

Bridging the Gap

Diaspora engagement in peacebuilding in the Horn of Africa

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After an extremely interesting, challenging, busy and above all, fun year I will conclude the master specialization "Conflicts, Territories and Identities" at the Radboud university of Nijmegen with this thesis. My interest for diaspora engagement could be explained by my interests in the linkages between places, people, and their homes, wherever these might be. When I started the research on this topic however, I did not have any idea about the various and extensive ways diaspora groups still were connected to the countries and communities where they came from. During the research I met many different people that all had their own interesting story and experience of that particular place that they still call "home". Personally I experienced it as extremely interesting to investigate to how these people still hope to return to their original home one day and that they in the meantime will do anything within their capabilities to make sure that when they return, their homes are a safe and pleasant place to be for them and for the generations after them. Although the process of investigating and writing was not always easy, I believe this thesis will give an interesting insight in the way the diaspora members from the Horn of Africa are active in their home countries.

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I hope you enjoy reading this thesis,

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In a globalizing world diasporas have become important forces that play a role in the interactions and relations between countries, regions and continents. Also in contemporary conflicts, conflict resolution and peacebuilding diaspora have a more and more important role to play. In the mainstream literature, diaspora are often seen to fuel conflict and exacerbate tensions through radical mobilization along ethnic and religious lines. New research findings, however, show that diaspora groups are playing an increasingly prominent role in peace and reconciliation processes. To what extent however, is not clear. This research aims at finding knowledge in the ways African diaspora (organisations) in the Netherlands try to influence the developments in their countries of origin and at finding knowledge in the ways those diaspora members are engaging themselves in positive peacebuilding practises. Hence the research question is;

To what extent, and in what ways, does the African diaspora in the Netherlands influence peacebuilding processes in the Horn of Africa?

The Horn of Africa is an area in Eastern Africa and includes in this research the countries Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea. The three countries that are subject in this research all have experienced a turbulent history that is marked with many violent events, civil wars and humanitarian crises. Somalia is infamous for the extreme internal cleavages between local clans, ethnic identity groups and (extremist) ideological communities. Ethiopia is comparable to Somalia with regard to the ethnic identity cleavages between communities and the civil wars it suffered. Until 1991 Ethiopia and Eritrea were one state although Eritrea already tried to secede from Ethiopia for decades. This means that both countries suffered war for many years. Until today there are still many mutual tensions between the clans and even occasional border struggles with Eritrea. Since Eritrea became independent only one president has ruled the country. This is a fact that upsets many Eritrean people because the regime is controlling the country in a dictatorial way.

To obtain the necessary information for this research in depth interviews have been held with respondents from the respective diaspora communities in the Netherlands. There were three respondents for Somalia, three for Ethiopia and three for Eritrea. The data derived from these interviews is compared to the theory regarding diasporas and their home attachment, the deterritorialization of their identities, their (possible) influence on peace and conflict and their role in the peacebuilding processes. Home attachment is a notion that refers to the way people maintain their identification and their feelings of belonging towards the place that they perceive as the place where they belong and where they feel culturally at home. Home attachment for diaspora communities thus means that even though these people live far away from where they came from, they still have an emotional connection with that place and with the people that still live there. This is also an important factor to define diaspora. The diasporas in this research are often created and fuelled by the violent conflicts that took or take place in their particular home countries. This explains the 'sense of loss' and the often present inability to return to one's homeland. By creating and maintaining a shared identity and home attachment there is a delocalization of the identity because it is not longer fixed in the homeland. This is used to explain the efforts the diaspora undertake to participate in and contribute to activities in their respective homelands. Diasporas can be influential actors in peacebuilding in the role of mediator or negotiator between the different tracks in society

because of their experiences in as well the host as the home country, because of the networks they are assumed to have and because of the drive to contribute for instance, but also through economic support. Chigas (2007) distinguishes three tracks of governance in post-conflict peacebuilding. Diaspora communities can engage themselves in and between these different tracks and their role will be different according to the track they are engaging themselves in. The different tracks are the official international and governmental actors as the track one actors; the community leaders, religious leaders, NGOs and other representatives as track two actors and the local level, grassroots community people as track three actors in peacebuilding. Many authors write about the conflict intensifying role of diasporas because of grievances they have, their possibility to organise themselves with members from their identity group in a host country, financial possibilities and not suffering the direct impact and effects of the physical violence makes that diaspora groups tend to be more extreme than the people that remain in the country of origin.

The interviews show that the respondents all still feel enormously attached to their homelands that they remain to perceive as their real and true home where they belong. They have their roots and their identity connected to the local community from where they originate and strongly connect to. Deterritorialization of the identities is therefore applicable on all three diaspora communities. In Somalia and Ethiopia the cleavages between (local) ethnic identity groups, clans and ideological communities are perceived as the most important factor for the conflicts that take place. The diaspora believe that they have specific abilities which they can use to contribute to peace compared to other development actors such as NGOs and foreign governments. Because of the combination of their local knowledge, networks, shared culture, experiences in both the host as the home country and the opportunities the host country provides they believe that diaspora organisations can contribute to peacebuilding as a track two actor that has an intermediary function between the other actors in the society. The diaspora fulfil this role in Somalia by providing basic facilities for the local population, by organising conferences where the different actors can meet, interact and share knowledge through education. These activities on the one hand need to create more social inclusion between the people from the different communities and on the other hand should lead to grassroots mobilisation what means that the people on the grassroots local level take action and participate in these processes that are ought to contribute to peace. The lack of governmental power and capabilities make that the Somali government is not actively participating and collaborating with the diaspora so there is hardly a national track one actor involved. This involvement remains mostly limited to support through funding. The same goes for collaboration with Dutch NGOs but they sometimes participate as partner during conferences and meetings that aim on awareness raising for the situation in Somalia.

Compared to the diaspora activity in Ethiopia the involvement of the national track one actor differs. The Ethiopian diaspora aim at bridging the gaps as well between (local) communities in the society as between the different track actors in society because they believe that more inclusion and more mutual trust will make the society less prone to conflict. Conferences and workshops must bring the actors from the different tracks in contact with each other so that they will discuss and interact what should lead to more mutual knowledge and understanding. Stimulating social inclusion in combination with educational projects is thus seen as the preferred method to create a more inclusive society which should lead to less conflict between different identity groups. Similar

events are held in the Netherlands too and these events aim to bridge the gaps between the diaspora members that originate from different identity groups. There are occasional collaborations between the diaspora organisations and CSO partners but these are mainly in Ethiopia. The cooperation with Dutch actors is difficult due to lack of capacity of the Ethiopian actors. They claim to lack capacity to efficiently organise themselves, to apply for funding and to effectively implement the desired activities. Nevertheless, even when collaborating with (Dutch) NGO's and other actors the activities will be predominantly limited to non-peacebuilding activities because of the Ethiopian restrictive policy towards peacebuilding and the lack of capacity

The diaspora from Eritrea is mainly focused on addressing the cause of conflict as they perceive it; the government. The extremely repressive government in Eritrea does not leave any space for peacebuilding activities or other kinds of activities that are criticizing the government's policy. Nor does the government leave room for political opposition or foreign involvement in Eritrea. The diaspora therefore predominantly engages in political activities from outside Eritrea. The aim of these activities is to overthrow the government. The first method to work against the government is by lobbying on European and Dutch track one level to ask for international restrictions and limitations on the Eritrean government. These political activities also include conferences and demonstrations against the Eritrean dictator, to gain attention for the Eritrean case and to mobilize fellow Eritreans to participate in the activities. Another method to achieve their goal is through economic support of armed forces that fight against the government. The diaspora justifies armed combat as a practice for peacebuilding because they are convinced that once the government is overthrow, whether this is done diplomatically or military, peace can return to Eritrea.

The advantages the diasporas derive from their host countries, combined with their specific abilities, enables them to have the opportunities to implement their activities more directly, more locally and in cooperation with the right local actors. This is the most important aspect of diaspora involvement in peacebuilding. The diaspora believe that they have the specific ability to function as track two actor to bridge the gap between the other actors from the different communities in all societies. Even the Eritrean diaspora believes this although their activities do not directly address community building or grassroots mobilization as peacebuilding activity. The Eritrean diaspora can be seen as the stereotype conflict intensifying diaspora although they are convinced that they do the right thing that is necessary because they perceive the government as main cause for the conflict that must be overthrown. The diaspora organisations from Ethiopia and Somalia believe that they are, until now, quite successful with regard to addressing the cleavages between communities and stimulating a more social inclusive society. These successes however remain generally limited to the local level at the moment. To be able to extend the range of the diasporas' activities they need to increase their capacity. Support from CSOs in the host countries could provide to a certain extent in this. Professionalization of the organisation in the Netherlands possibly leads to more Dutch (diaspora) support what could be positive for the organisation's capacities. The diaspora from Ethiopia and Somalia are thus capable of fulfilling the role of track two actors in their home countries, to mediate between different communities and identities, to provide economic support, to transfer knowledge to and between the local actors and to mobilize the local actors in these activities. If they have the resources, capacity and possibilities, the African diaspora indeed can bridge the gap between the different communities in their homelands and hence contribute to the peacebuilding processes.

RESEARCH PROBLEM

In a globalizing world diaspora have become important forces that play a role in the interactions and relations between countries, regions and continents. Also in contemporary conflicts, conflict resolution and peacebuilding diaspora have a more and more important role to play. In the mainstream literature, diaspora are often seen to fuel conflict and exacerbate tensions through radical mobilization along ethnic and religious lines. New research findings, however, show that diaspora groups are playing an increasingly prominent role in peace and reconciliation processes. Yet, to what extent is not clear. Diasporas in conflicts can be roughly divided into three main categories, namely diasporas as agents for promoting peace and development, secondly diasporas as elements that intensify conflict and finally diasporas that mix these categories¹. This research first aims to contribute to this discussion by giving insight in the ways diaspora in the Netherlands play a part in the peacebuilding processes in their countries of origin.

Different authors write about the roles diasporas can play in conflicts and in peacebuilding. However, most of the attention goes to the conflict fuelling and intensifying influences diasporas have or can have². Diasporas are seen as an important contributor to the continuance of violence as they are in the position to offer the means and resources to fight. Besides that, they are supposed to have the networks in and knowledge about their homelands in which they will involve themselves. We can think of resources like remittances, political support, political lobbying or (financing) arms. An example of this is a bombing in Colombo, Sri Lanka. It appeared to be that the bombs that were used were financed by a Canadian man of Sri Lankan origin. Another example was the support for the Kosovo Liberation Army by diaspora groups from Albania³.

Local influences in peacebuilding are an important force to develop a stable and sustainable post-conflict society. However, forces of globalization, an increasing mobility and developments in communication and transportation can have a delocalizing effect on the conflict and on the people that are identifying themselves with (the people in) the conflict. The effects of globalization and the spread of peoples over the globe nowadays influence local scale developments greatly. Diaspora in other countries have more and more influence on the (conflict) situation in their countries of origin. Globalization is accountable for reducing the *friction of distance*, factors as communication and transportation become less an obstacle for interaction. Therefore these factors become more influential, which makes that Africans are increasingly in the position to make conscious migration choices. It is thus necessary to investigate the diaspora influence to gain more insight in the ways the diaspora supports the original (home) community.

¹ Pirkkalainen, Päivi and Abdile, Mahdi, (2009), 'The Diaspora – Conflict – Peace – Nexus: A Literature Review' Diaspeace working paper no.1, p.5

² Collier, P. & Hoeffler, A. (2004) *Greed and grievance in civil war*. Oxford Economic Papers 56: 563-595, p. 568-575. Collier, P. & V.L. Elliott et al., (2003), 'Breaking the conflict trap; Civil war and development policy' World Bank & Oxford University Press, Washington, p. 74, Demmers, J., (2002), 'Diaspora and conflict: locality, long-distance nationalism, and delocalisation of conflict dynamics' in: *The Public*, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 85-96, p. 86

³ Collier, P. & V.L. Elliott et al., (2003), p. 85

RELEVANCY

Diasporas can offer, besides money and arms, also social, political and cultural resources to which they have access in their host countries. These resources can be things as free access to media, freedom of speech, financial resources or access to political lobbying. As mentioned, when taking diasporas into account regarding conflicts and peacebuilding (what not every author does, e.g. different authors contributed to the book '*Peace & Conflict in Africa*' and none of them speaks a word about diaspora influences regarding this topic), the focus is on the negative impact and influences that diasporas have or can have. This research will focus on the positive influences that the African diaspora in the Netherlands have or tries to have in peacebuilding processes in their countries of origin. The African diaspora is predominantly the result of the violent conflicts in Africa that occurred since the early 1990s, which contrasts the contemporary African diaspora to other diasporas⁴. This research investigates the role of the diaspora in the countries Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea in the Horn of Africa. These countries all have suffered many crises and conflicts over the last decades. Nowadays there is still no stable and secure society where people can live and develop themselves and their country. Therefore many people left these countries and many eventually came to the Netherlands where they built up a new life but remained connected to their homelands. With knowledge about the influence of diaspora it will be easier to create and apply future policies towards the prevention and the handling of conflict and the diaspora input in peacebuilding. This can lead to a better cooperation with and between the conflicting societies, and better coordination of support, funding and resources towards the conflicting societies. This is an important aspect for future policy as the diaspora have much influence in these processes. For instance, the remittances that are sent back to the countries of origin are higher than the amount of money that is sent as development aid. In Eritrea for example, the GDP exists for almost 50% of remittances that are sent by Eritrean diaspora.

The existing literature thus mainly writes about and refers to the conflict-intensifying influences that diaspora have. This explains why there is little found with regard to the peace increasing and sustaining effects of the diaspora and there is also little known about how to practically make use of these positive influences. This research tries to contribute to the main literature regarding this topic using the data collected from the field. This research will investigate whether the diaspora in the Netherlands have positive influences on conflicts, and thus positively contribute to peacebuilding rather than that they are as conflict intensifying as they would be according to the literature. This research links up to the existing research that is done for, and in cooperation with, the African Diaspora Policy Centre. This centre is participating in the DiasPeace research project. The focus of research of the DiasPeace project is on (positive) diaspora initiatives and collaboration between diaspora organisations and (Non) Governmental actors in the Netherlands and other European countries and it aims at the Horn of Africa. Hence the area of research for this thesis is similar. These actors include both governmental but also non-governmental and civil society actors. The first aim is to improve the interaction and collaboration of these parties with regards to peacebuilding initiatives and engagement, while keeping in mind also the non-intended and negative impacts, with as the final aim; to provide policy-relevant, evidence-based knowledge on how exiled populations from conflict regions play into the dynamics of conflict and peace

⁴ Mohamoud, A. A., (2006), '*African Diaspora and Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Africa*' Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen, p. 3

in their countries of origin and how these people collaborate with peacebuilding organisations in the Netherlands, so that realistic and efficient policy can be made.

The empirical goal of this research is to provide more understanding in the influences the diaspora in the Netherlands have on peacebuilding processes in their countries of origin. Practically, the results from this research should better inform the work of the people that work on policy and knowledge towards diaspora influence in peacebuilding, on the way diaspora in the Netherlands play into the dynamics of conflict and peacebuilding in the Horn of Africa and on the way the diaspora position themselves in this. Hence, the central question for this research is:

To what extent, and in what ways, does the African diaspora in the Netherlands influence peacebuilding processes in the Horn of Africa?

In order to be able to give an adequate answer to the research question the following sub questions are formulated:

- *What is the African Diaspora?*
- *How does the diaspora in the Netherlands identify itself with the conflict in their home-country? Do they identify with a particular party or do they see themselves as a bridging actor between the conflicting parties?*
- *What added value to support and development aid do the diaspora organizations believe they compared to other civil society actors?*
- *What do the diaspora organizations do, or try, to have economic, social or political influence on peacebuilding developments in their countries of origin?*
- *Do the diasporas participate in political processes in both the host and the home country? If so, how do they participate?*
- *Is there collaboration with non-diaspora parties such as NGOs or governmental institutes? If so, to what extent and in what form (political, economic, cultural etc.)?*
- *According to the members of the diaspora from the Horn of Africa; what are the effects on the peacebuilding processes and/or the conflict because of the diaspora influence?*

METHODOLOGY

Theory developing research aims to explore the theory's blind spot. One of the questions that one can ask is; How can existing theories be applied to those areas in which new developments take place? In this case, this research focuses on the "blind spot" namely; in which ways diasporas have other effects than only negative effects on peacebuilding processes. This research seeks knowledge in the ways African diaspora (organisations) in the Netherlands try to influence the developments in their countries of origin and at finding knowledge in the ways those diaspora members are engaging themselves in peacebuilding practises. Since much of the existing literature is aiming on the conflict intensifying role, this research thus investigates the gap, or blind spot, of the peace promoting engagement diaspora possibly have.

For a theoretical discussion of the relevant concepts a literature study is done to provide the theoretical framework for this thesis. To start, this theoretical framework demarcates the concept 'diaspora' for this research as it is a concept that is used and comprehended in many different ways. Furthermore, this theoretical framework must provide and

analyze the relevant academics' insight about the possible role of diasporas in peace and conflict in their country of origin, whether this is about positive or negative influence. Several concepts that provide the possibilities and incentives for the diaspora to participate in and try to influence the situation in their country of origin, such as globalization, new wars and the delocalisation of the conflict, will be described too. Much of this literature was acquired by doing an extensive search on the internet by using search engines and online libraries and academic databases. Also books from the library of the Radboud University and the African Study Centre in Leiden have been used. As a last but very valuable step the knowledge and resources available at the African Diaspora Policy Centre were used for completing the theoretical framework of this thesis.

The step following the literature study was to map the relevant diaspora organizations in the Netherlands that originate from the Horn of Africa. During an internship period of three months at the African Diaspora Policy Centre I participated in a research project that shows many similarities to this research. This research also focused on diaspora influences on peacebuilding but the main difference was that DiasPeace focused on the collaborations between the Dutch civil society actors and the diaspora. This internship facilitated me with at least a good notion about the diaspora and development sector. In addition to that, the extensive database, knowledge and network of this NGO facilitated me with a great share of useful information such as names of organisations and contact persons. It also provided me an interesting insight in the efforts many of these organisations make to opt for funding from the Dutch government and via mainstream Dutch NGOs such as Oxfam Novib, Cordaid, IKV and Hivos, which are supported by the Dutch government.

The data of this research was obtained through in depth interviews with members from the Ethiopian, Somali and Eritrean diaspora. The different actors have been found and approached after conducting an extensive mapping exercise on the internet. Table 1 in chapter 2 shows the number of migrants from the countries of research that are registered as living in the Netherlands in 2008. The mapping exercise soon showed that these migrants groups have been organising themselves on a broad range of topics and with different intentions. The data acquired during extensive mapping of diaspora (organisations) that are originating from Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea, throughout the whole of the Netherlands, is used for this thesis.

The first step was to map the diaspora organisations because that would facilitate conducting the fieldwork for this thesis. The organisations are thus mapped by searching extensively on the internet and subsequently through respondents' networks. The first, broad, mapping of diaspora organisations in the Netherlands led to a great number of different organisations and projects that have been or are to be implemented. Much of these organisations however focus on the integration of its members in the Dutch society in many different ways, ranging from cultural adaptation to language courses and youth support. The mapping exercise showed these results for the diaspora organisations of as well the Somali and Ethiopian as the Eritrean diaspora. Most of the organisations and initiatives that were approached were found through searching the internet by using the standard search-engines during the mapping that was carried out for the African Diaspora Policy Centre. Also the network of the African Diaspora Policy Centre was used for finding names and initiatives. These were checked for relevancy and approached when seemed relevant. Websites such as www.africaserver.nl list many initiatives, organisations and people from all African countries that have any kind of project implemented from within the Netherlands. This list of people and organisations was

organised per theme and per country which facilitates the search. As many of the projects and organisations did not exist anymore, often no response was heard. Many of the listed organisations were still only registered and not yet concretely active. In other cases projects were already implemented or finished and thus do not exist anymore. It also happened that the founders of the organisation responded to e-mails saying that they re-migrated to their respective country of origin. Hence an in-depth and face-to-face interview was difficult to carry out, also due to time and financial limitations. When there was a response the contact was maintained mainly through telephone and email.

The next step was to distinguish between the diaspora (organisations) that are involved in development work or peacebuilding or participate in any other way in their countries of origin, and the diaspora organisations that are not engaging in these kinds of practises. The reason for doing so is because this research aims to address the peace promoting role that diaspora can have. Therefore diaspora organisations that explicitly mentioned peacebuilding as one of their fields of work were interesting for this research. The diaspora (organisations) that claimed to be involved in development work and especially in peacebuilding processes were therefore approached for an interview. The interviews for this research can be described as in-depth and semi-structured. The interviews did not follow a fixed list of questions but followed an interview guide that was based on the sub-questions for this research.

Finally this led to a list with 9 Ethiopian organisations, 10 Somali organisations and 8 Eritrean organisations that are implementing activities and projects to engage themselves in the conflict and peacebuilding in their home countries or have activities in the Netherlands that aim for the same goals. All these organisations were approached per e-mail or by phone and eventually 3 Ethiopian, 3 Eritrean and 3 Somali organisations were interviewed. Interviews are supposed to give a good understanding in how the respondents as individual people experience and explain their involvement, activities and understandings of the perceived problems. Interviews give the opportunity for the respondents to explain their experiences and motivations in their own words. Because the diaspora respondents all want to positively contribute to peace, what contrasts with the literature, these interviews were assumed to give insights in the positive contribution of the different diaspora. During the interviews the dynamics of the conversation give the respondent room for explanation, exploring issues more thoroughly and room to raise issues that were not taken into account. Therefore interviews can give more information and thus a better understanding about the role in peacebuilding the African diaspora seems to have or claims to have. From the interviews with the diaspora organisations in the Netherlands is thus expected that they will give more insight in, and provide qualitative data about, the ways the diaspora (organisations) try to have influence and want to participate in the peacebuilding processes that take place in their homelands. The interviews give insights in the ways the diasporas positively contribute to peace and therefore gains knowledge to contribute to the theory's blind spot as described above.

The respondents for both Ethiopia and Eritrea all were men. To what extent this leads to a bias or one sided view for this research is unclear but possible. The respondents for Somalia were mixed what could give a more balanced insight. But again, to what extent there is a gender bias is unclear. I am aware of the notion that interviews mainly give information based on experiences and understandings of the respective respondents and therefore are partially formed through interpretations and assumptions of the respondents with regard to these topics. The results from the field work are linked and compared to the findings in the theoretical framework in order to be able to analyse the

sub-questions. Thereafter the data derived from these sub-questions will provide the information to conclude and discuss on the central question of research. Since there is only little theory written about the role of diaspora in peace, this research hopes to contribute to the development of such theory by investigating the efforts of the African diaspora through these interviews and see where these efforts fit in the peacebuilding theories, or not.

OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS

The next chapter (chapter 2) will give an introduction in the area of research and demarcates the specific countries that are investigated. A brief historical overview describes the most relevant events that have taken place there and could contribute to the creation of the diaspora that originates from the particular countries. In line with this history, several possibilities for diaspora engagement in these countries are described. Chapter 3 will provide the theoretical framework for this research. It will discuss the different aspects of contemporary conflicts that contribute to the creation of the African diaspora, the role of this diaspora in peace and conflict, peacebuilding and different peacebuilding practices in which diaspora can play a role. Next is chapter 4 in which the data from the field research is described and analysed according to the literature. The final chapter, chapter 5, first answers the sub-questions of this research and then concludes on the main question of research.

2

THE HORN OF AFRICA

This chapter demarcates the areas of research and gives a brief introduction in the background and the conflicts that took place in the particular countries in this research. These backgrounds provide more insight in the events that took place that eventually lead to the creation of a diaspora community outside the respective countries. This chapter will also discuss the most relevant past and present peacebuilding processes that are carried out in Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia in which diaspora played or can play a role. Since this research does not aim to provide a complete historical analysis of the countries involved, this description of the countries will be not very detailed with historical events but limited to the most relevant aspects that could have created the diasporas and now provide the diaspora organisations a way, or obstacles, to participate in the peacebuilding practises.

THE HORN OF AFRICA

This research investigates the diaspora influences on peacebuilding in the homelands of the diaspora in the Horn of Africa; hence the area of research is the Horn of Africa. The Horn of Africa is a part of Eastern Africa. Which countries are included in the Horn of Africa is interpreted and defined in different ways. What is commonly is accepted is that Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti definitely belong to the area that is known as 'the Horn of Africa'. However, there are organizations, institutes and researchers that include Kenya, Sudan and even Uganda as territories that belong to the Horn of Africa. When these countries are included this area then is it often called the "Greater Horn of Africa". According to the ADPC Kenya is often included because many development organizations and international support organizations are based in Kenya. Kenya thus plays an important role as a basis and relatively stable country for the international third party actors that work in the Horn of Africa. The exact reasons for including Uganda and Sudan in the Greater Horn are probably not only their geographical position, but also the fact that they have suffered the same kind of problems (Civil war, famine etc.) and have a relatively similar history as the other Horn countries do. These countries also suffer, or have suffered, severe acts of violence between clans, ideologies, religious groups, dictatorial regimes and ethnic groups, or suffer(ed) from conflicts over resources, territory and power. Figures 1 and 2 show the demarcations of and the differences between the Greater Horn of Africa and the Horn of Africa.



figure 1; The Greater Horn of Africa (source; www.fao.org)




figure 2; The Horn of Africa as it is used for this research. (source: NYStrom, Herff Jones Education Division)

This research focuses on three countries in the “smaller” Horn of Africa, namely the following; Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia. The choice to investigate diaspora influences on peacebuilding in these three countries in the Horn of Africa is made because most of the literature and research about the conflicts and peacebuilding in this area includes only these three countries, and not Djibouti. Besides that, these three chosen countries have a number of diaspora living in the Netherlands that is assumed to be relevant to have any input and influence on the situation in their home country. The diaspora from Djibouti in the Netherlands is assumed to be too few to have a significant impact on the country (see table 1 for the number of people from Djibouti in the Netherlands). Also, Djibouti is a relatively stable country nowadays compared to its neighbouring countries and therefore peacebuilding is less of an issue. Table 1 gives a brief overview of the numbers of migrants from the countries of research that lived in the Netherlands in 2008. This table clearly shows that the Somali community in the Netherlands is very large compared to the other communities. It also shows that the number of people from Djibouti is very small and this thus partly explains why Djibouti is left out of this research.

Country of Origin	# of people in NL in 2008
Djibouti	175
Eritrea	1031
Ethiopia	10659
Somalia	19549

Table 1; number of people from their respective country of origin that currently live in the Netherlands (Source: CBS-Statline 2010)

The next part of this chapter will give a brief overview of the different histories of the particular countries of research, the most important events that happened there, a background of the diaspora from that particular country in the Netherlands and their possible opportunities to engage themselves in their country of origin.

2.1 SOMALIA

Somalia is a very turbulent and fractured country and is often passing in the news as a country where rebelling factions rule the streets in the violent, government-less fragile (or failed?) state. Menkhaus (2003) mentions about this that Somalia actually should not even be seen as a failed state. His argument for this is that many of the contemporary Sub-Saharan states are seen as failed states because of the conflicts that take and took place, because of the underdevelopment in those countries and because of the unstable governments that are in power and still have some sovereignty in their territories. The latter is the big difference with Somalia; Somalia even lacks an unstable recognised government with any sovereignty for almost the last 20 years⁵. Therefore Somalia can be seen as a state beyond fragile states which needs a, for Somalia suitable and specific approach. There is no functioning government in Somalia, although there is an internationally recognised government, it lacks the power to function properly. The history of Somalia is marked with coups, militia and rebel rule in certain areas, clan conflicts, secessionist movements, religious struggles and the nowadays the piracy that is threatening the seas. This paragraph will give an introduction in the history of Somalia, provide some insight into peacebuilding attempts that are made in Somalia and discuss possible motivations and possibilities for diaspora engagement because of the conflict in and the history of Somalia.

When the European countries had their colonies in Africa, parts of Somalia were separated between the British and the Italian that each ruled their part of, what they both called, Somaliland. British Somaliland was the area that we still know as Somaliland. Italian Somaliland was the rest of what we today see as the Somali republic including Puntland. In 1960 British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland joined to form Somalia. The first few years of Somalia as one state were quite tranquil until in 1969 Mohamed Siad Barre acquired power by a coup. He started to rule Somalia with authoritarian socialist rule by his military government. Somalia suffered internal conflicts during these years of socialist rule and eventually got into war with Ethiopia in 1977, mainly over claims to land and power in certain territories, especially the Ogaden region that borders Ethiopia⁶. Eventually Ethiopia and Somalia got to an agreement in 1988, but in some areas, as Somaliland, the communities remained in conflict, as well against Ethiopia, against other clans and tribes as against the Somali regime. This led to even greater cleavages and conflict over territorial power in the already divided Somali society⁷. Hence it was not surprising that eventually in 1991 the socialist regime collapses and from that year Somalia did not longer have an official central government that controlled the state. Different conflicts between clans, state troops and other groups broke out, different areas suffered famine and drought and the country started to fall apart. In May 1991 Somaliland declared itself independent from the republic of Somalia. The northern clans that had the majority in those areas came into power in Somaliland. Somaliland however, is never recognised as an official country by the international community.

In 1993 the UN started with attempts to stop the conflict and alleviate the bad humanitarian conditions. However, they did not succeed and the UN eventually retreated

⁵ Menkhaus, K., (2003), *'State Collapse in Somalia: Second Thoughts'*, Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 30, No. 97, pp.405- 422, p. 407

⁶ CIA worldfactbook about Somalia

⁷ Lyons, T., & A. I. Samatar, (1995), *'Somalia. State collapse, multilateral intervention, and strategies for political reconstruction'* Brookings Institution, Washington, p. 2

in 1995 after having done only little address the bad conditions⁸. The Somali state remained in conflict over power, territory and borders between the different clans. There were several attempts by clans to claim authority over their region but most of these attempts failed. In 1998 the Northern region Puntland proclaimed autonomy from Somalia. Until now this area is relatively stable although there are incidental struggles over border and territorial claims. The Southern part of Somalia however maintained a fractured territory where disputes over different clan territories and boundaries remained.

In 2002 a peace process started which was led by the Kenyan government. In 2004 then finally a Somali interim government was created, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Meanwhile, in 2006, Ethiopian forces got into Somalia to support the TFG interim government against opposing parties and communities, mainly Islamic. The external support was necessary because the Somali state still lacked legitimacy and effectiveness to address the problems itself. Negotiations, that were sponsored by the UN, between the interim government and the opposition party (Alliance for Re-Liberation of Somalia, ARS) in Somalia in 2008 led to a creation of a unity government in 2009 where the TFG and the ARS joined forces. After this was concluded the Ethiopian troops withdrew from Somalia. Now the TFG-ARS government is working on creating institutional capacity and maintaining this to try to have elections in 2011. Yet, the major problem remains that the TFG is internationally recognised, but is highly contested within its own country by the different clans and parties. Nowadays the extremist organisation Al Shabaab controls more than half the country. This makes the work of the TFG a difficult task.

Somali grassroot organisations can play an important part in the conflict resolution as they can function as bridging actor between the members of the different clans⁹. Gilkes (1999) sees the strong clan culture and ethical differences as very important factors that keep dividing Somalia¹⁰. The different clans claim territories where they are the majority and thus conclude that they should rule in that particular territory. Warlords want to claim their own territories to rule and the government is in conflict with both the clans and warlords because obviously they think the government should rule and control the whole of Somalia As long as these approaches to territorial rule and sovereignty of majorities or the state are not settled in a way that is accepted by all parties the tensions are maintained¹¹. Thus what is at stake in Somalia is actually both state recognition and recognition of the government. Somaliland for example wants to be recognised as an independent state by the international community. Until now this claim has been rejected¹².

Conflicts between the clans in these territories are often traditionally negotiated and mediated by the different elders that represent the clans. This is possible because many relations between the clans are based on mutual inclusiveness and interdependence¹³. Both these territories have therefore been classified by the UN as zones of 'recovery', instead of the zones of 'transition' or 'crisis' into which the rest of Somalia falls¹⁴. Since

⁸ Gilkes, P., (1999), '*Briefing; Somalia*', African Affairs, Vol. 98, No. 393, pp. 571-577, p. 572

⁹ Salih, M.A., & L. Wohlgemurth (1994), '*Somalia; State and society in Turmoil*'. Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 21, No. 59, pp. 79-82, p. 80

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 571-572

¹¹ Gilkes, P., (1999), p. 573-574

¹² _____ (2002), '*Government Recognition in Somalia and Regional Political Stability in the Horn of Africa*', The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 247-272, p. 251

¹³ Francis, D.J., (ed.), (2008), '*Peace & conflict in Africa*', Zed Books Ltd, London, p. 116

¹⁴ Gilkes, P., (1999), p. 571

1992 the most actual governance in Somalia did not take place on the national but on the regional and local levels in society and was carried out by the local communities. The local communities, led by the clan elders, local intellectuals, businessmen and muslim leaders tried to create and maintain peace through local (sharia) courts. There are also cases where these local policies led to the improvement of the direct (local) area by providing basic services for food, health or security. Often these initiatives were carried out in close collaboration with local NGOs¹⁵. Another example of the local policies and initiatives towards the protection of the local community and prevention of conflicts are the 'neighbourhood watch' groups that are paid by residents of small local territories to provide the basic and most necessary security needs¹⁶.

(POSSIBLE) DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT IN SOMALIA

It is mentioned often in the preceding part that many of the conflicts in Somalia are in general between different clans that claim territorial power over certain areas. From this point of view we can assume that much of the conflicts are between different cultural groups. Different clans with their own history, common uses, traditions and territorial claims lead to the divisions through all different layers of society. This strong clan culture in Somalia may easily divide the Somali people because the identity constructing concepts of including and excluding can play a role in accepting (or rejecting) other clans and external (supportive) actors. This excluding of communities can be a reason for many people to flee the country as they are not safe anymore in their own country. Another reason for the protraction of the conflict is given by Menkhaus (2004) who notices that there will always be parties that thrive on the lasting of the conflict. Such actors can be as well local as external actors that profit from the disorder through criminal activities¹⁷. These actors need the conflict and the disorder to be able to continue their business and hence they will do everything that is in their reach to prevent the conflict from being solved as the conflict provides them with opportunities and living conditions that would be impossible for them to achieve in times of peace.

The structural societal, cultural and ethnical divisions in Somalia make it very difficult for the international community to involve themselves in Somalia as it is not at all clear who the legitimate and representative leaders are, where the official and accepted local and regional borders are and who or which clan or identity group is in power at the moment. It is therefore difficult to specify the local actors to involve as an outsider. However, Accord (2009) states that; "*for reconciliation to be achieved among Somali clans, representatives must be selected at the local level*"¹⁸. Accord thus acknowledges the importance of the local, grassroot level. Examples of initiatives on the local level are the peacebuilding efforts that are made by the international peacebuilding organisation "Interpeace"¹⁹. Their efforts are aiming at statebuilding activities that are centred around decentralization of policies. They implement this for instance through media campaigns that aim for more inclusion of the local actors. Somali diaspora are formally engaged in these activities. Hence this means that this organisation is involving diaspora, or at least

¹⁵ Menkhaus, K., (2004), p. 155

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 158

¹⁷ Menkhaus, K., (2004), '*Vicious circles and the security development nexus in Somalia*', in: Conflict, Security & Development, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 149-165, p. 151

¹⁸ Accord, (2009), '*Connecting Somali and International Peacemaking Strategies, Accord project on Somali peace processes*', Workshop Report Nairobi, July 2009, p. 2

¹⁹ Interpeace website

is acknowledging the importance to do so, to engage themselves in local scale peacebuilding activities.

Mentioned earlier in this chapter is the development and governance in Somalia on local and regional level that is led by the elders from different clans, intellectuals and religious leaders. The collaboration of these actors with local NGOs provides an entrance for diaspora (organisations) to involve themselves in the situation in their home country, and in this case in their home region, but only if the diaspora organisations truly engage in, and function as an inter-communal and inter-clan actor. Throughout the years of conflict many inter-clan conferences and negotiations have been held to promote peacebuilding, reconciliation and facilitation of disarmament but these initiatives have led to only very short term effects²⁰.

²⁰ Interpeace, (2009), *'The Search for Peace; A History of Mediation in Somalia since 1988'*. Centre for Research and Dialogue (CRD), p. 14

2.2 ETHIOPIA

Ethiopia is, like Somalia, a country with a very turbulent past. In its history several regimes were overthrown, the Ethiopian people suffered droughts and famines, economic crises and violent suppression by the ruling regimes. Nowadays there are still unstable regions in Ethiopia, especially the regions that border Eritrea and Somalia. Already in the past many violent conflicts between clans, peoples and states have been fought in these areas for different reasons such as territorial control (and thus power), control over resources and conflicts between ethnic and ideological groups. This paragraph will give an introduction in the contemporary history of Ethiopia where the most relevant events will be described. This paragraph will also provide any insight into peacebuilding attempts that are made in Ethiopia and search for possible motivations and possibilities for diaspora engagement in peacebuilding from the Netherlands.

In contrast to many other African countries Ethiopia maintained its freedom from colonial rule most of its time, except from a short Italian occupation between 1936 and 1941. The Italian influence in Ethiopia was more or less limited to the Eritrean territories. This period of Italian influence however was mainly through trade that the Italians did with Ethiopia as an important hub in the Italian trade routes. Eritrea at that particular time used to belong to the Ethiopian state but already saw itself as an independent or different state. When the Italians were forced out of Ethiopia, the UN in 1950 decided that the Eritrean territories and Ethiopia should be ruled as one state of Ethiopia, with Eritrea having a semi-autonomous status in this construction. This of course, was not an ideal decision for the Eritreans that wanted complete independence from Ethiopia. In contrast to that, Ethiopia claimed Eritrea to be a province in the Ethiopian state. Emperor Haile Selassie, who ruled Ethiopia already since 1930, even before the Italians came to Ethiopia, therefore forcefully annexed Eritrea as a part of Ethiopia, what led to increased tensions and conflict between Ethiopia and the Eritrean territories²¹.

Haile Selassie was eventually overthrown by the communist and military Derg junta that was led by General Mengitsu Mariam in 1974. The Derg acquired power through a coup that started after several events; starting with serious famines in the Northern parts of Ethiopia. These famines contributed to two economic crises in Ethiopia. Not knowing how to handle the social unrest that followed, Haile Selassie gave the military forces complete control over the Ethiopian state. This led to more uprisings, social unrest, riots and demonstrations because the military forces were not capable of ruling the state in a decent and organised way. Eventually, this led to the moment that the Derg obtained power after overthrowing the government (and emperor Haile Selassie) and arresting the leading persons of the old military regime. Riots and demonstrations however continued but these were suppressed forcefully by the military Derg²². This demarcates the new period in Ethiopian history and because of the violence that was used by the Derg regime this period is also known as the period of 'red terror'. Uprisings and demonstrations against the regime were violently suppressed.

In 1982, the fight against the Eritrean independence movement increased. As mentioned before, already starting in the 1960s, Eritreans rebelled because of their claims to be a separate people and thus should have an own state apart from Ethiopia²³. During the

²¹ Synnesael, S. (2009), *'de gewapende vrede tussen Ethiopië en Eritrea'*, in: Vrede. Tijdschrift voor internationale politiek, no. 400, vol. 52, pp. 38-41, p.38

²² Marcus, H.G., (1994), *'A History of Ethiopia'*, University of California Press, Berkeley, p, 181-188

²³ Marcus, H.G., (1994), p. 3

1970s there were several armed fights between Ethiopia and the part that of Ethiopia that wanted to secede as Eritrea. Ethiopia in this period was also in war with Somalia that in that time was supported by the United States. As the Derg regime was a communist regime they were heavily supported by the Soviet-Union with as well political support as military supplies. Since the Eritrean parties were not giving in to Ethiopia and continued their fight against the Ethiopian power over Eritrea, the Ethiopian Derg government eventually in 1982 set up an army to take over the Northern parts of Ethiopia again at the costs of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). These severe acts of violence led to many casualties amongst the Ethiopians, what subsequently led to unrest amongst the Ethiopian civilians. The combination of this social unrest with the famines that broke out in 1984, made the people of Ethiopia started to turn against the Derg regime²⁴. This combination of humanitarian crises and violence throughout several regions in Ethiopia led to a massive flow of Ethiopian refugees to other (mainly surrounding) countries.

After years of Derg regime the absolute power over Ethiopia was seized by Colonel Mengitsu Mariam who led the coup of the Derg years before and now proclaimed himself as president of Ethiopia. This however, was for a short period of time and he was eventually overthrown in 1991 by the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front, the EPRDF, which was created as a coalition of various Ethiopian rebel forces and peasant movements, in collaboration with the EPLF. This was a response to the societal problems in Ethiopia like uprisings, drought and humanitarian problems that led to great refugee flows²⁵. At the time that the EPRDF took power over Ethiopia in Addis Ababa the EPLF was in charge of the Eritrean territories. After this collaboration between Ethiopian and Eritrean forces the Eritrean people once more opted for independence. In 1993 there finally was an agreement that was accompanied by a new constitution²⁶. Eritrea got its official independence and many Ethiopians returned to their homeland because of the new hope the constitution brought.

Since 1994 Ethiopia has a new official constitution and the first official elections were held in 1995. However, tensions in the Northern part of Ethiopia between Ethiopia and Eritrea led to a new war in the late 1990s. This war was about the demarcation of the border and claims regarding territories in the area between both states. Ethiopia claimed territories that were already claimed by Eritrea and vice versa. Finally a peace treaty was signed in 2000. But until today there are still struggles over the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea. An internationally designated border commission tried to officially demarcate the border between these countries in 2007 but even today Ethiopia objects because it feels that it has to surrender Ethiopian territories to Eritrea, whereas Eritrea still claims the particular territories to be Eritrean. In 2005 elections were held in Ethiopia but this was a failure because of government repressions against the opposition. Ultimately, many opposition members, journalists and civil society leaders were put in prison. The result was that even more Ethiopian civil society organisations and diaspora organisations turned against the regime with demonstrations, protests and political pressure. Now the situation in Ethiopia seems to be tranquil as the state is recovering from the conflicts it suffered. Whether this is tranquillity through repression or denial of conflict or a genuine break from the conflict is unclear. How long this will last is uncertain

²⁴ Marcus, H.G., (1994), p. 202-205

²⁵ CIA Worldfactbook on Ethiopia (2010)

²⁶ Ibid.

as Ethiopia remains a relatively fragile state because of the internal cleavages, political pressure and tense relationship with Eritrea.

(POSSIBLE) DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT IN ETHIOPIA

As made clear in the preceding part, Ethiopia suffered various hardships over the last 50 years. The people suffered different problems such as ethnic violence, droughts and famines, political problems, dictatorial regimes and secession wars. These armed conflicts and humanitarian problems led to great flows of refugees from Ethiopia into the surrounding countries, but also into Europe. In the 1960s and 1970s the first Ethiopian migrants in the Netherlands and Europe were mainly students and people that moved to Western-Europe for work related issues.

After the fall of Emperor Haile Selassie and the take-over of state power by the Derg Regime a period of increased violence started. During this period many people fled the country to other countries, mainly in the (relatively) direct surrounding such as Sudan and Kenya, but also the Netherlands received a number of Ethiopian refugees. Because they fled for the repressing (communist) regime the refugees were marked as political refugees. When in 1982 the fight for Eritrean independence intensified, the refugee flow from Ethiopia increased. When, after years of conflict Eritrea became independent and Ethiopia got a new constitution, many Ethiopians returned to their homeland because of the new hope the constitution brought. However, Ethiopia still suffered many problems the following years what led to a constantly high level of migration.

The number of Ethiopian diaspora therefore is high and as shown in table 1, there are many Ethiopian people living in the Netherlands. Although the Ethiopian cultural and social communities are not as infamous for being segregated or opposed as the different clans in Somalia, there is a possibility that the different ethnic and ideological groups in Ethiopia only support their community at the cost of the other communities. An example of this is the Oromo community. The Oromo population is the largest cultural ethnical community in Ethiopia and the Oromo diaspora is an example of such a separate Ethiopian sub-community that organises itself with the aim to engage in different activities in Ethiopia. There are events organised by Ethiopian Oromo's in as well the host as the home country where the community was aiming to find support to maintain and strengthen the Oromo culture amongst the diaspora. Sorenson (1996) speaks of "*creating a sense of Oromo consciousness in order to mobilise support for current political objectives*"²⁷. This makes clear that the diaspora communities can encourage one and another to participate in cultural, political and social processes that aim to involve the community in the country of origin in different ways. Identity creation processes, sense of belonging and place attachment are thus important concepts for explaining the Oromo involvement as these concepts are used to mobilise the community. However, what counts for the Oromo people may also be applicable for people that belong to other tribes or clans or identify themselves with other ideologies.

Ethiopian diaspora have similar possibilities to engage themselves in peacebuilding processes in the homeland compared to the Somali and Eritrean diaspora. A common thing is that the diaspora can send money back to their family and friends that still live in, or returned to, Ethiopia in the form of remittances. These remittances can be used for daily consumption but also for more structural needs such as housing and education.

²⁷ Sorenson, J., (1996), '*Learning to be Oromo: Nationalist Discourse in the Diaspora*', *Social Identities*, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 439 – 468, p. 445

With these remittances the community in Ethiopia can participate in peacebuilding and help developing the post-conflict society, for instance by supporting local NGOs or civil society organisations that work in the field of peacebuilding. As there are Ethiopians in the Netherlands that have fled the home country because of droughts and famines, it can be an argument for them to support their family and friends to prevent them from suffering the same problems the diaspora members did.

Another possibility of diaspora engagement in peacebuilding in Ethiopia is given by Yassin (2007) and is about the participation in politics, advocacy and lobbying, of the Ethiopian diaspora in the United States. The Ethiopian diaspora in the United States is actively involved in different kinds of political initiatives to promote their case and to raise awareness amongst as well the US citizens and politicians and the members of their own diaspora community with the aim to pressure both the American as the Ethiopian government²⁸. As indicated, pressure from political lobbying groups may aim on the governments of as well the host as the home country. Aimed on the host country these lobbying groups can try to influence the foreign policy of the host country with regard to Ethiopia through sanctions such as embargoes and official pressuring of the Ethiopian government to implement democracy for instance.

²⁸ Yassin, Y, (2007), ' *Ethiopian Advocacy Groups in USA after the May Elections-Lobbying the American Legislature* ', pp. 123 – 135. in: Dahre, U.J., (ed.), (2007), ' *The Role of Diasporas in Peace, Democracy and Development in the Horn of Africa* ', Dept, of sociology, Lund University, Lund, p. 124

2.3 ERITREA

The preceding paragraph on Ethiopia already described that the history of Ethiopia obviously has a lot to do with the history of Eritrea. In the paragraph of the history of Ethiopia the tensions and armed conflicts between these two East-African states are intertwined in the history towards becoming the independent state Eritrea is nowadays. Although Eritrea is recognised as an independent and sovereign state since 1991, there are still many conflicts as well within the Eritrean state as along the Eritrean – Ethiopian borders and with other surrounding countries. Although Eritrea is the sovereign state it wished to be for decades, still vast parts of Eritrean territory are contested by Ethiopia as Ethiopia claims that these territories belong to Ethiopia. In addition to that, the humanitarian situation in Eritrea is at the moment far from safe and stable seeing that the International Human Rights Watch in 2009 took note of *'serious human rights violations by the Eritrean government, including arbitrary arrest, torture, appalling detention conditions, forced labor, and severe restrictions on freedom of movement, expression, and worship'*²⁹. This paragraph will describe the most relevant events that led to Eritrean independence and the events that occurred after the independence that have led to Eritrea as the state that it is now. Since Ethiopia and Eritrea were unified as one state until the early 1990s, the history of both countries is very similar and coherent.

Eritrea officially belonged to Ethiopia until 1991, although it had, as one of the provinces, a relatively independent status within the Ethiopian state. In 1991 Eritrean forces collaborated with Ethiopian forces to overthrow the ruling dictatorial regime. The years before the independence in 1991, the Eritrean history is marked with many acts of violence between states, ethnic and identity groups and secessionist attempts. As symbol of gratitude the Ethiopian governing regime gave Eritrea the opportunity to officially proclaim its independence. This was approved officially in 1993 through a referendum held by the Eritrean government³⁰. Thus since 1993 Eritrea was an official independent and internationally recognised state, and the government promised to create an own constitution.

When the independent status finally was obtained, both Ethiopia and Eritrea needed to recover from the fierce conflicts that had been fought. Because of the cooperation to overthrow the Ethiopian regime and the acts of goodwill towards Eritrea, expected was that the situation should stabilize quickly. This however, did not go as hoped for and expected and the tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea were increasing again. This in spite of the independent status Eritrea had at that moment, and all the interactions that took place between the countries. There was much trade (they shared a same currency) and flows of migration going on between both countries. Reasons for the tensions between the governments are, according to Iyob (2000), firstly the fact that the governments of both countries failed in clearly demarcating the official borders between the states. This meant that the states claimed territories as belonging to them, at the cost of the other state, which (obviously) could not agree with that, and vice versa. The Eritrean wanted to use the borders as they were drawn by the Italians in the colonial period but Ethiopia was aiming to re-border the territories of both states with regard to historical events and belongings. In addition to this, both states neither could agree over

²⁹ Human Rights Watch website (2009)

³⁰ CIA worldfactbook on Eritrea

the arrangements that should be made with regard to security, military and (local) administrative issues³¹.

The issues about the demarcation of the borders between Ethiopia and Eritrea led in 1998 to a new war between the countries because Ethiopia accused Eritrea of having Eritrean troops on Ethiopian territories, whilst Eritrea claimed those territories to be Eritrean. Ultimately the UN needed to send in troops to intervene in this conflict. As a result, in the year 2000, the UN stalled troops (peacekeeping operation) in the border regions to maintain a stable situation. In addition, the UN temporarily demarcated the borders between both countries to prevent possible future issues and claims regarding the boundaries for the period that the UN was active in the particular areas³². These demarcations made by the UN were not commonly accepted by Ethiopia and Eritrea as they persisted in their own claims on some territories. The UN peacekeeping troops left the border region in 2008 after the borders were another time demarcated by the Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Commission in 2007. These borders however, are still not accepted by Ethiopia³³. Until today the borders between Ethiopia and Eritrea are still contested, are still a topic of discussion and are one of the reasons for the present tensions between both countries. Also, there are occasional border struggles with the other surrounding countries Djibouti, Sudan and Yemen and there is even a proxy-war with Ethiopia going on in Somalia where Eritrea supports a Somali party that fights the Ethiopian support troops that are in Somalia³⁴. The regime in Eritrea still is the same as it was right after Eritrea proclaimed its independence. This is a fact that upsets many Eritrean people because the regime is controlling the country in a dictatorial way. In addition to that, the promised constitution is not yet complete and functioning. These problems, lack of rights and repressive measures lead to reasons and openings for Eritrean diaspora (organisations) to engage themselves in peacebuilding practises their home country.

(POSSIBLE) DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT IN ERITREA

Eritrea is a well known example of a country that relies heavily on economic support from its widespread diaspora. This however, is not always based on voluntary remittances that are sent back. This will be explained further on in this paragraph. The Eritrean diaspora is not only engaging itself in economic ways in the homeland, also in political and military ways the members of the Eritrean diaspora are and have been engaging in the country. Already starting in the colonial period many Eritreans migrated to Europe, mainly for work or study. In the period of Ethiopian rule that followed the colonization, many symbols of Eritrean sovereignty and of the Eritrean nation were suppressed by the Ethiopian government. When the struggle for Eritrean independence begun a great flow of refugees (diaspora) from Eritrea followed. Al-Ali et al. (2001) estimate the number of displaced Eritreans during this war around one million. The exact number of Eritrean people that live outside Eritrea however is difficult to estimate because Eritrea used to

³¹ Iyob, R., (2000), 'The Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict: Diasporic vs. Hegemonic States in the Horn of Africa, 1991- 2000', The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 38, No. 4, pp. 659-682, p. 661

³² Tronvoll, K., (1999), 'Borders of violence - boundaries of identity: demarcating the Eritrean nationstate', Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 22, No. 6, pp. 1037 – 1060, p. 1048. Iyob, R., (2000), p. 666

³³ CIA worldfactbook on Eritrea

³⁴ Human Rights Watch, (2009), 'Service for Life; State repression and indefinite conscription in Eritrea'. HRW publication, p. 4

belong to Ethiopia and therefore many Eritreans have become registered as Ethiopians³⁵. Many of these diaspora fled to neighbouring countries such as Egypt and Sudan. With these countries as basis for their uprising and independence battle, the Eritrean diaspora formed the Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM) from within Sudan, and the Eritrean diaspora in Egypt created the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). The diaspora thus used the neighbouring countries to organise themselves and to continue the armed struggle for Eritrean independence³⁶. This already shows the importance of the Eritrean diaspora in the history of the country. Since the Eritrean independence many Eritrean civilians still live outside of Eritrea. The Eritrean government always actively approached and persuade the diaspora to maintain its involvement in the country. For instance, after the independence struggle against Ethiopia ended the government of Eritrea gave all Eritrean people, also those living outside Eritrea, the opportunity to claim the Eritrean nationality. This was needed if they wanted to participate in the 1993 referendum where the population needed to vote for Eritrean independence. Besides that, when people claimed their Eritrean identity they would be granted free and easy access when they would go back to Eritrea³⁷. This shows the value the government attached to the Eritrean diaspora, right after the end of the independence war.

One of the most prominent ways of diaspora involvement in Eritrea is partly due to official government regulation. The government expects from all Eritrean people diaspora to pay a monthly 2% income tax as support for the Eritrean state. This tax is not compulsory but HRW describes several ways of governmental punishment for not paying this tax³⁸. In this way the government indirectly forces Eritrean diaspora to send remittances to support the country. About these remittances, both Kibreab and Iyob mention that most of it is not used to rebuild the post-conflict country by reconstructing social and physical infrastructure but it is predominantly used to feed the border conflicts³⁹. This is an obvious example of the repressiveness and malfunction of the government that made thousands of Eritrean already leave the country. At the same time the government was persuading the Eritrean diaspora to re-migrate to Eritrea as it needed its people in the post-war reconstruction. It is however, not unthinkable that many people that re-migrated not moved back because of their great sympathy for the government, there could be many people that re-migrated because they felt forced to go back because of threats (directed towards family for instance) from the government. The extremely repressive government in Eritrea thus makes it very difficult and dangerous for the Eritrean diaspora to actively and openly work on peacebuilding and on community development as that automatically would mean saying that the government lacks in carrying out its developmental tasks. The internet is therefore used extensively by the Eritrean diaspora. There are lots of online forums where the Eritreans can contact each other, share experiences and organise themselves in a non-physical way. About the Eritrean online community Bernal (2006) writes that "*Eritreans abroad use the Internet as a transnational public sphere where they produce and debate narratives of history,*

³⁵ Al-Ali, N, Black, R & Koser, K., (2001), '*The limits to 'transnationalism': Bosnian and Eritrean refugees in Europe as emerging transnational communities*', Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 578 – 600, p. 583

³⁶ Kibreab, G., (2007), '*The Eritrean Diaspora, the War of Independence, Post-Conflict (Re)-construction and Democratisation*', pp. 97 - 116. in: Dahre, U.J., (ed.), (2007), '*The Role of Diasporas in Peace, Democracy and Development in the Horn of Africa*', Dept, of sociology, Lund University, Lund, p. 98

³⁷ Iyob, R., (2000), p. 663, 671

³⁸ See Human Rights Watch, (2009), p. 75-77 for examples of this

³⁹ Kibreab, G., (2007), p.103 & Iyob, R., (2000), p. 677

*culture, democracy and identity. Through the web the diaspora has mobilized demonstrators, amassed funds for war, debated the formulation of the constitution, and influenced the government of Eritrea*⁴⁰. The internet thus provides the Eritrean diaspora a way of organising themselves and to communicate amongst the members of the diaspora, but it also facilitates political involvement and discussion. Bernal adds to this that "(...) *through their web postings, 'Internet intellectuals' interpret national crises, rearticulate values and construct community. Thus, the Internet is not simply about information but is also an emotion-laden and creative space. More than simply refugees or struggling workers, diasporas online may invent new forms of citizenship, community and political practices*"⁴¹. Whether this is also applicable on the Eritrean diaspora in the Netherlands is investigated in chapter 4.

⁴⁰ Bernal, V., (2006), '*Diaspora, cyberspace and political imagination: the Eritrean diaspora online*', Global Networks vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 161-179, p. 162

⁴¹ Ibid. p. 161

3

DIASPORAS, HOME ASSOCIATIONS AND INVOLVEMENT IN PEACE AND CONFLICT

INTRODUCTION

This chapter will describe and discuss the theoretical concepts of which is assumed that they will play a role in researching the possible efforts in the field of peacebuilding made by diaspora groups in their countries of origin. Most of the contemporary conflicts (“new wars”) are not longer between states but between identity- and cultural groups. Therefore it is assumed that the processes that shape these identities are an important aspect when looking at the ways how, and why, diaspora groups are engaging themselves in the situation in their homelands. The diaspora will frame the conflict in their homeland from the perspective of the particular identity group to which they belong. To gain insight in the ways the diaspora create and maintain their group identity, and engage in the (post)conflict situation in their homeland with those specific constructions of the conflict, this theoretical framework will discuss different factors of importance that play a role in identity shaping processes and are therefore useful for discussing diasporas and their potential influences on the conflict in their homelands.

This chapter will start with describing diaspora as a concept. What or who do we see as diasporas? What distinguishes a diaspora from a ‘common’ migrant group? How do diasporas identify themselves with the homeland and its community? What do so-called “new wars” mean for the creation and engagement of diaspora groups? These questions are needed to be able to identify diasporas and to be able to see them in relation with their homelands. Furthermore, it seems that the creation of a diaspora goes together with identity making processes but also with the concept of “home”. What do the diaspora see as the homeland? How do they create a home in the host-country? This creation of a “home-away-from-home” happens because diaspora break the link between ‘identity’ and ‘place’⁴². This break between a fixed-in-place-identity and the place it belongs to is influenced by globalisation. Globalisation effects the ways people can communicate and transport themselves etc. This leads to, what Demmers calls, the delocalization of the conflict⁴³. The diaspora can make efforts and can try to have influence in their countries of origin, whilst being located in other parts of the world. The question that rises is; what does the delocalization of the conflict and resources mean for the influence diaspora can have? This chapter will take the above into account and will give an overview of the relevant concepts and influences the diasporas have according to the leading literature.

The second part of this chapter discusses the role diasporas can play in peacebuilding in their home countries. In peacebuilding many different actors and practices can be distinguished. This part starts with considering and framing the different actors, levels of governance and approaches to peacebuilding. Subsequently the possible role that diasporas can play within these frames are explained.

⁴² Mercer, C., Page, B., & M. Evans, (2008), *Development and the African Diaspora; Place and the politics of Home* Zed Books Ltd., London, p. 52

⁴³ Demmers, J., (2002), p. 94

DIASPORAS

Diasporas are commonly described as groups of people that are forced to move from their home (country) and that consequently have a sense of "loss" that they derive from the inability to return to that particular home country⁴⁴. This is an important factor when distinguishing between diasporas and "common" migrants, although both of the concepts concern both mobility and the transportation of people. Migration is generally seen by Mercer, Page and Evans (2008) as movement of people as result of an act of rational thinking and choosing based on incentives and opportunities⁴⁵. Here one can think of moving to another country to build up a life or to study, but one can also think of tourism as a form of migration. There are several elements that play a role when defining diasporas and distinguishing a diaspora from migration. Brubaker (2005) identifies three elements that he thinks are constitutive for defining a diaspora⁴⁶. He mentions dispersion in space as the first element. This refers to the parts of the community that live outside their homeland, in separate communities. Clifford adds to this that a diaspora is not the same as migration or travelling, as this is often temporary. Diaspora takes into account the concept of *dwelling* and having a "home away from home"⁴⁷. The second element Brubaker mentions is the maintained orientation towards the homeland. As stated above, diaspora communities often still feel emotionally connected to their original home (country), whether this home is real or imagined. This attachment to the homeland, and to determine who are belonging to this homeland, happens through processes of in- and exclusion. This means that people that belong to a certain peoples or group can identify themselves with their fellow peoples or group members on basis of e.g. a shared history, language or notion of homeland. A shared notion of homeland thus can help distinguishing those that belong and not belong to one's identity group. This distinguishing of "members" facilitate the mentioned in- and exclusion processes. The territorialisation and demarcation of the homeland facilitates the identity processes as it becomes easier to identify the people that do and do not belong to the homeland and thus to the diaspora/community⁴⁸.

The third element Brubaker discusses is the notion of Boundary-Maintenance, to which he refers as the maintaining of the own (original) identity within the host-country. Boundary-maintenance enables diaspora to speak of themselves as a distinctive community with an own identity. The in- and exclusion processes again play a role in this when determining whether people share a common identity and thus a common connection to the homeland. By identifying oneself with the community, he or she is participating in the identity creating process. Thus it seems that there are several factors to take into account when defining diaspora. Clifford defined a diaspora as follows;

'A signifier, not simply of translocality and movement, but of political struggles to define the local, as distinctive community, in historical contexts of displacement'

(Clifford, J.,(1994), p. 308).

⁴⁴ Kalra, V.S., Kaur, R., Hutnyk, J., (2005), *'Diaspora & Hybridity'*, SAGE publications Ltd., London, p. 10

⁴⁵ Merer, C., Page, B., & M. Evans,(2008), p. 51

⁴⁶ Brubaker, R., (2005), *'The 'diaspora' diaspora'*. In: Ethnic and Racial studies, vol. 28, No. 01, pp. 1-19, p. 5-6

⁴⁷ Clifford, J., (1994), *'Diasporas'* in: Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 9, No. 3, Further Inflections: Toward Ethnographies of the Future, pp. 302-338, p. 308

⁴⁸ Kahler, M., & B.F. Walter eds. (2006), *'Territoriality and Conflict in an Era of Globalisation'* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 27-40.

With this definition Clifford takes into account the tension between the nation-state ideologies, indigenous and historical claims and movement of peoples. Claims of power over land or state because of "original" identities, majorities and minorities 'belonging' to those certain places, are as well political claims as a demarcation of the homeland to which a community belongs and thus from which the community derives its identity. According to him diasporas are thus communities that strongly maintain their connection with the territories that they claim and demarcate as the identity group that belongs there. In addition, diasporas are often created and fuelled by the violent conflicts that took or take place in their particular home countries. This explains the 'sense of loss' and the often present inability to return to one's homeland. Lyons (2004) therefore defined (conflict generated) diaspora as follows:

*"Conflict-generated diasporas are characterized by the source of their displacement (violent, often large-scale separation rather than relatively voluntary, often individual pursuit of economic incentives) and by the nature of their ties to the homeland (identities that emphasize links to symbolically valuable territory and an aspiration to return once the homeland is free rather than ties of narrower kinship and remittance relationships)."*⁴⁹
(Lyons, T., (2004), p. 3-4)

In his definition Lyons also distinguishes between diaspora and migrants when mentioning the absent voluntary factor that distinguishes both types of mobility. The symbolic relation and feelings of belonging to the homeland play an important role. In both definitions, Clifford and Lyons refer to the strong symbolic attachment and feelings of belonging to the homeland. In April 2005 the African Union (AU) organised an expert meeting about how to officially define the African diaspora. Eventually they came up with the following definition of the term:

*"The African diaspora consists of peoples of African origin living outside the continent, irrespective of their citizenship and nationality, and who are willing to contribute to the development of the continent and the building of the African Union"*⁵⁰
(African Union expert meeting 2005)

This research will focus on the African diaspora, and in particular on the African diaspora from Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia and hence will use the AU definition of diaspora. This definition does not explicitly take into account the tensions between identities, sense of loss and (forced) displacement, but it does consider the attachment of people to their homelands by stating that every person of African origin living outside the continent, that is willing to contribute to the development of the continent, is member of the African diaspora. This research investigates African diaspora in the Netherlands that (try to) contribute to peacebuilding in their homelands. Therefore these actors are covered by this definition and hence this definition is used.

Starting in the time of colonization, many African people were taken (mainly) overseas to the Americas, to work there as slaves. This is clearly a form of forced movement without giving those that move the feeling that they should ever return. For this research however, the slave trade is a historical event which had its effects on the peoples that belong(ed) to the families that were involved. The, for this research relevant, African

⁴⁹ Lyons, T., (2004), 'Engaging Diasporas to Promote Conflict Resolution: Transforming Hawks into Doves', Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, p. 3-4

⁵⁰ Meeting of Experts on the Definition of the African Diaspora 11 – 12 April 2005 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Website African Union.

diaspora is created in a more recent era and through more recent events, and especially through violent conflict. After the decolonization, vast parts of the African continent were struck by violent conflict. These wars not only displaced, but also ethnically cleansed complete communities. This forced migration with an inability to return, due to severe traumas, loss of family and home, but often accompanied by the will to return at one day, makes the diaspora stay attached to its country of origin. Therefore, the concepts of "home" and "belonging" are strongly connected to diasporas⁵¹. However, war is not the only reason why Africans have joined the diaspora. Due to the developments in communication and transportation, skilled Africans increasingly make the choice to voluntarily migrate from Africa to the more developed countries in Europe and North-America, to seek political asylum, study or in the hope to find better (economic) opportunities, often with the underlying idea to eventually stimulate and support their community back home⁵². What keeps them identifying themselves with their community is their shared sense of belonging to their home country. A shared notion of home and homeland makes that these contemporary diaspora can choose to migrate from their home country but still maintain their connectedness and identification with the home country whilst being in the host country. Conflict –generated diaspora often preserve their strong attachment to their homelands that are defined territorially. The conflict-generated diaspora often maintains this connection over great physical distances without having the certainty of going back⁵³. Often is their next step to do something back for their homeland and their community in the homeland, in the form of social, cultural, political or economic support.

DIASPORA, HOME ASSOCIATIONS AND GLOBALISATION

As described above, and in connection with (de)territorializing of the conflicts, the concept of *home* plays an important role in the connection the diaspora have with their countries of origin. Diasporas are maintaining their connection with their homeland, their home community and their personal home. They do this in several ways. Diaspora can physically maintain the connection with their family and friends back in the homeland, but they also can connect themselves through processes of identification. The latter is where conflict generated diasporas come into play as often for this diaspora, processes of identification with links to *symbolically* valuable territory are playing a role⁵⁴. This means that the people that are, often forcefully, removed from their homeland have an own image of their nation and the territory, their homeland, to which they identify themselves with. The concept of *home* is defined by Stuart Hall (1995) as:

*"a place where we naturally belong, where we originally came from, which first stamped us with our identity, to which we are powerfully bonded, as we are to our families, by ties that are inherited, obligatory and unquestioning. To be among those who share the same cultural identity makes us feel, culturally, at home."*⁵⁵

⁵¹ Kahler, M. & Walter, (2006), p. 12

⁵² Akyeampong, E., (2000), 'Africans in the Diaspora; The diaspora and Africa' in: African Affairs, vol. 99, pp. 183-215, p. 183

⁵³ Lyons, T., (2004), p. 5

⁵⁴ Al-Ali, N.S., 'Gender, Diasporas and post-cold war conflict', in: Smith, H., & P. Stares eds., (2007), 'Diasporas in conflict; peace-makers or peace-wreckers?' United Nations University Press, Tokyo, p. 43

⁵⁵ Hall, S. (1995), 'new Cultures for old?' in: Massey, D., & P. Jess eds.: *A place in the world? Places, Cultures and Globalisation*. In: T.S. Oakes & P.L. Price eds. (2008), 'The Cultural Geography Reader' Routledge, New York, p. 269

Hall thus defines home as a place where one belongs. Territoriality as an aspect of home implies a sense of belonging to a certain place with the ability to exclude people from that place⁵⁶. By using borders, as well mental as physical, identity groups are able to demarcate their territory. The processes of inclusion and exclusion in their turn facilitate the ability to exclude people from the identity group's territory. Mercer, Page and Evans (2008) add to this that diasporas however, are not as spatially fixed to a certain place that is, or can be, their home as Hall defined. Through the mobility and transnational movements diasporas break with the traditional (fixed) link between identity and place as they move and make a new home in a new place. However, because of belonging to a community with a shared history, values and ideals, the diaspora is constantly reproducing the home they came from in the new place that eventually becomes their home too⁵⁷.

Staying connected to one's home country without being in that particular place shows the deterritorialization of home for diaspora communities. It is more a "sense of place" and "feeling of belonging" to the home country than the physical state of "being somewhere" that assumedly plays a role when investigating the role diaspora communities play in their home countries. Kaldra et al. (2005) speak about the *deterritorialization of identities* when discussing the ideas and emotions of belonging to a certain place without actually being there⁵⁸. The notion of homeland is constantly being reproduced by the communities as the sharing of this notion and the common loyalty to the same place can strengthen their group identity⁵⁹. Connectedness to one's homeland without actually being there became much easier over the last decades because of globalisation effects. These effects also have much influence on the ways diaspora groups can operate and communicate as a transnational entity. Mentioned in the preceding part is the emotional connection diaspora communities have with their country of origin. They can identify themselves with their home as a real or as an imagined place. People identify themselves with an imagined home when they do not have direct physical access to that particular place and they thus have created a mental perception of that place that is constructed through the community's shared (hi)stories. By feeling bonded to their (imagined) community the exile communities see themselves as parallel and comparable to the communities in the homeland⁶⁰. Hence the role of diasporas in conflicts can be seen as the diasporas participating in the conflict in their homeland without actually being there. The construction of imagined communities is thus an important element for the identity shaping processes of diaspora.

The strong symbolic meaning of homeland makes it for diaspora a special, identity-laden concept. Lyons (2004) concludes from this that diaspora groups are not very likely to compromise or accept bargains off parts of their homelands for instrumental ends. Hence, conflicts over territories that are seen as homelands, as sacred sites of identity and belonging, tend to be more protracted when diaspora are involved⁶¹.

Globalisation increases the opportunities for diaspora formation as the diaspora can find and contact each other more easily. Globalisation therefore has affected the potential influence of diasporas because it becomes more and more easy for them to build and

⁵⁶ Holloway, L. & P. Hubbard, (2001), *People & Place; the extraordinary geographies of everyday life*, Pearson Education Limited, Essex, p. 97.

⁵⁷ Merer, C., Page, B., & M. Evans,(2008), p. 51-52

⁵⁸ Kalra, V.S., Kaur, R., Hutnyk, J., (2005), p. 32

⁵⁹ Holloway, L. & P. Hubbard, (2001), p.100

⁶⁰ Anderson, B., (1983), *Imagined Communities*. Verso, London, p. 33 & p. 192

⁶¹ Lyons, T., (2004), p. 6, p. 21

maintain strong links with people from their own community in the host country, and at the same time stay connected with the homeland communities⁶². This influence of globalisation is mainly possible through the rapid developments in the field of communication and transportation technology. Globalisation is accountable for reducing the so called friction of distance. This makes it possible that people, goods and, importantly, information, can transport and communicate over greater distances than before without any problems and at higher speeds as distance becomes less an obstacle⁶³. The decreased efforts, and more possibilities, for communication and transportation lead to a decrease in costs, what in turn led to an increase of cross border migration because people are better able to transport themselves quickly, relatively cheap and widespread to other places. Consequently this led to an increase of diaspora networks in developed countries as the globalizing technologies made it easier for diasporas to find each other and form networks between their members and between the homelands and their actual country of residence⁶⁴. An example of this is the significant use of internet forums by members of the Eritrean diaspora. They use these forums to discuss diverse topics, ranging from politics and history to Eritrean lifestyle, and to exchange experiences and practices⁶⁵. This increase of networks and improvement of communication possibilities is believed to play a role when trying to explain how, and gain insight in why diaspora communities in the Netherlands maintain their connectedness to their homelands and what that connectedness entails. The developed communication and transportation possibilities in the Netherlands can facilitate in many ways the means for the diasporas to be able to operate as a transnational entity, to maintain en strengthen their (international) network and engage in activities in their homelands. A new and assumedly influential example of the deterritorializing of diaspora, their identities and their connection to their home country, and therefore their relation to the conflict, is the rise in number of virtual communities on the internet. The members of a particular diaspora can be anywhere around the world, where they create, maintain and maybe even intensify their connectedness to and identity of/inclusion into the group via digital media. The notion of *homeland* and the diaspora involvement in that homeland is therefore created and reinforced in many different ways, from many different places⁶⁶. Assumed is that these virtual communities play an important role in maintaining and reinforcing the bonds diasporas have to their homeland because they can (virtually) meet with members of their community, share experiences and ideas and maybe even make efforts to mobilize the members of the diaspora to take action in any way and participate in the conflicts in their home countries.

OLD AND NEW WARS

In the introduction of this chapter is briefly referred to the type of contemporary conflicts, or so called "new wars", as a factor to play a role in producing diasporas, diaspora engagement in conflict and homeland associations of diasporas. Identity and cultural groups have become central in the "new wars" and according to Demmers this

⁶² Bercovitch, J., 'A neglected relationship Diasporas and conflict resolution' in: Smith, H., & P. Stares eds., (2007), 'Diasporas in conflict; peace-makers or peace-wreckers?' United Nations University Press, Tokyo, p.19

⁶³ Holloway, L., & P. Hubbard (2001), p. 16-17

⁶⁴ Kahler, M., & B.F. Walter eds. (2006), p. 111

⁶⁵ Bernal, V., (2005), 'Eritrea on-line: Diaspora, cyberspace and the Public sphere', American Ethnologist vol. 32, no. 4, pp. 660-675

⁶⁶ Kalra, V.S., Kaur, R., Hutnyk, J., (2005), p.32

new pattern of conflict leads to an increase in diaspora communities⁶⁷. "New wars" are in the literature distinguished from "old wars" in different ways. Although there is lots of debate going on regarding the difference between "old" and "new" wars, whether there is a real difference in type of conflict or there is just a contemporary (and thus different) way of framing the conflict so that it seems to be different, there are some factors that distinguish an "old" war from a "new" war. Nevertheless, most of the authors agree on the notion of an increased importance of identity groups⁶⁸. Henderson and Singer (2002) argue that the main differences between "old" and "new" wars are in locality of the conflict, are not longer between states but within states and that these conflicts differ in type of participants in and goal of the conflict⁶⁹. The change in locality refers to the shift in place where the conflicts are mainly fought, from (cold-war) Europe to post-colonial (and thus mainly African) regions. The "new wars" have identity groups as an important factor for the conflict, therefore internal factors rather than external factors play an increasingly important role for conflicts to occur. As an example of these internal factors Kalyvas (2001) mentions ethnonational conflict where different ethnic groups within a state fight over power, resources (thus greed as a cause for conflict) or land, instead of the "old" state versus state conflict⁷⁰. An example of this is Puntland in Somalia where this region got autonomous to a certain extent and where the borders are more or less drawn directly along the clan territories. There are also cases in Somalia where clans or rebel groups, that are the most powerful in a particular region claim sovereignty in that area at the cost of other (ethnic)groups, until the moment another, more powerful (ethnic)group shows up and seizes power⁷¹. This type of conflict, where different rebel groups, separatist movements or other non-state actors are participating distinguishes the "new" from the "old" war, the difference in participants in the both types of conflict.

Thus, "old" wars are often characterized as wars between states where the purpose of the wars served a common goal, and where the state controlled the socially organised wars through organizing the soldiers⁷². "New" wars are often explained as conflicts between identity groups and can as well be within states as in cross-state regions or in different places at the same time. In these wars the parties fight not using a fixed (state) army but by using rebels, hired forces, militia etc. Hence, "new" wars are not always economically and military supported by the state as "old" wars are ought to be. The different groups can have their own sources of personnel, financial and material support, which they can derive from a broad range of national and international actors⁷³. Hence, "new" wars are characterized as being conflicts not between two clearly distinguishable state armies, but between identity groups with involvement of external types of (armed) groups⁷⁴. This is where diaspora groups can play an important role in the conflict because they can maintain their connection to a state, to an ethnic group or to an identity group. Because of globalisation influences they even engage in these conflicts from other places in the world, in several ways.

⁶⁷ Demmers, J., (2002), p. 87-88

⁶⁸ Demmers, J., (2007), p. 6

⁶⁹ Henderson, E., J. Singer, (2002), "New wars" and rumors of "new wars", International Interactions, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 165 – 190, p. 166

⁷⁰ Kalyvas, S.N., (2001), "New" and "old" civil wars, a valid distinction? World Politics vol. 54 pp. 99-118, p. 99

⁷¹ Menkhaus, K., (2003), 'State Collapse in Somalia: Second Thoughts', Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 30, No. 97, pp. 405-422, p. 408

⁷² MacKinlay, J., (1999), 'What is new about new wars?', The RUSI journal, vol. 144, no. 4, pp. 84-86, p. 84

⁷³ Ibid., p. 85

⁷⁴ Kalyvas, S.N., (2001), p.103

The next paragraph will describe about the effects and influences that globalisation can have on diaspora engagement in a conflict and in the way diasporas identify themselves in the conflict and can engage in it. The globalisation effects that are mentioned here are seen as a factor to distinguish "new" wars. Not only diaspora but also gangs, separatist movements, religious groups, (foreign) militia and other groups that want to participate in the conflict can (and will) have profit of the techniques, transports and other tools that are within reach because of globalisation. This makes it easier for this type of actors to engage themselves in conflict (but also in peace promoting activities). This is why "new" versus "old" wars distinction is assumed to be a useful distinction when discussing diaspora influences in conflict when keeping in mind the identity processes that influence and create diasporas.

However, as mentioned earlier, not all authors agree on the clear and contemporary distinctions between the so-called "old" and "new" wars. Kalyvas for example, speaks about the often incomplete and biased way of analysing contemporary conflicts and comparing these to the "old" wars. He notices that it is often not clear to what extent a symptom of a conflict, such as looting in a "new" war for example, is a reason to engage in conflict or a means to continue the conflict. What the exact difference is with the "revolutionary taxation", which is more accepted as a practise in "old" wars, is therefore unclear. Economic reasons for conflict as an aspect of "new" wars are therefore not sufficient⁷⁵. Also Richards (2005) does not completely accept the distinguishing between "old" and "new" wars and mentions that there are plenty of places that are resource rich and where are no conflicts between rebel groups, militia, identity groups or whatsoever. They both however acknowledge that economic factors play a certain role and are thus necessary for conflicts. But only economic factors will not be a sufficient explanation for conflicts to happen as there are other factors that are needed to be taken into account. Therefore Richards argues that conflicts, and in this case "new" wars, not always just happen when the right factors that might trigger conflicts, such as valuable resources, different identities etc., are present but when there are parties that *organise* the conflict, and these parties do not, per definition, have to be states. Therefore conflict is an organised "social project"⁷⁶. Because conflicts are organised by its actors, diasporas can participate in organising the conflict as they can identify themselves with the different parties, support them in various ways and they can provide resources. Therefore diasporas can choose whether to participate in conflicts and peacebuilding or not. The following paragraph will discuss the different efforts and influences diasporas can have on conflict and peace in their country of origin as there are many different ways in which they can do this.

THE ROLE OF DIASPORAS IN CONFLICT AND PEACE

In the literature about the role of diasporas in conflict and peace one can find many differences in approaches and in points of view about the conflict intensifying role or peacebuilding role diasporas could have. About one thing however, most of the authors agree and that is that diaspora communities have an increasing important role in conflicts. Demmers (2002) lists four aspects why diasporas have this increasing importance. Her first point is that because of the new pattern of conflict, where the conflict is not longer between states but between identity groups within the territory of

⁷⁵ Kalyvas, S.N., (2001), p. 104

⁷⁶ Richards, P., (2005), 'New war, an ethnographic approach', in: P. Richards ed., 'No Peace, No War; an anthropology of contemporary armed conflicts'. Athens/Oxford; Ohio State University Press & James Curry, pp. 1-21, p.4-5

the state. Bigombe, Collier and Sambanis (2000) add to this that as the conflict is more and more between identity groups, diasporas have more incentives for action as they wish to preserve their common heritage (common culture, history, places, language etc.) which they could lose in case their identity group, or cultural group, loses the conflict⁷⁷. The diasporas however, are not physically within the territory of the state. As the new wars are between identity groups, the diaspora group resides outside the homeland and still can be involved in the conflict from there. The next aspect according to Demmers is the rise in number of war refugees. This is explained by the rise of violent inter-state wars that create large flows of refugees (diaspora) to other states, mostly in the surrounding of the country that suffers the conflict. Third is that an increased speed of communication and mobility makes the diaspora be able to maintain the social and political connections to their homelands. This is partly due to the earlier described effects and developments of globalisation. Because of this the diasporas are able to easily participate in the conflict in their country of origin. The final point Demmers makes is that the increased production of cultural and political boundaries makes diaspora in the host-countries maintain their group identity because of the processes of in- and exclusion that also play a role in the host-countries. This is because diasporas are in the host-countries an identity group and a particular community that lives in a society where they do not originate from. Therefore it is easy for the people in the host-country to identify diasporas as outsiders of the (in this case Dutch) society. Yet, this could also lead to the situation that the different sub-groups within the diaspora that are generalised by the people in the home country who perceive the diaspora as one group, come together because of this same and shared experience. This does not automatically mean that African diaspora in the Netherlands are per definition seen as outsiders and therefore unable to participate in society. Possible is that the diasporas are only identified as a group whose members do not originate from the Netherlands. Exceptions will always be there however. It is often hard for diaspora to settle and fully participate in the host-country so they maintain their own group identity, including their connection to the homeland⁷⁸.

Collier and Hoeffler (2004) focus in particular on the conflict intensifying influences that diasporas have. They write about diasporas as important sources of financing for rebel groups or militia. An example of this is the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) that aims for an independent Kosovo and eventually an independent Greater Albania. This group partly finances its actions through money they make with drug trafficking and mafia connections in Europe. In maintaining and controlling these networks, and providing armed troops for the conflict, the Albanian (extremist) diaspora supporters of the KLA have a great share⁷⁹. Another example of diaspora involvement in financing or organising actions that have a conflict intensifying, or at least a violent, effect was a bombing in Colombo, Sri Lanka in 1996. In this bombing 86 civilians got killed by explosives that were bought in Eastern Europe. Investigations after this bombing and the explosives used eventually showed that the explosives were financed by a Canadian man with a Sri Lankan origin⁸⁰.

⁷⁷ Bigombe, B., Collier, P. & N. Sambanis, (2000), '*Policies for building post-conflict peace*' in: *Journal of African Economies*, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 323-348, p. 334

⁷⁸ Demmers, J, (2002), p. 86-90

⁷⁹ IISS, (1999), '*The Kosovo Liberation Army, a struggle for power*', *Strategic Comments*, vol. 5, no. 4, p. 2

⁸⁰ Collier, P. & V.L. Elliott et al., (2003), p. 85-86

Collier and Hoeffler see a strong connection between the existence of a large diaspora community and a greater risk of (repeated) conflict⁸¹. Collier and Hoeffler explain this by pointing to the feelings of belonging to the country of origin and to their community that play a role for diasporas. These feelings of belonging make them concerned to the conflict and the developments around the conflict in their home country. With identification processes the diaspora will maintain and develop these feelings of belonging only more and more. Because diasporas are able to organise themselves in their host countries, the members of these diaspora groups can interact and (re)construct their identity as they often share the same ideas and experiences of the places in their country of origin. Giving and sharing the meaning to the places of 'belonging' is thus a factor that strengthens the communal identity⁸². This communal identity plays an important role in contemporary conflict as these contemporary conflicts are often mainly between ideological opponents/ different identity groups. Hence these conflicts are often more violent and longer lasting as they are about intangible values on which none of the conflicting parties easily is giving in⁸³.

Collier and Hoeffler also refer to the grievances that diasporas might have towards the situation in their home country, as a factor that makes the diaspora promote conflict⁸⁴. The violent conflict, forceful displacement from one's homeland, the loss of family members and possessions and the arrival in a new and unfamiliar country can be reasons for the diaspora to be grieved. Kaldra, Kour & Hutnyl agree that diasporas often suffer traumas because of forced displacement or violent pasts. The community preserves this traumas and even hatreds; that can indicate why diasporas keep financing the conflict in their home country. By providing financial resources (remittances) for the conflicting parties, the diasporas provide the resources to continue the conflict. Collier and Hoeffler concluded this after conducting regression analysis in which they conclude that diasporas have a significant effect on the conflict intensity and the probability of repetition of the conflict⁸⁵. Their research however, does only include diasporas in the United States and therefore this might not be the case for diaspora in other countries. What is generally accepted is that most of the support and influence from diasporas in the country of origin is financial⁸⁶. The diaspora that is living in a developed country with resources, freedom and security, in combination with the past grievances and relatively easy and quick access to the home country might explain this high level of remittances as the developed country offers more possibilities for sending remittances⁸⁷.

One of the main reasons that makes Collier and Hoeffler see diasporas as a conflict intensifying factor is the effect of the distance the diasporas have in the host country to their countries of origin. Living in another country, but still identifying themselves with the country of origin and the community in the country of origin, makes that diaspora communities are still emotionally, culturally and politically involved and tied to the social and political situation in their homeland. At the same time they can continue their participation in the conflict from their host country, through internet, television and other media, without being directly exposed to the violence and the other aspects of the

⁸¹ Collier, P. & A. Hoeffler, (2004), p. 568-575

⁸² Storey, D., (2001), *Territory; the claiming of space*, Pearson Education Limited, Essex. p. 17-19

⁸³ Bercovitch, J., (2007), in: Smith, H., & P. Stares eds., p. 24

⁸⁴ Collier, P. & A. Hoeffler, (2004), p. 588

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 575

⁸⁶ Bigombe, B., Collier, P. & N. Sambanis, (2000), p. 334

⁸⁷ Brinkerhoff, J.M., (2009), *Digital Diasporas; identity and Transnational Engagement* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.7. Kahler, M., & B.F. Walter eds. (2006), p. 117

conflict⁸⁸. The involvement in the conflict through digital media has a deterritorializing effect on the conflict. Hence Demmers speaks of diaspora participation in a, for them, 'virtual conflict' as they are not physically involved⁸⁹. Not suffering the direct impact and effects of the physical violence makes that diaspora groups tend to be more extreme than they the people that remain in the country of origin, therefore diaspora often support extremist groups as they often do have the means to finance this support and do not have to fear to suffer the physical consequences directly⁹⁰. This is supported by Kahler and Walter, who claim that diaspora remittances are a main resource for the continuation of the conflict⁹¹. This connection between diaspora and its (political) network in the homeland is a form of the long distance nationalism diasporas are involved in. When there is a conflict at play, the role and influence of diasporas becomes more clear and often these conflicts are becoming more prominent when there is a large diasporas involved as the conflicts in that case, tend to be longer lasting⁹². Bercovitch mentions about this that globalisation effects are very influential as these have brought the conflict closer to the diaspora but also the diaspora closer to the conflict, what facilitates diaspora participation in it⁹³.

There are different ways in which diasporas can participate in peace and conflict and in which diasporas can involve themselves in this. Mohamoud sums up four policy interests in which diasporas can be involved with regard to the influences they can have⁹⁴.

- Remittances and conflict in the homeland
- Diaspora political involvement in the homeland
- Diaspora civic-oriented involvement in the homeland
- Diaspora lobbying in the host country

In contrast to the negative notion about diasporas and the conflict intensifying effects these diasporas have according to the preceding authors, Mercer, Page & Evans (2008) see diasporas as (possibly) important actors in conflict resolution and peacebuilding processes. The four points by provided by Mohamoud can fit in both explanations of diaspora influences, as well conflict intensifying as conflict solving. As the literature mainly describes the conflict intensifying efforts by diaspora it is interesting to analyse how diasporas in developed host countries can use the different resources the developed country offers them, to have *positive* influence on the conflict in their home country. Here one can think of using the access to knowledge, security, access to and lobbying in politics, freedom of speech and free media. The (often) rich and developed country can enable the diaspora to mobilise financial resources, access to (trans-) national networks and political connections⁹⁵. The diaspora can use these resources to practice non-violent efforts and promote peacebuilding and reconciliation in their home countries. Also, because they have knowledge about the two different places, their home- and their host-country, they always have more knowledge about the needs in their home countries and the ways to provide it, than someone that is an outsider in the diaspora's home

⁸⁸ Demmers, J., (2002), p. 94

⁸⁹ Ibid. p. 94

⁹⁰ Collier, P. & V.L. Elliott et al., (2003), p. 85

⁹¹ Kahler, M., & B.F. Walter eds. (2006), p.111

⁹² Kalra, V.S., Kaur, R., Hutnyk, J., (2005), p. 20-21

⁹³ Bercovitch, J.(...), in: Smith, H. & P. Stares, (2007), p.20

⁹⁴ Mohamoud, A. A., (2006), '*African Diaspora and Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Africa*' Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen, p. 5

⁹⁵ Mohamoud, A. A., (2006), p. 2

country⁹⁶. This correlates with what Kahler & Walter mention about the facilities developed host-countries provide to exiled communities. Diaspora in developed countries can influence the situation in their home-countries by using the resources, media and freedom to establish and promote a political agenda and thus diasporas can be and stay political active with regard to their home country, whilst being in another country. Typical ways of engagement for diasporas are organising of conferences and workshops that need to support the consensus amongst the members of the diaspora communities. Also the promoting of dialogue and negotiations between groups and their members is part of this Creating and supporting a mutual understanding of the parties about the conflict, insight in other parties' perspectives and creating of trust are factors that can help to diminish the spoiler effects that diaspora can have towards the resolution of the conflict in the home countries⁹⁷. Wiberg (2007) speaks about "civic involvement" in which diaspora can participate as member of and collaborator with the civil society organisations in activities like those mentioned above⁹⁸.

By sending remittances the diasporas directly participate and have influence in their home countries financially, but by performing political lobbying they try to pressure the governments of the host-countries to take action. This action can be of different kinds. One can think of economical support, political pressure, development aid, education etcetera. Demmers (2007) gives examples of the Moluccan groups in the Netherlands that pressured the Dutch government to involve itself in Indonesia, the Albanian American Civic League that lobbied the US government during the war in Yugoslavia and Tamil organisations that on the one hand pressure the governments in their host countries and on the other hand try to influence the local governments in the home country⁹⁹.

The preceding part discussed theories that help to explain the diaspora's connections to their homelands and the participation in activities in the homeland. As is mentioned before in this theoretical framework, much of the literature regarding diaspora engagement in peace and conflicts is about the conflict intensifying role that diasporas had, have and possibly will have towards the situation in their home country. Nevertheless there are also peace promoting activities in which the diaspora can engage. The theories explained in the preceding part about diasporas, their role and methods of engagement in conflict and peace and the (possible) effects of globalisation show that there are many factors that are needed to be taken into account when investigating the possible influences of diaspora with regard to the conflict and peace(building) in their home countries. Globalisation effects on both the diaspora groups and on the Dutch society provide the members of these diaspora groups means to maintain connection to their home countries but also the means to implement peace promoting activities there. Being located in the Netherlands however, might also be constraining in any way because of the distance to the home countries for example. The ways in which diaspora can engage in peacebuilding in their countries of origin thus can be very diverse. The next paragraph will go deeper into the peacebuilding practices in which diaspora (organisations) in the Netherlands can engage.

⁹⁶ Mercer, C., Page, B., & M. Evans, (2008), p. 234

⁹⁷ PILPG, (2009), '*Engaging diaspora communities in peace processes*', Public International Law & Policy Group, p.1-4

⁹⁸ Wiberg, H., (2007), '*Diasporas and Conflict*', pp. 37 - 48 in: Dahre, U.J., (ed.), (2007), '*The Role of Diasporas in Peace, Democracy and Development in the Horn of Africa*', Dept, of sociology, Lund University, Lund, p. 44 - 48

⁹⁹ Demmers, J., (2007), p. 10

POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING

This paragraph goes into some approaches to peacebuilding, the actors in peacebuilding processes and the possibilities for diaspora to play a role in those peacebuilding processes. Several roles that diasporas can play in peacebuilding processes in their country of origin are discussed and some practises that they can implement are described. Peacebuilding is a concept that is used and interpreted in many different ways. There are thus several approaches to peacebuilding and every situation needs an own approach of peacebuilding for it to be useful or effective. In a summit meeting of the UN in 1992, then Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali spoke about post-conflict peacebuilding and the importance of it. Boutros-Ghali here defined post-conflict peacebuilding as;

*"Action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict."*¹⁰⁰

- Boutros- Ghali, 1992

This definition is still very broad and interpretable for multiple approaches. When Boutros-Ghali spoke about actions it is clear that there are many different actions that can be taken to identify and support the structures he was mentioning. Peacebuilding goes beyond just stopping the violence and signing a truce. Peacebuilding processes attempt to prevent, lessen and transform violent conflict and aims at addressing the root causes and negative effects of the conflict in society to create a sustainable and safe environment. The most important aspect that can be concluded out of the definition is that post-conflict peacebuilding should search for existing, peace promoting, aspects of the society that can be used to avoid a relapse into conflict. Which structures, actors and approaches should be used is to be determined and to be discussed.

The priority of post-conflict peacebuilding is to keep the opposing parties from returning to their violent acts so that the next steps, for the strengthening and solidifying of the peace, can be carried out. This is what Paris (1997) states when discussing the ultimate goal of peacebuilding. It is not simply to only stop the fighting, although this is an important aspect, but it is necessary to create conditions that will allow peace to endure after the departure of the peacebuilders themselves¹⁰¹. Paris thus argues that much of the peacebuilding activities are done by external actors, the internal actors that play a role in peacebuilding processes however should not be neglected. Until the mid 1990s peacebuilding was indeed focussed on the role of external actors. In addition, post-conflict peacebuilding historically focused to a great extent on the physical reconstruction of the country. One can think of rebuilding infrastructure and buildings. Also recreating an economically viable climate and formal institutions were often the main focus in peacebuilding. Since the mid 1990s the focus shifted more towards restoring social relations, which implies a greater role for actors from within the country that suffered the conflict¹⁰². Pouligny (2005) argues that there is much more that war destroys besides the physical, economical and "official" structures, and that *"wars also destroy trust, hope,*

¹⁰⁰ UN-website; Boutros-Ghali on the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992

¹⁰¹ Paris, R., (1997), *'Peacebuilding and the limits of liberal Internationalism'*, International security, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 54-89, p.57

¹⁰² Paffenholz, T., & C. Spurk, (2006), *'Civil society, civic engagement and peacebuilding'*, Social development papers; Conflict prevention and reconstruction, no. 36, World Bank, Washington. P. 15

identity, family and social ties"¹⁰³. In post-conflict peacebuilding it is difficult for governmental actors and international institutions to address these factors as these are often deeply rooted within the community that is struck by the conflict and often suffered violence. It thus seems that there is need for development actors that take into account the people and the processes of post-conflict peacebuilding on grassroots level. There are different approaches to how to deal with these effects of conflict on the communities and thus on post-conflict peacebuilding.

THREE TRACKS IN PEACEBUILDING

Chigas (2007) distinguishes three tracks of governance in post-conflict peacebuilding. These three tracks all deal with different levels of (societal) actors. Diaspora communities as actors in post-conflict peacebuilding are assumed to engage themselves in and between these different tracks. Their role will be different according to the track they are engaging themselves in.

The first track (track one) that Chigas describes is the level of official diplomacy that is done by official and visible actors, such as mediating, negotiation and cooperation between different official (international) governmental organizations. One can think of organisations and institutions as the national governments, the European Union, the African Union and the United Nations etc¹⁰⁴. This first track diplomacy is mainly tied to the interests of the official actors in the international system and thus does not formally take into account the different identity groups or private citizens¹⁰⁵. Diaspora organisations have possibilities to officially engage themselves on the first track level. This track level is in general contingent to the official institutions and diaspora members can be part of this because there are many higher educated diaspora or former community leaders that can use their knowledge, experience of network to engage in the first track of diplomacy. The peacebuilding initiatives taken by these official actors are often from a top-down approach as these actors only operate on the official level. An example of these official collaborations and ways of peacebuilding are negotiations between the high political leaders and the military leaders. These negotiations often lack input from the civil level. In addition to that, these official actors may lack the knowledge and needs of the community on the grassroots level.

Second track diplomacy actors Chigas describes as unofficial (often non-governmental), yet influential individuals and actors that are permitted more freedom to explore different perspectives and approaches due to the unofficial position they have. Examples of track two actors are (ex-) parliamentarians, members of think tanks, ethnical or religious leaders, activists and leaders of political movements and influential (international) NGOs¹⁰⁶. An important function of these track two actors is the intermediary function they have between the first track and the third track. The second track actors can fulfil the role of creating and coordinating the often absent relations between the top of the (inter)national actors such as governments, and the informal middle-level and grassroots

¹⁰³ Pouligny, B., (2005), *Civil Society and Post-conflict peacebuilding; ambiguities of international programmes Aimed at building 'new' societies*, Security Dialogue, vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 495-510, p. 496

¹⁰⁴ Chigas, D., (...), *Capacities and Limits of NGOs as conflict managers*, pp. 553-582, in: Crocker, C.A., Hampson, F.O. & P. Aall (eds.), (2007), *Leashing the dogs of war; Conflict management in a divided world*, United States institute of peace press, Washington, p. 554

¹⁰⁵ Davies, J. & E. Kaufman (eds.), (2003), *Second track / citizens' diplomacy Concepts and Techniques for conflict transformation*, Rowman & Littlefield publishers, Lanham, p.4

¹⁰⁶ Chigas, D., (...) p. 558-559

level actors. Davies & Kaufman describe this as addressing the “vertical” divisions within the tracks and communities¹⁰⁷. Track two actors can engage in peacebuilding in different ways. They can have the intermediary function between the other groups, they can provide capacity building training to educate the track three actors in peacebuilding, they can help rebuilding physical institutions and facilities, organise meetings between the different actors etc. In all these possible activities the focus can be either on improving the relations and communication between the other tracks or on providing training and tools to strengthen the track three actors. Diaspora communities have possibilities to engage as second track actors as they can organise themselves in diaspora organisations, NGOs or in political movements. These civil society actors, including the diaspora organisations play an important role in peacebuilding processes.

The track three actors are described as the actors that engage in activities at the local and community level and work on the social relationships that are important on that particular level. Chigas points out that these relationships are important because the people on the grassroots level often are stuck hardest by the conflict and experienced it in such a way that it had significant impact on their community and the social relations within that community. Third track peacebuilding thus should address and rebuild stability at the grassroots level and rebuild the social relations that are important at that level to maintain a stable peace¹⁰⁸. The track three actors are often relatively isolated from the other track actors. It thus is important to create and maintain a relationship between the different track actors to make the voice of the third track heard in the other levels. Diaspora organisations can be seen as interesting third track actors as they have the local knowledge, grassroots relations, identifications with the local and, through their organisation, access to and possible contacts with second track organisations as NGOs. However, the local knowledge of diaspora groups, and the assumed ties to the home country will not always be useful or relevant, because these diaspora groups have left the country for a period of time and therefore might have missed different developments what makes them having a wrong view on the present situation. Nonetheless, diaspora organisations still have roots and networks in their countries of origin and in their host country and therefore may be able to move between the different actors in the different tracks. Diaspora organisations thus might have an important and useful bridging function between the actors from the different tracks.

CIVIL SOCIETY AND PEACEBUILDING PRACTICES

The foregoing part shows that the three tracks of diplomacy and of approaching peacebuilding all take place on different levels of society. The second track actors can be an important group as they can function as intermediary actor between the three tracks through their network and access to the other levels. The second track actors however also have their limitations as they often do not have complete local knowledge and also often lack the official decisive power and resources. As mentioned above, diaspora groups often possess the local knowledge and networks and are therefore interesting for NGOs to add to the NGO’s network and to collaborate with. Pouligny argues that (international) NGOs have great capacity for peacebuilding but often they are limited in their capacity and knowledge to fully engage on the local level. The network and the diaspora’s knowledge are also very useful to help the NGOs interpreting the different

¹⁰⁷ Davies, J. & E. Kaufman, p.6

¹⁰⁸ Chigas, D., (...) p. 560-561

cultural factors of the local communities¹⁰⁹. Those different actors such as NGOs and diaspora organisations as civil society actors can therefore engage themselves within and between the different tracks in peacebuilding. According to Barnes (2006), one of the most important aspects of civil society is the capacity it has to address the underlying causes of the conflict and intermediating, with this knowledge, between local actors and their needs and the governmental institutions that are ought to provide security, the civil society actor thus as a bridging function. Barnes defines civil society as referring to “*the web of social relations that exist in the space between the state, the market and the private life of families and individuals; Interlinked with the concept of ‘civil society’ is the idea of social capital: the values, traditions and networks that enable coordination and cooperation between people*”¹¹⁰. This means that people, associations, unions and also identity groups can function as civil society actor. Diaspora members who organise themselves in an organisations and that share their identity and ideas can therefore also be seen as civil society actors. Civil society actors can participate on different levels and embraces a great range of sectors in which they can engage.

NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION

Negotiation and mediation as peacebuilding practices seek to provoke dialogue between the different groups which may help in bridging the gaps between the groups. Dialogue can be functional in constructing stable relationships and trust between these groups. A negotiation between two (or more) conflicting parties is often a complex process. In this case it might prove to be useful to introduce a mediating third party that tries to bring the conflicting parties together. This complexity of the conflict adds to the lasting of the conflict, therefore mediation can be useful in resolving the issue. Furthermore, mediation is appropriate in such a case when the conflict management efforts by the conflicting parties is proving inefficient and thus stalls. Important in this is that all the parties are willing to make more efforts towards peace and accept a third party to intervene¹¹¹. This mediator can be as well a third party (individual or organisation) that is an outsider to the conflict but the mediator can also be a person or an organisation that belongs to the society or community in which the conflict is fought¹¹². Besides that, the mediator can be an official representative of an organisation or a government, but a mediator can also be an unofficial individual. By acting as a mediator in a conflict, the mediator can try to influence the relationship with and between the conflicting parties. Diaspora organisations as civil society actor in peacebuilding have possibilities to function as bridging track two actor in the negotiation or mediation between different parties in the conflict. Stedman (1996) argues that mediation is more likely to be successful when the parties, on the one hand fear the consequences of continuing their armed conflict and see their fears of a settlement to be reduced on the other¹¹³. The indivisible arguments for each party make negotiations very difficult because in internal conflicts (“new wars”)

¹⁰⁹ Pouligny, B., (2005), p. 501-507

¹¹⁰ Barnes, C., (2006), *Agents for Change: Civil Society Roles in Preventing War & Building Peace*. ECCP, Den Haag, p. 7-9, p. 19

¹¹¹ Bercovitch, J., (2003), *Mediation in international conflict*, in: Zartman, W.I., & J.L. Rasmussen eds., *peacemaking in international conflict; methods & techniques*, United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC, pp. 125-153, p. 133

¹¹² Mitchell, C., (2003), *Mediation and the ending of conflicts*, in: Darby, J., & R. Mac Ginty eds., *Contemporary peacemaking; Conflict, violence and peace processes*, Palgrave, Houndmills-New York, pp. 77-86, p. 77-78

¹¹³ Stedman, S.J., (1996), *Negotiation and mediation in internal conflict*, in: Brown, M.E., ed., *The international dimensions of internal conflict*, The MIT press, Cambridge-London, pp. 341-376, p. 374

the issues over which the conflict is fought are often non-negotiable. Parties do not want to share power with their opponents, there is great mistrust between the adversaries and there are frequently ideological differences at the base of the conflict. Furthermore, negotiations and mediation in an internal conflict (civil war) are often hard to accomplish because the parties also have to overcome the security dilemma. The conflicting parties need to demobilize and disarm in order to be able to negotiate towards solving the conflict¹¹⁴. These differences again help the adversaries to construct an image (a not-to-be-trusted and hostile image) of the other¹¹⁵. Because the parties mistrust one another, they fear that the other party will make use of their disarmament and will attack them when disarming. This makes the parties reluctant to disarm.

Diaspora organisations as civil society actors can function as negotiators and engage to mediate and communicate with and between the other actors in the different tracks. The local knowledge that diaspora actors can have can be very useful because the greater share of peacebuilding activities by civil society actors are aimed at improving the situation on the local scale and for the local community¹¹⁶. Collaboration of diaspora organisations with other civil society actors in this case would be desirable because, as mentioned before, diaspora knowledge can be outdated or not accepted in relation to the contemporary situation. Cooperation with other actors such as NGOs and other local organisations etc. can help diaspora organisations to effectively implement activities and engage in activities on the local scale. Because for being effective as civil society actor, the type of support and the ways of building up and improving the relationship and the interactions with the local community are very important as these factors provide the context in which the peacebuilding takes place.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Besides negotiation and mediation there are other peacebuilding activities to which diaspora (organisations) probably can contribute. Examples of these are grassroots mobilization, bridging between cultures and economic development activities. About the latter, Woodward (2002) argues that there must be a peace dividend for the community for them to engage actively in the peace process. People need incomes for themselves to build up their lives again but they also need the government to provide any basic services, whilst keeping in mind that they must keep in mind not to refuel the inequalities that can caused the war¹¹⁷. Creation of employment possibilities is one of the important things that are needed to be done by the government. This is for the reason that employment not only provides the people with an income; it also keeps them from going into the illegal circuit to gain this income. Employment thus has a positive influence on public security. Unemployment is therefore a threat to peace because it destabilizes security¹¹⁸. People need money for their basic needs and besides the international organisations that provide humanitarian assistance, diaspora are an important source of money for the people, often family and friends, in the home-country through the remittances that they send. When the government is not functional or just not suitable, what is often the case in failed states, other actors might need to intervene and provide

¹¹⁴ Stedman, S.J., (1996), p. 344

¹¹⁵ Ibid. p. 347

¹¹⁶ Barnes, C, (2006), p.63

¹¹⁷ Woodward, S.L., (2002), '*Economic priorities for successful peace implementation*', in: S.J., Stedman, D. Rotchild & E.M. Cousens eds., *Ending civil wars: the implementation of peace agreements*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder-London, pp. 183-214, p. 186

¹¹⁸ Woodward, S.L., (2002), p. 201

economic support. An example of this is the case of Somalia. It is estimated that more than US\$750 million is entering Somalia each year, sent by the diaspora¹¹⁹. This is estimated to be between 25% en 50% of the country's GDP. Remittances thus are a very important source of external funding of developing countries, as well for consumptive use as for (small) investments. Remittances are very useful funds for developing on both the micro as the macro level. Because remittances are in general aimed at individual households, it is difficult for the government to intervene in these cash flows. Therefore remittances can be used very effectively on a selective local and personal basis¹²⁰. Yet, Maimbo (2006) warns for the distinction between diaspora as *survivors* and *exploiters* of the conflict that sent remittances to the home country with different aims. "Survivors use the remittance system to sustain the livelihoods of friends and family members who remain in the country during the period of conflict. (...)Exploiters abuse the remittance system to launder the proceeds of crime or finance the conflict for financial gain"¹²¹. Although much of the remittances sent are for personal consumption and for providing the basic needs, people also can use the remittances to support the conflicting parties by financing them. The same can happen with international aid that is sent by humanitarian relief organisations. Humanitarian aid can be stolen or taxed heavily by the pro-conflict parties and therefore contribute to the conflict that they prefer to have and sometimes even need, to maintain their way of life¹²². The diaspora that send remittances thus can provide financial support for as well personal consumption and uses as well as for military use.

GRASSROOT MOBILIZATION

The other peacebuilding activity mentioned to which diaspora (organisations) possibly can contribute, is contributing to the so-called grassroots mobilization. This mobilization can take place thanks to the networks and connections the diaspora organisations ought to have in their countries of origin. Because the diaspora can originate from different cities, towns, villages, clans, ethnic groups or religious communities, they all have personal knowledge about their community and also they have the networks within these, often local, communities. In the countries of residence the diaspora can organise themselves in organisations, foundations etc. and in this way combine their knowledge of and networks on the local level in their country of origin. Collaborations exist with other Civil Society Organisations like NGOs and other diaspora organisations, in either the diasporas' homelands or in the Netherlands. This can help in facilitating the initiatives that diaspora want to implement, but it can also help the Dutch NGOs being more efficient when providing local knowledge. Diaspora organisations in the Netherlands can realise several activities, such as organising events, meetings and information campaigns. These activities can serve different goals. The events can target to mobilise the rest of the diaspora in the Netherlands to involve themselves in issues regarding their home countries. Also, these activities can help to inform and persuade their peoples in the home country to participate in political processes by giving information and advice.

¹¹⁹ Hassan, M.A., & C. Chalmers, (2008), 'UK Somali Remittances Survey', DFID, http://www.diaspora-centre.org/DOCS/UK_Somali_Remittan.pdf, p. 7

¹²⁰ Ibid, p.6

¹²¹ Maimbo, S.M., (2006), 'Remittances and economic development in Somalia; an overview', Social Development papers; conflict prevention and reconstruction, no. 38. World Bank, Washington DC, p. 1

¹²² Shearer, D., (2000), 'Aiding or abetting? Humanitarian aid and its economic role in civil war', in: Berdal, M. & D.M. Malone, eds., *Greed and grievance: Economic agendas in civil wars*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder-London, pp. 189-203, p. 192-193

To end with, the events organised by diaspora organisations in the Netherlands may serve to create public and political support and awareness from the Dutch¹²³. About the organisations that organise these types of events Lyons (2004) writes that the conflict in the home country is the key reason for diaspora mobilization¹²⁴. However, he mentions that this mobilization is mainly to add to the conflict instead of adding to solving the conflict because the people are obviously not willing to give in on the symbols and territories that are valuable for the identity of the community. By mentioning this Lyons goes ignores the fact that diaspora not always promote conflict and that there definitely are diaspora members that are willing to discuss the terms.

Diaspora in developed countries can make use of their position to facilitate the transnational processes in which they can actively participate. Living in developed countries and experiencing for instance human rights, democratic processes and freedom can influence the diaspora to use this experience and to aid and develop their homelands. In the developed country the diaspora can promote their case to the receiving country's civil society organisations, raise awareness for the problems in their country and participate in constructing civil society organisations in their home country¹²⁵. This means that diaspora can make use of the fact that they can participate in more than just one society. The diaspora can use their knowledge of their homeland to promote it in the host country and at the same time they can make use of the practises, experiences and facilities that their host country provides them to participate and influence peacebuilding processes in their home country. Because they have a network in both countries they can facilitate and participate in the flow of information and the interaction that goes in and between the countries. Hence, diaspora members and diaspora organisations, that know how to make use of the facilities provided by the host country and that have the networks in the home country, can function as a bridging party between both worlds.

As the preceding part shows, in absence of a functional or accepted government, or because the government did not provide the necessary needs, the people of the respective countries need support. In the case of Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia non-state actors as diaspora organisations and NGOs had an increasingly important role in peacebuilding in their home country because the government was absent or incapable. In Somalia for example, track one actors are often international actors as the country only since 2009 has a president that is chosen through indirect elections. For almost the last twenty years, Somalia did not have an official government that could function as the national track one actor to engage itself in addressing the violence, managing the conflict and rebuilding its society. Since there was no central government that facilitated the needs to run a country, such as national security (as mentioned, there was no governing of the country at all) the Somali state lost control over its territory and gave militia, rebels and all different groups the opportunity to get hold of a territory where they could rule. This however, is not only the case in Somalia, also in Ethiopia and Eritrea the track two and three actors have the opportunities to more actively engage themselves in addressing the tensions between the different actors and the other problems the country has to cope with. The complex grassroot causes and influences that play a role in

¹²³ Østergaard-Nielsen, E., (2006), *'Diasporas and Conflict Resolution- Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?'*, DIIS Seminar, Copenhagen, p. 5

¹²⁴ Lyons, T., (2004), p. 7

¹²⁵ Mohamoud, A.A., & S. Osman, (200x), *'The African diaspora as agents of peace on the African continent'*, Conflict Trends, vol. X, no. X, pp 38 - 44, p. 41

contemporary peacebuilding make these non state actors (including the African diaspora) having more and more importance¹²⁶.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This chapter showed that diasporas are defined by their maintained connection to the home countries and the strong feelings of attachment that they are ought to have towards the community or identity group where they originate from. This strong attachment to one's home can be used to explain in which ways the diasporas identify themselves with the home countries and what efforts they therefore make to contribute to the conflicts in the home countries whilst living in another country. Through the globalisation influences diasporas are now able to participate and communicate in and with their communities from all over the world and therefore can also participate in peacebuilding practices in their home countries. They can do this in different ways; they are able to engage in political activities but also in other types of activities that influence peacebuilding in their home country. This can help describing in what types of activities the diasporas participate to influence peacebuilding in their home countries and what the effect of that participation is.

Remittances as form of economic support for peacebuilding is the most familiar way of contributing but diasporas can also contribute to development and peacebuilding in other ways, through grassroot mobilization or as a mediating actor for instance. Chapter two already described that the countries of research suffer many internal cleavages. Diaspora organisations can function as peacebuilding actors on the different tracks. On the first track of peacebuilding diasporas can participate as official actors in politics for example. They also have the opportunity to lobby at the international track one actors in their host country for instance. As second track actors the diasporas can engage in CSOs, NGOs or in political movements to fulfil the intermediary role between the first and third track or to provide support to the local level communities. Diaspora organisations can also function as third track actors because they have the local knowledge, grassroot relations, and identifications with the local communities. The local knowledge and the networks can give the diaspora organisations the specific added value compared to other actors in peacebuilding. Diaspora members thus have the possibility to engage themselves in peacebuilding in or between the different tracks, as well inside or outside their home country and eventually in collaboration with other actors. By doing so they can be in the position to bridge the cleavages between the communities or provide the means for development and support for instance. The diaspora members can use these different possibilities to contribute to peacebuilding in their respective home countries.

¹²⁶ Shaw, T.M., (2003), '*Regional dimensions of conflict and peace-building in contemporary Africa*' in: *Journal of International Development* no. 15, pp. 487-498, p. 488-491

4 DIASPORA IDENTITIES AND DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT IN PEACEBUILDING

INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses the data obtained from the interviews to answer and contribute to the sub-questions as these were stated in chapter 1. The mapping exercise from chapter 1 eventually led to the possibility to interview three respondents per country for this research. Unfortunately it appeared that many of the contacts initially found were either unable or unwilling to participate in an interview for this research. One point of interest to mention is that during the data collection process and during the interviews for this research the diaspora organisations already soon appeared to be managed in not always a very efficient way. Often these "organisations", that claim to be diaspora organisation, only have a few members, work on voluntary basis and are by far not as organised as the mainstream NGOs which they approach for support. This might partially explain the difficulty of finding a large amount of respondents for the interviews. I believe however that the interviewed respondents give extremely interesting insights and information regarding the engagement of the diaspora in peacebuilding. Because the information given by the respondents is case-sensitive some of the respondents refused to let the interviewer record the interview or did not want their names mentioned in the thesis. Therefore all the respondents are numbered as an anonymous source of information.

Each country has an own chapter and the data presented in each of these chapters are divided into four parts and these parts each deal with different themes where the respondents spoke about. Figure 3 schematically shows the different parts and themes that are identified from the interviews. The first part deals with what the diaspora from the respective country perceives as the main cause, or causes, of the conflict in their country. This part subsequently describes how the diaspora members identify themselves with their country of origin. The perceived cause(s) of the conflict possibly influence the way the diaspora identify themselves with their country or with a particular identity or community because they might perceive one of the conflicting parties as cause for the conflict and thus (do not) want to identify themselves with that party. This part will therefore try to give insight in the ways the diaspora in the Netherlands identifies itself with(in) the home country in order to answer the sub-question about how the diaspora identifies itself with the conflict in their home country and whether it identifies itself with a particular party in that conflict. This also influences the eventual activities the diaspora implement. The perceived cause(s) of conflict and the way of identifying with the home country lead to the next part. This second part elaborates on the diaspora's motivations to engage in activities in the home country since it is likely that this is influenced by the themes of the preceding part. The diaspora organisations in this research all engage in development and peacebuilding activities and it is possible that they have a specific topic where they focus on or an area they want to engage in because of that way they identify with a community or a party in the conflict. The second part also pays attention to the possible opportunities and restrictions that being located in the Netherlands brings for the diaspora for when it comes to organising or implementing activities. It is also possible that the country of origin provides the diaspora with opportunities to engage in activities. The home country however can also be very restrictive in this. This part thus gives the

insights and information needed to answer the sub-question regarding the specific role diaspora organisations see for themselves in peacebuilding compared to other (civil society) actors.

The third and fourth parts take into account the actual activities that the diaspora organisations do and the actual role and effects of the diaspora from the Netherlands as they perceive it. These activities can be divided as activities that are implemented in the Netherlands and activities that are actually carried out in the respective home countries. The opportunities and restrictions, in combination with the diaspora's specific abilities from the second part are assumed to influence the actual activities the organisations implement in both the Netherlands as the home country. The implementation of these activities can be the work of the diaspora organisation only but there are also possibilities that these organisations collaborate with other actors in order to be as effective as possible in their activities. This part therefore also takes into account the (possible) collaborations with other actors, as well in the Netherlands as in the home country of the diaspora. This part of the chapter thus gives the information and insights that aim to answer the sub-questions of this research that are about the activities of the diaspora organisations, the types of influence they try to have, the collaborations with other parties in this and ultimately what they perceive as the role of the diaspora in the Netherlands on peacebuilding.

Finally, as a provisional conclusion, the last part will conclude and give insight in the role the diaspora thinks it has on peacebuilding and it will give any concluding remarks on the preceding part and this part adds also the connections, or lack of connections, with the theory to the findings from the field research.




Figure 3: links between the different parts and themes

MAIN CAUSES OF CONFLICT AND DIASPORA

IDENTIFICATION WITH THE HOME COUNTRY

This part of the chapter describes what the Somali diaspora perceive as the main causes for the conflicts in their home country and the way the diaspora identifies itself with conflict in the home country. Somalia is known for the divisions in its society and the strong clan based identities. We can expect that the “new wars” theory is applicable on the conflicts in Somalia because of these internal divisions. Through the processes of in and exclusion people and their communities distinguish themselves from others on basis of a shared identity or ideology. Deterritorialization of the identities takes place when the diaspora members still use these values to distinguish themselves from others and still identify themselves with their particular community in Somalia. We expect the cleavages within society to be influential in the diaspora too.

1.1 CAUSES OF CONFLICT

Somalia deals with a civil war for already the last 20 years. Before this civil war broke out the country was ruled by a socialist regime that was opposed by many people. The Somali people had to suffer hardships, conflicts and danger for many years. In addition to that, the Somali society is notorious for being fractured between many different clans and (religious) identity groups. These different clans are, according to all respondents, influential in the contemporary situation of the Somali society but they do not see these issues as the main cause for the conflict in Somalia these days. The combination of historical aspects, the failing government, the differences between identity groups and their claims for power also have influence on the contemporary situation. Besides that, the conflicts take place between identity groups within, and spread through, the state. This corresponds with the “new wars” theory and diasporas can participate in this from all around the world through globalisation influences. Respondent 7 sees the failing government and the mistrust in the government by the population as the most prominent reason for the people to hold on to their clan based community. Because the state could not provide security for the last decades many people returned to their clan roots and clan community as they believed their clan would (try to) take over the role of the state in providing protection and security to its members. The clans however do not have the possibilities and power to be able to fulfil the role of the government because they lack the capacity and primarily operate on a local level. By trying to fill in the role of the state in the clan’s particular territory, they claim power in territories that they think belongs to their clan, and with which they thus identify themselves. By doing so, other people and other clans are automatically seen as “the others” that do not belong to the clan identity and thus not to the territory. The claiming of the territory is thus always at the cost of another community because of the in and exclusion processes and the power claims. All the different clans claim power over the same (parts of) territories, have their own program, all want to present the next president etc. the result is chaos.

Respondent 5 and 6 see the growing influence of extremist religious groups such as Al Shabaab as the biggest threat for the Somali society these days instead of the clans and the identity clashes that come with the clans. Respondent 5 even thinks that the clan differences as cause of the conflict are outdated and respondent 6 believes that these

issues are moving more to the background. Al Shabaab does not allow moderate Islam to be practised in Somalia and therefore they want to introduce Sharia law in every part of the country. To be able to do so they aim to overthrow the TFG, the interim government, and take its place so that they can officially rule Somalia. Respondent 5 thinks that the contemporary conflict is thus taking place on a higher level, between (religious) ideologies and not any longer between local communities, clans or groups. Respondent 6 believes that clan based issues are less prominent because Al Shabaab gains more power and does not allow these clan based identities to be practised and visible. Therefore the respondent agrees that extremist religious identities and groups are becoming more important and influential in Somalia, on every level of society. This as main cause for the conflict corresponds to a certain extent with the theory about "new wars" because this theory includes that the conflict is between different ideological communities throughout the whole country. Furthermore, the conflict takes place within a failed state where the government has no power. The extremist groups have much external support for their actions and fight to implement their ideas and identity upon the other communities that do not share these. The repressive and violent way of implementing Sharia law in Somalia consequently leads to resistance throughout the whole country and, according to the respondents, most of the conflicts nowadays take place because Al Shabaab counters these forms of resistance violently. The United States and Ethiopia even sent troops to Somalia in 2006 to fight against the extremist group. When the international troops left, a short period of relative tranquillity started but soon the extremists started to continue their fight. Here it seems that the conflict has other states involved. This is true to a certain extent but the conflict is not between Somalia and the other states, the conflict remained a conflict between the Somali state that was ideologically supported by the US and Ethiopia, against the extremist groups.

In contrast to the above, respondent 7 does not point out one cause as *the* cause of conflict in Somalia. According to respondent 7 the conflicts in Somalia started when the government failed to share the resources in a right and equal way. This already started with the dictatorial regime that did not do anything to contribute to the overall development of and security in Somalia. The dictatorial regime was overthrown and in the civil war that followed neither the failing government nor the opposition did have any power to provide security to its people and also failed to develop the country as chapter 3 described. People retreated to the clans that all claimed power and territories. This corresponds with what the other respondents said. The secession of regions such as Somaliland and Puntland is a result of this. Adding up to this the religious identity groups that try to apply Sharia law in the country and chaos is there. Because the people retreated to their own communities it became easier for extremist groups to take action, starting from within such a retreated and isolated community. In contrast to respondent 5 and 6, respondent 7 thus does not point to the extremist groups as the main contemporary cause of the conflict. According to respondent 7 the cause of the conflict is the sum of inequality, malfunctioning of the government, the polarisation between the clans and upcoming (religious) identity groups. The history of Somalia thus plays an important role in the present situation respondent 7 thinks. It started already in the late 1960's when the power over the country was seized by a coup. Since then there was no stable and trusted government but an authoritarian military government. The following years were marked with internal conflict and wars with neighbouring countries and since the early 1990's different clans and ethnic communities claimed territories and claimed power in those territories. These efforts still have their effect on the contemporary

Somali society as it still happens and the new autonomous states and regions of Somaliland and Puntland are proving this.

1.2 DIASPORA IDENTIFICATION

The different clans, identity- and ideological groups thus divide Somalia. People can originate from a specific area, belong to a certain clan or feel connected to some ideology. They therefore can identify themselves in several different ways with their home country or with their community. The respondents all have in common that the organisations in which they are active are inclusive for all Somali diaspora, no matter from which place they originate, to which clan they belong or which religion they have. The next chapters show that this also applies for the Eritrean and Ethiopian diaspora. The respondents all mention that the members in their organisation are open to everyone that is interested and thinks he or she can contribute to the organisation. Respondent 6 and 7 both mention that the clan based differences do not play a role in their diaspora organisation. Here they thus claim that the deterritorializing of the community identities is not applicable on their organisation. The diaspora organisations do not maintain their connection with their local identity outside Somalia and they possibly do this because they believe that the different identities contribute to the conflicts in Somalia as we saw in the previous paragraph. When implementing activities in Somalia the respondents thus not distinguish people based on clan, religious or ideological identity. Respondent 5 emphasises that their work predominantly aims at people with the Somali ethnic identity. Here the respondent means to aim at everyone that originates from Somalia, no matter where he or she lives. To work on development of Somalia through an inclusive and a not-identity bound organisation is very useful respondent 6 mentions because she thinks that many of the Somali diaspora members actually want to contribute to development of their home country. Often they do not know how or they only focus on their own community or clan because they feel (or are) most connected to them and they feel familiar and safe within their own community. These feelings of insecurity that people in the diaspora might have are not mentioned by respondents 5 and 7 thus they do not seem to see it as a problem. One would expect that the different identity groups and ideological communities remained visible in the diaspora. It might be part of the policy of the diaspora organisations to neglect these identity issues and share everyone under the same umbrella of Somali diaspora. Still it could be possible that indeed these local identification factors do not play a role any more or that the diaspora organisations do not admit that these factors play a role and therefore not tell it.

The organisation of respondent 6 for instance, is an umbrella organisation for Somali diaspora organisations. To be able to function as an umbrella organisation where different people come together it is necessary to be as inclusive as possible towards everyone that thinks he or she can contribute. More about these collaborations will be described further along this chapter. Respondent 6 and 7 include all Somali diaspora that want to do the same activities and share the same approaches to peacebuilding in Somalia. However, due to the turbulent situation in Somalia respondent 7 mentions that it often is difficult to be involved in activities throughout the whole country and therefore the organisations are often more or less forced to limit their actions in particular areas such as Somaliland and Puntland although they would like to work throughout the whole country. Respondent 7 thinks that it is possible that diaspora from different clans and identity groups collaborate because many of them belong to the second generation Somali diaspora in the Netherlands and grew up in the Netherlands. Therefore they are not paying much attention to the different (clan) identities as the older diaspora and are

thus more willing to cooperate. This possibly explains that the respondents say that there is hardly any deterritorialization of the clan identities within the diaspora. The younger generation diaspora members did not grow up distinguishing people based on clan or identity aspects.

PART 2 MOTIVATIONS, CAPABILITIES AND POSSIBILITIES FOR DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT

This part of the chapter goes into the motivations the diaspora have to participate in peacebuilding in Somalia. The ways the diaspora perceive the conflict and the causes of the conflict in their home country are assumed to influence their motivations to participate in peacebuilding. The preceding part showed that the diaspora see the internal cleavages as an important factor for the conflicts and therefore want to address these cleavages to support Somalia as their country of origin. The emotional attachment to the homeland then plays a role in motivating their participation. This part also describes the specific opportunities and abilities the diaspora has and of which it believes that it gives them an advantage compared to other actors in peacebuilding. They can have advantages because of the local knowledge and experiences they have derived from Somalia. On the other hand the diaspora can have advantages because they derive knowledge and experiences from places far away from the homeland. Both the home and the host countries thus can give the diaspora specific possibilities and abilities to address the issues in Somalia.

2.1 MOTIVATIONS FOR DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT

Because Somalia is a completely fractured state where the government is not capable to develop facilities, provide security and educate people, the diaspora has to do something. This is for all respondents their main motivation for being active in Somalia or to work on activities that address the present situation in Somalia. Respondent 5 for example mentions that she personally experienced the violence, underdevelopment and the hardships in Somalia and therefore wants to contribute to developing Somalia in a broad and diverse way because she feels that she now has the possibilities to do so. Respondent 6 adds to this that since there is no official government structure and policy for developing Somalia, other parties need to take over this role from the government. NGOs, CSOs and other organisations, such as diaspora organisations, thus have to participate in developing Somalia. Both respondent 5 and 6 see an important role for the diaspora in this. Respondent 7 mentions that it is the duty of the Somali people (the diaspora in this case) to do something back for their country of origin. She thinks that when more people, thus not only the diaspora but also the Dutch people, become aware of the situation in Somalia that it will result in more support for development.

Respondent 7 and his organisation want to take people out of their local thinking frame and want them to think more about Somalia and its society as a whole instead of fixing their attention to their own clan or region. A strong sense of belonging to a community plays a role for the diaspora when they motivate their involvement. This strong attachment to the country of origin and the strong identification with the homeland is a shared notion by all respondents. In addition to that they want to contribute to a change in the way people identify themselves with the communities or clans in Somalia. The respondents want to involve all Somali people to contribute to their shared homeland, Somalia. This is why the diaspora organisations in the Netherlands try to implement their

activities in an inclusive way where they identify with the Somali identity as a whole. For the Somali people however, there is no such thing as a feeling of belonging and a shared attachment to the homeland as we would expect. According to the respondents the Somali people belong to their particular local community and strongly identify themselves with that community instead of identifying with the country. Through the deterritorialization of the identities one would than expect that also the diaspora is extremely fractured and focused on the own community. The previous part however tells that this is not the case and therefore the diaspora organisations can contribute to the development in Somalia by bridging the cleavages between those communities by acting as an example for the local people for instance.

Activities focused only on the own clan or community are called "partial initiatives" by respondent 6. This means that the implementers of the activities do not take into account other people, fellow diaspora or fellow Somali people for instance. This is an example of a non-inclusive activity. To overcome these partial initiatives the organisation of respondent 6 coordinates projects in which all diaspora members can participate. When participating, the diaspora members have to cooperate with people from other communities than their own. Besides stimulating mutual interaction, the participants contribute to the development of other places rather than their own hometown or community. This is an activity especially suitable for the diaspora she thinks because the diaspora is more open for inclusivity. This contrasts with Lyons in chapter 3 who stated that conflicts over territories that are seen as homelands, and thus are claimed through identity processes, tend to be more protracted when diaspora are involved because the diaspora often maintain a strong notion of their homelands where they still feel connected to. This means that diaspora members tend to be less inclusive. In short can be summarised that all respondents want to contribute to the development of Somalia since it is their home country and because they think the TFG is not capable to do so. In addition to that, the respondents want to contribute to lessen the cleavages between people that still think from a clan or identity perspective, with regard to development initiatives in Somalia, so that all people can participate, collaborate and contribute in developing Somalia.

2.2 DIASPORA CAPABILITIES

The respondents are all optimistic about the activities they implement or want to implement. According to them, the diaspora from Somalia and their organisations have specific capabilities and possibilities that other organisations, institutions and initiatives lack. The most prominent and obvious advantage the diaspora has compared to other actors, the respondents mention for instance mainstream Dutch NGOs such as Oxfam Novib and Cordaid, is that the diaspora members are Somali people. Therefore they do not only share the same language and the same culture, they also know how the Somali society works, have local networks with family and friends, look Somali and through their networks have knowledge and experience of the situation in Somalia as it was and is. Respondent 5 thinks that because of this, the reach of Somali diaspora organisations is much greater than the reach of other development organisations that originate outside Somalia because the diaspora organisations can directly implement the activities and use the contacts without extra links and contact persons. Through the networks and local access diasporas have they can directly send people to specific places to work. Therefore diaspora organisations can easier implement local activities than other development organisations respondent 5 thinks.

Respondent 7 adds to this that the diasporas will use the experience they derived from living in another country, such as efficient transfer of knowledge and training of teachers, to better contribute to Somalia as they can combine their Somali knowledge with these experiences when planning and implementing the projects or activities. The higher educated diaspora can do the same work that international parties do in Somalia respondent 7 thinks. He gives an example of NGOs that have activities in Somalia such as trainings and seminars. These trainings and seminars are predominantly organised and facilitated by Dutch or Kenyan NGO employees for instance. These people do not only have their roots in another country, they also are paid many times the salary that a Somali diaspora employee would cost. Therefore he thinks that diaspora not only can take over the work of (I)NGOs, they will also make it more cost efficient. In addition to this respondent 7 thinks that the Somali people will accept and collaborate more easily with a diaspora member than with a non-Somali development agent because of these shared social and cultural characteristics. By saying this respondent 7 neglects the possibility that the diasporas are seen as traitors and as people that fled when it became dangerous in Somalia. This is possible because according to Collier and Hoeffler, the existence of a diaspora community increases the risk of conflict. From a distance the diaspora often maintain their grievances and their identifications with the home country. Diaspora participation in these, what Demmers calls, 'virtual conflicts' tend to be more extreme because the diaspora do not suffer the physical violence themselves like the local population does. Hence the people in Somalia might have a negative attitude towards the diaspora because they might increase the violence. Besides this, the cultural, ideological and identity issues that play a great role in the Somali society also seem to be neglected because the respondents' claims that the diaspora share the overall Somali culture. The previous part of this chapter showed that this Somali culture is highly contested because all clans and other identity groups have their culture and use it to claim power, territory or influence. To see the diaspora as influential because they share "the culture" is therefore too easy to say I believe. By saying that the diaspora members could take over the role of foreign NGOs the respondents try to place the diaspora members as track two actors in Somalia. If the diaspora members could take this role on them then they have to fill the gap between the other track actors in Somalia, for instance by bridging the identity cleavages between different local identity groups and unite them under the Somali identity group. The next part about the activities will go into the actual actions the diaspora organisations carry out to address this. However, the respondents for this research who implement these activities in Somalia all live in the Netherlands, far away from Somalia. Being located far away from Somalia supposedly can restrict people in their abilities to participate in the development of Somalia. On the other hand can being located in a developed, western country, supposedly offer opportunities, facilities and resources for the diaspora members to take action.

2.3 OPPORTUNITIES AND RESTRICTIONS

All respondents are more positive about the opportunities they have now because they live in the Netherlands than they are negative because they feel restricted in what they (want to) do. Respondent 5 mentions that for them, being located in the Netherlands is providing the opportunities to be more efficient and effective when implementing activities because that is how the Dutch system works compared to the Somali system. The Dutch system is much more organised, planned and thus efficient so the organisation of respondent 5 has to work in a similar way. This however is also a problem mentioned by the respondent because the Somali people have to adapt to this big difference in style

and way of working to be able to participate. When the diaspora wants to be effective they have to master the Dutch system first. Respondent 6 adds that the Dutch system regarding development aid and support is enormously bureaucratic and therefore time consuming. For people from Somalia, who are not used to a system like this, the bureaucratic regulations retain them from establishing activities respondents 5 and 6 mention. Probably the respondents say this with the co-financing in the back of their minds. To be taken into consideration by the Dutch NGOs for subsidies or co-financing, the diaspora organisations have to come up with complete proposals and detailed plans for the expenditure of the requested funds. This requires much time and efforts. Respondent 7 however does not see the Dutch system as a restrictive or hindering factor as people have to deal with it anyway. Respondent 7 thinks that the most important problem for diaspora that live in the Netherlands is that they become "westernized". This means that, although they claim to be familiar with the Somali culture and habits, they now and then need to adapt again to their country of origin as they copied the European habits, way of life and way of thinking. This would mean that they might start identifying themselves with the Dutch people and culture besides or instead of the Somali culture.

One of the most important opportunities the Netherlands offers the Somali diaspora is the possibility to establish and use (worldwide) networks. The next chapters will show that also the Eritrean and Ethiopian diaspora organisations see this as an important opportunity. These networks are used for sharing of knowledge, organising activities, political lobbying and gaining popular and political support through awareness raising initiatives. The freedom to establish and use these networks is therefore a much used opportunity for diaspora organisations respondent 5 thinks. As mentioned before, the organisation in which respondent 5 is active is a network organisation that functions as an umbrella for over 50 Somali organisations in the Netherlands. The diaspora organisations do not only establish and use networks that only exist of diaspora organisations, there are also many possible collaborations and networks between the diaspora organisations and Dutch NGOs. Respondent 6 sees the different experiences, culture and knowledge between the Somali diaspora and Dutch actors such as NGOs as complementary because of the specific abilities the diaspora derive from both societies. Cooperation in networks therefore makes the different actors more effective and efficient in their activities. Not only is the freedom to create and participate in networks useful for the diaspora, also the personal freedom of speech and the freedom to travel all over the world are extremely helpful according to respondent 5. Dutch citizens have no travel restrictions thus the diaspora members can travel over the world for activities, meetings and other events to put Somalia on the international agenda but only when they become Dutch citizens. This however could make it more difficult when the diaspora want to return to their homeland because they then do not longer possess the official Somali nationality.

This freedom makes sure that people can have political activities to address issues they think are important, even if it is against the government's policy. In Somalia (and also Ethiopia and Eritrea as we find out later) it is dangerous to go against the ruling regime thus lobbying is hardly possible. Compared to the other countries of research however this is not as strictly due to the national government but it depends more on the respective clan or identity group that is in power in a certain area. In the Netherlands they can demonstrate, lobby for Somalia or be politically active in other ways. The next part shows that the diaspora make use of these opportunities in the Netherlands. The political atmosphere in the Netherlands however is not always very helpful respondent 5

and 6 mention. This is mainly because of the complicated Dutch system. In addition to that she thinks that the Dutch government does not always take the diaspora too serious and therefore does not offer much support. To be able to be more efficient in its activities the Dutch government should acknowledge the diaspora's input in (international) development and it should be therefore be more supportive by providing funds. Now the Dutch government tends to prefer supporting the established and mainstream Dutch NGOs rather than smaller diaspora organisations. This is partly because those organisations are known by the government and therefore have priority but also because the government does not know enough about the diaspora organisations. Respondent 5 adds to this that one of the biggest problems in the Netherlands is the fact that Somalia is not on the list of countries in which the Dutch government is involving itself or is implementing (development) activities in. Therefore there is no official cooperation between the Netherlands and Somalia thus the respondent has to do much alone without any supporting networks or guidelines. This is both due to the lack of capacity from the TFG in Somalia that is not effective, has no international influence and does not try to involve the Somali diaspora in Somalia, as well due to the missing official Dutch policy regarding Somalia, however, this probably is strongly related. This support is another issue that hinders the efforts of a diaspora organisation. Because when it claims to be Somali, it is seen by the mainstream organisations as an organisation with which it is difficult to collaborate due to the lack of official, governmental, support and abilities to be effective in the country of origin. Because the diaspora organisations only have limited capacity it is difficult for them to implement the activities they want. A larger NGO that has capacity to implement activities on its own is less limited by the lack of collaborators the respondents believe. A diaspora organisation in the Netherlands thus has to organise and implement its activities mainly without official support from track one actors what limits them.

A last point of interest is the distance between the Netherlands and Somalia. It is reasonable to think that people will feel (or are) restricted because of this distance. All the respondents however think that this distance is no problem in any way because practically all communication is through telephone or over the internet. This facilitates the international networks to collaborate easily over great distances. Because of the globalisation effects the communities are thus able to maintain contact.

PART 3 ACTIVITIES

In the preceding part the respondents gave their view on the causes of the conflict in Somalia, their motivation for engaging in activities to address the problems in their country and the possibilities they have as diaspora to do so. We therefore expect that the diaspora's activities are mainly aiming at improving the living circumstances of the people in Somalia with the focus on peacebuilding activities. Their activities should address the cleavages in society and can therefore aim to mobilize the local communities to participate in peacebuilding. Involving track two actors such as religious and community leaders is also part of this. Bringing together communities also include projects that promote social inclusion and mutual knowledge transfer. The first part of the chapter describes the different activities the diaspora concretely implement in Somalia. They do this in different ways that range from organising conferences and trainings, to participating in constructing facilities for the Somali people. In addition, the diaspora implements activities in the Netherlands. The second paragraph of this part will deal with the activities that are implemented in and are aimed at the Dutch society.

Lobbying practises and mobilizing track one actors are examples of activities they can implement. The final paragraph of this part will touch upon the (possible) collaboration with other actors in these initiatives. Table 2 as shown below lists the different activities in which the respective respondents for Somalia are engaging in. Remarkable is that the respondents share many similar activities, especially when looking at the activities they implement in the Netherlands. Through the next paragraphs of this chapter these activities will be explained and elaborated on.

Respondent # → Type of activity ↓	5 <i>Som</i>	6 <i>Som</i>	7 <i>Som</i>
Home country			
Social inclusion/interaction	X	X	X
Awareness raising		X	X
Education		X	X
Knowledge transfer	X	X	X
Vocational training	X		X
Providing facilities	X	X	
Political actions (against government)			
the Netherlands			
Awareness raising	X	X	X
Community building	X	X	X
Mobilizing NL govern.	X	X	X
Stimulating remigrat.		X	X
Applying for funds	X	X	X
Conflict intensifying			
Remittances	X	X	X

Table 2; Activities of the Somali diaspora

3.1 ACTIVITIES IN THE HOME COUNTRY

All activities directly or indirectly aim at supporting and strengthening the local Somali communities. These efforts are seen by the respondents as the best way to develop Somalia, to prevent conflicts and to build peace. The same types of activities are mentioned by all respondents what shows that they more or less share the same approach towards peacebuilding and conflict prevention. They all want to address the cleavages in society and help developing people on the local level as they perceive this as important issues in Somalia. The first types of activities is supporting and creating facilities for the local communities. These facilities range from educational and medical facilities to community buildings. The second type of activities mentioned is organising conferences or seminars or participating in this. This should give people from different communities the opportunity to interact and to learn from each other. The diaspora can function as mediator in this by bringing the parties together and help them construct a stable relationship. The third activity can be generally described as community building projects through different means. The fourth and final type of activity that is mentioned is vocational training and education on the local level. These activities mainly aim to create capacity within the community to continue the use of the facilities that are present. Table 2 on the previous page shows the different topics in which the diaspora organisations are explicitly working.

3.1.1 COMMUNITY (RE)BUILDING

The first type of activities is the creating and supporting of facilities for the local communities. The organisations of respondent 5 and 6 are active in this, respondent 7 is not as table 2 shows. Respondent 5 mentions that their main activities aim at supporting and developing the local communities by financing and constructing educational and medical facilities. She mentions that the organisation not directly aim to address the conflict in Somalia because they lack the capacity to do so. Respondent 6 adds to this that, although organising conferences is their main activity, the construction of facilities is regarded as extremely important because gives them support from the local stakeholders and the local community. Respondent 6 perceives these local leaders, clan elders and religious stakeholders as the most important persons to work with before the diaspora will be able to implement any other local activity in Somalia. The local stakeholders have power in their own community and can make or influence decisions. These activities can be explained by the belief of both respondents that they as diaspora need to fulfil the role of the failing government. To be able to overcome the cleavages between communities this support is necessary. Most of these activities are carried out by the organisation's partners while the organisation of respondent 6 limits itself to the overarching coordination and communication between the partners in both the Netherlands as in Somalia. The diaspora organisations here are involved as track two actors that have an intermediary function between other groups. With the educational and medical facilities they improve the situation of the local level actors and through the educational facilities they can provide capacity building training to educate the track three actors in peacebuilding. Furthermore, these facilities are needed to simply improve the conditions of living for the local communities. The respondents here already touch upon collaboration with local actors that can be seen as the track three actors that can contribute to rebuilding and developing the community from the grassroot level.

3.1.2 SOCIAL INCLUSION AND EDUCATION

The second type of activities in Somalia, where all three respondents engage in, is organising conferences and seminars or participating in these. We see these types of activities also implemented by the diaspora from Eritrea and Ethiopia in the next chapters. Respondent 5 says that setting up conferences and seminars supports the communities because it facilitates dialogue and possibilities for knowledge transfer as well within as between the communities. Respondent 6 mentions that their conferences and seminars can aim as well directly as indirectly at peacebuilding and conflict prevention. The most important aspect is to bring together the people from the different communities, clans and religious groups. During these conferences and seminars the different people can meet and discuss issues they regard as important for the development of their community, the clan or the whole of Somalia. These activities are therefore also aiming at sharing knowledge and ideas between the different participants. To bring the different communities together respondent 6 mentions that the organisation tries to hold a neutral stance between all parties during such conferences. Bringing together, and creating interaction between, the different communities is an activity one could expect taking into account the perceived causes and influences in the conflicts in Somalia.

All respondents think that these meetings are very important, simply because there are hardly any moments where these people from all communities can meet and discuss these topics. People from all layers of society are invited and involved in these projects because these projects offer a platform to give an opinion or discuss plans in an

organised way. Again the respondents here try to place the diaspora organisations in the role of the track two actor with the intermediary function to bring the (local) communities and community leaders together and to provide capacity building for strengthening the third track actors and to educate them in peacebuilding activities. This is a form of grassroots mobilisation for peacebuilding. The meetings focus on improving the interactions and relations between the other track actors that are present. Respondent 5 however mentions that the extremist islam group Al Shabaab never participates in these seminars and conferences, although being invited. This is because they claim to have *the* solution for Somalia (Sharia law) and for carrying out this solution they do not need discussion, dialogue, alternatives or opposition. This explains why the respondents see this group as very influential in the conflict; it refuses to address the cleavages and possibly even strengthens these cleavages.

The respondents believe that they as diaspora from Somalia can function as a bridging actor between the local communities but also as actor in the interaction between the local community and the community leaders and local stakeholders. These projects are also used to inform people and to raise awareness for the situation of their country so that the people will participate in, or contribute to the activities. The organisation of respondent 7 aims to bring the people from different communities together and it wants to persuade people so that they are going to think for the society and for the country instead of only for their own village, clan or ideology group. Respondent 7 spoke about taking people out of their thinking frame and these activities have to contribute to that. Thus the diaspora organisation here again tries to involve itself as a bridging track two actor that facilitates interactions between the other actors (track two and three) for the development of Somalia through mediating between the different parties. The preferred way of doing this is through the media. Respondent 7's organisation broadcasts radio shows in southern and central Somalia. With these radio broadcastings the organisation tries to inform the fellow Somali people about the importance of their ability and responsibility to contribute to developing Somalia. This is a form of awareness raising under the people about the situation in their country and a way to persuade the track three actors to engage in activities to rebuild and develop their community from the grassroots level.

3.1.3 KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER

The last type of activities briefly mentioned by respondent 5 and 7 aims at the continuance of the use of facilities. These activities therefore aim at knowledge transfer and training and educating people. Respondent 7 regards these activities as the main activities of his organisation. His organisation aims to change and improve the attitude of the people and improve their capacity to develop themselves, their local community and their community members within the wider Somali community. Respondent 7 thinks that training and educating people, and changing people's misconceptions about other peoples and communities, is necessary to bridge the gap between different communities. The diaspora organisation provides the track three actors capacity building trainings in order to develop them and to contribute to their community from the grassroots level. Educating and training people thus should contribute to peacebuilding according to Respondent 7. The respondent possibly assumes that when people are able to develop themselves in a positive way that they will be more prone to contribute to developing their direct surrounding, in this case their local community. It is also possible that the respondent assumes that the local community realises that it can achieve more when

supporting each other and when they develop facilities that support the community. This however did not become quite clear from the interviews.

The preceding part shows that the respondents often cooperate with other actors to implement their activities in Somalia. These partners are mainly Somali CSOs and community based NGOs that are selected on the basis of several criteria, mainly focused on the organisation of and emancipation within the Somali partner organisation. Respondent 5 is supporting these Somali organisations predominantly in a financial way but it also monitors the results and effects so that future policy, events and implementations can be more effective. In turn, the diaspora organisation is funded in the Netherlands. To be able to maintain its funding from the Dutch government, the office in the Netherlands has to supervise the progress of the different activities closely. They do this through monitoring and evaluating the activities. Until now they claim that all activities have been successful. Respondent 5 says that they know that all activities were successful because they all managed to reach the targets and objectives that were formulated before implementing the activity, for instance a certain number of people educated or an amount of congresses organised. Therefore respondent 5 says that their projects contributed to more interaction in the Somali educational system through the dialogues and knowledge transfers that took place during the conferences. Also the networks between the different communities in Somalia are improved and strengthened because there now is more interaction. According to respondent 5 the track three actors are thus indeed strengthening and gaining capacity to contribute to peacebuilding. However, it is still necessary to help the people to continue using the contacts, interactions and networks. This is where the trainings play an important role. Training of trainers also has to counter the problem that often occurs when projects are finished (on paper) because then it is often unclear what to do next or what will happen with the facilities and the knowledge the people obtained from the project. The trainings help to make these facilities continue to function through training of trainers. Therefore local partners train teachers and stimulate people to go to school. Here the local track three actors are strengthened to fulfil a role in community development and eventually peacebuilding.

3.2 ACTIVITIES IN THE NETHERLANDS

All respondents mention several activities that they carry out in the Netherlands. These activities are also shown in table 2. These activities generally aim to make as well the Dutch as the Somali people in the Netherlands aware of the situation in Somalia and again, these initiatives are very similar to those of the Ethiopian and Eritrean diaspora as the next chapters will show. These activities, such as conferences and seminars, aim to generate support, predominantly financial, for instance through donations or memberships. During these events they often make plans for media campaigns, discuss lobbying ideas and try to persuade CSOs to participate in the projects that are already planned. Respondent 6 mentions about this that the media and internet nowadays play an important role in Somalia in spreading the news about what is happening in Somalia. Thus through the globalised networks the diaspora organisations have they interact and are connected with their homelands.

The main function in the Netherlands for the organisation of respondent 6 is that of "spokesperson" for a great share of the Somali diaspora organisations in the Netherlands. As umbrella organisation they have the overview and ability to speak on behalf of the Somali diaspora organisations with other NGOs and the Dutch government. Respondent 6

therefore says that most of the activities implemented in the Netherlands aim to make the diaspora speak as one voice for Somalia. To be able to speak for the whole community there are events specifically for the Somali diaspora in the Netherlands, to make them learn about and from each other with the aim to bring them together. The organisation of respondent 6 is thus also in the Netherlands involved as track two actor that functions as an intermediary between the first track Dutch government and the third track local community, the diaspora members in this case. As a track two actor the diaspora organisations is active in communicating between the different levels so that the different objectives, approaches and needs are adjusted so that they match.

All respondents engage in awareness raising campaigns as table 2 shows. By involving the Dutch government respondent 5 hopes that it eventually will do more for Somalia, for instance by implementing official foreign policy towards the country. Respondent 6 and 7 give an example of the last event where the Dutch government was represented during a conference. This conference took place in The Hague and they invited members of the Dutch ministry of foreign affairs, members of the Dutch co-funding NGOs, scientists and students, as well as Somali representatives from CSOs. During this event the different approaches were heard and the different actors got into contact. At these conferences they want the Dutch institutions to take concrete action and to support organisations and governments that want to develop Somalia. These conferences aim to discuss the future of Somalia and possible activities for positive contribution with representatives from the Dutch government, Somali track two actors and different NGOs, but these conferences also aim at awareness raising under the Somali diaspora respondent 6 and 7 mention. Other types of conferences aim at discussing and implementing approaches to peacebuilding. The organisation of respondent 5 says to lack capacity for implementing activities that address the conflict thus by participating in such conferences they try to learn new approaches that might be suitable for them. In general these conferences and meetings can be seen as lobbying activities that aim to generate support for the situation in Somalia. By applying for Dutch involvement in peacebuilding in Somalia the diaspora organisations possibly see a role for the Dutch government as mediator between local communities, development organisations or even governmental actors in Somalia.

The final type of activities mentioned by respondent 6 and 7 are, first, a project that is called "*project Brain gain*". This remigration project persuades and helps high educated Somali diaspora from Europe to go back to Somalia for a few months to work in development projects such as educational, vocational and medical centres and assist to develop local small scale businesses. This is an example where the diaspora organisations stimulate others to take the role of track two actor to educate and develop the local communities. The second activity is mentioned by respondent 7 and is about them broadcasting radio shows that aim at the Somali diaspora in the Randstad (Urbanised area in the Netherlands). It informs them about the recent developments and events in Somalia, tries to persuade the diaspora to also engage in the development of the home country and tries to involve them in the Dutch culture. Thus it also supports the integration of the Somali diaspora in the Netherlands whilst stimulating the Somali identity for the community.

3.3 OTHER ACTORS

Respondent 5 already mentioned the partners in Somalia her organisation cooperates with when carrying out the different activities. Respondent 5 adds that there are only few Somali organisations in the Netherlands that work *explicitly* in the field of peacebuilding.

As is mentioned before, respondent 6 is active in an umbrella organisation which coordinates around 50 Somali organisations. Respondent 6 thus collaborates on a large scale with other actors and this varies from partnerships for organising events to information and knowledge sharing and capacity building. The organisation of respondent 5 is one of the larger Somali diaspora organisations in the Netherlands and therefore the board did not find it necessary to be a member under the umbrella of the organisation in which respondent 6 is active. Respondent 7's organisation is a partner in this umbrella and they are often collaborating in the activities such as mentioned in the preceding part. In addition to that, respondent 7 mentions that there are collaborators, other Somali CSOs, in both Somalia as in the Netherlands.

Also the Dutch government and mainstream Dutch NGOs are collaborating actors for all the respondents. The types of collaborations in and between the different parties, network members and the government range from partnerships in organising conferences to a funding-only role in other activities and are thus very broad. The Dutch NGOs are predominantly the funding partners through the Dutch co-funding system that facilitates that some of the larger Dutch NGOs have the possibility to fund initiatives of smaller organisations. The Dutch NGOs are in turn subsidised by the Government. Respondent 7 mentions that the Dutch government is important for the lobbying and political awareness (and international awareness) with regard to Somalia. Still, the Somali partner organisations that represent the organisation from the Netherlands on a local level in Somalia are more important. They keep the Dutch partners up-to date and engage as the local track two and three actors in activities in Somalia. It is difficult to cooperate in projects in Somalia with Dutch partners because the Netherlands does not have international treaties with Somalia. Direct financing by Dutch NGOs in Somalia is therefore very difficult according to respondent 7. This might explain why the organisation of respondent 6 prefers working with their Somali local level partners for implementing activities because these organisations need the partnership more to be more effective and the funds are better locally used because they are directly in the right location. The Dutch actors are thus important for the funding, and thus the capabilities, of the diaspora organisations. In turn the Somali partners are important for carrying out the activities and using the obtained funds in the most efficient way.

PART 4 DIASPORA EFFECTS ON PEACEBUILDING

This part of the chapter discusses the effects the diaspora think they have on peacebuilding, whilst living in the Netherlands. The preceding parts show that all respondents see the diaspora as a major factor of support and development in the fractured society of Somalia. The most important role diasporas worldwide have is supporting their families financially and this could affect peacebuilding practises in Somalia. The remittances that are sent back to Somalia are the lifeline of many families so the diaspora is important for many people in Somalia. According to respondent 5, much of these remittances are not directly linked to or used for peacebuilding and conflict preventing activities but to provide the first basic needs of people. Besides that, many people that send money to Somalia do not know how to use the money to contribute to peacebuilding or conflict preventing activities. The effect of the remittances on peacebuilding is therefore supposed to be marginal. In addition to that he mentions that many people are reluctant to do anything in the field of peacebuilding because they do not trust the TFG or the local people in power. This is an important argument for people not to support the TFG because there is an extreme uncertainty about what will

happen with their money or what will happen to them if the TFG fails. Another possibility is the support many members of the diaspora give to extremist and militant groups such as Al Shabaab. This is what one would expect regarding the theories of Collier & Hoeffler for instance. Luckily this negative, conflict intensifying, support is much lesser than the general form of economic support in which most of the Somali diasporas are involved respondent 5 mentions. Respondent 6 does not agree with this and therefore mentions that the remittances are still an important source of funding for the Islamic extremist group Al Shabaab. Sending remittances to Al Shabaab is making the conflict last longer because the respondent perceives this organisation as main cause of the conflict. Because the remittances do not per definition contribute positively to peacebuilding the respondents engage in activities of which they believe do contribute positively, namely the activities mentioned in the preceding part.

An interesting point mentioned by respondent 6 is that the Somali diaspora can provide the country with high skilled and high educated intellectuals that are able to govern the country. She speaks about a worldwide trend that high-educated Somali diaspora eventually return to Somalia to help and develop the country, by participating in politics for instance. They know the culture and thus can work there, give advice and consult. The Somali community should make use of that knowledge and the remigration-stimulating activities contribute to this. She mentions that from countries such as the Netherlands and England diasporas returned and now are involved in the parliament. To improve and increase this, respondent 6 thinks that the Dutch government should do more to help young Somali people to engage in activities in Somalia. These young people need support in any way, informational or financial for instance, to be able to do something. Respondent 7 agrees with this and adds that especially the younger generation Somali diaspora wants the best for Somalia and tries to help developing the country in a positive and decent way. Mostly the older generation of Somali diaspora that suffered the many hardships, war and crises are still having vengeful feelings. People have therefore experienced many years of conflict but therefore know what they do *not* want to do and that is engaging in conflict as that will not develop Somalia. It is also assumable that many of the older generation Somali diaspora are grieved because of the things they endured. Grievances are related to the conflict intensifying role of diaspora. Violence, displacement from one's homeland and the strong linkages to the identity (groups) can lead to these grievances.

In the end, all respondents still see the diaspora as the important (f)actors that are having a (possible) positive input in the development of Somalia. Not all diaspora members are directly contributing to the development of the country. Some do not want to contribute; others support radical parties and thus contribute to the conflict what thus corresponds with Collier and Hoeffler's theory. Nevertheless, the major share of the diaspora wants peace and development the respondents believe. The diaspora acknowledge that they have the possibility to engage in both positive as negative efforts towards peacebuilding. And through the specific abilities and opportunities they have they should be able to contribute to peace.

This part of the chapter briefly summarizes the respondents' initiatives for engagement in activities in Somalia and approaches towards peacebuilding and partially concludes on the role they have or try to fulfil in peacebuilding in Somalia whilst living in the Netherlands.

Identification and motivation The general situation in Somalia is the main motivation for the diaspora members to take action. The extreme fragmentation and alienation between local communities is important to address and the Somali respondents all try to move the Somali diaspora into taking actions to help developing Somalia as a whole and try to make people look beyond their communities. To do this the respondents identify themselves with all Somali people as their national identity group and this shows that the diaspora maintains its attachment to the home country and wants to contribute to the development of the home country. The respondents now aim to address the cleavages at the local level before taking these activities to a higher level in the society. As mentioned in chapter 3, negotiation and mediation as a peacebuilding practices seek to provoke dialogue between different groups which may help bridging the gaps between the communities. Dialogue can be functional in constructing stable relationships and trust between these groups. This is what the respondents try to do. In addition to that the respondents are also trying to bring the diaspora together as one group that contributes to the development of their shared home country. By being inclusive for diaspora members from all different backgrounds they try to make them come together, create more mutual understanding and, eventually, make them cooperate. The respondents thus aim to bridge the gap between the different Somali identity groups by pointing them to their shared notion of being Somali people. The respondents believe that all diaspora members should share the same connection to the home country and should therefore be motivated to contribute to Somalia. With this standpoint the Somali diaspora are in line with the Ethiopian diaspora that has to deal with similar problems and has similar approaches to contribute to this.

Activities and specific input All respondents mention that their organisation wants to function as a chain in the link between NGOs in the Netherlands and local NGOs or community based organisations in Somalia. Because of the specific knowledge and the shared culture the collaboration, and thus development, should improve. The respondents thus believe they can contribute to the grassroot mobilisation through their organisations in the Netherlands because the diaspora does originate from Somalia. The specific added value of the diaspora is thus their local knowledge, the networks and their experiences. In addition to that the clan based and identity based cleavages that are prominent in Somalia are not that prominent in the diaspora. The diaspora therefore has less internal struggles and thus can function as an entity between local communities easier. This contrasts with Collier and Hoeffler who see a large diaspora community as a great risk for (new) conflict. The Somali diaspora thus thinks otherwise although they acknowledge the possible grievances. A task the diaspora organisations see for themselves is bridging the gap between the local track actors (track three) and the official institutional track actors (track one) by fulfilling the role of the track two actor or by supporting the existing track two actors. Table 2 shows that the respondents have a broad range of activities they implement to achieve this. For instance, one of the respondents mentions the meetings of elders and religious leaders from the different clans and communities. During these meetings these community leaders and prominent persons have dialogue and discussion where they can learn from and with each other

how to address the issues that affect all the communities. A more prominent role as bridging actor will give these community leaders more influence on the local grassroots level so that the communities can develop and contribute to peace from a local level. Also remarkable is that the diaspora are implementing many activities that address the Dutch society, they thus obviously regard the Dutch society as potentially very influential. The activities in the Netherlands that address the government or NGOs are used to obtain financial support and governmental attention and policy for Somalia. Furthermore there are activities in the Netherlands that must create inclusion and awareness amongst the diaspora members.

Remittances can be seen as economic support for the people in Somalia. This however, is not always explicitly peacebuilding oriented. According to the respondents there are many Somali diaspora that send remittances for personal consumption and to support their families in their basic needs. However, they also mention that there are many diaspora that send money to support groups and organisations that maintain or even increase the conflict. The diaspora can thus be seen as both "survivors" and "exploiters" with regard to the remittances. An alternative method to support the home country economically, although indirectly, is through education and providing facilities the respondents think. Employment can decrease the incentives for conflict because on the one hand people have a job and earn money, on the other hand it decreases the need for illegal activities what thus improves security. Therefore the organisations each have their method to educate people in some way. Respondent 6 and 7 are implementing vocational trainings, training of trainers and educational sessions so that people can find a job easier, teach each other and continue using the facilities. The high unemployment in Somalia however makes these activities not as effective as they hope.

Collaboration The respondents all have collaborations with different parties such as Dutch and Somali NGOs. These collaborations are used and created in a complementary way so that both collaborators help, advice and support each other with their activities. This corresponds with Pouligny who argued that NGOs often have great capacity for peacebuilding need the local knowledge to be more effective. Diaspora can fulfil this role. Many activities of respondent 5 and 6 are implemented in collaboration with local actors and with support from Dutch actors. Other parties that share the approaches and ideas for developing Somalia are thus important for the diaspora. International NGOs, but also Somali NGOs that work in the field of peacebuilding need to address the differences and tensions between the different identity and ideological groups if they want to stop the violence and bring these parties more together. Diaspora can play a role in doing this by bridging the gaps between the community leaders. Diaspora can show the track three actors at the local level that there are possibilities for dialogue, discussion and even cooperation as the diaspora members can experience this in their host countries. Remarkable is the lack of political activity in Somalia in collaboration with the government. This however can be explained by the lack of governmental power and capabilities. The extremist parties are controlling more than half of Somalia and this makes the TFG an even more unstable partner in peacebuilding.

Summarising can be said that the Somali diaspora in the Netherlands believes it can contribute to peacebuilding in Somalia and have positive effects on it because of different reasons. First they can help improving the relations between local level communities through the events where the local leaders meet, discuss and have dialogue. As expected the diaspora's activities mainly aim at improving the living circumstances of the people with the aim to address the cleavages in society and eventually mobilize the third track

actors to contribute to peace from a local level. The respondents believe this will create more understanding and mutual acceptance and thus less competition and tension between the different communities. The diaspora thus want to function as mediating party between the different communities. The second contribution they can make is to economic development in Somalia through different means, from direct supports such as remittances to indirect support through training and education and facilities. The remittances cannot be seen as only family supporting but also as conflict intensifying because these remittances are not per definition sent to family for consumption but sometimes also to parties that fight for their beliefs, their clan or their interest. Respondent 7 mentioned about this that many people support these conflict intensifying groups but they will not tell this publicly. According to Collier and Hoeffler this is the main reason why diasporas are often an intensifying party in conflicts. Thirdly the global networks the diaspora can access are a great asset to contribute to peacebuilding the respondents think. They believe that, because of their added value compared to other actors, that they can combine these to effectively address the problems in their home country. However, the respondents immediately point out their lack of capacity and hence their need for support if they want to make more effective contributions to peacebuilding.

Until now the diaspora claims to have some successes in which they mainly functioned as a mediating and intermediary track two actor and provided local communities with economic support, education and facilities. This contributes to a more tranquil and inclusive community where people can develop themselves they believe. Through more interactions with other communities, more and efficient input from local community leaders and NGOs and influenced by the diaspora organisation as track two actor the communities can contribute to peacebuilding, starting on a local scale.

MAIN CAUSES OF CONFLICT AND DIASPORA IDENTIFICATION WITH THE HOME COUNTRY

Similar to Somalia, the Ethiopian society suffers from the internal cleavages and social unrest. Therefore we can expect that the “new wars” theory is applicable in this case again. A difference with Somalia is that Ethiopia has a government that is as well internally as externally recognised and in power. Therefore the government could play an important role in peacebuilding in Ethiopia. Because Ethiopia has to deal with identity based conflicts we expect the cleavages that exist within society to be influential in the diaspora too. The first part of this chapter goes into the causes of conflict according to the diaspora members and into the ways these diaspora identify themselves with Ethiopia whilst living in the Netherlands.

1.1 CAUSES OF CONFLICT

The respondents from the Ethiopian diaspora all think that the roots of the contemporary conflict in Ethiopia lie in the history of the country and the effect this had on the Ethiopian society. The respondents however all see a different effect of this history on the way the Ethiopian society is arranged and on how the conflicts take place at this moment. The events that took place in Ethiopia; droughts, “red terror”, ethnic conflicts and fights for independence, have led to the situation where the people in society do not longer accept the political powers automatically because they are not satisfied with what they have and are not satisfied about their future perspectives (or the lack of future perspectives). Respondent 3 gives an example of the past situation where Ethiopia used to be ruled by a king (He probably refers to Haile Selassie and his predecessors here). He mentions that in the past, the people did not have anything to say about who is in power in Ethiopia. They also knew who was going to be the next king. Bad governance and inequalities in Ethiopia made the people doubt this system. The Ethiopian people became more involved in politics and did not accept the established powers as such anymore. The military regime that followed the king was trained to be military; it was not trained to govern a country. Hence Ethiopia was controlled in a violent way and conflicts were daily issues. After the military regime was overthrown everyone fought for the power in Ethiopia “*to get a piece of the cake*” respondent 4 says. This corresponds with the example of the Oromo community that is written in chapter 3. This ethno- cultural community organised itself to gain support and influence under its members to be able to have influence on a national scale in Ethiopia. Since there are many other ethno –cultural communities in Ethiopia this could also apply on them. Many people nowadays suffer extreme poverty. Respondent 3 says that because even till today, the government has not found a way to govern the country in such a way that people are treated in a fair and equal way, where people will find causes to commence new conflict and where the government lacks capacity to develop the country, therefore there is and will be conflict in Ethiopia.

What happened next was that people retreated to their own clan, their identity group, such as the Oromo community that started organising itself. This corresponds with what happened in Somalia when the people did not trust the government to provide security anymore. The preceding period in the Ethiopian history was therefore a period of artificial

unity respondent 8 thinks. This artificial unity was maintained during the Eritrean independence war so that Ethiopia had a common enemy. The tensions between communities and identities however kept growing. The people in the country are enormously splintered over different religious, ethnic and ideology groups. The discord between all different groups and communities lead to tensions between these groups. In addition to that the Ethiopian government does not try to create unity and does not try to rule the country in a stable and inclusive way. An example of this is the contesting attitude of the government towards the opposition parties. Respondent 3 describes in an example the government policy where the government gives the right for self determination and an own language to every single ethnic group in Ethiopia and thus these communities, even the smallest ones, have possibilities for an autonomous or even independent status. Because of the discords and tensions between the ethnic entities (clans) these ethnic differences were even more emphasised through this government policy and thus ethnicity became another factor for the conflict in Ethiopia. Because the different communities started organising themselves and started distinguishing themselves as one cultural identity group from, but maybe more important against, other communities, they used the local, ethnic and cultural differences to claim their share of the country.

1.2 LOCAL AND REGIONAL FACTORS FOR CONFLICT

Respondent 3 agrees with the above but distinguishes between different causes for the conflict in Ethiopia because of local and regional ethnical differences. There is a difference in cause of conflict between the Southern parts of Ethiopia and the Northern parts. The south of Ethiopia holds a high number of different, small scale, relatively locally active tribes and clans. In the north of Ethiopia only a few clans live but these clans each have a high number of members. Because of the diversity and small scale of the southern clans there is a lot of interaction between these clans. The respondent mentions that in the south are much interactive identity shaping processes going on between the members of the different clans. In one period clan "A" is dominant, in the next period clan "B" is dominant etcetera. This is common for these clans and therefore this way of live is more or less accepted. The majority of the conflicts in these areas are mainly about the use and possession of resources such as grazing lands and water sources. The government-policy of self determination is thus not very useful here because it is difficult to demarcate the territories and resources as these are used in an interactive way by the different clans. Furthermore, these clans have an interdependent connection with and towards each other. Therefore the conflicts take place when the different clans claim the resources at the cost of another clan and vice versa. But in the north, the cause of the conflict is different according to respondent 3. In the north only few different clans live and these clans are much bigger and live in a much bigger territory compared to the southern clans. The division between clans and their territories is clearer. The conflict in the north therefore is mainly due to power struggles, autonomy and statehood. The large clans that possess a large territory often claim more territory or power at the cost of the neighbouring clan. However, when this is solved people will find another reason to conflict, separation movements, based on local ethnic identities for instance. In general; possession of money and resources and the unequal distribution of this adds to the possibilities for conflict. Resources such as oil and the control over this, fertile lands etc. are things that people start to conflict about. Here the respondents thus also point to greed, resource competition and economic inequalities as causes for the conflicts. This is in line with Richards, who argues that economic factors are influential or even necessary

for conflicts to occur, yet economic factors alone are not sufficient and thus the identity and ideology issues play an important role too. The different ideologies and identities that clash within the country can fit within the "new wars" theory. These identity assets are seen by Collier and Hoeffler as influential for the lasting of the conflict, but also for the conflict intensifying role of the diaspora.

In short can be said that the respondents more or less agree that most of the conflicts started about having power and territorial control, later the ethnic differences and ideological groups were added as incentives for conflict. The government policy can be seen as an amplifying factor for this. Respondent 3 and 4 pay much of their attention to economic differences as cause for the conflict but also see the community based problems as important. The conflicts in Ethiopia are in general thus between different identity groups and because of their claims to power, resources or territory, just like the conflicts in Somalia. These claims to power can come together with the feelings of belonging that the people have to the territory they claim to have power in. Claiming territory and possible demarcation of these territories will always be at the cost of other people or groups that might see their homes being claimed by others. There also is the possibility that identity groups claim territories and explain it with identity based arguments, but that there are greed-based underlying motives. This can explain why the respondent spoke about groups that always find new reasons for conflict although they did not explicitly mention this.

1.3 DIASPORA IDENTIFICATION

Since the respondents claim the conflicts to be between identity groups it would be reasonable to think that these differences and tensions are noticeable within and between the diaspora in the Netherlands. If this is true then this should be noticed in the way the diaspora members identify themselves with their home country or with their specific clan or local community. Remarkable is therefore that none of the respondents claim to maintain their identification with a specific community or clan. Of course they have their roots in a certain clan or belong to a local community, they target the whole Ethiopian community for their activities and therefore explicitly say that they are working for all Ethiopians and thus not for the specific identity group. In chapter 3 Sorenson described these inclusion processes within the Oromo community that were used to increase the bonds and identity of the specific Oromo clan. This however thus not seems to apply for the respondents because they explicitly claim to identify themselves beyond the clan communities. Yet, the respondents make use of the same identification concepts to mobilise the Ethiopian community as a whole. We saw the same way of identifying in the Somali diaspora, regardless of the clan cleavages. Respondent 3 and 4 admit that their organisations at the moment lacks capacity to be active throughout the whole country and therefore they predominantly aim their activities at the capital, Addis Ababa, at the moment. But this is simply because the organisations lacks capacity to do more and therefore both respondents emphasise that there is no single group or community which the organisation is trying to support. Also respondent 8 aims at the Ethiopian people as a whole. He however explicitly mentions that his organisation prefers the youth to work with because they are not "contaminated" with the line of thought that many older Ethiopians have. They also do this when looking for support in the diaspora. They try to persuade young Ethiopians to contribute to their country of origin. Respondent 8 however does not clearly explain what is wrong with the line of thought of the elderly. The reason for not aiming at the older generation Ethiopian (diaspora) can possibly correspond with the same issues the Somali diaspora deal with, what means that this

might relate to the fact that this older generation experienced a lot of problems such as the dictatorial regimes, colonisation and war. This can lead to grievances, vengeful feelings and a very biased view on possibilities for solving the conflict in Ethiopia. By identifying in such way with the diaspora members, the organisation of respondent 8 indirectly implies that (older) diaspora are prone to contribute to the violence because of their experiences and thus because of past grievances since they are “contaminated” in their way of thinking. Another possibility is that the grievances of the older generation target the diaspora in such a way that they do not want to cooperate with the diaspora since they are the people that left Ethiopia when the problems increased. The diaspora organisations might be aware of this and therefore aim at the younger generation.

PART 2 MOTIVATIONS, CAPABILITIES AND POSSIBILITIES FOR DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT

This part of the chapter goes into the different motivations the diaspora have to engage in activities. We expect to see the causes of conflict influence the motivation for the diaspora to engage themselves in activities. This part also describes the capabilities and possibilities, but also the restrictions, the organizations derive from living outside the home country. Because the perceived causes of conflict were similar compared to those of the Somali diaspora it can be expected that the Ethiopian diaspora sees similar possibilities for engaging in peacebuilding.

2.1 MOTIVATIONS FOR DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT

None of the respondents explicitly identified himself with one particular community or clan and all want to contribute to the inclusivity of the Ethiopians in both Ethiopia as in the Netherlands. The ways the respondents identify themselves with their home country correspond with the way they frame the conflict and its causes and this reflects the way they motivate their involvement in Ethiopia. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, respondent 8 sees the splintered society as a big problem for Ethiopia and therefore wants to address these cleavages between the communities. He thus aims at the Ethiopian society as a whole but prefers the youth to work with. Respondent 3 and 4 acknowledge the differences in society and they want to address these but they have more attention for the unequal distribution of resources that lead to tensions because they see resource competition and economic inequalities as important causes for the conflicts. They thus want to contribute to a more equal division in society but because they lack the capacity to address the whole of Ethiopia they primarily focus on the capital city. By identifying with the Ethiopian community as a whole the respondents confirm the diaspora’s home attachment without being physically in that place. According to respondent 8, one of the main problems is that the Ethiopian people are splintered and there is only little cooperation between the polarised communities. This is the problem for as well the people in Ethiopia as the diaspora in the Netherlands. In contrast to their Somali counterparts that claimed to overcome the identity divisions in the diaspora. It is difficult to bring the people together and that is where respondent 8 mainly wants to contribute. Respondent 3 and 4 thus have a broader range of topics that they want to address.

2.2 DIASPORA CAPABILITIES

The preceding parts show that the Ethiopian diaspora in the Netherlands has some different views on the causes of the conflicts in Ethiopia but that they also share ideas with regard to the problems. Hence they have similar but also different ways in which they identify themselves with their home country and consequently they motivate their urge for involvement in their own specific way. Generally speaking, they all want to contribute to reducing, or even solving, the violence and developing Ethiopia and they believe that they as diaspora have specific possibilities to play a part in this. Respondent 4 speaks of a feeling of guilt because he left his home country, his friends and his family and therefore he wants to do something back for his country and the people. That is possible because he now lives in the Netherlands. His feeling of guilt is possibly related to the idea that the diaspora left the country when it became tense and then left their families and communities behind. In that case the feeling of guilt is maybe even some kind of fear for the people that they left behind and that had to go through the hardships.

An advantage of the diaspora is that the diaspora has the ability to communicate between all layers in the Ethiopian society, provided that the diaspora does not choose a side respondent 3 says. This is why the organisation of respondent 3 also targets Ethiopia as a whole. When maintaining a neutral stance as a diaspora organisation it becomes easier to speak with all parties that are involved. This varies from the different ethnical groups and the religious leaders to the government and members of the opposition parties. Assumedly the respondent sees this role for diaspora because diaspora share the culture, language and attachment to the home country and are therefore motivated to play a role in this. Hence Respondent 3 sees the diaspora play an important role as track two actor for the peacebuilding in Ethiopia. Respondent 3 claims that the diaspora, because of the combination of grassroot knowledge, local level contacts and the ability to organise on a NGO level, can function to mediate and negotiate between the 1st and 3rd track actors. At the same time he believes that the diaspora, because of the international position and contacts, has the ability to involve or gain support from other track one or two peacebuilding actors from outside Ethiopia. How respondent 3 tries to achieve this will be described in the next part of this chapter. Respondent 3 finally adds that a diaspora organisation has the advantage to work in Ethiopia less restricted by the Ethiopian government policy regarding international support and development aid. During the 2005 elections many (I)NGOs wrote about fraud and intimidation during the voting process. In response to this the Ethiopian government has forbidden international NGOs to work in the fields of peacebuilding and conflict prevention in Ethiopia. Local NGOs are allowed to work on these topics but these organisations have to show and prove that 91% (!) of their funds is generated in Ethiopia. Thus only 9% of the funds of Ethiopian NGOs can originate from international support. Hence due to these regulations it is very difficult for Ethiopians to be active in an NGO aiming to contribute to peacebuilding in the country. This is a strange measure because, according to respondent 3, almost 80% of the Ethiopian GDP is obtained from the international community. The international support claimed by respondent 3 is probably thus very marginal. What the respondents say about the restrictions on international support is opposed to the assumption in chapter 2 that stated that the diaspora could easily support foreign NGOs in the field of peacebuilding in a financial way through the 'common' remittances. Because of the restrictions on this it is likely that this support is less than expected or through different channels and thus not directly donated as economic support for peacebuilding.

Respondent 4 approaches the diaspora possibilities from a different point of view. The Ethiopian diaspora in the Netherlands has a different type of position in the Dutch society than they had in the Ethiopian society. The diaspora is able to think more about actions, events, plans and their involvement because they can see the problems from a different stance, as outsiders. He elaborates on this difference by explaining that in Ethiopia, as citizens, they did not have any support in any form by any party. The diaspora in the Netherlands obtains support through trainings, financing, awareness events and such things. This creates a better self image for the diaspora and gains them trust in what they want to do. In addition, the international experience of being in another country to which the diaspora need to adapt makes the diaspora more open for other approaches and views towards the home country respondent 4 believes. In the home country one can easily become stuck in his or her world, without hope or perspective for a better future. As mentioned before, diaspora claim to have knowledge about the home country. Therefore respondent 4 thinks that it is easier for diaspora to implement activities there that contribute to peacebuilding, if necessary in collaboration with the people that played a part in the conflict. What respondent 4 says corresponds with what the PILP-Group wrote about the use of an inclusive approach towards all parties that had or have their share in the conflict. Interactions between the parties may help create or facilitate understanding amongst the different parties or give insight in each others' perspectives. This could increase the mutual trust or understanding between the parties. An approach like this seems to fit diaspora organisations better. It is imaginable that when non-Ethiopian NGOs approach or cooperate with parties that are seen by many as cause of the conflict, others could think that the NGO chooses a side to support. The diaspora organisation can have a more neutral, bridging function in this.

Also according to respondent 8 this is an important thing in which diaspora can play a role. Respondent 8 generally thinks that the diaspora contribute to the conflict in any way because of the cleavages between the communities. He once more sees the ethnic identities as an important factor herein. The differences between the Ethiopians in the home country are taken to the Netherlands too because all parties have their own specific ideology and identity that they use in their creation of a home away from home. Once again the deterritorialization of both the identities and the conflict are acknowledged by the diaspora. Nonetheless respondent 8 believes that the members of the Ethiopian diaspora can contribute to peacebuilding and to the creation of a stable and united Ethiopian community because of the large number of Ethiopians that want peace. As a diaspora organisation it is possible to unite likeminded Ethiopians and to communicate between them because the diaspora share the culture and uses of the people and are therefore often seen as a trusted party compared to foreign NGOs. The diaspora therefore can help in creating unity amongst its members. Here the respondent thus agrees with his fellow Ethiopian, but also Somali, diaspora members. Yet this contrasts with the ideas of Collier and Hoeffler regarding their negative diaspora influence on conflict. This trust that the diaspora enjoys is the reason why diaspora organisations can include everyone as mentioned in the preceding part. Respondent 8 believes that diaspora can contribute a lot to their home country in a positive way because they have the advantage of experiencing a different world than their home country. The diaspora should use this knowledge to support the development of the country through knowledge transfer or just because of their experience.

2.3 OPPORTUNITIES AND RESTRICTIONS

The diaspora organisations all believe that they can contribute to peacebuilding and to community building practises from within the Netherlands. Working in the Netherlands on initiatives that have to address the home country obviously has implications for the possible actions the diaspora can undertake. Being located in a western world developed country on the other hand should provide the diaspora organisations with possibilities and resources to take action and to work on the issues of their choice. There is however a limitation that should be taken into account and that is the restrictive policy the Ethiopian government has implemented on international (development) aid and Ethiopian NGOs that work in the field of peacebuilding and conflict prevention. Because of these restrictive measures none of the respondents is explicitly working on peacebuilding in Ethiopia for the simple reason that it is not allowed. Furthermore, if the diaspora members try to contribute through a Dutch organisation they are possibly even more restricted. That they live in the Netherlands on the other hand provides them the opportunity to work on other topics. Remarkable what all mention is that the people in Ethiopia tend to accept more from the diaspora than from Ethiopian NGOs just because they live in the Netherlands. The Ethiopians see the diaspora as outsiders and therefore unselfish with regard to the problems there. This is remarkable because it is imaginable that the people in Ethiopia could see the diaspora as weak or as traitors since they left the country when it became tense. The feeling of guilt that respondent 4 perceives may refer to this because it can mean that he positions himself in the same way. However, the respondents claim that their "outsiders" view and the distance provides the opportunity to think about the problems in Ethiopia from a different, more distant, point of view. When living in Ethiopia problems and issues quickly become a normal aspect of daily life but a problem in Ethiopia viewed from the Netherlands can provide an enriching or new view on the issues in Ethiopia, just because one can look at it from a different perspective and from within a different framework about how a society can function. As Ethiopians they thus feel like having an advantage compared to Dutch actors for instance because they do not only share the common advantage of framing the problems from an outsider's perspective but they still have the shared history, culture, contacts and knowledge that a Dutch actor lacks.

Respondent 3 adds that besides this, the Dutch way of working and implementing activities can be very useful for projects in Ethiopia as he thinks that people work much more efficient in the Netherlands. Respondent 4 however does not agree with this because he thinks that this project-based thinking, with a tight time schedule, to which people are used in the Netherlands, does not always work the same way in Ethiopia. The way the Ethiopian society functions cannot always be completely combined with the way the society in the Netherlands functions. Therefore very often plans that are made in the Netherlands have to be adapted to the situation in Ethiopia. There is, to a certain extent, a gap between what one wants in the Netherlands, and what is realistic to do in Ethiopia. This is a big problem that they often encounter he says. This may be a factor that is influenced by the type of activities both actors try to implement.

Respondent 3 briefly mentions other opportunities and restrictions in Ethiopia. He commences with the problems due to the lack of first-hand information about the situation in Ethiopia. Although he claims to have networks and friends and families that still live in Ethiopia one is not personally informed or experienced and the information is often biased. Because of that, the diaspora in the Netherlands does not always get a good image about the situation because they are not there. Opposite to this is

respondent 8 who says that he is always up to date because of his sources in Ethiopia. There are thus two things that could be happening here. The first is that the diaspora organisations do not trust their sources in Ethiopia and fear that the news is biased for the gain of the people in Ethiopia. This might be true of course. The second possibility is that respondent 8 is right and that the people in Ethiopia contribute to the work of the organisations in the Netherlands by providing useful and right information so that initiatives and activities can be implemented as efficient as possible. However, through the media people should have lots of opportunities to stay up-to-date about what happens in Ethiopia.

Second is mentioned that one has opportunities in the Netherlands to establish an organisation, participate in networks and to opt for funding for this organisation. There are many NGOs that can provide funding. This however, is also restrictive for the diaspora respondent 4 says. Diaspora organisations are not automatically involved by Dutch NGOs in development aid and issues regarding development aid. The diaspora organisations often are less developed compared to the Dutch NGOs in the field of peacebuilding and development. Therefore they have to learn a lot. This is, as mentioned, possible in the Netherlands, but it needs time. The new Dutch government policy on development work however makes it more difficult for diaspora organisations to get funds through the NGOs respondent 3 concludes because the budgets are limited. Established organisations such as Oxfam Novib and Cordaid often like to work with and in their own networks and also with members of their own networks in Ethiopia. The networks of the diaspora members are hardly used while respondent 4 thinks that these networks might be very useful. The respondents say about this that it is very easy to find likeminded Ethiopians in the Netherlands and share thoughts. Therefore creating a network and working together is not only useful but also efficient the respondents say.

PART 3 ACTIVITIES

This part of the chapter will describe some of the activities the diaspora organisations implement to contribute to peacebuilding and development of the Ethiopian society. The different respondents see the ideological differences and the ethnic cleavages as important aspects of the conflict in Ethiopia and therefore want to address these issues. The organisations are not only active in Ethiopia; they are also organising activities in the Netherlands to persuade their fellow diaspora to participate and to contribute to the development of their home country, regardless of their clan based, cultural or regional origin. The following part will show that the respondents have more or less the same aims with the activities they implement, but their focus is different. All respondents aim at bridging the gaps as well between (local) communities in the society as between the different track actors in society because they believe that more inclusion and more mutual trust will make the society less prone to conflict. All respondents believe that his approach suits best in Ethiopia. As mentioned, all respondents share the same goal to achieve through their activities, so does respondent 8. The organisation of respondent 8 however predominantly focuses its activities on the Netherlands and more about this is described in the following paragraph about the activities that the diaspora organisations implement in the Netherlands.

3.1 ACTIVITIES IN THE HOME COUNTRY

The first part of this paragraph will describe how and why the respondents try to create more mutual trust by facilitating interactions between people from all different layers

(tracks) in society. Just as the Somali diaspora, the Ethiopians organise conferences and seminars where dialogue, mutual insights and discussion should create more trust amongst the communities. This should make the people more aware of each other and eventually lead to more acceptance and thus inclusion within and between the communities. The cleavages in the Ethiopian society that all respondents see as important factors for the conflict are probably the main reasons for these specific activities. Furthermore, respondent 4 explains the cooperation with people that are rejected by society, in projects to reintegrate them. An important group for this are the ex-military people. The organisation of respondent 4 tries to educate them but at the same time tries to involve them as teachers to tell people about their experiences in order to create more inclusivity. These educational initiatives are also mainly through conferences and seminars. This part of the chapter will first cover the activities that can be seen as the activities that aim at stimulating social inclusion. The second part will describe the educational projects in which respondent 4 is predominantly active. Thirdly the international awareness raising projects of the respondents will be discussed. Table 3 shows the different activities the Ethiopian diaspora is engaging in. It shows that they generally share the same activities that they implement in Ethiopia. Their aim is thus predominantly at improving the Ethiopian society by implementing activities that aim to promote inclusivity for everyone in Ethiopia. In the Netherlands the diaspora predominantly engages in activities that aim to involve the diaspora members and make them, and the Dutch, aware of the situation in Ethiopia.

Respondent # → Type of activity ↓	3 <i>Eth</i>	4 <i>Eth</i>	8 <i>Eth</i>
Home country			
Social inclusion/interaction	X	X	X
Awareness raising	X		X
Education		X	
Knowledge transfer	X		
Vocational training			
Providing facilities			
Political actions (against government)			
the Netherlands			
Awareness raising		X	X
Community building		X	X
Mobilizing NL govern.			
Stimulating remigrat.		X	
Applying for funds	X		
Conflict intensifying			
Remittances	X	X	X

Table 3; Activities of the Ethiopian diaspora

3.1.1 STIMULATING SOCIAL INCLUSION

As mentioned above, the respondents engage in activities that must improve the social inclusion and interaction in society. The organisations want to do this because they believe that the people in Ethiopia need to see that they have to cooperate and help each other to develop the country. The table shows that the activities in Ethiopia are predominantly community based and are not very politically oriented or implemented. Yet political actors are invited to participate and to contribute to the activities but this is not the focus of the activities in general. Eventually these activities will lead to less

conflict and a better, more stable and more inclusive society all respondents say (or hope?) because they believe that when people are more familiar with each other, have more mutual interaction and thus have more mutual knowledge, then they will accept each other easier. The organisation of respondent 3 tries to achieve this by organising conferences and workshops in which they invite members of the different groups so that they will interact. It is however difficult to openly speak about peacebuilding and conflict prevention in Ethiopia due to the mentioned government regulations, so the workshops are aiming at bridging the distances between the different communities and parties. This is a big difference compared to the Somali activities where the government is not limiting through its policy. On the other hand the Somali are limited because of the lack of capacity from their government, there is no support. Because the organisation of respondent 3 is maintaining a neutral status, they invite as well members of the government as from the opposition, religious leaders and community spokespersons. During these conferences and workshops the attendants can address issues they think are important to create to a better society. Respondent 3 tries to provoke dialogue between the different actors through this contact, wants to let them learn from each other and wants to point out the common aspects between different ideologies, religions or political preferences. By organising such meetings and positioning themselves in this position between all parties, respondent 3 makes clear that his organisation tries to support the track two actors because they facilitate the interaction with track one and three actors. The diaspora organisation here thus uses its network to invite people from all three tracks to interact in order to find shared interests and points of attention. Barnes argued in chapter 3 that a CSO (the diaspora organisation here) can function as a bridging actor between the different tracks. The organisation of respondent 3 is functioning this way by facilitating the meetings. However, Barnes adds that the CSO then can function as a mediating or negotiating party. This however is not mentioned by the respondent. The respondent mainly focuses on providing the possibility to meet and further he does not elaborate on the function of the diaspora organisation. He thus sees the diaspora organisation as a facilitator of negotiations rather than being a negotiator itself. Because the Ethiopian society is fractured between the different identity groups and clans people often only take notice of their own community. Respondent 3 hopes to achieve through the activities that people no longer only pay attention for their own familiar community, but to the Ethiopian society as a whole, just as the Somali respondents try to achieve in the Somali society. Functioning as a facilitating party in order to find these common aspects between the different actors and working with them is also the focus of respondent 8. We thus see that the Ethiopian and Somali diaspora already share similar problems and approaches to address these problems. In the next chapter we will see that the Eritrean diaspora has its own approach to peacebuilding because of the different situation in their home country.

3.1.2 EDUCATIONAL PROJECTS

The inclusivity promoting activities of respondent 4 that aim to educate the Ethiopian people also touch upon creating unity within Ethiopia. To achieve this they use, what respondent 4 calls, "controversial" methods that not everyone dares to use and what international actors probably cannot use. These activities include the marginal groups of society such as prostitutes but especially the ex-soldiers that are not serving in the army or in a militia group any more. They train and teach ex-militaries with the goal to reintegrate them in society. In addition to that they try to involve these people in educating the Ethiopian people. This activity is listed as an educational activity in table 3 because this is the main aim, to educate. However, it can also be seen as a project that

tries to raise awareness for the situation of the marginal groups. The respondent tells that his organisation facilitates these activities by itself. Further along this chapter we will find that there are only few parties respondent 4 collaborates with and he does not mention other Ethiopian parties. Hence it is not clear whether these kinds of activities are connected to a national DDR programme and thus are carried out throughout the whole of Ethiopia or whether this is a unique approach of the organisation. The respondent speaking about this kind of programme as “controversial” give the idea that there are probably only few (or even no?) similar programmes in Ethiopia.

The reason for implementing such an educational program is that there is a large group of unemployed ex-soldiers in Ethiopia at the moment. When the war officially stopped many soldiers turned unemployed from one day to the other. Because many soldiers did nothing else but being soldiers, they have difficulties reintegrating and picking up their live in society again. In addition to that, many people do not trust the ex-soldiers or even have strong grievances towards these ex-soldiers because they lost family or friends. This makes it more difficult for the ex-soldiers to reintegrate. Respondent 4 tries to involve these soldiers in conflict prevention courses as he sees them as the best person to give an example of what can happen in war, to tell people their stories and to educate kids. Often these ex-militaries still suffer wounds or are disabled because of the war so they can give an image of how it should change. Respondent 4 thinks that you should not ban the people that caused the conflict from society; you should involve them in telling and teaching people how and why future conflicts should be prevented. Obviously this is very difficult for many Ethiopians but the respondent believes that one should have more attention for these militaries as the situation in the country has changed enormously, in a positive way. Respondent 4 says that these people did their work, they had to. Nowadays these ex-soldiers can show and tell the next generation about how someone can do wrong things, unaware and unintended. Respondent 4 here clearly points to the armed troops as cause of the conflict just because they were the soldiers. At the same time he says that there are other people behind the conflict, namely the people that ordered the troops and thus had the actual power. However, by saying that these men “just did their jobs” respondent 4 completely ignores the human agency of those military people. This approach is an example of the inclusive approach as has been described before and that can be used to give insight in the others’ perspectives to eventually create mutual trust. Helping the soldiers telling their stories and giving insight in their motives may be useful for the people to overcome their grievances towards this group in society. To overcome the grievances people have from the conflict Respondent 4 thinks that people need to ‘take the next step’, lose the feelings of revenge. His organisation tries to stimulate this by organising seminars and conferences where community leaders, elders, the soldiers and other people that are interested are invited to have dialogue and to exchange thoughts and experiences to eventually learn to live with each other. Again conferences and seminars are used as a tool to bring the people together and to make them interact. Respondent 4 believes that activities as these will contribute to the unity and harmony in the society and that people are becoming less afraid and alienated of each other.

3.1.3 (INTERNATIONAL) AWARENESS RAISING PROJECTS

The preceding part shows that the organisations primarily try to close the gaps between the different identity groups through conferences and seminars where people can meet, discuss and come together. Another type of activity where respondent 3 and 8 engage in aims at international awareness raising for the situation in Ethiopia. Additionally this activity should persuade the Ethiopian diaspora members in Europe to take action. The

main focus for the awareness raising activities lies on a pilgrimage over land from the Netherlands to Ethiopia where stops are made and conferences are organised with Ethiopian diaspora communities, religious and communal leaders and where European political institutes are approached for attention and support for Ethiopia. Here the respondents clearly try to involve and persuade international track one and track two actors to first, pay attention to the situation in Ethiopia and second, to do something for Ethiopia. There are also similar pilgrimages organised in Ethiopia where the participants have to cross the whole country. These pilgrimages have a different route each time and also aim at bringing the people of different ideologies, identities and religions in contact to bridge the differences and to provoke dialogue. The respondents aim at the issues that they perceive as cause of the conflict with these activities. These pilgrimages often start in Addis Ababa and then lead to other regions in Ethiopia where subsequently a conference will be held. In this way the participants of the pilgrimage will see completely different parts of the country, meet people over there and eventually learn from the interactions. Also for these pilgrimages the diaspora organisations invite people from all three tracks but they try to focus their attention on the track one and track two actors. Respondent 8 mentions that his organisation tries to contribute to peacebuilding as a neutral entity, for instance by organising conferences and invite participants in such a way that every party is taken into account, thus also the government because they are part of the problem. Respondent 8 believes that if the government is a part of the problem that they should be involved to work towards a situation of cooperation with the government and therefore the track one and track two actors are important to include in the activities. This is remarkable because the government is seen by the diaspora organisations as an opposing party in the country that is responsible for much problems and lack of development in Ethiopia. Nonetheless do the diaspora organisations have no explicit activities that address the government as a problem. On contrary, they try to involve the government actors wherever it could be possible. Probably these organisations fear the government and possible sanctions that they might suffer if they blame the government for lacking in governing the country in a right and fair way.

3.2 ACTIVITIES IN THE NETHERLANDS OR AIMED AT THE NETHERLANDS

The preceding part already mentioned that the activities of respondent 8 predominantly aim at the Ethiopian community in the Netherlands. The other respondents also have different activities that aim at the Ethiopian community in the Netherlands as is shown in table 3. The activities in the Netherlands remain primarily aimed at creating support, attention and understanding for the situation in Ethiopia, just as the Somali diaspora tries to achieve for Somalia. In contrast to respondent 8's organisation, respondent 3 has only few activities in the Netherlands. The only thing his organisation does is applying for funds at Dutch NGOs and at the Dutch government. This however is a bit problematic because of the restrictive policy in Ethiopia regarding international support. Even when they receive Dutch funding for peacebuilding it will be difficult to put it to a use. The activities of respondent 4 primarily aim at Ethiopian youth that lives in the Netherlands and it intends to educate them about the Ethiopian history and culture and inspire them to participate in supporting Ethiopia in any way. One of the most recent projects respondent 4 speaks about involves Ethiopian diaspora in the Netherlands that is high educated or an experienced professional. These persons are sent to Ethiopia for 6 months to a year to work on a project or to do research. The high educated persons can help people and organisations to develop thanks to their experience and knowledge that they partially derived by living outside Ethiopia. With these projects he hopes that they

eventually will return to Ethiopia to contribute to the development of the country. As the table shows this organisation is the only one with this kind of activity.

Originally the organisation in which respondent 8 is active was established to provide a "home" for the Ethiopian diaspora in the Netherlands. This was the official goal of the organisation and clearly corresponds with the deterritorialization of the Ethiopian identity because the organisation tries to recreate a home for the Ethiopians outside their home country. The deterritorialization of the Ethiopian identity could bring conflict intensifying effects along because the organisation facilitates the possibility for Ethiopians to get together, organise themselves and share thoughts. Since many members of the Ethiopian diaspora can be seen as conflict generated diaspora it is assumable that these people are grieved and experience a certain sense of loss towards their home country. Organising themselves and repeated interactions with fellow diaspora probably strengthens their Ethiopian identity. This home away from home needs to, on the one hand, help them integrating and living in the Netherlands, but on the other hand to provide them with news, information and culture from their homeland. The attention and interest for this project however came to an end and respondent 8 thinks that this happened because of the fragmentation within the Ethiopian community, also in the diaspora community, because of the ideological and ethnical differences. Respondent 8 therefore was involved in organising conferences and seminars to bring the diaspora together. For these meetings they invited researchers, community leaders and even political actors from Ethiopia that are active in the field of conflict prevention and peacebuilding to discuss and interact together with the Ethiopian diaspora. On such conferences the diaspora organisation functions as bridging actor. Through these conferences the respondent more or less acknowledges the divisions that also exist within the diaspora. The different ideological or identity groups to which the diaspora members belong all recreate or reinforce their identity in their new home where they make their new home. Respondent 8 therefore acknowledges the deterritorialization of the conflict and he tries to prevent that the divisions increase. Respondent 8 believes that there are many people in the Ethiopian government and in other political parties, but also on a lower political scale and in religious organisations, who want to contribute to positive and peaceful development of Ethiopia. Unfortunately these people are often surrounded and controlled by people that thrive on the conflict respondent 8 says. What he thus tries to do is to involve the people that do want to contribute to peace in activities (such as the conferences and seminars) to bring them together so they can join forces and cooperate with other community and religious leaders. Thus the organisation of respondent 8 tries to bring together the community leaders to let them create unity amongst their community and between the different communities to promote peacebuilding in this way. Again the respondent sees the input of the track two actors to create more mutual knowledge, interactions and trust amongst the different communities as the preferred method for peacebuilding.

3.3 OTHER ACTORS

The preceding part briefly touched upon the network possibilities diasporas claim to have in the Netherlands. There are not only Dutch NGOs and government actors but also other diaspora organisations the Ethiopian diaspora can possibly cooperate with. Collaboration as partners with Dutch NGOs however is difficult according to respondent 4 and therefore his organisation predominantly collaborates with Eritrean and Somali CSOs that work on the same topics. There is some cooperation with Dutch universities to provide Dutch students the possibilities to do an internship or voluntary work in Ethiopia. Remarkable is

that he mentions Eritrean and Somali CSOs and does not say a word about other Ethiopian organisations. This is remarkable because there are still many tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea and there also have been many conflicts between Ethiopia and Somalia. Nonetheless the respondent mentions CSOs from these particular countries as his most prominent collaborating parties.

In contrast to the above respondent 8 says that over the last few years his organisation has much and intensive collaborations with Dutch NGOs such as Oxfam Novib and Cordaid, but also with religious organisations. Sometimes they cooperated as partners in organising conferences, sometimes they were the funding-receiving actor. For conferences the organisation of respondent 8 always invites people from the Dutch ministry of foreign affairs and professors from different universities as they hope that these representatives will make a contribution too. Respondent 3 says that his organisation always tries to involve both the Dutch as the Ethiopian government in their activities because they think it is important to make them aware of the issues they address, but also to show them that they see the governments as important parties. Also in the pilgrimage that is described in the previous part the organisation invites governmental actors. During the activities in Ethiopia there are always several religious and community leaders attending the workshops and conferences and sometimes government representatives. People that can function as track two actors are thus present during these events. There are also some NGOs the organisation occasionally worked with but this is not structured at the moment. What is obvious is that all the organisations see the government as an important actor to function in the interaction between the different religious, ideological and identity groups in Ethiopia. Respondent 4 acknowledges the need for collaboration with governmental actors, he however, does not have faith in professional collaboration with the governments and hence does not have much activities to involve them. The respondents all do believe that when the government has an inclusive and interactive policy, this will have its effects on the other groups, such as NGOs and diaspora organisations. Dutch CSOs and NGOs at the moment cannot do much but provide funding to the organisations.

PART 4 DIASPORA EFFECTS ON PEACEBUILDING

In general the respondents see a special role for the diaspora in alleviating the situation in Ethiopia and in the peacebuilding practises that they think are necessary for the country. As shown in the preceding part and similar to the problems in the Somali society, the respondents see the cleavages in the Ethiopian society as important and influential factors for the development of the country and for the development of peace in the country. Although respondent 8 says that his organisation predominantly tries to bridge the cleavages within the Ethiopian diaspora in the Netherlands, he acknowledges the problems that the other Ethiopian diaspora organisations see as the important factors for the conflict. The internal struggle for power and clashes between ideologies and local entities make that the conflict in Ethiopia can be seen as a 'new war'. The conflict in Ethiopia is an internal struggle for power where supporters of one of the parties involved can support their side, even when they are dispersed all over the world. The respondents in their turn use their location outside Ethiopia to organise themselves as the Ethiopian diaspora to contribute in a positive way to peace promoting activities.

About the role of the diaspora in the Netherlands on peacebuilding in Ethiopia respondent 3 and 8 are not very positive. Both respondents agree that "*Much of the conflicts in Ethiopia are imported*". With this they mean that they think that the diaspora take the

incentives, causes and experiences of the conflicts along with them to the host country where they maintain their identification with a certain party or community. This automatically means that when they maintain their grievances and keep identifying themselves with a particular community, they exclude others at the same time. This can explain why the respondents say that cooperation between Ethiopian organisations in the Netherlands is often impossible. This all makes that they think that the diaspora take the conflict with them. As long as they cannot reconcile or deal with the past the conflict will be maintained. The overall attitude regarding the government is very negative and the respondents do not think that a negative attitude will help developing the country in any way. As said before, the activities of the organisations do not explicitly aim to improve the government or to put the right persons in the influential positions. Respondent 3 thinks that this is mainly due to the wrong persons that are in charge, not because of a wrong vision or because of identity differences. Respondent 8 believes that the diaspora has a mainly conflict intensifying role because all parties have their own ideology that they want to promote and support, even at the cost of other people. Respondent 8 more or less acknowledges Demmers' theory about the deterritorialization of conflict. He does this on the one hand by clearly saying that the diaspora take the conflicts and differences with them to the host countries. On the other hand he, although indirectly, acknowledges this by addressing the differences within the Ethiopian diaspora in the Netherlands. Respondent 8 gives an example of the 2005 elections where the opposition won a large amount of seats in the parliament. There was however much pressure from the diaspora on the opposition and they were accused of fraud. Subsequently the diaspora boycotted the opposition and their win through demonstrations and protests. Eventually the opposition did not accept their win, pressured by the diaspora. This is an example of diaspora pressure that does not serve the countries best purpose. Respondent 8 still believes that the diaspora from Ethiopia has got an enormous potential to positively contribute to the development of the country, as well in a material as a financial way. He however fears that this "Ethiopian attitude" is not very contributing to the country because people do not care for their country, although they maintain their attachment to the country. He thinks this is due to a lack of experience with openness and inclusivity of the system in which they live. In this case he does not explicitly say that the Ethiopians take the conflict with them, but the aim of his initiatives is to lead to a decrease in mutual hostility and, in turn, to an increase in cooperation within the diaspora. It is interesting to investigate to what extent this respondent sees his own activities as facilitating this since that did not became quite clear from the interviews. Until now the effect of the diaspora on peacebuilding is thus marginal but the respondents still sees much potential.

Respondent 4 is much more positive about the role of the Ethiopian diaspora on peacebuilding because he thinks that there are a lot of diaspora that return to the country of origin to start or participate in a business to make a living there. Often the people that return bring with them a relatively large amount of money which they invest in the local economy. By doing this they are supporting the local people by creating employment and deploying facilities. Because this reduces poverty, gives people work and sometimes learns them skills the people in these places will be less prone to participate in conflict respondent 4 believes. Therefore he believes that the diaspora positively contributes to peace. Respondent 4 believes in economic development as the main peacebuilding activity that should be implemented. Diaspora members that are politically active however, are dangerous for the country he thinks. This is because they do not live there and therefore never have a complete image of the country and the

situation. Consequently their efforts might work destructive. Respondent 4 ultimately mentions that all political efforts are dangerous, but also the activities in Ethiopia that address education, healthcare and sports because this automatically means that one is criticizing the government. The government does not like that but at least acknowledges that there is a gap in which the diasporas are allowed (to a certain extent) to work. This partly can explain the lack of activities that address the government. The organisations fear that the government sees them as enemies or opponents of the state.

PART 5 CONCLUDING REMARKS

This part of the chapter briefly summarizes the respondents' initiatives for engagement in activities in Ethiopia and approaches towards peacebuilding and partially concludes on the role they have or try to fulfil in peacebuilding in Ethiopia whilst living in the Netherlands.

Identification and motivation The respondents of the Ethiopian diaspora clearly have maintained their attachment and feelings of belonging to Ethiopia and have the explicit wish to return to their country of origin once they feel safe to do so. The way the Ethiopian diaspora speaks about the home attachment corresponds largely with what their Somali counterparts mentioned in the previous chapter. The attachment to the home country is thus maintained but at the same time the diaspora mentioned their need for a home away from home. The creation of this home strengthens the identification process within the (diaspora) community. Hence the respondents confirm what Mercer, Page and Evans, Kaldra and Brubaker write about diaspora. Because of the dispersion in space, the attachment to the homeland and the shared identification with Ethiopia, the Ethiopian identity is becoming deterritorialised from the Ethiopian state. When the Ethiopian government gave the ethnic and identity groups the possibility to claim autonomy or a more independent status these identities became more of a problematic issue in Ethiopia. It facilitated processes of belonging and othering and therefore also processes of place identity and home-making. The respondents agree about the cleavages that exist in Ethiopia between the identity groups and the tensions that these cleavages trigger and this makes the problems similar to those in Somalia. This however is not longer visible in the diaspora as one would expect, the respondents claim. Economic inequality and lack of development are also problems that can trigger conflict the respondents think and this corresponds with Richards in chapter 3 who mentioned that economic factors play an important role in conflicts besides other factors such as identity cleavages. Where all respondents have the same overall goal, contributing to a more inclusive society with equal opportunities for development for everyone and this thus can be explained to their shared notion of the causes of conflict and the factors that influence it.

Activities and specific input The activities implemented are generally the same for all respondents and are very much similar to the activities the Somali diaspora implements. The next chapter will show that their Eritrean counterparts have other approaches to peacebuilding but still share the ideas about diaspora specific possibilities. Because they are Ethiopian the respondents can easier gain access to local communities, they have more and better knowledge about local uses, about the language, the shared values and the culture. They claim to have specific added value compared to other actors because of their special position towards the home country and their possibility to implement their activities directly on a local level. Furthermore, because they are located in the Netherlands they have an added value because it provides them with resources, an

international network and experiences of working in an efficient system. They do not elaborate on how they make much use of this however. Their activities predominantly consist of organising conferences and seminars where the different parties that play a role in society or in the conflict can come together. These activities are a result of the perceived influences in conflict, the identity cleavages for instance. During these activities they invite and try to involve as well track one as track two as track three actors. The respondents see the diaspora contribute to peace by performing as mediator and negotiator between the grassroots community (track three) and the government actors and other track one actors. The respondents believe that discussion and interaction between all parties should lead to more interaction between them, more knowledge about each other, and eventually, more trust between the members of the different communities. This will diminish the conflict and eventually lead to a more inclusive society. Noteworthy however is that none of the diaspora can give an elaborated explanation about the way in which they see the diaspora function as actor that mediates in peacebuilding between these actors. Their input remains limited to facilitating the events where the different track actors can meet and interact. The effect of this is thus unclear because although the diaspora facilitates that the communities come together and thus create more cohesion amongst the Ethiopians, they still have problems with implementing concrete peacebuilding activities. In contrast to their Somali counterparts the Ethiopian diaspora does not explicitly aim to involve or support the local track two actors to increase their efforts to bring the different communities together. The historical function of these community leaders might explain this. In Somalia these persons always used to fulfil the role as bridging actor between communities as there were always different clans and tribes. In Ethiopia these differences were created by the government and therefore there are no such historical functions for community leaders.

To mention briefly, economic problems and inequality are seen as important factors in the conflicts too. The respondents have no specific actions to target these economic problems directly but respondent 4 has high hopes for the voluntary returns of wealthy Ethiopian diaspora that stimulate the local economies. The attachment to the homeland is thus seen as an important asset for the intrinsic motivation to do something back. In addition to that, organising trainings and providing education to give people the baggage to develop themselves must counter the economic inequalities and lack of development and at the same time contribute to social cohesion and inclusion. Moreover, the educational efforts are also used for creation more cohesion but then through the reintegrating of ex-militia in society and sharing their experiences with those of the grieved people with the hope to create mutual understanding and acceptance. This will be the first step towards reconciliation then.

Collaboration The carrying capacity of the Ethiopian society and the development actors that do want to work on peacebuilding is not sufficient to have influence. In addition to that the government of Ethiopia is very restrictive in her policy regarding peacebuilding practices. This lack of capacity and the fear of naming activities as peacebuilding make that grassroots mobilization in Ethiopia as a peacebuilding practice is practically very hard to implement. The respondents keep mentioning the wrong policies and repressive measures of the government as opposing their actions. This, as we will see, shows similarities with the Eritrean diaspora and the problems with their government. Against the government however the Ethiopians do not have concrete initiatives, no political activities and no demonstrations. It seems that they try to keep the government on their side.

In line with what is mentioned in chapter 3, the (Ethiopian) NGOs (or Dutch, or other international) could work more efficiently when cooperating with the Ethiopian diaspora because of the diaspora-specific inputs according to Pouligny. This might also work the other way around since the diaspora organisations could use any form of support because they claim to lack the capacity to be as influential and effective as they want to be. Both respondent 3 and 8 speak about their partner NGOs in Ethiopia and explain that these organisations predominantly provide the diaspora organisation with information about events in Ethiopia. Remarkable is that they could not tell what this cooperation further compromises. Respondent 4 already mentioned to cooperate with parties that are seen as enemies by many Ethiopians. The occasional projects in the Netherlands have led to short collaborations but not to structural partnerships. There is thus only little collaboration with other non-diaspora parties for the Ethiopian diaspora organisations. Nevertheless, even when collaborating with NGO's and other actors the activities will be predominantly limited to non-peacebuilding activities because of the Ethiopian policy and the lack of capacity. This thus explains the, in my opinion, limited range of activities, such as conferences and seminars, that the diaspora implement in both the host as the home country. The respondents try to get together, work together and help each other and hence they show that they try to unite the diaspora in the host country. If it is possible to achieve this in the diaspora, that is ought to increase the conflict and maintain the past grievances and hatreds, then it should definitely be possible in the home-country one would say. However, the diaspora does not have to face and suffer the everyday problems, conflicts and hardships that the people in Ethiopia have. They still lack capacity in as well personnel, finances and support and thus the diaspora organisations are not able to implement all their plans. If they encounter these capacity problems in the Netherlands already then it is not unthinkable that their Ethiopian partners, that have to work in a less developed and more repressing environment, experience the same problems.

MAIN CAUSES OF CONFLICT AND DIASPORA
IDENTIFICATION WITH THE HOME COUNTRY

This part discusses what the Eritrean respondents perceive as the causes of the conflicts in Eritrea. Unlike Somalia and Ethiopia the conflicts in Eritrea do not occur mainly because of cleavages between identity groups but because of government repression. Therefore we can expect the diaspora to identify themselves in a different way with or against their country than the diaspora in the preceding chapters did. The next part shows that the three respondents do all agree on what they perceive as the main causes of conflict and also identify themselves in a similar way to their home country and the people of Eritrea.

1.1 CAUSES OF CONFLICT

All the Eritrean respondents agree about what they see as the cause of the contemporary conflict in Eritrea. Since Eritrea became independent in 1991 the regime did not do anything to develop the country in a decent and civilized way they say. This regime is in power already since the first moment of independence and it rules the country in a repressive way. Respondent 1 mentions for instance the lack of personal freedom, democracy, a constitution and political participation that the people of Eritrea have to deal with. This is also the most important reason for the resistance against the government respondent 2 agrees. He adds that the developments in the field of economics, education, humanitarian aspects or healthcare are completely stopped. In addition to that, the president in Eritrea has got absolute power and refuses to share his power, thus he is a dictator. Respondent 9 also acknowledges this and explains that through this absolute power in every aspect of the state the boundaries between the private and the public role of the government authorities is blurred, or even worse, completely gone, because the dictator that is in charge of this regime decides everything. All respondents thus agree that the dictatorial and repressive regime is the main reason for the failed status of Eritrea as a state and the conflicts that are a result of that.

Because of this many people fled the country as they were afraid to suffer violence and other humanitarian problems because there is no care for their human rights and personal freedom. Hence many Eritreans leave the country whenever they have the possibility to do so respondent 2 says. Within the country the regime sees anyone with a different view than the government as enemies of the state. People are thus not demonstrating against the regime because the regime will suppress it violently. People are arrested because of their political opinions or religious views, freedom of speech does not exist in Eritrea and there is no free press and journalism. This has influence on the activities the Eritrean diaspora implements as we will see further along the chapter. Because the government is an important part of the problem most activities will address the government instead of internal cleavages like in the case of Ethiopia and Somalia. Respondent 1 and 2 add to this that not only within Eritrea where the dictator is repressive, also within the region surrounding Eritrea the dictator is acting like he is in charge. Therefore Eritrea is in constant conflict with its neighbouring countries because of this regime. Respondent 2 concludes by mentioning that, according to him, the president thrives on conflict, as well within as outside Eritrea. In contrast to Somalia and Ethiopia

there are practically no identity- or local community based conflicts within Eritrea because the people have more severe problems to cope with respondent 2 thinks.

1.2 DIASPORA IDENTIFICATION

None of the respondents identifies himself with one particular community, identity group or ethnic group. Respondent 1 wants to contribute to Eritrea and all Eritreans hence he believes that it is necessary to be inclusive towards everyone. Nonetheless he mentions that everyone in Eritrea has got his or her roots connected to a clan with specific traditions, uses and histories but the clan culture is, compared to Somalia for example, not that influential and important and there is, as mentioned in the preceding part, not much conflict between clans or local communities. This however is his personal opinion and in reality he claims, many people still feel committed to their respective clan because of those traditions and shared history. This is a bit contrasting with what respondent 2 mentioned before but probably he means that as a part of all conflicts and problems in Eritrea, the ethnic differences play a relatively little role. Thus inclusivity is an aspect that is promoted by the respondents. Respondent 9 emphasises this by saying that *"I feel that I belong to the country and all country men are my compatriots"*. This corresponds with the theory about the shared sense of belonging to one's home country, even when that person is not physically in the home country. All respondents explicitly claim that they maintain the connectedness and identification with Eritrea whilst being in the Netherlands. The respondents thus clearly derive some sense of loss with regard to the home country since they have left it. They regret that they were not able to do something for their country when they were there and they rather did not leave the country. By maintaining the identification with Eritrea the respondents confirm the deterritorialization of their identities. At the same time they confirm what Brubaker mentioned as an important aspect for diasporas, namely the shared political claims to and demarcations of the homeland, Eritrea in this case, from which the respondents as diaspora derive their identity. They explicitly maintain emotionally attached to the state Eritrea. This maintained connection with the homeland however is for Collier and Hoeffler an important reason and explanation for the conflict intensifying efforts diaspora ought to have according to them. This strong and explicit attachment to Eritrea adds to the grievances diaspora possibly experience because of their sense of loss, displacement from the home country and the loss of family and friends.

Respondent 1 briefly mentions diaspora members who identify themselves in another way with Eritrea. The respondent identifies himself with the other people from all over Eritrea that collaborate for a more democratic and free Eritrea. As democracy and freedom are rights for everyone there is no such thing as local identity or regional clan identities that play a role in this. He is afraid for the people that are opposed to this because there are people in the Eritrean diaspora that identify themselves with the ruling regime and through support this regime they thus contribute to the conflict and problems in Eritrea he believes. The diaspora in that way intensifies the conflict or maintains the situation in Eritrea because of their support for the ruling regime. However, what the respondents do not mention or do not touch upon is the reason for migrating away from Eritrea for these persons. The respondents clearly fled Eritrea because of their opposition towards the government. The persons that are supporting the regime should have nothing to fear from it and therefore they do not have to flee on political ground. But we have to take in mind that they might have other reasons to migrate, a study or employment abroad for instance. Another possibility is that these people support the regime because of fear for reprisals. If this is the case then the question would be why

these persons still support the regime whilst living outside of Eritrea. One last possibility is that the people fled to other countries and, although supporting the regime, they were not satisfied with their standard of living. These diaspora members contribute to the image that many authors have about the conflict intensifying role of diaspora because through their support the parties that are seen as cause of the conflict obtain the means to continue. The respondents seem to differ from this image according to their position facing the government.

PART 2 MOTIVATIONS, CAPABILITIES AND POSSIBILITIES FOR DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT

2.1 MOTIVATIONS FOR DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT

Because Eritrea is a state where a dictatorial regime rules, decides and represses everything, the people lack rights, development and thus possibilities to change this. The Eritrean diaspora therefore can engage in different ways to address these problems. All respondents mention that the lack of development and repressiveness of the regime are the biggest problems Eritrea has to deal with. The respondents therefore want to engage in activities to help and support the country to become a stable and sustainable democracy. Because they all perceive the government as the main problem the activities thus have to address the government in any way. The next part of this chapter will describe the activities the diaspora implement to address the government. For all diaspora respondents the cause of the conflict is strongly related to their position as diaspora towards the conflict and their motivation to do something in return for their country. The previous part showed that the Eritrean regime provokes tensions and even armed conflict not only within Eritrea but also with its neighbouring countries. Respondent 9 acknowledges this and adds that he feels that he, as citizen of Eritrea, shares the plight, pain and problems of his fellow Eritreans and he therefore believes that he should do anything to curb the existing problems. Respondent 2 also believes that he needs to do something in return for his country and the only way of doing so is engaging in activities that he sees as promoting democracy and justice in Eritrea. He explains this by mentioning that he was able to get out of Eritrea alive and now that he is in the Netherlands he is experiencing freedom. There are many people that were not as lucky as he was. It seems that the respondents more or less feel compelled to do something back for the country where they came from. Still there is much emotional attachment to Eritrea and because they now live in the Netherlands they derive some sense of loss because at the moment they cannot return to Eritrea. This fits in what in the literature is described as diaspora and conflict generated diaspora that maintain their emotional connection towards the home country and thus contribute to the deterritorialization of the Eritrean identity. All respondents confirm their strong emotional connection and the need to do something to contribute in a, in their eyes, positive way to Eritrea, regardless of the physical distance to there. Grievances as a motivating factor for initiatives thus play an important role too. The idea of leaving the home country because of the regime whilst leaving people behind intensifies this. By saying that he needs to do something in return for the country respondent 2 emphasises this.

2.2 OPPORTUNITIES AND RESTRICTIONS IN THE NETHERLANDS

The respondents now live and work in the Netherlands and they all can enjoy the freedom, development and other facilities and possibilities the Netherlands offers them.

Hence can being located in the Netherlands provide different opportunities for the Eritrean diaspora organisations to plan activities or to take action. Being located far away from one's homeland however can also restrict the diaspora in taking actions, developing and implementing activities and thus can restrict the contribution to Eritrea. The regime in Eritrea on the other hand can also restrict the diaspora in implementing activities, in spite of the opportunities and the facilities for engagement in the Netherlands.

2.2.1 OPPORTUNITIES

The best reason and opportunity for engaging in activities regarding Eritrea from within the Netherlands is also strongly connected to the most severe restriction in Eritrea. Since the respondents are all active in an organisation that predominantly engages in Eritrea in a politically way it is practically impossible, and extremely dangerous, to carry out their activities in public in Eritrea. From within the Netherlands all respondents are able to carry out their activities without being afraid to get arrested or molested by government troops. Respondent 1 mentions that in the Netherlands they can enjoy freedom to do whatever they like to do without a government telling them what to do. In the Netherlands people and organisations have a place to stay, to use and to work for and from. He adds that in the Netherlands diaspora organisations are able to obtain funding, political support and contacts with people that have power to make the difference. Being located in the Netherlands thus offers possibilities for peacebuilding through as well political as economic methods and respondent 9 believe this to be the most useful for him. The next part of this chapter will go more into the actual implementations of activities.

For respondent 2 the most important opportunity is the possibility to obtain a decent education in the Netherlands. Besides that, the freedom that one enjoys in the Netherlands facilitates the creation and construction of relevant and useful networks, as well within the Netherlands as a host country (With other NGOs, political organisations and other diaspora organisations or members) as with likeminded people in or from Eritrea. Through their education and experience in the Netherlands, and because of their experiences in Eritrea, they believe to be able to help people developing and carrying out their plans and ideas. Being located in Western Europe also facilitates the network possibilities with the Eritrean diaspora in other European countries as they can contact and meet each other whenever and wherever they like. This enlarges their network and thus they have more possibilities to involve more and more people. The networks between development organisations are also very helpful for the Eritrean diaspora organisations. The Eritreans thus share the ideas regarding the network possibilities in the Netherlands with their Ethiopian and Somali counterparts. Respondent 9 mentioned that they do not directly need funding or a partnership, just support for very basic organisational issues is also extremely helpful. He is a relatively new Eritrean diaspora in the Netherlands and he just established his organisation. For doing this he got information, advice and support from Dutch development organisations. The respondents thus see many positive sides of being in the Netherlands. Through their experiences of both countries, the education they can have in the Netherlands and the network possibilities they see they believe that they can gain much support for their plans and activities.

2.2.2 RESTRICTIONS

The respondents acknowledge the amount of possibilities they have to get support, to find funding and to be advised but their main problem is successful applying for these

assets. Compared to Eritrea the Dutch system is probably very bureaucratic and the recent policy of the Dutch government regarding development aid and co-financing will not make things easier because there are only more demands and fewer possibilities to be successful in applying for funding or partnerships. Here the Eritreans share the ideas of their Ethiopian colleagues that also perceive the Dutch system as difficult to tackle. Respondent 2 is the only respondent that mentions the financial contribution his organisation receives from membership fees. The other respondents seem to depend only on these subsidies. This development scene therefore is seen as restrictive in some sense. For obtaining support there is much paperwork to do, the organisation must be organised very well and must know how to work in the Dutch system of subsidising. This costs lots and lots of time and therefore is a bit problematic for diaspora organisations that mainly work with people on a voluntary base. Respondent 1 for instance has a fulltime job and a family to take care of so it is difficult for him to make more extra efforts for the organisation. Therefore the (financial) capacity of the organisation hardly grows. This problem is however not recognised by the other actors, perhaps because their organisation is still in the establishing phase and needs to grow first. What respondent 2 and 9 both mention is the ignorance of most of the Dutch people, including the government, regarding the present situation in Eritrea. The Dutch people see such a problem as an "*imaginary fairytale or exaggerated reality*". Maybe partially because of this ignorance, respondent 2 adds, the Dutch government does not have official connections with Eritrea or an official policy regarding the country. Therefore it is even more difficult to gain government support for implementing activities there. It is however reasonable to think that the Dutch government does not have any relation with the Eritrean government exactly because of this regime.

Another point mentioned is that the diaspora that engages in activities against the regime, and that wants to return to Eritrea for vacation, work or to visit family and friends for instance, is risking to be arrested and imprisoned by the Eritrean government. Because there is no official connection from the Netherlands with Eritrea, the Dutch government cannot do anything in such a case. The diaspora is thus also restricted by the Eritrean government, although in this sense it is more because of a reasonable fear. One final possible restriction could be the distance between the Netherlands and Eritrea but none of the respondents is experiencing this as a problem or as a restriction. Respondent 1 and 2 tell that their organisations predominantly work through the internet, with forums and web pages. Respondent 1 maintains contact with the network in Eritrea through e-mail and these forums such as the www.dehai.org website. Globalisation of multimedia technology is extensively used by the Eritrean diaspora as it is one of the safest ways of communication and action for them. There is some sort of censoring that the Eritrean government tries to implement on the internet but the capacity of the government is lacking there is such a low number of slow internet connections in Eritrea so the censoring does not really work. Besides that, there are only very few websites that are based in Eritrea thus even when the government wants to censor a website they have little possibilities to do so. Here the diaspora make use of globalisation effects that provide them the possibility to be active from a distance in the field of peacebuilding. These effects facilitate the diaspora's connectedness to the homeland. Also, the diaspora shape imaginary communities online to communicate and interact with the community they identify themselves with. Probably a large number of users of the internet forums are not physically located in Eritrea but strengthen their connection to Eritrea through interactions with their community that shares a mutual sense of belonging to Eritrea. By mentioning the network possibilities, even through

Europe, the respondents confirm what is stated in the theory about this in chapter 3. Globalisation makes it easier for the diaspora to build and maintain links with people from their own community in the host country, and also the surrounding countries, and at the same time stay connected with the homeland. The diaspora from Somalia and Ethiopia mentioned internet as a means to communicate, they did not seem to make use of it as extensively as the Eritrean diaspora does.

2.2.3 DIASPORA SPECIFIC INPUT

All the respondents believe that living in the Netherlands is helpful for them for planning and implementing their activities. Because all members of their respective organisations originate in Eritrea they have a broad range of experiences and knowledge of Eritrea. This is therefore the reason why the respondents think that they will be very effective if they have the possibility to implement activities there. Yet, at the moment this is not possible and therefore all respondents limit their activities mainly to political activities as the next part will show. It might be useful for the respondents to increase their capacity first since they all claim to be limited because of this. This makes it very difficult to first, go successful through all bureaucratic demands the Dutch system requires and second, to implement larger scale activities that address the situation in Eritrea effectively. Respondent 1 claims that the diaspora members are much more concerned with the present situation in Eritrea than an outsider can possibly be. As Eritreans they have much more knowledge about the details of the past and present events and therefore can act more efficient. Because they are Eritreans they can do what non-Eritreans cannot do because of their personal motivation and concern for the home country. As Eritrean people they share the culture, uses and traditions and therefore can persuade parties such as military groups or civilian groups to take action. This is not possible for Dutch NGOs for instance. Again the respondents use the sense of loss that they feel because they are not longer in Eritrea. They claim to have more incentives for action than other parties (such as Dutch NGOs) have. They thus confirm Bigombe, Collier and Sambanis that write that diaspora want to preserve their common heritage such as their culture and traditions. By maintaining their communal identity also in the Netherlands the Eritrean diaspora can be seen as an outsider's community in the host country. This however is not the case for the respondents that all mention their full participation in the Dutch society. Their activities for Eritrea are only in their free time and still on a small scale.

Diaspora members are therefore more successful in persuading their fellow Eritreans for demonstrations and political lobbying so that they help and support developments to support freedom and an improved humanitarian situation in Eritrea respondent 1 thinks. Respondent 9 only recently arrived from Eritrea in the Netherlands and therefore his experiences of and his knowledge about the situation in Eritrea is still very fresh and intact what makes his input very useful compared to "second-hand" knowledge he thinks. The diaspora themselves believe that they can participate and implement activities in a much more inclusive way, not only because they share the culture but also because the Eritreans accept more from them and can identify more easy with fellow Eritreans than with Dutch NGOs for instance. Already mentioned briefly are the political activities in which they as diaspora are active. They see these types of actions as the best activities to contribute to peacebuilding in Eritrea.

Besides the experiences the diaspora members are assumed to have networks in the home country. This is also valid for the Eritrean diaspora and respondent 2 mentions

about this that *"we [the Eritreans] can use these networks for the activities we want to implement. Also, these networks in which we grew up, give us an advance compared to, for example, Dutch people or organisations because we know the culture, traditions, language and local communities"*. Here he refers back to the experiences and knowledge as described in the previous part. We know that the regime in Eritrea is extremely repressive and suspicious of people that might work against it. It is therefore assumable that the networks in Eritrea are far from efficient because they have to work secretly and with extreme cautiousness. If there is no freedom of speech or any other kind of personal freedom it is hard to imagine that the members in the network of the diaspora are able to have much impact on the situation in Eritrea. Unfortunately the respondents could not tell much more about this. They acknowledge that it is very difficult for their contact persons to undertake actions but they still argue that it is possible.

Another specific input that the Eritrean diaspora can have is because of the experiences they derive their host country. Respondent 9 immediately points to the freedom he is enjoying as a diaspora member in the Netherlands and respondent 1 adds to this that in the Netherlands he finally experiences what it is to be free and to live in a democracy. It can help them persuade the people in Eritrea to improve and develop their situation. The diaspora thus can use both kinds of experiences to better involve their fellow Eritreans. The respondents therefore see an advisory or informative role for the (educated) diaspora towards the people in Eritrea and for fellow Eritrean diaspora. They can use these experiences and transfer this kind of knowledge to Eritrea. In the developed countries it is also easy for diaspora to join and participate in networks with likeminded people or organisations. This is obviously not possible in Eritrea as there is no freedom to do or engage in whatever one likes to. According to respondent 2 the Eritrean diaspora hence has got more possibilities to do anything for the country than the people that are still in Eritrea can do. Again the Eritrean diaspora sees itself in the same specific way as the Ethiopian and Somali diaspora see themselves. They all believe to combine their specific experiences, networks, incentives and knowledge in order to be active as efficient as possible.

PART 3 ACTIVITIES

In the preceding part the respondents gave their view on the causes of the conflict in Eritrea, their motivation for engaging in activities to address the problems in their country and the possibilities they have as diaspora to do so. This part of the chapter will discuss the different activities the diaspora concretely plan and implement in both Eritrea and in the Netherlands. Table 4 on the next page shows the different activities the Eritrean diaspora is engaging in. Due to the repressive government it is obvious that their activities are predominantly political and address the government mostly, in contrast to the activities implemented by the Somali and Ethiopian diaspora organisations that predominantly aimed for more social inclusion and community building in the homelands.

Respondent # → Type of activity ↓	1 <i>Eri</i>	2 <i>Eri</i>	9 <i>Eri</i>
Home country			
Social inclusion/interaction			
Awareness raising	X		X
Education			
Knowledge transfer			
Vocational training			
Providing facilities			
Political actions (against government)	X	X	X
the Netherlands			
Awareness raising	X	X	X
Community building			
Mobilizing NL govern.	X	X	
Stimulating remigrat.			
Applying for funds	X	X	
Conflict intensifying	X		
Remittances	X	X	X

Table 4; activities of the Eritrean diaspora

3.1 ACTIVITIES IN THE HOME COUNTRY

From the preceding paragraphs one can conclude that it is very difficult to organise and implement any activities in Eritrea that aim at supporting and developing the Eritrean society because that would imply that the government does not do this. The diaspora see the government as the cause of the problems that thus should be removed. Obviously the government does not like that stance and therefore does support such activities. The activities are therefore predominantly implemented in a non-physical way in Eritrea, thus through the internet, via radio broadcasting and via television. The developments and globalisation effects on (digital) communication technologies are thus very important for the Eritrean diaspora. In case there are physical activities and actions taking place, these activities are carried out secretly and with great cautiousness. Respondent 2 and 9 do not even try to implement activities in Eritrea yet as they think that is too dangerous at the moment. Respondent 1 has few activities in Eritrea only this is done in secrecy with few participants. This is thus a great difference compared to the diaspora organisations from Somalia and Ethiopia who both openly implement activities in their homelands. The activities in Eritrea in table 4 therefore represent these non-physical activities.

Respondent 1 and 2 are both politically active with the aim to overthrow the ruling regime in Eritrea, predominantly through external political pressure. Their activities aim to inform and persuade their fellow Eritreans in Eritrea and in the diaspora to join them in their actions. Respondent 2 is only active in awareness raising from within the Netherlands and mainly through the internet. Being active online is the preferred and most used way of engaging in activities for many members of the Eritrean diaspora. Respondent 1 mentions that his organisation has members in Eritrea that keep the diaspora up-to-date and implement small scale and local activities such as meetings where anti-government people meet and discuss what they might do to overthrow the government. Just as the Somali and Ethiopian diaspora the Eritreans are involved in

facilitating the possibilities for the people to meet. However, the aim and intentions of the Eritrean meetings are completely different as there is no aim to bridge cleavages in society or to create more inclusion. Until now this is not very effective as they have to be on their guard all the time and obviously cannot work freely. The other types of activities respondent 1 mentioned, through radio and television, are neither implemented from within Eritrea because the state also controls these. There is one media source of the organisation in Ethiopia, very close to the Eritrean border from where the organisation of respondent 1 is broadcasting radio shows and sometimes television programs where they send messages to politically involve people and to do awareness raising projects. These awareness raising projects aim at informing the Eritreans what the government is doing to them, what they can do to improve their living conditions and why they should join the movement against the Eritrean government. It is thus also used to recruit support.

The diaspora organisations thus do not have very concrete projects to address the problems and to engage in peacebuilding in Eritrea because of their restrictions and the dangers of doing so. This strongly relates with what the respondents perceive as the cause of the conflict and this is consequently the main reason for these organisations to be active anywhere over the world but in Eritrea. In Eritrea it is very difficult or practically impossible to make use of the second and third track actors to improve the situation or influence the situation towards their preferences and therefore there are no activities similar to what the Somali and the Ethiopian organisations implement. The repressive regime and the people's fear for sanctions limit the possibilities of possible track two actors such as community leaders or religious leaders. The logical result is that the activities are predominantly carried out in and from other countries. This is a major difference compared to the activities that are implemented by the Somali and Ethiopian diaspora organisations in their respective home countries. These two countries also suffer problems but at least it is possible for them to organise any form of activity in the home country where track two actors are involved. In Eritrea there is no chance for these actors to have any influence.

3.2 ACTIVITIES IN THE NETHERLANDS OR AIMED AT THE NETHERLANDS

The preceding part already explained the difficulties and dangers that keep the diaspora organisations from engaging in activities in Eritrea. The activities are predominantly organised outside Eritrea but still aim to have effect in Eritrea or on the Eritrean society. The respondents also speak about initiatives that aim at the Dutch society and the Eritreans in Dutch society. In the Netherlands the organisations have many different activities that not only address the problems in Eritrea but that also need to inform and create support from both the host country's people as the Eritrean diaspora. We therefore can distinguish the activities in the Netherlands in general between political and lobby activities, awareness raising projects, economic support and military support and these are shown in table 4.

3.2.1 POLITICAL INITIATIVES

The first type of activities, the political and lobbying initiatives, are the most important type of activities for respondent 1 and 2 and these activities directly address what they perceive as the cause of the conflict. In the Netherlands these activities of respondent 1 mainly aim to gain funds and political support from the Dutch government. This support should lead to measures against the Eritrean government so that it becomes limited in its capabilities. An example of this was a lobby initiative at the Dutch ministry of foreign affairs which aimed to reach two objectives. The first objective was to promote their

case, thus their plea for development, security, democracy and freedom in Eritrea, and to gain funding for projects and activities they wanted to implement, such as awareness raising conferences and informational events. The second objective for them to contact the Dutch government was to inform it about the present situation in Eritrea and to make the Dutch government take action against this situation in Eritrea and to plea for international pressure on the Eritrean government. This is difficult because the Eritrean regime refuses international aid and involvement, therefore many European governments, including the Dutch, has practically no policy towards Eritrea. They also asked for governmental support to prevent that Eritreans in the Netherlands keep supporting the dictatorial regime. To be more persuading in doing this they collaborate with other Eritrean organisations that all have the same goal; to work against the dictatorship, to try to overthrow it and to install a democratic government. The organisation of respondent 2 was also involved in this. Not all of these collaborating parties are having political ambitions however, but nonetheless they participate because they share the same thoughts regarding the Eritrean government. They just want a change of regime so that they can safely go to Eritrea again.

Respondent 2 gives two examples of successes of these lobbying activities in which his organisation was involved. First he mentions the travel restrictions and weapon embargoes that are put upon the Eritrean regime by the European Commission after extensive lobbying of the Eritrean diaspora organisations. Secondly he mentions the freezing of the assets and finances of the Eritrean leader in European countries so that the Eritrean leaders are limited in their financial capabilities. For these efforts the diaspora organisations thus cooperate with international track one actors to address the problems in their home country. Even though they cannot actively implement activities in Eritrea they are convinced that the actions of the track one actors contribute to peacebuilding in Eritrea because the regime becomes limited in its resources and capabilities. The role of the diaspora organisations can be seen as a lobbying actor or as a whistleblower to demarcate the problems in the home country. The foreign government however is no mediator in this case as it does not try to bring conflicting parties together, the foreign government has a one-way implementation of actions towards the Eritrean government. In addition to that, the diaspora only aim at these track one actors as they are assumed to be the most influential and the best capable of taking actions in or towards Eritrea compared to other actors such as track two or track three actors.

Other activities mentioned by all respondents are conferences and demonstrations against the Eritrean dictator and to gain attention for the Eritrean case. With these conferences and demonstrations they aim to influence the other Eritreans in the Netherlands and raise awareness of what the organisations do, to persuade them to participate in the campaigns and to contribute to the development of the home country. These activities that are carried out in the Netherlands can be seen as grassroots mobilization activities because these activities include issues such as informative conferences and awareness raising programs. These activities have to lead to more involvement and possible mobilisation of their fellow Eritrean diaspora members. The demonstrations and conferences however also address the European governments and the international European institutes to persuade them to not support the Eritrean regime and to pay attention to the repressions in Eritrea. In addition to this the diaspora organisations invite the Dutch track one and track two actors such as the Dutch government and NGOs. Firstly these actors are invited to be informed about the situation and the diaspora's plans, but secondly, and more important, the diaspora try to involve

these actors in their initiatives or the diaspora organisations try to gain support from these actors.

3.2.2 CONFLICT INTENSIFYING ACTIVITIES

The last type of activities that is briefly mentioned by respondent 1 is not only extremely interesting but also particularly influential in the conflict. Respondent 1 tells that his organisation is involved in financial support for armed groups that fight against the government and the governmental troops. The finances are sent to these groups to support them in recruiting people, to obtain arms and other activities that fight the government. This is an obvious example of diaspora influences that maintain, or even increase, the violence in Eritrea. Respondent 1 explains this type of support for violence by saying that it is necessary to do so. Unfortunately he refuses to give more detail about this or to explain this any further. The conflict intensifying support is mainly through remittances that are sent but there are occasional Eritrean diaspora members that return to their country of origin to join these resistance groups. This once more shows that the conflict in Eritrea can be seen as an internal conflict between opponents and supporters of the regime. There is not so much a conflict between states but between movements that are supported by armed groups and each have different supporting parties behind them. Respondent 1 adds that the support of these types of organisations is something only the diaspora members can do because of the links with the home country, the shared values and the emotional motivation to help the home country. Furthermore the diaspora personally know and trust people in Eritrea. By saying this, the respondent is aware of the fact that these activities are directly increasing the conflict in Eritrea. Respondent 1 in this case thus uses economic support to contribute to conflict intensifying activities what confirms the theory of Collier and Hoeffler.

The overall Eritrean diaspora is a relatively large group (compared to the country's number of citizens). Collier and Hoeffler showed a strong connection between a large diaspora community and a greater risk of (repeated) conflict. They explain this by pointing to the feelings of belonging to the country of origin for the diaspora. This is exactly the motivation that the diaspora used for explaining their involvement in Eritrea. And moreover, the diaspora seem to participate in what Demmers described as 'virtual conflicts' because the diaspora participate in the violence from a distance, without being physically involved. Because the respondent is convinced that the government is the problem in Eritrea he justifies armed combat as a practice for peacebuilding because he is convinced that once the government is overthrow, whether this is done diplomatically or military, peace will return to Eritrea. The other respondents stay with their non-violent actions they say. Yet, they admit sending remittances to family and friends but also to supportive groups that have the same objectives, about their means however they do not elaborate.

3.3 OTHER ACTORS

The preceding part describes some of the most important activities of the Eritrean diaspora organisations in the Netherlands. What all respondents add is that they wished they could do more and that they could be more effective but that they lack the capacity to do so. Remarkable is that the respondents of the Eritrean diaspora spoken to practically only work in and from within the Netherlands. Within the Netherlands there are 6 similar Eritrean organisations respondent 1 says and there is mutual collaboration. There is not yet any cooperation with Dutch NGOs. The organisations of all respondents want to collaborate with Dutch NGOs and also apply for support and funding but at the

moment they lack the capacity to do this. Respondent 2 says that although they lack capacity for official applications for funding, they keep informing the Dutch NGOs about their activities, the results and their plans, just to create involvement and to make the Dutch NGOs familiar with the organisation and its activities. There is thus only collaboration between the Eritrean diaspora organisations in the Netherlands. Together they implement activities such as lobbying at the Dutch government. The diaspora organisations thus aim at the Dutch (but also European) track one actors for their lobbying activities but not (yet) to establish structural partnerships. The same goes for collaborations with Dutch track two actors such as NGOs. There are no structural partnerships or collaborations (yet) because of the lack of capacity they have.

About the Eritrean organisations respondent 2 mentions as a final remark that there are many small organisations, maybe 20 of them are really active but only six of these organisations have more than four members. This indicates the scale of the Eritrean diaspora organisations. Remarkable is that respondent 2 does cooperate with a non-Eritrean partner, namely DIR, an Ethiopian NGO that aims at fighting poverty, peacebuilding and supporting vulnerable groups. This cooperation can be seen by many Eritreans as questionable when taking into account the violent history between these two countries. This however is no problem for both organisations as they can support each other as partners respondent 2 says. About the activities they implement as partners the respondent did not elaborate.

PART 4 DIASPORA EFFECTS ON PEACEBUILDING

All respondents see the role of the Eritrean diaspora in the Netherlands as a potentially positive one but it needs to increase in capacity and it needs to grow to become really effective. Besides that there are still many people that support the regime. There is a lot that can be achieved by the diaspora from the Netherlands but then the diaspora organisations think they need to be supported more by the Dutch CSOs and the government because at this moment they lack the capacity for concrete and efficient actions. With more support respondent 1 believes that their activities to persuade fellow Eritreans to support them become more efficient because their lobbying campaigns can be improved and they possibly could increase the number of awareness raising events. The Eritrean diaspora organisations have thus the same ideas about their potential as the Somali and Ethiopian diaspora organisations. They also share the relative inefficiency due to the lack of capacity they have. The diaspora is very important respondent 2 says, but it is necessary to look at whose side one is. The opposition against the regime is growing, also in the Netherlands, and this is a sign that the diaspora is doing a good job he says. The negative role of diaspora is therefore declining but there is still much uncertainty and mistrust amongst the diaspora. Here the diaspora organisations, at least respondent 1, see the support to armed forces not as a negative role of the diaspora. They see this support contribute to their higher aim, overthrowing the government. Every action that aims for this is in their (his) eyes a positive contribution. It is arguable however that these efforts are actually not contributing to the development of the country or to a change in the government's attitude because the government will try to stay in power by countering the violence of these groups. It is thus possible that these actions have the opposite effect than the intended effect it is supposed to have. The effect of the diaspora's actions can therefore contribute to the conflict as well they contribute to peacebuilding in Eritrea. The same goes for remittances that the diaspora send back to Eritrea. All respondents speak about the remittances as a great and useful source of

support for many Eritreans. There are unfortunately many diaspora that still support the Eritrean government and government supporting parties through these remittances respondent 1 and 2 say. The remittances are thus not only used for personal consumption but also to support the political and military activities. One of the unofficial laws that the Eritrean regime made was a "diaspora tax", which meant that every member of the Eritrean diaspora should send a monthly 2% income tax as remittance to Eritrea to support the government in "ruling and developing the country". Respondent 2 thinks that there are still too many Eritreans who pay this tax and thus support and strengthen the regime. With the awareness raising programs respondent 2 wants to inform and persuade his fellow Eritrean diaspora to stop paying these taxes as they maintain the conflict in their home country. The people that send these types of remittances can in this context be seen as the so-called *exploiters* of the conflict because they send back these remittances that are used to finance the conflict, what eventually intensifies the conflict.

Mentioned briefly are mistrust and fear for fellow Eritreans. This is very present in Eritrea because people do not know who might be supporting the regime and thus betray diaspora who are not. People hence are afraid to give their honest opinion because they want to go back to Eritrea sometimes, to visit family and friends for instance. Many Eritreans are afraid to do anything because of this fear of the government. The Eritrean opposition actually exists but it only exists and is active from outside Eritrea because the government would arrest anyone that has other opinions than the government. A problem is that the great mistrust amongst Eritreans will make it difficult to have a new accepted government since the present governments did only little for the people. A new government thus needs to gain trust from the population whilst the people need to find their trust in each other again.

PART 5 CONCLUDING REMARKS

This part of the chapter briefly summarizes the respondents' initiatives for engagement in activities in Eritrea and approaches towards peacebuilding and partially concludes on the role they have or try to fulfil in peacebuilding in Eritrea whilst living in the Netherlands.

Identification and motivation Just as the diasporas from Ethiopia and Somalia do the Eritreans see themselves as important actors to contribute to peacebuilding in their home country. They also share the same way of identifying themselves with their home country. In contrast to Somalia and Ethiopia the Eritreans have no identity based conflict in their home country. They all aim to address the problems that their fellow Eritreans, with who they identify themselves, suffer. All Eritrean respondents clearly suffer to a certain extent a 'sense of loss' because they still feel connected to their home country and they want to contribute in any way, thus they share the features that characterize diasporas. Because of the repressive government and their opposing (political) views they are at the moment unable to return to their country. The respondents confirm what Pouligny says about wars; they destroy much more than just material things. The country now is divided between parties, there is no economic development and there is a great lack of trust amongst the Eritrean (diaspora). But although all respondents claim to promote inclusiveness amongst its followers, the respondents do not include the government and its supporters. Complete inclusiveness is therefore questionable. An explanation might be that the respondents have to choose sides and see the government as main cause. The Eritrean diaspora seem to have quite a good reason (the repression and dictatorial rule) for their actions and their stance opposing the government.

Just like the diaspora from Somalia and Ethiopia the Eritrean diaspora feels more or less compelled to do something in return for the country. The Eritreans believe that they have an advantage compared to Dutch NGOs and other actors to participate in and contribute to peacebuilding in Eritrea because of the combination of experiences, networks and knowledge they have from both the host as the home country. This notion is shared by the diaspora from the three countries; they all believe to have an added value compared to other actors so that they can organise and implement their activities more efficiently. Still it remains difficult for the Eritreans to implement anything in their home country because the members in their network cannot work in freedom and therefore their effectiveness is doubtful. This definitely has its effects on the concrete activities the diaspora undertake in or for Eritrea.

In the field of peacebuilding it is clear that it is very difficult for international track one actors to engage in activities in Eritrea. On the one hand this is due to the lack of international relations between the Netherlands and Eritrea and the attitude of the Eritrean regime towards the international world (and even towards its direct neighbours). On the other hand the situation within the country does not leave any space for international organisations to work on peacebuilding because it is simply denied by the government of Eritrea. They are not allowed to call their activities peacebuilding because that would mean that the government does not do her job in the right way. Engagement of track one and two actors from *outside* Eritrea can be used as a diplomatic instrument to pressure the government.

Activities The Eritrean diaspora organisations in the Netherlands see the present regime as the main cause of the conflict in Eritrea and consequently they are active against the Eritrean regime. The respondents share the same goal, a free and developing Eritrea, but have a bit of a different focus in their actual activities. The activities are roughly divided in political and economic activities but the emphasis is on the political activities. These activities mainly take place in the Netherlands and not in Eritrea as it is too dangerous to do so. The activities thus differ to a certain extent from the activities implemented by the Ethiopian and Somali organisations that organise conference and social activities and provide facilities in the respective countries. The political situation in Eritrea is the main reason for that.

The political activities implemented mainly include lobbying, demonstrating and awareness/support raising through conferences. The awareness raising campaigns need to inform the Dutch people through meetings and conferences about the situation in Eritrea, but also aim to persuade fellow diaspora to join and contribute in the actions against the regime, to support the diaspora and eventually participate in the organisations. According to the respondents many share their ideas but there are also many Eritreans that support the regime. The awareness raising campaigns and the demonstrations also target these people and persuade them to stop that support. The organisations in this case function as a track two actor that tries to mobilise and inform the local level actors in the host country in the activities that have to lead to peace. This is similar to the awareness raising activities of their Somali and Ethiopian counterparts who also try to persuade and involve likeminded diaspora members although they try to gain support for their social inclusion activities. The political lobbying efforts predominantly aim to generate both political as financial support from Dutch development and governmental actors and aim to pressure the government with this support. Through the lobbying activities the diaspora organisations thus also try to involve and mobilize international track one actors to address the situation in Eritrea by

pressuring or restricting the Eritrean government for example. With the financial support from these actors the organisations hope to be able to improve their lobbying capacity and increase the number of conferences and awareness raising campaigns so that they can extend their reach. Because of the lack of possibilities for physical activities and meetings in Eritrea the online diaspora is very important for the grassroots mobilization and lobbying activities. The influence of the internet seems to be more important for the Eritreans than for the Somali and Ethiopian diaspora.

The respondents see remittances as an important source of income for the people in Eritrea. Because one of the respondents admits to support military groups that fight against the government he confirms the prejudices and theories of many authors that wrote about the conflict intensifying role of diaspora in conflict. Also, by supporting and financing armed groups the diaspora fit in the theory about the "new wars" that not only stated that these new wars are not that much between states but between identities and ideologies, over power and resources and also more and more involve hired militia that just fights for the side that pays most. This kind of support also confirms Collier and Hoeffler, who see the diaspora as an important contributor to the conflict. The non-physical involvement because of the distance to Eritrea can possibly lessen the threshold to contribute in such a way. Since the diaspora chooses the side against their own government it is an internal conflict between supporters of ways of thought and ideologies. It is easy to see these activities as conflict intensifying but it is clear that the diaspora does not share this notion. The diaspora actually acknowledge that stopping the violence is an important aspect of peacebuilding but they argue that this 'temporary' violence it is necessary to create conditions which will allow peace to endure, thus overthrowing the government. Remarkable is that this type of activity is not mentioned by the respondents from the other countries. Because of the extreme cleavages there one could expect these diasporas to support their own identity group in a similar way.

Collaboration We see that there are only few collaborators that the diaspora organisations have. The collaborations with the parties from the host country remain limited to informative events and applications for funding. Furthermore they primarily involve themselves in political activities to persuade the track one actors in the host country. This however is not much of collaboration, it is a request. Also their collaborations with other parties, in this case mainly other Eritrean organisations, are politically aimed and not so much for humanitarian aid or development. The diaspora would like to cooperate with other parties to increase their effectiveness. For instance they would like to cooperate with the track two actors such as Dutch NGOs but also with NGOs in Eritrea. As Pouligny argued; many NGOs often lack the local level knowledge and capacity to address the local level sufficiently engage on local level peacebuilding. The Eritrean diaspora says that they can provide the NGOs (and other parties) with local level contacts and knowledge thus collaboration with NGOs seems to be very useful. The regime however does not allow NGOs to engage in activities that make the government look as if it lacks to provide that what the NGOs provide through their activities. Here the Eritreans face the similar problem as their Ethiopian counterparts because of the restrictions the NGOs face. By mentioning that they try to gain support from local communities for their activities, and their efforts to work or cooperate on the first track level they thus skip the second track actors. This possibly can be explained with the type of regime in Eritrea. There is no such thing as a public second track that is opposing the regime because that is forbidden and heavily opposed by the government.

This chapter concludes the research by first, answering the different sub-questions that are stated in chapter 1. Subsequently this chapter answers the research question.

THE AFRICAN DIASPORA

The first sub-question asked: *what is the African diaspora?* The literature study in chapter 3 shows that diaspora communities are commonly described as groups of people that live outside their country of origin and through the inability to return they derive a 'sense of loss' because they still are emotionally attached and bonded to that country. In the same chapter the African Union includes "*every people (person) of African origin living outside the continent that is willing to contribute to the development of the continent, is member of the African diaspora*". The diaspora members that provided the data for this research can all be seen as conflict generated diaspora that had to leave their home country in search for security. The Somali and Ethiopian diaspora have in common that they both left the home country because of the severe identity and ideology conflicts on each level of the society. In both states a failing government failed to provide security and equal distribution of the resources hence many people chose to leave. The Eritrean diaspora did not suffer identity based conflicts but a severely repressive regime that controls and restricts everyone in society. There is thus no democracy, no personal freedom and no development in Eritrea because of this government.

What all respondents have in common is that they all maintain their emotional attachment to their homeland and they strongly derive a sense of loss because they now live in the Netherlands. Although they create their homes away from home in the host countries, they still want to contribute to their homeland, they still identify themselves with the people in their homeland and they want to do anything within their reach to contribute to positive development of their homelands. The African diaspora in this thesis thus originates from the Horn of Africa and is established mainly because of the intense internal conflicts between ethnic and ideological communities and due to failing government policies. Hence the people that had the opportunity to leave the country did so. Therefore they are the African diaspora because of their maintained attachment to their home countries, their identification with these countries and its peoples and their efforts to contribute to the home countries.

DIASPORA IDENTIFICATION AND SPECIFIC INPUT

The second and third sub-questions asked how the diaspora in the Netherlands identifies itself with the conflict and their home country and what they believe they specifically could provide that is missing in support and development aid from other actors. We see that the diaspora members from all three countries of research remain strongly connected with their home countries. They all still feel attached to their homelands which they continue to perceive as their real and true home where they belong. They are aware of the internal cleavages in the countries that lead to conflicts and therefore identify themselves on a national scale with the country so that they do not choose sides and thus not exclude communities, although they have their roots and identity still connected to the local community where they originate from. Deterritorialization of the identities is therefore applicable on all three diaspora communities. The diaspora members explicitly

identify themselves with all people from their country as they do not want to participate in the clan and identity based conflicts, in the case of Somalia and Ethiopia, and because they want to contribute to their country and are only opposed to the government, in the case of Eritrea. The Eritrean community claims to identify with the whole Eritrean society, however, people that are on the government's side are excluded by them because they see the government and its supporters as the main cause of all conflicts and societal problems in Eritrea. The Somali and Ethiopian diaspora have in common that their activities aim on social inclusion and community building in the broader society, thus the diaspora organisations see themselves as bridging actor between the local communities but also between the local communities and track one and two actors. The Somali diaspora however, is more limited in this because the country lacks a government and thus a stable track one actor. An inclusive stance towards all identities and ethnic communities is necessary to function in the role as bridging actor. This is the role that all diaspora think they should play in their countries of origin. Their means to do so are different however.

The diasporas give themselves this role because they see specific inputs and roles that they (can) have and that other, non-diaspora, actors cannot have or fulfil. The diaspora organisations of Somalia and Ethiopia try to act as an actor that bridges the gap between (local) communities, community leaders, governmental actors, (I)NGOs and the diaspora and they believe to be the best party to do so because of their shared cultural identity and eagerness to contribute to the development of their respective countries. Other actors cannot engage in activities with these local actors in a similar way and therefore the local initiatives of foreign actors are less efficient. All respondents share the view that diaspora members can work more efficiently and effectively than the non-diaspora organisations in their countries of origin. Their anticipated reason for this is because they know the people and the local communities. They thus know where to go, who to speak, how to access local networks and how to interact with the respective community. The diaspora can do this because they share the same culture that includes factors such as a shared history, a shared national identity and the same language. Because of these shared values the diaspora believe that the people in their respective countries will be more prone to collaborate with them and to accept their support compared to the support offered by foreign NGOs or governments. The diasporas do not take into account the possibility that they are perceived as weak people who left the country when it became difficult or dangerous.

In addition to that, they derive knowledge and experiences from the host countries what gives them another advantage compared to local actors because they learn to frame the conflict and possible solutions from a distant and different point of view. They can use the additional knowledge and experiences from a distance through the communication possibilities globalisation effects facilitate. The diasporas believe that they are very useful partners for the host country's government because they are complementary in the field of development work. They put these abilities to a use in the different activities that the diaspora organisations implement in their countries of origin, whilst being located in the Netherlands. Pouligny wrote about NGOs that these organisations often have difficulties taking into account the local knowledge and resources as major inputs in rebuilding strategies and it is obvious that diaspora can fulfil this role and probably will be eager to do so as they maintained their attachment to the country from where they originate.

ACTIVITIES

The next sub-question aims to describe the activities the African diaspora engages in to have social, political or economic influence on peacebuilding developments in their countries of origin. There is a broad range of activities where the different diasporas engage in. Table 5 on the next page lists the different activities in which the different diaspora members are engaging themselves in. The activities are divided between activities in the home country and activities in the Netherlands. Table 5 shows that the Ethiopian and Somali diaspora generally share the same activities that aim to influence peacebuilding in their home countries. This is the result of their respective analyses of the conflict in their home country and consequently their identification with the home country.

Respondent # → Type of activity ↓	1 <i>Eri</i>	2 <i>Eri</i>	9 <i>Eri</i>	3 <i>Eth</i>	4 <i>Eth</i>	8 <i>Eth</i>	5 <i>Som</i>	6 <i>Som</i>	7 <i>Som</i>
Home country									
Social inclusion/interaction				X	X	X	X	X	X
Awareness raising	X		X	X		X		X	X
Education					X			X	X
Knowledge transfer				X			X	X	X
Vocational training							X		X
Providing facilities							X	X	
Political actions (against government)	X	X	X						
the Netherlands									
Awareness raising	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X
Community building					X	X	X	X	X
Mobilizing NL govern.	X	X					X	X	X
Stimulating remigrat.					X			X	X
Applying for funds	X	X		X			X	X	X
Conflict intensifying	X								
Remittances	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

Table 5; The different activities the African diaspora engages in

In Somalia and Ethiopia the diaspora tries, intended or not, to fulfil the role of track two actor for peacebuilding in their homelands. Because they perceive the internal cleavages as important for the conflicts the diasporas want to contribute to more social inclusion and mutual interaction between the different communities. They believe that the divisions between clans and identity groups contribute to the continuation of the conflicts because people from the different groups do not know and trust each other. Therefore there is almost no interaction, the different groups exclude each other and claim power in territories. This always goes at the cost of another group what in turn lead to tensions. To address this they organise conferences and seminars where people can meet, discuss and learn from and about each other in order to create more mutual trust. The respondents believe that this eventually will diminish the incentives for conflict because more mutual understanding and trust lessens the internal cleavages that intensify the conflicts. This means that by functioning as a bridging actor between the different communities, the different levels in society and acting inclusive towards all actors, the diasporas can be seen as the track two peacebuilding actors that are engaging in activities that aim to support the grassroot level, but also to mobilize the grassroot level actors to take action themselves. Besides that the diaspora tries to involve the existing

track two actors such as community and religious leaders so that they will use their influence to support and mobilize their communities. Table 5 shows that the diaspora organisations also try to strengthen the diaspora community in the Netherlands through their activities.

The Somali diaspora locally engages in community development projects that aim at improving the living circumstances of the people in the smaller communities through providing physical facilities for educational or medical purposes. These educational facilities are also used for vocational trainings. These trainings indirectly contribute to economic development. The Somali diaspora organisations thus acknowledge the importance of the local (track two) actors that are necessary in the peacebuilding processes and at the same time they function as the track two actor and try to support and bridge the gaps between the different grassroots level (track three) communities and thus have an intermediary function. The Somali respondents did not mention political activities as important for them and thus focus on the humanitarian circumstances only. This little political activity might have to do with the lack of official and governmental power of the TFG and with the enormously fractured society that is not very open and hospitable for political lobbying because of all their different claims on territory and power. There are thus hardly any political actors to collaborate with and therefore involvement of national track one actors is on a low level because it is very difficult to involve them. However, in the Netherlands they try to mobilize the Dutch government to create a policy regarding Somalia because there is none. The Eritrean diaspora does the same.

The Ethiopians in the Netherlands are engaging in similar activities as their Somali counterparts but unlike the Somali it tries to actively involve the Ethiopian governmental actors in these projects. Although the government is not always seen as the best partner for developing activities, it is seen by the Ethiopian diaspora as an important actor to include because it is the government and because it has the power to change things in society. The Ethiopian diaspora tries to put itself in the role of track two actor that has an intermediary function between actors from the first and third track. The Somali and Ethiopian diaspora share the belief that discussion and interaction between all parties should lead to more interaction between them, more knowledge about each other, and eventually, more trust between the members of the different communities. This will diminish the incentives conflict and thus eventually lead to a more inclusive society with less conflict.

Unlike the diaspora from Somalia and Ethiopia the Eritrean diaspora members do not participate in activities in Eritrea that contribute to social inclusion and interaction. The Eritrean diasporas predominantly focus on political activities to overthrow the government and thus the dictator because they see him as the main source of conflict and problems in Eritrea. Political activities and economic support through remittances are thus the only possible (safe) type of actions the Eritrean diasporas can participate in. The political activities mostly take place in the form of lobbying, awareness raising, conferences and meetings where the diaspora organisations invite their fellow diaspora members, but also track one actors from the country of residence and from international organisations such as the EU or the UN. During the meetings the diaspora try to gain support for their cause and try to persuade the international track one actors to limit the international capabilities of and support for the Eritrean government through embargoes for instance. Obviously these activities take place outside Eritrea. Political action is therefore the most prominent type of action for the Eritrean diaspora because the

diaspora wants to pressure the government and because it is not safe to implement social and humanitarian activities in Eritrea. There are members of the organisations that still live in Eritrea and they promote the activities of the organisations secretly on a small and local scale while maintaining contact over the internet. Table 5 also shows conflicts intensifying activities of the Eritrean diaspora members. These are supported mainly through economical ways in the form of remittances that directly support armed groups. In general the Eritrean diaspora thus undertakes actions to contribute to Eritrea in a way they perceive as positive but that can be understood as conflict intensifying too. The diaspora know that stopping the violence is an important aspect of peacebuilding but they see this armed battle against the government as a necessary measure to overthrow the government. This is thus a necessary step to be able to engage in peacebuilding. The Eritrean diaspora confirms the theory of Collier and Hoeffler with their actions. This theory sees diaspora as important actors that intensify and prolong violent conflicts. These activities can thus be explained as conflict intensifying but it is clear that the diaspora does not share this.

The diasporas in the Netherlands thus have a diverse range of social, political and economic activities that they implement to contribute to peacebuilding in their home countries. These activities in general put the diaspora in the role of track two actor that coordinates between the other actors and that tries to involve the local level actors as good as possible in a cooperative way. However, in contrast to the Somali and Ethiopian diaspora the Eritrean diaspora is not particularly trying to bridge a gap between the different communities, neither is it trying to mobilize the people on the grassroot level. The Ethiopian and Somali diaspora's activities often address the low developed circumstances amongst the local population and through development on the lower level they try to create more inclusive communities that interact. In the Netherlands the diasporas more or less have similar activities. These activities are predominantly applying for funds, sending back remittances, raising awareness for their case and applying for official policy and support from the Dutch government. The diaspora organisations thus mainly play the role of the track two actor in peacebuilding by involving and persuading both the track one actors and track three actors, of both the Dutch as the diaspora communities, in their activities.

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

The ways in which the diasporas participate in the political processes in both the home as the host countries answer the next sub-question; *do the diasporas participate in political processes in as well the host as the home country?* As we already saw in the previous part, the Eritrean diaspora is mainly politically active to contribute to Eritrea. All their activities have a political goal, as well the activities in Eritrea as those in the Netherlands. However, there are hardly any activities in Eritrea. The Somali and Ethiopian diasporas on the other hand are not that intensively politically active but focus on humanitarian activities. They try to involve the governments of their respective countries in the activities they (want to) implement, in conferences and in their social practices just as they do with the other parties. As intermediary or track two actors they try to bridge the gaps between local communities, local leaders and governmental actors. To what extent these activities can be seen as political is unclear, they just want to implement the activities as efficient as possible and if necessary they involve the political actors in this. The diaspora members from Ethiopia do not personally participate in politics in their countries, it remains to creating interaction, discussion and possible collaboration because they see the government as an important actor. The Somali diaspora sees the

higher educated diaspora members as the right people to govern Somalia and mentions that there are diaspora from the UK and the Netherlands that are now member of the TFG. The Somali diaspora thus sees important political possibilities in Somalia which the diaspora can fulfil. The Eritrean diaspora does nothing to involve their government in activities or to cooperate with them; they just try to overthrow it in order to be able to seat a new government that should rule the country in a better way. The Eritrean diaspora is thus predominantly active as opposition party in Eritrea. They have to do this from outside Eritrea as official opposition is not allowed in Eritrea.

The Dutch government on the other hand is perceived to be able to do a lot for the homelands. The diasporas impute much power and capabilities to the government of the Netherlands in different aspects. The Dutch government should politically be involved in the homelands, it should fund activities that address the homeland, it should support (politically and financially) the diaspora organisations and it should protect the diasporas when they implement their activities in their homelands. The diaspora members that live in the Netherlands are not participating in the political processes in an official function or whatsoever, they only try to gain support and funding from the Dutch government as citizens. The only political activities the diasporas in the Netherlands are participating in are the lobbying activities that aim to obtain attention, money and policy for the homelands. The political participation of the diaspora organisations should not be seen apart from the other activities they implement because the diaspora organisations believe that the political actors and they are complementary and together thus can achieve more when collaborating.

COLLABORATION

This part answers the sub-question; *Is there collaboration with non-diaspora parties such as NGOs or governmental institutes?* The preceding part showed that the governments of the home countries are perceived to be part of the problem or are at least having influence on the conflict. Therefore there is little collaboration between the diaspora organisations and governmental actors. The diasporas from Ethiopia and Somalia now and then try to involve governmental representatives in the conferences and seminars. This should lead to interactions and sharing of knowledge and insights between the government and the diaspora that functions as track two actor then. There are not yet structural collaborations established. This can be explained by the lack of a stable and trusted government in both countries. The lack of collaboration with the government in Eritrea is obvious regarding the diaspora's perceived cause of the conflict. Besides the little collaboration with governmental actors, the diaspora organisations do collaborate with non-diaspora parties.

The diaspora organisations have their contacts and networks in both the host- as the home country. These networks are already mentioned as a great advantage the diaspora organisations have compared to other development parties. With the other actors in these networks there are several forms of collaboration. All respondents mention the informative function their connections in their homelands have. Through the networks in the homelands the diaspora claim to be up-to-date about what happens there. Furthermore the diaspora organisations claim to be able to implement their plans or activities easier and more efficient through these networks. The collaborators in the diaspora's networks are thus often local actors that work for local CSOs or communities. The Eritrean diaspora members predominantly work together with other Eritrean diaspora parties in the Netherlands and few local parties in Eritrea. The local parties in Eritrea are

not defined very specifically, but clear is that the diaspora supports and collaborates with armed groups that share their aim to overthrow the government. In contrast to this, the Somali and Ethiopian diaspora collaborate with all kinds of parties such as NGOs and the government, as well in the Netherlands as in the homelands. The Ethiopian diaspora gives an example of collaboration with schools in the Netherlands and the Somali diaspora speaks about Somali NGOs as partners in both countries. There are even collaborations between the Somali and Ethiopian NGOs in the Netherlands to share knowledge and learn from each other. In addition, the diasporas collaborate with Dutch NGOs and the Dutch government in organising activities, although this latter collaboration predominantly remains to receiving funding and an occasional visit of a representative to a conference. Almost all Somali and Ethiopian activities that are listed in table 5 are either implemented in cooperation with support from another party or are funded by the Dutch government or via the Dutch co-financing system.

DIASPORA INFLUENCE

The final sub-question addresses what the diaspora members perceive as their effects on peacebuilding and the conflict in their respective home countries. First of all we can say that the diaspora organisations all believe that their activities positively contribute to the development of their respective home countries and that their activities thus have a positive effect. The Eritrean diaspora believes that with their political lobbying and support to armed groups, they will quicken the fall of the ruling government. In their eyes this can only improve the situation in Eritrea and therefore they think that they have positive effects on peacebuilding in Eritrea. Of course their activities can be put under the header "conflict intensifying" as well because the Eritrean diaspora openly supports armed conflict, although they claim that it aims for a higher goal. The Somali and Ethiopian diaspora organisations believe that through their activities they promote inclusiveness amongst the people. They try to show the people in their homelands that cooperation and acceptance of the "other" will lead to a better developed and more secure society. Inclusion thus leads to mutual acceptance what in turn contributes to peacebuilding because the cleavages between the identity groups diminish. In collaboration with development partners from the Netherlands the Somali organisations already developed facilities that directly improve the livelihood of the communities. Also the vocational trainings and the educational sessions have to contribute to peacebuilding because the people will develop skills to make money. Economic development of local communities is thus something the diaspora influences directly they believe. A better, a developing and a more stable economic situation contributes to peacebuilding because people can provide in their basic needs. Economic development will also lead to more security because people don't have to participate in illegal activities anymore. Remigration of high-educated or affluent diasporas that establish local businesses also contribute in a positive way to the development of local communities because these businesses create employment. However, there are Ethiopian diaspora members that are afraid that the diaspora take the incentives, causes and experiences of the conflicts along with them to the host country where they maintain their identification with a certain party or community. This automatically means that when they maintain their grievances and keep identifying themselves with a particular community, they exclude others at the same time. This all makes that they think that the diaspora take the conflict with them. Community building projects in the host country have to address these problems and until now these negative influences remained limited.

The effects of the diaspora's activities on the national level in the homelands also remain limited and this is mainly because the organisations lack the capacity to address areas and targets greater than the local communities at the moment. This is especially the case for the diaspora from Somalia and Ethiopia. If their actions are successful, these will lead to an increase of people on the local level that will participate in the peacebuilding efforts. This should be the result of the grassroots mobilization practises the diaspora organisations do. In case it is performed well the grassroots level actors should be(come) more prone to engagement in peacebuilding. If the ideas are working out as intended, thus communities interact more, become more interdependent and learn from each other, than peacebuilding activities should spread through the country using the networks of the different actors involved. The effects of the diaspora organisations on peacebuilding at the moment are thus limited but have the potential to spread and increase in effect once more people participate in the activities.

ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTION

The preceding part summarized the data derived from the interviews to conclude on the sub-questions that were stated in chapter 1 for all three diaspora communities. This part answers the main-question of this research. This main-question is;

To what extent, and in what ways, does the African diaspora in the Netherlands influence peacebuilding processes in the Horn of Africa?

It is clear that the diaspora from the Horn of Africa participates in different types of activities of which they believe that these will contribute to the development of and peacebuilding in their respective home countries. The African diaspora is not always explicitly targeting peacebuilding with their activities but they believe that the actions that address the (what they perceive as) cause of conflict will have a positive influence on the development of their respective home country and will lead to less conflict, what in turn can be seen as peace promoting. In this way the diaspora organisations thus differ from the overall notion that diasporas predominantly have a conflict intensifying role to play. Their experiences and knowledge from the home country could have given them incentives to exclude others, to be grieved or suffer traumas because of what happened or what they experienced, this however is not the case when taking into account their activities they implement. The diasporas all want to contribute in an inclusive and positive way to their home countries and the people that still live there, regardless of the identities or past events. The diaspora organisations all explicitly want to contribute to peacebuilding in a positive way and all participate as an identity group in the conflicts that can be seen as "new wars" because of the internal issues, external actors that play a role and the different parties that conflict. The diaspora from Somalia and Ethiopia have a more similar approach to have influence on peacebuilding processes in their home countries compared to the Eritrean diaspora. Therefore I believe that it is useful to distinguish between the activities of the Somali and Ethiopian diaspora on the one hand and the Eritrean diaspora on the other. What they have in common is that they all maintain a strong connection to their homeland. This explains their efforts and motivations to implement activities there. The advantages they derive from both the home and host countries give them the opportunities to implement activities more directly, more locally and in cooperation with the right local actors. This is the most important aspect of diaspora involvement in peacebuilding. The diaspora believe that they have the specific ability function efficiently as track two actors to bridge the gap between different communities and track one and three actors in all societies. Even the

Eritrean diaspora believes this although their activities do not address community building or grassroots mobilization as peacebuilding activity.

The diaspora organisations from Somalia and Ethiopia have several activities that can contribute to peacebuilding and the development of the home country. The most prominent activities aim at social inclusion and awareness raising on the local level. The activities they facilitate or participate in aim to provide opportunities for the different parties to meet, interact and share knowledge. By diminishing the cleavages between different identity groups, through facilitating events where all actors can meet and interact and by providing physical facilities that directly support to local level actors the diaspora organisations contribute to peace as a track two actor. As track two actor they try to function as a mediating or negotiating actor between actors from the first, second and third track for peacebuilding. They believe that education and employment, more interactions between communities and more mutual knowledge will lead to less internal cleavages and thus to less conflict since these cleavages are perceived as an important factors for conflict. Through the local networks the diasporas can implement the activities more efficient as they were ought to. Still the diaspora organisations often lack capacity to implement the activities on a nationwide scale and thus the activities remain limited to the areas that are chosen by the members of the respective organisations.

The Eritrean diaspora has a different approach to peacebuilding. Their activities are primarily limited to political lobbying activities in the host country because of the security problems they have to implement activities in Eritrea. The activities they implement are in their opinion necessary steps to work towards a safer and better Eritrea. These activities can also be seen as conflict intensifying and thus there is a two-way effect. The Eritrean diaspora aims at overthrowing the current regime. The activities they support might aim for positive change; the means to achieve this are very likely to provoke more conflict or increased repression. Putting a dictatorial regime, that is involved in several (international) conflicts, under even more international (external) pressure, and at the same time supporting armed forces to pressure the regime from inside the country, might be dangerous for the people in the country because of all this pressure on the regime. I therefore believe that the diaspora from Eritrea plays an important role in the country, whether this role is positive or negative is yet to be decided because it is unclear what will happen if the regime collapses and new people will (try to) seize the power. It is however also possible, and maybe even more likely, that the regime increases its repressive actions against its opponents what will be at the cost of the local level communities that have to endure this. Whether the diaspora takes this into account is doubtful. Nonetheless I believe that armed involvement is always a negative method for peacebuilding. The Eritrean diaspora seems to act like the stereotype diaspora that fights for its own ideals from outside the country of origin. Because they do not physically suffer the hardships in Eritrea and only see the repressive (re)action of the government they can intensify their actions. If this happens then this action-reaction vicious circle between the diaspora and the government might last for years.

It is difficult to say to what extent the activities of the Somali and Ethiopian diaspora organisations influence peacebuilding but it is clear that they have influence and that their aim is to contribute in a positive way. Although not all diaspora organisations explicitly engage in peacebuilding, they still believe to contribute to peace in a positive way what thus contrasts to the overall believe that diasporas mainly intensify conflict. Both the diaspora communities keep saying that they lack capacity to be as effective as they would be, they both are aware that they can have an important role in

peacebuilding in their countries of origin as actor that moves between the different levels in society. They are also aware that it difficult to be effectively involved in this because of the local situations. The combination of local networks and knowledge, a shared national culture, the fact that they feel strengthened by their international experiences and contacts and support from (inter)national collaborators make the diasporas actors that have influence. In addition, their self proclaimed successes in providing facilities, educating people, bringing the actors from all three tracks together, mobilizing people on the local level and the returning diaspora that occupy a political function show their possibilities and influence and therefore the diaspora must be taken serious as actors in peacebuilding. These successes however remain generally limited to the local level at the moment. To be able to extend the range of the diaspora's activities they need to increase their capacity. The diaspora members believe that more support from the host country can help increasing their capacity. All in all we can say that the diasporas from Somalia and Ethiopia are positively influencing peacebuilding in the Horn of Africa, yet the scale of these influences remains limited at the moment.

The respondents mentioned several capacity problems they have to face and the difficulties they had (and still have) when effectively implementing activities in their home countries. These included a lack of capacity to apply for financial support, to implement activities in the Netherlands and to address the problems in their home countries as effective as they would like to. Concerning policy development, dealing with these issues could be done through several ways. The data showed that there are several diaspora organisations that want to contribute in a broad range of different activities. It also told that many of these organisations are small scale and often lack decent organisation as the intro of chapter 4 exemplified. Professionalization of the organisations and limiting the diversity of the activities at one moment could be helpful to address these capacity issues. It was however remarkable to see that all respondents remained positive regarding their engagement, their activities and the (possible) outcome of the activities as the data showed in chapter 4.

An interesting development to follow is that of the Dutch development sector. As said, many diaspora organisations try to obtain all kinds of support from the Dutch government or the co-funding organisations. Now that we are in a period of economic crisis this sector is limiting the availability of funding and support and making it even harder to obtain any. Many of the diaspora organisations think that more support from this sector will increase their capacity to be able to be more efficient and effective in their activities. This limitation of available funding then could mean that the diaspora organisations have to find other ways and sources of support or else they might have to limit their activities or even cease to exist. The activities that aim to mobilise fellow diaspora in participating in the organisations and in activities could be a useful step to increase the number of members and in turn increase the organisations' capacities.

The data gives clear indication that diaspora activities are very case specific and related to the perceived causes of conflict and the possibilities for engagement in the country of origin. Therefore these cases should be individually followed if valid policy implications are to be formulated.

Somalia is becoming more and more controlled by the extremist groups that are seen as cause of the conflict by the respondents. Besides that there are still the clans and identity groups to deal with. More influence from extremist groups could lead to increased conflict. The respondents already mentioned that Al Shabaab does not participate in

conferences and seminars because they claim to have "the solution" for Somalia. It seems that they do not like external parties, which is how the diasporas could be perceived, to develop Somalia and to involve in national politics and peacebuilding. What will happen next is unclear but the information from news media shows severe repression and extreme violence now that Al Shabaab gains more and more power and territory. The TFG still is the official government but without any power and influence it will be difficult to govern the country and to stop the increasingly powerful Al Shabaab movement.

Secondly, concerning Eritrea. The diaspora from Eritrea aims to overthrow the government. They also spoke about great mistrust between people and lack of development in their society. The question will be whether there will be a better government if the present government is overthrown because it will be very difficult to accept this government. Further and more investigation of the diaspora influence on Eritrea possibly gives a black and white image of the country and of the different ideas that people have about it because it seems that the country is divided between two parties, those who are pro and anti government.

Thirdly is Ethiopia. Ethiopia is more or less a mix between both other countries, it has a government but that is repressive to a certain extent and on the other hand it has to deal with the cleavages between identity groups within its society. The diaspora organisations thus have to balance all the time between development work that addresses the cleavages in society and at the same time they have to implement and explain their activities in such a way that the government does not perceive these activities as critique and allows these to be implemented. It thus seems that all three countries of research are at the moment still very instable and turbulent and that makes it very difficult to predict what will happen in the (near) future.

The role of diasporas in peacebuilding in the near future will be positive according to the respondents from the respective countries, when they have the capacity and the resources they believe to be able to bridge the gaps between communities and identities and increase their positive influence on peacebuilding. The aim of this research was to investigate to what extent diaspora communities have positive influence on peacebuilding in their home countries and thus not contribute to conflict as they are generally perceived to do. The outcomes of this research show that there are diasporas in the Netherlands who are aware of the situation in their home countries and their position in the Netherlands, and who want to contribute to peace and development in their home countries. They show that there are many possibilities for diasporas to participate and contribute to peacebuilding instead of increasing the conflicts and cleavages within the societies. However, there are still many authors who claim the opposite. Further research in these areas may need to be performed in order to come to a generalization of understanding the role of diasporas peacebuilding.

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