

**Europeanization of UK defence policy: A European Defence
Capability supported by Atlanticists**



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Abstract:

This research uses the model of Europeanization by Radaelli (2003), Börzel and Risse (2003) and similarly used by Kalata (2009), to explain how "misfits" can be used to explain problems in the organization of and participation in ESDP-missions by the UK. The research uses a 'top-down' approach, together with rational institutionalist and sociological institutionalist logics to explain how these misfits have shaped policy responses. Misfits are recognized to exist in UK-NATO relations, EU-UK relations, National Strategy and Political Culture, Defence Expenditure and Troop Availability. This is followed by a analysis of the degree of reduction of the misfits over time by adaptation at the domestic level. The role of intervening variables; Norm Entrepreneurs, Political Culture, Formal Institutions and Veto Points, is explored to investigate their roles of socialization and persuasion in this case. The level of Europeanization of national policy is small due to the negative influence of Atlanticism and aversion to supranationalism in the UK, though these are not the main reasons more ESDP-missions were not set up.

Keywords: Europeanization, ESDP, Security, Misfit, Institutionalism, Atlanticism

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H1 Introduction

1.1 In recent years, the European Union has become more active as a player in international security. Starting out as a mostly economic and political entity, the path to becoming a security actor has been a slow one and there is still much debate whether the EU can now be described as a security actor, seeing how limited its hard security capabilities are, especially compared to some of the member states (Giegerich and Wallace, 2006). The process of development of the EU's security policy, first in the ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy) and later in the form of its successor the CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) has been a process of states trying to come to a common policy. New institutions have been developed and missions were organized within and outside of Europe (Kalata, 2009). Consequently the member states also had to follow the implementation of the newly set goals. A much used tool for the analysis of processes of changing domestic structures to fit new European goals is the Europeanization approach. Scholars have been using Europeanization to assess the effectiveness of European-level policies at the domestic level, as well as to understand how new European opportunities and constraints affect national policies (Graziano and Vink, 2007). In this research the Europeanization approach is used to explain levels of adaptation on the national level following the development of the ESDP. Europeanization is juxtaposed by an Neorealist alternative to explore how both theories can explain the UK's behaviour.

The UK has been one of the most important states help form and implement the new European norms on security policy. It helped initiate the development of a new discourse on European security cooperation and with its focus on developing practical capabilities, it has been an important player in implementation as well (Soder, 2010). The UK has for a long time been seen as one of the most Atlanticist and NATO oriented of the EU member states and its support for European defence cooperation therefore is unexpected. The role of the UK in developing new institutions and policy came unexpected for theorists of realism, who had expected that the UK would focus on its main military coalition, NATO. Though some lip-service to European cooperation could have been expected, true cooperation was expected to be reserved for the greater military powers. Why the UK has so actively participated in the creation of new European security and defence institutions and the missions that followed is a question that this research tries to answer.

1.2 Based on assumptions of realism, which is expected to be most accurate in the realms of 'hard' security and defence issues, any change in security policy would only be expected in a changed international power balance. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the world power balance as shifted to a US dominance in security capabilities. Since then the balance of power has not shifted greatly, making any large shifts in behaviour hard to explain. Furthermore according to realism states are

expected to be averse to sharing their military capabilities and alliances are only temporal phenomenon that suit specific moments. Among EU states, the UK is known to be critical of EU interference in national affairs. So why would it participate in efforts to start a coordination effort in the policy sphere where states historically have been most protective of, security? Since security and defence matter most for the core priorities of states and their power in terms of realism, coordination in this field is considered highly unlikely. If policy would be subject to processes of Europeanization, then any policy domain other than security would be more likely.

1.3 The integration processes of EU Member States (MS) adapting their own policy to a new European norm is described by a research approach known as "Europeanization" (Graziano and Vink, 2007). Within the Europeanization research approach there are a number of theories, which predict the process of Europeanization to occur in a specific fashion. In trying to describe the process of development of policy in Europe generally speaking two sub-approaches, a top-down and a bottom-up approach, can be distinguished.

Institutionalism is an example of a top-down approach that tries to explain how processes of integration influence policy in member-states and create spill over effects that lead to the expansion of the scope of EU policy. The theory, which focuses on the analyses of "domestic impact" of EU-level policies usually makes use of an analysis of 'misfits' between European policy and norms versus national implementation. The theory predicts that further integration is likely in the EU, even in policy fields that were earlier still seen as national matters, like security policy. A bottom-up approach for instance is Liberal Intergovernmentalism, which focuses on the way in which MS create policy and institutions based on their national and specifically economic interests. This theory considers the MS as the most important actors, which will sometimes have a preference for European integration in security matters if they believe this will help their security concerns (Moravcsik, 1993). These two theories use a different focus to describe the development of security policy in Europe and therefore arrive at different conclusions about how the Europeanization process can be best analyzed.

It is important to notice that the Europeanization of MS policy is not measured in terms of further integration or effectiveness of policy, but in its own terms. Because even though policies might differentiate or be less effective, this may still be the result of a process of European coordination efforts. The misfits between European rules, guidelines and norms and national policy are the criteria for measuring the level of Europeanization of MS policy. When member states adapt their policy with the goal to reduce the misfit between the European goals and implementation, the state has effectively adapted. The level of Europeanization represents the way in which MS are reacting to

European policy, which can include complete internalization of the stated norms, but also rejection of norms or policies and different steps in between. The Europeanization approach tries to explain the 'Europeanization' of states by their reaction to misfits and the resulting pressure put on the states by the EU and other outside sources. Though there might be a lot of pressure, institutionalism as a theory states that only when certain criteria are met, there will be acceptance of or resistance to the solutions for the misfits. These criteria are based two branches of institutionalism, sociological and rational institutionalism. This research is to identify whether Institutionalism can explain the policy changes on the MS level in security policy. Since the UK has changed its attitude towards European security cooperation in 1998, with the St Malo agreement with France, a new European norm of security has taken form. The implementation of the ideas and policies is analyzed in a top-down to explain why the UK has reacted in the way it has to the new European norm. By using the toolbox of Institutionalism the misfits between goals and existing means can be found and the level of adaptation or inertia to new policy explained.

1.4 In the next chapter I will explain how Europeanization as a research approach and theory can be recognized and distinguished. I will describe the difference between top-down and bottom-up approaches in more detail and explain my choice for a top-down approach and what the advantages are. There is a distinction between different branches of Institutionalism and I will explain how they are separated and which aspects are used in the misfits approach. Furthermore I will explain how Neorealism describes the development of European security cooperation and where it can be complemented. After this I present the hypotheses following from the theoretical debate. In the third chapter the hypotheses are operationalized and definitions are given for the measured phenomenon. The case selection is explained and strong and weaker aspects of the research are indicated. There is special attention for measuring the misfits and determining how adaptation pressure is identified. In the fourth chapter some additional information will be given about the context of the European defence policy and its development. This chapter functions as to clarify the role of MS in implementing and shaping EU policy and how their contribution is to be understood in comparison. The fifth chapter deals with solving the misfits and the role of adaptation pressure in doing so. Different policy and institutional misfits are identified and the level of the UK's adaptation is measured. In the sixth chapter an explanation is given for the UK's level of adaptation to the European security and defence policy norm. The possibility of describing the same process using alternative theories is also considered here. The thesis ends with some remarks on using Institutionalism for research and the societal relevance of this thesis in the seventh chapter.

Chapter 2 Theoretical framework

2.1 Europeanization as both a process and an approach

Many International Relations theories portray the state as a unitary actor, as Realism does as well. The state's interests are considered given and can be understood mostly in material terms. By many this approach is considered too limited since it ignores the importance of norms, values or other social factors, such as culture and national identity. Since the early 1990's, a reaction to this 'rationalist' dominance has gradually evolved, resulting in a large literature more focused on the importance of norms and social factors. (Rieker, 2006). With the increased integration of EU member-states and the growing role of the EU as an increasingly important provider of security it is expected that its security approach will influence the way in which security is defined at the national level (Rieker, 2006). The use of Europeanization as an approach to describe the national security policy of states is relatively new, though Europeanization has a longer history being used for theoretical European integration issues (Irondele, 2001). Europeanization has been used for several decades and was centred around the question how to account for the emerging European polity, but more recently an emerging literature focuses on the impact of European integration and Europeanization on domestic political and social processes of the member-states and beyond (Börzel and Risse, 2003).

Since Europeanization was long considered a descriptive term of the European integration process, a distinction has to be made between Europeanization as a (historical) *process* and the Europeanization *approach* that tries to describe and understand the process. Europeanization as a process includes the creation of the European Union and European integration, whilst Europeanization as an approach describes something that has to do with the penetration of the European dimension in national arenas of politics and policies (Irondele, 2001). In this research Europeanization as an approach is considered as a sort of meta-theoretical approach, in which there is an 'orchestration' of existing concepts and theories, with major theoretical import from comparative politics and theoretical policy analysis (Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003). Europeanization is often used as an explanation (explanans) for the development of policy convergence and supranationalism in Europe in the last few decades, but instead it should be regarded as the phenomenon that needs to be explained (explanandum) (Radaelli, 2000). Europeanization can only be given as an explanation when it is properly understood what it is, and which mechanisms and structures steer its direction. One conception is that Europeanization can be seen as the process of implementing European policy on a national scale and the congruent powers that create pressures for compliance and adaptation.

A different interpretation of how Europeanization works is to focus on the way European policy is formed by states or intrastate actors. At the same time there are differences, not only of what direction the relationship between Europe and states is, but also in what form the policy creation and adoption take place. Some theories, which are aimed at the Europeanization phenomenon, focus on a definition of states interests, whilst others focus on the different kinds of institutions, traditions and dialogues within the member states and in Brussels. These different directions have important implications for the way research should be structured and which conclusions can be drawn from them. Therefore I will describe in this chapter in which way I will use a certain conception of Europeanization as a model for researching the changes in defence policy.

The main purpose of Europeanization as an approach is to give insight into the process of policy formation which occurs in a loop between the national and the European level. In this loop, policy is formed on a national level, then goes to a European level where it becomes a European norm and/or directive. From there the policy process again influences the attitudes and power relations at the national level, thereby completing the loop. Figure 2.1 gives more insight into this process.




Figure 2.1 Europeanization Process (based on Radaelli, 2004)

In this figure, the equality of the different levels is important, because the EU not only influences the domestic level, but simultaneously is influenced by uploading of policy by member-states. Another consideration is that policy created at the same time of EU integration is depended on another outside influence like a new technological development affecting all countries. It may well be the case that a policy is created almost completely separate from EU-influence, even if EU-directives have been followed almost exactly, due to existing preferences on a national level which arose simultaneously because of a shared outside development. In research on the effects of EU policy ideas it is imperative to find proof that a policy wasn't devised at the national level, based on similar

experiences, but unrightfully interpreted as being a case of influence from the EU. The first two arrows (blue and red) in Figure 2.1 can be seen as part of bottom-up approaches, in which the influence from the national level on EU policymaking is explained. A bottom-up approach means that the description focuses on the process of integration itself and the creation of common institutions. Neofunctionalism, Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Multi Level Governance follow this approach. The second pair of arrows in Figure 2.1 (green and purple) stands for the top down approach in which the influence of EU policy on the national level is examined. Europeanization theory explicitly focuses on both these processes and the loop that they form in total. Together the top-down and bottom-up approach form the broader Europeanization approach, which can be defined in the following way:

Europeanization consists of processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and sub national) discourse, political structures and public policies.(Radaelli, 2000)

2.2 Bottom-up approaches

Bottom-up approaches involve states and lower levels of institutions forming, or 'shaping' European policy. The different bottom-up theories give different mechanisms for this process.

Intergovernmentalism focuses on the role of states and their domestic economic incentives for certain kinds of policy. Intergovernmentalism is a rationalist decision making approach and its most known version is the Liberal Intergovernmentalism of Moravcsik (1998). Intergovernmentalism makes the assumption that states with more bargaining power are better equipped to shape outcomes in EU negotiations than other states. These powerful states are more likely to be able to influence the EU policy making processes, especially when that policy field is very important to them and they succeed in forming winning coalitions through use of side-deals and payoffs. Another tactic that powerful states can use is threatening to walk out of that particular process or stopping support in other areas. So when states have a strong bargaining power and a great interest in the issue at hand, they will be more likely to be able to shape the content of EU policy. This is considered successful bottom-up Europeanization (Börzel and Panke, 2010).

Other, more institutional focused approaches pay attention to decision making processes to explain how and why states 'upload' their preferences to the European level. These approaches put more emphasis on formal rules such as decision-making procedures. Qualitative studies show that bargaining and voting power are very important for bottom-up Europeanization. Constructivist

research methods within bottom-up approaches assume that the preferences of state and non-state actors are flexible during interactions and can be changed through argumentation. Policy outcomes and integration dynamics are formed by arguing among member states. This involves supranational institutions like the commission or policy experts and epistemic communities (Howorth, 2004).

2.3 Top down approaches

Top down approaches assume that the EU causes adaptations of domestic policies, institutions and political processes if there is a misfit between European and domestic ideas and institutions (Börzel and Panke, 2010). There will only be change on the domestic level when there is a material cost involved or there are beliefs about how to address societal problems. European norms are expected to facilitate domestic change, but this change can lead to both convergence and divergence of policy. This process of European influence is considered to be a constant impetus of domestic change for all states. At the same time, domestic actors may use Europe in many ways. They can draw on legitimacy or laws without the express consent of Brussels. They may get entrapped in European and regional discourses that cannot be captured in the narrow notion of what was meant by the original inventors of the norms or policies (Börzel and Risse, 2012). Top down approaches use the concepts 'downloading' and 'taking' as synonyms, as opposites of 'uploading' and 'shaping', which are used in bottom-up approaches. The term downloading refers to the response of states to the EU, whilst uploading refers to the process of policy and norm creation by the member-states on the EU-level. States are good at downloading policy if they are able to respond swiftly to impetuses for change coming from the EU, in form of either law, policy or norm diffusion. If their own understanding of the problems and norms differs from that of the EU and/or their response to EU impetuses for change is flawed for technical reasons, their downloading will be problematic.

For downloading to occur and be described adequately it has to be clearly shown which norms and policies are being set by the European level to follow. According to the Europeanization approach the differences between the European policy and national existing practices form the pressure to adapt for the states. States are sensitive for pressure from different directions including Europe, intrastate actors and international institutions. Depending on the source of the adaptation pressure and the internal structure of the state, states react differently to pressure. The question how Europeanization has influenced the defence policy of the UK is best answered by using a top down approach, because it focuses on the implementation and internalization of European policy. A bottom-up approach would focus more on the uploading of UK policy to the EU level, which is less relevant for answering the main question. Though top down approaches generally recognize that their description does not fully capture the interaction between the state-level and the EU, due to leaving out the shaping of

policy by states, they recognize that with a top down approach it is possible to explain why certain states accept and implement policy better than other states. Top down approaches also have the benefit of distinguishing between different types of states and therefore the different likelihoods of implementation of certain policies.

The process of Europeanization of defence policy has, as is understood by both top down and bottom-up approaches, two sides in a loop in which there is constant mutual influencing. In this research I focus on the part of top down implementation of a European norm of defence policy, which I will argue came into existence during the late 90's. Another reason for focusing on this aspect of the loop is that there already has extensively been written on the reasons for the development of the European defence policy in the form of the ESDP. And that in the more recent years (1998-2008) there has been a period in which there was an obvious chance for states to in one way or another implement the newly developing notion of European defence policy. However, authors like Wright have claimed that top-down Europeanization isn't the right way to describe how the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), of which the ESDP is part, has influenced member states, because it doesn't explain how the preferences in the EU policy in fact represent the goals of the member states themselves (Wright, 2011). In this research, though making use of a top-down approach to look at implementation, there will be a part of the analysis dedicated to explain the links between the member-state preferences and the outcome of the full circle of Europeanization.

In this research a top-down approach is used because using both a top-down and bottom-up approach simultaneously would make it difficult to identify the pressure from the European level on the national level. If both approaches would be used simultaneously uploading effects of the state, creating changes on the international and domestic level, would constantly have to be described. . The period that is described has a relatively stable adaptational pressure for domestic implementation of a new norm, which gives a constant top-down pressure from the European level to the member-states. This means that the independent variable is international adaptational pressure, made up of several components, which drives state implementation. The pressure of the international level on the member state is expressed by social action, which is a set of four ways in which direct influence can be exerted. This includes coercion, manipulation of utility calculations as well as socialization and persuasion. In the following paragraph the specific top-down approach from within Europeanization that will be used in this research will be explored.

2.4 New Institutionalism

The current research phase of Europeanization has been characterized by a *new institutionalist* agenda. This has been part of efforts to better theorize the studies of Europeanization. New institutionalism is generally divided in three variants; Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI), Historical Institutionalism (HI) and Sociological Institutionalism (SI) (Soder,2010). The fact that there are three different models of explanation suggests that they might be mutually exclusive. This is not the case, since there have been efforts to synthesize the different institutionalisms. Not all authors place themselves neatly in one of the three mentioned categories, including Börzel and Risse, two significant contributors to the literature (Bulmer, 2007). In this research a combination of RCI and HI is used to analyze the change on the domestic level in a EU member-state.

Rationalist Institutionalism follows the 'logic of consequentialism'. In this logic, the policies and institutions as well as the misfits between European and domestic processes provide domestic actors with new opportunities and constraints in trying to fulfil their preferences. This can be viewed as a process of two steps. In the first step, a misfit of EU and domestic norms creates a demand for national adaptation. In the second step, the downloading of policies and ideas is shaped by the institutional forms and pressures exerted by the different strategic actors whose interests are involved. Europeanization in this sense can be seen as an emerging political opportunity structure that offers some actors additional resources with which to exert influence, while severely constraining the ability of others to pursue their goals (Börzel and Panke, 2010)

Change on a domestic level is enabled where the institutions of the states empower domestic actors to block change at veto points or to facilitate it through supporting formal institutions. So *veto points* and *formal institutions* are the two most important mediating factors in enabling the capacities of actors to exploit the newly created opportunity structure. Veto points are natural points of resistance in the decision making process, where certain power groups have the opportunity to make their own evaluation of the decision put before them. Not only is their option to block or adapt probably effective, but it is legitimized by its formal status. Formal institutions and their creation share a similar source of legitimacy, since they are created to deal with a certain subject matter. Therefore their claim to power in influencing a certain decision or implementation has a certain legitimacy. By claiming a certain topic or issue to be part of their policy paradigm, a new 'way of doing things' and shared beliefs are created. Thus, the logic of rationalist institutionalism suggests that Europeanization leads to domestic change through a differential empowerment of actors resulting from a redistribution of resources at the domestic level (Börzel and Risse, 2000).

Sociological Institutionalism conceptualizes the adaptational processes of Europeanization using a 'logic of appropriateness', which argues that actors behave in a manner that is conditioned by their collective shared understanding of what is socially acceptable behaviour. The norms, that form these collective shared understandings, influence the way in which actors define their goals and what they perceive as being rational action.

The first mediating factor is 'Change agents', or *Norm Entrepreneurs*, who mobilize in the domestic context and persuade other to redefine their interests and identities (Börzel and Risse, 2000). Examples of these norm entrepreneurs are Epistemic Communities or Advocacy Networks. The more active these norm entrepreneurs are and the more they succeed in making EU policies resonate with domestic norms and beliefs, the more successful they will be in bringing around domestic change (Börzel and Panke, 2010).

The second mediating factor is the *Political Culture*, which can be conducive to consensus-building and cost-sharing. A consensus-oriented or cooperative decision-making culture can help to overcome veto points by persuading that their use by actors would be inappropriate. In addition, this kind of culture allows for a sharing of adaptational costs, which spreads the pressure of adaptation, therefore making it more likely to be implemented. The alternative is a pluralist and confrontational culture, in which sharing adaptation costs is prevented and therefore the common benefits cannot be reaped either (Börzel and Risse, 2003). The top-down impact of Europeanization can be based on the fit or misfit of European policies or goals and national political culture and change agents. Thus, sociological institutionalism suggests that Europeanization leads to domestic change through a socialization and collective learning process resulting in norm internalization and the development of new identities (Börzel and Risse, 2000).

Sociological and Rational Institutionalism however aren't mutually exclusive. They often occur at the same time or seem to describe different moments in the same process. Norm entrepreneurs can come together to try and adapt a European policy or norm for domestic implementation and find themselves helped by domestic institutions like courts. Or they are blocked by strategic actors who consider their position to be endangered. In any case, using the different concepts offered by Sociological and Rational Institutionalism will help with better understand the phenomenon of Europeanization.

Historical institutionalism focuses on the question why the process of (European) integration has occurred at the moment it has. It tries to explain change by focussing on the 'stickiness' of institutional and policy arrangements and the great events that create critical junctures, breaking through the pre-existing equilibrium (Bulmer, 2007). Though this part of new institutionalism would

form an interesting addition to answer questions about the timing of national responses, it is left out of this research. This choice is made because the processes of adapting institutional and policy arrangements is dealt with within the part of rationalist institutionalism concerning the role of formal institutions. And the aspects of HI that focus on norm development and the timing of breakthroughs are also part of the description of sociological institutionalism. Therefore Historical Institutionalism is excluded from the analysis.

2.5 Misfits

One of the main commonalities in all approaches in Europeanization theory is the focus on misfits or 'goodness of fit'. To be able to examine the difference between different states and processes of implementation it is necessary that the European policies or norms don't fit the member states' policies or norms, which then have to be adapted to the pressures from Europe. The lower the compatibility between European and domestic processes, policies, and institutions, the higher the adaptational pressure (Börzel and Risse, 2000). Though this statement seems obvious, it implies that there is a link between the severity of the practical problem that is being faced and the desire to resolve the misfit, which might not always be the case. At the end of this research there will be a reflection on whether this was the case for the UK's defence policy and how this consideration, which seems generally accepted within the Europeanization approach, influences the analysis of adaptational pressure.

There are of course instances where existing state policies do not differ greatly or even at all from the new European policy or norms. This could be the case when a state is successful in uploading its preferences to the European level. Whether state or intrastate forces will be changed by the European discourse depends on whether the discussion on the EU-level are compatible with their own ideas and abilities. When the ideas discussed at the European level are compatible with the domestic level, they do not give rise to problems of compliance or implementation, since they fit the framing of goals and methods already at the local level. Nor do they provide new opportunities and constraints to local actors which could lead to a redistribution of power resources at the domestic level (Börzel and Risse, 2000).

There are two major types of misfits through which Europeanization exerts adaptational pressure on member states. The first possibility is that there is a misfit between European and domestic policies. This 'policy misfit' essentially creates compliance problems. Policies made in the EU can collide with national standards, instruments, techniques and the underlying problem-solving approach. As states are confronted with the mismatch between the national and European policies, they might try to counter its adaptational problem by uploading their own preferences back to the European level. The

degree to which states are successful in renegotiating their positions and the effects of EU-policy are expected to be correlated to the strength of the negotiation position of the member-state. As a result, all member states, including the 'Big Three' (France, UK and Germany), may face significant, albeit different degrees of adaptational pressure when they have to download European policies (Cowless, *et all*, 2001).

The second kind of misfit is an institutional misfit¹, which challenges domestic rules and procedures and the collective understanding attached to them. These misfits do not only show how institutions are unable to coordinate policy, but also that different institutions make claims on privileged decision powers. Europeanization might even threaten deep collective understandings of national identity as it touches upon constitutive norms such as state sovereignty (Cowless, *et all.*, 2001). The normative approach of both the European and the national level can be described using strategic culture, which is the description of how a set of norms creates a comprehensive viewpoint on the subject of security. The way in which misfits can be identified will be dealt with in chapter 3.

To answer the main question of this research, whether the UK has Europeanized its security policy, a combination of rationalist and sociological institutionalism is used. The process of how adaptation pressure is created by misfits between the European and the national level, which includes the difference in security culture, is first described. Then the measure of adaptation on the domestic level is determined by following social action from the European level, mediated by intervening variables, namely political culture, norm entrepreneurs, veto points and formal institutions. The theory of Institutionalism is used, because it gives insight in why certain aspects of the UK's security policy have changed and others haven't based on the difference in the found misfits. The second explanation for the UK security policy development is based on Neorealism and is used as an alternative to Europeanization in order to compare the benefits of both theories in explaining the UK's behaviour.

2.6 Neorealism

Neorealism explains state behaviour based on a number of assumptions, similar to traditional Realism, but there are some differences. Based on these differences Neorealism is chosen to offer an alternative hypothesis for explaining the development of UK security policy. Neorealism is presented by Keohane as a reformulation and systemization of Realism (Keohane, 1986). First of all, states are considered to be the only significant actors in international relations. Secondly, they are assumed to be rational actors, which can be understood in rational terms. Thirdly, they seek power based on self-interest. A realist analysis makes two steps. First it focuses on states that would form an effective threat, based on their power, alone or collectively. States are mistrusting other states and try to

increase their power. Secondly a realist analysis focuses on "interpreting the actions of those states not on the basis simply of their announced policy or on the assumption that they will behave morally, but rather on the premise that they are seeking rationally to increase their power" (Keohane, 1986). The great difference between Realism and Neorealism lies in their interpretation of the concept of power, which then opens up the interpretation of different kinds of state behaviour. Realism sees the acquisition of power not only as a means, but also as a goal in itself, which can be attributed to human nature (Keohane, 1986). Neorealism however considers the actions of state as separate from human nature and solely dependent on the characteristics of international politics. A second difference is that Realism sees cooperation as highly unlikely, whilst Neorealism is more open to temporary cooperation, but still sees it as a reflection of what can only be temporary interests. When the structure of the international system changes and interests are not clear, cooperation will also disappear. Thirdly, Neorealism assumes that propositions formulated at the 'unit level' cannot explain behaviour that is observed at the 'systems level' (Waltz, 1986). This is different from Realism, which assumes that state action is dependent on power, which is based on human nature. These assumptions of Neorealism form a systemic approach, which is quite broad and unspecific. As such it can "explain and predict continuity within a system. [...] [it can] for example explain why war recurs, [...] but it will not predict the outbreak of particular wars" (Waltz, 1986). So it is good at predicting stable periods, but changes in policy, especially rapid ones are more difficult to explain.

Neorealism is focused on what it considers to be the most crucial aspects of the international system, power and security. Since it focuses on the continuity of the system, based on a lack of change in the distribution of power, it would not expect change to occur if the distribution of power on the system level remains the same. And expressions of states, as long as they do not change the balance of power, do not matter for the system level. So, contrary to institutionalism theory, Neorealism assumes that cooperation will not change the way in which states make their decisions on security issues, because this is determined by the international power balance. If the security and defence policy of states, and the accompanying power that it exerts, would function as Neorealism says it does, cooperation would be very unlikely, though not impossible. It would however be motivated by short-term interests. The expectation of Neorealism therefore would be that states, especially in the field of security and defence, would not change their policy based on European norms and policy, unless it serves their interests in terms of power better. This leads to an alternative prediction of inter- and intrastate behaviour from Neorealism compared to Institutionalism, which places processes of adaptation and socialization above the concept of power. If the development of institutions, norms and policies leads to a different state behaviour regarding security and defence, whilst the system level remains the same, Neorealism would have difficulty in explaining state

behaviour, unless this behaviour is motivated by an increase in terms of power. If, however the system level has changed, this could explain the change on the national level, based on its systemic approach. Or alternatively, if it turns out that with the change of norms and policies, the security and defence capacity effectively been improved in participating states whilst not interfering with their autonomy in decision-making, this means that Neorealism can explain the change on the national level, based on its power-based approach. If however, there has been a change or norms and policies, without improvement of defence capabilities, or with a deterioration of the autonomy of decision-making in the involved states, this evolution would be hard to explain for Neorealism.

2.7 Hypotheses

Based on New Institutionalism theory, the following hypotheses are formulated:

H1A Adaptation pressure leads to change of national norms and policy to European norms and policy when intervening variables, separately or together, do not block downloading

H1B Adaptation pressure does not leads to change of national norms and policy to European norms and policy when intervening variables, separately or together, block downloading

Adaptation pressure in this context is based on the misfits between the European policy and norms and those of the member states as described by Börzel and Risse. Change of national norms and policy happens on the basis of the top-down process, which in itself uses elements from both Rational Institutionalism and Sociological Institutionalism. European norms and policies are considered to be expressed in a single security culture, which creates demand for change in policy and appropriate behaviour. These top-down changes are enabled when the intervening variables, Political Culture, Veto Points, Norm Entrepreneurs and Formal Institutions create favourable possibilities. If the intervening variables are not permissive however, inertia or even retrenchment may occur. The first two hypotheses are conflicting with that of realism, because they place the steering role of the international (in this case mostly European) level above that of the state in importance. Moreover, it uses a logic of appropriateness and a logic of consequentialism to explain state behaviour, contrary to the systemic approach of Neorealism.

The alternative hypothesis, based on Neorealism, is the following:

H0 There are no changes in the domestic level impacting security capabilities, unless states can increase their power without reducing their autonomy in decision-making.

Changes in the system level would mean that there had been a change in the power relations, therefore creating a new kind of system with different properties. If however the system doesn't

change in kind, there would also not be a reason to expect changes in state actions. Cooperation in security policy is possible, but only when it leads to an improvement of military capabilities for all states. States can only be expected to try and improve their power position if this does not reduce their autonomy over their military capabilities, because a limited control over military capabilities would form a new risk for states. Neorealism expresses its scepticism about state expressions of ideology and any other aspect of state behaviour other than military capabilities, so the focus of this research on security and defence policy enables a search for change in policy which is explicitly related to military capabilities. This means that in the case that there is change in the security policy of states, without clear power advantage for a state, Neorealism would have trouble to explain it.

Now that on the basis of the two theoretical approaches conflicting hypotheses have been formulated, the next chapter will deal with the operationalization of the different concepts that have been described.

H3 Methods

3.1 Introduction

In this methods chapter I will explain how I will use the combined theoretical model of Europeanization by Radaelli (2003) and Börzel & Risse (2003) to describe the levels of change that have occurred in the defence policy of the UK, based on certain areas of misfit between European and national policy. The alternative hypothesis is formed on the basis of Neorealism and describes what levels of domestic change could be expected whilst states try to increase their power. The hypotheses I formulated in the theoretical chapter will form the framework of this methodological chapter. First I will explain the case selection and which benefits and possible drawbacks. Secondly, I will describe how the key concepts present in Institutionalism can be measured, including the kind of factors that are expected to play a role in determining the levels of change. I will show how misfits between European and member-state policy can be identified and set up the criteria of how the changes in policy can be classified. After this I will explain how Neorealism would explain state behaviour and which kind of data was used in the research.

The operationalization chapter starts off with the main hypotheses of this research:

H1A Adaptation pressure leads to change of national norms and policy to European norms and policy when intervening variables, separately or together, do not block downloading

H1B Adaptation pressure does not leads to change of national norms and policy to European norms and policy when intervening variables, separately or together, block downloading

To determine whether this is the case, three research questions have to be answered:

- 1 Which misfits where there between EU and national policy?
- 2 Which intervening variables are influential in determining the level of change?
- 3 Which levels of change where there in policy ?

These three questions fit in the theoretical framework of top down Europeanization and the concept of national adaptation to misfits. In this chapter I explain how these questions will be answered and in chapter four I give the context of the selected period, ending with the answers to these three main questions in chapter five and six. To determine whether there was change, first the misfits that existed between the EU level and the UK need to be identified. After that, any intervening variables that had a significant influence on the level of change and whether it occurred need to be identified

and measured. The concluding question will be whether there in fact was a Europeanization effect as described by Institutionalism and how much this changed the defence policy of the UK. To effectively demonstrate how the model of top down Europeanization works, the downloading and the uploading effects are separated. And within the process of adaptation it needs to be identified which factors functioned as enabling or blocking agents to change. But first the use of a single case study needs to be explained, as well as the selection of the UK in the period 1998-2008 as a case.

3.2 Case selection

In this paragraph the case selection and choice for research method is explained, as well as some critical remarks on the limitations of the chosen method. The single case study format is used because it allows for an in-depth analysis of the causal links and the functioning of the intervening variables. In this research the main independent variable, adaptation pressure, does not vary and therefore the most important measurement takes place at the level of intervening and dependent variable. The choice for the UK over other states is made because of the size of its military and the impact of its participation in the ESDP as well as the Atlanticist and Euro-sceptical nature of the state. A comparative analysis of multiple countries and their change, considering the same intervening variables, would be preferable. But this is hard to put together whilst considering the unique circumstances of the different states. Detailed aspects like strategic culture and norm entrepreneurs cost time to analyze and describe. But the choice to use a similar structure as was used by other authors hopefully allows this research to be used in a comparative fashion, therefore countering some of the drawbacks of this being a single case. Another drawback is constituted by the fact that there are multiple sources of adaptation pressure. If there would be a scenario in which there would be no adaptation pressure from other international sources and solely from the EU, this would allow for a more precise comparison. According to the Europeanization however, the adaptation pressure is generated by the misfit between policy of the European and the domestic level. So a case which has no adaptation pressure would be one in which there is no international level demanding adaptation to European standards. This at the same time would make a comparative measurement impossible, since the intervening variables would not be able to be identified on the basis of their influence on the misfits, which would not exist. So the existence of misfits creates adaptation pressure, but this adaptation pressure can be exerted by multiple sources. This makes it necessary to investigate for each case which actors, exerting adaptation pressure, exist. Adding these elements makes a comparative case study setup too large for this limited research.

The problem of poor comparability is partly solved by the selection of the UK for this single case study, because the outcome of other cases measured in the same fashion, like that of Germany by

Kalata, can be compared to the results of the UK case (Kalata, 2009). The case selected in this research is the defence policy of the UK, centred on its participation in ESDP-missions (the name of the missions at one point changes, which will be further explained in chapter four). As described by Haverland (2005) it is not preferable to choose a case on the basis of random selection, because it may negatively affect the substantive relevance of the research project. In her article on Europeanization processes in the Bundeswehr Jesse Kalata suggested that the UK would be an interesting case, informative and allowing for methodological streamlining (Kalata, 2009). Because this research is written in a similar theoretical framework, the results are compared in chapter six to add to the knowledge about how different states react differently to comparable pressures from the EU. At the same time, the role of the UK as a very unlikely adaptor to European norms and rules in the field of security because of its Euro-sceptical attitude makes the research relevant for the measuring of the strength and influence of the Europeanization process. If even a Euro-sceptical, pro-NATO state with a significant military capacity is willing to adapt its policies, this would indicate a strong influence of the adaptation pressure.

It is important to include one of the most 'important' (powerful) member states, to be able to say something about the historical direction in which developments on the subject matter are going. Especially in the case of military developments, there are states which due to their size and relative spending on military capabilities have a much larger impact on the direction of defence policy than others. Focusing on defence policy allows for a relatively 'clean' field of research, with very little influence from other processes of Europeanization, since most defence cooperation is intergovernmental or within NATO rather than European. The UK, which is the third largest spender on its military in the world, only beaten by size by the French in Europe, is a good example of a major player in the defence industry. This means that the UK has a large influence in steering the defence policy of the EU, which is dependent on its member-states for any military means. What is also of interest for measuring Europeanization, is that the UK is one of the most Atlanticist members of the EU (Kalata, 2009). With its 'special relation' with the US and the strong participation in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the UK has relied on NATO for its strategic needs. Influencing of defence policy by the EU would not be expected in the UK's case on the basis of this preference for autonomy from European influence. This makes the UK a least likely case for European influence and therefore an important part of explaining the impact of Europeanization. Because if even the UK adapts its national policies to Europe in the policy field that they are most protective off, then the process must be very influential and possible obstacles can be considered either weak or not activated to halt the process.

3.3 Measuring Institutionalism

In this paragraph the hypotheses based on Institutionalism are operationalized:

H1A Adaptation pressure leads to change of national norms and policy to European norms and policy when intervening variables, separately or together, do not block downloading

H1B Adaptation pressure does not leads to change of national norms and policy to European norms and policy when intervening variables, separately or together, block downloading

First adaptation pressure is described, starting from the misfits by which it can be recognized and the actors that use social action to influence the states' level of implementation. Secondly the concept of social action and the different forms it takes is explained. The norms and policies that are being promoted from the international level are described in terms of security culture. Whether the adaptation pressure is effective is dependent on the role of the intervening variables. How to describe and identify these variables is determined on basis of the work of Radaelli, Kalata and Börzel and Risse. After this the measurement of different possible levels implementation is explained and criteria are given to determine which effect the adaptation pressure has had on national policy.

3.3.1 Misfits

To determine which misfits there are between the EU's principles and norms and existing national policy I first describe the European defence policy background and European norms and policies on defence. Determining how these ideas form the European policy gives context on the subject of defence cooperation and explains the process of uploading policy preferences by the different states. Once policy is established at the European level, adaptation pressure starts to be exerted on the member-states. The adaptational pressure in this research is described in terms of the underlying theory of social action, like coercion or socialization, and by the sources that exert this social action, like the EU or NATO. For the identification of uploading and downloading as well as what can be considered misfits I follow the method chosen by Kalata (2009):

For simplification's sake, here I consider upload to be input to development of new ESDP policy at the EU level and download to be national action implementing ESDP decision. Downloading then translates into participation in ESDP missions, in this study military missions. "Misfit" occurs when difficulties arise in implementing the action and affects both frequency and quality of participation. (Kalata, 2009)

To identify the misfits, meaning both the frequency and quality of participation in ESDP-missions, I look at the ESDP (and later CSDP) and the significant areas of misfit between it and the UK's military

policy. The misfits are based on the practical, political and institutional problems facing the application of the ESDP policy by the UK. Though these problems may be based on larger institutional and political discrepancies between European and national levels, the focus will be on what this means for the effective execution of European policy. In describing the friction between European policy and norms and implementation, the 'goodness of fit' is determined by the mismatch between European and domestic policies, processes and institutions (Börzel and Risse, 2000). And the lower the compatibility between European and domestic processes, policies and institutions, the higher the adaptational pressure (Börzel and Risse, 2000). Though they can be classified as either *policy misfits*, or *institutional misfits*, which both come with different aspects to pay attention too, it is firstly important to determine in which manner the misfits are the result of conflict between the European and the domestic level.

In this research, the focus is on the downloading aspect of Europeanization theory. As with regards to the ESDP-UK relation, this means that download is *the National action implementing ESDP decisions*. Though many of the missions of the ESDP are civilian or include largely civilian tasks, this is less relevant for this research, since participation in non-military missions isn't as hotly contended as the military aspects. It is especially the military aspects of the ESDP which seem to go against the intentions of the UK of keeping military cooperation inside NATO. In deciding which misfits are in fact the effective reason why EU policy isn't implemented, the selection will be made based on a combination of the arguments given by the member-state itself and the criticisms of a number of theorists. Defence policy in this research is limited to the frequency and quality of participation in ESDP-missions. The adaptation pressure arising from the misfits is expressed through social actions by states or institutions like the EU and NATO.

However, the description of misfits is deceptively simplistic and many authors do not specify in enough detail on which basis they select which misfits to focus on. If indeed the misfit is anything which is different from what the member-state tried to upload, this leaves the researcher to determine which aspects of policy were indeed specifically meant to be agreed to on the European level and where the margins for states were in negotiation. Practically this would be very hard, especially since trade-offs would have to be considered as against the preference of states. Furthermore it leaves the policy that might be preferable to states but which differs from their current national policies or institutions out of the definition. Since this would make it impossible to determine the impact of new European policy if it was preferred by member-states from being used in a misfit approach, this definition has considerable shortcomings.

Even though it has shortcomings, this research will try to use misfit as a tool to describe the differences between the European and the national policy and norms. What is considered difference between norms and policy is based on the relative importance for reducing the differences as far as is regarded necessary by the actors exerting adaptational pressure. This implies that the approach is explicitly accepting the premise that, based on analysis of government documents, expressions and analysis of behaviour, the premises of the subject policy can be pinpointed. This is important, because for the conceptual construct of misfits to work it should also be possible to determine the relative importance of the different misfits. To order the different misfits, it has to be assumed that the policy is in fact developed in order to resolve a problem or get to a certain outcome. Clearly, although this assumption does not seem problematic at first, it forces the researcher to accept the logic of the policy maker up to a certain extent and therefore disregard the possibility that the identification of what are problems is essentially a power based political process. In this case for instance it has to be assumed that the expression of intent to create a common European defence policy and military force are in fact sincere and not an expression of sophisticated public relations as realists might expect.

In the case of differing normative structures between the European and the national level it can be hard to identify which normative elements and policies make up a policy field. To place normative concepts formulated by policy makers in context we look at the difference between the starting positions of the European and the national strategic culture. This means looking at the national strategic culture in relation to the strategic culture of the EU, which is the outcome of European negotiations on long term goals, because these both deal with the normative aspects of security.

3.3.2 Measuring social action

Börzel and Risse (2011) describe a model of direct influence with four mechanisms of institutional change to explain how social action can change behaviour of states (see Table 3.1).

Table 3.1 Diffusion Mechanisms following Direct Influence Model

Social mechanism and underlying theory of social action	Promoter of Ideas (sender)
Coercion (force or legal imposition)	Coercive authority (<i>Herrschaft</i>), legal force
Manipulating utility calculations (instrumental rationality)	(Positive and negative) incentives and capacity-building
Socialization (normative rationality)	Promote Ideas through providing an authoritative model (normative pressure)
Persuasion (communicative rationality)	Promote ideas as legitimate or true through reason-giving

Source: Börzel and Risse, 2012

The first mechanism is *Physical or Legal coercion*, which means that states are compelled to follow EU guidelines if they are legally obligated. This is not the case in this research because of the voluntary base of participation in the ESDP-missions. The second mechanism of diffusion is that of *manipulating utility calculations*, in which manipulation of the pro's and con's that states face is used to steer their options (Börzel and Risse, 2011). In this research this would be the case if an actor exerting adaptation pressure gives financial incentives or organizes a trade-off involving military capabilities to incentivize a domestic actor to adopt certain policies. The third mechanism works through the logic of appropriateness and involves *Socialization*. Instead of trying to fulfil their own preferences, actors try to adapt to the social situation. In this regard, the EU can be seen as a gigantic socialization agency which actively tries to promote rules, norms, practices and structures of meaning to which member-states are exposed and which they have to incorporate into their domestic structures (Börzel and Risse, 2011). In this research, the norms of the domestic level are compared to those at the European level and norm entrepreneurs are traced to follow the promotion of norms, rules and practices from the European to the domestic level. *Persuasion* is the fourth mechanism and it builds on the *logic of arguing*. This means that actors will try to persuade each other to take over their interpretations of a certain claim or view. These processes of persuasion are analyzed by comparing the different logics of the most important domestic actors with those of the European level policy. In the fourth chapter the formation of European security strategy will be described and the four social mechanisms will be analyzed in chapter five and six.

3.3.3 Measuring Security culture

In the following paragraph I describe how security culture can be measured on the European and the national level and how it forms a measurable standard to be followed by states. Security Culture (also known as strategic culture), is a set of beliefs, assumptions, attitudes, norms, world views and patterns of habitual behaviour held by strategic decision-makers regarding the political objectives of war, and the best way to achieve it (Biava, *et all* 2011). There are two sides in the debate on the use of strategic culture. The first group tries to use strategic culture to show how the belief system of peoples form the totality of security concepts and ideas about who the enemy is and how to think about using force. The second view in the debate gives strategic culture a much smaller role and merely sees it as a way to characterize the discursive context of decision-making. Other, more structural variables like the balance of power and international power structures are also presumed to still play a large role. Strategic cultures are considered to exist both on a national and on an international level, like the EU.

In this research I will use documents on the strategic and security priorities of the UK to determine what factors shape its security culture and whether it is distinctly different from the broader European security culture. This analysis is based on the description of priorities in the different security strategy documents published by the UK, which only partly describes the decision making logic of the UK.

3.3.4 Measuring the intervening variables

Though adaptation pressure in the form of social action from the international level is considered strong enough to change behaviour on the national level, there are intervening variables that can impede this process. It is important to recognize that all EU-member states have different sources of adaptation pressure through their involvement in different security organizations, like NATO and the UN and that most states also display misfits with these organizations. It therefore becomes hard to distinguish which amount of change can be traced back to the EU. The pressure exerted by the demands of the ESDP are a good measuring point, since it has specific additional demands for commitment and these demands can therefore be traced back to the pressure by the EU (Kalata, 2009). To measure how rationalist and constructivist logics change national opportunity structures, four factors are used in Europeanization literature. These four factors, described by Börzel and Risse (2003), give a comprehensive insight in the process of adaptational pressure.

Rational institutionalism suggests that Europeanization creates change through the empowerment of different actors caused by a new redistribution of resources at the domestic level. From the

Rationalist perspective these are Multiple Veto Points and Formal Institutions. Sociological Institutionalism focuses on a 'logic of appropriateness' and processes of persuasion. Changing understandings of power and options play a big role in determining what happens and who is involved. When there is a misfit between the ideas and concepts that form policy, domestic structures come under pressure to change. Norm Entrepreneurs and Political Culture play a large role in this process.

Multiple Veto Points in a country's institutional structure can effectively empower actors with diverse interests to resist adaptational pressures emanating from Europeanization (Börzel and Risse,2000). When there are a large number of veto-points in the system, domestic players are empowered to demand changes of policy. Thus, multiple veto points empower domestic actors with diverse interests to avoid constraint and thus, effectively inhibit domestic adaptation (Börzel and Risse, 2000). In chapter five and six the possibilities for domestic actors to block ESDP-missions through their role in the institutional structure are examined.

Formal Institutions might exist providing actors with material and ideational resources to exploit new opportunities leading to an increased likelihood of change (Börzel and Risse,2000). When national institutions have the possibility to claim new responsibilities or domains of policy implementation they can use this opportunity to influence levels of implementation. Formal institutional ties can provide actors with the tools they seek for increasing their resources, thereby leading to an increased likelihood of change.

Norm Entrepreneurs or "Change Agents" mobilize in the domestic context and persuade others to redefine their interests and identities (Börzel and Risse,2009). These people are often situated within institutions which have some influence on the process, but what makes them influential is the manner in which they steer discourses and through organization create new power relations. They are identified in this research by their role in epistemic communities that launch new coordinative discourses, similar to the approach of Howorth (2004).

Political Culture and other informal institutions exist which are conducive to consensus-building and cost-sharing (Börzel and Risse,2000). Informal institutions entail collective understandings of appropriate behaviour that strongly influence the way in which domestic actors respond to Europeanization pressures (Börzel and Risse, 2000). Therefore in this research these informal institutions will be described on the basis of recognizable patterns of what is considered appropriate behaviour.

Through institutionalization and the spread of norms and general practices, the EU can have a major impact on member and third party states. When trying to show how European developments in policy making and new discourses influence national policy, there are however, some complications. When using an explicit policy directive, set within clear bounds of time and space, the tracing of the process of how the policy was created and then implemented is relatively easy. In the case of European defence policy, this is quite more complicated, since the process of Europeanization of defence policy is in many aspects a process that is an earlier stage of development than economic integration.

In answering the question of whether there is Europeanization of the defence policy of states, a distinction must be made between Europeanization and mere convergence. Since the European states are up to a certain level all concerned by the defence situation in Europe and confronted with the same processes of development in military strategy and hardware, some convergence is to be expected. In chapter four I describe the development of the European security culture and the ESDP-missions. I use these missions as a criteria because they are a practical and measurable expressions of a European policy set and strategic culture. The missions are good cases for testing because they are also used in work by other authors, like Kalata, and therefore comparable. Though Neorealism might consider the missions to be too small to be a significant change in the balance of power, they are an expression of ability to cooperate effectively and reduce risk to states. Therefore, these missions are indicative of newly developed capabilities and a higher level of trust among participating states.

3.3.5 Implementation

In this research the dependent variable is the kind of change that is brought about in the defence policy of EU member-states. Now the conception about how processes of institutional change affect member-states is clear, the next step is to explain in which way states can react to the adaptation pressures exerted onto them. In his research on the influence of Europeanizing on the Bundeswehr, Jesse Kalata (2009) uses both the models of Radaelli (2003) and Börzel & Risse (2003), which both consider Accommodation and Transformation as options of change in national Policy. Radaelli includes Inertia and Retrenchment whilst Börzel & Risse also see Absorption as an option. Absorption is a less influential option than accommodation and in it domestic structures are hardly altered. In this research I will identify which of these descriptions fits best with the observed change in the chosen member-state. Though different in nuances, together the descriptions of both articles enable a clear definition of different levels of adaptation. Radaelli (2003) shows that there are four ways in

which policy fields can be affected by norms, rules and procedures resulting from the emergence of the European system of governance:

- **Inertia:** Member states find that the policy doesn't fit, there is a lack of change. This may take the form of lags, delays in transformation and sheer resistance. The degree of domestic change is low.
- **Absorption:** Member states accommodate Europeanization. They adapt their policies and institutions. The degree of domestic change is modest.
- **Transformation:** Member states have to replace existing policies and institutions by new ones. There is fundamental domestic change.
- **Retrenchment:** The negative form of Europeanization, which can be the form of inertia or partial implementation. This can lead to national retrenchment against European trends.

Börzel and Risse (2003) used some different categories to describe the way Europeanization works, though these assume some of the same basic tenants;

- **Absorption:** member states incorporate European policies or ideas into their domestic structures, respectively, but without substantially modifying existing processes, policies, and institutions. The degree of domestic change is low
- **Accommodation:** Member states accommodate Europeanization pressure by adapting existing processes, policies and institutions without changing their essential features and the underlying collective understandings attached to them. One way of doing this is by "patching up" new policies and institutions onto existing ones without changing the latter. The degree of domestic change is modest.
- **Transformation:** Member states replace existing policies, processes, and institutions by new, substantially different ones, or alter existing ones to the extent that their essential features and/or the underlying collective understandings are fundamentally changes. The degree of domestic change is high.

Institutionalism covers both cases in which EU policies exist, and other cases in which EU-level discussions does not end up with policies, yet domestic actors reorient their behaviour because 'Europe' has become the common grammar (Radaelli, 2004). The multiple levels of interaction, combined with the overlap and spill over effects of different policy areas make it hard to determine the direction of influence. For constructivists focusing on deliberation and norm formation this is hardly regarded as an issue, but is instead recognized as the core of how policy and institutions are formed. The separate effect of Europeanization of the national strategic culture, though it will be

mentioned in this research, will only be described with regard to the position that the CSDP-missions have in the UK's national strategy. Change in the dependent variable must be clearly caused by the EU and not by other internal or external actors, so there needs to be a check for *alternative hypothesis*. In this research, the hypothesis based on Neorealism will fulfil this function.

3.4 Measuring Neorealism

The alternative hypothesis based on Neorealism for the explanation of the behaviour of the UK is based on the assumption that states seek to increase their power position.

H0 There are no changes in the domestic level impacting security capabilities, unless states can increase their power without reducing their autonomy in decision-making.

The power of a state is based on the division of capacities, especially military capabilities. Any significant change of capabilities forces states to rebalance their own capabilities to ensure their security in this dangerous world. In this research I will show how Neorealism would describe the behaviour of the UK in the period 1998-2008. First of all it should be clear what the range of the changes of policy by states is and when state-action is considered relevant for power in terms of capabilities. Secondly it needs to be determined how states assessed the possibilities to increase their power and which actions they used to do so. Realism is considered to offer a convincing analytical framework to understand ESDP operations, because Realism understand military power (and its acquisition) as a key to unlocking international political relations (Jahier, 2010).

To understand which actions are relevant, first power should defined in a measurable fashion. Power is the ability to influence another to act in ways in which that entity would not have acted otherwise. The preference of a state and its actual behaviour therefore need to be compared to see whether power has been exerted upon it. Power can be divided so-called *Hard Power* and *Soft Power*. Hard power is use of military or economic threat to force another entity to change their behaviour or face the consequences. Thereby hard power forces the involved parties to consider their interests in terms of calculable costs and benefits. Soft power is based on convincing the other entity to accept the other's ideas as valid. To Neorealism soft power can play a role in international relations, but cannot weigh up against security considerations of states, being rational actors. Therefore expressions of soft power can only matter in regards of less important matters than security. States are primarily interested in their own security and should not be inclined to engage in interventions as such behaviour would not enhance their relative power and increase their relative security (Jahier, 2010). The principles of soft power can only be taken into consideration when they are congruent with Neorealist principles of hard power. In this paper there will be no analysis of soft power, but the

focus will be on whether the behaviour of states is according to Neorealist principles of the use of hard power. This does not disregard the use of soft power as a factor, but it places it second to considerations of hard power, as prescribed by Neorealist theory. Therefore actions of states are first considered in the light of their effect on the balance of capabilities in terms of hard power. The actions of states are analyzed not on basis of their rhetoric goals, but solely on their effects on the increase of capabilities. Because states are assumed to mask their actions for the purpose of soft power expression, the stated goals are considered less relevant than the possible increase of capabilities (Keohane, 1986). The most important consideration in Neorealism is the prevention of decrease of security for the state. If the state loses autonomy over the use of its military forces this would mean a clear decrease of security. Furthermore, cooperation with other states in the realm of defence policy is only desirable when it increases military capabilities or strategic options, because cooperation in itself is not considered a valid goal. Neorealism in this research is considered to have a problem if it is found that states cooperate without clear improvement in power or give up autonomy over the use of its military capabilities.

In measuring the changes of policy by states, the only policies that are deemed relevant that have direct influence of the possibilities of states to force behaviour in other actors through economic or military means. The explanation towards the international and domestic press are deemed to be less relevant than documents for internal use, specifically those aimed at direct policy implementation. The clearest direct commands regarding changes in structure of institutions, expansion of military and economical capabilities in practical terms and military cooperation can be considered the best measurement of intention of states. The changes in policy are only considered to truly have had a result if they created a shift in the balance of power. Based on this analysis of intend and action, in terms of policy changes, the behaviour of states can be explained in Neorealist terms. If states act to increase their power position when they are able to do so by changing their policies, they indeed act according to the rationality of power maximization. The identification of moments when the state believes it can increase power are based on changes in policy regarding military and economic capabilities as expressed by top state-officials in official documents. In this way the actions of the state are coordinated and set in motion. Therefore these state decisions will be the main source for the testing of the Neorealist hypothesis.

3.5 Data collection

The main sources of information in this research are the scientific articles on the development of EU foreign policy, the ESDP and the relation between NATO and the EU. Furthermore the National Security Strategy papers of the UK, documents from the House of Commons and similar documents from the House of Lords of the UK give insight in the national preferences and discussions in the UK. To determine which misfits, both institutional and policy wise, are a hindrance to European policy implementation, a combination of these sources will be used. Limitations in this research are the limited influence of public discourse that will be discussed in this research, since the expressions of the government and policy elites will be considered as representative of the intentions of the UK as a state. This approach was chosen because the public opinion on participation in the missions is not expected to be a major influence on the quality and frequency of participation. The external relations with NATO-allies and the EU are expected to have an influence as well of the strategic culture among policy makers. Uploading of the UK's preferences will be a part of the narrative on the implementation, but will only be mentioned when it has led to a significant change in policy that subsequently was to be downloaded. This focus on one part of the Europeanization loop is due to the limited scope any research has to deal with. The data on the different military missions comes from a number of sources, including the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the EEAS (European External Action Service) website. In the next chapter the development of the ESDP will be examined in its historical context. The existing security culture is described as well as the ESDP-missions that followed from the new ESDP and the demands that this placed on member-states. After this, in the fifth and sixth chapter, the terms of Institutionalism and Neorealism are used to analyze the state-level behaviour.

H4: Changes in the European security and defence

This chapter describes the political situation at the European level and how the change in European security culture has led to the creation of the ESDP missions. First I give a description of the international security environment followed by the turnabout of the UK at St. Malo. Then I describe the formation of the European security culture and the role that the UK played in changing the norms and policies of the EU. This is followed by the new direction of policy set by the European council for members-states to implement. This new set of norms and policies is relevant because it forms the standard for implementation at the national level. After that I describe the different state and institutional actors that exert adaptation pressure through social actions onto the member states.

4.1 The international security environment

When the political situation in Europe changed with the fall of the Soviet Union there was room internationally for the development of new kinds of security policy and for the EU to enlarge its influence in Europe in relation to the US (Howorth, 2004). The US encouraged higher levels of European engagement in its own defence, since the necessity for the US to take care of this had become less obvious since the fall of the Soviet Union. There was during the early 1990s no progress, however, towards integration of security and defence policies in the EU. Neither in the Maastricht treaty, with its declaration of a common foreign and security policy having been 'hereby established', nor in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty (Ojanen, 2006). NATO supported a higher participation in terms of European states paying for military capabilities, but it was considered appropriate by the US, the UK and other Atlanticist-states that any defence initiative coming from Europe would be fitted into the existing NATO command structure. Due to its status of being the only effective organization in the realm of European defence and its pre-established division of functions, NATO was seen by many as the only serious effective defence organization for years to come (Anderson and Seitz, 2006). France, however, had always had a different vision of the possibility of European defence integration and of their own position with regards to a European defence force. They saw the changing reality of the security situation in Europe as an opportunity to create a European defence organization, separate from the influence of the US and with a distinctly 'European' character. This would enable France to 'show leadership' in European decision making on defence and allow for international power projection (Merlingen, 2011).

The end of the cold war also meant a change of focus in theorizing about defence, security and the role of the army. From large scale (conscription based) armies, to an approach which was more focused on crisis-management and humanitarian interventions. This led to the development of the

Petersberg tasks by the Western European Union (WEU). The Petersberg tasks mostly focused on creating both the will and the capabilities among European states to participate in humanitarian interventions and police tasks together. The wide range of tasks, from humanitarian aid to peace enforcement, were given to the Western European Union (WEU) in 1992 and later became integrated in the treaty of Amsterdam (which was signed in 1997 and implemented in 1999).

4.2 The British turnabout at St. Malo

The division between the Atlanticist UK and Europeanist France however got a great turnabout at the bilateral summit in December 1998 at Saint-Malo because of a British policy shift (Howorth, 2001). In fact, British foreign policy in the previous years under Thatcher and Major had kept to a security order that had essentially disappeared. John Major, Prime Minister from 1990-1997, had refused to engage his European colleagues in discussion on a European security identity and had worked exclusively with Washington, NATO and the more Atlanticist defence ministers of Europe to try and ensure a leading role for NATO in any new security structure, with a leading role for the UK as mediator (Howorth, 2004). With the St. Malo meeting between the UK and France a change in the way of thinking about European security cooperation was started. Though both France and the UK already around 1996 came to the conclusion that the WEU was more of a institutional problem than part of any solution, at that time their preferences had differed. The French wanted a military component to the EU, whilst the UK wanted to expand the European capabilities within NATO with an option for use by the EU (Howorth, 2004, p.218). With the new Labour government of Tony Blair coming into power in May 1997, there was a major policy shift on the side of the UK-government (Howorth, 2004). A new norm was formulated within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Ministry of Defence (MoD), as well as in multiple think-tanks like the Centre for European Reform. This new norm was that the UK should endorse a defence and security task for the EU (Howorth, 2004).

Two important factors assisted the government's decision. The first was the US message that the US, instead of being opposed to a European security capacity, as the UK had for a long time believed, supported it. The US even claimed a European defence capacity could be the salvation of the Alliance (Howorth, 2004). The second factor was the possibility of a new crisis in the Balkans. For Tony Blair, the failure to formulate an effective policy for the Balkans was a major reason (Howorth, 2000b). It was painfully obvious that Europe still was not able to solve a crisis in what it considered to be its own backyard (Howorth, 2004). Tony Blair's role in this turnabout by the UK was instrumental. Some analysts at the time have suggested that; 'if Tony Blair were to fall under a bus, the entire ESDP project could go back into reverse' (Howorth, 2000a). The reversal in the UK's preference can be

traced back to different speeches made by Blair in the run-up to the St. Malo meeting (Merlingen & Ostrauskaite, 2007). Subsequently, a group of UK officials became part of a new European epistemic community that was taking up the new paradigm and refining it (Howorth, 2004).

Now the UK was willing to consider a stronger cooperation, being one of the most important military powers in Europe, further integration could take place. The change in position by the UK led to the new plans in the European Council Cologne agreement of 1999, where the intention of creating a capacity for autonomous action was announced. In fact, the UK strongly preferred to start off with the establishment of troop formations and let the build-up of institutions wait. As UK's Defence Secretary George Robertson said; *'Institutional re-engineering alone will solve little... you cannot send a wiring diagram to a crisis'* (Howorth, 2001). The greatest new form of capacity would be the military 'Headline Goal 2003', which aimed at setting up a 50-60.000 men strong European Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) before 2003 which was to be based on military assets separate from NATO (Anderson & Seitz, p.26, 2006). The Headline Goal was to be decided at the European Council Helsinki Summit in 2000. The British trade-off in the preparations for the Helsinki Summit was to go along with a relatively high-profile COPS (Political and Security Committee, in the French acronym) in exchange for a genuine commitment to the construction of serious military capacity: the 'Headline Goal' (Howorth, 2001). Other member-states, like The Netherlands, Portugal, Austria and Ireland were relatively unhappy about the EU acquiring a security capacity at all, but accepted it because of the progress it meant for the development of the CFSP (Howorth, 2001). As a result, the turn of direction by the UK, which previously had insisted on participation in defence matters only in the context of NATO, led to a broader European foreign and security structure and in this way to a change in security culture. The way in which strategic decision-makers perceived the policy options for military conflicts had changed, therefore changing their habitual behaviour and world view. This new view on the role of the EU as a security actor fits the criteria for a change in security culture.

4.3 The formation of European security culture

During the period between 1998 and 1999 the European security culture had changed. This change led to a new set of norms and policies which then became a standard for EU member-states to comply with. The change of direction indicated by the St. Malo agreement between France and the UK can be considered a change of security culture because it was a change in the beliefs, assumptions, world views and patterns of habitual behaviour on the European level. The UK became convinced that the increase of military forces within an EU-framework was no longer a threat to NATO, but could be considered a reinforcement of its capabilities, the UK started to see the EU as a tool to ensure the political survival of NATO through its link with the EU (Merlingen, 2011). For

France, the militarization of the EU was mostly a way to beef up the EU's international profile as a security provider and as a possible future block alongside NATO. The view of the EU as a security actor and a weakened attachment to defence cooperation through NATO came to be shared by all EU member states to a certain extent (Meyer, 2005).

The first, broad strand which looks on security culture as a way of defining enemies and thinking about use of force can identify the move made in 1998 and 1999 as a possible redefinition of how crisis solving in and around Europe should be handled. The new idea was that conflict solution should take place with a European security approach which could combine use of force with a civilian element. The Petersberg tasks were specifically intended to deal with humanitarian, peacekeeping and peacemaking tasks. However, the Petersberg tasks were seen by some (like the French) as enabling a wide array of options for the EU to choose from instead of a general description of the responsibility for humanitarian intervention in crises. Other countries, like Sweden, preferred to integrate the Petersberg tasks into any security cooperation, whether it be NATO or the EU, because they saw it as an approach that focused more on humanitarian work and policing duties than on military cooperation. Dependent on the logic of the different states, the move to include military assets into the EU's policy domain can be either seen as a different way of thinking about crisis situations and therefore a change of security culture in the broad sense, or as mostly as a change of security in the narrow sense.

The narrower strand of security culture sees security culture as a way to characterize the discursive context of decision making. In this sense, there also was a change in security culture, since the WEU was discarded as a platform for these discussions and a EU mission became a option akin to NATO operations. This narrower strand fits better with the interpretation of France, which sees the CFSP as a way to enhance the role of the EU in military terms. So in terms of both conceptions of security culture there has been a change. Irrespective of these two interpretations of the change in security culture, the more Atlanticist members of the EU together with many of the former soviet-states, preferred continued cooperation with and involvement by the US within NATO (Anderson and Seitz, 2006). States like the UK now supported European cooperation, but remained worried about any reduction of the US's involvement in Europe and the effective functioning of NATO for a long time (Winn, 2003). But also for the Atlanticist states the security culture had changed with the recognition that a new military capability should be the responsibility of the EU. The new norms in the security culture were based on the assumption that;

"... the Council should have the ability to take decisions on the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the Treaty on European Union, the 'Petersberg tasks'.

To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO" (European Council, 1999).

4.4 The new role of the EU

The role of the EU and of the member-states in the international security environment had changed. The member states were now supposed to help and organize the set goal of credible military forces capable of autonomous action. This new goal was the effective new burden on the member-states. They would have to set up the necessary organizational capabilities and possibly new institutions that would make coordination of military capabilities by the EU a reality. This meant a real expansion of effort from the previously existing WEU and NATO responsibilities, because the intention was to be able to take such action without diverting efforts from NATO. And the WEU membership had not covered all EU-countries, so this also would mean a further field of integration for possible new member-states. As for the new security culture, the responsibilities of the EU were expanded in the field of security and defence. With the transfer of many of the capabilities of the WEU to the EU, the EU was now considered to be responsible for the Petersberg tasks. Javier Solana, who was the High representative of the CFSP was also appointed Secretary General of the WEU in 1999 (for an oversight of the CFSP-structure, see appendix 1). Being head of both operations allowed him to oversee the transfer of functions from the WEU to the EU. This meant that the new international norm was that the EU was now responsible for conflict prevention and crisis management, at least when the NATO was not involved. Starting from the enactment of the treaty of Lisbon in 2009 the ESDP is officially referred to as the CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy). When referring to the current structure and functioning of the institution I use this abbreviation instead of the ESDP.

The test for the new capabilities of the EU and their use in fulfilling the Petersberg tasks would be the missions organized within the context of the ESDP. The contribution to these missions in terms of frequency and quality of participation is the measuring tool for determining whether the UK has adopted the norms and policy of the international level. Whether the UK was able to take over the European norms and policy, possibly in spite of Veto Points, Formal Institutions, Norm Entrepreneurs and Political Culture, can be assessed by examining the organization and participation in the ESDP-missions, which will be discussed in Chapters five and six. The last section of this chapter will deal with the sources of adaptation pressure that used social action to incentivize the UK to create the conditions for successful European military missions.

4.5 Sources of adaptation pressure

To enforce the adoption of the new goals, adaptation pressure by a number of states and institutions was exerted on member-states. The four main sources of adaptation pressure on the UK and the social action they used will be identified in this paragraph; the European Council (representing the EU collectively), France, NATO, and the US. These four are selected based on their influence during the researched period as determined by the researcher. In the next chapter, where the misfits between the international level and the national level will be analyzed, the strength of the influence of the different sources of adaptation pressure will be assessed per misfit. This is because the influence of different sources differs per misfit in the way and strength of their influence. These differences are caused by the 'vulnerability' of the national level to influence and mediated by the intervening variables. In the following part only the most important sources, are mentioned because though the strength also depends on the conditions of the misfits, there are a number of sources that have had a distinctly greater influence on the UK national behaviour than others. This is not to say that they are exclusively responsible for changes in policy, since other international and national actors also played a great role.

The first major source of adaptation pressure is the European Council which in this research represents the preference of the EU member-states collectively. The EU as a collective wanted to expand its coordination in foreign policy to fulfil its goal of being a more coherent actor towards the outside world (Smith, 2000). At the same time the EU tries to involve the states that are the most influential in military terms so as to be as strong as possible when it speak with one mouth. Furthermore, the failure of the EU to take action during the Kosovo war was considered a public and moral failure. The European Council has the capability to use manipulation of utility calculations in terms of social actions. This means that it can give both positive and negative incentives and assist in capacity building. Though because the CFSP is firmly grounded in the intergovernmental structure, the possibility for negative incentives is almost minimal. Also the capability of the EU, especially in the early stages to give positive incentives through technical assistance or institutional capabilities was very limited because defence and security expertise was hardly available to the EU in comparison to the UK's own existing structures.

The second source of adaptation pressure, which also operated through its EU-links with the UK, was France. The French wanted European military capabilities for a number of reasons. First of all, they wanted a security cooperation that was not dominated by the US, i.e. NATO and that would enhance the political relevance of the EU. Secondly, a stronger military capability meant a expansion of French political and military options. Options in which it could expect to have more say than in NATO or in

the UN. And lastly, an expansion of European military spending would mean interesting new investments, possibly in France's military industry. France was not willing to strongly manipulate utility calculations, since this would have meant that it would significantly contribute to an expansion of military capabilities and this would undermine the leverage that it was using to motivate the UK. France mostly made use of socialization by promoting the concept of the ESDP. It provided an authoritative model and actively supported its use. The high levels of participation by France and its preference to set up ESDP-missions should be considered in this regard.

The third major source of adaptation pressure was NATO. The organization had no specific preference for the way in which new military assets would be created, this being a prerogative of the member-states. The only concern of the organization was that it would find a better way of dealing with new kinds of war. Already during the war in Yugoslavia in 1991-1995, NATO found that it was in need of more policing capabilities and troops deployable overseas. The pressure on NATO-members only increased with the start of the war in Afghanistan in 2001. To get more troops available for Afghanistan and the war in Iraq, the NATO would be putting pressure on all its members to supply and/or create more available troops. These could be used either for deployment in war, or as replacement in less active theatres like the Balkans (Merlingen, 2011). NATO also makes use of manipulation of utility calculations as a social action. It lacks the legal and influential requirements to force states to participate, but it promotes its preferences by using public opinion and high level meetings. The pressure NATO exerts can be classified as stronger than normative, because if states do not contribute significantly they risk a response from other NATO-members.

The last major source of adaptation pressure was the US. Though there is overlap in the general demand for troops during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, there was also the much older demand by the US for an increased participation by Europe as a whole as a requisite for US-involvement (Merlingen, 2011). The US is considered to be the UK's most significant ally and as a way to magnify the UK's influence across the globe by virtue of its capabilities. Any pressure by the US on the UK therefore has a significant meaning for policy makers on the national level. The US has the power to coerce, but would not use that in this case. Though they use the power of socialization to promote certain attitudes within the UK, the larger relationship between the two countries is too extensive not to consider the influence of the US as manipulation of utility calculations. The strength of the relationship between the US and the UK is based on a large number of shared interests, as well as large benefits for both sides that would be hard to attain without the others help. The whole political and theoretical concept of Atlanticism, which plays a large role in the UK's security and defence policy is based on the mutually beneficial, but also mutually manipulating relationship. The decision

to change direction at St. Malo itself was partially taken as a response to US adaptation pressure to create a military autonomous ESDP (Faleg, 2013).

Because of the change of security culture after St. Malo and the new demand for the development of a capacity of autonomous action since Cologne, there was a new set of normative and policy standards for the UK to follow. There was adaptation pressure exerted by the EU, France, NATO and the US to implement the agreed to goals, but there were a number of misfits between these goals and the reality of organizing EU missions in real conflict conditions as will be argued in the next chapter.

H5 Institutional and Policy Misfits

In this chapter I describe five misfits which were prohibitive of the UK's participation in ESDP-missions in either frequency or quality. The selection of misfits is based on an appraisal of the different mismatches between European and national policies, processes and institutions affecting European policy, norms and implementation in terms of the ESDP-missions. I start by giving a short introduction of the misfits and the order in which they will be addressed. After that I describe the misfits in depth and address the way in which their influence evolved during the period under research. Where necessary I give background information about the missions and the UK's level of participation. One limitation of the description of the misfits is the time period of 1998-2008. Though the concrete requirement for a military capacity only came into existence with the 1999 Cologne meeting, the new norm of a European defence capability was already clearly initiated by the St. Malo agreement. Preparations for the missions did not start that early, but there were already misfits between the new norms at the international and domestic level. Therefore the period of 1998-2000 will also be included.

I start with describing the institutional misfits. These misfits challenge domestic rules and procedures and the collective understanding attached to them. This kind of misfits does not only show when institutions are unable to coordinate policy, but at some points also that different institutions make claims on the same decision powers, for example with the question whether the EU or NATO has the right to intervene first in a crisis situation.

The first of these institutional misfits occurred between the UK and NATO, which I describe with special attention for the role that the US played as a NATO member-state. NATO as an organization and the US both started out as supporters of the ESDP, but with different ideas about how it should function, making actually organizing missions or setting up new military capabilities difficult. To the US, there were three important guidelines. These were expressed by Madeleine Albright in 1998, and called the three Ds, which the EU should avoid in its creation of a new security policy. These three D's stand for decoupling of European and North American security, discrimination for NATO states that want to participate in EU-missions and duplication of military capabilities that NATO already possesses (Howorth, 2004). For other NATO partners, especially Turkey, it was important that the EU would not exclude NATO-members in decision making or share secret information with non-NATO members in the EU. These demands by NATO-allies made setting up missions and organizational structure difficult.

The second institutional misfit is the setting up and coordination of new institutions at the European level and coordination with other EU-states. The EU and other EU-member states, especially France, had other institutional and practical preferences than the UK in terms of the way that the ESDP and its mission-structure should function. The time needed to resolve these differences and the compromises that needed to be made temporarily inhibited the UK from implementing the original goal of an autonomous military capability. Overall the relations between the UK, the EU and fellow EU member-states, prevented the ESDP-missions from performing qualitatively.

The third institutional misfit is between the new European norms on security and defence cooperation and the UK's domestic level. The UK's critical stance on setting up new European institutions and considerations of sovereignty have inhibited the functioning of some of the new institutions of the ESDP. The norms of the international level have not been accepted at the domestic level. This forms a hindrance to the participation in the missions, since domestic support among policy makers is low.

Next are the policy misfits. Policy misfits are essentially compliance problems due to differences in policy between the EU and the domestic level. European level intentions are hindered by national standards, techniques and sometimes the differences in underlying problem-solving approach.

The first policy misfit is the issue of defence expenditure. Europe has been lowering its defence spending ever since the fall of the Soviet Union, whilst at the same time needing money to reform their old structure militaries. This has left little budget for actual missions or setting up of new capabilities. For the UK this is both an internal and external problem in the organization of ESDP-missions, since it not only affects its own participation but also lowers the input of other states, therefore risking the quality and frequency of missions.

The second policy misfit is related with the first policy misfit and concerns the lack of available troops for overseas deployment. Due to a number of organizational and financial reasons European states only have a small number troops available for international deployment even though the states maintain a great number of soldiers which are not deployable outside their countries. This, much more than the problem of defence expenditure is a matter of policy and international coordination. The lacking number of deployable troops, mostly because of multiple simultaneous demands from international institutions, has also impacted the UK's participation in ESDP-missions.

Some information on the general aspects of the ESDP mission is necessary to understand which problems influenced their frequency and quality. During this chapter is will refer to a number of the military missions deployed within the ESDP framework. The scope of this research is the period of

1998-2008 in which there have been 8 military missions. The contribution by most member-states to the ESDP has been much smaller than that to NATO or the UN (Soder, 2010a). This means that for most countries the capabilities to fulfil the requirements of the missions exist if they would prioritize the ESDP over NATO and UN missions, especially looking at the total amount of troops available among EU member-states. Some states do not have certain capabilities and this means that they are not able to fulfil certain roles, but this is not the case for the UK. The missions are organized in such a way that they are always led by a "leading nation", which is responsible for the coordination of the mission, though another state can supply the location and staff of the headquarter. The leading nation usually supplies the biggest number of troops. Every missions requires a round of talks about which states will supply which troops and who is going to pay for which part of the mission. Two kinds of costs have been separated; common costs, like transport and medical services, and nation borne costs, like lodging and fuel.

5.1 Institutional misfits

5.1.1 NATO and US relation with the UK

In this paragraph the role of NATO and the US in relation with the UK are discussed. These two are discussed together because much of the pressure these two actors exert on UK security policy overlaps. Though their demands are not completely the same, they include a demand for more European capabilities and later on a recognition of the priority of NATO decision-making over that of the ESDP. The behaviour of the UK prime-ministers until the St. Malo meeting shows that the UK originally was sceptical about rhetoric of a European military force. After the turnabout by the new Labour government, the UK started to actively participate and encourage participation in the creation of a European military capability. The focus of the UK first and foremost was to increase European defence capabilities and bind the US to European security in the future. A misfit was the European Union's new European defence policy and the existing NATO structure. This led to the need for change in the relation between the EU and NATO. The role of NATO in this was that the NATO allies of the UK, especially those outside of the EU were reluctant to see capabilities designated for use by NATO used for another purpose. In 1999, the UK and France together suggested the creation of a European Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), and these suggestions were taken to the EU Summit in Helsinki in December 1999. Some called the RRF a potential 'European Army', though other states, like the UK, vigorously denied this (Howorth, 2001). There was a strong preference of the UK to start off with the establishment of troop formations and let the build-up of institutions wait. As UK's Defence Secretary George Robertson said it; 'Institutional re-engineering alone will solve little... you cannot send a wiring diagram to a crisis' (Howorth, 2001). There would

also be a number of new permanent Brussels-based bodies to plan and run military ESDP operations (Merlingen, 2011). From 1998 till 2008, the ESDP has undergone much institutionalization. The EU created the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, a Political and Security Committee, a European Union Military Committee, a European Union Military Staff, a Policy Unit, a Situation Centre, a European Defence Agency and an EU institute for Security Studies (Anderson and Seitz, 2006). Though these new institutions did not all come into being at the same time, they are all part of the necessary expansion of knowledge and capacities to enable successful military missions. Therefore I describe them only as a new institutional layer and don't describe go into the details of their own development (for an oversight, see Appendix 1). According to authors like Wright (2011) and Howorth (2012), this institutionalization has led to a new dynamic in which new norms and ideas are developed. These new norms are based on the experienced cooperation between the different specialists that make up the European institutions. These specialists, though officially representing their countries, are subject to socialization and persuasion processes in which cooperation and adaptation become increasingly important. Nevertheless, in 2006 there were still complaints that the political will for effective operations was missing:

"Efficient structures, access to suitable resources, institutional clarity count for little in the absence of real political will on the part of our Member-states". Javier Solana, High Representative (Anderson and Seitz, 2006).

An important step in setting up the ESDP was the Berlin Plus agreement of 2002, in which the relation between NATO and the ESDP was formally established. In this agreement, Turkey, which had been blocking the use of NATO capabilities by the ESDP, was promised that it would be involved in any ESDP mission using NATO capabilities and that Malta and Cyprus, which aren't part of NATO would be excluded (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2007). This created room for the first missions in the Western Balkans, where EU troops took over from the earlier NATO missions, whilst maintaining use of some of its equipment and organizational capabilities. The first mission of the ESDP was Concordia, which was conducted in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and consisted of a staff of 350 people. Their goal was military support and peacekeeping, which they took over from the NATO mission Allied Harmony (2001-2003)(Mix,2011). The UK contributed just 3 soldiers to the mission, compared to France's 82, though most large other nations, like Germany and Italy also only contributed between 1 and 5 soldiers (SIPRI, 2013). The mission was generally considered successful and it showed that it was possible for the EU to organize its own military mission, even though it had been a relatively small one.

With the Berlin-Plus agreement most of the problems of the use of NATO-capabilities by the EU were dealt with, though this did not solve any problems of lacking capabilities. The cooperation between the EU and NATO isn't without its flaws. Even though NATO officially has the right for first response since the Berlin-plus agreement there remains a discussion between NATO and the EU over which organization has the right to first response. An example of this is when the African Union asked for support in Darfur. In this case the two organizations started in 'a political beauty contest' and started operating parallel missions in 2005 (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2007). The EU provided a package of civilian and military measures to support AMIS (African Union's Mission in Sudan/Darfur). The EU deployed several dozen military and civilian personnel to AMIS during the two-and-a-half-year mandate. This personnel included on average 30 police officers, 15 military experts, and two military observers during the whole period of deployment (Council of the European Union, 2008).

The US originally strived for three important guidelines, the three Ds, to be followed by the EU in its creation of a new security policy. Though the US had made it very clear that they insisted on the three D's, they did not take action when the EU set up policies that went against them. The UK supported these three standards set by the US, but never made a breaking point of them in negotiations with other EU states. France had other plans for the direction of the ESDP, which it had always seen as a way to decrease American influence in Europe and to increase European cooperation. Therefore the idea that the ESDP should remain linked to NATO and not duplicate its capabilities was rejected by the French. France would take the lead in the development of European institutions and capabilities whilst trying to increase the autonomy of the ESDP.

In the same period as the first ESDP mission started, the debate about the Iraq war became increasingly intense and the US found itself confronted with resistance to its chosen policies by France, Germany and other countries in Europe. France, which had always envisioned the ESDP as an opportunity to create European military power separate from the influence of the US, suggested together with Belgium and Luxembourg to create a separate command capability for the ESDP (Cornish and Edwards, 2005). This led the US to see the whole ESDP initiative in a negative new light. It was feared that instead of being a form of increasing Europe's military powers in support of combined EU-US policy, the ESDP was merely duplicating NATO capabilities and possibly even becoming a future rival (Merlingen, 2011). Around the same time the EU was taking over for some of the tasks of the US in the Balkans with operation Althea. Althea is the largest force deployed so far by the EU, stationed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There were 2 key planning challenges. The 1000 American troops and the US as a framework nation as well had to be replaced. Finland became the framework nation that replaced the US. Since about 80 percent of the SFOR (Stabilization Forces) troops already were European, only badges needed to be replaced for them (Merlingen and Ostrauskaité, 2007).

The UK, together with Germany and Italy was one of the three main contributors of troops (Merlingen and Ostrauskaité, 2007). The mission is still ongoing but so far considered a success.

The fears of the US that the ESDP would be more separate from the US and follow its own course meant that the UK had a problem. For the UK, the cooperation between the US and Europe, in the form of NATO, was a major source of influence. The UK, through its 'special relationship' with the US, considered itself as a bridge between Europe and North America and considered the new development of affairs as being very detrimental to its own position. But after the invasion of Iraq, the tempers slowly cooled. The ESDP, which did not seem to evolve quickly into a significant military force, became seen by the US as a useful supplemental force in its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, where the EU could help with post-conflict assistance (Merlingen, 2011). Since the EU has experience and a positive reputation in civilian and paramilitary missions like the police and armed forces training missions in the Balkans and Africa, it functions as a complementary partner of the US. The Althea mission helped establish this new image, because it showed how military capabilities could be freed up by replacing US forces by European forces in theatres of less importance to the US. This process of beginning to trust the EU as a useful ally took place during the whole time span of 1998 till 2008, with an exception in the period around the run up to the Iraq war. In some situations, like interventions in Africa, the ESDP missions acted as a replacement of the US in UN sanctioned interventions (Merlingen, 2011). The ESDP-NATO relations have been problematic in the researched period because the NATO saw the ESDP as a possible competitor in its policy-domain. The US was for a while sceptical about the possibilities for a separate European force and many of the policy makers in the UK also had little trust in the new direction of Tony Blair, who was very much responsible for the turnabout by the UK. The UK at the same time was one of its biggest contributors and a driving force behind getting the institutional structures in place for effective deployment. Both NATO and the US have expressed support for the ESDP-missions, but only in a subsidiary role. By asking for troops for missions that are alternatives to ESDP-missions, the NATO has undermined the support for ESDP in the UK and remains to be seen as the most legitimate option for military cooperation. An example of this preference for military cooperation in NATO over ESDP missions is the EU NAVFOR mission. In December 2008 the EU launched the European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) Somalia – Operation Atalanta within the framework of the CSDP in response to the rising levels of piracy and armed robbery off the Horn of Africa and in the Western Indian Ocean (EUNAVFOR, 2013). The UK participated in the EU NAVFOR mission with ships, but later only contributed with ships through participation in the NATO mission; Ocean Shield (Soder, 2010a). By challenging the new collective understanding of the ESDP as a separate military option at the national level and making demands on

the institutional structure internationally, NATO and the US have inhibited the frequency and quality of ESDP-missions.

5.1.2 UK- EU relations

Similarly to the position of the US in the UK-NATO relations, next to the EU there is another country which has had a large impact on the way in which the relationship with the EU developed, namely France. Though the adaptation pressure from France on the UK is different in some aspects from that of the EU, there is much overlap. The relation between the UK and the EU is relevant for the level of compliance of the ESDP for a number of reasons. In general, the UK isn't a big supporter of the EU's supranationalist aspects. The efforts of EU institutions to try and gain influence on matters which are considered by the UK to be in the domain of the member states are considered undesirable. The UK is a strong supporter of NATO and the most Atlanticist nation in the EU. This means that any attempt to separate European security mechanisms from the transatlantic alliance will face resistance from the UK. There has been a growing support for the ESDP as it turns out to be able to function in a complementary role to NATO. This complementary role is mostly in combined civilian missions. The ambitions for the ESDP by EU-officials and France, however are much greater and more focused on a possible future common foreign policy. The build up of European security institutions and the role of the High representative have led the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy, of which the CSDP is now part) to have supranational elements, enlarging the role of the EU in security matters.

When it turned out that the Helsinki Headline Goal for setting up the RRF would not be met by 2003, the European Defence Agency (EDA) was formed to organize a better development process for the ESDP (Merlingen & Ostrauskaite, 2007). The EDA is responsible for the better coordination of defence expenditure and investment coordination but is hindered by the UK in performing its duties, because the UK perceives it to be interfering in state responsibilities. The new centrepiece of the 2010 Headline Goal was the formation of battle groups of about 1500 highly trained soldiers. In 2005 the modalities were outlined for the establishment of multifunctional civilian crisis management resources, including rapidly deployable Civilian Response Teams. In theory, the diversity of the EU's instruments is one of its greatest benefits. In practice however, bureaucratic infighting between EU institutions and member states often undermine the unity of purpose and the coherence of European foreign policy (Merlingen & Ostrauskaite, 2007).

Within the EU there are different stances regarding the direction the ESDP should head. Along with the Atlanticist and Europeanist countries, there also are the (former) neutral countries. Countries like Sweden and Finland insisted on balancing the militarization of the EU with the creation of civilian instruments, aimed at playing a more constructive role in peace building (Merlingen & Ostrauskaite,

2007). The UK's standpoint is that within the ESDP, more military capabilities should be available and this is also what is in the EU's planning (House of Commons, 2008). The UK has accepted a limited military role of the EU and now tries to go forward in using it effectively, though it still believes that it should be absolutely intergovernmental and NATO-friendly (House of Commons, 2008).

The UK's population in recent years has been opposed to the creation of a 'European Army'. Feelings that the Conservative party is particularly willing to exploit (Hood, 2008). Results from polling suggest that a majority of the British public supports the EU as a possible alternative to NATO (Eichenberg, 2003). However, when asked if there should be more defence spending in order to make the EU more autonomous from the US, only 17 % of the UK's population said to agree, as opposed to 25 % in Germany and 42 % in France (Eichenberg, 2003). In general, the British see NATO as more effective than the EU, whilst the Germans and French have about equal confidence in both (Eichenberg, 2003, p.638). The British public seems to support European defence cooperation and the participation in a European military force but without a great majority that is present in other European countries (Eichenberg, 2003). At the same time there is a strong support for NATO and a preference of an autonomous army over an European army (Eichenberg, 2003). The main reasons to keep perceiving NATO as the main and most powerful and reliable security structure still stand. Though the EU is now able to mount its own missions, its capabilities are still weak compared to that of NATO and there is discussion about the effectiveness of some of its missions. An example of a mission that though it was deemed a success, was a demonstration of the limits of the ESDP, is the EUFOR DRC mission. All scenarios for troop deployment foresaw a presence of anything between 50 and 4.000 troops in Kinshasa before the elections (Merlingen and Ostrauskaité, 2007). The UK made it clear that due to its heavy commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq it was not keen on taking the lead (Merlingen and Ostrauskaité, 2007). The French felt that since they had led the last mission, it was the turn of the reluctant Germans. In the end 400 troops were deployed in Kinshasa and a standby battalion size force was stationed in neighbouring Gabon. In total 1800 troops were involved. The Germans had insisted on a limited mandate and time schedule, which meant that the troops were pulled back on 30 November 2006. The operation wasn't led very efficiently and revealed multiple problems in the system of decision making (Merlingen and Ostrauskaité, 2007).

The institutional misfit between the UK and the EU on security is the different collective understanding of where the future lies for the UK's security relations with NATO and the EU. The UK's government, but also ministry of defence and foreign office seem unable to coordinate policy that is coherent with regards to their European commitments and the policy paradigm that they try to follow nationally. The national paradigm regards NATO as the primary military security partner and

the ESDP-missions as a option to include EU-partners, instead of the ESDP as an autonomous military capability, as was expressed in with the 1999 European Council decision.

5.1.3 National strategy and political culture

The national strategy documents of the UK give an insight in the security culture of the UK. They allow us to see how the UK has identified the role of the ESDP and the EU in their range of cooperation options. The national strategy documents together with a short analysis of the original intentions of the UK for the ESDP show how the domestic security culture and evaluation of the ESDP has been shaped and how this affected the acceptance of the ESDP policy.

The UK's national strategy up till 1998 was dominated by the focus on cooperation within NATO, based on the practical belief that it remained the only organization capable of large scale, faraway missions (Howorth, 2000a). It also enabled the British to use American capabilities like strategic planning and airlift capabilities (Howorth, 2000a). Furthermore, there was a strong integration of the UK's and US military, resulting from cooperation during the Cold war and earlier during the Second World War (Dunne, 2004). The UK, based on its 'special relation', shared much of its intelligence capabilities with the US and British firms were one of few in the world who had a foothold in the large defence-market of the US, based on mutual purchases by the UK and US (Hood,2008). This meant that the UK had a strong incentive to maintain strong relations with the US.

There were at the same time four reasons based on the UK's interest for a European build-up of military capabilities in any guise. Firstly, the UK was afraid that lack of will to maintain military strength in Europe after the cold war would be seen by the US as a sign that the European countries weren't prepared to invest in their own protection. This free-rider behaviour would be considered an argument for the US to abandon European security as a whole and to render NATO impotent (Howorth, 2000a). This could seriously impair the UK's security in case of a military conflict. Secondly, the build-up of a European security structure could lead to a more open market for defence procurement, which would improve competitive procurement and lower development costs (Strategic Defence Review, 1998). Thirdly, a European military capability could entice more Europeanist states, like France, to make troops available for international missions, preferably in a NATO-based structure (Merlingen, 2011). Fourth and lastly, the creation of a mission structure in the EU foreign policy pillar could be used to reign it back in, under the control of the states and away from the supra-nationalist direction the CFSP had been heading (Howorth, 2000a).

Looking at the statements in the 1998, 2002 and 2003 Security and defence strategy documents (Strategic Defence Review, 2002), a number of developments can clearly be identified. The

development of the ESDP as an important new security structure wasn't foreseen by the UK in its strategy documents. In the 1998 Strategic and Defence review, the WEU was still seen as the place for development of a European Defence Identity (EDI), which was to place any European military capacity within NATO (Strategic Defence Review, 1998). And European security was still considered the policy field of NATO (Strategic Defence Review, 1998). By 2002 the ESDP is mentioned shortly, but without any explanation about the future of its kind of missions or its relation towards NATO. Its focus is described as 'encompassing stabilization tasks, which are key to the overall campaign against international terrorism' (Strategic Defence Review, 2002). The 2003 White Paper; *Delivering Security in a Changing World*, refers to the UK as a leading contributor to the ESDP and NATO (Defence White Paper, 2003). The ESDP is described as in place, but still lacking credible capabilities. The relationship between NATO and the EU as seen by the UK is one of complementing each other instead of competition.

"The UK is a strong supporter of developing EU military capability to complement NATO, rather than competing with it. The EU, with its focus on crisis management operations outside the Union, has now established an operational Common Security and Defence Policy and the military structures required to support it, though significant shortfalls remain to be met before the Helsinki Headline Goal is achieved in full" (Defence White Paper, 2003).

In the 2008 Security strategy; 'security in an interdependent world', it is stated that collective action, through the UN, EU and NATO remains the most effective way of managing and reducing the threats faced (National Security Strategy of the UK, 2008). The EU is considered to have a vital role in securing a safer world, within and beyond the borders of Europe. Its domains are reckoned to include promoting security by engagement on every level, Government, business, civil society, education and individual (National Security Strategy of the UK, 2008). But still the relation with the US, including through its engagement in NATO is considered the most important bilateral relationship and central to the national security of the UK. Though less attention is being paid to the development of new institutions, there is a clear indication that the UK accepted the EU as having a military role inside and outside of Europe. There is still the call for developing a stronger international military capacity, but this should also include civil elements like judges, lawyers, police as well as civil stabilization experts (National Security Strategy of the UK, 2008). On the EU's Foreign and Security Policy the UK expresses that it wants it to be stronger and more accountable, with more integrated capabilities and a particular focus on its positive contribution to security sector reform. The EU-NATO relation is expected to be enhanced and expanded, whilst NATO's capabilities should grow to deal with the current unbalanced division of burden sharing (National Security Strategy of the UK, 2008).

The Strategic Reviews and the White Paper show an acceptance in the security culture of the UK of the new military role of the EU, but with the constant reminder that NATO will need to remain the main organization for European security. The role of Europe is seen as complementary, but since it chose to organize a military branch, the UK has the view that it should fulfil its set goals in the most financially efficient way. The communication of the security strategies towards the larger public and the role that multilateral cooperation has or should have seems not to have been effective in the UK. The conservatives have blamed Labour governments of wanting to build a European army and undermine British sovereignty (Giegerich, 2006). Though the conservatives have not changed the wording in the security strategies since, there is little public support for the role of the EU in security (Hood, 2008). The UK's national strategy has prevented the evaluation of the ESDP missions as important enough to invest more time and effort in. The framing of the ESDP missions as being an outcome of the search for a different goal, greater European capabilities, has led to the problem that making ESDP missions 'work' is not considered a main goal for the UK. The UK considers NATO as the only real player in high spectrum violence situations (Faleg, 2013). This leads to the reluctance of the UK to expand the institutional base of the ESDP and give more power to the EDA, which would increase military integration. Further military integration, organized by the EDA could be the source for new capabilities and more effective defence spending, but this is inhibited by the UK's interpretation of a 'limited' ESDP.

5.2 Policy Misfits

Policy misfits basically create compliance problems, as explained in chapter two. They create problems in the whole EU and collide with national standards, instrument, techniques and the underlying problem solving approach of the member states. They are influential in success and failure of the ESDP and they can be broader than only their effect on a single member state. The two policy misfits fit with the approach by Kalata (2009), who identified the same policy misfits as playing a role in Germany. By analyzing these same factors in the UK it is possible to later compare how these issues played a role in multiple EU member states.

5.2.1 Defence expenditure

in the 1990's governments had started to count on the so-called 'peace dividend' since they felt that their biggest threat, the USSR, was no longer there (Strategic Defence Review, 1998). Therefore European defence expenditure has seen a steady decline during this period. For the ESDP there is no official budget through which all missions are paid. Only ten percent of the budget of the military operations were covered as common costs, which are divided among Member-States on the basis of GDP (Menon, 2011). After lengthy negotiations it was decided in 2006 that the Athena mechanism,

described in the first institutional misfit, would cover a portion of the airlift expenditure, which is a major cost in most missions (Merlingen & Ostrauskaite, 2007). There are different sets of finance for military and civilian missions, with the civilian missions being financed from the CFSP budget line. Where the EU-civilian missions are not highly contested, the military operations face more problems. To counter problems of defence acquisition, research and dispersion among member-states, the EDA was founded in 2004. It has four main tasks: the development of defence capabilities, armaments cooperation, the consolidation of a European base for technological and industrial development in support of defence and advancing military research (Merlingen & Ostrauskaite, 2007).

The UK has been one of the biggest contributors in terms of its defence expenditure per GDP. However it is not possible to separate the part of the budget that is designated for NATO and that for the CSDP. The UK has had an average of 2.7% percent of GDP in the period of 1995-1999, of 2.3% in the period of 2000-2004 and 2.5 % from 2004-2009. Though France comes close to these numbers (2.9%, 2.5% and 2.3% in the same period) and in relative terms is quite similar to the UK, Germany isn't even close (1.6%, 1.4% and 1.3%). Even compared to the European average of the period, the UK and France stand out as high spenders (EU average: 2.1%, 1.9% and 1.8%) (NATO Defence Expenditure, 2011). In total terms, the UK and France still tower over Germany, which as the biggest of the three economies by far, is expected by the UK to carry at least an equal burden.

It remains a practical problem for the UK that it would like to see an increase in capabilities across Europe, but due to the fragmented setup of European defence spending, this would be a costly exercise without better European coordination. At the same time the EDA, which is responsible for better coordination has been given limited powers. Money-savers refusing to fund new European-level activities joined Atlanticists, which are wary of supranational armaments authority, to prevent the EDA from acquiring more powers and funds (Merlingen, 2007). The UK has been a particularly vocal opponent of a more powerful EDA. Because of its competitive defence sector, the UK fears that a powerful agency tasked with strengthening the EU-military complex might undermine the privileged relations that it has with the Pentagon, which is the world's largest buyer of military hardware (Merlingen, 2007).

The lack of defence expenditure makes it hard for the EU member-states to comply with the goals they set for themselves within the CFSP. The inability to fulfil the headline goal of 2003 and the lacking fulfilment of the battle groups concept are largely caused by the shortfall in defence expenditure and/or cooperation. States try to maintain the most capabilities for the least amount of money and are at the same time still dealing with the cold war heritage of their armies. At the same time states are trying to reform their militaries for more efficiency, though also at limited costs

(Braddon, 2010). These factors led to an absolute shortfall of capabilities for EU-missions, most clearly in a lack of available helicopters (Seibert, 2010). This problem could be solved through a more focused approach and a better division of European capabilities. But this would require a significant slice of national defence budget, and is already frequently creating conflict between long term plans and meeting everyday costs of troop deployment on actual missions (Braddon, 2010). Since the first option isn't considered likely, especially during the researched period, a raise of defence expenditure is needed to be able to have a sufficiently properly armed force capable of being deployed globally as situations demand (Braddon, 2010). The UK is mostly clearly confronted with the mismatch between national and European policies, since it has contributed most to NATO and the EU in the recent period and is trying to counter this mismatch by uploading its own preference of raising defence expenditure in Europe. Since the rest of Europe has not been willing to accommodate this desire, the alternative is that the UK would expand the policy domain of the CSDP to encompass more responsibilities as France wants, or allows for more intense military cooperation. Both these options are not considered by the UK however because they run against other preferences of Atlanticism and sovereignty over defence spending .

5.2.2 Troop availability

A large problem, especially for the original setup of the Helsinki Headline Goal was the availability of troops. Many European countries still have militaries much oriented towards traditional wars within Europe and a very small number of professional troops that are deployable abroad. Therefore the lack of troops is a clear matter of national standards, which for internationally deployable troops are set too low. Therefore this is a policy misfit. Germany for example has a total force of 250.000 troops, but only a pool of 35.000 for use by NATO's Rapid Response Force, the EU Headline Goals, UN missions, EU battle groups and standby troops for rescue and recovery operations (Kalata, 2009). The UK has faced overstretch of its troops based on commitments during the Afghanistan and Iraq war, which remains a problem (UK Defence white paper,2003).

Although France and the UK are the third and fourth in size of defence spending worldwide, they, as well as the other European states spend most money in national projects. This means that there is a lot of duplication all over Europe, with most states wanting to maintain or aim at the full-spectrum of capabilities (Merlingen, 2011). This has led to the problem that although Europe as a whole has half a million more personnel under arms than the US, around 70% of the armed forces cannot operate outside national territory (Menon, 2011). This has led to serious problems, like shortages in combat ready troops and even police trainers (Menon, 2011). In the case of the deployment in the DRC, the UK wasn't able to (nor willing) to take the lead, due to an overstretch of troops. The issue of

participation in the Althea and DRC missions was discussed in the parliamentary commission on the EU and approved before a decision was made in the council, though in practice the committees were only briefly informed and the issues failed to raise any significant political interest within the debates (Born, *et al*, 2008). Operation Artemis (2003) in the DRC, was as well supported by the UK (Merlingen, 2011). This support was based on the agreement between the UK and France that both had a historical link with Africa, which means they should be involved in solving political crises (Jahier,2010).Both the UK and France agreed on the necessity of leadership by their nations in assisting the DRC to develop a functioning national army (Jahier,2010). For the later EUFOR mission in the DRC (2006), the UK and France pressured Germany into taking the lead (2006) (Merlingen,2011). The UK could not handle being the leading nation in the DRC due to troop shortages (originating from commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan) (Merlingen & Ostrauskaite, 2007).

As the EDA started to fulfil its function as a policy coordinator, there have been plans to better the strategic airlift capabilities in Europe, which has been one of the most crippling of CSDP bottlenecks (Merlingen, 2011). The plans were supposed to lead to a European Air Transport Fleet, but due to technical problems, the first heavy aircraft deliveries were delayed till 2013-2014 (Merlingen, 2011). Another problem next to the strategic air lift capacity is the planning capability. Seen in the early days of the ESDP as one of the major problems, the EU has started to build up its own C4 ISTAR capabilities (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance) (Merlingen, 2011). Though the EDA has been more effective than expected, EU states still spend much more on national defence procurement than on European collaborative defence procurement (Merlingen, 2011). The EDA estimates that out of the total number of European forces in 2008, roughly 464,500 were deployable, and out of these about 125,000 were sustainable in external operations. The national policies of many member states still collide with that of the EU and though the UK sees itself as an example to others, it doesn't actually share the problem-solving approach of the EU, which is to coordinate spending through the EDA. This creates the mismatch of the UK's national and the European policy. Though the UK's governmental policy is to counter what they see as EU interference, they thereby make improved effectiveness of the CSDP unlikely. The policy misfits of low European defence expenditure and lacking troop availability are not caused by the UK, but nor can they easily be fixed without the UK enabling the EDA to gain a greater influence. Through the blockading of effective operation of the EDA and by limiting the policy scope and therefore importance of the CSDP, the UK is a factor in blocking effective improvement in these misfits that hinder the quality and frequency of missions.

5.3 Conclusion on misfits

To clarify which misfit had an effect on changes in policy I split up the effects of the misfit on the UK policy in degrees impact after which I summarize the combined effect of the misfits. The question here is whether the misfits have negatively influenced the quality and participation of the UK in ESDP-missions once deployment has been agreed upon. The willingness of the UK may impact the number of ESDP-missions the UK participates in. Quality of contribution involves both troop numbers and equipment. The impact of the misfits is considered "low" when it does not significantly affect willingness to deploy or quality of deployment, "medium" when it sometimes does, and "high" when it always does.

Table 5.3 Impact of Misfits

	Low/unknown impact	Medium (sometimes problematic)	High (always problematic)
UK-NATO/US relations		x	
UK- EU relation		x	
National Strategy and Political Culture	x		
Defence Expenditure		x	
Troop availability			x

The first misfit has not prevented the UK from participation and even from taking a leadership position in the setting up of the ESDP, though it has stretched the time period before missions could start considerably. The problematic ESDP/NATO relationship seems to have required some adaptation of the UK's position on the function of the WEU. Europe gained power to organize its own separate military force, but as long as the US accepted these changes, so did the UK. Though the civilian parts of the ESDP are not something that originates from the UK, it has not led to rejection of the ESDP by the UK either and it has won over other EU member states into supporting the missions. In the UK's relation with the EU and France the UK's inclination to oppose supra-nationalist aspects of EU cooperation has sometimes been problematic. Though the agenda structuring role of the High representative is accepted, the EDA is kept at bay by the UK because it is perceived as more threatening to national sovereignty over defence capabilities. The problems of effective defence expenditure and organization of forces remain problematic. The effective lack of troops remains the greatest problem as well for the UK's participation in and functioning of the ESDP. The missions that

had been agreed upon by the UK had at times to do without participation of the UK as well, because it did not have troops available.

The **UK-NATO relations** have been problematic because the NATO first saw the ESDP as a possible intruder in its policy-domain. The US was sceptical about the possibilities for a separate European force and many of the norm entrepreneurs in the UK also had little trust in the new direction of Tony Blair who was very much responsible for the turnabout by the UK. The Political culture of the UK, which is strongly Atlanticist has always remained sceptical about the possibilities of the CFSP. The **UK-EU relation** is central in explaining how the UK perceives the CSDP, and which efforts it is willing to make to make its missions possible. Though the UK did not use its veto powers during the researched period of 1998-2008, it does more recently by blocking the working of the EDA. The **national strategy** and changing **political culture** have not helped to consolidate the position of the CFSP. Though none of the opponents have been able to keep it out of the national strategic documents, it has also not gained the support of within the UK.

The policy misfits of defence expenditure and the number of combat ready troops, are perceived by the UK as its responsibility, but as a problem facing all of Europe. The UK, considering their expenses, concluded that they have already participated in and paid for enough military missions, both in NATO, for the EU and the UN. The UK's norm entrepreneurs have joined the policy makers in their opinion that the saving of the CSDP isn't the responsibility of the UK, but of those states that have contributed less. The problem of the number of **combat ready troops** therefore also get externalized to the other EU-member states. An alternative solution, of increasing cooperation and thereby more effectively using the spread out defence expenditures around the EU is blocked, mainly by the UK. The general image of the misfits is that they have had different sizes of impact on the participation of the UK in the ESDP and faced different levels of adaptation pressure from multiple sources. In the next chapter I make an analysis of the level of adaptation of the UK to the misfits and the role of the intervening variables in mediating the adaptation pressure.

H6 analysis:

6.1 Main question

In this chapter the level of change of UK defence policy is described whilst analyzing the impact of the four intervening variables; Veto Points, Formal Institutions, Norm Entrepreneurs and Political Culture. The impact of these four variables will be determined by a description of their impact on the separate misfits. Their overall impact is described at the end of the chapter. The main research question, whether adaptation pressure has led to a change of national norms and policy towards those of the European level, is answered by first looking whether the intervening variables have blocked implementation and if not, if change of national norms and policy has taken place. The level of change is measured in the terms of the theoretical model of Europeanization by Radaelli (2003), Börzel and Risse(2003) in a similar manner as in research by Kalata (2009). The levels of implementation are then summarized at the end of the chapter in order to conclude what has been the result of adaptation pressure and which impact the presence of the intervening variables had. If present, the impact of the different intervening variables is described per misfit and its role in national adaptation to the European norms and policy.

In the period from 1998 till 2008, the ESDP-missions faced a lack of finance, institutionalization and will of the member states to achieve results. But through coordination and compromise, there have been some small and bigger successes and the EU has developed its own military capability, though a number of goals remain unfulfilled. The five biggest misfits between the EU's missions setup and their actual execution have been the UK-NATO relations, the relations between the UK and the EU, the national strategy and political culture, defence expenditure and the lacking number of combat ready troops as described in the previous chapter.

6.2 Different factors in change and oversight of outcomes

6.2.1 UK-NATO relations

In the case of the relationship between the UK and NATO, there has been an important change of policy and norms in the UK. Where at first there was great scepticism on the side of both NATO-allies and conservatives within the UK about the usefulness of a European defence policy and fear of unnecessary duplication of capabilities, these worries got mediated by the success of some of the missions and the promise of a complementary role to NATO . The change of the UK-NATO relations was a **Transformation** in terms of the description by Radaelli (2003), Börzel and Risse (2003). The UK's existing options for security cooperation were changed and old institutions, mostly at the

European level were fundamentally changed. This changed a number of essential features of post-cold war military cooperation in Europe and was changed the underlying collective understanding of what responsibilities and options the EU offers. This does however not mean that all parties within the UK agree on the meaning of this change in policies, processes and institutions .

The organizational structure of the EU at first did not allow for effective security cooperation, mostly because there weren't any significant institutions in place. Decision-making procedures had to be formalized and a legal and financial framework had to be agreed upon. Though the UK first and foremost wanted to expand practical capabilities, it gave its support for the setting up of new institutions. Part of the process of creating the institutions was dealing with the **veto points** in the existing structure on the international level. In the case of the EU itself this meant that the question of whether this aspect of foreign policy should remain in the intergovernmental pillar or be moved into the communal part of the EU where it would constantly have to deal with the potential blocking power of member states. Due to the status of military missions as high politics and the fact that all of the major countries pushing for the creation of an enhanced CFSP wanted to protect their sovereignty in foreign affairs, the choice was made to keep the ESDP inside the foreign policy pillar where decisions are taken by the Council of the EU (Howorth, 2000c. This was in line with the national preference of the UK, which regarded the new institutional set up as a way to reign back supranational elements (Howorth, 2000a). Since the missions of the ESDP are based on the principle of leading nations, the different member states cannot be forced to cooperate, meaning that there are no veto points to block ESDP missions. The only veto point faced in creating the ESDP was the blocking of Turkey of use of NATO capabilities, but this was solved with a compromise in the Berlin-plus agreement. On the domestic level there are no veto points against missions with the EU. Since the parliaments are bound to the Joint Action decisions made by the Council of the European Union, they have no possibility of blocking the decision. With notable exceptions most parliaments are only informed about Joint Action after adoption. So even those parliaments that have the power of 'prior authorisation of deployments abroad' are presented with a *fait accompli* (Anghel, Born, Dowling, & Fuior, 2006). The UK's parliament does exercise a scrutinizing role over the CFSP and ESDP, through the European Union select committee of the House of Lords. Specifically through the Sub-committee C handling foreign affairs, defence and development policy. The committee has a mandate to approve all legally-binding decisions of the Council of Ministers before the government signs them. The government can proceed and sign a Joint Action regardless, though this is deemed an 'override' of procedure. In practice the ESDP decision-making makes ex-ante scrutiny over ESDP difficult to exercise (Anghel, Born, Dowling, & Fuior, 2006).

The setting up of **Formal institutions** on the international and national level was not a priority for the UK, but necessary for activation of the ESDP. The creation of new institutions on the international level has led to the formalization of change in the way security cooperation within Europe is conceived. With the introduction of new supporting structures like the PSC, EUMC, EUMS and the role played by the HR, the role of the EU in steering decisions has increased, therefore making discussions on intergovernmental decision-making less relevant (Howorth, 2012). There was a large political quarrel about the duplication of capabilities, but this is largely solved by the gradually changing nature of the relation between the EU and NATO. The NATO-member states seem to have accepted the expressed will of the EU countries to be able to operate outside of NATO, whilst maintaining cooperation with NATO in most operations (Ojanen, 2006). The EDA tries, with an explicit support by the French, to create capabilities that would allow the EU to operate completely without needing NATO. Where US first demanded that this violation of the three D's would not take place, and while it is still being resisted by the UK, it seems that most countries including the US have accepted separate EU missions as acceptable where they do not interfere with NATO's wish to operate. Currently the UK sees NATO and the EU both as alliances through which operations could be organized, though it specifically sees the EU's role as one of 'softer' methods.

The **Norm Entrepreneur** that had the biggest influence in transforming the NATO-ESDP relation was Tony Blair. His change of policy in 1998 with the St. Malo agreement was the first indication that the UK would not only stop its blockade of EU security cooperation, but that it would also actively contribute to it. Blair suggested not only that the UK would not endanger its position of mediation between NATO and Europe, but also that through enhanced cooperation with France the latter could be convinced to increase its share of military contribution to NATO. Processes of persuasion have had an effect among a small group around Tony Blair, but after that he failed in conveying his message to a larger audience. The idea that the ESDP was necessary seemingly hasn't stuck with the rest of Labour either, which fails to redirect the discussion on the domestic level to the possible advantages of the ESDP (Howorth, 2004).

The **Political Culture** inside of the UK has been working like a great brake on the changing relation between the NATO and the ESDP. Only reluctantly has the political and professional elite of the UK accepted that the option of security cooperation within the EU offers advantages and would not hurt the relationship with the US in such a manner as to limit the power of the UK. The changing perception of effective anti-terrorism and conflict resolution policy combined with the new ideas of good governance has led to a revaluation of the EU. The reputation of the EU as an effective institution to influence internal affairs of neighbouring countries has led it to be now considered by UK-policy makers as being one of multiple options to resolve security options. At the same time, any

effort to expand its role into what is conceived to be NATO's domain is fervently contested by the UK on the basis of its Atlanticist identity. The Atlanticist stance of most politicians and critical sentiments towards the EU have led to a tendency to perceive any cooperation within the EU as a unreliable enterprise. As long as the UK prefers to cooperate with the NATO in missions and the US in defence industry the perceived benefits for the UK seem greater when not engaging in high level military cooperation in Europe, though civilian and paramilitary missions have become more accepted .

6.2.2 UK-EU Relation

The UK-EU relation on defence policy has changed in the period of the research. At first glance, the new EU military missions could be seen as quite a dramatic change with the previous virtual non-existence of coordinated policy over a period of just 10 years. The UK however has preserved its preference for cooperation with NATO, and the missions it participated in have mostly been follow up missions of earlier NATO missions, like in the Balkans. The UK also has maintained its insistence on growing European contribution to military capabilities available for NATO and retains the right of intergovernmental deliberation in its decisions regarding the ESDP. Therefore UK has **Absorbed** the policies of the EU. It has temporarily shared a number of its military capabilities; like planning and coordination and of course troops, to operate with other EU member states in and outside the EU. At the national level they have however not created new procedures nor new institutions and the Atlanticist ideas still underlie the discussion on its relation with the EU on security.

At the domestic level **Veto points** in the form of votes of no confidence or binding referenda have not been used by parliament to block any of the decisions with regards to the UK-EU relationship during the development of the ESDP. The dominant position of the government ensured that there was no possibility to directly veto any decisions on the direction of the government with regards to the ESDP. The House of Lords as well has generally been supportive of the ESDP and the development of multilateral security cooperation. The participation of the UK in the ESDP has been relatively strong and even though the conservative opposition made a lot of negative comments on Blair's decisions, there was not much the opposition could do against the new course.

There are hardly any **Formal institutions** that play a large role within the UK that are linked to the ESDP. The Ministry of Defence is the leading department for ESDP matters (House of Commons, 2008). The National Operations Headquarter of the UK Northwood has been used for operation Atalanta (House of Lords, 2012). One of the most practical examples of the limited institution building in the UK through the ESDP is the Battle group. Though in theory available for deployment in 2005, 2008 and 2010, the troops designated for this task were in fact operating in Afghanistan. A criticism of the battle groups is that though they were useful for generating troop availability in some

countries, they were too small to be usable in many situations and there has been no political agreement on their use. They seem to have been created solely to hide the failure of the Headline Goals, which have never been met (House of Lords, 2012). The formal institutions in the UK have not changed the relationship between the UK and the EU.

The impact of the actions of **Norm entrepreneurs** like Tony Blair's move at the St. Malo meeting had an interesting impact. Tony Blair, did not take any further steps to increase the role of the UK in EU security policy and failed to convince many others in the UK of his chosen path. The discussion started off in the terms of Blair and Labours assumption of shared interests in Europe. The norm entrepreneurs surrounding Blair argued that these shared interests made multilateral cooperation beneficial and could be used to increase capabilities for NATO (Howorth, 2004). But the conservatives saw the whole enterprise in a different light. They considered cooperation with Europe as a threat to British sovereignty and a threat to the future of NATO. Blair and Labour in general failed to convince many others, because the debate was devoid of much substance and there was no connection established between the international threats and how the ESDP could help to solve them, either in cooperation with NATO or alone (Giegerich, 2006). The failure to convince the majority of the British public and elites has led to a clear disconnect between domestic public preferences and the now established European cooperation.

The UK's **Political culture** of Atlanticism and scepticism towards Europeanist tendencies play a large role in the relation with the EU on security. The idea that NATO is and should remain the most important organization in Europe with regards to security is deeply anchored in the political psyche of the British policy makers (Dunne,2004). It seems ironical that whilst stressing that Europe should fully focus on NATO, there is a simultaneous acceptance that European countries should increase their defence capabilities. And most experts agree that this is done most effectively through European cooperation and specialization by the different countries. To attain this goal of efficient cooperation, institutions like the EDA were created (House of Lords, 2012). But this institution is hindered by the UK, because they consider it to supranationalist and a threat to existing ties between the UK's and the US's defence industry. So whilst the UK's political culture generates pressure for more NATO and less Europe, it is confronted by solutions that create more European cooperation and 'less' NATO. The failure of further progress of the ESDP can be partly blamed on the disconnection, between the logic of appropriateness on the domestic level in the UK, and the logic of consequences on the European level. The struggle over the functioning of the EDA seems to be the perfect example of how this clash between logics or norms leads to different simultaneous conversations. The large defence contribution of the UK is not contested at the national level, but the

relationship with the EU leads both great political parties and the policy makers to reject cooperation plans, even though they could create long term benefits (House of lords, 2012).

6.2.3 National Strategy and Political Culture

The UK's security and political culture have not been strongly influenced by the changes in the European institutions. Though the strategies have changed over time, the part of the strategic documents that deal with the ESDP and the EU does not seem to be a central part of any analysis, but rather an addition to other mechanisms. The security relation with the EU is described as a means to cooperate with other states in changing international conditions. The strategy documents seem to follow the rise of European Institutions and missions instead of calling for their creation. It seems therefore that the UK's strategy on European security cooperation follows the trend of decisions being made on the European level. The national security strategy and political culture have **absorbed** the rise of the new European institutions, but it has not led to a substantial modification of existing processes, policies or institutions at the domestic level.

In terms of political culture and national strategy there are virtually no **Veto points**. Veto Points do not play a role changing the influence that the European level has on the national strategy. The strategy documents are formulated by the government and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and are then presented to parliament. These proceedings are not intervened in by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and were therefore separated from the group responsible for the decisions made in St. Malo. The government and MoD could possibly have used their influence to block or alter the ideas formulated in the defence strategy, but they have not done so. But also no initiatives for missions or any national institutions have come up through the national discourse, thus preventing a growth in importance of the missions domestically. Veto points remain inactive and therefore cannot be considered as a restraint to the influence that the European level has had in reducing the misfit between the national strategy and political culture and the new European norms.

The **formal institutions** have not made a significant impact concerning the national strategy on international cooperation. In theory there are a number of institutions that could have a formative influence on strategy in this regard. Parliament and both the Foreign and Defence ministries could have a large influence on formulating a different national strategy, but this does not seem to be the case. The strategic documents are more focused on maintaining capabilities and identifying how these capabilities remain relevant in modern warfare than on formulating a direction of international cooperation. Though the wording of the strategies has increasingly placed emphasis on cooperation within the EU, the 2012 strategy being an exception, there has been no mentioning whether European defence cooperation will grow in terms of capability, number of missions or any other regard. The

pressure from the EU to incorporate its logic seems not to have had the effect that the national institutions consider EU-missions as a go-to option in times of crises.

Norm entrepreneurs played a role in changing the national strategy, at least concerning European cooperation on defence policy. The British policy makers have an oppositional attitude and an accompanying disinterest towards the EU and a utilitarian view of European integration, including on the CFSP and security issues (Giegerich, 2006). The ideas of British policy makers are generally based on an accepted and constant exploitation of British identity by mainstream politicians, to argue against European integration. Tony Blair as prime minister, with a very small team, has changed the UK's position on whether a European military capability would be acceptable, though not clearly defining which shape it should take (Howorth, 2004). Though this had major consequences, it has not changed much of the discussion within British politics on security, in which NATO and the relationship with the US are still perceived as most vital. All in all the norm entrepreneurs have not been effective in changing the national strategy since the terms of its description have not substantively changed.

Though the UK's **Political culture** stresses the role of the country as a 'bridge between the US and Europe' and a large international player on security matters, the UK mostly identifies itself on the basis of its special relationship with the US (Giegerich, 2006). The preferences of the UK to in any crisis work with NATO above the EU are expressed in the national strategy, but this also fits the currently existing division of tasks between NATO and the EU. The difference in discourse between the Labour party and the conservatives was that Labour projected the ESDP as necessary multilateral cooperation to keep the US engaged in Europe, whilst the conservatives generally saw the ESDP as a threat to this same goal. Both discourses, though very different, focus on the priority of the relation with the US (Giegerich, 2006). In this regard the political culture prevented the ESDP from changing the national strategy substantively. It had however to be recognized by all that the ESDP meant that the UK now had new options of security cooperation within the EU.

6.2.4 Defence Expenditure

One of the main goals in creating the ESDP for the UK was to increase participation of Europe in NATO. This goal was based on the idea that if Europe would not show increased participation, the US might abandon European security. A major indicator of the division in carrying of the defence burden is the defence expenditure of countries. How this then translates in effective forces is another issue, but high defence expenditure as percentage of GDP shows the international community that a state is at least sacrificing a similar part of its wealth to defend the common interests. In Europe there have been countries that have traditionally spent more on their armies than others. Both France and

the UK have been big spenders in recent years, whilst Germany traditionally spends very little on its armed forces. With its relatively high defence expenditure compared to other EU states, the UK feels that it is doing (more than) its share. So though in Europe there is a misfit between state defence expenditure and the ESDP missions, this is not the case in the UK and therefore there is **inertia** in its policies. The lack of demand shows that though there is a misfit between NATO's demand for higher defence expenditure in Europe in general, this doesn't seem to affect the UK. This makes the problem of defence expenditure not a misfit between the UK and the EU, but between European states and NATO in general. Together with other NATO states the UK is trying to force those states that are not complying with the 2% defence spending of GDP guideline to increase their defence spending. This means that in this part I not only explain why the UK hasn't changed its own defence expenditure, but also what influence the different intervening variables in the UK have had on the misfit of defence expenditure between the EU and member-states in general.

Veto Points are not a clear issue with defence expenditure, since there isn't a formal mechanism for increases in defence expenditure by individual member states neither in NATO nor in the EU. NATO's 2002 Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) sought to solve perceived problems of operational capabilities. Though there is a regular review of these goals, there is no way to force states to comply with the stated goals. The use of Veto points within the UK to block a raising of the defence expenditure has never been an issue. There is one European **Formal institution** active to improve the effectiveness of defence, the EDA. But on the national level there have been no formal institutions blocking a raise in defence expenditure. The point seems not to have been raised in relation with fulfilling the ESDP goals.

Norm entrepreneurs played a large role other misfits, but regarding defence there was no call for higher expenditure. British policy makers have already adapted their threat assessment and initiated significant military reform before they launched the ESDP in 1998 together with France. Because of this early adaptation, the ESDP is perceived to be about other EU members. The UK's political leaders see the ESDP as a program for the rest of the EU to catch up with the UK's commitment, but not necessarily for any practical changes by the UK itself (Giegerich, 2006).

The UK's Atlanticist **political culture** focuses on trying to keep a strong relation with the US. Raising Europe's defence expenditure is seen as imperative to keep the NATO-alliance strong. The fact that France has become an active player in European missions and that these missions compliment NATO activities (like in the Balkans), show that this tactic seemingly partially works. The more effective use of the available funds, however is hindered by the same political culture, which prefers cooperation with the US above European coordination. The reservations about the EDA are also because of short-

term economic reasons and a general aversion to supranationalism, but the major point made in the political culture is that cooperation with the US is preferable.

6.2.5 Troop availability

The main problems for organizing ESDP missions from an EU perspective are the shortage of troops and the reluctance of states to supply them. The UK has delivered on a substantial number of missions, but at some times had to refuse participation due to a shortage of available deployable troops. They also abandoned their commitments to the EU-missions when they preferred to work with NATO in Somalia (Soder, 2010b). The problem of a troop shortage in EU-missions isn't considered by most actors as a problem for the UK though, but as a problem of the EU. The problem of lacking capabilities in Europe in general is seen as a problem for NATO. According to the UK it fulfils its commitments to NATO and the EU and therefore other countries should contribute more. When considering the effective reform of the UK's defence in the mid 90's and its considerable participation and defence expenditure record, it is easy to see why this notion is generally accepted. This leads to **inertia** at the side of the UK regarding the raising of the number of available troops.

Within the misfit of troop availability, **Veto points** on the domestic level of the UK aren't a hindrance to implementation of EU policy. There are groups, mostly conservatives, who are very critical about the costs of the missions and might in the future threaten defunding if the missions aren't set up differently. The first and only inquisition into the costs of a mission happened when the UK demanded it onto the Athena-mission in 2010 (Wright, 2011). It is possible that in the future the EU-missions will first need to pass a stricter examination into their cost before they can be started. This would give the ministry of finance a possible veto, though for now this remains uncertain.

The role of **Formal institutions** on the national level in the determining of what support should be lend to EU-missions is an interesting one. Though there is agreement on the purpose of EU in the national strategy and the fact that participation of the UK in EU-missions is part of its responsibilities, there is no real demand for the UK's participation formally coming from national institutions. If EU-missions do not fulfil their goals, when considered from the perspective of the UK's institutions the fault lies with the EU. The different ministries represent their own interests in determining the national strategy (Stolberg, 2012). Because none of the different ministries is responsible, neither are they very much interested in whether the EU succeeds in fulfilling its goals. Of course it would be considered an embarrassment if the CSDP fails, but to contribute large numbers of own troops would violate the core reason for its construction, namely the greater participation of the rest of Europe in defence matters. Considering that the EU member-states in general recognize that the UK already contributes to security in a considerable degree in many ways, there seems little pressure on the UK.

Pressure to contribute more troops would be expected to be low on the UK compared to other states, like Germany, that spends much less on its defence (NATO, 2011). France clearly contributes the most to the EU-missions and has been the framework nation for most missions.

The different **Norm entrepreneurs** on the domestic level are convinced that though there is a general European shortage in deployable troops, a solution probably lies in the more effective use of available funds than in raising expenditure (House of Lords, 2012). In the case of the UK, some are even concerned that it may be paying for a disproportionately large part of the CSDP (House of Lords, 2012). The most important norm entrepreneurs have framed the problem of lacking troop availability as a problem of Europe, which cannot be fixed by the UK, since it is already doing more than its share. This idea is readily accepted, since it fits both the reasoning of participating in the CSDP in the first place and the Atlanticist tendencies that underlie it. The reasoning of the norm entrepreneurs seems to be slightly different from that of the UK's general standpoint, which is that effective cooperation should be sought, but at the same time other states should raise their defence expenditure. The norm entrepreneurs seem to agree that this is not very likely and therefore better coordination is necessary.

The **Political culture** of the UK has very little respect for the effectiveness of the EU-missions in a military sense. Their goal has always been to enlarge the military capacities of other EU member-states and involve and reform their security structures more intensely. This has been successful in that sense that a number of member-states, most prominently France, are now more than ever involved in missions abroad. Though they are mentioned in the national strategy documents, the success of the missions does not seem very important to the UK, though much more for the EU as a whole. Any participation within NATO, which is regarded as much more important, takes immediate precedence over EU-missions. This was proven when the UK abandoned EU-cooperation for the coast of Somalia, to raise its contribution to the NATO mission in the same area. Because the end-goal of the mission is considered as less important than the fact that 'other' EU states actually contribute to international security, the idea of increasing the number of troops available for EU-missions is disregarded (Merlingen, 2011). This explains the **inertia** in the level of UK troops available to EU-missions. Though this time period is beyond the scope of this research, the fact that ships have been moved from the EU-mission to the NATO mission could even be considered a sign of retrenchment. This would coincide with the increased scrutiny that the finances of the missions and the EDA have been under from the UK's side.

6.3 Summary of intervening variables and implementation

6.3.1 Summary of Intervening variables

The outcome of the research in terms of evaluating the impact of the mediating factors on Europe's effect on the UK's security policy is that **Veto points** have not had any significant impact on the participation in EU-missions. Nor have veto points had a significant effect on the other related problems with the participation in ESDP-missions. **National institutions** also have not been involved in inhibiting the ESDP. Since there were no real incentives for them to be interested, neither in terms of expansion of capabilities, nor extra financial means available to their disposal, this comes as no big surprise. **Norm entrepreneurs** have been a more interesting influence on the participation of the UK in the ESDP. Tony Blair was instrumental in setting up the ESDP and in the future other leaders could be influenced by norm entrepreneurs to follow his example and create a stronger position for the CSDP. The biggest negative effect on the UK's participation, though interestingly enough not in the two misfits in which there was inertia, was the **political culture** of the UK. The broadly shared Atlanticism and the strongly present Euro-scepticism have had a negative impact on the way in which the UK has treated ESDP-missions. Though the general political culture of the UK is cooperative with regards to the implementation of international defence policy, it was also united in its refusal of more intense defence integration and surrendering sovereignty to supranational structures. The consensus among most policy makers and norm givers has been strong and aimed at preventing the EU from having a great impact on security policy. Even though deeper European cooperation could possibly enhance the defence capabilities of the whole of Europe. But though reform of the defence organization is considered to be good concept for the rest of Europe, the UK's own security structure is regarded as worth preserving from any European interference. Though the focus in this research has been on the downloading part of Europeanization theory, it has shown that Atlanticism and the discussion about sovereignty in defence policy has a direct impact on the downloading by member states. It also shows how the desire of the UK not to have interference in its military affairs by the EDA could in fact be hurting another desire; namely the increased capabilities of other European states to contribute to NATO. The UK however holds on to the demand that other states should increase their defence spending, giving its own defence spending as a model.

6.3.2 Summary of implementation

At the start of the period there was a great turnabout by the UK when it embraced European cooperation in defence policy and started the initiative for the ESDP with the French at St. Malo. After that there was a transformation in the **UK-NATO relations** when the latter started to accept EU security policy as a fact and as a possible supplement to NATO-operations instead of a potential

competitor. The UK's **strategic and political culture** absorbed the creation of the ESDP and the ESDP-missions, but did not give it a particular role in the broader UK national strategy. There was accommodation of the UK-EU relation with regard to the new institutions of the CFSP and the new military capabilities of the EU. The member states remained in charge or any use of their military capabilities, though the high representative got involved in the planning and framing process. There has been inertia in the UK's **defence expenditure** and the number of **combat ready troops**. This is due to the generally accepted evaluation by the UK and other states that the UK is already pulling its weight with regards to defence spending and participation in international missions. The fact that these problems plague the use of ESDP-missions in general isn't considered a big problem for the UK specifically, but for the reputation of the EU as a whole. The CFSP has not led to the acceptance of ESDP-missions as the go to framework when crisis situations arise in or near Europe, but they are now an option . Within the UK the EU-missions aren't as positively perceived as they are in other member-states. Neither institutions nor political actors seem to have anything to win by connecting their fate with its missions and the Atlanticism-based preference for NATO remains strong. The program seems to have succeeded partially in activating other actors to become more involved in European security, like France. The question whether domestic actors have adapted their behaviour because of the EU can be confirmed for a number of the misfits, though not for all.

6.3.3 Table 6.3 Oversight of outcomes

	Inertia	Absorption	Accommodation	Transformation	Retrenchment
UK-NATO relations				x	
National Strategy and Political Culture		x			
UK - EU relation			x		
Defence Expenditure	x				
Combat Ready troops	x				

This table shows to what degree the UK has adopted the EU defence policy goals. Though the UK has adapted its stance on the ESDP within its relation with NATO and the EU it still faces inertia in the problem areas of defence expenditure and the number of combat ready troops available in the missions. The national strategy and political culture have absorbed the new ideas of EU defence cooperation, but it has not transformed them.

6.4 Alternative explanation based on Neorealism

The Neorealist explanation for the behaviour of the UK during this period is based on the assumption that the UK as a state and rational actor strives to improve its self-interest. Based on these assumptions and with a knowledge of how the international power structure looked like in the period of 1998-2008, Neorealism should be able to give insight in how defence policy in an important security actor, like the UK, was influenced by the search for increase of power. The actions of the UK according to Neorealism should be aimed at increasing their power position and other moral or constructivist notions are considered less relevant.

With the change of the international system from bipolar to uni-polar because of the fall of the Soviet-Union, it would be expected that states would start balancing against the new dominant power. The ESDP missions of the EU and especially France can be regarded as a first step to challenge and counterbalance US-hegemony (Jahier,2010). This counterbalancing would be based on the idea that by showing that the EU is capable of organizing autonomous military missions, the EU member-states undermine dominance of NATO (Jahier,2010). The ESDP-missions are the most relevant outcome of the ESDP to Neorealism, because they are an expression of capabilities and the presentation of EU 'actorness' in world politics (Gegout, 2003). As well as being a possible counterbalance of US power, the EU can be seen as increasing its power in Africa by sending ESDP-missions. As Neorealism would expect, they only intervene in areas of strategic and economic importance and at a low cost of military casualties (Gegout, 2003). The ESDP-missions are in this sense a demonstration of power and therefore a rational act with low costs for the EU member-states. In this manner, Neorealism can explain the behaviour of states in term of use of their military capabilities, though it goes against a number of expressions made by actors on the state level. UK officials have often repeated that the goal of the ESDP is not to reduce the role of NATO, but to reinforce it (Howorth, 2004). The fluctuating kind, location and size of ESDP-missions would be hard to explain by Neorealism, since these effects are hard to trace back in changes in the structural composition of the balance during this period in which the US remained the dominant international power. The intention of the UK to increase participation of other EU member-states by giving a good example and by offering a new institutional framework within the EU is hard to explain on the basis of Neorealism. The limited military options of the ESDP and the inherent logic of appropriateness inherent in the concept of giving a good example do not fit well with Neorealist assumptions of priority of hard security.

6.5 Institutionalism compared to Realism.

Due to the different backgrounds of Institutionalism and Neorealism both have a different perspective on capabilities, actors, timeframes, interests and the role of ideas. Neorealism has a focus on state and system behaviour and Institutionalism focuses more on adaptational pressure and intrastate factors. In this paragraph, these differences are explored in order to compare the way the theories fit the different aspects of development of the ESDP.

The development of the ESDP is hard to describe in terms of absolute military capacity because of its stage in development and its dependence on states to commit troops. Its military capabilities can so far be described as weak in comparison to that of NATO. Even when looking at this stage after a number of years and missions, it takes a lot of time and effort to set up relatively small missions which some countries, like the UK would possibly be able to organize solely on their own if they were committed to it. From the perspective of institutionalism this is less relevant, because development of norms can be expected to take longer than the process of merely sending soldiers onto the same battlefield. The Neorealist perspective on the ESDP capacities can explain its limited scope as mere balancing US influence in a number of theatres and as the institutional preparations for other acts of balancing. The lacking success of military cooperation can be explained by the unease of states to give other states influence over their military capabilities, the sovereignty of control over this policy field being so jealously guarded. Why the ESDP would be constructed and continued in its form when capabilities for balancing are not impressive, nor why the civilian component plays an increasing role can be very well determined using Neorealism, though other research into this could be insightful (Gegout, 2003).

The second problem lies in determining the perspective of actors. The Neorealist looks at state actors as rational and therefore as having clear goals of power. This means that any analysis of development of capabilities has to be looked at in terms of actions instead of in terms of rhetoric. Because of the voluntary base of the ESDP and the slow decision-making process of the that constitutes missions, the ESDP does not seem a promising direction for exertion of power. The manner of setting up missions seems to fit well with Institutionalism, which also recognizes different levels of internalization on the national level as a brake on the development. Institutionalism mainly focuses on Europeanization as a phenomenon and the interests of state actors are considered merely in their impact on levels of adaptation.

The timeframe is problematic for both theories. Institutionalism has to deal with different pressures which create internalization, but also faces the choice of when to describe new uploading effects. The way to distinguish moments of uploading and downloading are hard to separate, because of

changing norms and the constant nature of the UK-EU relation. Neorealism faces similar issues because it bases itself on changes in the balance of power, which are simultaneously created by state-behaviour. The moments of changes in capacity are hard to predict in a situation in which the international power structure has not changed significantly. Both theories lack the relation with contextual input to determine specifically when changes will occur.

Institutionalism gives different institutional and sociological aspects of relations between different levels an important role, but pinpointing which interests are represented in this is considered less relevant. Development of norms and institutional aspects like veto points are separated from interests of the state as a singular actor. The misfit approach is based on the principle that discrepancies between the international level and the domestic level are obvious, but seems to fail to describe to which party the misfits are problematic. A certain assumption of 'practical' understanding, itself based on norms of problem-solving as a general good, is necessary to determine which issues are misfits and to whom in this version of Institutionalism. Neorealism is more open about its dismissal of the more detailed aspects of policy formation and 'construction' of interests because of its own systemic approach. Neorealism does not give much insight about the reasons why state show certain levels of adaptation, which Institutionalism does, but the misfit approach lacks a clear methodological approach to describe the set of actors whose interests can be identified at the domestic level.

The role of ideas and development of norms is a major aspect of Institutionalism, which considers national political culture and norm entrepreneurs to be either an enabling or a blocking force for adaptation pressure. The spreading of new norms is more influential than the existing international structure and can explain a great number of aspects of the creation of the ESDP, like the development of certain organizational aspects and its combined military and civilian aspects. Neorealism in this regard offers very little insight in the motivation for setting up the institutions of the ESDP and the consequent development of institutions like the EDA. The alternative explanation of the ESDP being a counterbalance to NATO seems to be contradicted by the UK's policy makers conviction that this should be prevented to happen. Though the costs of the ESDP are not high compared to deployments in Iraq or Afghanistan, the UK has invested in the ESDP and more so than many other EU states. Why it would do so to construct a counterbalance NATO, which gives the UK certain unique intelligence and military capabilities remains difficult to explain using Neorealism. Neorealism seems to be able to explain the ESDP missions as an expression of balancing by states as actors, but it has difficulty explaining the concrete shape, duration and location of missions, as well as the institutional setup that they are part of. The construction of the ESDP can be considered of little relevance to Neorealism based on its size, but these missions are rightfully regarded as a

demonstration of capability to act in a military fashion. The lack therefore of explanatory arguments for the ESDP due to lacking significant changes in the structure of international power relations remains a weakness of Neorealism. Realism considers itself to have much analytic power in the realm of military capabilities, due to their importance to the core preferences of states for power, but can be seen lacking in explanation with regards to the ESDP.

Institutionalism brings to bear that the adaptation pressure from the EU (mostly in the guise of pressure by France) and NATO to expand European capabilities has led to partial adaptation to the new plans for an at least semi-autonomous European military capability. The different levels of adaptation to the problems facing the development of the ESDP and its missions can be partially explained by the UK's political culture, norm entrepreneurs, institutions and veto points. Therefore Institutionalism seems to be better fitting to describe this development of European military capabilities than Neorealism.

6.6 Methodological considerations

A major methodological consideration for Institutionalism is its use of misfits as both a source of adaptation pressure and as a description of the disparity of between European and domestic policy. How this is assumed to work is described by Börzel and Risse (2003). The process of downloading forces states to accept a policy which is not per se the policy that they uploaded and this constitutes a 'misfit'. This degree of misfit then leads to adaptation pressure (Börzel and Risse, 2003). With the misfit approach the adaptation pressure is linked to resolving a difference between the international and domestic level. But misfits as a concept seem to be more complicated than acceptance of European policy, which might not be aimed at fixing a difference between EU and domestic policies, but can be based on other interests. There might also be adaptation pressure, not based on a will to bring the European and the domestic level in line in practical terms, but aimed at developing a new European or domestic discourse, disguised as a pressure to resolve a misfit. The pressure of the US for instance to resolve the misfits was not based on the fact that there was a European norm to which the UK should adapt, but based on the desire for an expansion of European military capabilities, which was considered a possible outcome of the ESDP.

The misfits approach has difficulty explaining problems dealing with solutions in which multiple actors are required to take action, like troop availability and defence expenditure. The need for coordination here is great, but the misfit between the national and the European level are open to interpretation of the member states, which hinders coordination. Furthermore interstate actions also play a role on the domestic level resolution of misfits as for example the UK prefers Germany to raise

its defence expenditure, but Germany does not. Adaptation on the domestic level in this case, like supporting more missions, can be blocked by actions of another member state.

The misfits approach also lacks an analysis of interests of different actors on the domestic level. Though the state is considered an actor in the creation of policy, the domestic actors are only regarded in their role of enabling or blocking policy. Within the UK there are those that consider a raise of defence expenditure and those who do not. The prevalence of one of these groups might not be a matter of spreading norms, but of winning elections. To better analyze the behaviour of domestic actors, future research should use cases with shorter time-periods and with more links to uploading effects. A better comparison of the contribution to the ESDP might be given if more cases are available, possibly considering how much other member-states have contributed and how the intervening variables affected their levels of internalization.

A comparison can already be made with the case of Germany, as described by Kalata (2009). Germany also had inertia in its misfits regarding defence expenditure and troop availability. These misfits are caused by an unclear national interest formulation with regards to defence policy and the confusing relationship between NATO and the ESDP, though this relationship has begun to change (Kalata, 2009). These parts of the outcome are quite similar in both cases. The role of the intervening variables however is not. In the case of Germany Veto Points have played a large role, whilst this wasn't the case in the UK. Where Norm Entrepreneurs occupied places of power in the UK, they were unorganized in Germany. Political culture played a minor role in Germany, but in the UK it remains an important inhibitor of further development of the CSDP. External pressure, which is separately identified as a variable by Kalata, but is considered as part of adaptational pressure in this research, played a small role in the case of Germany. In the UK it played a part in forming the preference of Norm Entrepreneurs. It was the analysis of the group of policy makers around Blair that considered the external pressure of the US to raise European defence capabilities to be instrumental in their turnabout at St. Malo and consequential participation in ESDP missions. The combination of these two studies shows that though both levels of adaptation are quite similar, the intervening variables played different roles in both cases. The role of political culture seems to be very influential in the case of the UK and the analysis of the political culture could be expanded on in the case of Germany. In terms of methodological streamlining, consideration should be given to problems of combining adaptation pressure into the misfit approach. There needs to be a clearer manner in which misfits are identified, not based on a self-evident difference between EU-level policy and state policy, but possibly on measurable conflicts of interests of separable actors. This could also prevent intervening variables like external normative pressure from overlapping with concepts of adaptational pressure.

H7 Conclusion

In this chapter will be discussed whether the hypotheses can be confirmed or have to be rejected. Then the consequences of the outcome for the theoretical model and the debate on Europeanization will be described. The research will be concluded by some reflections on the limitations of the research and the societal relevance.

7.1 Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1A, which considered that Adaptation pressure leads to change of national norms and policy to European norms and policy when intervening variables, separately or together, do not block downloading can be confirmed because there has been change of national norms and policy to include the ESDP as a policy option for the UK. And accordingly, the UK has actively participated in creating and organizing a number of ESDP-missions, thereby fulfilling the criteria of reducing the misfit by enabling frequency and quality. The UK-EU relation has had to change from not supporting a separate European security to active participation in EU-only ESDP missions. So at first glance, this could be seen as quite a dramatic change over a period of just 10 years. If however, we start at the point of the St. Malo agreement to develop a European defence capability and the subsequent approval and support of the US to do so then the development seems far less radical.

The second hypothesis, whether adaptation pressure does not lead to change of national norms and policy to European norms and policy when intervening variables block downloading, can also be confirmed since considerations of national strategy and political culture have blocked solutions for misfits in the form of UK policy towards the EDA. The UK has preserved its preference for cooperation with NATO, and the missions it participated in have mostly been follow up missions of earlier NATO missions, like in the Balkans. The UK also has maintained its insistence on growing European contribution to military capabilities available for NATO and retains the right of intergovernmental deliberation in its decisions regarding the use of the ESDP.

The UK overall has absorbed the policies of the EU and there has been implementation of a number of European norms and policies, showing the power of adaptation pressure. It has shared its military capabilities; like planning and coordination and of course troops, to operate with other EU member states in and outside the EU. At the national level they have however not created new procedures nor new institutions and the Atlanticist ideas still underlie the discussion on its relation with the EU on security. Therefore, though it is a mixed set of results, the intervening variables have partially blocked the resolution of some misfits, national expenditure and troop availability, which needed to be resolved in order to setup more ESDP missions in frequency and quality.

The second hypothesis, based on Neorealism stated that there would only be changes of policy by states if they believe that they can increase their power position without reduction of national sovereignty over military capabilities. This hypothesis has to be rejected on basis of the actions of the UK, which have not increased its power position in military terms, but has changed the European military cooperation. In the period of 1998 till 2008, the UK has helped create multiple institutions on the European level, which though they don't have a final say in any of the security issues will help to create new normative communities among experts and give the high representative influence in agenda-setting. This development may in the long term have an effect on decision making on the national level, through dispersion among national norm entrepreneurs, or through a new vision on the national strategy. But these effects are not considered relevant by Neorealism, which therefore cannot tell us much over how the process of Europeanization had influence or may evolve.

7.2 Relevance for the theoretical model

The Europeanization approach combines the two logics of sociological and rational institutionalism and this allows for a broad analysis of the downloading effects. The combined logics of sociological institutionalism and rational institutionalism both have shown insight in certain aspects of the development of the ESDP and ESDP-missions. The logic of sociological institutionalism, with its focus on political culture and norm entrepreneurs seems to have been most effective in showing which reasoning created the UK's positions on EU security cooperation and the following lack of lasting support domestically. The logic of rational institutionalism has been useful in showing how existing structures have been forced to adapt since there were no formal veto points to stop policy and norms. The adaptation by the UK was only prevented from being further internalized by a lack of incentives for national actors and failing persuasion by norm entrepreneurs. The UK as a state actor has not felt responsible for the success of individual ESDP-missions nor feels responsible for raising defence expenditure or troop numbers itself since it already feels that it has done enough in this regard. Socialization effects could therefore perhaps better be explored in a state that contributes less, which would give more insight in how the adaptation pressure functions in this regard. Europeanization as an approach has a number of limitations. As discussed in chapter six, there are methodological issues that need clarification. The relation between the concept of misfits and adaptational pressure sources needs to be refined. Furthermore it would be useful to develop clearer time-based criteria for uploading and downloading effects, which run the risk of overlapping. The re-introduction of Historical Institutionalism in the methodology of this branch of Europeanization could be helpful in this regard (Bulmer,2007).

7.3 limitations of research

The limitations of this research mostly lied in the difficulty in fitting the misfit approach to a unclear European level demand. The new norm of an autonomous military capability is not as clear as an implementation of a law or specific singular policy action. The misfit approach is based on an assumption that disparities between the European policy or standard and the domestic are relatively self obvious, but when this is not the case the selection of misfits becomes difficult. Further limitations arise from the international aspects of misfits hindering implementation. The degree to which states can be expected to resolve problems they only play a limited role in is difficult to take in account when considering whether the state has adapted to the international standard. The influence of the UK in trying to convince other states to raise their expenditure and troop numbers would be an interesting topic for further research, but does not fit the Europeanization approach set up of this research. The lack of classification of domestic actors in the Europeanization approach leads to a possible bias towards government action over norm entrepreneurs and other domestic an international groups. The findings of this researched can be generalized to other cases of Europeanization and national adaptation to external pressure. The impact of the political culture and especially aspects of Atlanticism on defence and security policy might be found to have an impact in other states as well.

7.4 Societal relevance

The UK's cautious position regarding the EU cooperation on security is supported by many British, who continue to regard NATO and the UK's relation with the US as more important than EU defence cooperation. The influence of Atlanticism and Euro-scepticism in this regard is substantial. The realization that it is not likely that other European states will take over the defence expenditure levels of the UK and that even the UK may have to lower its contribution due to economic conditions, might in the long term make the option of more supranational military cooperation more acceptable. The UK is however not the most likely country to press for more intense cooperation because its army is more efficient, both in operations and in export of military hardware, than that of other European states. Since the UK is one of the most important military actors in Europe, its participation in the CSDP remains crucial. It may be possible, with the influence of new norm entrepreneurs, that a blockade of further integration in the form of the EDA is stopped, opening an option for increased integration of EU military forces. Much depends on the development of the national discussion in the UK. As long as many in the UK remain sceptical about the role of the EU in defence, the CSDP having failed to raise European military capabilities significantly, has an uncertain future.

Glossary:

AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan/Darfur
C4 ISTAR	Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
COPS	Political and Security Committee (French Acronym)
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EDA	European Defence Agency
EDI	European Defence Identity
EEAS	European External Action Service
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU NAVFOR	European Union Naval Force
EU	European Union
EUFOR DRC	European Union Forces in DRC
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HI	Historical Institutionalism
HR	High Representative of the Union For Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MS	European Union Member States
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PCC	Prague Capabilities Commitment
PSC	Political and Security Committee
RCI	Rational Choice Institutionalism
RRF	European Rapid Reaction Force

SFOR	Stabilization Forces
SI	Sociological Institutionalism
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
UK	United Kingdom
USSR	United Socialist Soviet Republics
WEU	Western European Union

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

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Appendix



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