


Ethnic Identity & Politics:

attitudes of young people in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Tom Heinen



Master Thesis Human Geography 'Conflicts, Territories & Identities'

Radboud University Nijmegen Faculty of Management

August 2014

*** 'Nationalism Kills'**

Cover picture taken from a Radio Sarajevo report on the International Day against Fascism (<http://www.radiosarajevo.ba/novost/131114>). The words mock those found on a pack of cigarettes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 'Smoking Kills'. The phrase is repeated three times, in Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian. In most cases, the words are very similar or even completely the same for each language.

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Preface

Dear reader,

Before you lies my master thesis, the concluding piece of five years of studying Human Geography. As such, it reflects all the different theories and methods I have learned to use in this period. It is, on the other hand, also a reflection of new insights that I gained during my five-month stay in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Today, I am more convinced than ever that one can only know so much from reading about a country without visiting it. Perhaps this is even more true for a place about which so many books have been written. Alas, most of the recent works seem to focus on the country's misfortunes. There is, however, a never-ending range of stories to be told about this region. For this reason, I tried to visit other places when possible, towns such as Mostar and Banja Luka, even though I was based in Sarajevo. In my opinion, capitals should never be taken as perfect representations of an entire country. I found out that there are nice people throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that I definitely have to go back and meet some more.

With the twentieth anniversary of the Dayton Peace Agreement approaching, Bosnia-Herzegovina has dropped of the policy agenda of most international actors. Nevertheless, the political arena of the country remains divided along ethnic lines. A common held belief is that therefore, all people are ethnically divided. The task I equipped myself with was to see whether there is any truth in this assumption. After a few twists and turns, I settled with an internet questionnaire held among young people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. My colleagues at proMENTE Social Research, where I spend most of my five months as an intern, helped me out a lot in this regard, among other things with formulating the right questions, translating them into Bosnian, and getting the questionnaire online. In addition to all their help, they offered me a very warm stay in Sarajevo and made me feel part of the team, for which I am very grateful.

In addition, I want to thank my supervisor Dr. Bert Bomert for guiding me through the research and writing process. Our talks were always straightforward; his comments were enthusiastic and encouraging when appropriate, but also sceptical when needed. I also want to thank all the friends I made along the way who, besides helping me with my research in whatever small ways, made my stay in Bosnia-Herzegovina unforgettable. In particular, I would like to thank Daniel, Jess, and Bojan for organising their language gatherings, drinks, and music nights with such a nice blend of international and local people. Many thanks are also due to Dr. Valery Perry for hosting the 'research, wine and cheese meetings' and for sharing her experience as a long-term expat working in Sarajevo. I want to thank Dženana and Naida for discussing the questionnaire results and helping in its interpretation. Christine, Katarina and Aleksandra, thanks for being such great roommates and cooks. I would also like to express my gratitude to Dr. Igor Zekanović and Marko & Marko for their generous welcome to Banja Luka and their willingness to discuss my research plans in detail. Amra and Boris from the University of Sarajevo, thank you for the very nice discussions about geography and life in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and for helping me in my research. Finally, I would like to thank all the youth clubs, student organisations and others who helped me out a lot by distributing my questionnaire.

I wish you a pleasant time reading this thesis.

Tom Heinen

Nijmegen, August 2014



My last day at proMENTE. From left to right: Sidik, Esad, Ivona, Andrea, Lamija, and me. Steve, Ena, Vedran, and Dalila are not on the photo.

Executive summary

Ethnic identity played a major role in the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and continues to be a major source of controversy and political tension today. The October 2013 census, the first one to be held in more than twenty years, raised a particularly heated debate on three questions aimed at measuring ethnicity/nationality, religion, and mother tongue. Other policy areas such as constitutional reform and education are also dominated by ethnic strife. Nevertheless, there are also indications that ethnicity is no longer the defining aspect in peoples' lives. This is not to say that it has disappeared, but rather that it has become part of a complex identity structure that changes with time, place and social context.

Surprisingly, the existence of alternative and contextual identities is a topic that is rarely researched in the context of Bosnia-Herzegovina, nor is it acknowledged by the country's mainstream political parties. Instead, most attention is given to the categorisation of people on the basis of ethnic labels. There are occasions in which people are mobilised across ethnic boundaries on issues such as crime or lack of political progress, but these are often restricted to one-time events that are focussed on a specific issue which affects people regardless of their ethnicity. Although there seems to be a potential to mobilise people across ethnic boundaries, the success of political parties based on a multi-ethnic ideology has been modest at best. It seems difficult to translate support for cross-ethnic protests and citizen movements into political influence.

A rather narrow understanding of identity often prevails in Bosnia-Herzegovina, one that is limited to ethnicity, religion, and language. Alternative identities are oftentimes treated as irrelevant and grouped together under the heading 'Other'. However, the complexities of identity and political beliefs are too important to leave unattended, especially those of young people in countries recovering from conflict. Today's young people are the political, economic and cultural leaders of tomorrow and they will bring their attitudes, whether positive or negative, with them when they take over responsibility for running the country. It is also the first generation that has completed a full cycle of post-war education that propagated a different identity discourse than before the war. It is therefore surprising that there have not been more studies that focus on adolescents, as there are universal lessons to be learned concerning the link between social categorisation, identity and politics. The goal of this thesis is therefore to do what the census failed to do: to assess the importance of ethnicity in the identity and political attitudes of young people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The main question of this study is thus as follows:

How important is ethnicity in the identity of young people in Bosnia-Herzegovina and how does this relate to their political viewpoints?

This question can be further divided into two components. First of all, it is important to see whether there is something that can be characterised as an ethnic identity among young people and how important it is relative to other aspects of identity. Since there are not many useful data on this topic, the first goal was to gather the necessary information. The next step was to learn more about the political viewpoints of young people and the importance of ethnicity therein. These two elements were combined in order to see if ethnic identity and political viewpoints are related and to judge whether young people are susceptible to mobilisation by ethnic elites or more inclined to support multi-ethnic politics instead.

A web-based questionnaire was used to reach respondents in a large geographical area with limited resources. The questionnaire was distributed through personal networks, Facebook advertisements, and youth organisations in different parts of the country. Luckily, the focus on young people meant that most members of the target group had access to the internet. Other advantages are the lower possibility for social desirability bias compared to live questionnaires and a greater possibility to interact with the respondent compared to regular self-administered questionnaires. Much attention was given to answer controls and welcome/end messages in order to prevent potential errors. An extra benefit of a web-based questionnaire is the option to automatically save data and import it to statistical processing software, which eliminates the possibility for human errors. Overall, it can be concluded that web-based questionnaires provided the most representative results within the possibilities of this study.

The research forming the foundation of this thesis is guided by a particular understanding of the concept of identity. In short, the idea is that identities are multiple and fluid. From the perspective of social constructionism, identity is considered to be subject to change and varying according to social context. Identity gains meaning through discourse, for example through the media and education, and the close interrelation between identity and power necessitates a critical view on the concept of identity. Identities are not fixed or pre-given, but the result of political processes. This can be opposed to the common held idea, in Bosnia-Herzegovina and elsewhere, that identity is fixed and pre-given, a group-membership that is assigned at birth. Since the disintegration of Yugoslavia, ethnic elites in Bosnia-Herzegovina have used identity instrumentally as a way to mobilise support. This tactic, which can be seen as a form of identity politics, is characterised by a backward looking claim on power based on ethnic labels. The current status quo in Bosnia-Herzegovina can be qualified as one in which identity politics continues to be a popular political strategy. Each ethnic elite is in charge of its own means of sustaining ethno-political order, territory, law enforcement, education as well as other institutions.

Identity consists of both personal identity and social identity. Whereas personal identity is based on what sets the individual apart from others, social identity looks for similarities with other groups. Social categories represent a set of attributes, perceptions, and attitudes that form group prototypes. Social categorisation concerns the process of ascribing labels and behaviour patterns to particular groups by emphasising similarities within the group and differences with others. Still, people can have different identities depending on the amount of personal relationships and social groups they are attached to. Given that these identities are based upon and evaluated in their social context, they vary in their importance and salience. People might present themselves through 'self-narratives' as possessing a fixed and stable identity while in fact this is not the case. However, the degree to which identities are subject to change can vary considerably and some identities, like ethnic identity, can be very persistent.

After the application of selection criteria and control questions, 328 responses were available for statistical analysis. Existing literature, local observations, pilot testing, and discussions with young people from Bosnia-Herzegovina were used to inform the design of the questionnaire and the interpretation of the results. When possible, other studies were used to compare the sample of young people with other groups in society. Although the identity of young people in Bosnia-Herzegovina is a complex phenomenon, the number of responses to the questionnaire was sufficiently large to draw a number of significant conclusions.

The results of the questionnaire reveal a complex and nuanced picture of the identity of young people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, one that differs from the country's dominant discourses on ethnic identity. Although for most respondents ethnic identity forms a meaningful part of who they are, it is rarely the most important part of their identity. Family, humanity and being an individual are particularly important for many respondents. Although ethnic background influences the topics of geography and social relations, its influence is somewhat exaggerated. Geography is not as controversial as one might expect from its role in the war and most respondents are quite open towards other ethnic groups, although those with a strong attachment to ethnicity were a bit more likely to stick to their own group. In general, the results suggest that there are possibilities for mutual understanding and interethnic cooperation to develop. However, this does not take away the fact that many of Bosnia-Herzegovina's most important institutions, such as the media, the constitution, and the education system, continue to favour ethnic division.

The second part of the study was concerned with the political viewpoints of young people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It became clear that only around one in five respondents is inclined to agree with ethno-nationalistic statements. One's attachment to ethnic identity and related factors such as language and religion was again found to be an intermediary factor; a higher attachment to these factors relates with a greater support for ethno-nationalistic statements. This is also reflected in voting behaviour. Respondents who attach more to their ethnic identity were more likely to vote for a politician from their ethnic group and were more inclined to feel represented by one of the mainstream political parties. Nevertheless, although most respondents perceive inter-ethnic relations as a problematic issue, they do not see it as the foremost source of tension in society. Moreover, interethnic relations trail behind most other topics on the list of political problems, such as the economy, political transparency, and the future perspectives of young people. Compared to the general population, young people also appear more inclined to vote for a multi-ethnic party. There remains, however, a high level of distrust towards politicians of any ideological persuasion.

It can be concluded that the identity and political attitudes of young people are indeed much more complex than generally acknowledged; ethnicity is far from the only factor of importance. The effect of social categorisation in ethnic groups, whether through media, education, politics or other institutions, appears to be weaker than it is often assumed to be. The concept of identity politics thus seems to be out of touch with Bosnia-Herzegovina's first post-conflict generation. Although these are valuable insights in the identity and political attitudes of young people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there are a number of imperfections to the current study. One of the shortcomings of the dataset used in this study was that, compared to official figures, it included a disproportionate amount of Bosniaks, women, and citizens of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, one of the country's two entities. A future study on this topic would do well to reach out even more actively to those members of the target group that were underrepresented in the current research.

In addition to improving representation of different groups in society, the scope of the study could be extended over time and space. If the same patterns appear over different contexts as well as a prolonged period, it will be possible to make much stronger conclusions. In addition, studies like these could benefit from a better combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. Although questionnaires have the benefit of reaching a wide audience relatively easily, their results remain an aggregate of individual experiences. Identity is made in social context in relation to others and in order to grasp the most intricate aspects of identity, a deeper understanding of the underlying processes is necessary. Although being 'there' talking with locals and listening to their stories already makes a large difference, the use of focus groups or interviews could improve further study.

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Muslims¹ in Stolac, finds that identities change quite rapidly and radically, depending on different social contexts. In many situations, the Muslim community resists thinking in terms of one ethnic group versus the other, despite a history of nationalism during the war. A clear distinction is made between 'good Croats from here' and 'bad Croats from central Bosnia or elsewhere' (ibid, p. 297). In other situations, the Muslims of Stolac prefer to identify with a common Yugoslav past, a time in which ethnicity was not important and everybody got along.

There is thus reason to believe in the existence of alternative and contextual identities, depending on factors such as place and time. However, this phenomenon is rarely researched on a countrywide level, nor is it acknowledged by the mainstream political parties. Rather, they prefer labelling people according to rigid ethnic categories. Even though ethnic rhetoric is often present in politics and media, people do not always use ethnic reasoning in their everyday lives (Touquet, 2011a, p. 154). Indeed, there are occasions in which people are mobilised around issues that cross ethnic boundaries, such as crime or lack of political progress. However, this seems to be restricted to one-time events, such as the protests that erupted when Bosniak, Croat, and Serb political parties failed to reach an agreement on a law on personal identification numbers (Al Jazeera, 2013). This led the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina to order a stop in the registration of new-borns until the issue was resolved. As a result, it became impossible for parents to apply for medical insurance or travel abroad for life-saving treatment. In cases like these, the unwillingness of politicians to compromise has very concrete effects and people suffer regardless of their ethnicity.

Touquet's (2011b) analysis of post-ethnic politics in Bosnia-Herzegovina shows that there is a potential to mobilise people across ethnic boundaries. This is the case not only for those in the category of 'others', but also those in the Bosniak, Croat, or Serb groups that feel restricted by their identity labels. However, up until now, the success of political parties based on a multi-ethnic ideology has been rather marginal; it seems difficult to transform the support for cross-ethnic protests and citizen movements into political power. An example of this lack of success is the political party Naša Stranka (Our Party), which started from a successful citizens' movement but struggles to gain a foothold in the political arena.

Although ethnic tensions are experienced by people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, tensions between other social groups are also reported. A 2009 study by the United Nations Development Programme found that although 78.6% of the respondents perceived a 'lot of' or 'some' tension between ethnic groups; the amount was even higher for those that perceived tension between rich and poor (87.9%) or between managers and workers (85.6%) (UNDP, 2009, p. 42). Tensions were also perceived between old and young (77.5%), urban and rural (76.6%) and between men and women (67.7%). Another study in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2005 found that despite apparent tensions there remains a "fairly high level" of interethnic interaction (O'Loughlin, 2010, p. 28). In addition, 47% stated that they would like to have more friends from other ethnic groups (ibid, p. 47). However, notwithstanding the willingness to engage in interethnic contact, there remain high levels of social distrust as well as other barriers to interaction. Ethnic labels are reinforced in daily life, particularly when dealing with state institutions (Touquet, 2011a). More often than not, a person has to be

¹ Like a number of other scholars, Kolind uses the word Muslim (or in other cases, Bosnian Muslims) to designate the ethnic group also known as Bosniaks. In this thesis, the term Bosniak is preferred over the term Muslim, even though the latter has a long history of usage in the Habsburg Empire and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In reality, not all Bosnian Muslims practice their religion actively and even if they do, it is possible that they do not want to be identified with their religion only. Moreover, other ethnic groups like Croats and Serbs are also not named after their associated religions.

'something' in order to apply for something, whether it is registering for social benefits or running for political office. These divisions are already 'taught' in primary school (Majstorović & Turjačanin, 2013, p. 112).

1.1 Purpose and research question

Little research has been done into the relevance of ethnicity in the identity of young individuals. The recent October 2013 Census only asked three questions related to identity, namely religion, ethnicity, and mother tongue, with a limited number of answers. It can be argued that in reality only one question was asked, since religion, ethnicity and mother tongue are often conflated into one and the same thing. Thus, a Bosnian Croat is Catholic and speaks Croatian, a Bosniak is Muslim and speaks Bosnian, and a Bosnian Serb is Orthodox and speaks Serbian. This is of course a rather limited perspective on the concept of identity. Because of the design of the questionnaire, alternative identities are treated as irrelevant and grouped together as 'Other'. However, the studies cited above suggest that although ethnic categories can be meaningful, they are not the only markers of identity. Due to the violent ethnic conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990's and the nature of the ensuing peace agreement, however, the importance of ethnic identity is often taken for granted. The question is how important ethnicity really is in the lives of average people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially for those that belong to a new generation that was largely raised after the war. This research will therefore do what the official census failed to do: assess how important ethnicity really is for the identity and political attitudes of young people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The main question of this study is then as follows:

How important is ethnicity in the identity of young people in Bosnia-Herzegovina and how does this relate to their political viewpoints?

The answer to this question consists of two key elements. First of all, it is important to see whether there is something that can be characterised as an ethnic identity among young people and, if so, how important it is relative to other aspects of identity. Do the identity categories used in the 2013 census reflect the experienced identity of young people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, or is there something more? As of yet, there is not much useful information on this topic. The first goal of this thesis is therefore to gather this data. Secondly, it is important to know more about the political viewpoints of young people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. How important are ethnic issues in the political attitudes of young people in Bosnia-Herzegovina? One of the most important preconditions for successful multi-ethnic politics is that people from different ethnic groups reach a common ground on political issues. Preferably, this will happen on a long-term basis, thus transcending one-time events. The second part of the research question will therefore be used to see whether the political opinions of young people are solely ethnicity-based or also open to other issues.

Together, these two elements will give insight into the relation between identity and political viewpoints. It will also be tested whether the fact that ethnicity is important for someone's identity is reflected in his or her political attitudes. Based on the outcomes of this analysis the generation of young people will be compared to the rest of Bosnia-Herzegovinian society. How do their experiences compare to the rest of the country? Along this line we will discuss the possibility of a shift from the mainstream ethno-nationalistic parties to alternative, multi-ethnic, platforms.

1.2 Social and scientific relevance

This thesis will hold to light something that is often taken for granted, namely the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina along ethnic lines. Whereas many studies on Bosnia-Herzegovina take ethnic division as a starting point of their inquiry, this thesis will test whether it is justified to equate political division with social division. The focus of this thesis will specifically be on young people, a generation that is both undervalued and understudied. However, even though they might hold little power today, they will become the leaders of tomorrow. This fact alone makes it important to know what goes on in their minds, what place ethnicity takes in their understanding of themselves and how this relates to their political attitudes. Having insight in the lives of young people will ultimately give an insight into the direction in which Bosnia-Herzegovina is heading and whether the next generation of voters can potentially be mobilised around issues other than ethnic identity.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, there have not yet been many studies that focus on adolescent perceptions of identity and politics (Majstorović & Turjačanin (2013) provide a valuable exception). In effect, this is the first generation that has completed a full cycle of post-war education. It is often argued that the country's divided education system has a negative influence by perpetuating society's ethnic division among its students. However, the relationship between identity and education is something that has not yet been studied thoroughly and it is often understood as self-evident that education forms the identity of pupils. Although this seems plausible, it is rarely put to the test. Among other things, the results of this study will show whether the identity of young people indeed reflects the ethnic divisions according to which they were educated. This is particularly relevant in countries recovering from ethnic conflict since education is credited with a vital role in promoting or decreasing tensions in society (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000).

Although the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is unique in many ways, there are universal lessons to be learned when it comes to the link between post-conflict education, politics, media and identity. Even though the idea that identity is something objective or 'real' has been disqualified in the social sciences for some time, this realisation has not yet found its way into mainstream thought. This is illustrated by the way in which censuses are taken in general (Kertzer & Arel, 2002), and the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina's October 2013 census in particular (see paragraph 3.3.1 for more on this). This study presents an alternative approach to identity in a country where it is often defined in a narrow and therefore problematic way.

In addition, this thesis will contribute to the knowledge of identity formation in post-conflict contexts. Today's young people are the future political, economic and cultural leaders of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They will bring their attitudes, whether positive or negative, with them when they take over responsibility for running the country. These attitudes will tell more about the possibility for future reconciliation and reduction of ethnic divisions. It will likely be them who decide on a number of uncertainties regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina's future. Will the country make serious efforts to enter the European Union? Will its political system develop into a fully functioning democracy? The next generation of politicians and voters will steer the country in the direction they think is right. Without studying this group, this direction remains unclear. Luckily, there is an excellent way to fill this gap since young people can easily be reached through internet surveys.

1.3 Research Strategy and outline of the thesis

In order to gather the information necessary for answering the main research question presented above, a web-based questionnaire has been distributed among young people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this questionnaire, respondents were asked about their identity and political attitudes. Compared to other research methods, internet surveys deliver results that are more representative and need fewer resources. However, before elaborating upon the methodology used in gathering and analysing data, it is important to describe the context in which this study has taken place. First of all, it is vital to get a basic understanding of Bosnia-Herzegovina's recent history as well as the political organisation that has resulted from it. Chapter 2 will be concerned in particular with the 1992-1995 conflict, the Dayton Peace Agreement, and the country's political system referred to as consociationalism. Next, the theoretical background will be discussed for the main concepts used in this thesis. These include the different ways of understanding identity, identity politics, and social categorisation. This will be the topic of Chapter 3. Together with the section on Bosnia-Herzegovina's history, these theoretical insights will inform the selection and formulation of the questions used in the survey, as well as the interpretation of the results. In Chapter 4, it is time to elaborate upon the research method chosen for this thesis, the internet questionnaire. There are a number of advantages and possible disadvantages to this method, which will be carefully considered here. At the end of this chapter, an overview will be given of the different topics covered in the final questionnaire.

Having covered all the basics necessary to conduct a thorough study, the next part of the thesis will be concerned with the analysis of the questionnaire's results. First, the findings will be discussed that cover the identity of the respondents. This will be the main topic of Chapter 5. From there on, it will be possible in Chapter 6 to look at political attitudes and the relation with identity and ethnicity in particular. Chapter 7 will reiterate the research question presented earlier and summarise the main conclusions found in the analytical Chapters 5 and 6. In addition, attention is given to possible ways in which this study could be further improved methodologically and extended over space and time. There will be room for contemplation on things that went well, but also the limitations that are inherent in this kind of research.

2. About Bosnia-Herzegovina

Bosnia-Herzegovina is one of the six republics that used to form Yugoslavia. It is bordered by Croatia to the Northwest, Serbia to the East, Montenegro to the South and the Adriatic Sea to the West (see Figure 2). The country is divided in two entities with large degrees of autonomy, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Republika Srpska. The government in the Federation is further decentralised into ten cantons. Brčko district, a small but contested area in the northeast of the country, has the status of an autonomous district. It is not only of great strategic value as a link between the two parts of Republika Srpska, but also has symbolic value as a site of extensive ethnic cleansing during the 1992-1995 conflict. According to preliminary results of the latest census, the country counts 3,791,622 inhabitants. In the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina live 2,371,603 people, mainly Bosniaks and Croats, whereas in Republika Srpska live 1,326,991 people, mostly Serbs. Brčko district is home to 93,028 people (Agencija za statistiku Bosne i Hercegovine, 2013). The next paragraph will look further into the 1992-1995 conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In addition, an overview of key events that shaped Bosnia-Herzegovina's history can be found in Appendix A.



Figure 2: The political geography of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Clancy, 2010, p. 5).

2.1 The Bosnian Civil War

From 1945 to 1992, Bosnia-Herzegovina was part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It was the most multi-ethnic republic of Yugoslavia and unlike the other republics, it did not have a majority ethnic group. Muslims were the largest ethnic group, making up 43.7 per cent in the 1991 census. However, Serbs (31.4%) and Croats (17.3%) also represented large communities (Kaldor, 2006, p. 34). As can be seen in Appendix B, these different ethnic groups were scattered across the country. Ethnicity was and remains intertwined with religion. In addition to Muslims, who later renamed themselves Bosniaks, Serbs are often Orthodox, Croats are usually Catholic. In addition, there were a significant number of people that described themselves as Yugoslav, Jew, or Roma. It was, however, quite common for people from different ethnic groups to intermarry, particularly in urban areas where ethnic groups were more likely to live together. Interethnic marriages were generally considered to be unproblematic. This is confirmed by a representative survey that was carried out across Yugoslavia in 1989-1990, a time when the communist state already had shown serious signs of corrosion (Hodson, Sekulic, & Massey, 1994, pp. 1547-1552). Tolerance levels were positively correlated to mixed parentage and mixed marriage as well as the national diversity in the republics. Bosnia-Herzegovina was found to be the most tolerant of all Yugoslav republics.

Despite Bosnia-Herzegovina's multi-ethnic reputation, the country's first democratic elections of November 1990 resulted in the dominance of three large ethno-nationalistic parties, each representing one of the main ethnic groups (Kaldor, 2006, p. 35). Together, they claimed seventy per cent of the vote and dominated the new parliament. Before long, these three political parties became the main actors in the escalating conflict. The goal of the different ethnic elites was to protect their ethnic group from perceived threats, either real or imagined, with each claiming that it was reacting to threats from others. Not surprisingly, the coalition of three nationalistic parties was an uneasy one. Since the Bosniaks were the largest ethnic group, they were keen on keeping the country together. The Croats and Serbs, on the other hand, desired ethnically homogeneous territories that would join Croatia and Serbia proper. There have been different reports on the death toll of the conflict. However, the most recent estimates provide a minimum number of around 100,000 victims (Dzidic, 2013; Zwierzchowski & Tabeau, 2010).

2.1.1 The causes of the war

There are different views as to what caused the war and where most of the guilt lies. One of the most widespread notions is that of primordial 'ancient hatreds'. According to this line of thought, the Balkan region has always been characterized by ethnic strife and always will be. In this view, ethnic divisions were successfully suppressed during the Yugoslav period only to reappear later when the state apparatus began to crumble. The ethnic conflict that erupted was both inevitable and natural. This line of thought strongly influenced Western policy-makers, and according to Kaldor (2006, p. 37) served as an excuse for their inaction. In a sense, the 'Western World' adopted more or less the same rhetoric as the nationalist politicians whose actions they so ardently opposed. The Western conviction of the inevitability of Balkan conflict was based on a long tradition of reporting on the Balkans and Yugoslavia, or as the American envoy Richard Holbrooke named it, the 'Rebecca West Factor' (Holbrooke, 1998, pp. 22-24). Rebecca West's travel book 'Black Lamb and Grey Falcon' and its modern interpretation, Robert Kaplan's 'Balkan Ghosts', are said to have left the impression on readers that "nothing could be done by outsiders in a region so steeped in ancient hatreds" (ibid, p. 22). 'Balkan Ghosts' is even said to have kept United States President Bill Clinton from intervening in the early stages of the war (Kaufman, 1999).

In contrast, Kaldor uses the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina as an example of the instrumental and politically motivated use of ethnic identity in conflict (Kaldor, 2006, pp. 33-71). In the context of slowly eroding Yugoslav institutions, politicians used ethnic identity to mobilise people and cling on to power. For this purpose, national myths were reinvented and historical events compressed in order to create an illusion of continuous ethnic strife. Mueller (2000) argues against the idea that complete ethnic groups were at war with each other. Instead, the main performers of violence were small groups of criminals and plunderers, recruited by nationalistic politicians under the banner of ethnic identity. In this view, nationalism was not the driving force of violence, but rather “the characteristic around which the marauders happened to have arrayed themselves” (Mueller, 2000, p. 43). Since they were more opportunistic and sadistic than ideological in nature, it was common for armed groups to trade fuel and weapons with the enemy (ibid). Local militias hoarded humanitarian aid, then sold it to those who were meant to receive it for free in the first place.

There have indeed been periods in Balkan history characterised by inter-ethnic violence, perhaps most notoriously the Second World War. However, there are plenty of regions in Europe and the rest of the world that have experienced violent episodes in their history. In the former Yugoslavia, there were high rates of intermarriage, and opinion surveys indicated high levels of inter-ethnic tolerance, even shortly before conflicts broke out (Gagnon Jr, 1995, pp. 133-134). These phenomena were particularly strong in the ethnically mixed areas that became so contested shortly after.

The ‘ancient hatreds’ approach is right in attaching a key importance to the disintegration of Yugoslavia in explaining the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, it is short-sighted to argue that this released the ethnic strife that was up to then suppressed, resulting in an inevitable war. Many countries did quite fine after the collapse of communism, whereas others descended into violence. In addition, there have been large periods of peaceful coexistence in Bosnia-Herzegovina’s history, which could have provided a potential antidote to ethnic violence. Unfortunately, those who sought to fuel ethnic division forcefully omitted examples of inter-ethnic coexistence from national history. A critical link in converting animosities and prejudices into hatred were therefore the nationalist politicians practising identity politics (Kaldor, 2006). Unfortunately, in the case of former Yugoslavia these individuals were also the ones that were best equipped and organised to jump into the political vacuum created by the declining legitimacy of the Yugoslav state (Mueller, 2000, pp. 45-47). Often originating from the Yugoslav establishment, they knew how to manipulate the political system in their advantage and how to mobilise key assets such as the media and campaign funds. These people would become the leaders of newly reinvented ethnic elites who would create a political context in which ethnicity became the only identity that mattered (Gagnon Jr, 1995, p. 132). In response to shifting power structures, ethnic elites invoked inter-ethnic cleavages and later inter-ethnic violence in order to maintain their hold on power. A threat to the ethnic group was framed as a threat to the individual. Thus, rather than an inevitable outcome of ancient hatreds, ethnic conflict should be seen most of all as a political strategy.

2.2 The Dayton Peace Agreement

At the end of the Cold War, Yugoslavia quickly lost its strategic importance to the West. The United States left responsibility for Yugoslavia to Europe, because, simply put, other issues took priority: the unification of Germany, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the break-up of the Soviet Union (Holbrooke, 1998, p. 24). The inadequate reaction by the international community was caused in part by the widespread idea that ancient hatreds made intervention pointless, the confusion about who should

take charge (Brussels or Washington), and in part by the inability of European leaders to read the long-term strategies of their Balkan counterparts (Holbrooke, 1998, pp. 22-33). In addition, the international community was cautious to put its own soldiers in harm's way, making it even more difficult to enforce a breakthrough in the conflict (Mueller, 2000, p. 66).

From 1992 onwards, a series of peace plans was put forward in an effort to put an end to the conflict. This started with the Carrington-Cutileiro plan in the Spring of 1992 and culminated in the Dayton Agreement², which was signed in Paris on December 14, 1995 and formally ended the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In a way, the final agreement was quite similar to its unsuccessful predecessors, raising the question why it took almost four years to reach a compromise (Trbovich, 2008, pp. 315-323).³ According to Kaldor (2006, p. 63) the success of Dayton was primarily due to dramatic changes in the dynamics of the conflict. In the run up to what became the final round of peace talks, the international community had at last started to exercise military pressure on the Bosnian Serbs in the form of NATO airstrikes. In addition, in the months leading up to the negotiations, the Croats and Bosniaks, who had by then signed a ceasefire agreement, started to make rapid progress against the Serbs in both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Crampton, 1996, pp. 355-356). As a result, Serbs were quickly losing territory, from seventy to around fifty per cent of Bosnia-Herzegovina's territory. For the first time in the war, they were confronted with massive flows of refugees. Thus, especially the Serbs had more reason than ever to accept a compromise. In addition, ethnic cleansing was nearing completion and there were now relatively coherent territories for the different ethnic groups. Nevertheless, even though the conditions for peace talks were more favourable than before, the Dayton Peace Agreement did not come about easily.⁴

2.2.1 Annex 4: The Constitution

Although the Dayton Agreement dealt with a wide range of issues, Annex 4 on the Constitution is the issue that would shape the future of post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina (Ćurak & Turčalo, 2012, p. 62). Although the territorial sovereignty of the former Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was preserved, the peace treaty divided the country in two entities with large amounts of autonomy. The Serb dominated entity, Republika Srpska, constitutes 49% of Bosnia-Herzegovina's territory and has a strong central government. The Croat-Bosniak dominated entity, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, contains 51% of the country's territory and is divided in ten largely autonomous cantons that follow, to a certain extent, ethno-national lines between Bosniaks and Croats. It is difficult to classify the political structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as it is neither strictly con-federal nor federal in nature. Based on the differences between Republika Srpska, with a strong central government, and the Federation, with strong cantonal governments, it could be considered an asymmetrical confederation (Kasapović, 2005, p. 4). Because the entities and cantons have such large degrees of independence, they ended up with more governing power than the state (Markowitz, 2007, p. 44). Policy areas such as culture, language and history are considered to be unique and indivisible for each of the constituent peoples. In addition, the Dayton Peace Agreement included the creation of the Office of the High Representative (OHR). The High Representative is the final

² The full text of the Dayton Agreement can be found here: http://www.oscebih.org/dejtonski_mirovni_sporazum/EN/

³ Each peace plan preserved the territorial integrity of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but installed a relatively weak central government. Large degrees of autonomy were preserved for the three main ethnic groups. There were also similarities between the territorial distribution in the various peace plans, which can be compared here: <http://lisawaananen.com/bosniemap/bosniemap.swf>

⁴ For a detailed overview of the negotiations, read Richard Holbrooke's 'To End a War'.

authority in interpreting the Dayton Agreement. Its main task, as described in Annex 10, article II, is to monitor the implementation of the peace settlement and coordinate the actions of local and international actors. The Peace Implementation Council⁵ later decided to expand the High Representative's competences with the power to oust public officials and impose laws in order to promote the peace process.

2.3 Consociationalism

Post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina is an example of a country in which the political model of consociationalism is used to stabilise a divided society (Søberg, 2008, p. 716). Consociationalism is a broad term for the way in which "fragmented but stable democracies" are organised (Lijphart, 1969, p. 211). A consociational state is not characterised by a specific institutional design, but there should always be some form of elite cooperation working to stabilise society, in other words, "governance by elite cartel" (ibid, p. 216). In consociational democracies, there should be some kind of power-sharing mechanism in which all (ethnic) groups, or at least the major ones, have an interest. Other characteristics are group autonomy on issues such as education and culture, as well as proportional representation in politics, bureaucracy and other parts of the public sphere (Pildes, 2009). In some cases, like Bosnia-Herzegovina, seats in parliament are reserved for particular groups, governance powers are delegated to geographic sub-units and minority groups have veto rights.⁶ Bosnia-Herzegovina's constitution fulfils most of the requirements of consociationalism and, in some areas, even goes beyond it (Bieber, 2004, p. 3). According to Stojanović (2011, p. 99), "there is hardly a country which follows so closely Lijphart's model of consociational democracy", which can be seen in the rigid system of ethnic vetoes and the use of ethnic quotas in virtually all government institutions. Although already practiced informally in socialist Yugoslavia, ethnic representation quotas only became a formal part of Bosnia-Herzegovina's political system after the Dayton Peace Agreement (ibid., p. 100).⁷ The main state institutions, such as the Presidency, the Council of Ministers, and the Parliament, as well as the entity and cantonal governments are all organised on consociational principles. Some municipalities, as well as Brčko district, employ ethnic quotas as well.

In addition to proportional representation of civil servants, the following consociational arrangements are in place at the level of Bosnia-Herzegovina's state government. See Appendix C for a full overview of the political system of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

- **Presidency⁸**: The presidency consists of three rotating members, a Bosniak and a Croat from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and a Serb from Republika Srpska. Each member can veto a presidency decision that harms the vital interests of his or her entity (i.e. ethnic group). Whereas the President of any other country often explicitly represents all citizens, in Bosnia-Herzegovina the opposite is the case (Hadžidedić, 2012, p. 98). Serbs living in the Federation cannot run for presidency or vote for a Serbian candidate. The same goes for

⁵ The Peace Implementation Council is a coordination and consultation body of 55 countries and international organisations involved in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

⁶ In Bosnia-Herzegovina each ethnic group can be seen as a minority, since no one constitutes an absolute majority.

⁷ Although working under the banner of unity and equality, the different people of Yugoslavia were certainly not all equal, something that was reflected in the practice of census-taking (Markowitz, 2007, p. 41). A distinction was made between constituent nations, nations, those with a homeland outside of Yugoslavia, and so forth.

⁸ Article V of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Bosniaks and Croats living in Republika Srpska. People who do not belong to the constituent peoples or who do not wish to declare their ethnic affiliation cannot run for president. The European Court of Human Rights has recognised the discriminatory nature of this practice in its ruling on the Sejdić-Finci case.

- **Council of Ministers**⁹: No more than two-thirds of all Ministers are appointed from the Federation; the rest is appointed from Republika Srpska. Deputy Ministers cannot be from the same constituent group as their Ministers. In practice, the same '1:1:1' logic applies as in the case of the Presidency (Stojanović, 2011, p. 100). Since 2002, at least one minister or the secretary general has to be from the group of 'Others'. In the current Council of Ministers, there are three Bosniaks, two Croats, and three Serbs. In addition, there is a Minister from the group of 'Others' as well as a Croat Chairman.
- **Parliamentary Assembly**¹⁰: The approval of both chambers, the House of Peoples and the House of Representatives, is necessary to come to legislation. The chair of each chamber is formed by three delegates, one from each constituent group, with the position of chair and deputy chairs rotating. The House of Peoples is formed by fifteen delegates that are chosen by the entity parliaments. There are five Croats and five Bosniaks from the Federation and five Serbs from Republika Srpska. A majority of at least three members from each constituent group is necessary to pass a law, enabling each ethnic group to veto a decision that is against their interests. The House of Representatives has forty-two members, two-thirds are directly elected from the territory of the Federation and one-third is directly elected from the territory of the Republika Srpska. There is no explicit requirement regarding ethnicity.

2.3.1 Criticism on the consociational model

The consociational model drafted in Dayton has met a fair amount of criticism. Most of the critique does not challenge the merits the system had when negotiating an end to a very complex conflict between ethnic groups. Rather, most criticism focuses on the system's shortcomings almost twenty years later in a markedly less violent society. According to Lord Ashdown, former High Representative, the Dayton Agreement was "the ideal solution to the war, [but] the wrong basis to build a sustainable state" (Ashdown, 2014). One of the main drawbacks is that there is too much focus on group rights and that, as a result, the rights of the individual are neglected (Ćurak & Turčalo, 2012, p. 62; Stojanović, 2011, p. 101). Although Dayton to a certain extent helped to reconcile wartime disputes, this came at the expense of a functioning state. The system of ethnic representation encourages political parties to mobilise voters around ethnic issues, leaving many of the more serious problems, such as the bad economic situation, untouched (Touquet, 2011, pp. 455-456). Furthermore, it is difficult for multi-ethnic parties to establish a foothold in a political system favouring those that represent only a single ethnic group. Except for a small break in 2001, nationalist parties have controlled the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina since the first post-war elections of 1996. Depending on the person that fulfils the role of High Commissioner, he or she may actively intervene in the country's politics or choose to play a supervisory role instead (Søberg, 2008, p. 722). According to some, the interventions of the OHR bypass local institutions and leave little room for local moderate initiatives (Søberg, 2008, p. 725). The existence of the Office of the High

⁹ Article V of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Law On The Council Of Ministers Of Bosnia And Herzegovina.

¹⁰ Article IV of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Representative as final authority enables politicians to play the ethnic card since they do not have to put in any effort to try and reach a compromise themselves (Fontana, 2013, p. 460).

2.4 Political climate

Unfortunately, the ethno-nationalism in Bosnia-Herzegovina’s politics and institutions and the ineffectiveness of the state make it difficult to make progress on the development of democracy (Džihić, 2012, p. 13). As can be seen in Table 1, international studies indicate a worsening political climate in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Economist Democracy Index¹¹ ranks Bosnia at 98th out of 167 countries (Economist, 2013). With an average score of 5.11 out of 10, it is placed in the category of ‘hybrid regimes’, together with countries such as Mali and Lebanon.¹² Bosnia-Herzegovina scores especially low on the functioning of its government and on political participation. Over the last five years, the country’s score has gradually decreased from 5.78 in 2006 to 5.11 in 2012. This decline corresponds with the results from the Freedom House Democracy index, which measures a country’s performance on seven different aspects of democracy (Jahić, 2013).¹³ Scores range from 1 for the highest level of democratic progress to 7 for the lowest level of democratic progress, with Bosnia scoring 4.39 in 2013. Governance, media independence and corruption are major problem areas.

	Freedom House Democracy Index (lower is better)	Economist Democracy Index (higher is better)
2013	4.39	-
2012	4.36	5.11
2010	4.25	5.32
2008	4.11	5.70
2006	4.07	5.7

Table 2: Negative development of democracy in Bosnia-Herzegovina

¹¹ The Economist methodology is founded on what they call a ‘thick’ conception of democracy. Democracy ratings are based on five different dimensions, measured by a total of 60 different indicators.

¹² Countries are placed in one of four categories: ‘full democracy’, ‘flawed democracy’, ‘hybrid regime’, or ‘authoritarian regime’.

¹³ These are ‘electoral process’, ‘civil society’, ‘independent media’, ‘national democratic governance’, ‘local democratic governance’, ‘judicial framework and independence’, and ‘corruption’.

3. Theoretical framework

3.1 Identity

One of the main characteristics of the conflicts that followed the break-up of Yugoslavia was the central role of ethnic identity. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, perhaps more than anywhere else, identity is a source of power. This is reflected in the Dayton Agreement that ended the war and anchored the division of political power along ethnic lines in the Constitution. Today ethno-national identity continues to influence much of the political, social and economic life in the country. It is therefore no wonder that politicians, but also media outlets and entrepreneurs, use it for political and economic gain. The aim of this study is to see whether young people in Bosnia-Herzegovina actually experience identity in an ethnic way, and whether this is related to other issues, such as politics. In order to do so, it is first of all important to develop a clear understanding of the concept of identity and how it comes to be.

Identity can best be described as one's realisation that he or she is both an active agent and an object that is seen and perceived by others (Monroe, Hankin, & Vechten, 2000, p. 420). Although different conceptualisations of identity exist, most of them share the view that identities are multiple and changing according to context. This interacts with the force of self-continuity, the idea that even though a person can take on different roles, he or she will unconsciously seek to maintain continuity of personal character. At the same time, it is important to remain in touch with group identity, values, and behaviour. This can result in a struggle between personal identity and social or group identity. Monroe, Hankin & Vechten (2000, p. 422-429) describe a number of different socio-psychological approaches that look into the construction of social identity and its influence on behaviour. Although these theories are not mutually exclusive, social constructionism will be used as the main basis for this research. Social constructionism can be seen as the opposite of essentialism and primordialism. It rejects the idea of a single, fixed, identity. Instead, identity depends on social context and is therefore subject to change. People might present themselves, through 'self-narratives' as possessing a fixed and stable identity, while in fact they do not. Using the narrative of Yugoslav identity as an example, Monroe, Hankin & Vechten argue that narratives can change in the context of conflict and conflict resolution.

Identity gains meaning through discourse, for example through the media and education. The close interrelation between identity and power necessitates a critical view on the concept of identity, based on the idea that identities are not fixed or pre-given, but the result of political processes. This idea has long been recognised in academia. However, in Bosnia and Herzegovina there exists "a sea of primordialist ideas", among both political elites and their constituencies (Majstorović & Turjačanin, 2013, p. 28). According to this view, people are divided in different historically developed groups that are considered mutually exclusive. Membership of a group is considered as natural and something that has merit in itself (Bačová, 1998, pp. 31-33).

People have different identities depending on the amount of personal relationships as well as the number of relevant social groups one is attached to (Abrams, Frings & Moura, 2005, p. 332). Given that these identities are based upon and evaluated in their social context, they vary in their importance and salience. This is confirmed in a study by Kuo & Margalit (2012, p. 461) which shows that a respondent's identity can shift over time and context, even if someone claims to be strongly attached to his or her identity. However, the degree to which identities are subject to change can vary considerably. Some identities, like ethnic identity, can be very persistent. Yet when a formerly self-evident and natural ethnic identity is eroding, it can suddenly become important for people to

find an alternative 'Us' to provide a sense of identity, belonging and security (Bauman, 2004, p. 24, 29). According to Bauman (2004, p. 56), this was also the case during the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; the "crumbling walls of the nation-state" were increasingly unable to protect people from the forces of globalisation. In reaction to these forces, new regional groupings and states emerged in the post-Yugoslav space (Klemenčič & Schofield, 2004, p. 63).

Brubaker & Cooper (2000, p. 5) warn against reinforcing and reifying political concepts of identity by adopting it as a category of analysis. In daily life, people use identity as a way of making sense of the world. However, politicians also use the concept in order to mobilise a collective along certain lines. This is known as identity politics and is often cited as one of the factors behind the conflicts that followed the disintegration of Yugoslavia (Kaldor, 2006). For analytical purposes, it is better to use 'identification' instead of 'identity', because it is an active term that implies that there is someone doing the identifying (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000, p. 14). Such attempts at identifying are not necessarily successful or universal in their outcomes. How someone is identified, either by himself or by others, depends on the social context. It is therefore a mistake to conflate a system of categorisation or identification, such as the post-Dayton political system in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the intended result, in which case all people would self-identify with either one of the three ethnic groups or as 'Other'. According to Brubaker & Cooper (2000, pp. 26-27), the institutionalisation of ethnic and national categories, like in Bosnia-Herzegovina's October 2013 census, says little about the relevance of these labels for the people to which they are meant to apply. In addition, even if these categories are important avenues for political mobilisation, this does not mean they have the same role in peoples' everyday behaviour.

3.2 Identity Politics

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, politicians often use ethnic identity as an instrument to gain power. Especially during elections, ethnic identity is strengthened at the expense of other identities such as class or occupation. Two factors play a role in this process: politicians playing the ethnic card, as well as voters' realisation that the allocation of resources is decided on during elections (Eifert, Miguel & Posner, p. 495). Politicians are often blamed for employing ethno-nationalistic rhetoric as an easy way to get votes and find personal enrichment (Touquet, 2011a, p. 455). In doing so, they focus on those identity traits (i.e. ethnicity) that best suit their needs, while ignoring others. This form of politics came to be called 'identity politics' and was widely used in the conflicts that followed the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Identity politics is characterised by a backward-looking claim on power that is based on ethnic labels, which can be contrasted with a 'politics of ideas' centred on a forward looking ideal of society (Kaldor, 2006, pp. 7-8). For this purpose, ethnic identity is reconstructed and reinvented in order to serve as an instrument of mobilisation. This tactic was widely employed by Bosnia-Herzegovina's ethnic elites during the 1992-1995 conflict and its underlying logic was institutionalised in the Dayton agreements (ibid, pp.33-71). Identity politics was not only adopted by ethnic elites, however. The primordial idea of 'ancient hatreds' was also widely adopted in Western media and policy circles.

The concept of identity politics is widely used in the social sciences and its meaning differs considerably among different theoretical approaches (Bernstein, 2005, pp. 47-49). Its application covers not only ethno-nationalistic politics, but extends over a wide range of possible identities. This thesis adopts a postmodernist understanding of identity politics which interprets social categories as a way of regulating and dominating social groups. Although Bernstein illustrates that identity politics can also be practiced as bottom-up activism, from a postmodern perspective "identity politics

appears to be narrow, political, state-centred activism that fails to adequately address the cultural bases of power” (Bernstein, 2005, p. 56). Common complaints about identity politics are that it ignores the ability of different identities to mix or overlap. By enforcing a uniform group identity, the existence of intra-group diversity is both neglected and countered.

The current status quo in Bosnia-Herzegovina can be qualified as one in which identity politics remains a popular political strategy. Each ethnic elite is in charge of its own means of sustaining ethno-political order, territory, law enforcement, education and other cultural institutions (Sarajlić, 2011, pp. 65-66). Although the different ethnic elites have no explicit desire to dominate over other ethnic groups, there is also no will to share power in a productive way. The country’s ethnic elites focus on the division of power and direct their attention inwards in order to maintain their position as leaders of the group. They work with the same logic as during the war, that of ethnic exclusion and ethnic group rights in order to protect against threats by other ethnic groups (Majstorović & Turjačanin, 2013, p. 36). As a result, the consociational system perfectly protects group rights, but by consequence, the state government of Bosnia-Herzegovina remains an empty shell. It lacks the power and authority to guarantee basic human rights and enforce a real and well-functioning democratic system. From the perspective of ethnic elites, citizens are not individuals but rather building blocks for a collective purpose, identity politics remains the prevailing strategy of politicians.

Looking back at the conflicts that raged across former Yugoslavia in the 1990’s, one can see how successful identity politics can be. Stories of ancient hatreds remain, but conflicts are no longer resolved on the battlefield. Bosnia-Herzegovina’s society has changed in many ways. It has seen twenty rocky years of transition from war to peace, from socialism to democracy, and from a state-controlled economy to capitalism. A new post-war generation is reaching adulthood, raised in a changing world with new economies and new forms of communication. Identity politics has stayed, but does it still strike a chord with Bosnia-Herzegovina’s new generation?

3.3 Social Identity & Social Categorisation Theory

In order to look further into the role of group relations in the (re)construction of identity, it is helpful to address the theories of Social Identity and Social Categorisation. Social identity is described by Tajfel (in: Hogg, 2005, p. 134) as “the individual’s knowledge that he [or she] belongs to certain social groups together with some emotional and value significance to him of this group membership”. The individual’s relation to others forms the basis for both personal identity and social identity. However, whereas personal identity is based on what sets the individual apart from all others, social identity looks for similarities (Monroe, Hankin, & Vechten, 2000, pp. 421-422). Social identity traits are by their nature shared with others and an individual can be attached to multiple social groups (Majstorović & Turjačanin, 2013, p. 134). People have the tendency to activate the social identity that contributes most to their personal wellbeing at a given moment. As part of a social identity there are rules that define group membership, there is a shared objective as well as a common understanding of the ‘Other’ that defines what ‘We’ are not (ibid, p. 20). Members of a group share a similar worldview and understanding of the political interests and material conditions in which the group finds itself. The related perspective of Realistic Group Conflict Theory argues that groups who are in competition for the same resources will inevitably end up in conflict (Monroe, Hankin, & Vechten, 2000, pp. 432-435). The perception of such conflict would contribute to identification of the self with a group. Inter-group conflict can be reduced or prevented by introducing an overarching

goal. However, although competition might exacerbate animosities, proponents of social identity theory have found that it is not a prerequisite for intergroup tensions to develop.

Social identity is a concept that can be useful in explaining social behaviour. It determines which social groups people belong to as well as the social roles and behaviour that go with it (Hooper, 1976, p. 154). Social identity can help analyse and predict different kinds of social behaviour, particularly regarding inter- and intra-group activity. This can be measured using quantitative data, for example gathered through questionnaires. Scores on different identity items can be factor-analysed to determine the nature and number of social identities present in a data sample (Hooper, 1976). The results from a factor-analysis enable researchers to explore relationships between social identities and other variables, in this case the relationship between social identity and political attitudes. Studies, such as by Kuo & Margalit (2012), emphasise that identity changes over time, implying that someone's current social identity has limited explanatory power in the long run. However, since the focus here is on current social identities and political attitudes, this has limited implications for this study.

Behind the formation of social identities is the process of social categorisation (Hogg, 2005, p. 138). Social categories are represented by sets of attributes, perceptions, and attitudes that form group prototypes. These prescribe and emphasise the similarities within the group as well as the differences with those who fall outside the group. These prototypes serve as the basis for group-related behaviour. The process of social categorisation and prototyping results in the depersonalising and stereotyping of both the self and the other. By self-stereotyping, people seek to comply with the prescribed rules of behaviour and feeling of their group, creating in-group patterns of trust and solidarity. The more prominent and meaningful a social category becomes, the stronger these processes of depersonalisation and stereotyping will be (Abrams, Frings & Moura, 2005, p. 336). In such a case, group characteristics and outcomes are increasingly important and threats to the group become threats to the individual. There is a wide array of possible social categories, such as gender, occupation, religion, and others. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, however, ethnicity is often the most important, not least because of its heavily politicised nature (Majstorović & Turjačanin, 2013, p. 33).

Group competition can foster negative attitudes and behaviour towards each other, whereas in case of a common overarching goal intergroup relations tend to become more harmonious (Abrams, Frings & Moura, 2005, p. 331). By and large, the ethnic elites that came to power during the disintegration of Yugoslavia still control Bosnia-Herzegovina's politics and society. This is facilitated by provisions in the constitution that give each of the constituent peoples, Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs, a guaranteed share in the country's politics. Bosnia-Herzegovina's constitution was part of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the time, ending the war was of primary importance and, as a result, consociational checks and balances were built in to appease ethnic groups.

It is surprising then, that a survey among students in Bosnia-Herzegovina found that the attributes ascribed to one's own group, as well as other ethnic groups are often the same for Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs (Majstorović & Turjačanin, 2013, pp. 184-185). In combination with sharing language and part of their history, this could be an avenue for the "joint construction of social reality" (p. 184). Hospitality, for example, is a general trait of all people of Bosnia-Herzegovina and of South-Slavs in general (Majstorović & Turjačanin, 2013, pp. 184-185). In Table 2 below, other traits are shown which ethnic groups have in common, such as 'united'. The focus on keeping 'our own' ethnic group together is an important one in identity politics, and it is often reflected in political

statements in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As a consequence, Majstorović & Turjačanin’s respondents were likely to rate ‘unity’ as the weakest attribute of *their* ethnic group, but saw it as one of the strongest attributes of the other ethnic groups. This can be interpreted as a call for homogenisation within the ethnic group (ibid, pp. 176-177).

<u>Bosniaks</u>			<u>Croats</u>			<u>Serbs</u>		
Of Bosniaks	Of Croats	Of Serbs	Bosniaks	Croats	Serbs	Bosniaks	Croats	Serbs
Hospitable	Hospitable	United	Hospitable	Hospitable	United	Hospitable	United	Hospitable
Emotional	Polite	Strong	United	Polite	Hospitable	United	Hospitable	Brave
Honourable	Diligent	Hospitable	Backward	Emotional	Brave	Backward	Progressive	Honourable
Brave	Progressive	Brave	Impolite	Honourable	Diligent	Impolite	Diligent	Emotional
Peace-loving		Diligent		Strong	Aggressive	Aggressive	Deceitful	Diligent
Open		Dishonourable		Progressive		Deceitful	Selfish	Strong
Strong		Deceitful		Open			Dishonourable	
Diligent		Ruthless					Aggressive	

Table 2: Attributes most frequently ascribed to one’s own and other ethnic groups (Majstorović & Turjačanin, 2013, p. 185).

3.3.1 Social categorisation in practise: The October 2013 Census

Demography was one of the main rationales behind the 1992-1995 war and remains a very controversial issue in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Slack & Doyon, 2001). This made the recent census particularly relevant and sensitive since it is likely to reflect demographic changes caused by ethnic cleansing and internal displacement during the conflict.¹⁴ Political bickering between the three main ethnic groups is the main reason that the census has been postponed numerous times, even though the quality of public policy, such as that on housing, depends on detailed knowledge of the population (Perry, 2013, pp. 5-6). Finally, in October 2013, the first census in 22 years took place, but especially given the elections scheduled for 2014, this will not be the end of the discussion. Initial results of the census have already been leaked to the press and are claiming different and often incompatible results (Bieber, 2013).

A census gives knowledge and power to politicians by providing insight into demographic and social conditions, enabling them to govern a population more effectively (Kertzer & Arel, 2002, p. 6). It follows that those questions are asked that are needed by the government to improve its policies. However, the questions on ethnicity, religion and mother tongue that were asked in the October 2013 census do not easily fit this description. Moreover, EU guidelines make clear that these questions are not required from prospective EU member states (Perry, 2013, p. 8). Censuses measure that which is relevant for a society and its leaders. People are labelled in order to attain a more

¹⁴ Bosnia-Herzegovina is not the only post-conflict country in which censuses are controversial and highly politicised. This is also the case, in varying degrees, for its neighbouring countries in the Western Balkans (Visoka & Gjevori, 2013, p. 8), but also Nigeria (Odunfa, 2006), and recently Myanmar (Larson, 2014).

understandable reflection of society. However, the borders and categories that are created in the process not only mirror society, but also “enable its social construction” (Visoka & Gjevori, 2013, p. 4). Thus, the social reality is changed by the census that was meant to measure it. The ability to perpetuate social divisions and relationships of power makes the census an outstanding tool for ethnic elites.

The fact that Bosnia-Herzegovina’s politicians find it necessary to have exact numbers on ethnicity, religion and mother tongue shows that censuses are much more than objective headcounts. In this context, the census is no longer a simple bureaucratic and statistical exercise; it has become “an extension of the battle for domination and survival” (Visoka & Gjevori, 2013, p. 3). Rather, by categorising populations in fixed identity categories, censuses play a key role in constructing the social reality they are attempting to reflect (Kertzer & Arel, 2002, p. 2). The need to categorise and simplify goes hand in hand with the modern nation state’s desire to rule its population. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the primary mode of categorisation is ethnic. By assigning people to a certain collective identity, they are encouraged to internalise the logic that populations can and should be organised into clearly defined ethnic groups. The assumption that these categories can be objectively measured, implies that identity is something which is owned by each person individually, existing outside of political interference (ibid, p. 19). This same logic is followed by ethnic elites in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

3.4 Education

This thesis aims to give insight into the extent to which political discourses of ethnic division match the experiences of young people. Ethnic divisions, however, are not only present in the political domain. Education and the media are other notable parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s society in which these divisions are reflected (Majstorović & Turjačanin, 2013, p. 66). This is no wonder, since the “discourse of history [...] is simultaneously a discourse of identity” (Friedman, 1992, p. 194). The way in which the past is represented is linked to the construction of identity in the present, according to the wishes of those in charge of interpreting history (ibid, p.202-207). The debate on history and other aspects of ethnic identity is not limited to the houses of parliament, but also takes place in other locales such as the classroom. Especially when it comes to ‘national subjects’ such as history, geography, language and religion, the educational system of Bosnia-Herzegovina is divided to a great extent (Trbić & Hasanagić, 2007; Unicef, 2009). In some areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the debate on national subjects has resulted in ‘divided schools’ in which students of different ethnic groups share the same building, but are otherwise separated from each other. Students from one ethnic group attend classes at different hours than students from other ethnic groups, so that each group can be taught according to ‘their’ version of history, geography and language. In these schools there is little or no possibility for interethnic interaction.

Since the onset of the 1992-1995 conflict, education has been an important avenue for creating and maintaining ethnic divisions (Magill, 2010, p. 19; Kreso, 2008). The importance of education is due to its power to make and remake ethnic identity labels and imbue them with political and social meaning (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000, p. vii). People have to be mobilised around ethnic divisions in order for ethnic conflict to develop. With the ‘proper’ education, ethnic differences can evolve into lines of division and, ultimately, conflict. Education does not operate in a vacuum, however. It interacts with other factors such as the distribution of political and economic resources, political ideologies, bad governance, and history. These factors are directly or indirectly linked to the educational system (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000, p. vii; Degu, 2005, p. 129). Together with

other discursive arrangements, such as media and politics, the education system conveys real or perceived threats to ethnic identity and group survival. Many of the underlying factors are interrelated. Unequal funding practices, for example, can result in unequal access to education. This in turn affects the economic status of different ethnic groups and the possibility of students to be educated in the language and culture of their ethnic group. This will affect the balance of power and status of different groups and their ability to influence politics. In a political system like Bosnia-Herzegovina's, where groups are always afraid to lose out against one another, such complex dynamics should always be taken into account.

Ethnic identity is a social construct that is shaped and reshaped by education (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000, p. 2). Education is therefore not only about passing on objective knowledge, but also about teaching culture, values, behaviour and other factors related to group identity (ibid., p. ix; Akçali, 2010, p. 44). As such, the educational system can be an important resource in a group's struggle to survive. In addition to the content of group identity, education shapes the "rules of ethnic interaction" (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000, p. 3), thereby either promoting or discouraging understanding between ethnic groups. Children are receptive for such ethnic attitudes at an early age and once prejudices have been formed, they tend to increase over time (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000, p. 2). By shaping identity and the rules of ethnic interaction, education connects to many of the root causes of conflict. Nevertheless, the importance of education is not always recognised in post-conflict situations. Priority will go to those policy areas that yield more immediate political and economic results (Degu, 2005, pp. 130-131). In Bosnia-Herzegovina, this is reflected in both the domestic politicians' and international donors' attitude towards education. Relatively little official international aid is invested in education (Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry of Finance and Treasury, 2013). Political debates on education focus mainly on group rights regarding the 'national group of subjects', instead of using education to promote economic development and combat unemployment (Toè, 2013).

3.5 Media

Media play a central role in the complex system of institutions, interactions and experiences that shape someone's perspective on the world (Kenix, 2011, p. 139). Its influence is cumulative, which means that it builds up with continued exposure over time. Like education, the role of mass media is highly controversial in societies that are recovering from conflict (Matheson & Dursun, 2001). Different parties in conflict employ different standards when interpreting news coverage. People tend to accept at face value those reports that confirm their existing opinion while rejecting any opposing view as biased. When group identity is particularly important to the individual, it is more likely that he or she will be hostile towards media that are not in line with his/her group position, even if reporting is considered objective by non-partisans (Matheson & Dursun, 2001, p. 117). Media coverage concerning topics of conflict between social groups, which is potentially any topic in Bosnia-Herzegovina, is even more prone to such bias. However, people who are less attached to their group have a lower tendency to see other media as biased.

According to Matheson & Dursun (p. 118), these findings fit within the Social Identity and Social Categorisation theories. Individuals seek to enhance the status of their group, particularly when inter-group relations are competitive. To support this process, media coverage is selected that confirms the positive in-group bias and helps to establish one's own group as superior over the other. These findings are closely related to the Schema Theory. When processing information, people unconsciously employ certain structures (schemata) that reflect their values and expectations

(Monroe, Hankin, & Vechten, 2000, pp. 423-424). Schemata offer a template that helps to process information more efficiently, thereby relieving the cognitive burden. Once activated, this process can be quite resilient to change, which could lead to a distorted perception of reality.

The concept of hegemony can be useful in understanding the role media play in shaping society's dominant ideologies and identities (Kenix, 2011, p. 60). Those who are in control decide on the dominant perspectives that mainstream media broadcast into society. If this situation persists long enough, the public adopts more and more of these ideas and values. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, most of the mainstream media are either implicitly or explicitly linked to the country's various ethno-political elites, meaning that there is little objective reporting (Turcilo, 2010; Jukic, 2013). A case in point is the country's most read newspaper *Dnevni Avaz*, owned by Security Minister Fahrudin Radončić. In Republika Srpska, public broadcasting is a tool of the nationalist government while their colleagues in the Federation have to put up with boycotts, budget cuts and dismissals from different political sides (Kurspahić, 2012, pp. 124-125). This happens despite the formal existence of a legal framework that guarantees press freedom.

Because of their link with political interests, newspapers and other media are often used as political tools and have a tendency to report very differently on the same issue. In recent years, the media landscape in Bosnia-Herzegovina has seen a negative trend across the board, which is reflected in the Media Sustainability Index (IREX, 2013).¹⁵ Media outlets are often biased and affiliated with one of the main political parties, making it difficult for smaller and less powerful political parties to gain media attention. Most citizens focus on a limited number of media and thus rely on fragmented and biased news coverage, which in turn has a polarizing effect on society. In a study of five major Bosnian newspapers, Majstorović & Turjačanin (2013, p. 68-86), show how ethnic identity is often communicated through the media.¹⁶ The fact that this occurs frequently is recognised as a problem by Bosnia-Herzegovina's young people (ibid, p. 87-129). The question is to what extent the divisions conveyed through education and the mainstream media are effective in shaping the identity and political opinion of young people. It should be noted in this respect that there exist other means of getting information besides the mainstream media. Here, one could think of alternative media¹⁷ such as political blogs, online social networks, and student or youth organisations.

3.6 Ethnicity, nationality and constituent peoples

The concepts of ethnicity and nationality are often used interchangeably to denote the different groups of people living in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Historically, the term 'ethnic' was not used very often and only became prominent during the 1990's (Majstorović & Turjačanin, 2013, p. 14). Before then, during Yugoslav times, the usual terms were 'nation' for large groups and 'nationality' for smaller groups. The groups being referred to, however, have stayed the same. The nation of Croats is the same as the ethnic group of Croats. The ambiguity between ethnicity and nationality is reflected in the census form in which both terms are used next to each other. Because of this ambiguity, no real

¹⁵ The Media Sustainability Index monitors the development of the media on five different dimensions: 'free speech', 'professional journalism', 'plurality of news sources', 'business management', and 'supporting institutions'. All of these have worsened between 2009 and 2013.

¹⁶ Majstorović & Turjačanin carried out a discourse analysis of the main pages of five Bosnian newspapers during April 2010. Three newspapers that target one of the three ethnic groups, two newspapers that target all citizens (see Majstorović & Turjačanin (2013, p. 53-55) for a detailed description of their approach).

¹⁷ The distinction between mainstream and alternative media is problematic for a number of reasons, not least because they seem to be converging towards one another, see Kenix (2011).

difference can be made between the two terms. In most cases the term ethnicity will be used since this seems to be the most common in academia and the media when talking about Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, in some specific cases, the term 'national' is used, as in the common phrase 'national group of subjects'. In these cases, the meaning of the word 'national' is often similar to 'ethnic' or the two are conflated into 'ethno-nationalistic', which indicates a nationalism that draws heavily on ethnicity as a distinguishing factor. Ethno-nationalism is a continuation of pre-existing ethnic ties through shared memories and rituals (Smith, 1993, pp. 55-56). The focus is more on common ancestry (however real or imagined), folk history, and customs, instead of citizenship and the idea of being part of the same administrative community. Religion and language can be seen as the two main 'building blocks' of ethnic identity (Safran, 2008, p. 178). Both language and religion are usually acquired at birth and prone to be taken as primordial characteristics of an ethnic group. However, even though these terms often go together, they remain distinctive phenomena. Religion, for example, will be indicative of ethnicity only in a certain context. A Catholic citizen of Italy, will be identified as an Italian, whereas a Catholic citizen of Bosnia-Herzegovina will likely be identified as a Bosnian Croat.

With the negotiations that led to the Dayton agreements, a new term was added to an already confusing lexicon. This was the concept of 'constituent peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina', namely the Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs, which are the three largest ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Based on their status as constituent peoples, they have special political rights that are defined in the constitution.¹⁸ Smaller ethnic groups, such as Jews and Roma, are grouped together under 'Other' and have considerably less political rights. According to Majstorović & Turjačanin (2013, p. 17), in Bosnia-Herzegovina it is most of all important how other people identify you. People who do not claim to be part of a certain group will still be assigned an ethnic category based on their dialect or name. Ethnic identity differs from other possible identity labels in the sense that people have little influence on which ethnicity others assign to them.

¹⁸ These are described in more detail in §2.2-2.3

4. Methodology

The ultimate goal of this study is to make general conclusions about a large demographic group, 18-25 years old, located in an extensive geographical area, Bosnia-Herzegovina. This makes it well suited for questionnaire research (Denscombe, 2007, p. 154). The topics under consideration, identity and politics, are familiar to respondents since they are regular themes in Bosnia-Herzegovina's society. In Bosnia-Herzegovina's current political climate, media, and education system, it is quite common to think of people in ethnic categories. Although these topics are certainly contested, it is not necessarily controversial to talk about them. Still, given the sensitive nature of the topic, questions should be as neutral as possible in order to not offend anyone. As with any research method, there are advantages and disadvantages as well as ethical issues to take into consideration. These are elaborated upon in the following sections.

4.1 Web-based questionnaire

An important advantage of internet-based research methods is that they reach respondents in a large geographical area, without adding too much to the time and costs required (Madge, 2007, p. 253). The most likely alternative would have been to hand out paper-based surveys at schools and universities. This would imply printing and handing out or mailing the questionnaires, all of which would increase the costs and time needed for data collection (Vicente & Reis, 2010, p. 251). In addition, this approach would require approval from the relevant Education Ministries. These number fourteen in total and are spread throughout the country. Getting the necessary permits would require a significant amount of time and financial resources from the researcher. Moreover, even if allowed, administering surveys at schools and universities would be a lengthy process and leave many young people unaccounted for. After all, a considerable number of people aged 18-25 is no longer enrolled in a school or university. Thus, given the limited time and financial resources available for this study, web-based questionnaires were preferred over traditional paper questionnaires. Especially in these circumstances, a web-based questionnaire is the best option to reach a geographically dispersed target group.

According to Denscombe (2007, p. 10), there is little difference between web-based questionnaires and paper-based questionnaires regarding the quality of information captured. Furthermore, self-administered questionnaires in general tend to have less social desirability bias than in cases where an interviewer is present (Sue & Ritter, 2007, p. 40)). Although the use of the internet as a way of collecting data influences the selection of respondents and the way in which surveys are managed, this has no direct influence on the probability or non-probability of samples, nor does it have an effect on statistical inference (Vehovar, Manfreda & Koren, 2008, p. 275). Indeed, web-based questionnaires allow significantly more interaction with the respondent than those sent by mail and this can have a positive effect on the quality of data (Vicente & Reis, 2010, p. 260). This has been taken into account in the development of the questionnaire used in this study. For example, certain key questions had to be answered before continuing to the next page in order to prevent missing errors.

Since there is no actual interviewer, visual elements are the major communication link between the researcher and the respondent (Vehovar, Manfreda, & Koren, 2008, p. 278). It is important to think about answer controls and good welcome/end messages since these aspects take over the interviewer's role of guiding a respondent through the questionnaire. However, although visual effects and multimedia can provide extra stimuli they can also increase the risk of distracting a respondent (Denscombe, 2007, pp. 160-161). Unusual elements in a questionnaire can lead to poor

performance on factors such as dropout rate, missing data, and completion time (Manfreda & Vehovar, 2002, p. 278). Therefore, a rather basic version of the LimeSurvey software was used which had a simple layout that is clear and easy to navigate, providing the lowest amount of distraction as possible. Another important asset of LimeSurvey and similar programmes is that results are automatically saved into a database. This can later be opened with statistical software such as SPSS or Excel. Importantly, responses do not have to be entered by hand, which greatly improves the speed and accuracy of data collection.

4.2 Contacting respondents

One of the potential disadvantages of using web-based questionnaires is the possibility that not everybody in the target population has equal access to internet. This could lead to problems with coverage bias and sampling error because some groups are better represented than others (Vicente & Reis, 2010, p. 252). This will be taken into account when interpreting the questionnaires' results. However, it is also noted that internet users tend to be younger, with higher educational and income levels than the general population (Vicente & Reis, 2010, p. 252). According to a recent report, 93% of people aged 15 to 24 uses internet daily, compared to 75% of the total population between 10 and 75 years (Džihana, Ćendić, & Tahmaz, 2012). Since this study focuses on young people, the concern with equal access to internet is less of a problem than studies focussing on both young and old people. In addition, the duration of the survey-period, approximately one month, has been sufficiently long to enable less frequent users to respond as well.

Internet questionnaires should be as short as possible (Jansen, Joostens, & Kemper, 2004, p. 82). The longer the questionnaire, the greater the likelihood that respondents lose interest and fail to complete the survey. Although particularly relevant in the case of internet questionnaires, this is something that has to be taken into account in all forms of personal contact with research subjects, including regular paper-based surveys, but also interviews and focus groups. Considerable efforts have been made to preserve only those questions that are directly relevant to the purpose of this research. This selection was made with the help of a pilot study¹⁹ and consultations with colleagues.

There were three ways in which the questionnaire was distributed among potential respondents. First, the questionnaire was distributed across the personal network of the researcher, including colleagues at proMENTE social research and other friends and acquaintances in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Since this network is mainly located in and around Sarajevo, and to a lesser extent Banja Luka, there was a risk of coverage bias. To counter this effect, a large number of youth organisations and clubs throughout the country were asked to share the questionnaire on their Facebook page. Fourteen organisations responded and asked their members to participate in the survey. In addition, Facebook advertisements were used to gather additional respondents. These were targeted at the Facebook accounts of people between 18 to 25 years old and living in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a potential audience of 540,000.²⁰ Given the focus on young people, the possible exclusion of respondents not using internet or Facebook is relatively limited.²¹ Furthermore, since

¹⁹ The pilot study included around sixty geography students at the University of Sarajevo

²⁰ The potential campaign audience is Facebook's estimate of how many unique visitors are able to see an advertisement over a 30-day period. The number of people that actually sees an ad depends on the budget and duration of the campaign. The total potential campaign audience is less than three times higher (1,480,000), which confirms that young people are greatly overrepresented among Facebook users

²¹ A 2009 study found that 92% of the respondents in BiH aged 15-24 had heard of social networking sites, of which Facebook was by far the most popular (Gfk BH, 2009). Of those who used Facebook, 58% were aged 15-

Facebook is often used in people's spare time, individuals might have more time and willingness to participate compared to a phone-survey or paper-based survey, which might come at an inappropriate time. It should be taken into account, however, that not every Facebook user spends the same amount of time on the social network. In order to enable less frequent Facebook users to participate as well, advertisements covered a long period of time, which lasted from December 9, 2013, until January 10, 2014.

4.3 Questionnaire design

Questionnaire design is of key importance in the survey process. It is the component of research that is most open to the researcher's influence (Vehovar, Manfreda, & Koren, 2008, pp. 277-278). First of all, questions and answer options should be unambiguous, straightforward, and meaningful for the respondent (Jansen, Joostens, & Kemper, 2004, pp. 54-59). Answer categories should not overlap and should be in a logical order. It is also important to avoid suggestive formulations in the questionnaire. Suggestive formulation of questions and answer categories can function as a 'situational trigger' that influences people's identification process (Kuo & Margalit, 2012, p. 461). Questions asked earlier on in a questionnaire can influence the answers given to another question later on, which is called a 'priming effect' (ibid, p. 465-469). It is important to avoid such subtle political cues in order to avoid steering respondents in a certain direction.

Vicente & Reis (2010, p. 252) propose two strategies to manage the risk of non-response in a survey, both of which have been used in this study. The first strategy is proactive and works by offering an incentive that encourages individuals to complete the questionnaire, and tries to convince them of the importance to cooperate. Therefore, the questionnaire used for this study included a prize that participants could select at the end of the survey. Manfreda & Vehovar (2002) found that including an incentive significantly decreases dropout rates. This is supported by another meta-analysis on incentive-based experiments, which found that incentives increase the likelihood of someone participating in a survey with 19%, and retention rates increased by 27% compared to studies without incentives (Göriz, 2006, p. 65). As mentioned earlier, the advertisements on Facebook have been used to contact respondents over a longer period of time. Because of the longer-term exposure, it is more likely that somebody will eventually click on the advertisement and decides to participate. The second strategy proposed by Vicente & Reis (2010, p.253) is more defensive in character and aims to limit the aspects of questionnaire design that might cause people to withhold or stop cooperation, such as the length of the questionnaire and the way in which questions are formulated. Questionnaire design influences factors such as item non-response rate (i.e. the number of 'don't knows' and 'no opinions') and the number of dropouts.

Except for the question on the year of birth, all questions are of a closed nature. In most cases, closed questions are preferred over open questions since the latter are difficult to classify and analyse statistically (Jansen, Joostens, & Kemper, 2004, pp. 46-47). Closed questions, on the other hand, provide uniform information that can easily be quantified, compared and analysed (Denscombe, 2007, p. 166). In addition, closed questions are easier to answer than open questions and therefore less time-consuming and less demanding of the respondent (Vicente & Reis, 2010, pp. 260-261). This is important since the inclusion of difficult-to-answer questions increases the

24. Since then the number of Facebook users has risen considerably. By March 2013, Facebook had 1.11 billion active users worldwide, more than three times the number it had in late 2009 (The Associated Press, 2013).

likelihood of dropout (Manfreda & Vehovar, 2002, pp. 14-15). Other, related, factors that can lead to dropout are a loss of interest and the possibility of respondents getting annoyed.

However, there is also a possible disadvantage in using closed questions. It could be that respondents' true feelings are not reflected in the list of options that follows a question. As a result, some of the subtlety might be lost and respondents might become frustrated (Denscombe, 2007, p. 166). However, this has been countered by extensive testing of the questionnaire before settling on the definitive list of questions and answer-categories. Based on pilot results, it was decided that some extra answer categories had to be added. The final questionnaire aims to be as thorough as possible, without bothering respondents with irrelevant options. Wherever suitable, there is an option to state 'does not apply to me' and in some cases it is possible to choose 'other, please specify'. There is also a possibility to give further comments at the end of the questionnaire. Together, these adjustments attempt to better grasp the meaning that respondents try to convey and give room for more detailed answers. The results have been discussed with locals both during and after the enumeration period, in order to get a better idea of the meaning behind the numbers.

The questionnaire contains multiple pages in which related questions are grouped together, as different studies have found that this lowers item non-response rates (Vicente & Reis, 2010, p. 255). The chance that people respond to and finish a questionnaire is also influenced by the time they have to invest. Questionnaires should therefore be as short as possible and only include questions directly relevant for a study. An analysis of different studies by Vicente & Reis (2010, p. 256) found that non-response rates are lower when it is stated beforehand that the questionnaire will only take a short amount of time (10 minutes) versus a longer amount of time (30 minutes). There is, however, a negative effect on dropout rates if the announced length is exceeded by the actual time that is necessary. Based on a pilot-study of the survey, respondents were told that completing the questionnaire would take around 10 minutes.

Answer categories are provided in the form of so-called 'radio buttons', which means that all the answers are immediately visible. This can be contrasted with drop-down boxes, in which the list of options is only shown after clicking, or numeric entry in entry boxes. The use of radio buttons tends to lower item non-response (Vicente & Reis, 2010, p. 264). The number of points available is five, which provides a neutral option in order not to alienate those people that truly feel neutral and possibly skew the data (Sue & Ritter, 2007, pp. 50-51). Each scale point is labelled in order to prevent misinterpretation of scale definitions.

4.4 The questionnaire

The questionnaire contains eleven question groups, which are described below. The content and order of the questions is designed to fit the goals of the research, inspired by literature analysis and conversations with locals. A pilot study was held among part of the survey population; based on this some questions were re-formulated and extra answer categories were added. In addition, three control questions have been added to the questionnaire, formulated as such: 'If you read this, please select [answer category]'. The purpose of these questions is to identify and remove unreliable data. Respondents who do not read questions properly, or who select random answers in order to finish the survey as quickly as possible are removed from the dataset. Although the number of respondents will be lower, the results of statistical analysis become more reliable.

General outline (see Appendix D for full transcript)

1. General information: Respondents are asked about their age, gender, place of residence and occupational status.
2. 2013 Census: Respondents are asked whether they participated in the October 2013 census and to state their ethnicity, religion and mother tongue the same way they did in the original census. If respondents indicate that they did not participate in the census, they are asked what they would have answered. Based on these answers, respondents can be distinguished between different ethnic groups.
3. Identity: Respondents are asked about the personal importance of a number of factors, such as their gender, social class, political orientation, nationality, being a student, being young, and so forth. Rather than asking them directly about identity, which might trigger associations with ethnicity, the question is formulated in a more neutral way: 'how important are these things for who you are?'. By asking the question in such a manner, it is expected that respondents are more likely to consider other aspects than ethnicity.
4. Your opinion (1): Respondents are asked whether they perceive tension between a number of social groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina, such as old and young people, different ethnic groups, and others. These questions are based on a questionnaire used in the 2009 United Nations Human Development Report on Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNDP, 2009, p. 42). The results have been used to compare young people with the general population and to assess how they see ethnic tensions compared to other problems. After consultation with local researchers, it was decided to slightly rephrase some aspects compared to the UNDP report. Some phrases were potentially suggestive and could be unnecessarily offensive to respondents. In addition, extra social groups were added to suit the purposes of this specific study. These differences between the two pieces of research should be taken into account when comparing their results.
5. Your opinion (2): Respondents are asked to judge a number of statements related to the role of (ethnic) identity in the political system of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The answers have been used to see to what degree respondents support ethno-politics. The answers can be contrasted with the last part of the questionnaire, which is concerned with personal attitudes towards interethnic interaction.
6. Your opinion (3): Respondents are asked how proud they are, respectively, to be a member of their ethnic group, of being a citizen of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and of the area in which they live, the latter is stated by respondents earlier-on in the survey.
7. Political parties: Respondents are asked which political parties best represent their beliefs. Up to three answers are possible. Because of the question's design and the characteristics of the respondent group, the results are not a reliable indicator for election results. Rather, the responses to this question have been used to see which parties are supported by young people, those that focus on ethnicity versus those that can be considered multi-ethnic or post-ethnic. In the case of real elections there might be different dynamics that shape a voter's choice. It is possible that people feel very close to one party, but vote for another in order not to cast a 'lost' vote. Therefore, the question is asked in a way that makes sure respondents feel free to choose small parties that might not play an actual role in real elections. Furthermore, it was anticipated that some people are wavering between political parties. Respondents are therefore able to choose up to three parties from the list. In addition, respondents can choose 'local/regional party' and name a party that has not been

included in the list. If none of the parties is considered to adequately represent the respondent's beliefs, he or she can indicate this at the end of the list.

8. Political questions: In this question group respondents are asked to indicate how positive or negative they are regarding key political issues in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which were chosen on the basis of reports in the media and academia. Respondents are asked about their opinion on the status of Bosnia-Herzegovina's economy, relations between ethnic groups, and EU accession, as well as other political issues. Responses have been used to assess the relevance of ethnicity in comparison to other issues in the country. A question is also included that asks whether the respondent would consider voting for a multi-ethnic party.
9. Social relations: Respondents are asked about social relations and the role of ethnicity. Respondents are also asked about the nature of their friendships. According to O'Loughlin (2010, p. 28), this gives a good image of the possibility for inter-ethnic reconciliation. The definition of 'friend' remains open to the respondents' interpretation in order to enable comparison with a 2005 survey cited in O'Loughlin (2010).
10. Review of this survey: Respondents have the possibility to give further comments.
11. Prize draw: Respondents can select the prize they would like to win and leave their contact information.

4.5 Ethical considerations

Online research follows largely the same ethical considerations as offline research, but their practical implications might vary according to the context of a study (Madge, 2007, pp. 252-253). In general, it can be concluded from Madge (2007) that most ethical concerns arise when using online discussion forums or chat boxes as research material, because of the blurred line between what is private and what is public. In the case of web-based questionnaires largely the same precautions have to be taken as when using onsite questionnaires. Some important issues are: informed consent, confidentiality, data security, subject anonymity and privacy, and survey reporting which are discussed at length by Madge (2007) and Sue & Ritter (2007, p. 21-24). All these issues are taken into careful consideration throughout this study. Information about respondents is strictly confidential and all data has been made anonymous before including it in the report. An anonymised version of the original dataset is available upon request.

4.6 General characteristics of the survey sample

In total, 683 persons took part in the survey between December 9, 2013, and January 10, 2014. Out of these, 328 respondents fit the selection criteria for statistical analysis. Only those were selected that completed the entire questionnaire, were born between 1988 and 1996²², and answered all three of the control questions correctly. Although the use of control questions meant that an additional 168 respondents had to be removed, the remaining data is more reliable, making the conclusions drawn from the statistical analysis below more reliable as well.

Of the remaining 328 respondents included in statistical analysis, 220 (67.1%) are female and 108 (32.9%) are male. The average birth year is 1990.83 with a standard deviation of 2.134. Most of the respondents, 233, are students (71%), 28 respondents (8.5%) are employed, and 63 (19.2%) are unemployed. Two respondents worked as an intern or volunteer, and another two respondents did

²² Since the survey period included part of 2013 and 2014 the inclusion range for birth-year was set at 1988-1996.

not answer this question. A majority of 267 respondents (81.4%) live in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Another 52 respondents (15.9%) live in Republika Srpska, and 6 respondents (1.8%) in Brčko district. Compared to the preliminary results of the official census, respondents from the Federation are overrepresented.²³ Because of the politicized nature of Bosnia-Herzegovina's geography, respondents were also able to choose 'Other' and give their own definition of where they lived. Three respondents used this opportunity. Two of them stated their town and one stated the country of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Based on this low number, it seems that few people directly challenge the idea of entities, although this does not mean that they support it.

In the next two chapters, the results of the questionnaire will be discussed in more detail, together with other relevant sources of information. First of all, the importance of ethnicity for the respondents' identity will be analysed. Next, we will look into the political attitudes of respondents and the role ethnicity plays therein. Finally, the link between (ethnic) identity and political attitudes will be made to see whether there is a relation between the two.

²³ According to the preliminary results of the 2013 Census a total of 3,791,622 persons are living in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Out of these, 2,371,603 (62.55%) live in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1,326,991 (35.00%) live in Republika Srpska, and 93,028 (2.45%) persons live in Brčko District (Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2013).


5. Identity

5.1 Labelling the respondents

Ethnicity is the main label that people in Bosnia-Herzegovina are identified with. This logic will be followed in this report in order to facilitate comparison between groups and between different studies. However, this does not mean that these labels are recognised as something that is meaningful in itself. Indeed, one of the goals of this study is to find out whether it is possible to let go of these labels and find new, less restrictive ones.

The majority of the questionnaire's respondents took part in the October 2013 Census of Population, Households and Dwellings in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These people were asked to state what answers they gave in the census on the issues of nationality/ethnicity, religion, and mother tongue. Only a small minority, 5.2% of the respondents, did not participate in the census. They were asked to state what answers they would have given. The answers gathered here will be used later on in the statistical analysis of other questions, in order to differentiate between the results of different ethnic groups. In addition, it will be used to assess to what degree ethnicity corresponds with related categories such as religion and language.

Figure 3: Nationality/ethnicity




As can be seen in Figure 3, Bosniaks clearly form the largest ethnic/national group of respondents, constituting just over half of the respondents. Croats and Serbs both make up around fifteen per cent. The results for the October 2013 census questions on ethnicity/nationality, religious affiliation and mother tongue have not yet been publicised. Compared with the 1991 census²⁴, however, Bosniaks are overrepresented by around ten per cent, while Serbs are underrepresented by seventeen per cent. The number of Croats is about right. Together, the three main ethnic groups make up 82.5% in the survey sample, whereas they made up 92.1% of population in the 1991 census.

A significant share of the respondents states that they did not answer the question on nationality/ethnicity in the census as it was not mandatory. A similar number of people used the 'Other' category to define their nationality/ethnicity. Analysis of these answers indicates that most of the 'Others' tend to identify with the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina (e.g. by stating Bosnian or Bosnia and Herzegovinian) or a combination of identification with the state and identification with a national/ethnic group (e.g. Bosnian Serb). It is important to note the difference here between Bosniak and Bosnian; the first is derived from the ethnic group of Bosniaks (often equated with

²⁴ The numbers for the 1991 census are as follows: Muslims (Bosniaks) = 43.5%, Croats = 17.4%, Serbs = 31.2% (Markowitz, 2007, p. 42)


Muslims), while the term Bosnians is derived from the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A few others showed in their answers that they do not support the practice of dividing people along national/ethnic lines, by stating 'Eskimo' or 'Jedi', for example.

Figure 4: Religious affiliation



Religion is one of the most, if not the most, important markers of ethnicity in Bosnia-Herzegovina. For example, in Majstorović & Turjačanin's (2013, p. 113) focus groups respondents said that the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina are basically one people, divided across different religions. The seemingly natural relationship between religion and ethnicity is contributed to the lack of communication between religious groups, as religious leaders chiefly tend to their own flock (ibid, p. 163). At first glance, the responses on religious affiliation seem to overlap with those on ethnicity and nationality. Whether this assumption holds truth will be tested later.

Figure 5: Mother tongue



Similar to the October 2013 Census, the question on mother tongue was an obligatory part of the questionnaire. Thus, it was not possible to answer 'Ne Izjašnjavam se' (I don't want to state). As a result, there is no category of 'Not clarified'. What is striking is that the number of respondents speaking Bosnian as their mother tongue is significantly higher than the number of respondents claiming to be Bosniak. This difference can be explained by the fact that most people who stated their nationality/ethnicity as 'Other' or as 'Not clarified' stated Bosnian as their mother tongue (71.4% and 82.8%, respectively). In addition, two Croats and one Serb chose Bosnian as their mother tongue, but these are very small minorities within their ethnic/national groups.

It is often stated that in Bosnia-Herzegovina ethnic identification corresponds with religion, language, and an associated group-based view on the geopolitical situation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Majstorović & Turjačanin (2013, p. 99-104) found that young people still have a rather strong

tendency for ethnic identification with these themes. For Serbs, this means speaking Serbian, the survival and/or independence of Republika Srpska²⁵, and supporting Serbian sports teams. For Croats, it means speaking Croatian, supporting Croatian sports teams, and the desire for a Croat entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina. For Bosnians, it means speaking Bosnian, supporting Bosnian sports teams, and the feeling that entities should be abolished.

The findings of Majstorović & Turjačanin (2013, p. 99-104) are confirmed in this questionnaire. As can be seen in Tables 3 and 4 below, the categories of ethnicity, religion and language do indeed overlap for most respondents. In general, it can be said that Bosniaks are Islamic and speak Bosnian, Croats are Catholic and speak Croatian, and Serbs are Orthodox and speak Serbian. There is an exception for those whose ethnicity falls under 'Other' or 'Not clarified'. Most, but not all of them state Bosnian as their mother tongue. However, they do not show a clear preference for a religious affiliation. Looking at the three main ethnic groups of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs, it can be concluded that ethnicity/nationality, language, and religion are indeed highly intertwined, and that this also goes for younger generations. Thus, each one of these factors should be viewed in relation to the others. In the next section, ethnicity, religion and language are compared to other aspects related to identity.

	Islamic	Catholic	Orthodox	Agnostic	Atheist	Not clarified	Other	Total
Bosniak	164	0	0	2	3	4	0	173
Croat	0	46	0	1	1	1	0	49
Serb	0	0	40	4	0	1	1	46
Not clarified	8	0	0	4	6	10	0	28
Other	9	3	1	5	5	5	1	29
Total	181	49	41	16	15	21	2	325

Table 3: Nationality/ethnicity X Religious affiliation cross-tabulation

	Bosnian	Croatian	Serbian	Other (B/C/S)	other	Total
Bosniak	172	0	1	0	0	173
Croat	2	46	0	1	0	49
Serb	1	0	44	0	1	46
Not clarified	20	2	6	0	0	28
other	24	1	1	2	1	29
Total	219	49	52	3	2	325

Table 4: Nationality/ethnicity X Mother language cross-tabulation

5.2 The importance of different aspects of identity

It is not enough to know that respondents have an ethnic/national identity and that this overlaps with religion and language. Based on the theoretical background of this thesis, respondents are expected to have multiple identities that can co-exist together. It is therefore important to find out

²⁵ The relation between ethnic identification and geographic concepts, such as the different entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, will be addressed later in this chapter.

what these alternative identities are and how important they are compared to ethnic identity. In order to measure this, respondents were asked to mark the extent in which different identity factors are important for them. Each respondent was presented with twenty-three randomly listed factors, based on desk research, conversations with locals, and a pilot study of the questionnaire. Respondents could rate the different items on an ordinal scale ranging from 'very important', 'important', 'moderately important', 'a little important' to 'not important'. In addition, they had the option to choose 'does not apply to me' since it was expected that this would best fit the experience of some respondents, for instance atheists who would have to rate the importance of religion. At the bottom of the list, respondents had the opportunity to add another factor that was important for them, under the heading 'If there is anything else please specify'. From the group of respondents that fit the selection criteria, only 8 out of 328 (2.4%) used this option.²⁶ Some of these answers were similar to other categories, but slightly different in formulation. Overall, it can be said that the original twenty-three factors were sufficient for most respondents.

Below, the means and standard deviations of all 23 categories are listed.²⁷ Before proceeding to these results, it should be noted that there is some debate in academia on what statistical procedures can be performed on variables that are measured on an ordinal scale. Although it is clear that 'very important' (1) is a rank above 'important' (2), this does not mean that it is twice as important. Because the distance between two ranks is not exactly clear, it is difficult to interpret a mean value such as 1.16 (for 'my family'). For this reason, some argue that mean and standard deviation cannot be applied to ordinal data (Multon & Coleman, 2010). However, under certain circumstances, such statistics are used by social scientists on ordinal data (Dykema, Blixt, & Stevenson, 2008). In this case, using means as a measure of central tendency gives a clear indication of which variables are considered important and which are not as relevant. Other measures of central tendency, such as mode or median, have little explanatory value and other methods such as boxplots would be too complicated for comparing 23 variables. In order to make the ordinal data more suitable for ratio-level statistical procedures, the difference between different ranks was made as clear as possible to respondents. Each answer category was labelled and there were enough answer categories to choose from. Such measures help to improve data quality (Dykema, Blixt, & Stevenson, 2008).

The mean value indicates the importance of a variable for the average respondent. The lower the score, the more important the variable is (with 1= 'very important', 5= 'not important'). The sum value indicates the importance for the group as a whole and generally follows the same trend as the mean values. The standard deviation indicates the amount of variation from the mean value. This cannot be interpreted in a technical sense, because most of the variables are not normally distributed. However, it does give some indication of which items are disputed and which are not. The answer 'does not apply to me' is excluded from the analysis, because it does not fit in the scale between 'very important' – 'not important' and would artificially decrease the importance of categories that some people experience as irrelevant. The category 'other, please specify' is likewise not included, because respondents did not have the possibility to state the degree of importance of this factor.

²⁶ Without the exclusion of respondents based on the control questions, the number would be 20 out of 496 respondents, or 4%, which is still quite a marginal number (in this case we can expect respondents to answer the questions accurately, since they answered it on purpose).

²⁷ The category 'other, please specify' is not included, because it did not have the possibility to state the degree of importance.

Table 5: 'Please mark the extent to which these factors are important for you and what you are'

	N	Sum	Mean	Std. Deviation
1. My family	327	380	1.16	.521
2. That I am a human	327	397	1.21	.551
3. Me as an individual	328	462	1.41	.765
4. My profession	325	489	1.50	.804
5. That I am young	328	554	1.69	.955
6. My social status	328	572	1.74	.920
7. My language *	327	573	1.75	1.046
8. That I am a student	278	512	1.84	1.018
9. Bosnia and Herzegovina	320	618	1.93	1.204
10. Multiculturalism	321	637	1.98	1.105
11. My town or village	326	691	2.12	1.137
12. My gender	328	710	2.16	1.260
13. My religion *	318	721	2.27	1.456
14. My nationality *	321	779	2.43	1.445
15. My neighbourhood	325	806	2.48	1.148
16. Europe	320	851	2.66	1.252
17. My political attitudes	311	883	2.84	1.315
18. Balkan	319	914	2.87	1.173
19. Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina	307	894	2.91	1.454
20. Yugoslavia	276	980	3.55	1.373
21. Republika Srpska	270	962	3.56	1.430
22. Croatia	250	893	3.57	1.201
23. Serbia	244	896	3.67	1.333


Table 5 shows a clear difference in the perceived importance of different identity characteristics. The factors that are most important to respondents are 'family', 'being human', and 'being an individual'. Nearly all respondents consider these topics to be very important for who they are. The variables related to ethnicity, 'my language', 'my religion', and 'my nationality', marked (*), are clearly considered to be less important. In addition, they exhibit a larger standard deviation, which suggests that respondents are more divided in their opinion. Although the ethnicity variables overlap to a great extent, language is clearly considered by most respondents to be more important than religion and nationality. This could mean that more respondents will experience language as a sensitive issue compared to others aspects of ethnicity. Religion and ethnicity/nationality, on the other hand, are very important to some, but relatively unimportant to others.

Another interesting finding is that geographic or territorial issues are generally considered to be relatively unimportant. Most of these items are found in the bottom half of the list and show quite some variation between responses. This indicates that for some these factors are quite

important, while for others they are not, which is not surprising given the historic link between territory and ethnicity. It can be expected that ‘Serbia’ and ‘Republika Srpska’ are more important for Bosnian Serbs than they are for Bosniaks or Bosnian Croats. To see whether this is indeed the case, these variables will later be analysed for different ethnic groups.

In addition to rating each identity item separately, respondents were asked to name the single factor that is most important to them.²⁸ As can be seen in Figure 6 below, roughly seven out of ten respondents opted for ‘family’, ‘being human’, or ‘being an individual’ as the thing that defines them to the greatest extent. Results are quite similar to those found in Table 5. However, it seems that forcing respondents to choose has resulted in a more pronounced picture of what matters most to them, which is either ‘being human’, ‘being an individual’ and ‘family’. Even though other issues such as religion, language and nationality can be important, very few respondents see it as the most important factor in determining who or what they are.

Figure 6: Which one of the above defines you to the greatest extent?



This paragraph showed that, in general, respondents find non-ethnic issues more important than ethnic issues in determining who and what they are. However, most respondents still attach quite a lot of importance to ethnic issues such as language, religion and nationality. It will be interesting to see whether ethnic identity is more relevant to one group than it is to another and how this relates to their political attitudes.

5.2.1 Clustering of identities

There is reason to believe that some aspects of identity are more closely related than others. Religion, for example is often connected with ethnic identity or nationality, but disassociates itself from individualism. Principal component analysis has been used in order to see whether the list of identity factors could be reduced to a smaller set of composite variables or dimensions that measure roughly the same thing. SPSS includes the possibility to perform Categorical Principal Components Analysis or CATPCA. This function uses optimal scaling for ordinal variables, which is not possible in Factor Analysis or regular Principal Component Analysis (Meulman, Kooij, & Heiser, 2004, p. 50).

²⁸ Respondents had to choose the most important identity factor (‘which one of the above defines you to the greatest extent?’). They could choose from the previous 23 factors and, if applicable, the answer they gave under the ‘other, please specify’ option.

A very simple two-dimensional Categorical Principle Component Analysis (CATPCA) was carried out on fifteen of the twenty-three identity variables listed above, which can be seen in Figure 7. Geographical identity items are excluded because they will be analysed separately in paragraph 5.2.2 below. Together, the model explains 43.2% of the variation of respondents' input on these fifteen variables. Dimension 1 explains 30.8 per cent of variation and dimension 2 explains 12.4 per cent of variation.




Figure 7: Component loadings for Categorical Principle Component Analysis on two dimensions

A number of interesting conclusions can be drawn from Figure 7. First of all, 'My religion' and 'My nationality' appear at almost the same spot of the graph, which supports the idea that these factors often overlap in daily life in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They are likely to be part of the same underlying component, which could be described as a broad interpretation of ethnicity. Such a close relation between religion and nationality is not limited to Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is quite common for ethnicity and nationality to have commonalities with religion, such as a shared ideology, symbols and celebrations. In the words of Safran (2008, p. 172), "the ethnonation is a secularised religion". As discussed in the theoretical framework, language also seems to be related to this component. However, it can be inferred from Figure 7 that it is not clustered to the same extent as language and nationality. This could indicate that for some, language is related to ethnicity and religion, while for others it is not. Second, being young, 'My profession' and 'That I am a student' are also shown to be clustered together, indicating that they might be part of the same component. It could be that being a student is considered as a form of profession, also typically associated with being young. Third, 'Me as an individual' is located closely to 'Multiculturalism'. It could be said that a high score on individualism implies that people are less attached to a group and its culture and that, as a result, people are more open to other cultures.

5.2.2 Geographic/territorial identity

The attachment to geographical concepts has been tested in order to examine their presumed relation with ethnicity. Particularly in the first years after the 1992-1995 conflict, geography education was riddled with nationalistic rhetoric. Bosnian Croats were supplied with textbooks from their 'own country', and learned that Zagreb was their capital, not Sarajevo.²⁹ As can be seen in Table


²⁹ A similar situation applied to Bosnian Serbs.

5, there is a high degree of variation in the importance respondents ascribe to different geographical factors. There is reason to believe that this variation can be explained by the historic link between territory and ethnicity. Bosniaks are said to identify most strongly with the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, while Croats and Serbs have their ‘back-up homelands’ in Croatia and Serbia respectively (Majstorović & Turjačanin, 2013, p. 162). To see whether this holds true for our respondents, the experienced importance of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Republika Srpska, and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, have been analysed for each of the different ethnic/national groups. The results, which can be seen in the graphs below, offer a number of interesting insights.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

As expected, the category of Bosnia-Herzegovina is experienced as very important by the majority of Bosniak respondents. However, Croat respondents as well as those who declared as ‘Other’ or ‘Not clarified’ on the census also show high degrees of attachment to Bosnia-Herzegovina. In comparison, Serbs find Bosnia-Herzegovina relatively unimportant. This means that it might be more difficult for the state government to find legitimacy for their policies among Serbian youth since they appear the least likely to support the Bosnia-Herzegovina state government.


Figure 8: Experienced importance of Bosnia-Herzegovina



Croatia

Surprisingly, Croats experience Bosnia-Herzegovina as far more important than Croatia, which apparently does not function as a ‘back-up homeland’ after all. In the meantime, leading Croat parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina seek to establish their own Croat entity, arguing that they are being discriminated against, since both the Serbs and the Bosniaks have their own entity (Trukhachev, 2011). Croat respondents were not asked specifically whether they would favour the establishment of such an identity, but the results here do add some doubts about this idea. This is reflected in low support for other pro-ethnic policies,

Figure 9: Experienced importance of Croatia




which will be discussed later.

Serbia

Serb respondents are the only ones showing a large degree of attachment to Serbia. Compared to Croat respondents, the Serb respondents show much more affection towards their ‘back-up homeland’. The reasons for this remarkable difference behind Croat and Serb respondents are unclear and deserve further research.


Figure 10: Experienced importance of Serbia



Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Compared to other ethnic groups, Bosniak respondents show the most attachment to the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, although they find it not nearly as important as the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. All in all, relatively few people are enthusiastic about the Federation. This can be ascribed to a lack of legitimacy for this institution in general due to weak governance, political infighting, corruption and financial mismanagement (International Crisis Group, 2010). The Federation is loved “neither by the Bosniaks, who would like to abolish it together with RS (Republika Srpska) in favour of a unitary Bosnian state, nor by the Croats, who want an entity of their own” (ibid, p. i).

Figure 11: Experienced importance of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina



Republika Srpska

Similar to the country of Serbia, mostly Serb respondents attach importance to Republika Srpska. They have around the same affinity for their entity as Bosniak respondents have for the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Compared to the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (where mostly Bosniaks and Croats live), however, Republika Srpska seems to enjoy much more support from its inhabitants, which are mainly Serbs.

Categorical Principal Component Analysis was performed on the eight variables that each measure the importance of a certain place or geographical concept to one's identity. A simple model has been created based on two dimensions that together account for just under sixty per cent of the total variance on the geography items. Dimension 1 explains 34.2 per cent of variance while dimension 2 explains 24.6 per cent of variance. A positive score on dimension two correspond with a high score on 'Serbia', 'Republika Srpska', and to a lesser extend 'Croatia'. A low score on the other hand, corresponds with 'Bosnia-Herzegovina', the 'Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina', and 'Europe'.

The model, which can be seen in Figure 13, shows that several identities are clustered together, which could indicate that they belong to the same principal component. First of all, there is a close alignment between 'Serbia' and 'Republika Srpska', which could indicate that these areas are part of a larger region of 'Serbianness' or Serbian culture. Such a region could be termed a 'Greater Serbia', but this is a quite controversial political concept.³⁰ In addition, 'Europe' and 'Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina' are closely related to each other as well as, to a lesser extent, 'Bosnia-Herzegovina'. Surprisingly, there also seems to be some overlap between Croatia and Yugoslavia, although the

Figure 12: Experienced importance of Republika Srpska





Figure 13: Categorical Principal Component Analysis on geography

³⁰ The idea of a 'Greater Serbia' was a trademark of Slobodan Milosevic's ideology and one of his main political goals. It is thus closely associated with Serbian nationalism.

latter has a rather weak loading compared to the other variables, which means that it accounts for a lower amount of variance. 'Balkan' seems to be a relatively neutral concept and is not clearly related either to Serbia, Croatia, or Bosnia-Herzegovina.


5.3 A closer look at ethnic identity

It has become clear from paragraph 4.2 that ethnic identity and related aspects such as religion and language are important, but not all-important in the lives of most respondents. It will be interesting to see, however, how these issues are experienced by different ethnic groups. Therefore, Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs, as well as those that stated 'Not clarified' and 'Other', are compared on their scores regarding nationality, religion and language. A composite variable 'Ethnic identity' has also been calculated, combining the scores on 'My language', 'My nationality', and 'My religion'. As can be seen in the graphs above, Bosniak, Croat, and Serbian respondents tend to attach more importance to their ethnic identity than respondents in the 'Other' or 'Not clarified' groups. This is particularly evident in the cases of religion and nationality.

'My language'

Language is clearly considered by respondents to be the part of ethnicity that is most important to who they are. It is thus possible to perceive language as important, but nationality as relatively unimportant. This applies in particular to those who are 'Not clarified' or 'Other'. These respondents often experience language to be quite important, but rarely think of religion and nationality as factors of great importance.


Figure 14: Experienced importance of language



'My nationality'

Nationality is far more important for those belonging to the three main ethnic groups than it is for those who do not. This can be contributed to the remarkable way in which ethnicity is treated in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs are 'constituent peoples', something like critical components of a machine. With their ethnic membership comes group power, influence and protection. As a result, the importance of their ethnicity is reaffirmed regularly. All the other citizens of the country, from Roma to Jews and everything in between, are put in a single group of 'Others'. They have fewer constitutional rights, and less influence in

Figure 15: Experienced importance of nationality




general. Consequently, they have little to gain from their ethnic group membership in a material sense.

'My religion'

It appears that for Bosniak youth religion is somewhat more important than it is for Croats and Serbs. Similarly to the case of nationality, respondents in 'Not clarified' and 'Other' find religion relatively unimportant compared to members of the three main ethnic groups. Previously it was found that religion and nationality often overlap in Bosnia-Herzegovina.


Figure 16: Experienced importance of religion



Ethnic identity (composite variable)

The scores on 'My language', 'My nationality', and 'My religion' were combined into one variable that measures the importance of ethnic identity to a respondent. All scores were added up and the result was recoded into one of five groups. This was done in the following way: 3-6 -> important to very important, 6-9 -> moderately important to important, 9-12 -> A little important to moderately important, 12-18 -> Not important to a little important (this includes the few respondents who selected 'does not apply to me') The graph shows a similar pattern as the graphs for the individual variables. Bosniaks show most attachment to their ethnic identity, followed by Serbs and then Croats. These groups score above average. Respondents that belong to the 'Not clarified' and 'Other' groups are much less concerned with their ethnic identity and score below average. Later on, a similar composite variable will be used to analyse the relation between ethnic identification and various political topics.

Figure 17: Experienced importance of ethnic identity



5.3.1 Social relations

This paragraph will look into respondents’ social relations and the role of ethnicity therein. Using a number of statements, respondents were asked about the role of ethnicity in their personal life, such as the influence of ethnicity on social trust and establishing friendships. Finally, the assumption will be tested that having friends from other ethnic groups improves levels of interethnic trust.

The responses to the question ‘most people can be trusted’ show that, in general, social trust is quite low among the respondents. This is important when interpreting the results on the next statement, ‘most members of other ethnic groups can be trusted’. Surprisingly, as can be seen in Figure 18, the responses to this statement are more positive than those on trusting people in general. There is no clear explanation for these differing results and there are some inconsistencies with other results in the survey, for instance those which show that considerable tension is experienced between ethnic groups. It could be, however, that when asked about trusting people in general, respondents also include the country’s political and economic elites in their assessment. These are groups that most respondents are unlikely to trust. This is supported, among other things, by results that show high levels of tension between politicians and citizens and between board/directors and workers (see paragraph 5.2 ‘Ethnicity compared to other sources of tension’). When asked about trusting people from other ethnic groups, respondents might be more inclined to think about regular people like themselves, people which they are more likely to trust. In addition, there is a difference between society and personal life. When respondents say that there are tensions between ethnic groups in society, this does not necessarily mean that they experience this tension in their personal lives. All in all, it can be concluded from the above that although there is some social distrust felt by respondents, this is not due to ethnic factors.




Figure 18: Social trust

The other results also show a quite optimistic picture about the attitude of young people towards inter-ethnic relations. A large segment, almost half of the respondents, has friends from mixed ethnic groups. However, there also remains a large segment that has friends from mainly or solely his or her own ethnic group. As we will see below this is not necessarily due to a lack of willingness on behalf of the respondents.

A majority of respondents would like to have more friends from other ethnic/national groups. In some parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, however, ethnic groups are less mixed than others. This makes it more difficult to meet other ethnicities in a small rural village than it is in a multi-cultural city such as Tuzla. Overall, ethnic groups are more territorially concentrated due to ethnic cleansing and internal displacement in the 1992-1995 conflict. This would explain the discrepancy between the wish of having more inter-ethnic friendships and the actual number of these friendships. If no other ethnic groups are near, it is simply much more difficult to befriend them. However, this issue is experienced by only around fifteen per cent of respondents. Seven out of ten respondents think there are enough opportunities to meet members of other ethnic groups.

As can be seen in Figure 20, only a very small fraction of the respondents would not like to have more friends from other ethnic groups. There is, however, a significant group that remains undecided and neither disagrees or agrees with the statement presented to them. An explanation for this could be that they already have enough friends from different ethnicities, that they do not consider ethnicity as an important factor in establishing friendships, or a combination of these two factors. Fact is that only one in five thinks that ethnicity is important in establishing social relations.

It thus appears that ethnicity, and therefore the 1992-1995 ethnic conflict, does not play an important role in the attitude of most respondents towards peers from other ethnic groups. However, it is possible that this is different for those respondents who are more attached to religion, language, and nationality, three of the identity factors tested in paragraph 5.2. In other words,




Figure 19: My closest friends are...




Figure 20: I would like to have more friends who belong to different national/ethnic groups in this region




Figure 21: There is enough opportunity to meet members of other ethnic groups




Figure 22: Ethnicity is important in establishing social relations

respondents who consider ethnicity more important for who they are, might also find this more important in their social life and establishing friendships. In order to test this, the composite variable of ethnic identity will be used that has been described in paragraph 5.3, but without the four categories ascribed to them since this is not necessary for calculating the correlation of ethnic identity with other variables. In Table 6 below, Spearman's rank correlation coefficient is given for ethnic identity and respondents' attitudes towards social relations. Of the six variables associated with social relations, two have been found to exhibit a statistically significant and meaningful correlation with ethnic identity. Both 'ethnicity is important in establishing social relations' and 'my closest friends are ...' show a weak to moderate correlation with the importance of ethnic identity. Thus, when ethnic identity is highly important to a respondent, he or she is somewhat more likely to consider ethnicity important in establishing social relations and to have friends from only his or her own ethnic group. In addition, those who score higher on ethnic identity seem to be less trustful of members of other ethnic groups and less likely to wish for friends from ethnic groups. However, these correlations are only minor and statistically less significant than those described earlier.

Table 6: Correlation coefficient between ethnic identity (composition variable) and respondents' attitude towards social relations. A positive value indicates that respondents with a high score on ethnic identity are more likely to experience an issue as positive (** significant at the 0.01 level; *significant at the 0.05 level).

Most people can be trusted	Correlation Coefficient	-0.0101
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.067
Ethnicity is important in establishing social relations	Correlation Coefficient	0.333**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000
Most members of other ethnic groups can be trusted	Correlation Coefficient	-0.139*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.012
I would like to have more friends who belong to different national/ ethnic groups in this region	Correlation Coefficient	-0.133*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.016
There is enough opportunity to meet members of other ethnic groups	Correlation Coefficient	-0.017
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.753
My closest friends are ...	Correlation Coefficient	0.267**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000

5.3.2 Young people versus the general population

Comparison with other studies seems to be plausible only when looking at the group of participants as a whole. In the study used by O'Loughlin (2010), for example, a distinction is made only between Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. The study among young people, on the other hand, also included the possibility not to clarify or to clarify as other. Thus, the composition of the different groups is likely to be different, making a one on one comparison impossible. In addition, there are differences in survey method (paper-based vs. internet-based) as well as the formulation of questions and possible answer categories. Nevertheless, a glimpse at Table 7 below suggests that young people today are more likely to have friends from different ethnic groups than the general population in 2005. This could either be caused by a general tendency across society, an inclination of young people to cross ethnic boundaries more readily, or by a combination of these two factors. Unfortunately, the amount of

time that has passed since the 2005 survey took place makes it impossible to say this with any degree of certainty.³¹

	General population - 2005 (O'Loughlin, 2010, p. 52)				Young people – 2013/2014			
	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Total	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Total
All of my ethnic group	18%	7.9%	23.4%	18.4%	13.3	22.4%	32.6%	15.5%
Mostly from my ethnic group	36.5%	36.1%	31.2%	34.5%	32.9%	38.8%	32.6%	30.2%
From different ethnic groups	42.6%	53.5%	41.6%	44.1%	51.4%	32.7%	28.3%	49.7%
Mostly from other ethnic groups	0.5%	1.6%	1.1%	0.9%	1.7%	4.1%	6.5%	3.4%
All from other ethnic groups	0.6%	0.6%	0.4%	0.6%	0.6%	2.0%	0%	1.2%
Don't know/ refusal	1.7%	0.3%	2%	1.6%	/	/	/	/

Table 7: Inter-ethnic friendships - comparison between two different studies

Respondents were also asked about the opportunities they had to meet people from other ethnic groups. Most feel that there are enough possibilities to do so, although people with relatively few friends from other ethnic groups are somewhat less inclined to think so. Spearman's rank correlation coefficient was used to assess the correlation between opportunities and having friends from other ethnicities. A correlation was found of -0.237, which is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. This means that there is a weak to moderate correlation between the opportunity to meet people from other ethnic groups and actually having friends from other ethnic groups. Thus, although interaction with people from other ethnicities can be seen as a prerequisite, it is no guarantee that people of different ethnic groups will actually become friends.

Earlier research showed that having friends or neighbours from other ethnic groups has a positive influence on the perception of these groups (Majstorović & Turjačanin, 2013, p. 187). There is some support for this in the responses to this survey; having friends from different ethnic groups correlates to some extent with a feeling that members of ethnic groups can be trusted. Spearman's rank correlation coefficient was calculated at -0.188 for these two variables (significant at the 0.01 level), which indicates a weak relationship. It is thus likely that other factors also play a role in shaping someone's trust of other ethnic groups. Furthermore, it is important not to equate correlation with causation since a correlation coefficient does not say anything about the direction of this relation. It is also possible that trusting people from other ethnic groups enables people to befriend individuals from other these groups, instead of the other way around. It is also likely that both processes occur simultaneously and reinforce each other.

³¹ Efforts have been made by the author to find a more recent study, but these were unsuccessful.

5.4 Discussion

Based on the results above, it can be concluded that the identity of young people in Bosnia-Herzegovina is a complex phenomenon. The input given by respondents shows that their identity is not restricted to ethnicity and that other issues are also considered to be important for who they are. This corresponds with the theory that identity is multiple. Indeed, a number of factors is considered more important than ethnicity. Respondents are quite unified in experiencing 'family', 'being an individual' and 'being human' as the most important factors that determine who they are. These factors are non-ethnic, which offers some hope for the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina. There definitely seems to be a potential for building on common, overarching, values and thereby decreasing ethnic division in Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the other hand, this does not mean that nationality and related factors such as language and religion are no longer experienced as important. Especially at the institutional level, the focus is often on issues that divide rather than unite. For respondents, especially those belonging to the three constituent peoples, the Bosniaks, the Croats, and the Serbs, nationality, religion and language remain highly relevant for who they are. Although nationality and religion are most intertwined, language is also related to what can be termed a wider conception of ethnicity. Language is considered more important than nationality and religion, making it a potentially sensitive political issue.

The geographic organisation of the country, divided in entities and cantons, has been severely criticised by representatives from all ethnic groups. It is often claimed that Bosniaks would want a centralised country, that Croats wish to establish their own entity, and that Serbs prefer to be independent altogether. Another common held assumption is that Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs are loyal to their 'homelands' of Croatia and Serbia rather than to Bosnia and Herzegovina. These claims are not supported by the research findings. Rather surprisingly, young Croats seem to attach more to Bosnia-Herzegovina than to Croatia. Serb respondents were the least likely to show attachment to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Still, half of them find this an important aspect of who they are. Even though young Serbs seem to attach more importance to Republika Srpska and Serbia, there appears to be some consensus among all ethnic groups that Bosnia-Herzegovina is a relevant aspect of their lives. It therefore seems that geography is less controversial than expected.

Another positive note is that there is no evidence to support the assumption that ethnicity plays a negative role in social relations. Instead, a significant share of the respondents either already has friends from different ethnic groups or is open to establishing such relationships. Moreover, for most respondents ethnicity does not appear to be an important factor in connecting to peers. The situation is a bit different for those who attach a high degree of importance to ethnicity related factors such as language, religion and nationality. Respondents belonging to this group are more likely to perceive ethnicity as an important factor in establishing social relations and are more inclined to limit their circle of friends to their own ethnic groups.

In conclusion, it appears that the forces of social categorisation in Bosnia-Herzegovina are not as strong as they often are assumed to be. Even though Bosnia-Herzegovina's society remains organised along ethnic lines, this is not directly translated into the experienced identity of young people. Ethnicity is still part of many of the country's institutions, such as politics, education, and the media. However, it appears that young people are not always eager to copy these identity discourses and instead adopt other identities besides, and sometimes above, ethnic identity. This has implications for the way we look at institutions and their power to shape identity through discourse. The power of ethnic elites and the institutions they control to enforce an ethnic identity on young people is only partially successful. Young people's ability to resist these forces might be related to

access to alternative discourses, for example through alternative media on the internet, online networks or student networks. The role of these factors in the identity formation of young people is something that warrants further research. Meanwhile, Bosnia-Herzegovina's mainstream media, education system, and politics continue to focus much of these efforts on ethnic identity.

6. Politics


In the previous chapter, it became clear that there is more to the identity of young people than just ethnicity. In fact, other issues, such as family ties or the fact that one is an individual human being often take precedence. Bosnia-Herzegovina's political agenda, however, continues to be dominated by ethnic issues. The aim of this part of the analysis is to measure whether this corresponds with the political attitudes of young people. The goal of the questionnaire was to see whether, first, ethnicity is experienced as a political issue at all, and second, how it compares to other topics on the political agenda. This will tell us whether the prevailing ethno-political discourses in Bosnia-Herzegovina are shared by members of its younger generation. A new post-war generation is reaching adulthood that has been raised in a distinctly different world than their parents, characterised by a different mode of political organisation, capitalism, and new communication systems. Identity politics has stayed, but does it still strike a chord with Bosnia-Herzegovina's new generation?

6.1 Support for ethno-nationalistic politics

It was first of all important to find out whether ethno-nationalistic sentiments, characteristic of the identity politics practised in Bosnia-Herzegovina, are present among the sample population. Respondents were therefore presented with a number of ethno-national statements in order to assess how they see the role of ethnicity in the political organisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The statements were formulated in a way that mimics the ethno-national rhetoric of politicians, such as "My ethnic group is threatened by other ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina". For each statement, respondents could choose between five answers ('strongly agree', 'agree', 'neither agree nor disagree', 'disagree', 'strongly disagree'). This can be interpreted as a scale from a pro-ethnic political opinion (strongly agree) to a non-ethnic or multi-ethnic political opinion (strongly disagree). In the graph below, the scores can be viewed for each statement. Please note that in Figure 23 below, the scores on the statement regarding the Sejdić-Finci case (visible as the red line) were reversed in order to facilitate comparison between and across the variables. Those who 'strongly disagree' with the Sejdić-Finci judgement are actually shown as 'strongly agree'. This was done so that the resulting chart can be interpreted as a scale ranging from pro-ethnic on the left (strongly agree) to non-ethnic/multi-ethnic on the right (strongly disagree). Disagreeing with the judgement in the Sejdić-Finci case can be seen as a support for discrimination on ethnic grounds, which is in line with ethno-nationalistic ideology.

It becomes clear from Figure 23 that there is not much support for ethno-nationalistic standpoints. The scores on the different statements exhibit a clear pattern. Around twenty per cent agrees, twenty per cent neither agrees nor disagrees, and about sixty per cent disagrees with the statements. This means that only around twenty per cent of the respondents is likely to be sensitive for ethno-national sentiments.

Figure 23: Support for ethno-nationalistic statements



When analysing the results in more detail, there are a number of medium to strong correlations between the different variables. Most interesting is the relation with voting behaviour. In most cases there is a moderately strong correlation between agreeing with an ethno-nationalist statement and the intention to vote for a politician of the voter’s ethnic group. There is, for example, a positive correlation between ‘my ethnic group is threatened by other ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ and ‘at the next election I will vote for a politician who represents my ethnic group’. For these variables, Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient was calculated at 0.468 at the 0.01 significance level. This means that people who experience a threat to their ethnic group are more likely to vote for an ethno-nationalist politician during elections, and vice versa. Most other variables also show a moderate to strong correlation with the intention to vote on a politician who represents the respondent’s ethnic group.³² This means that ethno-nationalistic ideas regarding separate education, and exclusive rights for ethnic groups, are reflected in voting behaviour.

³² All are significant at the 0.01 level. Only the correlation with statement regarding the Sejdić-Finci judgment was weaker (Spearman rho = 0.15). ‘In December 2009 the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the

A majority of the respondents, however, does not seem to be very interested in such rhetoric. Those who do not feel that the main task of politicians is to protect their ethnic group also show little intention of voting for a politician from their ethnic group. This is quite surprising given the dominance of ethno-national themes in the political arena. An issue such as separate education in national subjects, for example, is often claimed as a vital right (Toè, 2013). This is reflected in the little support that respondents show for the political system in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is focused on ethnic representation and the protection of ethnic group rights. Most respondents disagree with the statement that the current political system, which has its roots in the Dayton Peace Agreement, is the only way to preserve stability. Most of them tend to agree with the European Court of Human Rights' ruling in the *Sejdić-Finci* case that the political system is discriminatory.

There is thus a clear lack of support for the political system in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, as we will see later on in this chapter, respondents also state that they perceive quite some tension between different ethnic and national groups. The main rationale of the current political system is to prevent this tension from escalating into (violent) conflict. Apparently, in the eyes of Bosnia-Herzegovina's younger generations, these benefits no longer outweigh the shortcomings regarding democracy, efficiency, rule of law, and transparency.

6.2 Ethnicity and other sources of social tension


Ethnicity was a central aspect of the 1992-1995 conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Today, the idea that ethnic tensions are what is wrong with the country remains very persistent. Both local and outside actors, politicians, citizens, and academics employ this logic. However, are there not also tensions between politicians and citizens, rich and poor people, urban and rural areas, and other groups? Although in various degrees, these tensions can be found in any modern society. In fact, research has shown that these tensions do indeed exist in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNDP, 2009). In public discourse, however, such problems appear to become overshadowed by the ethnic factor.

For this study, it is necessary to know what young citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina experience in terms of tensions in society. This will tell us more about the relative importance of ethnicity compared to other sources of tension. Respondents were therefore asked to indicate the amount of tension between people from different national and ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as six other categories. The question was as follows: 'In your opinion, is there a tension between the following groups of people in Bosnia and Herzegovina?' In order to facilitate comparison, the mean score was calculated for each variable, based on which four variables were selected to which respondents ascribed the highest amount of tension.³³ These can be seen in Figure 24. The remaining three categories were clearly considered to have less tension. These are 'people from rural and people from urban areas', 'old and young people', and 'men and women'.

exclusion of Jews and Roma from the highest positions of Bosnian government unlawful discrimination. Do you agree with this judgment?

³³ For this purpose, the variables were treated as interval level instead of ordinal level. 'Yes, a lot' was assigned a value of 1, 'Yes, a little' a value of 2, and 'No' was given a value of 3. Thus, the lower the mean score, the higher the amount of tension experienced. 'I don't know' was listed as a missing value.

Figure 24: Top four sources of tension in Bosnia-Herzegovina



By far the most tension is experienced between politicians and citizens. Here, 80.2% answered, 'Yes, a lot' and 15.9% answered, 'Yes, to some extent'. Respondents also ascribe considerable tension to the different national and ethnic groups in society. In this case, 59.8% of the respondents answered 'Yes, a lot' and 36.9% answered, 'Yes, to some extent'. However, this score is only slightly higher than the tension experienced between rich and poor people, and also not much higher than the tension experienced between board/directors and employees. Together, these results indicate that even though young people in Bosnia-Herzegovina recognise the existence ethnic tension, it is certainly not the only area of friction. Moreover, the major source of tension is clearly the relation between politicians and citizens.

Two other major sources of tension according to young people in Bosnia-Herzegovina are the relations between rich and poor, and relations between board/directors and employees. These factors are in fact deeply related. Unemployed people blame the political and economic leadership of the country for their poor situation, and for enriching themselves through corruption and cronyism. This frustration was one of the driving forces behind the countrywide protest movement in February 2014 known as the 'Bosnian Spring' (Pasic, 2014). These protests were started by industrial workers in Tuzla who were laid-off as a result of the privatisation and bankruptcy of once flourishing factories, a process that was accompanied by much corruption and controversy (Eminagić, 2014). From Tuzla, the protests spread to other cities and were joined by groups of students, unemployed people, intellectuals and other activists. The tension between board/directors and employees is a contributing factor to general social unrest. Salaries of directors and other officials of state-owned companies are reportedly ten times higher as those of counterparts in neighbouring countries (klix.ba, n.d.). Bosnia-Herzegovina's patchwork of laws and regulations has been amended "on numerous occasions" in order to fit the needs of the ruling elite (Blagovčanin, 2012, p. 82).

Although there is no recent information on income inequality in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Gini-coefficients that are available suggest a trend of rising inequality. In 2001, Bosnia-Herzegovina's Gini coefficient was 28, rising to 35.8 in 2004 and 36.2 in 2007 (World Bank, n.d.). In comparison, in the 2005-2012 period the European Union had a stable Gini coefficient between 30.3 and 30.8 (Eurostat, 2014). Many of Bosnia-Herzegovina's neighbours have similar levels of income distribution.³⁴ A factor

³⁴ For example, Croatia had a Gini coefficient of 30.5 in 2012, Serbia had a Gini coefficient of 29.6 in 2010 and Montenegro had a Gini coefficient of 28.6 in 2010 (World Bank, n.d.).

that contributes to the social discontent is Bosnia-Herzegovina's drastic rise in income inequality since the disintegration of Yugoslavia when the Gini coefficient averaged around 22 (Flakierski, 1989).³⁵

6.2.1 A cross-study comparison

In 2009, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Bosnia and Herzegovina published a report on social capital in Bosnia-Herzegovina that included a similar question on the amount of tension experienced between different social groups. Recent data is also available on the tension experienced by young people in Croatia aged 18 to 24 years old (Eurofound, 2012). These results will be compared with the survey that was carried out among young people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, it should be noted that there are some differences between these three studies. First of all, there was a difference in the methodology and target group. The survey among young people in Bosnia-Herzegovina used an online questionnaire that was aimed at citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina between 18 and 25 years old. The other two studies used face-to-face interviews aimed at all citizens of the respective countries. In addition, the surveys were held in different years, the UNDP survey in November 2009, the Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) youth survey in December 2013 and January 2014, and the Croatia survey in 2012. Finally, for the BiH youth survey the question was slightly reformulated, in order to be more neutral, and an extra answer category was added (politicians and citizens).³⁶ Despite these differences, comparing the results of the survey gives some interesting, albeit not definitive, insights into the differences and similarities between various generations and between young generations of different countries.

As can be seen in Table 8 below, the three groups of respondents often express somewhat similar results, but they differ in the area of society to which they ascribe the most tension. Whereas Bosnia-Herzegovina's society in general ascribe most tension to relations between rich and the poor, its younger generations experience most tension between politicians and citizens.³⁷ Especially when looking at the percentage of respondents that experience a lot of tension, 'politicians and citizens' scores very high among Bosnia-Herzegovina's youth (80.2%). For Croatia's youth most friction seems to be in the relation between management and workers. Another important difference between the three subject groups is in the number of respondents that experience tension between different ethnic groups. This ranges from 78.6% in Bosnia-Herzegovina's society in general, to 96.7% among the country's young people. Among Croatia's youth, 83.3% per cent experiences a lot or some tension between ethnic and national groups. It should be taken into account, however, that 'a lot of tension' and 'some tension' were combined into one percentage in order to facilitate comparison. It should be noted also that such high levels of tension are not limited to the Balkan region, as one might expect. In fact, across the European Union, almost nine out ten respondents in the age of 18 to 24 experience tension between different racial and ethnic groups (Eurofound, 2012). Nevertheless, Bosnia-Herzegovina's youth does stand out from the rest of society as well as its peers in

³⁵ For the 1964-1976 period.

³⁶ In the UNDP study the question was formulated as follows: "In all countries there sometimes exists tension between social groups. In your opinion, how much tension is there between each of the following groups in BiH?" In the author's own survey, the question was formulated as follows: "In your opinion, is there a tension between the following groups of people in Bosnia and Herzegovina?"

³⁷ As mentioned before, this category was not available in the UNDP survey among Bosnia-Herzegovina's general population. It was added to the 'young people' survey after pilot testing

neighbouring Croatia in that nearly all of the respondents experience tension between different ethnic groups.

This feeling might have been reinforced by the fact that the survey among young people in Bosnia-Herzegovina was held shortly after the October 2013 census. This event was surrounded by much controversy and debate about the civil war and the results of ethnic cleansing, which is expected to be reflected in the outcome of the census. It is therefore possible that that the particularly high amount of ethnic tension experienced by young people in Bosnia-Herzegovina is not of a structural nature, but rather due to the reawakening of ethnic tensions shortly before the survey was carried out. Moreover, the fact that ethnic tensions are experienced in society does not mean that respondents have any antagonistic feelings themselves. This matches earlier results that indicate low support for ethno-nationalistic politics and an openness towards inter-ethnic friendships.

	BiH society in general (UNDP, 2009)	BiH young people ³⁸	Croatia young people (Eurofound, 2012)
Politicians and citizens	/	96.1%*	/
Rich and poor	87.9%	93.6%	91.9%
Management and workers	85.6%	91.7%	94.3%
Different nationalities and ethnicities	78.6%	96.7%*	83.3%
Old and young	76.6%	64.3%	80.5%
Urban and rural	76.6%	78.2%	/
Men and women	67.7%	63.1	74.2%

Table 8: Percentage of respondents that experience a lot or some tension between social groups

*In the survey among BiH youth, 'Politicians and citizens' and 'Different nationalities and ethnicities' appear at similar levels of tension. However, in the first case the percentage of respondents that experiences a lot of tension is far higher than in the second case.

6.3 Ethnicity and other socio-political issues


In the previous paragraph, it became clear that Bosnia-Herzegovina's young people recognise ethnicity as an important source of tension. There is, however, a range of other relevant socio-political issues in Bosnia-Herzegovina that deserve attention. It is clear that, besides the existence of ethnic tensions, Bosnia-Herzegovina struggles with other problems related to, among other things, the economic situation, employment, and the environment. In order to put these into perspective, respondents were asked how they perceive inter-ethnic relations as well as eight other socio-political issues. Possible answers ranged from 'very positive', 'slightly positive', 'neutral', 'slightly negative', to 'very negative'. As can be seen in Figure 25, all of the issues that were presented to the respondents are viewed rather negatively. This is no surprise, since this is why they were selected in the first place. In most of the literature these issues are considered to be problem areas. The variables are sorted from most to least negative, enabling us to fully appreciate the considerable differences that exist between the various variables. The economic situation is undoubtedly considered *the* major socio-political problem facing the country. This is not surprising. Bosnia-Herzegovina's recovery from

³⁸ Author's own research (December 2013-January 2014)

the global economic crisis is slow and weak compared to the rest of the world (World Bank, n.d.). Its gross domestic product decreased by 0.7 per cent in 2012 and grew only a marginal 0.4 per cent in 2013. Related problems are unemployment and poverty.

In addition to the economy, other factors that are rated especially negative are the transparency of politicians and the effectiveness of the state. At the other end of the spectrum, inter-ethnic relations and also the environment are relatively well of. It is quite remarkable that nearly all issues are perceived to be worse-off than relations between ethnic groups. Ethnic relations are still seen as problematic and as we have seen before, there exist a lot of tensions between ethnic groups. Nevertheless, these results show that ethnic tensions are but one problem among many others.

Figure 25: Ethnicity compared to other socio-political issues



6.4 Political parties

A logical conclusion from the survey findings so far is that, if it were up to young people, politicians should worry less about ethnic issues and more about other, more pressing, problems. Even though most respondents perceive tension between different ethnic and national groups in society, only around twenty per cent is susceptible to ethno-national arguments. Only a minority feels that a

politician's main task is to protect their ethnic group, and a similar minority that intends to vote for a politician who represents their ethnic group. In addition, there exists an extensive list of political issues that is more acute than the relations between different ethnic groups. For most respondents inter-ethnic relations seem to take a relative backseat to other social and political problems. Nevertheless, many politicians keep using ethnic narratives in order to gain votes and discredit political opponents, a strategy that seems inconsistent with the political attitudes of most respondents. This raises the question of what the political landscape would look like if it were up to Bosnia-Herzegovina's youth.

In order to find out, respondents were asked two questions. First, they had to name up to three political parties that best represent their beliefs, out of a total of 59 political parties. Second, respondents were asked whether they would consider voting for a multi-ethnic party. The answers show which parties are supported by young people and whether they are open to multi-ethnic parties or not.

By and large, the respondents' political choices reflect the conclusions made earlier. The most surprising finding is that almost half of the respondents (43.3 per cent) feel that no party represents their beliefs. This is quite a lot, especially considering that this option was only given at the bottom of the list of political parties. It can be seen as an expression of the high amount of tension that exists between politicians and citizens. In a recent survey among 2,000 citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 77 per cent of the respondents felt that political parties were (extremely) corrupt, making it the most corrupt institution in the country (Transparency International, 2013). This lack of trust in politicians is reflected in the turnout for elections. In the most recent general elections in 2010, only 56.3 per cent of registered voters casted their vote (OSCE, 2010, p. 22).

The parties that did receive a significant share of the respondents' votes were Democratic Front (29.6%), Party for Democratic Action (17.7%), Social Democratic Party of BiH (16.1%) and Our Party (10.2%). Of these four parties, three can be considered multi-ethnic, whereas the other, the SDA, is a mainly Bosniak party. Thus, although trust in political parties appears to be rather low, the parties that *are* supported by young people appear to be open to multi-ethnic ideas. Now, how does this compare to the general population of Bosnia-Herzegovina? In this regard, the election for the House of Representatives seems to be the most interesting public vote to compare with. The House of Representatives is the highest-level legislative body of the country that is directly chosen by citizens, two-thirds from the Federation and one-third from Republika Srpska (Tafro-Sefić, et al., 2010, pp. 82-85). The results of these elections can be found in Table 9 below, together with the results of the survey among young people. Many of the mainstream political parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina still carry a strong ethnic connotation that is not directly visible in their name or program (Majstorović & Turjačanin, 2013, p. 66). It can be quite difficult to distinguish ethno-political from multi-ethnic parties without detailed knowledge of local politics. A useful guide in this process has been the list of descriptions found at the European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity's website.

Young people 2013/2014 (Which political party best represents your beliefs?)			House of representatives - October 2010 (OSCE, 2010, p. 22)			
	All voters		Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina voters		Republika Srpska voters	
1.	Democratic Front - DF	29,6%	Social Democratic Party BiH - SDP	26.1%	Alliance of Independent Social Democrats - SNSD	43.3%
2.	Party for Democratic Action - SDA	17,7%	Party for Democratic Action - SDA	19.4%	Serbian Democratic Party - SDS	22.2%
3.	Social Democratic Party BiH - SDP	16,1%	Union for Better Future – SBB BiH	12.2%	Party of Democratic Progress - PDP	6.5%
4.	Our Party - NS	10,2%	Croatian Democratic Union - HDZ BiH	11%	Democratic People's Alliance - DNS	4.6%
5.	Croatian Democratic Union - HDZ BiH	7,5%	Party for BiH - SBiH	7.3%		
6.	Alliance of Independent Social Democrats - SNSD	7,5%	Croatian Coalition HDZ 1990 - HSP BiH	4.9%		
7.	Union for Better Future – SBB BiH	7,0%	People's Party Work for Betterment - NSRZB	4.8%		
8.	Serbian Democratic Party - SDS	4,8%				
9.	Croatian Democratic Union 1990 - HDZ1990	4,3%				


Table 9: The votes of young people versus the general population. Parties that are considered multi-ethnic are coloured red (European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity, 2014).

Looking at Table 9 it becomes clear that there are some significant differences between the questionnaire results and the 2010 general election. Several new parties have entered the scene and seem to be doing well among Bosnia-Herzegovina's youth, such as Democratic Front and Our Party. Democratic Front was founded in 2013 by Željko Komšić, a Croat member of the presidency, after leaving the Social Democratic Party due to disagreements about proposed constitutional changes. The party aims to represent all citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina, something which Komšić claims the Social Democratic Party has failed to do (Efendic, 2013). Our Party is also a multi-ethnic party, but originates from a large-scale citizen movement. All in all, young people seem more inclined to vote for multi-ethnic parties than the rest of Bosnia-Herzegovina's citizens, at least compared to the 2010 elections. Identity politics is still practised by a considerable number of the mainstream political parties. It seems, however, that at the moment, this strategy is less successful among young people than it was among the general population four years ago. With this in mind, it will be interesting to

see how multi-ethnic parties will fare in the next elections, which are scheduled for October 2014, just after the publishing of the controversial October 2013 census results.

Another positive finding is that a majority of the respondents considers voting for a multi-ethnic party as a serious option (see Figure 26). Only around ten per cent of the respondents are unlikely to vote for such a party. However, this does not mean that all is well. With those stating 'maybe' and 'I don't know' combined, around one in four respondents has not yet made up his or her mind and could potentially go either way. In addition, it is worthwhile to remember that almost half of the respondents stated that no party represented their beliefs, due to a general lack of faith in politicians.³⁹ This is reflected in other studies, such as focus groups held by Majstorović & Turjačanin (2013, pp. 87-129) among students of different universities across Bosnia-Herzegovina. The lack of interest and fatigue with politics is a problem that also hurts multi-ethnic parties, both new and established ones. Regardless of how good their intentions may be, they will have to work hard to overcome the distrust of Bosnia-Herzegovina's citizens. Only then can they profit from the potential which they do have.

Figure 26: Would you consider voting for a multi-ethnic party?



6.5 The relationship between ethnic identity and politics

It seems likely that respondents who attach more importance to ethnicity and related aspects such as language and religion have different political beliefs than those who find these issues relatively unimportant. This paragraph will test whether these two factors are indeed related. In order to test this, a composite variable has been made by adding up the scores on the importance of ethnicity/nationality, language, and religion for respondents. Next, Spearman's rank correlation coefficient was calculated for the new ethnic composite variable and the different political topics covered before. Surprisingly, the importance of ethnic identity does not seem to play a role in the amount of tension experienced between different groups in society, including ethnic groups. The measured correlation coefficients are negligible and not statistically significant. However, in other instances significant correlations do indeed appear, specifically between ethnic identity and ethno-nationalistic statements, the perception of political issues, and voting behaviour.

³⁹ Respondents who stated that no party represents their beliefs were asked to elaborate on their answer; 27.5% used this option. The general theme of their responses is a lack of results and a lack of integrity on behalf of the political parties.

6.5.1 Ethnic identity versus ethno-nationalistic statements

Respondents who score high on ethnic identity seem to agree more with the various ethno-nationalistic statements than respondents who score relatively low. In particular, they are much more inclined to be proud of being a member of their ethnic group to vote for a politician from their ethnic group. In addition, respondents who attach more to ethnic identity are more likely to be proud of living in their part of the country, which in most cases concerns the entity they live in. This corresponds with the earlier observation in paragraph 5.2.1 that there is a relationship between geography and identity.

However, as can be seen in Table 10, most relationships do not exceed a moderate level of correlation and some are even weaker. For example, respondents who score high on the importance of ethnic identity are only slightly more likely to consider their ethnic group as threatened by others. Similarly, their inclination to disagree with the Sejdić-Finci judgement is only slightly higher than that of other respondents. In both these cases there is a statistically significant but nevertheless quite marginal distinction between people who experience ethnicity as important versus those who see it as relatively unimportant. It can be concluded from this that ethnic identity plays a role in the formation of politics, but that its influence can fluctuate considerably considering the specific topic at hand. There is not a one-on-one relationship between ethnic identity and politics, which suggests that there are other factors that shape political opinion in addition to identity. Such factors could be the influence of parents, the actual experience of inter-ethnic tension or violence, the awareness of and involvement in politics, and the susceptibility to ethno-national discourse coming from politicians, the media or educational sources. These factors and their relationships with the formation of identity and political attitudes have to be investigated further.

Table 10: Correlation coefficient between ethnic identity (composition variable) and ethno-nationalistic statements. A positive value indicates that respondents with a high score on ethnic identity are more likely to agree with these statements (** significant at the 0.01 level; *significant at the 0.05 level).

The main task of politicians is to protect my ethnic group	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed)	0.310** 0.000
At the next election I will vote for a politician who represents my ethnic group	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed)	0.354** 0.000
My ethnic group is threatened by other ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed)	0.142* 0.010
Some ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina should have more rights than others	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed)	0.316** 0.000
The current political system based on ethnic representation is the only way to preserve stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed)	0.253** 0.000
Different ethnic groups should have a separate education regarding the national group of subjects (history, geography, language)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed)	0.281** 0.000
In December 2009 the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the exclusion of Jews and Roma from the highest positions of Bosnian government unlawful discrimination. Do you agree with this judgment?	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed)	-0.174** 0.002
To what extent do you feel proud that you are a member of your ethnic group?	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed)	0.590** 0.000
To what extent do you feel proud that you are a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina?	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed)	0.165** 0.003
To what extent do you feel proud to live in your part of Bosnia and Herzegovina?	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed)	0.398** 0.000

6.5.2 Ethnic identity versus the perception of political issues and voting behaviour

Although the correlation coefficients remain quite small, respondents that attach more importance to ethnic identity generally have a less negative view on most of the political issues they were confronted with, including the relations between different ethnic groups. The only exception where there is no significant difference is in the perception of Bosnia-Herzegovina's chances of joining the European Union (EU). Ethnicity does not appear to play a role here. It could be that people who attach a lot of importance to ethnicity are more comfortable with the current political situation in the country, which is heavily focussed on safeguarding ethnic rights. As a result of this ethnic focus, they might worry less about other issues. However, it should be noted that the difference here remains between different degrees of negativity. The fact remains that nearly all respondents view these political issues in a negative way (see Figure 26).

Table 11: Correlation coefficient between ethnic identity (composition variable) and the perception of political statements. A positive value indicates that respondents with a high score on ethnic identity are more likely to experience an issue as positive (** significant at the 0.01 level; *significant at the 0.05 level).

Transparency of politicians in Bosnia and Herzegovina	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed)	0.192** 0.000
The effectiveness of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed)	0.182** 0.001
The economic situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed)	0.128* 0.020
Relations between ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed)	0.170** 0.002
The environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed)	0.205** 0.000
Future prospects of young people in Bosnia and Herzegovina	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed)	0.210** 0.000
Rule of Law in Bosnia and Herzegovina	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed)	0.156** 0.005
The level of democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed)	0.190** 0.001
Bosnia and Herzegovina's chances of joining the EU	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed)	0.074 0.178

In the questionnaire, two questions were asked related to voting behaviour. First, which political parties best represent the respondent's beliefs, and second, whether the respondent would consider voting for a multi-ethnic party. Regarding the first, respondents that attach more importance to ethnic identity were somewhat less likely to say that no party reflects their beliefs, showing a correlation coefficient of 0.174 at the 0.002 significance level. On the other hand, they show a negative correlation of similar strength with the question 'would you consider voting for a multi-ethnic party?' The correlation coefficient here is -0.187 at the 0.001 significance level. Although these correlations are small, they indicate that the more ethnicity-minded respondents are more likely to feel represented by the mainstream political parties, which focus more on ethnic issues. This corresponds with the fact that they are less likely to vote for alternative, multi-ethnic parties.

6.5 Discussion

Ethnicity is not the only factor that causes tension between different groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Young people perceive more tension between politicians and citizens than between ethnic groups. In addition, ethnicity is seen as just one among many other political issues. The economic situation, the transparency of the political system, the effectiveness of the state, the rule of law, future prospects of young people, the level of democracy, Bosnia and Herzegovina's chances of joining the EU, are all seen more negatively than relations between ethnic groups. In addition, most respondents show little interest in ethno-national political parties and their values. However, this does not mean that they are all lining up to vote for multi-ethnic parties. There is a serious problem with the trust people have in the political system and its politicians in general, regardless of a party's ideological course.

More than anything, the findings of this chapter show that there is a potential for the development of a more multi-ethnic or non-ethnic political system. However, this is easier said than done. Ethnic group rights are particularly well entrenched in the quintessential consociational agreement that is the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The case of Sejdić-Finci has proven that constitutional reform, even when demanded by the European Union, is not achieved overnight. A more bottom-up reform process has been set in motion by the February protests known as the Bosnian Spring, but it is too early to determine how successful this movement will be.

7. Conclusion

The main goal of this thesis was to assess how important ethnicity really is in the identity and political attitudes of young people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a generation that has largely been raised after the 1992-1995 war. The importance of ethnic identity is often taken for granted, primarily due to the violent ethnic conflict in the 1990's and the nature of the ensuing peace agreement. This is a perspective on Bosnia-Herzegovina's society that is widespread both inside and outside the country. However, the results of this thesis warrant a much more nuanced picture, based on one of those rare occasions in which young people were actually asked how they felt instead of being told how they should feel.

The question asked in this thesis was simple: "How important is ethnicity in the identity of young people in Bosnia-Herzegovina and how does this relate to their political viewpoints?" However, the answer to this question is much more complicated and, most of all, unique for each individual. In agreement with the understanding of identity as set forth in the theoretical framework, the identity of young people in Bosnia-Herzegovina is a complex phenomenon. Nevertheless, the number of responses to the questionnaire was sufficiently large to draw a number of conclusions. For most respondents, ethnic identity forms a meaningful part of who or what they are. It is, however, rarely the most important part of their identity. The input given by respondents shows that their identity is not restricted to ethnicity and that other issues are also considered to be important for who they are. These issues, among which family, humanity and individualism feature prominently, could present an avenue for mutual understanding and interethnic cooperation. However, although the potential to build on common, overarching, values is certainly there, many of Bosnia-Herzegovina's most important institutions, media, the constitution, and the education system, continue to favour ethnic division.

Two topics with a close relation to identity were analysed in particular. These were geography and personal relations. There are clear distinctions in how respondents of different ethnic groups experience territory. Young Serbs attach most importance to Republika Srpska and Serbia, whereas Bosniaks tend to find Bosnia-Herzegovina most important for who they are. Nevertheless, there appears to be some consensus among all ethnic groups that Bosnia-Herzegovina is a relevant aspect of their lives, which is important since it is, after all, the country they live in. It thus seems that geography is less controversial than one might expect. In addition, respondents were asked about their personal life and the role of ethnicity therein. In general, respondents are quite open toward other ethnic groups. However, it was also found that those with a strong attachment to ethnicity were more likely to stick to their own group.

The second part of the study was concerned with the political viewpoints of young people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Here, the goal was to see whether young people are solely concerned with ethnicity-based politics or whether they are also open to other issues. Thus, it was important to see whether ethnicity is experienced as a political issue at all, how it compares to other topics on the political agenda, and whether it stands out from other possible sources of tension in society. Results of the questionnaire show that only around one in five respondents is inclined to agree with ethno-nationalistic statements. One's attachment to ethnic identity and related factors such as language and religion was again found to be an intermediary factor. Those who attach more to ethnic identity are more likely to agree with ethno-nationalistic statements and to connect this with voting behaviour. They are also more likely to feel represented by one of the mainstream political parties.

Although ethnicity is seen as an issue, it is not the foremost source of social tension for most respondents and it trails behind many other topics on the list of political issues. The concept of

identity politics based on ethnicity thus seems to be out of touch with Bosnia-Herzegovina's first post-conflict generation. Young people seem to be more inclined than the general population to vote for a multi-ethnic party, although the results for the next elections will have to be awaited. However, this does not mean that the majority of the respondents will readily flock to multi-ethnic parties.

There remains a high level of distrust towards politicians of any ideological persuasion.

Ethnicity is no longer the sole factor of importance in the identity and political attitudes of young people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Moreover, the effect of social categorization into ethnic groups, whether through media, education, politics or other institutions, appears to be weaker than it is often assumed to be. The possibility of identity politics, as a strategy that fosters ethno-nationalistic sentiments, to be successful among Bosnia-Herzegovinian youth appears limited. After all, there does not seem to be much animosity to draw upon.

Possible avenues for further research

Because of the complex socio-political context of Bosnia-Herzegovina, one should be cautious to extend the conclusions of this research to a wider time frame or area. Identity, after all, is difficult to predict and remains highly dependent on social context. There are however, a number of ways in which the current research can be improved or expanded in order to make both more meaningful predictions about young people in Bosnia-Herzegovina's, as well as those in other countries.

One of the shortcomings of the dataset used in this study was that it included a disproportionate amount of Bosniaks, women, and people living in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina compared to the latest figures available.⁴⁰ The quality of the study could be improved by making sure that different parts of the country are represented equally, enabling the researcher to draw more confident conclusions. A future study should more specifically target Bosnian Serbs, men, and residents of Republika Srpska. This will of course be much easier once the full results of the latest census are publicised.

Identity by its nature changes over time and place. The fact that the current study is constrained to a relatively short period limits its explanatory power. In order to better comprehend the inherent dynamic of identity it is vital to track its development over time, for example on a year-by-year basis. This should not be too difficult since the same internet questionnaire can be carried out over fixed intervals in time and the same statistical procedures can be applied each time. Powerful results can be achieved with relatively little effort. By having a string of continuous data it will become possible to track the development of identity in time, which allows for making tentative predictions about the future. In addition, changes in society, such as contested elections, might be recognised by the effect they have on the experience of identity at that time. This will help us to better understand the role of contextual factors on identity and political beliefs.

Finally, any study into identity would benefit from a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. A questionnaire has the benefit of reaching a wide audience, the main reason it was selected for this thesis. However, its results remain but an aggregate of individual experiences. Yet, identity is made in social context; together with or explicitly without and in comparison with or juxtaposition to others. In order to grasp these intricate aspects of identity, a deeper understanding of these processes is necessary. Admittedly, being 'there', talking with locals, and listening to their stories with an open mind already makes a large difference. However, specific research methods

⁴⁰ Information on the composition of ethnic groups still relies on the 1991 census

could prove to be beneficial as well. In this case, one could think of a combination of questionnaire research with focus groups and in-depth interviews.

Reflection

This report aims to present the results of the questionnaire as objectively as possible. However, in a context such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, there is always a different side to a story. Especially when talking about a topic as subjective as identity, it is difficult not to offend anyone. Some people will be more pleased with the study's conclusions than others. However, as a researcher I have always tried to substantiate my claims as much as possible and to incorporate different perspectives. A questionnaire in itself only delivers numbers and it will always be up to an actual human being to interpret them. In some cases, the results speak for themselves, whereas in other cases a thorough understanding of the local context is necessary. To make this task somewhat easier, I have talked about the topic with locals whenever the opportunity presented itself. Although not explicitly mentioned in the text, I hope that their thoughts and opinions are reflected in my work.

Despite the interesting conclusions that were drawn from the questionnaire, it is important to take into account that these results remain only a snapshot of a specific place and time. However, as discussed in the concluding chapter, there are a number of ways in which the quality and scope of the study can be improved. As an academic, I have learned much about statistics and questionnaire research, two research methods I had relatively little experience in beforehand. When I began analysing the results, I realised that I did not take the easiest route. It took quite some time to reacquaint myself with all the intricacies of SPSS and statistical analysis. Today, I am glad I did choose this path and believe that I have become a better geographer by doing so.

Bosnia-Herzegovina is an incredibly interesting and beautiful, but also unpredictable country. In 1989, few would have predicted the rapid rise of ethno-nationalism that would soon spread conflict throughout Yugoslavia. Studies such as these might have helped to understand the more hidden dynamics that were present in society at the time, although it should be noted that there many people that did not support nationalism even at that time. Today, however, another ethnicity-based eruption of violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina seems unlikely from my point of view. From what I have seen, there is little appetite at this moment for anyone, not even nationalist politicians, to go back to conflict. The results of the questionnaire support this view. It would be great, but perhaps somewhat idealistic, if these feelings could be converted into political change as well.

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Appendix A: Timeline of key events in Bosnia-Herzegovina's history

Based on a profile by the BBC with additions and alterations by the author (BBC, 2014).

1463-1878	Ottoman rule.
1878-1918	Austria-Hungary establishes rule over Bosnia-Herzegovina following the conference of Berlin.
1914	Gavrilo Princip, a Bosnian Serb/Yugoslav nationalist, assassinates Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary in Sarajevo, triggering World War I
1918	Following its defeat in the First World War, the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapses and its territory is divided in different countries. Bosnia-Herzegovina becomes part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, which would later be renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.
1941	Bosnia-Herzegovina is annexed by Croatia, a puppet state of Nazi Germany. Serbs, Jews and Gypsies are sent to Croatian death camps. To this day, the number of Serbs that died here remains a source of inter-ethnic dispute. The controversial names 'Chetnik' (for Serbs) and 'Ustache' (for Croats) also date back to this era.
1945	The partisan lead Josip Broz Tito liberates Bosnia-Herzegovina from Nazi forces. Bosnia-Herzegovina becomes a republic within the Yugoslav Socialist Federation.
1991	Following the collapse of communism, nationalists win the first multiparty elections and form a coalition government despite having conflicting goals: Muslim nationalists want a centralised and independent Bosnia, Serb nationalists want to stay in Belgrade-dominated rump Yugoslavia, Croats want to join an independent Croatian state. In neighbouring Croatia, fighting erupts between government forces and Serb militias supported by the Yugoslav People's Army.
1992 February - March	Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Muslim nationalists form an alliance and outvote the Serbs at an independence referendum held on February 29 and March 1, 1992. Many Bosnian Serbs boycott the referendum and argue that it is unconstitutional. Bosnia-Herzegovina's parliament formally declares independence on March 3, 1992. On March 27, Bosnian Serb leaders declare autonomy of their territory.
1992 April 6	The United States and the European Community recognise Bosnia-Herzegovina's independence. War breaks out. Supported by the Yugoslav People's Army, Bosnian Serb forces lay siege to Sarajevo and make rapid gains in other parts of the country. Ethnic cleansing and other war crimes are widespread throughout various territories.
1992-1995	An extremely complex and dynamic conflict rages across Bosnia-Herzegovina and neighbouring Croatia. In Herzegovina, Muslims and Serbs form an alliance against Croats, whereas in central Bosnia, Croats and Serbs fight against Muslims. Fighting even occurs within ethnic groups. The UN designates Sarajevo, Goražde and Srebrenica as safe havens.
1994 March	Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Muslim forces sign ceasefire agreement, known as the Washington Agreement.
1995 July	Bosnian Serb forces under the command of General Ratko Mladic overrun the safe haven of Srebrenica. Despite the presence of Dutch UN troops, thousands of Bosnian Muslim men and boys are separated from their families and massacred.
1995 Summer - Autumn	Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat, and Republic of Croatia army forces make large territorial gains against the Bosnian Serbs. They are aided by NATO air strikes against Serb positions.
1995 November 1-21	After twenty-one days of negotiation, a peace agreement is reached between Croatia, Yugoslavia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Dayton Agreement) creates two entities of roughly equal size, one for Bosnian Muslims and Croats, the other for Serbs. An international peacekeeping force is deployed.

1996	The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia begins work in the Hague.
1997	The Peace Implementation Council extends the powers of the High Representative who oversees implementation of the Dayton Agreement.
1998	Nationalist politicians do well in general elections. The first Bosnian Muslims and Croats are convicted of war crimes in the Hague.
2000	Moderate parties do well in elections in the Muslim-Croat entity but nationalists gain the upper hand in the Serb entity. However, the main Serb nationalist party is forced to form a coalition headed by a moderate Prime Minister. The three main ethnic parties are excluded from the Federation and State governments.
2001 March	The OHR removes Croat member of the presidency Ante Jelavic from his office because of violation of the Dayton Agreement and pursuing an independent Croat state structure.
2001 December	The Serb Democrat Party, the main Bosnian Serb nationalist party, votes to expel all war crimes suspects. This includes the party's founder and wartime leader Radovan Karadzic.
2002 October	Nationalists win back power in elections.
2004 December	NATO's Stabilisation Force leaves Bosnia-Herzegovina and is succeeded by a smaller European Union-led force, EUFOR. It is the first operation of its kind for the European Union.
2006-2012	Nationalist parties continue to dominate the political scene. In the meantime, Bosnia-Herzegovina is pursuing EU and NATO membership without much progress.
2013 October	The first post-war census takes place amidst controversy on questions related to ethnic identity. Results are expected to reflect ethnic cleansing.
2014 February	Bosnian Spring erupts and protests take place in most major cities. Several politicians step down, but there are few structural changes.


Appendix B: Former Yugoslavia, Ethnic Majorities

Source: US Central Intelligence Agency. (1992). The Former Yugoslavia: A Map Folio. Washington: Library of Congress. Accessible online at: <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe/yugoslav.jpg>



Appendix C: The political system of Bosnia-Herzegovina

Adapted from International Crisis Group (2010, p. 26)



Appendix D: Questionnaire

Full transcript in English of the questionnaire used in this thesis:

Welcome message

Research on political attitudes and identities of young people in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Dear participants,

We invite you to take part in a study on political attitudes and identities of young people (18-25) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This survey is part of my master's thesis. One respondent will win a prize of choice with a value of 50 KM, which you will be able to choose at the end of the questionnaire. Before we start please note the following:

- Completing the questionnaire will take you 10 minutes of time.
- All your answers will be confidential and all references in the final report will be anonymous.
- Your answers will be used exclusively for research purposes

If you have any questions or concerns, please contact Tom Heinen from proMENTE Social research at: tom@promente.org

Thank you for your cooperation!

General information

First of all you please give us some information about yourself

Birth year? Only numbers may be entered in this field.	Enter your answer here: ----
Gender? Please select ONE of the answers:	<input type="radio"/> Female <input type="radio"/> Male
Your status? Please select ONE of the answers:	<input type="radio"/> Student <input type="radio"/> Employed <input type="radio"/> Unemployed <input type="radio"/> Other → ...
In which part of BiH do you live?	<input type="radio"/> Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina <input type="radio"/> Republika Srpska <input type="radio"/> Brčko district <input type="radio"/> Elsewhere → ...

2013 Census

Please answer the following questions about the Census in BiH, which was implemented in October 2013

Have you participated in the Census of population, households and dwellings between 1 and 15 October? Please select ONE of the answers:	<input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No
Please specify how you voted on the following issues during the Census which was conducted from 1 to 15 October 2013. If you have not participated in the Census, please indicate how you would have answered Please select ONE of the answers:	<input type="radio"/> Bosniak <input type="radio"/> Croat <input type="radio"/> Serb <input type="radio"/> Does not clarify <input type="radio"/> Other → ...

Religious affiliation

Please select ONE of the answers:

- Islamic
- Catholic
- Orthodox
- Agnostic
- Atheist
- Does not clarify
- Other → ...

Mother tongue

Please select ONE of the answers:

- Bosnian
- Croatian
- Serbian
- Other → ...

Identity (1)

Please indicate the extent to which these claims are important for you and for what you are. Select the appropriate response for each item:

	Very important	Important	Moderately important	Of little importance	Unimportant	Does not apply to me
My nationality	<input type="radio"/>					
My religion	<input type="radio"/>					
My language	<input type="radio"/>					
That I am a student	<input type="radio"/>					
My social status	<input type="radio"/>					
My political attitudes	<input type="radio"/>					
My gender	<input type="radio"/>					
That I am young	<input type="radio"/>					
My family	<input type="radio"/>					
If you are reading this, select "Not important"	<input type="radio"/>					
My town or village	<input type="radio"/>					
My neighbourhood	<input type="radio"/>					
Balkan	<input type="radio"/>					
Europe	<input type="radio"/>					
Bosnia and Herzegovina	<input type="radio"/>					
Yugoslavia	<input type="radio"/>					
Multiculturalism	<input type="radio"/>					
Me as an individual	<input type="radio"/>					
That I am a human	<input type="radio"/>					
My profession	<input type="radio"/>					

Serbia	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Republika Srpska	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Croatia	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If there is anything else please specify	Enter your answer here:					

Identity (2)

Which of the above statements you define to a large extent? (Please specify only one)

Please select ONE of the answers:

- My nationality
- My religion
- My language
- That I am a student
- My social status
- My political attitudes
- My gender
- That I am young
- My family
- If you are reading this, select "Not important"
- My town or village
- My neighbourhood
- Balkan
- Europe
- Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Yugoslavia
- Multiculturalism
- Me as an individual
- That I am a human
- My profession
- Serbia
- Republika Srpska
- Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Croatia
- Other (If there is anything else please specify)

Your opinion (1)

In your opinion, is there a tension between the following groups of people in Bosnia and Herzegovina? Select the appropriate response for each item:

	Yes, a lot	Yes, to some extent	No	I do not know
Rich and poor people	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Board/directors and employees	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Men and women	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Old and young people	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If you are reading this select "No"	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
People from rural and people from urban areas	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
People from different national and ethnic groups	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Politicians and citizens	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Your opinion (2)

To what extent do you agree with the statements below? Select the appropriate response for each item:

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
The main task of politicians is to protect my ethnic group	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
At the next election I will vote for a politician who represents my ethnic group	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My ethnic group is threatened by other ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Some ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina should have more rights than others	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The current political system based on ethnic representation is the only way to preserve stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Different ethnic groups should have a separate education regarding the national group of subjects (history, geography, language)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
In December 2009 the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the exclusion of Jews and Roma from the highest positions of Bosnian government unlawful discrimination. Do you agree with this judgment?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Your opinion (3)

Please answer. Select the appropriate response for each item:

	Very proudly	Somewhat proud	I am neutral on this issue	A little proud	Not at all proud
To what extent do you feel proud that you are a member of your ethnic group?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To what extent do you feel proud that you are a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
To what extent do you feel proud to live in your part of Bosnia and Herzegovina?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Political party

Which political party best expresses your beliefs? Please select between 1 and 3 answers:

- BH Slobodni demokrati – BH SD
- Bosanska stranka - BOSS
- Bosanska demokratska stranka - BDS
- Bosansko podrinjska narodna stranka - BPNS
- Bosanskohercegovačka patriotska stranka Sefer Halilović – BPS SH
- Bosanskohercegovačka stranka prava – BSP
- Demokratska Fronta – DF
- Demokrati Bosne i Hercegovine – Demokrati BiH
- Demokratska narodna zajednica BiH – DNZ BiH
- Demokratska stranka federalista - DSF
- Demokratska stranka invalida BiH – DSI BiH
- Demokratska stranka srpske - DSS
- Demokratski narodni savez – DNS
- Demokratski pokret Srpske - Depos
- Evropska ekološka stranka E5 – E5
- Građanska demokratska stranka Bosne i Hercegovine – GDS BiH
- Hrvatska demokratska unija BiH – HDU BiH
- Hrvatska demokratska zajednica Bosne i Hercegovine – HDZ BiH
- Hrvatska demokratska zajednica Bosne i Hercegovine 1990 – HDZ1990
- Hrvatska kršćanska demokratska unija BiH – HKDU BiH
- Hrvatska narodna zajednica – HNZ
- Hrvatska seljačka stranka BiH – HSS BiH
- Hrvatska stranka prava BiH – Đapić-dr. Jurišić
- Hrvatski blok BiH – HB BiH
- Hrvatski demokršćani – Demokršćani
- Liberalno demokratska stranka BiH - LDS
- Komunistička partija Bosne i Hercegovine - KP BiH

- Kongresna narodna stranka zaštite prava boraca, građana – pravde i morala – KNSBiH

- Narodna bošnjačka stranka - NBS

- Narodna demokratska stranka - NDS

- Narodna stranka radom za boljitak – Za boljitak

- Naša stranka - NS

- Nezavisna demokratska stranka – NDS

- Nova hrvatska inicijativa – NHI

- Nova stranka - NS

- Partija demokratskog progresa Republike Srpske - PDP RS

- Partija ujedinjenih penzionera Republike Srpske – PUP

- Pokret za promjene Bosne i Hercegovine – PZP-BiH

- Pokret za Trebinje - Stranka za Hercegovinu

- Politički pokret mladih BiH – Pokret mladih

- Radničko-komunistička partija Bosne i Hercegovine – RKP BiH

- Republikanska stranka Bosne i Hercegovine – RS BiH

- Savez nezavisnih socijaldemokrata – SNSD Milorad Dodik

- Savez za bolju budućnost Bosne i Hercegovine - SBBBH

- Socijaldemokratska partija Bosne i Hercegovine – SDP BiH

- Socijaldemokratska unija Bosne i Hercegovine – SDU BiH

- Socijalistička partija – SP

- Srpska demokratska stranka - SDS

- Srpska demokratska stranka 1990 - SDS 1990

- Srpska radikalna stranka Republike Srpske - SRS RS

- Stranka demokratske akcije - SDA

- Stranka demokratske aktivnosti za evropsku BiH - A-SDA

- Stranka dijaspore BiH - SDBiH

- Stranka socijalne sigurnosti srpskih boraca - SSSSB

- Stranka penzionera umirovljenika Bosne i Hercegovine – SP/U BiH

- Stranka za Bosnu i Hercegovinu - SBiH

- Stranka za narod Bosne i Hercegovine - SzaNBiH

- Zavičajni socijaldemokrati – ZSD

- Zeleni Bosne i Hercegovine - Zeleni BiH

- Local/regional party

- None*

- Other → ...

*Please specify why no political party expresses your political beliefs:

Political issues

How do you experience the following questions? Select the appropriate response for each item:

	Very positive	Slightly positive	Neutral	Slightly negative	Very negative
Transparency of politicians in Bosnia and Herzegovina	<input type="radio"/>				
The effectiveness of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina	<input type="radio"/>				
The economic situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina	<input type="radio"/>				
Relations between ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina	<input type="radio"/>				
The environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina	<input type="radio"/>				
Future prospects of young people in BiH	<input type="radio"/>				
Rule of Law in Bosnia and Herzegovina	<input type="radio"/>				
The level of democracy in BiH	<input type="radio"/>				
Bosnia and Herzegovina's chances of joining the EU	<input type="radio"/>				

Would you consider voting for a multi-ethnic party?

Please select ONE of the answers:

- | |
|---|
| <input type="radio"/> Yes |
| <input type="radio"/> Yes, depending on the rest of their program |
| <input type="radio"/> Maybe |
| <input type="radio"/> I probably would not |
| <input type="radio"/> No |
| <input type="radio"/> I do not know |

Social relations

To what extent do you agree with the statements listed below? Select the appropriate response for each item:

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Most people can be trusted	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Ethnicity is important in establishing social relations	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Most members of other ethnic groups can be trusted	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If you are reading this, please select "Strongly disagree"	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I would like to have more friends who belong to different national/ethnic groups in this region	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
There is enough opportunity to meet members of other ethnic groups	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

My closest friends are ...

Please select ONE of the answers:

- All of my ethnic group
- Mostly from my ethnic group
- From different ethnic groups
- Mostly from other ethnic groups
- All of the other ethnic groups

Opinion on this study

Is there anything else you would like to comment? If a question in the questionnaire should be clarified, please specify which and why.

Enter your answer here:

.....

Prize draw

Please select which prize you would like to win.

Please select ONE of the answers:

- Voucher of 50 marks for www.kupipoklon.ba
- Voucher of 50 marks for Cinema City of Sarajevo
- Voucher of 50 marks for DM Drogeriemarkt
- 50 marks credit for my mobile