the communication as hierarchical (informal and formal). In comparison, less than 28 percent of municipalities perceives the communication as hierarchal. However, according to Fisher's exact test ($p = .233$) there is no significant difference between municipalities and TCHs in reference to the kind of communication.

Table 24 Type of communication according to municipalities and TCHs

Type of communication used	MUNs	TCHs	Total
Hierarchical and formal	-	3.2%	1.9%
Hierarchical and partly informal	28.9%	40.3%	35.5%
Same level and formal	20%	9.7%	14%
Same level and informal	51.1%	46.8%	48.6%

The majority of PA relationships (71.4%) describes the communication as predominantly hierarchical and partly informal, as does the lion's share of AS (46.8%) (see table 25 below). The majority of PS relationships (67.9%) depict the type of communication as same level basis and partly informal. According to Fisher's exact test, the results for the type of relationship differ significantly ($p = .001$).

Table 25 Type of communication according to type of relationships

Type of communication used	PA	AS	PS
Hierarchical and formal	-	4.3%	-
Hierarchical and partly informal	71.4%	46.8%	20.8%
Same level and formal	14.3%	17%	11.3%
Same level and informal	14.3%	31.9%	67.9%

In respect of the ordinal logistic model, the type of communication is a categorical variable with four different answers. Since one of the categories only contains two respondents, this option 'hierarchical and formal' is excluded from the ordinal logistic regression to ensure higher validity of the model. The model with three categories statistically significantly predicted the dependent variable over and above the intercept-only model, $\chi^2(3) = 8.402$, $p = .038$, $N = 107$. The only significant predictor is having same level informal communication compared to having hierarchical and informal communication, with an estimate of 1.042, SE 1.042, $p = .015$. In other words, communicating on a same level basis with informality instead of communicating on a hierarchical basis with informality increases relationship satisfaction.

During the interviews, both municipalities and TCHs confirmed the importance of combining formal and informal communication. Writing an account of formal meetings and decisions is described as essential. "If you do not formalise certain matters, such as subsidies, you will find yourself in conflict with the other party sooner or later", according to one TCH manager. One of the municipalities also

underlines the importance of informal contact: “Formal communication needs informal communication. If you want something you have to informally bring it up so it can sink in”.

5.2.3. Barrier 3: psychological characteristics

5.2.3.1 Type of incentives

Municipalities (N= 45) score a 3.37 on average when rating their use PA incentives and a 3.53 on average on the use of PS incentives. TCHs (N=60) score a 3.27 on experiencing PA incentives and a 3.18 on experiencing PS incentives. The Mann-Whitney U test indicates that there is no significant difference between both groups on using/experiencing PA incentives ($U = 1220.000, z = -.988, p = .323$). However, municipalities and TCHs score significantly different on using/experience PS incentives ($U = 961.500, z = -.2855, p = .004$).

As can be seen from the table below (table 26), most municipalities score average on the implementation of PA incentives (62.2%). In the case of TCHs, the majority (61.7%) scores average on experiencing PA incentives. In other words, in general PA incentives are implemented averagely. In regard to implementing PS incentives, the majority of municipalities (53.3%) score strong, while the majority of TCHs (61.7%) score average on implementing of PS incentives. This indicates municipalities overestimate their implementation of PS incentives.

Table 26 Implementation of incentives according to municipalities and TCHs

	PA incentives		PS incentives	
	MUNs	TCHs	MUNs	TCHs
Very weak	-	-	-	1.7%
Weak	-	6.7	-	8.3%
Average	62.2%	61.7%	46.7%	61.7%
Strong	37.8%	30%	53.3%	26.7%
Very strong	-	1.7%	-	1.7%

PA relationships score average (3) on implementing PA incentives, whereas combined relationships score the highest (3.35) and PS incentives score above average (3.32). However, the difference is not significant according to the Kruskal-Wallis test, $\chi^2 (2, N=105) = 2.489, p = .288$.

When it comes to the perception of the use of PS incentives, PA scores the lowest with a 2.67 on average, combined relationships score a 3.28 and PS relationships score a 3.45. In other words, PA relationship score below average and combined and PS relationship above average. According to the

Kruskall-Wallis test the difference is not significant ($\chi^2 (2, N=105) = 5.548, p = .062$). However, MANOVA ($F(2, 102) = 4.780, n^2 = .086, p = .010$) and the significant correlation between having more principal-steward characteristics present in the relationship and implementing PS incentives ($r = .214, p = .007$) contradict this finding, making the difference between the three relationships debatable. Interestingly, there is also a significant correlation between the use of PA incentives and the use of PS incentives ($r = .289, \alpha = 0.01$). This indicates that the stronger one type of incentives is implemented, the stronger the other type of incentives is implemented as well. According to this result, we can infer that within the relationship both intrinsic and extrinsic methods of motivation are often used at the same time.

In regard to the results in percentages, all PA respondents (100%) score average on implementing PA incentives (see table 27). In AS relationships (54.3%) and PS relationships (64.2%) the majority scores average. Regarding the implementation of PS incentives, in all types of relationships the majority implements PS incentives averagely, with a score of 50 percent in a PA relationship, almost 57 in a AS relationship and almost 55 percent in a PS relationship. In other words, it is in all types of relationships the most common that PA and PS incentives are implemented averagely.

Table 27 Implementation of incentives per type of relationship

	PA incentives			PS incentives		
	PA	AS	PS	PA	AS	PS
Very weak	-	-	-	16.7%	-	-
Weak	-	6.5%	1.9%	16.7%	8.7%	-
Average	100%	54.3%	64.2%	50%	56.5%	54.7%
Strong	-	37%	34%	16.7%	32.6%	45.3%
Very strong	-	2.2%	-	-	2.2%	-

The model with all incentives included statistically significantly predicted the dependent variable over and above the intercept-only model, $\chi^2 (8) = 22.209, p = .005, N=105$. The only significant variable is ‘strengthening or weakening of reputation’ with an estimate of .982, SE .328, $p = .003$. In other words, when strengthening or weakening the reputation of the TCH is used as a reward, this highly increases the relationship satisfaction for both parties. Although this variable can be a negative measure (when the municipality weakens the reputation) it seems most respondents regard this variable in a positive manner. That is to say, they perceive it as a way of showing appreciation instead as of a way of punishing.

In the interviews, appreciation, or dearth thereof, was often mentioned as an important aspect of the relationship. Sometimes both parties forget to express their appreciation towards each other and assumed this was known, while the other party expressed a lack of appreciation. As for municipalities, it is advised by some respondents to not only to discuss whether the TCH has fulfilled the bare minimum demands, but to give compliments about shows, the wide array of people they attract or the way they communicate for example. On the other hand, it is also considerate for a TCH to show appreciation towards the municipality, as two respondents mentioned. As one of the TCH managers said: “As a theatre you must be thankful as well, that you get to exist, in exchange for this you will receive trust”.

Besides appreciation, showing trust towards the TCH and having a common goal are the best way to motivate the TCHs, according to the interviews. Although showing appreciation through giving autonomy is not a significant variable in the ordinal logistic regression, according to the interviews it is part of motivating the TCH. This seems to indicate that trust is not equal to giving autonomy, but perceived as something else.

When trust is lost this may cause frustration on both sides, as one TCH manager said: “Trust is the most important thing in the relationship, without trust you cannot succeed. Not in a company, not as Ajax, not in the cultural sector, nowhere”. Besides showing appreciation and trust and having a common goal, supporting and facilitating new initiatives is motivational for TCHs as well. Finally, two municipalities mentioned that they allow their TCH to build a small reserve financially, which has to be reinvested into the organisation.

5.2.4. Lack of mutual knowledge and understanding

This (sub-)barrier is not mentioned in the theoretical framework, but is derived from the interview results. Some of the interview results do not fit into any particular barrier from the theoretical framework, but make up a new barrier. This new barrier ‘Lack of mutual knowledge and understanding’ can be considered part of the different expectations barrier, as different expectations can be caused by a lack of knowledge and/or understanding of the other party.

Mutual understanding is imperative for a satisfactory relationship. There are three issues that often arise: politics, hostility and local context. Firstly, some TCHs intentionally avoid becoming involved in local politics. However, local politics do not only affect the alderman and public servants, but also the TCH. According to some respondents, many people in the city council are unaware of how a TCH operates, their costs (over the long term especially) and revenues and how the TCH benefits the local community. One example, as given by two TCHs, of financial unawareness is when council members, or sometimes aldermen and public servants, presume that as long as the room is fully occupied the show is financially rewarding. This is not always the case, as big acts, such as Tineke Schouten or Bert Visscher, can actually create a negative profit for (often smaller) TCHs. Moreover, smaller acts for half empty rooms

can be profitable to TCHs, according to these respondents. Being unaware of this information gives council members, public servants, and aldermen an incorrect picture, which often results in an incorrect judgment of the TCHs programme, their (financial) decisions and their request for subsidy. Moreover, understanding that media and general scrutiny can be demanding for politicians is important to create more understanding on the side of TCHs. One of the alderman exemplified the political pressure. When he publicly said a cultural organisation needed more subsidy he was heavily criticised: “There is this new alderman, why is it necessary now? I had to explain it to the council step by step (to gain support, NvH). Reading the first articles written about me was anything but pleasant”.

Secondly, several municipalities and TCHs experience a certain amount of hostility within the relationship, or mention examples of colleagues who experience this. One of the TCH respondents said the hostile attitude from TCHs towards municipalities is often unfair:

Managers often see the municipality as some kind of opponent, despite the fact that they are the main sponsor. Imagine Ajax or PSV (football teams, NvH), telling the main sponsors: “You should transfer the money, but besides that you are not allowed to get involved”. When a municipality finances 60 or 70 percent of your income you cannot tell them to just transfer the money and not get involved.

Another TCH respondent said it is important that municipalities treat the TCH with the same respect, as TCHs try their best to deliver a service to the local citizens.

Thirdly, one TCH respondent said it is important for TCHs to be aware of the context in which they operate. According to this respondent it is important for a TCH to have attention for the people in the region, their background and their interests. In this way, a TCH can make itself (more) valuable to the municipality and its citizens.

There are two solutions to the barrier of a lack of mutual knowledge and understanding.

Firstly, to acknowledge the influence of local politics on both the alderman and the TCH itself, TCH managers can invite after elections the new council to the theatre for an informative tour, as one TCH manager has been doing. During this visit to the theatre the manager shows the council around and explains how the theatre operates and clarifies the expenses of the theatre. This creates more understanding on the part of the council for the TCH and their subsidy request. An alternative for the theatre tour is giving a speech directed to the council. The TCH manager who mentions this solution said: “It is important to not only focus on the costs the TCH makes, but to also focus on what the local community receives in return for these costs”.

Secondly, utilising the societal value of a TCH; TCHs have the possibility to deliver a positive contribution to societal problems. Addressing the societal value of a TCH has three benefits. Firstly, it is

a way for the TCH to show appreciation towards the municipality and for the municipality to show appreciation towards the TCH. Secondly, it shows the TCH has attention for the context in which they operate, which increases support from the municipality and local citizens.

Two municipalities gave examples of TCHs' (potential) positive contribution to societal issues. One municipality took responsibility for temporary care (72 hours) of refugees, a decision not supported by everyone. The corresponding TCH says they considered these refugees citizens for 72 hours and therefore wanted to organise an event for them, as they were citizens of the municipality too. They organised a film screening and took care of the transport.

Another municipality has a relatively high number of unemployed citizens with a low income and low educational background. The local TCH provides internships for the inhabitants who receive welfare, this to prepare them for reintegration in the job market. Moreover, the TCH provides workshops and performances free of charge. In this way, everyone is able to enjoy culture. In addition to this, the TCH provides room for an Islamic organisation to cook for people and to welcome people to experience their culture, thereby reducing fear and prejudice towards Islamic culture.

Concerning the contribution to societal issues, the initiative can come from both parties. A municipality can discuss societal problems with the TCH, which may inspire a TCH to come up with a relevant performance or workshop. TCHs can also take initiative to come up with ideas how their organisation can help the municipality in tackling societal issues.

5.2.5. General advice

Two pieces of advice were given during the interviews that do not directly fit any existing barrier or are a new barrier. Therefore, these two pieces of advice are discussed in this separate section.

Firstly, one municipality advises other municipalities to give out a four-year budget. This gives more stability and security to the TCH and allows them to build on a four-year programme and to save up for larger investments. Secondly, one alderman emphasises the importance of keeping one's promise. If one of the parties is unable to keep their promise they should inform the other party in time and inform them of the reason. This prevents the other party from being caught by surprise and allows them to act upon this information.

5.3. Summary

An average municipality perceives their relationship with the TCH as an intermediate between the combined and principal-steward relationship, verging more towards a principal-steward relationship. The average municipality assesses all mechanisms as positive, scoring above average. The type of contract they use is the specified outcome-based contract. They regard both programmability of behaviour and measurability of outcomes as high. The type of communication used is same level and informal.

An average TCH perceives the relationship with the municipality as an intermediate between a combined and a principal-steward relationship, verging more towards a combined relationship. They assess the mechanisms lower than municipalities do, and unanimity and PS monitoring even as below average. They perceive the type of contract as global behaviour based. They perceive their work as having low programmability of behaviour, but having a high measurability of outcomes. The type of communication they experience is same level and informal.

The principal-agent relationship rarely exists, but is characterised by experiencing nearly all barriers. An average principal-agent relationship uses the detailed contract. The TCHs' work is regarded as having low programmability of behaviour and high measurability of outcomes. The type of communication that they use is hierarchical and partly informal.

The combined relationship occurs often and is characterised by scoring above average on all sub mechanisms, with the exception of suitable PS monitoring. An average combined relationship uses the global contract. The programmability and measurability of the TCHs' work is regarded as both high or as having low programmability and high measurability. The type of communication used is hierarchical and partly informal.

The principal-steward relationship is the most frequently occurring relationship. Of all types of relationships, this one perceives the presence of barriers the lowest. The average principal-steward relationship uses the global contract. Programmability is considered low, but measurability is considered high. The type of communication is same level basis and partly informal.

For an overview of the average results for municipalities and TCHs, and the three types of relationships, see appendix III and IV.

5.4. Hypotheses

Based on the results of the survey, the hypotheses (as mentioned in section 3.9) have been confirmed or rejected. The results can be seen in table 28 below.

Table 28 Hypotheses

Hypothesis	Confirmed or rejected
Municipalities and TCHs score the same on all barriers, as they have the same perception of the relationship	Rejected (6 of 9 score significantly different)
PA and PS relationships score equally on the general barriers: inadequate communication and Multiple Principals Problem	Rejected (2 of 2 score significantly different)
PA relationships score average or higher on suitable PA monitoring	Confirmed
PA relationships score below average on suitable PS monitoring	Confirmed
PA relationships score average or higher on suitable PA incentives	Confirmed
PA relationships score below average on suitable PS incentives	Confirmed
PS relationships score average or higher on suitable PS monitoring	Rejected
PS relationships score average or higher on suitable PS incentives	Confirmed
PS relationships score lower than average on suitable PA incentives	Rejected
The majority of PA relationships use a detailed contract	Confirmed
The majority of PS relationships use a global contract	Confirmed
The majority of PA relationships use hierarchical and formal communication	Rejected
The majority of PS relationships use same level and informal communication	Confirmed

6. Conclusion

This chapter concludes the outcomes of the study and gives recommendations to improve the relationship between municipalities and TCHs. Section 6.1. gives an answer to the four sub-questions. Section 6.2. answers the research question. Section 6.3. gives practical recommendations to improve the relationship Section 6.4. reflects on the research, outcomes, and theory. Finally, possibilities for further research are discussed.

6.1. Answers to the sub questions

6.1.1. How have TCHs developed into autonomous organisations?

Until the Second World War the majority of TCHs were owned by groups of citizens (Langeveld, 2009, p.39). After the Second World War the local government became more involved in establishing and operating TCHs, as a result of the need for governmental support to operate TCHs, and the development of cultural policies (Langeveld, 2009, p.39). During this period many municipalities created special units responsible for TCHs within their organisation (Langeveld, 2009, p.39).

More recently, municipalities have started to autonomise the TCHs. This was the result of both the NPM trend and a policy document from 1999 on entrepreneurial culture named 'Een ondernemende cultuur'. NPM, which rose to prominence in 1975, has four general characteristics: extra emphasis on performance, the introduction of market mechanisms in the public sector, viewing service users as customers, and transforming larger units and organisations into smaller and more specialised units (Hoods, 1991; Pollit, 2007; Klijn, 2014). 'Een ondernemende cultuur' was a national government policy document on cultural entrepreneurship. The document states that art should utilise the economic and societal value on top of the aesthetic value. This could best be realised by cultural entrepreneurship, which required the privatisation of cultural organisations (OCW, 2009).

6.1.2. How can the relationship between municipalities and TCHs be arranged?

Two models are used to depict the relationship between the principal and executive in this research: the principal-agent and the principal-steward theory. Both of these theories focus on the relationship between a principal and an executive (agent/steward). In the relationship between municipalities and TCHs, municipalities are principals as they commission orders and TCHs are executives as they provide services in exchange for funding. The first model, the principal-agent theory, is based on economic rationality and considers the executive as an agent. The theory consists of six main characteristics: goal conflict (focus on conflict), agents displaying opportunistic behaviour (distrust), agents being motivated by extrinsic rewards, agents identifying themselves scarcely with the

organisation, information asymmetry being perceived as a liability, and a management style which is focused on controlling.

The second model is the principal-steward theory, which was developed as an alternative to the principal-agent theory. The executive is considered a steward instead of an agent in this theory. The theory consists of six characteristics: similar goals (focus on cooperation), mutual trust, stewards being motivated by intrinsic rewards, stewards identifying themselves with the organisation, information asymmetry not being perceived as a liability and the management style being focused on involvement.




Figure 5 Relationship spectrum

Some authors portray the principal-agent and principal-steward theory as two separate theories (Van Slyke, 2006; Davis et al., 1997a). However, the critique (as mentioned more detailed in sections 3.2 and 3.3) of both models shows there is an ongoing debate on the prominence of certain characteristics and on whether the theories should be regarded as two separate theories or as one comprehensive principal-agent theory. In this study the principal-agent and principal-steward theory are regarded as two separate theories, each on the opposite side of a spectrum. Each relationship can be placed somewhere in the principal-agent/principal-steward relationship spectrum (see figure 5), according to the presence of principal-agent and/or principal-steward characteristics in the relationship. The more principal-steward characteristics that are (strongly) present in the relationship, the more the placement will be situated to the right. The more principal-agent characteristics that are (strongly) present, the more the placement will be situated to the left.

6.1.3. Which barriers to a good governance relationship exist between municipalities and TCHs?

For the relationship to succeed, it is crucial that both parties choose the same type of relationship. If both parties have different expectations of the relationship, this creates negative consequences (see section 3.4 for more details). If the principal chooses a principal-agent relationship and the executive chooses a principal-stewardship relationship, the executive feels betrayed and excessively controlled (Empty Nest Syndrome) (Van Thiel, 2014). If the principal chooses a principal-steward relationship and the executive chooses a principal-agent relationship, the principal feels betrayed as the executive will behave opportunistically (Moral Hazard) (Davis et al, 1997a, p.38).

According to Davis et al. (1997a) there are three mechanisms which determine the chosen type of relationship: the expectations about the other party, the situational characteristics and the psychological characteristics. If these mechanisms are not aligned with the chosen relationship, this can cause a manifestation of the 'Empty Nest Syndrome' or 'Moral Hazard'. One mechanism is a general one, while the principal-agent and principal-steward theories offer different perspectives on the other two mechanisms.

First of all, the mechanism of expectations. The possible barrier is different expectations and consists of two potential sub barriers. The first sub barrier is having different expectations of goals and the relationship in general, due to inadequate communication. The second sub barrier is having multiple principals with diverging goals and expectations present. Secondly, the mechanism of situational characteristics. The potential barrier is incompatible situational characteristics. The potential sub barriers in this regard are unsuitable monitoring, unsuitable contracts and using an unsuitable type of communication. Finally, the mechanism of psychological characteristics. The barrier in this regard is incompatible situational characteristics and consists of using unsuitable incentives.

6.1.4. How do municipalities and TCHs assess their relationship?

The type of relationship

Regarding the type of relationship both groups are in, there is a significant statistical difference. As can be seen on the spectrum (see figure 6 below), TCHs are verging more towards to the combined (neutral) relationship (3.32) and municipalities are verging more towards the principal-steward relationship (3.58). Moreover, the survey shows the majority of the municipalities (60%) perceive their relationship with the TCH as a principal-steward relationship, whereas the majority of the TCHs (50%) perceive their relationship with the municipality as a combined (neutral) relationship. However, on average both parties perceive their relationship as more of a principal-steward than a principal-agent relationship. Furthermore, only a very small amount of respondents perceive their relationship as principal-agent (7 out of 113), whereas none of the respondents perceive their relationship as an ideal type of principal-agent or principal-steward.




Figure 6 Relationship spectrum with placement of municipalities and TCHs

Assessing the relationship

When both parties assess the relationship with a mark the combined average on a scale from one to ten is a 7.3, which is more than sufficient. There is a significant statistical difference between the assessment of municipalities and TCHs; on average municipalities assess the relationship with a 7.6 whereas TCHs assess the relationship with a 7.1.

Characteristics of type of relationships

Separate factor analyses were conducted to get insight into which characteristics are present in each type of relationship, according to municipalities and TCHs. The factor analyses produced different outcomes, implying the characteristics of the type of relationships are different for municipalities and TCHs (see section 5.1 for more details). As for the principal-agent relationship, municipalities put high value on showing appreciation through financial and material means, whereas TCHs consider this the opposite of the principal-agent relationship. Both groups identify regular conflict present in the principal-agent relationship. As for the combined relationship, for municipalities four of the total six principal-steward characteristics are present and combined with one of the principal-agent characteristics on controlling (using performance indicators). In comparison, TCHs have two principal-agent control elements present in the combined relationship and no principal-steward elements present. For both groups conflict is absent in the combined relationship. In regard to the principal-steward relationship, TCHs have all six principal-steward characteristics present, whereas municipalities have five principal-steward characteristics present; ‘appreciation through giving autonomy and responsibility to the TCH’ is missing.

The outcomes of the factor analyses indicate that both groups perceive the characteristics of the three types of relationships differently. Considering the elements present in each type of relationship and the scale reliability as produced by the factor analyses, it can be concluded that in this research the principal-steward relationship is a distinct and recognisable type of relationship, while the combined and principal-agent relationship are perceived very differently.

Barriers according to the survey

The results from the survey show that municipalities perceive the presence of the barriers less than TCHs do, as they score above average (sufficient) on all sub mechanisms. The sub-mechanisms that TCHs assess as insufficient are the uniformity within the municipality and the implementation of suitable principal-steward monitoring. This means that the first and second barrier are present in this relationship. Moreover, the sub barriers which they perceive significantly differently are the type of relationship (principal-agent versus principal-steward characteristics), the quality of communication,

the presence of multiple principals, monitoring problems, and the implementation of principal-steward incentives.

With respect to the type of relationship, the principal-agent relationships have insufficient communication on expectations and insufficient uniformity within the municipality. The first barrier on different expectations is therefore present. Considering the second mechanism, the dominant type of communication is hierarchical, but lacks formality. This means the second barrier is present as well.

In regards to principal-steward relationships, these score below average when it comes to implementing suitable principal-steward monitoring instruments. This means the second barrier is present. Besides implementing principal-steward monitoring mechanisms below the average, they implement principal-agent incentives and principal-agent suitable monitoring above average. Considering the theory, implementing principal-agent incentives could be problematic. Implementing several principal-agent incentives and little principal-steward monitoring instruments could lead to a manifestation of the 'Empty Nest Syndrome' or 'Moral Hazard'. This means the third barrier is also present.

In regard to combined relationship, there were not hypotheses for these relationships.

The barriers according to interviews

Concerning the first barrier, the interviews reveal that communicating on expectations is not executed on a regular basis, but it is sometimes unjustifiably expected that the other party feels the same. Moreover, all TCHs experience the Multiple Principals Problem to a certain degree, while municipalities are not aware of the problem to the same extent. Concerning the second barrier, monitoring is often primarily focused on numbers, with little attention for the story behind the numbers. With regard to the third barrier, showing little appreciation towards each other and not experiencing trust in the relationship are mentioned as important shortcomings in the relationship.

The interviews also reveal a new barrier: a lack of mutual knowledge and understanding. TCHs sometimes deliberately avoid local politics, even though the council takes important decisions regarding their organisation. Moreover, sometimes there is little understanding for the situation of aldermen, who are sometimes caught in the middle between the council, citizens, and the TCH. This is especially common when it concerns finances, such as extra subsidy. In addition to this, some interviews reveal that TCHs can benefit from better informing the council as council members, and occasionally aldermen and public servants, have little knowledge on TCHs. Examples of this lack of knowledge are: being unaware of the operational costs of TCHs, how TCHs benefit local society and how low and high room occupancy do not directly predict revenues or financial losses. It is also important that the TCH is aware of the social context in which they operate. This way TCHs can focus on appealing a large and heterogeneous part of the population instead of appealing to a small and

homogeneous part. Moreover, they can play an active part in tackling societal problems. Finally, several municipalities and TCHs experience some degree of hostility in either their own relationship or in those of colleagues.

6.2. Answer to the research question

The purpose of this thesis is to identify possible barriers within the relationship between municipalities and TCHs resulting in recommendations to improve this relationship.

How can the relationship between municipalities and theatres and stages be improved?

The answer to this question is two-fold; it consists in part of the municipalities and TCHs in general and a part about the types of relationships these groups are in.

Municipalities and TCHs

Municipalities and TCHs should focus on a number of things. There should be a greater focus on resolving the first and second barrier, as according to TCHs the uniformity of the municipality and the implementation of principal-steward monitoring instruments are insufficient. Moreover, municipalities tend to assess sub mechanisms substantially more positive than TCHs do. Therefore it is advised to focus on improving the score of several sub mechanisms, as mentioned below.

First of all, municipalities should focus on discussing the perception of the relationship (presence of principal-agent versus principal-steward characteristics) since this seems to differ substantially. For the relationship to be satisfactory, especially lowering conflict, having a common goal and having trust are important for both parties in a relationship⁵. Secondly, municipalities are significantly more positive about the quality of communication than TCHs are, although both parties assess communication above average. Moreover, generally being satisfied with communication and having the same expectations and attitude towards the relationship are important for both groups to improve the relationship¹. Furthermore, the 'Multiple Principals Problem' is frequently present according to TCHs, but municipalities underestimate this. Agreement within the municipality on TCH policy is especially important for both parties' relationship satisfaction¹.

With respect to the second barrier, municipalities should focus on the presence of monitoring instruments (both principal-agent and principal-steward), since they perceive these as more positive than TCHs do. In fact, municipalities perceive implementation of principal-steward monitoring mechanisms to be above average whereas TCHs experience these far below average. To improve relationship satisfaction for both parties, there should be extra attention to ensure that monitoring is not hindering the functioning of the TCH¹. Moreover, it is important that the two parties agree on the

⁵ Based on the outcomes of the ordinal logistic regression with 'Relationship satisfaction' as dependent variable.

programmability and measurability of behaviour and outcomes. Perceiving measurability as high proved to be a positive contribution to relationship satisfaction¹. Furthermore, having the same level and informal communication instead of hierarchical informal communication positively influences relationship satisfaction for both parties¹.

Regarding the third barrier, municipalities should focus on the implementation of principal-steward incentives, especially if they would like to be in a mutual principal-steward relationship. At the moment municipalities are significantly more positive than TCHs when it comes to implementing principal-steward incentives, although both groups regard the implementation as above average. Using strengthening or weakening of the reputation of the TCH as a reward deserves extra attention¹, as implementing this incentive highly improves the relationship satisfaction⁶.

Type of relationship

When it comes to the type of relationship, principal-agent relationships should focus highly on improving the quality of communication and addressing the Multiple Principals Problem. When it comes to the style of communication they should consider formalising it more often, to lower chances on conflict because of ambiguity or opportunism.

Respondents with a principal-steward relationship should strongly consider installing more monitoring mechanisms suitable for a principal-steward relationship. In addition to this, lowering the degree of principal-agent incentives is something that should be strongly considered, as a high degree of principal-agent incentives can potentially have a negative result on intrinsically motivated stewards. However, PS incentives are implemented more strongly than principal-agent incentives, so this can potentially cancel out possible negative consequences caused by implementing principal-agent incentives.

As far as combined relationships, since these are a combination of principal-agent and principal-steward characteristics, there is no solid advice. These relationships perceive all mechanisms above average, except for suitable principal-steward monitoring. However, the results of the factor analysis demonstrated that municipalities and TCHs perceive the combined relationship very differently. Therefore, it is advised that both municipalities and TCHs discuss how they perceive the relationship and what their expectations of the relationship are.

The recommendations based on the interviews are discussed in the next section.

⁶ There are indications this variable entails only showing appreciation (positive) instead of using the reputation as an instrument to punish or reward (negative of positive) the TCH.

6.3. Recommendations

Expectations (communication)

Municipalities:

- Have regular meetings with everyone involved with the TCH (also different departments such as finance and real estate). During these meetings discuss expectations on the TCH's performance and municipal plans and budgets considering the TCH.
- Confirm that emails and documents have been received and react on the content, if possible, each time an email or document is received. This gives the TCH the impression they are being paid attention to and that the information they provide is being used.
- Actively discuss cultural policy documents or involve a TCH in writing the policy each time a new policy has to be/is published and during conversations on expectations. This ensures on the municipality's side that actions are aligned with policies and avoids empty promises, which can result in disappointment.
- Inform the TCHs on time about decisions every time decisions are made regarding their organisation. This creates feeling of trustworthiness, certainty and fairness toward the TCHs.

Municipalities and TCHs:

- Re-discuss goals and expectations and where you need understanding on short-comings on a regular basis. Especially when a new alderman, TCH manager or public servant is in place this is relevant. This helps to avoid disappointment and frustration caused by miscommunication and misinterpretation on goals and expectations.
- Name positive feedback first before mentioning points of improvement when you give critique to the other party. This averts conflict and a negative atmosphere.
- Try to fulfil your part of the agreements. If you are unable to do so, inform the other party on time of this and inform them on the reasons why. This helps to build and maintain trust and understanding and lessens frustration.

Multiple principals

Municipalities:

- Create an account manager who is in direct contact with the TCH. This account manager should discuss matters concerning the TCH with the alderman. This is recommended when there is a manifestation of the Multiple Principals Problem. Implementing this solution results in more transparency and certainty for the TCH and creates a better overview for the municipality.

TCHs:

- Clearly communicate which principal you respond to and redirect other municipal employees to your contact person when possible. This reduces pressure on your side and creates more transparency on the municipal side, as they can contact one particular person in their own organisation when they need information from your organisation.

Mutual knowledge and understanding

Municipalities:

- Whenever decisions are made that influence the TCH, explain the reasoning behind these decisions and what the consequences encompass. This helps to create more understanding and certainty for the TCH.
- Actively involve the TCH in the municipal goals by discussing societal problems and asking them for input whenever societal problems need to be addressed. This shows appreciation towards the TCH, as it makes them feel more connected to the municipality and it can inspire them to initiate new initiatives.
- Initiate contact and meetings between several parties and facilitate brainstorming on new initiatives for the TCH when possible. This fosters cultural innovation, shows appreciation towards the TCH and can act as an incentive.

TCHs:

- Actively inform (and persuade if necessary) the council on how the TCH operates, the costs a TCHs makes and how a TCH positively contributes to local society. It is advised to do this whenever a new council is installed and when decisions are made in the council concerning the TCH. This improves the knowledge of the council on the TCH and thereby enables them to make better informed decisions. In addition to this, it lessens the burden for the alderman and public servants who are sometimes caught in the middle. Moreover, it presumably leads to better outcomes for the TCH, as the council has more understanding for the TCHs' situation.
- Contribute to solving societal problems by organising events (e.g. performances or workshops) for the target group whenever the municipality experiences societal problems. In addition to this, focus on a broad and heterogeneous part of the population. This shows appreciation towards the municipality and increases the societal value of the TCH, which potentially creates more support from the council and alderman.

Monitoring

Municipalities:

- Assess whether monitoring instruments are not hindering the TCH's operations by discussing this with the TCH. If the TCHs confirms instruments are hindering them adjust these or ask advice from other municipalities and/or consultants on different monitoring instruments. When monitoring is not hindering the TCH this lessens frustration and improves (actual) performance on the TCHs' part.
- Discuss striking perceptions (such as perceiving few children visiting the TCH) instead of setting strict indicators to monitor the TCHs content, as this fosters creative solutions instead of resistance.

Type of contract

Municipalities and TCHs:

- Discuss views on programmability of behaviour and measurability of outcomes whenever expectations, goals and monitoring are discussed to ensure both parties are aware of each other's point of view. This creates more understanding for monitoring strategies.

Type of communication

Municipalities and TCHs:

- Consciously choose the style and manner in which you communicate towards the other party. In some cases, especially when it comes to important decisions such as subsidy attribution, formal communication is necessary to avoid conflict or misunderstandings in a later stage. In other cases, when the goal is to generate new ideas for example, informal communication is more suitable. The type of communication also depends on the type of relationship you have. The more principal-agent characteristics the relationship has, the more hierarchic and formal communication should be. In comparison, in a relationship with more principal-steward characteristics, same level and informal communication is usually more suitable.

Type of incentives

Municipalities and TCHs:

- Show appreciation and trust towards the other party on a regular basis, by giving positive feedback during meetings for example. This can result in a positive feedback loop, which creates a more satisfactory relationship for both parties.

6.4. Reflection on research, outcomes and theory

6.4.1. Reflection on research

This research has combined two methods of research, qualitative and quantitative. Despite the fact that some researchers are hesitant to combine these two methods, I am fully convinced it has benefitted this research to a high degree. Since both methods have their shortcomings, the combination provided answers to the research question the methods on their own could not. When it comes to the survey, some results are very different from the expectations derived from the theoretical framework. The interviews demonstrated that these unexpected outcomes were not the results of ambiguous items or social desirability, but a reflection of reality. The interviews provided the much needed explanations for this. On the other hand, if I had chosen to do only interviews, the results regarding the type of relationship would have been less coherent and comprehensible presumably. During the analysis of the combined results a picture unveiled that gave an impression of the situation of a large sector. Moreover, some people are more easily convinced by numbers, others more easily by words, by combining these methods any readers of this research are able to access the information.

Even though I do believe that combining the two methods has been a good choice, it did provide its own set of challenges. First of all, I did not have any notable experience with setting up an extensive survey prior to this research. Although Qualtrics (survey programme) was easy to work with, it was quite hard to translate questions into adequate statements. During interviews there is room to give examples while questioning, which is not possible during surveys. In addition to this, I had to keep the survey short to ensure as many people as possible would finish the survey. Taking this into account, setting up the survey was more challenging than I had expected beforehand. Looking back on the process with the knowledge I have now, I could make improvements in the process and in parts of the survey's content. Secondly, the dataset was relatively small. Although I had a very high response rate that I was very content with, the numbers are still relatively low for certain statistical procedures, increasing the chance that some statistical results are not representative. Moreover, the dataset lacked a normal distribution, making it even more challenging. This brings me to the third challenge I encountered, that statistics is not a hard science. As can be read in my methodological framework (chapter 4), I explained the decisions I have made during statistical procedures to a fairly high degree for a Masters' thesis. The reasoning behind this is that the rules for using certain procedures are very much debatable. Although I was aware of this beforehand, because of the challenges with my own dataset I became aware to a higher degree of how statistical results are influenced by the researcher's choices. This is especially the case when working with a small dataset, as the decisions made in these cases have a larger influence on the outcomes. Because of this realisation I have chosen to be transparent about the choices I have made considering statistical procedures. Finally, because of the

shortcomings mentioned beforehand I had to anticipate on many unexpected events. The research has its limitations, be that as it may, I think these were anticipated on as much as possible.

6.4.2. Reflection on outcomes

Of the survey's outcomes, many were unexpected. I anticipated a higher number of unsatisfactory relationships, as the goal was to improve the relationship. There is room for improvement, but, concerning the survey outcomes, generally the relationship is satisfactory for both parties. Municipalities and TCHs assessed the relationship with higher than a 7 on average. Another unexpected outcome was the low number of principal-agent relationships, as only 7 out of 113 respondents perceived themselves to be in this type of relationship. The framework of the research was based on having monitoring strategies, contracts, incentives etcetera aligned with the type of relationship to improve relationship satisfaction. However, as a result of the low number of principal-agent relationships, using this framework to give improvements to the relationship proved to be more difficult than expected. Therefore, an ordinal logistic regression was conducted for each barrier to provide recommendations in general, as this would be more useful for all kind of relationships. In addition to this, there was more attention for the differences between municipalities and TCHs in general. Moreover, based on the theoretical framework no value was attached to being in a principal-agent or principal-steward relationship, as long the two parties were in the same type of relationship. However, the survey indicates strongly that the more principal-steward elements the relationship contains, the more satisfactory the relationship is for both parties. As far as the interviews are concerned, the differences between people were striking. As was mentioned during the interviews several times: "it all comes down to persons". The different outlook on the same problems in both the group of municipalities and TCHs was salient. Although the respondents in both groups often named the same issues, their attitude towards handling and how they perceived these issues was sometimes very different. In the end the relationship between a municipality and TCH is based on the people that work there and whether they get along. Although valuable conclusions can be drawn and useful recommendations can be made based on the survey and interviews, in the end every relationship is different, as are the people involved in the relationship.

There are limitations to the research, as mentioned in chapter 4. Three of the main ones, considering generalisation of the results, are the sometimes missing reasons for non-response, the unknown influence of social desirability in the answers and the limitations of the used statistical methods. Despite these three limitations, I am convinced this thesis has provided valuable information on the relationship between municipalities and TCHs, useful recommendations to improve the relationship between both parties and constructive insights when it comes to applicability of the principal-agent and principal-steward in the public sector.

6.4.3. Reflection on theory

The principal-agent and principal-steward theory have been used for the theoretical framework. The theories and the belonging aspects proved valuable to assess the relationship between municipalities and TCHs, even though the principal-agent relationship did barely manifest itself according to the survey results. Davis et al. (1997a) mentioned three mechanisms that influence the choice of relationship. These mechanisms provided a challenge, as they were broad and often ambiguous. This made it sometimes complex to find ways to measure the mentioned concepts, as these had to be drawn from other authors and theories.

As far as the critique of the principal-steward theory not being a theory in its own right (Albanese et al., 1997), I disagree and agree at the same time. I disagree, because based on the theory and research both ideal types are opposites in my opinion. The principal-steward ideal type is significantly different from the principal-agent ideal type, mostly in their perception of human behaviour and motivating people. Moreover, based on the outcomes of this research there should be no debate on whether principal-steward theory is a theory in its own right. For both municipalities and TCHs, the principal-steward relationship as produced by factor analysis and the theoretical model scored very high on scale reliability (.794; .837; .834 respectively), whereas the principal-agent relationship scored very low. One of the possible reasons for this outcome is the difference between the public and private sector. The principal-agent theory is based on the private sector, in which subsidy relations and societal goals play a small part or even no part. These subsidy relations and societal goals make the relationship more complex. A municipality cannot choose between several TCHs to provide their inhabitants with culture, whereas TCHs cannot choose between several municipalities to provide them with subsidies. They are dependent on each other, whereas in the principal-agent relationship theoretically both parties can find a new principal or a new executive, although they may not favour this. Moreover, people employed in the (semi) public sector are often differently motivated than people employed in the private sector (Perry 1990; Perry 2008). The semi-public sector attracts many people who are intrinsically motivated (public service motivation), whereas the private sector attract many people who are extrinsically motivated (Perry 1990; Perry 2008). Therefore, in this research it may not be surprising that the principal-agent relationships are small in numbers whereas principal-stewards relationships are large in numbers. As both municipalities and TCHs provide public services, the nature of these organisations may naturally be more verged towards a principal-steward relationship. Their ideas, goals and expectations and the road towards realising this may be different, but the kind of motivation that drives these people is generally not.

On the other hand, I do agree with the critique of the principal-steward theory in general, because looking at the characteristics of both types of relationships and the methods (monitoring, contracts, incentives etc.) in my opinion both theories are part of a spectrum. In this research there are no

manifestations of ideal types, only three types emerged: principal-agent, combined or principal-steward. Therefore, it seems plausible that in reality the types of relationships consist out of a spectrum. In this spectrum organisations can shift more towards the principal-agent ideal type or to the principal-steward ideal type over time (see figure 5). This line of thinking affirms the principal-steward theory as being part of a more comprehensive principal-agent theory, the principal-executive theory. The focus lies on the relationship between the principal and the executive, which can have more or less elements of either the ideal principal-agent or the ideal principal-steward relationship. As the principal-agent theory is said to account for much behaviour in the private sector, this research suggests that much behaviour encountered in the public sector can probably be accounted for with principal-steward theory. Therefore, the principal-executive theories seem capable of explaining behaviour encountered in a wide range of organisations, ranging from private to public.

6.5. Further research

Based on the questions that rose during this research, I have two recommendations for further research. First, more research on the manifestation of the principal-agent and principal-steward relationship in the public sphere is advised. This research has given more insight into the situation in the TCH sector and has shown that the relationship characteristics are often different than expected. As has been shown before, as in the case of NPM for example, the public sphere functions differently from the private sphere as far as monitoring and motivation are considered. Therefore, it is not surprising if these theories, even though they are still being debated, would demonstrate themselves differently in the public sphere in general.

Second, as far as the cultural sector in the Netherlands is concerned, only TCHs have been examined. Therefore, it would be interesting if other organisations in the cultural sector were also examined on the same topic, so that a general conclusion could be drawn about the situation in the cultural sector. There is however the expectation that the outcomes of such a research will be highly similar to the outcomes of this research, as during conversations with municipalities often other cultural organisations such as the library or pop stages were mentioned as examples.

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Appendices

APPENDIX I:	List of interview respondents
APPENDIX II:	Geographical distribution of survey respondents
APPENDIX III:	Overview of municipalities' and TCHs' average scores on sub barriers
APPENDIX IV:	Overview of types of relationships' average scores on sub barriers
APPENDIX V:	Model goodness-of-fit scores ordinal logistic regression
APPENDIX VI:	Survey municipalities
APPENDIX VII:	Survey TCHs
APPENDIX VIII:	Interview manual municipalities
APPENDIX IX:	Interview manual TCHs

APPENDIX I: List of interview respondents

- Dhr. Riny van Rinsum
- Dhr. Erik Tausch
- Mevr. Gijsje van Honk
- Mevr. Cile Schulz
- Dhr. Daniël Wever
- Dhr. Leo Hegge
- Dhr. Jochem Otten
- Dhr. Yan van der Heijden
- Dhr. Frans Stienen
- Dhr. Hans Ronde
- Dhr. Bard boon

APPENDIX II : Geographical distribution of survey respondents

Table 1 Municipalities' response rates and their geographical distribution

Regio	Provincies	Totaal per regio	Gereageerd per regio	Percentage gereageerd van totaal per regio	Percentage regio vanuit totaal van regio's	Gereageerde percentage regio op totaal gereageerd
Noord	Groningen, Friesland en Drenthe	13	5	38.46%	12.38%	10.41%
Oost	Flevoland, Overijssel & Gelderland	27	14	51.85%	25.71%	29.16%
West	Zuid & Noord-Holland & Utrecht	40	18	45%	38.10%	37.5%
Zuid	Noord-Brabant, Limburg en Zeeland	25	11	44%	23.80%	22.91%
Totaal		105	48	45.71% procent gemiddeld (48/105)	100%	100 %

Table 2 TCHs' response rates and their geographical distribution

Regio	Provincies	Totaal aantal podia per regio	Gereageerd per regio	Percentage gereageerd vanuit totaal	Percentage regio totaal in verhouding tot andere regio's	Gereageerde percentage regio op totaal gereageerd
Noord	Groningen, Friesland en Drenthe	14	5	35.17%	10.29%	8.20%
Oost	Flevoland, Overijssel & Gelderland	30	17	56.66%	22.05%	27.87%
West	Zuid & Noord-Holland & Utrecht	64	31	48.43%	47%	50.82%
Zuid	Noord-Brabant, Limburg en Zeeland	28	8	28.57%	20.58%	13.12%
Totaal	Nederland	136	61	44.85% procent gemiddeld (62/136)	100%	100 %

APPENDIX III: Overview of municipalities' and TCHs' average scores on sub barriers

Sub barrier	Municipality average	TCH average	MANOVA test	Mann-Whitney test	Fisher's exact test	Correlation MUN and barrier ^b	Significant difference between groups
Type of relationship (1-5, 1-2 is principal-agent, 4-5 is principal-steward, 3 is combined)	3.58	3.31	F (1, 103) = 5.212, $n^2 = .048$, $p = .024$	$U = 1249.000$, $z = -2.253$, $p = .024$	N.A.	.165*	Yes
Communication (1-5, 5 is best)	3.8	3.35	F (1, 103) = 7.906, $n^2 = .071$, $p = .006$	$U = 895.500$, $z = -3.524$, $p = .000$	N.A.	-.301**	Yes
Multiple principals (1-5,5 is best)	3.89	2.87	F (1, 103) = 34.149, $n^2 = .249$, $p = .000$	$(U=629.000, z = -5.362, p=.000)$	N.A.	-.478**	Yes
PA monitoring (1-5, 5 is best)	3.91	3.38	F (1, 103) = 23.381, $n^2 = .185$, $p = .000$	$U = 810.000$, $z = -3.986$, $p = .000$	N.A.	-.337**	yes
PS monitoring (1-5, 5 is best)	3.07	2.33	F (1, 103) = 29.334, $n^2 = .222$, $p = .000$	$U = 491.500$, $z = -5.924$, $p = .000$	N.A.	-.492**	Yes

Type of contract	Global behaviour based contract (37.1%)	Specified outcome-based contract (48,9%)	N.A.	N.A.	$P = .227, 3.901$	No	
Type of contract: programmability and measurability^a	High programmability behaviour, high measurability outcomes (53,3%)	Low programmability of behaviour, high measurability of outcomes (50%)	N.A.	N.A.	$7,645, p = .048$	Yes	
Type of communication	Same level and informal (46.8%)	Same level and informal (51.1%)	N.A.	N.A.	$4.067, p = .233$	No	
PA incentives (1-5, 5 is best)	3.37	3.27	$F(1, 103) = 1.012, n^2 = .010, p = .317$	$U = 1220.000, z = -.988, p = .323$	N.A.	.095	No
PS incentives (1-5, 5 is best)	3.53	3.18	$F(1, 103) = 8.497, n^2 = .076, p = .004$	$(U = 961.500, z = -.2855, p = .004)$	N.A.	.272**	Yes

^a = This question is not taken into account for calculating the differences, as it is part of the contract barrier

^b = According to Kendall's tau

* = Significant at the .05 level

** = Significant at the .01 level

APPENDIX IV: Overview of types of relationships' average scores on sub-barriers

Sub barrier	PA	AS	PS	MANOVA test	Kruskall-Wallis test	Fisher's exact test	Correlation steward like relationship and positive score on mechanism ^b	Significant difference between groups
Communication (1-5, 5 is best)	2.29	3.38	3.84	F (2, 102) = 19.563, n ² = .270, p = .000	$\chi^2(2, N=109) = 24.688, p = .000$	N.A.	.397**	Yes
Multiple principals (1-5, 5 is best)	2.42	3.09	3.6	F (2, 106) = 7.119, n ² = .118, p = .001	$\chi^2(2, N=109) = 12, 143, p = .002$	N.A.	.268**	Yes
PA monitoring (1-5, 5 is best)	3.2	3.55	3.67	F (2, 102) = 2.858, n ² = .016, p = .062	$\chi^2(2, N=109) = 1.504, p = .472$	N.A.	.079	Yes
PS monitoring (1-5, 5 is best)	3.57	2.89	2.76	F (2, 102) = 1.525, n ² = 1.023, p = .223	$\chi^2(2, N=109) = 2.538, p = .281$	N.A.	.072	No
Type of contract	Detailed contract (57.2%)	Global contract (55.3%)	Global contract (66%)	N.A.	N.A.	(8.355), p = .201		No
Type of contract:	Low	High	Low	N.A.	N.A.	(2,009), p =		No

Programmability and measurability^a	programmability of behaviour, high measurability of outcomes (57.1%)	programmability of behaviour, high measurability of outcomes (38.3 %) & Low programmability of behaviour, high measurability of outcomes (38.3%)	programmability of behaviour, high measurability of outcomes (43.4%)			.941	
Type of communication	Hierarchical and partly informal (71.4%)	Hierarchical and partly informal (46.8%)	Same level basis and partly informal (67.9%)	<i>N.A.</i>	<i>N.A.</i>	(18,945), p = .001	Yes

PA incentives (1-5, 5 is best)	3	3.35	3.32	F(2, 102) = 1.031, $\eta^2 = .020$, p = .360	$\chi^2(2, N=105) = 2.489$, p = .288	N.A.	r = .035	No
PS incentives (1-5, 5 is best)	2.67	3.28	3.45	F(2, 102) = 4.780, $\eta^2 = .086$, p = .010	$\chi^2(2, N=105) = 5.548$, p = .062	N.A.	r = .214*	No ^c

^a = This indicator is not taken into account into calculating differences as it is part of the Type of contract barrier

^b = According to Kendall's Tau

^c = According to the Kruskal-Wallis test

* = Significant at .01 level

** = Significant at .001 level

APPENDIX V: Model goodness-of-fit scores ordinal logistic regression

Variable	Deviance's goodness-of-fit score	Pearson's goodness-of-fit score	Likelihood ratio test	Number of significant variables
PA characteristics	$\chi^2(122) = 108.368, p = .806$	$\chi^2(122) = 163.268, p = .007$	$\chi^2(4) = 38.887, p = .000$	1
PS characteristics	$\chi^2(130) = 91.012, p = .996$	$\chi^2(130) = 108.657, p = .913$	$\chi^2(6) = 72.136, p = .000$	2
Total relationship characteristics	$\chi^2(202) = 120.494, p = 1.000$	$\chi^2(202) = 132.095, p = 1.000$	$\chi^2(10) = 81.676, p = .000$	2
Communication	$\chi^2(55) = 44.301, p = .849$	$\chi^2(55) = 121.614, p = .000$	$\chi^2(3) = 56.138, p = .000$	2
Multiple Principals	$\chi^2(28) = 32.056, p = .272$	$\chi^2(28) = 43.088, p = .034$	$\chi^2(2) = 16.956, p = .000$	1
Monitoring PA	$\chi^2(100) = 113.599, p = .167$	$\chi^2(100) = 179.737, p = .000$	$\chi^2(6) = 18.547, p = .005$	1
Monitoring PS	$\chi^2(141) = 137.120, p = .577$	$\chi^2(141) = 155.371, p = .193$	$\chi^2(5) = 11.603, p = .041$	0
Monitoring	$\chi^2(199) = 165.091, p = .962$	$\chi^2(199) = 283.590, p = .000$	$\chi^2(11) = 28.016, p = .003$	1
Type of contract	$\chi^2(3) = 4.645, p = .200$	$\chi^2(3) = 4.059, p = .255$	$\chi^2(3) = 5.405, p = .144$	0
Measurability and programmability	$\chi^2(3) = 4.313, p = .230$	$\chi^2(3) = 4.190, p = .242$	$\chi^2(3) = 10.188, p = .017$	1
Type of communication	$\chi^2(3) = .635, p = .888$	$\chi^2(3) = .619, p = .892$	$\chi^2(3) = 8.402, p = .038$	1
Type of incentives PA	$\chi^2(94) = 84.093, p = .758$	$\chi^2(94) = 188.183, p = .000$	$\chi^2(4) = 16.860, p = .002$	1
Type of incentives PS	$\chi^2(94) = 93.626, p = .491$	$\chi^2(94) = 129.486, p = .000$	$\chi^2(4) = 118.164, p = .000$	0

		.009	.024	
Type of incentives	$\chi^2 (188) =$	$\chi^2 (188) =$	$\chi^2 (8) = 24.070,$	1
total	144.378, p = .992	243.592, p =	p = .002	
		.004		

APPENDIX VI: Survey municipalities

Q1 Geachte heer/mevrouw,

U krijgt deze enquête toegestuurd omdat uw gemeente een of meerdere theaters en/of concerthallen [TCH] heeft en u betrokken of verantwoordelijk bent voor het beleid ten aanzien daarvan.

Waarom deze enquête

Het doel van deze enquête is inzicht te krijgen in de relatie tussen gemeenten en podia. Alle stellingen en vragen in deze enquête hebben betrekking op dit onderwerp. De uitkomsten worden gebruikt om de huidige situatie in kaart te brengen en aanbevelingen te geven voor het verbeteren van de relatie indien nodig.

Het onderzoek wint in grote mate aan kwaliteit als zoveel mogelijk gemeenten hun medewerking verlenen en daarom zou het enorm helpen als u deze enquête invult.

Uitleg over het invullen

Het invullen van de enquête duurt gemiddeld 10 minuten en wordt volledig anoniem verwerkt. Er zijn geen goede of foute antwoorden. Er zijn in totaal 4 blokken met vragen. Per blok van vragen en stellingen staat bovenaan aangegeven hoe u dient te antwoorden. Indien u meer dan een TCH binnen uw gemeente heeft, probeer dan de vraag voor meerdere TCHs in het algemeen te beantwoorden. Mocht u vragen hebben over de enquête stuurt u dan een e-mail naar nicolevanherpt@gmail.com.

Indien u prijs stelt op een exemplaar van het rapport dat over dit onderwerp wordt geschreven, dan kunt u dit aan het eind van de vragenlijst aangeven.

Nogmaals hartelijk bedankt voor uw medewerking!

Q2 Zou u hieronder de per email verstrekte code willen invullen?

Q3 Relatie Dit onderdeel heeft betrekking op het type relatie dat u met de theater en/of concerthal [TCH] heeft. Lees de stellingen zorgvuldig.

Q4 Wanneer ik de relatie met TCH een cijfer van 1 t/m 10 zou moeten geven zou ik deze beoordelen met een:

- 1 (1)
- 2 (2)
- 3 (3)
- 4 (4)
- 5 (5)
- 6 (6)
- 7 (7)
- 8 (8)
- 9 (9)
- 10 (10)

Q5 U kunt hieronder eventueel toelichting geven op uw antwoord op de vorige vraag:

Q6 Er volgen nu een aantal stellingen. Geef per stelling aan in welke mate u het (on)eens bent.

	Zeet mee oneens (1)	Oneens (2)	Neutraal (3)	Eens (4)	Zeet mee eens (5)
De TCH is betrokken bij onze gemeente. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Er is regelmatig conflict in onze met de TCH. (2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
We betrekken de TCH in het maken van beleid. (3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Er is sprake van wederzijds vertrouwen tussen ons en de TCH. (4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Onze waardering van de TCH wordt met name in financiële en materiële middelen geuit. (5)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Onze waardering van de TCH wordt met name door het geven van vrijheid en verantwoordelijkheid aan TCH geuit. (6)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
We controleren regelmatig het handelen van de TCH. (7)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
We beoordelen de TCH met name via prestatie-indicatoren. (8)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
De TCH en wij hebben een gemeenschappelijk doel. (9)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Wij vertrouwen op de vakinhoudelijke kennis van de TCH. (10)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q7 Communicatie van verwachtingen Dit onderdeel gaat over het communiceren van verwachtingen door u en de TCH naar elkaar. Lees de stellingen zorgvuldig.

Q8 Er volgen nu drie stellingen. Geef per stellingen aan in welke mate u het (on)eens bent.

	Zeer mee oneens (1)	Mee oneens (2)	Neutraal (3)	Mee eens (4)	Zeer mee eens (5)
We zijn tevreden over de communicatie met de TCH. (1)	<input type="radio"/>				
Het is voor de TCH duidelijk wat voor verwachting wij van hen hebben. (2)	<input type="radio"/>				
Onze organisatie heeft het gevoel dat de TCH dezelfde insteek in de relatie heeft als wij. (3)	<input type="radio"/>				

Q9 U kunt nu eventueel toelichting geven op de stelling 'Onze organisatie heeft het gevoel dat de TCH dezelfde insteek in de relatie heeft als wij':

Q10 Monitoren Dit onderdeel heeft betrekking op het monitoren van de TCH. Lees alle stellingen zorgvuldig.

Q11 Hieronder staan een aantal stellingen. Beantwoord iedere stelling met ja of nee.

	Ja (1)	Nee (2)
De prestatie-indicatoren zijn door de TCH zelf ontwikkeld. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Het gedrag van de TCH wordt door middel van gedragsprotocollen gestuurd door ons (2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Een onafhankelijke organisatie (zoals een consultancybureau) beoordeelt de prestaties van de TCH. (3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Wanneer we monitoren wordt er ook gekeken of de informatie verstrekt door de TCH compleet is. (4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Naar aanleiding van de	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

resultaten van onze monitoring worden er vragen gesteld aan de TCH. (5)		
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Q12 Er volgt nu een tweede blok stellingen. Geef per stelling aan in welke mate u het (on)eens bent.

	Zeer mee oneens (1)	Mee oneens (2)	Neutraal (3)	Mee eens (4)	Zeer mee eens (5)
Onze monitoring staat het functioneren van de TCH niet in de weg. (1)	<input type="radio"/>				
Bij onze monitoring ligt de nadruk vooral op maatschappelijke resultaten van de TCH en niet op prestatie-indicatoren. (2)	<input type="radio"/>				
De prestatie-indicatoren die we gebruiken voor het monitoren van de TCH geven de werkelijkheid goed weer. (3)	<input type="radio"/>				
Er wordt veelal gebruik gemaakt van onafhankelijke bronnen (zoals bijvoorbeeld consultants of accountants) voor de beoordeling van de TCH. (4)	<input type="radio"/>				
We plegen overleg over de invulling en vormgeving van contracten met de TCH. (5)	<input type="radio"/>				
De TCH wordt aangemoedigd om mee te doen met peer review of benchmarks. (6)	<input type="radio"/>				
Het is belangrijk dat de TCH verantwoording aflegt aan hun	<input type="radio"/>				

klanten/gebruikers. (7)					
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Q13 Als één opdrachtgever handelen Binnen de gemeente hebben vaak meerdere afdelingen met een TCH te maken, bijvoorbeeld een beleidsafdeling en een financiële afdeling. Dit onderdeel heeft betrekking op welke mate u binnen de gemeente op één lijn zit.

Q14 Beantwoord de volgende stelling met ja of nee. Rollen zoals opdrachtgever en toezichthouder zijn binnen onze gemeente geïntegreerd in één contactpersoon, in één contract of in één afdeling.

- Ja (1)
- Nee (2)

Q15 Er volgen een aantal stellingen. Geef per stelling aan in welke mate u het (on)eens bent.

	Zeer mee oneens (1)	Mee oneens (2)	Neutraal (3)	Eens (4)	Mee eens (5)
Vanuit de gemeente wordt met één stem naar de TCH gecommuniceerd. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Binnen de gemeente zit iedereen op één lijn (politicus-beleidsmedewerker en beleidsmedewerker-beleidsmedewerker) qua TCH beleid. (2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Binnen de gemeente hebben we regelmatig overleg over het TCH- beleid met alle betrokken partijen binnen de gemeente. (3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Het is voor mij duidelijk wat andere betrokkenen binnen de gemeente over het TCH-beleid denken. (4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q16 Passend contracttype Dit onderdeel heeft betrekking op het soort contract dat uw organisatie met de TCH heeft.

Q17 Bij de volgende twee vragen dient u het antwoord dat het meest van toepassing is op de huidige situatie te selecteren. Het type contract dat de gemeente met de uitvoerende organisatie heeft past het beste bij:

- Gedetailleerd gedragsgebaseerde contract (operationeel gedrag toegelicht). (1)
- Gedetailleerd uitkomstengebaseerde contract (operationele doelen toegelicht). (2)
- Globaal gedragsgebaseerde contract (bevat gewenst gedrag in grote lijnen) (4)
- Globaal uitkomst gebaseerde contract (bevat alleen abstracte doelen). (3)

Q18 Met de programmeerbaarheid van gedrag wordt er bedoeld op de mate waarin de opdrachtgever aan kan geven wat voor gedrag hij wenst van de uitvoerende organisatie. Meetbaarheid heeft betrekking op de meetbaarheid van de resultaten van het werk dat wordt geleverd door de uitvoerende organisatie en in welke mate het duidelijk is wat positieve en negatieve resultaten zijn. Welke beschrijving past het beste bij het werk dat TCH doet:

- Hoge programmeerbaarheid (gedrag) en lage meetbaarheid van uitkomsten. (1)
- Lage programmeerbaarheid (gedrag) en lage meetbaarheid van uitkomsten. (2)
- Hoge programmeerbaarheid (gedrag) en hoge meetbaarheid van uitkomsten. (3)
- Lage programmeerbaarheid (gedrag) en hoge meetbaarheid van uitkomsten. (4)

Q19 Passende communicatie Dit onderdeel gaat over het soort communicatiestijl die uw organisatie gebruikt.

Q20 Er volgt nu een vraag. Kies het antwoord dat het meest van toepassing is op de huidige situatie. Vanuit de gemeente hebben we de gewoonte om met name op de volgende wijze met TCH te communiceren:

- Langs hiërarchische lijnen en formeel. (1)
- Langs hiërarchische lijnen en (deels) informeel. (2)
- Op gelijk niveau en formeel. (3)
- Op gelijk niveau en (deels) informeel. (4)

Q21 U kunt eventueel een toelichting geven op uw antwoord op de vorige vraag 'Vanuit de gemeente hebben we de voorkeur om met name op de volgende wijze met de TCH te communiceren:

Q22 Aantrekken van geschikt personeel Dit onderdeel heeft betrekking op hoe TCH personeel aantrekt en uw invloed als gemeente hierop.

Q23 Er volgen nu vier stellingen. Geef per stelling aan in welke mate u het (on)eens bent.

	Zeer mee oneens (1)	Mee oneens (2)	Neutraal (3)	Mee eens (4)	Zeer mee eens (5)
De TCH probeert het meest geschikte personeel aan te trekken door financieel en materieel aantrekkelijke middelen te bieden. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
De TCH probeert het meest geschikte personeel aan te trekken door de nadruk te leggen op de sociale resultaten van de organisatie en vrijheid te geven binnen de aangeboden functie. (2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Er zijn vanuit de gemeente afspraken met de TCH over maximale lonen en de hoogte van eventuele bonussen van het personeel. (3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Om het beste personeel te kunnen aantrekken mag de TCH van de gemeente financieel aantrekkelijke middelen aanbieden. (4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q24 Gebruik van motiverende middelen Het laatste onderdeel heeft betrekking op hoe uw organisatie probeert de TCH te motiveren.

Q25 Dit is het laatste blok met stellingen. Geef per stelling aan in welke mate u het (on)eens bent.

	Zeër mee oneens (1)	Mee oneens (2)	Neutraal (3)	Mee eens (4)	Zeër mee eens (5)
De TCH moet zelf de risico's dragen voor haar gedrag. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Wij kiezen ervoor de TCH veel autonomie te geven. (2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Wanneer de TCH goed presteert wordt ze hier financieel en/of materieel voor beloond. (3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
De TCH wordt door middel van prestatie-indicatoren beoordeeld door ons. (4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Wij belonen de TCH door middel van het versterken van hun reputatie. (5)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Wij geven de TCH richtlijnen om zelf hun gedrag te corrigeren. (6)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Wanneer de TCH heeft bijgedragen aan het verwezenlijken van sociale doelen wordt dit teruggekoppeld naar TCH. (7)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
We houden de TCH op de hoogte over	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

beleidskeuzes van de gemeente die hun organisatie kunnen beïnvloeden. (8)					
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Q26 Dit was de laatste vraag. Hartelijk bedankt voor het invullen van de enquête. Mocht u nog vragen en/of opmerkingen hebben dan kunt u deze hieronder invullen:

Q27 Indien u het op prijs stelt een digitaal rapport met de resultaten te ontvangen, dan kun u hier uw e-mail adres achterlaten. Dit wordt apart verwerkt van uw antwoorden:

APPENDIX VII: Survey TCHs

Q1 Geachte heer/mevrouw,

U krijgt deze enquête toegestuurd omdat uw organisatie als podium is aangesloten bij de VSCD.

Waarom deze enquête

Het doel van deze enquête is inzicht te verkrijgen in de relatie tussen gemeenten en podia. Alle stellingen en vragen in deze enquête hebben betrekking op dit onderwerp. De uitkomsten worden gebruikt om de huidige situatie in kaart te brengen en aanbevelingen te geven voor het verbeteren van de relatie indien nodig.

Het onderzoek wint in grote mate aan kwaliteit als zoveel mogelijk schouwburgen en concerthallen hun medewerking verlenen, daarom zou het enorm helpen als u deze enquête invult.

Uitleg over het invullen

Het invullen van de enquête duurt gemiddeld 10 minuten en wordt volledig anoniem verwerkt. Er zijn geen goede of foute antwoorden. Er zijn in totaal 5 blokken met vragen. Per blok van vragen en stellingen staat bovenaan aangegeven hoe u dient te antwoorden. Lees de stellingen en vragen zorgvuldig. Mocht u vragen hebben over de enquête stuurt u dan een e-mail naar nicolevanherpt@gmail.com.

Indien u prijs stelt op een exemplaar van het rapport dat over dit onderwerp wordt geschreven, dan kunt u dit aan het eind van de vragenlijst aangeven.

Nogmaals hartelijk bedankt voor uw medewerking!

Q2 Zou u hieronder de per email verstrekte code willen invullen?

Q3 Mijn organisatie is op de volgende manier verzelfstandigd:

- Stichting. (1)
- Naamloze vennootschap [NV]. (2)
- Vereniging. (3)
- Besloten vennootschap [BV]. (4)
- Mijn organisatie is niet verzelfstandigd. (6)
- Anders, namelijk (5) _____

Q4 Relatie Dit onderdeel heeft betrekking op de relatie die uw organisatie met de gemeente heeft. Lees de stellingen zorgvuldig.

Q5 Wanneer ik de relatie met de gemeente een cijfer van 1 t/m 10 zou moeten geven zou ik deze beoordelen met een:

- 1 (1)
- 2 (2)
- 3 (3)
- 4 (4)
- 5 (5)
- 6 (6)
- 7 (7)
- 8 (8)
- 9 (9)
- 10 (10)

Q6 U kunt hieronder eventueel toelichting geven op uw antwoord op de vorige vraag:

Q7 Er volgen nu een aantal stellingen. Geef per stelling aan in hoeverre u het met de stelling (on)eens bent.

	Zeer mee oneens (1)	Mee oneens (2)	Neutraal (3)	Mee eens (4)	Zeer mee eens (5)
Er is regelmatig conflict in onze relatie met de gemeente. (1)	<input type="radio"/>				
Door de gemeente worden we bij, voor ons relevant, beleid betrokken. (2)	<input type="radio"/>				
We voelen ons verbonden met de gemeente. (3)	<input type="radio"/>				
Er is sprake van wederzijds vertrouwen tussen ons en de gemeente. (4)	<input type="radio"/>				
De waardering vanuit de gemeente wordt met name door middel van financiële en materiële middelen geuit. (5)	<input type="radio"/>				
De waardering vanuit de gemeente blijkt met name uit het feit dat ze ons vrijheid en verantwoordelijkheid	<input type="radio"/>				

geven. (6)					
De gemeente controleert regelmatig het handelen van onze organisatie. (7)	<input type="radio"/>				
Onze organisatie wordt met name beoordeeld via prestatie-indicatoren. (8)	<input type="radio"/>				
De gemeente en onze organisatie hebben een gemeenschappelijk doel. (9)	<input type="radio"/>				
De gemeente vertrouwt op onze vakinhoudelijke kennis. (10)	<input type="radio"/>				

Q8 Communicatie van verwachtingen Dit onderdeel gaat over het communiceren van verwachtingen door uw organisatie en de gemeente aan elkaar.

Q9 Er volgen nu drie stellingen. Geef per stelling aan in hoeverre u het met de stelling (on)eens bent.

	Zeer mee oneens (1)	Mee oneens (2)	Neutraal (3)	Mee eens (4)	Zeer mee eens (5)
Onze organisatie is tevreden over de communicatie met de gemeente. (1)	<input type="radio"/>				
Het is duidelijk wat voor verwachtingen de gemeente van onze organisatie heeft. (2)	<input type="radio"/>				
Onze organisatie heeft het gevoel dat de gemeente dezelfde insteek in de relatie heeft als wij. (3)	<input type="radio"/>				

Q10 U kunt hier eventueel een toelichting geven op uw antwoord op de laatste stelling 'Onze organisatie heeft het gevoel dat de gemeente dezelfde insteek in de relatie heeft als wij':

Q11 Monitoren Deze stellingen hebben betrekking op het monitoren van uw organisatie door de gemeente.

Q12 Hieronder staan een aantal stellingen. Beantwoord iedere stelling met ja of nee.

	Ja (1)	Nee (2)
De prestatie-indicatoren zijn door onze organisatie ontwikkeld. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
De gemeente stuurt onze organisatie door middel van gedragsprotocollen. (2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Een onafhankelijke organisatie (zoals een consultancybureau) beoordeelt onze prestaties. (3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
De gemeente controleert of de door ons verstrekte informatie met betrekking tot het monitoren compleet is. (4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
De gemeente stelt ons vragen naar aanleiding van de resultaten van het monitoren. (5)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q13 Er volgt nu een tweede blok stellingen. Geef per stelling aan in welke mate u het (on)eens bent.

	Zeer mee oneens (1)	Mee oneens (2)	Neutraal (3)	Mee eens (4)	Zeer mee eens (5)
Het monitoren door de gemeente staat het functioneren van onze organisatie niet in de weg. (1)	<input type="radio"/>				
De nadruk ligt te veel op prestatie-indicatoren en te weinig op maatschappelijke resultaten. (2)	<input type="radio"/>				
De prestatie-indicatoren geven de werkelijkheid goed weer. (3)	<input type="radio"/>				
Er wordt veelal gebruikt gemaakt van onafhankelijke bronnen (zoals	<input type="radio"/>				

bijvoorbeeld consultants of accountants) voor onze beoordelingen. (4)					
De gemeente overlegt met ons over de invulling en vormgeving van contracten. (5)	<input type="radio"/>				
De gemeente moedigt onze organisatie aan om mee te doen met peer reviews of benchmarks. (6)	<input type="radio"/>				
De gemeente stimuleert dat onze organisatie verantwoording aflegt aan klanten/gebruikers. (7)	<input type="radio"/>				

Q14 Als één opdrachtgever handelen Binnen de gemeente hebben vaak meerdere afdelingen met een theater en/of concerthal te maken, bijvoorbeeld een beleidsafdeling en een financiële afdeling. Deze stellingen hebben betrekking op in welke mate de gemeente als één opdrachtgever handelt.

Q15 Beantwoord de volgende stelling met ja of nee. Onze organisatie ervaart dat er meerdere opdrachtgevers binnen de gemeente zijn.

- Ja (1)
- Nee (2)

Q16 Beantwoord de volgende stelling met ja, nee of weet niet. Rollen, zoals opdrachtgever en toezichthouder, binnen de gemeente zijn geïntegreerd in één contactpersoon, in één contract of in één afdeling.

- Ja (1)
- Nee (2)
- Weet niet (3)

Q17 Er volgt nog een blok met stellingen. Geef per stelling aan in welke mate u het er mee (on)eens bent.

	Zeer mee oneens (1)	Mee oneens (2)	Neutraal (3)	Mee eens (4)	Zeer mee eens (5)
Het bestaan van meerdere opdrachtgevers binnen de gemeente veroorzaakt	<input type="radio"/>				

problemen/onduidelijkheden voor onze organisatie. (1)					
Vanuit de gemeente wordt met één stem naar onze organisatie gecommuniceerd. (2)	<input type="radio"/>				
Binnen de gemeente zit iedereen op één lijn (politicus-beleidsmedewerker en beleidsmedewerker-beleidsmedewerker) qua theater en concerthallen beleid. (3)	<input type="radio"/>				

Q18 Passend contracttype Dit onderdeel heeft betrekking op het soort contract dat uw organisatie met de gemeente heeft.

Q19 Bij de volgende twee vragen dient u het antwoord dat het meest van toepassing is op de huidige situatie te selecteren. Het type contract dat onze organisatie met de gemeente heeft past het beste bij:

- Gedetailleerd gedragsgebaseerde contract (operationeel gedrag toegelicht). (1)
- Gedetailleerd uitkomstengebaseerde contract (operationele doelen toegelicht). (2)
- Globaal gedragsgebaseerde contract (bevat gewenst gedrag in grote lijnen). (4)
- Globaal uitkomstengebaseerde contract (bevat alleen abstracte doelen). (3)

Q20 Met de programmeerbaarheid van gedrag wordt er bedoeld op de mate waarin de opdrachtgever aan kan geven wat voor gedrag hij wenst van de uitvoerende organisatie. Meetbaarheid richt zich op de meetbaarheid van de resultaten van het werk van de uitvoerende organisatie en of de resultaten positief zijn. Welke beschrijving past het beste bij het werk dat uw organisatie doet:

- Hoge programmeerbaarheid van gedrag en lage meetbaarheid van uitkomsten. (1)
- Lage programmeerbaarheid van gedrag en lage meetbaarheid van uitkomsten. (2)
- Hoge programmeerbaarheid van gedrag en hoge meetbaarheid van uitkomsten. (3)
- Lage programmeerbaarheid van gedrag en hoge meetbaarheid van uitkomsten. (4)

Q21 Passende communicatie Dit onderdeel heeft betrekking op het soort communicatie dat u met de gemeente heeft.

Q22 Er volgt nu een vraag. Kies het antwoord dat het meest van toepassing is op de huidige situatie. U kunt later eventueel een toelichting geven op uw antwoord. Vanuit de gemeente is er de gewoonte om met name op de volgende wijze met onze organisatie te communiceren:

- Langs hiërarchische lijnen en formeel. (1)
- Langs hiërarchische lijnen en (deels) informeel. (2)
- Op gelijk niveau en formeel. (3)
- Op gelijk niveau en (deels) informeel. (4)

Q23 U kunt hier eventueel toelichting geven op uw antwoord op de vorige vraag:

Q24 Aantrekken van geschikte werknemers Dit onderdeel heeft betrekking op het aantrekken van geschikte werknemers door uw organisatie.

Q25 Er volgen nu vier stellingen. Geef per stelling aan in hoeverre u het met de stelling (on)eens bent.

	Zeër mee oneens (1)	Mee oneens (2)	Neutraal (3)	Mee eens (4)	Zeër mee eens (5)
Onze organisatie probeert de meest geschikte werknemers aan te trekken door financieel en materieel aantrekkelijke middelen te bieden. (1)	<input type="radio"/>				
Onze organisatie probeert de meest geschikte werknemers aan te trekken	<input type="radio"/>				

<p>door de nadruk te leggen op sociale resultaten van de organisatie en vrijheid te geven binnen de functie. (2)</p> <p>Er zijn afspraken met de gemeenten over maximale lonen en de hoogte van eventuele bonussen binnen onze organisatie. (3)</p> <p>Wanneer wij de beste mensen willen aantrekken door financieel aantrekkelijke middelen te bieden wordt dit geaccepteerd door de gemeente. (4)</p>	<input type="radio"/>				
	<input type="radio"/>				

26 Gebruik van motiverende middelen Het laatste onderdeel heeft betrekking op het gebruik van motiverende middelen door de gemeente.

Q27 Dit is het laatste blok met stellingen. Geef per stelling aan in welke mate u het (on)eens bent.

	Zeer mee oneens (1)	Mee oneens (2)	Neutraal (3)	Mee eens (4)	Zeer mee eens (5)
Onze organisatie moet zelf de risico's dragen voor ons gedrag. (1)	<input type="radio"/>				
Onze organisatie krijgt veel autonomie vanuit de gemeente. (2)	<input type="radio"/>				
Onze reputatie wordt versterkt door de gemeente afhankelijk van ons gedrag. (3)	<input type="radio"/>				
Wanneer onze organisatie naar wens	<input type="radio"/>				

<presteert (4)="" <br="" beloond.="" en="" financieel="" hier="" materieel="" of="" voor="" we="" worden=""></presteert> Onze organisatie wordt door middel van prestatie-indicatoren beoordeeld door de gemeente. (5) Wij worden door de gemeente goed op de hoogte gehouden over beleidsontwikkelingen die betrekking hebben op onze organisatie. (6) Wij worden door de gemeente gestimuleerd om de door hun opgezette richtlijnen qua gedrag te volgen. (7) Wanneer wij hebben bijgedragen aan het verwezenlijken van sociale doelen wordt dit door de gemeente teruggekoppeld naar onze organisatie. (8)	<input type="radio"/>				
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Q28 Dit was de laatste vraag. Hartelijk bedankt voor het invullen van de enquête. Mocht u nog vragen en/of opmerkingen hebben dan kunt u deze hieronder invullen:

Q29 Indien u het op prijs stelt een digitaal rapport met de resultaten te ontvangen, dan kun u hier uw e-mail adres achterlaten. Dit wordt apart verwerkt van uw antwoorden:

APPENDIX VIII: Interview manual for municipalities

Solutions to barrier 1:

1. Wat verwacht u van de relatie met de TCH?
2. Hoe verzekert u zich ervan dat de TCH hetzelfde van de relatie verwacht?
3. A. Wordt er gebruik gemaakt van communicatieplannen?
B. Zo ja, waar bestaan deze uit?
C. Waar ligt de nadruk op binnen deze plannen?
4. Hoe verzekert u zich ervan dat er een één principaal-één uitvoerder relatie is? (uitleg)
5. A. Wat voor monitoring strategieën worden er gebruikt? (uitleg)
B. Zijn deze effectief naar uw mening?
C. Waarom passen deze bij de gekozen relatie?

Solutions to barrier 2:

1. Hoe past de managementstijl bij de gekozen relatie? (uitleg)
2. A. Wat voor soort contract wordt er gebruikt? (uitleg)
B. Waarom past dit bij de relatie?
3. A. Kiest de gemeente ervoor om langs hiërarchische lijnen en formeel te communiceren of meer voor een gelijkvloerse en meer informele vorm?
B. Waarom is voor deze manier gekozen?
C. Hoe implementeert de gemeente deze manier van communiceren?

Solutions to barrier 3:

1. A. Hoe worden werknemers aangetrokken tot de TCH? Heeft u hier zicht op als gemeente?
B. Waarom past het bij de relatie om werknemers op deze manier aan te trekken? (alleen wanneer A ja)
2. A. Hoe wordt de TCH gemotiveerd?
B. Waarom is er voor deze prikkels gekozen?
C. Hoe worden deze geïmplementeerd?

Algemene oplossingen:

1. Wordt er gebruik gemaakt van oplossingen waar ik niet naar gevraagd heb?
2. Is er nog ander advies wat u wilt geven?
3. Wat is naar uw mening het meest belangrijk voor de betrokken partijen om een goede relatie te hebben?

Navraag:

Heeft u nog andere vragen en/of opmerkingen?

APPENDIX IX: Interview manual for TCHs

Solutions to barrier 1:

1. Wat verwacht u van de relatie met de gemeente?
2. Hoe verzekert u zich ervan dat de gemeente hetzelfde van de relatie verwacht?
3. Hoe weet uw organisatie wat er door de gemeente verwacht wordt?
4. A. Wordt er gebruik gemaakt van communicatieplannen door uw organisatie?
B. Zo ja, waar bestaan deze uit?
C. Waar ligt de nadruk op binnen deze plannen?
5. Is er sprake van een één principaal-één uitvoerder relatie? (uitleg)
6. Hoe kan een één principaal-één uitvoerder relatie beter verzekerd worden naar uw mening?
7. A. Wat voor monitoring strategieën worden er gebruikt door de gemeente? (uitleg)
B. Zijn deze effectief naar uw mening?
C. Passen deze bij de relatie? En waarom?

Solutions to barrier 2:

4. Past de managementstijl van de gemeente bij de gekozen relatie? En waarom? (uitleg)
5. A. Wat voor soort contract wordt er gebruikt door de gemeente? (uitleg)
B. Past dit bij de relatie? En waarom?
6. A. Kiest de gemeente ervoor om hiërarchisch en formeel te communiceren of meer voor een gelijkvloerse en meer informele vorm?
B. Past dit bij de relatie naar uw mening?

Solutions to barrier 3:

1. A. Hoe worden werknemers aangetrokken tot uw organisatie?
B. Heeft u met de gemeente overleg gehad over op wat voor manier u werknemers aantrekt?
 B. Past het bij de relatie om werknemers op deze manier aan te trekken? En waarom?
2. A. Hoe wordt uw organisatie gemotiveerd door de gemeente?
 B. Past dit bij de relatie? Waarom?

Algemene oplossingen:

8. Wordt er gebruik gemaakt van oplossingen waar ik niet naar gevraagd heb?
9. Is er nog ander advies wat u wilt geven?

10. Wat is naar uw mening het meest belangrijk voor de betrokken partijen om een goede relatie te hebben?

Navraag:

Heeft u nog andere vragen en/of opmerkingen?