

Executive Summary

This explorative research focuses on the reasons behind peace operations deployed by the European Union (EU). During the 1990s the EU became a regional security organisation. In 2001 the European Council in Laeken declared that the EU was capable of conducting some crisis-management operations. In January 2003 the European Union (EU) deployed its first peace operation under the EU-flag. Many different operations followed. In the period 2002 until 2007 the European Commission decided to deploy twenty peace operations. These European peace operations are deployed in Europe as well as in Asia and Africa. The broad spread of the EU operations is the puzzle of this research. There are many conflicts in which the EU could intervene, so the question rises why the EU deploys peace operations in some states and not in others. This explorative research determines which reasons for interventions do or do not apply on the EU peace operations. Therefore the central research question is:

Based on which reasons does the European Union deploy peace-operations in a certain region or state?

To answer this central research question, this research has two research goals. First this research wants to explain the reasons for EU interventions in a certain state or region. But second this research goes further than just a static explanation of one moment in time, by looking at developments and differences. The two research goals are:

- To explain the reasons for EU interventions in a certain state or region
- To look at developments and differences in reasons for EU interventions.

To answer the central research question three steps are taken. The first step is to form a general picture of the EU and especially the second pillar and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The second step is to look at the first research goal: the reasons for the EU to deploy a peace operation in a region or state. And the third step is to look at the second research goal: developments and differences in the reasons to intervene.

The first research goal is studied by the analyses of arguments of legitimisation and theoretical grounds. The arguments of legitimisation are found in the official decisions of the European Council to deploy a peace operation: the Council Joint Actions of all twenty cases. These arguments focus mainly on peace agreements, UN mandates, the willingness of the EU, a request of the host state and co-operation with other international organisations. The theoretical grounds are found in existing literature on interventionism. Based on the theoretical approaches from this literature hypotheses are formulated and tested on the twenty cases. These hypotheses are about political, economic and social issues.

The second research goal is studied by combining the results of the measurements on arguments of legitimisation and theoretical grounds for periods of time, locations and kinds of peace operations. This way, developments in periods of time and differences between locations and kinds of peace operations are made visible.

Based on the measurements, the following conclusions are drawn:

1. The EU never intervened without an UN Security Council Resolution (75%) and/or a request or invitation of the host state (85%).
2. In ninety-five percent of the cases the EU intervened on request of the host state (85%) and/or the UN/AU (20%).
3. Causal relations to the decision-making process of the European Council are found for the theoretical grounds development aid, humanitarian action and human rights. The EU intervenes in states that it supports with above average amounts of development aid, with a high level of violence and that are considered partly free or not free at all.

4. Although EU member states have colonised almost the whole world, only forty percent of the operations are deployed in states with a colonial relation to an EU member state for fifty years or longer, these cases are mostly African.

5. When the EU intervenes in a state, it feels a continued responsibility for the state, according to the results for references to earlier operations and the many prolongings of operations.

6. In almost all European cases (85.7%) the EU stated to act according to the Stabilisation and Association policy.

7. The EU was externally pressed to act for military operations in Africa.

Since this is an explorative research, further research is necessary. The results are a first indication of which reasons do apply on the EU and which reasons doesn't, but to draw more hard conclusions further research is needed. Especially recommended for further research are the reasons for interventions in Europe and the external pressure on the EU to intervene by military operations in Africa.

Preface

In 2001 the European Council in Laeken stated that the European Union (EU) was capable of conducting some crisis-management operations. Since 2002 the European Council decided over different peace operations led by the EU. The objective of this new instrument was, in the words of High Representative Javier Solana, to contribute to “a fairer, safer and more united world”. To fulfill this objective a first European police operation was deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina in January 2003. This operation was quickly followed by more operations, as well civilian as military and as well in Europe as in Asia and Africa. This research studies all these operations decided on between 2002 and 2007.

When I started thinking about a subject for my Master thesis in October 2007, the European Union peace operations quickly came to mind. I knew about the European involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. I also was aware of some European operations in other continents. The discussion over the new operation in Chad and CAR was still going on at that time. But I didn't know the EU already decided on twenty operations at the end of 2007. As the newest development in conflict-prevention and – management, these EU operations had to be the subject of my research. Because the Master Conflicts, Territories and Identities is a co-operation between Human Geography and the Center for International Crisis Analysis and Management (CICAM), the research should contain as well a conflict aspect as a geographical aspect. After some consideration the solution was clear. The research should be on the spread of the EU operations over different continents and regions.

Because this is a new development, less is known about the subject. Therefore this research is explorative. This is exactly one of the main reasons why this research interests me. The development is new, the social and scientific relevance is high and the subject is not studied extensively yet. Therefore I was seized by the subject. My first plans for the research were far too ambitious, but despite all good meant advises to limit the research, I insisted on the twenty cases and the many arguments and theoretical grounds to test on the cases. While I was operationalising the measurements, I understood why I should have limited my research. It was hard to operationalise all factors of the research end to find the necessary information for the measurements. Looking at the final result I'm glad I was stubborn and choose not to choose some cases or hypotheses. The resulting research is too long, but my goal is achieved. I wanted to give some first insights in the reasons for the EU to intervene in a state or region by deploying a peace operation. Since the size of this research was limited to study the different reasons in depth, further research is necessary, as is pointed out in the conclusions. Despite this research does provide first insights in the reasons of the EU.

I'm thankful for the help I got from different people and institutions during my research. As interneer of the resort Military Diplomatic Relations of the Ministry of Defense I got the opportunity to speak with policy makers, representatives and foreign representatives. Of great help was the meeting with LtCol Arthur Stam, the military representative for NATO/EU at the Dutch embassy in Brussels. At the same day I got the opportunity to visit a meeting of TEPSA and ISIS Europe to hear Jacek Saryusz-Wolfski – the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament – speak about a new report on the role of the Parliament and the foreign and security policy of the EU. Also I would like to thank Professor James Meernik of the University of North Texas for his time to talk over his theories. Of great help were the assistance of the information agencies of the European Commission and EuroStat. Thanks to them I received information, that was not available at the websites at that time. I also thank my uncle Jan van de Weem for reading the final script carefully on my English. The English is far from perfect, but at least it is understandable. Finally I would like to thank my supervisor Jair van der Lijn for his time and advises during the one and a half year from the first ideas to the final

thesis. Despite we did not always agree on the choices I made, the conversations about the different chapters were always helpful. Thanks to all these people and institutions, I could finish this research successfully.

Toine van de Ven

Vught, March 4, 2009

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Abbreviations

| | |
|--------------|--|
| AFDL | Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire |
| AMIS | African Union Mission In Sudan |
| AMM | Aceh Monitoring Mission |
| AU | African Union |
| CAP | Common Agricultural Policy |
| CAR | Central African Republic |
| CARDS | Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation |
| CFSP | Common Foreign and Security Policy |
| CGS | Council General Secretariat |
| CIS | Commonwealth of Independent States |
| CIVCOM | Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management |
| Civ-Mil Cell | Civil-Military Cell |
| CMC | Crisis management concept |
| COPPS | Co-ordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support |
| COREPER | Committee of Permanent Representatives |
| CPCC | Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability |
| CSCE | Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe |
| DDR | Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration |
| DG E | Directorate-General for External Relations and Politico-Military Affairs |
| DG RELEX | Directorate-General of External Relations |
| DRC | Democratic Republic of the Congo |
| DSACEUR | Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe |
| EC | European Communities (since 1992 renamed European Community) |
| ECHO | European Community Humanitarian Office |
| ECMM | European Community Monitoring Mission |
| ECSC | European Coal and Steel Community |
| EDA | European Defence Agency |
| EDC | European Defence Community |
| EEC | European Economic Community |
| EMS | European Monetary System |
| EMU | Economic and Monetary Union |
| ENP | European Neighbourhood Policy |
| EPC | European Political Community |
| EPC | European Political Cooperation |
| ESDP | European Security and Defence Policy |
| EU | European Union |
| EUBAM | European Union Border Assistance Mission |
| EUFOR | European Union Force |
| EUISS | European Union Institute for Security Studies |
| EUJUST | European Union Rule of Law Mission |
| EUMC | European Union Military Committee |
| EUMM | European Union Monitoring Mission |
| EUMS | European Union Military Staff |
| EUPAT | European Union Police Advisory Team |
| EUPM | European Union Police Mission |
| EUPOL | European Union Police Mission |
| EUPT | European Union Planning Team |
| EUSC | European Union Satellite Centre |
| EUSEC | European Union advisory and assistance mission for security reform |
| FTA | Free Trade Area |
| FYROM | Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia |
| GAERC | General Affairs and External Relations Council |
| HR | High Representative |
| ICC | International Criminal Court |

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| ICG | International Crisis Group |
| ICISS | International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty |
| IFOR | Implementation Force |
| IGC | Intergovernmental Conference |
| ISAF | International Security Assistance Force |
| JHA | Justice and Home Affairs |
| KFOR | Kosovo Force |
| KLA | Kosovo Liberation Army |
| MINURCAT | United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and in Chad |
| MONUC | Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organisation |
| NLA | National Liberation Army |
| NRF | NATO Response Force |
| OECD | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development |
| OEEC | Organisation for European Economic Cooperation |
| OHQ | Operation Headquarter |
| OpsCen | Operations Centre |
| OSCE | Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe |
| PfP | Partnership for Peace |
| PJCC | Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters |
| PLO | Palestine Liberation Organisation |
| PMG | Politico-Military Group |
| PSC | Political and Security Committee |
| PU | Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (Policy Unit) |
| QMV | Qualified Majority Voting |
| R2P | Responsibility to protect |
| RDC | République Démocratique du Congo |
| RELEX | Foreign Relations Counsellors Working Group |
| RRF | Rapid Reaction Force |
| SEA | Single European Act |
| SFOR | Stabilisation Force |
| SG | Secretary-General |
| SG/HR | Secretary General and High Representative for the CFSP |
| SITCEN | Joint Situation Centre |
| SPLA | Sudan People's Liberation Army |
| SSR | Security sector reform |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNAMID | AU/UN hybrid operation in Darfur |
| UNMIK | United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo |
| UNMIS | United Nations Mission in Sudan |
| UNPROFOR | United Nations Protection Force |
| US(A) | United States (of America) |
| USSR | Soviet Union (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) |
| WEU | Western European Union |

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Chapter 1 - A new development

§ 1.1 Introduction

"This is a world of new dangers but also of new opportunities. The European Union has the potential to make a major contribution, both in dealing with the threats and in helping realise the opportunities. An active and capable European Union would make an impact on global scale. In doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world." (Solana 2003, 14). This is the conclusion of the European Security Strategy of 2003. The formation of this strategy is the result of a process for further European integration on defence and foreign affairs that started after the end of the Cold War in 1989.

For almost five decades the world was divided into two blocks, a Western block under American leadership and an Eastern block under Soviet leadership. This division was best seen on the European continent, which was – in the famous words of the former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill – divided by an Iron Curtain from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic (Churchill 1946). In 1989 the Cold War came to a sudden, unexpected end. The symbol of the end of the division in East and West was the fall of the Berlin Wall on the 9th of November 1989. A year later both Western as Soviet politicians declared the end of the Cold War. This was such a radical development that the British historian Eric Hobsbawm claims in his book *Age of Extremes* the year 1989 as the actual end of the twentieth century and the start of a new century (Hobsbawm 1994).

The end of the Cold War changed the world. Not only for the United States, the Soviet Union and their allies, but for the whole world. Many states that were – voluntary or 'forced' – part of one of the blocks, now became free. For the world that had been frozen by the paralysing division, the spring started. Hopes were high that this spring would create a peaceful world. During the Cold War the conflict between the United States (US) and the Soviet Union (USSR) was 'cold', but their tensions were fought out in other wars like in Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan. In other parts of the world – mainly in Africa – economic, ethnic and nationalistic conflict erupted. The United Nations (UN) – the organisation that was established directly after the Second World war to prevent future conflicts – could not accomplish her task successfully because of the division between East and West, both armed with a right to veto in the Security Council. The end of conflict between East and West and the breakdown of the bipolar world made way for optimism. The UN could finally enforce a new world order, based on the rule of law and the principle of collective security. The end of the stalemate between the US and USSR in the Security Council, ensured that the UN could take up her role as maintainer of international peace and security (Russet and Sutterlin 1991, 69, 83; Malik and Dorman 1995, 161).

But the end of the Cold War also created new tensions. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War became the end of the USSR and their belt of East-European satellite states. The USSR disintegrated in 1991 in fifteen republics. Most of these new republics became members of the new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) that was founded on December 21, 1991.¹ The CIS was meant to officially determinate the USSR, but at the same time prolong the co-operation between the republics after the end of the USSR because of the common history of these states. According to the Agreement on the establishment of the CIS as well as the Charter of the CIS, with respect for state sovereignty and the right of self-determination – although some would say the CIS is an instrument for Russia to maintain its influence over the former Soviet Republics (CIS 1991; CIS 1993). The former Soviet satellite states in East-Europe became independent states again. Although this was a potential risk for new conflicts, most of these states transformed to democratic and capitalistic states quite fast. It was the break-up of former Yugoslavia – cynically since Yugoslavia was the only East-European state that was


¹ Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.

no satellite state of the USSR – which led to new conflicts on the Balkan. But the end of the Cold War did not only led to tensions in Europe, in different parts of the world existing conflicts that were suppressed but not resolved, re-emerged after the end of the Cold War. But these new tensions did not led to a growth of the number of conflicts. Research from Peter Wallensteen and Karin Axell shows that the years round 1990 show a small increase of conflicts, although most of these conflicts were minor conflicts. This is explained by the fact that tensions that were suppressed during the Cold War re-emerged, while tensions that emerged during the Cold War were solved. In many conflicts in Third World states the US and the USSR supported friendly regimes with weapons, military advisors and finances. After the Cold War this support ended, which led to the downfall of these regimes and the end of these conflicts (Wallensteen and Axell 1993, 333-335).

Because Europe was the continent which was most frozen by the Cold War, most of the post-Cold War conflicts emerged on this continent. In the period 1989-1992 Europe was the only region with a growing number of conflicts, while there was little change in Asia and Africa and even a decrease of the number of conflicts in South America (Wallensteen and Axell 1993, 333-335). However, on the long term the end of the Cold War led to a decrease of the number of conflicts. In research of Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen the highlights of conflicts are also in the early 1990s, at the end of the Cold War. During the nineties the number of conflicts declined and in the 2000s this number reached the lowest level since mid 1970s (Harbom and Wallensteen 2007, 624-625).

The optimism about the new order in the post-Cold War world was not only emphasised by the decline of conflicts, but also by the strong increase of international commitment to act in conflict situations. This is shown by the growth of states that participate in peace operations. Trevor Findlay states that in 1988 only 26 states were involved in UN peacekeeping, while in 1994 already 76 states contributed to peace operations. More than half of these contributors to UN peace operations of 1994 were never involved in operations before 1989 (Findlay 1996, 2-3). After the Cold War the main objective of military force became international rule of law and security instead of territorial defence. The number of UN peace operations grows firmly directly after the Cold War. During the 1990s the UN deployed 35 new operations, an enormous growth in comparison with the decades of the Cold War (See figure 1.1).

Figure 1.1: Number of UN peace operations (UN n.d.)²



² The figures of the 1940s and 2000s are not comparable to the other decades since the UN is established in 1945 and the data is from early 2008. The enormous difference of the 1990s with the other decades is nevertheless very clear.

The strong growth of peace operations and the increase of the international commitment is not only shown by the UN. During the 1990s it became a new development for regional security organisations to deploy peace operations. The UN Charter allowed this development. Article 52 of the Charter recognises the "(...) existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security (...)". And according to article 53 the Security Council can even "(...) utilise such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority" (UN 1945, art 52 (1), art. 53 (1)). Officially the UN still maintains the highest authority, since the UN must be fully informed of the actions of the regional organisations, must approve actions and actions must be in line with the rules of the UN Charter (UN 1945, art. 53, art. 54). In 1994 the UN even institutionalised the possibility for co-operation with regional organisations further in Resolution 49/57, since these co-operations should strengthen the effectiveness of the UN (UN 1994). Peace operations deployed by regional security organisations became a common procedure. The new developments in the European Union (EU) must be seen against this background.

§ 1.1.1 The rise of the European Union as regional security organisation

According to the European Security Strategy, since 1990 almost four million people have died in war of which ninety-percent civilians and over eighteen million people have left their homes as a result of conflict. Because the world has been more open and interconnected since the end of the Cold War, Europe is partly dependent on other regions. This interdependence makes Europe vulnerable for conflicts in other regions (Solana 2003, 2). Therefore the EU wants to be a global player, which takes part in international conflict-prevention and -management. Formerly, the European member states were involved in peace operations by their membership of security organisations like the UN or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), but since the millennium these European states can also operate under the EU-flag. This positions the EU as a global player and as new security organisation.

This new role of the EU is the result of the newest developments in the process of European integration. After the successful formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, several West-European states formed a regional organisation for mainly economic co-operation. This organisation, called the European Economic Community (EEC), was founded by signing the Treaty of Rome in 1957. The EEC quickly expanded its activities and in 1965 the organisation was renamed the European Communities (EC) by the Brussels Treaty. In 1992 a new step was taken in the co-operation, a step that could be seen as the beginning of the new European security organisation. In Maastricht the member states of the EC signed the Treaty on European Union, which entered into force on November 1, 1993.³ This treaty led to the creation of the EU, which had a broader focus than its predecessors. It contains three policy fields:

- First pillar: European Community (EC)
- Second pillar: Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
- Third pillar: Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)

The pillar European Community is the continuation of the predecessor of the EU – the EC – and deals mainly with economic, social and trade matters. The pillar Justice and Home Affairs introduces law enforcement, criminal justice, civil judicial matters and asylum and immigration into European co-operation. But the new role of Europe as global player and security organisation was constituted by the second pillar, the Common Foreign and Security Policy that built on the foundation of the moderately successful European Political Cooperation (EPC).

Although the EU's foreign and security policy has a foundation in the EPC, it was new since it became an official part of a treaty and because the focus of the pillar was more extended than the EPC. In the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997, which entered into force on the first of May 1999, the pillar – just like the other pillars – was further defined

³ Also called the Treaty of Maastricht. In this research the official name – Treaty on European Union – will be used.

and broadened.⁴ In article 10 of the Amsterdam Treaty title V of the Treaty on European Union was amended. Important changes of this amendment were the strengthening of the position of the foreign policy, the introduction of the Secretary General and High Representative for the CFSP (SG/HR) and the clarification of the instruments.

Most important for the position of the EU as a security organisation was the formation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) under the CFSP. Tasks that were formerly part of the Western European Union (WEU) were transferred to the EU's defence policy. Thereby the Petersberg tasks – humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making – became instruments of the foreign policy of the EU (Amsterdam Treaty 1997, Art. J.7 (2)). This created the possibility for the EU to act as a global player on the international stage in conflict prevention and management. European member states would no longer only contribute to peace operations as members of the UN or NATO, but also under the EU-flag.

§ 1.1.2 Defining the key concepts

Before going into the puzzle that is central to this research, four key concepts – which have already been named above – have to be defined. These are: peace operation, intervention, (regional) security organisation and conflict.

Peace operation: There is no clear definition of the term peace operation. None of the important security organisations seems to have a clear definition, although the term is frequently used. In fact the term seems to be a collection of different activities undertaken by these organisations, such as peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace-building (Van der Lijn 2006, 2).

These activities have different mandates and are performed during different stages of conflicts. What unifies these different activities is the aim they want to achieve. Since the UN is still the highest authority on the area of peace operations and also regional organisations have to operate in line with the rules of the UN, this aim is based on the Charter of the UN (UN 1945, art. 53, art. 54). According to chapter VI and VII the goal of the UN is to settle disputes and maintain international peace and security (UN 1945). This sounds very much as an idealistic metalevel goal, but in the European Security Strategy this aim of the UN is clearly formulated when speaking about using the policy instruments of the EU effectively to contribute to a fairer, safer and more united world (Solana 2003, 11-14). Every peace operation has to add to this goal by fulfilling its mandate. They are means to reach this aim, next to diplomatic means as negotiation, enquiry, mediation, arbitration or judicial settlement (UN 1945, art. 33). According to this distinction, diplomatic missions to states are no peace operations. Traditionally peace operations were performed by military personnel – in the famous words of former UN secretary-general Dag Hammarskjöld: "Peacekeeping is not a soldier's job, but only a soldier can do it" – but with the development of peace operations from classic peacekeeping to operations with other tasks, more civilians became involved. Taken the above into account, peace operations will be defined as followed in this research:

Definition of a peace operation:

Activities undertaken by the UN or a regional organisation with consent of the UN, which aims to create stable and peaceful relations in conflict areas by civil and/or military means.

In the case of the EU, not all activities that could be named under this definition of peace operations are allowed. The activities of the ESDP are the Petersberg tasks – humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. For example peace enforcement is no activity that can be undertaken by the EU according to the present rules. Nevertheless the activities that are undertaken by the EU do fall under the above definition of peace operations. The

⁴ Officially this treaty is called the Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty of the European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts. In this research this treaty will be named the Amsterdam Treaty.

definitions of the different kinds of activities undertaken by the EU are – when necessary – described in the following chapters.

Intervention: Intervening is to get involved in another's affairs. This research focuses on the involvement of states and security organisations in the affairs of a state or states when there is a conflict by deploying a peace operation. Diplomatic involvement in other states is no part of this research and will not be taken into account. Therefore the definition of intervention is used in this research is as following:

Definition of a intervention:

The involvement of a state or an organisation in another state or region by the deployment of a peace operation.

In this research this term will be used as a synonym for deploying a peace operation, unless stated otherwise.

(Regional) security organisation: Regional arrangements or agencies are recognised by the UN in the UN Charter and even co-operation with these arrangements or agencies is regulated by this Charter (UN 1945, art. 52, art. 53). But the UN is not clear about what a regional arrangement or agency is. In the scientific debate a security organisation is called a security community, a term proposed by Karl Deutsch (1957). According to Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett a community can be characterised by three factors. First the members must have shared identities, values and meanings, second the members have significant and direct relations with each other and third the members must have mutual long-term interests and even show altruistic behaviour. But what distinguishes a security community from any other community is the dependable expectation of peaceful change. Conflicts between members will not be solved by the use of force. In the case of a security community these members are states.

Adler and Barnett name two ideal types of security communities, namely loosely-coupled and tightly-coupled security communities. In a loosely-coupled security community members only restrain themselves from the use of force, but in a tightly-coupled security community the co-operation goes much further. Members are self-restrained, but there is also a system of collective mutual assistance and a system of rule (Adler and Barnett 1998, 30-34). Perhaps the loosely-coupled security community can best be compared with the UN, while the NATO can be named as a tightly-coupled security community.

For this research this last distinction is not of much importance. But there is another factor that can be added to the distinction between security communities. Since this research is about peace operations, this factor will be added to the definition of a security organisation. This excludes for instance security communities on the field of justice and police. The goal of these peace operations must be the maintenance of international peace and security, as stated in the UN Charter.

Definition of a security organisation:

A community of member states, which restrain themselves from the use of force against each other, that deploys peace operations to maintain international peace and security.

The above definition is the same for a regional security organisation. The term 'regional' only adds a geographical positioning to the security organisation. It distinguishes a security organisation with members from the same region or continent, from a global organisation of which most states in the world are member. The EU has only member states from the European continent and will therefore be called a regional security organisation.

Conflict: A conflict can be defined in many different ways. Most of the definitions that can be given fall outside of the focus of this research. There will have to be violence or at least a reasonable threat before deploying a peace operation. Therefore in this research the term conflict stands for an armed conflict. Because in this research the database of conflict of the Swedish university of Upsalla is used – which is also used by Harbom and Wallenstein (2007), also the definition of conflict of the Upsalla database will be used in this research (Upsalla Universitat 2006).

Definition of a conflict:

A contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths a year.

Now it is clear what is meant in this research with the key concepts peace operations, intervention, (regional) security organisation and conflict, the puzzle that is central to the research can be explained.

§ 1.2 The problem definition and research question

With the transfer of the Petersberg tasks from the WEU to the ESDP of the EU, the EU became a security organisation according to the definition used in this research. Of course the EU was already longer active on the international stage. For instance by the monitoring mission (ECMM/EUMM) on the Western Balkans – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania – at the borders of the EU. Already since 1991 the EC/EU monitored the tensions in the neighbouring Balkan states. But these actions were political or diplomatic. Since 2003 the EU got the possibility to deploy peace operations to this and other regions.

§ 1.2.1 The puzzle: where to intervene?

This new possibility of the EU to deploy peace operations was used instantly. Already in 2003 – the same year the European Council approved the European Security Strategy – the EU deployed four peace operations according the ESDP. Most of these operations were deployed in conflict areas at the borders of Europe, but the EU also deployed an operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). In the period from 2002 until 2007 the EU decided on twenty peace operations (See figure 1.2).

Figure 1.2: EU-led operations according the ESDP (EU n.d.)

| Decision: | Deployed: | Operations: | Where: |
|------------------|------------------|--|--------------------------------|
| 11-03-2002 | 2003-now | EU Police Mission (EUPM BiH) | Bosnia and Herzegovina |
| 27-01-2003 | 2003 | EU Force Concordia (EUFOR Concordia) | Macedonia |
| 25-06-2003 | 2003 | Operation Artemis (---) | DR Congo |
| 29-09-2003 | 2003-2005 | EU Police Mission Proxima (EUPOL Proxima) | Macedonia |
| 28-06-2004 | 2004-2005 | EU Rule of Law Mission Themis (EUJUST Themis) | Georgia |
| 12-07-2004 | 2004-now | EU Force Althea (EUFOR Althea) | Bosnia and Herzegovina |
| 09-12-2004 | 2005-2007 | EU Police Mission Kinshasa (EUPOL Kinshasa) | DR Congo |
| 07-03-2005 | 2005-now | EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission (EUJUST LEX) | Iraq |
| 02-05-2005 | 2005-now | EU advisory and assistance mission for security reform in DR Congo (EUSEC RDC) | DR Congo |
| 18-07-2005 | 2005-2007 | EU Support to African Union Mission In Sudan II (EU AMIS II Support) | Sudan (Darfur) |
| 09-09-2005 | 2005-2006 | Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) | Indonesia |
| 07-11-2005 | 2005-now | EU Border Assistance Mission Moldova/Ukraine (EUBAM Moldova/Ukraine) | Moldova/ Ukraine |
| 14-11-2005 | 2006-now | EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) | Palestinian Territories |
| 24-11-2005 | 2005-2006 | EU Police Advisory Team (EUPAT) | Macedonia |
| 12-12-2005 | 2005-now | EU Border Assistance Mission Rafah (EUBAM Rafah) | Palestinian Territories (Gaza) |
| 10-04-2006 | 2006-now | EU Planning Team (EUPT Kosovo) | Serbia (Kosovo) |
| 27-04-2006 | 2006 | EU Force DR Congo (EUFOR RDC) | DR Congo |
| 30-05-2007 | 2007-now | EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan) | Afghanistan |
| 05-06-2007 | 2007-now | EU Police Mission in DR Congo (EUPOL RDC) | DR Congo |
| 15-10-2007 | 2008-now | EU Force in Chad and Central African Republic (EUFOR Chad/CAR) | Chad/CAR |

The above list of EU peace operations decided on in the period 2002 until 2007 is most striking for the widespread geographical distribution of operations. It is surprising how broad the range of the EU-led peace operations is. In the terminology of the UN the EU is definitely a regional agency, since the members of the EU are all European states. According to the UN Charter and Resolution 49/57 a regional organisation has a role in regional and international co-operation. But the specific role of the regional organisation is on the regional level in support of international efforts to maintain peace and security (UN 1945; UN 1994). This is stressed several times in Resolution 49/57 by phrases like "(...) appropriate for regional action (...)", "Regional efforts (...)" and "(...) at the regional level (...)" (UN 1994, preamble, art. 5-8). From that perspective it would be logical for an European security organisation like the EU to deploy peace operations in Europe and the direct neighbouring regions. The practice is that the EU acts out of area. It deploys peace operations in Europe as well as in regions in Africa and Asia, far from the European borders (See figure 1.3).

Figure 1.3: EU-led operations in several regions/continents 2000-2007

| <i>Continent:</i> | <i>Region:</i> | <i>Operations:</i> | <i>States:</i> |
|-------------------|-----------------|--------------------|---|
| Europe | Western Balkans | 6 | Macedonia, Serbia (Kosovo) and Bosnia and Herzegovina |
| | East-Europe | 1 | Moldova/Ukraine |
| Asia | South Caucasus | 1 | Georgia |
| | Middle-East | 3 | The Palestinian Territories and Iraq |
| | South-East | 1 | Indonesia |
| | Central Asia | 1 | Afghanistan |
| Africa | --- | 7 | DRC, Sudan (Darfur), Chad and CAR |

As shown in figure 1.3 the geographical distribution of the European peace operations is striking. The question is how this distribution can be explained. According to the description of a regional organisation of the UN, it seems illogical for the EU to operate far from the European borders. A regional organisation should be focused on the region. The EU does not focus on its region, but chooses to operate worldwide. This choice is made because "(...) in the era of globalisation distant threats may be of much concern as those that are near at hand." (Solana 2003, 6). Taken this decision of the EU for granted, the question should be why the EU intervenes in some conflicts and not in others.

There are numerous conflicts in which the EU could intervene, but where the EU did not chose to deploy a peace operation. Since there are so many conflicts, it is the choice of the EU to intervene in the conflicts in fourteen different states by twenty peace operations and in the same time not in other conflicts. This is illustrated by research of Harbom and Wallensteen (2007). Although they show that the highlight of conflicts is early 1990s, the decline of conflicts did not mean there was no conflict to intervene in after 2003. Harbom and Wallensteen illustrate this on basis of the database of conflicts of the University of Upsalla (Upsalla Universitat 2006). In the period from 1989 until 2006 this database counts for hundred twenty-two conflicts in eighty different states. After the decline in the 1990s, the number of conflicts seems to have stabilised round thirty conflicts every year in the 2000s (See figure 1.4). This includes several conflicts on the European continent. In fact, even more European conflicts than the EU chooses to intervene in (Harbom and Wallensteen 2007, 624; Upsalla Universitat 2006).

Figure 1.4: EU operations versus total conflicts, 2003-2007

| | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 |
|---|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Total conflict locations | 32 | 29 | 32 | 32 | 32 | --- |
| EU decisions to deploy operation | 1 | 3 | 3 | 8 | 2 | 3 |
| Active EU operations | 0 | 4 | 4 | 12 | 13 | 12 |

On basis of this data can be concluded that the EU is active in some conflicts and not in others and that the EU chooses to deploy peace operations in regions far from the European borders. This is supported by other information about conflicts, like the data of the International Crisis Group (ICG) (ICG 2007).

§ 1.2.2 Central research question

If there are so many conflicts the EU could choose to intervene in, the question rises why the EU deploys peace operations in some states and not in others. This research will look at the reasons for the EU to intervene in a certain state or region. Therefore the central question of this research will be:

Central research question:

Based on which reasons does the European Union deploy peace operations in a certain region or state?

This central research question can be divided in several relevant sub-questions. These will be discussed in the design of the research. First the goals and the relevance of this research for the reasons behind the geographical distribution of EU-led peace operations will be addressed.

§ 1.3 Research goals: explaining European interventions

This research will focus on the puzzle and the central research question that is accounted for above. Since the EU can choose out of many conflicts to intervene in, there will have to be a weighing of reasons, arguments, risks and interests in the process of decision-making before an intervention. The list of EU-led peace operations is only the outcome of this weighing, while most interesting is the weighing itself. This weighing will be the main issue studied in this thesis.

The European operations are scattered around three continents: Europe, Africa and Asia. This seems to be in line with the data, since these are the continents with the most armed conflicts according to the Upsalla database of conflicts (Upsalla Universitat 2006). It also seems to proof that fear for overspill of conflicts and the security of the 'national border' is at least not the only reason for European interventions. There must be other reasons for intervention.

Of course there are lots of factors that can not be shown by just looking at a statistic figure. The EU is also not the only security organisation that intervenes in conflicts. The UN, but also other regional security organisations deploy peace operations. Besides these organisations, there are also individual or groups of states that intervene in conflicts. So the EU does not have the monopoly on peace operations and that will have an effect on the choices and the process of decision-making. Also of important influence will be the capacity of the EU. Even for a relatively rich and influential organisation as the EU, it would seem impossible to find the resources to act in all of the conflicts at one moment in time. Choices have to be made!

The central goal of this research is to explain these choices of the EU. Since the EU-led peace operations are a relatively new development, there is not much known about the weighing of European interventions. Therefore this research wants to explain why the EU intervenes in a state. But it is not enough to look only at the total of reasons for intervention of the twenty operations decided on between 2002 and 2007. This research also wants to look at developments and differences in the reasons for intervention. Especially since peace operations are a new instrument for the EU, it is possible that the reasons for intervention changed because of lessons learned. Because this research will also look at these developments and differences, it will form a complete picture of the background of European peace operations and will go further than a static explanation of one moment in time. To summarise, the goals of this research are:

- To explain the reasons for EU interventions in a certain state or region
- To look at developments and differences in reasons for EU interventions.

§ 1.4 The relevance of this research

Now the goals of this research are made clear, the next question that has to be answered is why this research is of any relevance. Only knowledge is no purpose on itself, research must serve some purpose. Since there is not much known about European peace operations, this research is explanatory with the purpose to create insights in the reasons for intervention. These insights contribute to as well social as scientific goals. Therefore the social and scientific relevance of this research will be addressed.

§ 1.4.1 Social relevance

The social relevance is closely connected to the impact of peace operations on the society. According to Simon Chesterman post-Cold War operations show two major transformations, namely an expansion in number as well as in scope (Chesterman 2001, 122). Jair van der Lijn also names the growing frequency of peace operations, but names in addition the development in the kinds of operations (Van der Lijn 2006, 1-2). This last development seems closely interconnected with what Chesterman means when he names the expansion in scope. These developments named by Chesterman and Van der Lijn increased the impact of peace operations on the society in the post-Cold War period in comparison to the operations during the Cold War.

First the expansion in number or the growing frequency of operations. In figure 1.1 the enormous growth of UN peace operations is shown with 35 new operations in the 1990s, against 18 operations in the five decades during the Cold War. But besides this growth in UN operations, during the 1990s there also was a growth in operations by regional organisations with the authorisation of the UN. This strong growth of international interventions in conflicts brings along high costs. To deploy so many peace operations funds, resources and thousands of soldiers are necessary. These costs have to be brought up by the international community. Since peace operations are mainly still a 'soldier's job', thousands have to send their friends and relatives to conflict areas. The enormous growth of operations – and the greater scale of the post-Cold War operations – call for much more funds, resources and personnel, so the impact of these operations on society is much greater than during the Cold War.

The expansion of the scope of the operations is shown by the changing mandate of peace operations (Chesterman 2001, 122-123). The mandate changed from the use of force for self-defence in monitoring or observation operations to the enforcement of peace with the use of all necessary means. In this development Van der Lijn distinguishes five generations of operations. The classic concept of peacekeeping – first generation – was to place soldiers between competing parties with the consent of these parties to monitor a cease-fire. After the end of the Cold War this classic concept changed by adding peace-building aspects – second generation –, humanitarian intervention with the use of force – third generation –, delegation of tasks to regional organisations – fourth generation – and the use of force as a threat to guarantee co-operation – fifth generation (Van der Lijn 2006, 16-22). Along with these changing mandates the role of the personnel involved in the operations changed. They have to be prepared to fight with all means to make the operation successful, instead of using violence only in case of self-defence. Therefore operations need to have more personnel and more heavy equipment's, which means there are greater costs to the deployment of an operation.

The change in the kinds of conflicts seems to be closely connected to the expansion of the scope. Van der Lijn notices a decrease of conflicts in the post-Cold War period, but a strong relative growth of intrastate conflicts. This trend is supported by the statistic findings of Harbom and Wallensteen. Of the 122 conflicts in the period 1989-2006 only 7 can be defined as interstate conflicts, while 89 are intrastate conflicts and 26 are internationalised intrastate conflicts (Harbom and Wallensteen 2007, 624). These intrastate conflicts make peace operations more complex, since these kinds of conflicts are more chaotic than interstate conflicts. Most of the post-Cold War interstate conflicts are highly decentralised with different badly organised militias, private armies and warlords and see the use of gratuitous, senseless violence with as result more civilian than military casualties (Kalyvas 2001, 102, 113-116). This kinds of conflict calls for

different approaches in peace operations, such as the increasing role of force in third and fifth generation peacekeeping.

Besides these developments in peace operations, also the evolution of the media has a direct effect on the impact of conflict on the society. Conflicts, fights and human suffering, but also the body bags of peacekeepers can be seen directly in the media. Conflict and peace operations get a clearer face by the images in newspapers, on television and later also on the internet.

The result of these developments in the 1990s is the need for more funds, resources and personnel, images of human suffering in the media and more complex tasks for peacekeepers. These changes makes that – although the total number of conflicts is decreasing – post-Cold War conflicts have a greater impact on society than Cold-War conflicts. Therefore the study of peace operations with the intention to maintain peace and security is of social relevance.

§ 1.4.2 Scientific relevance

The scientific relevance of this research is closely connected to the relatively newness of European peace operations. As shown before, earlier peace operations were longer known, but this instrument of international politics could not develop during the Cold War. First generation peacekeeping maintained the status quo. It was only after the Cold War that the operations developed by adding new aspects or changing mandates. The quickly changing generations of peacekeeping after the end of the Cold War show that lessons had to be learned to react adequately too the new situation in the post-Cold War world. The expansion of the number of operations and the scope of the operations, together with the changing kinds of conflicts, make peace operations an instrument which is still subject of research. The EU-led peace operations are the newest branch in this field of study, since these operations are deployed since 2003.

By exploring the EU-led peace operations, this research can contribute to the scientific knowledge about peace operations in several ways. First of all this research aims to provide insight in the motivation for the EU to decide to deploy peace operations in the twenty cases in the period 2002 until 2007. By studying these cases, case-specific motivations for EU interventions can be given. Secondly this research intends to provide knowledge about the general reasons for the EU to intervene in conflicts. By analysing the specific motivations for interventions in the twenty cases, this research aspires to indicate the main reasons for the EU to intervene in a conflict. And third this research hopes to contribute to the knowledge about interventions in general. The EU is one of the regional security organisations that deploys peace operations approved by the UN. Insights in the motivations of the EU can be compared with reasons for intervention of other organisations. This could enlarge the insight in the motivations for regional security organisations in general to intervene. By this three ways this research hopes to contribute to the scientific knowledge about peace operations.

§ 1.5 Conceptual design of the research: three steps to an answer

Following the two research goals, this research can be divided into three phases. The first phase is to form a general picture of the EU and especially of the CFSP and ESDP. In the second phase the first research goal is central. This part of the research focuses on the reasons for intervention. The third phase looks at the developments and differences, the second research goal (See figure 1.5).

Figure 1.5: The three phases of the research

| <i>Phase:</i> | <i>Subject:</i> | <i>Contains:</i> |
|----------------------|------------------------------|--|
| <i>First</i> | European Union | General picture, focussing on the second pillar and the ESDP |
| <i>Second</i> | Reasons | The arguments of legitimation and theoretical grounds for intervention |
| <i>Third</i> | Developments and differences | Developments in period of time and differences between locations and kinds of peace operations |

§ 1.5.1 The first phase: the rise of the European Union as security organisation

As stated in the introduction, the EU was mainly an economic co-operation that expanded its activities over the years. The role as a security organisation according to the CFSP and ESDP is the newest expansion of the EU activities. To understand the European interventions, the possibilities of this new policy of the EU have to be studied. Therefore a general picture will be formed of the EU and more specific of the CFSP and the ESDP.

Because the research focuses on the reasons for intervention, or – as it is called before – the weighing of arguments, risks and interests, the decision-making process will be an important part of this general picture. Also the relations of the EU as new security organisation with traditional security organisations like NATO, OCSE and UN will be taken into account. These relations could have an influence on the choices of the EU to intervene because of agreements or regulations. During this first phase the following sub-questions will be asked:

1. How is the ESDP organised?
2. What is the position of peace operations in the EU policy?
3. How is the decision-making process over EU peace operations organised?
4. What is the relation between the ESDP and other security organisations?

§ 1.5.2 The second phase: the European Union's reasons for intervention

The second step of the research is to achieve the first research goal: explain the reasons for EU interventions in a certain state or region. In this research these reasons will be split up into two categories, which will be named arguments of legitimation and theoretical grounds.

Arguments of legitimation are the reasons for interventions that will be named during the decision-making process. Before the EU deploys a peace operation there is a democratic process of decision-making with debate and discussion. The conclusion of this process is the decision to do or do not deploy a peace operation. During this process arguments for and against the intervention in a certain state will be exchanged. The supporters of an intervention shall have to argue why it is allowed to interfere in the affairs of another state. If the EU finally chooses to intervene, it shall have to legitimate its operations. Therefore these reasons will be called arguments of legitimation.

Theoretical grounds are reasons for interventions from existing theoretical approaches. Theories and hypothesis of existing literature on interventionism are used to test different possible reasons for the decisions of the EU to deploy an operation in a certain state or area. Some of these theoretical grounds are also named as arguments of legitimation during the process. Despite this the test of the theoretical grounds is a completion of the research. By testing these theoretical grounds from existing literature about interventionism, this research can also study subconscious, not directly relevant or not named reasons for European interventions. In the methodological chapter the different theories that are used, are formulated into hypotheses that are tested on the different European peace operations.

It is of importance to state that this research focuses only on the reasons for intervention before deploying a peace operation. The debates about changing the mandates of a peace operation during the operation or about prolonging an operation are of no relevance to this research. Therefore the sub-questions that will be asked in this second phase of the research are:

5. Which arguments of legitimation are used to argue the need for intervention?
6. Which theoretical grounds can be applied to the European interventions?

§ 1.5.3 The third phase: developments and differences of reasons for intervention

The third phase of the research is meant to achieve the second research goal: to look at developments and differences in reasons for EU interventions. This research will distinguish three kinds of developments and differences.

First object of study is the development of reasons in a period of time. The EU peace operations are a new instrument of policy and therefore can be developed because of lessons learned in early operations. Second object of study are the differences of reasons between different locations. As seen before the EU intervenes in three different

continents. It is interesting to see if there are other reasons for interventions near the borders – on the European continent – than for operations elsewhere. Third object of study are differences between reasons for different kinds of operations. Peace operations can be divided into different categories, which could possibly all have their own kinds of reasons to be deployed.

By studying these developments and differences, this research looks beyond a static explanation for the reasons for the EU to intervene in a certain state or region. The following three sub-questions will be asked:

7. Do the reasons for intervention develop over a period of time?
8. Do the reasons for intervention differ in different locations?
9. Do the reasons for intervention differ in various kinds of peace operations?

Each of these questions are part of the total explanation. If all of these sub-questions are answered, the central research question can be answered and the research goals can be reached.

§ 1.6 Methodology: research methods and data

In order to work out these three phases step by step, different kinds of methods will be used. In the first phase qualitative content analysis is used. On basis of the analysis of literature, articles and documents, a general picture of the EU, the CFSP and the ESDP will be formed. Especially the foundational documents of the European security policy, the Treaty on European Union and the Amsterdam Treaty, will be studied.

In the second phase as well qualitative content analysis as data-analysis are used to find answers for the sub-questions. To answer the sub-question about arguments for European interventions, the Council Joint Actions – the official decisions of the European Council to deploy a peace operation – of the twenty peace operations are studied by qualitative content analysis. Probably whole books could be written over the debates over the deployment of a peace operation alone. Therefore this research has to focus on a part of these debates. The choice to analyse the Council Joint Actions follows on the assumption that the most important and convincing arguments out of the decision-making process are used to account for the intervention. If so then these arguments should be named in these official decisions of the European Council to deploy peace operations. By studying the Council Joint Actions of the twenty operations decided on in the period 2002 until 2007 the most important arguments for interventions can be absorbed.

Also the other sub-question of the second phase of the research is answered by using qualitative content analysis and data-analysis. As stated earlier, hypotheses are formed on basis of theoretic approaches from literature on interventionism, which are tested on the European peace operations. These hypotheses are formed on basis of the theories of Andrew Dorman, Simon Chesterman, Martha Finnemore and James Meernik (Dorman 1995; Chesterman 2001; Finnemore 2003; Meernik 2004). Dorman studies the attitude of Western European states to interventions. He describes five principal reasons why West-European states would intervene, namely historical ties, dependence on raw materials, internal and external pressure, threat of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction and fear for the spread of ethnic unrest at the European borders (Dorman 1995, 111). Chesterman writes about developments in the legitimization of peace operations and describes three new threats for peace and security that could be reasons for intervention, namely internal armed conflicts, humanitarian crisis and disruption of democracy (Chesterman 2001, 128-160). Finnemore's book is a study of the changing of norms on interventions. It describes the current international system and the rules for interventions from a constructivist view (Finnemore 2003, 98). Meernik studied the interventions of the US and found that there are four different main reasons for the American president to intervene, namely security and power goals, economic interests, liberal idealist aims and domestic political interests (Meernik 2004, 8). In the methodological chapter hypotheses on basis of these approaches are formulated. These hypotheses are tested, by using statistical data and literature and articles. This could give insights in which hypotheses are valid for the EU and which theoretical grounds can be applied to the EU.

During the third phase, the results of the second phase will be analysed for developments in period of time and differences between locations and kinds of operations. For all three data-analysis is used. The findings out of the second phase are classified and compared to find differences and resemblances. To study the developments in period of time, the operations are classified in blocks of periods of time. To study the differences between locations, the operations are classified according to continent. And to study the differences between the kinds of peace-operations, the operations are classified into the various kinds of operations. On basis of these analyses of the data, developments and differences that can provide more insights are made visible.

§ 1.7 Structure of the thesis

In the following chapters the puzzle named in the second paragraph of this introductory chapter is examined further. Leads hereby are the three phases of the research design. The second chapter describes the security policy of the EU. First it contains a brief history of the evolution of the EU since the Second World War. Next the focus is on the CFSP and the ESDP. Thereby the goals, instruments and organisation of the policies are discussed as well as the relation of the ESDP to other security organisations like the UN, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the NATO.⁵

The third chapter describes the methodological framework of this research. First the current debate on interventionism is discussed. Following the research designs of the analyses of the arguments of legitimation and the theoretical grounds are described. Finally, the chapter also describes the research design for the comparative analyses of the cases on developments and differences. These methodological choices result in measurements in chapter four and five. In chapter four the arguments and hypotheses are tested on the twenty cases. Also the background of the different conflicts are described briefly per state or region. Chapter five describes the analyses of the results of chapter four for developments in period of time and differences between locations and kinds of operations.

In chapter six the central research question and the sub-questions are answered. Also this chapter reflects on the research and the methodological choices. Finally recommendations are done for further research.

⁵ Until January 1, 1995 the OSCE was known as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE).

Chapter 2 - The ESDP, an European military revolution?

According to Gilles Andréani, Christoph Bertram and Charles Grant the European Security and Defence Policy could be described as an European military revolution (Andréani et al 2001). At least the new policy created new possibilities for the European Union that were never possible or even under reach during the fifty years of integration in the twentieth century. After several failures and shaky initiatives on political integration in the domain of foreign policy, this development made foreign policy including a military capability an integrated part of the European organisational structure. Although this didn't mean there was a single European army or a single foreign policy, the European foreign policy got its own face with the SG/HR for the CFSP. This was the European answer to the famous question of the former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger: "Who do I call if I want to call Europe?"

To see in how far the new policy of the European Union is a military revolution for the European civil power, this chapter contains a brief history of the evolution of the EU since the end of the Second World War. After the formation of a general picture of the EU, the second paragraph of this chapter focuses on the framework of the foreign policy: the CFSP. Eventually the third paragraph describes the goals, instruments and organisation of the ESDP. This paragraph contains the essence of the new development studied in this thesis. Finally, the relation between the ESDP and security organisations as the UN, the OSCE and the NATO is described.

§ 2.1 The European Union

The fact that the EU includes a CFSP since 1993 is the result of decades of European integration. A process of integration that proceeded with ups and downs and successes and failures. Depending on the persons in governments, the Commission, pressure groups and European and international circumstances, new steps could be taken successfully.

§ 2.1.1 The start of European integration

The first real step on the road of European integration was taken on May 9, 1950 with the Schuman Declaration of the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman. He announced the plan – originated by the head of France's General Planning Commission Jean Monnet – to form a supranational community for coal and steel between the former enemies West Germany and France. The goal of this community was to place the coal and steel industries of France and West-Germany – key sectors of industrial production and war-making potential – under joint management to eliminate sources of frictions and build confidence by co-operation. Although Franco-German integration was the main target of the community, it would also be open for other European countries. In practice this could only be the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Italy, because the Eastern European countries were part of the Soviet sphere of influence, the Scandinavian countries were sceptical about supranationalism and Britain was reluctantly to involve itself in European integration (Dinan 2005, 24-25).

The Schuman Declaration was not the first step of European co-operation after the Second World War. But it was the first real step on the road of European integration because it was a step to a more federal European structure. The Dunkirk Treaty of March 1947, the American Marshall Plan of June 1947, the Benelux customs union of January 1948, the Brussels Treaty of March 1948, the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) of April 1948, the Atlantic defence organisation NATO of April 1949 and the Council of Europe of May 1949 can not be compared to this community.

While the negotiations about the community were still going on, a new idea for European integration came forward. Under US pressure for West-German rearmament in the context of the Korean War and the seriousness of the Cold War, the French Prime Minister René Pleven announced the Pleven Plan in 1950. This plan laid in line with the plan of a supranational community for coal and steel and again Monnet was the architect. To prevent a German remilitarization, which the French feared, the Pleven plan supplied

in a European Defence Community (EDC) with a supranational European army in which German units were integrated. This way the French could have at least some control on West Germany. Ironically, France had initiated this plan – as the least worst outcome since the US insisted on German rearmament – but in the end rejected the final treaty (Parsons 2006, 114).

The negotiations between France, West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Italy (the Six) on the community for coal and steel and the EDC went on simultaneously and on April 18, 1951 the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was established by the Treaty of Paris.⁶ Only a month later a treaty was signed on the EDC. To guarantee democratic control over the military, even a European Political Community (EPC) was connected to the EDC. But while the ECSC came into force after ratification by all members on the 23rd July 1952, the EDC was never ratified by the French parliament. The EDC went for ratification to the French National Assembly on the 20th of August 1954, four years after Pleven launched the idea. By that time the French had changed their mind, because the Cold War pressure lessened after Stalin's death, the war in Korea had ended, French forces were preoccupied by colonial conflict in Indochina and Britain's refusal to enter the EDC made the French fear for a German dominance (Dinan 2005, 28-29; Parsons 2006, 114). But although the EDC failed, France could not prevent West Germany from being integrated into the military structure. France had to accept the renegotiations of the mutual defence treaty of Brussels of 1948 to include West Germany. The result of these talks was the Paris Agreement of October 23, 1954, which led to the establishment of the Western European Union (WEU). The original members of the Brussels Treaty – Britain, France, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands – were supplemented by West Germany and – on request of France – Italy. This German membership proved to be the first step to a NATO membership and in May 1955 West Germany became a member of NATO (Dinan 2005, 29).

The failure of the EDC and the EPC marked the borders for European integration. Co-operation with a supranational character on the domain of defence and foreign politics was just a bridge too far. It would take almost twenty years before steps could be taken on European integration in the domain of foreign policy. And even the temporary CFSP and ESDP are not as radical as the EDC and EPC of the fifties. A French alternative for the failures of the EDC and EPC – the Fouchet Plan, named after the French diplomat Christian Fouchet – launched by the French president Charles de Gaulle in 1960 was rejected resolutely by all five others of the Six. This plan comprised a common foreign and defence policy, but had intergovernmental institutions. The other rejected it because it was not compatible with the other integrating initiatives already taken and could only strengthen the French position. All De Gaulle could win out of it, was a bilateral treaty with Germany to institutionalise the Franco-German alliance according to the structure of the Fouchet Plan. Although De Gaulle considered this a failure, the Franco-German talks according to this Elysée Treaty⁷ would stimulate further European integration (Dinan 2005, 45-46).

§ 2.1.2 New initiatives: building on the ECSC

After the failure of the EDC and EPC, functionalism – focus on common interests and needs shared by states – seemed to be the most successful path for further European integration. Two new initiatives were launched in 1955. On one hand a sectoral integration on atomic energy and on the other hand broad economical co-operation by the creation of a customs union. Although there were lots of remarks with both ideas, both were worked out by a committee led by the Belgium Minister of Foreign Affairs Paul-Henri Spaak. The committee Spaak was positive on both proposals and advised to realise both, but in different institutions and treaties. After negotiations on an intergovernmental conference this led to the Treaties of Rome on March 25, 1957. Here the six member

⁶ Officially named the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community.

⁷ Also known as the Treaty of Friendship and Reconciliation.

states of the ECSC established the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) (Dinan 2005, 31-32).⁸

Of the two plans, Euratom was the least disputed. To form a single market without internal borders and with a joint external tariff seemed a too big step, also because there were other alternatives. The British had launched the idea for an European Free Trade Area (FTA), which could contain more member states – including of course Britain – and would be more loosely than the proposed EEC. In the end the member states of the ECSC choose for the – US supported – more political organisation the EEC. The vague desire to improve the French image of the EDP-failure, a reaction against the Communist Party following the Soviet invasion of Hungary, the legacy of the Suez crisis and the concern to be left economically behind created the circumstances for a minimal majority in the French parliament. But not until the guarantee was given that the French overseas possessions would also be part of the community and an agricultural policy would be set up (Dinan 2005, 32-33; Gillingham 2006, 76-77; Parsons 2006, 117-118).

Both guarantees were fulfilled, which meant that the French colony of Algeria would also be part of the community from 1958 until the independence in 1962 and that in July 1958 the foundations for the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) were laid. The CAP is a system of European agricultural subsidies and programmes, which secured food distributions and ensured a fair standard of living for persons engaged in agriculture. Although it was commonly seen as an expensive and unnecessary policy, the CAP was no more than a continuation of member states national policy during the post-war years. These critics could be right for economical reasons, but not for the political implications (Knudsen 2006, 192-196). Dinan even states that without the CAP the EEC would never have existed (Dinan 2005, 39).

The following step in European integration was taken in 1965. In Brussels the members of the ECSC, Euratom and EEC decided to follow along the road of European unity and combine the institutions of the three communities into a single Council and Commission. This resulted in the Brussels Treaty of April 8, 1965.⁹ When this treaty came into force on July 1, 1967 the European Communities (EC) were established. The three communities were still three legal persons, but with combined institutions.

The success of the co-operation was also seen by other states. Already in August 1961 Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Norway applied to join the EEC. Twice – in 1963 and 1967 – these states were denied access to the community, because of the French veto against Britain. It would take the resignation of the French president De Gaulle before new steps could be taken on the Summit in The Hague (Martin 2006, 139).

In December 1969 the leaders of the member states met in The Hague. Hopes were high for this meeting, since the new French president George Pompidou was decisive to resolve some old problems under the motto 'complementation, deepening and enlargement'. Pompidou was not against the British accession, if other problems like the financing of the CAP could be resolved. Shortly after the Summit this problem was resolved, opening the way for Britain to join the communities. Two other important results of the Hague Summit were the appointment of the committee Werner and the committee Davignon. The committee Werner was a committee led by Luxembourg's Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Pierre Werner that would study the possibilities of a European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The committee Davignon was the first European initiative on political co-operation since the failure of the Fouchet Plan. Led by the Belgian diplomat Etienne Davignon, this committee would report on the issues involved in forming a political union (Dinan 2005, 58-59; Griffiths 2006, 172-173).

The results of the Hague Summit formed a sense of optimism about European integration. In the year after the Summit this optimism was visible in the results. In April an agreement was made on the finances of the EC, in June the accession negotiations of Britain, Denmark, Ireland and Norway started again and in October the reports of both committees were presented. Despite the optimistic sense, the 'complementation,

⁸ The first Treaty of Rome was the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, the second the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community.

⁹ Also Merger Treaty, officially Treaty establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities.

deepening and enlargement' of the EC was not an overall success. The enlargement didn't succeed with all potential members. After the accession negotiations Norway turned down the membership in a referendum. Therefore this Scandinavian country was not part of the first enlargement of 1973 (See figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1: EU enlargements

| <i>Enlargement:</i> | | <i>Member states:</i> | |
|---------------------|------|---|----|
| <i>Original</i> | 1958 | Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands | 6 |
| <i>First</i> | 1973 | Britain, Denmark and Ireland | 9 |
| <i>Second</i> | 1981 | Greece | 10 |
| <i>Third</i> | 1986 | Spain and Portugal | 12 |
| <i>Fourth</i> | 1995 | Austria, Finland and Sweden | 15 |
| <i>Fifth</i> | 2004 | Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia | 25 |
| <i>Sixth</i> | 2007 | Bulgaria and Romania | 27 |

Also the reports of the committees were not as successful as they seemed. In October 1970 Werner and Davignon presented their reports. Werner presented a plan to form an European EMU with in the end a single currency. His ambitious seven-stage plan to form this EMU by 1980 by institutional reform and closer political integration failed, because the national currencies of the member states wiggled in and out the bandwidth of the Werner Plan. The German Mark pushed through the top, while the British Pound, French Franc and Italian Lire fell through the bottom of the bandwidth. This, along with France doubt for a supranational EMU, made the states freeze the plans for an EMU (Dinan 2005, 60, 74). Davignon presented a framework for European Political Cooperation (EPC). Foreign Ministers of the member states should meet twice a year and their political directors should have more frequent meetings, with the goal to co-ordinate the foreign policies of the states. In practice the co-ordination of the states foreign policy wasn't as easy as it seemed. It was hard to find issues on which the states could adopt a common position (Dinan 2005, 60; Griffiths 2006, 173; Martin 2006, 139).

§ 2.1.3 Towards a single Union

After the optimism of the Hague Summit, European integration seemed to have lost part of its spirit in the 1970s and early 1980s. The replacement of the failed EMU by the European Monetary System (EMS) in July 1978 and the expansion of the communities by Greece in 1981 and Spain and Portugal in 1986 were just small steps compared to the dynamics of the 1960s. A new impulse came in the second half of the 1980s with the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986. This act was the first major reform of the Treaty of Rome of 1957 (Dinan 2005, 108; Ludlow 2006, 219).


Although the Communities existed already since 1957, the main goal of a single market was not reached yet. This market should be an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital would be ensured. In 1985 Commission's president Jacques Delors and the British Vice-President and Commissioner for Internal Market, Tax Law and Customs Arthur Cockfield produced a report with three hundred barriers to form a single market and recommendations on how the single market could be realised. The SEA set a date – the year 1992 – by which all these three hundred barriers had to be solved. To ease this process, qualified majority voting became the norm for most of the decisions to form a single market. Besides the main goal of the single market, the SEA also contained agreements on foreign policy, the role of the European parliament and the EMU. The EPC was formalised by the SEA and aimed at better co-operation and the formulation of common positions. The role of the parliament was a sensitive issue, with a result that wasn't satisfactory to the parties, namely the involvement of the parliament in some issues. The EMU was also just a small part of the SEA. Delors favoured further economical integration, but couldn't find enough support. The SEA only mentions the need to converge economical and monetary policies in the future. Despite that the results were not radical enough for all member states, the SEA started a new period of activism and dynamics in European integration and provided

the foundations for the changes in the 1990s and 2000s (Dinan 2005, 104-105, 109-111; Ludlow 2006, 227-229).

Three fields of integration were worked out in the period after the SEA, namely the agreed single market, the EMU and a political union. For the single market there was a plan. The barriers of the report of Cockfield had to be solved before 1992, so a single market could be realised by then. The EMU and the political union still had to be resolved, since the SEA was not so clear about these issues.

After the failure of the Werner Plan, the monetary integration of Europe was limited to the EMS. This was a system to prevent large fluctuations between the currencies of the member states. In practice this meant that Germany dominated the European system, because of the strong German Mark against the weaker currencies of for instance France and Italy. Therefore mainly France wanted to form an European monetary union, so they would at least have a small control over monetary policy. Germany was never so keen on the France proposals to form such an union, because of the strong German position. But in 1988 the Germans reacted positive on a new French proposal. German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher placed the matter on the agenda of the Council. To study possibilities a committee was formed under leadership of the Commission's president Delors. Bankers of the central banks of each member state and three academics formed the committee. Ten months later the committee reported that an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) could be achieved in three phases. The negotiations on the EMU would start on an intergovernmental conference (Heisenberg 2006, 235-238).

These negotiations on the EMU would be simultaneously with negotiations on a political union. This union was stimulated in a joint French-German letter of President François Mitterand and Chancellor Helmut Kohl. The momentum for further European integration seemed to be there and the international situation – developments in Central and East Europe, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the possibility of German reunification – needed more European political co-operation. Although European leaders decided to have two intergovernmental conferences in December 1990, the idea of the EMU was much clearer than the political union. The Delors report was clear on how the EMU should be formed, while the final goals of the political union were not. It was mainly Germany who forced both initiatives to be negotiated simultaneously, since it could lose the most of the EMU and win the most of the political union (Dinan 2005, 116-118).



At the start of the two intergovernmental conferences in December 1990, two important changes were visible on the European continent. In June 1990 Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg signed the Schengen Agreement, which intended to abolish the internal borders between these states. And in October 1990 East and West Germany were reunited, with the permission of the former occupying powers. Both of these changes were of little influence in the process of the conference, but had a huge impact on the future. The Schengen Agreement would become part of the European integration in the Amsterdam Treaty. The German reunification made East Germany direct part of the communities and strengthened the German position.

For the negotiations on the EMU and the political union this was of less direct importance. After a year of negotiating, the intergovernmental conferences resulted in a new treaty which established the European Union (EU). The treaty was signed in Maastricht on February 7, 1992 and came into force after ratification by the member states on November 1, 1993. The Union incorporated the framework of the communities and complemented it with the EMU and the political union. The result of the negotiations on the EMU were that the third phase of the EMU – the establishment of a single currency – would take place at the latest by 1999. The negotiations on the political union resulted in the second and third pillar of the Union. The first pillar was the old framework of the European Community (EC), which deals with economical, social and trade matters. New were the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) – the second pillar – and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) – the third pillar. The CFSP pillar built on the foundation of the moderate successful EPC. The JHA pillar introduces law enforcement, criminal justice, civil judicial matters and asylum and immigration. Because of the difference in opinion between member states in favour of federalism and those against federalism, the Luxembourg presidency created a system of three pillars capped by the European Council. This way the CFSP and JHA were kept on an intergovernmental basis, outside of the Treaty of Rome (Dinan 2005, 121-123).

§ 2.1.4 Amending and expanding the European Union

Since the establishment of the EU, the treaties of Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon have amended the Treaty on European Union. The European Constitution, that would merge previous treaties, failed in 2005. Besides amended, the EU is also expanded rapidly in the period since 1992. In 1995 Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU. The great expansion eastwards in 2004, extended the EU with the memberships of the Czech Republic, (Greek) Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. The latest expansion is the 2007 expansion with Bulgaria and Romania (See figure 2.1). In fifteen years the EU transformed from a community of twelve states into an organisation of twenty-seven states. In order to prepare the EU for these extensions, the efficiency of the EU had to be improved.

The first amendment was the Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty of the European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, which came into force on May 1, 1999. The intergovernmental conference to prepare these changes was already agreed on in the Treaty on European Union and should mainly adjust the decision-making procedures. The conference was not very successful for these procedures. Although the member states could agree quickly on the size, location and legislative powers of the European parliament, the weight of votes in the Council and the size of the Commission were hard issues to solve. Since many states wanted to extend the range of policies for qualified majority voting, the issue of the weight of votes of member states became important in the view of the extension to the east. Reweighting of votes should prevent majorities in which the largest states – presenting most of the population and wealth – were put in a minority. Other hard issue was the size of the Commission. It would become impossible for all members to have at least one commissioner in the Commission after further expansion.


The treaty signed on October 2, 1997 couldn't solve all these issues. Therefore the member states agreed on a temporary solution. Every state would deliver one commissioner for the Commission after the next enlargement and in return the votes of the states in the Council would be reweighted. The extension of qualified majority voting, reweighting of the Council votes and the size and composition of the Council were left to a later conference. The Amsterdam Treaty did however make some decisions, like the subsidiarity of national parliaments and on changes in policy areas. It expanded the CFSP and made some changes in the JHA, which focused more on criminal matters and was renamed into the Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters (PJCC) (Dinan 2005, 166-168).

To tackle the 'Amsterdam leftovers' a new conference was called for in 2000. This new amendment resulted in the Treaty of Nice of February 26, 2001. Although the point of the intergovernmental conferences on decision-making was to form an understandable system of voting, the results were far from easy. The technical result of the Nice

negotiations was a Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) system, in which decisions were taken if the majority exists out of seventy-two percent of the votes, an absolute majority of member states and sixty-two percent of the EU population. The settlement on the QMV made it possible to extend the subjects for majority voting. On the issue of the Commission the states agreed on one commissioner for each member until the EU reached twenty-seven states. The size and composition of the Commission at that time would have to be worked out later (Dinan 2005, 170-172).

That the results of Amsterdam and Nice were also a disillusion for EU leaders, was expressed by their call for a deeper and wider debate, even before the Nice Treaty came into force on February 1, 2003. This debate should contain the position of national parliaments, simplification of the treaties, the demarcation of competences and the Charter of Fundamental Rights – a European document on human rights. To prepare the intergovernmental conference which should follow up Nice, the EU leaders decided to form a convention of national leaders, representatives of national parliaments, represents of the European Commission and representatives of the European parliament (Dinan 2005, 173-174). While the debate about treaty reform was going on in the convention in 2002 and 2003, one of the most visible aspects of European integration was introduced: the Euro. In existence in non-physical form since January 1999, new notes and coins to replace the old national currencies were introduced in twelve states on January 1, 2002.

Figure 2.3: Evolution of the European integration, part II (1993-2003)



In July 2003 a draft text of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was presented as the result of the convention.¹⁰ In June 2004 the EU leaders approved the draft constitution, which should merge the treaties on which the European Union was founded – the Treaty establishing the European Community and the Treaty on European Union – and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The European Union would become one legal person of which the three pillars would become a part (Dinan 2005, 181-182).

The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe failed in the ratification process. While already eighteen of the twenty-five national parliaments of the member states agreed on the treaty, the French and Dutch civilians voted against it in referendums on May 29, 2005 and June 1, 2005. After these negative votes the ratification process was stopped and a period of rethinking started. It took until March 2007 – despite some other initiatives – before EU leaders agreed to relaunch the process for institutional reform. The result of the negotiations on this Reform Treaty is signed on December 13, 2007 in Lisbon.

The Lisbon Treaty did not replace the former treaties on which the EU was grounded, but amended them.¹¹ The EU flag, anthem and motto are left out of it, but still exist – as already for a long time. These amendments on the treaties of Rome and Maastricht should have prepared the Union for the future and make decision-making possible with the growing number of member states. The European Council will become an official part of the European institutions and will have a full-time elected president.

¹⁰ Commonly referred to as the European Constitution.

¹¹ Officially called the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, also named the Reform Treaty.

The European Commission will be decreased to eighteen commissioners. The new High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy will be part of this Commission. In decision-making double-majority voting will be the system by 2014, national vetoes are dropped in almost fifty policy areas and the European Parliament and Court of Justice will get more power (The Irish Times (December 14, 2007) 10; Süddeutsche Zeitung (December 14, 2007) 8; Financial Times (December 14, 2007) 2).

The Treaty of Lisbon should come into force after ratification by all member states on January 2009. Since not all member states ratified the treaty before January 2009, the treaty will come into force as soon as the last member state have ratified it. The reforms of this treaty should make the European Union ready for their role on the international stage, but also for coming expansion. Meanwhile there are already three official candidate countries – Croatia, the Republic of Macedonia and Turkey – and four potential candidates – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia – for a coming extension of the EU. All of these potential new members shall have to take over the achievements and the whole body of laws of the period 1957 till 2007 – the *acquis communautaire*. Old member states still show differences in their phases of integration on fields as the Schengen Agreement, Euro and WEU (See appendix A).

§ 2.2 External relations: the Common Foreign and Security Policy

With the establishment of the CFSP as the second pillar of the EU by the Treaty on European Union, an important step in the policy area of foreign affairs and security was taken for the EU. It replaced the moderate successful EPC, which was a too passive and decentralised forum to reach common positions on important issues (Dinan 2005, 60; Griffiths 2006, 173; Martin 2006, 139). Important issues like the German reunification in 1990 were still handled outside of the EPC and external crises like the Persian Gulf War and the civil war in Yugoslavia demonstrated the lack of a co-ordinated European security policy. This resulted in the need for an institutionalised foreign policy of the EU and in June 1990 the European Council decided to convene an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) together with the IGC on the EMU. The developments within the EU like a single market and a possible EMU were expected to enlarge the European international interests. But also the American reluctance to get involved in Yugoslavia fed the belief that the EU must take more responsibility for its own security. The end of the Cold War and the new developments in Eastern European states accented the need for a common foreign policy (Smith 2004, 178-179; Dinan 2005, 585).

With the CFSP the EU would become a global actor. In the original Treaty on European Union that founded the CFSP, the objectives of the European foreign and defence policy were:

- To safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union;
- To strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways;
- To preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principle of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter;
- To promote international co-operation;
- To develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (TEU 1992, J.1).

In the Treaty of Amsterdam these objectives were clarified by slightly expanding some of the definitions. An important supplement was the phrase on external borders to the third objective. This was the first time the EU referred to external borders, which must protect an area of freedom, security and justice (Smith 2004, 227). In the European Security Strategy of 2003 the SG/HR for the CFSP Javier Solana again stated the need for the EU to have a clear European foreign and defence policy in order to play their role on the international stage: "The EU is becoming a global actor. This means that it must also be a pillar of the organisation of a new world, more free and more united, fairer and safer" (Solana 2003, 5). But despite the fact that most EU member states saw the events in the 1990s as signs for the need of a common European policy on foreign affairs and defence,

there was still much disagreement over the scale, scope and shape of the policy, especially concerning defence. Therefore the CFSP is still under construction and develops further with every summit, conference and treaty.

§ 2.2.1 The process of developing the CFSP

The IGC on the EMU and political co-operation started in December 1990 in Brussels and were concluded in December 1991. On February 7, 1992 the Treaty on European Union was formally signed in Maastricht and entered into force on November 1, 1993. Despite the awareness of the need to strengthen the foreign and security policy of the EU, the results of the negotiations were not as farguing as many hoped. Several issues were left unresolved, while the CFSP provided a broad framework, instead of a clear blueprint for future co-operation. On one hand because the member states couldn't agree on the institutional form of the policy, and on the other hand because the negotiations on the EMU were considered of greater importance. Result of the disagreement about the form of the CFSP between federalists – mainly Germany, Italy and the Netherlands – and anti-federalists – Great Britain and Denmark – led to the three-pillar structure, which kept the CFSP on an intergovernmental basis outside of the Treaty of Rome. Despite this disagreement and the unresolved issues, the CFSP was certainly an improvement in comparison with the EPC (Smith 2004, 180-181; Dinan 2005, 121).

Although the CFSP was not included in the EC, the CFSP became a more integrated part of the EU than the EPC ever had been. There was no longer the necessity to have special meetings over political issues, because on ministerial meetings policy issues from all pillars could be discussed. Also the European Commission and the European Parliament were more closely related to the CFSP than to the EPC. The Commission became involved in decision-making, implementation of decisions, funding and coherence with the EC. The Parliament got some new authorisations next to old rights under the EPC. But the real strength of the CFSP in comparison to the EPC lies in the more binding character. Instead of consultations, the CFSP must result in regular foreign policy outputs, which are legally binding for the member states and must be implemented by their diplomatic and consular missions. To finance the policy outputs financial agreements were made. Although the CFSP was intergovernmental, some decisions could be made by QMV. This cleared the way for a more effective foreign policy. A common defence policy was still a bridge too far early 1990s. The preamble, article B and article J.4 of the Treaty on European Union explicitly names defence, what is already a significant progress with the stiff refusal to speak about defence in the EPC. But it was still too early to merge the WEU and the EU. The more Atlantic orientated member states didn't see the need for an European defence next to the military co-operation in the NATO. Therefore the treaty only names defence and points vaguely at an "(...) eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence (...)" (TEU 1992, art. B, J.4 (1)). In a separately attached Declaration on Western European Union a compromise was found by strengthening the WEU as the defence arm of the EU as well as the European pillar of the NATO. For decisions in these defence matters unanimity is needed always (Smith 2004, 181-188).

To resolve the unsolved issues of the IGC from 1990 to 1991, a following IGC should be started after five years. In this new IGC also the experiences of the first years CFSP were taken into account and resulted in the codification and expansion of some of the practical reforms of these years. In June 1995 the preparations for the new IGC started in Messina. The CFSP was one of the major issues of the IGC. On the official opening in Turin in March 1996 the foreign ministers made clear that the principles and policy areas of the CFSP need to be defined clearer, as well as the actions needed to defend the EU's interests in these areas. Also the procedure and structures for decision-making needed to be clarified and a new agreement over the CFSP budget was necessary. On all of these issues steps were taken in the final agreement that was concluded in Amsterdam in June 1997. On October 2, 1997 the Treaty of Amsterdam was signed and entered into force on May 1, 1999 (Smith 2004, 226; Dinan 2005, 163-165).

Important results of the Treaty of Amsterdam were the procedures in decision-making, policy implementation and financing. To successfully achieve common positions the decision-making process was adapted. All decisions on non-defence CFSP actions

could be taken by QMV, although member states still had an escape for reasons of national interest. For defence issues the concept of flexibility was introduced. Member states could 'opt in' on actions, while others would not act. Still all members must accept the final decisions and those who didn't 'opt in' must refrain from conflicting action. To implement the CFSP decisions new institutions are founded. First of all the position of a High Representative (HR) for the CFSP was created. This function would be combined with the function of Secretary-General (SG) of the Council. This person must give a face to the European foreign policy and must assist the presidency for CFSP issues. Second a CFSP Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit was founded and placed by the Council General Secretariat along with the CFSP Secretariat. This institution must ensure more coherence in the EU foreign policy. Third the continuation and visibility of the CFSP was improved by changing the Troika of former, current and future presidency holders into a Troika of the SG/HR, a member of the European Commission – the person charged with external relations – and the rotating presidency. Last the financing of the CFSP was improved. The Treaty on European Union already provided the CFSP with resources, but this funding could come from as well the EC budget as the member states. The Treaty of Amsterdam made clear that the EC budget was the primary source of CFSP resources. At the same time the budget was increased from 20-25 million Euro in the first few years to 40-70 million Euro during the Amsterdam talks (Smith 2004, 227-231).

Also during this IGC, defence was a tough issue. The questions about the relations between the CFSP, the NATO and the WEU were not all resolved. Just like in the Treaty on European Union article B and article J.7 of the Treaty of Amsterdam mentioned a possible common defence if the European Council should decide so in the future. The NATO was still the dominant security institution in Europe, especially since the EU still had no experience with own military operations. But despite these issues, still small steps were taken towards a European defence. The links between the EU and the WEU were strengthened by the Birmingham Declaration of May 1996 in which the WEU made clear it was ready to serve as the defence arm of the EU. In the Treaty of Amsterdam the EU didn't create an own defence capability, but it did incorporate the WEU Petersberg tasks and calls the WEU an integral part of the EU. And although there was no official institutional integrating, nor legal interweaving of constitutional treaties, a bridge was build between the CFSP and the WEU. The readiness of the WEU to support the EU was shown by the founding of several new institutions, the movement of its secretariat from London to Brussels and the shortening of its presidency from a year to a half year just like the EU. Also since 1999 the SG/HR for the CFSP is also the secretary-general of the WEU (Pagani 1998, 742; Smith 2004, 232).

After the Treaty of Amsterdam was signed, the willingness of the EU members to discuss a common defence grew. In December 1998 the first real step to an ESDP was taken by Great-Britain and France on an Anglo-French summit on St Malo. Both states declared that the EU must have "(...) the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible, military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so (...)" (Deighton 2002, 725, Duke 2002, 26-27). Especially the British willingness to pursue greater European defence co-operation was a prominent change. Great-Brittain had always been detached to European defence initiatives as Europe's greatest supporter of the NATO. On the following European Councils in Cologne (June 1999), Helsinki (December 1999) and Santa Maria da Feira (June 2000) a European military force, the integration of the WEU in the EU and EU armament co-operation were important issues of discussion. Despite these discussions, the Treaty of Nice – the result of a new summit in 2000 – contained only few provisions over the CFSP, the ESDP and the WEU. A small indication of the importance could be seen in the renaming of the Political Committee into the Political and Security Committee. Furthermore some adjustments were made for decision-making and enhanced co-operation. But the summit in Nice failed to make decisions over expanding arms co-operation or higher defence spendings to support the ESDP (Deighton 2002, 725-726; Duke 2002, 26-27; Smith 2004, 233-237).

Because the reform of the CFSP was no part of the agenda of Nice, the formation of a simpler and clearer structure for the CFSP was still a leftover to be resolved. An attempt to form such a structure was done in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for

Europe. In this treaty the basic treaty of the EC – the Treaty establishing the European Community – and of the EU – the Treaty on European Union, modified by the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice – were merged into a new treaty together with modifications and adjustments. An important change was the abolishment of the pillar structure. The three pillars the EC, the CFSP and the PJCC would become unified in the EU with one legal body. The simplification was also visible in the replacement of the CFSP instruments joint actions and common positions by decisions. And another important change was the choice to merge the SG/HR for the CFSP and the Commissioner for External Relations into a new EU Minister for Foreign Affairs, who would also be the Vice President of the European Commission. This would give Europe one clear voice on the international stage (Dinan 2005, 176-182).

The changes of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe were not implemented since the treaty was rejected in referendums in France and the Netherlands. After a period of reflection some of the changes were again introduced in the Treaty of Lisbon. This treaty also abolishes the pillar structure – although the Euratom and WEU did not become part of the legal body of the EU. Also the function of EU Minister for Foreign Affairs is preserved, but renamed into the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The treaty was supposed to become effective on January 1, 2009, but since not all member states have ratified the treaty it will become effective on a later moment.

§ 2.2.2 Instruments, institutions and decision-making of the CFSP

Because this research discusses the European operations decided on from 2003 until 2007, the instruments and decision-making process of the Treaty on European Union as amended by the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice will be taken into account. The latest changes by the Treaty of Lisbon are of no influence on the cases in this research.

The CFSP is an intergovernmental pillar, so the highest authority is the European Council of the member states. The European Commission and the SG/HR for the CFSP are both subsidiary to the Council. Initiatives to act must be taken by the European Council consisting out of the heads of state or the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) of ministers of foreign affairs or defence. In practice the positions of the European Commission and the SG/HR are much stronger. Not all instruments to achieve the objectives of the CFSP are part of the CFSP pillar. Despite the first provision of article J.1, which states that the CFSP covers "(...) all areas of foreign and security policy", some instruments or policy areas are the full responsibility of the European Commission (TEU 1992, J.1). For instance trade and sanctions regulations are the exclusive right of the Commission, while humanitarian aid, development assistance, rehabilitation and reconstruction are the shared responsibility of the Commission and member states. Since the EU is a strong economic power and provides more than half of the worldwide development and humanitarian aid, these means are influential sticks and carrots. Also the Commission manages the CFSP budget, which gives it certain influence. Co-operation with the European Commission is also required because external relations are one of the responsibilities of the Commissioner of External Relations. Therefore the Commission is represented in the European Council, as well as in the Troika and CFSP/ESDP committees and working-groups. Also the SG/HR is in practice more than only an executioner of the will of the European Council. Since the SG/HR prepares foreign policy decisions and the implementation of Council's decisions and also participates in Council meetings, the Troika and in CFSP/ESDP committees and working-groups, he has wide informal powers. Therefore formally the European Council is the highest authority, in practice it needs the European Commission and the SG/HR. Therefore both the European Council as the European Commission were made responsible for ensuring unity, coherence and effectiveness of the EU's external activities on security, economy and development policy in the Treaty on European Union. To use the instruments of the EC for the European foreign policy the co-operation of the European Commission is needed. For instruments of the CFSP like common strategies, common positions and joint actions the Council is the highest authority (TEU 1992, art. C, art. J.8; Smith 2004, 183; Björkdahl and Strömvik 2008, 16, 19-20).

Because the European Council meets only several times a year, decision-making must be prepared by different institutions. The lion's share of the decisions is however taken by the Council. Normally this will be the GAERC of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, but since the Council is one single body irrespective of the ministers meeting, also other configurations of the Council can make decisions.¹² The most important institute supporting the Council is the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), existing out of the (deputy) head of the missions of the EU member states in Brussels.¹³ This institution already existed in the EC and is the most important connection between the European capitals and Brussels. Main task of COREPER is to assure co-ordination and coherence between policies of the members as well as policies of the EU itself. In the starting years of the CFSP, the hierarchy in the CFSP decision-making process wasn't decided on – one of the loose ends. Because COREPER created a greater continuity and guaranteed coherency in the policy of the EU, COREPER placed itself at the centre of day-to-day decisions on CFSP actions. Prepared CFSP proposals are guided through COREPER before they would go to the European Council. COREPER decides whether the proposal is a ministerial decision and if the decision needs debate in the European Council. Hereby COREPER also takes into account the coherence with EC affairs, supported by the Relex Counsellors who examine the institutional, legal and financial aspects of proposals. In practice CFSP issues are already agreed upon on a lower level (Smith 2004, 222-224; Björkdahl and Strömviik 2008, 14-15) (See appendix B).

This lower level would be the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the key body of the CFSP/ESDP.¹⁴ This body is composed of national representatives from the member states, a representative of the European Commission – external affairs – and representatives of the Council Secretariat. The PSC usually meets twice a week and is tasked with the monitoring of the international situation in areas covered by the CFSP, to define policies and prepare options for the European Council, the political control and strategic direction of peace operations. To perform these tasks the PSC is supported by a number of committees and working-groups. Most important are the Politico-Military Group (PMG), the EU Military Committee (EUMC), the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) and the Foreign Relations Counsellors Working Group (RELEX). The PMG carries out the preparatory work on the ESDP – technical work and arrangements with the NATO. The EUMC is the highest military body of the European Council structure and exists out of military representatives of the Chiefs of Defence of the member states. The EUMC gives advice and makes recommendations to the PSC on all military aspects within the EU. It also provides directions to the military staff. The CIVCOM is working parallel with the EUMC. CIVCOM exists out of civilian representatives of the member states. It provides information, drafts and recommendations and gives input on the political and civilian aspects of crisis management and conflict prevention. RELEX is a group of counsellors who advice on institutional, legal and financial aspects of CFSP proposals (Duke 2002, 99-127; Gourlay 2004, 406-407; Björkdahl and Strömviik 2008, 15-16) (See appendix B).

Next to COREPER, the PSC and the committees and working-groups, the European Council is supported by the Council General Secretariat (CGS). This CGS evolved from a traditional secretariat into the institutional memory of the Council, including the ability to advice on policy and to prepare proposals. With the Treaty of Amsterdam the CGS was merged with the CFSP secretariat, led by the new Secretary General and High Representative for the CFSP (SG/HR). The SG/HR participates in the European Council and GAERC meetings and is a member of the Troika. The SG/HR contributes to the formulation and preparation of foreign policy decisions and the implementation of decisions. The SG/HR is supported by the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PU), the Directorate-General for External Relations and Politico-Military Affairs (DG E), the EU

¹² The Joint Action of Operation Artemis was adopted by the Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs and the operation was formally launched by the Ministers of Agriculture (Björkdahl and Strömviik 2008, 15).

¹³ Within COREPER a division is made between COREPER I and COREPER II. CFSP proposals are discussed within COREPER II.

¹⁴ Also known under its French acronym COPS: Comité politique et de sécurité.

Military Staff (EUMS), a Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) and the Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN). The PU consists out of (seconded) diplomats from different member states and the European Commission. It monitors analysis and assessments international developments and events with a focus on early warning of potential crises. Furthermore it prepares optional papers with recommendations and strategies for the European Council. Within the CSG the DG E follows upon CFSP issues. Of importance are the Directorate on Defence Aspects (DG E VIII) and the Directorate on Civilian Crisis Management (DG E IX). The EUMS exists out of military and civilian experts seconded by the member states. The EUMS provides military experience and support to the EUMC and the SG/HR for EU-led military operations, early warning functions, strategic planning and situation assessments. Within the EUMS is among other bodies the Civil-Military Cell (Civ-Mil Cell) to enhance civil-military coherence. Located within the Civ-Mil Cell is also the EU Operations Centre (OpsCen) that can serve as an operational headquarter for smaller EU-led operations, especially for joint civilian-military operations. The new institute the CPCC provides – since June 2007 – a joint civil-military planning capability together with the Civ-Mil Cell of the EUMS. It is under the political and strategic control of the PSC and the authority of the SG/HR. The SITCEN exists out of a body of military and civilian personnel for 24-hour monitoring on potential crisis regions, terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass-destruction. It also provides strategic intelligence-based information. Hereby the SITCEN provides situation analysis and early warning signals and supports peace operations (Duke 2002, 99-127; Gourlay 2004, 407-408; Björkdahl and Strömviik 2008, 16-19) (See appendix B).

Officially the role of the European Commission within the CFSP is limited, since it is formally an intergovernmental pillar. In practice the Commission does have quite some influence on the CFSP and ESDP. The Commissioner for External Affairs is the link between the GAERC and the SG/HR. Also the Commissioner maintains the relations with the UN, OSCE and the Council of Europe. The tasks of the Commission's Directorate-General of External Relations (DG RELEX) in the area of security focus on humanitarian assistance, democratisation, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR). Directorate A is responsible for policy areas as the CFSP, crisis management and conflict prevention. Also under the responsibility of the Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid and of importance for the foreign relations of the EU is the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) and EuropeAid. ECHO is the office responsible for emergency humanitarian and food aid worldwide. EuropeAid is the office which co-ordinates the EU external aid programs, with exclusion of aid during the association-process and the humanitarian activities of ECHO. EuropeAid acts worldwide and supports as well individual states as regions (Dinan 2005, 555; Björkdahl and Strömviik 2008, 20) (See appendix B).

Last institutions of importance for the CFSP/ESDP are different European agencies. These agencies are set up in order to accomplish specific technical, scientific or managerial tasks. Agencies of importance in the area of security and defence are the European Defence Agency (EDA), the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) and the European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC). The EDA was established in 2004 to improve the European defence capabilities. Therefore it develops defence capabilities, promotes defence research and technology, promotes armaments co-operation and creates a competitive European defence market. The EUISS is a European think tank about security and defence. The agency must help develop the CFSP, foster a European common security culture and enrich the strategic debate. The EUSC supports decision-making in the area of security and defence by providing analysis of satellite images and collateral data (Dinan 2005, 319, 601; Sens 2007, 17) (See appendix B).

The decision-making process of the CFSP/ESDP is a complicated process. Since the CFSP is intergovernmental, every member state can veto any decision. The number of policy areas that can be decided on with QMV is limited and can be bypassed if decisions damage important and stated reasons of national interest of individual member states. On the other hand CFSP decision-making involves considerable fewer formalised steps than other EU issues. The main focus of power is the European Council. Despite the lesser formal steps, Björkdahl and Strömviik state that decisions to launch a peace

operation rarely follow a straightforward or clear-cut pattern. This problem lies most in the negotiation before the decision and the implementation of the decision to deploy a peace operation. Since this research focuses on the peace operations that are decided on, the problems before and after the decision of the European Council to deploy an operation is of lesser interest. To understand the process, a 'simplified' decision-making process is described below (Björkdahl and Strömviik 2008, 23).

The initiative to place a proposal on the agenda can come from as well inside of the EU – member states as well as the European Commission and the SG/HR – as outside the EU – the UN, other international organisations or peace negotiators. An idea must be introduced in the PSC by a member state – normally the presidency. Here the idea is discussed generally on the political feasibility, the strategic desirability and the presence of capacity. If these first considerations point to a vague possibility, the process follows with a more detailed examination of the idea. The PSC asks information from the European Commission, the member states, the Council Secretariat, the SITCEN and the EUSC. During this process the PSC and the Council Secretariat can contact third parties – the UN or NATO –, possible third contributors or regional organisations. Also a fact-finding mission can be dispatched. If the result of this gathering of information is a general acceptance in the PSC, the formal phase of the decision-making process is started. The PSC asks the relevant Council Secretariat body – EUMS or DG E – to formulate options for the possible operation. The main product of this phase is the crisis management concept (CMC). This document describes the general political assessment of the situation, the overall objectives of the operation and one or more proposed courses of action. The strategic options are drafted by the EUMS or DG E under guidelines given by the PSC and directed by the EUMC and CIVCOM. The CMC is discussed in the PSC – normally circulating more than once – and agreed upon. At the same time, the personnel and financial capabilities are prepared. Once there is agreement on the operation between the member states, a belief that enough capabilities will be gathered and – if necessary – a mandate is provided, the formal decision must be taken by the European Council. This proposal of a Joint Action comes from the PSC and passes the RELEX-committee and COREPER II before it reaches the Council. The Joint Action specifies the objective, mandate, scope and duration of the operation. After the European Council has decided upon the Joint Action unanimously, the operation can be planned and implemented. Normally, the process of operational planning runs simultaneously with the process of the formal decision, since the member states also want to judge this part of the process before they take a decision. If the date to launch the operation is included in the Joint Action the implementation is of no concern of the Council. Otherwise the Council must take a separate decision to launch the operation. After the operation is launched the committee of contributors becomes the main forum for discussions on the operation. The PSC has the overall responsibility for issues relating to ongoing operations. As mandated in the Joint Actions, some decisions can be taken by the PSC. But it is the European Council that decides to change a mandate, to prolong or to end an operation (Björkdahl and Strömviik 2008, 24-35). The simplified steps of the decision-making process are shown in the below figure 2.4. A more extensive decision-making figure is shown in the appendix (See figure 2.4 and appendix C).

Figure 2.4 Decision-making process of EU-led peace operations

| Informal phase: | Information phase: | Planning phase: | Decision by the Council: | Implementation phase: |
|-------------------------|----------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Initiative Introduction | Research possibility | CMC Capability Mandate | Joint Action | Operational planning Launching |

§ 2.3 The European Security and Defence Policy

As described in paragraph 2.1 and 2.2 the development of the CFSP/ESDP was a hot issue for decades and the development was a constant process of framing and reframing of policy space and reflection on internal and external factors. Early 1990s the EU was

still characterised as “(...) an economic power, a humanitarian Goliath, a political dwarf and a military worm.” (Graf Von Kielmansegg 2007, 629). Mid 2000s the EU was still no military giant – although the combined member states are the second strongest military power in the world (Hellman and Sharp 2009) – but it shows it was no longer willing to be a political dwarf and a military worm. The EU seems to agree with former secretary-general of the UN Kofi Annan’s quote “You can do a lot with diplomacy, but of course you can do a lot more with diplomacy backed up by firmness and force.” (Quille 2004, 435). By adding military means to the economic and diplomatic tools, the EU develops a more comprehensive framework for external relations.

Important steps to form the ESDP were taken by the integration of the Petersberg tasks in the CFSP by the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997, by the Anglo-France declaration of St Malo in 1998 and by the formation of an European Security Strategy in 2003. But although the EU declared the ESDP operational in the Laeken Declaration of December 2001, still many steps have to be taken. The framework and procedures of the ESDP are self-limiting, there is still a gap between expectations and capabilities and member states are divided about the future of the ESDP. In line with its civilian tradition, the EU is still most comfortable by using its soft power instruments of economy and diplomacy and is cautious to use hard military power (Deighton 2002, 729; Gourlay 2004, 404-405; Bono 2004, 441).

§ 2.3.1 The Petersberg tasks

In June 1992 the council of ministers of the WEU met in the German governments Petersberg guesthouse near Bonn. An important issue on this meeting was the strengthening of the WEU operational capacity. With the resulting Petersberg Declaration the WEU functions were expanded to include a range of peacekeeping operations. Next to the common defence, as stated in the Washington Treaty and the modified Brussels Treaty, WEU military units could be used for:

- Humanitarian and rescue tasks;
- Peace-keeping tasks;
- Tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.

This list of possible operations was transferred from the WEU to the CFSP in the Treaty of Amsterdam. Thereby some remarks have to be made. First of all the list is no exhausting definition, but a description of the core contents. Second, the understanding of the Petersberg tasks are not clear. The terms peacekeeping and peacemaking are not codified clearly and because the WEU lacks a practice or well-developed doctrine this cannot clarify their meaning. This has led to discussion about the interpretation of the Petersberg tasks. It is clear that the operational capacities of the CFSP are limited by international law, since the EU refers to the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter and to the obligations of member states within the WEU and NATO. But while some argue that peace-enforcement is expressly excluded from the list of tasks, other deny this limitations by arguing that when the Petersberg tasks were formulated peacemaking meant the same as peace-enforcement. The Treaty of Amsterdam has no clear outcome for this discussion. What is clear and is important to notice, is the fact that there is no geographical limitation to the CFSP (Pagani 1998, 738-741; Graf Von Kielmansegg 2007, 630-631, 637-638).

The different tasks of the Petersberg tasks are listed in order of their military intensity. The humanitarian and rescue tasks are the tasks with the lowest military intensity. Both tasks focus on the protection of individuals. Humanitarian tasks are securing supplies and basic needs for the population in emergency situations. The role of military forces in these kind of operation is to command or support supplying or protective actions. Rescue tasks aim to liberate and evacuate individuals from emergency situations. These operations usually are undertaken to protect EU citizens (Graf Von Kielmansegg 2007, 631-632). The peacekeeping tasks involve a higher military intensity. Although the concept of peacekeeping is not codified clearly, it refers to the concept of the UN and follows UN practice. At least, classical peacekeeping and modified peacekeeping. Robust peacekeeping is excluded, since it better fits the military intensity of the third category of the Petersberg tasks. With classical peacekeeping is meant the

positioning of troops as a neutral buffer between the parties with consent of these parties. In this concept force may only be used for self-defence. Modified peacekeeping focuses on humanitarian goals, but is aimed at conflict resolution instead of individual relief (Graf Von Kielmansegg 2007, 633-634). These two concepts can be compared to the first and third generation peacekeeping of Van der Lijn (Van der Lijn 2006, 16-22). The greatest definition problem is the category of tasks with the highest military intensity: tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.

While the first two categories of the Petersberg tasks refer to a purpose, this category refers to military force instead of the purpose for which the force is to be used. As stated above, there is a discussion about the question in how far the use of military force of the EU is limited. The Treaty on European Union as well as the amendments by the Treaty of Amsterdam and Nice do not provide us with an answer. In the Treaty of Lisbon the list of tasks is extended, but still not clear since the phrase 'tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking' is still included in the list of tasks. According to Graf Von Kielmansegg the solution of the discussion lies within the term's crisis management and peacemaking. He defines crisis management as a military action in an acute conflict that forms a threat to the peace and aims at containing the threat and peacemaking as forcible pacification, so not necessarily with the consent of the host state (Graf Von Kielmansegg 2007, 634-635, 643). These definitions would provide no limitation to the military intensity of European operations. This seems to be supported by the appeal in the European Security Strategy for the EU to be more active and able to act "(...) to the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention (...)", including "(...) when necessary robust intervention." (Solana 2003, 11). On the other hand the Security Strategy also denies a military solution for threats. "(...) none of the new threats is purely military nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments." (Solana 2003, 7).

Although Graf Von Kielmansegg has a convincing argument and robust intervention is named in the Security Strategy, it is questionable of this is really meant that way. Several EU member states would simply not accept that, as is discussed in paragraph 2.3.3. It can also be argued that it would be a too strong break with the civilian ethos of the EU. Therefore it is sure the EU will not use these outer limits of their toolbox lightly (Deighton 2002, 720). And different authors argue that this is not necessary, since the more civilian approach and the experience in civil-military co-operation of the EU works. The EU simply does better in nation building by combining military and civil instruments. Therefore Ståle Ulriksen plies in his article for the development of EU's own military concepts and structures, based on it own strength, interests, values and visions, instead of copying NATO or US doctrines (Ulriksen 2004, 458).

§ 2.3.2 The military capabilities of the ESDP

On St Malo the British Prime Minister Blair and the French president Chirac stated that the EU needed to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage. "To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible, military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises, acting in conformity with our respective obligations to NATO." (Deighton 2002, 725). To back up autonomous action of the EU by a credible military force an increase of the military capabilities was needed. But despite different action plans to increase these capabilities, there is still a gap between capabilities and expectations.

On the European Council in Helsinki in December 1999 the heads of state of the member states took a first step to overcome this gap by setting a military capability target named the Helsinki Headline Goal. In this Headline Goal the member states declared they would form an European Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) existing of a force up to corps strength (50.000 to 60.000 men). This corps has to be supported by airborne and naval assets and should be able to be deployed within sixty days for a period of a year. The RRF should be able to act across the full range of the Petersberg tasks and had to be completed by 2003. Reverse to the NATO Response Force (NRF), the RRF is no standing army. The member states contribute to the RRF with national contingents and

keep their influence over the actions of these contingents. Following the Helsinki Headline Goal the EUMS investigated three scenarios according the Petersberg tasks, to determine the necessary military assets. The result of these studies was the Helsinki Force Catalogue, which determined the capabilities needed by the EU and the discrepancy between the real and the ideal capabilities.

At the Laeken European Council of 2001 the European Council stated the EU was capable of conducting some crisis-management operations. In 2003 this was confirmed by the GAERC, by declaring the EU has the operational capabilities to act according the Petersberg tasks, but limited and constrained by recognised shortfalls. The EU still didn't have the capabilities to act to the whole spectrum of the Petersberg tasks on its own. Therefore the European Council set a new capability target, the Headline Goal 2010. This plan has to create the necessary capability to act to the whole spectrum of the Petersberg tasks. Next to military capabilities, these plans also concern civilian capabilities to act, like police officers, administrators, jurists, etc.

The EU has no military structure for co-operation like the NATO. The institutions for decision-making or supporting the SG/HR for the CFSP can't be compared to such a structure. It is still questionable of this structure will evolve on the short run, most likely by merging the military structure of the WEU into the EU. A movement into merging is already visible since the 1990s. In 1997 the Petersberg tasks were incorporated into the ESDP, end 1999 the SG/HR for the CFSP also became the Secretary-General of the WEU and in 2002 the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) and European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC) replaced the Western European Union Institute for Security Studies and the Western Union Satellite Centre. Despite these processes the WEU is still used as an instrument for the EU, but is no part of the EU.

Because of the lack of a military structure, the possibilities for the EU to act are limited. For every operation the commanding structure must be discussed and be decided on. This limits autonomous EU operations to two command possibilities. First the option of the framework nation. Therefore five national Operation Headquarters (OHQs) are available: the French OHQ in Mont Valérien, the British OHQ in Northwood, the German OHQ in Potsdam, the Italian OHQ in Rome and the Greek OHQ in Larissa. For instance operation Artemis used the French OHQ, while EUFOR RDC uses the German OHQ. The second option is the new Operations Centre in Tervuren (Belgium), which became operational in January 2007. From this centre small operation up to the size of a battlegroup – some 2,000 troops – can be commanded.

Without the necessary military forces and without a military structure, the EU is still not capable of deploying autonomous peace operations to the whole spectrum of the Petersberg tasks. To overcome this problem, the EU must use NATO assets and structures. The co-operation between both organisations is formalised in the Berlin Plus arrangements. According to this agreement the EU gets access to NATO planning, NATO European command options and use of NATO assets and capabilities. In return the EU has to consultate over these operations with NATO. For extensive EU operations the NATO headquarter will be used as command centre with the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) as the highest in command.

§ 2.3.3 Disagreement between EU member states about the future of the ESDP

As described in paragraph 2.2.1 defence was and still is a hot issue for the member states of the EU. Every step in the development of the ESDP is influenced by political space after new negotiations and internal and external events. But still there is much discourse about the ESDP between the member states.

The EU member states can roughly be divided into three groups, with different opinions about the ESDP: the neutrals, the Atlantics and the Europeans. The neutrals – for instance Ireland, Finland, Sweden and Denmark – are very cautious within the ESDP. According to them it must focus completely on civilian operations and crisis management. Denmark even negotiated an opt-out of the ESDP in the Treaty on European Union. The Atlantics place the transatlantic ties above European defence co-operation. The NATO and the relations with the US are more important than the ESDP. The ESDP must therefore be seen as the European pillar of the NATO and not as an alternative to NATO. The most prominent Atlantic in the EU is Great Britain, supported by among others the

Netherlands. Therefore Great Britain was quick to nuance its support for European defence co-operation after the St Malo declaration with the 'three D's': no duplication of NATO assets, no decoupling of transatlantic ties and no discrimination against non-EU NATO members. The Europeans – led by France – have the opposite opinion of the Atlantics. They do want the EU to have their own military capabilities, without necessarily co-operate or consult the NATO (Deighton 2002, 729; Duke 2002, 28; Sens 2007, 13).

Next to these divisions between the member states, a second debate is about the right of member states to outsource a crucial policy area as defence. Defence is still seen as higher politics and a crucial part of the state. How far can the institutional structure of the EU be empowered without creating a new massive state? How far will the transferring of rights upgrade the interests of individual member states? The fear to outsource defence to the EU can be seen in the complicated process of little steps towards the ESDP and the discussion between federalists and anti-federalists that created the three-pillar structure (Deighton 2002, 736; Dinan 2005, 121).

As long as the CFSP and ESDP are intergovernmental, differences of opinion between member states limit the capability of the EU to act. This counts especially for the ESDP, since defence issues cannot be resolved by majority voting. A striking example of the division within the EU was the dispute over the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. While Great Britain supported the US-led invasion, France and Germany led the opposition against this invasion. Exactly therefore the adoption of a common European Security Strategy by the European Council in December 2003 was seen as a major achievement, since the EU was considered to be too divided over the issues of foreign affairs and defence (Biscop 2004, 1-2, 42).

§ 2.4 The ESDP in relation to other security organisations

The EU wasn't the only organisation that started to create capabilities for peace operations during the 1990s. The once exclusive right of the UN, became an area of growing interest for regional security organisations. In June 1992 foreign Ministers of NATO member states announced the willingness to support peacekeeping activities and in July 1992 the Helsinki Document provided the CSCE/OSCE with a framework for peacekeeping. With the development of the CFSP/ESDP the EU cleared the way for the same kind of activities. According to Solana the EU had to take up the responsibility that comes with being a global actor, but what can the EU add to this spectrum of security organisations? Traditionally Europe is strongly interwoven with international institutions, but the CFSP/ESDP must provide the EU with its own instruments for foreign and security policies. How will this effect the relation of the EU with other security organisations? (Pagani 1998, 737-738; Deighton 2002, 736).

The movement of the EU fits into the process of the UN. In the post-Cold War period the UN could take up its role as maintainer of international peace and security, resulting in a strong increase of peace operations. The call for mechanisms of crisis prevention and management and the will to revitalise regional organisations, resulted in the further institutionalising of the possibility to co-operate with regional organisations in Resolution 49/57. Hereby peace operations deployed by regional security organisations became a common procedure (UN 1994; Malik and Dorman 1995, 161; Pagani 1998, 737). Of all UN regional partners, the EU is one of the most important contributors to international peace and security as a regional security organisation. According to a report of the UN delegation to the EU, the EU is "(...) a crucial and highly valued partner of the United Nations." (UN 2007, 9). The co-operation between the UN and the EU cover political, organisational and operational co-operation. On the political level there are many meetings between UN and EU officials and regular discussions between the UN secretary general and the EU SG/HR for CFSP, the presidency and members of the European Commission. Organisational there is a broad network of relations between the organisations. The EU has a permanent delegation to the UN headquarter in New York and vice versa the UN has a delegation in Brussels. In addition the EU also has representatives at other major UN sites, like Geneva, Vienna, Rome, Paris and Nairobi. And although the EU is no official member of the UN but has an observer status, the European Commission is represented in forums with areas with an exclusive Community

competence like trade. In the area of international peace and security, the EU members co-ordinate their input. On the operational level the UN and the EU have worked together in many operations. The EU as well supported, as preceded and followed UN operations. This co-operation is recorded in a joint statement, which names different specific tasks - African peacekeeping, multidimensional peacekeeping, including police, rule of law and security sector reform – and regions – Africa, the Balkans and the Middle East – although the enumeration is not limited (UN-EU 2007). The EU supplements the UN by its activities.

The relation of the EU with the OSCE can also be characterised as supplementary. Both organisations work together politically, organisational and operational. The EU is an important member of the OSCE and the major contributor of extra-budgetary funding for OSCE activities in the field. Since the OSCE has no military structure and is involved in civilian tasks, the co-operation between the organisations focus on judicial and police reform, public administration, anti-corruption, democratisation, institution-building, human rights, media development, economic development, border control, human smuggle and election processes. Security threats that need a more militarised approach are not executed by the OSCE. Since the OSCE doesn't operate outside of the territory of their member states, the co-operation between the EU and OSCE focus mainly on regions as the Balkans, the South Caucasus and Eastern Europe. Next to these European areas, the EU is one of the partners of the OSCE for activities in the Black Sea region and Central Asia. Despite this successful co-operation, Sven Biscop notices a drawback of the growth of the EU for the OSCE. Since both the NATO as the EU claim a global role in the field of peace operations, the public discussion is about these organisations and the OSCE is no major topic in the public debate. In practice the EU and the OSCE do co-operate well on all levels. They do have regularly meetings, they do co-operate in the field, but this is not visible since in the public opinion it is the EU that is leading in for instance the Balkan. According to Biscop the EU should highlight the co-operation with the OSCE and thereby put the OSCE also publicly forward as an important partner (Biscop 2005).

The relation with the NATO is probably the most problematic. While the organisations formalised their co-operation in the Berlin Plus arrangements, their relation is challenged by discussions over the EU military ambitions and the position of some EU states that are no member of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. This political problem is striking in the operational co-operation between the organisations. The military ambition of the EU is as well a discussion within the EU as between the EU and the NATO. The ambition of the EU is to be able to act globally to the whole spectrum of the Petersberg tasks. While the military structure of the EU is by far not as developed as NATO's structure, in the future the ESDP can become a duplication of the NATO and thereby damage the Atlantic relation. Another problem is the status of EU member states like Malta and Cyprus. According to the Berlin Plus arrangement EU members that are no NATO member, must be a PfP-partner. This way EU neutral states can attend EU-NATO meetings. Malta reactivated its PfP-membership in 2008, but Cyprus is still no partner of the NATO. NATO member Turkey makes a great problem of this lack of membership, especially because of its ill relation with Greek-Cyprus. But even the mutual agreements in the arrangements of 2002, led to discussion. When the EU needs NATO assets to deploy an operation, the NATO has the right of first refusal. For independent EU operations this was never agreed. Despite this, the first out-of-area military operation of the EU – operation Artemis in Congo in 2003 – led to frustrations in Washington, since the Bush administration didn't agree on an EU intervention instead of a NATO intervention. Same thing happened during the operation to support the African Union (AU) in Darfur. The Bush administration argued the NATO should lead the operations while the EU should stay out. Meanwhile also the EU wanted to support the AU. In the end both organisations supported the AU, but both organisations worked next to each other with two command centres instead of a combined centre (Keohane 2006).

Of course the EU has relations with many other organisations than only the UN, the OSCE and the NATO. But because these organisations have the operational capability to deploy peace operations, the focus is on these organisations. As shown above the relation of the EU with the UN and the OSCE is very good. The organisations co-operate

on the political, organisational and operational level. The relation with the NATO is dim, thanks to some political issues which drawback on the operational co-operation in the field. Despite this, the NATO and the EU also have positive experiences, like the follow-up operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina – EUFOR Althea follows SFOR/IFOR – and the use of NATO assets by the EU in Macedonia – EUFOR Concordia.

Chapter 3 - The research framework

In the first chapter the key concepts and the rough outlines of the research frame are described shortly. After the formation of a general picture of the EU, the CFSP and ESDP in the second chapter, the focus is on the research methods. This chapter extensively discusses the methodology and data that are used to answer the central research question. First the status quo in the debate on interventionism is discussed briefly. The second paragraph puts forward the research design. The following paragraphs elaborate on the different aspects of this design. First the qualitative content analysis of the Council Joint Actions to research the arguments of legitimation is described. Second the different hypotheses that are formulated from theories and approaches in literature on interventions are operationalised. And third the different categories for the comparative analyses of developments and differences are described.

§ 3.1 Status quo in the debate about interventionism

In chapter one the definition of an intervention is given. It is clear that the deployment of a peace operation is a kind of intervention, since states or organisations interfere in the domestic affairs of another state. This is a sharp contrast to the principle of sovereignty of states. While in the classic concept of peacekeeping competing parties – including the state - had to agree on the deployment of the operation, third and fifth generation peacekeeping operations are allowed the use of violence to enforce the aim and success of the operation (Van der Lijn 2006, 16-22). This development seems to place some reasons above sovereignty. The question is which reasons can be placed above this principle. This contrast between state sovereignty on the one hand and higher causes on the other, is the main issue in the scientific debate about interventions.

A sovereign state possesses the highest authority on the territory of that state. Other states will not interfere in the decision-making process of that state. This concept is historically connected to the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. There is a broad scientific consensus that the principles or constitutive rules of the system of modern states – state sovereignty, exclusive territoriality, legal equality, non-intervention, standing diplomacy and international law – were codified by the Westphalian Peace Congress (Teschke 2002, 6; Nagan and Hammer 2004, 149). Critics however state that the principles of the modern state were not directly universally accepted after the Peace of Westphalia, and that powerful states in practice do control the domestic affairs of lesser states. These critics may be right to some extent, but one cannot deny the fact that the concept of state sovereignty was codified at the peace congress in 1648 and thereby was expressed as a guiding principle (Burch 2000; Fagelson 2001; Teschke 2002). After 1648 the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention were unquestionable connected to each other and were widely accepted as part of international law. The Westphalian system of sovereign states is also the basis of the UN as the sovereignty of states is recorded in the UN Charter, as is the principle of territorial integrity and non-intervention (UN 1945, art. 2). Theoretically the principle of sovereignty stands strong for the centuries since 1648 and is seen as the basis for the modern state. Therefore the cracks – as well recent as historical – in the principle by interventions are widely discussed. Basically there is one central question in this whole debate: is it allowed to break the rules of the Westphalian system and intervene in the domestic affairs of another state and if yes, when is it allowed?

There are many different forms of intervention: overt or covert, economic, diplomatic or military, etc (Otte 1995, 4). As different authors state, all these forms of intervention were still common during the centuries after Westphalia despite the principle of sovereignty. But although history already has shown many cracks in the principle, there is a great difference between the violation of the principle before and after the 1990s. And that difference is the fact that the principle itself was not at discussion. Hans Morgenthau claims that states always paid lip service to the international law and condemned interventions by other states. Strangely enough at the same time these states approved their own interventions for their own interests (Morgenthau 1967, 425-

426). States tried to legitimise their intervention by pointing at international law, but the principle of sovereignty lasted. This changed during the 1990s. The principle of sovereignty was no longer undisputed, there are exceptions to the general rule. The question is which principle weighs heavier than another. These cracks in the principles of sovereignty and non-interventionism are more influential, since the results seems to be that the formulation of international law changes from 'intervention in another state is not allowed' into 'intervention in another state is not allowed except when...'. Which principles are placed higher than state sovereignty?

According to Nagan and Hammer this question comes forth out of changing character of sovereignty in international law and international relations. The traditional sovereign state controls a territorial base with determined borders, controls a population connected by solidarity, loyalty and primary notions of group affiliation and identity, controls internal power and competencies and control the competence to represent the state internationally. Foreign intervention in these states was forbidden by international law – the Westphalian system. Recent developments like the growth of international memberships, the attention and coding of human rights and the strengthening of international law have limited the sovereignty of the states. The membership of international organisations – for instance the UN – limits the state, because even a sovereign state is obliged to the rules and responsibilities of the organisation to become a member. This is even more visible in supranational arrangements, where the state relinquishes some of its authority in exchange for the membership. Sovereignty is also limited by the growing attention for human rights. These rights were already codified in treaties like the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the Geneva Convention of 1949. During the last fifty years the popular support for human rights has grown. Sovereignty is no longer an excuse for violations of human rights. The strengthening of international law supports this change of view on sovereignty. Violators of international law must be held responsible for their criminal conduct by the international community. For this reason different ad hoc tribunals are established to research and prosecute violations and this development paved the way for the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague. The ICC can persecute those who abuse their sovereignty. These changes are revolutionary, since they challenge the historical concept of sovereignty of the state in favour of rights for individuals and international obligations (Nagan and Hammer 2004, 141, 151-152, 158, 167-168, 170). The problem of international law is the international anarchy, because of the lack of a higher government. Within a state rules are enforced by a police force and a judicial system. The international community has no such a system. Every state is sovereign and therefore the highest authority within their territory. As pointed out by Nagan and Hammer the opinion about this sovereignty is shifting, but it is still unclear when sovereignty may be violated because of a higher cause.

In his research for changes in the behaviour of the UN Security Council Chesterman analyses three important shifts. In different cases the Council recognised domestic affairs like internal armed conflict, humanitarian crises and disruption to democracy as threats to international peace and security (Chesterman 2001, 128). This would mean that the principles of no internal violence, no abuse of human rights and the upheaval of democracy would be placed above the principle of non-intervention. The humanitarian reason for intervention seems to be the strongest principle. As Nagan and Hammer have pointed out the growing support for human rights and the prosecution of abuses of these rights have limited the sovereignty of the state. If the state fails to fulfil its responsibilities towards its population, the international community must act. This concept is called the 'responsibility to protect' (R2P), a concept put forward by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). In a report of December 2001 the ICISS responded to the question of former secretary-general of the UN Kofi Annan how to react as international community on systematic violations of human rights like in Rwanda and Srebrenica, if humanitarian interventions are an assault on sovereignty (ICISS 2001). Earlier Annan stated that state sovereignty should be redefined in the new millennium, while underlining the failure of the international community in conflicts in Rwanda and East Timor and of the Security Council in Kosovo.

According to Annan these precedents have learned that "(...) the world cannot stand aside when gross and systematic violations of human rights are taking place (...)" (Annan 1999). State sovereignty must be brought in line with individual sovereignty, the fundamental freedom of individuals. And Annan is very clear that the protection of humans must stand above the protection of the concept of the state (Annan 1999). Also David Fagelson supports this view. He states that there is hope to shift the balance of sovereignty from the nation-state towards the protection of human rights (Fagelson 2001, 500). Although there is also much criticism on the concept of R2P, it could provide a legal and ethical base for humanitarian interventions. If the rights of the individual are violated by the state, the state doesn't fulfil its duties towards the population and the international community is allowed to intervene in the domestic affairs of the state. The question is whether the international community has the right to intervene on behalf of human rights of individuals or if it is the duty of the international community to intervene for humanitarian reasons. Another important question is when to intervene. Must the international community intervene if there is a threat of violations to human rights, if one person is violated or if we can speak about genocide and massive killings? These questions are still widely debated.

The other two shifts in the behaviour of the UN Security Council in the 1990s analysed by Chesterman are internal armed conflict and disruption to democracy. The UN agreed on these conflicts as threats to international peace and security and therefore can legitimise an intervention. The readiness to determine internal conflicts as such a threat, followed the successful action against Iraq in 1991 sanctioned by UN resolution 688. A precedent for intervention in a disruption to democracy was created by operation Restore Democracy in Haiti in 1994 sanctioned by UN resolution 940 (Chesterman 2001, 129-130, 151-152). On the other hand, both these categories of intervention could also be seen as humanitarian reason for intervention. The conflict in Iraq between the Baath regime of Saddam Hussein and the Kurdish people and the persecution by the new dictatorial regime in Haiti of the followers of the former government violate above all the fundamental freedom of individuals.

The above mentioned shifts in the character of international law and international relations can legitimise an intervention, because the principles can be placed above the principle of sovereignty of the state. But these developments should never have the intention to legitimise actions of individual states. Especially the concept of R2P is clearly about the international community acting on behalf of the rights of individuals. Therefore unilateral interventions are illegal. Because there is no high authority in the anarchic system of states, the organisation that comes closest to such an authority must legitimise interventions: the UN.

But even if interventions can be legitimised and authorised, why would states invest funds, resources and personnel? The own interests of the state are still no legitimation for interventions, besides the interest for international peace and security. Is the international community so altruistic to intervene in states on behalf of the population without gaining from it? According to different authors this is surely not the case. Just like in the centuries after Westphalia, states only use arguments that sound legitimate in the spirit of that time to legitimise their interventions as justification for their own interests. In their research Neta Crawford as well as Martha Finnemore and Anthony Lang state that not the reasons for interventions have changed, but only the arguments to legitimise the interventions (Owens 2004). Humanitarian justifications can still be used to secure economic interests like raw material or energy, or to eliminate a possible military threat and prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Annan tries to say the same, although far less explicit, when he states that our concept of national interests failed to follow the process after the Cold War and that the collective interest should be the national interest to face the (humanitarian) challenges of today. The appearance that UN-approved reasons, like humanitarian, are not the only reasons for states to intervene, is best shown in Annan's notice that "(...) states are willing to act in some areas of conflict, but not in others where the daily toll of death and suffering is as bad or worse." (Annan 1999). Of course there could be more reasons for this


observation of Annan, like the lack of capabilities at that moment or a security threat, but it seems that states try to intertwine the legal reasons with their own interests.

In all of the debates described above, the state is still the central actor. The debate is about sovereignty, humanitarian interventions and state interests, but little is written about international organisations like security organisations. Despite the trend of a growth of peace operations of regional organisations like for instance the NATO, the OSCE and the EU since the 1990s. The UN does have a role in the debate as the highest authority for legitimising operations, but what about the regional organisations like the EU? How about their tension between moral duties and economic, social or political interests? And to return to the central question of this research, for what reasons do they intervene in a certain state or region (and not in another)? Because so little is written about these questions, this research will use the exiting literature on interventionism of states to research the interventions of the EU. The results of this research could add to the debate by placing organisations as central actor instead of only states.

§ 3.2 The research design

As described in the first chapter, this is an explorative research since there is little known and written about the general reasons for intervention of the EU. To find an answer for the central research question and achieve the two research goals, the research is split into five themes. To explain the reasons for the EU interventions in a certain state or region – the first research goal – the arguments of legitimation and theoretical grounds are researched. To analyse developments and differences in reasons for EU interventions – the second research goal – the developments in period of time, differences between locations and differences between kinds of operations are analysed. In the following paragraphs all of these five themes are operationalised (See figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1: Design of the research



Before the operationalisation of the five themes is discussed, the general outline of the research is described. This research is a survey with twenty case studies. Because the central research question is a general question about EU interventions, the research focuses on the whole spectrum of EU operations. It is hard to select a representative group of operations that could be analysed intensive, because EU operations are relatively new and thereby the choice is limited. The many different aspects of operations make it harder to choose a representative group. Therefore all twenty EU-led peace operations decided on from 2002 until 2007 are used as cases. Although a survey – because of the great number of research units – is characterised by a quantitative approach, this research uses qualitative as well as quantitative analysis. In this way the outcome of this research can answer the central research question about EU interventions in general and give information about the reasons for intervention in the different cases.

§ 3.3 Operationalisation of the arguments of legitimatisation

The arguments of legitimatisation are measured by using the formal decision of the European Council to deploy a peace operation: the Council Joint Actions. Since interventions are more the exception than the rule – which is the Westphalian system of sovereign states with the principle of non-interventionism – interventions must be legitimised with good arguments. For the EU this must weigh extra heavy since it must not only legitimise its behaviour towards the international community, but also the member states must convince each other since the CFSP is an intergovernmental pillar and decisions must be taken unanimously. During the decision-making process within the EU the pro and contra arguments for the intervention are discussed. As described in paragraph 2.2.2 member states must agree on an idea for a peace operation in different institutions before a proposal can be placed on the agenda of the European Council (See figure 3.2).

Figure 3.2 Decision-making process of EU-led peace operations

| Informal phase: | Information phase: | Planning phase: | Decision by the Council: | Implementation phase: |
|-------------------------|----------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Initiative Introduction | Research possibility | CMC Capability Mandate | Joint Action | Operational planning Launching |

Because the size of this research and the number of cases, it is impossible to study all decision-making processes and discussions. Therefore smart choices have to be made, which will limit the amount of information without corroding the credibility of the results. The Council Joint Action as the official decision of the European Council and as the final product of the discussion whether to deploy an operation, is an useful indicator for the arguments of legitimatisation. The assumption of this choice to study the Joint Action is that this final proposal to decide upon the deployment of a peace operation will contain the most important arguments of the discussions during the informal, information and planning phase, to legitimise the decision to deploy an operation. This assumption is supported by the description of Björkdahl and Strömvik. According to these researchers a Joint Action generally contains among other specifications “(...) an outline of the political context and the reasons for undertaking the operation, the relationship to other ongoing operations (...) in the area, the objectives of the operation and the legal grounds (...)” (Björkdahl and Strömvik 2008, 31-32). By analysing the Joint Actions of the twenty cases the amount of information can be limited. For these analyses qualitative content analysis is used. Because the Joint Actions contain the most important arguments of the discussion, this method to measure the arguments of legitimatisation does not damage the validity and reliability of the research. The process after the formal decision of the European Council to deploy a peace operation is of no influence on this research. The central research question asks for the reasons for the EU to deploy peace operations. Changes in the mandate during the operation as well as the reasons for prolonging the operations or the reasons to end the operation are therefore – although interesting – not of use for this research.

§ 3.4 Operationalisation of the theoretical grounds

In the scientific debate, constructivists point at the own interest of intervening states behind the legitimatisation of the intervention. The presumption that some conflict areas are more interesting to operate in than others because of the interests of the intervening states is also illustrated by the quotation of Annan. In this research the possible influence of these kinds of interests on the choice of the EU to deploy a peace operation will be analysed on theoretical grounds, by testing hypotheses based on existing literature on interventionism. As stated before, there is little known about the reasons for intervention by the EU. Existing literature contains mainly reasons for states to intervene. Still this

literature is used to form several hypotheses, which can be tested on the cases. The literature that is used are James Meernik's *The political use of military force in the US foreign policy* (2004), Martha Finnemore's *The purpose of intervention* (2003), Simon Chesterman's *Just War or just peace? Humanitarian intervention and international law* (2001) and Andrew Dorman's *Western Europe and military intervention* (1995).

The choice for this literature is based on their points of view. Meernik's book is an analysis of American interventions since 1798. Meernik describes the reasons behind the decision of the US presidents to intervene somewhere. He distinguishes four main theoretical approaches, which contain different reasons to use force. First Meernik discusses security, power and realist explanations for interventions, second he studies economical explanations, third he describes the role of liberal idealism and fourth he explains the influence of domestic politics. Meernik concludes that none of these explanations is able to explain all US interventions since 1798 simultaneously. Therefore Meernik calls the explanations complementary and competitive. They can complement each other to explain interventions, but they are also competitive since some claims are incompatible (Meernik 2004, 206). Finnemore's book is a study of the changing of norms on interventions. It describes the current international system and the rules for interventions from a constructivist view. She notices that over centuries the norms for the use of force have changed. In her research for changing norms, she describes accepted norms for each period. According to Finnemore interventions in the current system are legitimate when pointed at territorial violations, humanitarian disasters, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. But all interventions must be legitimised by international organisations and by preference be undertaken by multilateral forces (Finnemore 2003, 98). Chesterman studies processes of change in international law, which he illustrates by operations of the UN. This provides the research with a legal view on interventions. In his study of the changes in UN interventions, Chesterman distinguishes three important shifts. First he describes the fading distinction between international and internal, by the growing number of interventions in domestic armed problems. Second he notices that, although humanitarian crisis can hardly be called a threat to international peace and security, more interventions are legitimised for humanitarian reasons. Third Chesterman describes the shift to intervene in disruptions to democracy (Chesterman 2001, 128-129, 140, 151, 152). Finally Dorman describes different reasons for interventions of the EU. In Dorman's study five principle reasons for the Western European states to intervene are described, namely historical ties, economic dependence (especially from raw materials), internal and external pressure, threat of the spreading of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction and ethnic unrest on the European borders. Although the principle reasons of Dorman are not really supported by clear tests or evidence, they will be used and tested in this research (Dorman 1995, 110-111).

Based on the above mentioned literature, fifteen theoretical grounds are distinguished, which are tested on the twenty cases of this research. The intention hereby is to split theoretical approaches into simple theoretical grounds. For instance Meernik uses multiple security goals for one theoretical approach. To test the reason security and power for an US intervention, he uses as well the protection of territory as the protection of citizens, the protection of friendly governments, war prevention and American honour as indicators. In this research these indicators will be split into individual subjects that by preference can be tested by one or at most a few indicators. The reason for this choice is to enlarge the chance that non-causal relations can be excluded. Guided by this principle, fifteen theoretical grounds are distinguished which are formulated into hypotheses and will be tested on the twenty cases of this research. In the table below the foundation of these theoretical grounds are named (See figure 3.3).

Figure 3.3 Foundation theoretical grounds

| Theoretical ground: | Literature: |
|---------------------------------------|---|
| 1. Protection of territory | Meernik, Dorman & Chesterman |
| 2. Protection of citizens | Meernik |
| 3. Protection of friendly governments | Meernik |
| 4. Terrorism | Finnemore |
| 5. Non-proliferation | Finnemore & Dorman |
| 6. Economic interests | Meernik & Dorman |
| 7. Raw materials | Meernik & Dorman |
| 8. Development aid | Meernik |
| 9. Regimes | Meernik & Chesterman |
| 10. Internal pressure | Meernik & Dorman |
| 11. External pressure | Dorman |
| 12. Humanitarian action | Meernik, Finnemore, Dorman & Chesterman |
| 13. Human rights | Meernik |
| 14. Territorial violations | Meernik & Finnemore |
| 15. Historical ties | Dorman |

All of the theoretical grounds named above are discussed separately in the following fifteen subparagraphs. In these subparagraphs first the background of the theoretical ground is discussed, followed by the formulation of one or more hypotheses and the operationalisation of the measurement.

Different operationalisations contain questionable scales for different scores. For instance for the hypotheses in which quantitative research is performed on newspapers, it is questionable if the results can be caught in categories. To measure and compare scores it is important to be clear beforehand what is considered a low score and what a high score, but at the same time this can violate the reality. Therefore an argued balance has to be found. Another remark before going to the operationalisations concerns the testing of the hypotheses. These are measured as separate possible reasons for the EU to decide to deploy a peace operation. This ignores the possibility that hypotheses alone are not sufficient explanations, while they could also be of influence on the decision-making process complementary to each other. Therefore hypotheses can be considered falsified as singular explanation, but that doesn't mean the theoretical ground has no influence at all.

§ 3.4.1 Protection of territory

In his research Meernik found this factor of importance for the US interventions in the period between 1798 and 1941. In eleven percent of the cases, the intervention was (partly) inspired by territorial reasons. In his hypothesis about the interventions of the US after 1941, Meernik strangely enough excludes this factor (Meernik 2004, 46-47, 66-67). This could point at a change in reasons to intervene. Perhaps territorial reasons were no longer accepted as legitimate or there was no longer any threat to US territory. This last view is partly shared by Dorman. He states the EU protects its territory by containing the conflicts at the borders. Not because of a territorial threat, but because of a threat of a spillover of the negative effects of the violence across the border. This concerns mainly the ethnic unrest on the Balkan (Dorman 1995, 111). Chesterman also supports this vision. In his analysis of the UN Security Council he states that internal conflicts can be a threat to international peace and security. In such cases the international community is allowed to intervene in the domestic affairs of that state (Chesterman 2001, 128-130).


An aggressive act on EU territory - as in some of Meernik cases of the US between 1798 and 1941 - is no problem for the EU. In case of such aggression the mutual defence agreements – NATO article five – should become effective. This hypothesis measures the fear for overspill of negative effects like unrest, refugees, crime, etc. that crosses the border, because of the conflict on the other side. In such situations an intervention aims to protect the own territory from the aversive effects of the conflict. Since there is no real visible threat like troops crossing the border, the measuring must be based on the

perception of the negative effects and the supposed need to act. The theoretical ground should measure if the EU is more likely to deploy a peace operation if a fear for overspill of negative effects to the own territory is perceived. Therefore the following hypothesis and conceptual model are formulated (See figure 3.4):

Hypothesis 1 – protection of territory

If the EU perceives a fear of overspill of negative effects of a conflict to the own territory, the EU will be more likely to deploy a peace operation.

Figure 3.4 Conceptual model – protection of territory



Because this hypothesis is about perception, it is impossible to measure with indicators using hard evidence. Preferable qualitative content analysis would be used to measure if there is a perceived fear of overspill. Because of the many cases and the limited size of this research, quantitative research is used to study European newspapers. The assumption is that newspapers are opinion leaders and put forward the European view of the effects on the EU. The newspapers that are used are quality papers from the greater EU-member states Great Britain (The Guardian), Germany (Die Welt) and France (Le Monde). For each of these newspapers is measured how many articles connect the state of the cases and a territorial threat to the EU in the year before the decision to deploy a peace operation. Therefore the database Lexis Nexis is used. The search terms that are used are ‘threat EU’, ‘drohung EU’ and ‘menace UE’ in Lexis Nexis. The total number of articles found are categorised to indicate if it is considered a low or high score. If no articles are found, the score is zero. If one till ten articles are found, the score is one point. If eleven till twenty-five articles are found, the score is two. If twenty-six till hundred articles are found, the score is three points. And if more than hundred articles are found, the score is four points. Because three newspapers are studied, the scale varies from zero until twelve points. To exclude coincidental connections as far as possible, a score from zero until three stands for no fear of overspill, a score from four until six stands for low fear of overspill, a score from seven until nine stands for medium fear of overspill and a score from ten until twelve stands for high fear of overspill.


§ 3.4.2 Protection of citizens

In Meernik’s research the factor protection of citizens was the most significant security reason for an intervention. In sixty percent of the cases in the period between 1798 until 1941 the protection of US citizens was (one of) the reason(s) to intervene. But also after 1941 Meernik found a strong correlation between threats or violence against US citizens and the choice of the president to intervene (Meernik 2004, 46-47; 69-71). The question is in how far this factor can also be explanatory for EU interventions. To distinguish this factor from the above factor to protect territory, the citizens that are threatened or violated must be abroad at that moment. Otherwise it would be seen as an aggression on EU territory and not specific on EU citizens. Therefore the following hypothesis and conceptual model are formulated (See figure 3.5):

Hypothesis 2 – protection of citizens

If EU citizens abroad are threatened or violated, the EU will be more likely to deploy a peace operation.

Figure 3.5 Conceptual model – protection of citizens



To measure this hypothesis, two indicators are used. The first indicator is the number of EU citizens who live in the state the EU intervenes in. This number is measured using the data of the database Eurostat. This database provides the numbers of emigrants from the EU to other states. The assumption is that the EU is more likely to intervene if more EU citizens are threatened, more citizens would mean a higher chance for an EU-led peace operation. Therefore the number of citizens will be measured as the percentage of the total EU citizens. If up to 0,0000005 percent EU citizens – which is circa 500 persons – live in the other state, the number of citizens is medium. If more than 0,0000005 percent of the EU citizens live in the other state, the number of citizens is high. If otherwise no EU citizens live in the state, the hypothesis is of no influence on the case. In that case the second indicator is of no importance, the hypothesis will be falsified. On a scale from zero to two, no citizens score zero, a medium number scores one and a high number scores two.

The second indicator is the possible threat to the abroad EU citizens. This possible threat is measured by qualitative analysis of perceived threats in European newspapers in the year before the decision to intervene. The newspapers that will be used will be quality papers from the greater EU-member states Great Britain (The Guardian), Germany (Die Welt) and France (Le Monde). If the analysis of these papers show a low level of violence, the threat will be qualified as low. If the analysis show a high level of violence but not directly focused on EU citizens, the threat is qualified as medium. If the analysis show a high level of violence that is directly focused on EU citizens, the threat is qualified as high. The results will be stronger if the news in the different newspapers is coherent. On a scale from one to three, a low threat scores one, a medium threat scores two and a high threat scores three.


To measure the threat against EU citizens, as well the first as the second indicator is of importance. More EU citizens abroad as well as a higher threat to these citizens will both mean a higher change for a peace operation. Because the hypothesis is specific on EU citizens, more weight will be regarded for the number of citizens. To mix both indicators the score of the first indicator is multiplied with the score of the second indicator. This way a scale from zero to six is formed. A score of zero means no EU citizens and therefore no threat to citizens. A score of one to two is a low threat to EU citizens. There is either a low number of citizens with some threat or many citizens without a threat. A score of three is a medium threat to EU citizens. The number of citizens is low, but the threat is directly focused upon them. A score of four to six is a high threat to EU citizens. The number of citizens is high and there is a medium or high level of violence in the state.

§ 3.4.3 Protection of friendly governments

The research of Meernik demonstrates the protection of friendly governments was an important reason for the US to intervene in the period between 1798 until 1941. In 14.5 percent of the US interventions in that period, at least one of the objectives was the protection of a friendly government (Meernik 2004, 46). Possibly this would also be an important reason for the EU to intervene. Therefore the following hypothesis and conceptual model are formulated (See figure 3.6):

Hypothesis 3 – protection of friendly governments

If a violent conflict is threatening a friendly government, the EU will be more likely to deploy a peace operation.



The hardest issue to measure this hypothesis is to give indicators for a friendly government. The EU has contacts and relations with almost all other states. But not all of these other states can be called friendly governments. To have a friendly relation a level

of trust must be achieved. This level of trust is measured using two indicators. The first indicator measures if the state is an ally of the EU. This is measured by looking at the NATO, the military organisation closely related to the EU. A membership of this organisation is an expression of trust. If a state is no member but is connected to the organisation – like an observer – this also counts for some level of trust. This indicator is measured on a scale from zero to two. Members of the organisation get a score of two, states that are associated but no member score one and states that are not associated score zero.

The other indicator is an agreement with the EU. The EU has different sorts of agreements with other states. A difference is made between economic agreements, partnerships and association agreements. Economic agreements – free trade associations, custom unions, etc. – count for some trust, but less than the other agreements. Partnerships – the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) – count for more trust, but again not as much as an association agreement. States with an association agreement are the potential members of the nearby future and count therefore as the highest form of trust and friendship. This indicator is measured on a scale from zero to three. States with no agreement score zero, states with an economic agreement score one, states with a partnership score two and potential members score three. The relations of the states are measured at the moment of the decision of the European Council to deploy a peace operation.

To measure the relation of the government with the EU, both indicators have to be mixed. To weigh both indicators equally, the first indicator is multiplied with three and the second indicator is multiplied by two, so both form a scale from zero until six. The score on both indicators is added and forms a scale from zero to twelve. If a state scores zero to six, the level of trust is not so high that the government of the state can be considered a special friend of the EU. If a state scores seven to twelve, the level of trust is high enough to state that the state is a friend of the EU. If a state is not considered a friend of the EU, that doesn't automatically mean it has a bad relation with the EU, only that the government isn't a special friend of the EU.


§ 3.4.4 Terrorism

Although Meerniks monograph is from 2004, the factor terrorism is not specifically discussed as a reason for US interventions. In his hypothesis Meernik cumulates all these factors into a hypothesis about anti-US violence. But in recent developments terrorism is becoming a more important issue and therefore a possible reason for the EU to intervene in another state. The most well known example is probably the US-led intervention of a coalition of states in Afghanistan after the terrorist attacks of nine eleven. Finnemore names terrorism as a legitimate reason to intervene in her enumeration. She points out that this interventions should be multilateral and authorised by an international organisations (Finnemore 2003, 98). Since this research doesn't focus on just interventions, but on peace operations, the influence of terrorism is measured for the choice of the European Council to deploy a peace operation. The problem is that it is hard to proof relations of a state with terrorists. So this research doesn't measure a factual relation between a state and terrorism, but the perceived relations. Therefore the following hypothesis and conceptual model are formulated (See figure 3.7):

Hypothesis 4 – terrorism

If a state has perceived relations with terrorists, the EU will be more likely to deploy a peace operation.

Figure 3.7 Conceptual model – terrorism



Just like the hypothesis on the protection of territory this hypothesis is about perception. Therefore the same method of measurement is used. The perceived relation between


states and terrorism is measured by quantitative research of European quality newspapers like The Guardian, Die Welt and Le Monde. If no articles are found, the score is zero. If one till ten articles are found, the score is one point. If eleven till twenty-five articles are found, the score is two. If twenty-six till hundred articles are found, the score is three. And if more than hundred articles are found, the score is four. Because three newspapers are studied, the scale varies from zero until twelve. Just like the measurement of protection of territory coincidental connections are excluded as far as possible by considering a score from zero until three as no association with terrorism. A score from four until six stands for some association with terrorism, a score from seven until nine stands for medium association with terrorism and a score from ten until twelve stands for high association with terrorism.

§ 3.4.5 Non-proliferation

Another important security threat is the spread of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Although this is an important security threat, and non-proliferation seems to be an important issue for the US, this factor is not tested by Meernik. Finnemore and Dorman do name this factor as possible reason for an intervention. Finnemore calls it a legitimate reason to intervene in the current international system. Hereby she points at international agreement to prevent the further spread of weapons of mass destruction like in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Dorman points at the increasing threat to the EU by a further spread of these weapons (Finnemore 2003, 98; Dorman 1995, 111). Would the prevention of the spread of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction be a reason for the EU to intervene in a state? To answer this question the relation between a state and attempts to proliferation must be made plausible. For instance not all nuclear activities are directed at the acquirement of weapons of mass destruction. Because it is hard to proof this relation, this research will not measure a factual relation between the state and proliferation, but the perceived relation. Therefore the following hypothesis and conceptual model are formulated (See figure 3.8):

Hypothesis 5 – non-proliferation

If it is perceived that a state has plans to proliferation, the EU will be more likely to deploy a peace operation.



This hypothesis is again about perception. Therefore the same method like the measurements of the hypotheses on protection of territory and terrorism are used. The perceived risk of proliferation is measured by quantitative research of The Guardian, Die Welt and Le Monde. If no article are found, the score is zero points. If one till ten articles are found, the score is one point. If eleven till twenty-five articles are found, the score is two. If twenty-six till hundred articles are found, the score is three. And if more than hundred articles are found, the score is four. Because three newspapers are studied, the scale varies from zero until twelve. Also for this measurement coincidental connections are excluded by considering a score from zero until three as no risk for proliferation. A score from four until six stands for low risk of proliferation, a score from seven until nine stands for medium risk of proliferation and a score from ten until twelve stands for high risk of proliferation.


§ 3.4.6 Economic interest

Both Meernik and Dorman point at economic interests of a state as reason for interventions. In Meernik's research of the period between 1798 until 1941, the protection of economic interests was a factor in fifty-two percent of the cases (Meernik 2004, 99). Despite the fact that the protection of economic interests is not accepted as a legitimate reason to intervene in another state, it could be of importance for the

economic power of the EU. The EU could deploy a peace operation in a state to protect its economic power and secure its economic interests. If the economic interest of the EU in a state is higher, the chance of an intervention would be higher. Therefore the following hypothesis and conceptual model are formulated (See figure 3.9):

Hypothesis 6 – economic interests

If the EU has more economic interests in a state, the EU will be more likely to deploy a peace operation.



To measure the economic interest of the EU in a state, three indicators are used: the import and export of the EU and the state and the economic investments of the EU in the state. The scores on the import and export are higher, if the EU either imports or exports more to the state. For the indicator economic investment states also score higher if the investment of the EU in the state is higher. All three indicators are measured in the same way. The measurement is relatively, because the importance of the import, export and investments are relative to the importance of other trade and investments of the EU.


Therefore of all indicators the average import, export and investment in other states is measured. If the amount of import, export or investment in the case is lower than the average, the score is low. If the amount of import, export or investment in the case is higher than the average, the score is high. To combine the three indicators, the score low stands for one point and the score high stands for two points. The combined scores form a scale from three to six. If states score three or four points, the economic interest is considered low. If states score five or six points, the economic interest is considered high.

§ 3.4.7 Raw materials

Despite the fact that the above hypothesis was about economic interests of the EU member states in general and raw materials are important economic factors, raw materials as a factor is separated because of the high dependence of EU member states on these raw materials for industrial and other reasons. This high dependence makes the states vulnerable. Therefore it could be reasoned that of all economic factors, raw materials are considered essential for the state and therefore an important reason for interventions (Dorman 1995, 111; Meernik 2004, 114). The assumption is that by deploying a peace operation the EU could secure the supply for raw materials. A state that has more raw materials would be more interesting to intervene in, than a state with fewer raw materials. Therefore the following hypothesis and conceptual model are formulated (See figure 3.10):

Hypothesis 7 – raw materials

If a state has many raw materials, the EU will be more likely to deploy a peace operation.



Because it is not possible to measure all raw materials, a selection of materials that are used as indicators had to be made. In this research the following five materials are measured: oil, gas, uranium, copper and coltan (tantalum-niobium).¹⁵ These raw

¹⁵ Coltan is a relatively unknown raw material that is essential for the production of modern equipment's like mobile phones, laptops and PCs.


materials are chosen because they are relatively rare and because the EU has a great demand for these materials. Therefore these five materials are qualified to test if the presence of raw materials is a reason for the EU to deploy a peace operation. If the proved reserves of such a raw material in a state is within the top ten of producers of the material worldwide, the state scores two points on the indicator. If the state only contains a small amount of the raw material, the state scores one point. If the state doesn't contain the raw material, the state scores zero points. Because five materials are measured, states can score on a scale from zero until ten. A score from zero until two points is categorised as few raw materials, a score of three or four is categorised as a medium amount of raw materials and a score of five or higher is categorised as many raw materials. To score five points a state has to have all raw materials or has to be a top ten producer for at least one raw material.

§ 3.4.8 Development aid

According to Meernik the chance of a US intervention is greater if the amount of US aid is higher (Meernik 2004, 113-114). Development aid is a long term investment for the (re)building of a state. A conflict would probably undo the effect of this investment. Therefore the US would intervene to protect the earlier investments. As the most important donor of development aid worldwide, these reasoning could possibly also count for the EU. To protect the sunken costs – earlier investments – the EU would intervene. If these costs are higher and the EU already spend lots of funds, it is more likely the EU will protect these investments and deploys a peace operation. Therefore the following hypothesis and conceptual model are formulated (See figure 3.11):

Hypothesis 8 – development aid

If the amount of development aid given by the EU to the state is higher, the EU will be more likely to deploy a peace operation.



To test this hypothesis, the sunken costs of the EU and the EU member states are measured. Since as well the EU and the individual member states have a budget for development aid, both the budget of the EU and the budget of the member states are used as indicators. To measure the indicator EU the annual reports of the Europeaid are used. To measure the indicator EU member states the database of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is used.¹⁶ For both indicators the average of the yearly total budgets is compared with the development aid to the states in the different cases in the year before the decision of the European Council. If the amount of aid is lower than the average, this is considered as low. If the amount of aid is higher than the average, this is considered high. Since the data of Europeaid is in Euro's and the data of OECD is in dollars, both indicators can't easily be adjusted. Therefore both indicators are not combined as the total amount of aid, but relatively. For each category a case can score one point if points if the amount of aid is low and two points if the amount of aid is high. These scores of both indicators form the total score on a scale from two to four. If a case scores two points, this is indicated as low amount of development aid. If a case scores three points, this is indicated as medium amount of development aid. And if a case scores four points, this is indicated as high amount of development aid.

¹⁶ Not all member states of the EU are also member of the OECD. Therefore not all data about development aid of these states is available. Despite this, the data of the OECD is used as an indicator since nineteen of the twenty-seven member states – including the greatest – are part of the OECD.

§ 3.4.9 Regimes


In his fourth chapter Meernik describes the idea of liberal idealism. This means the “(...) philosophy that stresses the dignity of individuals using rationality to determine their political and economic destinies and realised through procedural and substantive, democratic government.” (Meernik 2004, 119). In the foreign policy of the US the support of democracies and the spread of liberal democracy is an important issue. The ideological support for liberal democracies have an effect on the choice of the US president to intervene in a state (Meernik 2004, 151-153). Since all member states of the EU are liberal democracies, the ideological support for other like-minded states could be a reason for an EU-led intervention.

This hypothesis is about two kinds of support for like-minded governments. First of all the EU could use peace operations to spread the idea of liberal democracy. Second the EU could support democratic states which are becoming less democratic, to prevent this transition. Both of these kinds of support by the deployment of a peace operation are researched. Therefore the following hypotheses and conceptual models are formulated (See figure 3.12 and 3.13):

Hypothesis 9a – regimes: level of democracy

If a state is not democratic, the EU will be more likely to deploy a peace operation.


Figure 3.12 Conceptual model – regimes: level of democracy



Hypothesis 9b – regimes: democracy in transition

If a state becomes less democratic, the EU will be more likely to deploy a peace operation.

Figure 3.13 Conceptual model – regimes: democracy in transition



To measure how a state scores on the scale of democracy, the database Polity IV is used. This database numbers states from zero until ten, whereby zero is non-democratic and ten is maximum democratic. To test hypothesis 9a, this scale of Polity IV is categorised into three categories. States who score zero until five points are considered non-democratic. States who score six until eight points are considered democratic in some way, but not completely. States who score nine or ten points are considered democratic. To test hypothesis 9b, the scores of every state in the five years before the peace operation are considered on transitions. Thereby only negative transitions are of importance. If a state became less democratic in the five years before the operation and scores less than nine points, a negative transition of democratic states is of influence on the choice of the EU to intervene.


§ 3.4.10 Internal pressure

As put forward in chapter 2, initiatives to deploy a peace operation can come from as well inside as outside of the EU. By inside Björkdahl and Strömviik mean initiatives from member states, the European Commission or the SG/HR for the CFSP (Björkdahl and Strömviik 2008, 24). Meernik and Dorman point at another level of internal pressure, namely the internal pressure from within EU member states. In his research Meernik shows the effect of popularity, election time and different domestic problems on the choice of the US president to intervene (Meernik 2004, 203). But other possible influences are pressure groups or NGO's. In the decision-making process of the CFSP/ESDP the member states are the highest authority, but perhaps internal pressure is of influence on the decisions of the states. More internal pressure of citizens, pressure

groups and NGO's on the member states, would mean the earlier deployment of a peace operation. Therefore the following hypothesis and conceptual model are formulated (See figure 3.14):

Hypothesis 10 – internal pressure

If member states of the EU are pressured to intervene from within, the EU will be more likely to deploy a peace operation.




Because the extent of this research is limited, it is impossible to study the internal situation of all EU member states for every decision to deploy a peace operation. Therefore this research focuses on the initiating member state. To measure if the decision is influenced by internal pressure, the internal situation of the initiating state is researched. If there is clearly no internal pressure to deploy a peace operation, the hypothesis is falsified. If there is some internal pressure, but it is unclear if this pressure influences the government, the hypothesis could be verified. If there is internal pressure and the government changed its opinion because of the pressure, the hypothesis is clearly verified.

§ 3.4.11 External pressure

Besides the above hypothesis about internal pressure, Dorman also names external pressure as a reason for interventions. If this external pressure is from all actors outside of the EU, this is a broad platform for ideas. Björkdahl and Strömviik manage to limit this platform to reasonable proportions. They put forward that (successful) external pressure comes from the UN, other international organisations and peace negotiators (Björkdahl and Strömviik 2008, 24-26). Because the UN is also an international organisation, this theoretic ground will be split into two hypotheses. The first focuses on pressure of international organisations and the second focuses on pressure of peace negotiators. If either an international organisation and/or a peace negotiator pressures the EU, the European Council would be more likely to deploy an peace operation. Therefore the following hypotheses and conceptual models are formulated (See figure 3.15 and 3.16):


Hypothesis 11a – external pressure: international organisations

If an international organisation exerts pressure on the EU to intervene, the EU will be more likely to deploy a peace operation.



Hypothesis 11b – external pressure: peace negotiators

If a peace negotiator request the EU as third party monitor, the EU will be more likely to deploy a peace operation.



To measure the first hypothesis the number of international organisations that can influence the EU member states have to be limited. Because of the extent of this research it is impossible to study all international organisations. Therefore this research

focuses on the most important partner organisations of the EU: the UN, the NATO, the WEU, the OSCE and the AU. By qualitative analysis this research measures if these organisations have requested the EU to deploy a peace operation.


The second hypothesis is measured by looking at requests from international peace negotiators. According to Björkdahl and Strömviik peace negotiators can request the EU to be a third party monitor in conflict resolution. As example they name the operation in Aceh (Björkdahl and Strömviik 2008, 26).

§ 3.4.12 Humanitarian action

As described in paragraph 3.1, an important shift in the debate about sovereignty and interventionism is humanitarian action. Under certain circumstances humanitarian reasons legitimate an intervention. According to Finnemore this is considered legal in the current international system (Finnemore 2003, 98). Also Meernik names the right and freedoms of individuals as "(...) a legal and moral claim on foreign policies." (Meernik 2004, 150). In the case of widespread social violence the US president would be more likely to intervene. Meernik describes this widespread social violence as high levels of death and destruction (Meernik 2004, 151). This could also account for the decisions of the EU to deploy a peace operation. Therefore the following hypothesis and conceptual model are formulated (See figure 3.17):

Hypothesis 12 – humanitarian action

If a humanitarian disaster takes place in a state, the EU will be more likely to deploy a peace operation.




To measure if a humanitarian disaster takes place in a state, the level of violence is measured. Therefore the data of the conflict barometer of the Heidelberg institute on international conflict research is used. This data is categorised into five categories with different states of violence and intensity. The first two categories are non-violent and have a low intensity. These categories are named latent conflict and manifest conflict. The third category is the crisis, a violent conflict with a medium intensity. The fourth and fifth categories are severe crisis and war. These categories are violent conflicts with a high intensity. In the conflict barometer states can have conflicts in different scales of violence and intensity at the same moment, for instance in different parts of the country. In this research the states are considered as a whole and the highest intensity score is counted. If a conflict in a case has a high intensity, the intervention is considered to be humanitarian action.

§ 3.4.13 Human rights

The above hypothesis about humanitarian action focuses on the deployment of a peace operation in the case of a humanitarian disaster. Of course the loss of lives is the ultimate threat for an individual. Other important issues are political rights and civil liberties. The protection of human rights is also an important aim of the EU. Therefore also this issue is taken into account and the following hypothesis and conceptual model are formulated (See figure 3.18):

Hypothesis 13 – human rights

If human rights are violated in a state, the EU will be more likely to deploy a peace operation.




The level of the human rights of a state is measured by using the database of freedomhouse. This database qualifies the political rights and the civil liberties of inhabitants of states. On both indicators states can score from 1 until 7, with 1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest level of freedom. The average of both indicators will be the score of the state in this research. An average score from 1 to 2.5 is a free state, an average score from 2.6 to 5.0 is a partly free state and an average score from 5.1 to 7.0 is not free. If the score of the state is higher, the human rights are violated more often.

§ 3.4.14 Territorial violations

As described earlier in the paragraph on the status quo of the debate on interventions, every state is sovereign. Foreign interference with the domestic affairs of a state is forbidden by international law. Violations of the territory of a sovereign state are infringements of international law. According to Meernik and Finnemore the international community will not allow this. Finnemore argues that in the current international system these violations are a legal reason to intervene on behalf of the violated state (Finnemore 2003, 98). Meernik state the protection of the international system as a reason to intervene for the US (Meernik 2004, 66). In the case of a territorial violation the international community could intervene on behalf of the invaded state. This research tests if this reason also counts for the EU. Therefore the following hypothesis and conceptual model are formulated (See figure 3.19):

Hypothesis 14 – territorial violations

If a state violates the territory of another state, the EU will be more likely to deploy a peace operation.



To measure this hypothesis, it has to be clear what is considered a territorial violation of the sovereignty of a state. Not all military forces abroad can account for that since some interventions in other states are considered legitimate. Therefore this research measures a territorial violation as the opposite of Finnemore's legitimate norm of intervention. According to Finnemore, interventions have to be legitimised by an international organisation and performed by a multilateral force. Therefore interventions that are performed unilateral and/or without the consent of an international organisation are considered territorial violations.


§ 3.4.15 Historical ties

Most European states have a historical tie with states all over the world. Dorman argues most of these states still have interests in or ties with their former colonies. This could be a reason to be more likely to support an intervention in a state with which an European state has historical ties (Dorman 1995, 111). Since the member states of the EU together had colonial ties with almost all states in the world, it is not interesting to test if the EU has a historical tie with a state. More interesting is to test if the historical tie of some EU member states are of more influence than the tie of other EU member states. This is tested by different hypotheses. The assumption is that greater EU member states have more influence and therefore that the historical ties of these states are more influential. These greater EU member states are the states with the most number of votes in the European Council: Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy. These states together represent more than half of the total population of the EU. Therefore the following hypotheses and conceptual models are formulated (See figure 3.20, 3.21, 3.22 and 3.23):

Hypothesis 15a – historical ties: Germany

The EU will be more likely to deploy a peace operation in states with a historical relation with Germany.


Figure 3.20 Conceptual model – historical ties: Germany



Hypothesis 15b – historical ties: France

The EU will be more likely to deploy a peace operation in states with a historical relation with France.


Figure 3.21 Conceptual model – historical ties: France



Hypothesis 15c – historical ties: United Kingdom

The EU will be more likely to deploy a peace operation in states with a historical relation with the United Kingdom.


Figure 3.22 Conceptual model – historical ties: United Kingdom



Hypothesis 15d – historical ties: Italy

The EU will be more likely to deploy a peace operation in states with a historical relation with Italy.

Figure 3.23 Conceptual model – historical ties: Italy



To measure these hypotheses, the historical tie of a state with an EU member state has to be qualified. A historical tie is accountable if there is a long connection between the former colony and the EU member state. Therefore only historical connections between states longer than fifty years are taken into account.

§ 3.5 Operationalisation of the developments in period of time

To look at developments in the reasons for the deployment of peace operations over time, the arguments of legitimatisation as well as the theoretical grounds are categorised into periods of time. Since the researched period is short, it is doubtful how to categorise the reasons. The easiest and perhaps the clearest categorisation is to make six categories of a year. On grounds of validity of the results this seems the best choice. Although the number of cases in some of the categorised years will be limited, to put more years in one category limits the numbers of categories. This would have a greater impact on the results, because when a reason is named once, it does not have to mean it is a development. When there are more categories it is better to see if a new reason is part of a development or just a one-time experience. Therefore the years 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007 are all categories in the comparison (See figure 3.24).

Figure 3.24 Categories for comparison of periods of time

| | | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 |
|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Reasons for intervention | Arguments of legitimation | | | | | | |
| | Theoretical grounds | | | | | | |

To increase the validity of the research, a reason for intervention must be named several times before it is accounted for. A reason has to be named at least twice in each period of time. This way singular reasons can be excluded from the research. This is in line with the research goal to look at general developments in the EU interventions. Specific reasons for one case must not trouble the general view.

§ 3.6 Operationalisation of the differences between locations

To look at differences between reasons for intervention in locations, the reasons for intervention are categorised by continent. Since there are only twenty cases to study in the period from 2002 until 2007, the validity of the research would suffer if the continents would be subdivided into regions. For some regions there are only one or two cases to study. Since the EU deployed peace operations in three different continents, these continents are the categories in this comparison (See figure 3.25).

Figure 3.25 Categories for comparison of locations

| | | Europe | Africa | Asia |
|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------|--------|------|
| Reasons for intervention | Arguments of legitimation | | | |
| | Theoretical grounds | | | |

The geographical borders of the continents are described in the table below (See figure 3.26). When it is not clear to which continent a state belongs, the state is categorised according to the location of the conflict in the state.

Figure 3.26 Borders of the continents

| | Geographical borders |
|---------------|--|
| Europe | The Arctic Ocean in the north, the Ural Mountains, the Black Sea and Caucasus Mountains in the east, the Mediterranean Sea in the south and the Atlantic Ocean in the west |
| Africa | The Mediterranean Sea in the north, the Suez Canal and the Red Sea in the east, the Indian Ocean in the south-east and the Atlantic Ocean in the west |
| Asia | The Arctic Ocean in the north, the Pacific Ocean in the east, the Indian Ocean in the south and the Suez Canal and Ural Mountains in the west |

The same as the comparison of developments in period of time, a reason for intervention must be named several times before it is accounted for. A reason has to be named at least twice in each period of time. To be accounted as a change, a reason must be named at least in one of the categories and not in at least one of the others. The validity and reliability of such a change will become greater if the reason is named more often.

§ 3.7 Operationalisation of the differences between kinds of operations

To look at differences between kinds of operations the cases are categorised into two categories: civilian and military operations. The EU operations could be divided in much more categories – for instance border operations, police missions, etc. – but than the number of operations in each category would be too small. Therefore the choice is made to make two categories to compare the reasons to intervene. (See figure 3.24).

Figure 3.27 Categories for comparison of kinds of operations

| | | Civilian operations | Military operations |
|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| Reasons for intervention | Arguments of legitimation | | |
| | Theoretical grounds | | |

It is hard to describe the exact distinction between these two categories, since sometimes military personnel is involved in civilian operations, while in other times also civil personnel is involved in military operations. The difference is the task of the operation, but this division is unclear. Therefore this research maintains the division made by the EU itself. In the documents of the EUMS – for instance the bulletin of the EUMS *Impetus* – every operation is qualified as a civil or a military operation. On basis of this distinction, differences and resemblances are analysed.

In the following two chapters all of the above operationalisations are used to measure the arguments of legitimation, test the hypotheses and compare the results.

Chapter 4 - Twenty case studies: European reasons for intervention

In the previous chapter as well the arguments of legitimation as the fifteen theoretical grounds are operationalised. In this chapter the arguments and hypotheses are tested on the twenty cases. First the backgrounds of the different conflicts are described briefly per state or region. Second the arguments of legitimation in the Council Joint Actions are studied and third the fifteen theoretical grounds are measured.

§ 4.1 Backgrounds of the conflicts

Since the EU declared the ESDP operational in the Laeken Declaration in 2001, the EU has decided to deploy twenty peace operations until 2007. As shown in figure 4.1 the first peace operation was decided on in 2002 and deployed in 2003. Many new decisions and deployments followed in the next years. The climax of the period 2002 until 2007 is the year 2005. That year the European Commission agreed on eight Council Joint Actions for new peace operations and that same year eight new operations were deployed while four operations were active already (See figure 4.1).

Figure 4.1: The number of EU peace operations

| | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 |
|-----------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Joint Action decisions | 1 | 3 | 3 | 8 | 2 | 3 |
| Newly deployed operations | --- | 4 | 2 | 8 | 3 | 2 |
| Still active operations | --- | --- | 2 | 4 | 10 | 10 |
| Total active EU operations | --- | 4 | 4 | 12 | 13 | 12 |

Although the EU decided on twenty operations between 2002 and 2007, it doesn't mean the EU is also active in twenty different states. In some states the EU deployed different operations, which work simultaneously or follow-up each other. In the following paragraphs the conflict backgrounds and the different EU operations in the twelve states and regions where the EU deployed operations are described briefly.

§ 4.1.1 Bosnia and Herzegovina

In November 1995 the Dayton Agreement – the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina – ended three and half years of conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This conflict was one of a series of violent conflicts between 1991 and 2001 after the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia fell apart. In Bosnia and Herzegovina a conflict over independence from Yugoslavia started a conflict between the three main ethnic groups in the state, the Bosniaks, the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs. The international community forced the conflict to an end in 1995. First the UN started the peace operation UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in February 1992, which was initially meant to ensure conditions for peace talks and create security. Despite this operation tensions turned into war, first between the Bosniaks and Croats on one side and the Serbs on the other side, later between all three ethnic groups. In March 1994 mediation in the conflict between the Bosniaks and Croats led to the Washington Agreement. Among other events, the fall of Srebrenica and a mortar attack on the market of Sarajevo led to a military intervention of the NATO. In August 1995 a two-week bombing operation – Operation Deliberate Force – was started to weaken the Bosnian Serb army and prevent attacks on UN "safe havens". Next to this use of force,



diplomatic pressure from among others the US, Russia, Germany and France forced the leaders of the different groups to appear at the negotiations in Dayton (Britannica 2009, Bosnia and Herzegovina).

The result of the Dayton Agreement was a division of the state into two entities, which together form a federation. The entity Republika Srpska is mainly Serbian, while the entity Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is mainly Bosniak-Croatian. The power of this new entity is shared by an equal third for each ethnicity. This resulted in a high and unaffordable number of presidents, ministers and members of parliament. An important aspect of the Dayton Agreement was the mandate of the international community to monitor and implement the components of the agreement. Security was provided by an international force, first of UNPROFOR and after December 1995 of NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR), later replaced by NATO's Stabilisation Force (SFOR). Later the influence of the international community grew, when the UN High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina was installed with a mandate to overrule all decision of the Bosnian political leaders if their decisions would not support stabilisation and security (Britannica 2009, Bosnia and Herzegovina).

Almost ten years after the signing of the Dayton Agreement, the international community was still involved in large numbers. Many EU member states were already involved in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO force. Within the CFSP/ESDP the EU could also become involved as leading organisation. The first peace operation of the EU was the EU Police Mission Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM BiH), which was deployed on January 1 2003 to replace the UN International Police Task Force. In line with the Dayton Agreement, EUPM's objective was to establish sustainable policing arrangements under ownership of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A second EU operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was deployed in December 2004. Until then the military aspects of the Dayton Agreement were implemented and guaranteed by the NATO SFOR operation. The mandate of this operation would end in December 2004 and on the Istanbul Summit in June 2004 NATO members agreed on ending the operation to expand the presence of the NATO in Afghanistan. On July 12, 2004 the European Council decided to deploy EU Force Althea (EUFOR Althea) to succeed SFOR. Next to the civilian operation EUPM BiH, the EU would also guarantee security by military presence. On December 2, 2004 EUFOR took over from SFOR. Both EUPM BiH and EUFOR Althea are still active today (EU n.d.).

§ 4.1.2 The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

In 1991 the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) became independent from Yugoslavia, without direct involvement in the different civil wars that resulted after the splintering of Yugoslavia. It was only after the Kosovo war in 1999 and the streams of Albanian refugees, that the already existing tensions between the Macedonian majority and the Albanian minority aggravated and a violent conflict started. Shortly after the Kosovo war Albanian radicals took up the arms against the Macedonian government to pursue Albanian independence. The Albanian rebels were organised in the National Liberation Army (NLA). This civil war was fought from March until June 2001.




The conflict ended with an intervention of a NATO ceasefire monitoring force. On August 13 2001 a peace deal was signed between the Macedonian government and representatives of the ethnic Albanians. This Ohrid Framework Agreement provided for a greater political power and cultural recognition of the Albanian minority. In return the NLA had to disarm and the Albanians had to give up their claim to independence. The implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement was overseen by the NATO, which started operation Essential Harvest to collect and destroy the weapons of the NLA (Britannica 2009, Macedonia).

Until 2007 the European Council decided on three peace operations in the FYROM. The first operation was also the first military operation of the EU. On request of the Macedonian government the European Council decided to deploy EU Force Concordia (EUFOR Concordia). The objective of EUFOR Concordia was to establish a stable secure environment and allow the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. To perform this military operation the EU used the Berlin Plus Agreement to use the assets of the NATO. The operation was deployed from March until December 2003. This military operation was followed by a civilian peace operation. EUFOR Concordia ended in December 2003, since it was no longer necessary for an international force to provide security. This task was handed over to the Macedonian authorities. But on request of the Macedonian government the EU would still help with different parts of the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. Therefore the EU deployed EU Police Mission Proxima (EUPOL Proxima). Objective of the operation was to monitor, mentor and advice the Macedonian police to help fight organised crime and promote European policing standards. It was deployed from December 2003 until December 2005. A third EU peace operation in the FYROM was the follow-up to EUPOL Proxima in December 2005. In the consultations of the EU and the FYROM, the Macedonian government had made clear they would welcome an EU Police Advisory Team (EUPAT) to bridge the time between EUPOL Proxima and a new project by the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS). Therefore the EU deployed EUPAT directly after the end of EUPOL Proxima until the CARDS project started in June 2006 (EU n.d.).

§ 4.1.3 The Democratic Republic of the Congo

Since the Democratic Republic became independent in 1960, the country has a history of conflicts and violence. The new independent state started with chaos: there were mutinies in the army, two provinces attempted to get their own independence, there was serious opposition against the constitution and there was a power struggle in the government itself. The institutions of the Republic of the Congo were weak and underdeveloped. In 1965 Major General Joseph Mobutu seized power by a military coup. Mobutu changed the name of the state to Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and in 1971 again into Republic of Zaïre. He quickly solidified his hold on power, which he held for 32 years by sham elections and use of brutal force. His government was characterised by breaches of human rights, repression and corruption. In 1994 a civil war was started by the great shift in the balance of power and the demographics by the massive inflow of refugees from the conflict in the neighbouring states Rwanda and Burundi. This civil war is also known as the First Congo War. Supported by Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Angola the main opposition party, the Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire (AFDL) overthrew Mobutu in 1997. This was not the end of the conflict, since new opposition was created. In August 1998 the Second Congo War started. This conflict involved seven other African states next to the DRC – Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Zambia, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Ethiopia. On July 17, 1999 the signature of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement imposed a first breakthrough. Next to a cease-fire and the release of prisoners of war, this agreement provided for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force. In February 2000 the UN deployed the Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo (MONUC) to monitor the peace process. A process that knew different setbacks and problems. The cease-fire was only shortly lived upon and the intervention forces of neighbouring states were not willing to leave the DRC. In April 2003 a new step was taken by the signing of the 'Sun City Accord'. This agreement provided for the establishment of a government of unity and eventual elections. In later



agreements an accord was reached between all parties and at the same time an agreement was signed with the foreign states to withdraw their forces from the DRC. A transitional constitution was ratified in 2004 and a unity government, which contained representatives of all the main parties, was formed. The elections, which were scheduled for mid-2005, were postponed for twelve months, but were held quite successfully in 2006. The remaining rebel groups – mainly in the east – are still pressured to end their actions, to end the civil war (Britannica 2009, Congo (Kinshasa)).

The EU is an active supporter of the peace process in the DRC and has deployed five peace operations in the DRC. The first was operation Artemis, which was the first EU operation outside of European territory and the first autonomous military operation. An ethnic conflict erupted in the province of Ituri in the northeast of the DRC in April 2003, after 7.000 Ugandan forces withdrew from the region. To secure the region and protect the fragile peace process, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan called for an temporary multinational force in the region, until MONUC could be reinforced and take over control. The EU responded to this request of the UN. On June 5, 2003 the European Council decided to deploy operation Artemis in the DRC. Since the French government had already shown interest in the operation, operation Artemis became an EU operation under French leadership. A total force of about 1.800 personnel was deployed in Ituri from June until September 2003. In September the responsibility for the region was handed over to MONUC (Britannica 2009, Congo (Kinshasa)).

Only one and a half year later the EU returned to the DRC by deploying the EU Police Mission Kinshasa (EUPOL Kinshasa). This was the first civilian operation of the EU outside European territory. The security in the DRC was still maintained by the UN operation MONUC. The UN needed additional training assistance for police reforms and requested UN members to support an Integrated Police Unit. Also the government of the DRC requested the EU to assist in establishing this unit. On December 9, 2004 the European Council decided to deploy EUPOL Kinshasa. The operation was deployed from April 2005 until June 2007. Next to EUPOL Kinshasa the EU established an EU advisory and assistance mission for security reform (EUSEC RDC). Following a request of the government of the DRC, the European Council decided on this operation on May 2, 2005. EUSEC RDC was deployed on June 2005 and is still active today. The objective of the operation was to provide advice and assistance to the authorities in charge of security, while promoting human rights, and international humanitarian law, gender issues and children affected by armed conflicts, democratic standards, principles of good public management, transparency and observance of the rule of law. A third simultaneous EU operation in the DRC was deployed in June 2006. To support the UN operation MONUC during the general elections in the DRC, the UN invited the EU to deploy a military operation. EU Force République Démocratique du Congo (EUFOR RDC) was authorised by the UN on April 25, 2006 and on April 27 the European Council decided to deploy the peace operation. The operation was conducted in full agreement with the government of the DRC and in close co-ordination with MONUC. EUFOR RDC was ended on November 30, 2006 (EU n.d.).

A fifth EU peace operation in the DRC was the successor of EUPOL Kinshasa. On June 5, 2007 the European Council decided to deploy a new police operation to follow upon EUPOL Kinshasa. EU Police Mission République Démocratique du Congo (EUPOL RDC) should help the authorities with security sector reform, especially in the domain of police and justice. The operation must complement the military operation EUSEC RDC. The operation was deployed in July 2007 and is still active today (EU n.d.).

§ 4.1.4 Georgia

Georgia became independent on April 9, 1991, shortly before the collapse of the USSR. After a coup end 1991, the state became embroiled in a civil war that lasted until 1995. In 1995 the central government was restored, but during the civil war the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia had declared independence and separated from the state with support of Russia. In 2003 the president of Georgia was deposed by the Rose Revolution, a protest led by the opposition after fraud with parliamentary elections. In 2004 opposition leader Mikheil Saakashvili was elected president. The new government

promised to resolve the political crisis, fight the corruption and resolve the unresolved questions of separatism of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Britannica 2009, Georgia).

To help Georgia in the reform process, the Georgian government requested the EU for support. In response the European Council decided to deploy the first EU Rule of Law operation (EUJUST Themis). The operation was deployed on July 2004 and its objective was to assist the Georgian authorities addressing challenges in the criminal justice system and develop the reform process. Within the framework of the operation senior and highly experienced personnel supported, mentored and advised the Georgian authorities. In July 2005 the operation was ended, after its main aims were achieved (EU n.d.).



§ 4.1.5 The Republic of Iraq

Iraq was ruled by the Ba'athparty of Saddam Hussein from 1979 until 2003. This reign was characterised by violence like the Iran-Iraq War, the invasion of Kuwait and the following Gulf War, human right abuses and genocide. On March 20, 2003, a coalition led by the US invaded Iraq. This invasion was not supported by an UN resolution, although the US points at violations of UN Resolution 687 (1991). It was not until 2004 that the international force in Iraq was legalised by the UN in Resolution 1546 (2004), which stated to end the occupation and recover a fully sovereign and independent Iraq. At the same time the government authority was transferred from the Coalition Provisional Authority to an Iraqi Interim Government. Permanent elections were held in October 2005 (Britannica 2009, Iraq).



The EU wanted to contribute to a secure, stable, unified, prosperous and democratic Iraq within the framework of UN Resolution 1546. Therefore the EU sent a fact-finding mission to Iraq. After studying the results of this mission, the EU declared its readiness to launch a rule of law operation for Iraq. Following an invitation of the Iraqi government, the European Council decided to deploy an EU Integrated Rule of Law operation (EUJUST LEX). The objective of the operation was to strengthen the police, judiciary and penitentiary systems and promote human rights. The operation was deployed in July 2005 and is still active today (EU n.d.).

§ 4.1.6 The Republic of Sudan

Sudan became independent of the United Kingdom and Egypt on January 1, 1956. Already a year before a civil war had begun between the predominantly Arab and Muslim north and the Christian and Animistic south. This first Sudanese Civil War lasted until 1972, with the Addis Ababa Agreement. In this agreement the southern Sudan became autonomous. Under these conditions ten years of relative peace followed, until the conflict was blazed again in 1983. President Gaafar Nimeiry violated



the agreement by trying to create a federal Sudan including the south. After he imposed the Islamic law Shari'a on whole Sudan, including the non-Muslim south, the Second Sudanese Civil War started. The southern Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) fought the central government for twenty years. The state became divided on racial, religious and regional grounds and estimated two million people were killed and four million people were displaced. The conflict led to food shortages, starvation and malnutrition. It was not until 2003 that peace talks between the SPLA and the government made progress. On January 9, 2005 the Nairobi Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed. Southern Sudan was granted autonomy and a referendum over independence in six years. To support the peace process the UN Security Council established the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). The mission must support the implementation of the peace agreement and offer humanitarian assistance and protection of human rights (Britannica 2009, Sudan).

At the same time a new conflict erupted in the province of Darfur in west Sudan. This conflict was a continuation of tribal clashes in the region since the early 1970s. In 1994 the central government claimed success over the rebels, but in 2003 the fighting resumed. This violent conflict is named the worst humanitarian crisis of the 21st century. Already 2.5 million people have been displaced and estimate 200,000 to 400,000 people are killed. On May 5 2006 the government and the largest rebel group signed the Darfur Peace Agreement. This agreement was supervised by the African Union (AU). A problem was that the agreement was only signed by one rebel group and not by all groups. So the violence continued and the government and government sponsored militias launched new offensives. Despite different new agreements, the violence continued (Britannica 2009, Sudan).

In 2004 the AU launched the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to monitor a cease-fire in the Darfur crisis. On July 18, 2005 the AU requested the EU for further support for the enhanced operation in Darfur. On July 20 the European Council decided to launch the EU support operation to AMIS II. To uphold African ownership the EU backed the AU's political, military and police efforts by equipment and assets, planning, technical assistance, military observers, tactical and strategic transportation and training. The operation was deployed from July 2005 until December 2007, when the AU/UN hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) took over (EU n.d.).

§ 4.1.7 The Republic of Indonesia

Aceh is a region of Indonesia on the northern tip of the island of Sumatra. The region has a long history of conflicts for independence and autonomy. Directly after Indonesia claimed independence after the Second World War, a civil war erupted in Aceh which was won by the faction that supported the Indonesian state. After the transfer of authority from the Dutch government to Indonesia in 1949, new tensions rose between the Islamic people of Aceh and the mostly Christian Batak people. In 1953 the tensions led to a rebellion. In 1959 the Indonesian government gave Aceh a special status with a great degree of autonomy. In 1963 a peace agreement was signed, which ended the Islamic Rebellion. During the 1970s new tensions rose between the central government and the people of Aceh over the distribution of profits of the exploitation of the natural resources of Aceh. A separatist group called the Free Aceh Movement called for independence of Aceh in 1976. At first the group had few followers, until the Indonesian government took repressive measures after different incidents during the late 1980s. During the 1990s the free Aceh Movement renewed its activities, with large support from the Acehnese people. Further autonomy and the right for Islamic law tempered the conflict, until new repressive measures were taken. In 2003 the Free Aceh Movement again started an offensive. The conflict was still



going on when the Tsunami disaster struck Aceh in December 2004. This disaster helped to solve the conflict after 29 years of violence. On August 15, 2005 a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement. Aceh would receive a special autonomy and the government troops would withdraw in exchange for the disarmament of the Free Aceh Movement (Britannica 2009, Indonesia).

To support the peace agreement the EU together with contributing states of ASEAN, Norway and Switzerland provided monitors. On request of the Indonesian government and fully supported by the Free Aceh Movement the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) was deployed on September 15, 2005. The AMM must monitor the implementations of the Memorandum of Understanding, like the decommissioning of the armaments of the Free Aceh Movement and the relocation of Indonesian military and police forces. The operation was concluded on December 15, 2006, after local elections were held on the 11th of December (EU n.d.).

§ 4.1.8 Ukraine and Moldova

Both Ukraine and Moldova are former republics of the Soviet Union. On August 24, 1991 Ukraine declared independence, followed only three days later by Moldova. The Moldovan region of Transnistria east of the Dniester river at the Ukrainian border, which is largely inhabited by ethnic Russians and Ukrainians, feared the Moldovan nationalism and also declared itself independent. This led to a war between Moldova and separatist forces in Transnistria in 1992. After Russia intervened on behalf of Transnistria a cease-fire was concluded in July 1992. This cease-fire held, although the status of the territory remained unresolved. The



The intervening Russian forces remained stationed in Transnistria after the conflict. The status of Transnistria is still negotiated. The unresolved question over authority led to a problem for border management between Moldova and Ukraine along the border in Transnistria. Therefore the Presidents of Moldova and Ukraine requested the EU for support in a joint letter (Britannica 2009, Ukraine, Moldova).

After a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the European Commission and the governments of Moldova and Ukraine, the European Council decided on November 7, 2005 to deploy the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM Moldova/Ukraine). EUBAM is an advisory operation, which aims to improve the capacity of the Moldovan and Ukrainian border and customs services by providing advice and training. The operation was deployed on November 30, 2005 and is still active today (EU n.d.).

§ 4.1.9 The Palestinian Territories

After the Ottoman Empire collapsed the British Mandate for Palestine was established in 1922. The future of Palestine was a subject of disputes between Arabs and Jews. In 1947 the UN proposed a plan for the division of the mandated territory between an Arab and a Jewish state, with a special status for the city of Jerusalem. On November 1947 the partition plan passed the UN General Assembly. Before the plan could be implemented, Israel declared its independence on May 14, 1948, one day



before the expiration of the British Mandate. The surrounding Arab states responded by declaring war. The Arab-Israeli war was won by Israel and concluded by the Armistice Agreement in March 1949. After the war Israel controlled many of the regions that according to the plan of the UN were designated for the Arab state, while the regions under Arab control became under the control of Jordan and Egypt. During the Six-Day War in 1967 Israel captured and controlled both territories. In October 1974 the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) was founded to represent the Palestine people. The PLO's goal was ending the occupation and freedom for all Palestinian people. The discontent with the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the occupation of southern Lebanon turned into Palestinian protest action known as the First Intifada. This Intifada started in 1987 and ended in 1993 with the signing of the Oslo Accords. The Accords provided for the creation of a Palestinian Authority to administrate the regions the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the withdrawal of the Israel Defence Forces from these regions. After five years a permanent agreement would be negotiated. Although this period expired in 1999, no final agreement was concluded. In September 2000 the Second Intifada started. A new solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was proposed by the Quartet – the US, the EU, Russia and the UN. This Roadmap for Peace called for an Israeli and a Palestinian state. In exchange for statehood the Palestinian Authority had to make democratic reforms and abandon the use of terrorism. Israel on the other hand had to end the settlement activities on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Britannica 2009, Palestinian Authority, Israel).

As part of the Quartet the EU supported the implementation of the Roadmap. To do so the EU launched two CFSP/ESDP operations in the Palestinian Territories. The first operation is the EU Border Assistance Mission Rafah (EUBAM Rafah). As part of the Roadmap the Israel Defence Forces should withdraw from the Gaza Strip. A result of this withdrawal was the closure of the vitally important Rafah Crossing Point at the border of the Palestinian Territories and Egypt. Because Israel would not hand over this crossing to the Palestinian Authority for security concerns, the EU deployed an operation to provide third party presence and build confidence between the two parties. EUBAM Rafah was deployed in November 2005 and is still active today. The second operation of the EU is a police operation on the request of the Palestinian Authority. EU Police Co-ordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS) must support the Palestinian Authority in establishing sustainable and effective police arrangements. EUPOL COPPS was deployed in January 2006 and is still active today (EU n.d.).

§ 4.1.10 Kosovo

The region that is nowadays known as Kosovo became Serbian territory during the Balkan Wars early 1910s. As Serbian territory it became part of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and later of the Federal Yugoslavia. The history of Kosovo within the Serbian republic is characterised by inter-ethnic tensions between the Albanian and Serb people. Although Kosovo gained limited autonomy, the Kosovar Albanians were harassed and Albanian protests were suppressed. During the 1980s the tensions worsened. The Serbian president Slobodan Milošević reduced the autonomy of the region and culturally oppressed the Albanian population. The Albanians reacted



by a non-violent separatist movement to achieve an independent Kosovo. In a referendum in September 1991 98 percent of the Kosovan population voted for independence. This referendum was declared illegal by the Serbian authorities. The following years the Serbian oppression of Kosovo continued and led to a radicalisation of the Albanians. The non-violent resistance turned into violent resistance after the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was founded in 1996. There was less international interest in Kosovo during the disintegration of Yugoslavia. After the Bosnian War the KLA started an


offensive against Serbian forces, known as the Kosovo War. During 1998 the conflict came under the attention of the West. After a failed cease-fire in 1998, the Račak massacre in January 1999 and reports of ethnic cleansing, an international conference was convened in March 1999. This conference prepared an agreement known as the Rambouillet Accords. According to this agreement Kosovo's autonomy would be restored, the Serbian forces would withdraw from Kosovo and a NATO peacekeeping force would be deployed. This was unacceptable for the Serbian government. To force the Serbian force out of Kosovo, NATO started a bombing campaign from March 24 to June 11 1999. Finally Serbian president Milošević accepted the conditions and on June 12 NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR) entered Kosovo backed by UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999). The UN resolution also placed Kosovo under interim UN administration. To administer Kosovo the UN deployed the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) (Britannica 2009, Kosovo, Serbia).

While the discussions about the future status of Kosovo continued, the UN indicated the organisation would be fully engaged with Kosovo until the end of resolution 1244. Because Kosovo would need international support on the medium term, the European Council expressed the willingness to play a role in the nearby future. To prepare for this future operation, the EU send a fact-finding mission to Kosovo early 2006. The recommendation of this mission was to establish a planning team to prepare for the future operation. This was welcomed by the provisional institutions of self-government of Kosovo and the UN Special Representative in Kosovo. On April 10 2006 the EU Planning Team for Kosovo (EUPT Kosovo) was deployed. Important is the notice that this decision of the EU was not intended to prejudge the outcome of the ongoing debate over the future status of Kosovo. After the results of EUPT Kosovo were reported, the European Council decided to deploy a rule of law operation in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo) in February 2008 (EU n.d.).

§ 4.1.11 The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

Although Afghanistan was never a colony, the United Kingdom had great influence in the state until King Amanullah Khan acceded to the throne in 1919. As a monarchy, Afghanistan's longest period of stability was under the rule of King Zahir Shah from 1933 until 1973. In 1973 the monarchy was overthrown by a coup and Afghanistan became a republic. In 1978 the regime was overthrown again and the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan came into power. Ever since Afghanistan is a permanent state of civil war. The new government was closely allied with the Soviets, while a great part of the population opposed the secular nature of the government. This led to different violent conflicts. On December 24, 1979 the Soviet Union intervened Afghanistan on behalf of the Afghan government. The US saw the opportunity to weaken the Soviet influence by supporting the Islamic forces against the pro-Soviet government. Mujahideen forces violently resisted the government. The following ten years of Soviet occupation led to many killings and over five million refugees. In 1989 the Soviet forces retreated from Afghanistan after being unsuccessful to destroy the Mujahideen forces. After the Soviet Union left Afghanistan, the US lost interest in Afghanistan and the state was left war-ravaged. The civil war between the Mujahideen forces and the government continued until the government was overthrown in 1992. After the Mujahideen took power, the unity between the different factions evaporated and the civil war continued in a state of warlordism. During these fights the Taliban Movement was formed in 1994. The Taliban took the capital Kabul in 1996 and quickly controlled 95 percent of the state (Britannica 2009, Afghanistan).

The interest of the international community turned to Afghanistan again after the terrorist attacks in the US on September 11 2001. In response to the attacks the US




threatened to overthrow the Taliban government for refusing to hand over Osama Bin Laden and other Al-Qaeda leaders. To destroy the Al-Qaeda terrorist training camps in Afghanistan the US launched a military campaign – operation Enduring Freedom – together with some allies. The Taliban government was overthrown and later replaced by the Afghanistan Transitional Administration. This US-led invasion of Afghanistan was followed by a NATO-led security and development mission established by the UN Security Council Resolution 1386 (2001). The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) first was charged with securing Kabul and the surrounding areas, but in October 2003 it was authorised to expand through the whole of Afghanistan. After the removal of the Taliban government the Taliban continued as a resistance movement, continuing the civil war against the new government and the international forces (Britannica 2009, Afghanistan).

Early 2006 the EU was one of the participants of the London Conference on Afghanistan. The result of this conference – the Afghanistan Compact – established a framework for the international co-operation with Afghanistan for the next five years. In November 2006 the EU and the Afghan government agreed on a joint declaration 'Committing to a new EU Afghan Partnership'. In this agreement the EU committed itself to a secure, stable, free, prosperous and democratic Afghanistan. As a contribution to the process in Afghanistan the European Council decided to deploy a police operation after a fact-finding mission concluded this would provide added value. The UN Security Council and the Afghan government welcomed this decision. The EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan) aims at the establishment of an effective police system under Afghan ownership. The operation monitors, mentors, advises and trains Afghan police officers on the central, regional and provincial levels. The operation was deployed on June 15 2007 and is still active today (EU n.d.).

§ 4.1.12 The Republic of Chad and the Central African Republic

Chad and the CAR are two neighbouring states at the western border of the Sudanese region Darfur. As described above in paragraph 4.1.6, a humanitarian crisis is occurring in this region. This crisis also influences both neighbouring states, on top of the internal conflicts of both states. Both Chad and the CAR are former French colonies that became independent in 1960. In Chad the independence was followed by a civil war in 1965, because of tensions between the Islamic north and the ruling south. In 1979 the northern rebels conquered the capital N'Djamena. This did not end the fighting, because the different rebel factions contended for the power. In June 1982 former rebel leader Hissène Habré won this battle. He consolidated a dictatorship based on corruption and (ethnic) violence, by uniting the Chadians against Libyan forces. In 1990 general Idriss Déby overthrew him. Under his rule the situation in Chad seemed to change positively, but in 2005 a new civil war broke out. Rebels supported by the Sudanese government attacked villages and towns, stole cattle, murdered people and burned houses. On December 23, 2005 the government of Chad declared war on Sudan because of this support. On May 3, 2007 this conflict ended by the signing of an agreement. Though this did not end the rebel's attacks (Britannica 2009, Chad).



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After its independence in 1960 non-democratic chosen presidents ruled the CAR for three decades. Within the CAR the opposition against these presidents grew, but it was not until the end of the Cold War that the international community did support the opposition. In 1993 the first democratic elections were held with support of different donor states and the UN. Ange-Félix Patassé won these elections. During his rule he replaced many of the supporters of the former presidents out of the south for his supporters out of the north. The tensions grew and Patassé's public support steadily decreased. In 1996-1997 there were three army mutinies against the government, which led to widespread destruction and raising ethnic tensions. With support of foreign forces

Patassé regained control. On January 25, 1997 the Bangui Peace Accords provide for an inter-African military mission. In 1998 this mission was replaced by the UN Mission MINURCAT. Despite the decrease of support Patassé won his second elections in 1999. His second period of rule was again characterised by failed coups and distrust. On October 25, 2002 general Francois Bozizé launched an attack from Chad on the government. In March 2003 they successfully overthrow Patassé. After a transitional period he was elected president in 2005, although Patassé was not allowed to run. During the rule of Bozizé rebel troops started to attack different towns and cities. The rebels accused Bozizé of ruling on an ethnic base and replacing people from other ethnic groups out of important political and economic functions. The government of the CAR accused Sudan of supporting the rebels. The civil war ended when the rebels and the government signed a peace agreement on April 13, 2007 (Britannica 2009, Central African Republic).

Main problem for the conflicts in Chad and the CAR are the diffuse borders. Fighters could retreat and prepare attacks from neighbouring states. Also the fighters could not be recognised between the streams of refugees and hide in refugee camps around the borders between Chad, the CAR and the Sudanese region of Darfur. In UN Security Council Resolution 1706 (2006) the UN reaffirmed that the conflict in Darfur could negatively effect the rest of Sudan as well as the rest of region, especially Chad and the CAR. Therefore the Security Council requested for the deployment of a multidimensional UN mission to Chad and CAR. To bridge this time the EU indicated it was willing to deploy a military bridging operation. In UN Security Council Resolution 1778 (2007) the establishment of a UN mission in Chad and the CAR was approved and the EU was authorised to deploy a military operation for twelve months. The EU Force in Chad/CAR (EUFOR CHAD/CAR) should improve security in eastern Chad and the north-east of the CAR. More specifically the operation aims to protect civilians and refugees, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and ensure the security of UN personnel. The operation is deployed on January 28, 2005 and is intended to be followed by the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and in Chad (MINURCAT) after a year (EU n.d.).

§ 4.2 The arguments of legitimation of the EU operations

To study the arguments of legitimation the Council Joint Actions of the twenty cases are analysed. The results show that the different arguments that are used in the Joint Actions can be brought back to a total of eleven arguments. These eleven arguments of legitimation are:

1. Based upon the implementation of an international (peace) agreement
2. Based upon an UN Security Council Resolution
3. Conflict is considered a threat to regional/international peace and security
4. Based upon the EU Stabilisation and Association policy
5. The EU has expressed the willingness to act
6. Based upon request or invitation of the host state
7. Based upon request of the UN or the AU
8. Succeeds a UN or NATO operation
9. Precedes a UN or NATO operation
10. Supports a UN or AU operation
11. References to continue the work of earlier EU operations

The results of the analysis of the twenty Council Joint Actions are described in figure 4.2 below. An argument is only recorded if it is explicitly stated in the Joint Action. For instance, if there is an international peace agreement, but this is not named in the Joint Action it is also not recorded in the table (See figure 4.2).

Figure 4.2: The arguments of legitimation per EU operation

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 |
|--------------------------------------|----|----|----|----|----|-----------------|----|----|---|----|----|
| EUPM BiH | X | X | | X | X | X | | X | | | |
| EUFOR Concordia | X | X | | X | X | X | | X | | | |
| Artemis | X | X | | | | | X | | | X | |
| EUPOL Proxima | X | X | X | X | X | X | | | | | |
| EUJUST Themis | | | X | | | X | | | | | |
| EUFOR Althea | X | X | | X | X | | | X | | | X |
| EUPOL Kinshasa | X | X | X | | X | X | X | | | X | X |
| EUJUST LEX | | X | | | X | X | | | | | |
| EUSEC RDC | X | X | X | | X | X | | | | | X |
| Amis II Support | X | X | | | | | X | | | X | |
| AMM | X | | | | | X | | | | | |
| EUBAM Ukraine/Moldova | | | | | | X | | | | | |
| EUPOL COPPS | X | | | | X | X | | | | | |
| EUPAT | X | X | | X | | X | | | | | X |
| EUBAM Rafah | X | | | | X | X | | | | | |
| EUPT Kosovo | | X | | X | X | X ¹⁷ | | | | | |
| EUFOR RDC | X | X | | | | X | X | | | X | X |
| EUPOL Afghanistan | X | X | | | | X | | | | | |
| EUPOL RDC | X | X | | | X | X | | | | | X |
| EUFOR Chad/CAR | | X | | | X | X | | | X | | |
| Percentage of total EU operations | 75 | 75 | 20 | 30 | 60 | 85 | 20 | 15 | 5 | 20 | 30 |

The most outstanding results are the records for the arguments (1) 'implementation of a (international) peace agreement', (2) 'UN Security Council Resolution', (5) 'the willingness of the EU to act' and (6) 'a request or invitation of the host state'. In 85 percent of the cases the EU is requested or invited – usually after the EU first expressed its willingness to operate – to deploy a peace operation. If we also take in account the argument (7) 'a request of the UN/AU' for support of the EU, the total percentage of EU operation based on a request is even 95 percent. The only exception is the military operation in Bosnia in 2004. Also of great importance are the arguments of legitimation based upon the implementation of an international (peace) agreement or a UN Security Council Resolution. In 75 percent of the cases, the EU points at an agreement. Also in 75 percent of the cases a UN resolution is named. This percentage would also be higher if we would not take into account the operations that are deployed to support governments with reform without a direct conflict situation like Georgia and Ukraine/Moldova.

Less named is the argument (3) 'considered a threat to regional/international peace and security'. Although many conflicts could be named a threat, the Council Joint Actions only named this reason four times. This is strange since the goal of the operations should be to support peace and security. Other less named arguments are (4) 'EU Stabilisation and Association policy' (30%), (8) 'succeeds a UN/NATO operation' (15%), (9) 'precedes a UN/NATO operation' (5%) and (10) 'support a UN/AU operation' (20%). Another less named argument is (11) 'references to continue the work of earlier EU operations'. Thirty percent is low, but since a reference to an earlier operation is only possible if the EU deploys two or more operations in a state, it's relatively high. In twelve cases it is impossible to refer to earlier operations since there were no operations in that state or region before. In fact this argument is used six out of eight times it could be used.

¹⁷ Although Kosovo didn't have an official government, the EU was welcomed by as well the UN Special Representative for Kosovo and the Kosovar Provisional Institutions of Self Government.

§ 4.3 The hypothesis on the protection of territory

This hypothesis measures the fear for overspill of negative effects of the conflict to the territory of the EU. This is measured by quantitative analysis of articles in The Guardian, Le Monde and Die Welt in the year before the decision of the European Council to deploy a peace operation. This study is performed by search terms in Lexis Nexis for these periods of time. Since the negative effects of the conflicts like refugees or criminality are researched and not the possibility a territorial conflict with the EU, the broad search terms 'threat EU', 'drohung EU' and 'menace UE' are used in combination with the names of the states. The number of articles in the different newspapers is shown in the table below (See figure 4.3).

Figure 4.3: The scores on the hypothesis on the protection of territory

| | The Guardian | Die Welt | Le Monde | Score | Conclusion |
|--------------------------------------|--------------|----------|----------|-------|---|
| EUPM BiH | 11 | 5 | 22 | 5 | Low |
| EUFOR Concordia | 6 | 1 | 9 | 3 | None |
| Artemis | 0 | 0 | 12 | 2 | None |
| EUPOL Proxima | 6 | 3 | 6 | 3 | None |
| EUJUST Themis | 4 | 0 | 12 | 3 | None |
| EUFOR Althea | 7 | 2 | 21 | 4 | Low |
| EUPOL Kinshasa | 1 | 1 | 8 | 3 | None |
| EUJUST LEX | 92 | 15 | 313 | 9 | Medium |
| EUSEC RDC | 1 | 1 | 8 | 3 | None |
| Amis II Support | 10 | 2 | 31 | 5 | Low |
| AMM | 9 | 0 | 26 | 4 | Low |
| EUBAM Ukraine/Moldova | 1 | 0 | 9 | 2 | None |
| EUPOL COPPS | 8 | 1 | 8 | 3 | None |
| EUPAT | 3 | 1 | 3 | 3 | None |
| EUBAM Rafah | 5 | 1 | 8 | 3 | None |
| EUPT Kosovo | 5 | 1 | 10 | 3 | None |
| EUFOR RDC | 1 | 1 | 9 | 3 | None |
| EUPOL Afghanistan | 16 | 5 | 60 | 6 | Low |
| EUPOL RDC | 2 | 1 | 16 | 4 | Low |
| EUFOR Chad/CAR | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | None |
| Percentage of total EU operations | | | | | 65% none 30% low 5% medium 0% high |

The results of this measurement show fear for overspill of the negative effects of conflicts to the territory of the EU is no explanation for EU interventions. In most cases the fear can be considered completely absent, in some cases it is low. The only case in which a more serious relation between threats and the EU is found, is Iraq. But still this case is considered a medium fear for overspill. Based on these results this hypothesis is falsified as a singular explanation for EU interventions. Despite this conclusion it is remarkable to see how different the search results are for the three different newspapers. All cases score way higher in Le Monde and way lower in Die Welt. The trends are the same, Iraq scores highest, followed by Afghanistan and Sudan.

§ 4.4 The hypothesis on the protection of citizens

To measure this hypothesis the first step would be to look at the number of EU citizens living in the states of the cases. The second step would be to look at the threat to these citizens by qualitative analysis of newspapers. The Eurostat database doesn't contain the total number of EU citizens living abroad. It only contains the data of the yearly number of immigrants and emigrants for these states to and from the EU. Therefore this hypothesis can't be measured.

§ 4.5 The hypothesis on the protection of friendly governments

To measure if the government of the state is considered a special friend of the EU at the moment of the decision of the European Council to deploy a peace operation, the level of trust between the EU and the government is measured. Therefore two indicators are used. The first indicator measures if the state is an ally of the EU and is a member or observer of the NATO. If a state is member of the NATO's Partnership for Peace Program, this is measured as an observer. The second indicator measures if the state has an economic agreement, a partnership or an association agreement with the EU. On the first indicator states can score on a scale from zero to two, with zero is no member of observer of either organisation, one is observer of at least one of the organisations and two is member of at least one of the organisations. On the second indicator states can score on a scale from zero to three, by which zero is no agreement, one is an economic agreement, two is a neighbourhood partnership and three is an association agreement (See appendix D). The total score of every state is measured on a scale from zero until twelve. In the table below the different scores for the governments of the states the EU has decided to deploy a peace operation is shown, together with the conclusion that can be drawn from the total score (See figure 4.4).

Figure 4.4: The scores on the hypothesis on the protection of friendly governments

| | NATO | Agreement | Total score | Conclusion |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------|---|-------------|---|
| EUPM BiH | 0 | 1 | 2 | No special friend |
| EUFOR Concordia | 1 | 3 | 9 | Special friend |
| Artemis | 0 | 1 | 2 | No special friend |
| EUPOL Proxima | 1 | 3 | 9 | Special friend |
| EUJUST Themis | 0 | 1 | 2 | No special friend |
| EUFOR Althea | 0 | 1 | 2 | No special friend |
| EUPOL Kinshasa | 0 | 1 | 2 | No special friend |
| EUJUST LEX | 0 | 1 | 2 | No special friend |
| EUSEC RDC | 0 | 1 | 2 | No special friend |
| Amis II Support | 0 | 1 | 2 | No special friend |
| AMM | 0 | 1 | 2 | No special friend |
| EUBAM Ukraine/Moldova | 1 | 2 | 7 | Special friend |
| EUPOL COPPS | 0 | 2 | 4 | No special friend |
| EUPAT | 1 | 3 | 9 | Special friend |
| EUBAM Rafah | 0 | 2 | 4 | No special friend |
| EUPT Kosovo | 0 | 0 | 0 | No special friend |
| EUFOR RDC | 0 | 1 | 2 | No special friend |
| EUPOL Afghanistan | 0 | 1 | 2 | No special friend |
| EUPOL RDC | 0 | 1 | 2 | No special friend |
| EUFOR Chad/CAR | 0 | 1 | 2 | No special friend |
| | 0 | 1 | 2 | |
| Percentage of total EU operations | 20% observer 80% no relation | 5% no agreement 65% economic 15% ENP 15% association | | 20% special friend 80% no special friend |

Only four EU peace operations are deployed in states with a special relation with the EU. The hypothesis states that the EU would be more likely to deploy a peace operation if a friendly government is threatened. This data is no proof for that hypothesis. Most of the states in which the EU intervened did only have an economic agreement with the EU, but that is quite normal since almost all states have an economic relation with the EU. The only exception is Kosovo, which was no official state at that moment. But Serbia – to which Kosovo belonged – was negotiating an association agreement at that time.

§ 4.6 The hypothesis on terrorism

This hypothesis measures the influence of perceived terrorist links on the decision of the European Council to deploy a peace operation. This is measured by quantitative analysis of articles in The Guardian, Le Monde and Die Welt in the year before the decision of the European Council to deploy a peace operation. This study is done by search terms in Lexis Nexis for these periods of time. The terms used are 'terrorism', 'terrorismus' and 'terrorisme' in combination with the names of the states. The number of articles in the different newspapers is shown in the table below (See figure 4.5).

Figure 4.5: The scores on the hypothesis on terrorism

| | The Guardian | Die Welt | Le Monde | Score | Conclusion |
|--------------------------------------|--------------|----------|----------|-------|---|
| EUPM BiH | 93 | 95 | 56 | 9 | Medium |
| EUFOR Concordia | 21 | 0 | 13 | 4 | Low |
| Artemis | 9 | 24 | 12 | 5 | Low |
| EUPOL Proxima | 17 | 0 | 17 | 4 | Low |
| EUJUST Themis | 50 | 25 | 57 | 8 | Medium |
| EUFOR Althea | 41 | 49 | 38 | 9 | Medium |
| EUPOL Kinshasa | 12 | 5 | 17 | 5 | Low |
| EUJUST LEX | 1459 | 783 | 1231 | 12 | High |
| EUSEC RDC | 10 | 15 | 8 | 4 | Low |
| Amis II Support | 56 | 48 | 29 | 9 | Medium |
| AMM | 91 | 52 | 51 | 9 | Medium |
| EUBAM Ukraine/Moldova | 5 | 3 | 11 | 4 | Low |
| EUPOL COPPS | 271 | 95 | 94 | 10 | High |
| EUPAT | 5 | 0 | 5 | 2 | None |
| EUBAM Rafah | 276 | 86 | 89 | 10 | High |
| EUPT Kosovo | 34 | 36 | 18 | 8 | Medium |
| EUFOR RDC | 5 | 8 | 7 | 3 | None |
| EUPOL Afghanistan | 642 | 373 | 229 | 12 | High |
| EUPOL RDC | 4 | 26 | 7 | 5 | Low |
| EUFOR Chad/CAR | 0 | 2 | 7 | 2 | None |
| Percentage of total EU operations | | | | | 15% none 35% low 30% medium 20% high |

Besides the amazing result of the search on Iraq, followed by the results on Afghanistan and the Palestinian Territories, the most remarkable result is the spread of the percentages over the categories. The EU deploys peace operations in states that are highly associated with terrorism as well as states that are not at all associated with terrorism. Despite the fact terrorism is named an important issue in the European foreign policy, these results don't proof it to be a decisive factor in the decision-making process of the EU.

§ 4.7 The hypothesis on non-proliferation

This hypothesis measures the influence of perceived proliferation ideas on the decision of the European Council to deploy a peace operation. This study is done by search terms in Lexis Nexis for these period of time. The terms used are 'nuclear proliferation', 'Massenvernichtungswaffen proliferation' and 'prolifération nucléaire' in combination with the names of the states. The result of this quantitative measurement of the articles in The Guardian, Le Monde and Die Welt is shown in the table below (See figure 4.6).

Figure 4.6: The scores on the hypothesis on non-proliferation

| | The Guardian | Die Welt | Le Monde | Score | Conclusion |
|--------------------------------------|--------------|----------|----------|-------|--|
| EUPM BiH | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | None |
| EUFOR Concordia | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | None |
| Artemis | 2 | 0 | 2 | 2 | None |
| EUPOL Proxima | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | None |
| EUJUST Themis | 5 | 0 | 5 | 2 | None |
| EUFOR Althea | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | None |
| EUPOL Kinshasa | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | None |
| EUJUST LEX | 67 | 9 | 57 | 7 | Medium |
| EUSEC RDC | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | None |
| Amis II Support | 3 | 0 | 2 | 2 | None |
| AMM | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | None |
| EUBAM Ukraine/Moldova | 2 | 0 | 4 | 2 | None |
| EUPOL COPPS | 10 | 1 | 0 | 2 | None |
| EUPAT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | None |
| EUBAM Rafah | 2 | 1 | 0 | 2 | None |
| EUPT Kosovo | 2 | 0 | 2 | 2 | None |
| EUFOR RDC | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | None |
| EUPOL Afghanistan | 21 | 1 | 8 | 4 | Low |
| EUPOL RDC | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | None |
| EUFOR Chad/CAR | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | None |
| Percentage of total EU operations | | | | | 90% none 5% low 5% medium 0% high |

In ninety percent of the case the host state is not associated with proliferation issues. In five percent there is a low connection (Afghanistan) and in another five percent there is a medium association (Iraq). Based upon these results non-proliferation can be ruled out as decisive factor in the decision-making process of the EU. Again the differences between the results of the three newspapers are remarkable. For these results cases score higher in the Guardian and again lower in Die Welt. It is consistent that the highest result for Die Welt is also the highest total result: the medium score of the Iraq case.

§ 4.8 The hypothesis on economic interests

To measure the influence of economic interests on the decision of the EU to deploy a peace operation in a state or region, three indicators would be used: import, export and direct investment. But because the direct investment data of Eurostat does not contain the results of the majority of cases, this indicator is not used. Therefore the measurement is adjusted to the indicators import and export data of the OECD (OECD n.d.). Still the average is measured and compared to the cases, but the combined scale from three to six are reformed to a scale from two to four. A score of two points is considered low, a score of three points medium and a score of four points high. The calculations can be found in the appendix (See appendix E). The results of the measurement and the conclusion that can be drawn is shown in the table below (See figure 4.7).

Figure 4.7: The scores on the hypothesis on economic interests

| | Import | | Export | | Total score | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|------|--------------------------------------|------|---|--------|
| | Low | High | Low | High | Low | High |
| EUPM BiH ¹⁸ | Low | 1 | Low | 1 | 2 | Low |
| EUFOR Concordia | Low | 1 | Low | 1 | 2 | Low |
| Artemis | Low | 1 | Low | 1 | 2 | Low |
| EUPOL Proxima | Low | 1 | Low | 1 | 2 | Low |
| EUJUST Themis | Low | 1 | Low | 1 | 2 | Low |
| EUFOR Althea | Low | 1 | Low | 1 | 2 | Low |
| EUPOL Kinshasa | Low | 1 | Low | 1 | 2 | Low |
| EUJUST LEX | Low | 1 | Low | 1 | 2 | Low |
| EUSEC RDC | Low | 1 | Low | 1 | 2 | Low |
| Amis II Support | Low | 1 | Low | 1 | 2 | Low |
| AMM | High | 2 | Low | 1 | 3 | Medium |
| EUBAM Ukraine/ Moldova | Low | 1 | High | 2 | 3 | Medium |
| | Low | 1 | Low | 1 | 2 | Low |
| EUPOL COPPS ¹⁹ | Low | 1 | Low | 1 | 2 | Low |
| EUPAT | Low | 1 | Low | 1 | 2 | Low |
| EUBAM Rafah | Low | 1 | Low | 1 | 2 | Low |
| EUPT Kosovo | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| EUFOR RDC | Low | 1 | Low | 1 | 2 | Low |
| EUPOL Afghanistan | Low | 1 | Low | 1 | 2 | Low |
| EUPOL RDC | Low | 1 | Low | 1 | 2 | Low |
| EUFOR Chad/CAR | Low | 1 | Low | 1 | 2 | Low |
| | Low | 1 | Low | 1 | 2 | Low |
| Percentage of total EU operations | 5% unknown 90% low 5% high | | 5% unknown 92.5% low 2.5% high | | 5% unknown 87.5% low 7.5% medium 0% high | |

The results are very clear. The opposite of the relation of the hypothesis seems to be the reality. The states in which the EU intervenes are of low economic interest to the EU. Of course the direct investments of the EU in the states are not measured, but the results for the indicators import and export are clear. This factor doesn't seem to be a decisive reason for the EU to intervene.

§ 4.9 The hypothesis on raw materials

To measure if a state has many raw materials, five raw materials are measured: oil, gas, uranium, copper and coltan (tantalum-niobium). For each of these raw materials the state can score on a scale from zero to two, with zero for no such material, one if the state does contain the raw material and two if the state is a top ten producer of the raw material. The data are gathered from the CIA World Factbook and the British Geological Survey (CIA n.d.; Hetherington e.o. 2008). These both sources of information do not contain data about the raw materials for the Palestinian Territories and Kosovo, but only for Israel and Serbia. Therefore the amount of raw materials in the Palestinian Territories and Kosovo can't be measured. In the table below the scores of the different states and the conclusion that can be drawn from the total score are shown (See figure 4.8).

¹⁸ Data of 2002, no data for 2001.

¹⁹ Data of 2005, no data for 2004.

Figure 4.8: The scores on the hypothesis on raw materials

| | Oil | Gas | Uranium | Copper | Coltan | Total score | Conclusion |
|-----------------------------------|--------|--------|---------|--------|--------|-------------|---|
| EUPM BiH | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Low |
| EUFOR Concordia | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Low |
| Artemis | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 6 | High |
| EUPOL Proxima | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Low |
| EUJUST Themis | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3 | Medium |
| EUFOR Althea | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Low |
| EUPOL Kinshasa | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 6 | High |
| EUJUST LEX | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | Medium |
| EUSEC RDC | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 6 | High |
| Amis II Support | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3 | Medium |
| AMM | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 4 | Medium |
| EUBAM Ukraine/ Moldova | 1 1 | 1 0 | 2 0 | 0 0 | 0 0 | 4 1 | Medium/low |
| EUPOL COPPS | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| EUPAT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | Low |
| EUBAM Rafah | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| EUPT Kosovo | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| EUFOR RDC | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 6 | High |
| EUPOL Afghanistan | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | Low |
| EUPOL RDC | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 6 | High |
| EUFOR Chad/CAR | 1 0 | 0 0 | 1 1 | 0 0 | 0 0 | 2 1 | Low |
| Percentage of total EU operations | | | | | | | 15% unknown 35% low 5% low/medium 20% medium 25% high |

There is only one state that contains a high amount of raw materials according to this measurement: the DRC. Because the EU is already connected to the peace process in the DRC since 2003 and has deployed five operations already, the total percentage of states with a high amount of raw materials is 25. But at least 35 percent of the operations are deployed in states with a low amount of these valuable raw materials. According to the hypothesis the EU would be more likely to deploy an operation if a state has many raw materials. These results do not proof this causal relation.

§ 4.10 The hypothesis on development aid

This hypothesis is measured by the annual reports on the implementation of the EC developments and external assistance policies and the data of the OECD (EuropeAid 2002-2007, OECD n.d.). These sources of information don't have all data for Kosovo and Ukraine. Therefore the development aid to Kosovo and Ukraine can't be measured. The measurements of the amount of development on both indicators can be found in the appendix (See appendix F). In the table below the scores on the indicators, the total score and the conclusion that can be drawn are shown (See figure 4.9).

Figure 4.9: The scores on the hypothesis on development aid

| | Member states | EU | Total score | Conclusion |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------|---|
| EUPM BiH | 2 | 2 | 4 | High |
| EUFOR Concordia | 1 | 2 | 3 | Medium |
| Artemis | 2 | 2 | 4 | High |
| EUPOL Proxima | 1 | 2 | 3 | Medium |
| EUJUST Themis | 1 | 1 | 2 | Low |
| EUFOR Althea | 2 | 2 | 4 | High |
| EUPOL Kinshasa | 2 | 2 | 4 | High |
| EUJUST LEX | 2 | 2 | 4 | High |
| EUSEC RDC | 2 | 2 | 4 | High |
| Amis II Support | 2 | 2 | 4 | High |
| AMM | 1 | 1 | 2 | Low |
| EUBAM Ukraine/ Moldova | --- | 2 | --- | --- |
| | 1 | 1 | 2 | Low |
| EUPOL COPPS | 2 | 2 | 4 | High |
| EUPAT | 1 | 2 | 3 | Medium |
| EUBAM Rafah | 2 | 2 | 4 | High |
| EUPT Kosovo | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| EUFOR RDC | 2 | 2 | 4 | High |
| EUPOL Afghanistan | 2 | 2 | 4 | High |
| EUPOL RDC | 2 | 2 | 4 | High |
| EUFOR Chad/CAR | 1 | 1 | 2 | Low |
| | 1 | 1 | 2 | |
| Percentage of total EU operations | 7.5% unknown 32.5% low 60% high | 5% unknown 17.5% low 77.5% high | | 7.5% unknown 17.5% low 15% medium 60% high |

It seems that a high level of development aid is a factor for deploying a peace operation. In sixty percent of the operations the amount of development aid is higher than the average amount of aid spend on states by as well the EU member states as the EU. In different even a threefold of the average amount of aid was spend. These results indicate that there is a relation between the amount of development aid and the decision to deploy a peace operation.

§ 4.11 The hypotheses on regimes

To test the both subhypotheses on regimes both the level of democracy and an eventual negative transition are measured. To test the subhypothesis about the level of democracy, the score of a state at the moment of the decision of the European Council is measured. To test the second subhypothesis about a transition, the scores in the five years before the decision of the Council are measured. The data are gathered from the Polity IV database (Marshall and Jaggers n.d.). There are some complications by using this database. First of all the database doesn't have data about the Palestinian Territories and Kosovo, but only for Israel and Serbia. Therefore the regimes in the Palestinian Territories and Kosovo can't be measured. Second the database doesn't have information about Bosnia and Herzegovina, because it is considered under UN administration. Therefore also Bosnia and Herzegovina can't be measured. And third the database doesn't give scores on the scale from zero to ten for states under foreign interruption (-66), anarchy (-77) or transition with many positive and negative moves in short periods of time (-88). This limits the information to test the subhypotheses. In the table below the scores of the different states and the conclusion that can be drawn from the total score are shown (See figure 4.10).

Figure 4.10: The scores on the hypotheses on regimes

| | Year before decision | | | | | | Conclusions | |
|---|----------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|--|---|
| | 5 th | 4 th | 3 rd | 2 nd | 1 st | 0 th | Status | Transition |
| EUPM BiH | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| EUFOR Concordia | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 9 | 9 | Democratic | Positive |
| Artemis | -77 | -77 | -77 | -77 | -77 | -88 | Unclear transition | Unclear |
| EUPOL Proxima | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 9 | 9 | Democratic | Positive |
| EUJUST Themis | 6 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 7 | Semi-democratic | Negative/ positive |
| EUFOR Althea | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| EUPOL Kinshasa | -77 | -77 | -77 | -77 | -88 | -88 | Unclear transition | Unclear |
| EUJUST LEX | 0 | 0 | 0 | -66 | -66 | -66 | Foreign interruption | Unclear |
| EUSEC RDC | -77 | -77 | -77 | -88 | -88 | -88 | Unclear transition | Unclear |
| Amis II Support | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Non-democratic | None |
| AMM | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 8 | 8 | Semi-democratic | Positive |
| EUBAM Ukraine/ Moldova | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | Semi-democratic | None Positive |
| EUPOL COPPS | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| EUPAT | 6 | 6 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | Democratic | Positive |
| EUBAM Rafah | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| EUPT Kosovo | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| EUFOR RDC | -77 | -77 | -88 | -88 | -88 | 6 | Semi-democratic | Positive |
| EUPOL Afghanistan | -66 | -66 | -66 | -66 | -66 | -66 | Foreign interruption | None |
| EUPOL RDC | -77 | -88 | -88 | -88 | 6 | 6 | Semi-democratic | Positive |
| EUFOR Chad/CAR | 1 5 | 1 1 | 1 1 | 1 1 | 1 1 | 1 1 | Non-democratic | None Negative |
| Percentage of total EU operations | | | | | | | 25% unknown 10% non-democratic 25% semi-democratic 15% democratic 15% unclear transition 10% foreign interruption | 25% unknown 5% negative transition 15% no transition 35% positive transition 20% unclear transition |

Remarkable is the diversity of the results of this measurement. There is neither a kind of regime nor a kind of transition that could be a clear reason for the EU to intervene in a state or region. The results of the status of the regime are too diverse to conclude about the first subhypothesis on the level of democracy. According to this subhypothesis the EU would be more likely to intervene if the state is less democratic. Despite the fact that only fifteen percent of the cases is about a democratic state, also only ten percent of the interventions is in non-democratic states. The numbers are troubled by the great amount of unclear transitions (code -88) and foreign interruptions (code -66).

The second subhypothesis on democracies in transition can be accounted falsified. There is no single evidence that the EU would be more likely to intervene if there is a negative transition. Of all the cases in only two cases a negative transition is shown, both long before the decision over the operation.

§ 4.12 The hypothesis on internal pressure

To measure the internal pressure on the EU to deploy a peace operation, the pressure within the state that proposes an intervention would be measured. Requests at the European Commission and the Dutch representative for the EU resulted in an explanation why this information could not be given. The process of decision-making is too complex to point at a state that first proposed a peace operation. Therefore this hypothesis cannot be measured.

§ 4.13 The hypotheses on external pressure

This hypothesis is subdivided into two subhypotheses. The first subhypothesis concerns the request for an EU operation from international organisations and the second subhypothesis concerns a request as third party monitor in conflict resolution. Both these hypotheses are measured by qualitative analysis of the Council Joint Actions. In the table below the results are shown (See figure 4.11).

Figure 4.11: The scores on the hypotheses on external pressure

| | Request international organisation | Request for monitoring peace treaty | No pressure |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------|
| EUPM BiH | | | X |
| EUFOR Concordia | | | X |
| Artemis | X | | |
| EUPOL Proxima | | | X |
| EUJUST Themis | | | X |
| EUFOR Althea | | | X |
| EUPOL Kinshasa | | | X |
| EUJUST LEX | | | X |
| EUSEC RDC | | | X |
| Amis II Support | X | | |
| AMM | | X | |
| EUBAM Ukraine/ Moldova | | | X |
| EUPOL COPPS | | | X |
| EUPAT | | | X |
| EUBAM Rafah | | | X |
| EUPT Kosovo | | | X |
| EUFOR RDC | X | | |
| EUPOL Afghanistan | | | X |
| EUPOL RDC | | | X |
| EUFOR Chad/CAR | | | X |
| Percentage of total EU operations | 15% | 5% | 80% |

Both subhypotheses can be considered falsified. In total only twenty percent of the cases the EU is requested to act by an international organisation or an international peace negotiator. This is because in many cases the EU already expressed the willingness to act before an organisation requested the EU to deploy an operation. Therefore we cannot speak of external pressure in these cases.

§ 4.14 The hypothesis on humanitarian action

To measure the hypothesis on humanitarian action the data of the conflict barometer of the Heidelberg institute on international conflict research is used (Heidelberg 2002-2007). In the table below the results are shown (See figure 4.12).

Figure 4.12: The scores on the hypothesis on humanitarian action

| | Intensity | Score |
|--------------------------------------|------------------|-----------------------------------|
| EUPM BiH | 1 | Low |
| EUFOR Concordia | 3 | Medium |
| Artemis | 5 | High |
| EUPOL Proxima | 3 | Medium |
| EUJUST Themis | 3 | Medium |
| EUFOR Althea | 2 | Low |
| EUPOL Kinshasa | 5 | High |
| EUJUST LEX | 5 | High |
| EUSEC RDC | 4 | High |
| Amis II Support | 5 | High |
| AMM | 3 | Medium |
| EUBAM Ukraine/ Moldova | 2 2 | Low |
| EUPOL COPPS | 4 | High |
| EUPAT | 3 | Medium |
| EUBAM Rafah | 4 | High |
| EUPT Kosovo | 3 | Medium |
| EUFOR RDC | 4 | High |
| EUPOL Afghanistan | 5 | High |
| EUPOL RDC | 4 | High |
| EUFOR Chad/CAR | 4 | High |
| | 4 | |
| Percentage of total EU operations | | 15% low 30% medium 55% high |

The categories with the high intensity of violence are clearly the greatest with fifty-five percent. States with such a high level of violence are considered humanitarian disasters and therefore ask for humanitarian action. Only fifteen percent of the cases score low on this theoretical ground, therefore this factor seems to be an important issue in the decision-making process of the EU.

§ 4.15 The hypothesis on human rights

To measure if human rights are violated in a state, the database of Freedomhouse is used (Freedomhouse n.d.). Both the political rights and the civil liberties of the citizens of the state in the year of the decision of the European Council to deploy a peace operation are measured. The total score is the average of the combined score on these indicators, with 1 as the highest and 7 as the lowest level of freedom. In the table below the scores of the different states and the conclusion that can be drawn from the total score are shown (See figure 4.13).

Figure 4.13: The scores on the hypothesis on human rights

| | Political rights | Civil liberties | Total score | Conclusion |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|--|--|
| EUPM BiH | 5 | 4 | 4.5 | Partly free |
| EUFOR Concordia | 3 | 3 | 3 | Partly free |
| Artemis | 6 | 6 | 6 | Not free |
| EUPOL Proxima | 3 | 3 | 3 | Partly free |
| EUJUST Themis | 4 | 4 | 4 | Partly free |
| EUFOR Althea | 4 | 4 | 4 | Partly free |
| EUPOL Kinshasa | 6 | 6 | 6 | Not free |
| EUJUST LEX | 7 | 5 | 6 | Not free |
| EUSEC RDC | 6 | 6 | 6 | Not free |
| Amis II Support | 7 | 7 | 7 | Not free |
| AMM | 3 | 4 | 3.5 | Partly free |
| EUBAM Ukraine/ Moldova | 4 3 | 3 4 | 3.5 3.5 | Partly free |
| EUPOL COPPS | 5 | 6 | 5.5 | Not free |
| EUPAT | 3 | 3 | 3 | Partly free |
| EUBAM Rafah | 5 | 6 | 5.5 | Not free |
| EUPT Kosovo | 6 | 5 | 5.5 | Not free |
| EUFOR RDC | 6 | 6 | 6 | Not free |
| EUPOL Afghanistan | 5 | 5 | 5 | Partly free |
| EUPOL RDC | 5 | 6 | 5.5 | Not free |
| EUFOR Chad/CAR | 6 5 | 6 4 | 6 4.5 | Not free Partly free |
| Percentage of total EU operations | | | 15% 2.1-3.0 20% 3.1-4.0 12.5% 4.1-5.0 47.5% 5.1-6.0 5% 6.1-7.0 | 0% free 47.5% partly free 52.5% not free |

It is remarkable that none of the states in which the EU deploys a peace operation are considered free on the scale of Freedomhouse. Almost the half of them is considered partly free and slightly more than half is considered not free. This data could be supportive for the hypothesis that the EU is more likely to deploy a peace operation if human rights are violated. The spread of the total score over the different categories does not fully support this, but this picture could be clearer if more cases are studied in the future. At least the EU doesn't intervene in states that are considered free.

§ 4.16 The hypothesis on territorial violations

To test if the EU is more likely to deploy a peace operation if the territory of a state is violated by another state, the interventions shortly before the decision of the European Council to deploy a peace operation are studied. As described in the previous chapter two indicators are used to measure if a state is territorially violated. First of all the presence of unilateral or multilateral foreign forces and second a mandate of an international organisation. If foreign forces are present in another state without a mandate or if it is a unilateral presence, this will be considered a territorial violation. The table below shows the scores on these indicators, the backgrounds are shown in the appendix (See figure 4.14 and appendix G).

Figure 4.14: The scores on the hypothesis on territorial violations

| | Foreign forces | | Mandate | | Territorially violated |
|-----------------------------------|----------------|-------|---------|----|------------------------|
| | Uni | Multi | NATO | UN | |
| EUPM BiH | | X | X | | |
| EUFOR Concordia | | X | X | | |
| Artemis | X | X | | | X |
| EUPOL Proxima | | X | X | | |
| EUJUST Themis | | | | | |
| EUFOR Althea | | X | X | | |
| EUPOL Kinshasa | X | X | | | X |
| EUJUST LEX | | X | | | X |
| EUSEC RDC | X | X | | | X |
| Amis II Support | | | | | |
| AMM | | | | | |
| EUBAM Ukraine/ Moldova | X | | | | X |
| EUPOL COPPS | X | | | | X |
| EUPAT | | X | X | | |
| EUBAM Rafah | X | | | | X |
| EUPAT Kosovo | | X | X | | |
| EUFOR RDC | X | X | | | X |
| EUPOL Afghanistan | | X | | | X |
| EUPOL RDC | X | X | | | X |
| EUFOR Chad/CAR | | | | | |
| Percentage of total EU operations | 40% | 65% | 30% | 0% | 50% |

Half of the EU peace operations is deployed in states that are territorially violated. The rest of the operations are deployed in states that are not intervened by foreign forces or that are intervened by a multilateral force with a mandate. Remarkable is the fact that none of these interventions is legalised by an UN mandate, but only by NATO mandates.

Despite the result of fifty percent territorial violations, this can't be considered a proof for the hypothesis. In most of the cases the EU doesn't deploy the operation to drive off the aggressor, but to help the state in the process following the violation. For instance in the cases of the US-led interventions without an international mandate in Iraq and Afghanistan, the EU doesn't intervene to help the state against the violators. The EU deployed a peace operation to build up Iraq and Afghanistan after the intervention, together with the US. Therefore this can't be considered proof for the hypothesis.

§ 4.17 The hypotheses on historical ties

The historical ties are measured by four hypotheses on the greatest EU member states. To measure these hypotheses, the historical tie of a state with an EU member state has to be qualified. A historical tie is accountable if there is a long connection between the former colony and the EU member state. Therefore only historical connections between states longer than fifty years are taken into account. The table below shows the last historical connection of states as a colony of an EU member state (See figure 4.15).

Figure 4.15: The scores on the hypotheses on historical ties

| | Most recent historical connection |
|--------------------------------------|--|
| EUPM BiH | Austria-Hungary 1878-1918 |
| EUFOR Concordia | No EU state |
| Artemis | Belgium 1885-1960 |
| EUPOL Proxima | No EU state |
| EUJUST Themis | No EU state |
| EUFOR Althea | Austria-Hungary 1878-1918 |
| EUPOL Kinshasa | Belgium 1885-1960 |
| EUJUST LEX | Mandate of United Kingdom 1917-1932 |
| EUSEC RDC | Belgium 1885-1960 |
| Amis II Support | United Kingdom 1898-1956 |
| AMM | Netherlands 1602-1949 |
| EUBAM Ukraine/ Moldova | No EU state No EU state |
| EUPOL COPPS | Mandate United Kingdom 1922-1948 |
| EUPAT | No EU state |
| EUBAM Rafah | No EU state |
| EUPT Kosovo | No EU state |
| EUFOR RDC | Belgium from 1885-1960 |
| EUPOL Afghanistan | Some periods under United Kingdom |
| EUPOL RDC | Belgium from 1885-1960 |
| EUFOR Chad/CAR | France 1902-1960 France 1889-1960 |
| Percentage of total EU operations | 35% No EU state 25% No relation for 50 years or longer 25% Belgium 5% United Kingdom 5% Netherlands 5% France |

It is remarkable that more than half of the states in which the EU intervenes has no colonial relation of fifty years or longer with an EU member state. In forty percent of the cases the state has a historical colonial relation with an EU state and only in ten percent of the cases with a great EU state like United Kingdom and France. None of the operations is performed in former colonies of Germany or Italy. These results disprove the hypotheses on historical ties.

§ 4.18 Falsified or complementary?

As stated in chapter three the hypotheses can be falsified in this chapter based on the measurements, but that does not proof the theoretical ground has no influence at all. The theoretical ground could still be of influence as a complementary factor. Based upon the measurements above the hypotheses of the theoretical grounds protection of territory, friendly governments, terrorism, non-proliferation, economic interests, raw materials, regimes (subhypothesis transitions), external pressure, territorial violations and historical ties are falsified. The hypotheses on protection of citizens and internal pressure on the other hand are not tested because of a lack of information. The results of the hypothesis regimes (subhypothesis level of democracy) are unclear. This leaves the theoretical grounds on development aid, humanitarian action and human rights as possible individual factors of influence in the decision-making process of the EU.

Chapter 5 - Differences and developments

In the previous chapter the arguments of legitimation and the hypotheses from chapter three are tested on the twenty peace operations of the EU decided upon in the period 2002-2007. This chapter focuses on the second research goal: to look at differences and developments in reasons for the EU to intervene.

To research if there are differences and developments in the decision-making process of the EU, developments in period of time, differences between locations and differences between kinds of operations are studied. The result of this research is described below in three separate paragraphs. Every paragraph contains a study of the arguments of legitimation and the theoretical grounds. The theoretical grounds protection of citizens and internal pressure were not tested in chapter four because of a lack of information and are therefore also not taken into account in the comparisons below.

All the comparisons focus on the percentage of the cases that have a certain score. Thereby the cases for which no data were available are not taken into the calculation of the theoretical grounds to prevent a pollution of the comparison.

§ 5.1 Developments in period of time

To measure the developments in time, the cases are categorised per year of decision. Each of the cases is placed in the category of the year in which the European Council adopted the Council Joint Action and formally decided to deploy a peace operation.

§ 5.1.1 Developments in period of time of the arguments of legitimation

First the arguments of legitimation per period of time are studied. The comparison is shown in the table below (See figure 5.1).

1. Based upon the implementation of an international (peace) agreement
2. Based upon an UN Security Council Resolution
3. Conflict is considered a threat to regional/international peace and security
4. Based upon the EU Stabilisation and Association policy
5. The EU has expressed the willingness to act
6. Based upon request or invitation of the host state
7. Based upon request of the UN or the AU
8. Succeeds a UN or NATO operation
9. Precedes a UN or NATO operation
10. Supports a UN or AU operation
11. References to continue the work of earlier EU operations

Figure 5.1 Arguments of legitimation per period of time (in percentage)

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 |
|-------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| 2002 | 100 | 100 | 0 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 0 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2003 | 100 | 100 | 33.3 | 66.7 | 66.7 | 66.7 | 33.3 | 33.3 | 0 | 33.3 | 0 |
| 2004 | 66.7 | 66.7 | 66.7 | 33.3 | 66.7 | 66.7 | 33.3 | 33.3 | 0 | 33.3 | 66.7 |
| 2005 | 75 | 50 | 12.5 | 12.5 | 50 | 87.5 | 12.5 | 0 | 0 | 12.5 | 25 |
| 2006 | 50 | 100 | 0 | 50 | 50 | 100 | 50 | 0 | 0 | 50 | 50 |
| 2007 | 66.7 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 66.7 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 33.3 | 0 | 33.3 |

Many of the arguments of legitimation are quite frequently used over the periods of time. The argument (1) 'implementation of an (international) peace agreement' is used in the majority of cases in each year. The relatively low score of fifty percent in 2006 can be explained because this category exists of only two cases. The same can be said of the arguments (5) 'the willingness of the EU to act' and (6) 'a request or invitation of the host state'. These arguments are also valid for the majority of the cases and the exceptions are singular and spread over the years.

Other arguments are less frequently named, but count only in singular cases. Argument (3) 'considered a threat to regional/international peace and security' is strangely enough named only for EUPOL Proxima in 2003, EUJUST Themis and EUPOL Kinshasa in 2004 and EUSEC RDC in 2005. This can't be explained by the cases itself, because with the exception of Georgia the EU intervened more than once in these cases and for the other cases this argument wasn't named. Argument (7) 'a request of the UN/AU' is named four times, spread over the years 2003-2006, argument (8) 'succeeds a UN/NATO operation' is named three times spread over the years 2002-2004, argument (9) 'precedes a UN/NATO operation' is named only once in 2007 and argument (10) 'support a UN/AU operation' is named four times spread over the period 2003-2006. There is no clear patron visible for these arguments.

Other arguments show a clear development in time. Argument (2) 'UN Security Council Resolution' the difference between 2004 and 2005 and the other periods is remarkable. In the year the European Council decides over the eight peace operations, only half of them are based upon a UN resolution, while in the other periods all operations are based upon a UN resolution. This prominent difference does not mean a change in the policy of the EU for two reasons. First because in the period before 2004 and after 2005 still all Joint Actions name the argument of an UN resolution. Second because the great difference in 2005 can be explained by looking at the cases. The operation in Indonesia (AMM) was on request of the signing parties of the peace treaty, the operation in Ukraine/Moldova was on request of the both governments and for the two operations in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah) the EU is part of the Quartet together with the UN. Therefore this is no sign of a decreasing interest of the EU for the role of the UN. Argument (4) 'EU Stabilisation and Association policy' seems to become less important every year. In 2002 and 2003 this argument was named for three cases, but later this argument counts only for one case a year in the period 2004-2006 and none in 2007. This can logically be explained because this argument is used only for interventions in Europe and most European operations are decided on between 2002 and 2004. Argument (11) 'references to continue the work of earlier EU operations' are named six times since 2004. That can easily be explained because it must refer to an earlier operation. Therefore this argument could not be used before 2004.

§ 5.1.2 Developments in period of time of the theoretical grounds

The developments in period of time of the theoretical grounds are shown in the eight tables below (See figure 5.2-5.8).

Figure 5.2 Theoretical grounds per period of time I (in percentage)

| | Score on territory | | | | Score on friendly government | |
|-------------|--------------------|------|--------|------|------------------------------|------|
| | None | Low | Medium | High | Yes | No |
| 2002 | 0 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 100 |
| 2003 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 66.7 | 33.3 |
| 2004 | 66.7 | 33.3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 100 |
| 2005 | 62.5 | 25 | 12.5 | 0 | 25 | 75 |
| 2006 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 100 |
| 2007 | 33.3 | 66.7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 100 |

There is no development shown on the score on the protection of territory. For most years the score is none or low, with the only exception the EUJUST LEX operation in Iraq in 2005. The theoretical ground friendly government also shows no development over time. Only in 2003 and 2005 operations are deployed in states with a government with a friendly status. In most cases the governments had no special status.

Figure 5.3 Theoretical grounds per period of time II (in percentage)

| | Score on terrorism | | | | Score on non-proliferation | | | |
|-------------|--------------------|------|--------|------|----------------------------|------|--------|------|
| | None | Low | Medium | High | None | Low | Medium | High |
| 2002 | 0 | 0 | 100 | 0 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2003 | 0 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2004 | 0 | 33.3 | 66.7 | 0 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2005 | 12.5 | 25 | 25 | 37.5 | 87.5 | 0 | 12.5 | 0 |
| 2006 | 50 | 0 | 50 | 0 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2007 | 33.3 | 33.3 | 0 | 33.3 | 66.7 | 33.3 | 0 | 0 |

The scores on the theoretical ground terrorism are spread very randomly over the years. In earlier years it seems the EU intervenes in states that have a low or medium association with terrorism, but when the number of operations grows in later years the scores are spread over all four categories of association. In contradiction to terrorism the scores on non-proliferation are clear. All scores, except EUJUST LEX in 2005 and EUPOL Afghanistan in 2007, show no relation to proliferation.

Figure 5.4 Theoretical grounds per period of time III (in percentage)

| | Score on economic interests | | | Score on raw materials | | | Score on development aid | | |
|-------------|-----------------------------|--------|------|------------------------|--------|------|--------------------------|--------|------|
| | Low | Medium | High | Low | Medium | High | Low | Medium | High |
| 2002 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 100 |
| 2003 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 66.7 | 0 | 33.3 | 0 | 66.7 | 33.3 |
| 2004 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 33.3 | 33.3 | 33.3 | 33.3 | 0 | 66.7 |
| 2005 | 81.3 | 18.8 | 0 | 25 | 58.3 | 16.7 | 20 | 13.3 | 66.7 |
| 2006 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 100 |
| 2007 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 66.7 | 0 | 33.3 | 33.3 | 0 | 66.7 |

The theoretical ground economic interests show a quite clear image. There are only two exceptions to the general rule that the cases score low on economic interests and both exceptions are in 2005. One exception is Indonesia of the AMM operation and the other is Ukraine of the EUBAM operation on the border between Ukraine and Moldova. The scores on raw materials are more spread over the years. The high scores in 2003-2007 are the result of the yearly decision to deploy a new operation in the DRC, while most cases score low on raw materials. Some other exceptions are the medium score for Georgia in 2004 and Iraq, Sudan and Ukraine in 2005. The theoretical ground development aid scores mostly high for each year. An exception is the year 2003, in which two out of three cases score medium. These both cases are the civilian and the military operations deployed in Macedonia. There are some other exceptions, but there is no development visible toward a greater or lesser importance of this reason over the years.

Figure 5.5 Theoretical grounds per period of time IV (in percentage)

| | Score on regimes: level of democracy | | | | |
|-------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------|------------|--------------------|----------------------|
| | Non-democratic | Semi-democratic | Democratic | Unclear transition | Foreign interruption |
| 2002 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 2003 | 0 | 0 | 66.7 | 33.3 | 0 |
| 2004 | 0 | 50 | 0 | 50 | 0 |
| 2005 | 16.7 | 33.3 | 16.7 | 16.7 | 16.7 |
| 2006 | 0 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2007 | 33.3 | 33.3 | 0 | 0 | 33.3 |

Because the scores of the theoretical ground regimes (subhypothesis level of democracy) are spread over five categories while some years have no more than two or three cases, it is hard to analyse these results. The year 2002 has no results because the database contains no data for Bosnia and Herzegovina in this period. The results after 2002 are

spread over the different categories. The clear hundred percent in 2006 is because there was only one case – EUFOR RDC – for which data was available in that year.

Figure 5.6 Theoretical grounds per period of time V (in percentage)

| | Score on regimes: transition | | | |
|------|------------------------------|------|----------|---------|
| | Negative | None | Positive | Unclear |
| 2002 | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 2003 | 0 | 0 | 66.7 | 33.3 |
| 2004 | 25 | 0 | 25 | 50 |
| 2005 | 0 | 25 | 41.7 | 33.3 |
| 2006 | 0 | 0 | 100 | 0 |
| 2007 | 16.7 | 50 | 33.3 | 0 |

The theoretical ground regimes (subhypothesis transition) is more clear than the above theoretical ground regimes (subhypothesis level of democracy). In most years the majority of operations are deployed in states with a positive transition. Exceptions are the years 2004 and 2007. In 2004 this is because there are no results for Bosnia Herzegovina and the case of Georgia shows as well a negative as a positive transition within the five years before the decision to deploy a peace operation. The unclear transition of EUPOL Kinshasa therefore scores relatively high. In 2007 one of the three cases shows a positive transition, but the score no transition is relatively higher since both Afghanistan and Chad show no transition in the five years before the decision to intervene.

Figure 5.7 Theoretical grounds per period of time VI (in percentage)

| | Score on external pressure | | | Score on humanitarian action | | |
|------|----------------------------|-------------------|-------------|------------------------------|--------|------|
| | International organisation | Monitoring treaty | No pressure | Low | Medium | High |
| 2002 | 0 | 0 | 100 | 100 | 0 | 0 |
| 2003 | 33.3 | 0 | 66.7 | 0 | 66.7 | 33.3 |
| 2004 | 0 | 0 | 100 | 33.3 | 33.3 | 33.3 |
| 2005 | 12.5 | 12.5 | 75 | 12.5 | 25 | 62.5 |
| 2006 | 50 | 0 | 50 | 0 | 50 | 50 |
| 2007 | 0 | 0 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 100 |

The majority of the scores on the theoretical ground external pressure show no pressure on the EU to intervene. There are only four exceptions to this general rule. Only for Artemis, Amis II Support and EUFOR RDC there was a request of an international organisation, without a first expression of willingness of the EU. The operation in Indonesia in 2005 is the only case in which the EU is asked to monitor a peace agreement. The theoretical ground humanitarian action seems to show a development towards more humanitarian action over time. In 2002 the only case – Bosnia and Herzegovina – scores low, but in the following years the majority transfers from medium to a high level of violence. With as final result a score of hundred percent in 2007.

Figure 5.8 Theoretical grounds per period of time VII (in percentage)

| | Score on human rights | | | Score on territorial violations | |
|------|-----------------------|-------------|----------|---------------------------------|------|
| | Free | Partly free | Not free | Yes | No |
| 2002 | 0 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 100 |
| 2003 | 0 | 66.7 | 33.3 | 33.3 | 66.7 |
| 2004 | 0 | 66.7 | 33.3 | 33.3 | 66.7 |
| 2005 | 0 | 62.5 | 37.5 | 62.5 | 37.5 |
| 2006 | 0 | 0 | 100 | 50 | 50 |
| 2007 | 0 | 50 | 50 | 66.7 | 33.3 |

The theoretical ground human rights have a quite even spread over the years. The majority of the cases scores partly free yearly, but another group varying from one third to half of the yearly cases score not free. The only exception in the scores is the year 2006. Both cases in this year – the case in Kosovo and the case in the DRC – score not free. The theoretical ground territorial violations seems to make a switch between 2002-2004 and 2005-2007. In the first period most cases are not territorially violated, while in the second period the majority cases are territorially violated. Eight of the thirteen cases since 2005 are territorially violated against two of the seven in the period 2002-2004.

Figure 5.9 Theoretical grounds per period of time VIII (in percentage)

| | Score on historical ties | | | | | |
|-------------|--------------------------|------------------|---------|----------------|-------------|--------|
| | No EU state | No long relation | Belgium | United Kingdom | Netherlands | France |
| 2002 | 0 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2003 | 66.7 | 0 | 33.3 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2004 | 33.3 | 33.3 | 33.3 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2005 | 25 | 37.5 | 12.5 | 12.5 | 12.5 | 0 |
| 2006 | 50 | 0 | 50 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2007 | 0 | 33.3 | 33.3 | 0 | 0 | 33.3 |

The scores on the theoretical ground historical ties are spread over the years. The colonial histories of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and France are singular exceptions. The scores of Belgium is spread over the whole period 2003-2007 as former owner of the colony Congo. But most cases have no colonial relation with an EU state or at least not longer than fifty years.

Most theoretical grounds show no development over the years. The results are quite even per year or are spread over all categories for every year. Only two theoretical grounds seem to show a development over time. Humanitarian action seems to become more important over time. In 2005 and 2007 most cases score high on the level of violence, while in 2002 and 2003 most cases scored low. Another possible development is territorial violations. In the period 2002-2004 most cases are not territorially violated, while in 2005-2007 most cases are.

§ 5.2 Differences between locations

To measure the differences between locations, the cases are categorised per continent. The total number of cases is too low to divide the locations into regions. The fact that the results for the continent Africa are mostly effected by the operations in the DRC is taken into account.

§ 5.2.1 Differences between locations of the arguments of legitimation

First the arguments of legitimation per continent are studied. The comparison is shown in the table below (See figure 5.10).

1. Based upon the implementation of an international (peace) agreement
2. Based upon an UN Security Council Resolution
3. Conflict is considered a threat to regional/international peace and security
4. Based upon the EU Stabilisation and Association policy
5. The EU has expressed the willingness to act
6. Based upon request or invitation of the host state
7. Based upon request of the UN or the AU
8. Succeeds a UN or NATO operation
9. Precedes a UN or NATO operation
10. Supports a UN or AU operation
11. References to continue the work of earlier EU operations

Figure 5.10 Arguments of legitimization per continent (in percentage)

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 |
|---------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Europe | 71.4 | 85.7 | 14.3 | 85.7 | 71.4 | 85.7 | 0 | 42.9 | 0 | 0 | 28.6 |
| Asia | 66.7 | 33.3 | 16.6 | 0 | 50 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Africa | 85.7 | 100 | 28.6 | 0 | 57.1 | 71.4 | 57.1 | 0 | 14.3 | 57.1 | 57.1 |

Just like with the developments in time, different arguments of legitimization score high on all categories. The argument (1) 'implementation of an (international) peace agreement' is named in most cases in all three continents. In Asia this argument is named lesser than in Europe or Africa, but still in two-third of the cases. Also the arguments (5) 'the willingness of the EU to act' and (6) 'a request or invitation of the host state' have a wide majority in all three continents. Argument (5) 'the willingness of the EU to act' is named in half of the cases in Asia and more than half of the cases in Africa. In Europe this arguments is named in even 71.4 percent of the cases. Argument (6) 'a request or invitation of the host state' is named in 71.4 percent of the cases in Africa, 85.7 percent of the cases in Europe and in all cases in Asia. Other arguments are named far lesser. Argument (3) 'considered a threat to regional/international peace and security' is named only in four cases. These cases are spread quite evenly over the continents. However this is strange, less can be said of this argument.

The other arguments show clear differences between the continents. Argument (2) 'UN Security Council Resolution' is named for most cases in Europe and all cases in Africa, but only for two out of six cases in Asia. This can be explained by looking at the cases. The four Asian cases in which no UN resolution is named in the Joint Action are Georgia (EUJUST Themis), Indonesia (AMM) and the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah). In Georgia the EU isn't helping in a violent conflict, but is there to improve government and help with reforms. In Indonesia the EU is requested to implement a peace agreement by the signing parties. And in the case of the Palestinian Territories the EU co-operates with the UN in the Quartet. Therefore this is no sign of lesser importance of the UN in a specific continent. Argument (4) 'EU Stabilisation and Association policy' is named only for the European continent. This is logical, because this policy is intended for states in Europe. The EU has other policies for states in other continents. Argument (7) 'a request of the UN/AU' is named only for the continent Africa. This is most remarkable because it is named in the Joint Actions of four out of seven African cases. For the request of the AU (AMIS II) the connection to Africa is logical since the organisation is African. The UN is a different story since it is a global organisation. The request of the UN for support in Africa and not for other continents could suggest different things. First it could suggest a lack of interest of the EU to act in Africa, because the UN has to request for support in this continent and not for support in others. It could also point at a greater interest of the UN to the African continent. And of course it could also suggest there are more or more complex conflicts on the African continent. All three of these suggestions possibly contain an essential truth. The size of this research doesn't allow it to study these suggestions extensive, although at the end of this chapter this question is elaborated briefly by a cross-examination.

Argument (10) 'support a UN/AU operation' is clearly connected to the argument of a request of the UN/AU. In the same cases the EU received a request of the UN or the AU, the Joint Action named the support of a UN or AU operation as argument. This argument is therefore only used for Africa. Argument (8) 'succeeds a UN/NATO operation' is named only for the continent Europe and not for Asia or Africa. This can't be explained by the kind of organisations the EU succeeds. The UN is a global organisation and the Europe-based NATO also operates in Asian states like Afghanistan. Therefore it is remarkable the EU only succeeds UN and NATO operations in Europe. Finally argument (11) 'references to continue the work of earlier EU operations' is named for two cases in Europe, but for four cases in Africa. All these African cases are operations in the DRC. There are no Asian cases in which this argument is used. That is logical because in most cases in Asia only one operation is deployed. The only exception are the cases in the Palestinian Territories, but these operations (EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah) are

deployed in the same period and therefore don't succeed each others work but work next to each other.

§ 5.2.2 Differences between locations of the theoretical grounds

The differences between locations of the theoretical grounds are shown in the eight tables below (See figure 5.11-5.18).

Figure 5.11 Theoretical grounds per continent I (in percentage)

| | Score on territory | | | | Score on friendly government | |
|---------------|--------------------|------|--------|------|------------------------------|------|
| | None | Low | Medium | High | Yes | No |
| Europe | 71.4 | 28.6 | 0 | 0 | 57.1 | 42.9 |
| Asia | 50 | 33.3 | 16.7 | 0 | 0 | 100 |
| Africa | 71.4 | 28.6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 100 |

The theoretical ground protection of territory show an equal division of the cases over the scores none and low in Europe and Africa. The results for Asia are different because of the medium score for Iraq. Besides the singular exception of Iraq, the scores for Asia would be quite the same as Europe and Africa. The theoretical ground protection of friendly governments does show a great difference between the continents. Europe is the only continent in which there are governments with a special friendly status. This is logical since states outside of Europe have lesser chance to be a NATO-member or to have an association agreement and therefore generally score lower on this measurement.

Figure 5.12 Theoretical grounds per continent II (in percentage)

| | Score on terrorism | | | | Score on non-proliferation | | | |
|---------------|--------------------|------|--------|------|----------------------------|------|--------|------|
| | None | Low | Medium | High | None | Low | Medium | High |
| Europe | 14.3 | 42.9 | 42.9 | 0 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Asia | 0 | 0 | 33.3 | 66.7 | 66.7 | 16.7 | 16.7 | 0 |
| Africa | 28.6 | 57.1 | 14.3 | 0 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

The results of the comparison of the theoretical ground terrorism show a remarkable difference between the continents. In Europe most cases score low or medium, in Africa the majority of the cases score low, but in Asia two-third of the cases score high. In Europe and Africa none of the cases score high, but in Asia the majority. Iraq, the Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan are highly associated with terrorism. In these Asian cases terrorism could still be a reason for the EU to intervene. The score on non-proliferation again show a difference for Asia. In Europe and Africa none of the cases are associated with proliferation, but in Asia two cases are. Again this concerns Iraq and Afghanistan.

Figure 5.13 Theoretical grounds per continent III (in percentage)

| | Score on economic interests | | | Score on raw materials | | | Score on development aid | | |
|---------------|-----------------------------|--------|------|------------------------|--------|------|--------------------------|--------|------|
| | Low | Medium | High | Low | Medium | High | Low | Medium | High |
| Europe | 91.7 | 8.3 | 0 | 91.7 | 8.3 | 0 | 9.1 | 54.5 | 36.4 |
| Asia | 83.3 | 16.7 | 0 | 25 | 75 | 0 | 33.3 | 0 | 66.7 |
| Africa | 100 | 0 | 0 | 14.3 | 14.3 | 71.4 | 14.3 | 0 | 85.7 |

The theoretical ground economic interests show little differences between the continents. Europe and Asia both have one exception to the general rule that the EU's economic interests are low, namely Ukraine and Indonesia. A great difference between the continents is shown by the theoretical ground raw materials. A wide majority of the European cases score low on raw materials, while seventy-five percent of the Asian states score medium. But the greatest difference is Africa. It is the only continent where cases score high on this theoretical ground. A remark is that all five cases that score high are operations in the DRC. The other two African cases score low and medium. The score

on development aid is divided strangely. The theoretical ground seems to be of more influence in Asia and Africa. Europe is the only continent with cases that score medium on this theoretical ground. At the other continents the majority of the cases scores high.

Figure 5.14 Theoretical grounds per continent IV (in percentage)

| | Score on regimes: level of democracy | | | | |
|---------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------|------------|--------------------|----------------------|
| | Non-democratic | Semi-democratic | Democratic | Unclear transition | Foreign interruption |
| Europe | 0 | 25 | 75 | 0 | 0 |
| Asia | 0 | 50 | 0 | 0 | 50 |
| Africa | 28.6 | 28.6 | 0 | 42.9 | 0 |

The theoretical grounds regimes (subhypothesis level of democracy) show a remarkable difference between Europe and the other two continents. Europe is the only continent in which the EU intervenes in democratic states. This doesn't mean Europe is the only continent that contains democratic states, but it is the only continent in which the EU deploys peace operations in democratic states. Asia is the only continent with foreign interruptions, thanks to the US-led invasions in Afghanistan and Iraq. The African cases are divided, some are not democratic, some are semi-democratic, but almost half of them are in unclear transition. Again this could be seen as a suggestion for a more complex conflict in Africa, since unclear transition would mean it is unclear if there is a positive or negative process going on. A conflict with many fallbacks and new solutions and peace talks, like the conflict in the DRC is more complex to label clearly.

Figure 5.15 Theoretical grounds per continent V (in percentage)

| | Score on regimes: transition | | | |
|---------------|------------------------------|------|----------|---------|
| | Negative | None | Positive | Unclear |
| Europe | 0 | 12.5 | 87.5 | 0 |
| Asia | 12.5 | 25 | 37.5 | 25 |
| Africa | 7.1 | 21.4 | 28.6 | 42.9 |

The theoretical ground regime (subhypothesis transition) also shows a difference between Europe and the other two continents. In Europe almost all cases show a positive transition in the five years before the decision to deploy a peace operation. The only exception is Ukraine with no transition. In Asia and Africa the scores are spread more evenly over the categories. Remarkable is the high number of unclear cases in Africa.

Figure 5.16 Theoretical grounds per continent VI (in percentage)

| | Score on external pressure | | | Score on humanitarian action | | |
|---------------|----------------------------|-------------------|-------------|------------------------------|--------|------|
| | International organisation | Monitoring treaty | No pressure | Low | Medium | High |
| Europe | 0 | 0 | 100 | 42.9 | 57.1 | 0 |
| Asia | 0 | 16.7 | 83.3 | 0 | 33.3 | 66.7 |
| Africa | 42.9 | 0 | 57.1 | 0 | 0 | 100 |

According to these results the operations in Europe show no external pressure, contrary to the operations in Asia and Africa. In Asia the EU was requested once to monitor the peace agreement in Indonesia before it expressed its willingness to act. In Africa the EU was requested by international organisations to act in Sudan and twice in the DRC. The results for the theoretical ground humanitarian action show a higher level of violence in Asian and African cases than in European cases. In Europe the cases show a low or medium level of violence, while in Asia two-third of the cases and in Africa all cases show a high level of violence. Humanitarian action is a more important reason to intervene in Asia and Africa than in Europe.

Figure 5.17 Theoretical grounds per continent VII (in percentage)

| | Score on human rights | | | Score on territorial violations | |
|---------------|-----------------------|-------------|----------|---------------------------------|------|
| | Free | Partly free | Not free | Yes | No |
| Europe | 0 | 85.7 | 14.3 | 14.3 | 85.7 |
| Asia | 0 | 50 | 50 | 66.7 | 33.3 |
| Africa | 0 | 7.1 | 92.9 | 71.4 | 28.6 |

The score on human rights show great differences between the continents. In Europe 85.7 percent of the cases score partly free, while in Africa 92.9 percent of the cases are not free at all. Asia scores in between with fifty percent partly free and fifty percent not free. The results for the theoretical ground territorial violation show that territorial violations are more common for the Asian and African cases than the European. In Europe only in Moldova foreign forces are stationed without mandate of an international organisation. In Asia in two-third of the cases and in Africa in 71.4 percent of the cases are territorially violated.

Figure 5.18 Theoretical grounds per continent VIII (in percentage)

| | Score on historical ties | | | | | |
|---------------|--------------------------|------------------|---------|----------------|-------------|--------|
| | No EU state | No long relation | Belgium | United Kingdom | Netherlands | France |
| Europe | 71.4 | 28.6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Asia | 33.3 | 50 | 0 | 0 | 16.7 | 0 |
| Africa | 0 | 0 | 71.4 | 14.3 | 0 | 14.3 |

The scores on the theoretical ground historical ties show the EU does not intervene in former colonies of EU states in Europe. The East-European states were never a colony of a West-European state and if they were not long enough – for instance in the case of Austria-Hungary. Also in Asia many of the states with a colonial relation were no colony for at least fifty years. The United Kingdom had a mandate over Iraq for 25 years, Palestine for 26 years and some periods it ruled over Afghanistan, but all these relations were too short to count as a historical tie. The only operation in a former colony is the operation in Indonesia, the former Dutch colony. Africa is the opposite of Europe, because all cases are former colonies. This result is not strange since European states colonised almost whole the continent.

To summarise there are many differences between the operations in the different continents. This could indicate some theoretical grounds are no factor of influence if tested on all cases, but they could be of influence for the operations in some continents.

§ 5.3 Differences between kinds of operations

To measure if there is a difference between kinds of operations, the cases are divided into two categories: civilian and military operations. As explained in chapter three, the cases could be divided into more categories – police operation, rule of law operation, border operation, etc – but the result would be a too small number of operations in each category. The categories are based upon the division between military and civilian operations of the EUMS in their magazine *Impetus* (2008).

§ 5.3.1 Differences between kinds of operations of the arguments of legitimation

First the arguments of legitimation per kind of operation are studied. The comparison is shown in the table below (See figure 5.19).

1. Based upon the implementation of an international (peace) agreement
2. Based upon an UN Security Council Resolution
3. Conflict is considered a threat to regional/international peace and security
4. Based upon the EU Stabilisation and Association policy
5. The EU has expressed the willingness to act

6. Based upon request or invitation of the host state
7. Based upon request of the UN or the AU
8. Succeed a UN or NATO operation
9. Precedes a UN or NATO operation
10. Supports a UN or AU operation
11. References to continue the work of earlier EU operations

Figure 5.19 Arguments of legitimation per kind of operation (in percentage)

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 |
|-----------------|------|------|------|------|------|-----|-----|------|------|-----|------|
| Civilian | 71.4 | 64.3 | 28.6 | 28.6 | 64.3 | 100 | 7.1 | 7.1 | 0 | 7.1 | 28.6 |
| Military | 83.3 | 100 | 0 | 33.3 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 33.3 | 16.7 | 50 | 33.3 |

Some of the arguments of legitimation are very alike for both categories. Argument (1) 'implementation of an (international) peace agreement' is named in a majority of as well the civilian as the military operations. Argument (4) 'EU Stabilisation and Association policy' is named far less, but relatively as much for civilian operations as for military operations. Argument (5) 'the willingness of the EU to act' is named in half of the military cases and slightly more for the civilian cases: 64.3 percent. Argument (11) 'references to continue the work of earlier EU operations' is named in 28.6 percent of the civilian cases and 33.3 percent of the military cases.

Other arguments of legitimation show greater differences between the kind of operations. First of all it is important to notice the EU has never deployed a military operation without (2) a 'UN Security Council Resolution'. In most civilian operations (64.3%) the EU also acts with support of a UN resolution. As stated repeatedly above, these exceptions to the rule – 75 percent of the cases – can easily be explained. EUJUST Themis (Georgia) is no violent conflict situation but an operation to support reforms, the operation in Indonesia (AMM) is a request to implement a peace agreement by the signing parties, the border operation in Ukraine/Moldova is on request of both governments and in the cases of the operations in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah) the EU co-operates with the UN in the Quartet.

Why the argument (3) 'considered a threat to international/regional peace and security' is named only in civilian cases is a question. It seems far more logical that military operations are deployed to deal with a threat to peace and security. Probably this can only be explained by seemingly random use of this argument. In fact, for most operations this argument could count as valid.

Argument (6) 'a request/invitation of the host state' shows a remarkable difference between military and civilian operations. The EU hasn't deployed a civilian operation without a request or invitation of the host state to act, while for half of the military operations the Council Joint Action doesn't speak about a request or invitation. Another remarkable difference between the military and the civilian operations is argument (5) 'a request of the UN/AU'. In half of the military operation the EU received such a request while only in one civilian case such a request was send. Because these requests are related with argument (10) 'support a UN/AU operation', the same difference can be seen there.

A small difference between civilian and military operations is visible for argument (8) 'succeeds a UN/NATO operation'. Civilian cases score 7.1 percent and military cases score 33.3 percent. This difference seems greater than it is, because this argument is used only three times in total: once in a civilian case and twice in a military case. Another slight difference between civilian and military cases is argument (9) 'precedes a UN/AU operation'. This argument is named only for one military operation.

§ 5.3.2 Differences between kind of operations of the theoretical grounds

The differences between kinds of operations of the theoretical grounds are shown in the eight tables below (See figure 5.19-5.26).

Figure 5.19 Theoretical grounds per kind of operation I (in percentage)

| | Score on territory | | | | Score on friendly government | |
|-----------------|--------------------|------|--------|------|------------------------------|------|
| | None | Low | Medium | High | Yes | No |
| Civilian | 64.3 | 28.6 | 7.1 | 0 | 78.6 | 21.4 |
| Military | 66.7 | 33.3 | 0 | 0 | 83.3 | 16.7 |

There is no real difference between civilian and military operations visible for the theoretical ground protection of territory. There is one civilian case (Iraq) which scores medium, but most civilian and military case score no territorial threat followed by some cases with a low level of threat. The theoretical ground protection of friendly governments is also divided quite evenly over the civilian and military cases. Both categories show a majority of no special friends.

Figure 5.20 Theoretical grounds per kind of operation II (in percentage)

| | Score on terrorism | | | | Score on non-proliferation | | | |
|-----------------|--------------------|------|--------|------|----------------------------|-----|--------|------|
| | None | Low | Medium | High | None | Low | Medium | High |
| Civilian | 7.1 | 35.7 | 28.6 | 28.6 | 85.7 | 7.1 | 7.1 | 0 |
| Military | 33.3 | 33.3 | 33.3 | 0 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

The theoretical ground terrorism shows some difference between military and civilian operations. The military cases are divided equally over the scores none, low and medium, while the civilian cases are spread more equally. In the cases with the highest terrorist association – Iraq, the Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan – only civilian operations are deployed. The scores on the theoretical ground non-proliferation are more equal for civilian and military operation. The only two exceptions to the general rule that proliferation plays no part, are the civilian cases Afghanistan and Iraq. All the other cases show no association with proliferation.

Figure 5.21 Theoretical grounds per kind of operation III (in percentage)

| | Score on economic interests | | | Score on raw materials | | | Score on development aid | | |
|-----------------|-----------------------------|--------|------|------------------------|--------|------|--------------------------|--------|------|
| | Low | Medium | High | Low | Medium | High | Low | Medium | High |
| Civilian | 88.5 | 11.5 | 0 | 40.9 | 31.8 | 27.3 | 20 | 16 | 64 |
| Military | 100 | 0 | 0 | 50 | 16.7 | 33.3 | 16.7 | 16.7 | 66.7 |

The theoretical ground economic interests shows a similar image for the civilian and military cases. The only two exceptions – Indonesia and Ukraine – do not influence the outcome, because they are just one and a half of the fourteen civilian cases.²⁰ The results of the theoretical ground raw materials are spread evenly for as well the civilian as the military cases. There are some small differences, but there is no patron of great differences visible. The same can be said of the results on the theoretical ground developments aid.

Figure 5.22 Theoretical grounds per kind of operation IV (in percentage)

| | Score on regimes: level of democracy | | | | |
|-----------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------|------------|--------------------|----------------------|
| | Non-democratic | Semi-democratic | Democratic | Unclear transition | Foreign interruption |
| Civilian | 0 | 40 | 20 | 20 | 20 |
| Military | 40 | 20 | 20 | 40 | 0 |

Although the results of the theoretical ground regimes (subhypothesis level of democracy) for both the civilian and military cases are spread, a remarkable difference is visible. All operations in non-democratic states are military. The results for semi-

²⁰ Ukraine only counts for a half since it is part of the same case as Moldova: the EUBAM operation on the border between Moldova and Ukraine.

democratic, democratic and unclear transition is more alike. The cases with foreign interruptions – Iraq and Afghanistan – are both civilian.

Figure 5.23 Theoretical grounds per kind of operation V (in percentage)

| | Score on regimes: transition | | | |
|-----------------|------------------------------|------|----------|---------|
| | Negative | None | Positive | Unclear |
| Civilian | 5 | 15 | 50 | 30 |
| Military | 10 | 30 | 40 | 20 |

The theoretical ground regimes (subhypothesis transition) shows no great differences between civilian and military operations. There are slightly more military operations in the cases with a negative or no transition, but this difference is not very great.

Figure 5.24 Theoretical grounds per kind of operation VI (in percentage)

| | Score on external pressure | | | Score on humanitarian action | | |
|-----------------|----------------------------|-------------------|-------------|------------------------------|--------|------|
| | International organisation | Monitoring treaty | No pressure | Low | Medium | High |
| Civilian | 0 | 7.1 | 92.9 | 14.3 | 35.7 | 50 |
| Military | 50 | 0 | 50 | 16.7 | 16.7 | 66.7 |

The scores on the theoretical ground external pressure do differ for the civilian and military cases. With the exception of the AMM operation in Indonesia, all civilian cases are decided on without external pressure. For the military cases only half of them is decided on without external pressure. For the other half of the cases a request of the UN or AU was send before the EU had expressed the willingness to act. The results of the theoretical ground humanitarian action doesn't show great differences between civilian and military operations.

Figure 5.25 Theoretical grounds per kind of operation VII (in percentage)

| | Score on human rights | | | Score on territorial violations | |
|-----------------|-----------------------|-------------|----------|---------------------------------|------|
| | Free | Partly free | Not free | Yes | No |
| Civilian | 0 | 50 | 50 | 33.3 | 66.7 |
| Military | 0 | 41.7 | 58.3 | 57.1 | 42.9 |

The difference between the civilian and military cases for the theoretical ground human rights is small. The division between operations in states that are partly free and not free at all is exactly fifty-fifty for the civilian cases, while the military operations relatively slightly more deployed in states that are not free (58.3%). The theoretical ground territorial violations do show some difference between civilian and military cases. One third of the civilian operations are deployed in states that are territorially violated, while 57.1 percent of the military operations are deployed in such states. But as stated in chapter four the EU doesn't intervene on behalf of the violated states.

Figure 5.26 Theoretical grounds per kind of operation VIII (in percentage)

| | Score on historical ties | | | | | |
|-----------------|--------------------------|------------------|---------|----------------|-------------|--------|
| | No EU state | No long relation | Belgium | United Kingdom | Netherlands | France |
| Civilian | 42.9 | 28.6 | 21.4 | 0 | 7.1 | 0 |
| Military | 16.7 | 16.7 | 33.3 | 16.7 | 0 | 16.7 |

The results of the theoretical ground historical ties show some differences between civilian and military operations. Civilian operations seem to be deployed more in states that have no former colonial relation to an EU member state and if they were former colonies at least not longer than fifty years. Only 28.5 percent of the civilian cases are former colonies, 21.4 of Belgium (DRC) and 7.1 of the Netherlands (Indonesia). For the military cases only one third has no colonial relation with an EU member state. In one

third of the cases it was a former Belgium colony, 16.7 percent a former colony of the United Kingdom (Sudan) and also 16.7 percent of former France colony (Chad-CAR).

To summarise, there are some differences between the kinds of operations. The greatest differences are visible for the theoretical grounds regime (subhypothesis level of democracy), external pressure and historical ties. According to the results for regime (subhypothesis level of democracy) military operations are deployed earlier in non-democratic states than civilian operations. Remarkable is the result of external pressure from the UN or AU on the EU in fifty percent of the military cases and none in the civilian cases. And last the relatively great amount of military operations in former colonies.

§ 5.4 Combining the results

In chapter four the twenty cases are analysed for every argument of legitimation and theoretical ground. In this chapter these results are compared for developments in period of time and differences between locations and kind of operations. But perhaps other combinations could still provide new information and results. Because of the limited size of this research not all possible new combinations can be tested, but the most remarkable results of this chapter will be cross-examined.

If the three different comparisons in this chapter are combined, it becomes very clear that there is no even spread of the operations over time, continent or kinds of operation. This is made visible in the table below (See figure 5.27).

Figure 5.27 Spread over time, continent and kind of operation

| | Europe | | Asia | | Africa | | | |
|-------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------|------|
| | Civilian | Military | Civilian | Military | Civilian | Military | | |
| 2002 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 5% |
| 2003 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 15% |
| 2004 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 15% |
| 2005 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 40% |
| 2006 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 10% |
| 2007 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 15% |
| | 5 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 20 | 100% |
| | 25% | 10% | 30% | 0% | 15% | 20% | | |

Because of this uneven spread, the results of the comparisons could be effected. This is most clear for the developments in period of time. In some periods the European Council decided over only one (2002) or two (2006) peace operations. This is a sharp contrast with the decisions over eight new operations in the year 2005. As stated above, this research is limited and therefore not all categories can be cross-examined to discover new layers of information. Therefore the focus will be on a question that is asked several times during the above analyses: the dilemma of external pressure on operations in Africa and/or on military operations. Therefore the argument of legitimation 'a request of the UN/AU' and the theoretical ground external pressure is cross-examined (See figures 5.28 and 5.29).

Figure 5.28 Cross-examination of the argument request of the UN/AU (in percentage)

| | Civilian | | Military | |
|---------------|----------|------|----------|-----|
| | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Europe | 0 | 100 | 0 | 100 |
| Asia | 0 | 100 | --- | --- |
| Africa | 33.3 | 66.7 | 75 | 25 |

Figure 5.29 Cross-examination of external pressure (in percentage)

| | Civilian | | Military | |
|---------------|----------|------|----------|-----|
| | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Europe | 0 | 100 | 0 | 100 |
| Asia | 16.7 | 83.3 | --- | --- |
| Africa | 0 | 100 | 75 | 25 |

Is the EU pressured by the UN and AU to act in African cases because of the fact that it is on the African continent or because of the military background of the operations? As is clearly visible in figure 5.28 the UN and AU only requested the EU to act in Africa and not in Europe or Asia. But three out of four of these requests resulted in a military operation, while the EU does not lightly act military. In figure 5.29 it is clear that the EU is only pressured in four cases, one Asian case and three military African cases. In all the other cases the EU had received no request or had already expressed the willingness to act.

If the results of figure 5.28 and 5.29 are combined, the main focus of external pressure are military cases in Africa. Both military operations outside of Africa (EUFOR Althea and EUFOR Concordia) are not pressured by the UN or AU. The civilian cases in Africa are also not pressured. Only EUPOL Kinshasa was on request of the UN, but as measured by the theoretical ground external pressure the EU already expressed its willingness to act before this specific request was send to the EU. Therefore this is not qualified as external pressure. The military African cases Operation Artemis, AMIS II Support and EUFOR RDC are the only operations in which external pressure is exerted on the EU and the UN or AU clearly requested the EU to act before the EU expressed its willingness. This means only one military African operation is decided on without external pressure or a request of the UN/AU: EUFOR Chad/CAR. For this operation the EU expressed its willingness to bridge the period until an UN operation would be established. This is strange, since the EU was not so willing to act in the other three military operations in Africa, while operation Artemis also was a temporarily operation.

Chapter 6 - Conclusion

After a process of decades, the EU decided early 1990s to become a global player, with the ability to take part in international conflict prevention and management. Most important for the position of the EU was the development of the ESDP under the CFSP. By transferring the Petersberg tasks from the WEU to the ESDP, the EU could deploy its own peace operations. In the period 2002-2007 the European Council decided to deploy seven operations in Europe, six operations in Asia and seven operations in Africa.

The puzzle of this research is this remarkable broad range of EU-led peace operations. Data from different sources show there are far more conflicts in this period of time. For instance Harbom and Wallensteen name a yearly average of more than thirty conflicts in the period 2002-2006 (Harbom and Wallensteen 2007, 624). Since the EU doesn't operate in all conflicts, the organisation must choose in which conflicts it acts. This choice is not geographically based, as shown by the many operations out-of-area in Asia and Africa. Therefore this research central question was to find out on what reasons the EU chooses to deploy a peace operation in a certain region or state.

In the previous chapters the necessary information to formulate an answer on this central research question is gathered. Chapter two described the EU, the CFSP and the ESDP. In chapter three the methodological choices are discussed. The methodology of chapter three is used to measure the arguments and hypotheses in chapter four and to look at developments and differences in chapter five. In this final chapter the information found in these previous chapters is analysed to formulate a final answer on the central research question.

§ 6.1 Methodological reflections

As described in the methodological chapter of this research, the character of the research is explorative, since there is little known about the reasons of the EU to intervene in a certain region or state. This research should provide a first inside in the possible reasons for the EU to intervene in a conflict in a certain region or area. The explorative character of the research has an effect on the outcomes. Therefore these effects and the validity and reliability of the research are addressed before the analysis of the results.

§ 6.1.1 A small 'N'... but too much information

In this research twenty cases are studied. This seems like a great amount of cases, but if these cases are divided by period of time, location or kinds of operation, the number of cases is too small. This clearly effects the results and also the conclusions. Despite the small 'N', the research still provides lots of information, since the twenty cases are tested by eleven arguments of legitimation and twenty hypotheses. Because of the limited size of this research choices have to be made. These choices always have an effect on the validity and reliability of the results. For instance the measurement of the arguments of legitimation based upon analyses of the Council Joint Actions, limits the size of the research but possibly also excludes some arguments named during the decision-making process. By making smart and argued choices the negative effects on validity and reliability are limited to a reasonable amount. For the example of the arguments of legitimation, the choice was supported by the description of the content of Joint Actions by Björkdahl and Strömvik (2008, 31-32). But also the choices how to measure the theoretical grounds and how to compare the developments and differences are argued in the third chapter. When possible, this research uses respected databases as sources of information. This improves the reliability of the results. During the comparison of the developments and differences the effect of the limited number of cases in some categories is continuously taken into account. For this reason the comparison in kinds of operation is limited to two categories: military and civilian.

§ 6.1.2 The effects of methodological choices

Another important methodological effect is the choice to test the arguments of legitimation and the theoretical grounds only on the twenty cases over which the European Council has decided between 2002 and 2007. This choice has some

consequences for the interpretation of the outcome of the measurements. By analysing only the cases on which the European Council has decided to act, a part of information is missed, namely the cases in which the EU decided not to act. On the one hand the size of the research would not allow such an extensive investigation, on the other hand the information that would be needed to study the cases in which the EU decided not to act is hard to find. Because this research is a first study for possible reasons of the EU to intervene this is no great problem for this research, but for further research this information is required. In the recommendations for further research this is taken into account. But what has to be clear before analysing the results of the measurements is that none of the reasons can be verified but only falsified. If a clear majority of the cases support the assumption of the influence of a certain reason, this is only a possibility. It is plausible, but shall have to be tested on other cases, in conflicts in which the EU didn't decide to act. In the tradition of science this research tries to exclude reasons. What remain are reasons that are clearly of no influence and reasons that are possible influential. These reasons also need to be retested to find out if they are complementary.

§ 6.2 Analysing the results

In chapter four of this research the arguments of legitimation and the theoretical grounds are tested on the twenty cases. These results are compared for developments in period of time and differences between location and kinds of operations in chapter five. Based on these both chapters, the central research question can be answered.

§ 6.2.1 The arguments of legitimation

The arguments of legitimation do not give as much information about the choices of the EU to intervene in a certain region or state as assumed in chapter three. The content of the Council Joint Actions is more about the organisation of the operation. There is only limited space for the arguments to deploy the operation. These arguments shall have to be exchanged more extensive during the discussion in the informal, information and planning phase of the decision-making process. Despite the limited information, there are still some interesting results of the analysis of the arguments of legitimation.

First of all, it is important to notice that all the peace operations on which the European Council decided from 2002 until 2007 are legitimised with a UN Security Council Resolution and/or a request or invitation of the host state. The EU has never intervened without an UN resolution or permission of the host state. This increases the legitimation of the EU-led peace operations. A remarkable difference between these both arguments is that hundred percent of the military operation had a UN Security Council Resolution, while hundred percent of the civilian operations were with consent of the host state. But despite this, the fact that it is legitimate to operate is no answer to the question why to intervene in a certain region or state. Other arguments can – implicit or explicit – answer that question much better.

In seventy-five percent of the cases the Joint Actions points at a (international) peace agreement. The EU-operations should support the implementation of these agreements. Another argument for the EU to act is because the operation is in line with the EU Stabilisation and Association policy. Of course this policy is focused on European states and therefore doesn't count for Asian or African cases. In total this argument is named in thirty percent of the cases, which is 85.7 percent of the European cases. This indicates European states that are potential future EU members can count on EU support. Other arguments to intervene are the requests of the UN or AU (20%) and succeeding (15%), preceding (5%) or supporting (20%) of UN, AU or NATO operations. All of these arguments are named only for some cases, but in total an argument relating to a UN, AU or NATO operation is named in forty percent of the cases. This must not be mistaken with external pressure. In different of these cases the EU already had expressed its willingness to act, before a request for of a EU-operation. In sixty percent of the cases the Council Joint Actions explicitly names the expression of the willingness of the EU to act. Although this is again no argument to deploy a peace operation in a certain region or state, it can perhaps explain why there is a relatively low external pressure on the EU to act. The explicit expression of the willingness to act is named most for European and

civilian cases. This result is a valuable addition to the results of the theoretical ground external pressure.

Strangely enough the argument 'considered a threat to regional/international peace and security' is named only in twenty percent of the cases. This would be the argument expected to return in almost every Council Joint Action, because international peace and security should be the goal of the European interventions. According to the European Security Strategy "An active and capable European Union would (...) contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world." (Solana 2003, 14). But the argument that points at this important statement from the European strategy is used only in some cases and only in the period 2003-2005. There is no reason why peace and security would be a more important argument in 2003-2005 than it would be in 2002 or 2006-2007. Since this argument is only used in some cases, it would be logical to use it in cases where military instruments are used. This also isn't the reality. The argument 'considered a threat to regional/international peace and security' is used only in civilian cases. This is a major question mark in the Council Joint Actions.

A final argument to deploy a peace operation was the reference to continue the work of earlier EU operations. This argument is used in thirty percent of the cases. This is a high amount if we take into account the fact that the EU intervened in different regions. From 2004 this argument is used several times, especially for African cases (57.1%). This can be explained by the five operations in the DRC. In the Joint Actions of these operations, the European Council regularly refers to the earlier operations. This indicates the EU feels connected to the states in which it operates. In the DRC operations are followed by another, but in other states operations are prolonged as long as the problems are not solved or the goals are not achieved.

§ 6.2.2 The theoretical grounds

Many of the theoretical grounds tested in chapter four have no direct relation to the decision of the European Council to deploy a peace operation in a certain region or state. As stated before this is no proof that these theoretical grounds have no influence at all. As shown in chapter five by comparing the results, some theoretical grounds do show some relevance for periods of time, locations or kind of operations. Two theoretical grounds – protection of citizens and internal pressure – could not be compared, because they are not measured by lack of information. The other theoretical grounds could give some insight in the decision of the European Council to deploy a peace operation in a certain region or state.

After the measurements of chapter four, only the theoretical grounds development aid, humanitarian action and human rights seem to have a direct relation to the decision of the European Council to deploy a peace operation. Development aid could be an important factor, since the majority of the cases are the receivers of an above average amount of development aid of the EU and its member states. This would indicate that the investments of the EU and the member states as donors of development aid, are important factors in the decision-making process of the EU. Remarkable is that the amount of development aid is of lesser importance in the European cases. Most European cases score medium (54.4%), while Asia (66.7%) and Africa (85.7%) mostly score high on development aid.

Theoretical ground humanitarian action also has a relation to the decision of the European Council. Only fifteen percent of the cases score low on this theoretical ground. In thirty percent of the cases the level of violence is medium and in fifty-five percent the level of violence is high. In these cases of medium and high levels of violence, humanitarian action could be a reason for the EU to intervene in a certain region or state. In fact this factor seems to become more important over time. In 2002 and 2003 most cases score low, while in 2005 (62.5%), 2006 (50%) and 2007 (100%) the majority of the cases score high on this theoretical ground. Another difference can be seen between the continents. In Europe the cases score low (42.9%) or medium (57.1%) on this theoretical ground, while in Asia (66.7%) and Africa (100%) the majority of the cases score high.

Finally the theoretical ground human rights shows a clear pattern for the interventions of the EU. In the period 2002-2007 the EU never intervened in a state that is considered free. The states in all twenty cases have problems with human rights. Almost half of the cases (47.5%) is considered partly free, while more than half (52.5%) are considered not free at all. Although all states have a problem with human rights, there is a clear division between the continents. In Europe most cases are considered partly free (85.7%), while in Africa the majority of the cases are considered not free (92.9%). Asia is just in between with fifty percent partly free and fifty percent not free.

Besides these three theoretical grounds that indicate a positive relation between the theoretical ground and the decision of the European Council to deploy a peace operation in a certain region or state, other theoretical grounds show a negative relation. For the hypotheses of these theoretical grounds no direct causal relation was found in chapter four, but still the results show information about the European peace operations.

First of all the theoretical grounds concerning the protection of territory. There is no indication that the EU intervenes in a certain region or state because of a fear of overspill of the negative effects of the violence to EU territory. In sixty-five percent of the cases no relation between this fear and the cases is found. In thirty percent of the cases only a low relation was found. For this theoretical ground also no developments in time or differences between locations or kinds of operations can be seen. Therefore it seems of no influence at all. The same can be said of the theoretical grounds non-proliferation and economic interests. These theoretical grounds also show a negative relation between the reason and the decision of the EU. In ninety percent of the cases there is no evidence of a relation between proliferation and the cases. Only in the cases in Iraq and Afghanistan some associations are made between proliferation and these states. The economic interests of the EU also play no role in the decision-making process of the EU. In 87.5 percent the interests are low and in none of the cases these interests are high. Also no development in period of time or differences between locations or kind of operations are found for these theoretical grounds.

The theoretical ground protection of friendly governments shows that this plays no particular role in the decision-making process. In eighty percent of the cases the government of the state had no special friendly relation with the EU. The only exceptions were all European states: Macedonia, Ukraine and Moldova. This is logical because states outside of Europe have lesser chance to be a NATO-member or have an association agreement with the EU and therefore generally score lower on this measurement.

The theoretical ground external pressure shows that in eighty percent of the cases no request of an international organisation or to monitor a peace treaty was sent to the EU before the EU already expressed its willingness to act. As described above by the arguments of legitimation, in sixty percent of the cases the EU explicitly expressed its willingness to act, in many cases before a request of an organisation was sent. Remarkable differences can be seen for locations and kind of operations. All requests of international organisations focus on military operations in Africa. This could indicate an abstention of the EU to operate in Africa and/or in military cases and a need for external pressure on the EU to act in these cases. Based on these results it is hard to indicate whether this is because it is in Africa or because these are military operations. Surely since the African military operation EUFOR Chad/CAR show no signs of external pressure.

Half of the states in the cases are violated territorially. These states are invaded by an unilateral force or a multilateral force without the mandate of an international organisation. According to Finnemore this is illegal (2003, 98). But as argued in chapter four this seems to have no influence on the decision-making process of the EU. In the cases of violations, the operations of the EU do not focus against the aggressors, but they support reform and civilian administration to rebuild the states. The EU intervened in states that are territorially violated mostly in Asia and Africa and in more recent years. Of course this doesn't change the observation that the operations of the EU don't focus on the aggressors. Probably this theoretical ground does not play a role in the decision-making process of the EU.

Finally the theoretical ground historical ties can give some information on the relation between former colonies and the decision of the European Council to intervene in

a certain region or state. In most cases the states are no former colonies of EU member states (35%) or were colonies but not for at least fifty years or longer (25%). The forty percent of the cases that are former colonies for fifty year or longer, lay mainly in Africa and are mostly military operations. This is no strange result, since almost whole Africa was divided between the European states and most military operations are deployed in Africa. Because almost whole Africa is a former European colony, this is no proof that the former colonial connection is a reason to intervene. In other continents there is no sign of a relation between a historical tie and an intervention. It is remarkable that the general opinion seems to be that the EU interventions would legitimate the foreign policies of the greatest EU member states like France in Africa. The former colonial ties are no proof for this assumption, since most EU operations are deployed in the former Belgium colony DRC.

Besides all these theoretical grounds that show a positive or negative relation with the decision of the European Council to deploy a peace operation in a certain region or state, some theoretical grounds do possibly indicate a relation for a certain period of time, location or kind of operation. The effect of these theoretical grounds is unclear for all the cases, but are visible in periods of time, location or kind of operations.

The results of the theoretical ground terrorism are spread over the different categories. Therefore it is hard to say if this factor plays a role in the decision-making process of the European Council. But there are more clear differences between the continents and kind of operations. The association with terrorism is highest in Asia. In no single Asian case none or a low association is found, but only medium (33.3%) and high (66.7%). In Europe and Africa none of the cases scored high. Strangely enough in all the cases that are highly associated with terrorism, civilian operations are deployed.

The amount of raw materials a state possesses has also no clear relation with the decision of the European Council. There is only one state in which the EU has intervened which has a high amount of raw materials: the DRC. But because the EU already intervened five times in this state, this effects the results for all operations and especially for Africa. Still this is no proof of an importance of the amount of raw materials, since all other cases score low or medium on this theoretical ground.

The theoretical ground regimes is divided into two subhypothesis. The first subhypothesis is the level of democracy. The results of this measurement are unclear because of the high amount of unknown data (25%) and unclear transitions (15%) in the Polity IV database. But despite this lack of information, the results for the differences in locations and kinds of operations do show some interesting information. First of all, only on the African continent the EU has intervened in non-democratic states, while in Europe almost all cases (75%) are democratic. In the non-democratic states the EU deployed only military operations, while in the cases of foreign interventions only civilian operations were deployed. This would support the earlier conclusion that the EU doesn't intervene in states that are territorially violated to focus on the aggressors. If the EU should operate to drive away the aggressor it certainly would be expected all these operations to be military. For the subhypothesis transitions also twenty-five percent of the cases is unknown and twenty percent is unclear. The remaining fifty-five percent of the cases show a slight majority of positive transitions. Most states were becoming more democratic in the five years before the decision of the European Council to intervene. But because of the many unknown and unclear data this is no evidence of a positive relation. For the continents the evidence is clearer. In 87.5 percent of the European cases a positive transition is visible. The other continents show a spread over the different categories.

§ 6.2.3 Answering the central research question

How could the information of both the arguments of legitimation and the theoretical grounds give an answer on the central research question? In fact it can't. To be sure of the reasons of the EU to intervene in a certain region or state, the research should include states in which the European Council decided not intervene. This explorative research is of interest because it provides the first insights about which reasons seem very plausible to have influence and which reasons doesn't. This way the central research

question can be answered in a certain way. For a more clear answer further research will be necessary.

Despite the explorative character of this research, some hard conclusions can be drawn. First of all that all EU peace operations are legitimate according to international law. Of course legitimacy doesn't proof anything about the locations of the operations, but it does if the logic is reversed. It seems the EU doesn't intervene in a region or state if the operation wouldn't be legitimate. The legitimacy of the operation would be a major issue in the decision-making process of the European Council. Other factors that seem to have a strong relation with the choices of the EU are the amount of development aid, the level of violence and respect for human rights. Most cases show an above average amount of development aid of the EU and its member states, a high level of violence and always a lack in the execution of human rights. Of no influence on the decision of the European Council seems to be a fear of overspill of the negative effects of the conflicts, the fear for proliferation, the protection of European economic interests or friendly governments, territorial violations and former colonial ties. Also external pressure on the EU doesn't seem to be a major reason. Only in three cases the EU was clearly requested by the UN or AU to support, while only in one case the EU was asked to monitor a peace treaty. Despite the fact that external pressure seems no major factor, the presence of an international organisation does seem to have some effect on the decisions of the EU. In forty percent of the cases the UN, NATO or AU are present, were present in the past or will be present in the future.

It seems the EU feels itself responsible for the process in the regions and states after the decision to intervene. In thirty percent of the cases the Council Joint Action refers to earlier EU operations in the same state and builds further on the work of these operations. This points at a binding effect, which is strengthened by the many prolongings of operations in other states. The EU seems to feel itself responsible for the wellbeing of the states. Of the twenty operations decided on between 2002 and 2007, eleven are still active despite the fact that for many of these operations the first mandate already expired and was prolonged.

Besides these reasons that count as possible general rules for decisions of the European Council, other factors seem to indicate a relation only for some locations. First the continent Europe. Because these conflicts are on the border of the EU, it was expected the main reason for an intervention was the fear of spillover of the negative effects of conflicts to EU territory. The theoretical ground protection of territory shows no proof for this assumption. But it is unclear what other reason the European Council had to deploy a peace operation in European states. The economic interests are low, the states possess no great amounts of raw materials, the amount of development aid is in majority medium, the states are mostly democratic and show positive transitions, there is no sign of external pressure, the level of violence is low, there are little territorial violations and the states are no former colonies for at least fifty years. Would the fact that most governments are considered friendly (57.1%) and the states are only partly free (85.7%) be the only reason for the EU to intervene? The arguments of legitimation add another factor: the EU Stabilisation and Association policy. In 85.7 percent of the European cases this argument was expressed in the Council Joint Actions. This policy is the framework in which the EU negotiates with states over stabilisation, the transition to a market economy and regional co-operation, with as possible result an accession. That would indicate the EU intervenes in these European cases to support the states and to prepare them as close partners and possible future member states. This support would surely include the human rights in the states and explains why such a high amount of the governments of these states are considered friendly. Despite the negative result for the theoretical ground protection of territory, the influence of the Stabilisation and Association policy shows the importance of a stabile neighbourhood for the EU.

For Asia and Africa the argument EU Stabilisation and Association policy can't be the explanatory factor, because this policy focuses on the European territory only. For both these continents the above mentioned general reasons development aid, humanitarian action and human rights can be applied. Both Asia and Africa show high

amounts of development aid, high levels of violence and problems with the execution of human rights. Asia further shows a very high level of association with terrorism. This could be a specific reason to intervene in Asian states, but it surely doesn't count for the cases in other continents. There are no other reasons that indicate a relation to the decision of the European Council to intervene in Asian states.

In Africa the cases score higher than the other continents on raw materials, non-democratic states and former colonies. The high amount of raw materials can be led back to the five operations in the DRC. Both other African cases show low and medium scores on this theoretical ground. So this is no proof that the presence of raw materials is an important reason for EU interventions in Africa. Also the theoretical ground historical ties is doubtful. Since almost all African states are former European colonies, this is no distinguishing factor to intervene in an African state. External pressure seems to be a complementary factor for Africa. In 57.1 percent of the African cases the EU received a request of the UN or the AU and in 42.9 percent of these cases this request was sent before the EU expressed the willingness to act. This is a great difference with Europe and Asia. Only for the military operations in Africa the EU has clearly been pressured to act by international organisations. This could indicate a certain fear or lack of interest to act in Africa. For instance the UN – a global organisation – has to request the EU to intervene in Africa, while such a request is not necessary for other continents. But it could also indicate the African cases are more complex than the conflicts in Asia and Europe and therefore need more attention. But also more than half of the African cases is military. And as stated in paragraph 2.3.1 the EU doesn't act lightly on military operations. So also the fact that the African conflicts need a military intervention instead of the favoured civilian approach of the EU could be an explanation for the need of international organisations to request the EU for help in African conflicts. The cross-examination in paragraph 5.4 doesn't give a clear answer, especially because of the exception of the operation in Chad/CAR.

The most important conclusions of the research are summarised in the table below (see figure 6.1).

Figure 6.1 Most important conclusions

1. The EU never intervened without an UN Security Council Resolution (75%) and/or a request or invitation of the host state (85%).
2. In ninety-five percent of the cases the EU intervened on request of the host state (85%) and/or the UN/AU (20%).
3. Causal relations to the decision-making process of the European Council are found for the theoretical grounds development aid, humanitarian action and human rights. The EU intervenes in states that it supports with above average amounts of development aid, with a high level of violence and that are considered partly free or not free at all.
4. Although EU member states have colonised almost the whole world, only forty percent of the operations are deployed in states with a colonial relation to an EU member state for fifty years or longer, these cases are mostly African.
5. When the EU intervenes in a state, it feels a continued responsibility for the state, according to the results for references to earlier operations and the many prolongings of operations.
6. In almost all European cases (85.7%) the EU stated to act according to the Stabilisation and Association policy.
7. The EU was externally pressed to act for military operations in Africa.

§ 6.3 Recommendations for further research

This research is relevant because of the great impact of post-cold War conflicts on the society and the aim to provide insights in the motivations of the EU and to contribute to the knowledge of interventions in general. The knowledge about the peace operations of the EU was limited and this research should give some more insights. Therefore broad

goals were placed and extensive questions were asked. As result this research gives some first insights, but still further research is necessary to draw more hard conclusions.


First of all it would be interesting to test the conclusions of this research on the newest operations of the EU. Since 2007 the EU has decided on three new operations: a rule of law operation in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo) that follows the planning operation EUPT Kosovo, a security sector reform operation in Guinea-Bissau (EU SSR Guinea-Bissau) and the first maritime operation of the EU near the Somali coast (EU NAVFOR Somalia). Especially the first maritime operation could provide some new insights. Second, the reasons for which a relation with the decision-making process of the EU is found shall have to be put to more tests. These reasons become more relevant if they distinguish the states in which the EU did and didn't intervene. Therefore the reasons shall have to be tested on cases in which the EU didn't intervene. If a difference is found between the reasons for EU interventions in conflicts and non-interventions in others, that would be a much stronger proof for the relevance of the reason. And third, the reasons for which no relation was found, shall have to be retested. This research is explorative and gives some first insights, but that doesn't say the results are hard enough to falsify the reasons for which no relation was found. Perhaps they do have influence on other cases or perhaps they have some influence if they are tested complementary to other reasons. Finally, further research has need for special attention on the two remarkable results of this explorative research: reasons for interventions in Europe and the external pressure on the EU to intervene by military operations in Africa. Because in Europe the Stabilisation and Association policy is of great importance it seems that stable borders are major reasons of the EU, despite the low scores on the theoretical ground protection of territory. The question about military operations in Africa is discussed several times in this research, but mainly because of the exception EUFOR Chad/CAR no clear answer is found. Therefore both these results shall have to be examined further.

Appendix


Appendix A - Members of organisations on January 1, 2008

| | <i>Schengen:</i> | <i>Euro:</i> | <i>WEU:</i> | <i>NATO:</i> |
|-------------------------------|------------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|
| <i>EU-members:</i> | | | | |
| Austria | X | X | X | |
| Belgium | X | X | X | X |
| Britain | | | X | X |
| Bulgaria | | | X | X |
| Cyprus | | X | | |
| Czech Republic | X | | X | X |
| Denmark | X | | X | X |
| Estonia | X | | X | X |
| Finland | X | X | X | |
| France | X | X | X | X |
| Germany | X | X | X | X |
| Greece | X | X | X | X |
| Hungary | X | | X | X |
| Ireland | | X | X | |
| Italy | X | X | X | X |
| Latvia | X | | X | X |
| Lithuania | X | | X | X |
| Luxembourg | X | X | X | X |
| Malta | X | X | | |
| Netherlands | X | X | X | X |
| Poland | X | | X | X |
| Portugal | X | X | X | X |
| Romania | | | X | X |
| Slovakia | X | | X | X |
| Slovenia | X | X | X | X |
| Spain | X | X | X | X |
| Sweden | X | | X | |
| <i>Non-EU-members:</i> | | | | |
| Andorra | | X | | |
| Canada | | | | X |
| Iceland | X | | X | X |
| Kosovo | | X | | |
| Monaco | X | X | | |
| Montenegro | | X | | |
| Norway | X | | X | X |
| San Marino | | X | | |
| Turkey | | | X | X |
| United states | | | | X |
| Vatican city | | X | | |

Appendix B - Institutions of the CFSP/ESDP (Björkdahl and Strömvik 2008, 14)



Appendix C - Decision-making process of the CFSP/ESDP (Björkdahl and Strömvik 2008, 25)



Appendix D – Agreements EU and states

| | NATO | | | Agreements | | | |
|--------------------------|--------|------------|--------|------------|--------------|-------------|--------|
| | Member | PfP | Score | Economic | ENP | Association | Score |
| EUPM BiH | --- | --- | 0 | Yes | --- | --- | 1 |
| EUFOR Concordia | --- | Yes | 1 | Yes | --- | 2001 | 3 |
| Artemis | --- | --- | 0 | Yes | --- | --- | 1 |
| EUPOL Proxima | --- | Yes | 1 | Yes | --- | 2001 | 3 |
| EUJUST Themis | --- | --- | 0 | Yes | --- | --- | 1 |
| EUFOR Althea | --- | --- | 0 | Yes | --- | --- | 1 |
| EUPOL Kinshasa | --- | --- | 0 | Yes | --- | --- | 1 |
| EUJUST LEX | --- | --- | 0 | Yes | --- | --- | 1 |
| EUSEC RDC | --- | --- | 0 | Yes | --- | --- | 1 |
| Amis II Support | --- | --- | 0 | Yes | --- | --- | 1 |
| AMM | --- | --- | 0 | Yes | --- | --- | 1 |
| EUBAM Ukraine/Moldova | --- | Yes Yes | 1 1 | Yes Yes | 2005 2005 | --- | 2 2 |
| EUPOL COPPS | --- | --- | 0 | Yes | 2005 | --- | 2 |
| EUPAT | --- | Yes | 1 | Yes | --- | 2001 | 3 |
| EUBAM Rafah | --- | --- | 0 | Yes | 2005 | --- | 2 |
| EUPT Kosovo | --- | --- | 0 | --- | --- | --- | 0 |
| EUFOR RDC | --- | --- | 0 | Yes | --- | --- | 1 |
| EUPOL Afghanistan | --- | --- | 0 | Yes | --- | --- | 1 |
| EUPOL RDC | --- | --- | 0 | Yes | --- | --- | 1 |
| EUFOR Chad/CAR | --- | --- | 0 0 | Yes | --- | --- | 1 1 |

Appendix E – Calculations import hypothesis economic interests

Appendix E.1 – The average amount of import and export per year²¹

| | Import | | Export | |
|-------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| | Total | Average | Total | Average |
| 2001 | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 2002 | 933 995 865 749 | 4 364 466 662.38 | 942 866 268 082 | 4 405 917 140.57 |
| 2003 | 1 119 002 625 793 | 5 228 984 232.68 | 1 107 115 080 236 | 5 173 434 954.37 |
| 2004 | 1 383 154 076 909 | 6 463 336 807.99 | 1 361 780 435 379 | 6 363 459 978.41 |
| 2005 | 1 687 776 773 802 | 7 886 807 354.21 | 1 660 653 018 285 | 7 760 060 833.11 |
| 2006 | 1 951 812 689 060 | 9 120 620 042.34 | 1 809 698 802 153 | 8 456 536 458.66 |

²¹ The calculation is based upon a total of 214 states.

Appendix E.2 – The comparison for import

| | Average import | Import of EU | Score |
|-----------------------------------|------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| EUPM BiH ²² | 4 364 466 662.38 | 591 815 934 | Low |
| EUFOR Concordia | 4 364 466 662.38 | 526 190 683 | Low |
| Artemis | 4 364 466 662.38 | 1 174 688 782 | Low |
| EUPOL Proxima | 4 364 466 662.38 | 526 190 683 | Low |
| EUJUST Themis | 5 228 984 232.68 | 307 524 793 | Low |
| EUFOR Althea | 5 228 984 232.68 | 819 899 890 | Low |
| EUPOL Kinshasa | 5 228 984 232.68 | 818 483 820 | Low |
| EUJUST LEX | 6 463 336 807.99 | 3 158 120 750 | Low |
| EUSEC RDC | 6 463 336 807.99 | 809 921 823 | Low |
| Amis II Support | 6 463 336 807.99 | 308 296 960 | Low |
| AMM | 6 463 336 807.99 | 12 131 611 277 | High |
| EUBAM Ukraine/ Moldova | 6 463 336 807.99 | 5 536 722 049 482 729 140 | Low Low |
| EUPOL COPPS ²³ | 6 463 336 807.99 | 12 929 254 | Low |
| EUPAT | 6 463 336 807.99 | 914 812 303 | Low |
| EUBAM Rafah | 6 463 336 807.99 | 12 929 254 | Low |
| EUPT Kosovo | 7 886 807 354.21 | --- | --- |
| EUFOR RDC | 7 886 807 354.21 | 912 752 249 | Low |
| EUPOL Afghanistan | 9 120 620 042.34 | 43 894 991 | Low |
| EUPOL RDC | 9 120 620 042.34 | 773 658 179 | Low |
| EUFOR Chad/CAR | 9 120 620 042.34 | 44 108 018 77 323 912 | Low Low |
| Percentage of total EU operations | | | 5% unknown 90% low 5% high |

Appendix E.3 – The comparison for export

| | Average export | Export of EU | Score |
|-----------------------------------|------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| EUPM BiH ²⁴ | 4 405 917 140.57 | 1 256 448 673 | Low |
| EUFOR Concordia | 4 405 917 140.57 | 953 650 155 | Low |
| Artemis | 4 405 917 140.57 | 335 850 350 | Low |
| EUPOL Proxima | 4 405 917 140.57 | 953 650 155 | Low |
| EUJUST Themis | 5 173 434 954.37 | 357 275 970 | Low |
| EUFOR Althea | 5 173 434 954.37 | 1 438 331 873 | Low |
| EUPOL Kinshasa | 5 173 434 954.37 | 422 656 374 | Low |
| EUJUST LEX | 6 363 459 978.41 | 1 603 409 960 | Low |
| EUSEC RDC | 6 363 459 978.41 | 489 932 979 | Low |
| Amis II Support | 6 363 459 978.41 | 1 016 332 423 | Low |
| AMM | 6 363 459 978.41 | 5 678 480 576 | Low |
| EUBAM Ukraine/ Moldova | 6 363 459 978.41 | 8 916 712 549 704 203 600 | High Low |
| EUPOL COPPS ²⁵ | 6 363 459 978.41 | 59 478 248 | Low |
| EUPAT | 6 363 459 978.41 | 1 199 673 120 | Low |
| EUBAM Rafah | 6 363 459 978.41 | 59 478 248 | Low |
| EUPT Kosovo | 7 760 060 833.11 | --- | --- |
| EUFOR RDC | 7 760 060 833.11 | 627 731 355 | Low |
| EUPOL Afghanistan | 8 456 536 458.66 | 459 040 110 | Low |
| EUPOL RDC | 8 456 536 458.66 | 723 003 382 | Low |
| EUFOR Chad/CAR | 8 456 536 458.66 | 205 218 613 108 575 986 | Low Low |
| Percentage of total EU operations | | | 5% unknown 92.5% low 2.5% high |

²² Data of 2002, no data for 2001.

²³ Data of 2005, no data for 2004.

²⁴ Data of 2002, no data for 2001.

²⁵ Data of 2005, no data for 2004.

Appendix E.4 – Score on hypothesis economic interests

| | Import | | Export | | Total score | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------|--------------------------------------|--------|------------------------|-----|
| | | | | | | |
| EUPM BiH | Low | 1 | Low | 1 | 2 | Low |
| EUFOR Concordia | Low | 1 | Low | 1 | 2 | Low |
| Artemis | Low | 1 | Low | 1 | 2 | Low |
| EUPOL Proxima | Low | 1 | Low | 1 | 2 | Low |
| EUJUST Themis | Low | 1 | Low | 1 | 2 | Low |
| EUFOR Althea | Low | 1 | Low | 1 | 2 | Low |
| EUPOL Kinshasa | Low | 1 | Low | 1 | 2 | Low |
| EUJUST LEX | Low | 1 | Low | 1 | 2 | Low |
| EUSEC RDC | Low | 1 | Low | 1 | 2 | Low |
| Amis II Support | Low | 1 | Low | 1 | 2 | Low |
| AMM | High | 2 | Low | 1 | 3 | Low |
| EUBAM Ukraine/ Moldova | Low Low | 1 1 | High Low | 2 1 | 3 2 | Low |
| EUPOL COPPS | Low | 1 | Low | 1 | 2 | Low |
| EUPAT | Low | 1 | Low | 1 | 2 | Low |
| EUBAM Rafah | Low | 1 | Low | 1 | 2 | Low |
| EUPT Kosovo | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| EUFOR RDC | Low | 1 | Low | 1 | 2 | Low |
| EUPOL Afghanistan | Low | 1 | Low | 1 | 2 | Low |
| EUPOL RDC | Low | 1 | Low | 1 | 2 | Low |
| EUFOR Chad/CAR | Low Low | 1 1 | Low Low | 1 1 | 2 2 | Low |
| Percentage of total EU operations | 5% unknown 90% low 5% high | | 5% unknown 92.5% low 2.5% high | | 5% unknown 100% low | |

Appendix F – Calculations hypothesis development aid

Appendix F.1 – Average aid of EU member states

| | Total bilateral aid | Total states | Average aid |
|-------------|---------------------|--------------|-------------|
| 2001 | 15 839.48 | 182 | 87.03 |
| 2002 | 19 218.66 | 182 | 105.60 |
| 2003 | 23 884.42 | 182 | 131.23 |
| 2004 | 26 073.50 | 182 | 143.26 |
| 2005 | 38 513.95 | 182 | 211.62 |
| 2006 | 40 503.21 | 182 | 222.55 |

Appendix F.2 – Comparison aid of EU member states

| | Average aid | Aid to state | score |
|-----------------------------------|-------------|--------------|---------------------------------------|
| EUPM BiH | 87.03 | 192.09 | High |
| EUFOR Concordia | 105.60 | 83.79 | Low |
| Artemis | 105.60 | 243.19 | High |
| EUPOL Proxima | 105.60 | 83.79 | Low |
| EUJUST Themis | 131.23 | 57.65 | Low |
| EUFOR Althea | 131.23 | 165.53 | High |
| EUPOL Kinshasa | 131.23 | 3466.64 | High |
| EUJUST LEX | 143.26 | 584.45 | High |
| EUSEC RDC | 143.26 | 883.68 | High |
| Amis II Support | 143.26 | 357.04 | High |
| AMM | 143.26 | 0.43 | Low |
| EUBAM Ukraine/ Moldova | 143.26 | --- 35.35 | --- Low |
| EUPOL COPPS | 143.26 | 229.46 | High |
| EUPAT | 143.26 | 87.06 | Low |
| EUBAM Rafah | 143.26 | 229.46 | High |
| EUPT Kosovo | 211.62 | --- | --- |
| EUFOR RDC | 211.62 | 465.04 | High |
| EUPOL Afghanistan | 222.55 | 641.44 | High |
| EUPOL RDC | 222.55 | 580.70 | High |
| EUFOR Chad/CAR | 222.55 | 90.77 | Low |
| | | 37.93 | Low |
| Percentage of total EU operations | | | 7.5% unknown 32.5% low 60% high |

Appendix F.3 – Average aid of EU

| | Total aid | Total states | Average aid |
|-------------|-----------|--------------|-------------|
| 2001 | 5 891.76 | 148 | 39.81 |
| 2002 | 5 920.30 | 150 | 39.47 |
| 2003 | 6 331.13 | 150 | 42.21 |
| 2004 | 6 926.19 | 149 | 46.48 |
| 2005 | 7 497.39 | 153 | 49.00 |
| 2006 | 8 129.50 | 154 | 52.79 |

Appendix F.4 – Comparison aid of EU

| | Average aid | Aid to state | score |
|-----------------------------------|-------------|----------------|---------------------------------------|
| EUPM BiH | 39.81 | 168.61 | High |
| EUFOR Concordia | 39.47 | 56.71 | High |
| Artemis | 39.47 | 77.15 | High |
| EUPOL Proxima | 39.47 | 56.71 | High |
| EUJUST Themis | 42.21 | 25.06 | Low |
| EUFOR Althea | 42.21 | 120.23 | High |
| EUPOL Kinshasa | 42.21 | 70.86 | High |
| EUJUST LEX | 46.48 | 110.94 | High |
| EUSEC RDC | 46.48 | 201.08 | High |
| Amis II Support | 46.48 | 55.47 | High |
| AMM | 46.48 | 34.28 | Low |
| EUBAM Ukraine/ Moldova | 46.48 | 60.71 8.08 | High Low |
| EUPOL COPPS | 46.48 | 150.43 | High |
| EUPAT | 46.48 | 59.54 | High |
| EUBAM Rafah | 46.48 | 150.43 | High |
| EUPT Kosovo | 49.00 | --- | --- |
| EUFOR RDC | 49.00 | 171.85 | High |
| EUPOL Afghanistan | 52.79 | 175.99 | High |
| EUPOL RDC | 52.79 | 177.04 | High |
| EUFOR Chad/CAR | 52.79 | 47.56 11.09 | Low Low |
| Percentage of total EU operations | | | 5% no data 17.5% low 77.5% high |

Appendix F.5 – Score on hypothesis economic interests

| | Member states | | EU | | Total score | |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-----|---------------------------------------|-----|---|--------|
| | High | Low | High | Low | High | Low |
| EUPM BiH ²⁶ | High | 2 | High | 2 | 4 | High |
| EUFOR Concordia | Low | 1 | High | 2 | 3 | Medium |
| Artemis | High | 2 | High | 2 | 4 | High |
| EUPOL Proxima | Low | 1 | High | 2 | 3 | Medium |
| EUJUST Themis | Low | 1 | Low | 1 | 2 | Low |
| EUFOR Althea | High | 2 | High | 2 | 4 | High |
| EUPOL Kinshasa | High | 2 | High | 2 | 4 | High |
| EUJUST LEX | High | 2 | High | 2 | 4 | High |
| EUSEC RDC | High | 2 | High | 2 | 4 | High |
| Amis II Support | High | 2 | High | 2 | 4 | High |
| AMM | Low | 1 | Low | 1 | 2 | Low |
| EUBAM Ukraine/ Moldova | --- | --- | High | 2 | --- | --- |
| | Low | 1 | Low | 1 | 2 | Low |
| EUPOL COPPS ²⁷ | High | 2 | High | 2 | 4 | High |
| EUPAT | | 1 | High | 2 | 3 | Medium |
| EUBAM Rafah | High | 2 | High | 2 | 4 | High |
| EUPT Kosovo | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| EUFOR RDC | High | 2 | High | 2 | 4 | High |
| EUPOL Afghanistan | High | 2 | High | 2 | 4 | High |
| EUPOL RDC | High | 2 | High | 2 | 4 | High |
| EUFOR Chad/CAR | Low | 1 | Low | 1 | 2 | Low |
| | Low | 1 | Low | 1 | 2 | Low |
| Percentage of total EU operations | 7.5% unknown 32.5% low 60% high | | 5% unknown 17.5% low 77.5% high | | 7.5% unknown 17.5% low 15% medium 60% high | |

²⁶ Data of 2002, no data for 2001.

²⁷ Data of 2005, no data for 2004.

Appendix G – Backgrounds hypothesis territorial violations

| | | Foreign forces | | Mandate | |
|-----------------------------------|--|----------------|-------|---------|----|
| | | Uni | Multi | NATO | UN |
| EUPM BiH | NATO intervention to end the Bosnian War in 1995 | | X | X | |
| EUFOR Concordia | NATO intervention to the Albanian insurgency | | X | X | |
| Artemis | Internal conflicts, unilateral invasions and multilateral invasions by neighbouring states | X | X | | |
| EUPOL Proxima | NATO intervention to the Albanian insurgency | | X | X | |
| EUJUST Themis | Internal problems with autonomy of South Ossetia and Abkhazia since 1995 | | | | |
| EUFOR Althea | NATO intervention to end the Bosnian War in 1995 | | X | X | |
| EUPOL Kinshasa | Internal conflicts, unilateral invasions and multilateral invasions by neighbouring states | X | X | | |
| EUJUST LEX | US-led invasion in 2003 | | X | | |
| EUSEC RDC | Internal conflicts, unilateral invasions and multilateral invasions by neighbouring states | X | X | | |
| Amis II Support | Civil war with crossborder effects | | | | |
| AMM | Civil war in Atjeh | | | | |
| EUBAM Ukraine/Moldova | Russian troops stationed against will of the Moldavian government in Transnistrian region at the Ukrainian-Moldovan border | X | | | |
| EUPOL COPPS | Territories occupied by Israel | X | | | |
| EUPAT | NATO intervention to the Albanian insurgency | | X | X | |
| EUBAM Rafah | Territories occupied by Israel | X | | | |
| EUPT Kosovo | NATO intervention to force the Serbian troops out of Kosovo | | X | X | |
| EUFOR RDC | Internal conflicts, unilateral invasions and multilateral invasions by neighbouring states | X | X | | |
| EUPOL Afghanistan | US-led invasion in 2001 | | X | | |
| EUPOL RDC | Internal conflicts, unilateral invasions and multilateral invasions by neighbouring states | X | X | | |
| EUFOR Chad/CAR | Civil war with crossborder effects Civil war with crossborder effects | | | | |
| Percentage of total EU operations | | 40% | 65% | 30% | 0% |

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