

# **The Establishment of UNTAC**

## **Power or Persuasion?**

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## Abstract

The agreements on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) were signed in October 1991 in Paris. UNTAC's establishment was initiated by the UN Security Council's Permanent Five (P-5) member states with Resolution 668 in September 1990, making it the first UN transitional authority. There were conflicting interests regarding intervention in Cambodia in the years after Vietnam's invasion – however, none of the P-5 vetoed the resolutions leading up to UNTAC. The Soviet Union seemed to be the obstructing factor in the early 1980s; its changing position is surprising. It is also puzzling why the P-5 came up with a large-scale mandate, when the conflicting parties in Cambodia were already seeking reconciliation. The question that this thesis tries to answer is the following: *'Why did the P-5 of the UN Security Council decide upon the establishment of the far-reaching United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), despite their initial conflicting interests and the improving situation in Cambodia?'* A neorealist and constructivist approach are applied to this case in order to find out if either provides an adequate explanation of the change in international outcomes. Waltzian neorealism's expectation of system change as the cause is refuted: empirically, the transformation of a bipolar into a unipolar balance of power cannot be confirmed. A constructivist framing analysis does provide some insight: the P-5 were able to use a 'comprehensive political settlement frame' in the discourse on the Cambodian situation from the late 1980s.

*Keywords: UNTAC; Security Council; International Outcomes; Neorealism; Constructivism*



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## List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

<b>ASEAN</b>	Association of Southeast Asian Nations ( <i>political and economic international organisation</i> )
<b>Comintern</b>	Communist International ( <i>Soviet-based international communist party; 1919-1943</i> )
<b>CGDK</b>	Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea ( <i>coalition government of Khmer Rouge, FUNCINPEC, and KPNLF factions; 1982-1993</i> )
<b>CPK</b>	Communist Party of Kampuchea ( <i>Cambodian communist party, known as Khmer Rouge; 1966-1981</i> )
<b>CPP</b>	Cambodian People's Party ( <i>Vietnam-supported Cambodian communist party; 1991-now. Successor of the Vietnam-supported KPRP</i> )
<b>FUNCINPEC</b>	Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique, Et Coopératif ( <i>Cambodian royalist party; 1981-now</i> )
<b>ICP</b>	Indochinese Communist Party ( <i>Comintern-controlled Vietnamese communist party; 1930-1951</i> )
<b>KPNLF</b>	Khmer People's National Liberation Front ( <i>Cambodian anti-communist party; 1979-1993</i> )
<b>KPRP</b>	Khmer People's Revolutionary Party ( <i>Cambodian communist party; 1951-1966. The CPK became its Khmer successor, Vietnam-supported defectors kept the KPRP name until 1991</i> )
<b>PDK</b>	Party of Democratic Kampuchea ( <i>Cambodian democratic socialist party, succeeding the CPK; 1981-1993</i> )
<b>PRK</b>	People's Republic of Kampuchea ( <i>Vietnamese-supported Cambodian state, ruled by the KPRP/ CPP; 1989-1993</i> )
<b>SNC</b>	Supreme National Council ( <i>Cambodian 12-member transitional authority council; 1990-1993</i> )
<b>UNTAC</b>	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia ( <i>1991-1993</i> )

## **List of Actors**

### **Hun Sen (\*1952)**

Served as Foreign Minister (1979-1986, 1987-1990) and Prime Minister (1985-now) of Cambodia. Associated with the KPRP (until 1991) and CPP. His leadership in the 1980s was supported by Vietnam and the Soviet Union.

### **Khmer Rouge (1968 – 1997)**

Political party and guerrilla movement. Its political factions are also known as KPRP (until 1966), CPK (until 1981), and PDK (1981-1993). The party became extremely divided during and after the UN mission in Cambodia, and was eventually dissolved.

### **Lon Nol (\*1913 – †1985)**

Served as Prime Minister (1966-1967, 1969-1971) of Cambodia. Associated with the Khmer Renovation, an anti-communist, nationalist, and right-wing party that organised the 1970 coup against Norodom Sihanouk's rule.

### **Norodom Sihanouk (\*1922 – †2012)**

Served as King (1941-1955, 1993-2004) and Prime Minister (1955-1970) of Cambodia. Associated with FUNCINPEC. Overthrown by Lon Nol in 1970. President of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (1982-1987) and Supreme National Council (1990-1993).

### **Permanent Five**

The five member states of the United Nations that have been granted permanency in the UN Security Council: China, France, Soviet Union/Russia, United Kingdom, United States. The permanent five have the right to veto resolutions within the Security Council.

### **Pol Pot (\*1925 – †1998)**

Served as Prime Minister (1976-1979) of Cambodia. Associated with the Khmer Rouge, being the KPRP/CPK leader from 1963-1981. Under his communist dictatorship, the lives of more than 20 percent of the Cambodian population were lost due to execution, starvation, disease, and hard labour.

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## **1. Introduction**

The agreements on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) were signed on 23 October 1991 in Paris (United Nations, 2003). UNTAC was to restore and maintain peace, promote national reconciliation, and ensure the right to self-determination of the Cambodian people through free and fair elections. The request for such a framework was initiated by the UN Security Council's Permanent Five (P-5) member states with Resolution 668 in 1990, and was the first of its kind. UNTAC was under direct responsibility of the UN's Secretary-General, and was to be advised by the Supreme National Council (SNC), a coalition of representatives for the Vietnamese government and for the Cambodian opposition parties. Would the President of the SNC be unavailable to make a decision on how to advise upon the political situation, the Secretary-General's Special Representative had the power to do so instead. Furthermore, UNTAC had direct control over administrative agencies concerned with foreign affairs, national defence, finance, public security, and information (United Nations, 1991). The provided mandate also included the power to install UN personnel in these diverse agencies. Additionally, the UNTAC mission was allowed to supervise or even control civil police, law enforcement and judicial processes, and military operations. Lastly, and this is one of its most important tasks, it was to organise elections in Cambodia. This goal included the ambition of establishing new electoral laws in the country. The newly elected government would have to adopt several previously composed principles for a new constitution laid down in the final act of the Paris Conference (United Nations, 1991). Taking in mind some important historical events preceding UNTAC it seems unexpected, at first sight, that the UN Security Council's P-5 developed its political framework at the time.

### *Historical context*

Cambodia had persistently been challenged by political conflict in the second half of the twentieth century. Violence against political opponents was common under Prince Norodom Sihanouk's rule, installed by the French colonial administration in 1941 (Brown and Zasloff, 1998). Sihanouk governed Cambodia in various positions of power until his reign was overthrown by Prime Minister Lon Nol's coup in 1970 (Hensengerth, 2008). Lon Nol turned the monarchy into a right-wing and pro-United

States republic, but failed to stabilise the political climate. Support for communism was increasing, empowering organised armed forces, and the country started to suffer from a spillover of the Vietnam war (Solomon, 2000). In 1975, Pol Pot's CPK (Communist Party of Kampuchea, more widely known as the Khmer Rouge) took control of the state and installed a brutal, autogenocidal regime. Vietnamese troops ended Pol Pot's rule only a few years later by capturing Phnom Penh in 1979 (Cambodia Tribunal Monitor, n.d.). The government in Phnom Penh would be in the hands of the Vietnamese until 1991, while a coalition of Sihanouk and supporting royalists, the communist party replacing the CPK (Party of Democratic Kampuchea, PDK), and the anti-communist and republican Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) was aiming to oust it.

Several meetings between the Cambodian coalition and the Vietnamese-controlled Phnom Penh government took place in Jakarta in the late 1980s, ultimately leading to the 1989 Paris Conference on Cambodia and the Paris Agreements on UNTAC in 1991. The Security Council's P-5 were not directly involved in the Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIMs), but representatives of the other Indochinese states and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) were. It is puzzling why the Security Council would initiate a peacekeeping mission this late, when the conflicting parties in Cambodia were already seeking reconciliation through the JIMs. Vietnam had also pulled out its armed troops from the country in September 1989, making the case for intervention seemingly less convincing. The content of the mandate is part of this puzzle, too: the transitional period, which lasted from February 1992 to September 1993, meant a severe loss of national sovereignty and independence for Cambodia. UNTAC took control over many state institutions, supervised Cambodia's use of 'hard power', and laid the basis for a new constitution. It was also a costly operation: 22,000 military and civilian personnel were involved (compared to 11,000 for the East Timor transitional administration and about 5,000 for the Kosovo mission) and its financial burden was \$1.6 billion (compared to \$480 million and \$40 million for East Timor and Kosovo respectively) (United Nations, n.d.<sup>a; b; c</sup>).

The United Nations did not intervene in the Vietnamese invasion, since there was disagreement between the members of the Security Council about the matter. The Soviet Union supported Vietnam's Hanoi-based government in Cambodia – while China supported the Khmer Rouge and took an anti-Vietnam stance (Vámos, 2010). These conflicting interests revolved mainly around the geopolitical importance of

Vietnam: the Soviet Union posed a threat to China's influence in the region. Thus, "the competition over Cambodia reflected a strategic conflict between the two regional powers" (Feng, 2007: 70). According to Morris (1999), the Chinese government assumed that the Soviet Union had urged Vietnam to invade Cambodia – though there is no evidence suggesting this was the case. In January 1979, the Soviet Union vetoed a draft resolution proposing a ceasefire and the withdrawal of foreign troops from Cambodia (Xinhua General News Service, 16 January 1979). The anti-Vietnamese position was backed by the United States, United Kingdom, and France. Clearly, there were clashing positions within the Security Council. Rationalist theories would expect that the Permanent Five states' self-interest (or the self-interests of the superpower(s) among them) should, in some way, have made the P-5 agree to Resolution 668 and follow through by signing the Paris Agreements. As Elizabeth Cousens states: "The UN is clearly constrained in addressing conflicts that occur within the territory of one of the P-5, or in any area in which the P-5 have key interests" (2004: 113). There were conflicting interests regarding intervention in Cambodia in the years after Vietnam's invasion – but none of the P-5 vetoed the resolutions leading up to the establishment of UNTAC. The Soviet Union seemed to be the obstructing factor prior to the establishment of UNTAC; its changing position is surprising. China brought up the Cambodian situation multiple times in the 1980s, accusing the Soviet Union of supporting Vietnamese aggression. Other than that, there was mainly silence on the issue dividing the Permanent Five. What, then, created a common position among them that made them perceive the Cambodian situation as one in need of an intervention? Ultimately, the question that this thesis will try to answer is the following: *'Why did the P-5 of the UN Security Council decide upon the establishment of the far-reaching United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), despite their conflicting interests and the improving situation in Cambodia?'*

#### *Scientific and societal relevance*

The literature on the establishment of UNTAC mostly has the character of historical or legal analysis. Many authors (Curtis, 1993; Irvin, 1993; Jennar, 1994; Hughes, 1996; Brown and Zasloff, 1998; Chong, 2002; Keller, 2005; Curtis, 1998) have focused on the content or success of the mission or on the Cambodian post-conflict society. There are a few other cases of far-reaching transitional authority exercised by the UN, which have already been compared to the UNTAC case by some authors (Griffin and Jones, 2000;

Brandt, 2005; Croissant, 2008). Most comparative analyses of UN state-building missions, however, do not even include Cambodia and focus on Kosovo and East Timor instead (Ruffert, 2001; Strohmeyer, 2001; Stahn, 2005). Studies on the establishment of UNTAC have mostly been of a descriptive, instead of an explanatory, nature (Curtis, 1993; Chesterman, 2004; Keller, 2005). Overall, the largest portion of the relatively small amount of research on transitional authority in Cambodia is about its influence on the post-UNTAC situation; in other words, about how successful the mission was. Because of the fact that the case is so little discussed in academic literature, this thesis will try to provide new insights into UNTAC and the Security Council's role in Cambodian conflict settlement.

In a review article of several books on UNTAC, Jamie Metzl asks: "Should UNTAC be judged in comparison with other UN missions by how well the United Nations fulfilled its mandate, or by the appropriateness of the mandate itself, or by its social and economic impact on Cambodia, or by the actions of the foreign powers who organized and ran it or by the outcome which the treaty, the mission, and the electoral process produced?" (1995: 85-86). Metzl hints at a 'confluence of interests' among the big powers involved, but does not offer an explanation for the creation of a common interest either from the reviewed literature or from his own perspective. In this thesis, I will not judge UNTAC's success – I will investigate the political process preceding its foundation. The three puzzling aspects (why intervene when the situation seemed to be improving, with a mandate of such a large scale, and with conflicting interests between the Permanent Five?) to that part of UN history have not and cannot be answered from a purely historical or legal point of view. The research question requires an approach from International Relations (IR) theory, since power positions as well as political processes and the international outcomes following from them are to be analysed. From this perspective, an attempt will be made to diminish the gap in the literature on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia. The present body of research leaves options for an analysis of the political processes preceding UNTAC, a reasoning behind its establishment – an answer to the 'why' question. An IR analysis offers a different outlook for understanding the historical events in Cambodia, and could help to explain why it took so long for the United Nations to do something about the long-lasting political conflict in the country. Two grand theories of International Relations will be tested to that end: neorealism and constructivism.

### *Theoretical perspectives*

Neorealism, a theory based on rationalist assumptions, may provide some insight into the factor of system change as an influence on Soviet behaviour. Kenneth Waltz' ideas on the distribution of (material) capabilities and the balance of power will be a main focus for the neorealist explanatory model applied to this thesis. Polarity change, if empirically confirmed, may have been the key to changing interests and with that, changing UN policy on Cambodia. To assess the polarity of the system between 1979 (the year Vietnam took Phnom Penh) and 1990 (the year Resolution 668 was adopted), a calculation of the relative capabilities of the P-5 will be performed. This will be done on the basis of multiple indicators of economic, military, and political power, aggregated into national power scores. The driving mechanism behind changing interests is expected to be a change in power (Waltz, 1979).

A completely different perspective on the case comes from constructivist theory, which does not emphasise on material assets as much as neorealism does, but instead asserts that ideas and identities guide state interests and behaviour (Wendt, 1999). My main focus here will be on framing theory, which provides a basis for analysing socialisation mechanisms between actors. In assessing constructivist assumptions, then, I choose to perform a framing analysis of Security Council documents. Changing dominant frames on the situation in Cambodia may be interpreted as being of importance in establishing a common interest in developing UNTAC, and therefore guided the P-5 in making that decision. Here, the driving mechanism would be a change in persuasion.

### *Outline*

In Chapter 2, a meta-theoretical discussion will be followed by a more elaborate presentation of the neorealist and constructivist assumptions relevant to the transformation of international outcomes. Next, in Chapter 3, these assumptions will be displayed in operationalised hypotheses that are to be tested empirically. This chapter will also describe the methods and data used for the separate neorealist and constructivist analyses. Chapter 4, consecutively, provides a historical background of the Cambodian conflict and the UNTAC mission. All chapters lead up to the fifth, which depicts the results of the empirical assessment of neorealist and constructivist explanations of the establishment of UNTAC. The findings will be interpreted with regard to how they meet the hypothesised expectations. Finally, Chapter 6 evaluates the

approaches used and outcomes produced, answers the research question, and discuss recommendations for further research. In the end, this thesis should show which of the two might have been the mechanism that changed the international outcomes regarding Cambodia: power or persuasion.

## **2. Theoretical Framework**

In this chapter, two grand theories in the field of International Relations will be juxtaposed, highlighting the explanatory power and shortcomings of both. Two explanatory approaches, one derived from rationalist theory and the other from constructivist theory, will be proposed. These approaches may be able to provide some insight into the establishment of UNTAC. Framing theory (as part of constructivist thought) fills the gap between states' different identities and ideas, and changing international outcomes towards common interests.

### **2.1 Rationalism vs. Constructivism**

#### *Rationalism*

Most rationalist theories are essentially individualist when it comes to their ontology, meaning that actions are assumed to be taking place on the level of individual units (Fearon and Wendt, 2002; Jupille et al., 2003). In international relations, these units are usually states. Being individual actors in a world where their survival is of utmost importance, states have some predisposition towards maintaining or obtaining power for themselves (Barkin, 2003). This is the core interest of states, and it is what rationalists tend to focus on. States struggle for power in the international arena, and they are expected to practice international politics in a rational way. The premise of rationality in rationalist theory can be explained in two simple statements. Firstly, states have preferences and beliefs (henceforth termed as 'interests') about the conditions of the world and international politics. These interests are presumed to be exogenous to the state, thus given and fixed and not dependent on a changing structure or context (Gourevitch, 2002; Jupille et al., 2003). Secondly, states' interests will determine the way they act. On the basis of its interests, a state will make a calculation of the costs and benefits relating to the viable options that may be chosen to achieve the ends reflecting that state's interests. Assuming that the state is a rational actor in terms of instrumentality means that it will always choose to act in a way that suits its interests in the best way possible (Gourevitch, 2002; Jupille et al., 2003). External constraints, (expectations of) other states' behaviours, material capabilities, and other costs and risks are taken into account in a state's considerations. Whether states are in fact rational is not so much the question in rationalist theory; they are assumed, and sometimes

prescribed, to be. This theoretical starting point redirects the attention from insecurities about states' interests to the question of which actions we can expect from states on the basis of power relations and the assumption of rationality.

When states determine their course of action in light of certain anticipations, all the while being guided by self-interest, one may argue that they follow a logic of consequentiality (March and Olsen, 1989; Blom-Hansen, 1997). This means that decision-making is done with the consequences of the various available options in mind. At this point, the notion of 'constraints' becomes important. According to rationalist theories, the context of the international system imposes constraints on the range of alternatives that states have in choosing their actions. Rationalists view those constraints as regulative: they are not internalised restrictions on behaviour, but intrinsically arbitrary rules of the system that states may either disregard or recognise in order to act in accordance with their self-interest. Rules are arbitrary in the sense that they "simply reflect interests and powers, or they are irrelevant" (March and Olsen, 2004: 5). States do not adhere to certain values indefinitely, but make rational decisions. It could be a rational choice to follow the rules, while it may also be rational to not do so – depending on the specific context and in particular on the power relations characterising the system. The logic of consequentiality holds that states take norms and rules into account in their calculations on the alternatives available, but ultimately make an instrumentally rational choice (Checkel, 2005). O'Neill (2000) suggests that different strands of rationalist theory would find that interests or preferences are either real and empirically observable or systematically structured (in international relations, structured according to a system of anarchy). Both models contain the notion that interests will be pursued rationally, as the 'aim of optimal preference satisfaction' guides all action (O'Neill, 2000). The first model can be found in March and Olsen (1989), too: their definition of a 'revealed preference' theory (taking preferences as exogenous) holds that the empirical observation of preferences is only possible if one takes them for granted as real, given, and stable. The non-rationalist counterpart to the revealed preference theory, according to them, is the idea that preferences are not stable, precise, or exogenous.

The consideration of geopolitics is often essential in establishing what a rational choice for a state might be in pursuing its interests: interests are (partly) given by a country's geopolitical situation (Schimmelfennig, 2005). Geography matters in politics, because it tells us how large a country is, who its neighbours are, in what continent it lies, what kinds of natural resources it has, whether it has access to a sea or ocean, and

so forth. These aspects, spare the sporadic redrawing of national borders and exhaustion of resources, do not change. The political consequences of geography can be, for instance, that a landlocked country is land-oriented in its expansionist ambitions. Sempa (2002) also mentions the containment policy of the United States, central to analyses of the Cold War. Mercille (2008) explains that the US interest in Indochina was, at least partly, geostrategic. For now, it suffices to say that geopolitical interests are part of the ideas on national interests in rationalist IR theory. This is evident in the definition that Blouet offers: “Geopolitics is the study of the strategic value of Earth space in the context of the competing territorial, economic, and political ambitions of states” (1994: 285). Control over resources, routes, and territory are in the national interests of all states. Attempts at maintaining or extending geopolitical influence are expected among spatially close states, but relational proximity (expressed through trade relations, colonial ties, migrant linkages, or joint membership of international organisations) can also matter in defining relationships between states on the basis of their geopolitics (Perkins and Neumayer, 2008). Both economic gains and the exertion of influence are facilitated by proximity and/or interdependence (Schimmelfennig, 2005).

What, then, does all of this mean for the creation of common interests? Connecting that concept to the rationalist views on self-interest would lead to believe that states only pursue a common interest if it is deemed a viable alternative in achieving self-interest. Rationalists think a state would not follow an interest that is harmful to its own, which is a simple enough assumption. As Olson states, organisations – in this case, the Security Council – serve purely individual (state) interests, while “their characteristic and primary function is to advance the common interests of groups of individuals” (Olson, 1965: 7). It may be difficult, if not impossible, to decide at what point a common interest is present at all. Ultimately, the underlying problem is how one can make assumptions about a state’s prior preferences and beliefs. This is what rationalists tend not to explain; most of them will assume that a state seeks survival, and makes costs-benefits calculations to decide upon the best means towards ends related to ensuring its survival. What exactly constitutes the ends relating to survival cannot be deduced from a rationalist theoretical framework. Moreover, as Weldes (1996) finds, it is problematic that the concept of national interest in rationalist theory does not allow any space for interpretation and interest formation. Common interests may in fact exist according to rationalism, but they will merely exist coincidentally. They cannot be given shape through international norms or

rules, since states have conflicting prior preferences and beliefs that determine what courses of action are perceived by them as optional. Norms and rules are constraining, and may be disregarded if that serves the self-interest of states best. Interests are only changed strategically, by states themselves. This is done in a simple learning process, which most rationalists deem unworthy of much attention (Wendt, 1992). The formation of a common interest cannot be established through a rationalist study, since it will assume that interests are placed within a ‘black box’.

### *Constructivism*

Opening up that black box, and hence allowing interest formation to be exposed and susceptible to interpretation, is what constructivist theory aims to do. Whereas rationalist approaches start from “the assumption that an independent reality is directly accessible both to statesmen and to analysts” (Weldes, 1996: 279), constructivists deny this individualist perspective by proposing a holist ontology. Social structures (such as international relations) are, in the view of constructivists, not reducible to individual units but instead they are powerful constructs in themselves (Wendt, 1999). Relationships between units are of utmost importance in the international system. Intersubjective ideas or understandings define the character of international relations between states. Instead of viewing interests that states have as given, constructivists endogenise them – meaning that interests originate from shared ideas about the world (and the meaning that states give to those ideas) and are to be problematised as social constructions (Weldes, 1996). This is the core assumption of constructivist theory: there is a socially constructed reality that exists through the intersubjective understandings created among multiple actors (Christiansen et al., 1999).

The fact that a constructivist worldview is very much different from a rationalist one is apparent if one considers the epistemological questions that constructivism asks: first, constructivism questions whether knowledge claims can hold any power other than discursive power; second, it questions the appropriateness of causal explanations in the social sciences (Fearon and Wendt, 2002). Several strands of constructivist theory disagree about the answers to these questions – but that these questions are central to social inquiry is most certainly a defining characteristic of constructivism. One cannot take reality as it presents itself to us for granted, since it is constructed through the meaning we attach to it, the (shared) ideas we have about it. Therefore, social scientists must lay bare the socially constructed nature of a ‘reality’ in order to be able to interpret

it and then make claims about it. In international relations, this means that one should interpret the constructions of states – if states are assumed to be the appropriate units of analysis – and their interests, placed within the context of a constructed international structure. Instead of using causal explanations, constructivists tend to argue that norms, ideas, identities and such are constitutive of behaviour (Fearon and Wendt, 2002) and establish their existence by using methods of interpretation. The idea of constitutive norms stands directly opposed to the logic of consequences. It relates to a logic of appropriateness, which implies that actors have some intrinsic desire to follow norms, and may behave in a non-selfish way if a norm is important enough to them.

The logic of appropriateness accommodates the idea that common interests may be created through the effects of norms, a mechanism impossible in purely rationalist theory (which finds that norms may only be regulative or constraining, not constitutive). The notion of the pursuance of national interests, serving state survival, by means of instrumental and rational deliberations is criticised by, amongst others, Jutta Weldes and Martha Finnemore. The latter has found, for instance, that military interventions have often occurred in states where neither geostrategic nor economic importance to the interveners was present (Finnemore, 1996). Weldes (1996) argues that the rationalist notion of the national interest is too vague and problematically accepts reality as it presents itself to us as truth. She points out that if one takes reality as ‘given’, one cannot explain the mechanism behind it – a critique shared by Wildavsky (1987) and Wendt (1999). Endogenising preferences, as constructivists have proposed, solves that problem. Moravcsik (2001), however, suggests that constructivists are unable to distinguish changes in preferences from changes in strategy, that the difference between strategic manipulation and sincere argumentation cannot clearly be established, and that excluding rational imperatives beforehand easily leads to confirmations of constructivist hypotheses.

#### *Use of theories in this research*

The main disagreements between constructivist and rationalist theories lie in their epistemology and ontology, making it difficult to compare the two streams at all and leading to endless critique from one side on the worldviews of the other. A fixed and knowable world versus a socially constructed world requiring interpretation, an individualist concept of states in the international system versus a holist or collectivist one – these fundamental differences are arguably incompatible. Still, rationalist

(specifically neorealist) and constructivist explanations for the issue at hand in this thesis can be tried and tested separately. One approach might hold more explanatory power in this particular case than the other, but that does not mean that it is essentially more ‘correct’ in the larger theoretical debate. No attempts at theory-building or bridge-building will be made. This thesis is about explaining a change in the policy of the United Nations’ Security Council, and attempting to explain it by separately testing two very different theories and their assumptions. Though both rationalist and constructivist theory have many subdivisions, rationalism in particular is a very broad umbrella term (partially) covering the likes of classical realism, neorealism, liberalism, and neoliberalism. In order to narrow down my rationalist analysis, I choose to focus on neorealist perspectives. This choice is a relatively obvious one seeing the topic of interest: the years leading up to the development of UNTAC’s framework coincided with the development of neorealist theory (Nye and Welch, 2014), starting with the influential 1979 publication of *Theory of International Politics* by Kenneth Waltz. To surrender the events of the 1980s to a neorealist explanation is an interesting test of the theory in its heyday. In addition, neorealist theory offers insight into security interests and the relationships between states on the basis of their power status (Waltz, 1979; Gilpin, 1981).

The next sections will elaborate on the key assumptions of neorealism and constructivism. The main focus will be on those assumptions that relate to explanations for change in international outcomes.

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
## 2.2 Neorealist Explanations

The international system is built on the social relations and structures that actors develop. Neorealists such as Kenneth Waltz (1979) and Robert Gilpin (1981) claim that the creation of that system is based on the particular interests that states have. As preferred policies based on self-interest are likely to vary among states, states oftentimes find themselves in conflict with one another and everyone’s interests. Any conflict is particular to the relative distribution of power, or the balance of power, in the international system: some interests are better served by the social relations and structures that are present, and those interests will reflect the ambitions of the most powerful actors. Interests (though always based on survival) and the balance of power

will change over time, as changes occur in the international system. Gilpin and Waltz both highlight changes in military power, economic interests, and political alignments as the important variables that underlie changes and instabilities in world politics.

### *Anarchy*

‘Structure’ is one of the most important terms in neorealism – it is often named structural realism (Donnelly, 2005). The structure of the international system is made up of interactions between states, which depend on the attributes of those states, and constrains actors to behave in a certain way. Another basic concept underlying the theory is ‘anarchy’. According to Gilpin, the condition of anarchy is such that “there is no authority or control over the behavior of actors” (Gilpin, 1981: 27). This is in stark contrast to constructivist theory, which finds that there is control precisely in the relational aspect of the international system. Neorealists find crucial dissimilarities between domestic political systems and the international system, on the basis of which they make their point about the absence of control in the latter. There is no government and no judiciary in the international system. Instead, those with the most power are those who have the most authority and thus those who most often guide decision-making in international alliances or organisations. Who has great power status and who does not depends on the ever-changing distribution of it. The Waltzian neorealist theoretical model is presented schematically in Figure 2.1. Power relations are based on the distribution of capabilities among states, while the international structure of the system (anarchy) constrains states to behave according to individualist and materialist dictates – most importantly, the principle of self-help.



*Figure 2.1: Waltzian anarchy. (Source: compiled by author)*

### *Survival*

Those who because of their wealth of capabilities are most successful at surviving (and possibly obtaining more power for themselves) and accordingly at protecting their national interests, will be the great powers in the international system. Kenneth Waltz (1979) explains how this fundamental mechanism works by comparing states to corporations in an economic analogy, explaining how they have to react to other states' actions and how those reactions may change the actions. Actions taken by actors in the international system are continually interrelated. Since it is assumed that states seek survival, the success of which depends on their own effort (the international system is one of 'self-help'), they have to act as to meet the requirements of survival (Waltz, 2000<sup>a</sup>). If a state manages to secure its survival, it may strive to maximise its power, just as firms aim to maximise profits. Determining what those acts should look like involves the calculation of costs and benefits – incorporating the expected actions and reactions of other states. These depend on the particular structure of the international system, for which the number of great powers is the most important determinant.

### *Bipolarity*

Waltz (1979) claims that multipolarity cannot provide the most stable (meaning, broadly, the most peaceful and efficiently managed) anarchic international system, because the nature of that balance of power leads to ever-changing alliances. Because the power differences among them are not very large, alliances shift – resulting in a permanent insecurity. Some remarks should be made when it comes to the exact numbers of great powers in the multipolar system: a system of three such states may easily be turned into a bipolar system when two of the states jointly throw down the third. This consequence is less likely in a more stable system of four states, wherein alignments do not necessarily mean the downfall of one great power. Five is the last threshold number, according to Waltz: if the number of powers in the international system is higher, uncertainty rules international relations as states have to analyse the capabilities and interests of so many other players in the game.

The international system was largely believed to be of a bipolar nature at the time Waltz wrote *Theory of International Politics* (Nye and Welch, 2014). In a bipolar system, there are no alignments between great powers. Alternating alignments in multipolar systems limit the policy choices for states because they have to make and maintain alliances; this does not hold for bipolar systems, wherein there is room for

states to pursue their own interests to a larger extent. Bipolarity means a low economic interdependence, since the size and share of wealth of great powers tends to increase as the number of them decreases, leading to more economic self-sufficiency (Waltz, 1979; Waltz, 1988). Military interdependence follows a similar pattern, as balancing will revolve more around the capabilities of the great powers themselves than it will on the external capabilities of allies. Moreover, both states will aim for the highest level of capability among the two of them, meaning that expenditures will rise and become a heavy economic burden as well as a source of conflict domestically (Gilpin, 1981). Low interdependence, according to Waltz, ultimately means a low closeness of contact, increasing the risk of conflict. It is difficult to tilt the balance of power in a bipolar system, since there are great inequalities between the great powers and all other states – making realignments by those other states of minor concern.

The bipolar system provides the most certainty for great powers, as they do not have to take into account the actions and reactions of a large number of other states. Waltz finds it impossible to believe that states would ever act both in their self-interest and for the survival or stability of the system, making flexible alignments extremely unlikely in bipolar systems. The status quo provides a level of certainty to all states in a system, but only smaller states will put that certainty above the uncertainty of a change in the balance of power (Gilpin, 1981). The United States and the Soviet Union – argued by Waltz and many others (for instance, see Bull, 1980; Huntington, 1999; and Nye and Welch, 2014) to be the two superpowers in the Cold War following the end of the Second World War – merely had to take each other into account in their calculations, making the status quo fairly easy to assess and uncertainties and miscalculations less frequently observed. Although Waltz (2004) finds that two states will check and balance each other, Gilpin adds that this balance is an unstable one: “if the delicate balance between the great powers is disturbed by a minor change, the consequences could be greater than would be the case in a multipolar system” (1981: 91).

The tendency to overreact is the vice of the bipolar system – the American interference in Vietnam, for example, is said to be such an overreaction (Gilpin, 1981). Overreaction is said to show in other surrogate wars (i.e. wars that were never fought out on American or Soviet soil) of the Cold War period, since actual war would have brought along the risk of nuclear attacks. The surrogate wars were the overreaction of one or both states to turn some events into international crises (Waltz, 1979). Both Waltz and Gilpin find that the propensity towards overreaction is inherent in a bipolar

system because of the low interdependence characterising the relationship between the two states ruling it. Since third-party allies are of little influence, the superpowers can choose to disregard 'peripheral' states – but overreaction happens precisely because the two *can* mingle in the affairs of the periphery (Christensen and Snyder, 1990). If one of the great powers chooses to do so, the other is likely to want to put a halt to it immediately. However, wars resulting from overreaction will always be limited wars (Waltz, 1979; Waltz, 1988).

### *Unipolarity*

Addressing the changes in the international system since the end of the Cold War in 1989, and defending the remaining explanatory power of (neo)realism, Waltz later outlined the characteristics of unipolarity – the system that is argued to rule the post-Cold War world. Gilpin may have predicted this structural change when he found that “inflexible bipolar configurations of power frequently presage the outbreak of hegemonic conflict” (1981: 199). While Waltz’ theoretical conceptualisation defends the stability of non-alignment in bipolar systems, Gilpin argues that the two great powers of the Cold War era were never in a stable relationship with one another. With the breaking up of the Soviet Union, the United States were the only superpower left. This meant that they had the upper hand in international cooperation (Nye and Welch, 2014). Waltz finds this problematic, since in the absence of a real balance of power, one overwhelming power will make other states try to (unsuccessfully) balance against it. One of the reasons why a unipolar system is said to be so unstable, is because the hegemonic power will weaken itself as it meddles with conflicts abroad too much (Waltz, 2000<sup>b</sup>). Even when it restrains itself in this aspect, smaller states will try to make alliances or increase their relative capabilities in the face of unbalanced power. Another destabilising factor is the prospect of one rival gaining enough power to challenge the hegemon, which would eventually shape the structure of the system into bipolarity (Nye and Welch, 2014).

Gilpin finds that since the nineteenth century, the international system is characterised by a succession of hegemonies (1981). In contrast to Waltz, Gilpin believes unipolarity to be a stable system. Hegemonic leaderships, he argues, usually survive because the superpower imposes its preferences onto smaller states who benefit from this in some way or simply accept it. So while Waltz claims that the lack of balancing (leading to the eventual counterbalancing by alliances or one rival power) and

the offensive politics exercised by hegemons are causes of instability (meaning that the unipolar system is unlikely to last long), Gilpin views the same characteristics of unipolarity as arguments for its stability. The differences between the authors in this respect relate to the debate between offensive and defensive realists, to which I shall return later. Challenging the hegemonic stability theory, Layne (1993) asserts that unipolarity is a 'moment'; the premise that overwhelming power necessarily causes resistance in the international system is supported by the fact that hegemons are (potentially) threatening and the smaller powers vulnerable. Drawing upon historical evidence from other 'unipolar moments', he argues that these moments "cause geopolitical backlashes that lead to multipolarity" (Layne, 1993: 32). Both Waltz and Layne think great power emergence in unipolar systems inevitable. The claim that unipolar systems are unstable is upheld by Wohlforth (1999), Pape (2005), and Jervis (2006), among others. However, plenty of arguments can be made for both sides of the argument (Mastanduno, 1997).

Whereas the danger of the bipolar system is overreaction, the pitfall of the unipolar system is overextension. Overextension is not relational, as overreaction (requiring another superpower for the other to react to) is. It is the policy of exerting power beyond capability (Lebow, 2007), instead of fighting limited wars. One could also call it a miscalculation of diminishing returns: the wars fought to maintain hegemonic status or further it may be costly, and without restraints the costs can rise quickly. This is what ultimately erodes hegemonic power. It can be said that overextension has indeed occurred after the Cold War. The United States, with its tendency to perceive itself as the primary protector of peace, justice, and democracy, is likely to be the instigator of conflict. It no longer needs to calculate the interests and preferences of the Soviet Union when determining its own course of action. Being unconstrained, impulsive actions are suddenly within the realm of possibilities. The structural change of the international system from bipolarity to unipolarity has thus affected the international outcomes that we see occurring. According to neorealism, only such structural changes can actually transform the world of outcomes and policy in the international arena. As Waltz finds, in comparing unipolar with bipolar systems, "constancy of threat produces constancy of policy; absence of threat permits policy to become capricious" (2000<sup>b</sup>: 29). In comparing the international system to domestic politics, the absence of checks and balances in both fields means 'arbitrary and destructive governance' which is only beneficial to the ruler and not to the ruled (Waltz,

2004). If Waltz' assumptions about bi- and unipolarity are correct, and if there was in fact a structural change in 1989, his neorealist theory might explain the policy change regarding the Cambodian situation in the late 1980s. The hegemonic position of the United States at the time meant that it determined the international agenda, which explains the lack of a Soviet veto against Resolution 668. The establishment of UNTAC should thus result from the US national interest involved in that particular policy.

The next two sections will show why the distribution of relative capabilities is so important to the balance of power in international politics, and how the notion of national interests is related to the balance of power. Also, neorealist assumptions about system change and its implications for interests will be discussed. Section 2.2.3, finally, will converge the basic theoretical assumptions of neorealism into an explanatory model and abstract hypotheses on the outcomes of international relations – policy.

### **2.2.1 Relative Capabilities**

According to neorealist theory, the structure of the international system is defined by the ordering principle of the distribution of capabilities (Donnelly, 2005). The relations between similar units, by this strand of theory defined as states that are unitary actors in the system, depends on the distribution of power among them. Whereas actors in the domestic system perform various tasks that complement each other, states in the international system do not differentiate functionally (Waltz, 1979). Since the international system is anarchic (meaning that there are effectively no functional differentiations among states and no higher authority to which they are subordinate), the only differences between states are on the variable of material capabilities. The power positions of states can only be assessed through the analysis of the capabilities that states have to perform similar tasks, most importantly on the level of military, economic, and political might. Waltz acknowledges the fact that this assessment requires us to abstract from any other feature of states – surely, every theory must abstract and oversimplify to some level in order to present some generally valid reasoning. Donnelly rightfully states that “theories in the social sciences typically identify law-like regularities rather than exceptionless deterministic laws” (2005: 40).

The military, economic, and political are the dimensions that most neorealists focus on. They are argued to be the most important elements in the assessment of capabilities, since changes in these variables mean a change in power relations in the international system – possibly structural change. Capabilities of these sorts determine

whether a state may conquer territory, survive financially, or benefit otherwise from being able to change the international system (Gilpin, 1981), or whether a state is able to survive (Waltz, 1979). Some more capabilities may be added, such as the size of states' population and territory, their resource wealth, and technological innovativeness. It is important to recognise that neorealists focus on the "variation in the distribution of objective material power capabilities" (Legro and Moravscik, 2014). This variation tells us how states are situated within the balance of power. The scores on the military, economic, and political variables together must be taken into consideration in establishing the level of power that a state has, relative to other states.

### **2.2.2 National Interests**

Neorealism assumes that the differentiation of outcomes in the international system is subject to structural change. This is because national interests towards certain policies change when the structure of the system changes. Some, but not all, neorealists argue that states will always try to enhance their relative position (Walt, 1998; Carlsnaes, 2002). The division between those who think so and those who do not, is formulated as the distinction between offensive, or aggressive, and defensive realists. The former type is clearly represented in the neorealist bodies of literature by John Mearsheimer, the latter by Stephen Walt (Carlsnaes, 2002). The scholars used to introduce neorealism in the above sections also take different positions, Waltz being a defensive realist and Gilpin taking the offensive position (Biersteker, 2002). If the analysis of costs and benefits allows for aggression, Mearsheimer (1990) claims, states *will* show aggressive behaviour to maximise their power relative to that of other states and simultaneously weaken other states' power positions. The trade-off is here perceived as a zero-sum game. When assessing relative capabilities, the offensive neorealist finds that "the distribution of power between states tells us how well-positioned states are to commit aggression" (Mearsheimer, 1990: 13). In this sense, power is all about who could win a war. Defensive neorealists, on the other hand, find that other elements – particularly the form of threats (Carlsnaes, 2002) – must be taken into consideration before one could predict or explain a state showing aggressive behaviour. According to Walt (1998), the central assumption of defensive realists is that smaller states only seek survival. The great powers balance alliances, while the smaller ones tend to bandwagon on the security those alliances provide. His focus is on a reformulation of the balance of power theory into a 'balance of threat' theory (Walt, 1987). Indeed, the question of power is

often one of security and the absence and presence of threats. If one would assume the two broad varieties of neorealism to tell us something about the true nature of states, neither approach would be correct when reflecting their claims upon the real world (Donnelly, 2005). There is no constant aggression, nor is there constant peace.

The state does not act in service of the system it finds itself in (although it may, at times, benefit from keeping the status quo if that ensures its survival), but rather acts in its own interests, which is what it is structurally constrained to do (Waltz, 2014). Contrasting constructivism, neorealists do not believe that a state's national interest may line up with that of another state in the normative environments of international institutions (Mearsheimer, 1995). Instead, states will calculate what the best behaviour is to serve self-interests, taking effects on the balance of power into account. Collective survival is an interest unthinkable in neorealist theory: states' behaviour is forced to follow the national interest because of the anarchic structure of the international system (Mearsheimer, 1995). Whether a state attempts to move beyond survival, aiming for power as an end goal in itself, or not, is a matter of discussion. Taking Waltz' ideas on unipolarity into account, one could argue that even a defensive conception of neorealism allows for the idea that a hegemonic power will seek to maximise power rather than to sustain security. Extending this argument, one could assume that an actor's choice between aggressive or defensive behaviour depends on the distribution of capabilities and the distribution of power, and the costs-benefits calculations employed to pursue the national interests that in turn depend on relative power status. Rationally speaking, this would be a very reasonable assumption about state behaviour.

The national interest of the hegemon in a unipolar system, unconstrained by the conflicting interests of other states, is free to be expanded up until the point that other states feel threatened and try to counterbalance the solitary great power (Waltz, 2000<sup>b</sup>). In addition, overextension disturbs the stability of the unipolar system because it can lead the hegemon to exhaust its capabilities, possibly to such extent that it will ultimately stand more equal relative to other states. Thus, when the structure of the international system changes into a unipolar one, the interest of the hegemon is likely to be to expand power. The limits to behaving on the basis of that interest are reached when the distribution of capabilities changes (leading the balance of power to change) or attempts to balance the distribution of power – either by the formation of alliances or by strengthening relative capabilities – are made by other states (Waltz, 2000<sup>b</sup>).

### 2.2.3 Explanatory Model

In neorealist explanations of change, the most important tasks are to demonstrate how capabilities are distributed among states (and with that, the type of polarity characterising the international system) and to assume the national interests (related to the will to survive and/or maximise power) of those states. In explaining collective outcomes chosen by multiple self-interested actors in the international system, neorealists need to establish that the relevant actors' national interests were overlapping prior to taking the initiative towards a common policy. In unipolar systems, there is only one relevant actor: the hegemon. In bipolar systems, a common policy can be the result of decision-making on the international level if the two superpowers have both calculated it to work in their interest.

To be able to fully comprehend a neorealist theoretical application towards explaining change in the international system (which might be able to explain the dramatically changed UN policy regarding Cambodia), relative capabilities and national interests are two of the most important variables under consideration. The relative capabilities of states, forming the basis of the distribution of power and hence the power relations between states, is the first independent variable in the neorealist explanatory model (Waltz, 1979; Gilpin, 1981; Grieco, 1988; Klotz, 1995; Donnelly, 2005). The second variable, the national interest of states, is dependent on their capabilities in relation to those of other states. Protecting the survival of the state, the most vital of national interests, is the most important objective to all states in the international system. Whatever is necessary to ensure survival will cost something, and precisely what it costs will be calculated in a rational way (Grieco, 1988). The actions following from a rational analysis of the state's position vis-à-vis others and what that means to its national interest, lead to a certain favoured policy. Figure 2.2 presents a simple explanatory model based on the assumptions of neorealist theory.




Figure 2.2: Neorealist explanatory model. (Source: adapted from Klotz, 1995: 20)

The expected outcomes of this model depend on what kind of polarity follows from the distribution of relative capabilities among states. A transformation of international outcomes is explained through polarity change: change in the distribution of capabilities

may lead to change in the distribution of power, and therefore accommodate the interests of one (in a unipolar system), two (in a bipolar system), or multiple (in a multipolar system) states, depending on how many states have an extreme score on the high end of relative power. International outcomes, or policies, are decided upon by those states. From these premises, abstract theoretical hypothesis relative to unipolar and bipolar systems may be formulated:

*H1a. In a unipolar system, wherein one state has the most capabilities and thus the most power, that state's national interest determines international outcomes.*

*H1b. In a bipolar system, wherein two states have the most capabilities and thus the most power, those states' national interests determine international outcomes.*

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### **2.3 Constructivist Explanations**

Alexander Wendt's *Social Theory of International Politics* (1999) was, as the title of the work suggests, written as a response to Waltz' *Theory of International Politics* (1979). In it, Wendt opposes some of the core assumptions of neorealism – most importantly, the theoretical postulates of individualism and materialism. The 'neo-neo' debate (between neorealists and neoliberalists), Wendt argues, has curbed theoretical advancement and conversation. A constructivist reply to this debate, though partitioned, added a social element to international relations theory. This addition became especially important as the Cold War saw its end and a new international system sprouted from that event. Constructivists claimed that an explanation for this systemic change could not be found in individualist and materialist theory. Indeed, dominant IR theories were frustrated by the unexpected developments in world politics in the late 80s and early 90s.

#### *Ideas and the logic of appropriateness*

Whereas Waltz' assumptions lead to believe that the anarchical structure of the international system is necessarily one of conflict and self-help, Wendt proposes that anarchy depends on how states socially relate to one another. This follows from holist and idealist assumptions rather than from individualist and materialist ones. The

international system is one of relationships rather than one of conflicting individual units, and as such shapes identities and interests. Constructivist theory finds that states cannot choose what ideas and behaviours are available to them – they do not simply choose their interests. The neorealist assumption that survival is the main interest of states is, according to constructivists, too abstract and too vaguely defined. Moreover, since identities are always variable, there is no essential, abstract national interest to be assumed (Wendt, 1999). The combinations of ideas and behaviours that are optional in the social structure, wherein states relate to each other, exist because the meanings over those options are shared. States can only choose what available option they prefer, and what policy they deem fit for working out that preferred option. Norms, ideas, and identities guide action, and create (common) interests and outcomes about which states have shared understandings.

O'Neill (2000) introduces some critique on instrumental rationalist decision-making by presenting the idea that if one finds that interests are viewed as intrinsically arbitrary, it may be questioned why the pursuit of ends relating to those interests is done rationally. He states that “whenever the content of preferences is vile or reviled, doubt can be cast on the presumption that securing or pursuing those subjective ends is rational” (O'Neill, 2000: 15). It is thus implied that rationality is inherently related to morality, which may of course be a questionable implication in itself (and certainly so in a context of international politics wherein power and survival are at stake) but not completely undeniable. Rationality assumptions simplify the complexity of and change in decision-making. In weighing one's alternatives, costs and benefits are not the only elements entering the calculation. Ethics, ideas, identities, norms, discourse, and frames all influence that process. Transformations of (common) interests are possible because ethics, ideas, and so forth change. Neorealist theory has little to no attention for the significance of these elements – if considered at all, it is in terms of regulative constraints external to the state. However, as constructivist theory argues, they can be assumed to be of a constitutive nature as well. Following this argument, one finds that socialising mechanisms determine what a state's interest would be in the first place, and thus shape the range of options that that state views as possible courses of actions. Instead of a logic of consequentiality, one applies a logic of appropriateness: norms, ideas, and identities are internalised, causing a state to determine its actions by considering whether or not they are appropriate means to the ends of their constructed interests. Appropriateness is an inherently ideational term, as the idea of what is

appropriate completely depends on how actors meaningfully construct it. Consequentiality, on the other hand, depends on the rationally assumed elements of a calculation.

### *Anarchy*

An elementary constructivist theoretical model is presented in Figure 2.3 (found on the next page). Rather than presuming that states relate to each other in certain ways on the basis of a distribution of capabilities, it is assumed that international relationships are based on the distribution of ideas (Wendt, 1999). Furthermore, the “identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by [shared ideas] rather than given by nature” (Wendt, 1999: 1). The structure of the international system is still one of anarchy, but it is necessarily a social structure and it can present itself in many forms: it is subject to the relations between states and the meaning they give to their relations. It is not simply an unalterable anarchic structure, as rationalists would argue – rather, “anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt, 1999: 6). Questioning the basic elements of the international system as they present themselves to us, and hence viewing the state as a social construct too, could be one further alteration to the structure as neorealism presented it. However, Wendt’s state-centrist assumption will be accepted in the constructivist part of this research for now. In the regulation of relationships of conflict and cooperation, states can still be argued to be the main actors in the international system. Moreover, they are the actors through which system change ultimately develops (Wendt, 1999). This idea mirrors Waltz’ assumption of change: changes at unit level may affect the ordering of power relations to such extent that the structure of the international system is transformed. However, in Wendt’s theory, it is the relations between units and not the composition of material capabilities at the level of a single unit (relative to that of other single units) that constitute the system. Material capabilities are influenced by the ideas and identities resulting from those interactions. As such, the theories are comparable on the assumption of state-centrism and system change, but not on the assumption of the causes of change.




Figure 2.3: *Wendtian anarchy*. (Source: compiled by author)

The following sections will elaborate on the role of identities and ideas in the (trans)formation of interests, and specifically focus on common interest formation through socialisation. Framing is discussed as a socialisation effect. Also, constructivist assumptions about the (trans)formation of intersubjective understandings, interests, and international outcomes will be explained. Section 2.2.4, finally, will bring those assumptions together into an explanatory model and theoretical hypotheses.

### 2.3.1 Identities and Ideas

Neorealism attempts to explain social life through the analysis of material capabilities, disregarding identities, ideas, and norms (Legro and Moravcsik, 2014). Relative power is not the only attribute that can be distributed among states (Buzan et al., 1993). Identities, because they are relational, can also be viewed as distributed attributes. The individualist ontology of neorealism assumes identities (and also ideas and interests) as prior to any interaction, independent of relations to other states (Devetak, 2005). It is important at this point to distinguish the relative capabilities from the identity of a state. Hopf demarcates the concept of identities by stating that they “perform three necessary functions in a society: they tell you and others who you are and they tell you who others are [and] in telling you who you are, identities strongly imply a particular set of interests or preferences with respect to choices of action in particular domains, and with respect to particular actors” (1998: 175). The distribution of material capabilities may tell you and others what you have and tell you what others have, but what this means depends on intersubjective understandings or ideas. There may be great powers and small powers, bipolarity or unipolarity, but how these systems are perceived by states depends on the type of anarchy that defines the social structure of the international system (Wendt, 1999).

Three broad ‘cultures of anarchy’ are distinguished by Wendt: the Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian, here ranked from a low degree of cooperation to a high one. States relate differently to each other (more explicitly, the Self identifies with the Other to a certain extent – or not at all) in these cultures – their collective identities change when the culture changes. Also, the three cultures can be internalised to various degrees. Identities are mostly issue-specific, not total. A collective identity, in Wendt’s theory, is formed through interdependence, and/or common fate, and/or homogenisation, and self-restraint (Wendt, 1999). These mechanisms, dubbed ‘master variables’ by Wendt, have been discussed by other IR scholars of various theoretical backgrounds, too (for instance, the first is an important concept in Waltz’ neorealist theory). Trust among states is built by either repeated compliance, peaceful settlement of disputes, and/or critical reflection upon one’s (hostile) attitude (Suganami, 2006). These scenarios show self-restraint in state behaviour, which signals to other states that cooperation (and perhaps eventually a collective identity) lie within the scope of international outcomes.

According to Wendt, the transformative potential of the international system depends on the scores on the four master variables. However, there may be additional variables on which the formation of collective identities could rely. Suganami (2006) proposes that power inequalities, the variety of agents in international politics, and the identities that these different agents claim must also be taken into consideration. Checkel’s (2008) notion of socialisation (according to him, the process causing changes in state interests and identities) includes three different mechanisms: strategic calculation, role playing, and normative suasion. Klotz (1995) adds community standards and related sanctions as instruments of socialisation. Nevertheless, intersubjective ideas ultimately lie at the base of the collective identities of states (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001). In fact, ideational factors in the international system construct these identities. Interdependence, common fate, homogeneity, and self-restraint may be present in delineated cultures; differences can be ascribed significant importance or not (Neumann, 1999). Identity formation is multidimensional, and the elements of collective identities are being given meaning only through the prevalent ideas in a culture (Neumann, 1999; Hopf, 1998).

Intersubjective ideas constitute international actors’ social reality, or in other words, the shared meaning that is given to material reality defines the spectrum of interests and international outcomes among those actors (Adler, 2013). ‘Meaning’ can also be described as the specific interpretation of something that is observed in material

reality, then constituted in social reality through that interpretation. The constitution of social reality is what leads behaviour and policies, and the reconstitution of it leads to change in international outcomes. The construction of meaning regarding material reality, which consequently constitutes social reality, is one of the fundamental elements of Wendt's (1999) constructivism. He explains that interests and identities are not simply given, but that they are constructed through ideas. Interactions between states are of a certain culture because they share a certain social reality: the social structure of the international system determines the meaning of power and content of interests, resulting in certain outcomes dependent on those interests. Instead of a material structure (which neorealists assume), there is a social structure; instead of the distribution of capabilities (which Waltz says constitutes the power relations, thus the structure of the system), there is a distribution of ideas constituting reality (Wendt, 1999).

Wendtian constructivism, as a reply to Waltzian neorealism, henceforth views change in the international system as the result of a changed distribution of ideas. Wendt (1999) also calls the distribution a 'discursive formation', which would make a change in that distribution a 'discursive reformation'. Change happens when a discourse, which is the array of meaningful ideas constituting social reality (Adler, 2013), is transformed. In that case, one type of discourse (including a specific set of meaningful ideas) becomes dominant over another or multiple other discourses around the same issue. Interpreting an issue through different understandings about material reality, then, changes identities and interests of states – and ultimately causes a different variation of outcomes. Finally, actors and the structure of the international system are mutually constitutive, meaning that change in one of the elements will effect change in the other (Wendt, 1999). This is because actors need shared ideas or an intersubjective social reality to define their actions in the international system. The rules of the game of international politics are set by the structure, but the structure depends on the intersubjective understandings of actors.

The effect of dominant shared ideas may contradict rationalist beliefs about state interests. One particular form of constructivist theory, critical constructivism, has largely different assumptions about the role of ideas than 'mainstream' constructivism does. Critical constructivists claim that ideas are inherently linked to power in the sense that dominant ideas reflect and reinforce power relations. Hopf (1998) makes a distinction between conventional and critical variants of constructivism, arguing that the former has distanced itself from critical theory (and relates more to traditional IR

theory) and the latter has not. While both types of constructivism depart from the same ontological standpoint, epistemologically there are some oppositions among them. Conventional constructivism accepts and adopts most positivist requirements for research. Critical constructivism, on the other hand, problematises positivist methods by stating that they are not critical of the understandings about (social) reality they deduce (Hopf, 1998). Some critical-constructivist reflections will be part of this thesis' conclusion, but meta-theoretical differences will henceforth be left for what they are.

### **2.3.2 (Common) Interests**

Determining what national interests a state has, if one cannot simply reduce them to the aim of survival and power maintenance or maximisation, requires interpretation. Factors that are of influence in the establishment of any interest are collective meanings, culture, norms, values, and identities (Finnemore, 1996; Wendt, 1999). Such factors may make actors with seemingly different interests opt for similar behaviour. From this conception, it seems as though constructivists argue that states make choices relying on ideational considerations only. Most constructivist theorists, however, do leave some space for the material realm in their understandings of international relations. The extent to which material considerations matter does depend on how much and what kind of meaning states attribute to elements in the material realm.

According to Wendt (1999), balancing power is no longer necessary when states mutually identify in such a way that they do not feel threatened by one another. If states in the international system want the same thing, their sense of self becomes a collective one. The distribution of interests is an uncertainty, meaning that states can never truly know another state's intentions, but that does not necessarily mean that states make worst-case assumptions about it. States do know each other, to a certain degree, based on a history of relations – “history matters” (Wendt, 1999: 109). The continuous interaction between states builds identities, from which states can not only infer interests but also adopt those interests. As such, identities imply interests (Hopf, 1998) and a change in interests or the formation of a common interest occurs through change in identities. Though the state will have some basic interests, “the content even of these pre-social interests is affected by states' (...) collective identities, which to varying degrees are constructed by the international system” (Wendt, 1999: 234). A collective identity creates collective interests, to the point that some international interests actually become national interests – not simply because they overlap coincidentally, as

neorealists would argue, but because international norms or preferences are internalised to some extent. When international interests are substantially internalised to be national interests, the international system is no longer definitely one of self-help but possibly one of other-help. Other-help, then, is done because serving the Other's interest is in the Self's interest, too. Such conclusions could never be drawn from neorealist theory, as it presumes identities and interests can be known a priori – which then prevents the possibility of theorising the conditions for cooperation (Hopf, 1998).

Finally, since collective ideas and identities are issue-specific, so are collective interests. As Weldes (1996) finds, interests are socially constructed as being meaningful, and what is meaningful is derived from intersubjective understandings. Because of the issue-specificity of common interests, every distinguishable common interest is created on the basis of meanings specific to the ideas and identities that states share. But not only are interests constructed as meaningful, they are also necessary for the state to opt for a certain international outcome. The next subsection will elaborate on the role of socialisation mechanisms in the (trans)formation of interests.

#### *State socialisation*

State socialisation may be the internalisation of norms, or indeed frames; states develop norms through their interaction, and through defining and repeating them, they will eventually be internalised to such extent that they guide interests and behaviour (Alderson, 2001). State socialisation through framing can be regarded as elaborate norm formation; frames do not only tell us what (not) to do, they may also contain a problem-definition, assign blame to something or someone responsible for the problem, and provide specific prescriptions for who should do what to resolve the problem. The dominant framing of a situation enables certain policies to be regarded as appropriate and constrains the scope of policy options available to decision-makers at the same time (Alderson, 2001). Something that was previously not considered a problem may suddenly be regarded as being a problem, and the appropriate behaviour for dealing with it may be internalised by the actors that are persuaded by the particular framing.

Neorealism grants some space for socialising effects, but views them as the effects of anarchy which constitute a system of self-help and balance of power politics that guide state behavior as these 'norms' are internalised. In constructivism, the range of norms that may be internalised (which could, in theory, be any norm imaginable as long as it can be related to the shared understandings of the socialising states) is not

based on this individualist and self-interested logic.

The internalisation of norms or frames is a different kind of effect on the international level than it is in the individual-psychological sense (Alderson, 2001) – an example of the latter may be when children internalise the gender norms of a society by performing gender unambiguously. State socialisation's most visible and key characteristic is institutionalisation, which is the complete adoption of a norm or frame. At this point of socialisation, the internalisation has become part of the international structure that determines appropriate behaviour. Flockhart (2006) calls the event of institutionalisation a tipping point, as it shows actors' support for and compliance with norms. When norms are internalised at the international level (for instance, in international organisations), often there is some kind of legislation to affirm its adoption. Of course, laws need not be respected, but they are likely to guide practice. Gheciu (2005) found that identities and interests are malleable even in security alliances such as NATO. She argues that successful socialisation (meaning internalisation) of security norms among former communist countries was achieved in the sense that "the socializees would be consistent in their (re)definition of identity/interest in accordance with the new ideas, and they would uphold the new definitions vis-à-vis different audiences and in different circumstances" (Gheciu, 2005: 982). The successful adoption of a norm or frame in an international context, then, is the institutionalisation and adherence to it.

### **2.3.3 Framing as Socialisation**

Ideational interpretative research examines how actors perceive or change their interests as they are influenced by ideas, sometimes to the extent that one could speak of 'reality shifts' (Fisher, 2003). The construction of realities happens wherever actors seek collective action (as in the Security Council), and framing processes are challenges to the dominant realities – those that are most widely understood as meaningful in a policy arena (Benford and Snow, 2000). Framing reality differently can be done through the reshaping of meaningfulness of different parts of perceived realities. Interests that follow from the dominantly perceived realities can be reframed to the point where previously conflicting interests are no longer present, and instead agreement on policy becomes possible. Realities, here, can be commonly held beliefs about the world or about the actors that engage in framing processes. The shared ideas of actors are thus reframed; they are transformed into new ideas and subsequently new identities develop.

These basic ideas about framing do not come from IR theory, but from social movement theory. Finnemore and Sikkink (2001) suggest that the framing mechanism as described above is applicable to the level of international politics. Hence, it may be selected as an analytical method to lay bare constructivist mechanisms in this study.

The construction of meaning, through framing, in international relations happens when a particular meaning is attached to an event or situation by a particular representation of it, leading to a change of opinion or the perception of having certain political opportunities (Chong and Druckman, 2007; Joachim, 2003). Actors may intentionally construct frames in order to offer alternative ideas or solutions to a debate or conflict – but frames can also limit available actions, as Autesserre (2009) shows. Actors' windows of opportunity, as perceived by the actors themselves, depend on contestations in the political discourse. The structure constrains this discourse, which leaves only meaning left to be contested (Fiss and Hirsch, 2005). Thus, one can view the effects of framing as constraining or as constitutive – both may be right (Checkel, 1997). If one accepts the latter variant, one would view framing effects as constitutive of ideas and identities; if one accepts the former, framing is perceived to be an intermediary effect that takes place in the 'black box' of interest formation. Either the effect is that the rational calculation of costs and benefits is altered by a dominant frame, or that the frame socially (re)constructs interests (Checkel, 1997; Jupille et al., 2003). The arguments in favour of constraining effects largely come from liberalist theory, while constitutive socialising effects are usually part of constructivist thought. Tannenwald (1999) and Autesserre (2009) highlight a third effect that framing may have: an enabling or permissive effect, which we can observe when constraints or 'other facts about the world' are overcome by the use of a certain frame.

Framing is often used as a process variable in constructivism that provides some understanding of the formation of or change in common interests. It may have a socialising effect, aiding in the formation (and perhaps internalisation) of a collective identity through the shaping of shared ideas. Socialisation, ultimately, will make states "replicate practices legitimated by prevailing structures" (Klotz and Lynch, 2007: 36). It is much more specific than ideology, and indeed frames are often issue-specific (Benford and Snow, 2000). Taking into account that frames may overlap and be multi-layered (Klotz and Lynch, 2007), it is conceivable that frames can be part of larger ideas, strategies used to serve a larger interest or accomplish some larger goal. Benford and Snow (2000) argue that ideology, although related, is distinguishable from frames

in its persistency and thickness: it forms a large set of beliefs (which are internalised to some extent). The distinction is perhaps most aptly made by Oliver and Johnston, who find that a frame is “an orientating principle that points one in a direction of seeing things, and an ideology (...) a system of ideas arrived at through education, socialization, and debate” (2005: 197). Since ideologies are entire systems of collectively held beliefs and shared ideas, they accommodate or constrain framing. Differences in framing often relate to differences in political and cultural contexts, histories, and ideologies; different systems of ideas provide different outcomes (Oliver and Johnston, 2005; Verloo, 2005).

Apart from how frames work, two other central questions in framing theory are when framing effects take place and how one frame becomes the dominant one if frame contestation takes place. Some find that the more tightly linked the community, the greater the possibilities are for rhetorical coercion (Krebs and Jackson, 2007). This also logically follows from Wendt’s ideas on collective identity formation: the more interdependent a community is, the more shared understandings it is likely to have. Within a community, there are shared understandings of what counts as acceptable discourse. When a collective identity is significantly internalised, one would expect that framing has a more substantial effect than if the identity is a weak one. Thus, there are scope conditions to the effectiveness of frames in changing interests. This is, as Checkel (2013) points out, missing from Autesserre’s theory – specific contexts may not allow for framing effects to happen at all, which is when instrumental effects become more important. One may refute instrumentalism and instead argue, based on Oliver and Johnston’s (2005) ideas, that these specific contexts could be ideologies. Benford and Snow (2000) provide insight into some contextual factors constraining or facilitating framing processes, while Krebs and Jackson (2007) argue that the potential outcomes of rhetorical contestation (which includes framing) can be outlined in a simple model of rhetorical coercion. These two approaches to scope conditions for framing effects will be discussed more elaborately below.

Benford and Snow (2000) claim that political opportunity structures, cultural opportunities and constraints, and audience effects are the main factors that affect framing processes. Political opportunity structures are the ideational landscapes that provide for a limited set of possible frames that are ‘acceptable’ or ‘appropriate’. Culture shapes political opportunities – which are, at least partly, socially constructed. Actors may perceive a certain political structure either as enabling or constraining.

Cultural opportunities depend on “meanings, beliefs, ideologies, practices, values, myths, narratives” (Benford and Snow, 2000: 630), which are resources for actors to create collective action frames from. The third scope condition for framing effects is the targeting of the right audiences. These facilitating and constraining variables hold for social movement framing, but they may have different effects when applied to interstate relations and action. For instance, in international arenas with a small number of members (such as the Permanent Five of the UN Security Council), a very specific and unchanging audience will be addressed. Still, if one would extend the cultural factor, one may find that a similar effect holds at the international level as perceived by Wendt: states are likely to adopt frames that correspond with their shared understandings. What kinds of frames are facilitated or constrained may, in addition, be particular to the culture that states find themselves in. Also, as Mills (1940) theorised decades ago, within institutions especially, particular understandings limit legitimate discourse and framing – a notion inherently linked to the logic of appropriateness.

Krebs and Jackson’s (2007) conditions are presented in the form of a theoretical model of the outcomes of rhetorical contestation. In criticising the lack of focus on rhetoric in politics, they claim that rhetorical coercion is of great importance to political contest. The model is based on the hypothetical situation wherein one politician claims an opposing argument towards another politician in front of an audience, the second politician being in the position to accept or resist the argument. The first politician’s argument consists of both a frame and a set of implications (which follow from that frame); one or both of these elements may either be accepted or rejected by the opposition. This leads to four potential outcomes: in case both the frame and the implications are accepted, policy change is expected; if the frame is accepted and the implications rejected, implication contest follows (in which case different policies are proposed on the basis of the same frame); if the frame is rejected and the implications accepted, a mixed result is perceived where policy change is justified on different grounds by the second politician; and if both the frame and the implications are rejected, framing contest takes place (since framing limits the rhetorical interaction in debates, a common perspective will be contested and then potentially constructed). Thus, a framing process may assist in creating collective outcomes if both a frame and the attached implications are accepted by actors who are in political contestation. Risse (2000) adds one important prerequisite for successful rhetoric that Krebs and Jackson’s model lacks: the actor that is to be convinced of an argument should be prepared to be

convinced and reach argumentative consensus. His view is that a logic of arguing exists alongside the consequentialist and appropriate logics of action; the rationality of the logic of arguing is that participants in a discourse seek common understanding. Overall, the model of rhetorical coercion (perhaps in combination with Risse's deliberations) could be applicable to international politics, since persuasion leads to dominant frames and (re)defined interests in domestic as well as international political contestations (Krebs and Jackson, 2000; Klotz and Lynch, 2007). It should be noted that although often incorporating speech and text, framing need not be a rhetorical and linguistic process – it can be done through images or simply through actions, since one actor's "choices of tactics and the connections between their actions and their rhetoric" (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001: 409) communicate something to other actors. Ultimately, it is a method of persuasion, presented to those who are to be persuaded in many different forms.

One recurring argument made by some of the above and other scholars is that framing effects are likely to take place, and frames are likely to become dominant, when they resonate with previously held understandings of the locus wherein they are introduced – as Peter A. Hall states, "congruence between the ideas and the circumstances" is essential to persuasiveness (1989: 370). However, Laffey and Weldes (1997) find that the 'fit' between ideas is actually made by actors themselves. They support this claim by pointing out the problematic consequence of accepting the congruence between new and existing ideas as given rather than constructed: it omits the possibility of establishing to what extent existing ideas constrain the acceptance of new frames. This notion is discernable in Krebs and Jackson's (2000) threefold explanation for the fact that rhetorical innovation usually takes quite a long time. Firstly, structures of discourse, or 'rhetorical universes', need to be relatively stable. Secondly, new rhetorical forms have to build on arguments that hold in the existing rhetorical arena. Thirdly, existing arguments and frames tend to drown out new ones. Combining these factors with the model of rhetorical coercion and Risse's (2000) logic of arguing, one finds that framing is something that actors have to actively involve themselves in, while they are constrained to some extent by shared understandings predominant in the rhetorical and political arenas.

### 2.3.4 Explanatory Model

Constructivist theory offers an explanation for international (common) outcomes that is very much different from neorealist explanations. It introduces the idea of common interest formation through socialisation. The precise mechanism that converts the national interests of states into a common interest and subsequently the selection of the policy – the establishment of UNTAC – is to be investigated. Constructivism’s interpretation-driven analysis refutes the positivist thinking of rationalist approaches that facts are separable from values (Benneyworth, 2011). Thus, constructivists would argue that the construction of intersubjective ideas and their meanings allow actors to agree on policies. Real interests can never be known, but one can interpret the signals that states send out (Müller, 2004) and give meaning to the state of affairs on the basis of that interpretation.

In constructivist explanations of collective interests, it is of primary concern that one establishes what kind of relationships exist among states. Shared ideas and identities constitute what the national interests of those states may be. More broadly put, collective understandings shape the spectrum of policy options that states are able to manoeuvre in. The meaning of the distribution of capabilities and hence the balance of power is filtered through ideas; ideas are constitutive of power and interests. The material realm is not objectively assessed, but intersubjectively. The assumed collectiveness of ideas is one of the factors distinguishing constructivist from rationalist theory. These considerations lead to the explanatory model in Figure 2.4.




Figure 2.4: Constructivist explanatory model. (Source: compiled by author)

A constructivist rationale would be that “international-level ideational structures exercise a powerful force in the world creating similar global effects in many countries” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001: 404). This is the second part of the explanatory mechanism of the constructivist model: the part that explains how socialising effects at the international level create the opportunity for establishing a common interest, and with that, possibly a common outcome. It is the part that opens up the black box of interest formation, as it attempts to show that the interaction between structures and actors creates a certain interest (Jupille et al., 2003). One could infer from these ideas

the presumption that there are diverging interests prior to any effect at the international level. Most constructivists would say that these conflicting interests are the result of different domestic identities, values, or norms. They are likely to change as states encounter other states and develop certain social relations with them. Whether individual or common, interests develop according to the ideas and identities that exist between states; hence, transformations and formations of (common) interests depends on states' relationships with one another. Hypothesis 2a follows from the explanatory model and its implications:

*H2a. Ideas constitute states' interests, which determine international outcomes.*

From the theoretical deliberations in the previous subchapters, it is clear that socialisation takes place within the black box of interest formation. It therefore needs some place in the explanatory model of constructivist theory. Framing has been argued to be of great importance in the discourses that socialise states, and its effect may be considered as constraining, enabling, or constituting. The difference between constraining and constituting effects may seem more of a difference of interpretation of the effect, or an issue of semantics, than that it seems an actually different effect altogether. Arguing for the one or the other depends on how one believes the international system to influence national interests. However, in this case, I have chosen to view framing effects as a process variable, intermediating in the formation of interests. This is because I want to study a change in policy, and think it to be the reason for interest transformation. The transformation of interests through a socialising mechanism, framing effects, is presented schematically in Figure 2.5. This theoretical model implies a more elaborate hypothesis, containing the socialisation effect of framing. Framing effects are able to transform decision-making processes by transforming the shared ideas among actors and thereby also their definition of interests. The redefinition of interests then constrains or enables policy-making. There may be multiple framings in a particular discourse, but there may eventually be a dominant one that has gained acceptance through processes of persuasion.



*Figure 2.5: Constructivist explanatory model with framing as process variable.  
(Source: compiled by author)*

The reformulated abstract hypothesis for explaining changes in decision-making is therefore:

*H2b. Ideas may be transformed through framing effects, leading states to (re)define their interests and thereby international outcomes.*

The use of ‘(re)define’ is specifically suiting to describe framing effects, since frames are largely constituted around a problem definition. The (re)definition of a problem can be a (re)definition of shared ideas about it. The hypothesis is careful not to be definite: socialisation through framing is not always successful (meaning, internalised) and thus does not always impose an actual redefinition.

The next chapter will provide an operationalisation of the neorealist and constructivist explanatory models applied to the case of the establishment of UNTAC. It will introduce and discuss the methods used to test both theoretical approaches. The most important concepts from this chapter will return in the operationalised hypotheses of this research.



### **3. Methodology**

In this chapter, the conceptual frameworks of neorealist and constructivist theories will be operationalised so that the explanatory power of both approaches may be tested. The research methods used to assess the effect of the relevant variables in each explanatory model will be clarified. Also, a justification for the data used to analyse the case will be provided. Overall, Chapter 3 links the theoretical framework to the empirical analysis.

#### **3.1 Research Design**

The analyses from both approaches are single case studies, the case being observed over time. The primary reason for choosing this research design is that the situation is, in the view of the author, a particular one wanting explanation from an International Relations perspective (as opposed to the more descriptive International Law angle). Nowhere will it be claimed that the outcomes of this study may be generalised or related to other cases, as the process leading to UNTAC was specific in the context of the time and place wherein it is observed. The case is one of UN Security Council decision-making, but that does not necessarily make it comparable to other decisions. Policies introduced in the same time may lack the context of a specific place to make it comparable, while policies introduced for the same place may lack the context of a specific time. Moreover, even in the same time and place, there may still be variation in the decision-making processes and important influences on it. This analysis is case-oriented, not variable-oriented; within-case, not cross-case (Gerring, 2007). It allows for the testing of multiple hypotheses to find the best suiting explanation for this particular case.

#### **3.2 Neorealist Operationalisation**

This section will introduce the expectations for the empirical findings on the basis of the neorealist theoretical framework. The explanatory models and complementary hypotheses will assist in structuring this research's operationalised variables and hypotheses. The dependent variable – the establishment of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia – is the same for all hypotheses, neorealist and constructivist ones. The processes explaining the outcome, however, are very much different depending on the theoretical perspective.

The most important concepts for assessing change in the international system in neorealism are relative capabilities and national interests. The empirical section will

elaborate on how US and Soviet interests were conflicting for some time before the Cambodian mission. It should be avoided that this study becomes a descriptive one, as plenty of other studies on UNTAC already are (for instance, see Curtis, 1993; Chesterman, 2004; Keller, 2005). The distribution of power needs to be assessed previously to system change and afterwards. This means that the types of polarity, and the interests resulting from the diverging balances of power, have to be measured. The number of powers in the international system matter also for the assessment of interests, as power relations (which are different depending on the polarity of the system) influence how states behave according to their interests – and what those interests could be in the first place.

Polarity, or the balance of power, is based on the relative capabilities of states. Waltz explicitly mentions the following capabilities that make up military, economic, and political power: size of population, size of territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, and political stability and competence (1979: 131) – Buzan et al. (1993) find that military strength, economic capability, and political stability possibly encompass the other components. Territory and population, according to Robert Gilpin (1981), can also be perceived as economic quantities: change in their quantity depends on certain economic conditions. In a sense, they are resources, too. One may argue that territory, population, and natural resources are all indicators of economic power. Stephen Walt (1987) believes that the distribution of aggregate capabilities is not the only determinant of the balance of threat (as opposed to the balance of power, a concept vital to Waltz' and Gilpin's theories), but does introduce capabilities similar to those Waltz mentioned.

### *Indices of power*

There are multiple indices that measure national power; I will compare the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC), Comprehensive National Power (CNP), and National Power Index (NPI) scoring systems in this section. They will be compared mainly on the basis of their closeness to Waltz' assumptions about relative capabilities.

Joel David Singer founded the Correlates of War project in 1963, attempting to collect data on interstate wars around the world in the post-Napoleonic era (Correlates of War Project, n.d.). One of the project's data sets holds data for the National Material Capabilities (NMC) index, which has often been used to measure the distribution of capabilities – and with that, the distribution of power – among states. The

accompanying codebook defines power as “the ability of a nation to exercise and resist influence” (Correlates of War Project, 2010: 3), and measures it by three basic indicators: demographic, industrial, and military capabilities. The independent variables conveying these indicators are iron and steel production, military expenditures, military personnel, primary energy consumption, total population, and urban population. The scores on these variables lead to a Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) score. There are some problems with this methodology if one were to use it to establish the relative capabilities of great powers in line with neorealist theory. Firstly, political stability factors are not taken into account. Secondly, economic power is not measured – industrial capacity is a different resource altogether. Also, the deindustrialisation of developed countries in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century could lead to believe that industrial capacity is no longer a leading factor for establishing power.

One of the newest quantitative indices of relative national power is the National Power Index (NPI), introduced by Korean authors Kim et al. in a 2013 article. The creators argue it to be a distinct and improved index compared to existing ones because of its external validity, meaning that the method produces acceptable generalisations and hence is applicable to other settings. It is based on Weber’s conception of power – “jede Chance, innerhalb einer sozialen Beziehung den eigenen Willen auch gegen Widerstreben durchzusetzen” (Weber, 1922: 50), operationalised as “the power of A over B as the differences in winning probabilities” (Kim et al., 2013: 84). By testing the external validation of the NPI and CINC, comparing both assessments of competition, rational power, and possible resistance (‘Widerstreben’), they found that the CINC is not externally valid while the NPI is. Power differences are distorted in the CINC index as it disproportionately measures skewed variables; the NPI transforms the components of national power so that they together form a reliable scale (Index of National Power, n.d.). The new index has not been compared to the CNP, as the authors claim that theirs is not a comprehensive but simple one – though it could ultimately serve as the basis for a more nuanced measurement (Kim et al., 2013). Conclusively, the NPI seems to measure power as ‘who wins?’ fairly well. There are some problems, however, when it comes to its use for measuring power in line with neorealist theory: it explicitly excludes factors such as military power because it is claimed to be a raw component of power and distortedly distributed among states, not actually measuring general capacity (Kim et al., 2013). The National Power Index uses only the components of raw-population index (the quantity of people) and human-development quotient (the quality

of manpower), which in combination measure national capacity. Though, indeed, capacity could be argued to reflect relative power very well, the NPI method does not fit a Waltzian-based approach that perceives relative power to be a reflection of the distribution of material capabilities.

Another relatively new index is the Comprehensive National Power (CNP) index, which is of Sino-Japanese origin. In contrast to the NMC, it does take geopolitical factors and economic resources into account. It also adds some other factors that the NMC lacks. The sum total of power in the CNP method is established by focusing on eight types of resources (economic, human capital, natural, capital, knowledge and technological, government, military, and international), measured by 23 different indicators. The indicators may be weighted differently depending on the theoretical foundation that a scholar provides. According to Angang and Honghua (2004), CNP covers both material strength and ideational power, with a focus on strategy. They weigh knowledge and technology considerably higher than other resources, which they defend with the claim that traditional or industrial resources matter less in international relations nowadays. In that sense, the CNP might be able to show a more correct balance of power than the CINC would. However, it does not exactly match what most neorealists are looking for, as their emphasis is usually on hard power when it comes to calculating the distribution of capabilities (although some neorealists, such as Stephen Walt, do stress that ideology is a strong cause of alliance formation).

#### *A Waltzian index of power*

Having compared three different indices of national power, the Comprehensive National Power index seems most fit for establishing capability distribution. Focusing on military, economic, and political power means that the CNP's resource categories need to be reviewed (though removing some categories or indicators makes the index less nuanced, that is a point for later discussion), in order to see if they convincingly relate to Waltz' variables. Angang and Honghua's (2004) CNP contains eight components, some of which seem to relate to Waltz'. Indicators of relating components will be selected to measure the distribution of capabilities. The following list briefly assesses whether the capability variables are suitable for a Waltzian index of power.

1. *Economic resources*, measured as per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)<sup>1</sup>: comparable to Waltz' economic capability;
2. *Human capital*, measured by the working age population (x) the number of years of education received by that population: the first indicator is relatable to Waltz' population size, the second is not comparable to any of Waltz' variables;
3. *Natural resources*, indicated by a) arable land, b) annual fresh water withdrawals, c) commercial energy use, and d) electricity production: comparable to Waltz' resource endowment;
4. *Capital resources*, measured by a) gross domestic investment, b) foreign direct investment, and c) market capitalisation: not directly relatable to any of Waltz' variables<sup>2</sup>;
5. *Knowledge and technological resources*, indicated by a) number of personal computers, b) internet users, c) patent applications filed by domestic residents, d) scientific and technological journal articles, and e) R&D spending: not directly comparable to any of Waltz' variables;
6. *Governmental resources*, measured by the fiscal spending of the central government: since this indicator "reflects the ability of a national government to mobilize and utilize resources" (Angang and Honghua, 2004: 13), it may be comparable to Waltz' political stability and competence;
7. *Military resources*, indicated by a) the number of armed forces personnel, and b) military-related expenditures of the defence ministry: comparable to Waltz' military strength;
8. *International resources*, measured by a) volume of exports and services, b) volume of imports and services, c) royalty and license fees receipts, and d) royalty and license fee payments: not directly comparable to any of Waltz' variables.

#### *Indicators of political power*

There is only one indicator in the CNP set that *may* relate to Waltz' notion of political stability and competence. Since the notion is an important one (political power being one of the three most important capabilities), another indicator will be used. Political

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<sup>1</sup> PPP estimates "the value of international dollar per capita GNP and per capita GDP" (Angang and Honghua, 2004: 4).

<sup>2</sup> Capital resources reflect the size and/or development of the financial market.

stability can be assessed by looking at fundamental change or the lack thereof. Russett (1993), Gates et al. (2006), Hadenius and Teorell (2006), Arriola (2009), and many others have measured political stability by regime duration. Since it “is anchored in institutional consistency” (Gates et al., 2006: 907), the time since regime change (in years) will be taken as an additional indicator of political stability. The types of regimes, while they may also influence the stability of a polity, will not be given weight but only distinguished so they can be used to mark regime change. Russett (1993) identifies four types: clear democracies, other democracies, unknown regimes, and non-democratic regimes. It is arguably problematic to have a democratic regime be the ‘default’, as it may be the result of a Western bias<sup>3</sup>. Gates et al.’s (2006) categorisation does not face that difficulty. They discern three types: autocratic, democratic, and inconsistent. The issue with this categorisation is that it is very limited and, by including an ‘inconsistent’ type, does not actually seem ideal to mark regime change. A more elaborate understanding of regime types is provided by Marshall et al. (2016), who find that regimes may be identified as being on an autocratic-democratic scale –regimes may be of various natures, possessing traits of both archetypes. The authors measure regime durability by “the number of years since the most recent regime change” (Marshall et al., 2016: 17). Regime change occurs if there is a change of at least three points on the score of their ‘polity’ variable over a period of less than four years. The ‘polity’ score is the score combined of several indicators of autocracy and democracy. Each year without regime change is added up, starting again at 0 if regime change has occurred.

### *Indicators of economic power*

Having established another indicator of political stability, some remarks need to be made on the indicators of economic power. Angang and Hongua (2004) measure economic power by GDP per capita by PPP, and also show comparisons of the percentage share of GDP (based on PPP) in the world’s total. GDP per capita by PPP data are unavailable for the Soviet Union, which is why GDP per capita data will be compared. The difference between these indicators is that GDP by PPP controls the value of the Gross Domestic Product for the purchasing power within each state (for instance, consumers can buy more of some product for 1\$ in China than they can in the United Kingdom), while simple GDP does not. This makes GDP per capita a less

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<sup>3</sup> I do not mean to problematise Russett’s work, as the book referenced to attempts to explain democratic peace. I problematise ‘democracy as default’ in my own research.

reliable indicator of wealth. For this reason, the world percentage share of GDP based on PPP is added to the aggregation of economic capability. Roughly speaking, this indicator shows how much of the world's wealth is in the hands of a state.

### *System change*

The 23 original indicators in Angang and Honghua (2004) are weighted differently and are combined and processed through a formula that gives the Comprehensive National Power score. Waltz' scoring system is easier: states are ranked by power, and their power is based on their aggregated capabilities. Power is, in this way, abstracted from 'unit level attributes' (Buzan et al., 1993). Rank depends on all the elements mentioned previously (size of population, size of territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, and political stability and competence), but Waltz is not explicit as to whether (and if so, how) we should weigh the different variables. All that he argues is that they make up power. He may have tried to avoid to be too specific in this matter, because the importance of particular indicators may change over time. This is what Angang and Honghua (2004) argue, noting that different types of assets are important in the 'information age' than in industrial times. Waltz' list of variables does not include technological prowess or knowledge (though one could imagine it being grouped under resources or perhaps as part of military strength), which may lead to believe that it does not reflect modern times. However, the period under study (1979-1990) is still before the introduction of the World Wide Web and second-generation mobile phones. It would be fair to say, with some caution, that Waltz' ideas on capabilities are applicable here.

In Table 3.1 (p. 48), the list of capabilities and their indicators is presented. The capabilities are solely based on Waltz, and the indicators are mostly taken from Angang and Honghua. The scoring system is as follows:

- a) The measurement for every indicator is done for every P-5 member state;
- b) States are assigned a score on the basis of their rank (whereby 1<sup>st</sup> = 1, 2<sup>nd</sup> = 0.75, 3<sup>rd</sup> = 0.5, 4<sup>th</sup> = 0.25, 5<sup>th</sup> = 0); and
- c) If multiple indicators make up one variable, every score counts for the share of the indicator in that variable.

The indicators all have the same weight in the calculation of the final score. Ultimately,

capabilities are aggregated according to a scoring system wherein maximum scores on all indicators result in the highest capability score of 6, and minimum scores result in the lowest score of 0. The scoring system shows how the capabilities among the Permanent Five are distributed, and over time it should be found that bipolarity was indeed transformed into unipolarity. The year Resolution 668 was adopted, 1990, is the last reference point. The first is the year Vietnam took Phnom Penh: 1979. Should the United States come out with a distinctly high score at some point in time (what makes it distinct would be argued on the basis of the findings), and if the US had an interest in establishing UNTAC, Waltz' theory holds. The theoretical hypothesis of bipolarity (*H1b. In a bipolar system, wherein two states have the most capabilities and thus the most power, those states' national interests determine international outcomes*) will not be formulated as an operationalised hypothesis, since the Soviet Union would not have opted for the outcome that we see in 1990, and its interests (together with those of the United States) would be expected to have determined international outcomes in a bipolar system. The expectation, now, is that system change was the cause of changing international outcomes. This leads to the following operationalised hypothesis:

*H1: If, in the late 1980s, the United States had the most capabilities and were therefore the hegemon in a unipolar system, it was in the national interest of the United States to establish UNTAC.*

Hypothesis 1 is the 'unipolar' hypothesis, based on US hegemony. In the beginning of this chapter, it was argued that polarity has to be established – this is what the index of national power has been created for. However, most importantly in this research is to show that there has in fact been a polarity change. The system's transformation would have to be demonstrated through empirical findings on the distribution of relative capabilities to such extent that the balance of power was altered definitively. The end of the Cold War is said to be the end of bipolarity, but I will still put that statement to the test. In the introduction of this thesis, it has been mentioned that the Soviet Union had vetoed intervention in Cambodia twice in 1979. Its interest has had to have changed for Resolution 668 to be signed (in 1990) by all the Permanent Five including the Soviet Union. Following neorealist assumptions, its changing stance on the matter would have originated from a system change (the United States becoming the hegemonic power). This led the Soviet Union to pursue its survival by means of different policy

preferences. Since the relevant resolution was signed in 1990, a transformation of the system would have to be seen no later than this for Hypothesis 1 to be applicable. I have deliberately chosen to use the term ‘the late 1980s’, since I do not want to limit myself in finding unipolarity – system change is in fact expected in 1989 or 1990, but if US hegemony is found earlier, that should not be a problem for the theory to apply. Next, when it comes to ‘the most capabilities’, scores should be sufficiently higher than those of the other Permanent Members, where ‘higher’ is subjective and therefore needs to be argued well. The assumptions on hegemony will apply if the United States’ solitary power status can be affirmed.

Hypothesis 1 should be correct if we take the commonly held beliefs about the historic system change (mostly argued to have taken place in 1989, with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the beginning of independence resistance in the Soviet Republics) for granted. However, if the empirical test of the distribution of capabilities suggests that the international system was still bipolar at the time, Hypothesis 1 may be rejected.

If the findings confirm the idea that system change had occurred, which is thought to have caused the establishment of UNTAC by eliminating the Soviet Union’s interests, the first part of the hypothesis may be accepted. However, it is of importance to then affirm that the decision to establish UNTAC was definitely not just ‘not against the national interest’ of the powerful state(s), but specifically ‘in favour of the national interest’ of the United States. This is because neorealism assumes that states will make rational, instrumental decisions on the basis of costs-benefits calculations, which would not allow for costly operations abroad without some benefit in return. The UNTAC mandate was a far-reaching one; the interests (geostrategic or other) of the United States would have to explicitly benefit from the intervention in Cambodia in the early 1990s. If this were not so, it has to be argued that this was a case of overextension – the type of behaviour that a hegemon in a unipolar system may show.

If Hypothesis 1 cannot be accepted on the basis of the empirical findings, a neorealist explanation of the establishment of UNTAC as proposed in the theoretical and methodological sections of this thesis cannot hold. That does not mean that there is nothing that neorealism can tell us about the establishment; just that the Waltzian-based approach cannot tell us why the U-turn in Soviet behaviour happened.

<b>Capability</b>	<b>Indicator(s)</b>	<b>Measurement</b>	<b>Score</b>
Size of population	(Size of population)	Population total	
Size of territory	(Size of territory)	Surface area (km <sup>2</sup> )	
Resource endowment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Arable land</li> <li>b) Crude petroleum output</li> <li>c) Natural gas output</li> <li>d) Commercial energy use</li> <li>e) Electricity production</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Total area (km<sup>2</sup>)</li> <li>b) Output (millions of kg)</li> <li>c) Output (millions of m<sup>3</sup>)</li> <li>d) Energy use (kg of oil equivalent per capita)</li> <li>e) Output (in TWh)</li> </ul>	Each counts as 20%
Economic capability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Gross Domestic Product (GDP)</li> <li>b) GDP share</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) GDP per capita (1990 GK \$)</li> <li>b) GDP share of world total (%)</li> </ul>	Each counts as 50%
Military strength	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Armed forces personnel</li> <li>b) Military-related expenditures</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Armed forces personnel total</li> <li>b) Expenditure as % of GDP</li> </ul>	Each counts as 50%
Political stability and competence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Fiscal spending of the central government</li> <li>b) Numbers of years of regime stability</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Expenditure as % of GDP</li> <li>b) Number of years since regime change</li> </ul>	Each counts as 50%

*Table 3.1: Aggregated capabilities. (Source: compiled by author)*

### **3.3 Constructivist Operationalisation**

This section will introduce the expectations for the empirical findings on the basis of the constructivist theoretical framework. The explanatory models and complementary hypotheses will assist in structuring this research's operationalised variables and hypotheses. It should be noted that the socialising effect of framing as displayed in Figure 2.5 (p. 33) is taken as the basis of the constructivist methodological application. This ensures a focused empirical study of specific discourse, instead of leaving open any socialising mechanism that could be part of the 'black box' of interest formation. To that end, framing analysis is central to the constructivist part of this research.

#### *Benefits and biases*

Framing analysis can produce relatively tangible results and statistics. The results of a show the occurrence and recurrence of words or combinations of words, possibly revealing a pattern of some kind that can be linked to one or multiple actors. As Wendt (1999) states, the evolution of ideas and identities over time includes the important element of discursive history. That is precisely what lies at the heart of the constructivist methodological assessment of the establishment of UNTAC: the analysis of particular discourses through the period 1979-1990. Indeed, "measuring the difference between self-interested or collectively interested motivations cannot be done by simply looking at behaviour" (Wendt, 1999: 240). Many authors have managed to demonstrate normative and framing effects through the analysis of texts (Klotz and Lynch, 2007).

In the interpretation of language (thus, also of frames), a danger one should always look out for is bias. That bias can lie in the theoretical expectations of the researcher: they are looking for something and therefore exaggerate their findings in order to make them correspond to their expectations. This can be (partially) overcome by analysing multiple different types of source material or having multiple people interpret the same source material, thereby increasing the validity of the overall interpretation (Klotz and Lynch, 2007). Of course, one might argue that no single interpretation of social reality is definitely correct. However, some standards will have to be maintained in research – and the quality (and sometimes quantity) of data are essential in that respect. The negative effect of some bias may precede interpretation in the selection of resources and data, or it may show in the interpretation of the results based on those data. More on the sources used for the constructivist approach will be discussed in Chapter 3.2.2. I will justify my choice for the particular data in that section.

A possible bias specific to frame analysis is that the researcher fails to understand that a frame or a combination of frames may be part of a larger narrative, a ‘master frame’. The uncovering of such larger mechanisms is a task usually undertaken by critical constructivists (or critical realists), and is not at order here. As stated previously, this study is highly context-specific; I do not wish to lay bare deeper structures of oppression or reflect upon mainstream thought and its role in reproducing such structures. Nevertheless, I would like to position myself as Kevin Dunn does: “I recognize I am not neutral, and I am not too concerned with charges of interpretative bias” (2008: 91). His study of how some things become thinkable (how certain outcomes are enabled) through discourse is an appropriate starting point for the method of framing analysis.

### *Interpretation of frames*

Dunn (2008) argues that the construction of social ideas and identities also produces meanings attached to those ideas and identities. The ‘how-question’ is the leading one in his research, reflecting the interpretative nature of most of constructivist thinking. Most importantly, however, the ‘how-question’ is not only presented through one or multiple broad research questions. It is fundamental to the methodological element of research, too. Having taken consideration of possible bias, the question that follows in the analysis of discourse is ‘how does it represent reality?’. This is the identification of frames, which Grbich (2013) elaborates on further. She proposes some guidelines for framing identification: read the text twice (skimming it first and then critically examine it), identify any strategic placement of words, note what was not said (but could have been), and identify who speaks or writes and who does not. For large amounts of text, with the important actors (the P-5) already established, it is easy to look for who says what by searching digital files. Like Dunn, Grbich highlights the interpretative basis of textual analysis – the researcher *will* need to answer the question ‘how do I interpret this?’. Grbich (2013) also offers guidelines as to how one may go about interpreting the frames found in a discourse: be aware of how many sentences are used on one aspect vis-à-vis another, establish who is passive and who is powerful, find out whether one actor takes power from another (by downplaying their arguments or by comparing them to something or another actor), note connotations (e.g. ‘conflict’ versus ‘situation’), note the use of certain versus uncertain language (e.g. ‘will’ versus ‘might’), and specify the overall mood or character of the frame (e.g. optimist/pessimist, offensive/defensive,

resolving/problematising). These are all things that one should keep in mind when analysing frames. However, they are guidelines for wider interpretation only. There are other, more straightforward ways of analysing and categorising frames. One such approach includes the distinction between four elements of framing:

1. *What is the problem?* (problem identification/diagnosis);
2. *Who is responsible?* (problem attribution/roles in diagnosis);
3. *What should be done?* (solution/prognosis);
4. *Who should do it?* (action attribution/roles in prognosis).

These four elements of a frame have been acknowledged by Benford and Snow (2000), Entman (1993), but Verloo (2005) has been the one to very clearly put them in a scheme as different parts of policy frames. Adopting this approach makes it fairly easy to see how things have been framed and by whom, and moreover if dominant framings have changed over time. I will add one question to the list that I consider relevant to my study: *For who is it a problem?*. The answer to this question provides additional information that can be used to analyse changing frame dominance or the internalisation of one frame by another actor. If something is regarded as a problem for all actors, action is more likely to be undertaken. Relating to the formation of a common interest, I expect to find a dominant frame wherein the action attribution element clearly calls for collective action, as opposed to assigning the task of solving the problem to a certain actor (who may or may not also be held responsible for the problem). The historical background section may provide information that will lead to other expectations, such as who is expected to be the actor creating the dominant (collective action) frame – was it the actor(s) with the highest interest in the establishment of UNTAC or not, and what does this tell us?

#### *Framing analysis*

The analysis of frames will be done systematically by filling out the results for every frame that is found in a pre-made table. An example of a table containing frames is illustrated in Table 3.4. There is no codebook to be followed, as doing so would constrain the scope of possible interpretations of the texts. For every piece of text formulated by one of the Permanent Five of the Security Council (the only actors taken into consideration in this framing analysis), it firstly needs to be established whether one

could speak of a diagnosis. If this seems reasonable, the four questions will be applied to the text and the answers will be kept in the table. In addition, the actor (or actors) who framed the problem will be noted. This approach eliminates some bias, and also allows for an a posteriori categorisation of frames into groups. That is what Grbich (2013) recommends when textual analysis includes the identification of multiple frames. The categories of frame groupings, like the individual framings, are to be labeled. In the end, the tables with framing results are displayed and interpreted. In that stage, one may count frame occurrence per group and per frame, which will then also have to be presented in a different table.

<b>Document code (date)</b>	<b>Frame</b>	<b>Actor</b>	<b>What is the problem?</b>	<b>For who is it a problem?</b>	<b>Who is responsible?</b>	<b>What should be done?</b>	<b>Who should do it?</b>
A (dd/mm/yyyy)	(label)	X	...	...	...	...	...
B (dd/mm/yyyy)	(label)	Y	...	...	...	...	...
C (dd/mm/yyyy)	(label)	Z	...	...	...	...	...
(...)	(...)	(...)	(...)	(...)	(...)	(...)	(...)

*Table 3.2: Example of framing analysis table. (Source: compiled by author, adapted from Verloo, 2005: 24)*

The meaning of the frames identified in the texts can only be meaningful in their context. This means that the findings do not apply to other times, spaces, and social relations. If any dominant framing is found, its discourse provides a representation of reality specific to the context of the 1979-1990 Permanent Five's deliberations on and perceptions of the situation in Cambodia. The following operationalised hypothesis demonstrates the importance of changing frame dominance in asserting the change in interests and therefore the constrained or enabled international outcomes for the P-5:

*H2: The ideas of the P-5 regarding the Cambodian situation were transformed by means of a change in frame dominance, which redefined their interests, and thereby redefined the UNTAC outcome as the appropriate one.*

Hypothesis 2 is to be accepted if, on the basis of framing tables and good argumentation, it can be said that a dominant frame containing a prognosis positively

relating to the establishment of UNTAC has appeared somewhere between 1979 and 1990. Framing relates to UNTAC if there is any notion of UN or international involvement in the prognosis of the Cambodian ‘problem’. It is expected that the Soviet Union did not view the Cambodian situation as a problem needing intervention in 1979; other than that, prior to historical considerations, I cannot tell what to expect about the results. Frame dominance will be asserted on the basis of Krebs and Jackson’s (2007) model of rhetorical coercion. This held that frame dominance can be established if one finds that both the frame *and* its implications have been accepted by the actor that is to be convinced of them. At that point, policy change is to be expected. This makes the constructivist analysis slightly easier to perform, as an actual change in ideas and identities is very hard to establish empirically. I will assume that the ‘logic of arguing’ (Risse, 2000) holds here, meaning that actors that are to be convinced in fact allow themselves to be convinced, to reach a common understanding. In this way, we can view changing frame dominance as a mechanism that leads to new common understandings; thus, different ideas about the situation or event that is being framed. Finally, to make a distinction between frames and implications, I will consider the diagnostic elements of the frame as ‘frames’ and the prognostic elements as ‘implications’ in my empirical analysis. I have chosen to do this because a frame may posit a certain belief about a situation or event (or asks ‘*what is this a case of?*’; a frame *frames*), while an implication posits what that belief means (or asks ‘*what follows from this belief?*’; an implication *implies*).

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### **3.4 Data**

The neorealism-based and constructivism-based methods require a very different kind of data. Therefore, the choice of data will be discussed separately. However, several points should return in both sections: data availability, justification of the data used, and the limitations of the data used.

#### *Neorealism: Aggregated Capabilities*

The national power index based on Angang and Honghua (2004), adjusted so as to relate to Waltz’ definition of relative capabilities, asks a fairly large amount of statistical data about the Permanent Five of the Security Council. Most of those are easily

accessible through the World Bank Databank, which is available online and offers a wide range of all sorts of development indicators. The World Bank does not provide statistics for the Soviet Union, meaning that the figures for this state have to be calculated by summing up the numbers of the fifteen republic that were part of the Union. These are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. With regard to some indicators, data from these countries are not available in the World Bank Databank for the period of interest. Luckily, Mitchell's (2007<sup>a</sup>; 2007<sup>b</sup>; 2007<sup>c</sup>) collections contain statistics on most of the world's states between 1750 and 2005. Missing data from the World Bank will not simply be replaced by Mitchell's figures; if I do take data from Mitchell on the Soviet Union, I will take the data for the other four states for that indicator from Mitchell, too. This ensures that the data are comparable, as they would be measured in the same way originally.

Unfortunately, I will at times have to use several different sources for the same indicator. The World Bank's and Mitchell's collections are not always exhaustive. Neither offer GDP per capita data for the Soviet Union (or in the case of the World Bank, for the fifteen republics), for instance. There is, however, an excellent source that does: The Maddison Project Database. It holds GDP per capita figures for most of the world's countries over a period of more than two centuries, and measures them in international Geary-Khamis dollars with 1990 as its reference year. This means that the figures are perfectly comparable: they are all relative to value and price levels of the individual states and relative to international price levels of 1990.

The scores on the indicator of military expenditure are also taken from a different data source than the World Bank or Mitchell, namely from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). I have received a copy of their Extended Military Expenditure Database upon request (the downloadable version on their website does not contain pre-1988 figures). SIPRI's data set does not contain figures for the Soviet Union and China, which I was forced to extract from different sources. The estimates for Soviet military expenditure were not to be found in any official database, so I have to look into literature analysing different estimates of the expenditure by Soviet and American governmental and scholarly calculations. Data for Chinese military expenditure are taken from GlobalSecurity.org, a non-profit organisation providing security information. It does not reveal its sources for the statistics.

Regime change, as discussed previously, has been operationalised very well by Marshall

et al. (2016). Their data collection has resulted in the Polity IV Project, which has been founded for the Center for Systemic Peace. The accompanying data set provides information on political regime characteristics and transitions from 1800 to 2015. The set contains data for all of the P-5. Data for the other indicator of political stability, government expenditure, can be found in the World Bank Databank – with the exception of Soviet Union data. Here, I came across another availability problem; there is no data set with comparable indicators that includes the Soviet Union. Again, I will have to resort to literature to find out what the best estimate would be.

While most data come from respected and reliable sources, I will at times have to rely on some that may not provide highly accurate information – estimates, even. This is, however, perfectly understandable when it comes to Soviet Union data. The regime was not known for its transparency, making it hard to compose reliable data at all. Gathering statistical data on the Soviet economy, military, and polity was a prime objective of (amongst others) United States intelligence in the Cold War period. Available US data on the Soviet Union may not be reliable either, as Steinberg (1992) shows in his comparison of military expenditure calculations. Whenever the availability of data permitted, I have chosen the most academic of sources for all data in the aggregated capabilities result tables. These tables can be found in Appendix 2 or through download links.<sup>4</sup>

### *Constructivism: Framing Analysis*

Whereas reliability was a problem for the statistical data used in the neorealist method, it is most likely not an issue for the documents used for a constructivist framing analysis. I have gathered 55 Security Council documents from the UN's database, for which I made sure that they were dated between 01/01/1979 and 20/09/1990 (the day that Resolution 668 was signed). Also, I have checked whether they contained texts coming from one or more P-5 members, and that these texts were about the situation in Cambodia. The resulting 55 documents are a variety of texts: speeches, statements, meeting summaries, draft resolutions, communiqués, and meeting records. All of them are specifically addressed to or sent from the Security Council – not the General Assembly or another United Nations body. With regards to reliability, it could be argued that meeting records, for instance, may have been altered after meetings. If they were,

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<sup>4</sup> See: <https://4126866blog.wordpress.com/>.

that would not necessarily have serious implications: alterations are only relevant if they change the diagnosis or prognosis of a frame in the text. Ultimately, I do think it is safe to say that UN documents contain original texts and are thus reliable.

The available texts contain mainly quotes or statements made by China and the Soviet Union. The United States, France, and the United Kingdom have mentioned the situation in Cambodia a handful of times from their state's position, and far more in joint communications from the Permanent Five. This means that probably, less can be said about their framing efforts than about those of China and the Soviet Union. This does not mean that the three states aforementioned had no interest at all in the situation.

Some documents come from a P-5 actor in combination with a non-Security Council Member. The Soviet Union in particular issued joint communiqués (with Thailand, Angola, and India) in which comments about Cambodia were made. This need not be a problem; in these types of communications, it is often stated that the positions are specifically those of one or the other state, or both. Moreover, considering the Soviet Union's power status, these texts are more likely to represent the opinions of that state and not of the less powerful ones. I do not think that there will be any misrepresented frames, and trust that these communications display the framing of the Cambodian situation as the Soviet Union saw fit.

One issue remains left to be discussed regarding data availability. The Security Council's records are readily available, but there are no meeting records to be found of the Paris Conference of 1989 (where all the P-5 joined the parties to the Cambodian conflict in negotiations) or of the six P-5 meetings on Cambodia in the first half of 1990. As I think these meetings have been very constructive towards the establishment of UNTAC, it is very unfortunate that they are not available.

#### 4. Historical Background

The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia started on the 25<sup>th</sup> of December 1978, after years of conflict within and between both countries (Anderson, 2011<sup>a</sup>). Cambodia, as a ‘failed state’, was an easy target for an offensive from Vietnam. In this chapter, Cambodia-Vietnam relations, as well as the particular framework constituting UNTAC, will be described. Ultimately, an overview of important historical developments provides some insight into the establishment of the UNTAC mission.



Figure 4.1: Map of Indochina, 1954-1975. (Source: Anderson, 2011<sup>b</sup>)

#### **4.1 Cambodia and Vietnam**

Vietnam's communists had been active in the Communist International (Comintern), an international political organisation designed by Vladimir Lenin in 1919 (Chase, 2001). Its goal was to establish world communism, and served to further the interests of the Soviet regime. Being a member of the organisation was to be an ally to the Soviet Union (Chase, 2001). The idea of French Indochina (the French-occupied territories of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos) becoming a so-called 'federated union' had existed since Lenin first came up with the notion of such unions in 1920 (Morris, 1999). Emulating Russia's dominant role in spreading communist political thought in the Soviet Union, Vietnam assumed leadership over the establishment of a similar union in its own region. However, communism was not gaining ground in Cambodia and Laos until the 1940s. And even when communist movements started sprouting there, they were mostly controlled by or even fully composed of people from ethnic Chinese and Vietnamese backgrounds (Morris, 1999). The Vietnamese Communist Party nevertheless changed its name to the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP), which later controlled the Viet Minh organisation founded in 1941. The Viet Minh gained popularity and a small amount of local power in 1945, when the Japanese failed to succeed in their attempt to take over most of Indochina and left the region in a power vacuum. Anti-colonial resistance in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos was supported by the Viet Minh. This did not necessarily increase support for the Viet Minh in Cambodia and Laos: centuries of conflict and Vietnamese imperialism had created a reluctance towards regional harmonisation (Morris, 1999). Only in Vietnam was the Viet Minh able to instigate a revolutionary uprising, in August 1945.

French colonial rulers had experienced a diminishing power over Indochina since the start of the Second World War, and to ensure some maintenance of the power that was left, installed the Cambodian Norodom Sihanouk as head of state of Cambodia in 1941 (Brown and Zasloff, 1998). Sihanouk's consistent struggle for Cambodian independence was finally answered in 1953 – before then, the Cambodian struggle was dispersed because of immigration flows of Chinese and Vietnamese workers (Morris, 1999). This influx helped the Viet Minh to organise themselves in Cambodia, mainly in the form of armed revolutionary fronts. These military shields, in turn, protected the political organisation of Vietnamese communists in the country. As Morris argues, these efforts led to the creation of a communist anti-colonial party that was effectively paving "the way for the emergence of a new Cambodian political party under Vietnamese

control” (Morris, 1999: 34). Vietnam’s occupation thus started from within Cambodia, several decades before an actual invasion took place.

#### *Relations during the Vietnam war*

After Cambodia was granted independence in 1953, Sihanouk remained in power as king until 1955 and as prime minister until 1970. The change in status was orchestrated by himself, in order to acquire executive political power instead of a mere ceremonial role (Smith, 1967; Widyono, 2008). Although popular support for his political career was enormous, Sihanouk did not manage to create a climate of political stability and national unity in Cambodia. Relations with the United States were worsening as Cambodia opted for neutrality in its connections to the Vietnam War (1955-1975) – a political stance which China fully accepted (Morris, 1999; Widyono, 2008). The spillover of the Vietnam War, most visible in border regions where North Vietnamese fighters built sanctuaries and the Ho Chi Minh Trail (supplying goods to North Vietnam, see the map in Figure 4.1) ran through Cambodian territory, did force Cambodia to abandon its position of neutrality early in the war. Hoping to prevent a further spillover and looking to guarantee security and sovereignty to Cambodia, Sihanouk reached out to China and North Vietnam and later condemned the US’ aggression. His alignment with the communist regimes was a strategic one, as he believed them more able to achieve victory in the Indochina wars (Deth, 2009).

Sihanouk did not displace the Vietnamese from Cambodia’s border regions, which ultimately led to a campaign of US air raids. Between 1965 and 1973, the US had dropped more than two million tonnes of munition over Cambodian territory (Owen and Kiernan, 2006). The bombing campaign mainly killed civilians and increased support from the culturally marginalized borderland peoples for the Khmer Rouge faction in Cambodia, which had previously been known as the underground Khmer People’s Revolutionary Party (KPRP) and, since 1966, as the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK). The Khmer were a secret political organisation rooted in Vietnamese communism. In fact, the KPRP originated from the split of the ICP into three separate communist parties in 1951. The Khmer Rouge (as the KPRP and CPK will henceforth collectively be referred to) were in opposition against Norodom Sihanouk, because his royalist politics were incompatible with their radical communist beliefs (Morris, 1999). Intensified contacts with Vietnamese communists and Chinese Maoists throughout the 1960s helped the Khmer Rouge in their political struggle, but North Vietnam

strategically diffused its support for the Khmer versus Sihanouk. Sihanouk's solidarity was necessary for the use of Cambodian territory, while Khmer relations were important for long-term revolutionary ambitions for the Indochinese region (Morris, 1999). Thus, in the late 60s, Cambodia was completely involved in the Vietnam War and internally heavily fragmented.

In 1970, the pro-American General Lon Nol – who had been prime minister since 1966 – committed a coup following multiple anti-Vietnamese protests throughout Cambodia (Clymer, 2011; Morris, 1999). Sihanouk sought refuge in Beijing, and started to openly support the Khmer Rouge and their leader, Pol Pot (Widyono, 2008). In this period, Khmer guerrilla warfare was added to the political tensions. While North Vietnam tried to gain ground in Cambodia to further its revolutionary causes by promoting a communist insurgency with popular support from the Cambodian people, it also began to clash with the Khmer Rouge more often than before. The Khmer were wary of Vietnam's ambitions and declared them enemies of Cambodia. Violent attacks on Viet Cong forces followed soon thereafter. As US-Vietnam relations started to normalise when the 1973 Paris Peace Accords were signed, the Khmer Rouge refused to negotiate an end to the regional violence. Strangely, after American bombing ceased in that same year, the Khmer organised a military offensive on Phnom Penh (Morris, 1999). This attempt at a political takeover failed, but a repeated attack in 1975 did succeed. At that point in time, support for Vietnamese communism had dwindled so much that the Khmer Rouge were able to win their war against it. The North Vietnamese communists' goal of conquering South Vietnam stood in the way of their ambition to take control of Cambodia's government: they needed the Khmer, but the Khmer refused to cooperate and focused on centuries-old ethnic hatred against the Vietnamese to further their own political ambitions in Cambodia.

### *The Pol Pot regime*

As the Khmer Rouge's seizure of power played out in April 1975, Lon Nol left for the United States. The communist revolution of Cambodia, then renamed 'Democratic Kampuchea', was a violent one. Cities were emptied out: the urban population was forced to leave for the countryside to become peasants, while government and military officials were executed as they were identified among the evacuees (Morris, 1999; Kiernan, 2008). The cleansing of the cities went hand in hand with the abolishment of markets and money, the displacement of Vietnamese minorities, the defrocking of

Buddhist monks (part of a plan to remove religion from society), and other policies helping with the construction of a ‘socialist’ Cambodian state. The main reason to expel urban citizens to the country was to avoid anticipated famine and malnourishment. However, also important was the continued battle for the conquest of the Mekong Delta in southern Vietnam, where a significant Cambodian minority resided (Kiernan, 2004; Kiernan, 2008). Emptying the large cities made Cambodia less vulnerable to large-scale counterattacks and dissident movements.

The former urban population were deemed second-class citizens, as were those people who had not previously lived in Khmer-controlled zones. The division between ‘old’ and ‘new’ people was one that had dire consequences for the ‘new’ (Vickery, 1999). Rural populations did not treat them kindly, and they were often left to fend for themselves without land to grow rice and without skills to adapt to life in the country or forest. While “arbitrary justice, sudden violent death, political oppression, exploitative use of religion and anti-religious reaction, both violent and quiescent, were common facts of life long before the war and revolution of the 1970s” (Vickery, 1999 18), inescapable starvation and disease among large segments of the Cambodian population were added to that equation. Combined with the number of deaths through execution (of Vietnamese, Buddhist monks, people previously in power positions, people suspected to be spies or defectors, people of bourgeois descent, and later intellectuals and party rivals, too), the 1975-1979 Pol Pot regime cost the lives of approximately 1.8 million people – accounting for more than 20 percent of Cambodia’s population at the time (Vickery, 1999; Kiernan, 2003).

#### *Vietnamese occupation*

The genocidal Khmer Rouge-regime ended with the Vietnamese invasion of Democratic Kampuchea, which started 25 December 1978 and was completed 7 January 1979 with the capture of Phnom Penh (Morris, 1999). New leaders, people favourable to the Vietnamese government, were installed in Cambodia (then renamed ‘People’s Republic of Kampuchea’, or PRK). One of the central figures of this group was the Khmer Rouge defector and Soviet-supported Hun Sen. As a prominent member of the Cambodian People’s Party (PPP), he was first appointed as foreign minister of Cambodia, and after 1985 he took the position of both foreign minister and prime minister. Hun Sen often met with Vietnamese and Soviet diplomats throughout his time in office, and passed down their instructions to Phnom Penh’s government departments – where many

positions had been taken by Vietnamese advisers (Morris, 1999). The regime was kept in place from Hanoi through the political and economic support from the Soviet Union to Vietnam.

McCargo (2004) argues that the take-over of Cambodia was in the Vietnamese interest of countering Chinese dominance in the region. It was the 'export' of the communist revolution, which also spread to Laos and the borders of Thailand. Instead of a 'world revolution', however, Vietnam was isolated from the world as the result of its expansionism (Dosch and Ta Minh Tuan, 2004). The invasion of Cambodia was most strongly condemned by China, but the United States and many other Southeast Asian and Western states backed this position (Becker, 1998).

#### **4.2 UNTAC Mission**

When Vietnam invaded Cambodia, China was the first to protest the move. It accused Vietnam of a 'war of aggression' and issued its first ever Security Council draft resolution (S/13022) in January 1979, which not only ordered the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia but also called for a halt on aid to Vietnam. The resolution was never voted upon because the Soviet Union, China's main opponent in the Cambodia debate, proclaimed that it would never sign it. It repeatedly argued that the United Front for the National Salvation of Kampuchea (UFNSK, the creator of the PRK) should be recognised as the legitimate governmental representation of Cambodia. The Soviet Union also did not regard the situation as an invasion and occupation, but as a people-based uprising and thus an internal affair of Cambodia (Widyono, 2008). The anti-Vietnamese position was a difficult one to defend for China and its allies in UN discussions, as pro-Vietnam forces could easily portray them as supporters of the Pol Pot regime. Furthermore, China harmed its own position in the debate when it organised military attacks against Vietnam in early 1979.

After the Soviet veto against the ASEAN-originated Security Council draft resolution S/13162 which also requested a Vietnamese withdrawal, the Cambodian issue came to an impasse. The issue came to be a dividing one within the Security Council, and by the mid-1980s, the relationships between the Soviet Union and China, and the Soviet Union and the United States, were severely damaged by the long-lasting debate (Becker, 1998). Negotiations between the Cambodian and Vietnamese parties seemed impossible (Morris, 1999). The PRK never got its UN seat, which remained to be represented by Prince Sihanouk (residing in Beijing). A contra-movement was founded

with the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), backed by ASEAN, the United States, and China, comprising both communist and non-communist parties: the Khmer Rouge, Sihanouk's FUNCINPEC (Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique, Et Coopératif), and the anti-communist Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF).

### *Towards a resolution*

Eventually, in the late 1980s, reconciliation between Vietnam and Cambodia became imaginable as Vietnam was economically drained from the occupation of its neighbour and the Soviet Union's aid was reduced (Clarke, 2004). Diplomatic efforts from most sides were intensified, and proposals for a resolution (which had also come from many sides of the conflict, including Sihanouk, ASEAN, China, and Vietnam itself) were starting to define similar goals. The three Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIMs) between 1988 and 1990 provided a neutral ground for the difficult negotiations between the four main Cambodian parties: the PRK and the three members of the CGDK. Hun Sen and Prince Sihanouk also met several times in this period. All of these talks led up to the Paris Conference, held between 30 July and 30 August 1989. It was the event that ended the complete stalemate in the Cambodian debate. The four Cambodian parties were joined by the ASEAN states (Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand), the P-5, Vietnam, Laos, Australia, Japan, India, Canada, Zimbabwe (representing the Non-Aligned Movement<sup>5</sup>), and the UN Secretary-General; the conference was co-chaired by France and Indonesia (Brown and Zasloff, 1998; United Nations, n.d.). Although the Paris Conference on Cambodia did come up with ideas for a settlement of the conflict, its strategy was not acceptable to the Cambodian parties. They did not trust each other enough to share power, and Hun Sen refused to let the Khmer Rouge participate in future political coalitions – a difficult issue for most of the participants of the conference (Brown and Zasloff, 1998; Widyono, 2008).

### *Comprehensive political settlement*

With nothing but a statement to show for the work achieved at the Paris Conference, the need for a resolution remained. One important development, however, took place quickly after the end of the conference: Vietnam completely withdrew its troops from

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<sup>5</sup> The Non-Aligned Movement is a movement created by developing countries to provide a neutral middle ground for states that did not want to become part of Western or Soviet alliances or pacts (BBC, 2009).

Cambodia in September 1989. This has often been explained as a necessary choice for Vietnam, in relation to its economic crisis, which had been delayed far too long already (Morris, 1999; Clarke, 2004; Dosch and Ta Minh Tuan, 2004). International pressures may have ultimately helped Vietnam to make this decision. In early 1990, the Permanent Five of the UN Security Council began to lay down the foundations for a ‘comprehensive political settlement’ of the Cambodian situation (United Nations, 1990<sup>a</sup>). Their plan was based on the discussions between all parties held so far, and in particular leaned on the late-1989 Australian proposal for power-sharing with regards to the development of a Supreme National Council (SNC) (Brown and Zasloff, 1998). At the end of the round of meetings in New York and Paris, the P-5 issued a statement (S/21689) containing their framework defining the crucial elements of a settlement. The framework was based on five major arrangements (worked out in 36 articles):

1. Transitional arrangements regarding the administration of Cambodia during the pre-election period;
2. Military arrangements during the transitional period;
3. Elections under United Nations auspices;
4. Human rights protection;
5. International guarantees.

(United Nations, 1990<sup>b</sup>: 2).

Transitional arrangements included the establishment of the SNC, which was to be organised by the Cambodian parties that also were to decide on its precise composition. The SNC would represent Cambodia in the interim period before the new elections, but also had to “delegate to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) all powers necessary to ensure the implementation of the comprehensive agreement, including those relating to the conduct of free and fair elections and the relevant aspects of the administration of Cambodia” (United Nations, 1990<sup>b</sup>: 8). Its role was mainly advisory. In addition, all administrative bodies (especially foreign affairs, national defence, finance, public security and information bodies) within Cambodia were to be put under UN supervision or control to ensure neutrality.

With regards to the military component of the settlement, the UNTAC mission was to be one of peacekeeping. The focus was on the supervising and verification of a ceasefire, including the continued withdrawal of all foreign forces from Cambodia and

the regrouping of domestic forces into cantonment areas. Additionally, disarmament was included as a tactic to minimise the risk of civil war erupting again.

The organisation of free and fair elections in Cambodia was the prime task for the United Nations. Voter registration was to be directed on the basis of new electoral regulations, campaigns and political participation had to be monitored and facilitated, and many other criteria composed the framework for internationally recognised democratic elections.

During the involvement of UNTAC in Cambodian politics, the Cambodian people would have to be guarded against recurring violence. The framework specifically refers to Cambodia's tragic history (meaning the Pol Pot regime) in calling for the non-return to past policies violating human rights. The usual UN Charter's provisions regarding human rights would have to be enforced, and refugees who had fled from Cambodia would have to be eligible to vote in the elections.

Finally, international guarantees should be made to safeguard and recognise Cambodia's neutrality and independence, and to respect the outcomes of the UN-organised elections. These guarantees were to be given by all parties of the Paris Conference, but any member of the United Nations would be able to adhere to the principle of a sovereign Cambodia. They would not be unconditional: Cambodia had to commit to the rules laid out for its transition.

The framework, in a slightly refined form, was presented as a draft resolution and subsequently adopted as UN Security Council Resolution 668 on 20 September 1990. This was, effectively, the establishment of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia. It became official with the signature of the 1991 Paris Agreements, where all parties to the Paris Conference came together again. It was the first mission with such a vast mandate (Chesterman, 2004), including UN supervision and control over domestic institutions, and the organisation of elections. The operation was successful to some extent: foreign aid was returning to Cambodia as sanctions were lifted, refugees could return, and diplomatic relations started to improve (Becker, 1998). Also, relatively peaceful elections were achieved. However, the Khmer Rouge withdrew support for UNTAC in late 1991 (Morris, 1999), the CPP challenged the 1993 election results (Brown and Zasloff, 1998), and Hun Sen took power in a 1997 coup against his coalition partners (Chesterman, 2004). Good and bad things can be said about UNTAC and its success in achieving parliamentary democracy in Cambodia; its framework remains, to this day, a milestone in United Nations peacekeeping.



## **5. Results and Interpretation**

In this chapter, the empirical findings of my research will be presented. Again, the neorealist and constructivist approach will be discussed separately. After a short introduction to the empirical analyses, the outcomes will be presented in tables and figures and interpreted according to the theories' assumptions. The spreadsheet files containing the distribution of capabilities and framing analysis results can be found online<sup>6</sup>. Appendix B (p. 109) consists of all tables displaying relative capabilities (per indicator) and Appendix C (p. 117) is the list of documents used for framing analysis.

### **5.1 Neorealist Approach**

The Permanent Five of the United Nations' Security Council were assigned permanency and the veto, as they were the powers that were victorious in the aftermath of the Second World War. The Security Council's permanent delegations therefore do not represent the power relations as they change, but those of 1945. The veto system ensured that no decisions were taken that were conflicting with the specific national interests of the five great powers at the time (Mahbubani, 2004). The special position of the P-5 means that if a problematic situation's resolution is not in their interests, it is very likely that no action will be undertaken – even if the elected ten members argue in favour of intervention. The right to veto does not come with any specific responsibility; the UN Charter simply does not include such obligation.

The great power status of the United Kingdom, France, and China did not last long: in the Cold War period, the United States and the Soviet Union were effectively the only two power blocs in the international system. Their rivalry in the period from 1945 to 1989 paralysed decision-making in the Security Council, since the superpowers had competing interests (Rawski and Miller, 2004). Waltz even argued that “never before in modern history have the great powers depended so little on the outside world, and been so uninvolved in one another's economic affairs, as the United States and the Soviet Union have been since the war” (Waltz, 1988: 624). The result of this low interdependence, according to him, was that disputes could largely be ignored. However, they would still have to define their interests in terms of the other's position.

This is how Waltz, and with him many others (neorealists and non-realists) saw the international relations up until 1989. As discussed in the methodological chapter, the

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<sup>6</sup> See: <https://4126866blog.wordpress.com/>

distribution of capabilities would have to have changed in favour of the United States for the Soviet Union's power to be diminished. The unipolar hypothesis was introduced to test that there was indeed polarity change in the late 1980s. Despite the fall of the Berlin Wall and the uprisings within the Soviet Union, often considered as the markers of the end of the Cold War and thus the end of bipolarity, the results suggest otherwise.

*Unipolarity or bipolarity?*

Below, in Figure 5.1, the results of the aggregation of relative capabilities have been illustrated over the years 1979-1990. This figure depicts the combined scores on the thirteen indicators that make up six variables, for which a maximum score of 1 per variable can be scored. The graph thus shows the national power score on the Y-axis, ranging from a minimum score of 0 to a maximum score of 6. The higher the score, the more capabilities a state has. The X-axis represents the time period of interest. Therefore, this graph presents aggregated capability scores as they change over time. These scores are *relative*, as the points are divided according to rank; Figure 5.1 represents states' ranks based on their relative capabilities, which are the signifiers of relative power status. In addition to the aggregated scores, I will highlight results on the military, economic, and political indicators in the following paragraphs.




Figure 5.1: Aggregated capabilities scores of the P-5, 1979-1990.

On the basis of my calculations, it can only be argued that there is a bipolar system throughout the years under consideration: the United States and the Soviet Union consistently score between 4.2625 and 4.85 (see Appendix B), moving closer to each

other at the end of the 1980s. At no point do the US national power scores move beyond the Soviet ones. The superpowers' scores are significantly higher than those of the other three Permanent Members: China scores between 2.525 and 2.775 (signifying a middle range power status on the scale), while France and the U.K. never obtain more than 2 points at all. China's scores lie further from the Soviet and US scores than they do from the French and British ones. These figures lead to believe that China, France, and the United Kingdom cannot be considered great powers relative to the United States and Soviet Union. These two latter states *can* be considered superpowers among the P-5, but since there is no comparison with other possibly powerful countries (for example, Japan), this cannot indefinitely be generalised to world power status. It is, however, very likely that the US and the Soviet Union were indeed the only two superpowers using the national power index presented in Chapter 3.

#### *Military power*

Since it measures fairly stable factors such as territory size and population numbers, big countries with a relatively large population will always have an advantage in this type of power calculation. The Soviet Union covered an extremely large area (more than 22 million square kilometres); even the United States' and China's surfaces did not come close. Since large territory oftentimes coincides with large populations, and since large populations offer a large military potential, it is no wonder that the Soviet Union's number of military personnel was as big as it was. Figure 5.2 represents the scores on the indicator of military personnel in millions of people. Numbers were only available for three years, but since the trends seem very consistent, I have given the Soviet Union 1 point for all years (1979-1990) on this indicator (China got 0.75 points, the United States got 0.5, France 0.25, and the United Kingdom 0).




Figure 5.2: Armed forces personnel of the P-5, 1985-1990.

The number of armed forces personnel is only one indicator on the military variable; the percentage of GDP spent on the military has also been taken into account. Since it was extremely hard to find reliable accounts for it, I was bound to take the Soviet Union's military expenditure data from an academic source. Steinberg (1992) compared Goskomstat's (the Soviet statistics committee), the CIA's (United States intelligence), and Grigorii Isaakovich Khanin's (a Soviet economist) figures on Soviet GDP and the military expenditure as a share of that GDP. He came to the conclusion that accurate percentages were somewhere between 15 and 20 in the 1980s. Based on this, the most accurate I could get was estimating a 17.5 percent share for all years. Even if it had been on the lower end of Steinberg's estimate, the Soviet Union would still have scored highest on this indicator. Taking that into consideration, the scores are most likely still accurate even if the numbers are not very precise. Figure 5.3 shows how the Soviet military expenditure as a percentage of GDP was significantly higher than that of any other Permanent Member of the Security Council. The others score around 4 to 6 percent share consistently, and they all seemed to reduce the military share by the end of the 1980s. On the basis of Figures 5.2 and 5.3, one would argue that the Soviet Union was the most powerful of the P-5 in terms of military capabilities. Some remarks will have to be made about this conclusion in the last section of this subchapter.




Figure 5.3: P-5's military expenditure as % of GDP, 1979-1990.

### *Economic power*

Having discussed the indicators of military capabilities, I will now move to the economic side of power. I have collected data on the GDP per capita from The

Maddison Project's database, which covers all of the P-5's figures. Moreover, it represents the figures in international Geary-Khamis dollars, making them well comparable to one another. Considering this, it is clear that GDPs relative to population numbers are highest in the Western states: the United States, France, and the United Kingdom. Whereas those countries' GDP per capita rises considerably throughout the period of interest, the same cannot be said for the Soviet Union (where GDP per capita is relatively constant) and China (where GDP per capita increased yearly, but only slightly). The graph in Figure 5.4 illustrates these differences.




Figure 5.4: GDP per capita of the P-5 (1990 Int. G-K \$), 1979-1990.

Since GDP per capita cannot be the only measurement of economic power, I have included an indicator measuring the percentage of wealth relative to the world's total GDP. Developments on this indicator, pictured in Figure 5.5, were not extreme: the United States was steadily in first place, and the Soviet Union in second for all years analysed. France and the U.K. are again situated close to one another in this graph, but France scores higher throughout and China passes the United Kingdom in 1990 (see Appendix B). Numbers for 1979 GDP share were not available (at least not from the same source), so I have taken the 1980 ratios as a basis for the 1979 scores on this indicator.

The two indicators show one consistent tendency in the balance of economic power: between 1979 and 1990, the United States had the strongest economy. Though France and the United Kingdom come relatively close to its GDP per capita, their share of the world GDP is no match for the US' score. And although the Soviet republics

together held a little over 7 percent of the international GDP for most of the 1980s, the United States' share is more than three times as much and the other Member States' shares are not much below the Soviet Union's score.




Figure 5.5: P-5's GDP share of world total, 1980-1990.

### *Political power*

Next, I will move to the indicators of political stability and competence, which are regime stability and government expenditure. Political stability has been taken from the Polity IV data set, which holds statistics on regime stability and transitions for 162 contemporary countries between 1800 and 2015. A regime's stability, according to the creators of the data set, depends on "the number of years a polity endured without abrupt, major change" (Marshall et al., 2016: 3). Multiple indicators are part of the measurement of stability, and they relate to democratic or autocratic characteristics. Whether a regime is a democracy or autocracy does not matter in the calculation of capabilities; only the years of stability are of importance. The Polity IV data set shows a regime transformation in the Soviet Union in 1988. Scores on the competitiveness of political participation and autocracy level both changed in favour of more democratic characterization between 1987 and 1988 measurements. The Soviet Union's regime stability number was thus reduced to zero in 1988. Consistent regime change caused that score to remain zero in the following years. The figures in Table 5.1 represent the number of years that a state has been politically stable, or in other words, for how many years it has not experienced regime transformation in multiple variables of the Polity IV index.

Year	United States	Soviet Union	China	France	United Kingdom
1987	178	65	38	18	107
1988	179	0	39	19	108
1989	180	0	40	20	109
1990	181	0	41	21	110

Table 5.1: P-5's regime stability in years, 1987-1990.

The Soviet Union's lack of political stability is made up for by its extremely high score on government expenditure as a percentage of the GDP (see Figure 5.6), which is derived from CIA (1983), Deb (1996), and Maddison (1998). These sources all found that the share of GDP spent on the Soviet central government's final consumption was *at least* 50 percent in the 1980s. Given the fact that the Soviet economy was based on state ownership and control over production and assets, making it a 'command economy' (Wu, 1994: 7), the extreme score is not very surprising. Again, I was not able to find more specific numbers – but in this case too, the Soviet Union's scores are so distant from the other Permanent Members' that this should not be an issue. Also, the American, Chinese, French, and British scores are quite stable throughout the entire period. Analysing these results in relation to regime stability, one could say that scores on these two indicators of political stability and competence are not interrelated. They tell us very different things about the state of a country's internal political situation.





Figure 5.6: P-5's general government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP), 1979-1990.

### *Alternative calculations*

After the discussion of the results on the military, economic, and politics indicators, I would like to turn again to the aggregated capabilities scores. According to my index, relative power was not in favour of one hegemonic power in 1989 (or even 1990, for that matter) but instead bipolarity still characterised the international system at the time. Before Hypothesis 1a (expecting unipolarity) would be rejected too quickly, I have calculated national scores in various ways on the basis of the same statistics. The first alternative calculation weighs the economic, military, and political variables twice in the aggregation of relative capabilities. This means that a total score can count up to 9 points. I have chosen this alternative as my first recalculation, since Waltz (1979) most explicitly mentions the three variables as the most important ones in assessing relative state power throughout his work. In comparing the results, displayed as a graph in Figure 5.7, it is clear that this assessment does not really make much of a difference to the question of polarity. China's score is slightly closer to France and the U.K.'s, but the Soviet Union and United States are still very near to one another at the top of the list. The only dissimilarity between their scores in Figure 5.1 and 5.7, is that the US scores marginally higher than the Soviet Union from 1988 to 1990. The difference is only 0.10 points, which can in no way be regarded as significant.



*Figure 5.7: Economic, military, and political variables weighed double.*

Two other alternative calculations have been applied to the index: one in which all indicators have been weighed equally (thus, states could score one point on each

indicator, resulting in a maximum total score of 13) and one in which only the economic, military, and political indicators have been measured (thus, states could score one point on each indicator, resulting in a maximum total score of 6). Both result in scores very much alike to the original aggregation and the first alternative calculation (see Appendix B). In Figure 5.8, all four methods of calculation have been combined in one graph to show how similar the scores turn out to be.




Figure 5.8: Comparison of 4 methods of calculating aggregated capabilities scores.

Whatever method is used, on the basis of the power index with its thirteen indicators, measured with statistical data that have been gathered in consideration of reliability, Waltz' variables making up the distribution of relative capabilities cannot empirically verify unipolarity between the Permanent Five in the late 1980s. Thus, Hypothesis 1;

*H1: If, in the late 1980s, the United States had the most capabilities and were therefore the hegemon in a unipolar system, it was in the national interest of the United States to establish UNTAC,*

will have to be rejected. It cannot even be tested on the basis of my calculations. The United States did not have the most capabilities and was most definitely not a hegemon in 1990. The international system at that time is, on the basis of the distribution of

capabilities, still a bipolar one.

Since the first part (US hegemony in the late 1980s) cannot be confirmed through empirical analysis, and because for that reason the neorealist explanation for changing international outcomes does not hold, the second part of Hypothesis 1 will not be given attention. The United States still had to consider the Soviet Union's interest if indeed, the balance of power would be based on material capabilities, and the Soviet Union still had the position to disregard American interests to some extent. If neorealist assumptions were correct, the latter would have vetoed UNTAC. In light of the abovementioned balance of power, the interests of both the United States and the Soviet Union with regard to Cambodia would have to be discussed – but any change in Soviet interests (as was expected) would be due to other factors than system change.

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## 5.2 Constructivist Approach

### *Frame grouping*

Whereas the neorealist approach focused on assessing power, the constructivist approach concentrates on persuasion. It is an assessment of changes in framing, rather than in material capabilities, that should show how interests were revised and international outcomes transformed. The framing analysis of 55 Security Council documents provided 203 instances of framing. All of the Permanent Five partook in framing, sometimes on their own account and sometimes joined by others (at times, the entire P-5 group). There are many ways to look at these frames: one could focus on relationships between certain frames and certain actors, the temporal situation of frames (when were they used), the occurrence of frames throughout the period of analysis, or other factors. Additionally, one could organise frames by the answers to the questions of frame analysis as displayed in Chapter 3.3. This last method would, however, require far too much elaborate and complex work for me to accomplish within reasonable time limits.

I have chosen to group the frames according to occurrence (in total), main actor using the frame, the time period wherein the frame was used, whether it was a frame in favour or against undertaking action in Cambodia (by action, I mean intervention), and

whether the frame was directed at the proceedings of the Security Council and other actors regarding (non-)intervention or at the assessment of the situation in Cambodia. In addition, I have combined related frames into larger groups (see Table 5.2): anti-China, anti-Soviet Union, anti-Vietnam, comprehensive political settlement (the term that was consistently used by the P-5 in the lead-up to the establishment of UNTAC), political settlement (the term used before ‘comprehensive political settlement’ was coined), pro-Phnom Penh (meaning the Vietnamese-controlled government in Phnom Penh), and regional stability frames. These groups consist of the frames that have most often occurred throughout 1979-1990. My threshold number for larger group frame occurrence was 10; other framings that could not be grouped into larger categories have not been included here. The frames are ordered by longevity: the ones that were used for the longest period of time are at the top of the table.

#### *Anti-Vietnam frame*

Table 5.2 shows that the ‘anti-Vietnam’ frame was used more than any other frame, and that it was mainly used by China. The anti-Vietnam label includes smaller framings such as Vietnamese aggression, Vietnamese gangster logic, and Vietnamese hegemonism (see Appendix C.II). These frames seemed to be aimed at condemning Vietnam’s invasion in Cambodia, while posing that event as being part of a larger Vietnamese plan to assert regional influence in Indochina or the whole of Southeast Asia (for instance, see S/PV.2108, S/13007, S/PV.2112, and S/13407). In the second worksheet of the xlsx file (‘Groupings’), it can be seen that China was the only one using these specific frames targeting Vietnam, except for one accusation of invasion made by the United States (S/PV.2110). China’s anti-Vietnam frame was not adopted by any other actor, even though it was the most occurring frame and was spread over the longest period of time. What is clear from the original table in the first worksheet (‘Framing analysis’), is that anti-Vietnamese frames were not used from late 1988 until a few months before the draft resolution on comprehensive political settlement was adopted. In S/21388 (United Nations, 9 July 1990), an interview on Sino-Vietnamese exchanges with a member of China’s foreign ministry was shared; this person repeated earlier accusations, while Vietnam’s troops had already left Cambodia for almost a year. It is puzzling why China had wanted to share this interview with the Security Council.

FRAME	OCCUR- RENCE	MAIN ACTOR	TIME PERIOD	PRO/ CONTRA ACTION	PROCEDURAL/ ASSESSMENT
<b>Anti-Vietnam</b>	80	China	01/01/1979 - 09/07/1990	Pro	Both (mostly assessment)
<b>Regional stability</b>	12	US, Soviet Union, China	07/01/1979 - 13/03/1990	Pro	Assessment
<b>Political settlement</b>	14	Soviet Union, China	16/03/1979 - 22/05/1989	Pro	Procedural
<b>Anti-Soviet Union</b>	16	China	01/01/1979 - 05/01/1980	Pro	Both (mostly assessment)
<b>Comprehensive political settlement</b>	27	P-5	29/09/1989 - 31/08/1990	Pro	Procedural
<b>Pro-Phnom Penh</b>	12	Soviet Union	01/01/1979 - 19/04/1979	Contra	Both (mostly procedural)
<b>Anti-China</b>	10	Soviet Union	01/01/1979 - 16/03/1979	Contra	Both (mostly assessment)

*Table 5.2: Larger groupings of framing analysis results.*

### *Framing the situation*

There are multiple frames that have been used by just one of the P-5, and were thus never adopted by the others. Main examples are the anti-China and pro-Phnom Penh frames, used by the Soviet Union, and the anti-Soviet Union frame employed by China – which was adopted only once, by the United Kingdom (S/PV.2110). It seems probably here, that China and the Soviet Union were the parties that clashed most often in the discussion on Cambodia within the Security Council. This shows, for instance, in the different ways in which ‘the situation in Cambodia’ was termed: China usually framed it as an annexation or a war of aggression, the Soviet Union constructed it as a civil war and thus internal affair of the Cambodian people (see the third worksheet in the xlsx file, ‘Descriptions of the situation’). Taking in mind the historical evidence on the Vietnamese invasion, this conclusion is an obvious one: the Soviet Union supported Vietnam politically and financially in its communist expansionist project for the Indochinese region. China probably regarded this as an attack on its own regional

influence, as Hensengerth (2006) and Vámos (2010) imply. Since the attack on Cambodia could in that sense be regarded an indirect attack on Chinese foreign policy, it is understandable that China dominated the debate on Cambodia in terms of the number of frames.

### *Regional stability frame*

That number, however, matters less if we consider that Chinese framings were almost never shared by other actors among the P-5. When they were, it was mostly a one-time occasion. The only larger frames that were shared were never the ones that China dominated (first). There is one frame preceding any talk of settlement which was used by all actors: the ‘regional stability’ frame. It does not seem to occur that much when looking at frame labels, but the issue here is that frames have only *one* label. The frame that was shared the most by the P-5 until the mid-1980s was in fact ‘regional stability’. The occurrence of it has not been counted when it was a secondary matter to a clear framing, but it appears to be a very dominant frame when the *For who is it a problem?*-column is analysed. Indochina, Southeast Asia, or the whole of Asia were very regularly understood to be the ‘victim’ of the Cambodian situation by all of the Permanent Five. Adding the occurrence of these ‘victimhood’ references in the framing analysis, combined with regional stability frame occurrence, one finds that regional stability was part of at about 30 percent of China’s frames, 25 percent of the Soviet Union’s frames, and 60 percent of American framing.

Regional stability may be a uniting frame, but it is a very broad one, and one without a consistent direction – regional stability may be interpreted in many ways. The Soviet Union appeared to use the frame to project an anti-Chinese frame (arguing that the Chinese attack on the Sino-Vietnamese border in 1979 was part of China’s imperialist agenda), while China used it to portray Vietnam and the Soviet Union as the causes of instability in Southeast Asia. Also, if the frame would indeed have been able to unite the P-5, it is strange that the focus of victimhood turned more and more to *Cambodia* as negotiations intensified in the late 1980s. In joint communications from the Permanent Members, it was never framed as a dominant aspect of the Cambodian situation. Up until the point that the terms ‘political settlement’ and ‘comprehensive political settlement’ were introduced, there does not seem to be a clear change of frame dominance at first sight. To be able to better analyse the frames as they occurred, I will provide a more detailed description of some important frames as placed on a timeline.

### *Timeline of frames*

Almost 50 percent of the frames were found in the first half of 1979, which was the year Vietnam invaded Cambodia. There were some other matters that directed the P-5's attention away from the issue. First, the Cambodian debate was taken hostage by discussions over the Sino-Vietnamese conflict (1979). Then, it was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1980) that demanded attention. In 1982, the Cambodian issue was only referred to in order to make accusations towards socialist states in a discussion on American involvement in the anti-revolutionary movement in Nicaragua. During the rest of the early 1980s, the Permanent Members were relatively silent on Cambodia. That all changed in the second half of the 1980s (mainly from 1988 to 1990), when they suddenly started to agree upon the direction that the Security Council should take regarding a settlement of the Cambodian conflict. The following timeline chronologically discusses the documents that I think were most important in the framing of that conflict. Central to this discussion are the following questions: 1) What is the essence of the situation in Cambodia, according to the actor(s)? and 2) What is the essence of the solution that the situation in Cambodia requires, according to the actor(s)? These questions reflect Krebs and Jackson's (2007) distinction between frames and implications – which both need to be adopted by an actor in order for them to be convinced, and hence possibly result in policy change.

#### **11/01/1979: S/13022**

This was China's draft resolution, which was discussed in the 2109<sup>th</sup> and 2112<sup>th</sup> Security Council meetings. It framed the situation in Cambodia as Vietnamese aggression, which endangered international peace and Cambodian sovereignty. Also, China called for the withdrawal of Vietnam's forces from Cambodia and for the UN and all states to halt aid to Vietnam. China dropped the vote on its resolution, as ASEAN's draft resolution (S/13027) was perceived to have a better chance at being adopted (seeing as it came from non-aligned members). The Soviet Union vetoed S/12027, claiming that 'the reason for discussing Kampuchea was to prod the Council towards interference in the internal affairs of Kampuchea'. It recognised the People's Revolutionary Council (or UFNSK) as the legitimate government of Cambodia, argued that the facts on which both draft resolutions were based were distorted, and accused China of seeking hegemony in the region. According to the Soviet Union, the situation in Cambodia was an internal affair with which the Security Council should not interfere.

**05/01/1980: S/PV.2186**

Security Council meeting 2186 saw the last time a frame on Cambodia was used by the Soviet Union for more than five years. It was the only use of a ‘Western imperialism’ frame, holding that Western powers had obligations towards Cambodia and the region that they failed to meet. These obligations seemed to relate to the refugee crisis that resulted from the violence in Indochina. Refugee frames have only been used by China, and were consistently combined with accusations against Vietnam. The Soviet Union may have been right in attacking the United States, United Kingdom, and France for not discussing the refugee problem, but this rhetoric diverted attention from the conflict causing it. It is fair to say that at this point, the Soviet Union still refused to agree with the other Permanent Members on the character of the Cambodian problem.

**12/02/1981: S/14373**

In this document, the last allegation by China directed against the Soviet Union has been found. It was stated in a press conference by China’s Premier Zhao that ‘Vietnam’s pursuance of regional hegemonism with Soviet backing is the root cause of tension in Southeast Asia and of the disruption of peace and stability in the region’. Instead of the earlier accusations of the Soviet Union being the mastermind behind the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, the tone had already softened down here. Interestingly, in S/15633 (02/03/1983), China did ask the Soviet Union to stop supporting Vietnam without explicitly mentioning the Soviet Union as being responsible for Vietnamese aggression. China did keep framing Vietnam as an aggressor with hegemonic ambitions, but no other Permanent Member took over this discourse. Nothing in the framing analysis suggests a reason for China’s changing framing regarding Soviet guilt. Perhaps the Sino-Vietnamese war weakened China’s position in the battle for frame dominance.

**02/03/1983: S/15633**

China mentions elections under United Nations supervision for the first time, while it still represents the situation as a Vietnamese invasion and accused Vietnam of attempting to trick international actors into looking away from its aggressive behaviour. This move was a bold one: while intervention was not even on the table, China already appointed a role for the UN in a solution for the Cambodian problem. At this point, neither the frame, nor its implications, were adopted by the actor that needed to be convinced: the Soviet Union. China remains resolute in both parts of its rhetoric, and

does not seem to yield in favour of finding a middle way.

**25/05/1986 – 02/06/1988: S/18099, S/19918, S/20297**

Joint Communiqués from the Soviet Union and non-P-5 states, proposing a political settlement for the ‘problems in Southeast Asia’, are shared with the Security Council. The frames used here focusing mainly on a solution, not on a problem – and even the prognoses are relatively vague. The actors framed as being responsible for ending the conflict are the parties directly involved in it. The Soviet Union especially sees a role for the Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIMs) to that end. There is no mention of culpability on any side, but at this point the Soviet Union seems convinced that there *is* a problem that is in need of a solution. This should be considered a change in frame dominance, but it is difficult to tell whether that change took place in mid-1986 or if it was developing over two years’ time.

**10/02/1989 – 22/05/1989: S/20459, S/20649**

A joint statement and communiqué are issued by the Soviet Union and China, and they are in favour of Vietnamese withdrawal. Both states see a role for the United Nations in settling the conflict in Cambodia. The two parties seem to have overcome their rhetorical differences mainly by sticking to a frame of political settlement that does not include accusations towards any specific actor. The diagnosis consists of a regional stability element, a prevention (of civil war) element, and mostly on the achievement of political settlement for the ‘internal problems of Kampuchea’. The solution proposed is multifaceted too, including a role for a coalition government of the conflicting parties in Cambodia and a role for the UN as a control mechanism for supervising ‘Vietnamese troop withdrawal, cessation of foreign military aid, maintenance of peace in Kampuchea and conduct of free elections’. Additionally, it calls for a conference on the matter – which was indeed organised later that year. The compromise between the Soviet Union and China coincided with the intensified diplomatic relations between the conflicting parties of Cambodia (the first JIM had already passed, and the second was due nine days after S/20459 was shared with the Security Council), which made the statement fit well within the discourse of that time. The compromise seemed possible partly because of the negotiations between the Cambodian and Vietnamese parties: the Soviet Union could no longer deny Vietnamese involvement in the conflict, and China was able to push its prognosis by dropping allegations for the time being. In addition, since China and the

Soviet Union have both applied the regional stability frame for a long time, it may have eventually helped them to talk about the situation in similar terms – even though it had different implications for the two states prior to 1989. This change in discourse did not exactly develop as Krebs and Jackson’s (2007) rhetorical coercion would expect: the diagnosis (the assessment of the problem) was fused with the prognosis (the implications following from beliefs about the problem). The implications were accepted by the Soviet Union, but the frame never was. Instead, a new frame was developed.

**29/09/1989: S/20868**

The Soviet Union and the United States together propose a ‘comprehensive political settlement’. It is the first time that this term, which has been used consistently thereafter, has been used by Permanent Members in Security Council documentation. The two states initiate a moratorium on military assistance to the Cambodian parties (a term which implicitly includes the Vietnamese parties to the conflict) and propose to organise meetings with the Permanent Five on the issue of political settlement. The talks are held between January and August 1990, and while there are no meeting records available, every meeting is reported upon to the Security Council.

**03/10/1989: S/20880**

The Permanent Five jointly propose a framework for a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian situation, and announce to negotiate on its details soon.

**18/01/1990 - 31/08/1990: S/21087, S/21149, S/21196, S/21318, S/21689**

The Permanent Five share their deliberations on the comprehensive political settlement. S/21196 is the first to mention a United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia. It is visible in the framing results that throughout the process, a broad concept of settlement as a solution to the Cambodian issue, is narrowed down and becomes a relatively workable solution with a more specific content.

The historical timeline of the use of frames among the P-5 of the Security Council shows that a redefinition of a frame did happen, but it cannot (with certainty) be said that the frame has been internalised. The dominant frame, which was eventually adopted by all of the actors of interest, could be the larger grouped frame of ‘comprehensive political settlement’. The frame was redefined in terms of emphasis, mainly: accusations

and slander were discarded from the diagnosis of the Cambodian situation, which was ultimately considered a problem for Cambodia defined in terms of procedure more than of assessment. From September 1989 onwards, a comprehensive political settlement was seen as the solution by all of the Permanent Five. Framing focused on prognosis instead of diagnosis, refuting Krebs and Jackson's model of rhetorical coercion: we see a change in the international outcome, even though neither the frame, nor the implications, had won. The Soviet Union and China, who were rhetorical enemies at the start of the debate, have evidently changed their positions to some extent. China 'lost' its diagnosis of Vietnamese aggression, while the Soviet Union lost both its diagnosis (the issue being an internal affair) and prognosis (the issue therefore not being in need of intervention). However, the Soviet Union seemed to be on the forefront of the creation of a new frame to be adopted by the P-5, namely the 'political settlement' frame introduced in 1986. It was soon used by China, and in late 1989 re-entered the discourse as the 'comprehensive political settlement' frame. The comprehensive political settlement frame may have become the dominant frame through P-5 interaction on the basis of a shared understanding: that the situation in Cambodia was in need of political settlement. The framing analysis could therefore lead to the interpreted conclusion that interaction between actors – and possibly the influence of external events such as the JIMs – changed ideas and interests regarding the situation Cambodia, and therefore opened up the possibility to change international outcomes. That change was the establishment of UNTAC. Considering this interpretation, Hypothesis 2,

*H2: The ideas of the P-5 regarding the Cambodian situation were transformed by means of a change in frame dominance, which redefined their interests, and thereby redefined the UNTAC outcome as the appropriate one,*

may therefore be accepted. The change in frame dominance should be situated between 25 May 1986, when the Soviet Union issued the political settlement frame (S/18099), and 3 October 1989, when the Permanent Five collectively used the comprehensive political settlement frame (S/20880). While the Soviet Union was the one to introduce the foundation for the uniting frame in 1986, a common position was completely achieved in 1989. One could say that the UNTAC outcome has been redefined as the appropriate one as of 3 October 1989, since this was the point when the framework for the peacekeeping mission was agreed upon by the P-5 of the UN Security Council.

## 6. Conclusion

This chapter will firstly summarise my findings, relate them to the expectations outlined in the methodological chapter, and define the conclusions that can be drawn from my analyses. Secondly, some potential limitations to both the neorealist and constructivist approach will be discussed. Thirdly, I will introduce recommendations for further research on the establishment of UNTAC. A final paragraph will return to the scientific and societal relevance of this study and provide some concluding notes.

### *Findings*

As stated in Chapter 1, there were conflicting interests regarding intervention in Cambodia in the first couple of years after Vietnam's invasion. The Soviet Union blocked a resolution proposing a withdrawal of Vietnamese forces, and seemed to be an obstructing factor in the negotiations on the situation. However, none of the Permanent Five of the Security Council vetoed the resolutions leading up to UNTAC. The Soviet Union's changing position was surprising. This is the most crucial thing that I have tried to explain in this study. The research question guiding my analyses was:

*'Why did the P-5 of the UN Security Council decide upon the establishment of the far-reaching United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), despite their conflicting interests and the improving situation in Cambodia?'*

Waltzian neorealism would expect that the distribution of capabilities among the Permanent Five of the Security Council had shifted to such extent that one could speak of system change: the bipolar international system, with the United States and the Soviet Union as superpowers, would turn into a unipolar one with the United States as hegemon. Unipolarity would mean that the American national interest determined international outcomes. The outcome in question, the establishment of UNTAC, should thus have benefitted that interest. The results of the aggregation of material capabilities, which have been calculated according to my index of national power based on Angang and Honghua's (2004) method, could not be interpreted as showing system change. In fact, while it was expected that a change in polarity would be seen in the late 1980s, the system seemed to remain bipolar even in 1990. The main problem following from that conclusion, is why Waltz defends the end of bipolarity in 1989, when it could not be

empirically assessed. Perhaps, relative capabilities are not all that is relevant. A state may possess many resources but not make use of them efficiently. A lack of efficiency was certainly visible in the Soviet military capabilities: the Red Army lacked commanders and training, making the staggering number of personnel somewhat less impressive (Odom, 1998).

The constructivist approach focused on ideas and how they could be transformed through the changing domination of certain frames in a discourse. A change in ideas would lead to a change in interests, possibly enabling common interests among the P-5. The Soviet Union's changing position regarding appropriate international outcomes would then be explained by a change in frame dominance and with that a redefinition of the Soviet interest. The framing analysis of 55 Security Council documents has provided support for that explanation. It has also shown China's failure in establishing a dominant frame: while it was the Permanent Member to problematise the situation in Cambodia most often, its framing of the issue was never adopted by other Permanent Members. The Soviet Union introduced a frame in 1986 that seemed acceptable to all of the P-5, who took over the 'political settlement' frame in a redefined version: the 'comprehensive political settlement' frame. The actual adoption of that frame took place in 1989, which is why it can be said that frame dominance has changed in that year. The comprehensive political settlement frame enabled (or constrained) the P-5 to intervene in Cambodia through the establishment of UNTAC. The socialisation effect of the frame was successful because it was internalised through institutionalisation, by means of signing the Paris Agreements in 1991.

The main assumption leading from this framing analysis, in relation to the research question, is that precisely *because* the situation was improving (through increased negotiations on reconciliation by the parties to the conflict) that a common interest in establishing UNTAC was possible. The Soviet Union could no longer deny that there was conflict in Cambodia because of the negotiations between Vietnamese and Cambodian parties. Thus, two parts of the threefold puzzle may be explained by a constructivist framing analysis: why the conflicting interests have been overcome, and why UNTAC was developed as the Cambodian situation was improving. All that would remain to be answered is why the P-5 agreed upon to scale of the operation. This could be because UNTAC was the first ever UN transitional authority, and the parties involved may not have been able to make a good estimate of the necessary costs and size as they could not be compared to those of similar missions.

It follows that the constructivist approach has been able to offer a better explanation of the establishment of UNTAC than the neorealist one. Whereas it has been assumed on the basis of neorealist theory that the change in power would be the cause of the changing international outcome, a constructivist analysis led to the interpretation of a change in persuasion to be the reason for that. However, the constructivist framing analysis tells us nothing about relative power relationships, as it only allows for the interpretation of discourse. Perhaps, the changing position of the Soviet Union was not actually the cause of system change but of overreaction – argued to be the danger of the bipolar system (Waltz, 1979). An entirely different method would have to be designed to evaluate the possible truthfulness of that claim. Ultimately, such an explanation would depart from Waltz, who assumed that a change in the relative capabilities of states causes them to revise their national interests. It is difficult to tell how constructivism can add to a neorealist explanation in this case, since its ideas about the structure of the international system are completely different.

Neorealism does not tell us much about processes of interest formation, as interests are assumed to be exogenously given. I have, in this study, tried to explain both an international outcome as well as the process prior to it. For this kind of research focus, a constructivist analysis seems more suitable than a rationalist one. This is because constructivist theory allows for the interpretation of processes (for instance, framing as socialisation) and the resulting outcomes in international relations. It may have been unfair to pit these two approaches against each other – but as I have explained in Chapter 3, I did expect to find system change. While it certainly cannot be claimed that the distribution of capabilities and the assumption of self-interested behaviour fail to give us insights into international outcomes, or that ideas are the source of every redefinition of interests, it seems that empirically, there is more to say for a Wendtian-constructivist analysis of this particular case than there is for a Waltzian-neorealist one. The next two sections will elaborate on the possible limitations of both approaches.

#### *Neorealist approach: potential limitations*

The measurements on the various indicators that were used to calculate aggregate capabilities scores (see Appendix B) sometimes lie very close together – or very wide apart. These intervals are not reflected in the scoring system that was used, because there was only a differentiation between places 1 to 5 with intervals between capability scores being of equal size (0.25 point). There are thirteen indicators in total, so the

variations could somewhat even out in the final calculations. The United Kingdom's and France's scores would be much lower if one were to measure them *to scale*, but the final result tables are mainly serving to show change in power relations in a system of polarity. China, France, and the United Kingdom are no great powers when their capacities are viewed relative to those of the Soviet Union and United States, and this does not change between 1979 and 1990.

Some limitations of my data have been discussed in the methodological chapter, and also at some points in Chapter 6. Soviet Union statistics were often difficult to find, and when found, their reliability could be disputed. I have used scholarly sources for estimates of Soviet armed forces personnel, military expenditure, and government expenditure. There were some websites that did provide figures, but their trustworthiness could not be determined due to a lack of sources given. Since there might still be issues of reliability regarding the data that I have used, my results could potentially be skewed. However, it has been argued throughout the discussion of the findings that even when estimates were imprecise, the scores were still distinct.

Concerning the choice of indicators of capabilities, I do not think that a different array of indicators would lead to an extremely different result in the aggregation of capabilities – that is, as long as they are based on Waltz' components of power: size of population, size of territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, and political stability and competence (Waltz, 1979: 131). Several methods of calculating these indicators into aggregated capabilities scores (national power scores) have been tested. Not one provided an empirical basis for arguing in favour of unipolarity. The theory of the distribution of relative capabilities may not accurately mirror actual relative power. Empirically, the theory does not seem to hold. However, it *may* hold if one were to add variables that lacked from Waltz' list. Some further comments in that regard will be made in the section discussing further recommendations.

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, it should be noted that in 1986, president Gorbachev of the Soviet Union introduced the policies of *glasnost* and *perestroika*, aiming for liberalisation and democratisation (Zubok, 2009). They were important causes of the Union's disintegration (Deb, 1996). A decisive role can also be attributed to ethnic and cultural clashes between the Soviet Union's peoples. The political transformation has been reflected in the Union's regime durability score. Nevertheless, the drastic social and political changes at the time cannot properly be portrayed by

statistical figures on (material) capabilities. The Soviet Union's political control began to diminish heavily in 1990, and in December 1991, the Union was eventually dissolved. The international system may have reacted to the Soviet Union's troubles before a capability shift could be detected. This gives way to explanations that take ideas or ideologies into account. Perhaps, this was first and foremost a war of ideology, which the Soviet Union lost under Gorbachev's rule. In the end, the power status of a state might not (only) be grounded in its material capabilities, but (also) in the minds of the diplomats and leaders of the international system.

*Constructivist approach: potential limitations*

The influence of external events on the changing frame dominance between 1986 and 1989 has not been analysed in my constructivist approach. The Soviet Union's position changed not instantly, but over the course of several years – some international developments could have affected or brought about this process. It should also be considered that domestically, the Soviet Union was radically transforming its political regime. International and domestic events are almost completely left out of the framing analysis, which means that it is a study of discourse independent from structural change or other phenomena that may influence that discourse. Framings in other institutions (the United Nations' General Assembly, ASEAN, or the JIMs) could have been adopted by P-5 states. This cannot be established by focusing on the Security Council alone. Though I have explicitly, and for a reason, limited myself to one unit of decision-making only, the Security Council may be too small a focus. Southeast Asian relations and wider United Nations discussions may have been of importance in changing ideas. Still, if changing international or domestic structures indeed helped to bring about UNTAC, their influence *is* illustrated through the use of frames in the Security Council. My analysis tried to affirm that frame dominance among the P-5 of the Security Council changed, and the results can certainly be interpreted in favour of that expectation.

In the constructivist method's data section, it was said that the Permanent Five's meetings on Cambodia in 1990 were not recorded, and that this was an unfortunate omission from my framing analysis. In retrospect, it was not a problem: the change in frame dominance seems to have happened quite some time before the meetings took place. Records of the Paris Conference in 1989, which I could not find, might have been useful to further study the ideas (and possibly a transformation thereof) among the P-5. But the rules of the game may have been very different in the Paris negotiations than in

Security Council communications, which could be true for other non-Security Council documents as well. My framing analysis has shown only how frames have been used, contested, and adopted by China, the Soviet Union, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom in a Security Council context between 1979 and 1990.

One last comment should be made on the reliability of the coding. A codebook had not been prepared, since I did not want to limit my interpretation of the texts by using frames that were established beforehand. This method did result in some interesting frame labels such as ‘Vietnamese gangster logic’ and ‘Vietnamese fascism’ (I have stumbled upon multiple Nazi-Germany references), but it cannot be claimed that the analysis was free from any bias whatsoever. Another researcher may have found different results, and given different labels to framings. Frames could then have also been interpreted differently. I feel that this is the greatest critique that could be made on the part of my constructivist analysis of the case. My counterargument would be that the tone of the frames nevertheless would still be interpreted in a similar way: China’s negative attitude towards Vietnam, the Soviet Union’s support for the People’s Republic of Kampuchea, and the eventual relinquishment of those previously strongly defended positions, could hardly be left undetected.

#### *Recommendations for further research*

As has been stated before, neither Waltzian neorealism, nor Wendtian constructivism, take too much account of the influence of domestic politics on relationships between states. This can be argued to be a shortcoming of both approaches. Internal political struggle is likely to have played a part in the Soviet Union’s changing foreign policy. As Sophie Quinn-Judge (2004) argues, Gorbachev’s policies of *glasnost* and *perestroika* gave legitimacy to the Vietnamese reform process (called *doi moi*). The internal restructuring of several regimes could prove a valuable addition to understandings of the changing international outcomes regarding the Cambodian conflict.

Some perspectives that allow for the incorporation of that element, and perhaps also for the role of individual leaders such as Gorbachev, could come from liberalism or constructivist theories that are not state-centred. Neoliberal or neoliberal institutionalist theories, which focus on cooperation rather than conflict between states, may be applied (Whyte, 2012). Neoliberal (institutionalist) assumptions highlight that institutions can be powerful in international relations – something that neorealism does not accept. Waltz, for instance, does not take account of the veto power of the Permanent Five

states. Even if I could have established unipolarity with US hegemony, would there be a reason to believe that unipolarity stops the Soviet Union from using its right to veto resolutions? Relative power may be affected by the positions that states have in international organisations.

A second point of recommendation, which is directed at the methodological part of the neorealist analysis, is to include more variables in the index of relative power. More indicators may show more intricate differences between states' relative capabilities. One could add variables to the index of power which are not fundamentally related to Waltz' six components. I would then suggest to focus on the capabilities that can be argued to have been of most importance for international power status between 1979 and 1990. A new index may include technological development, military intelligence, education, financial investment, infrastructure, and diplomacy. This would mean a departure from Waltz, but it could be a step towards a more elaborate index that measures the positions of states on the balance of power.

Thirdly, regarding the framing analysis, I think there is certainly room for a more detailed study of the discourse on the situation in Cambodia. Possibly the most interesting and also the most viable expansion would be to include documents issued by the General Assembly of the United Nations. The Permanent Five have been involved in the debate in this UN organ, as well. The results of the framing analysis in this research may be used as the basis for a codebook, thus providing researchers with a starting point for analysing P-5 framing on the Cambodian conflict – which could extend to the analysis of General Assembly resolutions and meeting records.

Finally, a focus on regional relations, instead of the international arena, may be appropriate. Southeast Asia or larger Asia, including the Soviet Union, possibly has its own regional structure that is not completely constrained by worldwide power balances and ideas. A neorealist analysis may be applied to the distribution of capabilities within such a region. Waltz never called for that kind of approach, but it may of course be followed regardless. In addition, a constructivist analysis could incorporate speeches or communiqués from (Southeast) Asian states to compare to the discourse in the United Nations. This might show how certain frames can work on one international level but not on another. It could also potentially lay bare that different ideas dominate discourses on the same issues – which, in a critical constructivist analysis, may be viewed as being part of a larger inequality or deep structural differences between Southeast Asia and the rest of the continent, or (Southeast) Asian states and the (Western) world.

### *Final remarks*

The establishment of UNTAC has not previously been subjected to an approach based on International Relations theory. It has been mentioned that other studies have mostly been of a descriptive nature – something which cannot be said for this study. I have tested two grand theories from the field of IR, which offered very different expectations about the political processes leading to a change in international outcomes. Certainly, it seems clear at this point why an intervention in Cambodia took so long for the Permanent Five to agree upon: they most likely did not have an intersubjective understanding of the conflict prior to the late 1980s. I hope that this thesis has provided some insight into the political background of the little discussed transitional authority in Cambodia.

The results of my study show that the expectations based on constructivist theory could be supported by empirical evidence more than neorealist assumptions could be. In using the specific models that I have chosen to find explanations for the specific case of this thesis, a constructivist framing analysis has at least partly answered the research question. The international outcome of the establishment of UNTAC could not be confirmed to be the cause of a change in polarity, but there is support for claiming that a change in dominant framing was the reason for it. In this chapter, some remarks have been made on the limitations of both theoretical and methodological approaches to the case. After this review, it can be said that a framing analysis, based on constructivist theory, has shown that the ideas of the Permanent Five members of the Security Council regarding the situation in Cambodia may have been redefined through framing effects. This is not a *causal* explanation, but an interpretation of a very particular discourse in a particular context and time.

If I were to link this finding to the neorealist expectations of system change, I would argue that if there is unipolarity, it is a social construct – much as bipolarity and the Cold War were. The end of bipolarity was when we stopped perceiving the Soviet Union as a superpower, and that may well have been in 1989. However, on the basis of the framing analysis as performed in this study, it is argued that the changing position of the Soviet Union and subsequently the creation of a common position on international outcomes has probably taken place between 1986 and 1989. The transformation meant that the Permanent Five were able to talk in similar terms based on similar ideas. In that sense, processes of persuasion have triumphed over distributions of power in the road towards the establishment of UNTAC.





## Appendix A: List of References

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## Appendix B: Distribution of Capabilities

### Population total

Year	United States	Soviet Union	China	France	United Kingdom
1979	225,055,000	261,702,076	969,005,000	55,130,594	56,246,951
1980	227,225,000	264,014,786	981,235,000	55,340,782	56,314,216
1981	229,466,000	266,359,532	993,885,000	55,585,824	56,333,829
1982	231,664,000	268,605,577	1,008,630,000	55,858,727	56,313,641
1983	233,792,000	270,874,046	1,023,310,000	56,156,284	56,332,848
1984	235,825,000	273,413,962	1,036,825,000	56,470,769	56,422,072
1985	237,924,000	275,985,987	1,051,040,000	56,795,686	56,550,268
1986	240,133,000	278,544,935	1,066,790,000	57,132,691	56,681,396
1987	242,289,000	281,126,894	1,084,035,000	57,482,591	56,802,050
1988	244,499,000	283,615,672	1,101,630,000	57,836,486	56,928,327
1989	246,819,000	286,054,611	1,118,650,000	58,182,702	57,076,711
1990	249,623,000	287,719,344	1,135,185,000	58,512,808	57,2475,86

Source: World Bank DataBank.

### Surface area (in km<sup>2</sup>)

Year	United States	Soviet Union	China	France	United Kingdom
1979-90	9,629,090	22,307,189	9,562,950	243610	243610

Source: World Bank DataBank.

### Arable land (in km<sup>2</sup>)

Year	United States	Soviet Union	China	France	United Kingdom
1979	1,887,550	1,268,300	964520	174010	68290
1980	1,887,550	1271100	961750	174720	69180
1981	1,887,550	1251300	967900	175260	69070
1982	1,877,650	1229300	1017000	176510	69130
1983	1,877,650	1194900	1073000	176690	68990
1984	1,877,650	1178700	1140000	178090	69220
1985	1,877,650	1156100	1201000	179230	69900
1986	1,877,650	1146000	1205000	179980	69400
1987	1,857,420	1130000	1202000	181670	69350
1988	1,857,420	1127700	1209000	178130	68860
1989	1,857,260	1101500	1222000	177099	67020
1990	1,856,760	1088700	1238000	177848	66200

Source: World Bank DataBank, Mitchell (2007<sup>c</sup>) for Soviet Union.

### Crude petroleum production (in millions of kg)

Year	United States	Soviet Union	China	France	United Kingdom
1979	420818	588000	106152	1200	76600
1980	424196	603000	105946	1200	78900
1981	421804	609000	101221	1700	87900
1982	425591	613000	102123	1600	100000
1983	427515	616000	106068	1700	111000
1984	438127	613000	114613	2100	121000
1985	441479	583000	124895	2600	122000
1986	428154	599000	130668	2900	121000
1987	419442	607000	134140	3200	118000
1988	419442	606000	137046	3400	109000
1989	410637	589000	137641	3200	87000
1990	382077	553000	138306	3000	88000

Source: Mitchell (2007<sup>a</sup>; 2007<sup>b</sup>; 2007<sup>c</sup>).

### Natural gas production (in millions of m3)

Year	United States	Soviet Union	China	France	United Kingdom
1979	552033	406597	16065	8408	39232
1980	547512	435000	15780	8173	37294
1981	541854	465000	14103	7691	37410
1982	501990	501000	13250	7139	37841
1983	454535	536000	13534	7215	38700
1984	493062	587000	13989	6854	38529
1985	465311	643000	14359	5863	42971
1986	497441	686000	15269	4571	45304
1987	514046	727000	15553	4239	47641
1988	528974	770000	15809		45755
1989	535399	796000	16662		
1990	550839	815000	16946	2857*	49549

Source: Mitchell (2007<sup>a</sup>; 2007<sup>b</sup>; 2007<sup>c</sup>).

\* Taken from IEA Statistics (2015).

### Energy use (kg of oil equivalent per capita)

Year	United States	Soviet Union*	China	France	United Kingdom
1979	8327		619	3482	3859
1980	7942	6258	610	3465	3524
1981	7648		597	3370	3415
1982	7259		607	3272	3397
1983	7199		622	3340	3378
1984	7443		651	3440	3371
1985	7456	6742	658	3589	3551
1986	7376	6797	671	3623	3598
1987	7622	6958	694	3691	3619
1988	7850	7001	720	3652	3643
1989	7890	6905	724	3780	3626
1990	7672		767	3828	3597

Source: World Bank DataBank.

\* Taken from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1991), calculated into equivalent per capita by author.

### Output of electricity (in TWh)

Year	United States	Soviet Union	China	France	United Kingdom
1979	2319	1238	219	231	279
1980	2354	1294	301	247	265
1981	2359	1326	309	265	259
1982	2302	1367	328	266	254
1983	2368	1419	351	283	257
1984	2479	1493	377	310	262
1985	2567	1544	411	329	274
1986	2598	1599	450	346	279
1987	2716	1665	497	361	280
1988	2854	1705	545	373	266
1989	2971	1722	585	387	292
1990	2835	1726	621	399	297

Source: Mitchell (2007<sup>a</sup>; 2007<sup>b</sup>; 2007<sup>c</sup>).

**GDP per capita (in 1990 international Geary-Khamis \$<sup>7</sup>)**

Year	United States	Soviet Union	China	France	United Kingdom
1979	18789	6472	895	14634	18050
1980	18577	6427	938	14766	18779
1981	18856	6433	977	14840	18956
1982	18325	6536	985	15132	18560
1983	18920	6687	1043	15245	18560
1984	20123	6709	1060	15382	19038
1985	20717	6708	1079	15530	19586
1986	21236	6923	1101	15833	19786
1987	21788	6952	1125	16158	19792
1988	22499	7043	1216	16790	20243
1989	23059	7112	1270	17300	20935
1990	23201	6894	1309	17647	21487

Source: *The Maddison Project (2014)*.

**GDP based on PPP (share of world total in %)**

Year	United States	Soviet Union	China	France	United Kingdom
1980	24.61	7.12	2.186	4.74	4.17
1981	24.72	7.22	2.253	4.69	4.03
1982	24.11	7.43	2.444	4.77	4.01
1983	24.55	7.53	2.641	4.71	4.13
1984	25.11	7.40	2.903	4.56	4.05
1985	25.17	7.26	3.171	4.47	4.03
1986	25.19	7.26	3.338	4.43	4.06
1987	25.08	7.18	3.593	4.38	4.10
1988	25.02	7.22	3.833	4.38	4.12
1989	24.99	7.18	3.847	4.41	4.06
1990	24.68	6.95	3.873	4.39	3.55

Source: *Econstats (2013)*.

**Armed forces personnel total**

Year	United States	Soviet Union*	China	France	United Kingdom
1985	2151600	5300000	3900000	464300	334000
1989	2240000	4200000	3900000	554000	318000
1990	2180000	3990000	3500000	550000	308000

Source: *World Bank DataBank*.

\* Taken from Odom (1998).

<sup>7</sup> Geary-Khamis dollars are international prices reflecting relative values combined with country PPPs reflecting relative country price levels (OECD, 2003).

### Military expenditure (as % of GDP)

Year	United States	Soviet Union*	China**	France	United Kingdom
1979	4.77	17.50		3.74	4.19
1980	4.96	17.50		3.84	4.49
1981	5.43	17.50		3.95	4.46
1982	6.57	17.50		3.92	4.81
1983	6.04	17.50	6.80	3.92	4.83
1984	5.89	17.50	5.80	3.85	4.93
1985	6.12	17.50	5.10	3.79	4.76
1986	6.30	17.50	4.60	3.72	4.53
1987	6.08	17.50	4.20	3.77	4.19
1988	5.75	17.50	3.80	3.59	3.77
1989	5.55	17.50	1.50	3.50	3.61
1990	5.28	17.50	1.60	3.44	3.56

Source: SIPRI Extended Military Expenditure Database, Beta Version (2016).

\* Estimate by Steinberg (1992: 36).

\*\* Taken from Globalsecurity.org (2016).

### Years since regime change

Year	United States	Soviet Union	China	France	United Kingdom
1987	178	65	38	18	107
1988	179	0	39	19	108
1989	180	0	40	20	109
1990	181	0	41	21	110

Source: Polity IV Project, 2016.

### General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP)

Year	United States	Soviet Union*	China	France	United Kingdom
1979	15.4	50	15.3	20.3	19.4
1980	15.9	50	14.9	20.9	20.8
1981	15.8	50	15.0	21.6	21.2
1982	16.5	50	15.2	22.0	21.1
1983	16.3	50	15.0	22.2	20.9
1984	15.6	50	15.3	22.4	20.6
1985	15.8	50	14.4	22.4	19.8
1986	16.0	50	14.7	22.1	19.8
1987	15.9	50	13.9	21.9	19.1
1988	15.6	50	13.1	21.5	18.3
1989	15.6	50	13.8	20.9	17.9
1990	15.9	50	14.1	21.0	18.1

Source: World Bank DataBank

\* Estimated to be at least 50% of GDP by CIA (1983), Deb (1990), and Maddison (1998).

**Aggregated capabilities: indicators combined into 6 variables**

Year	United States	Soviet Union	China	France	United Kingdom
1979	4,3875	4,8	2,5625	1,4	1,85
1980	4,2625	4,8	2,6625	1,35	1,925
1981	4,2625	4,8	2,6625	1,4	1,875
1982	4,2625	4,8	2,6625	1,4	1,875
1983	4,275	4,85	2,675	1,4	1,8
1984	4,4	4,85	2,55	1,7	1,5
1985	4,4	4,8	2,65	1,7	1,45
1986	4,4	4,8	2,65	1,7	1,45
1987	4,4	4,8	2,65	1,7	1,45
1988	4,4	4,55	2,775	1,775	1,45
1989	4,4	4,55	2,525	1,9	1,575
1990	4,4	4,55	2,65	1,9	1,45

*This table represents the aggregated capabilities score as outlined in Chapter 3.1.x. Scores range from 0 to 6.*

**Aggregated capabilities: indicators combined into 6 variables, doubly weighed economic, military, and political variables**


Year	United States	Soviet Union	China	France	United Kingdom
1979	6,575	7,05	3,65	2,4	3,1
1980	6,325	7,05	3,725	2,35	3,3
1981	6,325	7,05	3,725	2,4	3,25
1982	6,325	7,05	3,725	2,4	3,25
1983	6,4	7,1	3,55	2,4	3,05
1984	6,65	7,1	3,3	2,7	2,75
1985	6,65	7,1	3,4	2,7	2,7
1986	6,65	7,1	3,4	2,7	2,7
1987	6,65	7,1	3,4	2,7	2,7
1988	6,65	6,55	3,65	2,9	2,7
1989	6,65	6,55	3,15	3,15	2,95
1990	6,65	6,55	3,4	3,15	2,7

*This table represents the aggregated capabilities score with the economic, military, and political variables weighed twice. Scores range from 0 to 9.*

### Aggregated capabilities: equally weighed indicators

Year	United States	Soviet Union	China	France	United Kingdom
1979	10,375	10,25	4,375	3	4,5
1980	10,125	10,25	4,875	2,75	4,5
1981	10,125	10,25	4,875	3	4,25
1982	10,125	10,25	4,875	3	4,25
1983	10	10,5	4,75	3	4,25
1984	10,25	10,5	4,5	3,5	3,75
1985	10,25	10,25	5	3,5	3,5
1986	10,25	10,25	5	3,5	3,5
1987	10,25	10,25	5	3,5	3,5
1988	10,25	9,75	5,25	3,5	3,5
1989	10,25	9,75	4,75	3,75	3,75
1990	10,25	9,75	5	3,75	3,5

*This table represents the aggregated capabilities score with all indicators weighed equally. Scores range from 0 to 13 (on each of the 13 indicators, states can score 0 to 1 point).*




*Equally weighed indicators.*

### Aggregated capabilities: only economic, military, and political indicators

Year	United States	Soviet Union	China	France	United Kingdom
1979	4,375	4,5	1,625	2	2,5
1980	4,125	4,5	1,625	2	2,75
1981	4,125	4,5	1,625	2	2,75
1982	4,125	4,5	1,625	2	2,75
1983	4,25	4,5	1,75	2	2,5
1984	4,5	4,5	1,5	2	2,5
1985	4,5	4,5	1,5	2	2,5
1986	4,5	4,5	1,5	2	2,5
1987	4,5	4,5	1,5	2	2,5
1988	4,5	4	1,75	2,25	2,5
1989	4,5	4	1,25	2,5	2,75
1990	4,5	4	1,5	2,5	2,5

*This table represents the aggregated capabilities score, counting only the economic, military, and political indicators (equally). Scores range from 0 to 6.*



*Economic, military, and political indicators onl*

## Appendix C: Framing Results

### I. Framing results

The spreadsheet file containing all framing results is available at: <https://4126866blog.wordpress.com/>.

### II. Framing results: Groupings

FRAME	OCCURRENCE	ACTOR(S)	TIME PERIOD	PRO/CONTRA ACTION	PROCEDURAL /ASSESSMENT
Chinese aggression	3	Soviet Union	19/02/1979 - 16/03/1979	Contra	Assessment
Chinese hegemonism	3	Soviet Union	15/01/1979 - 16/03/1979	Contra	Assessment
Chinese lies	2	Soviet Union	01/01/1979 - 19/02/1979	Contra	Procedural
Comprehensive political settlement	6	United States + Soviet Union, P-5	29/09/1989 - 31/08/1990	Pro	Procedural
Conference	1	United States	16-3-1979	Pro	Procedural
Conflict settlement	1	Soviet Union	2-3-1989	Pro	Procedural
Cooperation	3	P-5	23/07/1990 - 31/08/1990	Pro	Procedural
Elections	5	P-5	18/01/1990 - 31/08/1990	Pro	Procedural
Follow the rules	3	United States, United Kingdom	01/01/1979 - 02/04/1982	Pro	Procedural

FRAME	OCCURRENCE	ACTOR(S)	TIME PERIOD	PRO/CONTRA ACTION	PROCEDURAL /ASSESSMENT
Guarantees	1	P-5	31-8-1990	Pro	Procedural
Human rights	3	United States, P-5	23/02/1979 - 31/08/1990	Pro	Procedural
Internal affairs	4	Soviet Union	01/01/1979 - 15/01/1979	Contra	Assessment
Justice	1	China	28-8-1988	Pro	Procedural
Lurking genocide	1	China	30-8-1979	Pro	Assessment
Military aid	1	Soviet Union + China	22-5-1989	Pro	Procedural
Neutrality	3	China, P-5	02-03-1983 - 31/08/1990	Pro	Procedural
Peace	3	P-5	18/01/1990 - 31/08/1990	Pro	Procedural
Political settlement	14	United States, China, Soviet Union, Soviet Union + China, Soviet Union + <i>others</i>	16/03/1979 - 22/05/1989	Pro	Procedural
Prevention	3	China, Soviet Union + China	10/02/1989 - 09/07/1990	Pro	Procedural
Puppet regime (Vietnam)	7	China	01/01/1979 - 28/08/1988	Pro	Assessment
Puppet regime (Pol Pot)	2	Soviet Union	01/01/1979 - 15/01/1979	Contra	Assessment
Recognition of revolutionaries	8	Soviet Union	01/01/1979 - 19/04/1979	Contra	Procedural
Refugees	5	China	20/06/1979 - 11/02/1986	Pro	Assessment

FRAME	OCCURRENCE	ACTOR(S)	TIME PERIOD	PRO/CONTRA ACTION	PROCEDURAL /ASSESSMENT
<b>Regional stability</b>	12	ALL	07/01/1979 - 13/03/1990	Pro	Assessment
<b>Renewed fighting</b>	1	France	10-11-1989	Pro	Assessment
<b>Security Council discord</b>	2	United States, United Kingdom	27/02/1979 - 16/03/1979	Pro	Procedural
<b>Sovereignty</b>	3	France, United Kingdom, P-5	12/01/1979 - 16/03/1990	Pro	Procedural
<b>Soviet guilt</b>	4	China, United Kingdom	01/01/1979 - 05/01/1980	Pro	Assessment
<b>Soviet lies</b>	5	China	01/01/1979 - 15/01/1979	Pro	Procedural
<b>Soviet social-imperialism</b>	7	China	01/01/1979 - 31/12/1979	Pro	Assessment
<b>Territorial integrity</b>	1	France	12-1-1979	Pro	Procedural
<b>Transition</b>	6	P-5	18/01/1990 - 31/08/1990	Pro	Procedural
<b>UN role</b>	5	China, P-5	01/01/1979 - 31/08/1990	Pro	Procedural
<b>Vietnamese aggression</b>	33	China	01/01/1979 - 09/07/1990	Pro	Assessment
<b>Vietnamese colonialism</b>	1	China	30-8-1979	Pro	Assessment
<b>Vietnamese defiance</b>	3	China	27/06/1980 - 09/07/1990	Pro	Procedural
<b>Vietnamese fascism</b>	2	China	01/01/1979 - 06/07/1979	Pro	Assessment
<b>Vietnamese gangster logic</b>	13	China	01/01/1979 - 12/02/1981	Pro	Procedural

<b>FRAME</b>	<b>OCCURRENCE</b>	<b>ACTOR(S)</b>	<b>TIME PERIOD</b>	<b>PRO/CONTRA ACTION</b>	<b>PROCEDURAL /ASSESSMENT</b>
<b>Vietnamese hegemonism</b>	9	China	01-01-1979 - 12/02/1981	Pro	Assessment
<b>Vietnamese invasion</b>	4	United States, China	13/01/1979 - 09/07/1990	Pro	Assessment
<b>Vietnamese social-imperialism</b>	3	China	06/07/1979 - 15/08/1979	Pro	Assessment
<b>Vietnamese-Soviet hegemonism</b>	4	China	15/01/1979 - 23/02/1979	Pro	Assessment
<b>Western imperialism</b>	1	Soviet Union	5-1-1980	Contra	Procedural
<b>Withdrawal</b>	1	P-5	18-1-1990	Pro	Procedural

### III. List of documents used for framing analysis

*These documents can be retrieved from the Dag Digital Library  
(<http://repository.un.org/handle/11176/8>)*

<b>Document code</b>	<b>Date</b>
S/PV.2108	1-1-1979
S/13007	7-1-1979
S/13022	11-1-1979
S/PV.2109	12-1-1979
S/PV.2110	13-1-1979
S/13030	15-1-1979
S/PV.2111	15-1-1979
S/PV.2112	15-1-1979
S/13086	15-2-1979
S/13099	19-2-1979
S/PV.2114	23-2-1979
S/13119	24-2-1979
S/PV.2115	24-2-1979
S/PV.2116	25-2-1979
S/PV.2117	27-2-1979
S/PV.2129	16-3-1979
S/13259	19-4-1979
S/13407	20-6-1979
S/13420	28-6-1979
S/13440	6-7-1979
S/13459	18-7-1979
S/13477	31-7-1979
S/13494	15-8-1979
S/13523	30-8-1979
S/13717	31-12-1979
S/PV.2186	5-1-1980
S/14029	27-6-1980

<b>Document code</b>	<b>Date</b>
S/PV.2347	2-4-1982
S/15286	12-7-1982
S/15633	2-3-1983
S/15687	6-4-1983
S/15963	8-9-1983
S/16970	20-2-1985
S/17023	12-3-1985
S/17816	11-2-1986
S/18099	25-5-1986
S/19918	2-6-1988
S/19985	5-7-1988
S/20159	28-8-1988
S/20297	28-11-1988
S/20459	10-2-1989
S/20498	2-3-1989
S/20649	22-5-1989
S/20868	29-9-1989
S/20880	3-10-1989
S/20958	10-11-1989
S/21087	18-1-1990
S/21149	15-2-1990
S/21187	13-3-1990
S/21196	16-3-1990
S/21318	29-5-1990
S/21388	9-7-1990
S/21404	23-7-1990
S/21689	31-8-1990