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| Support for democracy in Eastern European former communist countries |
| A cross-national research on the period of 1995-2014 |
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**Master’s thesis comparative politics
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**Abstract**

The fall of communism in Eastern Europe resulted in a considerable number of new developing democracies around the early 1990s. Citizens of these countries suddenly found themselves in a new political context to which they had to adjust. Over twenty years later, it has become apparent that some of these democracies have done better than others in terms of democratic, but also economic performance. Similarly, populations in Eastern European countries vary in their support for democracy, a factor which is often seen as essential for a well-functioning democracy. This thesis employs three different theories in order to find out which factors explain support for democracy. These theories involve democratic learning, governmental performance and socialisation. After examining potential explanations for support for democracy using a multilevel design in order to combine macro-level data with survey data, this research reveals three significant conclusions. The first conclusion is that support for democracy is not affected by the mechanism of cohort replacement. Young Eastern European generations simply do not have more support for democracy than older generations. The second is that economic governmental performance, as well as governmental performance as perceived by citizens, influences the support for democracy that these citizens have. This outcome indicates that people in Eastern Europe to a significant extent evaluate the merit of democracy by its output, rather than by its inherent merit. The third conclusion is that individuals who are more politically active have more support for democracy compared with people who are less politically active, suggesting that those who are more familiar with democratic institutions also have more support for democracy.

**Introduction**

In recent times, former Soviet countries have been important in world news on many occasions. The most recent is Russia’s involvement in Ukraine – first the annexation of Crimea, and then the war in eastern Ukraine. It should not be forgotten, however, that the unrest in this country started with a civil uprising, because citizens did not agree with president Yanukovych’s shift towards Russia, but wanted to see more westernisation and movement towards the more liberal European Union instead (BBC News, 2014). Ukraine’s population, because they demanded changes towards a more liberal state, set this entire chain of events in motion. Values, meaning judgment of what is important in life, lead to certain behaviour, resulting even in revolutions and change of regimes. The kind of values a person or the population of a country possesses no doubt influences their surroundings, with sometimes enormous consequences.

 The goal of this thesis is identifying which factors influence support for democracy on an individual level amongst populations in European post-communist countries. I consider this over roughly twenty years, from 1995 to 2014. This period of time is desirable for multiple reasons. First, a period of twenty years is a period in which real changes can reasonably occur. Also, the research is concerned with the effects after the end of communism and the start of democratisation. For most of the countries included in the research, 1995 is soon after this moment. Lastly, research also bids practicality, and the data that is necessary for the study is well available for this period of time.

 My priority in this thesis is placed upon explaining as much as possible of the dependent variable, using an array of different factors that are thought to have an effect on support for democracy. In this attempt I use the three main theories to aid me in answering this central research question:

*Which factors to which extent have influenced support for democracy on an individual level amongst populations in Eastern European former communist countries between 1995 and 2014?*

 Whilst the question itself is simple enough, answering it is less so. I have utilised three promising theories which have some overlap but also clear disputes. Beside these theories, I include a selection of control variables that could also plausibly affect the dependent variable. However, it is unrealistic to think that all factors which significantly influence support for democracy can be identified. I may uncover some important ones or, just as interestingly, disprove some that were expected to be of influence.

 The first theory, the democratic learning theory, considers democratic institutions and political participation. It states that more experience with democracy leads an individual to having more support for democracy (Rohrschneider, 1999; Marquart-Pyatt and Paxton, 2007). More *exposure to democratic institutions,* notably political participation (Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003), and more *education in a democratic state* lead to this increased support for democracy. This means that the amount of time that a country has been democratic is of importance. The longer it has been democratic, the more opportunity there has been for citizens to be exposed to democratic institutions and the more opportunity for education. Views and values held by an individual do actually change over that person’s life course as they are more exposed to democratic institutions and/or education in the new democracy. These changes occur slowly and gradually – meaning that they will happen only after a country has been democratic for quite some time.

 The next theory that is employed is what I have called the governmental performance theory. This theory’s most important claim is that better governmental performance, both objective performance as well as performance perceived by an individual, leads to more support for democracy (Finkel, Humphries and Opp, 2001; Mishler and Rose, 1997; Mishler and Rose, 2002). Objective governmental performance is likely to influence perceived performance and have a direct effect on democratic support itself (Magalhães, 2014; Kotzian, 2011). According to the governmental performance theory, a person may significantly change their views and values over their life course as well. However, in order for support for democracy to arise, individuals do not need to get used to the recently introduced democratic system. They rather have to see that that the new democratic system is beneficial because of its output. The governmental performance theory predicts that changes can occur much more rapidly after democratisation than the democratic learning theory claims.

 The third and final main theory used in this thesis is the socialisation theory, as introduced by Inglehart (2000; 2008). The first premise of this theory is contradictory with the one of the central claims of the democratic learning theory and the political performance theory: individuals do not significantly change their views, but maintain those views that they adopt during their *formative years* (ibid.). Change is made not over the life course of single individuals, but due to *cohort replacement*. Younger people, who lived their formative years in a democracy, are taught democratic values (Inglehart, 1977; 2000; Marquart-Pyatt and Paxton, 2007), while older generations maintain their less democratic views (Finkel, Humphries and Opp, 2001; Evans and Whitefield, 1995). New generations with more democratic views gradually replace the older generations, which will have held on to their old, less democratic views. After a substantial change in a society – like democratisation – support for democracy in that society will gradually change as well, because the new context produces different values for individuals in their formative years, and because older generations are slowly being replaced by new generations.

 The three main theories that are used in this thesis have originally either been used to find out if support for democracy is affected in the ways they predicted, or mainly used on value change itself, as is the case with the socialisation theory (Inglehart 2000; 2008). The three theories offer different explanations for support for democracy and so there are some contradictions present between the theories. This has to do with the question of whether individuals alter their support for democracy over time, after democratisation. The democratic learning theory and the political performance theory argue that individuals’ views can change considerably (Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003; Finkel, Humphries and Opp, 2001), while the socialisation theory states that they do not change significantly (Inglehart, 1977). Eventually, this disagreement between the two sides is reducible to the fundamental question of whether people ever really change. While the democratic learning theory and the political performance theory agree on that individuals can change their views and values, they disagree on the time frame in which this happens. Democratic learning should only occur after a reasonable amount of time, when citizens have gotten acquainted with democratic institutions (Marquart-Pyatt and Paxton, 2007). The key factor in the governmental performance theory to predict changes in support for democracy is not time, but both objective and perceived governmental performance. In such a way, changes can occur much more sudden.

 This research can shed some light on the contradiction. By taking two theories that give an explanation of how individuals change these values and one theory that explains how populations change values, even though individuals do not, I exhibit the clash that is present between the two sides. And by answering the central question it will also become clear which theory is most accurate in their claims.

 The manner in which I shall work towards answering the central question deserves some short remarks early on. In this research, I use cross-national data in order to come to findings based on statistical evidence. It is very much worth noting that some of the variables that are used are on the macro level, while others are on the micro level. Some of the independent variables are on the micro level and some of the independent variables are on the macro level, multilevel analysis has to come into play. The research will include all post-communist European countries – save for East Germany, as it is now part of the unified Germany.

 In the next chapter, I shall discuss the theoretical foundations of the research in a more lengthy fashion. This means considering the theories in full and deriving hypotheses from different aspects of those theories. Also, this is the part in which contradictions between the theories are discussed. This chapter should elucidate the theories, form hypotheses and implicitly introduce the variables that are to be operationalised in chapter three and tested in the fourth chapter.

 Chapter three is designed to take the theoretical basis that is worked out in the second chapter and convert the purely theoretical design into a researchable design. The variables will be operationalised in this chapter and specific methodological choices, such as case selection and the manner of testing, are to be explained. At the end of the chapter, the preconditions for building statistical models will be met.

 Which logically means that chapter four is the chapter in which those models are actually built. The end result of this will be fairly complex, so I run multiple, increasingly eleborate, models. After this the tests themselves are run and the results are examined. With these results, I can then maintain or discard my hypotheses and make meaningful statements on the effects.

 In the concluding chapter there will be attention for the results on a slightly higher level. Having tested my hypotheses already, I can address the question of what these results mean. That entails examining which of the three main theories hold after testing. Also, which causal directions are plausible, or even possible? Have any of the tests yielded surprising outcomes? What can these results tell us about the world and contribute to the base of scientific knowledge? And finally, what can it *not* tell us, that a study with a different research design perhaps could?

**Theoretical framework**

There have been various ways in which scholars have tried to explain support for democracy in new democracies. In order to try and find an explanation for democratic support in new democracies, I look at three different theories. The choice for using the following theories, besides the evidence in their favour, is that they all attempt to explain support for democracy in very different ways. Despite some similarities and overlap between the theories, they make claims that are not fully reconcilable with each other. The theory of democratic learning expects slow, gradual increase in democratic values in the life course of individuals (Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003). The governmental performance theory expects support for democracy to be most heavily influenced by governmental performance or perceptions of it – which can happen almost instantaneously (Finkel, Humphries and Opp, 2001). Finally, the socialisation theory predicts a gradual increase in democratic values in the population as a whole, through a mechanism involving cohort replacement (Inglehart and Wetzel, 2005). The incompatibility of these theories means that not all three can have it right in the cases of former communist Eastern European countries.

***The democratic learning theory***

The first of these theories is the democratic learning theory. The democratic learning theory makes the prediction that as a country has been a democracy for a longer period of time, its citizens’ support for democracy will increase (Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003). More particularly it claims that *individuals* become more in favour of democracy after democratisation of their country; they change their values gradually in the course of their lifetimes (Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003; Marquart-Pyatt and Paxton, 2007). Democratic learning occurs when citizens learn about what democracy is and what it can do in practice[[1]](#footnote-1). According to the theory, democratic learning occurs in two ways: in both a system-external[[2]](#footnote-2) and a system-internal manner, which are not mutually exclusive.

 The system-external way offers an explanation for democratic support predating the introduction of democracy, but the system-internal manner addresses increasing support for democracy after democratisation (Rohrschneider, 1999). Their approach holds that this increase is explained in terms of democratic institutions and the institutions of education (Marquart-Pyatt and Paxton, 2007) in the newly democratised country itself (Rohrschneider, 1999; Weil, 1993). *'Democratic institutions are in essence a set of arrangements for organising political competition, legitimating rulers and implementing rule'* (Luckham et al., 2000: 10). This involves the set of procedures which facilitate free elections (Martin, 1993; Luckham et al., 2000), and the rule of law (Luckham et al., 2000).

 Firstly, democratic values will increase if citizens gain experience in interacting with democratic institutions (Rohrschneider, 1999), such as voting procedures (Martin, 1993) and political rights. Secondly, education in a democracy leads to an increase in support for democracy (Marquart-Pyatt and Paxton, 2007) by creating a *‘“culture of democracy”’* (Acemoglu et al., 2005: 44); education is a way in which understanding of democracy is increased and democratic values are transferred. Exposure to democratic institutions influences how people’s values are shaped, making a country’s institutional framework a key element in shaping democratic values (Rohrschneider, 1999).

 The first thing to consider now is exposure to democratic institutions and education in general (Weil, 1993; Dalton et al., 2007; Acemoglu et al., 2005). What matters for all manners of exposure to institutions is the length of time that a country has been democratic. When a country has had a democratic system for a longer period of time, people living in that country will have lived in a democracy for more time. The longer a country has been democratic, the more support for democracy its population will hold, as there has been more opportunity for citizens to be exposed to democratic institutions (Rohrschneider, 1999; Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003; Marquart-Pyatt and Paxton, 2007). In other words: because a longer democratic period means more opportunity for exposure to democratic institutions, one expects to find that as an individual has lived in a democracy longer, their support for democracy will increase.

*H1:* *The longer an individual has lived in a democracy, the more support for democracy they will have.*

 Education is another manner in which people get exposure to democratic institutions. In a democracy the propagated values shall generally be consistent with democratic values (Marquart-Pyatt and Paxton, 2007), more than in a nondemocracy. An authoritarian regime has no motive for promoting and facilitating democratic education, while a democratic regime does. The resulting assumption is that this lack of motive will restrain authoritarian regimes for doing so, while democratic regimes do have this motive and therefore do promote and facilitate democratic values in education. For this reason individuals who enjoyed education after democratisation get more exposure to democratic values through the educational system (ibid.). This exposure to democratic values is why the theory predicts that education after democratisation leads to support for democracy.

*H2: The more education an individual has had after democratisation, the more support for democracy they will have.*

 In a democracy, citizens will be exposed to democratic institutions and interact with them. The more an individual interacts with these institutions, the more they will understand the institutions – through sheer experience (Weil, 1993; Dalton et al., 2007). Understanding the institutions of a democracy has two consequences. The first of these is that citizens will begin to see their inherent benefit (Dalton et al., 2007). At the very least democratic institutions function as a protection against tyranny; unwanted leaders can be voted out of their positions of power (Schumpeter, 1956). Because leaders can be voted out of power if they try to oppress their citizens, democratic institutions safeguard and promote freedom, liberties and equal treatment (ibid.; Dalton et al., 2007). Secondly, understanding the way institutions work increases the feeling that individuals can themselves have an impact on political decisions (Lee, 2006). Also, it increases the belief that citizens in general can have such an impact (ibid.). Because of those two reasons, individuals will see the benefits of democracy for themselves, which in turn leads to support for democracy. Political activity increases exposure to institutions and therefore leads to more understanding of democracy (Marquart-Pyatt and Paxton, 2007; Lee, 2006; Mishler and Rose, 1999; Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993). This understanding of democracy is what increases support for democracy and is why political activity leads to more support for democracy.

*H3: The more politically active an individual is, the more support for democracy they will have.*

 Not only exposure to democratic institutions and education matters, but also the quality of these institutions is important (Przeworski, 1991). Democratic institutions have to function properly in order to have a positive effect on democratic support. The explanation for support for democracy is that citizens learn about using democracy and its benefits through institutions (Rohrschneider, 1999; Weil, 1993; Przeworski, 1991; Marquart-Pyatt, 2007). If these institutions are defective and because of this do not improve this understanding, the influence of exposure to democratic institutions on support for democracy will be greatly diminished (Przeworski, 1991). Therefore, the quality of democratic institutions will positively influence the relationship between exposure to democratic institutions and support for democracy. This means that quality of democratic institutions should affect the effects described in the three previous hypotheses. Consequently, this interaction hypothesis consists of three parts.

*H4a: The higher the quality of democratic institutions in a country is, the stronger the relationship between the time that an individual has lived in a democracy and support for democracy will be.*

*H4b: The higher the quality of democratic institutions in a country is, the stronger the relationship between education after democratisation and support for democracy will be.*

*H4c: The higher the quality of democratic institutions in a country is, the stronger the relationship between political activity and support for democracy will be.*

 Important to keep in mind is that the democratic learning theory states that people significantly change their values after democratisation and after familiarisation with democratic institutions (Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003; Marquart-Pyatt and Paxton, 2007). Although it also tells us that these changes will occur rather slowly and gradually (Marquart-Pyatt and Paxton, 2007); individuals over time grow support for democracy after democratisation of their country, because of increasing exposure to democratic institutions.

***The governmental performance theory***

The second theory that offers an explanation for democratic support involves governmental performance, which is why I call it the governmental performance theory. This theory argues that citizens are more inclined to support the newly instated democratic system if the new government delivers good economic and political outcomes (Mishler and Rose, 2002; Finkel, Humphries and Opp, 2001; Kotzian, 2011; Magalhães, 2014; Camacho, 2014), even claiming that ‘*the regime’s performance on these dimensions is crucial in the development and solidification of support in emerging democracies*’ (Finkel, Humphries and Opp, 2001: 340).

 First, a clear distinction has to be made between objective governmental performance and perceived governmental performance, which are two different things. Objective governmental performance is the outcome a government produces, including both economic performance (Rose and Mishler, 1994) and non-economic performance (Evans and Whitefield, 1995; Norris, 1999), such as political rights and corruption levels (Bratton and Mattes, 2001; Camacho, 2014; Norris, 1999). Perceived governmental performance is how citizens think the government has performed, both economically and non-economically (Mishler and Rose, 1999; 1997).

 Objective governmental performance influences support for democracy in two ways. The first is a direct effect. Citizens will notice the effects of governmental performance themselves (Kotzian, 2011), even if they do not attribute them to governmental performance. People who are satisfied with the way things are going in their environment are less likely to be dissatisfied with the system that helped create or sustain that environment. Therefore, if a country’s government delivers good performance, that country’s citizens will have more support for democracy.

*H5: The higher objective governmental performance is, the more support for democracy individuals in this country will have.*

 The second way is not a direct effect of objective governmental performance on support for democracy, but works through perceived governmental performance. Perceived governmental performance is influenced by objective governmental performance (Finkel, Humphries and Opp, 2001; Mishler and Rose, 1997): citizens do actually notice good performance. Citizens who have lived in a socialist system are used to holding their government responsible for every aspect of their own welfare (Mishler and Rose, 1999), which makes them more likely to attribute economic performance to their government. This is the second mechanism through which the theory works. If individuals perceive a government as providing ample individual and collective goods – whether those are material or not – they will be more satisfied with this government. Because of their satisfaction with their government’s output they support democracy itself (Mishler and Rose, 1999; Hardin, 1982).

*H6: The better an individual perceives governmental performance to be, the more support for democracy they will have.*

 Even though the governmental performance theory at first glance may seem in ways similar to the democratic learning theory, they are in fact very different. The democratic learning theory states that contact with democratic institutions and having education in a democratic country will gradually increase the support for democracy an individual has. In contrast, the governmental performance theory argues that governmental performance and performance evaluation influence democratic support. Also, time is not an element in this theory. Change in democratic support occurs if governmental performance or perceived governmental performance changes and can happen much faster. There is an element of institutional performance present in the democratic learning theory, but this differs from the governmental performance theory. Good performance of democratic institutions is seen as having an influence on the relationship between exposure to democratic institutions and support for democracy. In the governmental performance theory there is a direct relationship between performance and support for democracy. For democratic learning, quality of democratic institutions is a prerequisite for the other effects to exist. If the quality of democratic institutions is low, the other effects will be low. The institutional side of governmental performance is theorised, in contrast, to affect support for democracy itself.

 How individuals perceive governmental performance is not yet explained in this mechanism. They look at collective and individual benefit they believe the system brings, both economic and political (Norris, 1999; Evans and Whitefield, 1995; Rose and Mishler, 1994). The income of citizens on an individual level should then also be of significant influence (Shafiq, 2009). If citizens attribute their own financial situation to the merit or faults of democracy, it stands to reason that they hold more support for democracy if they do well for themselves. A system in which an individual thrives should rationally be a system they support. So if a person’s household income is high in a democracy, this person should support democracy.

*H7: The higher the income of an individual’s household is, the more support for democracy they will have.*

 Looking only at financial well-being holds a great limitation. Individuals will not only look at their monetary situation when they assess their own well-being. For this reason it is also useful to look at the social position of citizens in their societies. Social classdoes contain an important economic aspect, but is not limited to it. It is also concerned with other, less tangible aspects of social life. What one should think of here is status, which Max Weber described as consisting of prestige and honour that is attributed by other individuals (Clark and Lipset, 2001).

 Also, individuals who have become fairly affluent, but grew up in a working-class environment, may still view themselves as working class. Similarly, those referring to themselves as middle or upper class may since have lost their wealth but not their class affiliation. Individuals who are satisfied with their social position in society are more likely to have support for democracy, through a mechanism that is similar to the one that makes income affect support for democracy. Their social position is one they can be satisfied with, and a democratic system is a system in which they have been able to achieve this. People who do not have a social position they are satisfied with, are less likely to be as positive towards democracy. So a person’s social position should positively affect their support for democracy.

 *H8:* *The better an individual’s social position is, the more support for democracy they will have.*

***The socialisation theory***

The last of the three theories is the socialisation theory, based on Inglehart’s (1977; 2000; 2008) work, in which he offers an explanation for value change in populations. His theory is founded upon two basic assumptions. The first of these, which Inglehart (1977) calls the *scarcity hypothesis*, is based on Maslow’s (1943; 1954) hierarchy of needs (see figure 1). This hierarchy of needs consists of five levels of needs, starting with the most basic one: physiological, safety, love and belonging, esteem and self-actualisation (Maslow, 1943; 1954).

**[Insert figure 1 about here]**

 A human being will always start by making sure the most basic needs are fulfilled. These are the goods which are necessary for survival: sustenance, clothing and shelter (ibid.). If a person’s physiological needs are fulfilled, they will no longer be required to devote all of their time to pursuing the most basic needs. Then they can move their focus to the next level, safety. The same goes for the rest of the levels: if someone’s needs of a specific level are fulfilled, this person will start focusing on the needs of a higher, less basic level. If an individual reaches the level of esteem, they will among other things start to prioritise independence and freedom, and one of the characteristics of the level of self-actualisation is a democratic attitude (Maslow, 1970). In short, people will give their attention to matters of freedom and democracy only in a situation where they have no direct worries regarding survival, safety or love and belonging (Maslow, 1954; Maslow, 1970; Inglehart, 1977; Knutson, 1972). In times of famine or war, people will make physiological needs and personal security their first and often only priority, leaving no attention for matters such as democracy.

 Equally important, Inglehart (1977; Inglehart and Wetzel, 2005) explains, is his *socialisation hypothesis*. For this part, the concept of *formative years* is of great importance. The notion of formative years holds that there is a period in a person’s youth in which they form their set of values – after this period this set is much less flexible (Inglehart 1971; 2000; 2008). These values, the theory argues, do not change much after those important formative years, but remain quite rigid (Inglehart, 1971; Inglehart, 2000; Inglehart 2008; Evans and Whitefield, 1995; Rokeach, 1968). It is not that values cannot change after a person reaches adulthood, but it is simply less likely to happen (Inglehart, 1977).

 The idea of formative years, taken together with Maslow’s (1943; 1954) hierarchy of needs, is the basis for Inglehart’s (1971) mechanism of cohort replacement. In a period of strife, people focus on the more basic needs in the hierarchy of needs (Maslow, 1954). In prosperity and safety, people have more attention for the less basic needs, such as freedom and democracy (Maslow, 1954; McLeod, 2007). There has not been a World War for many decades, but there are still many people around who were in their formative years in the time of the Second World War. Because these people formed their sets of values in a dangerous time when material goods and safety gained the highest priority, fewer of them will have attributed much worth to the level of esteem or especially that of self-actualisation (Inglehart, 1977). It seems probable that personal security in communist countries, also after the Second World War, would have been more of a priority to citizens. In these countries the rule of law was not always heeded (Thornburgh, 1990) and citizens would have to be careful with their own government. Individuals who lived their formative years under the communist regime are therefore also expected to be more focused on the more basic needs in Maslow’s (1954) hierarchy of needs than individuals who had their formative years after democratisation. Also, democratisation leads to an educational system that in general teaches children in their formative years democratic values (Marquart-Pyatt and Paxton, 2007) and no longer values that correspond with the old authoritarian regime. Education can function as a communication network in which individuals’ values get influenced (Inglehart, 1977). Individuals who were too young to have had these formative years before the country adopted a democratic system and are brought up in a democracy, are taught these democratic values from the start, whereas members of older generations have inherited the values of the system that preceded the democratic one (Dalton, 1994; Weil, 1996). This supports the prediction that having the formative years after democratisation leads to more support for democracy.

 The theory claims that while values of individual citizens do not change much, the values of populations do. Members of older birth cohorts die and they are gradually replaced by new birth cohorts. Such an occurrence of *cohort replacement* is the manner in which society’s values can change without individuals ever adjusting their personal values (Inglehart, 1977; 2000; 2008; Inglehart and Wetzel, 2005). *‘The continual emergence of new participants in the social process and the continual withdrawal of their predecessors compensate the society for limited individual flexibility’* (Ryder, 1965: 844). This leads to the first and most general prediction of the theory. As a country has been democratic for a longer period of time, its population’s support for democracy gradually increases. That is because young generations have more support for democracy than older generations, and young generations gradually replace old generations.

*H9:* *The longer a country has been democratic, the more support for democracy individuals in this country will have.*

 This in itself does not distinguish the theory from the democratic learning theory, seeing as the latter makes this same prediction. However, for the socialisation theory this should only work on a macro level, where the democratic learning theory considered it on a micro level. For this reason hypothesis 9 is a hypothesis with a macro-level independent variable. This makes for a theoretical distinction with hypothesis 1, which made a claim with the length of time an individual has lived in a democracy as its independent variable.

 As mentioned, the manner in which values in populations change, according to the socialisation theory, is because younger generations have had their formative years in a less insecure period of time – one of democracy – which leads to them having more support for democracy (Maslow, 1954; Maslow, 1970; Inglehart, 1977; Knutson, 1972). Also, education in a democratic system teaches democratic values to individuals in their formative years (Marquartt-Pyatt, 2007; Inglehart 1977). The resulting prediction is that individuals who were in their malleable formative years during or after their country democratised will have more support for democracy that those who have not spent any of their formative years in a democracy.

*H10: Individuals who lived in a democracy for a part of their formative years will have more support for democracy than those who have not.*

 Then through a process of cohort replacement the more democratic younger generations gradually replace the older, less democratic generations. However, if one should take a birth cohort – people within the population who were born in the same period of time – one should find that their support for democracy does not change much. Within a birth cohort, support for democracy should not even change after democratisation. This leads to the final hypothesis[[3]](#footnote-3):

*H11:* *Democratic support within birth cohorts does not significantly change over time.*

**Data and method**

This chapter shall first discuss the empirical data that is used for measuring the variables. Then the individual variables used in the models have to be operationalised. After that, other methodological choices will be elucidated and it will be briefly explained what sort of tests are to be done in the next chapter.

 The first choices that should be discussed at this point are those regarding country selection. The reason I want to focus on Eastern European former communist countries is, first and foremost, the very similar situations these countries had to deal with around the same time. When the Soviet Union was dissolved in December of 1991, its former member states were forced to make extensive changes to their political systems. Similarly, around the same time the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia comes to an end. Many of the newly independent states that were created when the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia disbanded took this opportunity to introduce a democratic system. All of these countries have gotten a similar impulse roughly around the same time: the end of a larger, federal communist system and newly attained independence. There are twenty-three countries that are included in the research, which are: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. All of these countries have experienced this same impulse and seemed like they were democratising. At least they are comparable because they all had this same change around the same time and were under communist rule for a considerable length of time. Because this research focuses on multiple periods of time, there are more than twenty-three observations, as table 1 will show.

 Because a considerable portion of the hypotheses contains micro-level variables, I use survey data. This data is taken from the waves of 1999-2001 and 2008-2010 of the European Values Study (GESIS, 2015) and the 1994-1998, 1999-2004, 2005-2009 and 2010-2014 waves of the World Values Survey (World Values Survey, 2015a). In these surveys, inhabitants of many countries were asked a set of opinion questions regarding all sorts of matters.

**[Insert table 1 about here]**

 Survey response rates can be found in table 1, which also shows survey data availability per country and survey wave. In the data that is used for this research, 84 surveys have taken place over six waves in twenty-three countries. Of 50 of those surveys the response rate was retrieved. With this data, it is difficult to make inferences, but a few comments can be made. First, the aim of at least getting a 70 percent response rate has often not been achieved. The average response rate is approximately 68,6 percent, so that is also just below that aim. Then, what stands out is that the response rates in Russia in the waves of 1999-2004 and 2005-2009 were very low. Especially the 10,2 percent in 1999-2004 is very odd – even more so if one compares it to Russia’s response rate in 1995-1998 of 74,9 percent. The survey notes report that in that deviant survey wave in Russia, 36,3 percent of the attempted interviews was unsuccessful because it was ‘impossible to enter the house / doorway’ (World Values Survey, 2015b). That does not mean that no one was home or that the intended interviewee refused to participate, as those individuals have been accounted for as well. Given the diverse manners in which response rates are recorded for each survey, it may well be that this Russian response rate is so low partly due to different coding rules. Alternatively, there may be an unknown factor drastically decreasing response to the survey. What is certain is that despite that very low response rate, the survey researchers did continue the interviews until they had over 2000 valid survey responses.

 Continuing until a satisfactory number of valid interviews was attained has been standard practice for all of the surveys. For the rest, although there are a few other low response rates, there seem to be no other very surprising irregularities. Finally, respondents were not interviewed at multiple moments in time; each time a survey was conducted, different individuals were questioned. Appendix 4 contains the full survey questions relevant to this research, which respondents were asked to answer.

 Combining data from both the European Values Study and World Values Survey datasets is not problematic; the survey questions I use are in fact exactly the same in both surveys. For this reason, data from both sources can be used without compatibility problems. This does not mean that every survey question was asked in every survey wave, or in every country. Some questions are missing in certain waves, just like some countries are missing in certain waves. Appendix 2 shows which questions were asked in which survey waves.

 Appendix 2 shows that the survey questions used in this research are present in most survey waves, but merely looking at whether the data is available is not enough. It is also important to consider response rates per variable and survey wave, in order to see if there is a high percentage of missing cases per variable, which could possibly skew the results. These numbers are displayed in appendix 3. As this table shows, the response rates are all quite high: almost all item-wave combinations have gotten a response percentage of 85-100 percent. The only combination that is notably lower is social class in the 2005-2009 wave, and this one still has a 77,9 percent response percentage, which is not very low. Besides, there is no reason to expect any underlying variable of impact causing this lower response, because this item received a response rate of around 95 percent in all three of the other waves in which it was present.

***Operationalisation***

The variables as they are formulated in the theoretical chapter are not yet prepared for testing. In this part, all variables will be made measurable. At the end of the chapter it will be clear how the variables are measured, how they are coded, and why it is done in this precise way.

 *Dependent variable: support for democracy*

The dependent variable, the phenomenon I attempt to explain in this research, is popular support for democracy. This variable is measured on the individual – or micro – level. The EVS and WVS both contain survey items that measure this. In measuring support for democracy, I use the survey question that asks respondents if they think a democratic political system ‘*is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing* [their] *country’* (World Values Survey, 2015a). This question directly asks respondents what they think about democratic rule in a very comprehensible way, making this a valid measurement of their support for democracy.

 There are four possible answers – apart from “don’t know” and missing scores; I have recoded the values for the item so that very bad is coded as ‘1’; fairly bad as ‘2’; fairly good as ‘3’; and very good as ‘4’. This variable will be treated as a continuous variable, in order to use linear mixed models. I am aware of the fact that this is not optimal, but the four possible values for the variable are formulated in such a way that makes it reasonable to treat them as though they are equally spaced from each other.

***Independent macro-level variables***

*Time since democratisation*

In order to measure time since democratisation, it first has to be apparent if and when a country became democratic. In order to measure democracy I employ the often-used Freedom House scores (Freedom House, 2014). This study has measured democratic quality in the factors of political rights and civil liberties. The average of these two scores indicates the level of democracy in a country at a certain moment. The difficult part in measuring this variable lies in the unclear practical demarcation of democracy. It is important to make a distinction between democracies on the one hand and non-democracies on the other. In doing so, I have chosen to use a most inclusive view of democracy. At any point in time, a country that Freedom House describes as either ‘free’ or ‘partly free’ will be seen as being democratic in that year. Free or partly free countries are the ones with a score of 1 to 5; not free are countries with an average score of 5,5 to 7. The number of years from the point in time that a country was continuously democratic until the moment of observation is the time since democratisation. That moment of observation is taken to be the median year of the survey wave. In the case of an even number of years in the wave, so where the median is not one year, the side with the largest number of respondents is taken as moment of observation. The values for this variable are displayed in appendix 5. Time since democratisation is a continuous variable.

*Objective political performance and quality of democratic institutions*

The measurement of political performance I use is the presence of democratic freedoms – in the form of political rights. This indicator was named by Finkel, Humphries and Opp (2001) as being a matter which is generally beneficial to all citizens and can therefore be used as non-economic indicator of good political performance. The same variable is used in order to measure quality of democratic institutions.

 The distinction between political performance and quality of democratic institutions is a subtle and arduous one. Objective political performance and quality of democratic institutions are both measured by presence of political rights. There is a distinction that can be made even if the two variables use the same measurement. The theory considering political performance, the governmental performance theory, predicts that political performance can influence support for democracy rather swiftly and, more importantly, directly. Objective political performance is entered as a direct effect, whereas quality of institutions is tested as an interaction effect on the other variables of the democratic learning theory. This being a cross-level effect is something to remain aware of, as makes the eventual model more complex. The more detailed practical side of this will be elaborated upon in the analysis chapter.

 Freedom House (2014) measures political rights on a seven-point scale for each country in every year – scores which I use for this variable. To make the outcomes easier to read, I have recoded the variable so ‘1’ indicates the lowest degree and ‘7’ the highest degree of political rights. These categories can be seen as roughly equally spaced, which is why this is treated as a continuous variable. Political rights are the element of democracy which corresponds with democratic freedom – the liberty to freely participate in political life. Their counterpart, civil liberties, entails more general freedoms – rights in general which the government cannot compromise.

*Objective economic performance: gross domestic product per capita*

Changes in gross domestic product (GDP) are more relevant than objective GDP. A government coming into office when the GDP per capita is very low cannot be expected to turn it all around in a short period of time. So, instead of comparing the GDP to other countries, it is more useful to compare the GDP to the GDP in the same country in previous years. Citizens will notice clear growth or decline in GDP, more directly than they will notice the country’s GDP compared to every other country. In order to measure a difference in GDP for meaningful periods of time, for each wave I take each country’s GDP per capita in the average year in which the values surveys were taken and detract the GDP per capita of five years earlier. This results in absolute growth numbers.

 Finally, I make these numbers relative. I am interested in the growth rate, rather than absolute growth numbers. With a growth rate of the same percentage, a rich country will have more absolute growth than a poor country. Conversely, with the same absolute GDP growth, the relative growth of a poor country will be much larger. For this reason, GDP growth is often displayed in a percentage of the country’s own past GDP, which is exactly what I shall do here. Using percentages means this is a continuous variable.

***Independent micro-level variables***

*Political activity*

For measuring political participation, I use survey questions which ask the respondent about their position regarding: (a) signing a petition; (b) boycotts; (c) lawful demonstrations; and (d) unofficial strikes. The reason for taking this measurement of political participation is the active element in it. What these survey questions show, is which people are concerned enough with their political environment that they are prepared to engage in it. Possible answers – apart from “don’t know” or other missing scores – are (1) would never do; (2) might do; and (3) have done.

 The political activity variables, four items in total, score a 0,776 on Cronbach’s α. This really is a high score, which means that there is a good fit; the variables measure roughly the same phenomenon (Field, 2009). Because these measures fit so well together, I can now justifiably merge these four measurements into one variable. This also means the interaction effect that will be needed for political participation will not need as much as eight entries, but just two. After taking an average of the four items, the scale still goes from 1 to 3. The intervals are now 0,25 instead of the former intervals of 1, but there are eight different values – I treat the variable as continuous whilst assuming that the spacing between values is roughly equal.

 These manners of active political participation are all forms of “protest participation”, but this is political participation nonetheless. Individuals who have participated in these activities and those who might do so are likely to be more alike to each other than to those who would not do so. Unconventional political participation depends on external events to occur: an individual will only engage in protest activity if there is something they strongly disagree with (Marsh and Kaase, 1979). If this individual is not dissatisfied, they have no reason to protest. But, that does not mean that they *would not* protest, if they found that they strongly disagreed with political decisions. The reason that the people who might protest have not in fact protested is often a factor which is external to themselves. If their government had done unacceptable things, these people would be part of the group who answered that they have participated in these forms of protest. These more active forms of political participation are not the same as conventional political activity such as voting, which occurs *‘regularly and predictably’* (ibid.: 59). However, research has indicated that demonstrating positively correlates with participation in electoral politics (Saunders, 2014). The people who participate in political protest are in fact the people who participate more in politics in general.

*Years of education after democratisation*

This variable is measured by using the year of birth of the respondent, the age at which they finished their education, the moment of democratisation and the year in which the survey was conducted. Once again, the values represent an amount of years, and this is on a continuous scale. The age at which children usually begin their primary education is around age six. This starting age shall be assumed for all respondents.

 With this information it is possible to calculate how long the interval is between the start of the respondent’s education and the moment they finished it. The number of years a respondent has had after their country democratised can be calculated as follows: *survey year* – *age of respondent* + *age at which respondent finished education* – *age at which respondent started democratic education = number of years of education after democratisation*. If respondents have not yet finished their education, the year in which the survey is taken is used instead. If the year in which the respondent started their education is before the year of democratisation, the year of democratisation is used as the age at which democratic education was started.

 An assumption that has to be made is that people start their education as children and then continuously enjoy education, until they cease to do so and try to find work. This supposes that people do not pause their education at some point and that they do not start an education after they have started their professional lives – which of course is not always so. Because of this simplification, individuals who have had only a few years of education, with long intervals between them, are seen as having been in the educational system for all of those years. This means that in reality some of the people have had fewer years of education in a democracy than measured. In theory, that should mean that the effect on support for democracy is slightly weakened in the tests. In any case, it does not enhance the effect, meaning that it could only lead to a type II error and not to a type I error.

*Income*

For this research, income is also measured on a micro level. There are some comments to be made here, as the variable is not as straightforward as it may appear to be; because this variable is based on survey data, it is not a fully objective measure of income.

 With the survey question I use, respondents were asked to categorise themselves into one of ten relative income scales. It is a relative classification they had to make. Respondents did not state their income itself, but they were shown a card on which were ten income ranges. These ranges each represented ten percent of the country’s population, sorted by income. Then, the respondents only had to point at the range in which their own household was situated. This variable is coded from ‘1’, being the lowest ten percent, to the highest ten percent, coded as ‘10’. There are ten categories and the spacing between categories is equal – considering the fact that each category includes ten percent of the population – so this is entered into the models as a continuous variable.

 Having respondents compare themselves to their fellow citizens gives one insight regarding how well they are doing in the current system compared to how well others thrive in that system. This survey question is an indicator of the importance of micro distribution of economic wealth as opposed to economic wealth on a national level.

*Social class*

Besides just financial well-being, I look at social class. Social class includes an economic component, but it is more than that. Max Weber has argued that status, which is honor or prestige which individuals can receive, is even more important than economic gain (Clark and Lipset, 2001). There is a survey question in the European Values Study and World Values Survey that asked respondents to categorise themselves into one of five social classes. This question is used for measuring this variable. After recoding the five classes are: (5) lower class; (4) working class; (3) lower-middle class; (2) upper-middle class and (1) upper class. This variable has five categories with intervals between each category which cannot be expected to all be approximately equal in distance. For this reason it has to be regarded as a categorical variable – and the ‘lower class’ group shall be taken as reference category.

*Perceived governmental performance*

Confidence in the government is an indication of how people think the government has performed in the past and will perform in the future. One would not have confidence in a government they perceive as having performed poorly in the past. Confidence is earned – whether this confidence or someone’s perception of governmental performance is justified does not matter for this variable. For these reasons, confidence in the national government can be used as an indicator of perceived governmental performance.

 There is a survey question which directly asks how much confidence the respondent has in the national government*,* with four possible answers. I have recoded the answers into four possible answers – (3) ‘not very much’, (2) ‘quite a lot’ and (1) ‘a great deal’. I use the fourth category, (4) ‘none’, as reference group. This is the group I compare the rest of the groups with – making the variable of perceived governmental performance a categorical variable.

*Formative years in democracy*

In this research, there is a variable regarding individuals’ formative years. This variable is concerned with whether an individual spent at least part of their formative years in a democratic country. With information on a respondent’s year of birth, which is available in the used survey data, and the information of which year it was that a country democratised, which I have already introduced in this chapter, it is possible to calculate this. The final element needed is to set an age at which formative years are supposed to end. Inglehart is not very clear on his own operationalisation of the concept himself. What could be found is that '*[f]ifteen or 20 years after an era of prosperity began, the birth cohorts that had spent their formative years in prosperity would begin to enter the electorate'* (Inglehart, 2008: 132). Following this demarcation, avoiding an arbitrary discussion with arguments based on few facts, I have chosen to use the end age of twenty. It is not relevant what the starting age of those formative years is. If one took the age of fifteen as starting age, the results would be the same as those for a starting age of zero. This is because the youngest respondent in the dataset is fifteen at the time of interviewing; so for both measurements this person would be included the ‘yes’ group. For this reason I can treat the variable as if one’s formative years span from the age of zero to the age of twenty.

 From here on obtaining the variable correctly is not too complex. Those who had already passed the age of twenty at the moment that their country democratised, have not spent any part of their formative years in a democracy. Not having spent part of one’s formative years in democracy is to be the reference category for this dummy variable, so it is coded with the value ‘1’. Those who had not passed twenty at that moment *did* spend some of their formative years in democracy and are coded as ‘0’.

*Overview of dependent and independent variables*

Table 2 contains descriptive statistics for the dependent and all independent variables: the number of valid cases, mean, standard deviation, and the minimum and maximum value. Support for democracy means by country and survey wave can be found in appendix 6.

**[Insert table 2 about here]**

This data is quite self-explanatory, but there are a few remarks to be made. First, the variables income and social class have a small N. Out of a total of 113191 possible observations, these variables have respectively 71135 and 56745 observations. Using a multilevel model has multiple advantages, one of which is being able to deal with missing data on one variable without having to discard all the data for the respondent. This is why this smaller N is probably not very problematic. Still, in order to be thorough, this will be examined in a robustness check later on.

 The means and scales of the variables are divergent. This is best exemplified by looking at the dummy variable formative years in democracy and the continuous variable relative GDP growth per capita. What is visible by inspecting the scales is that the maximum amount of time between democratisation and the moment of observation is 29 years. This is an adequate amount of time in which delayed effects should have taken place, if they take place at all.

***Control variables***

*Post-materialism*

Inglehart used his socialisation theory in order to explain value change within populations (Inglehart, 2000; 2008). Originally, he applied it to increasing post-materialist values and demonstrated that cohort replacement is the mechanism which facilitates the increase of post-materialist values in societies. The concept of post-materialism includes appreciation for things such as democracy and expression (Inglehart, 1971). This means individuals who are seen as having strong post-materialist values should also display a great deal of democratic support. The possible values for this variable are (1) post-materialist (2) mixed and (3) materialist. This variable is a categorical one. As the expectation would be that post-materialism increases, the default position is materialist. For this reason, the reference category is to be (3) ‘materialist’.

*Age*

In both the democratic learning theory and the socialisation theory, it is expected that younger generations will have more support for democracy than the older generations who have experienced the previous, non-democratic system. What should be accounted for, however, is the possibility that people simply lose their support for democracy as they get older. Neither of the two theories expects age itself to play a role of importance in explaining support for democracy, but it is rather the period of time in which one is born that matters. Nonetheless, adding age as a control variable may demonstrate an overall effect of age. Age is measured in years and therefore is a continuous variable.

*Sex*

Human thought and behaviour is very much influenced by our biological nature, and there is a clear biological difference between men and women. Sex is a variable that has been shown to be of consequence in explaining value differences (Schwartz and Rubel, 2005). Controlling for sex in a study on democratic values for this reason is simply a logical step. Because this information was filled out by the interviewer conducting the survey, the variable concerns sex, not gender. Therefore, a simple distinction between male and female was made. This being a dummy variable, I have coded male as reference category ‘2’ and female as ‘1’.

*Religiosity*

Religiosity is a variable that very concerned with values as well. A function of all holy scriptures is to act as a set of instructions that teach people how to live, what to believe and how to think. Having such a fixed set of rules or guidelines could be of great influence on individuals’ democratic values. The precise manner in which religion matters for support for democracy is unclear, but this variable is of course only included as control variable, which means the precise mechanism behind such an effect should not be in focus here. Three forms of religiosity are belonging, believing and behaving (Layman and Green, 1998). Of these three, I include a measurement of believing in the model. Belonging to a religious denomination does not necessarily coincide with one’s beliefs, and neither does the frequency of going to church or praying. Measuring belief will be done in the most basic manner: does the respondent believe in God, (0) no or (1) yes? The latter will be the reference group. This simple dummy variable has caught a most fundamental aspect of the difference in belief between religious and non-religious people.

***Method***

As mentioned before, this research has a multilevel design. The dependent variable, support for democracy, is a micro-level variable. In the end, I am examining which factors influence *individuals’* propensity to have support for democracy. But, the basic set-up of this study is likely much improved by acknowledging the possibility that micro-level variables are nested within a higher-level variable. Macro-level variables cannot be nested within this variable, as they are not on the first level – which the micro-level variables are. Having a nested, or multilevel, model means that the average support for democracy varies between groups and also that effects that micro-level predictors have on the dependent variable may vary between groups.

 Because the data in this research is taken both at different moments and in different countries, this second-level variable in which the individual-level predictors will be nested is country-wave combinations. This variable, also called the identifier, holds the combination of every country with every survey wave. Besides this identifier, there are some macro-level variables present in the models as well: time since democratisation, political rights and relative GDP growth per capita. The next chapter features the part in which this structure will be discussed at length, whilst constructing the multilevel model.

**Analysis**

Having first introduced the variables and relationships between variables in the theoretical chapter, and measured and operationalised these variables in the previous chapter, this is the part in which all the tests are to be run. The variables are all ready to be put to the test, but I think for the purpose of clarity, some things are best briefly repeated here.

 The dependent variable is taken to be a continuous one and the independent variables contain both continuous and categorical variables. This, in combination with the multilevel character of the research, results in a linear mixed model. In order to construct a good model, I follow what is considered good practice in building a multilevel model by starting simple and building a model by step by step increasing complexity. I shall do this by first drafting a model only containing micro-level independent variables, then adding micro-level control variables and then carefully introducing macro-level variables. This last group holds much fewer observations: there are 23 countries in the study, with a total of 84 observations. For this reason, it should be checked whether including all macro-level variables simultaneously can be done without drastically impairing the strength of the model.

*Building the model: one level versus two levels*

As I mentioned above, I work towards a full multilevel linear model with interaction effect in steps in order to keep things clear and organised. The first step is setting up a multilevel null model. Such a model does not consider independent variables, but just displays the population mean and variance. The equation of this null model is:

 *Yij = γ00 + u0j + eij*

 In this equation, *γ00* represents the grand mean, the mean of the entire population. The other two terms in the equation are variances. *uoj* is the group variance, or in other words: the variance of groups from the grand mean. In this study those groups are country-wave combinations, so it is the variance of particular countries in a particular survey wave from the grand mean. This is sometimes also called variance *between groups*. *eij*is the variance of individuals within those country-wave combinations, or variance *within groups*. A one-level model only accounts for variance of individuals from the grand mean.

 The first thing to do is estimating the null model and testing whether adding the between-group variance improves the model. This is done by adding a random intercept. Random simply means it differs between groups; intercept just means the starting value of the dependent variable. Thus, having a random intercept means that the value of the dependent variable, if the values for the predictors are zero, varies between groups. In a one-level model this intercept is fixed, meaning that before adding independent variables, the starting point of the dependent variable is the same for every group.

 Running the null model reveals that the group variance (*u0j*) is 0,049640 and individual variance (*eij*) is 0,513072. The test for determining whether a multilevel approach is even needed is the same test that is used for testing the significance of the proportion of variance explained by the groups. This proportion of variance is easily calculated by doing:

 $\frac{u0j}{uoj+eij}=\frac{0,049640}{0,049640+0,513072}=0,088215…$

 When a random intercept is added and the model has become a nested model, one can compare the log-likelihood value of this model with that of the null model with a fixed intercept. With the resulting χ2 change, together with the change in degrees of freedom, the p-value is then obtained.

 With a χ2 change of 9115,32 and change in degrees of freedom of 1 – only one parameter was added – the p-value approaches 0 so closely that there should be no doubt that the random intercept is highly significant. This value is below our α, set at a conventional 0,05. This means that country-wave combinations vary from each other in their overall support for democracy. Using a multilevel model is significantly better than just using a one-level model. Country-wave combinations vary from each other in their overall support for democracy and thus a multilevel model shall be used. It also shows that the proportion of the variance attributed to group variance, of approximately 8,8 percent, is significant.

*Running different models*

The multilevel null model has been tested and found significant. The next step is adding independent variables to the model. I will first add micro-level predictors. To start with, these will all be included as fixed factors, which means assuming that the strength of the effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable is equal for each country in each year. Such a model is called a random intercepts model. In later models, this will be adjusted, but for the sake of gradually creating complexity in the model it is desirable to start with fixed effects only. Also, for the most part, the hypotheses that are to be tested in this thesis do not call for random effects.

 After running the first model that contains predictors, the model can be expanded. The first expansion is adding control variables. These are all micro-level variables, and every variable will still be included as having a fixed effect only. So this second model is very similar to the first model; the only difference is that it contains control variables.

 The third step is adding macro-level variables. This is something one ought to be careful with. The reason for that is that macro-level variables have much fewer cases to build upon. The number of countries in my research is twenty-three, but this is not the identifier of the second level. Country-wave combination is the variable in which the micro-level data is nested, which means there is a maximum of no less than 138 observations on which these models can be built. The macro-level variable of time since democratisation is one that has no missing data. GDP growth has 128 valid observations and political rights 132 observations out of the 138 possible observations. Because of the relatively high number of macro-level observations and good availability of this data, it is not problematic to include all three of these variables. I have confirmed this by checking whether any combination of macro-level variables has a very deviant impact on the micro-level variables, or if they affect each other, but this is not the case.

 Up to the third model, all effects have been included as fixed effects only. Only the intercept has had a random term. This means testing for certain effects, while assuming that the strength of these effects are equal for each group – in this research, for each country-wave combination. The starting point – when the value of the predictor is zero – may vary from country to country, but the slope of every regression line is the same. For most variables this is no problem, as I do not have a corresponding hypothesis testing whether the effect slope varies. However, the effects of the micro-level predictors involved in the cross-level interaction effect which is present in the democratic learning theory do need to be tested for random slopes. There are three micro-level variables whose effects are hypothesised to be affected by the quality of institutions – here measured by taking political rights. Those micro-level variables are the time lived in a democracy, political activity and years of democratic education. First, it has to be checked whether these three variables have significant random effects on support for democracy. If not, the effect does not vary between country-wave combinations and there is no variance to be explained by an interaction effect. Using the same test I used to demonstrate the significance of a random intercept, it turns out that political activity and years of democratic education have significant random terms, while time lived in a democracy does not. This means that only the two variables will be entered as having random effects.

 The fifth and last model is the one in which the two interaction effects of political rights will be included. All the elements that are necessary for these interactions were already present in the previous model, so the only practical difference is entering the interactions themselves.

 After running these models, in order to find out whether support for democracy within birth cohorts change over time, there is another test that has to be done. That is the test examining change in support for democracy over time within birth cohorts. In order to do this test, I first take four birth cohorts, each spanning fifteen years, and plot their support for democracy over the six moments of measurement – the survey waves. This is visible in figure 3 and table 5. The birth cohorts themselves are divided into groups of people who were born in 1930-1944, 1945-1959, 1960-1974 and 1975-1989. The cohorts before and after these four consist of much fewer respondents, which is why I chose to only use these cohorts. Then I want to find out if the means of support for democracy in one cohort vary significantly over different points in time. This is done for all four birth cohorts separately, using ANOVA in order to see if any of the means of support for democracy at one moment of measurement are significantly different from any of the means at another moment of measurement.

 *Analysing the output*

The previous section should have made clear how the models are built and what is done in every model. Table 3, containing the output gained from these models, is also quite plain about which elements are present in which model, but how and why the models are constructed as has been done would otherwise have been clear. Table 4 holds some accompanying information which further clarifies the contents of table 3. Now, having run the multilevel models, I can interpret their results. I shall do this following the hypotheses: one by one, all hypotheses will be examined and based on the results in table 3 they will be either kept or discarded.

**[Insert table 3 and table 4 about here]**

 The first hypothesis is: *the longer an individual has lived in a democracy, the more support for democracy they will have.* In none of the five models does this effect have a p-value lower than an α of 0,05, which means that there is no significant statistical effect between the length of time of time an individual has lived in a democracy and their support for democracy. What is more, in the previous section I have even checked for any differences between country-wave combinations and these were also not significant. This means that there are no reasons to retain this hypothesis and therefore it must be rejected.

 Hypothesis 2 was formulated as: *the more politically active an individual is, the more support for democracy they will have.* The first four models are very clear on this effect: it is present and it is a highly significant one. The most elaborate and complex of these models, the fourth, is the one that contains and controls for the most elements, except for interactions. Therefore, this model should be more accurate than the previous three. Significance in the fifth model has suddenly disappeared, but this is not a surprising nor a confusing find. This is the model in which an interaction effect has been added, containing this variable. That interaction effect is highly significant, so it was to be expected that this would interfere with the significance of the direct effect in the model. This does not negate the direct effect of political activity. The estimate of the effect of political activity is very similar in the other four models. The most elaborate of these, the fourth model, shows an estimate of 0,120417. This means that the average difference between individuals who have participated in all four of the political activities and those who would never do any of them is 0,240834 point on the scale of support for democracy. This is a lot, given that the standard deviation of support for democracy is 0,7519. The effect between political activity and support for democracy is clearly to be called a strong positive effect. A positive effect is exactly what the hypothesis predicted, so this is a hypothesis that can be kept.

 The last of the direct effects that the democratic learning predicted was that of years of democratic education on support for democracy. The corresponding hypothesis looked like this: *the more education an individual has had after democratisation, the more support for democracy they will have.* In none of the models does the positive fixed effect of democratic education on support for democracy show to be statistically significant. However, the random effect did do so. This means that this predictor does not work in the same way in every country-wave combination. There are significant variances between groups, but if groups are disregarded this effect is not significant. This makes it difficult to either keep or reject this hypothesis. The significant random effect shows that the hypothesis may apply to some groups, and for this reason should not be hastily rejected. How the groups vary is not known, however. It may be that in some countries the variable has a negative effect instead of the predicted positive effect. The hypothesis cannot be refuted for every country, but there is no significant effect on the entire population of cases, which is why I will not keep the hypothesis.

 The fourth hypothesis concerns the interaction effect of quality of democratic institutions. It was split up into three sub-hypotheses: *the higher the quality of democratic institutions in a country is, the stronger the relationship between the time that an individual has lived in a democracy and support for democracy will be; the higher the quality of democratic institutions in a country is, the stronger the relationship between education after democratisation and support for democracy will be;* and *the higher the quality of democratic institutions in a country is, the stronger the relationship between political activity and support for democracy will be.* These interaction effects consist of political rights interacting with the three independent variables seen in the first three hypotheses: time lived in democracy, political activity and years of democratic education. The last of these showed no significant random effect, so this interaction did not have to be tested. The other two are included in the fifth model. Of these, only the interaction with political activity is statistically significant. This indicates that the only form of exposure whose effect is affected by the quality of democratic institutions is political activity and that only the third sub-hypothesis can be kept. The other two have to be rejected.

 Proceeding to the next hypothesis and with this to the governmental performance theory, hypothesis number five was phrased as follows: *the higher objective governmental performance has been, the more support for democracy individuals in this country will have.* Objective governmental performance consists of both economic performance and political performance. The former is measured by GDP growth per capita in percentages in the previous five years; the latter by political rights, which was in this hypothesis predicted to have a direct effect. The effect of GDP growth, with estimates between 0,002645 and 0,003315, seems small at first, although it is highly significant. A closer look reveals that the highest recorded positive growth rate in the data is approximately 373,7 percent and the highest negative growth rate is –48,97 percent. This is a difference of 422,67 percent at its outer values. More importantly, GDP growth per capita of over 100 percent is not uncommon in the data. That means that this variable has a strong positive effect on support for democracy. In contrast, political rights by themselves do not have a significant direct effect on the dependent variable in every model. In the model containing all the independent variables and control variables, political rights show no significance. Only when the interaction effects are added does this predictor become statistically significant. What follows is the situation that the economic part of the variable is in favour of keeping the hypothesis and the direct effect of political rights is not significant. Because a certain part of governmental performance – economic performance that is – does affect support for democracy, the hypothesis can be retained.

Hypothesis six is that of perceived governmental performance: *the better an individual perceives governmental performance to be, the more support for democracy they will have.* This is the first categorical variable to be analysed, measured by confidence in government in four categories. The results of all models are once again very similar, which is good in terms of robustness. Besides being similar to each other, the estimates are also high and highly significant. One thing that stands out is the clear increasing support for democracy as one proceeds to categories of higher confidence in the government. This means that support for democracy increases as support in government increases. The effect is also strong; the difference in support for democracy between individuals who have no confidence in the government and those who have a great deal of confidence is about 0,236. This sort of correlation is exactly what the hypothesis predicted and therefore hypothesis six will be kept.

 Moving on from collective governmental performance to the impact on people’s own positions, the seventh hypothesis made a prediction about household income: *the higher the income of an individual’s household is, the more support for democracy they will have.* Looking at the models’ output, there appears to be a connection between the two variables. The relationship is significant in all models except for model number five, the interaction model. It is a somewhat weak connection, as household income had a scale of ten categories and the estimate of the effect is roughly 0,0048. An estimated difference in support for democracy of 0,048 between the lowest and highest category is not a strong effect. Also, the effect is only significant with an α of 0,05. However, the effect is indeed significant, which means that this hypothesis is maintained.

 Hypothesis number eight is somewhat related to the previous one, as social class contains some element of income. The hypothesis itself looks like this: *the better an individual’s social position is, the more support for democracy they will have.* The results are indeed largely significant and positive, as this hypothesis predicted. Moreover, they are very robust: they do not change much in any new model. The upper middle class, lower middle class and working class all have significantly more support for democracy than the lower class. The estimates for these four classes are also ascending like predicted: the higher the class, the more support for democracy. However, the one notable exception is the upper class, which does not significantly deviate from the lower class in their support for democracy, as is visible in figure 2. Because of the fact that the upper class is not behaving as predicted, the original hypothesis must be rejected. An important remark that has to accompany this rejection is that the other classes do in fact all behave in accordance with the theory and the hypothesis. The effect is present for all but the upper class.

**[Insert figure 2 about here]**

 Now only the third and final theory is left: the socialisation theory. Its first hypothesis, and the ninth of this thesis, was: *the longer a country has been democratic, the more support for democracy individuals in this country will have.* Time since democratisation is the name of this variable in the output of table 3, and in none of the three models in which it was included is there statistical significance. What follows is that citizens do not become more and more democratic as their country has had a democratic system for a longer period of time and that the hypothesis can be rejected.

 Hypothesis ten is the last hypothesis that was tested with the multilevel model. It was phrased as: *individuals who have had at least one of their formative years in a democracy will have more support for democracy than those who have not.* The effect of the variable is not statistically significant when only micro-level predictors are used in the model, but after including control variables in the second model, it is well significant – and it remains this way in every subsequent model. Accompanying this significance is something quite strange. The effect, which was hypothesised to be positive, is instead a negative one. The practical meaning of this is that individuals who have spent part of their formative years in a democracy are actually less supportive of democracy than those whose formative years had already passed by the time of democratisation. The hypothesis has to be discarded as it even seems that the opposite of it is true.

 The eleventh hypothesis is a bit different from the other ten: *democratic support within birth cohorts does not significantly change over time.* The previous hypotheses predicted a positive effect on the dependent variable and in one case a positive effect on another effect. This hypothesis, however, predicts that there is no effect at all. Time should not have a significant influence on support for democracy within birth cohorts, according to this hypothesis. Birth cohorts means over different waves are visualised in figure 3 and also displayed in table 5. With an ANOVA this can be tested, testing all four cohorts, one at a time. The outcome of these four separate tests I have not put in a table, as the results are the same for every test: Levene’s statistic and Welch’s test both have values approaching 0,000 in every case. The significance of Levene’s statistic means that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was violated and calls for the use of Welch’s test. The significance of Welch’s test in turn signifies that at least one of the tested means significantly deviates from at least one other mean. In other words, support for democracy over time within a birth cohort does vary. Because the same results were found for every tested birth cohort, this is true for all cohorts. Consequently, the hypothesis is to be rejected.

**[Insert figure 3 and table 5 about here]**

*Multicollinearity and robustness*

Multicollinearity can be a problem for mixed models, so this is an aspect that I have examined before proceeding with other tests and analysis. What I found is perhaps not surprising. The variables that measured the years since democratisation, years of democratic education and years lived in a democracy all have high multicollinearity scores, which are the tolerance and VIF. Because these three variables are all calculated using largely the same elements, this was to be expected. The variable of formative years in democracy does not display potentially problematic tolerance and VIF scores, even if a continuous scale for number of formative years would be taken.

 Now, the other three variables do show multicollinearity, but this does not necessarily mean they are not usable. Multicollinearity can be problematic because it can affect the outcome of the models. Small changes may then alter the outcomes quite strongly, which is not good for the robustness of the model. Therefore, this is something I had to check before proceeding with the analysis. It turned out that the multicollinearity did not make the model unstable. Different combinations of systematically including and excluding the multicollinear variables did not much change the estimates or standard errors of any of the variables, and did not have an impact on which variables came out significant. This means that the variables can be kept in the model.

 For the variable of age I have performed the same test. Not because of high multicollinearity scores – which were not present – but because of a theoretical overlap with other variables. Years of democratic education, years lived in a democracy and formative years in democracy all contain an element of age. This did not lead to multicollinearity and omitting or including the variable age does not have much impact on the estimates, standard errors or significance of other variables. After performing these checks, it is safe to assume that the variable of age is not a problematic one to include in the models.

 One robustness check is focused on dealing with a theoretical difficulty in the design of the research. The micro-level variables of years lived in a democracy, years of democratic education and formative years in democracy are all in some way derived from the macro-level variable of time since democratisation. This variable takes note of the moment of democratisation of a country, but does not factor in the quality of the country’s democracy, nor does it account for a possible relapse to authoritarianism. Maintaining a very inclusive view of democracy was a deliberate choice. However, not accounting for the quality of democracy at all would create a weak spot in the entire research. For this reason, I have done two separate and quite different robustness checks, which can be found in appendix 7. The manner of measuring democracy has been explained the operationalisation of the variable of time since democratisation. I use the same Freedom House score (Freedom House, 2014) averages, and do not have to alter them. The scale goes from the most free countries (1) to countries which are definitely not free (7).

 The first robustness test, model 6, is very similar to model 4, which included all variables but no interaction effects. The difference is that the new model only includes countries which are coded as democratic at the moment of measurement. This means that countries that have relapsed to authoritarianism are no longer counted among democracies. The only noteworthy change in the outcome is that the effect of household income then loses its significance. In reality the p-value of this effect shifts from 0,048 to 0,054, so this is in fact not a radical change at all.

 The second manner in which I checked the robustness of the model was using model 4 again, but now adding the variable of democracy as a direct predictor and in an interaction with time since democratisation. This model does not differ from the model that was used in the analysis section in any noteworthy way. There is no variable that is made statistically significant or whose significance is removed by the additions and both the direct effect of democracy and the interaction effect are not significant themselves. Only including the democracy variable without the interaction does not produce any different results. Doing these robustness checks in two ways made clear that it is not problematic to include even countries that may not have been democratic for the entire period of time and that the quality of that democracy was not a factor that should have been accounted for. The models are not changed in any meaningful way, so using a model that uses an inclusive method is justified.

 Because the democratic learning theory and the governmental performance theory have some colliding expectations regarding time frames, this is one more thing I ought to give some attention. The democratic learning theory expects delayed effects, whereas the governmental performance theory has no reason to expect such delays. In order to contemplate these effects, I have plotted the means of the independent variables that show significant effects to assess whether there may be delayed or rapidly acting effects. If a mean plot looks like the mean plot of support for democracy, it suggests a rapid effect. If it resembles the mean plot of support for democracy if the latter plot were moved to the left, it suggests a delayed effect. The effects of social class and confidence in the government do not remotely resemble the support for democracy mean plot, so for clarity I have omitted them from figure 4. This figure does include lines representing the means of the variables political activity, GDP growth, income and of course the dependent variable support for democracy. There are no values indicated on the vertical axis, because the scales between variables differ. This figure is solely concerned with the shapes of the lines.

**[Insert figure 4 about here]**

 The scales of the variables do not matter here, the shape of the line is the only thing examined. One should be careful when looking at these shapes, however, because the six survey waves are not equally spaced and there is even some overlap between the waves of 1999-2001 and 1999-2004 and between the waves of 2005-2009 and 2008-2010. This having been said, none of these predictors has a clear delayed effect. Political activity, the variable which was expected to show such an effect, is already rising between 1995-1998 and 1999-2001 – before support for democracy – but this is enough to support the claim that there is a delayed effect. Therefore, this matter cannot be definitively concluded, but there is no real evidence for the existence of delayed effects, which was predicted by the democratic learning theory.

 In all the previous tests, it was assumed that the samples were random samples and that they were representative of the population. In the third chapter, when I discussed survey response rates and missing data, it was revealed that there are some points that may cause worry. Most importantly, response rates have not been uniformly high – most obviously in Russia in 2005-2009, with a response rate of 10,2 percent. Convenient enough, the World Values Survey and European Values Study data provides a weight variable that can be used in trying to make the samples more representative of the actual populations. I ran the model containing all direct effects and the model with all effects including interaction effects after weighting the data. The significance and strength of the effects in these models are very similar to their unweighted counterparts. The only element that noticeably changed was the significance of formative years in democracy: this effect was already significant with an α of 0,01, but after adding weight it was also significant with an α of 0,005. These results indicate that not adding weight to the data does not make the output any more vulnerable.

 The last robustness test relates to the relatively small N of the predictors income and social class. The variable of income was not present in the 2008-2010 survey wave and social class was not present in the survey waves of 1999-2001 and 2008-2010. Fortunately, multilevel models can handle missing data, so they did not have to discard two entire survey waves. Still, the variables income and social class have a much smaller N than the other micro-level variables, which is why I have done a robustness test to see if that produces any problems for the model. The results of this test are visible in appendix 7, in model 8, which is the model with all variables – except for income and social class – without interaction effects. These results show outcomes that do not differ much from model 4. The only notable differences are that having spent formative years in democracy is even more significant and that the control variable age now has a significant negative effect. These results completely match the results and inferences in the previous analysis.

**Conclusion and discussion**

The outcomes of the models are all relatively straightforward and it has been possible to retain, reject or alter all of the hypotheses. I now have to draw conclusions about these results. In the first chapter, I formulated this research question:

*Which factors to which extent have influenced support for democracy on an individual level amongst populations in Eastern European former communist countries between 1995 and 2014?*

Knowing which phenomenon I sought to study, I found three theories that all provided different mechanisms for explaining variance in support for democracy. The first of these was the democratic learning theory, a theory which focuses on exposure to democracy as an explaining factor for support for democracy. This theory proposes that being in contact with democratic institutions, through ways such as political activity, education in a democratic system and simply living in a democracy, increases a person´s support for democracy. This is a gradual process: some time needs to pass in order for these effects to become noticeable. Also, the quality of these institutions needs to be good in order for these effects to occur (Przeworski, 1991).

 The second theory, the governmental performance theory, takes a more immediate and direct approach. It claims that rather than learning to support democracy, people have support for democracy if their government produces good output. This should work both on a country level and on an individual level, focused on not only material but also immaterial gain, and because of both objective results and what citizens perceive these results to be. There is no lengthy process connected to this effect; changes in support for democracy can happen almost instantaneously.

The third theory that was tested was the socialisation theory, as used by Inglehart (1977; 2000; 2008). While the other two theories predicted that change in support for democracy is brought about because individuals during their life course change their views, the socialisation theory claims that individuals do not change their views much and that change in democratic support occurs because of cohort replacement. Older, less democratic generations die and are replaced by younger people who have more support for democracy. Those younger generations are more democratic because they grew up in a democratic system, which instils democratic values in people.

 The first and very notable conclusion that can be drawn based on the tested hypotheses is that the socialisation theory does not seem to hold within the boundaries of this study. None of the aspects that were examined agreed with the predictions in the theoretical chapter. The most striking discovery is that the amount of time since democratisation is not of significant importance to support for democracy, which means that support for democracy is not gradually increasing through a mechanism of cohort replacement. In Eastern European former communist countries, support for democracy is not structurally increasing at all.

 Support for democracy does vary, however. This happens over time, between different countries and of course between individuals. Democratic learning and governmental performance appear to do a better job of explaining and predicting a person’s support for democracy. As mentioned above, the amount of time passed since democratisation does not significantly affect support for democracy, and so unsurprisingly, neither does the amount of time that an individual has lived in a democracy. In contrast, exposure to democratic institutions by active participation is a factor in explaining support for democracy. The *active* part is crucial in this relationship. People who are actively engaged in education in a democracy or political activity are more favourable towards democracy. Support for democracy is not something that automatically develops over time, but takes a more direct form of interaction between individual and democratic institutions.

 The claims made in the governmental performance theory are most universally supported by the results produced by this research. Welfare, both personal and collective, predicts support for democracy quite well. Perceiving the government to perform adequately is also connected to high support for democracy. If people are satisfied with their own lives or if they are satisfied with the economic situation of their country, they see this as a sign that democracy works and their support for democracy increases. Similarly, if people see their country’s leaders as doing a good job, they will also see this as a sign that democracy works and increase their support for democracy.

 Concluding in brief, it is not so that support for democracy in Eastern European post-communist countries has been increasing over the period of 1995 to 2014. Citizens in these countries partly base their support for a democratic system on how they perceive their government to perform and on how this government actually performs. Besides this, active interaction with democratic institutions also increases support for democracy.

 What this says about people in a more general sense is that they are largely gain-seeking beings. Nonetheless, if one becomes more engaged with democratic society, appreciation for democracy increases. This is an explanation based on intrinsic merit of democracy. However, support for democracy does not appear to rely just on the intrinsic value of democracy, but is much influenced by consequentialism. People do assess the democratic system on the basis of its output; the benefit it brings in terms of wealth and status. Democracy is meant to give the citizens the power to get rid of unwanted leaders. That is a quality of democracy that is used to illustrate the merit of democracy. However, what is also happening is quite the reverse: the performance of governments is used to judge democracy. Citizens in Eastern European countries to a significant extent judge support for democracy on the basis of what material gain it yields. This research only included Eastern European countries, and so it may not be possible to extrapolate the findings of the thesis to other regions. In order to find out whether Eastern Europeans really differ in their support for democracy – and the factors explaining it – from citizens in the rest of Europe and the world, studies similar to this one but including and comparing countries from multiple regions may be carried out.

*Discussion*

The analysis chapter revealed that support for democracy within birth cohorts do significantly change over time. That leads to hypothesis number eleven being rejected, which explicitly stated that support for democracy within birth cohorts should remain the same. Yet, there is some criticism that can be expressed over this hypothesis. Inglehart (1971; 1977; 2000; 2008) did not claim that there would be no change at all within birth cohorts; his hypothesis was that change within birth cohorts would not be the main mechanism through which value change occurs. So while there would be some fluctuations within birth cohorts over time, the main increase in support for democracy would be caused by cohort replacement. The results indeed show fluctuations, which may or may not be structural, but this does not impair the socialisation theory. The lack of significant evidence for a relationship between time since democratisation and support for democracy and between having spent formative years in democracy and support for democracy is much more crucial in doing so.

 One other point worth noting is the decision to treat the dependent variable as a continuous one. Treating an ordinal variable as continuous is more commonly done with a scale of measurement consisting of five points, but the support for democracy scale has four. Because the four possible answers have no real distance to one another, making this variable a continuous one also means simulating distances and assuming that these distances are equal. Conceding that having to do this is indeed not ideal and that it would be better to use a variable with a larger scale, I argue that in this situation it is a good option. First, the answers “very bad”, “fairly bad”, “fairly good” and “good” are intuitively not spaced in an obviously uneven manner. There may be unequal distances, but universal agreement on which distance is greater than another is unlikely. Second, treating the variable as continuous makes it possible to run a linear mixed model, but more importantly: the significance of most of the output is relatively clear. Except for the effect of household income, all of the significant effects have a p-value smaller than 0,01 and none of the insignificant effects in the model have a p-value close to the threshold of an α of 0,05. This means that these effects are not barely statistically significant, but rather clearly, and that the probability of errors due to model design choices are relatively small.

 Making statements about causality is a hazardous practice, which is why I refrained from doing so up to the discussion. There were a few significant effects, those of political activity, income, social class, formative years in democracy and relative GDP growth per capita. In the theory these variables all had a causal effect on support for democracy, but providing cogent evidence for causality is not easily obtained. Causal effects of income and social class on support for democracy are plausible, as there are probably not that many people whose personal income and social class increase because of their high support for democracy. Political activity could go both ways: a learning effect of political activity is plausible, but it might also be that people participate in political activities because they already supported the principles and practices of democracy. It is not plausible that a country’s GDP growth is caused by its support for democracy, but it may still be that there is a third factor influencing both GDP growth and support for democracy. A causal effect of relative GDP growth per capita on support for democracy is, especially in congruence with the other positive results of the governmental performance theory, also a plausible relationship. Finally, spending formative years in democracy has an odd effect on support for democracy, seeing as the discovered significant effect is the opposite of the predicted effect. Of course, a person’s support for democracy will not have any influence on their year of birth. It is plausible that there is a negative causal effect of formative years in democracy on support for democracy. Having experienced hardship under the old communist regime would be a good reason to support democracy, but backing up such a statement would require more research.

 The conclusion that government performance positively affects support for democracy is a peculiar one, from a rational perspective. While it is understandable that economic performance is partly accredited to the political system, perceived governmental performance was also correlated with support for democracy. This relationship, despite the fact that it was predicted by the governmental performance theory, seems partly counter-intuitive. If a person likes their government – or perceives it to function well, it is possible that they will therefore have more confidence in the merits of democracy and thus more support for it. But a person who dislikes their current government should rationally prefer a democratic system above a non-democracy, for the simple reason that leaders can be replaced relatively easily in a democracy. Rationally, both perceiving the government to perform well and perceiving it to perform poorly should increase to support for democracy. The results, in contrast, show an almost linear relationship between the two variables. It should be interesting to learn what the reasons behind these findings are and if they are the same across different countries.

**Tables and figures**

*Table 1: availability of survey data and survey response rates in percentages*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Country** | **1995-1998** | **1999-2001** | **1999-2004** | **2005-2009** | **2008-2010**  | **2010-2014** |
| Albania | x |  | 51,7 |  | 88 |  |
| Armenia | 90,4 |  |  |  | 66 | x |
| Azerbaijan | x |  |  |  | 94,4 | x |
| Belarus | 48,8 | x |  |  | 76 | x |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina |  |  | 70,1 |  | 82,7 |  |
| Bulgaria | 85,1 | x | x | x | 75,6 |  |
| Croatia | 79,6 | x |  |  | 70 |  |
| Czech Republic | x | x |  |  | 61,6 |  |
| Estonia | 78,5 | x |  |  | 67 | x |
| Georgia | x |  |  | 60,6 | 60,2 |  |
| Hungary | x | x |  | 41,1 | 51,3 |  |
| Latvia | 64,7 | x |  |  | 79,2 |  |
| Lithuania | 40,1 | x |  |  | 65,9 |  |
| Macedonia | 89,9 |  | 81,4 |  | 73,7 |  |
| Moldova | 85,6 |  | x | 71,2 | 47 |  |
| Montenegro | x |  | 77,6 |  | 87,8 |  |
| Poland | 76,9 | x |  | 56,7 | 83 | x |
| Romania | 82,6 | x |  | 50,6 | 54,4 | x |
| Russia | 74,9 | x |  | 10,2 | 35,7 | x |
| Serbia | x |  | 51,6 |  | 69,9 |  |
| Slovakia | 87,5 | x |  |  | 60,7 |  |
| Slovenia | 95,9 | x |  | 68,2 | 62,7 | x |
| Ukraine | 85,1 | x |  | x | 60,3 | x |

*Source: World Values Survey (2015a) and GESIS (2015).*

*Note:* x *indicates that the data is available but response rates are missing*

*Table 2: descriptive statistics on dependent variable and predictors*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Variable** | **Valid N micro level** | **Mean** | **Std. deviation** | **Minimum** | **Maximum** | **Valid N macro level** |
| Support for democracy | 97907 | 3,1807 | 0,7519 | 1 |  4 |  |
| Years lived in democracy | 112655 | 14,0684 | 6,5928 | 0 |  29 |  |
| Political activity | 85075 | 1,4957 |  0,51 | 1 |  3 |  |
| Years of democratic education | 113191 | 13,7027 | 6,4246 | 0 |  29 |  |
| Household income | 71135 | 4,4694 | 2,3668 | 1 |  10 |  |
| Confidence in government | 91515 | 2,7953 |  | 1 |  4 |  |
| Social class | 56745 | 3,3766 |  | 1 |  5 |  |
| Formative years in democracy | 112655 | 0,6999 |  | 0 |  1 |  |
| Political rights | 109411 | 5,0883 | 1,8251 | 1 |  7 | 132 |
| Relative GDP growth per capita | 105249 | 61,0508 | 81,5523 |  -48,97 |  373,70 | 128 |
| Time since democratisation | 113191 | 14,1225 | 6,6888 | 0 |  29 | 138 |

*Note: standard deviations have been included only for continuous variables*

*Table 3: linear multilevel regression estimates of all effects on support for democracy*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Fixed effects** |  **Model 1** |  **Model 2** |  **Model 3** |  **Model 4** |  **Model 5** |
| Intercept | 2,799836\*\*\* | 2,844663\*\*\* | 2,826356\*\*\* | 2,914733\*\*\* | 3,110763\*\*\* |
|  | (0,087248) | (0,089255) | (0,142295) | 0,147691 | 0,177923 |
| Years lived in democracy | -0,002686 | -0,005247 | -0,007006 | -0,007055 | -0,009868 |
|  | (0,007873) | (0,007820) | (0,012584) | (0,013917) | (0,014518) |
| Political activity | 0,132833\*\*\* | 0,115006\*\*\* | 0,115115\*\*\* | 0,120417\*\*\* | -0,033207 |
|  | (0,009506) | (0,009613) | (0,009613) | (0,014642) | (0,031024) |
| Years of democratic education | 0,004864 | 0,007384 | 0,007817 | 0,009721 | 0,002734 |
|  | (0,004295) | (0,004371) | (0,004952) | (0,005790) | (0,010716) |
| Household income | 0,006624\*\* | 0,004887\* | 0,004820\* | 0,004802\* | 0,004590 |
|  | (0,002399) | (0,002422) | (0,002421) | (0,002428) | (0,002422) |
| Confidence in the government: a great deal | 0,230023\*\*\* | 0,237030\*\*\* | 0,236128\*\*\* | 0,236062\*\*\* | 0,236504\*\*\* |
| Confidence in the government: quite a lot | 0,161065\*\*\* | 0,169379\*\*\* | 0,168875\*\*\* | 0,167550\*\*\* | 0,167751\*\*\* |
| Confidence in the government: not very much | 0,085626\*\*\* | 0,090720\*\*\* | 0,090428\*\*\* | 0,090261\*\*\* | 0,090581\*\*\* |
| Confidence in the government: none at all | - | - | - | - | - |
| Social class: upper class | 0,064193 | 0,048773 | 0,048754 | 0,049981 | 0,052761 |
| Social class: upper middle class | 0,095244\*\*\* | 0,082739\*\*\* | 0,082623\*\*\* | 0,081380\*\*\* | 0,083254\*\*\* |
| Social class: lower middle class | 0,079832\*\*\* | 0,072237\*\*\* | 0,072386\*\*\* | 0,070454\*\*\* | 0,070864\*\*\* |
| Social class: working class | 0,059283\*\*\* | 0,054683\*\*\* | 0,054763\*\*\* | 0,053822\*\*\* | 0,054745\*\*\* |
| Social class: lower class | - | - | - | - | - |
| Formative years in democracy: yes | -0,016444 | -0,039801\*\* | -0,039789\*\* | -0,040168\*\* | -0,040469\*\* |
| Formative years in democracy: no | - | - | - | - | - |
| Political rights |  |  | -0,005435 | -0,030987 | -0,070199\* |
|  |  |  | (0,024611) | (0,025382) | (0,032545) |
| GDP growth per capita |  |  | 0,002645\*\*\* | 0,003315\*\*\* | 0,003089\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0,000777) | (0,000779) | (0,000765) |
| Time since democratisation |  |  | 0,000902 | 0,000298 | 0,002122 |
|  |  |  | (0,010511) | (0,011144) | (0,011520) |
| Post-materialism: post-materialist |  | 0,227775\*\*\* | 0,227747\*\*\* | 0,226828\*\*\* | 0,225711\*\*\* |
| Post-materialism: mixed |  | 0,075432\*\*\* | 0,075373\*\*\* | 0,075541\*\*\* | 0,075779\*\*\* |
| Post-materialism: materialist |  | - | - | - | - |
| Age |  | -0,000734 | -0,000736 | -0,000724 | -0,000709 |
|  |  | (0,000429) | (0,000429) | (0,000429) | (0,000429) |
| Sex: female |  | -0,029907\*\*\* | -0,029907\*\*\* | -0,030173\*\*\* | -0,030364\*\*\* |
| Sex: male |  |  | - | - | - |
| Belief in God: yes |  | -0,020052 | -0,019944 | -0,019937 | -0,019783 |
| Belief in God: no |  | - | - | - | - |
| Political rights\*Political activity |  |  |  |  | 0,032124\*\*\*(0,006233) |
| Political rights\*Years of democratic education |  |  |  |  | 0,001549(0,002095) |

*Table 3: linear multilevel regression estimates of all effects on support for democracy*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Random effects** |  **Model 1** |  **Model 2** |  **Model 3** |  **Model 4** | **Model 5** |
| σe2 individual level variance | 0,504345(0,004559) | 0,501187(0,004530) | 0,501186(0,004530) | 0,500078(0,004524) | 0,500087(0,004523) |
| σu2u0 group level variance | 0,064632(0,017455) | 0,062484(0,016889) | 0,042576(0,011544) | 0,031302(0,012032) | 0,033437(0,011802) |
| σ2u1 slope variance of political |  |  |  | 0,003167 | 0,000521 |
| participation |  |  |  | (0,001421) | (0,000698) |
| σ2u2 slope variance of  |  |   |  |  0,000085 | 0,000073 |
| years of democratic education |  |  |  | (0,000058) | (0,000052) |
| **Model summary** |  |  |  |  |  |
| -2 Log likelihood | 52905,641 | 52750,934 | 52740,263 | 52716,862 | 52698,792 |
| N on group level |  138 |  138 |  128 |  128 |  128 |
| N on individual level | 97907 | 97907 | 97907 | 97907 | 97907 |

*\* = Significant with α=0,05
\*\* = Significant with α=0,01
\*\*\* = Significant with α=0,005
Note: values in parentheses display standard errors of the estimates.*

*Table 4: description of contents of each model in table 3*

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Model 1** | *Only micro-level predictors, with only the intercept with a random effect* |
| **Model 2** | *Micro-level predictors and control variables, with only the intercept with a random effect* |
| **Model 3** | *All predictors on both levels, with only the intercept with a random effect* |
| **Model 4** | *All predictors on both levels, with random intercept and slopes* |
| **Model 5** | *All predictors on both levels, with random effects and quality of institution interactions* |



*Figure 1: Maslow’s (1943; 1954) hierarchy of needs*

****

*Figure 2: means of support for democracy per social class*



*Figure 3: support for democracy means by survey wave and birth cohort*

|  |
| --- |
| *Table 5: support for democracy means by survey wave and birth cohort* |
|   |   | ***Wave*** |
|  |  | **1995-1998** | **1999-2001** | **1999-2004** | **2005-2009** | **2008-2010** | **2010-2014** | **Total** |
| ***Birth cohort*** | **1930-1944** | 3,1788 | 3,0762 | 3,3294 | 3,2743 | 3,0741 | 3,1417 | 3,1465 |
| **1945-1959** | 3,2147 | 3,1365 | 3,4018 | 3,2510 | 3,1271 | 3,2078 | 3,1916 |
| **1960-1974** | 3,2132 | 3,1289 | 3,3892 | 3,2726 | 3,1131 | 3,1726 | 3,1807 |
| **1975-1989** | 3,2898 | 3,1713 | 3,4238 | 3,2731 | 3,1157 | 3,1486 | 3,1850 |
| **Total** | 3,2218 | 3,1364 | 3,3949 | 3,2697 | 3,1158 | 3,1733 | 3,1852 |



*Figure 4: shapes of the mean plots of support for democracy and some significant predictors*

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**Appendices**

*Appendix 1: overview of hypotheses*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Theory** | **Level of independent variable** | **Hypothesis** |
| Democratic learning | Micro | 1 | The longer an individual has lived in a democracy, the more support for democracy they will have. |
| Micro  | 2 | The more education an individual has had after democratisation, the more support for democracy they will have. |
| Micro | 3 | The more politically active an individual is, the more support for democracy they will have. |
| Macro(interaction) | 4a | The higher the quality of democratic institutions in a country is, the stronger the relationship between the time that an individual has lived in a democracy and support for democracy will be. |
| 4b | The higher the quality of democratic institutions in a country is, the stronger the relationship between education after democratisation and support for democracy will be. |
| 4c | The higher the quality of democratic institutions in a country is, the stronger the relationship between political activity and support for democracy will be. |
| Governmental performance | Macro | 5 | The higher objective governmental performance has been, the more support for democracy individuals in this country will have. |
| Micro | 6 | The better an individual perceives governmental performance to be, the more support for democracy they will have. |
| Micro | 7 | The higher the income of an individual’s household is, the more support for democracy they will have. |
| Micro | 8 | The better an individual’s social position is, the more support for democracy they will have. |
| Socialisation | Macro | 9 | The longer a country has been democratic, the more support for democracy individuals in this country will have. |
| Micro | 10 | Individuals who have had at least one of their formative years in a democracy will have more support for democracy than those who have not. |
| Micro | 11 | Democratic support within birth cohorts does not significantly change over time. |

*Appendix 2: presence of survey items needed for the variables by survey wave*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Survey item** | **1995-1998** | **1999-2001** | **1999-2004** | **2005-2009** | **2008-2010** | **2010-2014** |
| Support for democracy | x | x | x | x | x | x |
| Signing petition | x | x | x | x | x | x |
| Joining boycott | x | x | x | x | x | x |
| Demonstrating | x | x | x | x | x | x |
| Joining strikes | x | x | x | x | x | x |
| Household income | x | x | x | x |  | x |
| Social class | x |  | x | x |  | x |
| Age of finishing education | x | x | x | x | x | x |
| Age / year of birth | x | x | x | x | x | x |
| Confidence in government | x | x | x | x | x | x |

*Source: World Values Survey (2015a).*

*Note: x indicates that the data is available*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|   | ***Support for democracy*** | ***Signing petition*** | ***Joining in boycott*** | ***Attending lawful demonstration*** | ***Occupying buildings/ factories*** |
| **Wave** | **Count**  | **Valid** | **Count**  | **Valid** | **Count**  | **Valid** | **Count**  | **Valid** | **Count**  | **Valid** |
| 1995-1998 | 24283 | 83,0% | 27002 | 92,3% | 26613 | 91,0% | 27354 | 93,5% | 26609 | 91,0% |
| 1999-2001 | 14541 | 84,4% | 15928 | 92,5% | 15420 | 89,5% | 16065 | 93,3% | 15547 | 90,3% |
| 1999-2004 | 5789 | 88,7% | 5682 | 87,1% | 5609 | 86,0% | 5793 | 88,8% | 5647 | 86,6% |
| 2005-2009 | 10053 | 88,2% | 10661 | 93,5% | 10596 | 92,9% | 10757 | 94,4% | 0 |   |
| 2008-2010 | 30487 | 87,4% | 31959 | 91,6% | 31450 | 90,1% | 31993 | 91,7% | 31511 | 90,3% |
| 2010-2014 | 11684 | 91,9% | 10965 | 86,3% | 10917 | 85,9% | 10996 | 86,5% | 0 |   |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|   | ***Household income*** | ***Age of finishing education*** | ***Age*** | ***Confidence in government*** | ***Social class*** |
| **Wave** | **Count**  | **Valid** | **Count**  | **Valid** | **Count**  | **Valid** | **Count**  | **Valid** | **Count**  | **Valid** |
| 1994-1998 | 25130 | 85,9% | 0 |   | 28867 | 98,7% | 27766 | 95,0% | 28290 | 96,8% |
| 1999-2001 | 15797 | 91,7% | 16931 | 98,3% | 17210 | 99,9% | 0 |   | 0 |   |
| 1999-2004 | 5927 | 90,9% | 6371 | 97,7% | 6519 | 99,9% | 6269 | 96,1% | 6174 | 94,6% |
| 2005-2009 | 10597 | 93,0% | 11004 | 96,5% | 11400 | 100,0% | 10697 | 93,8% | 8879 | 77,9% |
| 2008-2010 | 0 |   | 32067 | 91,9% | 34766 | 99,6% | 33251 | 95,3% | 0 |   |
| 2010-2014 | 12493 | 98,3% | 12235 | 96,3% | 12691 | 99,9% | 12383 | 97,4% | 12205 | 96,0% |

*Appendix 3: survey response rates by survey item and survey wave*

*Appendix 4: survey questions used for measuring and constructing the variable of post-materialism*

**Support for democracy:**

‘I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad

way of governing this country?:

(…)

V130. Having a democratic political system

1 Very good

2 Fairly good

3 Fairly bad

4 Very bad‘

**Political activity:**

‘I’m going to read out some forms of political action that people can take, and I’d like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it:

Have done Might do Would never do

V85. Signing a petition 1 2 3

V86. Joining in boycotts 1 2 3

V87. Attending peaceful 1 2 3

 demonstrations

V88. Joining strikes 1 2 3

V89. Any other act of protest? 1 2 3’

**Age of finishing education:**

‘At what age did you (or will you) complete your full time education, either at school or at an

institution of higher education? Please exclude apprenticeships [*NOTE: if respondent indicates to be*

*a student, code highest level s/he expects to complete*]:

V249. \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ (*write in age in two digits*)’

**Income:**

‘ On this card is an income scale on which 1 indicates the lowest income group and 10 the highest

income group in your country. We would like to know in what group your household is. Please,

specify the appropriate number, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come

in:

V239. Lowest group Highest group

 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10’

**Social class:**

‘People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, or the

upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the:

V238.
1 Upper class

2 Upper middle class

3 Lower middle class

4 Working class

5 Lower class’

**Confidence in government:**

‘I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?:

A great deal Quite a lot Not very much None at all

V115. The government

 (in your nation’s capital) 1 2 3 4’

**Post-materialism:**
‘People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. On this card are listed some of the goals which different people would give top priority. Would you please say which one of these you, yourself, consider the most important? (Code one answer only under “first choice”):
And which would be the next most important? (Code one answer only under “second choice”)

* A high level of economic growth
* Making sure this country has strong defence forces
* Seeing that people have more say about how things  are done at their jobs and in their communities
* Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful

If you had to choose, which one of the things on this card would you say is most important? (Code one answer only under “first choice”):
And which would be the next most important? (Code one answer only under “second choice”):

* Maintaining order in the nation
* Giving people more say in important government decisions
* Fighting rising prices
* Protecting freedom of speech

Here is another list. In your opinion, which one of these is most important? (Code one answer only under “first choice”):
And what would be the next most important? (Code one answer only under “second choice”):

* A stable economy
* Progress toward a less impersonal and more humane society
* Progress toward a society in which Ideas count more than money
* The fight against crime’

*Appendix 4: survey questions used for measuring and constructing the variable of post-materialism (continued)*

**Believe in God:**
‘Do you believe in God?
V148.
1 Yes
2 No’

*Source: World Values Survey (2015a).*

*Appendix 5: Year of democratisation by country; time since democratisation by country-wave combination*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  **Time passed since democratisation** |
| **Country** | **Year of democratisation** | **1995-1998** | **1999-2001** | **1999-2004** | **2005-2009** | **2008-2010** | **2010-2014** |
| Albania | 1991 | 5 | 9 | 10 | 16 | 18 | 21 |
| Armenia | 1990 | 6 | 10 | 11 | 17 | 19 | 22 |
| Azerbaijan | 1990 | 6 | 10 | 11 | 17 | 19 | 22 |
| Belarus | 1990 | 6 | 10 | 11 | 17 | 19 | 22 |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | 1996 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 11 | 13 | 16 |
| Bulgaria | 1990 | 6 | 10 | 11 | 17 | 19 | 22 |
| Croatia | 1992 | 4 | 8 | 9 | 15 | 17 | 20 |
| Czech Republic | 1983 | 13 | 17 | 18 | 24 | 26 | 29 |
| Estonia | 1990 | 6 | 10 | 11 | 17 | 19 | 22 |
| Georgia | 1990 | 6 | 10 | 11 | 17 | 19 | 22 |
| Hungary | 1984 | 12 | 16 | 17 | 23 | 25 | 28 |
| Latvia | 1990 | 6 | 10 | 11 | 17 | 19 | 22 |
| Lithuania | 1990 | 6 | 10 | 11 | 17 | 19 | 22 |
| Macedonia | 1990 | 6 | 10 | 11 | 17 | 19 | 22 |
| Moldova | 1983 | 13 | 17 | 18 | 24 | 26 | 29 |
| Montenegro | 1999 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 8 | 10 | 13 |
| Poland | 1983 | 13 | 17 | 18 | 24 | 26 | 29 |
| Romania | 1990 | 6 | 10 | 11 | 17 | 19 | 22 |
| Russia | 1990 | 6 | 10 | 11 | 17 | 19 | 22 |
| Serbia | 1999 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 8 | 10 | 13 |
| Slovakia | 1990 | 6 | 10 | 11 | 17 | 19 | 22 |
| Slovenia | 1983 | 13 | 17 | 18 | 24 | 26 | 29 |
| Ukraine | 1990 | 6 | 10 | 11 | 17 | 19 | 22 |

*Appendix 6: support for democracy means by country and wave*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Country** | **1995-1998** | **1999-2001** | **1999-2004** | **2005-2009** | **2008-2010** | **2010-2014** |
| Albania | 3,7823 |   | 3,5883 |   | 3,3582 |   |
| (0,4352) |   | (0,563) |   | (0,7291) |   |
| Armenia | 3,1045 |   |   |   | 3,3752 | 3,4553 |
| (0,7293) |   |   |   | (0,6844) | (0,6974) |
| Azerbaijan | 3,365 |   |   |   | 2,7682 | 3,151 |
| (0,5724) |   |   |   | (0,9997) | (0,7771) |
| Belarus | 3,1912 | 3,3067 |   | 3,1605 | 3,0107 |   |
| (0,7778) | (0,7721) |   | (0,7333) | (0,7765) |   |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina |   |   | 3,3554 |   | 3,1179 |   |
|   |   | (0,6834) |   | (0,7859) |   |
| Bulgaria | 2,9942 | 3,2142 |   |   | 3,1052 | 3,1532 |
| (0,7158) | (0,6883) |   |   | (0,6223) | (0,7473) |
| Croatia | 3,2952 |   |   | 3,6108 | 3,4187 | 3,385 |
| (0,6982) |   |   | (0,5429) | (0,592) | (0,7412) |
| Czech Republic | 3,7084 | 3,527 |   |   | 3,1511 |   |
| (0,5017) | (0,5453) |   |   | (0,6853) |   |
| Estonia | 3,2848 | 3,3658 |   |   | 3,0645 |   |
| (0,68) | (0,6603) |   |   | (0,7993) |   |
| Georgia | 3,254 | 3,0147 |   |   | 3,0306 | 3,1507 |
| (0,7242) | (0,5977) |   |   | (0,6842) | (0,6927) |
| Hungary | 3,3943 | 3,213 |   | 3,3564 | 3,0682 |   |
| (0,7081) | (0,7462) |   | (0,6969) | (0,7661) |   |
| Latvia | 3,0992 | 3,127 |   |   | 3,0318 |   |
| (0,6392) | (0,7081) |   |   | (0,7) |   |
| Lithuania | 3,0773 | 3,0323 |   |   | 2,8902 |   |
| (0,6447) | (0,6067) |   |   | (0,6873) |   |
| Macedonia | 3,0891 |   | 2,9524 | 3,2615 | 3,0569 |   |
| (0,6915) |   | (0,8721) | (0,7438) | (0,7739) |   |
| Moldova | 3,2019 |   | 3,3859 |   | 3,3949 |   |
| (0,8961) |   | (0,7192) |   | (0,6677) |   |
| Montenegro | 3,5818 |   | 3,5565 |   | 3,2821 |   |
| (0,6535) |   | (0,6439) |   | (0,7301) |   |
| Poland |   | 3,0393 |   | 3,0585 | 3,0761 | 3,015 |
|   | (0,7053) |   | (0,6794) | (0,6619) | (0,6777) |
| Romania | 3,5578 | 3,2394 |   | 3,4801 | 3,1347 | 3,3316 |
| (0,7073) | (0,7524) |   | (0,6214) | (0,7665) | (0,7955) |
| Russia | 2,5261 | 2,612 |   | 2,9924 | 2,8807 | 2,9962 |
| (0,7724) | (0,7536) |   | (0,7676) | (0,7402) | (0,7787) |
| Serbia | 3,3745 |   | 3,4282 |   | 3,2148 |   |
| (0,734) |   | (0,6489) |   | (0,6725) |   |
| Slovakia | 3,3698 | 3,1134 |   |   | 3,1019 |   |
| (0,6655) | (0,7855) |   |   | (0,6602) |   |
| Slovenia | 3,2463 | 3,2836 |   | 3,3052 | 3,1871 | 3,0653 |
| (0,7662) | (0,7193) |   | (0,7789) | (0,6974) | (0,7601) |
| Ukraine | 2,9416 | 3,01 |   | 3,101 | 2,8308 | 3,1507 |
| (0,7557) | (0,7062) |   | (0,8424) | (0,8081) | (0,7618) |
| Total | 3,2132 | 3,1289 | 3,3892 | 3,2726 | 3,1131 | 3,1726 |
| (0,7517) | (0,7435) | (0,7154) | (0,737) | (0,7518) | (0,7618) |

*Note: standard deviations are displayed in parentheses*

*Appendix 7: robustness check accounting for democracy*

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Fixed effects** |  **Model 6** | **Model 7** | **Model 8** |
| Intercept | 3,006488\*\*\* | 4,059559\*\*\* | 3,004375\*\*\* |
|  | (0,190568) | (1,081693) | (0,145730) |
| Years lived in democracy | -0,004272 | -0,009192 | -0,007675 |
|  | (0,014778) | (0,014339) | (0,013898) |
| Political participation | 0,127911\*\*\* |  0,120716\*\*\* | 0,124895\*\*\* |
|  | (0,014073) | (0,014756) | (0,014831) |
| Years of democratic education | 0,009297 |  0,010504 | 0,009975 |
|  | (0,006426) | (0,005892) | (0,005754) |
| Household income | 0,004986 | 0,004784\* |  |
|  | (0,002582) | (0,002428) |  |
| Confidence in the government: a great deal | 0,198731\*\*\* | 0,236085\*\*\* | 0,241207\*\*\* |
| Confidence in the government: quite a lot | 0,167275\*\*\* | 0,167490\*\*\* | 0,171474\*\*\* |
| Confidence in the government: not very much | 0,089205\*\*\* | 0,090222\*\*\* | 0,092705\*\*\* |
| Confidence in the government: none at all | - | - | - |
| Social class: upper class | 0,032910 | 0,050161 |  |
| Social class: upper middle class | 0,083987\*\*\* | 0,081371\*\*\* |  |
| Social class: lower middle class | 0,068480\*\*\* | 0,070397\*\*\* |  |
| Social class: working class | 0,058975\*\*\* | 0,053773\*\*\* |  |
| Social class: lower class | - | - |  |
| Formative years in democracy: yes | -0,041810\*\* | -0,040090\*\* | -0,042783\*\*\* |
| Formative years in democracy: no | - | - | - |
| Political rights | -0,061084 | -0,141792 | -0,031799 |
|  | (0,033258) | (0,114984) | (0,025248) |
| GDP growth per capita | 0,003405\*\*\* | 0,003385\*\*\* | 0,003285\*\*\* |
|  | (0,000776) | (0,000765) | (000775) |
| Time since democratisation | 0,003460 | -0,009822 | 0,000911 |
|  | (0,011476) | (0,014244) | (0,011125) |
| Post-materialism: post-materialist | 0,251411\*\*\* | 0,226711\*\*\* | 0,231623\*\*\* |
| Post-materialism: mixed | 0,094374\*\*\* | 0,075449\*\*\* | 0,078665\*\*\* |
| Post-materialism: materialist | - | - |  |
| Age | -0,000619 | -0,000722 | -0,001136\*\* |
|  | (0,000456) | (0,000429) | (0,000421) |
| Sex: female | -0,034079\*\*\* | -0,030143\*\*\* | -0,029984\*\*\* |
| Sex: male | - | - | - |
| Belief in God: yes | -0,003805 | -0,019952 | -0,016381 |
| Belief in God: no | - | - | - |
| Democracy\*Time since democratisation |  | 0,002871(0,003553) |  |
| Democracy |  | -0,176902 |  |
|  |  | (0,153724) |  |

*Appendix 7: robustness check accounting for democracy (continued)*

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Random effects** |  **Model 6** |  **Model 7** | **Model 8** |
| σe2 individual level variance | 0,495754(0,004918) | 0,500053(0,004523) | 0,500687(0,004529) |
| σu2u0 group level variance | 0,028972(0,011075) | 0,028866(0,011638) | 0,031114(0,011920) |
| σ2u1 slope variance of political | 0,002002 | 0,003257 | 0,003334 |
| participation | (0,001284) | (0,001452) | (0,001463) |
| σ2u2 slope variance of political | 0,000067 |  0,000094 | 0,000080 |
| participation | (0,000053) | (0,000062) | (0,000055) |
| **Model summary** |  |  |  |
| -2 Log likelihood | 43657,153 | 52715,472 | 52746,816 |
| N on group level |  128 |  128 |  128 |
| N on individual level | 97907 | 97907 | 97907 |

*\* = Significant with α=0,05
\*\* = Significant with α=0,01
\*\*\* = Significant with α=0,005
Notes: values in parentheses display standard errors of the estimates.*

1. This does not mean that democracy is a meaningless term for people who have not experienced democracy themselves; these individuals do have an understanding of the concept and believe it involves freedoms, liberties and rights (Dalton *et al.*, 2007). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. A system-*external* manner is democratic learning which citizens get from looking at other democratised countries, also called the demonstration effect (Weil, 1993). It is an assumption offering a possible explanation for democratic support predating democratisation (Rohrschneider, 1999). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. For a full and clearly organised overview of hypotheses, see appendix 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)